G.R. No. 194751.November 26, 2014.

*
AURORA
respondent.

N.

DE

PEDRO,

petitioner, vs. ROMASAN

DEVELOPMENT

of title without giving the person, in whose name the certificate was issued all the opportunities to be
heard.
CORPORATION,

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; Courts may exercise their powers validly and with
binding effect if they acquire jurisdiction over: (a) the cause of action or the subject matter of the case; (b)
the thing or the res; (c) the parties; and (d) the remedy.Courts may exercise their powers validly and
with binding effect if they acquire jurisdiction over: (a) the cause of action or the subject matter of the
case; (b) the thing or the res; (c) the parties; and (d) the remedy. Jurisdiction over the subject matter
refers to the power or authority of courts to hear and decide cases of a general class. It is conferred by
the Constitution or by law. It is not acquired through administrative issuances or court orders. It is not
acquired by agreement, stipulation, waiver, or silence. Any decision by a court, without a law vesting
jurisdiction upon such court, is void. Jurisdiction over the thing or res is the power of the court over an
object or thing being litigated. The court may acquire jurisdiction over the thing by actually or
constructively seizing or placing it under the courts custody. Jurisdiction over the parties refers to the
power of the court to make decisions that are binding on persons. The courts acquire jurisdiction over
complainants or petitioners as soon as they file their complaints or petitions. Over the persons of
defendants or respondents, courts acquire jurisdiction by a valid service of summons or through their
voluntary submission. Generally, a person voluntarily submits to the courts jurisdiction when he or she
participates in the trial despite improper service of summons.
Constitutional Law; Due Process; Due process requires that those with interest to the thing in
litigation be notified and given an opportunity to defend those interests.Due process requires that those
with interest to the thing in litigation be notified and given an opportunity to defend those interests.
Courts, as guardians of constitutional rights, cannot be expected to deny persons their due process
rights while at the same time be considered as acting within their
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
53
VOL. 743, NOVEMBER 26, 2014

53

De Pedro vs. Romasan Development Corporation

jurisdiction. Violation of due process rights is a jurisdictional defect. This court recognized this
principle in Aducayen v. Flores, 51 SCRA 78 (1973). In the same case, this court further ruled that this
jurisdictional defect is remedied by a petition for certiorari.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; The cardinal precept is that where there is a
violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted from their jurisdiction.The relation of due
process to jurisdiction is recognized even in administrative cases wherein the standard of evidence is
relatively lower. Thus, in Montoya v. Varilla, 574 SCRA 831 (2008): The cardinal precept is that where
there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted from their jurisdiction. The violation
of a partys right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or
disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision
rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; The court does not have competence or authority to proceed with an action for
annulment of certificate of title without giving the person, in whose name the certificate was issued all the
opportunities to be heard.An action for annulment of certificate of title is quasi in rem. It is not an
action against a person on the basis of his personal liability, but an action that subjects a persons
interest over a property to a burden. The action for annulment of a certificate of title threatens
petitioners interest in the property. Petitioner is entitled to due process with respect to that interest.
The court does not have competence or authority to proceed with an action for annulment of certificate

Same; Same; Same; Service of Summons; A decision rendered without proper service of summons
suffers a defect in jurisdiction.Regardless of the nature of the action, proper service of summons is
imperative. A decision rendered without proper service of summons suffers a defect in jurisdiction.
Respondents institution of a proceeding for annulment of petitioners certificate of title is sufficient to
vest the court with jurisdiction over the res, but it is not sufficient for the court to proceed with the case
with authority and competence.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Personal Service of Summons; Personal service of summons is the
preferred mode of service of summons.Personal service of summons is the preferred mode of service of
summons. Thus, as a rule, summons must be served personally upon the defendant or respondent
wherever he or she may be found. If the defendant or respondent refuses to receive the summons, it
shall be tendered to him or her. If the defendant or respondent is a domestic juridical person, personal
service of summons shall be effected upon its president, managing partner, general manager, corporate
secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel wherever he or she may be found.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Substituted Service of Summons; The rules allow summons to be
served by substituted service only for justifiable causes and if the defendant or respondent cannot be
served within reasonable time.Other modes of serving summons may be done when justified. Service
of summons through other modes will not be effective without showing serious attempts to serve
summons through personal service. Thus, the rules allow summons to be served by substituted service
only for justifiable causes and if the defendant or respondent cannot be served within reasonable time.
Substituted service is effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendants residence with
some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at
defendants office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Service of Summons by Publication; Service of summons by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation is allowed when the defendant or respondent is
designated as an unknown owner or if his or her whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained
by diligent inquiry.Service of summons by publication in a newspaper of general circulation is
allowed when the defendant or respondent is designated as an unknown owner or if his or her
whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry. It may only be effected after
unsuccessful attempts to serve the summons personally, and after diligent inquiry as to the defendants
or respondents whereabouts.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Service of Summons by Extraterritorial Service; Service of summons
by extraterritorial service is allowed after leave of court when the defendant or respondent does not
reside or is not found in the country or is temporarily out of the country.Service of summons by
extraterritorial service is allowed after leave of court when the defendant or respondent does not reside
or is not found in the country or is temporarily out of the country.
Constitutional Law; Due Process; The issuance of a judgment without proper service of summons
is a violation of due process rights.The issuance of a judgment without proper service of summons is a
violation of due process rights. The judgment, therefore, suffers a jurisdictional defect. The case would
have been dismissible had petitioner learned about the case while trial was pending. At that time, a
motion to dismiss would have been proper. After the trial, the case would have been the proper subject
of an action for annulment of judgment. Petitioner learned about the action for annulment of title only
after trial. Instead of filing an action for annulment of judgment, however, she filed a motion for new
trial without alleging any proper ground. Rule 37 of the Rules of Court provides that a party may move
and the court may grant a new trial based on the following causes: (a) Fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against and by reason of which
such aggrieved party has probably been impaired in his rights; or (b) Newly discovered evidence, which
he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial, and which if
presented would probably alter the result.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Annulment of Judgments; An action for annulment of judgment
may be filed to assail Regional Trial Court (RTC) judgments when resort to other remedies can no longer
be had through no fault of petitioner.A petition for annulment of judgment is a recourse that is
equitable in character. It is independent of the case and is allowed only in exceptional cases as where
there is no available or other adequate remedy. An action for annulment of judgment may be filed to
assail Regional Trial Court judgments when resort to other remedies can no longer be had through no
fault of petitioner. Section 1 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides: Section 1. Coverage.
This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders and
resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner. An action for annulment of judgment may be based on only two grounds: 1) extrinsic fraud;
and 2) lack of jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; Lack of jurisdiction being a valid ground for annulment of judgments,
circumstances that negate the courts acquisition of jurisdiction including defective service of summons
are causes for an action for annulment of judgments.Lack of jurisdiction being a valid ground for
annulment of judgments, circumstances that negate the courts acquisition of jurisdiction including
defective service of summons are causes for an action for annulment of judgments. However, this
court had an occasion to say that an action for annulment of judgment may not be invoked (1) where
the party has availed himself of the remedy of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate
remedy and lost; or (2) where he has failed to avail himself of those remedies through his own fault or
negligence. Thus, an action for annulment of judgment is not always readily available even if there are
causes for annulling a judgment.
Same; Same; Same; Petitioners filing of the petition for annulment of judgment after she had
filed a motion for new trial and lost, with both actions raising the same grounds, reveals an intent to
secure a judgment in her favor by abusing and making a mockery of the legal remedies provided by law.
Petitioners filing of the petition for annulment of judgment after she had filed a motion for new trial
and lost, with both actions raising the same grounds, reveals an intent to secure a judgment in her favor
by abusing and making a mockery of the legal remedies provided by law. This kind of abuse is what this
court tries to guard against when it limited its application, and stated in some of the cases that an
action for annulment of judgment cannot be invoked when other remedies had already been availed.
Same; Same; Annulment of Certificate of Titles; An action for annulment of certificate of title is a
direct attack on the title because it challenges the judgment decree of title.An action for annulment of
certificate of title is a direct attack on the title because it challenges the judgment decree of title.
In Goco v. Court of Appeals, 617 SCRA 397 (2010), this court said that [a]n action for annulment of
certificates of title to property [goes] into the issue of ownership of the land covered by a Torrens title
and the relief generally prayed for by the plaintiff is to be declared as the lands true owner. Hence,
there was no violation of Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 when petitioners title was declared
null and void by the Regional Trial Court.
Same; Same; Litis Pendentia; Requisites of litis pendentia.The requisites of litis pendentia are:
(a) identity of parties, or interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for,
the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such
that any judgment rendered in the other action, will, regardless of which party is successful, amount
to res judicata in the action under consideration.
Land Titles; Certificate of Title; It is true that certificates of title are indefeasible and binding
upon the whole world.Petitioner argues that her certificate of title was erroneously declared null and
void because based on OCT No. P-691, she is the real owner of the property. It is true that certificates of
title are indefeasible and binding upon the whole world. However, certificates of title do not vest

ownership. They merely evidence title or ownership of the property. Courts may, therefore, cancel or
declare a certificate of title null and void when it finds that it was issued irregularly.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Quisumbing, Fernando & Javellana Law Office for petitioner.
RRV Legal Consultancy Firm for respondent.
LEONEN,J.:
Regardless of the type of action whether it is in personam, in rem or quasi in rem the
preferred mode of service of summons is personal service. To avail themselves of substituted service,
courts must rely on a detailed enumeration of the sheriffs actions and a showing that the defendant
cannot be served despite diligent and reasonable efforts. The sheriffs return, which contains these
details, is entitled to a presumption of regularity, and on this basis, the court may allow substituted
service. Should the sheriffs return be wanting of these details, substituted service will be irregular if no
other evidence of the efforts to serve summons was presented.
Failure to serve summons will mean that the court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant. However, the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration is tantamount to
voluntary appearance.
This Rule 45 petition seeks the review of the Court of Appeals July 7, 2010 decision in C.A.-G.R.
S.P. No. 96471. The Court of Appeals denied petitioners action for annulment of the Regional Trial
Court decision, which, in turn, nullified her certificate of title.
This case originated from separate complaints for nullification of free patent and original
certificates of title, filed against several defendants. 1 One of the defendants is petitioner Aurora De
Pedro (De Pedro).2 The complaints were filed by respondent Romasan Development Corporation before
the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City on July 7, 1998.3
Respondent Romasan Development Corporation alleged in its complaints that it was the owner and
possessor of a parcel of land in Antipolo City. 4 The land was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 236044.5
Based on respondents narrative, its representative, Mr. Rodrigo Ko, discovered sometime in
November 1996 that De Pedro put up fences on a portion of its Antipolo property. 6 Mr. Ko confronted De
Pedro regarding her acts, but she was able to show title and documents evidencing her ownership. 7
Mr. Ko informed respondent about the documents. 8 Upon checking with the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office-Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(CENRO-DENR), it was discovered that the DENR issued free patents covering portions of respondents
property to the following:
a. Defendant Nora Jocson, married to Carlito Jocson OCT No. P-723, Free Patent No. 045802-91616;
b. Defendants Heirs of Marcelino Santos[,] represented by Cristino Santos OCT No. P-727, Free
Patent No. 045802-91-919;
c. Defendant Aurora de Pedro married to Elpidio de Pedro OCT No. 691, Free Patent No. 04580291-914;
d. Defendant Wilson Dadia OCT No. P-722, Free Patent No. 045802-91-915; and

e.
Defendant
Prudencio
Marana
P-721, Free Patent N[o]. 045802-91-923.9 (Emphasis supplied)

OCT

No.

Based on these free patents, the Register of Deeds issued titles covering portions of respondents
property.10 Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 691, Free Patent No. 045802-91-914 was signed by the
Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office in favor of De Pedro on December 9, 1991. 11
Respondent further alleged in its separate complaints that the government could not legally issue
the free patents because at the time of their issuance, the land was already released for disposition to
private individuals.12 OCT No. 438, from which respondents TCT No. 236044 originated, was already
issued as early as August 30, 1937.13
Respondent also prayed for the payment of attorneys fees and exemplary damages. 14
Attempts to personally serve summons on De Pedro failed. 15 The officers return, dated February
22, 1999 reads in part:
OFFICERS RETURN
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 15 th and 18th day of February, 1999, I have served a copy of the
summons with complaint and annexes dated January 29, 1999 issued by Regional Trial Court, Fourth
Judicial Region, Branch 74, Antipolo City upon defendants in the above entitled case on the following, to
wit:
1.AURORA N. DE PEDRO Unserved for the reason that according to the messenger of Post
Office of Pasig their [sic] is no person in the said given address.16
Respondent filed a motion to serve summons and the complaint by publication. 17
On August 17, 1998, the Regional Trial Court granted the motion. 18 The summons and the
complaint were published in Peoples Balita on its April 24, May 1, and May 8, 1998 issues. 19
On July 15, 1999, respondent moved to declare all defendants in its complaints, including De
Pedro, in default for failure to file their answers. 20 Respondent also moved to be allowed to present
evidence ex parte.21 The Regional Trial Court granted the motions on August 19, 1999. 22
On January 7, 2000, the Regional Trial Court issued an order declaring as nullity the titles and
free patents issued to all defendants in respondents complaint, including the free patent issued to De
Pedro.23 Thus:
Accordingly the Court declares as a nullity the following titles and Free Patents issued to the
Defendants.
a. Defendant Nora Jocson married to Carlito Jocson OCT No. P-723; Free Patent N[o]. 045802-91616;

Once the Decision becomes final and in order to give full force and effect to the Decision of the
Court nullifying the titles and patents issued to the defendants, the latter are directed to surrender the
same within a period of ten (10) days from the finality of said Decision to the Registry of Deeds of
Marikina City and failure on the part of the defendants to surrender the owners duplicate of the titles
in their possession, defendant Register of Deeds of Marikina City is authorized to cancel the same
without the presentation of said owners duplicate of titles in the possession of the
defendants.24 (Emphasis supplied)
In so ruling, the Regional Trial Court noted that none of the defendants, including De Pedro, filed
an answer to respondents complaints.25 The Regional Trial Court also noted the committee report
admitting CENROs irregularity in the issuance of the free patents to the defendants in the case. 26
The Regional Trial Court also found that the title and free patent issued to De Pedro were
void.27 As early as August 30, 1937, or before the free patents were issued to the defendants in the case,
OCT No. 438 was already issued to the propertys original owner. 28 Hence, the property was already
segregated from the mass of public domain that can be disposed by the government. 29
On March 30, 2000, De Pedro, through counsel, filed before the Regional Trial Court a motion for
new trial, alleging that the counsel received notice of the January 7, 2000 decision on March 16, 2000. 30
De Pedro argued that the Regional Trial Court did not acquire jurisdiction over her person because
of improper and defective service of summons. Citing the officers return dated February 22, 1999, De
Pedro pointed out that summons was not personally served upon her for the reason that according to
the messenger of Post Office of Pasig their (sic) is no person in the said given address. 31
De Pedro also argued that the case should have been dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia.
She alleged that there was a pending civil case filed by her, involving the same property, when
respondent filed the complaints against her and several others.32
On September 30, 2002, the Regional Trial Court issued an order denying De Pedros motion for
new trial.33
The Regional Trial Court ruled that summons was validly served upon De Pedro through
publication, in accordance with the Rules of Court. 34 Moreover, counting from the date of the summons
publication beginning on March 2, 2000, the motion for new trial was filed beyond the 15-day period
within which the motion may be filed.35 Therefore, the Regional Trial Court decision had become final
and executory.36
The Regional Trial Court also ruled that the reckoning period for filing the motion for new trial
cannot be De Pedros counsels receipt of the decision. This is because at the time of the issuance of the
courts decision, which had already become final and executory, De Pedros counsel was yet to enter his
appearance for De Pedro.37

b. Defendant Heirs of Marcelino Santos represented by Cristino Santos OCT N[o]. P-727; Free
Patent N[o]. 045802-91-919;
c. Defendant Aurora N. de Pedro married to Elpidio de Pedro OCT No. P-691; Free Patent No.
045802-91-914; d. Defendant Wilson Dadia OCT No. P-722; Free Patent No. 045802-91-915;
e. Defendant Prudencio Marana OCT No. P-721; Free Patent N[o]. 045802-91-923.

De Pedro filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, alleging that the Regional Trial
Court committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied her motion for new trial.38

There being clear bad faith on the part of the Private defendants in obtaining said Free Patents
and titles in their names covering the portions of the property of the plaintiff, said defendants are each
ordered to pay to the plaintiff the amount of P20,000.00 as attorneys fees, P3,000.00 as appearance fee
and also P50,000.00 as moral damages with costs against said private defendants.

The Court of Appeals noted De Pedros belated filing of her motion for new trial. The Court of
Appeals also noted De Pedros failure to allege any ground that would justify the grant of a motion for
new trial under Rule 37, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. 40

On March 30, 2006, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit, and
affirmed the denial of De Pedros motion for new trial.39

De Pedros motion for reconsideration was denied in the Court of Appeals resolution dated August
24, 2006.41
De Pedro elevated the case to this court, but this was likewise denied in the resolution dated
October 4, 2006 for failure to pay the Special Allowance for the Judiciary and sheriffs fees. 42
On October 11, 2006, De Pedro filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of the
January 7, 2000 judgment of the Regional Trial Court 43 on grounds of lack of jurisdiction, litis
pendentia, and for having been dispossessed of her property without due process.
Citing Pantaleon v. Asuncion,44 De Pedro pointed out that [d]ue process of law
requires personal service to support a personaljudgment, and, when the proceeding is strictly in
personam brought to determine the personal rights and obligations of the parties, personal service
within the state or a voluntary appearance in the case is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction [so]
as to constitute compliance with the constitutional requirement of due process.45
De Pedro also claimed to be the real owner of the property by virtue of OCT No. P-691. 46 She
pointed out that the same Regional Trial Court branch ordered the reconstitution of her title to the
property in 1997.47 The Regional Trial Court also issued a certificate of finality stating that an Entry of
Judgment had already been issued by the Court of Appeals dated January 16, 2006. 48
On July 7, 2010, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision denying De Pedros petition for
annulment of judgment.49 The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DENIED.50
The Court of Appeals ruled that since petitioner already availed herself of the remedy of new trial,
and raised the case before the Court of Appeals via petition for certiorari, she can no longer file a
petition for annulment of judgment.51
De Pedros motion for reconsideration was denied on December 3, 2010: 52
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED for lack of
merit.53
On January 13, 2011, De Pedro filed before this court a Rule 45 petition, seeking the reversal of the
July 7, 2010 Court of Appeals decision and the December 3, 2010 Court of Appeals resolution. 54
The issues in this case are:
I.

Whether the trial court decision was void for failure of the trial court to acquire
jurisdiction over the person of petitioner Aurora N. De Pedro; and

II. Whether filing a motion for new trial and petition for certiorari is a bar from filing a petition for
annulment of judgment.
Petitioner argues that respondents prayer for attorneys fees, appearance fees, exemplary damages,
and costs of suit sought to establish personal obligations upon petitioner in favor of respondent. 55 Hence,
the case filed by respondent before the Regional Trial Court was an action in personam, which required
personal service upon her for the courts acquisition of jurisdiction over her person. 56 In this case, the
Regional Trial Court allowed service of summons by publication instead of ordering that summons be
served by substituted service.57 Improper service of summons rendered the trial court decision null and
void.58 It means that the court could not acquire jurisdiction over the person of petitioner.59

Petitioner also argues that respondents complaints were dismissible on the ground of litis
pendentia, pointing to the alleged pending case between the same parties and involving same subject
matter at the time when respondent filed its complaint before the Regional Trial Court in 1998. 60 The
alleged pending case was filed in 1997 by petitioner and her spouse against respondent, seeking
enforce[ment] of their rights as owners, and claim[ing] damages for the unlawful and illegal acts of
dispossession, terrorism and violence which they, their family and their close relatives were subjected to
by [respondent].61
On her ownership of the property, petitioner argues that she was able to obtain OCT No. P-691 in
1991 in strict and faithful compliance with all the requirements. 62 When the Register of Deeds lost the
records pertaining to the property, the Regional Trial Court ordered the reconstitution of the title on
September 23, 1997.63 The same trial court issued the certificate of finality of the order on March 16,
2006.64
Moreover, petitioner refers to a counter-affidavit issued by a certain Jesus Pampellona, Deputy
Public Land Inspector of CENRO-Antipolo, in the preliminary investigation of a case before the
Department of Justice, docketed as I.S. No. 99-503 and entitled: Rodrigo Sy v. Maximo Pentino, et al.
Petitioner highlights Pampellonas statements that the free patent applicants for the property were
found to be in actual, public, adverse and continuous possession on the specific lots applied for by them
with several improvements like the house of Mrs. Aurora de Pedro and several fruit[-]bearing trees with
an average age of 20-25 years scattered within the twelve (12) hectares area applied for by the above
named applicants;65 Based on the affidavit, Pampellona was unaware, at the time, of any previous title
issued in favor of any person or entity covering the subject lots above mentioned as there was at that
time, no existing record, both in the CENRO, Antipolo, Rizal, or at the Land Management Bureau in
Manila, attesting to the issuance of previous titles on the subject lots. 66
Lastly, petitioner argues that the trial court decision was null and void, considering that
petitioners title was cancelled in contravention of Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, which
prohibits collateral attack upon certificates of title.67
In its comment, respondent argues that the process server tried other forms of substituted service,
including service by registered mail.68
Respondent also argues that petitioner was in evident malice and bad faith when she allegedly did
not disclose in her petition other actions taken by her after the Regional Trial Court had denied her
motion for new trial.69 Particularly, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals,
pertaining to the trial courts denial of the motion for new trial. 70 When the petition for certiorariwas
denied, petitioner also filed a petition for review before this court, which was also denied. 71 For these
reasons, petitioners petition for review before this court deserves outright dismissal. 72
I
The sheriffs return must show the details of the efforts exerted to personally serve summons
upon defendants or respondents, before substituted service or service by publication is availed

Courts may exercise their powers validly and with binding effect if they acquire jurisdiction over:
(a) the cause of action or the subject matter of the case; (b) the thing or the res; (c) the parties; and (d)
the remedy.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter refers to the power or authority of courts to hear and decide
cases of a general class.73 It is conferred by the Constitution or by law. 74 It is not acquired through
administrative issuances or court orders. It is not acquired by agreement, stipulation, waiver, 75 or
silence.76 Any decision by a court, without a law vesting jurisdiction upon such court, is void.

Jurisdiction over the thing or res is the power of the court over an object or thing being litigated.
The court may acquire jurisdiction over the thing by actually or constructively seizing or placing it
under the courts custody.77

Violation of due process rights is a jurisdictional defect. This court recognized this principle
in Aducayen v. Flores.88 In the same case, this court further ruled that this jurisdictional defect is
remedied by a petition for certiorari.89

Jurisdiction over the parties refers to the power of the court to make decisions that are binding on
persons. The courts acquire jurisdiction over complainants or petitioners as soon as they file their
complaints or petitions. Over the persons of defendants or respondents, courts acquire jurisdiction by a
valid service of summons or through their voluntary submission. 78 Generally, a person voluntarily
submits to the courts jurisdiction when he or she participates in the trial despite improper service of
summons.

Similarly in Vda. de Cuaycong v. Vda. de Sengbengco,90 this court held that a decision that was
issued in violation of a persons due process rights suffers a fatal infirmity.91

Courts79 and litigants must be aware of the limits and the requirements for the acquisition of court
jurisdiction. Decisions or orders issued by courts outside their jurisdiction are void. Complaints or
petitions filed before the wrong court or without acquiring jurisdiction over the parties may be
dismissed.80
Petitioner argued that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over her person because she was
not properly served with summons. After the summons had returned unserved to petitioner because
there [was] no person in the said given address, 81 the trial court allowed the publication of the
summons to petitioner.
Jurisdiction over the parties is required regardless of the type of action whether the action is in
personam, in rem, or quasi in rem.
In actions in personam, the judgment is for or against a person directly. 82 Jurisdiction over the
parties is required in actions in personam because they seek to impose personal responsibility or
liability upon a person.83
Courts need not acquire jurisdiction over parties on this basis in in rem and quasi in rem actions.
Actions in rem or quasi in rem are not directed against the person based on his or her personal
liability.84
Actions in rem are actions against the thing itself. They are binding upon the whole world. 85 Quasi
in rem actions are actions involving the status of a property over which a party has interest. 86Quasi in
rem actions are not binding upon the whole world. They affect only the interests of the particular
parties.87
However, to satisfy the requirements of due process, jurisdiction over the parties in in
rem and quasi in rem actions is required.
The phrase, against the thing, to describe in rem actions is a metaphor. It is not the thing that
is the party to an in rem action; only legal or natural persons may be parties even in in rem actions.
Against the thing means that resolution of the case affects interests of others whether direct or
indirect. It also assumes that the interests in the form of rights or duties attach to the thing which
is the subject matter of litigation. In actions in rem, our procedure assumes an active vinculum over
those with interests to the thing subject of litigation.
Due process requires that those with interest to the thing in litigation be notified and given an
opportunity to defend those interests. Courts, as guardians of constitutional rights, cannot be expected
to deny persons their due process rights while at the same time be considered as acting within their
jurisdiction.

The relation of due process to jurisdiction is recognized even in administrative cases wherein the
standard of evidence is relatively lower. Thus, in Montoya v. Varilla:92
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are
ousted from their jurisdiction. The violation of a partys right to due process raises a serious
jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the
fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for
lack of jurisdiction.93
An action for annulment of certificate of title is quasi in rem. It is not an action against a person
on the basis of his personal liability, 94 but an action that subjects a persons interest over a property to
a burden. The action for annulment of a certificate of title threatens petitioners interest in the property.
Petitioner is entitled to due process with respect to that interest. The court does not have competence or
authority to proceed with an action for annulment of certificate of title without giving the person, in
whose name the certificate was issued all the opportunities to be heard.
Hence, regardless of the nature of the action, proper service of summons is imperative. A decision
rendered without proper service of summons suffers a defect in jurisdiction. Respondents institution of
a proceeding for annulment of petitioners certificate of title is sufficient to vest the court with
jurisdiction over the res, but it is not sufficient for the court to proceed with the case with authority and
competence.
Personal service of summons is the preferred mode of service of summons. 95 Thus, as a rule,
summons must be served personally upon the defendant or respondent wherever he or she may be
found. If the defendant or respondent refuses to receive the summons, it shall be tendered to him or
her.96
If the defendant or respondent is a domestic juridical person, personal service of summons shall be
effected upon its president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or inhouse counsel wherever he or she may be found.97
Other modes of serving summons may be done when justified. Service of summons through other
modes will not be effective without showing serious attempts to serve summons through personal
service. Thus, the rules allow summons to be served by substituted service only for justifiable causes
and if the defendant or respondent cannot be served within reasonable time. 98 Substituted service is
effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendants residence with some person of suitable
age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendants office or regular
place of business with some competent person in charge thereof. 99
Service of summons by publication in a newspaper of general circulation is allowed when the
defendant or respondent is designated as an unknown owner or if his or her whereabouts are unknown
and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry. 100 It may only be effected after unsuccessful attempts to
serve the summons personally, and after diligent inquiry as to the defendants or respondents
whereabouts.

Service of summons by extraterritorial service is allowed after leave of court when the defendant or
respondent does not reside or is not found in the country or is temporarily out of the country. 101
If a defendant or respondent voluntarily appears in trial or participates in the proceedings, it is
generally construed as sufficient service of summons. 102
In this case, summons was served by publication.
A look into the content of the sheriffs return will determine if the circumstances warranted the
deviation from the rule preferring personal service of summons over other modes of service. The sheriffs
return must contain a narration of the circumstances showing efforts to personally serve summons to
the defendants or respondents and the impossibility of personal service of summons. Citing Hamilton v.
Levy,103 this court said of substituted service in Domagas v. Jensen:104
The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be stated in the
proof of service or Officers Return; otherwise, any substituted service made in lieu of personal service
cannot be upheld. This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of
service. It is a method extraordinary in character and hence may be used only as prescribed and in the
circumstances authorized by statute. Here, no such explanation was made. Failure to faithfully, strictly,
and fully comply with the requirements of substituted service renders said service ineffective. 105
This court also said in Manotoc v. Court of Appeals:
The date and time of the attempts on personal service, the inquiries made to locate the defendant,
the name/s of the occupants of the alleged residence or house of defendant and all other acts done,
though futile, to serve the summons on defendant must be specified in the Return to justify substituted
service. The form on Sheriffs Return of Summons on Substituted Service prescribed in the Handbook
for Sheriffs published by the Philippine Judicial Academy requires a narration of the efforts made to
find the defendant personally and the fact of failure.
....
However, in view of the numerous claims of irregularities in substituted service which have
spawned the filing of a great number of unnecessary special civil actions of certiorari and appeals to
higher courts, resulting in prolonged litigation and wasteful legal expenses, the Court rules in the case
at bar that the narration of the efforts made to find the defendant and the fact of failure written in
broad and imprecise words will not suffice. The facts and circumstances should be stated with more
particularity and detail on the number of attempts made at personal service, dates and times of the
attempts, inquiries to locate defendant, names of occupants of the alleged residence, and the reasons for
failure should be included in the Return to satisfactorily show the efforts undertaken. That such efforts
were made to personally serve summons on defendant, and those resulted in failure, would prove
impossibility of prompt personal service.
Moreover, to allow sheriffs to describe the facts and circumstances in inexact terms would
encourage routine performance of their precise duties relating to substituted service for it would be
quite easy to shroud or conceal carelessness or laxity in such broad terms. 106
A sheriffs return enjoys the presumption of regularity in its issuance if it contains (1) the details of
the circumstances surrounding the sheriffs attempt to serve the summons personally upon the
defendants or respondents; and (2) the particulars showing the impossibility of serving the summons
within reasonable time.107It does not enjoy the presumption of regularity if the return was merely pro
forma.
Failure to state the facts and circumstances that rendered service of summons impossible renders
service of summons and the return ineffective. In that case, no substituted service or service by
publication can be valid.

This court in Manotoc explained that the presumption of regularity in the issuance of the sheriffs
return does not apply to patently defective returns. Thus:
The court a quo heavily relied on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty.
It reasons out that [t]he certificate of service by the proper officer is prima facie evidence of the facts set
out herein, and to overcome the presumption arising from said certificate, the evidence must be clear
and convincing.
The Court acknowledges that this ruling is still a valid doctrine. However, for the presumption to
apply, the Sheriffs Return must show that serious efforts or attempts were exerted to personally serve the
summons and that said efforts failed. These facts must be specifically narrated in the Return. To
reiterate, it must clearly show that the substituted service must be made on a person of suitable age
and discretion living in the dwelling or residence of defendant. Otherwise, the Return is flawed and the
presumption cannot be availed of. As previously explained, the Return of Sheriff Caelas did not comply
with the stringent requirements of Rule 14, Section 8 on substituted service. (Emphasis supplied)
In the case of Venturanza v. Court of Appeals, it was held that x x x the presumption of regularity
in the performance of official functions by the sheriff is not applicable in this case where it is patent that
the sheriffs return is defective. (Emphasis supplied) While the Sheriffs Return in the Venturanza case
had no statement on the effort or attempt to personally serve the summons, the Return of Sheriff
Caelas in the case at bar merely described the efforts or attempts in general terms lacking in details as
required by the ruling in the case of Domagas v. Jensen and other cases. It is as if Caelas Return did
not mention any effort to accomplish personal service. Thus, the substituted service is void. 108
In this case, the sheriffs return states:
OFFICERS RETURN
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 15 th and 18th day of February, 1999, I have served a copy of the
summons with complaint and annexes dated January 29, 1999 issued by Regional Trial Court, Fourth
Judicial Region, Branch 74, Antipolo City upon defendants in the above entitled case on the following, to
wit:
1.AURORA N. DE PEDRO Unserved for the reason that according to the messenger of Post
Office of Pasig their [sic] is no person in the said given address.109
This return shows no detail of the sheriffs efforts to serve the summons personally upon petitioner.
The summons was unserved only because the post office messenger stated that there was no Aurora N.
De Pedro in the service address. The return did not show that the sheriff attempted to locate
petitioners whereabouts. Moreover, it cannot be concluded based on the return that personal service
was rendered impossible under the circumstances or that service could no longer be made within
reasonable time.
The lack of any demonstration of effort on the part of the sheriff to serve the summons personally
upon petitioner is a deviation from this courts previous rulings that personal service is the preferred
mode of service, and that the sheriff must narrate in his or her return the efforts made to effect personal
service. Thus, the sheriffs return in this case was defective. No substituted service or service by
publication will be allowed based on such defective return.
The issuance of a judgment without proper service of summons is a violation of due process rights.
The judgment, therefore, suffers a jurisdictional defect. The case would have been dismissible had
petitioner learned about the case while trial was pending. At that time, a motion to dismiss would have
been proper. After the trial, the case would have been the proper subject of an action for annulment of
judgment.

Petitioner learned about the action for annulment of title only after trial. Instead of filing an action
for annulment of judgment, however, she filed a motion for new trial without alleging any proper
ground. Rule 37 of the Rules of Court provides that a party may move and the court may grant a new
trial based on the following causes:

Section2.Grounds for Annulment.The annulment may be based only on the grounds of

extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a
motion for new trial or petition for relief.

(a)Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against and by reason of which such aggrieved party has probably been impaired in his rights;
or
(b)Newly discovered evidence, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and
produced at the trial, and which if presented would probably alter the result. 110

Lack of jurisdiction being a valid ground for annulment of judgments, circumstances that negate
the courts acquisition of jurisdiction including defective service of summons are causes for an
action for annulment of judgments.114

Petitioner insisted in her motion for new trial that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
her person. She did not allege that fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence impaired her
rights. Neither did she allege that she found newly discovered evidence that could have altered the trial
court decision. When her motion for new trial was denied, she filed a petition for certiorari, insisting
that her motion for new trial should have been granted on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over her
person. The Court of Appeals denied the petition for her failure to allege any ground for new trial. We
cannot attribute error on the part of the Court of Appeals for this denial because, indeed, lack of
jurisdiction is not a ground for granting a new trial.
What cannot be denied is the fact that petitioner was already notified of respondents action for
annulment of petitioners title when she filed a motion for new trial and, later, a petition for certiorari.
At that time, petitioner was deemed, for purposes of due process, to have been properly notified of the
action involving her title to the property. Lack of jurisdiction could have already been raised in an action
for annulment of judgment.
Thus, when petitioner erroneously filed her motion for new trial and petition for certiorari instead
of an action for annulment of judgment, she was deemed to have voluntarily participated in the
proceedings against her title. The actions and remedies she chose to avail bound her. Petitioners failure
to file an action for annulment of judgment at this time was fatal to her cause. We cannot conclude now
that she was denied due process.

However, this court had an occasion to say that an action for annulment of judgment may not be
invoked (1) where the party has availed himself of the remedy of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or
other appropriate remedy and lost; or (2) where he has failed to avail himself of those remedies through
his own fault or negligence. 115 Thus, an action for annulment of judgment is not always readily
available even if there are causes for annulling a judgment.
In this case, petitioners main grounds for filing the action for annulment are lack of jurisdiction
over her person, and litis pendentia. These are the same grounds that were raised in the motion for new
trial filed before and denied by the Regional Trial Court.
Applying the above rules, we rule that the Court of Appeals did not err in denying petitioners
petition for annulment of the Regional Trial Courts judgment. Petitioner had already filed a motion for
new trial and petition for certiorari invoking lack of jurisdiction as ground.
Petitioners filing of the petition for annulment of judgment after she had filed a motion for new
trial and lost, with both actions raising the same grounds, reveals an intent to secure a judgment in her
favor by abusing and making a mockery of the legal remedies provided by law.
This kind of abuse is what this court tries to guard against when it limited its application, and
stated in some of the cases that an action for annulment of judgment cannot be invoked when other
remedies had already been availed.
As this court explained in Macalalag v. Ombudsman:116

II
Petitioner is already barred from filing a petition for annulment of judgment
A petition for annulment of judgment is a recourse that is equitable in character. 111 It is
independent of the case112 and is allowed only in exceptional cases as where there is no available or
other adequate remedy.113
An action for annulment of judgment may be filed to assail Regional Trial Court judgments when
resort to other remedies can no longer be had through no fault of petitioner. Section 1 of Rule 47 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Section1.Coverage.This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of
judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner.
An action for annulment of judgment may be based on only two grounds: 1) extrinsic fraud; and 2)
lack of jurisdiction. Section 2 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court states:

Rule 47, entitled Annulment of Judgments or Final Orders and Resolutions, is a new provision
under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure albeit the remedy has long been given imprimatur by the
courts. The rule covers annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders and resolutions
in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for
relief or other appropriate remedies could no longer be availed of through no fault of the petitioner. An
action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case where the judgment
sought to be annulled is rendered. The concern that the remedy could so easily be resorted to as an
instrument to delay a final and executory judgment, has prompted safeguards to be put in place in order
to avoid an abuse of the rule. Thus, the annulment of judgment may be based only on the grounds of
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, and the remedy may not be invoked (1) where the party has
availed himself of the remedy of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedy and lost
therefrom, or (2) where he has failed to avail himself of those remedies through his own fault or
negligence.117 (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, this court ruled in Sigma Homebuilding Corporation v. Inter-Alia Management
Corporation, et al.:118
A petition for annulment of judgment is an extraordinary remedy and is not to be granted
indiscriminately by the Court. It is allowed only in exceptional cases and cannot be used by a losing party
to make a mockery of a duly promulgated decision long final and executory. The remedy may not be

invoked where the party has availed himself of the remedy of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedy and lost, or where he has failed to avail himself of those remedies through his own
fault or negligence.
Litigation must end sometime. It is essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice
that, once a judgment becomes final, the winning party should not be deprived of the fruits of the
verdict. Courts must therefore guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that undesirable
result. Thus, we deem it fit to finally put an end to the present controversy.119 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, an action for annulment of judgment will not so easily and readily lend itself to abuse by
parties aggrieved by final judgments. 120 Petitioner cannot abuse the courts processes to revive a case
that has already been rendered final against her favor, for the purpose of securing a favorable judgment.
An action for annulment of judgment cannot be used by petitioner who has lost her case through fault of
her own, to make a complete farce of a duly promulgated decision that has long become final and
executory.121
III
Filing an action for annulment of title is not a violation of Section 48 of Presidential Decree
No. 1529
Petitioner insists that the annulment of her title was a violation of Section 48 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529, which provides:
Sec.48.Certificate not subject to collateral attack.A certificate of title shall not be subject to
collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance
with law.
Petitioner is mistaken. In Sarmiento, et al. v. Court of Appeals,122this court said:
An action is deemed an attack on a title when the object of the action or proceeding is to nullify the
title, and thus challenge the judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed. The attack is direct
when the object of the action is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the
other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack
on the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof.123
An action for annulment of certificate of title is a direct attack on the title because it challenges the
judgment decree of title.
In Goco v. Court of Appeals,124 this court said that [a]n action for annulment of certificates of title
to property [goes] into the issue of ownership of the land covered by a Torrens title and the relief
generally prayed for by the plaintiff is to be declared as the lands true owner. 125
Hence, there was no violation of Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 when petitioners title
was declared null and void by the Regional Trial Court.
Petitioner, however, points to the following statement made by this court in another case involving
these same parties:126
The
resolution
of
the
issue
will
not
involve
the
alteration, correction or modification either of OCT No. P-691 under the name of petitioner Aurora de
Pedro, or TCT No. 236044 under the name of respondent corporation. If the subject property is found to
be a portion of the property covered by OCT No. P-691 but is included in the technical description of the
property covered by TCT No. 236044, the latter would have to be corrected. On the other hand, if the

subject property is found to be a portion of the property covered by TCT No. 236044, but is included in
the property covered by OCT No. P-691, then the latter title must be rectified. However, the rectification
of either title may be made only via an action filed for the said purpose, conformably with Section 48 of
Act No. 496.
....
A. The action of the petitioners against respondents, based on the material allegations of the
complaint, if one for recovery of possession of the subject property and damages. However, such action is
not a direct but a collateral attack of TCT No. 236044. Neither did the respondents directly attack OCT
No.
P-691 in their answer to the complaint. Although the respondents averred in said answer, by way of
special and affirmative defenses, that the subject property is covered by TCT No. 236044 issued in the
name of the respondent corporation, and as such the said respondent is entitled to the possession
thereof to the exclusion of the petitioners, such allegations does not constitute a direct attack on OCT
No. P-691, but is likewise a collateral attack thereon...127
Petitioner misreads the import of what we said in that case. That case involves petitioners action
for recovery of possession and damages against respondents. It also involved respondents allegations
that the property was covered by a certificate of title in its name and, therefore, its entitlement to the
possession of the property. It does not involve an action for annulment of title.
When this court said that such action is not a direct but a collateral attack of TCT No. 236044 or
that such allegations does [sic] not constitute a direct attack on OCT No. P-691, but is likewise a
collateral attack thereon, we were referring to both parties action for and allegations of possessory
rights over the property. This court was not referring to an action for annulment of title, which is the
case involved here. To reiterate, an action for annulment constitutes a direct attack on a certificate of
title.
IV
The requisites of litis pendentia are not satisfied when respondent filed its action for
annulment of title
Petitioner argued that the case for annulment of title was dismissible on the ground of litis
pendentia because there was a pending civil case filed by her against respondent.
The requisites of litis pendentia are: (a) identity of parties, or interests in both actions; (b) identity
of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of
the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action, will, regardless of
which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.128
Although both cases involve the same parcel of land, petitioner was not able to show that there was
identity of the relief prayed for. A review of the complaint in the said civil case shows that it was a case
for damages, for alleged improper conduct of respondent relating the property. The action filed by
respondent was an action for annulment of petitioners title.
Petitioner was also not able to show that the relief prayed for in both cases were founded on the
same facts. Petitioners complaint for damages was founded on the alleged misconduct of respondent.
Respondents action for annulment of title was founded on the alleged irregularity in the issuance of
petitioners title.
Hence, the petitioner was not able to show that all the requisites for litis pendentia are present.
Respondents action for annulment of title cannot be dismissed on this ground.
V

A certificate of title does not vest ownership

Petitioner argues that her certificate of title was erroneously declared null and void because based
on OCT No. P-691, she is the real owner of the property.
It is true that certificates of title are indefeasible and binding upon the whole world. However,
certificates of title do not vest ownership. 129 They merely evidence title or ownership of the
property.130 Courts may, therefore, cancel or declare a certificate of title null and void when it finds that
it was issued irregularly.

Notes.In civil cases, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be acquired either by
service of summons or by the defendants voluntary appearance in court and submission to its authority.
(Optima Realty Corporation vs. Hertz Phil. Exclusive Cars, Inc., 688 SCRA 317 [2013])
Without a valid service of summons, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the defendant,
unless the defendant voluntarily submits to it. (Philippine Womans Christian Temperance Union, Inc.
vs. Teodoro R. Yangco 2nd and 3rd Generation Heirs Foundation, Inc., 720 SCRA 522 [2014])
o0o

In this case, the trial court ruled based on the committee report that the free patents and original
certificate of title issued to petitioner were irregularly issued, and, therefore, invalid.
The principle of bar by prior judgment is embodied in Rule 39, Section 47(b) of the Rules of Court:
Section47.Effect of judgments or final orders.The effect of a judgment or final order rendered
by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as
follows:
....
(b)In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as
to any other matter that could have been missed in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and
their successors-in-interest, by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding,
litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity[.] (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the trial court, by annulling petitioners certificate of title and declaring its issuance
irregular, directly adjudged petitioners certificate of title as void. Because petitioner failed to appeal
and cause the annulment of the trial courts judgment as to her titles validity, this question is already
barred. This judgment has already attained finality and can no longer be litigated.
This court explained in FGU Insurance Corporation v. Regional Trial Court131 the doctrine of
finality of judgment, thus:
Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment, a decision that has
acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect,
even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be
made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. Any act which violates this
principle must immediately be struck down.132
In any case, even if petitioners original certificate of title was not irregularly issued as she claims,
her original certificate of title was issued later than the title from which respondents title originated.
As a rule, original titles issued earlier prevail over another original title issued later. 133 Therefore,
petitioners later-issued title cannot prevail over respondents title, which was derived from an earlier
issued original certificate of title.

G.R. No. 173559.January 7, 2013.*

LETICIA DIONA, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, MARCELINA DIONA, petitioner, vs. ROMEO
A. BALANGUE, SONNY A. BALANGUE, REYNALDO A. BALANGUE, and ESTEBAN A.
BALANGUE, JR., respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Annulment of Judgments; A Petition for Annulment of Judgment
under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is a remedy granted only under exceptional circumstances where a
party, without fault on his part, has failed to avail of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition
for relief or other appropriate remedies.A Petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the
Rules of Court is a remedy granted only under exceptional circumstances where a party, without fault
on his part, has
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
23

VOL. 688, JANUARY 7, 2013

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals July 7, 2010 decision in C.A.-G.R.
S.P. No. 96471 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Mendoza and Reyes,** JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment affirmed.

Diona vs. Balangue

23

failed to avail of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies. Said rule explicitly provides that it is not available as a substitute for a remedy
which was lost due to the partys own neglect in promptly availing of the same. The underlying reason
is traceable to the notion that annulling final judgments goes against the grain of finality of judgment.
Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective
administration of justice that once a judgment has become final, the issue or cause involved therein
should be laid to rest.

entire devotion to the interest of his client, warmth and zeal in the maintenance and defense of his
rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, to the end that nothing can be taken or
withheld from his client except in accordance with the law. Judging from how respondents former
counsel handled the cause of his clients, there is no doubt that he was grossly negligent in protecting
their rights, to the extent that they were deprived of their property without due process of law.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals.

Same; Same; Same; Due Process; While under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court a Petition
for Annulment of Judgment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction,
jurisprudence recognizes lack of due process as additional ground to annul a judgment.While under
Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court a Petition for Annulment of Judgment may be based only on the
grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, jurisprudence recognizes lack of due process as
additional ground to annul a judgment. In Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, 280 SCRA 20 (1997), this Court
declared that a final and executory judgment may still be set aside if, upon mere inspection thereof, its
patent nullity can be shown for having been issued without jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law.

Same; Same; Courts; Courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in excess of
what is being sought by the party. They cannot also grant a relief without first ascertaining the evidence
presented in support thereof.It is settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the
pleadings or in excess of what is being sought by the party. They cannot also grant a relief without first
ascertaining the evidence presented in support thereof. Due process considerations require that
judgments must conform to and be supported by the pleadings and evidence presented in court.
In Development Bank of the Philippines v. Teston, 545 SCRA 422 (2008), this Court expounded that: Due
process considerations justify this requirement. It is improper to enter an order which exceeds the scope
of relief sought by the pleadings, absent notice which affords the opposing party an opportunity to be
heard with respect to the proposed relief. The fundamental purpose of the requirement that allegations
of a complaint must provide the measure of recovery is to prevent surprise to the defendant.

Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Ordinarily, the mistake, negligence or lack of competence of counsel binds
the client; A recognized exception to the rule is when the lawyers were grossly negligent in their duty to
maintain their clients cause and such amounted to a deprivation of their clients property without due
process of law.Ordinarily, the mistake, negligence or lack of competence of counsel binds the client.
This is based on the rule that any act performed by a counsel within the scope of his general or implied
authority is regarded as an act of his client. A recognized exception to the rule is when the lawyers were
grossly negligent in their duty to maintain their clients cause and such amounted to a deprivation of
their clients property without due process of law. In which case, the courts must step in and accord
relief to a client who suffered thereby.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Claustro & Claustro Law Office for petitioner.
Reynaldo A. Ruiz for respondents.

DEL CASTILLO,J.:

The grant of a relief neither sought by the party in whose favor it was given nor supported by the
evidence presented violates the opposing partys right to due process and may be declared void ab
initio in a proper proceeding.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assails the November 24, 2005 Resolution 2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 85541 which granted the Petition for Annulment of
Judgment3 filed by the respondents seeking to nullify that portion of the October 17, 2000 Decision 4 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 75, Valenzuela City awarding petitioner 5% monthly interest
rate for the principal amount of the loan respondents obtained from her.
This Petition likewise assails the CAs June 26, 2006 Resolution 5denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.

Factual Antecedents

Same; Same; A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of his client, warmth and zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, to the end that
nothing can be taken or withheld from his client except in accordance with the law.A lawyer owes

The facts of this case are simple and undisputed.

On March 2, 1991, respondents obtained a loan of P45,000.00 from petitioner payable in six months
and secured by a Real Estate Mortgage6 over their 202-square meter property located in Marulas,
Valenzuela and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. V-12296. 7 When the debt became due,
respondents failed to pay notwithstanding demand.

Thus, on September 17, 1999, petitioner filed with the RTC a Complaint 8 praying that respondents be
ordered:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the [petitioner], ordering the [respondents]
to pay the [petitioner] as follows:

a) the sum of FORTY FIVE THOUSAND (P45,000.00) PESOS, representing the unpaid principal loan
obligation plus interest at 5% per month [sic] reckoned from March 2, 1991, until the same is
fully paid;
b)

(a) To pay [petitioner] the principal obligation of P45,000.00, with interest thereon at the rate of 12%
per annum, from 02 March 1991until the full obligation is paid.

P20,000.00 as attorneys fees plus cost of suit;

c) in the event the [respondents] fail to satisfy the aforesaid obligation, an order of foreclosure shall be
issued accordingly for the sale at public auction of the subject property covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. V-12296 and the improvements thereon for the satisfaction of the
[petitioners] claim.

(b) To pay [petitioner] actual damages as may be proven during the trial but shall in no case be less
than P10,000.00; P25,000.00 by way of attorneys fee, plus P2,000.00 per hearing as appearance fee.
(c) To issue a decree of foreclosure for the sale at public auction of the aforementioned parcel of land,
and for the disposition of the proceeds [thereof] in accordance with law, upon failure of the
[respondents] to fully pay [petitioner] within the period set by law the sums set forth in this
complaint.
(d) Costs of this suit.

Other reliefs and remedies just and equitable under the premises are likewise prayed
for.9 (Emphasis supplied)

Respondents were served with summons thru respondent Sonny A. Balangue (Sonny). On October
15, 1999, with the assistance of Atty. Arthur C. Coroza (Atty. Coroza) of the Public Attorneys Office,
they filed a Motion to Extend Period to Answer. Despite the requested extension, however, respondents
failed to file any responsive pleadings. Thus, upon motion of the petitioner, the RTC declared them in
default and allowed petitioner to present her evidence ex parte.10

Ruling of the RTC sought to be annulled.

In a Decision11 dated October 17, 2000, the RTC granted petitioners Complaint. The dispositive
portion of said Decision reads:

SO ORDERED.12 (Emphasis supplied)

Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion for Execution, 13 alleging that respondents did not interpose
a timely appeal despite receipt by their former counsel of the RTCs Decision on November 13, 2000.
Before it could be resolved, however, respondents filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment 14 dated January
26, 2001, claiming that not all of them were duly served with summons. According to the other
respondents, they had no knowledge of the case because their co-respondent Sonny did not inform them
about it. They prayed that the RTCs October 17, 2000 Decision be set aside and a new trial be
conducted.

But on March 16, 2001, the RTC ordered 15 the issuance of a Writ of Execution to implement its
October 17, 2000 Decision. However, since the writ could not be satisfied, petitioner moved for the public
auction of the mortgaged property, 16 which the RTC granted. 17 In an auction sale conducted on
November 7, 2001, petitioner was the only bidder in the amount of P420,000.00. Thus, a Certificate of
Sale18 was issued in her favor and accordingly annotated at the back of TCT No. V-12296.

Respondents then filed a Motion to Correct/Amend Judgment and To Set Aside Execution
Sale19 dated December 17, 2001, claiming that the parties did not agree in writing on any rate of
interest and that petitioner merely sought for a 12% per annum interest in her Complaint. Surprisingly,
the RTC awarded 5% monthly interest (or 60% per annum) from March 2, 1991 until full payment.
Resultantly, their indebtedness inclusive of the exorbitant interest from March 2, 1991 to May 22, 2001
ballooned from P124,400.00 to P652,000.00.

In an Order20 dated May 7, 2002, the RTC granted respondents motion and accordingly modified
the interest rate awarded from 5% monthly to 12% per annum. Then on August 2, 2002, respondents
filed a Motion for Leave To Deposit/Consign Judgment Obligation21 in the total amount of P126,650.00.22

Taking their cue from the Decision of the CA in the special civil action for certiorari, respondents
filed with the same court a Petition for Annulment of Judgment and Execution Sale with
Damages.26They contended that the portion of the RTC Decision granting petitioner 5% monthly
interest rate is in gross violation of Section 3(d) of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court and of their right to due
process. According to respondents, the loan did not carry any interest as it was the verbal agreement of
the parties that in lieu thereof petitioners family can continue occupying respondents residential
building located in Marulas, Valenzuela for free until said loan is fully paid.

Displeased with the RTCs May 7, 2002 Order, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA via a
Petition for Certiorari23 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. On August 5, 2003, the CA rendered a
Decision24 declaring that the RTC exceeded its jurisdiction in awarding the 5% monthly interest but at
the same time pronouncing that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in subsequently reducing the rate
of interest to 12% per annum. In so ruling, the CA ratiocinated:

Indeed, We are convinced that the Trial Court exceeded its jurisdiction when it granted 5%
monthly interest instead of the 12% per annum prayed for in the complaint. However, the proper remedy
is not to amend the judgment but to declare that portion as a nullity. Void judgment for want of
jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Initially, the CA denied due course to the Petition. 27 Upon respondents motion, however, it
reinstated and granted the Petition. In setting aside portions of the RTCs October 17, 2000 Decision,
the CA ruled that aside from being unconscionably excessive, the monthly interest rate of 5% was not
agreed upon by the parties and that petitioners Complaint clearly sought only the legal rate of 12% per
annum. Following the mandate of Section 3(d) of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, the CA concluded that the
awarded rate of interest is void for being in excess of the relief sought in the Complaint. It ruled thus:

(Leonor vs. CA, 256 SCRA 69). No legal rights can emanate from a resolution that is null and void
(Fortich vs. Corona, 312 SCRA 751).

WHEREFORE, [respondents] motion for reconsideration is GRANTED and our resolution dated
October 13, 2004 is, accordingly, REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, another is entered
From the foregoing, the remedy of [the respondents] is to have the Court declare the portion of the
judgment providing for a higher interest than that prayed for as null and void for want of or in excess of
jurisdiction. A void judgment never acquire[s] finality and any action to declare its nullity does not

ordering the ANNULMENT OF:

prescribe (Heirs of Mayor Nemencio Galvez vs. CA, 255 SCRA 672).
(a)public respondents impugned October 17, 2000 judgment, insofar as it awarded 5% monthly
interest in favor of [petitioner]; and
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Petition having merit, is hereby GIVEN DUE
COURSE. Resultantly, the challenged May 7, 2002 and September 5, 2000 orders of Public Respondent

(b)all proceedings relative to the sale at public auction of the property titled in [respondents]
names under Transfer Certificate of Title No. V-12296 of the Valenzuela registry.

Court are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. No costs.

The judgment debt adjudicated in public respondents impugned October [17, 2000] judgment is,
likewise, ordered RECOMPUTED at the rate of 12% per annum from March 2, 1991. No costs.

SO ORDERED.25 (Emphases in the original; italics supplied.)

SO ORDERED.28 (Emphases in the original.)

Proceedings before the Court of Appeals

Petitioner sought reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in its June 26, 2006 Resolution. 29

Issues

Hence, this Petition anchored on the following grounds:

While conceding that the RTC patently made a mistake in awarding 5% monthly interest,
petitioner nonetheless invokes the doctrine of immutability of final judgment and contends that the RTC
Decision can no longer be corrected or modified since it had long become final and executory. She
likewise points out that respondents received a copy of said Decision on November 13, 2000 but did
nothing to correct the same. They did not even question the award of 5% monthly interest when they
filed their Motion to Set Aside Judgment which they anchored on the sole ground of the RTCs lack of
jurisdiction over the persons of some of the respondents.

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW
WHEN IT GRANTED RESPONDENTS PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT AS A
SUBSTITUTE OR ALTERNATIVE REMEDY OF A LOST APPEAL.

II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR AND
MISAPPREHENSION OF LAW AND THE FACTS WHEN IT GRANTED RESPONDENTS
PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT OF THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF VALENZUELA, BRANCH 75 DATED OCTOBER 17, 2000 IN CIVIL CASE NO.
241-V-99, DESPITE THE FACT THAT SAID DECISION HAS BECOME FINAL AND ALREADY
EXECUTED CONTRARY TO THE DOCTRINE OF IMMUTABILITY OF JUDGMENT.30

Petitioners Arguments

Petitioner claims that the CA erred in partially annulling the RTCs October 17, 2000 Decision. She
contends that a Petition for Annulment of Judgment may be availed of only when the ordinary remedies
of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no
fault of the claimant. In the present case, however, respondents had all the opportunity to question the
October 17, 2000 Decision of the RTC, but because of their own inaction or negligence they failed to avail
of the remedies sanctioned by the rules. Instead, they contented themselves with the filing of a Motion
to Set Aside Judgment and then a Motion to Correct/Amend Judgment and to Set Aside Execution Sale.

Petitioner likewise argues that for a Rule 47 petition to prosper, the same must either be based on
extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction. However, the allegations in respondents Rule 47 petition do not
constitute extrinsic fraud because they simply pass the blame to the negligence of their former counsel.
In addition, it is too late for respondents to pass the buck to their erstwhile counsel considering that
when they filed their Motion to Correct/Amend Judgment and To Set Aside Execution Sale they were
already assisted by their new lawyer, Atty. Reynaldo A. Ruiz, who did not also avail of the remedies of
new trial, appeal, etc. As to the ground of lack of jurisdiction, petitioner posits that there is no reason to
doubt that the RTC had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case and over the persons of the
respondents.

Respondents Arguments

Respondents do not contest the existence of their obligation and the principal amount thereof. They
only seek quittance from the 5% monthly interest or 60% per annum imposed by the RTC. Respondents
contend that Section (3)d of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court is clear that when the defendant is declared in
default, the court cannot grant a relief more than what is being prayed for in the Complaint. A
judgment which transgresses said rule, according to the respondents, is void for having been issued
without jurisdiction and for being violative of due process of law.

Respondents maintain that it was through no fault of their own, but through the gross negligence
of their former counsel, Atty. Coroza, that the remedies of new trial, appeal or petition for relief from
judgment were lost. They allege that after filing a Motion to Extend Period to Answer, Atty. Coroza did
not file any pleading resulting to their being declared in default. While the said lawyer filed on their
behalf a Motion to Set Aside Judgment dated January 26, 2001, he however took no steps to appeal from
the Decision of the RTC, thereby allowing said judgment to lapse into finality. Citing Legarda v. Court
of Appeals,31 respondents aver that clients are not always bound by the actions of their counsel, as in the
present case where the clients are to lose their property due to the gross negligence of their counsel.

With regard to petitioners invocation of immutability of judgment, respondents argue that said
doctrine applies only to valid and not to void judgments.

Our Ruling

The petition must fail.

We agree with respondents that the award of 5% monthly interest violated their right to due
process and, hence, the same may be set aside in a Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed under Rule
47 of the Rules of Court.

Annulment of judgment under Rule 47;

an exception to the final judgment rule;
grounds therefor.

A Petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is a remedy granted
only under exceptional circumstances where a party, without fault on his part, has failed to avail of the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies. Said rule
explicitly provides that it is not available as a substitute for a remedy which was lost due to the partys
own neglect in promptly availing of the same. The underlying reason is traceable to the notion that
annulling final judgments goes against the grain of finality of judgment. Litigation must end and
terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective administration of justice that
once a judgment has become final, the issue or cause involved therein should be laid to rest. 32

While under Section 2, Rule 47 33 of the Rules of Court a Petition for Annulment of Judgment may
be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, jurisprudence recognizes lack of
due process as additional ground to annul a judgment. 34 In Arcelona v. Court of Appeals,35 this Court
declared that a final and executory judgment may still be set aside if, upon mere inspection thereof, its
patent nullity can be shown for having been issued without jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law.

Grant of 5% monthly interest is way

beyond the 12% per annum interest

sought in the Complaint and smacks

of violation of due process.

It is settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in excess of what is
being sought by the party. They cannot also grant a relief without first ascertaining the evidence
presented in support thereof. Due process considerations require that judgments must conform to and
be supported by the pleadings and evidence presented in court. In Development Bank of the Philippines
v. Teston,36 this Court expounded that:

Due process considerations justify this requirement. It is improper to enter an order which exceeds
the scope of relief sought by the pleadings, absent notice which affords the opposing party an
opportunity to be heard with respect to the proposed relief. The fundamental purpose of the
requirement that allegations of a complaint must provide the measure of recovery is to prevent surprise
to the defendant.

Notably, the Rules is even more strict in safeguarding the right to due process of a defendant who
was declared in default than of a defendant who participated in trial. For instance, amendment to
conform to the evidence presented during trial is allowed the parties under the Rules. 37 But the same is
not feasible when the defendant is declared in default because Section 3(d), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court
comes into play and limits the relief that may be granted by the courts to what has been prayed for in
the Complaint. It provides:

(d)Extent of relief to be awarded.A judgment rendered against a party in default shall not exceed the
amount or be different in kind from that prayed for nor award unliquidated damages.

The raison dtre in limiting the extent of relief that may be granted is that it cannot be presumed that
the defendant would not file an Answer and allow himself to be declared in default had be known that
the plaintiff will be accorded a relief greater than or different in kind from that sought in the
Complaint.38 No doubt, the reason behind Section 3(d), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court is to safeguard
defendants right to due process against unforeseen and arbitrarily issued judgment. This, to the mind
of this Court, is akin to the very essence of due process. It embodies the sporting idea of fair play 39 and
forbids the grant of relief on matters where the defendant was not given the opportunity to be heard
thereon.

In the case at bench, the award of 5% monthly interest rate is not supported both by the allegations
in the pleadings and the evidence on record. The Real Estate Mortgage 40 executed by the parties does
not include any provision on interest. When petitioner filed her Complaint before the RTC, she alleged
that respondents borrowed from her the sum of FORTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P45,000.00), with
interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum41and sought payment thereof. She did not allege or pray
for the disputed 5% monthly interest. Neither did she present evidence nor testified thereon. Clearly, the
RTCs award of 5% monthly interest or 60% per annum lacks basis and disregards due process. It
violated the due process requirement because respondents were not informed of the possibility that the
RTC may award 5% monthly interest. They were deprived of reasonable opportunity to refute and
present controverting evidence as they were made to believe that the complainant [petitioner] was
seeking for what she merely stated in her Complaint.

Neither can the grant of the 5% monthly interest be considered subsumed by petitioners general
prayer for [o]ther reliefs and remedies just and equitable under the premises x x x.42 To repeat, the
courts grant of relief is limited only to what has been prayed for in the Complaint or related thereto,
supported by evidence, and covered by the partys cause of action. 43 Besides, even assuming that the
awarded 5% monthly or 60% per annum interest was properly alleged and proven during trial, the same
remains unconscionably excessive and ought to be equitably reduced in accordance with applicable
jurisprudence. In Bulos, Jr. v. Yasuma,44 this Court held:

In the case of Ruiz v. Court of Appeals, citing the cases of Medel v. Court of Appeals, Garcia v.
Court of Appeals, Spouses Bautista v. Pilar Development Corporation and the recent case of Spouses
Solangon v. Salazar, this Court considered the 3% interest per month or 36% interest per annum as
excessive and unconscionable. Thereby, the Court, in the said case, equitably reduced the rate of interest
to 1% interest per month or 12% interest per annum. (Citations omitted)

It is understandable for the respondents not to contest the default order for, as alleged in their
Comment, it is not their intention to impugn or run away from their just and valid
obligation.45Nonetheless, their waiver to present evidence should never be construed as waiver to
contest patently erroneous award which already transgresses their right to due process, as well as
applicable jurisprudence.

Respondents former counsel was

grossly negligent in handling the case

of his clients; respondents did not lose

ordinary remedies of new trial, petition

that it awarded exorbitant and unconscionable rate of interest. Its difference from what is being prayed
for by the petitioner in her Complaint is so blatant and very patent. It also defies elementary
jurisprudence on legal rate of interests. Had the counsel carefully read the judgment it would have
caught his attention and compelled him to take the necessary steps to protect the interest of his client.
But he did not. Instead, he filed in behalf of his clients a Motion to Set Aside Judgment 49 dated January
26, 2001 based on the sole ground of lack of jurisdiction, oblivious to the fact that the erroneous award
of 5% monthly interest would result to his clients deprivation of property without due process of law.
Worse, he even allowed the RTC Decision to become final by not perfecting an appeal. Neither did he file
a petition for relief therefrom. It was only a year later that the patently erroneous award of 5% monthly
interest was brought to the attention of the RTC when respondents, thru their new counsel, filed a
Motion to Correct/Amend Judgment and To Set Aside Execution Sale. Even the RTC candidly admitted
that it made a glaring mistake in directing the defendants to pay interest on the principal loan at 5%
per month which is very different from what was prayed for by the plaintiff.50
A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of his client, warmth and zeal in the maintenance
and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, to the end that nothing can
be taken or withheld from his client except in accordance with the law. 51 Judging from how respondents
former counsel handled the cause of his clients, there is no doubt that he was grossly negligent in
protecting their rights, to the extent that they were deprived of their property without due process of
law.

In fine, respondents did not lose the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief and other
remedies through their own fault. It can only be attributed to the gross negligence of their erstwhile
counsel which prevented them from pursuing such remedies. We cannot also blame respondents for
relying too much on their former counsel. Clients have reasonable expectations that their lawyer would
amply protect their interest during the trial of the case. 52 Here, [r]espondents are plain and ordinary
people x x x who are totally ignorant of the intricacies and technicalities of law and legal procedures.
Being so, they completely relied upon and trusted their former counsel to appropriately act as their
interest may lawfully warrant and require.53

for relief, etc. through their own fault.

Ordinarily, the mistake, negligence or lack of competence of counsel binds the client. This is based
on the rule that any act performed by a counsel within the scope of his general or implied authority is
regarded as an act of his client. A recognized exception to the rule is when the lawyers were grossly
negligent in their duty to maintain their clients cause and such amounted to a deprivation of their
clients property without due process of law. 46 In which case, the courts must step in and accord relief to
a client who suffered thereby.47

The manifest indifference of respondents former counsel in handling the cause of his client was
already present even from the beginning. It should be recalled that after filing in behalf of his clients a
Motion to Extend Period to Answer, said counsel allowed the requested extension to pass without filing
an Answer, which resulted to respondents being declared in default. His negligence was aggravated by
the fact that he did not question the awarded 5% monthly interest despite receipt of the RTC Decision
on November 13, 2000. 48 A simple reading of the dispositive portion of the RTC Decision readily reveals

As a final word, it is worth noting that respondents principal obligation was only P45,000.00. Due
to their former counsels gross negligence in handling their cause, coupled with the RTCs erroneous,
baseless, and illegal award of 5% monthly interest, they now stand to lose their property and still owe
petitioner a large amount of money. As aptly observed by the CA:

x x x If the impugned judgment is not, therefore, rightfully nullified, petitioners will not only
end up losing their property but will additionally owe private respondent the sum of
P232,000.00 plus the legal interest said balance had, in the meantime, earned. As a court of
justice and equity, we cannot, in good conscience, allow this unconscionable situation to
prevail.54

Indeed, this Court is appalled by petitioners invocation of the doctrine of immutability of

judgment. Petitioner does not contest as she even admits that the RTC made a glaring mistake in
awarding 5% monthly interest.55 Amazingly, she wants to benefit from such erroneous award. This
Court cannot allow this injustice to happen.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed November 24, 2005 and
June 26, 2006 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 85541 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio (Chairperson), Brion, Perez and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

Petition denied, resolutions affirmed.

Notes.Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the litigation which
is committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the unsuccessful party has been prevented from
exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent. ( Philippine Tourism
Authority vs. Philippine Golf Development & Equipment, Inc., 668 SCRA 406 [2012])

The remedy of annulment of judgment is only available under certain exceptional circumstances as
this is adverse to the concept of immutability of final judgments. (Antonino vs. The Register of Deeds of
Makati City, 674 SCRA 227 [2012])

G.R. No. 183926.March 29, 2010.*

GENEROSA ALMEDA LATORRE, petitioner, vs. LUIS ESTEBAN LATORRE, respondent.

Actions; Venue; Where the action in the Regional Trial Court is for the Declaration of Nullity of
the Deed of Absolute Sale involving a real property, the venue for such action is unquestionably the proper
court of the place where the real property or part thereof lies.Sections 1 and 2, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure provide an answer to the issue of venue. Actions affecting title to or possession of real
property or an interest therein (real actions) shall be commenced and tried in the proper court that has
territorial jurisdiction over the area where the real property is situated. On the other hand, all other
actions (personal actions) shall be commenced and tried in the proper courts where the plaintiff or any
of the principal plaintiffs resides or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides. The
action in the RTC, other than for Collection, was for the Declaration of Nullity of the Deed of Absolute
Sale involving the subject property, which is located at No. 1366 Caballero St., Dasmarias Village,
Makati City. The venue for such action is unquestionably the proper court of Makati City, where the
real property or part thereof lies, not the RTC of Muntinlupa City.

Same; Same; Pleadings and Practice; In this jurisdiction, we adhere to the principle that the
nature of an action is determined by the allegations in the Complaint itself, rather than by its title or

heading; It is also a settled rule that what determines the venue of a case is the primary objective for the
filing of the case.In this jurisdiction, we adhere to the principle that the nature of an action is
determined by the allegations in the Complaint itself, rather than by its title or heading. It is also a
settled rule that what determines the venue of a case is the primary objective for the filing of the case.
In her Complaint, petitioner sought the nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale on the strength of two
basic claims that (1) she did not execute the deed in favor of respondent; and (2) thus, she still owned
one half () of the subject property. Indubitably, petitioners complaint is a real action involving the
recovery of the subject property on the basis of her co-ownership thereof.

Same; Same; Certiorari; Where the denial by a regional trial court of a Motion to Dismiss is done
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, the aggrieved party could file a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition.Respondent also
did not do very well, procedurally. When the RTC denied his Motion to Dismiss, respondent could have
filed a petition for certiorariand/or prohibition inasmuch as the denial of the motion was done without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. However, despite this lapse, it is clear that respondent did not waive his objections to the
fact of improper venue, contrary to petitioners assertion. Notably, after his motion to dismiss was
denied, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration to contest such denial. Even in his Answer Ad
Cautelam, respondent stood his ground that the case ought to be dismissed on the basis of improper
venue.

or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is
whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the
evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact.

Same; Hierarchy of Courts; Pursuant to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, direct resort from the
lower courts to the Supreme Court will not be entertained unless the appropriate remedy sought cannot
be obtained in the lower tribunals.In her Reply to respondents Comment, petitioner prayed that this
Court decide the case on the merits. To do so, however, would require the examination by this Court of
the probative value of the evidence presented, taking into account the fact that the RTC failed to
adjudicate this controversy on the merits. This, unfortunately, we cannot do. It thus becomes
exceedingly clear that the filing of the case directly with this Court ran afoul of the doctrine of hierarchy
of courts. Pursuant to this doctrine, direct resort from the lower courts to the Supreme Court will not be
entertained unless the appropriate remedy sought cannot be obtained in the lower tribunals. This Court
is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it
by the Constitution and by immemorial tradition.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Br. 256.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.

Appeals; Three (3) Modes of Appeal from Decisions of the Regional Trial Court.Petitioner came
directly to this Court on a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, in relation to Rule 41, of the
Rules of Civil Procedure on alleged pure questions of law. In Murillo v. Consul, we laid down a doctrine
that was later adopted by the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. In that case, this Court had the
occasion to clarify the three (3) modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC, namely: (1) ordinary appeal
or appeal by writ of error, where judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2) petition for review, where judgment was rendered by the RTC in
the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) petition for review to the Supreme Court. The first mode
of appeal, governed by Rule 41, is brought to the Court of Appeals (CA) on questions of fact or mixed
questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal, covered by Rule 42, is brought to the CA on
questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of appeal, provided in Rule
45, is filed with the Supreme Court only on questions of law.

Same; Questions of Law; Questions of Fact; Words and Phrases; A question of law arises when
there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the
doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.A question of law arises when there is doubt
as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as
to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Our ruling in Velayo-Fong v. Velayo, 510 SCRA 320 (2006) is
instructive: A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts,
while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a
question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what
the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the
evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law

Sycip, Salazar, Hernandez & Gatmaitan for petitioner.

Verano Law Firm for respondent.
RESOLUTION
NACHURA,J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45, in relation to Rule 41, of the
Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City,
Branch 256, dated April 29, 2008.

The facts of the case are as follows:

In October 2000, petitioner Generosa Almeda Latorre (petitioner) filed before the RTC of
Muntinlupa City a Complaint3 for Collection and Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Absolute Sale with
application for Injunction against her own son, herein respondent Luis Esteban Latorre (respondent),
and one Ifzal Ali (Ifzal).

Petitioner averred that, on September 28, 1999, respondent and Ifzal entered into a Contract of
Lease4 over a 1,244-square meter real property, situated at No. 1366 Caballero St., Dasmarias Village,
Makati City (subject property). Under the said contract, respondent, as lessor, declared that he was the
absolute and registered owner of the subject property. Petitioner alleged that respondents declaration
therein was erroneous because she and respondent were co-owners of the subject property in equal
shares.

Petitioner narrated that, on March 14, 1989, she and respondent executed their respective Deeds of
Donation, conveying the subject property in favor of The Porfirio D. Latorre Memorial & Fr. Luis
Esteban Latorre Foundation, Inc. (the Foundation). Thus, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
1619635 was issued in the name of the Foundation. Subsequently, on September 2, 1994, petitioner and
respondent executed separate Deeds of Revocation of Donation and Reconveyance of the subject
property, consented to by the Foundation, through the issuance of appropriate corporate resolutions.
However, the Deeds of Revocation were not registered; hence, the subject property remained in the
name of the Foundation. Petitioner insisted, however, that respondent was fully aware that the subject
property was owned in common by both of them. To protect her rights as co-owner, petitioner formally
demanded from Ifzal the payment of her share of the rentals, which the latter, however, refused to heed.

Moreover, petitioner averred that, on or about August 16, 2000, she discovered that respondent
caused the annotation of an adverse claim on the TCT of the subject property, claiming full ownership
over the same by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale 6 dated March 21, 2000, allegedly executed by
petitioner in favor of respondent. Petitioner claimed that the deed was a falsified document; that her
signature thereon was forged by respondent; and that she never received P21 Million or any other
amount as consideration for her share of the subject property. Thus, petitioner prayed that Ifzal be
enjoined from paying the rentals to respondent, and the latter from receiving said rentals; that both
Ifzal and respondent be ordered to pay petitioner her share of the rentals; and that respondent be
enjoined from asserting full ownership over the subject property and from committing any other act in
derogation of petitioners interests therein. Petitioner also prayed for the payment of moral and
exemplary damages, litigation expenses, and costs of the suit.

Respondent immediately filed a Motion to Dismiss 7 on the sole ground that the venue of the case
was improperly laid. He stressed that while the complaint was denominated as one for Collection and
Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Absolute Sale with application for Injunction, in truth the case was a
real action affecting title to and interest over the subject property. Respondent insisted that all of
petitioners claims were anchored on her claim of ownership over one-half () portion of the subject
property. Since the subject property is located in Makati City, respondent argued that petitioner should
have filed the case before the RTC of Makati City and not of Muntinlupa City.

Ifzal also filed his motion to dismiss on the ground of want of jurisdiction, asserting that he was
immune from suit because he was an officer of the Asian Development Bank, an international
organization.

The RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order dated November 6, 2000, restraining Ifzal from
paying his rentals to respondent and enjoining the latter from receiving from the former the aforesaid
rentals. The RTC also directed both Ifzal and respondent to pay petitioner her share of the rentals, with
the corresponding order against respondent not to commit any act in derogation of petitioners interest
over the subject property.

In its Order dated January 2, 2001, the RTC denied respondents motion to dismiss. The RTC ruled
that the nature of an action whether real or personal was determined by the allegations in the
complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff was entitled to recover upon the claims aserteda
matter resolved only after, and as a result of, a trial. Thus, trial on the merits ensued.

Undaunted, respondent filed an Answer Ad Cautelam8 dated March 19, 2001, insisting, among
others, that the case was a real action and that the venue was improperly laid. 9 Respondent narrated
that he was a former Opus Dei priest but he left the congregation in 1987 after he was maltreated by
his Spanish superiors. Respondent alleged that petitioner lived with him and his family from 1988 to
2000, and that he provided for petitioners needs. Respondent also alleged that, for almost 20 years, the
Opus Dei divested the Latorre family of several real properties. Thus, in order to spare the subject
property from the Opus Dei, both petitioner and respondent agreed to donate it to the Foundation. In
1994, when respondent got married and sired a son, both petitioner and respondent decided to revoke
the said donation. The Foundation consented to the revocation. However, due to lack of funds, the title
was never transferred but remained in the name of the Foundation.

Respondent asseverated that he and his wife took good care of petitioner and that they provided for
her needs, spending a substantial amount of money for these needs; that because of this, and the fact
that the rentals paid for the use of the subject property went to petitioner, both parties agreed that
petitioner would convey her share over the subject property to respondent; and that, on March 21, 2000,
petitioner executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of respondent.

Respondent further alleged that sometime in March to May 2000, the relationship of the parties, as
mother and son, deteriorated. Petitioner left respondents house because he and his wife allegedly
ignored, disrespected, and insulted her. 10 Respondent claimed, however, that petitioner left because she
detested his act of firing their driver.11 It was then that this case was filed against him by petitioner.

In the meantime, in its Order dated May 15, 2003, the RTC dismissed petitioners claim against
Ifzal because the dispute was clearly between petitioner and respondent.

First. Petitioner filed her complaint with the RTC of Muntinlupa City instead of the RTC of Makati
City, the latter being the proper venue in this case.

On April 29, 2008, the RTC ruled in favor of respondent, disposing of the case in this wise:

While the case herein filed by the plaintiff involves recovery of possession of a real property
situated at 1366 Caballero St., Dasmarias Village, Makati City, the same should have been filed and
tried in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City who, undoubtedly, has jurisdiction to hear the matter
as aforementioned the same being clearly a real action.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the above-entitled case is hereby DISMISSED for want of
jurisdiction, all in pursuance to the above-cited jurisprudence and Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.

SO ORDERED.12

Aggrieved, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration,13which the RTC denied in its
Order14 dated July 24, 2008 for lack of merit.

Hence, this Petition, claiming that the RTC erred in treating the venue as jurisdiction and in
treating petitioners complaint as a real action.

While the instant case was pending resolution before this Court, petitioner passed away on
November 14, 2009. Thus, petitioners counsel prayed that, pending the appointment of a representative
of petitioners estate, notices of the proceedings herein be sent to petitioners other son, Father Roberto
A. Latorre.15

As early as the filing of the complaint, this case had been marred by numerous procedural
infractions committed by petitioner, by respondent, and even by the RTC, all of which cannot be
disregarded by this Court.

Sections 1 and 2, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provide an answer to the issue of
venue.16 Actions affecting title to or possession of real property or an interest therein (real actions) shall
be commenced and tried in the proper court that has territorial jurisdiction over the area where the real
property is situated. On the other hand, all other actions (personal actions) shall be commenced and
tried in the proper courts where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides or where the
defendant or any of the principal defendants resides. 17 The action in the RTC, other than for Collection,
was for the Declaration of Nullity of the Deed of Absolute Sale involving the subject property, which is
located at No. 1366 Caballero St., Dasmarias Village, Makati City. The venue for such action is
unquestionably the proper court of Makati City, where the real property or part thereof lies, not the
RTC of Muntinlupa City.18
In this jurisdiction, we adhere to the principle that the nature of an action is determined by the
allegations in the Complaint itself, rather than by its title or heading. 19 It is also a settled rule that
what determines the venue of a case is the primary objective for the filing of the case. 20 In her
Complaint, petitioner sought the nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale on the strength of two basic
claims that (1) she did not execute the deed in favor of respondent; and (2) thus, she still owned one half
() of the subject property. Indubitably, petitioners complaint is a real action involving the recovery of
the subject property on the basis of her co-ownership thereof.

Second. The RTC also committed a procedural blunder when it denied respondents motion to
dismiss on the ground of improper venue.

The RTC insisted that trial on the merits be conducted even when it was awfully glaring that the
venue was improperly laid, as pointed out by respondent in his motion to dismiss. After trial, the RTC
eventually dismissed the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, even as it invoked, as justification,
the rules and jurisprudence on venue. Despite the conduct of trial, the RTC failed to adjudicate this case
on the merits.

Third. Respondent also did not do very well, procedurally. When the RTC denied his Motion to
Dismiss, respondent could have filed a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition inasmuch as the denial
of the motion was done without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.21However, despite this lapse, it is clear that respondent did not waive
his objections to the fact of improper venue, contrary to petitioners assertion. Notably, after his motion
to dismiss was denied, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration to contest such denial. Even in his
Answer Ad Cautelam, respondent stood his ground that the case ought to be dismissed on the basis of
improper venue.

Finally, petitioner came directly to this Court on a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45,
in relation to Rule 41, of the Rules of Civil Procedure on alleged pure questions of law. In Murillo v.
Consul,22 we laid down a doctrine that was later adopted by the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
In that case, this Court had the occasion to clarify the three (3) modes of appeal from decisions of the
RTC, namely: (1) ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error, where judgment was rendered in a civil or
criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2) petition for review, where
judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) petition for
review to the Supreme Court.

The first mode of appeal, governed by Rule 41, is brought to the Court of Appeals (CA) on questions
of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal, covered by Rule 42, is brought to
the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of appeal,
provided in Rule 45, is filed with the Supreme Court only on questions of law.

so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and by

immemorial tradition.27

Accordingly, we find no merit in the instant petition. Neither do we find any reversible error in the
trial courts dismissal of the case ostensibly for want of jurisdiction, although the trial court obviously
meant to dismiss the case on the ground of improper venue.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while
there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. 23 Our
ruling in Velayo-Fong v. Velayo24 is instructive:

Velasco, Jr. (Acting Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro,**Peralta and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Petition denied.

A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while
there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a
question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what
the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the
evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law
or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is
whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the
evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact. 25

In her Reply to respondents Comment, 26 petitioner prayed that this Court decide the case on the
merits. To do so, however, would require the examination by this Court of the probative value of the
evidence presented, taking into account the fact that the RTC failed to adjudicate this controversy on
the merits. This, unfortunately, we cannot do. It thus becomes exceedingly clear that the filing of the
case directly with this Court ran afoul of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Pursuant to this doctrine,
direct resort from the lower courts to the Supreme Court will not be entertained unless the appropriate
remedy sought cannot be obtained in the lower tribunals. This Court is a court of last resort, and must

Note.Prior to foreclosure sale, an action for the release of the mortgage is a personal action,
following the doctrine laid down in Hernandez v. Rural Bank of Lucena, 81 SCRA 75 (1978), possession
and ownership over the properties subject of the mortgage having remained with, in this case
respondent-mortgagor. (Banco De Oro-EPCI, Inc. vs. Daguna, 570 SCRA 388 [2008])
o0o