Stone 2013
Stone 2013
Stone 2013
International Centre for Cultural and Heritage Studies, School of Arts and Cultures, Newcastle University,
1820 Windsor Terrace, Newcastle upon Tyne NE1 7RU, UK (Email: [email protected])
http://antiquity.ac.uk/ant/087/ant0870166.htm
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Definitions
It must be stressed that the military is only
one player in a theatre that also involves
politicians, civil servants, governmental
and non-governmental authorities and
agencies. Other types of cultural property
(the contents of libraries, archives, art
Figure 1. Damage caused by looters in 2003 to the National
galleries etc.) are also equally at risk. I use
Museum in Baghdad. Had the Coalition planners taken the
here the more legal term cultural property
protection of cultural property seriously, this probably would
(as used in the 1954 Hague Convention)
c Joanne Farchakh Bajjaly)
not have happened. (
rather than the more common term cultural
heritage. This is to make a not very
comfortable distinction between tangible and intangible cultural heritage and, more
importantly, to distinguish between the work going on in relation to the 1954 Hague
Convention and the anthropology-based work of so-called Human Terrain Teams deployed
by the USA in Afghanistan and Iraq (AAA-CEAUSSIC 2009 [for a list of organisational
acronyms, see Appendix]) and the UKs recently created Defence Cultural Specialist Unit
(DCSU 2011). It is accepted that the distinction is an artificial one and Kila (2012) prefers
to use the term cultural resources. However, while the two remain inextricably linked in
reality, for the sake of focus the distinction is maintained in this text. The point should also
be emphasised that, contrary to some speculation, there is absolutely no presumption, or
implication, that cultural property related to western culture, or cultural property assimilated
by western culture, has any greater call on protection than any other cultural property; nor
is there any implication that cultural property dating to any particular chronological period
should have priority over that dating to any other period.
Recent studies
A great deal has been written concerning the destruction and looting of cultural property
in Iraq that followed the 2003 invasion by the coalition led by the USA and the UK (e.g.
Foster et al. 2005; Polk & Schuster 2005; Stone & Farchakh Bajjaly 2008; Rothfield 2009)
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and the events have been the topic of a large number of seminars and conferences. The first
PhD to study the issue has just been passed at the University of Amsterdam (Kila 2012) and
another grant offered, at Deakin University in Melbourne, to carry out PhD research on
measuring the destruction of heritage and spikes of violence in Iraq. Less has been written
about the longer-term armed conflict in Afghanistan and its equally devastating impact
on that countrys cultural property (although for some information see the newsletters of
the Aga Khan Development Network [n.d.]). In the main, damage and looting in these
countries has been a secondary issue, caused and allowed by, but not a primary focus of, the
conflictjust as damage to cultural property during the Second World War was generally
collateral damage (e.g. Woolley 1947; Nicholas 1995). The same is not true of the fighting
in the former Yugoslavia where the destruction of cultural property was frequently a primary
objective of the conflict (e.g. Chapman 1994; Barakat et al. 2001).
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or in transit; as a result no troops on the ground had a clear understanding of the nature
or importance of the cultural property with which they might come into contact. Second,
there had been no pre-invasion discussion of the importance of cultural property and as a
result no troops from any coalition army had direct orders to protect it; it was simply not
on their list of things to do. Finally, heritage advisers had no access to levels of seniority
sufficient to influence events.
With hindsight, little of this is surprising, as neither the military, nor other relevant parts
of government, nor cultural property experts, had given a great deal of thought to CPP
since the early 1950s when the UK signed, but did not ratify, the 1954 Hague Convention.
While claiming to work within the spirit of the Convention, the UK is now arguably
the most significant military power, and the only one with extensive military involvements
abroad, not to have ratified this convention. This is despite a 2004 announcement by
the then Minister for Heritage that the UK intended to ratify the Convention and its
Protocols (DCMS 2004); despite a draft bill going through Select Committee scrutiny in
2008 (DCMS 2008); despite assurances by relevant ministers of both the current and most
recent governments that ratification was a definite government objective (meetings with
Barbara Follett 10 June 2009 and Ed Vaizey 10 May 2011); despite the Rt Hon Jeremy
Hunt MP Secretary of State for Culture, Olympics, Media and Sport writing to the Chair of
the Parliamentary Business and Legislative Committee in March 2012 strongly registering
his interest in the inclusion of a Cultural Property (Armed Conflicts) Bill within the third
session of this Parliament; and despite the anticipated publication in the summer of 2013 of
the Iraq Inquiry that is expected, following evidence submitted by a group of 13 cultural and
heritage organisations (UK National Commission for UNESCO 2010), to have ratification
at the earliest possible opportunity as one of its recommendations.
To have any influence on military doctrine and practice, cultural property experts must
be either fully on the insidei.e. be a relatively senior uniformed member of the armed
forcesor, at the very least, be fully accepted by the inside at a senior level. While most
NATO forces include staff, usually referred to as either CIMIC (Civil-Military Co-operation)
or Civil Affairs, who might be regarded as being where such expertise should lie, under the
current financial climate it is inconceivable that the military will employ senior officers
for their cultural property expertise alone, where such expertise could be co-opted from
elsewhere. Cultural property experts are therefore obliged to shoulder the responsibility for
creating an environment where CPP is valued, and advice accepted concerning its protection,
by the military and, crucially, by their political masters.
Improving priority
Given the failures in Iraq, this may sound nave, but developments in two areas provide some
cause for optimism. First, UK military operations increasingly include civilian personnel
from a number of government departments related to the establishment of the rule of law
during operations. There is an opportunity for the Department for Culture, Media and Sport
to engage with this increasingly complex operational environment, and pressure needs to be
applied to ensure this opportunity, and responsibility, is taken. Second, changes in NATO
military doctrine since 2003 acknowledge responsibility not only to win a war but to deliver
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a stable country capable of functioning independently after the war. The development of this
so-called 3Ddefence, diplomacy, development (see Teijgeler 2011)or comprehensive
approach, as currently being developed by NATO (e.g. Jackobsen 2008), has been matched
by a call for the revision of military doctrine by a number of member states including the
USA and UK (e.g. Hammes 2004). A small part of this development is the acceptance by
military planners that CPP can act as a force-multipliera positive action that makes it
easier to achieve military success. At least some members of the military have learnt that,
for example, if they use a minaret as an observation post or, worse still, a sniper location,
they will readily lose the goodwill of the local population (Corn 2005). This connection
reinforces the overlap between cultural property, as a concept relating to physical buildings
and objects, and cultural heritage, as epitomised by a communitys relationship with such
physical manifestations of their culture. If they look after and respect the minaret, goodwill,
if it does not increase, is at least not damaged irreparably. Some military thinkers have
also acknowledged that the looting and sale of illicit antiquities is often associated with the
funding of conflict (see, in relation to Iraq, Bogdanos 2008: 124), and while dealing with
the sale of illicit antiquities may not be an issue on which the military would necessarily
lead, the prevention of looting during, and immediately following, conflict, and thus the
strangulation of the trade, may well be a military responsibility and certainly a military
force-multiplier.
Other advances can be seen in conferences and specialised meetings held by different
groups and organisations regarding CPP, usually with particular emphasis on Iraq and
Afghanistan. These have moved slowly from accusation and recrimination to suggesting, and
indeed developing, heritage awareness training for the military (Figure 2). Other examples
include the education programmes developed for US forces by the Archaeological Institute
of America (AIA) (Rose 2007); the playing cards for troop use showing examples of cultural
property and good practice developed for a number of countries in the Middle East by the
USA (Zeidler & Rush 2010); the playing cards produced for UK training areas produced
by Defence Infrastructure Organisation (DIO) (Brown 2010); and those produced for the
Dutch military (Kila 2012).
In the UK, DIO archaeologists have organised archaeological excavations in order to
aid the recovery of troops who have served overseas in Iraq and Afghanistan. The benefits
of doing archaeology have been manifold, including the alleviation of major stresses and
maladies, allowing wounded troops to sleep again and return to their units, providing
new skills and a lifelong hobby, and delivering good archaeology that would otherwise not
have been done. The original project was limited to the partial excavation of a damaged
site on Salisbury Plain but has since been enlarged to include the recording of the crash
site of a Stirling bomber at Lurgashall, and work placements with Wessex Archaeology,
Canterbury Archaeology and the Churches Conservation Trust (Walshe et al. 2012; Osgood
pers. comm.) (Figure 3). A number of groups with greater or lesser influence and levels
of activity have sprung up, e.g. CHAMP, an informal liaison group between interested
military and the AIA, Saving Antiquities for Everyone (SAFE) and the World Association
for the Protection of Tangible and Intangible Cultural Heritage (WATCH). In 2009, the
International Military Cultural Resources Working Group (IMCuRWG) was established to
enhance military capacity to implement CPP across the full range of operations, provide a
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Figure 2. Members of the US Army Reserve 354th Civil Affairs Brigade receiving cultural heritage awareness training at the
c Corine Wegener)
Smithsonian National Museum of American History. (
forum for international co-operation and networking for those working within the military
context, identify areas of common interest, share best practices and lessons learned and
raise awareness of military commitment to CPP, both tangible and intangible. In 2010,
Lieutenant Colonel Joris Kila of the Dutch Reserve became IMCuRWG President and is
currently negotiating a support infrastructure with several governments (Kila pers. comm.).
To date, IMCuRWG participants are primarily from Europe, North America and the Middle
East, but the group is seeking to establish a network in all regions. Finally, the International
Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property (ICCROM),
based in Rome, has developed and taught a course on first aid to cultural heritage in times
of conflict in 2010 and 2011, with the third iteration of the course to be held in the autumn
of 2012 (ICCROM 2012).
Blue Shield
The international body that should be leading on CPP is the International Committee for
the Blue Shield (ICBS), set up in 1996 to work to protect the worlds cultural heritage
threatened by wars and natural disasters, and recognised in the 1999 2nd Protocol to the
1954 Hague Convention as the official adviser to the inter-governmental Committee for
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict. The blue shield itself was
identified in Article 16 of the 1954 Hague Convention as the distinctive emblem to be used
to facilitate the recognition of cultural property protected by the Convention. The ICBS is
made up of representatives from five organisations: the International Council on Archives;
the International Council of Museums; the International Council on Monuments and Sites;
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A four-tier approach to the protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict
Figure 3. Rifleman digging at the Saxon cemetery of Barrow Clump, Salisbury Plain, as part of Operation Nightingale.
c Richard Osgood)
(
the International Federation of Library Associations and Institutions; and the Co-ordinating
Council of Audiovisual Archives Associations. With this membership the ICBS immediately,
and quite correctly, broadens the whole discussion of CPP beyond archaeology.
Unfortunately, a lack of finance has limited its impact and, until it held its first
international conference in November 2011 (funded mainly by South Korea), has essentially
only been able to issue statements expressing, for example as it did in 2003, . . .its profound
concern about the potential damage to, and destruction of, cultural heritage in the event of
war in Iraq. . . urging . . .all the governments concerned to work within the spirit of the
Hague Convention. . .to protect archives, libraries, monuments and sites, and museums, if
war breaks out in Iraq and in the region (ICBS 2003). A more proactive approach has been
taken by the Association of National Committees of the Blue Shield (ANCBS) created in
2008 partly in frustration at the inability of the ICBS to be more proactive. The ANCBS
sent a small delegation, in conjunction with IMCuRWG, to liaise with and provide support
for antiquity authorities over looting and damage in both Egypt and Libya (see for links
Blue Shield 2011) and it also provided information to the USA, UK and NATO on sites to
be protected during the aerial bombing of Libya. It is currently working on the provision
of a similar list for Syria. Some of this has been possible through the agency of the US
Committee of the Blue Shield, set up in 2007 as the result of tremendous hard work by
a number of archaeologists and lawyers (in particular Corine Wegener, a retired US Civil
Affairs (Reserve) Major who was deployed to Iraq in May 2003 and worked at the, then
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looted, National Museum). It was pressure from the US Committee of the Blue Shield and
others that finally convinced the USA to ratify the 1954 Hague Convention.
A four-tier approach to the protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict
The third tier of co-operation is during conflict. Here there is little opportunity, or need,
for specific (civilian) cultural property expertise being deployed. The primary goal of the
military in a conflict situation is the winning of the conflict and a non-military cultural
property expert would be out of place and a liability. The CPP role would therefore focus on
damage limitation and re-emphasising, wherever and whenever possible, the conscience role
in military operations (Nicholas 1995: 237). Key to this role would be to prevent the looting
of collections and archaeological sites and to stifle the associated trade in illicit antiquities.
This would require constant liaison with a key individual or group on any combat staffthe
deployed military legal advisor(s). It is in this context that ratification of the 1954 Hague
Convention becomes crucial. The key players during tier three have to be those individuals
in uniform tasked with CPP as an aspect of their duties; it may be that there are military
personnel with the relevant expertise available to the force commander, but a reach-back
facility to local experts, such as staff in NGOs like the ANCBS, would be essential.
The fourth and final tier is post conflict. Here the emphasis has to be on stabilisation
and the emergency aid, repair, and conservation required to mitigate any damage inflicted
by the conflict. These are obviously not primarily military responsibilities, but may require
military facilitationfor example, safe access to, and liaison between, local experts within the
country and their international colleagues, and the military. It may well require the military
to facilitate the provision of necessary materials and technology (e.g. conservation chemicals
and equipment) and would certainly involve the military helping to counter development
of the trade in illicit antiquities. It must be stressed that tier four can only begin once
the military situation has been resolved and security ensured and that there may well be
considerable uncertainty over when tier three blurs into tier four. In Iraq this happened
too slowly, as evidenced by the almost complete failure until recently to implement any of
the planned course of action agreed at the seminar on international support for museums
and archaeological sites in Iraq held at the British Museum in April 2003 (Curtis 2008:
203204).
A fundamental axiom of tier four is the return of responsibility for cultural property to
local authorities at the earliest opportunity. These should also be supported by colleagues
from relevant NGOs, e.g. the Red Cross/Crescent, and by cultural property experts from
the international community, e.g. the ANCBS. Good examples of the type of work that
could be carried out under tier four are the collaborative work that was possible between
an international group of archaeologists, led by the British Museum, and staff of the State
Board of Antiquities in Iraq facilitated by the British Army to inspect archaeological sites in
the south of Iraq; and work carried out by the British Museum with the help and support
of the British Army to develop plans for a new museum in Basra (Curtis et al. 2008; Clarke
2010; Curtis 2011).
Conclusion
The above approach is intended as a first step towards implementing a viable strategy for
CPP wherever armed conflict takes place, not only in Iraq and Afghanistan. Some military
colleagues have already questioned its functionality and have asked, reasonably, what aspects
of other training should be dropped in order to prepare for this additional mission. The
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approach does not begin to address issues relating to the increasing use of private security
companies by member states of NATO. Any success relies on a number of key developments,
including: the ratification of the 1954 Hague Convention and its two Protocols by the UK; a
generally more engaged cultural property sector; the significant strengthening of the various
elements of the Blue Shield; and the development of a university-based centre for developing
a research capacity and principles, methodologies and guidelines.
The approach does, however, go some way towards addressing concerns raised by some
cultural property experts as to when, and under what conditions, they should be willing to
work with the military (e.g. see Shearer et al. 2011). We need to develop networks of the
willing, where individuals can operate within their own ethical comfort zone. Crucially, we
need to win the understanding and support of the politicians, and their civil servants, who
decide to send military personnel to war. All these and many other issues lie in the path of
the development and implementation of the four-tier approach. However, if we do not start,
if we do not take the initiative, then we are condoning a situation where cultural property
is put at significant risk whenever and wherever there is armed conflict in the future. Is that
a risk we should be willing to take without at least trying to mitigate its potential impact?
Acknowledgements
I am very grateful to Joris Kila, Peter Sonnex, Corine Wegener and Barney White-Spunner for having read and
commented on an earlier version of this paper. As ever, all mistakes and imperfections are the authors alone.
Appendix
List of organisations referenced
AAA-CEAUSSIC American Anthropological Association Commission on the Engagement of Anthropology
with the US Security and Intelligence Communities
AIA Archaeological Association of America http://www.archaeological.org/
ANCBS Association of National Committees of the Blue Shield http://www.ancbs.org/
CHAMP Cultural Heritage by AIA-Military Panel http://aiamilitarypanel.org/
CIMIC Civil-Military Co-operation http://www.cimic-coe.org/
DCSU Defence Cultural Specialist Unit
DCMS Department for Media, Culture and Sport http://www.culture.gov.uk/
DIO Defence Infrastructure Organisation http://www.mod.uk/defenceinternet/microsite/dio/
HTS Human Terrain System http://humanterrainsystem.army.mil/
ICBS International Committee for the Blue Shield
ICCROM International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property
http://www.iccrom.org/
IMCuRWG International Military Cultural Resources Working Group
SAFE Saving Antiquities for Everybody http://www.savingantiquities.org/
WATCH World Association for the Protection of Tangible and Intangible Cultural Heritage
http://www.eyeonculture.net/
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