ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He
created them male and female. (Genesis 5:1-2)

surgery2 in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr.

Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the
Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he
(petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to
be married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate
changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to
"female."

Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she
heard voices coming from inside the bamboo. "Oh North Wind! North
Wind! Please let us out!," the voices said. She pecked the reed once,
then twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit open. Out
came two human beings; one was a male and the other was a female.
Amihan named the man "Malakas" (Strong) and the woman "Maganda"
(Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas and Maganda)

An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the
Peoples Journal Tonight, a newspaper of general circulation in Metro
Manila, for three consecutive weeks.3 Copies of the order were sent to
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar of
Manila.

When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular,

does the law recognize the changes made by a physician using scalpel,
drugs and counseling with regard to a persons sex? May a person
successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the
birth certificate to reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery?

During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr.

Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American fianc, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.

On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed

a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth
certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The petition,
docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil registrar of
Manila as respondent.

Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment
or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the
purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present sex.

Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila
to the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on
April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes
Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was
registered as "male."
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically
male but feels, thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always
identified himself with girls since childhood. 1 Feeling trapped in a
mans body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He
underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast
augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a "woman"
culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment

On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were

established. No opposition to the petition was made.

On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision 4 in favor of

petitioner. Its relevant portions read:

The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief
asked for.
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be
more in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. With his
sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has always felt, thought and
acted like a woman, now possesses the physique of a female.
Petitioners misfortune to be trapped in a mans body is not his own
doing and should not be in any way taken against him.
Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be
caused to anybody or the community in granting the petition. On the
contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-awaited

happiness on the part of the petitioner and her [fianc] and the
realization of their dreams.
Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to
deny the present petition despite due notice and publication thereof.
Even the State, through the [OSG] has not seen fit to interpose any
[o]pposition.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and
ordering the Civil Registrar of Manila to change the entries appearing
in the Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner, specifically for petitioners first
name from "Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and petitioners gender from
"Male" to FEMALE. 5
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the
OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. 6 It alleged
that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth
certificate by reason of sex alteration.
On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals 7 rendered a decision8 in
favor of the Republic. It ruled that the trial courts decision lacked legal
basis. There is no law allowing the change of either name or sex in the
certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery.
Thus, the Court of Appeals granted the Republics petition, set aside
the decision of the trial court and ordered the dismissal of SP Case No.
02-105207. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was
denied.9 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his
birth certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code,
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048. 10
The petition lacks merit.
A Persons First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of
Sex Reassignment
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition
for change of name and sex. As found by the trial court:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment
or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the
purpose of making his birth records compatible with his
present sex. (emphasis supplied)

Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a

female, he became entitled to the civil registry changes sought. We
disagree.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and
entities for purposes of identification. 11 A change of name is a privilege,
not a right.12 Petitions for change of name are controlled by
statutes.13 In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial
authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law).
In particular, Section 1 of RA 9048 provides:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and
Change of First Name or Nickname. No entry in a civil register shall
be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or
typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can
be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil
registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act
and its implementing rules and regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. 14 It vests the power
and authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city
or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law,
therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now
primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The
intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from
the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until
and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed
and subsequently denied.15 It likewise lays down the corresponding
venue,16 form17 and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the
proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily
administrative in nature, not judicial.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name
may be allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. The
petition for change of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of
the following cases:

(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous,

tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;

ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected

without a judicial order.

(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and
continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by
that first name or nickname in the community; or

Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended
by RA 9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved.
The correction or change of such matters can now be made through
administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In
effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court the correction of such errors.22 Rule 108 now applies only to
substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register. 23

(3) The change will avoid confusion.

Petitioners basis in praying for the change of his first name was his
sex reassignment. He intended to make his first name compatible with
the sex he thought he transformed himself into through surgery.
However, a change of name does not alter ones legal capacity or civil
status.18 RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the
ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing
petitioners first name for his declared purpose may only create grave
complications in the civil registry and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present
proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such
change.19 In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the
use of his true and official name.20 In this case, he failed to show, or
even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his
true and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the
change of petitioners first name was not within that courts primary
jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil
registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an
improper remedy because the proper remedy was administrative, that
is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as
the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila
where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit
since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice him at all.
For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed
petitioners petition in so far as the change of his first name was
concerned.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As
To Sex On the Ground of Sex Reassignment
The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is
a legal issue and the court must look to the statutes. 21 In this
connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:

Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error"

is:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act, the following
terms shall mean:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in

the performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or
typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous,
such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which
is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be
corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or
records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the
change of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis
supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of
sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial
change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407
and 408 of the Civil Code:24
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status
of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5)
annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from

the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of

natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of
citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation;
(15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of
the Civil Code include even those that occur after birth. 25 However, no
reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion
that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or
error from" while to change means "to replace something with
something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a
substitute."26 The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All
entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name and
sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of
certain acts (such as legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate
children and naturalization), events (such as births, marriages,
naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal
separations, annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of
marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship,
civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of
name). These acts, events and judicial decrees produce legal
consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status and
nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the
laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not among those acts or events
mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned
by any law, expressly or impliedly.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that
is, the sum total of capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of
his age, nationality and his family membership. 27
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and
relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily
terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or
illegitimate, or his being married or not. The comprehensive
term status include such matters as the beginning and end of legal
personality, capacity to have rights in general, family relations, and its
various aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation,

marriage,
supplied)

divorce,

and

sometimes

even

succession. 28 (emphasis

A persons sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It

is a part of a persons legal capacity and civil status. In this connection,
Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status
shall be governed by special laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex
reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to petitioners cause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. The declaration of the
physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default thereof,
the declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient
for the registration of a birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall
be exempt from documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local
civil registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician
or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either parent of the
newborn child.
In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the
following facts: (a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of
infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of parents or, in case the
father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e)
place where the infant was born; and (f) such other data as may be
required in the regulations to be issued.
xxx

xxx

xxx (emphasis supplied)

Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of

the facts as they existed at the time of birth. 29 Thus, the sex of a
person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the
physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant.
Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment,
the determination of a persons sex made at the time of his or her
birth, if not attended by error,30is immutable.31
When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their
common and ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative
intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female" as used in the Civil

Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other
laws) should therefore be understood in their common and ordinary
usage, there being no legislative intent to the contrary. In this
connection, sex is defined as "the sum of peculiarities of structure and
function that distinguish a male from a female" 32 or "the distinction
between male and female."33 Female is "the sex that produces ova or
bears young"34 and male is "the sex that has organs to produce
spermatozoa for fertilizing ova."35 Thus, the words "male" and "female"
in everyday understanding do not include persons who have
undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are employed
in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning are presumed
to have been used in that sense unless the context compels to the
contrary."36 Since the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was
enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be
argued that the term "sex" as used then is something alterable through
surgery or something that allows a post-operative male-to-female
transsexual to be included in the category "female."
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his
body and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no
law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that
reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or
change of the entries in his birth certificate.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or
Sex Be Changed on the Ground of Equity
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance
with the principles of justice and equity. It believed that allowing the
petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is
wrong.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging
legal and public policy consequences. First, even the trial court itself
found that the petition was but petitioners first step towards his
eventual marriage to his male fianc. However, marriage, one of the
most sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent
union between a man and a woman.37 One of its essential requisites is
the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a
female.38 To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially
reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations.
It will allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone
sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual).

Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women such
as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of
women,39 certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code 40 and the
presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the
Rules of Court,41 among others. These laws underscore the public
policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if
petitioners petition were to be granted.
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or
court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence,
obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license for
courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to
apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it.
In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose
to do so, to determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of
the effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines
becomes particularly important in this case where the claims asserted
are statute-based.
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of
first name and for correction or change of entries in the civil registry,
where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof
must be presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the
legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex
reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform
with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the
guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on
when a person may be recognized as having successfully changed his
sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion a law on that
matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no
law exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal
branch of government, Congress.
Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of
happiness, contentment and [the] realization of their dreams." No
argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are people
whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly
recognized parameters of social convention and that, at least for them,
life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve

questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not

by the courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
FILIPINA Y. SY, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SAN FERNANDO, PAMPANGA, BRANCH
XLI, and FERNANDO SY, respondents.

For review is the decision1 dated May 21, 1996 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 44144, which affirmedthe decision2 of the Regional
Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, denying the petition 3 for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of the spouses Filipina Sy
and Fernando Sy.
Petitioner Filipina Y. Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted
marriage on November 15, 1973 at the Church of Our Lady of Lourdes
in Quezon City. 4 Both were then 22 years old. Their union was blessed
with two children, Frederick and Farrah Sheryll who were born on July 8,
1975 and February 14, 1978, respectively.5
The spouses first established their residence in Singalong, Manila, then
in Apalit, Pampanga, and later at San Matias, Sto. Tomas, Pampanga.
They operated a lumber and hardware business in Sto. Tomas,
Pampanga.6
On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Since
then, the spouses lived separately, and their two children were in the
custody of their mother. However, their son Frederick transferred to his
father's residence at Masangkay, Tondo, Manila on May 15, 1988, and
from then on, lived with his father.7
On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation,
docketed as Civil Case No. 7900 before the Regional Trial Court of San
Fernando, Pampanga. Later, upon motion of petitioner, the action was
later amended to a petition for separation of property on the grounds
that her husband abandoned her without just cause; that they have

been living separately for more than one year; and that they
voluntarily entered into a Memorandum of Agreement dated
September 29, 1983, containing the rules that would govern the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership.8 Judgment was rendered
dissolving their conjugal partnership of gains and approving a regime
of separation of properties based on the Memorandum of Agreement
executed by the spouses.9 The trial court also granted custody of the
children to Filipina. 10
In May 1988, Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted parricide
against her husband, docketed as Criminal Case No. 88-68006, before
the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Filipina testified that in the afternoon
of May 15, 1988, she went to the dental clinic at Masangkay, Tondo,
Manila, owned by her husband but operated by his mistress, to fetch
her son and bring him to San Fernando, Pampanga. While she was
talking to her son, the boy ignored her and continued playing with the
family computer. Filipina got mad, took the computer away from her
son, and started spanking him. At that instance, Fernando pulled
Filipina away from their son, and punched her in the different parts of
her body. Filipina also claimed that her husband started choking her
when she fell on the floor, and released her only when he thought she
was dead. Filipina suffered from hematoma and contusions on different
parts of her body as a result of the blows inflicted by her husband,
evidenced by a Medical Certificate issued by a certain Dr. James
Ferraren. She said it was not the first time Fernando maltreated her. 11
The Regional Trial Court of Manila, however, in its decision 12 dated
April 26, 1990, convicted Fernando only of the lesser crime of slight
physical injuries, and sentenced him to 20 days imprisonment.
Petitioner later filed a new action for legal separation against private
respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 8273, on the following grounds:
(1) repeated physical violence; (2) sexual infidelity; (3) attempt by
respondent against her life; and (4) abandonment of her by her
husband without justifiable cause for more than one year. The Regional
Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, in its decision 13 dated
December 4, 1991, granted the petition on the grounds of repeated
physical violence and sexual infidelity, and issued a decree of legal
separation. It awarded custody of their daughter Farrah Sheryll to
petitioner, and their son Frederick to respondent.
On August 4, 1992, Filipina filed a petition 14 for the declaration of
absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando on the ground of

psychological incapacity. She points out that the final judgment

rendered by the Regional Trial Court in her favor, in her petitions for
separation of property and legal separation, and Fernando's infliction of
physical violence on her which led to the conviction of her husband for
slight physical injuries are symptoms of psychological incapacity. She
also cites as manifestations of her husband's psychological incapacity
the following: (1) habitual alcoholism; (2) refusal to live with her
without fault on her part, choosing to live with his mistress instead;
and (3) refusal to have sex with her, performing the marital act only to
satisfy himself. Moreover, Filipina alleges that such psychological
incapacity of her husband existed from the time of the celebration of
their marriage and became manifest thereafter. 15
The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, in its
decision 16 dated December 9, 1993, denied the petition of Filipina Sy
for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando. It
stated that the alleged acts of the respondent, as cited by petitioner,
do not constitute psychological incapacity which may warrant the
declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision
of the trial court. In the decision 17 of the Court of Appeals dated May
21, 1996, it ruled that the testimony of petitioner concerning
respondent's purported psychological incapacity falls short of the
quantum of evidence required to nullify a marriage celebrated with all
the formal and essential requisites of law. Moreover, the Court of
Appeals held that petitioner failed to show that the alleged
psychological incapacity of respondent had existed at the time of the
celebration of their marriage in 1973. It reiterated the finding of the
trial court that the couple's marital problems surfaced only in 1983, or
almost ten years from the date of the celebration of their marriage.
And prior to their separation in 1983, they were living together
harmoniously. Thus, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the
lower court which it found to be in accordance with law and the
evidence on record. 18
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, 19 which the Court of
Appeals denied in its resolution dated November 21, 1996. 20
Hence, this appeal by certiorari
following issues:

21

wherein petitioner now raises the

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

MANIFESTLY OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ON THE DATE OF THE
CELEBRATION OF THE PARTIES' MARRIAGE ON NOVEMBER 15, 1973,
NOT DISPUTED BY RESPONDENT FERNANDO, THERE WAS NO
MARRIAGE LICENSE THERETO;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS BY STATING THAT THE
GROUNDS RELIED UPON BY APPELLANT [herein petitioner] DO NOT
CONSTITUTE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY AS WOULD JUSTIFY
NULLIFICATION OF HER MARRIAGE TO APPELLEE [herein respondent];
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS BY STATING THAT
APPELLANT FAILED TO SHOW THAT THE ALLEGED UNDESIRABLE
ACTUATIONS OF APPELLEE HAD EXISTED OR WERE PRESENT AT THE
TIME THEIR MARRIAGE WAS CELEBRATED IN 1973;
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN AFFIRMING THE
ERRONEOUS RULING OF THE LOWER COURT THAT THERE IS A
REDEEMING ATTITUDE SHOWN TO THE COURT BY RESPONDENT
FERNANDO WITH RESPECT TO HIS CHILDREN AND ALSO BELIEVES
THAT RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES IS NOT A REMOTE
POSSIBILITY WHICH IS ERRONEOUS; AND
5. WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE OF SANTOS
APPEALS (240 SCRA 20) IS APPLICABLE HERETO. 22

V.

COURT

OF

In sum, two issues are to be resolved:

1. Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private
respondent is void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license at
the time of the ceremony; and
2. Whether or not private respondent is psychologically incapacitated
at the time of said marriage celebration to warrant a declaration of its
absolute nullity.
Petitioner, for the first time, raises the issue of the marriage being void
for lack of a valid marriage license at the time of its celebration. It
appears that, according to her, the date of the actual celebration of
their marriage and the date of issuance of their marriage certificate
and marriage license are different and incongruous.

Although we have repeatedly ruled that litigants cannot raise an issue

for the first time on appeal, as this would contravene the basic rules of
fair play and justice, 23 in a number of instances, we have relaxed
observance of procedural rules, noting that technicalities are not ends
in themselves but exist to protect and promote substantive rights of
litigants. We said that certain rules ought not to be applied with
severity and rigidity if by so doing, the very reason for their existence
would be defeated. 24 Hence, when substantial justice plainly requires,
exempting a particular case from the operation of technicalities should
not be subject to cavil. 25 In our view, the case at bar requires that we
address the issue of the validity of the marriage between Filipina and
Fernando which petitioner claims is void from the beginning for lack of
a marriage license, in order to arrive at a just resolution of a deeply
seated and violent conflict between the parties. Note, however, that
here the pertinent facts are not disputed; and what is required now is a
declaration of their effects according to existing law.
Petitioner states that though she did not categorically state in her
petition for annulment of marriage before the trial court that the
incongruity in the dates of the marriage license and the celebration of
the marriage itself would lead to the conclusion that her marriage to
Fernando was void from the beginning, she points out that these
critical dates were contained in the documents she submitted before
the court. The date of issue of the marriage license and marriage
certificate, September 17, 1974, is contained in their marriage contract
which was attached as Annex "A" in her petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and thereafter
marked as Exhibit "A" in the course of the trial. 26 The date of
celebration of their marriage at Our Lady of Lourdes, Sta. Teresita
Parish, on November 15, 1973, is admitted both by petitioner and
private respondent, as stated in paragraph three of petitioner's petition
for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court,
and private respondent's answer admitting it. 27 This fact was also
affirmed by petitioner, in open court, on January 22, 1993, during her
direct examination, 28 as follows:
ATTY. RAZON: In the last hearing, you said that you were married on
November 15, 1973?
FILIPINA SY: Yes, Sir.
November 15, 1973, also appears as the date of marriage of the
parents in both their son's and daughter's birth certificates, which are

also attached as Annexes "B" and "C" in the petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and thereafter
marked as Exhibits "B" and "C" in the course of the trial. 29 These
pieces of evidence on record plainly and indubitably show that on the
day of the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage license. A
marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the
marriage void ab initio. In addition, the marriage contract shows that
the marriage license, numbered 6237519, was issued in Carmona,
Cavite, yet, neither petitioner nor private respondent ever resided in
Carmona. 30
Carefully reviewing the documents and the pleadings on record, we
find that indeed petitioner did not expressly state in her petition before
the trial court that there was incongruity between the date of the
actual celebration of their marriage and the date of the issuance of
their marriage license. From the documents she presented, the
marriage license was issued on September 17, 1974, almost one year
after the ceremony took place on November 15, 1973. The ineluctable
conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted without a
marriage license. Nowhere do we find private respondent denying
these dates on record. Article 80 of the Civil Code 31 is clearly
applicable in this case. There being no claim of an exceptional
character, the purported marriage between petitioner and private
respondent could not be classified among those enumerated in Articles
72-79 32 of the Civil Code. We thus conclude that under Article 80 of the
Civil Code, the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is
void from the beginning.
We note that their marriage certificate and marriage license are only
photocopies. So are the birth certificates of their son Frederick and
daughter Farrah Sheryll. Nevertheless, these documents were marked
as Exhibits during the course of the trial below, which shows that these
have been examined and admitted by the trial court, with no
objections having been made as to their authenticity and due
execution. Likewise, no objection was interposed to petitioner's
testimony in open court when she affirmed that the date of the actual
celebration of their marriage was on November 15, 1973. We are of the
view, therefore, that having been admitted in evidence, with the
adverse party failing to timely object thereto, these documents are
deemed sufficient proof of the facts contained therein.33

The remaining issue on the psychological incapacity of private

respondent need no longer detain us. It is mooted by our conclusion
that the marriage of petitioner to respondent is void ab initio for lack of
a marriage license at the time their marriage was solemnized.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, dated December 9, 1993 as
well as the Decision promulgated on May 21, 1996 by the Court of
Appeals and its Resolution dated November 21, 1996 in CA-G.R. No.
44144 are set aside. The marriage celebrated on November 15, 1973
between petitioner Filipina Yap and private respondent Fernando Sy is
hereby declared void ab initio for lack of a marriage license at the time
of celebration. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

in March 1971, when Castro discovered she was pregnant, that the
couple decided to live together. However, their cohabitation lasted only
for four (4) months. Thereafter, the couple parted ways. On October
19, 1971, Castro gave birth. The baby was adopted by Castro's brother,
with the consent of Cardenas.
The baby is now in the United States. Desiring to follow her daughter,
Castro wanted to put in order her marital status before leaving for the
States. She thus consulted a lawyer, Atty. Frumencio E. Pulgar,
regarding the possible annulment of her marriage. Through her
lawyer's efforts, they discovered that there was no marriage license
issued to Cardenas prior to the celebration of their marriage.
As proof, Angelina Castro offered in evidence a certification from the
Civil Register of Pasig, Metro Manila. It reads:

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND ANGELINA M. CASTRO, respondents.

February 20, 1987

The case at bench originated from a petition filed by private

respondent Angelina M. Castro in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage to Edwin F.
Cardenas. 1 As ground therefor, Castro claims that no marriage license
was ever issued to them prior to the solemnization of their marriage.

This is to certify that the names EDWIN F. CARDENAS and ANGELINA M.

CASTRO who were allegedly married in the Pasay City Court on June
21, 1970 under an alleged (s)upportive marriage license
no. 3196182 allegedly issued in the municipality on June 20, 1970
cannot be located as said license no. 3196182 does not appear from
our records.

Despite notice, defendant Edwin F. Cardenas failed to file his answer.

Consequently, he was declared in default. Trial proceeded in his
absence.

Issued upon request of Mr. Ed Atanacio.

The controlling facts are undisputed:

On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were
married in a civil ceremony performed by Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City
Court Judge of Pasay City. The marriage was celebrated without the
knowledge of Castro's parents. Defendant Cardenas personally
attended to the processing of the documents required for the
celebration of the marriage, including the procurement of the
marriage, license. In fact, the marriage contract itself states that
marriage license no. 3196182 was issued in the name of the
contracting parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro Manila.
The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife
since the marriage was unknown to Castro's parents. Thus, it was only

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

(Sgd) CENONA D. QUINTOS

Senior Civil Registry Officer
Castro testified that she did not go to the civil registrar of Pasig on or
before June 24, 1970 in order to apply for a license. Neither did she
sign any application therefor. She affixed her signature only on the
marriage contract on June 24, 1970 in Pasay City.
The trial court denied the petition. 2 It held that the above certification
was inadequate to establish the alleged non-issuance of a marriage
license prior to the celebration of the marriage between the parties. It
ruled that the "inability of the certifying official to locate the marriage
license is not conclusive to show that there was no marriage license
issued."

Unsatisfied with the decision, Castro appealed to respondent appellate

court. She insisted that the certification from the local civil registrar
sufficiently established the absence of a marriage license.
As stated earlier, respondent appellate court reversed the Decision of
the trial court. 3 It declared the marriage between the contracting
parties null and void and directed the Civil Registrar of Pasig to cancel
the subject marriage contract.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines urges that respondent appellate
court erred when it ruled that the certification issued by the civil
registrar that marriage license no. 3196182 was not in their record
adequately proved that no such license was ever issued. Petitioner also
faults the respondent court for relying on the self-serving and
uncorroborated testimony of private respondent Castro that she had no
part in the procurement of the subject marriage license. Petitioner thus
insists that the certification and the uncorroborated testimony of
private respondent are insufficient to overthrow the legal presumption
regarding the validity of a marriage.
Petitioner also points that in declaring the marriage between the
parties as null and void, respondent appellate court disregarded the
presumption that the solemnizing officer, Judge Pablo M. Malvar,
regularly performed his duties when he attested in the marriage
contract that marriage license no. 3196182 was duly presented to him
before the solemnization of the subject marriage.
The issues, being interrelated, shall be discussed jointly.
The core issue presented by the case at bench is whether or not the
documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private
respondent are sufficient to establish that no marriage license was
issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to the celebration of the
marriage of private respondent to Edwin F. Cardenas.
We affirm the impugned Decision.
At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the
law governing marital relations was the New Civil Code. The
law 4 provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage
license first issued by a local civil registrar. Being one of the essential

requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a license would render the

marriage voidab initio. 5
Petitioner posits that the certification of the local civil registrar of due
search and inability to find a record or entry to the effect that marriage
license no. 3196182 was issued to the parties is not adequate to prove
its non-issuance.
We hold otherwise. The presentation of such certification in court is
sanctioned by Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
Sec. 29. Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by an
officer having custody of an official record or by his deputy, that after
diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist
in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above
provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office
contain no such record or entry.
The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that
despite diligent search, a particular document does not exist in his
office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found
in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are
public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a
register book where they are required to enter all applications for
marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the
marriage license was issued and such other relevant data. 6
The certification of "due search and inability to find" issued by the civil
registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged
under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a
marriage license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion
and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate
of "due search and inability to find" sufficiently proved that his office
did not issue marriage license no. 3196182 to the contracting parties.
The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her testimony in
support of her petition is, in itself, not a ground to deny her petition.
The failure to offer any other witness to corroborate her testimony is
mainly due to the peculiar circumstances of the case. It will be
remembered that the subject marriage was a civil ceremony performed
by a judge of a city court. The subject marriage is one of those
commonly known as a "secret marriage" a legally non-existent
phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated

without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of either or both

of the contracting parties. The records show that the marriage between
Castro and Cardenas was initially unknown to the parents of the
former.
Surely, the fact that only private respondent Castro testified during the
trial cannot be held against her. Her husband, Edwin F. Cardenas, was
duly served with notice of the proceedings and a copy of the petition.
Despite receipt thereof, he chose to ignore the same. For failure to
answer, he was properly declared in default. Private respondent cannot
be faulted for her husband's lack of interest to participate in the
proceedings. There was absolutely no evidence on record to show that
there was collusion between private respondent and her husband
Cardenas.
It is noteworthy to mention that the finding of the appellate court that
the marriage between the contracting parties is null and void for lack
of a marriage license does not discount the fact that indeed, a spurious
marriage license, purporting to be issued by the civil registrar of Pasig,
may have been presented by Cardenas to the solemnizing officer.
In fine, we hold that, under the circumstances of the case, the
documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private
respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject
marriage license.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED there being no showing of
any reversible error committed by respondent appellate court.
SO ORDERED.
JAIME
vs.
CARMELITA N. CARDENAS, respondent.

O.SEVILLA, petitioner,

DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the reversal of the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74416 dated 20
December 2004 which set aside the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati City, in Civil Case No. 94-1285 dated 25 January
2002.

In a Complaint3 dated 28 March 1994 filed by Jaime O. Sevilla before

the RTC, he claimed that on 19 May 1969, through machinations,
duress and intimidation employed upon him by Carmelita N. Cardenas
and the latter's father, retired Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed
forces of the Philippines, he and Carmelita went to the City Hall of
Manila and they were introduced to a certain Reverend Cirilo D.
Gonzales, a supposed Minister of the Gospel. On the said date, the
father of Carmelita caused him and Carmelita to sign a marriage
contract before the said Minister of the Gospel. According to Jaime, he
never applied for a marriage license for his supposed marriage to
Carmelita and never did they obtain any marriage license from any
Civil Registry, consequently, no marriage license was presented to the
solemnizing officer.
For her part, Carmelita refuted these allegations of Jaime, and claims
that she and Jaime were married civilly on 19 May 1969, 4 and in a
church ceremony thereafter on 31 May 1969 5 at the Most Holy
Redeemer Parish in Quezon City. Both marriages were registered with
the local civil registry of Manila and the National Statistics Office. He is
estopped from invoking the lack of marriage license after having been
married to her for 25 years.
The trial court made the following findings:
In support of his complaint, plaintiff [Jaime] testified that on May 19,
1969, he and defendant [Carmelita] appeared before a certain Rev.
Cirilo D. Gonzales, a Minister of the Gospel, at the city hall in Manila
where they executed a Marriage Contract (Exh. "A") in civil rites. A
certain Godofredo Occena who, plaintiff alleged, was an aide of
defendant's father accompanied them, and who, together with another
person, stood as witness to the civil wedding. That although marriage
license no. 2770792 allegedly issued in San Juan, Rizal on May 19,
1969 was indicated in the marriage contract, the same was fictitious
for he never applied for any marriage license, (Ibid., p. 11). Upon
verifications made by him through his lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Abola, with
the Civil Registry of San Juan, a Certification dated March 11, 1994
(Exh. "E") was issued by Rafael D. Aliscad, Jr., Local Civil Registrar of
San Juan, that "no marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued by
said office." On May 31, 1969, he and defendant were again wed, this
time in church rites, before Monsignor Juan Velasco at the Most Holy
Redeemer Parish Church in Brixton Hills, Quezon City, where they
executed another marriage contract (Exh. "F") with the same marriage

license no. 2770792 used and indicated. Preparations and expenses for
the church wedding and reception were jointly shared by his and
defendant's parents. After the church wedding, he and defendant
resided in his house at Brixton Hills until their first son, Jose Gabriel,
was born in March 1970. As his parents continued to support him
financially, he and defendant lived in Spain for some time, for his
medical studies. Eventually, their marital relationship turned bad
because it became difficult for him to be married he being a medical
student at that time. They started living apart in 1976, but they
underwent family counseling before they eventually separated in 1978.
It was during this time when defendant's second son was born whose
paternity plaintiff questioned. Plaintiff obtained a divorce decree
against defendant in the United States in 1981 and later secured a
judicial separation of their conjugal partnership in 1983.
Atty. Jose M. Abola, then counsel for the plaintiff, himself manifested
that when his service was engaged by plaintiff, and after the latter
narrated to him the circumstances of his marriage, he made inquiries
with the Office of Civil Registry of San Juan where the supposed
marriage license was obtained and with the Church of the Most Holy
Redeemer Parish where the religious wedding ceremony was
celebrated. His request letters dated March 3, 1994 (Exh. "J"), March 7,
1994 (Exh. "L"), March 9, 1994 (Exh. "M") and March 11, 1994 (Exh.
"K") were all sent to and received by the Civil Registrar of San Juan,
who in reply thereto, issued Certifications dated March 4, 1994 (Exh.
"I"), and March 11, 1994 (Exh. "E") and September 20, 1994 (Exh. "C"),
that "no marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued by that office."
Upon his inquiry, the Holy Redeemer Parish Church issued him a
certified copy of the marriage contract of plaintiff and defendant (Exh.
"F") and a Certificate of Marriage dated April 11, 1994 (Exh. "G"),
wherein it noted that it was a "purely religious ceremony, having been
civilly married on May 19, 1969 at the City Hall, Manila, under Marriage
License No. 2770792 issued at San Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969."
Perlita Mercader, Registration Officer III of the Local Registry of San
Juan, identified the Certificates dated March 4, 1994, March 11, 1994
and September 20, 1994 issued by Rafael Aliscad, Jr., the Local Civil
Registrar, and testified that their office failed to locate the book
wherein marriage license no. 2770792 may have been registered (TSN,
8-6-96, p. 5).

Defendant Carmelita Cardenas testified that she and plaintiff had a

steady romantic relationship after they met and were introduced to
each other in October 1968. A model, she was compelled by her family
to join the Mutya ng Pilipinas beauty pageant when plaintiff who was
afraid to lose her, asked her to run away with him to Baguio. Because
she loved plaintiff, she turned back on her family and decided to follow
plaintiff in Baguio. When they came back to Manila, she and plaintiff
proceeded to the latter's home in Brixton Hills where plaintiff's mother,
Mrs. Sevilla, told her not to worry. Her parents were hostile when they
learned of the elopement, but Mrs. Sevilla convinced them that she will
take care of everything, and promised to support plaintiff and
defendant. As plaintiff was still fearful he may lose her, he asked her to
marry him in civil rites, without the knowledge of her family, more so
her father (TSN, 5-28-98, p. 4) on May 19, 1969, before a minister and
where she was made to sign documents. After the civil wedding, they
had lunch and later each went home separately. On May 31, 1969, they
had the church wedding, which the Sevilla family alone prepared and
arranged, since defendant's mother just came from hospital. Her family
did not participate in the wedding preparations. Defendant further
stated that there was no sexual consummation during their
honeymoon and that it was after two months when they finally had
sex. She learned from Dr. Escudero, plaintiff's physician and one of
their wedding sponsors that plaintiff was undergoing psychiatric
therapy since age 12 (TSN, 11-2-98, p. 15) for some traumatic problem
compounded by his drug habit. She found out plaintiff has unusual
sexual behavior by his obsession over her knees of which he would
take endless pictures of. Moreover, plaintiff preferred to have sex with
her in between the knees which she called "intrafemural sex," while
real sex between them was far and between like 8 months, hence,
abnormal. During their marriage, plaintiff exhibited weird sexual
behavior which defendant attributed to plaintiff's drug addiction (TSN,
11-5-98, pp. 5-8). A compulsive liar, plaintiff has a bad temper who
breaks things when he had tantrums. Plaintiff took drugs like
amphetamines, benzedrine and the like, "speed" drugs that kept him
from sleep and then would take barbiturates or downers, like
"mogadon." Defendant tried very hard to keep plaintiff away from
drugs but failed as it has become a habit to him. They had no fixed
home since they often moved and partly lived in Spain for about four
and a half years, and during all those times, her mother-in-law would
send some financial support on and off, while defendant worked as an
English teacher. Plaintiff, who was supposed to be studying, did

nothing. Their marriage became unbearable, as plaintiff physically and

verbally abused her, and this led to a break up in their marriage. Later,
she learned that plaintiff married one Angela Garcia in 1991 in the
United States.
Jose Cardenas, father of defendant, testified that he was not aware of
the civil wedding of his daughter with the plaintiff; that his daughter
and grandson came to stay with him after they returned home from
Spain and have lived with him and his wife ever since. His grandsons
practically grew up under his care and guidance, and he has supported
his daughter's expenses for medicines and hospital confinements
(Exhs. "9" and "10").
Victoria Cardenas Navarro, defendant's sister, testified and
corroborated that it was plaintiff's family that attended to all the
preparations and arrangements for the church wedding of her sister
with plaintiff, and that she didn't know that the couple wed in civil rites
some time prior to the church wedding. She also stated that she and
her parents were still civil with the plaintiff inspite of the marital
differences between plaintiff and defendant.
As adverse witness for the defendant, plaintiff testified that because of
irreconcilable differences with defendant and in order for them to live
their own lives, they agreed to divorce each other; that when he
applied for and obtained a divorce decree in the United States on June
14, 1983 (Exh. "13"), it was with the knowledge and consent of
defendant who in fact authorized a certain Atty. Quisumbing to
represent her (TSN, 12-7-2000, p. 21). During his adverse testimony,
plaintiff identified a recent certification dated July 25, 2000 (Exh. "EE")
issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, that the marriage
license no. 2770792, the same marriage license appearing in the
marriage contract (Exh. "A"), is inexistent, thus appears to be
fictitious.6
In its Decision dated 25 January 2002, declaring the nullity of the
marriage of the parties, the trial court made the following justifications:
Thus, being one of the essential requisites for the validity of the
marriage, the lack or absence of a license renders the marriage void ab
initio. It was shown under the various certifications (Exhs. "I", "E", and
"C") earlier issued by the office of the Local Civil Registrar of the
Municipality of San Juan, and the more recent one issued on July 25,
2000 (Exh. "EE") that no marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued

by that office, hence, the marriage license no. 2770792 appearing on

the marriage contracts executed on May 19, 1969 (Exh. "A") and on
May 31, 1969 (Exh. "F") was fictitious. Such a certification enjoys
probative value under the rules on evidence, particularly Section 28,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, x x x.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the civil marriage between
Jaime O. Sevilla and Carmelita N. Cardenas solemnized by Rev. Cirilo D.
Gonzales at the Manila City Hall on May 19, 1969 as well as their
contract of marriage solemnized under religious rites by Rev. Juan B.
Velasco at the Holy Redeemer Parish on May 31, 1969, NULL and VOID
for lack of the requisite marriage license. Let the marriage contract of
the parties under Registry No. 601 (e-69) of the registry book of the
Local Civil Registry of Manila be cancelled.
Let copies of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil and
property registries in accordance with Article 52 of the Family Code.
Likewise, let a copy hereof be forwarded the Office of the Solicitor
General for its record and information.7
Carmelita filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated
20 December 2004, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court
and held:
In People v. De Guzman (G.R. No. 106025, February 9, 1994), the
Supreme Court explained that: "The presumption of regularity of
official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The presumption,
however, prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is
rebutted, it becomes conclusive."
In this case, We note that a certain Perlita Mercader of the local civil
registry of San Juan testified that they"failed to locate the book
wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is registered," for the
reason that "the employee handling is already retired." With
said testimony We cannot therefore just presume that the marriage
license specified in the parties' marriage contract was not issued for in
the end the failure of the office of the local civil registrar of San Juan to
produce a copy of the marriage license was attributable not to the fact
that no such marriage license was issued but rather, because it "failed

to locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is registered."

Simply put, if the pertinent book were available for scrutiny, there is a
strong possibility that it would have contained an entry on marriage
license no. 2720792.
xxxx
Indeed, this Court is not prepared to annul the parties' marriage on the
basis of a mere perception of plaintiff that his union with defendant is
defective with respect to an essential requisite of a marriage contract,
a perception that ultimately was not substantiated with facts on
record.8
Jaime filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 6 January 2005 which
the Court of Appeals denied in a Resolution dated 6 April 2005.
This denial gave rise to the present Petition filed by Jaime.
He raises the following issues for Resolution.
1. Whether or not a valid marriage license was issued in accordance
with law to the parties herein prior to the celebration of the marriages
in question;
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly applied and relied on
the presumption of regularity of officials acts, particularly the issuance
of a marriage license, arising solely from the contents of the marriage
contracts in question which show on their face that a marriage license
was purportedly issued by the Local Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro
Manila, and
3. Whether or not respondent could validly invoke/rely upon the
presumption of validity of a marriage arising from the admitted "fact of
marriage."9
At the core of this controversy is the determination of whether or not
the certifications from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan stating that
no Marriage License No. 2770792 as appearing in the marriage
contract of the parties was issued, are sufficient to declare their
marriage as null and void ab initio.

Based on the foregoing provisions, a marriage license is an essential

requisite for the validity of marriage. The marriage between Carmelita
and Jaime is of no exception.
At first glance, this case can very well be easily dismissed as one
involving a marriage that is null and void on the ground of absence of a
marriage license based on the certifications issued by the Local Civil
Registar of San Juan. As ruled by this Court in the case of Cario v.
Cario13:
[A]s certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila,
their office has no record of such marriage license. In Republic v. Court
of Appeals, the Court held that such a certification is adequate to prove
the non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any circumstance of
suspicion, as in the present case, the certification issued by the local
civil registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged
under the law to keep a record of all date relative to the issuance of a
marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of
petitioner and the deceased has been sufficiently overcome. It then
became the burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid
and that they secured the required marriage license. Although she was
declared in default before the trial court, petitioner could have squarely
met the issue and explained the absence of a marriage license in her
pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this Court. But petitioner
conveniently avoided the issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an
argument that will put her case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed
validity of their marriage cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner
Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having been solemnized without the
necessary marriage license, and not being one of the marriages
exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab
initio.

We agree with the Court of Appeals and rule in the negative.

The foregoing Decision giving probative value to the certifications

issued by the Local Civil Registrar should be read in line with the
decision in the earlier case of Republic v. Court of Appeals,14 where it
was held that:

Pertinent provisions of the Civil Code which was the law in force at the
time of the marriage of the parties are Articles 53, 10 5811 and 80.12

The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that

despite diligent search, a particular document does not exist in

his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not

to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil
registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of
maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all
applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the
applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such other
relevant data. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the certification to be issued by the Local Civil Registrar must
categorically state that the document does not exist in his office or the
particular entry could not be found in the register despite diligent
search. Such certification shall be sufficient proof of lack or absence of
record as stated in Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. a written statement signed by an
officer having the custody of an official record or by his deputy that
after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to
exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above
provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office
contain no such record or entry.
We shall now proceed to scrutinize whether the certifications by the
Local Civil Registrar of San Juan in connection with Marriage License
No. 2770792 complied with the foregoing requirements and deserved
to be accorded probative value.
The first Certification15 issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan,
Metro Manila, was dated 11 March 1994. It reads:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
No Marriage License Number 2770792 were (sic) ever issued by this
Office. With regards (sic) to Marriage License Number 2880792, 16 we
exert all effort but we cannot find the said number.
Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force
locating the above problem.

The second certification17 was dated 20 September 1994 and provides:

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that no marriage license Number 2770792 were ever
issued by this Office with regards to Marriage License Number
2880792, we exert all effort but we cannot find the said number.
Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force
locating the above problem.
San Juan, Metro Manila
September 20, 1994
(SGD)RAFAEL
D.
Local Civil Registrar

ALISCAD,

JR.

The third Certification,18 issued on 25 July 2000, states:

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that according to the records of this office, no Marriage
License Application was filed and no Marriage License No. 2770792
allegedly dated May 19, 1969 was issued by this Office to MR. JAIME O.
SEVILLA and MS. CARMELITA CARDENAS-SEVILLA.
This is to further certify that the said application and license do not
exist in our Local Civil Registry Index and, therefore, appear to be
fictitious.
This certification is being issued upon the request of the interested
party for whatever legal intent it may serve.
San Juan, Metro Manila
July 25, 2000

San Juan, Metro Manila

(SGD)RAFAEL
D.
Local Civil Registrar

March 11, 1994

(SGD)RAFAEL

Local Civil Registrar

D.

ALISCAD,

JR.

ALISCAD,

JR.

Note that the first two certifications bear the statement that "hope and
understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the

above problem." It could be easily implied from the said statement that
the Office of the Local Civil Registrar could not exert its best efforts to
locate and determine the existence of Marriage License No. 2770792
due to its "loaded work." Likewise, both certifications failed to state
with absolute certainty whether or not such license was issued.
This implication is confirmed in the testimony of the representative
from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Ms. Perlita
Mercader, who stated that they cannot locate the logbook due to the
fact that the person in charge of the said logbook had already retired.
Further, the testimony of the said person was not presented in
evidence. It does not appear on record that the former custodian of the
logbook was deceased or missing, or that his testimony could not be
secured. This belies the claim that all efforts to locate the logbook or
prove the material contents therein, had been exerted.
As testified to by Perlita Mercader:
Q Under the subpoena duces tecum, you were required to bring to this
Court among other things the register of application of/or (sic) for
marriage licenses received by the Office of the :Local Civil Registrar of
San Juan, Province of Rizal, from January 19, 1969 to May 1969. Did
you bring with you those records?
A I brought may 19, 1969, sir.
Q Is that the book requested of you under no. 3 of the request for
subpoena?
A Meron pang January. I forgot, January . . .
Q Did you bring that with you?
A No, sir.
Q Why not?
A I cannot locate the book. This is the only book.
Q Will you please state if this is the register of marriage of marriage
applications that your office maintains as required by the manual of
the office of the Local Civil Registrar?
COURT
May I see that book and the portion marked by the witness.

xxxx
COURT
Why don't you ask her direct question whether marriage license
2880792 is the number issued by their office while with respect to
license no. 2770792 the office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan is
very definite about it it was never issued. Then ask him how about no.
2880792 if the same was ever issued by their office. Did you ask this
2887092, but you could not find the record? But for the moment you
cannot locate the books? Which is which now, was this issued or not?
A The employee handling it is already retired, sir. 19
Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect that
utmost efforts were not exerted to locate the logbook where Marriage
License No. 2770792 may have been entered, the presumption of
regularity of performance of official function by the Local Civil Registrar
in issuing the certifications, is effectively rebutted.
According to Section 3(m),20 Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed is among
the disputable presumptions.
In one case, it was held:
A disputable presumption has been defined as a species of evidence
that may be accepted and acted on where there is no other evidence
to uphold the contention for which it stands, or one which may be
overcome by other evidence. One such disputable/rebuttable
presumption is that an official act or duty has been regularly
performed. x x x.21
The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by
affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. 22
The presumption of regularity of performance of official duty is
disputable and can be overcome by other evidence as in the case at
bar where the presumption has been effectively defeated by the tenor
of the first and second certifications.
Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of nonissuance of Marriage License No. 2770792. It can also mean, as we
believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook just cannot be found.
In the absence of showing of diligent efforts to search for the said

logbook, we cannot easily accept that absence of the same also means
non-existence or falsity of entries therein.

contract of marriage.' Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio Always

presume marriage."30

Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact
leans toward the validity of the marriage, the indissolubility of the
marriage bonds.23 The courts look upon this presumption with great
favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is
of great weight.24

This jurisprudential attitude towards marriage is based on the prima

facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. 31

The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect

and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution
and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.25
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and lived
together for several years producing two offsprings, 26 now adults
themselves. It took Jaime several years before he filed the petition for
declaration of nullity. Admittedly, he married another individual
sometime in 1991.27 We are not ready to reward petitioner by declaring
the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom and in the process
allow him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy. 28
Our Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family
as a basic social institution. Our family law is based on the policy that
marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the
State is vitally interested. The State can find no stronger anchor than
on good, solid and happy families. The break-up of families weakens
our social and moral fabric; hence, their preservation is not the
concern of the family members alone.29
"The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is x x x
marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it
is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public
is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans
toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption
or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is
that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not
what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in
the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption
established by our Code of Civil Procedure is `that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful

By our failure to come to the succor of Jaime, we are not trifling with
his emotion or deepest sentiments. As we have said in CaratingSiayngco v. Siayngco,32 regrettably, there are situations like this one,
where neither law nor society can provide the specific answers to
every individual problem.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 20 December 2004 and the
Resolution dated 6 April 2005 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Nollora VS People of the Phillipines

The Case
G.R. No. 191425 is a petition for review 1 assailing the
Decision2 promulgated on 30 September 2009 as well as the
Resolution3 promulgated on 23 February 2010 by the Court of Appeals
(appellate court) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31538. The appellate court affirmed
the 19 November 2007 Decision4 of Branch 215 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City (trial court) in Criminal Case No. Q-04-129031.
The trial court found accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. (Nollora) guilty of
bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced
him to suffer imprisonment. Co-accused Rowena Geraldino(Geraldino)
was acquitted for the prosecutions failure to prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
The Facts
The appellate court recited the facts as follows:

On August 24, 2004, Assistant City Prosecutor Raymond Jonathan

B. Lledo filed an Information against Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. (Nollora) and
Rowena P. Geraldino (Geraldino) for the crime of Bigamy. The
accusatory portion of the Information reads:

trial conference was terminated and the case was set for initial
hearing. Thereafter, trial ensued.

That on or about the 8 th day of December 2001 in Quezon City,

Philippines, the above-named accused ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR., being
then legally married to one JESUSA PINAT NOLLORA, and as said
marriage has not been legally dissolved and still subsisting, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a subsequent or
second marriage with her [sic] co-accused ROWENA P. GERALDINO,
who knowingly consented and agreed to be married to her co-accused
ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR. knowing him to be a married man, to the
damage and prejudice of the said offended party JESUSA PINAT
NOLLORA.

As culled from the herein assailed Decision, the respective testimonies

of prosecution witnesses were as follows:

Upon his arraignment on April 18, 2005, accused Nollora assisted by

counsel, refused to enter his plea. Hence, a plea of not guilty was
entered by the Court for him. Accused Geraldino, on the other hand,
entered a plea of not guilty when arraigned on June 14, 2005. On even
date, pre-trial conference was held and both the prosecution and
defense entered the following stipulation of facts:
1. the validity of the first marriage between Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
and Jesusa Pinat Nollora solemnized on April 6, 1999 at Sapang Palay,
San Jose del Monte;
2. that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted the second marriage with
Rowena P. Geraldino on December 8, 2001 in Quezon City;
3. that in the Counter-Affidavit of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., he admitted
that he contracted the second marriage to Rowena P. Geraldino;
4. that Rowena P. Geraldino attached to her Counter-Affidavit the
Certificate of Marriage with Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. dated December 8,
2001;
5. the fact of marriage of Rowena P. Geraldino with Atilano O. Nollora,
Jr. as admitted in her Counter-Affidavit.
The only issue thus proffered by the prosecution for the RTCs resolution
is whether or not the second marriage is bigamous. Afterwards, pre-

Evidence for the Prosecution

xxx (W)itness Jesusa Pinat Nollora xxx testified that she and
accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. met in Saudi Arabia while she was
working there as a Staff Midwife in King Abdulah Naval Base
Hospital. Atilano O.Nollora, Jr. courted her and on April 6, 1999, they
got married at the [IE]MELIF Chruch [sic] in Sapang Palay, San Jose del
Monte, Bulacan (Exhibit A). While working in said hospital, she heard
rumors that her husband has another wife and because of anxiety and
emotional stress, she left Saudi Arabia and returned to the Philippines
(TSN, October 4, 2005, page 10). Upon arrival in the Philippines, the
private complainant learned that indeed, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
contracted a second marriage with co-accused Rowena P. Geraldino on
December 8, 2001 (Exhibit B) when she secured a certification as to
the civil status of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. (Exhibit C) from the National
Statistics Office (NSO) sometime in November 2003 Upon learning this
information,
the
private
complainant
confronted
Rowena
P. Geraldino at the latters workplace in CBW, FTI, Taguig and asked her
if she knew of the first marriage between complainant
andAtilano O. Nollora, Jr. to which Rowena P. Geraldino allegedly
affirmed
and
despite
this
knowledge,
she
allegedly
still
married Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. because she loves him so much and
because they were neighbors and childhood friends. Private
complainant also knew that Rowena P. Geraldino knew of her marriage
with Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., because when she (private complainant)
was brought by Atilano O.Nollora, Jr. at the latters residence in Taguig,
Metro Manila and introduced her to Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.s parents,
Rowena P. Geraldino was there in the house together with a friend and
she heard everything that they were talking about.
Because of this case, private complainant was not able to return to
Saudi Arabia to work as a Staff Midwife thereby losing income
opportunity in the amount of P34,000.00 a month, more or less. When
asked about the moral damages she suffered, she declared that what
happened to her was a tragedy and she had entertained [thoughts] of

committing suicide. She added that because of what happened to her,

her mother died and she almost got raped when Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
left her alone in their residence in Saudi Arabia. However, she declared
that money is not enough to assuage her sufferings. Instead, she just
asked for the return of her money in the amount of P50,000.00 (TSN,
July 26, 2005, pages 4-14).
Prosecution witness Ruth Santos testified that she knew of the
marriage between the private complainant and Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.,
because she was one of the sponsors in said wedding. Sometime in
November 2003, she was asked by the private complainant to
accompany the latter to the workplace of Rowena P. Geraldino in
FTI, Taguig, Metro Manila. She declared that the private complainant
and Rowena P. Geraldinohad a confrontation and she heard that
Rowena P. Geraldino admitted that she (Rowena) knew of the first
marriage of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. and the private complainant but she
still went on to marry Atilano O.Nollora, Jr. because she loves him very
much (TSN, October 24, 2005, pages 3-5).
Evidence for the Defense
The defenses version of facts, as summarized in the herein assailed
Decision, is as follows:
Accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. admitted having contracted two (2)
marriages, the first with private complainant Jesusa Pinat and the
second with Rowena P. Geraldino. He, however, claimed that he was a
Muslim convert way back on January 10, 1992, even before he
contracted the first marriage with the private complainant. As a
[M]uslim convert, he is allegedly entitled to marry four (4) wives as
allowed under the Muslim or Islam belief.
To prove that he is a Muslim convert even prior to his marriage to the
private complainant, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. presented a Certificate of
Conversion
dated
August
2,
2004
issued
by
one Hadji Abdul KajarMadueo and approved by one Khad Ibrahim
A. Alyamin wherein it is stated that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. allegedly
converted as a Muslim since January 19, 1992 (Exhibit 2, 3 and 4).
Aside from said certificate, he also presented a Pledge of Conversion
dated
January
10,
1992
issued
by
the
same Hadji Abdul Kajar Madueo and approved by one Khad Ibrahim
A. Alyamin (Exhibit 7).

He claimed that the private complaint knew that he was a Muslim

convert prior to their marriage because she [sic] told this fact when he
was courting her in Saudi Arabia and the reason why said private
complainant filed the instant case was due to hatred having learned of
his second marriage with Rowena P. Geraldino. She [sic] further
testified that Rowena P. Geraldino was not aware of his first marriage
with the private complainant and he did not tell her this fact because
Rowena P. Geraldino is a Catholic and he does not want to lose her if
she learns of his first marriage.
He explained that in his Marriage Contract with Jesusa Pinat, it is
indicated that he was a Catholic Pentecostal but that he was not aware
why it was placed as such on said contract. In his Marriage Contract
with Rowena P. Geraldino, the religion Catholic was also indicated
because he was keeping as a secret his being a Muslim since the
society does not approve of marrying a Muslim. He also indicated that
he was single despite his first marriage to keep said first marriage a
secret (TSN, January 30, 2006, pages 2-13).
Defense witness Hadji Abdul Qasar Madueo testified that he is the
founder and president of Balik Islam Tableegh Foundation of the
Philippines and as such president, he has the power and authority to
convert any applicant to the Muslim religion. He alleged that sometime
in 1992, he met accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. in Mabini (Manila) who
was then going abroad. Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. applied to become a
Muslim (Exhibit 14) and after receiving the application, said accused
was indoctrinated regarding his obligations as a Muslim. On January 10,
1992, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. embraced the Muslim faith. He was then
directed to report every Sunday to monitor his development.
In the year 2004, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. visited him and asked for a
certification because of the filing of the instant case. On October 2,
2004, he issued a Certificate of Conversion wherein it is stated
that AtilanoO. Nollora, Jr. is a Muslim convert since January 10, 1992.
Apart from the above-mentioned document, their Imam also issued a
Pledge of Conversion (Exhibit 7). He declared that a Muslim convert
could marry more than one according to the Holy Koran. However,
before marrying his second, third and fourth wives, it is required that
the consent of the first Muslim wife be secured. Thus, if the first wife is
not a Muslim, there is no necessity to secure her consent (TSN, October
9, 2006, pages 2-12).

During his cross-examinations, he declared that if a Muslim convert

gets married not in accordance with the Muslim faith, the same is
contrary to the teachings of the Muslim faith. A Muslim also can marry
up to four times but he should be able to treat them equally. He
claimed that he was not aware of the first marriage but was aware of
the second. Since his second marriage with Rowena P. Geraldino was
not in accordance with the Muslim faith, he advised Atilano O. Nollora,
Jr. to re-marry Rowena P. Geraldino in accordance with Muslim marriage
celebration, otherwise, he will not be considered as a true Muslim (TSN,
June 25, 2007, pages 3-7).
Accused Rowena P. Geraldino alleged that she was only a victim in this
incident of bigamous marriage. She claimed that she does not know
the private complainant Jesusa Pinat Nollora and only came to know
her when this case was filed. She insists that she is the one lawfully
married to Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., having been married to the latter
since December 8, 2001. Upon learning that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
contracted a first marriage with the private complainant, she
confronted the former who admitted the said marriage. Prior to their
marriage, she asked Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. if he was single and the
latter responded that he was single. She also knew that her husband
was a Catholic prior to their marriage but after she learned of the first
marriage of her husband, she learned that he is a Muslim convert. She
also claimed that after learning that her husband was a Muslim
convert, she and Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., also got married in accordance
with the Muslim rites. She also belied the allegations of the private
complainant that she was sought by the private complainant and that
they had a confrontation where she admitted that she knew
that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. was married to the private complainant and
despite this knowledge, she went on to marry him because she loved
him very much. She insisted that she only came to know the private
complainant when she (private complainant) filed this case (TSN,
August 14, 2007, pages 2-8).5
The Trial Courts Ruling
In its Decision6 dated 19 November 2007, the trial court
convicted Nollora and acquitted Geraldino.
The trial court stated that there are only two exceptions to prosecution
for bigamy: Article 417 of the Family Code, or Executive Order No. 209,
and Article 1808 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines,

or Presidential Decree No. 1083. The trial court also cited Article 27 of
the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, which provides
the qualifications for allowing Muslim men to have more than one wife:
[N]o Muslim male can have more than one wife unless he can deal with
them in equal companionship and just treatment as enjoined by Islamic
Law and only in exceptional cases.
In convicting Nollora, the trial courts Decision further stated thus:
The principle in Islam is that monogamy is the general rule and
polygamy is allowed only to meet urgent needs. Only with the
permission of the court can a Muslim be permitted to have a second
wife subject to certain requirements. This is because having plurality of
wives is merely tolerated, not encouraged, under certain
circumstances (Muslim Law on Personal Status in the Philippines
by Amer M. Bara-acal and Abdulmajid J. Astir, 1998 First Edition, Pages
64-65). Arbitration is necessary. Any Muslim husband desiring to
contract subsequent marriages, before so doing, shall notify
the Sharia Circuit Court of the place where his family resides. The clerk
of court shall serve a copy thereof to the wife or wives. Should any of
them objects [sic]; an Agama Arbitration Council shall be constituted. If
said council fails to secure the wifes consent to the proposed marriage,
the Court shall, subject to Article 27, decide whether on [sic] not to
sustain her objection (Art. 162, Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines).
Accused Atilano Nollora, Jr., in marrying his second wife, co-accused
Rowena P. Geraldino, did not comply with the above-mentioned
provision of the law. In fact, he did not even declare that he was a
Muslim convert in both marriages, indicating his criminal intent. In his
converting to the Muslim faith, said accused entertained the mistaken
belief that he can just marry anybody again after marrying the private
complainant. What is clear, therefore, is [that] a Muslim is not given an
unbridled right to just marry anybody the second, third or fourth time.
There are requirements that the Sharia law imposes, that is, he should
have notified the Sharia Court where his family resides so that copy of
said notice should be furnished to the first wife. The argument that
notice to the first wife is not required since she is not a Muslim is of no
moment. This obligation to notify the said court rests upon
accused Atilano Nollora, Jr. It is not for him to interpret the Sharia law.
It is the Sharia Court that has this authority.

Costs against accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.

In an apparent attempt to escape criminal liability, the
accused recelebrated their marriage in accordance with the Muslim
rites. However, this can no longer cure the criminal liability that has
already been violated.
The Court, however, finds criminal liability on the person of
accused Atilano Nollora, Jr., only. There is no sufficient evidence that
would pin accused Rowena P. Geraldino down. The evidence presented
by the prosecution against her is the allegation that she knew of the
first marriage between private complainant and Atilano Nollora, Jr., is
insufficient[,] being open to several interpretations. Private
complainant alleged that when she was brought by Atilano Nollora, Jr.,
to the latters house in Taguig, Metro Manila, Rowena P. Geraldino was
there standing near the door and heard their conversation. From this
incident, private complainant concluded that said Rowena
P. Geraldino was aware that she and Atilano Nollora, Jr., were married.
This conclusion is obviously misplaced since it could not be reasonably
presumed that Rowena P. Geraldinounderstands what was going on
between
her
and Atilano Nollora,
Jr.
It
is
axiomatic
that (E)very circumstance favoring accuseds innocence must be taken
into account, proof against him must survive the test of reason and the
strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment (People
vs. Austria, 195 SCRA 700). This Court, therefore, has to acquit Rowena
P. Geraldino for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, as
follows:
a) Finding accused ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR. guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Bigamy punishable under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code. This court hereby renders judgment imposing
upon him a prison term of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1)
day of prision correccional, as minimum of his indeterminate sentence,
to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, plus
accessory penalties provided by law.
b) Acquitting accused ROWENA P. GERALDINO of the crime of Bigamy
for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.

SO ORDERED.9
Nollora filed a notice of appeal and moved for the allowance of his
temporary liberty under the same bail bond pending appeal. The trial
court granted Nolloras motion.
Nollora filed a brief with the appellate court and assigned only one
error of the trial court:
The trial court gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of
the crime charged despite the prosecutions failure to establish his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.10

The Appellate Courts Ruling

On 30 September 2009, the appellate court dismissed Nolloras appeal
and affirmed the trial courts decision.11
The appellate court rejected Nolloras defense that his second marriage
to Geraldino was in lawful exercise of his Islamic religion and was
allowed by the Quran. The appellate court denied Nollorasinvocation of
his religious beliefs and practices to the prejudice of the non-Muslim
women who married him pursuant to Philippine civil laws. Nolloras two
marriages were not conducted in accordance with the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws, hence the Family Code of the Philippines should
apply. Nolloras claim of religious freedom will not immobilize the State
and render it impotent in protecting the general welfare.
In a Resolution12 dated 23 February 2010, the appellate court
denied Nolloras motion for reconsideration. The allegations in the
motion for reconsideration were a mere rehash of Nolloras earlier
arguments, and there was no reason for the appellate court to modify
its 30 September 2009 Decision.
Nollora filed the present petition for review before this Court on 6 April
2010.
The Issue

validity except for the lack of capacity of Nollora due to his prior
marriage.16
The issue in this case is whether Nollora is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of bigamy.

The Courts Ruling

Nolloras petition has no merit. We affirm the rulings of the appellate
court and of the trial court.
Elements of Bigamy
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed
upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage
before the former marriage has been
Date of Marriage
legally dissolved, or before the absent
spouse
has
been
declared a) April 06, 1999
presumptively dead by means of a a) December 08, 2001
judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.

The marriage certificate17 of Nollora and Pinats marriage states

that Nollora and Pinat were married at Sapang Palay IEMELIF
Church, Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan on 6 April 1999.
Rev. Jonathan De Mesa, Minister of the IEMELIF Church officiated the
ceremony. The marriage
certificate18 of Nollora and Geraldinos marriage states
that Nollora and Geraldino were married at Maxs Restaurant, Quezon
Avenue, Quezon City, Metro Manila on 8 December 2001.
Rev. Honorato D. Santos officiated the ceremony.
A certification dated 4 November 2003 from the Office of the Civil
Registrar General reads:
We certify that ATILANO JR O. NOLLORA who is alleged to have been
born on February 22, 1968
Place of Marriage
from ATILANO M. NOLLORA
SR and FLAVIANA OCLARIT,
b) SAN JOSE DEL MONTE, BULACAN
b) QUEZON CITY, METRO MANILA (2nd appears in our National
Indices of Marriage for
District)19
Groom for the years 1973
to 2002 with the following information:

The elements of the crime of bigamy are:

1. That the offender has been legally married.
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or
her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed
dead according to the Civil Code.
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage.
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity.13

Before the trial and appellate courts, Nollora put up his Muslim religion
as his sole defense. He alleged that his religion allows him to marry
more than once. Granting arguendo that Nollora is indeed of Muslim
faith at the time of celebration of both marriages, 20 Nollora cannot
deny that both marriage ceremonies were not conducted in accordance
with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, or Presidential Decree No.
1083. The applicable Articles in the Code of Muslim Personal Laws
read:

The circumstances in the present case satisfy all the elements of

bigamy.
(1) Nollora is
legally
married
to
Pinat;14 (2) Nollora and Pinats marriage has not been legally dissolved
prior to the date of the second marriage; (3) Nollora admitted the
existence
of
his
second
marriage
to
Geraldino; 15 and
(4) Nollora and Geraldinos marriage has all the essential requisites for

Art. 14. Nature. - Marriage is not only a civil contract but a civil
institution. Its nature, consequences and incidents are governed by this
Code and the Sharia and not subject to stipulation, except that the
marriage settlements to a certain extent fix the property relations of
the spouses.

Art. 15. Essential Requisites. - No marriage contract shall be perfected

unless the following essential requisites are complied with:
(a) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(b) Mutual consent of the parties freely given;
(c) Offer (ijab) and acceptance (qabul) duly witnessed by at least two
competent persons after the proper guardian in marriage (wali) has
given his consent; and
(d) Stipulation of the customary dower (mahr) duly witnessed by two
competent persons.
Art. 16. Capacity to contract marriage. - (1) Any Muslim male at least
fifteen years of age and any Muslim female of the age of puberty or
upwards and not suffering from any impediment under the provisions
of this Code may contract marriage. A female is presumed to have
attained puberty upon reaching the age of fifteen.
x x x.
Art. 17. Marriage Ceremony. - No particular form of marriage ceremony
is required but the ijab and the qabul in marriage shall be declared
publicly in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage and
the two competent witnesses. The declaration shall be set forth in an
instrument in triplicate, signed or marked by the contracting parties
and said witnesses, and attested by the person solemnizing the
marriage. One copy shall be given to the contracting parties and
another sent to the Circuit Registrar by the solemnizing officer who
shall keep the third.
Art. 18. Authority to solemnize marriage. - Marriage maybe
solemnized:
(a) By the proper wali by the woman to be wedded;
(b) Upon the authority of the proper wali, by any person who is
competent under Muslim law to solemnize marriage; or
(c) By the judge of the Sharia District Court or Sharia Circuit Court or
any person designated by the judge, should the proper wali refuse
without justifiable reason, to authorize the solemnization.
Art. 19. Place of solemnization. - Marriage shall be solemnized publicly
in any mosque, office of the Sharia judge, office of the Circuit Registrar,
residence of the bride or her wali, or at any other suitable place agreed
upon by the parties.

Art. 20. Specification of dower. - The amount or value of dower may be

fixed by the contracting parties (mahr-musamma) before, during or
after the celebration of marriage. If the amount or the value thereof
has not been so fixed, a proper dower (mahr-mithl) shall, upon petition
of the wife, be determined by the court according to the social
standing of the parties.
Indeed, Article 13(2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that
[i]n case of a marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim,
solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or this Code,
the[Family Code of the Philippines, or Executive Order No.
209, in lieu of the Civil Code of the Philippines] shall
apply. Nolloras religious affiliation is not an issue here. Neither is the
claim that Nollorasmarriages were solemnized according to Muslim law.
Thus, regardless of his professed religion, Nollora cannot claim
exemption from liability for the crime of bigamy.21
Nollora asserted in his marriage certificate with Geraldino that his civil
status is single. Moreover, both of Nolloras marriage contracts do not
state that he is a Muslim. Although the truth or falsehood of the
declaration of ones religion in the marriage certificate is not an
essential requirement for marriage, such omissions are sufficient
proofs of Nolloras liability for bigamy. Nolloras false declaration about
his civil status is thus further compounded by these omissions.
[ATTY. CALDINO:]
Q: In your marriage contract, Mr. Witness, with Jesusa Pinat, you
indicated here as your religion, Catholic Pentecostal, and you were
saying that since January 10, 1992, you are already a
[M]uslim convert. . . you said, Mr. Witness, that you are already a
[M]uslim convert since January 10, 1992. However, in your marriage
contract with Jesusa Pinat, there is no indication here that you have
indicated your religion. Will you please go over your marriage contract?
[NOLLORA:]
A: When we got married, they just placed there Catholic but I didnt
know why they did not place any Catholic there.
xxx

Q: Now, Mr. Witness, I would like to call your attention with

respect to your marriage contract with your co-accused in this
case, Rowena Geraldino, x x x will you please tell us, Mr.
Witness, considering that you said that you are already a
[M]uslim convert on January 10, 1992, why in the marriage
contract with Rowena Geraldino, you indicated there your
religion as Catholic, Mr. Witness?
A: Since I was a former Catholic and since I was then keeping, I
was keeping it as a secret my being my Balik-Islam, thats why I
placed there Catholic since I know that the society doesnt
approve a Catholic to marry another, thats why I placed there
Catholic as my religion, sir.
Q: How about under the column, civil status, why did you
indicate there that youre single, Mr. Witness?
A: I also kept it as a secret that I was married, earlier
married.22 (Emphasis supplied)
xxx
[PROSECUTOR TAYLOR:]
Q: Would you die for your new religion, Mr. Nollora?

A: Yes, maam.
Q: Did you secure that permission from your first wife, Jesusa Nollora?
A: I was not able to ask any permission from her because she was very
mad at me, at the start, she was always very mad, maam. 23

In his petition before this Court, Nollora casts doubt on the validity of
his marriage to Geraldino. Nollora may not impugn his marriage
to Geraldino in order to extricate himself from criminal liability;
otherwise, we would be opening the doors to allowing the
solemnization of multiple flawed marriage ceremonies. As we stated
in Tenebro v. Court of Appeals:24
There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a
marriage,
although
void ab initio,
may
still
produce
legal
consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal
liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the States penal
laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to
deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some
manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple
marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise
of futurity and commitment.

A: Yes, maam.
Q: If you would die for your new religion, why did you allow that your
faith be indicated as Catholic when in fact you were already as you
alleged [M]uslim to be put in your marriage contract?

[A:] I dont think there is anything wrong with it, I just signed it so we
can get married under the Catholic rights [sic] because after that we
even got married under the [M]uslim rights [sic], your Honor.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The Decision of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31538 promulgated on 30 September 2009
and the Resolution promulgated on 23 February 2010 areAFFIRMED.
Petitioner Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Bigamy in Criminal Case No. Q-04-129031 and is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment with a term of two years, four months and
one day of prision correccional as minimum to eight years and one day
of prision mayor as maximum of his indeterminate sentence, as well as
the accessory penalties provided by law.

xxx

Costs against petitioner Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.

Q: Under your Muslim faith, if you marry a second wife, are you
required under your faith to secure the permission of your first wife to
get married?

SO ORDERED.

xxx

LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner,

PHILIPPINES, respondent.

vs.

PEOPLE

OF

THE

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the
decision[1] dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR No. 20700, which affirmed the judgment [2] dated August 5, 1996 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol, Branch 4, in Criminal Case No.
8688. The trial court found herein petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy and sentenced him to a
prison term of seven (7) months of prision correccional as minimum to
six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. Also
assailed in this petition is the resolution[3] of the appellate court, dated
September 25, 2000, denying Morigos motion for reconsideration.
The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo, are as follows:
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the
house of Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a
period of four (4) years (from 1974-1978).
After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact
with each other.
In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia
Barrete from Singapore. The former replied and after an exchange of
letters, they became sweethearts.
In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to
work
there.
While
in Canada,
they
maintained
constant
communication.
In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition
appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they
were married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at
Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.
On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada
leaving appellant Lucio behind.

On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General
Division) a petition for divorce against appellant which was granted by
the court on January 17, 1992 and to take effect on February 17, 1992.
On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha
Lumbago[4] at the Virgen sa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol,
docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The complaint seek (sic) among
others, the declaration of nullity of accuseds marriage with Lucia, on
the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.
On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an
Information[5] filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran [City], with the
Regional Trial Court of Bohol.[6]
The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground
that the civil case for judicial nullification of his marriage with Lucia
posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His motion was
granted, but subsequently denied upon motion for reconsideration by
the prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy case, which was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 8688, herein petitioner pleaded not
guilty to the charge. Trial thereafter ensued.
On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its judgment in
Criminal Case No. 8688, as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds accused
Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Bigamy and sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
ranging from Seven (7) Months of Prision Correccional as minimum to
Six (6) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor as maximum.
SO ORDERED.[7]
In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitioners
claim that his first marriage to Lucia was null and void ab initio.
Following Domingo v. Court of Appeals, [8] the trial court ruled that want
of a valid marriage ceremony is not a defense in a charge of bigamy.
The parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their
marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial
declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed
to marry again.

Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court

cited Ramirez v. Gmur,[9] which held that the court of a country in
which neither of the spouses is domiciled and in which one or both
spouses may resort merely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce, has
no jurisdiction to determine the matrimonial status of the parties. As
such, a divorce granted by said court is not entitled to recognition
anywhere. Debunking Lucios defense of good faith in contracting the
second marriage, the trial court stressed that following People v. Bitdu,
[10]
everyone is presumed to know the law, and the fact that one does
not know that his act constitutes a violation of the law does not exempt
him from the consequences thereof.
Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 20700.
Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 was
pending before the appellate court, the trial court rendered a decision
in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the marriage between Lucio and Lucia
void ab initio since no marriage ceremony actually took place. No
appeal was taken from this decision, which then became final and
executory.
On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CR No.
20700 as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.[11]
In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate court
stressed that the subsequent declaration of nullity of Lucios marriage
to Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020 could not acquit Lucio. The reason is
that what is sought to be punished by Article 349 [12] of the Revised
Penal Code is the act of contracting a second marriage before the first
marriage had been dissolved. Hence, the CA held, the fact that the first
marriage was void from the beginning is not a valid defense in a
bigamy case.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained
by Lucia from the Canadian court could not be accorded validity in the
Philippines, pursuant to Article 15 [13] of the Civil Code and given the
fact that it is contrary to public policy in this jurisdiction. Under Article
17[14] of the Civil Code, a declaration of public policy cannot be

rendered ineffectual
jurisdiction.

by

a judgment

promulgated

in

foreign

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate courts decision,

contending that the doctrine in Mendiola v. People,[15] allows mistake
upon a difficult question of law (such as the effect of a foreign divorce
decree) to be a basis for good faith.
On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the motion for lack
of merit.[16] However, the denial was by a split vote. The ponente of the
appellate courts original decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, Justice
Eugenio S. Labitoria, joined in the opinion prepared by Justice Bernardo
P. Abesamis. The dissent observed that as the first marriage was
validly declared void ab initio, then there was no first marriage to
speak of. Since the date of the nullity retroacts to the date of the first
marriage and since herein petitioner was, in the eyes of the law, never
married, he cannot be convicted beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.
The present petition raises the following issues for our resolution:
A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO
APPLY THE RULE THAT IN CRIMES PENALIZED UNDER THE REVISED
PENAL CODE, CRIMINAL INTENT IS AN INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE.
COROLLARILY, WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
FAILING TO APPRECIATE [THE] PETITIONERS LACK OF CRIMINAL INTENT
WHEN HE CONTRACTED THE SECOND MARRIAGE.
B.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE RULING IN PEOPLE VS. BITDU (58 PHIL. 817) IS APPLICABLE TO
THE CASE AT BAR.
C.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO
APPLY THE RULE THAT EACH AND EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE FAVORING
THE INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. [17]
To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not petitioner
committed bigamy and if so, whether his defense of good faith is valid.

The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good
faith upon the divorce decree of the Ontario court. He highlights the
fact that he contracted the second marriage openly and publicly, which
a person intent upon bigamy would not be doing. The petitioner further
argues that his lack of criminal intent is material to a conviction or
acquittal in the instant case. The crime of bigamy, just like other
felonies punished under the Revised Penal Code, is mala in se, and
hence, good faith and lack of criminal intent are allowed as a complete
defense. He stresses that there is a difference between the intent to
commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. Hence, it does
not necessarily follow that his intention to contract a second marriage
is tantamount to an intent to commit bigamy.
For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits
that good faith in the instant case is a convenient but flimsy excuse.
The Solicitor General relies upon our ruling in Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,
[18]
which held that bigamy can be successfully prosecuted provided all
the elements concur, stressing that under Article 40 [19] of the Family
Code, a judicial declaration of nullity is a must before a party may remarry. Whether or not the petitioner was aware of said Article 40 is of
no account as everyone is presumed to know the law. The OSG
counters that petitioners contention that he was in good faith because
he relied on the divorce decree of the Ontario court is negated by his
act of filing Civil Case No. 6020, seeking a judicial declaration of nullity
of his marriage to Lucia.
Before we delve into petitioners defense of good faith and lack of
criminal intent, we must first determine whether all the elements of
bigamy are present in this case. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,[20] we laid
down the elements of bigamy thus:
(1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or
her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially
declared presumptively dead;
(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for
the existence of the first.

Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that during the
pendency of CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, the RTC of Bohol Branch 1, handed
down the following decision in Civil Case No. 6020, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
decreeing the annulment of the marriage entered into by petitioner
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete on August 23, 1990 in Pilar, Bohol and
further directing the Local Civil Registrar of Pilar, Bohol to effect the
cancellation of the marriage contract.
SO ORDERED.[21]
The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony
performed between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead,
what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the
two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus
held that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles
3[22] and 4[23] of the Family Code. As the dissenting opinion in CA-G.R.
CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, This simply means that there was no
marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to
the date of the first marriage. In other words, for all intents and
purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first
marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first
marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law, never married.
[24]
The records show that no appeal was taken from the decision of the
trial court in Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the decision had long become
final and executory.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must
have been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the
petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first
marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage
being declared void ab initio, the two were never married from the
beginning. The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect.
Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes,
petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the
marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first
marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but
logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where
there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be
acquitted of the instant charge.

The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished

from Mercado v. Tan.[25] In the latter case, the judicial declaration of
nullity of the first marriage was likewise obtained after the second
marriage was already celebrated. We held therein that:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary
before a subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters
into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial
declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier
union is characterized by statutes as void. [26]
It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was
actually solemnized not just once, but twice: first before a judge where
a marriage certificate was duly issued and then again six months later
before a priest in religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage
appeared to have transpired, although later declared void ab initio.
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was
performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and
Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The
mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to
a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such
act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly
valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy
unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he
contracts a subsequent marriage.
The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally
construe a penal statute in favor of an accused and weigh every
circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure that
justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present case, we held
that petitioner has not committed bigamy. Further, we also find that we
need not tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith
or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision,
dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
20700, as well as the resolution of the appellate court dated
September 25, 2000, denying herein petitioners motion for
reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner Lucio
Morigo y Cacho is ACQUITTED from the charge of BIGAMY on the
ground that his guilt has not been proven with moral certainty.

SO ORDERED.

RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 167746

Vs.
ROSITA A. ALCANTARA and HON. COURT
OF APPEALS,
Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by

petitioner Restituto Alcantara assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals dated 30 September 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 66724 denying
petitioners appeal and affirming the decision [2] of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 143, in Civil Case No. 97-1325 dated
14 February 2000, dismissing his petition for annulment of marriage.
The antecedent facts are:
A petition for annulment of marriage[3] was filed by petitioner against
respondent Rosita A. Alcantara alleging that on 8 December 1982 he
and respondent, without securing the required marriage license, went
to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who
could arrange a marriage for them. They met a person who, for a fee,
arranged their wedding before a certain Rev.Aquilino Navarro, a
Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC BR Chapel. [4] They got married on
the same day, 8 December 1982. Petitioner and respondent went
through
another
marriage
ceremony
at
the
San
Jose
de Manuguit Church in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage
was likewise celebrated without the parties securing a marriage

license. The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite,

appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a
resident of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a
license with the local civil registrar of the said place. On 14 October
1985, respondent gave birth to their child Rose Ann Alcantara. In 1988,
they parted ways and lived separate lives. Petitioner prayed that after
due hearing, judgment be issued declaring their marriage void and
ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the corresponding marriage
contract[5] and its entry on file.[6]
Answering petitioners petition for annulment of marriage, respondent
asserts the validity of their marriage and maintains that there was a
marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification from the Office
of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. Contrary to petitioners
representation, respondent gave birth to their first child named Rose
Ann Alcantara on 14 October 1985 and to another daughter named
Rachel Ann Alcantara on 27 October 1992.[7] Petitioner has a mistress
with whom he has three children. [8] Petitioner only filed the annulment
of their marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage.[9] Respondent,
in fact, has filed a case for concubinage against petitioner before
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City,
Branch
60.
[10]
Respondent prays that the petition for annulment of marriage be
denied for lack of merit.
On 14 February 2000, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143, rendered its
Decision disposing as follows:
The foregoing considered, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. The Petition is dismissed for lack of merit;
2. Petitioner is ordered to pay respondent the sum of twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00) per month as support for their two (2) children on
the first five (5) days of each month; and
3. To pay the costs.[11]

As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing

the petitioners appeal. His Motion for Reconsideration was likewise
denied in a resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 6 April 2005.[12]

The Court of Appeals held that the marriage license of the parties is
presumed to be regularly issued and petitioner had not presented any
evidence to overcome the presumption. Moreover, the parties marriage
contract being a public document is a prima facie proof of the
questioned marriage under Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
[13]

In his Petition before this Court, petitioner raises the following issues
for resolution:
a. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it
ruled that the Petition for Annulment has no legal and factual basis
despite the evidence on record that there was no marriage license at
the precise moment of the solemnization of the marriage.
b. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it
gave weight to the Marriage License No. 7054133 despite the fact that
the same was not identified and offered as evidence during the trial,
and was not the Marriage license number appearing on the face of the
marriage contract.
c. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it
failed to apply the ruling laid down by this Honorable Court in the case
of Sy vs. Court of Appeals. (G.R. No. 127263, 12 April 2000 [330 SCRA
550]).
d. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it
failed to relax the observance of procedural rules to protect and
promote the substantial rights of the party litigants.[14]
We deny the petition.
Petitioner submits that at the precise time that his marriage with the
respondent was celebrated, there was no marriage license because he
and respondent just went to the Manila City Hall and dealt with a fixer
who arranged everything for them. [15] The wedding took place at the
stairs in Manila City Hall and not in CDCC BR Chapel where
Rev. Aquilino Navarro who solemnized the marriage belongs.[16] He and
respondent did not go to Carmona, Cavite, to apply for a marriage
license. Assuming a marriage license from Carmona, Cavite, was

issued to them, neither he nor the respondent was a resident of the

place.
The
certification
of
the
Municipal
Civil
Registrar
of Carmona, Cavite, cannot be given weight because the certification
states that Marriage License number 7054133 was issued in favor of
Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario[17] but their marriage
contract bears the number 7054033 for their marriage license number.
The marriage involved herein having been solemnized on 8 December
1982, or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law
to determine its validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at
the time of its celebration.
A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of
the
Civil
Code,
the
absence
of
which
renders
the
marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3)[18] in relation to Article
58 of the same Code.[19]
Article 53 of the Civil Code[20] which was the law applicable at the time
of the marriage of the parties states:
Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are
complied with:

In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[22] the Local Civil

Registrar issued a certification of due search and inability to find a
record or entry to the effect that Marriage License No. 3196182 was
issued to the parties. The Court held that the certification of due
search and inability to find a record or entry as to the purported
marriage license, issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, enjoys
probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a
record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Based
on said certification, the Court held that there is absence of a marriage
license that would render the marriage void ab initio.
In Cario v. Cario,[23] the Court considered the marriage of therein
petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased Santiago S. Carino as
void ab initio. The records reveal that the marriage contract of
petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as
certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their
office has no record of such marriage license. The court held that the
certification issued by the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the
non-issuance of the marriage license. Their marriage having been
solemnized without the necessary marriage license and not being one
of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, the
marriage of the petitioner and the deceased is undoubtedly
void ab initio.

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.
The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the States
demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage,
in the maintenance of which the general public is interested. [21]
Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn
the validity of his marriage. The cases where the court considered the
absence of a marriage license as a ground for considering the marriage
void are clear-cut.

In Sy v. Court of Appeals,[24] the marriage license was issued on 17

September 1974, almost one year after the ceremony took place on 15
November 1973. The Court held that the ineluctable conclusion is that
the marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage license.
In all these cases, there was clearly an absence of a marriage license
which rendered the marriage void.
Clearly, from these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered void
on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that
the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the
marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification
from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued
to the parties. In this case, the marriage contract between the
petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license number. A
certification to this effect was also issued by the local civil registrar
of Carmona, Cavite.[25] The certification moreover is precise in that it

specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was

issued,
namely Restituto Alcantara and
Rosita Almario,
further
validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties
herein.
The certification of Municipal
of Carmona, Cavite, reads:

Civil

Registrar Macrino L.

Diaz

This is to certify that as per the registry Records of Marriage filed in

this office, Marriage License No. 7054133 was issued in favor of
Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario on December 8, 1982.
This Certification is being issued upon the request of Mrs. Rosita
A. Alcantara for whatever legal purpose or intents it may serve.[26]

This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed and the issuance of the marriage license was done
in the regular conduct of official business.[27] The presumption of
regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty. However, the presumption
prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it
becomes conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in
support of the presumption and, in case of doubt as to an officers act
being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its
lawfulness.[28] Significantly, apart from these, petitioner, by counsel,
admitted
that
a
marriage
license
was,
indeed,
issued
in Carmona, Cavite.[29]
Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the
marriage license, claims that neither he nor respondent is a resident
of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we still hold that there is no sufficient
basis to annul petitioner and respondents marriage. Issuance of a
marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of
the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the
absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period
for publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the
validity of the marriage.[30] An irregularity in any of the formal
requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or

parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and

administratively liable.[31]
Again, petitioner harps on the discrepancy between the marriage
license number in the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar,
which states that the marriage license issued to the parties is No.
7054133, while the marriage contract states that the marriage license
number of the parties is number 7054033. Once more, this argument
fails to sway us. It is not impossible to assume that the same is a mere
a typographical error, as a closer scrutiny of the marriage contract
reveals the overlapping of the numbers 0 and 1, such that the
marriage license may read either as 7054133 or 7054033. It therefore
does not detract from our conclusion regarding the existence and
issuance of said marriage license to the parties.
Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean
hands,[32] petitioner cannot pretend that he was not responsible or a
party to the marriage celebration which he now insists took place
without the requisite marriage license. Petitioner admitted that the civil
marriage took place because he initiated it. [33] Petitioner is an educated
person. He is a mechanical engineer by profession. He knowingly and
voluntarily went to the Manila City Hall and likewise, knowingly and
voluntarily, went through a marriage ceremony. He cannot benefit from
his action and be allowed to extricate himself from the marriage bond
at his mere say-so when the situation is no longer palatable to his taste
or suited to his lifestyle. We cannot countenance such effrontery. His
attempt to make a mockery of the institution of marriage betrays his
bad faith.[34]
Petitioner and respondent went through a marriage ceremony twice in
a span of less than one year utilizing the same marriage license. There
is no claim that he went through the second wedding ceremony in
church under duress or with a gun to his head. Everything was
executed without nary a whimper on the part of the petitioner.
In fact, for the second wedding of petitioner and respondent, they
presented to the San Jose de Manuguit Church the marriage contract
executed during the previous wedding ceremony before theManila City
Hall. This is confirmed in petitioners testimony as follows
WITNESS

As I remember your honor, they asked us to get the necessary

document prior to the wedding.
COURT
What particular document did the church asked you to produce? I am
referring to the San Jose de Manuguit church.
WITNESS
I dont remember your honor.
COURT
Were you asked by the church to present a Marriage License?
WITNESS
I think they asked us for documents and I said we have already a
Marriage Contract and I dont know if it is good enough for the marriage
and they accepted it your honor.
COURT
In other words, you represented to the San Jose de Manuguit church
that you have with you already a Marriage Contract?
WITNESS
Yes your honor.

The logical conclusion is that petitioner was amenable and a willing

participant to all that took place at that time. Obviously, the church
ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage, thereby cleansing
whatever irregularity or defect attended the civil wedding. [36]
Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner -- that they appeared before a
fixer who arranged everything for them and who facilitated the
ceremony before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the
Gospel of the CDCC Br Chapel -- will not strengthen his posture. The
authority of the officer or clergyman shown to have performed a
marriage ceremony will be presumed in the absence of any showing to
the contrary.[37] Moreover, the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to
investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly and
regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All the solemnizing officer
needs to know is that the license has been issued by the competent
official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of the license that
said official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the contracting
parties had fulfilled the requirements of law.[38]
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in
favor of the validity of the marriage.[39] Every intendment of the law or
fact leans toward the validity of the marriage bonds. The Courts look
upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled;
on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED for
lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September
2004 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 143
of Makati City, dated 14 February 2000, are AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.

COURT
SO ORDERED.
That is why the San Jose de Manuguit church copied the same
marriage License in the Marriage Contract issued which Marriage
License is Number 7054033.
WITNESS
Yes your honor.[35]

UVY N. COSCA, EDMUNDO B. PERALTA, RAMON C. SAMBO, and

APOLLO
A.
VILLAMORA, complainants,
vs.
HON. LUCIO P. PALAYPAYON, JR., Presiding Judge, and NELIA B.
ESMERALDA-BAROY, Clerk of Court II, both of the Municipal
Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, respondents.

Esteban R. Abonal for complainants.

Haide B. Vista-Gumba for respondents.

PER CURIAM, J.:

Complainants Juvy N. Cosca, Edmundo B. Peralta, Ramon C. Sambo,
and Apollo Villamora, are Stenographer I, Interpreter I, Clerk II, and
Process Server, respectively, of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur. Respondents Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon, Jr. and Nelia B.
Esmeralda-Baroy are respectively the Presiding Judge and Clerk of
Court II of the same court.
In an administrative complaint filed with the Office of the Court
Administrator on October 5, 1992, herein respondents were charged
with the following offenses, to wit: (1) illegal solemnization of marriage;
(2) falsification of the monthly reports of cases; (3) bribery in
consideration of an appointment in the court; (4) non-issuance of
receipt for cash bond received; (5) infidelity in the custody of detained
prisoners; and (6) requiring payment of filing fees from exempted
entities. 1
Pursuant to a resolution issued by this Court respondents filed their
respective Comments. 2 A Reply to Answers of Respondents was filed
by complainants. 3 The case was thereafter referred to Executive Judge
David C. Naval of the Regional Trial Court, Naga City, for investigation
report and recommendation. The case was however transferred to First
Assistant Executive Judge Antonio N. Gerona when Judge Naval
inhibited himself for the reason that his wife is a cousin of respondent
Judge Palaypayon, Jr. 4
The contending versions of the parties regarding the factual
antecedents of this administrative matter, as culled from the records
thereof, are set out under each particular charge against respondents.
1. Illegal solemnization of marriage
Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriages even
without the requisite marriage license. Thus, the following couples
were able to get married by the simple expedient of paying the
marriage fees to respondent Baroy, despite the absence of a marriage
license, viz.: Alano P. Abellano and Nelly Edralin, Francisco Selpo and

Julieta Carrido, Eddie Terrobias and Maria Gacer, Renato Gamay and
Maricris Belga, Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario, and Sammy
Bocaya and Gina Bismonte. As a consequence, their marriage
contracts (Exhibits B, C, D, F, G, and A, respectively) did not reflect any
marriage license number. In addition, respondent judge did not sign
their marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization,
the reason being that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license
to be submitted by the parties which was usually several days after the
ceremony. Indubitably, the marriage contracts were not filed with the
local civil registrar. Complainant Ramon Sambo, who prepares the
marriage contracts, called the attention of respondents to the lack of
marriage licenses and its effect on the marriages involved, but the
latter opted to proceed with the celebration of said marriages.
Respondent Nelia Baroy claims that when she was appointed Clerk of
Court II, the employees of the court were already hostile to her,
especially complainant Ramon Sambo who told her that he was filing a
protest against her appointment. She avers that it was only lately when
she discovered that the court had a marriage Register which is in the
custody of Sambo; that it was Sambo who failed to furnish the parties
copies of the marriage contract and to register these with the local civil
registrar; and that apparently Sambo kept these marriage contracts in
preparation for this administrative case. Complainant Sambo, however,
claims that all file copies of the marriage contracts were kept by
respondent Baroy, but the latter insists that she had instructed Sambo
to follow up the submission by the contracting parties of their marriage
licenses as part of his duties but he failed to do so.
Respondent Judge Palaypayon, Jr. contends that the marriage between
Alano P. Abellano and Nelly Edralin falls under Article 34 of the Civil
Code, hence it is exempt from the marriage license requirement; that
he gave strict instructions to complainant Sambo to furnish the couple
a copy of the marriage contract and to file the same with the civil
registrar, but the latter failed to do so; that in order to solve the
problem, the spouses subsequently formalized their marriage by
securing a marriage license and executing their marriage contract, a
copy of which was filed with the civil registrar; that the other five
marriages alluded to in the administrative complaint were not illegally
solemnized because the marriage contracts were not signed by him
and they did not contain the date and place of marriage; that copies of
these marriage contracts are in the custody of complainant Sambo;
that the alleged marriage of Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido, Eddie

Terrobias and Maria Emma Gaor, Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga,
and of Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario were not celebrated by
him since he refused to solemnize them in the absence of a marriage
license; that the marriage of Samy Bocaya and Gina Bismonte was
celebrated even without the requisite license due to the insistence of
the parties in order to avoid embarrassment to their guests but that, at
any rate, he did not sign their marriage contract which remains
unsigned up to the present.
2. Falsification of monthly report for July, 1991 regarding the number
of marriages solemnized and the number of documents notarized.
It is alleged that respondent judge made it appear that he solemnized
seven (7) marriages in the month of July, 1992, when in truth he did
not do so or at most those marriages were null and void; that
respondents likewise made it appear that they have notarized only six
(6) documents for July, 1992, but the Notarial Register will show that
there were one hundred thirteen (113) documents which were
notarized during that month; and that respondents reported a notarial
fee of only P18.50 for each document, although in fact they collected
P20.00 therefor and failed to account for the difference.
Respondent Baroy contends, however, that the marriage registry
where all marriages celebrated by respondent judge are entered is
under the exclusive control and custody of complainant Ramon Sambo,
hence he is the only one who should be held responsible for the entries
made therein; that the reported marriages are merely based on the
payments made as solemnization fees which are in the custody of
respondent Baroy. She further avers that it is Sambo who is likewise
the custodian of the Notarial Register; that she cannot be held
accountable for whatever alleged difference there is in the notarial fees
because she is liable only for those payments tendered to her by
Sambo himself; that the notarial fees she collects are duly covered by
receipts; that of the P20.00 charged, P18.50 is remitted directly to the
Supreme Court as part of the Judiciary Development Fund and P150
goes to the general fund of the Supreme Court which is paid to the
Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Respondent theorizes
that the discrepancies in the monthly report were manipulated by
complainant Sambo considering that he is the one in charge of the
preparation of the monthly report.
Respondent Judge Palaypayon avers that the erroneous number of
marriages celebrated was intentionally placed by complainant Sambo;

that the number of marriages solemnized should not be based on

solemnization fees paid for that month since not all the marriages paid
for are solemnized in the same month. He claims that there were
actually only six (6) documents notarized in the month of July, 1992
which tallied with the official receipts issued by the clerk of court; that
it is Sambo who should be held accountable for any unreceipted
payment for notarial fees because he is the one in charge of the
Notarial Register; and that this case filed by complainant Sambo is
merely in retaliation for his failure to be appointed as the clerk of court.
Furthermore, respondent judge contends that he is not the one
supervising or preparing the monthly report, and that he merely has
the ministerial duty to sign the same.
3. Bribery in consideration of an appointment in the court
Complainants allege that because of the retirement of the clerk of
court, respondent judge forwarded to the Supreme Court the
applications of Rodel Abogado, Ramon Sambo, and Jessell Abiog.
However, they were surprised when respondent Baroy reported for
duty as clerk of court on October 21, 1991. They later found out that
respondent Baroy was the one appointed because she gave a brandnew air-conditioning unit to respondent judge.
Respondent Baroy claims that when she was still in Naga City she
purchased an air-conditioning unit but when she was appointed clerk of
court she had to transfer to Tinambac and, since she no longer needed
the air conditioner, she decided to sell the same to respondent judge.
The installation and use thereof by the latter in his office was with the
consent of the Mayor of Tinambac.
Respondent judge contends that he endorsed all the applications for
the position of clerk of court to the Supreme Court which has the sole
authority over such appointments and that he had no hand in the
appointment of respondent Baroy. He contends that the airconditioning
unit
was
bought
from
his
co-respondent on installment basis on May 29, 1992, eight (8) months
after Baroy had been appointed clerk of court. He claims that he would
not be that naive to exhibit to the public as item which could not be
defended as a matter of honor and prestige.
4. Cash bond issued without a receipt

It is alleged that in Criminal Case No. 5438, entitled "People vs.

Mendeza, et al., "bondswoman Januaria Dacara was allowed by
respondent judge to change her property bond to cash bond; that she
paid the amount of P1,000.00 but was never issued a receipt therefor
nor was it made to appear in the records that the bond has been paid;
that despite the lapse of two years, the money was never returned to
the bondswoman; and that it has not been shown that the money was
turned over to the Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac.
Respondent Baroy counters that the cash bond was deposited with the
former clerk of court, then turned over to the acting clerk of court and,
later, given to her under a corresponding receipt; that the cash bond is
deposited with the bank; and that should the bondswoman desire to
withdraw the same, she should follow the proper procedure therefor.
Respondent judge contends that Criminal Case No. 5438 was archieved
for failure of the bondsman to deliver the body of the accused in court
despite notice; and that he has nothing to do with the payment of the
cash bond as this is the duty of the clerk of court.
5. Infidelity in the custody of prisoners
Complainants contend that respondent judge usually got detention
prisoners to work in his house, one of whom was Alex Alano, who is
accused in Criminal Case No. 5647 for violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act; that while Alano was in the custody of respondent judge,
the former escaped and was never recaptured; that in order to conceal
this fact, the case was archived pursuant to an order issued by
respondent judge dated April 6, 1992.
Respondent judge denied the accusation and claims that he never
employed detention prisoners and that he has adequate household
help; and that he had to order the case archived because it had been
pending for more than six (6) months and the accused therein
remained at large.
6. Unlawful collection of docket fees
Finally, respondents are charged with collecting docket fees from the
Rural Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, Inc. although such entity is
exempt by law from the payment of said fees, and that while the
corresponding receipt was issued, respondent Baroy failed to remit the
amount to the Supreme Court and, instead, she deposited the same in
her personal account.

Respondents Baroy contends that it was Judge-Designate Felimon

Montenegro (because respondent judge was on sick leave) who
instructed her to demand payment of docket fees from said rural bank;
that the bank issued a check for P800.00; that she was not allowed by
the Philippine National Bank to encash the check and, instead, was
instructed to deposit the same in any bank account for clearing; that
respondent deposited the same in her account; and that after the
check was cleared, she remitted P400.00 to the Supreme Court and the
other P400.00 was paid to the Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac.
On the basis of the foregoing contentions, First Vice-Executive Judge
Antonio N. Gerona prepared and submitted to us his Report and
Recommendations dated May 20, 1994, together with the
administrative matter. We have perspicaciously reviewed the same and
we are favorably impressed by the thorough and exhaustive
presentation and analysis of the facts and evidence in said report. We
commend the investigating judge for his industry and perspicacity
reflected by his findings in said report which, being amply
substantiated by the evidence and supported by logical illations, we
hereby approve and hereunder reproduce at length the material
portions thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
The first charge against the respondents is illegal solemnization of
marriage. Judge Palaypayon is charged with having solemnized without
a marriage license the marriage of Sammy Bocaya and Gina Besmonte
(Exh. A). Alano Abellano and Nelly Edralin (Exh. B), Francisco Selpo and
Julieta Carrido (Exh. C), Eddie Terrobias and Maria Emma Gaor (Exh. D),
Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga (Exh. F) and Arsenio Sabater and
Margarita Nacario (Exh. G).
In all these aforementioned marriages, the blank space in the marriage
contracts to show the number of the marriage was solemnized as
required by Article 22 of the Family Code were not filled up. While the
contracting parties and their witnesses signed their marriage
contracts, Judge Palaypayon did not affix his signature in the marriage
contracts, except that of Abellano and Edralin when Judge Palaypayon
signed their marriage certificate as he claims that he solemnized this
marriage under Article 34 of the Family Code of the Philippines. In said
marriages the contracting parties were not furnished a copy of their
marriage contract and the Local Civil Registrar was not sent either a

copy of the marriage certificate as required by Article 23 of the Family

Code.
The marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte is shown to have been
solemnized by Judge Palaypayon without a marriage license. The
testimonies of Bocay himself and Pompeo Ariola, one of the witnesses
of the marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte, and the photographs taken
when Judge Palaypayon solemnized their marriage (Exhs. K-3 to K-9)
sufficiently show that Judge Palaypayon really solemnized their
marriage. Bocaya declared that they were advised by Judge
Palaypayon to return after ten (10) days after their marriage was
solemnized and bring with them their marriage license. In the
meantime, they already started living together as husband and wife
believing that the formal requisites of marriage were complied with.
Judge Palaypayon denied that he solemnized the marriage of Bocaya
and Besmonte because the parties allegedly did not have a marriage
license. He declared that in fact he did not sign the marriage
certificate, there was no date stated on it and both the parties and the
Local Civil Registrar did not have a copy of the marriage certificate.
With respect to the photographs which show that he solemnized the
marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte, Judge Palaypayon explains that
they merely show as if he was solemnizing the marriage. It was
actually a simulated solemnization of marriage and not a real one. This
happened because of the pleading of the mother of one of the
contracting parties that he consent to be photographed to show that as
if he was solemnizing the marriage as he was told that the food for the
wedding reception was already prepared, visitors were already invited
and the place of the parties where the reception would be held was
more than twenty (20) kilometers away from the poblacion of
Tinambac.
The denial made by Judge Palaypayon is difficult to believe. The fact
alone that he did not sign the marriage certificate or contract, the
same did not bear a date and the parties and the Local Civil Registrar
were not furnished a copy of the marriage certificate, do not by
themselves show that he did not solemnize the marriage. His
uncorroborated testimony cannot prevail over the testimony of Bocaya
and Ariola who also declared, among others, that Bocaya and his bride
were advised by Judge Palaypayon to return after ten (10) days with
their marriage license and whose credibility had not been impeached.

The pictures taken also from the start of the wedding ceremony up to
the signing of the marriage certificate in front of Judge Palaypayon and
on his table (Exhs. K-3, K-3-a, K-3-b, K-3-c, K-4, K-4-a, K-4-b, K-4-c,
K-4-d, K-5, K-5-a, K-5-b, K-6, K-7, K-8, K-8-a and K-9), cannot possibly be
just to show a simulated solemnization of marriage. One or two
pictures may convince a person of the explanation of Judge
Palaypayon, but not all those pictures.
Besides, as a judge it is very difficult to believe that Judge Palaypayon
would allows himself to be photographed as if he was solemnizing a
marriage on a mere pleading of a person whom he did not even know
for the alleged reasons given. It would be highly improper and
unbecoming of him to allow himself to be used as an instrument of
deceit by making it appear that Bocaya and Besmonte were married by
him when in truth and in fact he did not solemnize their marriage.
With respect to the marriage of Abellano and Edralin (Exh. B), Judge
Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized their marriage, but he claims
that it was under Article 34 of the Family Code, so a marriage license
was not required. The contracting parties here executed a joint
affidavit that they have been living together as husband and wife for
almost six (6) years already (Exh. 12; Exh. AA).
In their marriage contract which did not bear any date either when it
was solemnized, it was stated that Abellano was only eighteen (18)
years, two (2) months and seven (7) days old. If he and Edralin had
been living together as husband and wife for almost six (6) years
already before they got married as they stated in their joint affidavit,
Abellano must ha(ve) been less than thirteen (13) years old when he
started living with Edralin as his wife and this is hard to believe. Judge
Palaypayon should ha(ve) been aware of this when he solemnized their
marriage as it was his duty to ascertain the qualification of the
contracting parties who might ha(ve) executed a false joint affidavit in
order to have an instant marriage by avoiding the marriage license
requirement.
On May 23, 1992, however, after this case was already filed, Judge
Palaypayon married again Abellano and Edralin, this time with a
marriage license (Exh. BB). The explanation given by Judge Palaypayon
why he solemnized the marriage of the same couple for the second
time is that he did not consider the first marriage he solemnized under
Article 34 of the Family Code as (a) marriage at all because
complainant Ramon Sambo did not follow his instruction that the date

should be placed in the marriage certificate to show when he

solemnized the marriage and that the contracting parties were not
furnished a copy of their marriage certificate.
This act of Judge Palaypayon of solemnizing the marriage of Abellano
and Edralin for the second time with a marriage license already only
gave rise to the suspicion that the first time he solemnized the
marriage it was only made to appear that it was solemnized under
exceptional character as there was not marriage license and Judge
Palaypayon had already signed the marriage certificate. If it was true
that he solemnized the first marriage under exceptional character
where a marriage license was not required, why did he already require
the parties to have a marriage license when he solemnized their
marriage for the second time?
The explanation of Judge Palaypayon that the first marriage of Abellano
and Edralin was not a marriage at all as the marriage certificate did not
state the date when the marriage was solemnized and that the
contracting parties were not furnished a copy of their marriage
certificate, is not well taken as they are not any of those grounds under
Article(s) 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the Family Code which declare a
marriage void from the beginning. Even if no one, however, received a
copy of the marriage certificate, the marriage is still valid (Jones vs.
H(o)rtiguela, 64 Phil. 179). Judge Palaypayon cannot just absolve
himself from responsibility by blaming his personnel. They are not the
guardian(s) of his official function and under Article 23 of the Family
Code it is his duty to furnish the contracting parties (a) copy of their
marriage contract.
With respect to the marriage of Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido
(Exh. C), and Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario (Exh. G), Selpo
and Carrido and Sabater and Nacarcio executed joint affidavits that
Judge Palaypayon did not solemnize their marriage (Exh. 13-A and Exh.
1). Both Carrido and Nacario testified for the respondents that actually
Judge Palaypayon did not solemnize their marriage as they did not
have a marriage license. On cross-examination, however, both
admitted that they did not know who prepared their affidavits. They
were just told, Carrido by a certain Charito Palaypayon, and Nacario by
a certain Kagawad Encinas, to just go to the Municipal building and
sign their joint affidavits there which were already prepared before the
Municipal Mayor of Tinambac, Camarines Sur.

With respect to the marriage of Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga (Exh.
f), their marriage contract was signed by them and by their two (2)
witnesses, Atty. Elmer Brioso and respondent Baroy (Exhs. F-1 and F-2).
Like the other aforementioned marriages, the solemnization fee was
also paid as shown by a receipt dated June 7, 1992 and signed by
respondent Baroy (Exh. F-4).
Judge Palaypayon also denied having solemnized the marriage of
Gamay and Belga allegedly because there was no marriage license. On
her part, respondent Baroy at first denied that the marriage was
solemnized. When she was asked, however, why did she sign the
marriage contract as a witness she answered that she thought the
marriage was already solemnized (TSN, p. 14; 10-28-93).
Respondent Baroy was, and is, the clerk of court of Judge Palaypayon.
She signed the marriage contract of Gamay and Belga as one of the
two principal sponsors. Yet, she wanted to give the impression that she
did not even know that the marriage was solemnized by Judge
Palaypayon. This is found very difficult to believe.
Judge Palaypayon made the same denial of having solemnized also the
marriage of Terrobias and Gaor (Exh. D). The contracting parties and
their witnesses also signed the marriage contract and paid the
solemnization fee, but Judge Palaypayon allegedly did not solemnize
their marriage due to lack of marriage license. Judge Palaypayon
submitted the affidavit of William Medina, Vice-Mayor of Tinambac, to
corroborate his testimony (Exh. 14). Medina, however, did not testify in
this case and so his affidavit has no probative value.
Judge Palaypayon testified that his procedure and practice have been
that before the contracting parties and their witnesses enter his
chamber in order to get married, he already required complainant
Ramon Sambo to whom he assigned the task of preparing the marriage
contract, to already let the parties and their witnesses sign their
marriage contracts, as what happened to Gamay and Belga, and
Terrobias and Gaor, among others. His purpose was to save his
precious time as he has been solemnizing marriages at the rate of
three
(3)
to
four
(4)
times
everyday
(TSN,
p.
12;
2-1-94).
This alleged practice and procedure, if true, is highly improper and
irregular, if not illegal, because the contracting parties are supposed to
be first asked by the solemnizing officer and declare that they take

each other as husband and wife before the solemnizing officer in the
presence of at least two (2) witnesses before they are supposed to sign
their marriage contracts (Art. 6, Family Code).

register of the MTC of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, however, shows that

there were actually one hundred thirteen (113) documents notarized
by Judge Palaypayon for the said month (Exhs. Q to Q-45).

The uncorroborated testimony, however, of Judge Palaypayon as to his

alleged practice and procedure before solemnizing a marriage, is not
true as shown by the picture taken during the wedding of Bocaya and
Besmonte (Exhs. K-3 to K-9) and by the testimony of respondent Baroy
herself who declared that the practice of Judge Palaypayon ha(s) been
to let the contracting parties and their witnesses sign the marriage
contract only after Judge Palaypayon has solemnized their marriage
(TSN,
p.
53;
10-28-93).

Judge Palaypayon claims that there was no falsification of the monthly

report of cases for July, 1992 because there were only six (6) notarized
documents that were paid (for) as shown by official receipts. He did
not, however, present evidence of the alleged official receipts showing
that the notarial fee for the six (6) documetns were paid. Besides, the
monthly report of cases with respect to the number of documents
notarized should not be based on how many notarized documents were
paid of the notarial fees, but the number of documents placed or
recorded in the notarial register.

Judge Palaypayon did not present any evidence to show also that he
was really solemnizing three (3) to four (4) marriages everyday. On the
contrary his monthly report of cases for July, 1992 shows that his court
had only twenty-seven (27) pending cases and he solemnized only
seven (7) marriages for the whole month (Exh. E). His monthly report
of cases for September, 1992 shows also that he solemnized only four
(4) marriages during the whole month (Exh. 7).

Judge Palaypayon admitted that he was not personally verifying and

checking anymore the correctness of the monthly reports because he
relies on his co-respondent who is the Clerk of Court and whom he has
assumed to have checked and verified the records. He merely signs the
monthly report when it is already signed by respondent Baroy.

In this first charge of having illegally solemnized marriages, respondent

Judge Palaypayon has presented and marked in evidence several
marriage contracts of other persons, affidavits of persons and
certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar (Exhs. 12-B to 12-H).
These persons who executed affidavits, however, did not testify in this
case. Besides, the marriage contracts and certification mentioned are
immaterial as Judge Palaypayon is not charged of having solemnized
these marriages illegally also. He is not charged that the marriages he
solemnized were all illegal.
The second charge against herein respondents, that of having falsified
the monthly report of cases submitted to the Supreme Court and not
stating in the monthly report the actual number of documents
notarized and issuing the corresponding receipts of the notarial fees,
have been sufficiently proven by the complainants insofar as the
monthly report of cases for July and September, 1992 are concerned.
The monthly report of cases of the MTC of Tinambac, Camarines Sur for
July, 1992 both signed by the respondents, show that for said month
there were six (6) documents notarized by Judge Palaypayon in his
capacity as Ex-Officio Notary Public (Exhs. H to H-1-b). The notarial

The explanation of Judge Palaypayon is not well taken because he is

required to have close supervision in the preparation of the monthly
report of cases of which he certifies as to their correctness. As a judge
he is personally responsible for the proper discharge of his functions
(The Phil. Trial Lawyer's Asso. Inc. vs. Agana, Sr., 102 SCRA 517). In
Nidera vs. Lazaro, 174 SCRA 581, it was held that "A judge cannot take
refuge behind the inefficiency or mismanagement of his court
personnel."
On the part of respondent Baroy, she puts the blame of the falsification
of the monthly report of cases on complainant Sambo whom she
allegedly assigned to prepare not only the monthly report of cases, but
the preparation and custody of marriage contracts, notarized
documents and the notarial register. By her own admission she has
assigned to complainant Sambo duties she was supposed to perform,
yet according to her she never bother(ed) to check the notarial register
of the court to find out the number of documents notarized in a month
(TSN, p. 30; 11-23-93).
Assuming that respondent Baroy assigned the preparation of the
monthly report of cases to Sambo, which was denied by the latter as
he claims that he only typed the monthly report based on the data

given to him by her, still it is her duty to verify and check whether the
report is correct.
The explanation of respondent Baroy that Sambo was the one in
custody of marriage contracts, notarized documents and notarial
register, among other things, is not acceptable not only because as
clerk of court she was supposed to be in custody, control and
supervision of all court records including documents and other
properties of the court (p. 32, Manual for Clerks of Court), but she
herself admitted that from January, 1992 she was already in full control
of all the records of the court including receipts (TSN, p. 11; 11-23-93).
The evidence adduced in this cases in connection with the charge of
falsification, however, also shows that respondent Baroy did not
account for what happened to the notarial fees received for those
documents notarized during the month of July and September, 1992.
The evidence adduced in this case also sufficiently show that she
received cash bond deposits and she did not deposit them to a bank or
to the Municipal Treasurer; and that she only issued temporary receipts
for said cash bond deposits.
For July, 1992 there were only six (6) documents reported to have been
notarized by Judge Palaypayon although the documents notarized for
said month were actually one hundred thirteen (113) as recorded in the
notarial register. For September, 1992, there were only five (5)
documents reported as notarized for that month, though the notarial
register show(s) that there were fifty-six (56) documents actually
notarized. The fee for each document notarized as appearing in the
notarial register was P18.50. Respondent Baroy and Sambo declared
that what was actually being charged was P20.00. Respondent Baroy
declared that P18.50 went to the Supreme Court and P1.50 was being
turned over to the Municipal Treasurer.
Baroy, however, did not present any evidence to show that she really
sent to the Supreme Court the notarial fees of P18.50 for each
document notarized and to the Municipal Treasurer the additional
notarial fee of P1.50. This should be fully accounted for considering
that Baroy herself declared that some notarial fees were allowed by
her at her own discretion to be paid later. Similarly, the solemnization
fees have not been accounted for by Baroy considering that she
admitted that even (i)n those instances where the marriages were not
solemnized due to lack of marriage license the solemnization fees were
not returned anymore, unless the contracting parties made a demand

for their return. Judge Palaypayon declared that he did not know of any
instance when solemnization fee was returned when the marriage was
not solemnized due to lack of marriage license.
Respondent Baroy also claims that Ramon Sambo did not turn over to
her some of the notarial fees. This is difficult to believe. It was not only
because Sambo vehemently denied it, but the minutes of the
conference of the personnel of the MTC of Tinambac dated January 20,
1992 shows that on that date Baroy informed the personnel of the
court that she was taking over the functions she assigned to Sambo,
particularly the collection of legal fees (Exh. 7). The notarial fees she
claims that Sambo did not turn over to her were for those documents
notarized (i)n July and September, 1992 already. Besides there never
was any demand she made for Sambo to turn over some notarial fees
supposedly in his possession. Neither was there any memorandum she
issued on this matter, in spite of the fact that she has been holding
meetings and issuing memoranda to the personnel of the court (Exhs.
V, W, FF, FF-1, FF-2, FF-3; Exhs. 4-A (supplement(s), 5-8, 6-S, 7-S and
8-S).
It is admitted by respondent Baroy that on October 29, 1991 a cash
bond deposit of a certain Dacara in the amount of One Thousand
(P1,000.00) Pesos was turned over to her after she assumed office and
for this cash bond she issued only a temporary receipt (Exh. Y). She did
not deposit this cash bond in any bank or to the Municipal Treasurer.
She just kept it in her own cash box on the alleged ground that the
parties in that case where the cash bond was deposited informed her
that they would settle the case amicably.
Respondent Baroy declared that she finally deposited the
aforementioned cash bond of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos with the
Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) in February, 1993, after this
administrative case was already filed (TSN, pp. 27-28; 12-22-93). The
Pass Book, however, shows that actually Baroy opened an account with
the LBP, Naga Branch, only on March 26, 1993 when she deposited an
amount of Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos (Exhs. 8 to 8-1-a). She
claims that One Thousand (P1,000.000) Pesos of the initial deposit was
the cash bond of Dacara. If it were true, it was only after keeping to
herself the cash bond of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos for around
one year and five months when she finally deposited it because of the
filing of this case.

On April 29, 1993, or only one month and two days after she finally
deposited the One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos cash bond of Dacara,
she withdrew it from the bank without any authority or order from the
court. It was only on July 23, 1993, or after almost three (3) months
after she withdrew it, when she redeposited said cash bond (TSN, p. 6;
1-4-94).
The evidence presented in this case also show that on February 28,
1993 respondent Baroy received also a cash bond of Three Thousand
(P3,000.00) Pesos from a certain Alfredo Seprones in Crim. Case No.
5180. For this cash bond deposit, respondent Baroy issued only an
annumbered temporary receipt (Exh. X and X-1). Again Baroy just kept
this Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos cash bond to herself. She did
not deposit it either (in) a bank or (with) the Municipal Treasurer. Her
explanation was that the parties in Crim. Case No. 5180 informed her
that they would settle the case amicably. It was on April 26, 1993, or
almost two months later when Judge Palaypayon issued an order for
the release of said cash bond (Exh. 7).
Respondent Baroy also admitted that since she assumed office on
October 21, 1991 she used to issue temporary receipt only for cash
bond deposits and other payments and collections she received. She
further admitted that some of these temporary receipts she issued she
failed to place the number of the receipts such as that receipt marked
Exhibit X (TSN, p. 35; 11-23-93). Baroy claims that she did not know
that she had to use the official receipts of the Supreme Court. It was
only from February, 1993, after this case was already filed, when she
only started issuing official receipts.
The next charge against the respondents is that in order to be
appointed Clerk of Court, Baroy gave Judge Palaypayon an air
conditioner as a gift. The evidence adduced with respect to this charge,
show that on August 24, 1991 Baroy bought an air conditioner for the
sum of Seventeen Thousand Six Hundred (P17,600.00) Pesos (Exhs. I
and I-1). The same was paid partly in cash and in check (Exhs. I-2 and
I-3). When the air conditioner was brought to court in order to be
installed in the chamber of Judge Palaypayon, it was still placed in the
same box when it was bought and was not used yet.
The respondents claim that Baroy sold it to Judge Palaypayon for
Twenty Thousand (P20,00.00) Pesos on installment basis with a down
payment of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos and as proof thereof the
respondents presented a typewritten receipt dated May 29, 1993 (Exh.

22). The receipt was signed by both respondents and by the Municipal
Mayor of Tinambac, Camarines Sur and another person as witness.
The alleged sale between respondents is not beyond suspicion. It was
bought by Baroy at a time when she was applying for the vacant
position of Clerk of Court (to) which she was eventually appointed in
October, 1991. From the time she bought the air conditioner on August
24, 1991 until it was installed in the office of Judge Palaypayon it was
not used yet. The sale to Judge Palaypayon was only evidenced by a
mere typewritten receipt dated May 29, 1992 when this case was
already filed. The receipt could have been easily prepared. The
Municipal Mayor of Tinambac who signed in the receipt as a witness did
not testify in this case. The sale is between the Clerk of Court and the
Judge of the same court. All these circumstances give rise to suspicion
of at least impropriety. Judges should avoid such action as would
subject (them) to suspicion and (their) conduct should be free from the
appearance of impropriety (Jaagueta vs. Boncasos, 60 SCRA 27).
With respect to the charge that Judge Palaypayon received a cash bond
deposit of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos from Januaria Dacara
without issuing a receipt, Dacara executed an affidavit regarding this
charge that Judge Palaypayon did not give her a receipt for the
P1,000.00 cash bond she deposited (Exh. N). Her affidavit, however,
has no probative value as she did not show that this cash bond of
P1,000.00 found its way into the hands of respondent Baroy who
issued only a temporary receipt for it and this has been discussed
earlier.
Another charge against Judge Palaypayon is the getting of detention
prisoners to work in his house and one of them escaped while in his
custody and was never found again. To hide this fact, the case against
said accused was ordered archived by Judge Palaypayon. The evidence
adduced with respect to this particular charge, show that in Crim. Case
No. 5647 entitled People vs. Stephen Kalaw, Alex Alano and Allan
Adupe, accused Alex Alano and Allan Adupe were arrested on April 12,
1991 and placed in the municipal jail of Tinambac, Camarines Sur
(Exhs. 0, 0-1, 0-2 and 0-3; Exh. 25). The evidence presented that Alex
Alano was taken by Judge Palaypayon from the municipal jail where
said accused was confined and that he escaped while in custody of
Judge Palaypayon is solely testimonial, particularly that of David Ortiz,
a former utility worker of the MTC of Tinambac.

Herein investigator finds said evidence not sufficient. The complainants

should have presented records from the police of Tinambac to show
that Judge Palaypayon took out from the municipal jail Alex Alano
where he was under detention and said accused escaped while in the
custody of Judge Palaypayon.
The order, however, of Judge Palaypayon dated April 6, 1992 in Crim.
Case No. 5047 archiving said case appears to be without basis. The
order states: "this case was filed on April 12, 1991 and the records
show that the warrant of arrest (was) issued against the accused, but
up to this moment there is no return of service for the warrant of arrest
issued against said accused" (Exh. 0-4). The records of said case,
however, show that in fact there was a return of the service of the
warrant of arrest dated April 12, 1991 showing that Alano and Adupe
were arrested (Exh. 0-3).
Judge Palaypayon explained that his order dated April 6, 1992
archiving Crim. Case No. 5047 referred only to one of the accused who
remained at large. The explanation cannot be accepted because the
two other accused, Alano and Adupe, were arrested. Judge Palaypayon
should have issued an order for the arrest of Adupe who allegedly
jumped bail, but Alano was supposed to be confined in the municipal
jail if his claim is true that he did not take custody of Alano.
The explanation also of Judge Palaypayon why he ordered the case
archived was because he heard from the police that Alano escaped.
This explanation is not acceptable either. He should ha(ve) set the case
and if the police failed to bring to court Alano, the former should have
been required to explain in writing why Alano was not brought to court.
If the explanation was that Alano escaped from jail, he should have
issued an order for his arrest. It is only later on when he could not be
arrested when the case should have been ordered archived. The order
archiving this case for the reason that he only heard that Alano
escaped is another circumstance which gave rise to a suspicion that
Alano might have really escaped while in his custody only that the
complainants could not present records or other documentary
evidence to prove the same.
The last charge against the respondents is that they collected filing
fees on collection cases filed by the Rural Bank of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur which was supposed to be exempted in paying filing
fees under existing laws and that the filing fees received was deposited
by respondent Baroy in her personal account in the bank. The evidence

presented show that on February 4, 1992 the Rural Bank of Tinambac

filed ten (10) civil cases for collection against farmers and it paid the
total amount of Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos representing filing fees.
The complainants cited Section 14 of Republic Act 720, as amended,
which exempts Rural Banks (from) the payment of filing fees on
collection of sums of money cases filed against farmers on loans they
obtained.
Judge Palaypayon, however, had nothing to do with the payment of the
filing fees of the Rural Bank of Tinambac as it was respondent Baroy
who received them and besides, on February 4, 1992, he was on sick
leave. On her part Baroy claims that the bank paid voluntarily the filing
fees. The records, however, shows that respondent Baroy sent a letter
to the manager of the bank dated January 28, 1992 to the effect that if
the bank would not pay she would submit all Rural Bank cases for
dismissal (Annex 6, comment by respondent Baroy).
Respondent Baroy should have checked whether the Rural Bank of
Tinambac was really exempt from the payment of filing fees pursuant
to Republic Act 720, as amended, instead of threatening the bank to
have its cases be submitted to the court in order to have them
dismissed. Here the payment of the filing fees was made on February
4, 1992, but the Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos was only turned over to
the Municipal Treasurer on March 12, 1992. Here, there is an undue
delay again in complying with her obligation as accountable officer.
In view of the foregoing findings that the evidence presented by the
complainants sufficiently show that respondent Judge Lucio P.
Palaypayon, Jr. had solemnized marriages, particularly that of Sammy
Bocaya and Gina Besmonte, without a marriage license, and that it
having been shown that he did not comply with his duty in closely
supervising his clerk of court in the preparation of the monthly report
of cases being submitted to the Supreme Court, particularly for the
months of July and September, 1992 where it has been proven that the
reports for said two (2) months were falsified with respect to the
number of documents notarized, it is respectfully recommended that
he be imposed a fine of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS with a
warning that the same or similar offenses will be more severely dealt
with.
The fact that Judge Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts or
certificates of those marriages he solemnized without a marriage
license, there were no dates placed in the marriage contracts to show

when they were solemnized, the contracting parties were not furnished
their marriage contracts and the Local Civil Registrar was not being
sent any copy of the marriage contract, will not absolve him from
liability. By solemnizing alone a marriage without a marriage license he
as the solemnizing officer is the one responsible for the irregularity in
not complying (with) the formal requ(i)sites of marriage and under
Article 4(3) of the Family Code of the Philippines, he shall be civilly,
criminally and administratively liable.
Judge Palaypayon is likewise liable for his negligence or failure to
comply with his duty of closely supervising his clerk of court in the
performance of the latter's duties and functions, particularly the
preparation of the monthly report of cases (Bendesula vs. Laya, 58
SCRA 16). His explanation that he only signed the monthly report of
cases only when his clerk of court already signed the same, cannot be
accepted. It is his duty to closely supervise her, to check and verify the
records if the monthly reports prepared by his clerk of court do not
contain false statements. It was held that "A judge cannot take refuge
behind the inefficiency or incompetence of court personnel (Nidua vs.
Lazaro, 174 SCRA 158).
In view also of the foregoing finding that respondent Nelia EsmeraldaBaroy, the clerk of court of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur, has been found to have falsified the monthly report of
cases for the months of July and September, 1992 with respect to the
number of documents notarized, for having failed to account (for) the
notarial fees she received for said two (2) months period; for having
failed to account (for) the solemnization fees of those marriages
allegedly not solemnized, but the solemnization fees were not
returned; for unauthorized issuance of temporary receipts, some of
which were issued unnumbered; for receiving the cash bond of Dacara
on October 29, 1991 in the amount of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos
for which she issued only a temporary receipt (Exh. Y) and for
depositing it with the Land Bank of the Philippines only on March 26,
1993, or after one year and five months in her possession and after
this case was already filed; for withdrawing said cash bond of One
Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos on April 29, 1993 without any court order
or authority and redepositing it only on July 23, 1993; for receiving a
cash bond of Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos from Alfredo Seprones
in Crim. Case No. 5180, MTC, Tinambac, Camarines Sur, for which she
issued only an unnumbered temporary receipt (Exhs. X and X-1) and
for not depositing it with a bank or with the Municipal Treasurer until it

was ordered released; and for requiring the Rural Bank of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur to pay filing fees on February 4, 1992 for collection
cases filed against farmers in the amount of Four Hundred (P400.00)
Pesos, but turning over said amount to the Municipal Treasurer only on
March 12, 1992, it is respectfully recommended that said respondent
clerk of court Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy be dismissed from the service.
It is provided that "Withdrawal of court deposits shall be by the clerk of
court who shall issue official receipt to the provincial, city or municipal
treasurer for the amount withdrawn. Court deposits cannot be
withdrawn except by order of the court, . . . ." (Revised Manual of
Instructions for Treasurers, Sec. 183, 184 and 626; p. 127, Manual for
Clerks of Court). A circular also provides that the Clerks of Court shall
immediately issue an official receipt upon receipt of deposits from
party litigants and thereafter deposit intact the collection with the
municipal, city or provincial treasurer and their deposits, can only be
withdrawn upon proper receipt and order of the Court (DOJ Circular No.
52, 26 April 1968; p. 136, Manual for Clerks of Court). Supreme Court
Memorandum Circular No. 5, 25 November 1982, also provides that "all
collections of funds of fiduciary character including rental deposits,
shall be deposited immediately by the clerk of court concerned upon
receipt thereof with City, Municipal or Provincial Treasurer where his
court is located" and that "no withdrawal of any of such deposits shall
be made except upon lawful order of the court exercising jurisdiction
over the subject matter.
Respondent Baroy had either failed to comply with the foregoing
circulars, or deliberately disregarded, or even intentionally violated
them. By her conduct, she demonstrated her callous unconcern for the
obligations and responsibility of her duties and functions as a clerk of
court and accountable officer. The gross neglect of her duties shown by
her constitute(s) a serious misconduct which warrant(s) her removal
from office. In the case of Belen P. Ferriola vs. Norma Hiam, Clerk of
Court, MTCC, Branch I, Batangas City; A.M. No. P-90-414; August 9,
1993, it was held that "The clerk of court is not authorized to keep
funds in his/her custody; monies received by him/her shall be
deposited immediately upon receipt thereof with the City, Municipal or
Provincial Treasurer. Supreme Court Circular Nos. 5 dated November
25, 1982 and 5-A dated December 3, 1982. Respondent Hiam's failure
to remit the cash bail bonds and fine she collected constitutes serious
misconduct and her misappropriation of said funds constitutes
dishonesty. "Respondent Norma Hiam was found guilty of dishonesty

and serious misconduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service

and (the Court) ordered her immediate dismissal (from) the service.
xxx xxx xxx
We here emphasize once again our adjuration that the conduct and
behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the
dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk,
should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. His
conduct, at all times, must not only be characterized by propriety and
decorum but, above all else, must be beyond suspicion. Every
employee should be an example of integrity, uprightness and
honesty. 5 Integrity in a judicial office is more than a virtue, it is a
necessity. 6 It applies, without qualification as to rank or position, from
the judge to the least of its personnel, they being standard-bearers of
the exacting norms of ethics and morality imposed upon a Court of
justice.
On the charge regarding illegal marriages the Family Code pertinently
provides that the formal requisites of marriage are, inter alia, a valid
marriage
license
except
in
the
cases
provided
for
therein. 7 Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any of the
essential or formal requisites shall generally render the marriage
void ab initio and that, while an irregularity in the formal requisites
shall not affect the validity of the marriage, the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and
administratively liable. 8
The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those
affected by the illegal marriages, and what we are providing for herein
pertains to the administrative liability of respondents, all without
prejudice to their criminal responsibility. The Revised Penal Code
provides that "(p)riests or ministers of any religious denomination or
sect, or civil authorities who shall perform or authorize any illegal
marriage ceremony shall be punished in accordance with the
provisions of the Marriage Law." 9 This is of course, within the province
of the prosecutorial agencies of the Government.
The recommendation with respect to the administrative sanction to be
imposed on respondent judge should, therefore, be modified. For one,
with respect to the charge of illegal solemnization of marriages, it does
appear that he had not taken to heart, but actually trifled with, the
law's concern for the institution of marriage and the legal effects

flowing from civil status. This, and his undeniable participation in the
other offenses charged as hereinbefore narrated in detail, approximate
such serious degree of misconduct and of gross negligence in the
performance of judicial duties as to ineludibly require a higher penalty.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby imposes a FINE of P20,000.00 on
respondent Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon. Jr., with a stern warning that any
repetition of the same or similar offenses in the future will definitely be
severely dealt with. Respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy is hereby
DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits
and with prejudice to employment in any branch, agency or
instrumentality of the Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations.
Let copies of this decision be spread on their records and furnished to
the Office of the Ombudsman for appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.
MERCEDITA MATA ARAES, petitioner, vs. JUDGE SALVADOR M.
OCCIANO, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Araes charges respondent judge with Gross
Ignorance of the Law via a sworn Letter-Complaint dated 23 May 2001.
Respondent is the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of
Balatan, Camarines Sur. Petitioner alleges that on 17 February 2000,
respondent judge solemnized her marriage to her late groom
Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license and at
Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction.
They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this
marriage until her husband passed away. However, since the marriage
was a nullity, petitioners right to inherit the vast properties left by
Orobia was not recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving the
pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy.
Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge
for his illegal acts and unethical misrepresentations which allegedly
caused her so much hardships, embarrassment and sufferings.

On 28 May 2001, the case was referred by the Office of the Chief
Justice to then Acting Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepao for
appropriate action. On 8 June 2001, the Office of the Court
Administrator required respondent judge to comment.
In his Comment dated 5 July 2001, respondent judge averred that he
was requested by a certain Juan Arroyo on 15 February 2000 to
solemnize the marriage of the parties on 17 February 2000. Having
been assured that all the documents to the marriage were complete,
he agreed to solemnize the marriage in his sala at the Municipal Trial
Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. However, on 17 February 2000,
Arroyo informed him that Orobia had a difficulty walking and could not
stand the rigors of travelling to Balatan which is located almost 25
kilometers from his residence in Nabua. Arroyo then requested if
respondent judge could solemnize the marriage in Nabua, to which
request he acceded.
Respondent judge further avers that before he started the ceremony,
he carefully examined the documents submitted to him by petitioner.
When he discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite
marriage license, he refused to solemnize the marriage and suggested
its resetting to another date. However, due to the earnest pleas of the
parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery of provisions for the
occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human
compassion. He also feared that if he reset the wedding, it might
aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who just suffered from a
stroke. After the solemnization, he reiterated the necessity for the
marriage license and admonished the parties that their failure to give it
would render the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured
respondent judge that they would give the license to him in the
afternoon of that same day. When they failed to comply, respondent
judge followed it up with Arroyo but the latter only gave him the same
reassurance that the marriage license would be delivered to his sala at
the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.

marriage due to the want of a duly issued marriage license and that it
was because of her prodding and reassurances that he eventually
solemnized the same. She confessed that she filed this administrative
case out of rage. However, after reading the Comment filed by
respondent judge, she realized her own shortcomings and is now
bothered by her conscience.
Reviewing the records of the case, it appears that petitioner and Orobia
filed their Application for Marriage License on 5 January 2000. It was
stamped in this Application that the marriage license shall be issued on
17 January 2000. However, neither petitioner nor Orobia claimed it.
It also appears that the Office of the Civil Registrar General issued a
Certification that it has no record of such marriage that allegedly took
place on 17 February 2000. Likewise, the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur issued another Certification dated 7
May 2001 that it cannot issue a true copy of the Marriage Contract of
the parties since it has no record of their marriage.
On 8 May 2001, petitioner sought the assistance of respondent judge
so the latter could communicate with the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur for the issuance of her marriage
license. Respondent judge wrote the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua,
Camarines Sur. In a letter dated 9 May 2001, a Clerk of said office,
Grace T. Escobal, informed respondent judge that their office cannot
issue the marriage license due to the failure of Orobia to submit the
Death Certificate of his previous spouse.
The Office of the Court Administrator, in its Report and
Recommendation dated 15 November 2000, found the respondent
judge guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly issued marriage
license and for doing so outside his territorial jurisdiction. A fine of
P5,000.00 was recommended to be imposed on respondent judge.
We agree.

Respondent judge vigorously denies that he told the contracting

parties that their marriage is valid despite the absence of a marriage
license. He attributes the hardships and embarrassment suffered by
the petitioner as due to her own fault and negligence.

Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129, the

authority of the regional trial court judges and judges of inferior courts
to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial jurisdiction as
defined by the Supreme Court.

On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of Desistance

dated 28 August 2001 with the Office of the Court Administrator. She
attested that respondent judge initially refused to solemnize her

The case at bar is not without precedent. In Navarro vs. Domagtoy,

[1]
respondent judge held office and had jurisdiction in the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. However,

he solemnized a wedding at his residence in the municipality of Dapa,

Surigao del Norte which did not fall within the jurisdictional area of the
municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos. We held that:
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinance to
marry the faithful is authorized to do so only within the area or diocese
or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of
this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize
marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law
are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific
jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas
and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside
his courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the
formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not
affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating
official to administrative liability. [2] (Emphasis supplied.)
In said case, we suspended respondent judge for six (6) months on the
ground that his act of solemnizing a marriage outside his jurisdiction
constitutes gross ignorance of the law. We further held that:

valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases

provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing
officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not
possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner.
In this respect, respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.
Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of
Desistance filed by petitioner. This Court has consistently held in a
catena of cases that the withdrawal of the complaint does not
necessarily have the legal effect of exonerating respondent from
disciplinary action. Otherwise, the prompt and fair administration of
justice, as well as the discipline of court personnel, would be
undermined.[5] Disciplinary actions of this nature do not involve purely
private or personal matters. They can not be made to depend upon the
will of every complainant who may, for one reason or another, condone
a detestable act. We cannot be bound by the unilateral act of a
complainant in a matter which involves the Courts constitutional power
to discipline judges. Otherwise, that power may be put to naught,
undermine the trust character of a public office and impair the integrity
and dignity of this Court as a disciplining authority. [6]

The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at

least, proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the
ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and competent in
understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be
conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in the
instant case. x x x While magistrates may at times make mistakes in
judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge
exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which
has greatly prejudiced the status of married persons. [3]

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge

of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined
P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same
or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.

In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is

limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of
solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines
Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative
liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he
allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but
nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage.

DECISION

Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage

without the requisite marriage license. In People vs. Lara,[4] we held
that a marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage license is
void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license cannot render

SO ORDERED.
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondent.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our
jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law
of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing
personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be
proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and
judgments; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and
the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to
our law on evidence.

The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to nullify the January 7, 1999 Decision [1] and the March 24,
1999 Order[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 28,
in Civil Case No. 3026AF. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia
and Rederick A. Recio solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan
City as dissolved and both parties can now remarry under existing and
applicable laws to any and/or both parties.[3]
The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted
Decision.
The Facts
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an
Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. [4] They lived
together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, [5] a
decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by
an Australian family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown
by a Certificate of Australian Citizenship issued by the Australian
government.[6] Petitioner -- a Filipina -- and respondent were married on
January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan
City.[7] In their application for a marriage license, respondent was
declared as single and Filipino.[8]
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately
without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. While the two were
still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in
accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia. [9]

citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in

Australia in 1989;[12] thus, he was legally capacitated to marry
petitioner in 1994.
On July 7, 1998 -- or about five years after the couples wedding and
while the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending -- respondent
was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney,
Australia because the marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down. [13]
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complaint be dismissed on
the ground that it stated no cause of action. [14] The Office of the
Solicitor General agreed with respondent. [15] The court marked and
admitted the documentary evidence of both parties. [16] After they
submitted their respective memoranda, the case was submitted for
resolution.[17]
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the
divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized in the
Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis of any
defect in an essential element of the marriage; that is, respondents
alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its Decision
on the divorce decree obtained by respondent. The Australian divorce
had ended the marriage; thus, there was no more marital union to
nullify or annul.
Hence, this Petition.[18]
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:

On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity

of Marriage[10] in the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy -respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he
married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of
respondents marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.

In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had

revealed to petitioner his prior marriage and its subsequent
dissolution.[11] He contended that his first marriage to an Australian

The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained
in Australia by the respondent ipso facto terminated his first marriage
to Editha Samson thereby capacitating him to contract a second
marriage with the petitioner.

The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to

present a certificate of legal capacity to marry constitutes absence of a
substantial requisite voiding the petitioners marriage to the respondent
3
The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family
Code in this case.
4
The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11,
13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53 of the Family Code as the applicable
provisions in this case.
5
The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce decree
obtained by the respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated the
parties to remarry, without first securing a recognition of the judgment
granting the divorce decree before our courts.[19]
The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we
shall concentrate on two pivotal ones: (1) whether the divorce between
respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and (2) whether
respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry
petitioner. Because of our ruling on these two, there is no more
necessity to take up the rest.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson
Petitioner assails the trial courts recognition of the divorce between
respondent and Editha Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,
[20]
petitioner argues that the divorce decree, like any other foreign
judgment, may be given recognition in this jurisdiction only upon proof
of the existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2)
the alleged divorce decree itself. She adds that respondent miserably
failed to establish these elements.

Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the

Family Code, marriages solemnized abroad are governed by the law of
the place where they were celebrated (the lex loci celebrationis). In
effect, the Code requires the presentation of the foreign law to show
the conformity of the marriage in question to the legal requirements of
the place where the marriage was performed.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off
points for our discussion. Philippine law does not provide for absolute
divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. [21] A marriage between two
Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad,
because of Articles 15[22] and 17[23] of the Civil Code.[24] In mixed
marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 [25] of the
Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in
case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry. [26] A divorce obtained abroad by a
couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided it is consistent with their respective national laws. [27]
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and
proof are concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that
aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.
[28]
Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our
courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
[29]
Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.
Divorce as a Question of Fact
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in
evidence, it must first comply with the registration requirements under
Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code. These articles read as
follows:
ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting
parties shall file separately a sworn application for such license with
the proper local civil registrar which shall specify the following:
xxxxxxxxx
(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage
was dissolved or annulled;

xxxxxxxxx
ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously
married, the applicant shall be required to
ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously
married, the applicant shall be required to furnish, instead of the birth
or baptismal certificate required in the last preceding article, the death
certificate of the deceased spouse or the judicial decree of the
absolute divorce, or the judicial decree of annulment or declaration of
nullity of his or her previous marriage. x x x.
ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the
marriage, the partition and distribution of the properties of the
spouses, and the delivery of the childrens presumptive legitimes shall
be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property;
otherwise, the same shall not affect their persons.
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce
decree is a public document -- a written official act of an Australian
family court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of its authenticity
and due execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is
given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be
presented and admitted in evidence. [30] A divorce obtained abroad is
proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a
judgment is the judgment itself.[31] The decree purports to be a written
act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign
country.[32]
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or
document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign
country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof
attested[33] by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the
record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of
his office. [34]
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to
be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court. [35] However,

appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules

on evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondents cause, when the divorce decree of May 18,
1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to
its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in
the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. [36] The trial court ruled that
it was admissible, subject to petitioners qualification. [37] Hence, it was
admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed,
petitioners failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree
admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia. [38]
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code
is not necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine
personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992.
[39]
Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him
with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. [40] Naturalized
citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former states, don the
attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian,
respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum
juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law
falls upon petitioner, because she is the party challenging the validity
of a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was satisfied with
the original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital laws
of Australia, because she had lived and worked in that country for quite
a long time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by
Philippine courts; thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign laws
in the exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the party who
alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or
defense of an action.[41] In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of
proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are
denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the
material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters.
[42]
Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden
of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon
him.

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial

notice of foreign laws.[43] Like any other facts, they must be alleged and
proved. Australian marital laws are not among those matters that
judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. [44] The
power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every
reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.
Second Issue: Respondents Legal Capacity to Remarry
Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce,
respondent was legally incapacitated to marry her in 1994. Hence, she
concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was
validly admitted in evidence, adequately established his legal capacity
to marry under Australian law.
Respondents
contention
is
untenable. In
its
strict
legal
sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause
arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types. The two
basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2)
limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the
marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full
force.[45] There is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce
was procured by respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree -- a
conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same
as a separation from bed and board, although an absolute divorce may
follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no
reconciliation is effected.[46]
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some
foreign statutes and practices, still restrict remarriage. Under some
other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute; thus, the
guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the ground of adultery
may be prohibited from marrying again. The court may allow a
remarriage only after proof of good behavior.[47]
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction
that reads:

1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes

absolute (unless the other party has died) commits the offence of
bigamy.[48]
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by
respondent may have been restricted. It did not absolutely establish
his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law. Hence, we
find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously
assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondents
capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a
disputable presumption or presumptive evidence as to his civil status
based on Section 48, Rule 39 [49] of the Rules of Court, for the simple
reason that no proof has been presented on the legal effects of the
divorce decree obtained under Australian laws.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by
Article 21 of the Family Code was not submitted together with the
application for a marriage license. According to her, its absence is
proof that respondent did not have legal capacity to remarry.
We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is
determined by the national law of the party concerned. The certificate
mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been sufficient
to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it
in court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie
evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant
for a marriage license.[50]
As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves
respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner. A review of the records
before this Court shows that only the following exhibits were presented
before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit A Complaint; [51] (b)
Exhibit B Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (FilipinoAustralian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in
Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija;[52] (c) Exhibit C Certificate of Marriage
Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian)
on March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila; [53] (d) Exhibit D Office of
the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City Certification that no information
of annulment between Rederick A. Recio and Editha D. Samson was in

its records;[54] and (e) Exhibit E Certificate of Australian Citizenship of

Rederick A. Recio;[55] (2) for respondent: (a) Exhibit 1 -- Amended
Answer;[56] (b) Exhibit 2 Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution
of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia; [57] (c) Exhibit 3 Certificate
of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio; [58] (d) Exhibit 4 Decree
Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia
Certificate;[59] and Exhibit 5 -- Statutory Declaration of the Legal
Separation Between Rederick A. Recio and Grace J. Garcia Recio since
October 22, 1995.[60]
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who
was then a naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to
marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with petitioners
contention that the courta quo erred in finding that the divorce decree
ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry
without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the
Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to
prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioners prayer to declare her marriage to
respondent null and void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn
out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry
petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe
that the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court
to receive evidence, if any, which show petitioners legal capacity to
marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo may declare a
nullity of the parties marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being
already in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were both
obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March
1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.

DELGADO
VDA.
DE
DANAO,
ANGELA
DELGADO
ARESPACOCHAGA, TERESA DELGADO PERLAS, CAROLINA
DELGADO-ARESPACOCHAGA, RODOLFO DELGADO, BENJAMIN
DELGADO, GLICERIA DELGADO and CLEOFAS DELGADO; and
HEIRS OF GORGONIO DELGADO, namely, RAMON DELGADO
CAMPO, CARLOS DELGADO CAMPO, CLARITA DELGADO CAMPOREIZA, YOLANDA DELGADO ENCINAS, FELISA DELGADO CAMPOENCINAS
and
MELINDA
DELGADO
CAMPOMADARANG, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN, namely,
GUILLERMO R. DAMIAN and JOSE R. DAMIAN; HEIRS OF
HORTENCIA RUSTIA CRUZ, namely, TERESITA CRUZ-SISON,
HORACIO R. CRUZ, JOSEFINA CRUZ-RODIL, AMELIA CRUZENRIQUEZ and FIDEL R. CRUZ, JR.; HEIRS OF ROMAN RUSTIA,
SR., namely, JOSEFINA RUSTIA ALBANO, VIRGINIA RUSTIA
PARAISO, ROMAN RUSTIA, JR., SERGIO RUSTIA, FRANCISCO
RUSTIA, LETICIA RUSTIA-MIRANDA; and GUILLERMINA RUSTIA,
as
Oppositors;1 and
GUILLERMA
RUSTIA,
as
Intervenor,2 Respondents.3
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to reinstate the
May 11, 1990 decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 55,4 in SP Case No. 97668, which was reversed and set aside by
the Court of Appeals in its decision5 dated October 24, 2002.
FACTS OF THE CASE

WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial

justice, we REMAND the case to the court a quo for the purpose of
receiving evidence which conclusively show respondents legal capacity
to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties
marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.

This case concerns the settlement of the intestate estates of Guillermo

Rustia and Josefa Delgado.6 The main issue in this case is relatively
simple: who, between petitioners and respondents, are the lawful heirs
of the decedents. However, it is attended by several collateral issues
that complicate its resolution.

SO ORDERED.

The claimants to the estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado

may be divided into two groups: (1) the alleged heirs of Josefa
Delgado, consisting of her half- and full-blood siblings, nephews and
nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, and (2) the alleged heirs
of Guillermo Rustia, particularly, his sisters, 7 his nephews and

N THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF THE DECEASED

JOSEFA DELGADO AND GUILLERMO RUSTIA CARLOTA DELGADO
VDA. DE DE LA ROSA and other HEIRS OF LUIS DELGADO,
namely, HEIRS OF CONCHA VDA. DE AREVALO, HEIRS OF LUISA

nieces,8 his
illegitimate
child,9 and
10
child (ampun-ampunan) of the decedents.

the de

facto adopted

The alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado

The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa 11 Delgado by
one Lucio Campo. Aside from Josefa, five other children were born to
the couple, namely, Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, and Gorgonio, all
surnamed Delgado. Felisa Delgado was never married to Lucio Campo,
hence, Josefa and her full-blood siblings were all natural children of
Felisa Delgado.
However, Lucio Campo was not the first and only man in Felisa
Delgados life. Before him was Ramon Osorio12with whom Felisa had a
son, Luis Delgado. But, unlike her relationship with Lucio Campo which
was admittedly one without the benefit of marriage, the legal status of
Ramon Osorios and Felisa Delgados union is in dispute.
The question of whether Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio ever got
married is crucial to the claimants because the answer will determine
whether their successional rights fall within the ambit of the rule
against reciprocal intestate succession between legitimate and
illegitimate relatives.13 If Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado had been
validly married, then their only child Luis Delgado was a legitimate
half-blood brother of Josefa Delgado and therefore excluded from the
latters intestate estate. He and his heirs would be barred by the
principle of absolute separation between the legitimate and illegitimate
families. Conversely, if the couple were never married, Luis Delgado
and his heirs would be entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgados
intestate estate, as they would all be within the illegitimate line.
Petitioners allege that Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado were never
married. In support thereof, they assert that no evidence was ever
presented to establish it, not even so much as an allegation of the date
or place of the alleged marriage. What is clear, however, is that Felisa
retained the surname Delgado. So did Luis, her son with Ramon Osorio.
Later on, when Luis got married, his Partida de Casamiento14 stated
that he was "hijo natural de Felisa Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa
Delgado),15 significantly omitting any mention of the name and other
circumstances
of
his
father.16 Nevertheless,
oppositors
(now
respondents) insist that the absence of a record of the alleged
marriage did not necessarily mean that no marriage ever took place.

Josefa Delgado died on September 8, 1972 without a will. She was

survived by Guillermo Rustia and some collateral relatives, the
petitioners herein. Several months later, on June 15, 1973, Guillermo
Rustia executed an affidavit of selfadjudication of the remaining properties comprising her estate.
The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
Sometime in 1917, Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa
Delgado17 but whether a marriage in fact took place is disputed.
According to petitioners, the two eventually lived together as husband
and wife but were never married. To prove their assertion, petitioners
point out that no record of the contested marriage existed in the civil
registry. Moreover, a baptismal certificate naming Josefa Delgado as
one of the sponsors referred to her as "Seorita" or unmarried woman.
The oppositors (respondents here), on the other hand, insist that the
absence of a marriage certificate did not of necessity mean that no
marriage transpired. They maintain that Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado were married on June 3, 1919 and from then on lived together
as husband and wife until the death of Josefa on September 8, 1972.
During this period spanning more than half a century, they were known
among their relatives and friends to have in fact been married. To
support their proposition, oppositors presented the following pieces of
evidence:
1. Certificate of Identity No. 9592 dated [December 1, 1944] issued to
Mrs. Guillermo J. Rustia by Carlos P. Romulo, then Resident
Commissioner to the United States of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines;
2. Philippine Passport No. 4767 issued to Josefa D. Rustia on June 25,
1947;
3. Veterans Application for Pension or Compensation for Disability
Resulting from Service in the Active Military or Naval Forces of the
United States- Claim No. C-4, 004, 503 (VA Form 526) filed with the
Veterans Administration of the United States of America by Dr.
Guillermo J. Rustia wherein Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia himself [swore] to his
marriage to Josefa Delgado in Manila on 3 June 1919; 18
4. Titles to real properties in the name of Guillermo Rustia indicated
that he was married to Josefa Delgado.

The alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia

Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any children. With no
children of their own, they took into their home the youngsters
Guillermina Rustia Rustia and Nanie Rustia. These children, never
legally adopted by the couple, were what was known in the local
dialect as ampun-ampunan.
During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo Rustia did manage to
father an illegitimate child, 19 the intervenor-respondent Guillerma
Rustia, with one Amparo Sagarbarria. According to Guillerma, Guillermo
Rustia treated her as his daughter, his own flesh and blood, and she
enjoyed open and continuous possession of that status from her birth
in 1920 until her fathers demise. In fact, Josefa Delgados obituary
which was prepared by Guillermo Rustia, named the intervenorrespondent as one of their children. Also, her report card from the
University of Santo Tomas identified Guillermo Rustia as her
parent/guardian.20
Oppositors (respondents here) nonetheless posit that Guillerma Rustia
has no interest in the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia as she was
never duly acknowledged as an illegitimate child. They contend that
her right to compulsory acknowledgement prescribed when Guillermo
died in 1974 and that she cannot claim voluntary acknowledgement
since the documents she presented were not the authentic writings
prescribed by the new Civil Code.21
On January 7, 1974, more than a year after the death of Josefa
Delgado, Guillermo Rustia filed a petition for the adoption 22 of
their ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia. He stated under oath "[t]hat
he ha[d] no legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children or
natural children by legal fiction."23 The petition was overtaken by his
death on February 28, 1974.
Like Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia died without a will. He was
survived by his sisters Marciana Rustia vda. deDamian and Hortencia
Rustia-Cruz, and by the children of his predeceased brother Roman
Rustia Sr., namely, Josefina Rustia Albano, Virginia Rustia Paraiso,
Roman Rustia, Jr., Sergio Rustia, Francisco Rustia and Leticia Rustia
Miranda.24
ANTECEDENT PROCEEDINGS

On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, the daughter of Luis

Delgado, filed the original petition for letters of administration of the
intestate estates of the "spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia"
with the RTC of Manila, Branch 55. 25 This petition was opposed by the
following: (1) the sisters of Guillermo Rustia, namely, Marciana
Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz;26 (2) the heirs of
Guillermo Rustias late brother, Roman Rustia, Sr., and (3) the ampunampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia. The opposition was grounded on
the theory that Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao and the other claimants
were barred under the law from inheriting from their illegitimate halfblood relative Josefa Delgado.
In November of 1975, Guillerma Rustia filed a motion to intervene in
the proceedings, claiming she was the only surviving descendant in the
direct line of Guillermo Rustia. Despite the objections of the oppositors
(respondents herein), the motion was granted.
On April 3, 1978, the original petition for letters of administration was
amended to state that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia
were never married but had merely lived together as husband and
wife.
On January 24, 1980, oppositors (respondents herein) filed a motion to
dismiss the petition in the RTC insofar as the estate of Guillermo Rustia
was concerned. The motion was denied on the ground that the
interests of the petitioners and the other claimants remained in issue
and should be properly threshed out upon submission of evidence.
On March 14, 1988, Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa substituted for
her sister, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, who had died on May 18,
1987.
On May 11, 1990, the RTC appointed Carlota Delgado vda. de de la
Rosa as administratrix of both estates. 27 The dispositive portion of the
decision read:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, petitioner and her coclaimants to the estate of the late Josefa Delgado listed in the
Petitions, and enumerated elsewhere in this Decision, are hereby
declared as the only legal heirs of the said Josefa Delgado who died
intestate in the City of Manila on September 8, 1972, and entitled to
partition the same among themselves in accordance with the
proportions referred to in this Decision.

Similarly, the intervenor Guillerma S. Rustia is hereby declared as the

sole and only surviving heir of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia, and thus,
entitled to the entire estate of the said decedent, to the exclusion of
the oppositors and the other parties hereto.
The Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of the estate of Josefa Delgado
executed by the late Guillermo J. Rustia on June 15, 1973 is hereby SET
ASIDE and declared of no force and effect.
As the estates of both dece[d]ents have not as yet been settled, and
their settlement [is] considered consolidated in this proceeding in
accordance with law, a single administrator therefor is both proper and
necessary, and, as the petitioner Carlota Delgado Vda. de dela Rosa
has established her right to the appointment as administratrix of the
estates, the Court hereby APPOINTS her as the ADMINISTRATRIX of the
intestate estate of the decedent JOSEFA DELGADO in relation to the
estate of DR. GUILLERMO J. RUSTIA.
Accordingly, let the corresponding LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION issue
to the petitioner CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA upon her
filing of the requisite bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (P500,000.00).
Finally, oppositor GUILLERMINA RUSTIA RUSTIA is hereby ordered to
cease and desist from her acts of administration of the subject estates,
and is likewise ordered to turn over to the appointed administratix all
her collections of the rentals and income due on the assets of the
estates in question, including all documents, papers, records and titles
pertaining to such estates to the petitioner and appointed
administratix CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA, immediately
upon receipt of this Decision. The same oppositor is hereby required to
render an accounting of her actual administration of the estates in
controversy within a period of sixty (60) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.28
On May 20, 1990, oppositors filed an appeal which was denied on the
ground that the record on appeal was not filed on time. 29 They then
filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus30 which was dismissed
by the Court of Appeals.31 However, on motion for reconsideration and
after hearing the parties oral arguments, the Court of Appeals
reversed itself and gave due course to oppositors appeal in the
interest of substantial justice.32

In a petition for review to this Court, petitioners assailed the resolution

of the Court of Appeals, on the ground that oppositors failure to file
the record on appeal within the reglementary period was a
jurisdictional defect which nullified the appeal. On October 10, 1997,
this Court allowed the continuance of the appeal. The pertinent portion
of our decision33 read:
As a rule, periods prescribed to do certain acts must be followed.
However, under exceptional circumstances, a delay in the filing of an
appeal may be excused on grounds of substantial justice.
xxx xxx xxx
The respondent court likewise pointed out the trial courts
pronouncements as to certain matters of substance, relating to the
determination of the heirs of the decedents and the party entitled to
the administration of their estate, which were to be raised in the
appeal, but were barred absolutely by the denial of the record on
appeal upon too technical ground of late filing.
xxx xxx xxx
In this instance, private respondents intention to raise valid issues in
the appeal is apparent and should not have been construed as an
attempt to delay or prolong the administration proceedings.
xxx xxx xxx
A review of the trial courts decision is needed.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court
hereby AFFIRMS the Resolution dated November 27, 1991 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23415, for the APPROVAL of the
private respondents Record on Appeal and the CONTINUANCE of the
appeal from the Manila, Branch LV Regional Trial Courts May 11, 1990
decision.
SO ORDERED.
Acting on the appeal, the Court of Appeals 34 partially set aside the trial
courts decision. Upon motion for reconsideration, 35 the Court of
Appeals amended its earlier decision. 36 The dispositive portion of the
amended decision read:

With
the
further
modification,
our
assailed
decision
is RECONSIDERED and VACATED. Consequently, the decision of the
trial
court
is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
A
new
one
is
hereby RENDERED declaring: 1.) Dr. Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado Rustia to have been legally married; 2.) the intestate estate of
Dr. Guillermo Rustia, Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the children of
Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) entitled to partition among themselves the
intestate estate of Josefa D. Rustia in accordance with the proportion
referred to in this decision; 3.) the oppositors-appellants as the legal
heirs of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia and thereby entitled to partition
his estate in accordance with the proportion referred to herein; and 4.)
the intervenor-appellee Guillerma S. Rustia as ineligible to inherit from
the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia; thus revoking her appointment as
administratrix of his estate.

1. whether there was a valid marriage between Guillermo Rustia and

Josefa Delgado;

The letters of administration of the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo

Rustia in relation to the intestate estate of Josefa Delgado shall issue to
the nominee of the oppositors-appellants upon his or her qualification
and filing of the requisite bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).

Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:

Oppositor-appellant Guillermina Rustia Rustia is hereby ordered to

cease and desist from her acts of administration of the subject estates
and to turn over to the appointed administrator all her collections of
the rentals and incomes due on the assets of the estates in question,
including all documents, papers, records and titles pertaining to such
estates to the appointed administrator, immediately upon notice of his
qualification and posting of the requisite bond, and to render an
accounting of her (Guillermina Rustia Rustia) actual administration of
the estates in controversy within a period of sixty (60) days from notice
of the administrators qualification and posting of the bond.
The issue of the validity of the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by
Dr. Guillermo Rustia on June 15, 1973 isREMANDED to the trial court
for further proceedings to determine the extent of the shares of Jacoba
Delgado-Encinas and the children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo)
affected by the said adjudication.
Hence, this recourse.
The issues for our resolution are:

2. who the legal heirs of the decedents Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado are;
3. who should be issued letters of administration.
The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
A presumption is an inference of the existence or non-existence of a
fact which courts are permitted to draw from proof of other facts.
Presumptions are classified into presumptions of law and presumptions
of fact. Presumptions of law are, in turn, either conclusive or
disputable.37

Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are

satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome
by other evidence:
xxx xxx xxx
(aa) That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and
wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage;
xxx xxx xxx
In this case, several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a
valid marriage existed between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado.
Their cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be doubted. Their
family and friends knew them to be married. Their reputed status as
husband and wife was such that even the original petition for letters of
administration filed by Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao in 1975 referred
to them as "spouses."
Yet, petitioners maintain that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia had
simply lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage. They make much of the absence of a record of the contested
marriage, the testimony of a witness 38 attesting that they were not
married, and a baptismal certificate which referred to Josefa Delgado
as "Seorita" or unmarried woman.39
We are not persuaded.

First, although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of

marriage, its absence is not always proof that no marriage in fact took
place.40 Once the presumption of marriage arises, other evidence may
be presented in support thereof. The evidence need not necessarily or
directly establish the marriage but must at least be enough to
strengthen the presumption of marriage. Here, the certificate of
identity issued to Josefa Delgado as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia, 41 the
passport issued to her as Josefa D. Rustia, 42 the declaration under oath
of no less than Guillermo Rustia that he was married to Josefa
Delgado43 and the titles to the properties in the name of "Guillermo
Rustia married to Josefa Delgado," more than adequately support the
presumption of marriage. These are public documents which are prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein. 44 No clear and convincing
evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of the truth of the
recitals therein was presented by petitioners.

As mentioned earlier, presumptions of law are either conclusive or

disputable. Conclusive presumptions are inferences which the law
makes so peremptory that no contrary proof, no matter how strong,
may overturn them.48 On the other hand, disputable presumptions, one
of which is the presumption of marriage, can be relied on only in the
absence of sufficient evidence to the contrary.

Second, Elisa vda. de Anson, petitioners own witness whose testimony

they primarily relied upon to support their position, confirmed that
Guillermo Rustia had proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado and that
eventually, the two had "lived together as husband and wife." This
again could not but strengthen the presumption of marriage.

All things considered, we rule that these factors sufficiently overcame

the rebuttable presumption of marriage. Felisa Delgado and Ramon
Osorio were never married. Hence, all the children born to Felisa
Delgado out of her relations with Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo,
namely, Luis and his half-blood siblings Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba,
Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa, all surnamed Delgado, 51 were her
natural children.52

Third, the baptismal certificate 45 was conclusive proof only of the

baptism administered by the priest who baptized the child. It was no
proof of the veracity of the declarations and statements contained
therein,46 such as the alleged single or unmarried ("Seorita") civil
status of Josefa Delgado who had no hand in its preparation.
Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage of Guillermo
Rustia and Josefa Delgado. In this jurisdiction, every intendment of the
law leans toward legitimizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together
apparently in marriage are presumed to be in fact married. This is the
usual order of things in society and, if the parties are not what they
hold themselves out to be, they would be living in constant violation of
the common rules of law and propriety. Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio. Always presume marriage.47
The Lawful Heirs Of Josefa Delgado
To determine who the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado are, the
questioned status of the cohabitation of her mother Felisa Delgado
with Ramon Osorio must first be addressed.

Little was said of the cohabitation or alleged marriage of Felisa

Delgado and Ramon Osorio. The oppositors (now respondents) chose
merely to rely on the disputable presumption of marriage even in the
face of such countervailing evidence as (1) the continued use by Felisa
and Luis (her son with Ramon Osorio) of the surname Delgado and (2)
Luis
Delgados
and
Caridad
Concepcions Partida
de
Casamiento49 identifying Luis as "hijo natural de Felisa Delgado" (the
natural child of Felisa Delgado).50

Pertinent to this matter is the following observation:

Suppose, however, that A begets X with B, and Y with another woman,
C; then X and Y would be natural brothers and sisters, but of half-blood
relationship. Can they succeed each other reciprocally?
The law prohibits reciprocal succession between illegitimate children
and legitimate children of the same parent, even though there is
unquestionably a tie of blood between them. It seems that to allow an
illegitimate child to succeed ab intestato (from) another illegitimate
child begotten with a parent different from that of the former, would be
allowing the illegitimate child greater rights than a legitimate child.
Notwithstanding this, however, we submit that
succession should be allowed, even when the illegitimate brothers and
sisters are only of the half-blood. The reason impelling the prohibition
on reciprocal successions between legitimate and illegitimate families
does not apply to the case under consideration. That prohibition has
for its basis the difference in category between illegitimate and

legitimate relatives. There is no such difference when all the children

are illegitimate children of the same parent, even if begotten with
different persons. They all stand on the same footing before the law,
just like legitimate children of half-blood relation. We submit, therefore,
that the rules regarding succession of legitimate brothers and sisters
should be applicable to them. Full blood illegitimate brothers and
sisters should receive double the portion of half-blood brothers and
sisters; and if all are either of the full blood or of the half-blood, they
shall share equally.53
Here, the above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to her
by full-blood, except Luis Delgado, her half-brother. Nonetheless, since
they were all illegitimate, they may inherit from each other.
Accordingly, all of them are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado.
We note, however, that the petitioners before us are already the
nephews, nieces, grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado.
Under Article 972 of the new Civil Code, the right of representation in
the collateral line takes place only in favor of the children of brothers
and sisters (nephews and nieces). Consequently, it cannot be exercised
by grandnephews and grandnieces.54 Therefore, the only collateral
relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to partake of her intestate
estate are her brothers and sisters, or their children who were still
alive at the time of her death on September 8, 1972. They have a
vested right to participate in the inheritance. 55 The records not being
clear on this matter, it is now for the trial court to determine who were
the surviving brothers and sisters (or their children) of Josefa Delgado
at the time of her death. Together with Guillermo Rustia, 56 they are
entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado in accordance with Article 1001
of the new Civil Code:57
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the
widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the
inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other
one-half.
Since Josefa Delgado had heirs other than Guillermo Rustia, Guillermo
could not have validly adjudicated Josefas estate all to himself. Rule
74, Section 1 of the Rules of Court is clear. Adjudication by an heir of
the decedents entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit is
allowed only if he is the sole heir to the estate:

SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. If

the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or
the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives
duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing
letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they
see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register
of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary
action of partition. If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to
himself the estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of
the register of deeds. x x x (emphasis supplied)
The Lawful Heirs Of Guillermo Rustia
Intervenor (now co-respondent) Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate
child58 of Guillermo Rustia. As such, she may be entitled to
successional rights only upon proof of an admission or recognition of
paternity.59 She, however, claimed the status of an acknowledged
illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia only after the death of the latter
on February 28, 1974 at which time it was already the new Civil Code
that was in effect.
Under the old Civil Code (which was in force till August 29, 1950),
illegitimate children absolutely had no hereditary rights. This draconian
edict was, however, later relaxed in the new Civil Code which granted
certain successional rights to illegitimate children but only on condition
that they were first recognized or acknowledged by the parent.
Under the new law, recognition may be compulsory or
voluntary.60 Recognition is compulsory in any of the following cases:
(1) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the
offense coincides more or less with that of the conception;
(2) when the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the
alleged father (or mother)61 by the direct acts of the latter or of his
family;
(3) when the child was conceived during the time when the mother
cohabited with the supposed father;
(4) when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the
defendant is his father. 62

On the other hand, voluntary recognition may be made in the record of

birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in any authentic
writing.63
Intervenor Guillerma sought recognition on two grounds: first,
compulsory recognition through the open and continuous possession of
the status of an illegitimate child and second, voluntary recognition
through authentic writing.
There was apparently no doubt that she possessed the status of an
illegitimate child from her birth until the death of her putative father
Guillermo Rustia. However, this did not constitute acknowledgment but
a mere ground by which she could have compelled acknowledgment
through the courts.64 Furthermore, any (judicial) action for compulsory
acknowledgment has a dual limitation: the lifetime of the child and the
lifetime of the putative parent.65 On the death of either, the action for
compulsory recognition can no longer be filed. 66 In this case, intervenor
Guillermas right to claim compulsory acknowledgment prescribed
upon the death of Guillermo Rustia on February 28, 1974.
The claim of voluntary recognition (Guillermas second ground) must
likewise fail. An authentic writing, for purposes of voluntary
recognition, is understood as a genuine or indubitable writing of the
parent (in this case, Guillermo Rustia). This includes a public
instrument or a private writing admitted by the father to be his. 67 Did
intervenors report card from the University of Santo Tomas and Josefa
Delgados obituary prepared by Guillermo Rustia qualify as authentic
writings under the new Civil Code? Unfortunately not. The report card
of intervenor Guillerma did not bear the signature of Guillermo Rustia.
The fact that his name appears there as intervenors parent/guardian
holds no weight since he had no participation in its preparation.
Similarly, while witnesses testified that it was Guillermo Rustia himself
who drafted the notice of death of Josefa Delgado which was published
in the Sunday Times on September 10, 1972, that published obituary
was not the authentic writing contemplated by the law. What could
have been admitted as an authentic writing was the original
manuscript of the notice, in the handwriting of Guillermo Rustia himself
and signed by him, not the newspaper clipping of the obituary. The
failure to present the original signed manuscript was fatal to
intervenors claim.
The same misfortune befalls the ampun-ampunan, Guillermina Rustia
Rustia, who was never adopted in accordance with law. Although a

petition for her adoption was filed by Guillermo Rustia, it never came to
fruition and was dismissed upon the latters death. We affirm the ruling
of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals holding her a legal
stranger to the deceased spouses and therefore not entitled to inherit
from them ab intestato. We quote:
Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem, which [created]
between two persons a relationship similar to that which results from
legitimate paternity and filiation. Only an adoption made through the
court, or in pursuance with the procedure laid down under Rule 99 of
the Rules of Court is valid in this jurisdiction. It is not of natural law at
all, but is wholly and entirely artificial. To establish the relation, the
statutory requirements must be strictly carried out, otherwise, the
adoption is an absolute nullity. The fact of adoption is never presumed,
but must be affirmatively [proven] by the person claiming its
existence.68
Premises considered, we rule that two of the claimants to the estate of
Guillermo Rustia, namely, intervenor Guillerma Rustia and the ampunampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia, are not lawful heirs of the
decedent. Under Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if there are no
descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or surviving spouse,
the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased. Therefore, the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia are the
remaining claimants, consisting of his sisters, 69 nieces and nephews.70
Entitlement To Letters Of Administration
An administrator is a person appointed by the court to administer the
intestate estate of the decedent. Rule 78, Section 6 of the Rules of
Court prescribes an order of preference in the appointment of an
administrator:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no
executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are
incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give a bond, or a person dies
intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin,
or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such
surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if
competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of
kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if
the husband or widow or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after
the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that
the administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted
to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to
serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may
be granted to such other person as the court may select.
In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is
the interest in the estate of the one to be appointed. 71 The order of
preference does not rule out the appointment of co-administrators,
specially in cases where
justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be
represented in the management of the estates, 72a situation which
obtains here.
It is in this light that we see fit to appoint joint administrators, in the
persons of Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and a nominee of the
nephews and nieces of Guillermo Rustia. They are the next of kin of the
deceased spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia, respectively.

3. Guillermo Rustias estate (including its one-half share of Josefa

Delgados estate) shall be inherited by Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian
and Hortencia Rustia Cruz (whose respective shares shall
be per capita) and the children of the late Roman Rustia, Sr. (who
survived Guillermo Rustia and whose respective shares shall be per
stirpes). Considering that Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and
Hortencia Rustia Cruz are now deceased, their respective shares shall
pertain to their estates.
4. Letters of administration over the still unsettled intestate estates of
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado shall issue to Carlota
Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and to a nominee from among the heirs of
Guillermo Rustia, as joint administrators, upon their qualification and
filing of the requisite bond in such amount as may be determined by
the trial court.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Petitioner,

WHEREFORE, the petition (which seeks to reinstate the May 11, 1990
decision of the RTC Manila, Branch 55) is hereby DENIED. The assailed
October 24, 2002 decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with
the following modifications:

CRASUS L. IYOY,
R e s p o n d e n t.

1. Guillermo Rustias June 15, 1973 affidavit of self-adjudication is

hereby ANNULLED.

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

2. the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall inherit half of the

intestate estate of Josefa Delgado. The remaining half shall pertain to
(a) the full and half-siblings of Josefa Delgado who survived her and (b)
the children of any of Josefa Delgados full- or half-siblings who may
have predeceased her, also surviving at the time of her death. Josefa
Delgados grandnephews and grandnieces are excluded from her
estate. In this connection, the trial court is hereby ordered to
determine the identities of the relatives of Josefa Delgado who are
entitled to share in her estate.

- versus-

G.R. No. 152577

Present:
September 21, 2005

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office
of the Solicitor General, prays for the reversal of the Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001,
[1]
affirming the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City,
Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998,
[2]
declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely
Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void on the basis of Article 36 of the Family
Code of the Philippines.

The proceedings before the RTC commenced with the filing of a

Complaint[3] for declaration of nullity of marriage by respondent Crasus
on 25 March 1997. According to the said Complaint, respondent Crasus
married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Bradford Memorial Church, Jones
Avenue, Cebu City. As a result of their union, they had five children
Crasus, Jr., Daphne, Debbie, Calvert, and Carlos who are now all of
legal ages. After the celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus
discovered that Fely was hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant. In
1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.),
leaving all of their five children, the youngest then being only six years
old, to the care of respondent Crasus. Barely a year after Fely left for
the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a letter from her requesting
that he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the said
request. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the
letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an
American, with whom she eventually had a child. In 1987, Fely came
back to the Philippines with her American family, staying at Cebu Plaza
Hotel in Cebu City. Respondent Crasus did not bother to talk to Fely
because he was afraid he might not be able to bear the sorrow and the
pain she had caused him. Fely returned to the Philippines several times
more: in 1990, for the wedding of their eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in 1992,
for the brain operation of their fourth child, Calvert; and in 1995, for
unknown reasons. Fely continued to live with her American family in
New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been openly using the surname of her
American husband in the Philippines and in the U.S.A. For the wedding
of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had invitations made in which she was
named as Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus. At the time the Complaint was filed, it
had been 13 years since Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus,
and there was no more possibility of reconciliation between them.
Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint that Felys acts
brought danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated
her psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of
marriage. Such incapacity, being incurable and continuing, constitutes
a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36, in
relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the
Philippines.
Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim[4] with the RTC on 05 June 1997.
She asserted therein that she was already an American citizen since
1988 and was now married to Stephen Micklus. While she admitted

being previously married to respondent Crasus and having five children

with him, Fely refuted the other allegations made by respondent
Crasus in his Complaint. She explained that she was no more hottempered than any normal person, and she may had been indignant at
respondent Crasus on certain occasions but it was because of the
latters drunkenness, womanizing, and lack of sincere effort to find
employment and to contribute to the maintenance of their household.
She could not have been extravagant since the family hardly had
enough money for basic needs. Indeed, Fely left for abroad for financial
reasons as respondent Crasus had no job and what she was then
earning as the sole breadwinner in the Philippines was insufficient to
support their family. Although she left all of her children with
respondent Crasus, she continued to provide financial support to them,
as well as, to respondent Crasus. Subsequently, Fely was able to bring
her children to the U.S.A., except for one, Calvert, who had to stay
behind for medical reasons. While she did file for divorce from
respondent Crasus, she denied having herself sent a letter to
respondent Crasus requesting him to sign the enclosed divorce papers.
After securing a divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely married her
American husband and acquired American citizenship. She argued that
her marriage to her American husband was legal because now being
an American citizen, her status shall be governed by the law of her
present nationality. Fely also pointed out that respondent Crasus
himself was presently living with another woman who bore him a child.
She also accused respondent Crasus of misusing the amount
of P90,000.00 which she advanced to him to finance the brain
operation of their son, Calvert. On the basis of the foregoing, Fely also
prayed that the RTC declare her marriage to respondent Crasus null
and void; and that respondent Crasus be ordered to pay to Fely
the P90,000.00 she advanced to him, with interest, plus, moral and
exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and litigation expenses.
After respondent Crasus and Fely had filed their respective Pre-Trial
Briefs,[5] the RTC afforded both parties the opportunity to present their
evidence. Petitioner Republic participated in the trial through the
Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu.[6]
Respondent Crasus submitted the following pieces of evidence in
support of his Complaint: (1) his own testimony on 08 September
1997, in which he essentially reiterated the allegations in his
Complaint;[7] (2) the Certification, dated 13 April 1989, by the Health

Department of Cebu City, on the recording of the Marriage Contract

between respondent Crasus and Fely in the Register of Deeds, such
marriage celebration taking place on 16 December 1961; [8] and (3) the
invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, wherein Fely
openly used her American husbands surname, Micklus. [9]

Defendants
before the
annulment
manifested
instance.

Felys counsel filed a Notice, [10] and, later on, a Motion, [11] to take the
deposition of witnesses, namely, Fely and her children, Crasus, Jr. and
Daphne, upon written interrogatories, before the consular officers of
the Philippines in New York and California, U.S.A, where the said
witnesses reside. Despite the Orders [12] and Commissions[13] issued by
the RTC to the Philippine Consuls of New York and California, U.S.A., to
take the depositions of the witnesses upon written interrogatories, not
a single deposition was ever submitted to the RTC. Taking into account
that it had been over a year since respondent Crasus had presented
his evidence and that Fely failed to exert effort to have the case
progress, the RTC issued an Order, dated 05 October 1998,
[14]
considering Fely to have waived her right to present her evidence.
The case was thus deemed submitted for decision.

Certainly defendants posture being an irresponsible wife erringly

reveals her very low regard for that sacred and inviolable institution of
marriage which is the foundation of human society throughout the
civilized world. It is quite evident that the defendant is bereft of the
mind, will and heart to comply with her marital obligations, such
incapacity was already there at the time of the marriage in question is
shown by defendants own attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff.

Not long after, on 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its Judgment
declaring the marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely null and void ab
initio, on the basis of the following findings

Going over plaintiffs testimony which is decidedly credible, the Court

finds that the defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of
such psychological incapacity to comply with her marital obligations.
These are her excessive disposition to material things over and above
the marital stability. That such incapacity was already there at the time
of the marriage in question is shown by defendants own attitude
towards her marriage to plaintiff. And for these reasons there is a legal
ground to declare the marriage of plaintiff Crasus L. Iyoy and
defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy null and void ab initio.[15]

The ground bearing defendants psychological incapacity deserves a

reasonable consideration. As observed, plaintiffs testimony is decidedly
credible. The Court finds that defendant had indeed exhibited
unmistakable signs of psychological incapacity to comply with her
marital duties such as striving for family unity, observing fidelity,
mutual love, respect, help and support. From the evidence presented,
plaintiff adequately established that the defendant practically
abandoned him. She obtained a divorce decree in the United States of
America and married another man and has establish [sic] another
family of her own. Plaintiff is in an anomalous situation, wherein he is
married to a wife who is already married to another man in another
country.

intolerable traits may not have been apparent or manifest

marriage, the FAMILY CODE nonetheless allows the
of the marriage provided that these were eventually
after the wedding. It appears to be the case in this

In sum, the ground invoked by plaintiff which is defendants

psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital
obligations which already existed at the time of the marriage in
question has been satisfactorily proven. The evidence in herein case
establishes the irresponsibility of defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy, firmly.

Petitioner Republic, believing that the afore-quoted Judgment of the

RTC was contrary to law and evidence, filed an appeal with the Court of
Appeals. The appellate court, though, in its Decision, dated 30 July
2001, affirmed the appealed Judgment of the RTC, finding no reversible
error therein. It even offered additional ratiocination for declaring the
marriage between respondent Crasus and Fely null and void, to wit
Defendant secured a divorce from plaintiff-appellee abroad, has
remarried, and is now permanently residing in the United States.

Plaintiff-appellee categorically stated this as one of his reasons for

seeking the declaration of nullity of their marriage
Article 26 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance
with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and
valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO CITIZEN AND A FOREIGNER
IS VALIDLY CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE IS THEREAFTER VALIDLY
OBTAINED ABROAD BY THE ALIEN SPOUSE CAPACITATING HIM OR HER
TO REMARRY, THE FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALL LIKEWISE HAVE CAPACITY
TO REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW.
The rationale behind the second paragraph of the above-quoted
provision is to avoid the absurd and unjust situation of a Filipino citizen
still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the latter is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse because he or she has obtained a
divorce abroad. In the case at bench, the defendant has undoubtedly
acquired her American husbands citizenship and thus has become an
alien as well. This Court cannot see why the benefits of Art. 26
aforequoted can not be extended to a Filipino citizen whose spouse
eventually embraces another citizenship and thus becomes herself an
alien.
It would be the height of unfairness if, under these circumstances,
plaintiff would still be considered as married to defendant, given her
total incapacity to honor her marital covenants to the former. To
condemn plaintiff to remain shackled in a marriage that in truth and in
fact does not exist and to remain married to a spouse who is
incapacitated to discharge essential marital covenants, is verily to
condemn him to a perpetual disadvantage which this Court finds
abhorrent and will not countenance. Justice dictates that plaintiff be
given relief by affirming the trial courts declaration of the nullity of the
marriage of the parties.[16]

After the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution, dated 08 March 2002,

[17]
denied its Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner Republic filed the
instant Petition before this Court, based on the following
arguments/grounds
I. Abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondents wife do not per
se constitute psychological incapacity.
II. The Court of Appeals has decided questions of substance not in
accord with law and jurisprudence considering that the Court of
Appeals committed serious errors of law in ruling that Article 26,
paragraph 2 of the Family Code is inapplicable to the case at bar. [18]
In his Comment[19] to the Petition, respondent Crasus maintained that
Felys psychological incapacity was clearly established after a full-blown
trial, and that paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code of the
Philippines was indeed applicable to the marriage of respondent Crasus
and Fely, because the latter had already become an American citizen.
He further questioned the personality of petitioner Republic,
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, to institute the
instant Petition, because Article 48 of the Family Code of the
Philippines authorizes the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the
trial court, not the Solicitor General, to intervene on behalf of the
State, in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of
marriages.
After having reviewed the records of this case and the applicable laws
and jurisprudence, this Court finds the instant Petition to be
meritorious.

I
The totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to support
the finding of psychological incapacity of Fely.
Article 36, concededly one of the more controversial provisions of the
Family Code of the Philippines, reads
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the

essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if

such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Issues most commonly arise as to what constitutes psychological
incapacity. In a series of cases, this Court laid down guidelines for
determining its existence.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[20] the term psychological incapacity was
defined, thus
. . . [P]sychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly cognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by
Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated[21]
The psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a)
Gravity It must be grave or serious such that the party
would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a
marriage;
(b)
Juridical Antecedence It must be rooted in the history of the
party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may
emerge only after the marriage; and
(c)
Incurability It must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
[22]

More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of

Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines were handed down by
this Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,[23] which,
although quite lengthy, by its significance, deserves to be reproduced
below

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to
the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This
is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation
of the nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the
family and marriage are to be protected by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the
family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that
the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so
as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as
a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained.
Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness
was existing when the parties exchanged their I do's. The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but
the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must
be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily

to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or

employment in a job

be established by the totality of the evidence presented during the

trial.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of
the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.

Using the guidelines established by the afore-mentioned jurisprudence,

this Court finds that the totality of evidence presented by respondent
Crasus failed miserably to establish the alleged psychological
incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there is no basis for declaring
their marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by

Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and
wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to
parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in
the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall
be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification,
which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons
for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit
to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the
case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor
General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.[24]
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,[25] further clarified that there is no
requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be
personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine
qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity. Such psychological incapacity, however, must

The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus before

the RTC was his testimony, which can be easily put into question for
being self-serving, in the absence of any other corroborating evidence.
He submitted only two other pieces of evidence: (1) the Certification on
the recording with the Register of Deeds of the Marriage Contract
between respondent Crasus and Fely, such marriage being celebrated
on 16 December 1961; and (2) the invitation to the wedding of Crasus,
Jr., their eldest son, in which Fely used her American husbands
surname. Even considering the admissions made by Fely herself in her
Answer to respondent Crasuss Complaint filed with the RTC, the
evidence is not enough to convince this Court that Fely had such a
grave mental illness that prevented her from assuming the essential
obligations of marriage.
It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant
spouse.[26] Irreconcilable
differences,
conflicting
personalities,
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by
themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity
under the said Article.[27]
As has already been stressed by this Court in previous cases, Article 36
is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at
the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a
serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as
to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume.[28]

The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that hurt and
embarrassed respondent Crasus and the rest of the family. Her hottemper, nagging, and extravagance; her abandonment of respondent
Crasus; her marriage to an American; and even her flaunting of her
American family and her American surname, may indeed be
manifestations of her alleged incapacity to comply with her marital
obligations; nonetheless, the root cause for such was not identified. If
the root cause of the incapacity was not identified, then it cannot be
satisfactorily established as a psychological or mental defect that is
serious or grave; neither could it be proven to be in existence at the
time of celebration of the marriage; nor that it is incurable. While the
personal examination of Fely by a psychiatrist or psychologist is no
longer mandatory for the declaration of nullity of their marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, by virtue of this Courts
ruling in Marcos v. Marcos,[29] respondent Crasus must still have
complied with the requirement laid down in Republic v. Court of
Appeals and Molina[30] that the root cause of the incapacity be
identified as a psychological illness and that its incapacitating nature
be fully explained.
In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage.[31] No less than the Constitution of 1987 sets the policy to
protect and strengthen the family as the basic social institution and
marriage as the foundation of the family.[32]
II
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is not
applicable to the case at bar.
According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the
Philippines
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation
wherein one of the couple getting married is a Filipino citizen and the
other a foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated. By its
plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be

applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely

because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a
Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely
herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a
divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the United
States in 1984, after which she married her American husband in
1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American
citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a
Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in
Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by
Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal
capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws,
then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between
Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce
from respondent Crasus.

III
The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf of the
Republic, in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of
marriages.
Invoking Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines, respondent
Crasus argued that only the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to
the RTC may intervene on behalf of the State in proceedings for
annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages; hence, the Office of
the Solicitor General had no personality to file the instant Petition on
behalf of the State. Article 48 provides
ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent
collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed.
That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General does
not bar him or his Office from intervening in proceedings for annulment
or declaration of nullity of marriages. Executive Order No. 292,
otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, appoints the
Solicitor General as the principal law officer and legal defender of the

Government.[33] His Office is tasked to represent the Government of the

Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and
agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring
the services of lawyers. The Office of the Solicitor General shall
constitute the law office of the Government and, as such, shall
discharge duties requiring the services of lawyers. [34]
The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines is to
ensure that the interest of the State is represented and protected in
proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages by
preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or
suppression of evidence; and, bearing in mind that the Solicitor
General is the principal law officer and legal defender of the land, then
his intervention in such proceedings could only serve and contribute to
the realization of such intent, rather than thwart it.
Furthermore, the general rule is that only the Solicitor General is
authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf of the People or the
Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought before this Court or
the Court of Appeals.[35] While it is the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
who actively participates, on behalf of the State, in a proceeding for
annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC, the
Office of the Solicitor General takes over when the case is elevated to
the Court of Appeals or this Court. Since it shall be eventually
responsible for taking the case to the appellate courts when
circumstances demand, then it is only reasonable and practical that
even while the proceeding is still being held before the RTC, the Office
of the Solicitor General can already exercise supervision and control
over the conduct of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal therein to better
guarantee the protection of the interests of the State.
In fact, this Court had already recognized and affirmed the role of the
Solicitor General in several cases for annulment and declaration of
nullity of marriages that were appealed before it, summarized as
follows in the case of Ancheta v. Ancheta[36]
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals [268 SCRA 198 (1997)], this
Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Art. 48 of the Family Code, one of which concerns the role of the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the State:

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall
be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification,
which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons
for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit
to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the
case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor
General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. [Id., at 213]
This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin [355 SCRA 285 (2001)]
reiterated its pronouncement in Republic v. Court of Appeals [Supra.]
regarding the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the State[37]
Finally, the issuance of this Court of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,
[38]
which became effective on 15 March 2003, should dispel any other
doubts of respondent Crasus as to the authority of the Solicitor General
to file the instant Petition on behalf of the State. The Rule recognizes
the authority of the Solicitor General to intervene and take part in the
proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages
before the RTC and on appeal to higher courts. The pertinent provisions
of the said Rule are reproduced below
Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition.

(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy of the
petition on the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the City
or Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from the date of its filing and
submit to the court proof of such service within the same period.
Sec. 18. Memoranda. The court may require the parties and the public
prosecutor, in consultation with the Office of the Solicitor General, to
file their respective memoranda in support of their claims within fifteen
days from the date the trial is terminated. It may require the Office of
the Solicitor General to file its own memorandum if the case is of
significant interest to the State. No other pleadings or papers may be

submitted without leave of court. After the lapse of the period herein
provided, the case will be considered submitted for decision, with or
without the memoranda.

affirming the Judgment of the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case
No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy
remains valid and subsisting.

Sec. 19. Decision.

SO ORDERED.
(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public
prosecutor, shall be served with copies of the decision personally or by
registered mail. If the respondent summoned by publication failed to
appear in the action, the dispositive part of the decision shall be
published once in a newspaper of general circulation.
(3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days from
notice to the parties. Entry of judgment shall be made if no motion for
reconsideration or new trial, or appeal is filed by any of the parties, the
public prosecutor, or the Solicitor General.

Sec. 20. Appeal.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Petitioner,

G.R. No. 154380

.

- versus CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III,

Respondent.

Promulgated:
October 5, 2005
x-------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

(2) Notice of Appeal. An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General may

appeal from the decision by filing a Notice of Appeal within fifteen days
from notice of denial of the motion for reconsideration or new trial. The
appellant shall serve a copy of the notice of appeal on the adverse
parties.
Given the foregoing, this Court arrives at a conclusion contrary to
those of the RTC and the Court of Appeals, and sustains the validity
and existence of the marriage between respondent Crasus and Fely. At
most, Felys abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy, give
respondent Crasus grounds to file for legal separation under Article 55
of the Family Code of the Philippines, but not for declaration of nullity
of marriage under Article 36 of the same Code. While this Court
commiserates with respondent Crasus for being continuously shackled
to what is now a hopeless and loveless marriage, this is one of those
situations where neither law nor society can provide the specific
answer to every individual problem.[39]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001,

Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party
is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce
decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse
likewise remarry under Philippine law?
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make
a definite ruling on this apparently novel question, presented as a pure
question of law.
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails
the Decision[1] dated May 15, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of
Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and its Resolution[2] dated
July 4, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The court a
quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is
capacitated to remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art.
26 of the Family Code and by reason of the divorce decree obtained
against him by his American wife, the petitioner is given the capacity
to remarry under the Philippine Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[3]

The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M.
Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an,
Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter,
Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their
son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had
been naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had
obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley.
She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut
Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to
remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No
opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the
same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF
THE FAMILY CODE[4]
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is
not applicable to the instant case because it only applies to a valid
mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino
citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file
a petition for annulment or for legal separation. [5] Furthermore, the
OSG argues there is no law that governs respondents situation. The
OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial
determination.[6]
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable
to his case but insists that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a
divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise
capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution.[7]
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed
before the trial court actually constituted a petition for declaratory

relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court

provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES

Section 1. Who may file petitionAny person interested under a deed,

will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected
by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or other
governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring
an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any
question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his
rights or duties, thereunder.
...
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be
a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons
whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a
legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for
judicial determination.[8]
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a
marriage between two Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien
citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in the
U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner
representing the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of
marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration of
his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal
interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial
determination inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation
ensues and puts into question the validity of his second marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of
the Family Code apply to the case of respondent? Necessarily, we must
dwell on how this provision had come about in the first place, and what
was the intent of the legislators in its enactment?
Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law

Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the Family Code, which
took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code,
Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending
Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was
added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance
with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and
valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis
supplied)
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the
situation presented by the case at hand. It seems to apply only to
cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties
are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at
the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino
citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen
and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry,
and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the
U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings [9] on the Family Code,
the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered
the following objections to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:
1.
The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those
whose spouses are Filipinos who divorce them abroad. These spouses
who are divorced will not be able to re-marry, while the spouses of
foreigners who validly divorce them abroad can.

2.
This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of
divorce even for Filipino citizens. For those whose foreign spouses
validly divorce them abroad will also be considered to be validly
divorced here and can re-marry. We propose that this be deleted and
made into law only after more widespread consultation. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed
that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia
Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married
to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married
to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985
case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[10] The Van Dorn case involved a
marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held
therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is
valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is
capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later
on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court
of Appeals.[11] In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens
when they got married. The wife became a naturalized American
citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court
therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his
naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law
and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the
rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be
interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of
them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce
decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if
the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the
marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and

injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact

and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the
clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its
spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law.
A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal
meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent. [12]
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse
who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the
contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application
of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1.
There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2.
A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of
the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid
divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter
to remarry.
In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American
citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated
between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien
wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry.
Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article
26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino
spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
We are also unable to sustain the OSGs theory that the proper remedy
of the Filipino spouse is to file either a petition for annulment or a
petition for legal separation. Annulment would be a long and tedious
process, and in this particular case, not even feasible, considering that
the marriage of the parties appears to have all the badges of validity.
On the other hand, legal separation would not be a sufficient remedy
for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally separated

Filipino spouse would still remain married to the naturalized alien

spouse.
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence
duly submitted by respondent concerning the divorce decree and the
naturalization of respondents wife. It is settled rule that one who
alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not
evidence.[13]
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his
allegation that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen.
Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own
courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. [14] Such
foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged
and proved.[15] Furthermore, respondent must also show that the
divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically
required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient
to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No.
227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been
divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and
remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the present
petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are
unable to declare, based on respondents bare allegations that his wife,
who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce
decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is now
capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly
upon respondents submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines
is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and
Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave,
Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.