House Hearing, 110TH Congress - The 2007 Hurricane Season: Are We Prepared?

THE 2007 HURRICANE SEASON:
ARE WE PREPARED?
FULL HEARING
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
MAY 15, 2007
Serial No. 11035
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON
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Congress.#13
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BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California,
PETER T. KING, New York
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
LAMAR SMITH, Texas
NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
JANE HARMAN, California
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon
TOM DAVIS, Virginia
NITA M. LOWEY, New York
DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
Columbia
BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana
ZOE LOFGREN, California
DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas
MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas
CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin
GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida
Islands
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
DAVID DAVIS, Tennessee
HENRY CUELLAR, Texas
CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania
YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York
AL GREEN, Texas
ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado
VACANCY
JESSICA HERRERA-FLANIGAN, Staff Director & General Counsel
ROSALINE COHEN, Chief Counsel
MICHAEL TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk
ROBERT OCONNOR, Minority Staff Director
(II)
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CONTENTS
Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security:
Oral Statement .....................................................................................................
Prepared Statement .............................................................................................
The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From the State
of New York, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland Security ........
The Honorable Gus M. Bilirakis, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Florida .....................................................................................................
The Honorable Christopher P. Carney, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Pennsylvania ....................................................................................
The Honorable Yvette D. Clarke, a Representative in Congress From the
State of New York ................................................................................................
The Honorable Donna M. Christensen, a Delegate in Congress From the
U.S. Virgin Islands ...............................................................................................
The Honorable David Davis, a Representative in Congress From the State
of Tennessee .........................................................................................................
The Honorable Bob Etheridge, a Representative in Congress From the State
of North Carolina .................................................................................................
The Honorable Al Green, a Representative in Congress From the State of
Texas .....................................................................................................................
The Honorable James R. Langevin, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Rhode Island ...........................................................................................
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Texas:
Oral Statement .....................................................................................................
The Honorable Nita M. Lowey, a Representative in Congress From the State
of New York ..........................................................................................................
The Honorable Eleanor Holmes Norton, Delegate in Congress From the
District ..................................................................................................................
The Honorable Ed Perlmutter, a Representative in Congress From the State
of Colorado ............................................................................................................
The Honorable Mike Rogers, a Representative in Congress From the State
of Alabama ............................................................................................................
The Honorable Loretta Sanchez, a Representative in Congress From the
State of California ................................................................................................
The Honorable Christopher Shays, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Connecticut .............................................................................................
The Honorable Ginny Brown-Waite, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Florida .....................................................................................................
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WITNESSES
PANEL I
The Honorable R. David Paulison, Director, Federal Emergency Management
Agency, Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement .....................................................................................................
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(III)
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IV
Page
PANEL II
Mr. Joe, Becker, Senior Vice President, Preparedness and Response,
American Cross National Headquarters:
Oral Statement .....................................................................................................
Mr. Craig Fugate, Director, Florida Division of Emergency Management:
Oral Statement .....................................................................................................
Mr. William Jenkins, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues
Division, Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement .....................................................................................................
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APPENDIXES
Appendix I: Enhanced Capabilities for Catastrophic Response and Recovery ...
Appendix II: Related GAO Products ......................................................................
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THE 2007 HURRICANE SEASON:

ARE WE PREPARED?
Tuesday, May 15, 2007
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY,
WASHINGTON, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 1:09 p.m., in Room 311,
Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Bennie Thompson [chairman
of the committee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Thompson, Sanchez, Lowey, Norton,
Jackson Lee, Christensen, Etheridge, Langevin, Cuellar, Carney,
Green, Perlmutter, King, Shays, Rogers, Brown-Waite, Bilirakis,
and Davis of Tennessee.
Chairman THOMPSON. [Presiding.] The Committee on Homeland
Security will come to order.
The committee is meeting today to receive testimony from FEMA
and other key stakeholders on what has been done to prepare for
the 2007 hurricane season.
Good afternoon. On behalf of the members of the committee, let
me welcome our panel. We are glad that all of you are here to discuss preparations for this years hurricane season.
First of all, I am enormously concerned, Mr. Paulison, that
FEMA is still not compliant with the committees requirement that
testimony be submitted within 48 hours of the hearing. We have
shared this to the secretary. I know you have significant jurisdictional issues, a lot of committees. We have said we would work
through it. And I understand what other challenges you have before you, but we have some committee rules that we have adopted,
and, to the extent practicable, we would like to see them followed.
The purpose of this hearing is to examine whether FEMA is adequately coordinating activities with its partners and the state and
local level as well as key stakeholders in the private sector.
The 2007 Atlantic hurricane season officially begins on June 1
and will last until November 30. The fact that FEMA still not has
issued the strategy that establishes practices and procedures for coordination among federal, state and local governments is very disturbing.
I called this hearing to examine just how FEMA is doing and
whether all key stakeholders are ready to respond and coordinate
effectively. As a member of the Gulf Coast, I have particular interest in seeing FEMA apply the lessons learned from Katrina into
practices for the future. In the event that a hurricane makes landfall and puts our communities at risk, we need to know that FEMA
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will respond quickly and administer assistance in an evenhanded
way.
Another key player that has some hard lessons learned from
Katrina was the American Red Cross. I am interested in hearing
how the organization plans to coordinate with FEMA. As we all
know, FEMAs response to Hurricane Katrina was abysmal. Last
year, Congress passed major FEMA reforms with an expectation
that we would see some real progress at this beleaguered agency.
I expect that Mr. Paulison will have an explanation for its agencys failure to produce a national response plan by the start of hurricane season, and FEMA will have a lot of explaining to do if it
is not all ready when a hurricane makes landfall this season.
I want to thank the witnesses again for being here and look forward to their testimony.
The chair now recognizes the ranking member of the full committee, the gentleman from New York, Mr. King, for an opening
statement.
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BENNIE G. THOMPSON,
CHAIRMAN,
The Purpose of this hearing is to examine whether FEMA is adequately coordinating activities with its partners on the State and local level as well as key stakeholders in the private sector. The 2007 Atlantic hurricane season officially begins
on June 1st and will last until November 30th.
The fact that FEMA still has not issued the strategy that establishes practices
and procedures for coordination among Federal, State and local governments is very
disturbing.
I called this hearing to examine just how FEMA is doing, and whether all key
stakeholders are ready to respond and coordinate effectively. As a Member from the
Gulf Coast, I have a particular interest in seeing FEMA apply the Lessons
Learned from Katrina into practices for the future.
In the event that a hurricane makes landfall and puts our communities at risk,
we need to know that FEMA will respond quickly and administer assistance in an
evenhanded way.
Another key player that has some hard Lessons Learned from Katrina was the
American Red Cross. I am interested in hearing how the organization plans to coordinate with FEMA.
As we all know, FEMAs response to Hurricane Katrina was abysmal. Last year,
Congress passed major FEMA reforms with an expectation that we would see some
real progress at this beleaguered agency.
I expect that Mr. Paulison will have an explanation for his agencys failure to
produce the National Response Plan within the required period. Mr. Paulison, explanations dont excuse and excuses dont explain. And FEMA will have a lot of explaining to do if it is not ready when a hurricane makes landfall this season.
Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me thank you for holding this hearing and for the bipartisan effort that we are making,
as far as ensuring that FEMA is given the jurisdiction and the
tools to get the job done.
Last year, our committee, working in a bipartisan way, was very
instrumental in the enactment of the FEMA reform bill, which kept
FEMA within the Department of Homeland Security but certainly
set up a chain of command and gave the director, I believe, the authority and the power that he needs to get the job done in times
of terrorist attacks and natural disasters.
That legislation clarified the command structure and required establishment of a surge capacity force. It also consolidated emergency communications, grant-making, and other responsibilities.
Let me just say also, speaking as someone from New York, I
want to commend FEMA for the job they did during the heavy
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snowstorms this year. They delivered generators less than 24 hours
after the snowfall ended, and even though it was not in my district,
in talking to people around the State, they were very appreciative
of the job you did, the professionalism and the timeliness.
I also, like the chairman, would appreciate testimony being provided to the committee on time. At the same time, however,
though, I think it is important and upon us in the Congress to
work in a bipartisan way to reduce the number of committees that
Director Paulison, Secretary Chertoff and all the undersecretaries
and assistant secretaries have to report to.
So while I am not excusing the late testimony, I also realize that
it is in everyones interest, including the countrys, primarily the
countrys, that we consolidate this so you are not going from committee to committee and getting caught up in jurisdictional entanglements.
I look forward to your testimony. I want to commend you for the
job that you have done. You took over under very trying circumstances. Certainly, from talking to first responders across the
country, particularly those in the fire service, they speak very highly of the efforts that you are making. Unfortunately, you are in a
job where, I guess, you are judged by mistakes.
But all I can say is that I certainly want to commend you for the
enthusiasm, the professionalism and the energy that you bring to
the job, and I look forward to your testimony today.
I yield back.
Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much.
Other members of the committee are reminded that, under the
committee rules, opening statements may be submitted for the
record.
I now welcome our first panel. We are pleased to have the administrator of FEMA, Mr. David Paulison, here to testify. Mr.
Paulison has an extensive background in the emergency preparedness arena, having served as the U.S. fire administrator and as the
fire chief of MiamiDade County in Florida.
Without objection, the witnesss full statement will be inserted
into the record. I now ask Mr. Paulison to summarize his statement for the committee for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF HON. R. DAVID PAULISON,
FEDERAL
EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
DIRECTOR,
AGENCY,
Mr. PAULISON. Chair Thompson, I appreciate the invitation.

Ranking Member King.
And, just for the record, I take very seriously your issues with
getting our testimony in on time, and we will make a very honest,
concerted effort to make sure we do that.
I also take very seriously your comments about the national response plan. We are working very diligently to get that out and operating. I will talk about that a little bit in my testimony. I am
sure it will come up during the questioning.
We have made steady progress to approve our preparedness posture for the 2007 hurricane season. The new FEMA is leaning further forward to deliver more effective disaster assistance, not only
to individuals but to communities impacted by the disaster.
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You can see our results in our response this year in Florida,
Georgia, the Alabama tornadoes, the noreaster that affected the
states in the Mid-Atlantic and up in New England and just last
week in Greensburg, Kansas. In each of these cases, FEMA was engaged as a partner with the state immediately, we deployed operational and technical experts, we rolled logistics and communication capabilities even before the disaster declaration was declared,
and we coordinated with the governor to facilitate a presidential
disaster delegation.
It was also FEMA that supported and helped facilitate the effective unified command among many federal, state and tribal and
local partners involved in these responses. We called this an engaged partnership. Our response in these diverse and numerous
events across the breadth of this great country are evidence of the
new FEMAs readiness for the 17 currently predicted storms during
the 2007 hurricane season.
With the first named storm of the season, Andrea, already behind us, lets look at our advanced preparation, our plans for operations during the storm and our proved ability to help with the
long-term recovery.
Local governments will always, always be the first to respond,
but FEMA has an important role to play. The old paradigm of waiting for the state and local governments to become overwhelmed before providing federal assistance simply does not work in todays
environment.
Under our engaged partnership, FEMA has strengthened our relationship with key state and local partners. A one-size-fits-all approach to emergency management will not work. FEMA is helping
each state analyze their strengths and weaknesses. Thus, our planning is more informed, and we can better anticipate specific needs
and quickly move to support each state.
A visible demonstration of improved federal capabilities is our
playbook of pre-scripted mission assignments. It contains plans for
a range of federal support that may be requested in a disaster and
lays out interagency coordination needed to ensure that it gets
there. The support ranges from heavy helicopters from the Department of Defense, generators from the Army Corps of Engineers, to
disaster medical assistance teams from HHS and emergency roadclearing teams from the U.S. Forest Service.
Prior to Katrina, we had just a handful of these pre-scripted mission assignments. Last year, we had about 40, and this year, we
have over 180 pre-scripted mission assignments with over 21 federal agencies.
So dont believe the stories that say FEMA and the federal government is not ready and do not have plans in place. We do and
they are getting better.
With these preparations under way, FEMA will be ready to act.
We have prearranged contracts, an improving logistics system and
other elements that are already in place to expedite our response.
FEMA can surge its own teams and assess them to an area in anticipation of an approaching storm.
This forward-leaning new FEMA is evident of our response in the
tornado that devastated Greensburg. In the first 72 hours, FEMA
coordinated the efforts of numerous federal agencies, supplies
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rolled in before they were requested, mobile support vehicles moved
in early, and when the state asked us to supplement their urban
search and rescue efforts, the FEMA task force was on the ground
within hours.
I also need to point out that the Kansas City National Guard, led
by General Todd Bunting with the local mayor and the city administrator, simply did an outstanding job of responding to this disaster, despite the fact that their homes were destroyed also.
I am proud of the response by our team of federal, state and local
partners in responding to this tragedy.
Now, once a storm has passed, FEMA is also better prepared to
help with the recovery. FEMAs disaster assistance directorate has
expanded its capabilities to provide mass care, sheltering, debris
removal, victim registration, including enhanced protections
against waste, fraud and abuse, and coordination among government and private-sector entities, all moving to provide assistance.
I am pleased to report that on May 3, 2007, an offer was made
and accepted for the national disability coordinator. This individual
is in clearance in our security office, and the official start date has
not been declared, but we should have her on board by the end of
this month.
One recent example is FEMAs response to the storms and flooding that hit the Northeast earlier this spring. FEMA had staff on
the ground before the rain stopped, evaluated damage and registering victims. Mobile assistance centers were available in the
immediate wake of the storm. The first individual financial aid was
actually delivered less than 24 hours after the president signed the
first disaster declaration. This fast, efficient, multi-state response
shows the type of action you can expect from FEMA during this
years hurricane season.
In conclusion, we have made real progress at FEMA and are
much better prepared for the 2007 hurricane season. By leaning
further forward to coordinate the federal response, which is more
informed through assessments and communication with our partners, we can better serve all Americans.
Today, FEMA has created an engaged partnership with state and
local governments, we have facilitated and supported effective unified command across all levels of government, we have engaged
with hurricane-prone states to gain a better understanding of the
vulnerabilities, and we have improved logistics and communication
capabilities to improve our response, and we have a much improved
disaster assistance capability for recovery efforts.
Now, we are not done yet. We have a lot of work to do, but if
our progress over the past year is any indication, I believe we are
on the right track for fulfilling our vision of becoming the nations
preeminent emergency management agency.
I am especially proud of the men and women who work at
FEMA. They really have put their heart and souls into rebuilding
this agency.
So I want to thank this committee and you, Chairman Thompson, particularly, for your continued support, and I look forward to
the opportunity to discuss with you about the 2007 hurricane season.
[The statement of Mr. Paulison follows:]
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PREPARED STATEMENT
OF
R. DAVID PAULISON
Good morning, Chairman Thompson, and Members of the Committee.

I welcome the opportunity to appear before this Committee to discuss how the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is prepared for the 2007 Hurricane Season.
The guiding principle of the new FEMA is that we are leaning further forward
to deliver more effective disaster assistance to individuals and communities impacted by a disaster. We call it engaged partnership. That is the FEMA you saw
in the Florida, Georgia, and Alabama tornadoesthe Noreaster that affected the
New England States and most recently in Kansas where the community of Greensburg was devastated by a tornado.
In those disasters you saw a FEMA that became an engaged partner with the
State within minutes of the disaster, immediately deployed operational and technical experts to the disaster site, started moving logistics and communications capabilities even before a disaster declaration and coordinated with the Governor to facilitate a Presidential disaster declaration. And, FEMA has supported and helped
to facilitate an effective Unified Command with other Federal agencies, and State
and local officials.
All of these actions were taken by a well led, motivated, and professional FEMA
workforce that has embraced and enhanced the vision and reality of a new FEMA.
Colorado State University has predicted 17 named storms, including 9 hurricanes,
of which 5 are expected to be major hurricanes. Predictions from the National Hurricane Center (NHC) are scheduled to be released on May 22, 2007, during National
Hurricane Preparedness Week.
FEMA is preparing for an active 2007 hurricane season by taking the following
actions:
1. Establishing a heightened posture of hurricane preparedness;
2. Engaging our State and Federal partners in more thorough and informed
hurricane planning; and
3. Building FEMAs operational capabilities to provide effective response and recovery.
Establishing a Heightened Posture of Hurricane Preparedness
FEMA is placing primary emphasis on strengthening the FederalState partnership to better ensure we are able to achieve shared objectives for a safe, coordinated
and effective response and recovery effort. First, we are emphasizing the States primary responsibility to provide for the safety and security of their citizens. The
States must take the lead to ensure they and their local jurisdictions are prepared
for hurricane season.
The Stafford Act acknowledges the Constitutional authority of a State to respond
to incidents within that State through the States Emergency Management Agency
or similar agency, which incorporates the States mutual aid system and principles
of the Incident Command System, and provides the structure through which State
and local government agencies respond. The State Emergency Management Agency
coordinates the overall management of an emergency to include requests for support
and resources from other State agencies, from other States under the Emergency
Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), and for supplemental assistance from
the Federal government. The EMAC process offers state-to-state assistance during
Governor-declared states of emergency: EMAC offers a responsive and straightforward system for states to send personnel and equipment to help disaster relief
efforts in other states. When one States resources are overwhelmed, other states
can help to fill the shortfalls through EMAC.
The strength of EMAC and the quality that distinguishes it from other plans and
compacts lies in its governance structure, its relationship with federal organizations,
states,counties,territories, and regions, and the ability to move just about any resource one state has to assist another state.
Second, FEMA, by advancing the concept of engaged partnership, then stands
shoulder-to-shoulder with the Statethere to support, fill gaps, and help to achieve
a successful response and recovery. In the past, our system was cued to sequential
failure: where the State held back until the local jurisdiction was overwhelmed, and
the Federal system held back until the State was overwhelmed. This approach, evident in the response to Katrina, ensured caused delays in delivering support. Under
engaged partnership, FEMA has strengthened the relationship between FEMA Regional Administrators and State Emergency Managers to focus on more deliberate
disaster planning. In preparation for this hurricane season, we have engaged each
of the 18 hurricane impact States (Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas),
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the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the Territories in a focused effort to identify
strengths and weaknesses. We are engaging now in discussions to fill gaps and develop mitigation strategies to ensure successful response and recovery. FEMA is prepared to allocate commodities and enlist the assistance of other departments and
agencies as needed to ensure a strong response to a States call for assistance. And,
as a result of our joint planning, we can anticipate a States needs and be more able
to quickly provide support.
Third, FEMA has extended our reach across the span of Federal agencies to ensure the smooth and responsive coordination of Federal support when it is needed.
The most visible demonstration of that coordination is the array of Federal capabilities contained in our playbook of pre-scripted mission assignments. This playbook
represents an examination of the range of Federal support that may be requested
in response to a disaster. It also includes advance inter-agency coordination to ensure delivery of that capability when it might be called upon in time of need. At
present, we have gained approval for 103 separate forms of assistance and are reviewing 85 potential pre-scripted mission assignments over a span of 21 Federal
agencies. This support ranges from heavy-lift helicopters from DOD, to generators
from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, to Disaster Medical Assistance Teams from
HHS and Emergency Road Clearing Teams from the U.S. Forest Service. These prescripted mission assignments will result in more rapid and responsive delivery of
Federal support to States.
Disaster response support is coordinated through one or more of the National Response Plans (NRP) 15 Emergency Support Functions (ESFs). The ESFs serve as
the primary operational-level mechanism supporting FEMA in providing State and
local disaster assistance in functional areas such as transportation, communications,
public works and engineering, firefighting, mass care, housing, human services, public health and medical services, search and rescue, agriculture, and energy. The
signatories to the NRP provide substantial disaster response assistance in their
areas of expertise and provide operational support for FEMA when assigned missions to support the disaster response. In addition, FEMA can surge its own teams
and assets into an area in anticipation of an approaching storm or event that is expected to cause a significant impact and result in a declared emergency or major
disaster and can turn to other DHS components such as the U.S. Coast Guard for
assistance. The surge capability allows FEMA to position assets prior to the event
to enable a quick response, but actual assistance cannot be provided until the Governor requests and the President approves a disaster declaration.
Within the first 72 hours after the tornado devastated Greensburg, Kansas,
FEMA coordinated the efforts of numerous Federal agencies in their ESF roles
under the NRP. For example, the DHS/National Communication System (ESF 2)
worked with the State and local officials to reestablish communications infrastructure, advising local government as necessary, and providing needed technical assistance. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (ESF 3) management team for critical facility restoration planning was on-site providing technical assistance to state and local
government. Additionally, Mobile Emergency Response Support (MERS) in the form
of 13 small Mobile Emergency Operations Vehicles (MEOVs) and one large MEOV
were deployed to Greensburg for communications and command and control support.
The larger MEOV was provided to serve as the Unified Command Post.
To further strengthen our partnerships, FEMA is actively engaging with State
governments and other Federal partners in joint exercises as we prepare for the
2007 Hurricane Season. During the first week in May, FEMA tested the national
incident management system and its response operations during an exercise called
Ardent SentryNorthern Edge, which depicted a Category 3 hurricane that struck
Newport, Rhode Island.
Engaging with State and Federal Partners in More Thorough and Informed
Preparedness Planning
As we approach the 2007 Hurricane Season, FEMA is a taking a three-tier approach to planning. First, we are engaging each of the 18 hurricane impact States,
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the Territories in focused hurricane planning. This includes employing a Gap Analysis Tool that will inform the planning
process. Second, we are providing specific attention to the Gulf Coast States pursuing for the first time regional development of a Gulf Coast Evacuation Plan.
Third, we are pursuing specific planning efforts with our partners in the State of
Louisiana, in recognition of their fragile condition following the devastation of Hurricane Katrina. Last, we are also focusing Catastrophic Disaster Response Planning
on Southeast Louisiana and the State of Florida.
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Hurricane Gap Analysis Tool
FEMA is employing a Gap Analysis Tool that is serving as the basis for better
understanding vulnerabilities in a more consistent manner. The Gap Analysis Tool
was developed in coordination with the State of New York Emergency Management
Office/New York City Office of Emergency Management and has been implemented
to provide FEMA and its partners at both the State and local levels in the hurricane
prone regions of the country with a snapshot of asset gaps at the National, State
and local levels
The initiative is a joint effort between State Emergency Management representatives and FEMA Regional representatives to conduct a series of structured discussions with local jurisdictions to better understand potential disaster response asset
gaps in the critical areas of debris removal, evacuation, sheltering, interim housing,
healthcare facilities, commodity distribution, communications, and fuel. The discussions are providing an opportunity for local jurisdictions to ask specific questions of
Federal and State officials and identify issues of critical concern to help long-term
preparedness programs. We are confident that through these structured discussions,
we will all be better prepared.
Specific gaps are determined by identifying a series of requirements in each critical area within each location and then subtracting the corresponding capabilities
for meeting those requirements for each location. By June 1, 2007, the data will be
compiled for the jurisdictions within the hurricane prone States, reviewed, and then
incorporated into FEMAs planning efforts. Although our initial use of this method
is being applied for the upcoming hurricane season, this process is applicable to all
hazards and the goal is to build upon lessons learned and apply the tool to all locations for all hazards on an ongoing basis.
The new FEMA has made a conscious effort to focus broadly on all 18 hurricaneprone States, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and Territories to prepare for the
2007 Hurricane Season. Today, FEMA is working closely with each of the 18 state
emergency management communities in hurricane prone states using a consistent
set of measures and tools to evaluate strengths and vulnerabilities.
We are actively conducting these analyses with state emergency managers. So,
not only have we improved our ability to respond, we also will have a better understanding of what type of response and supplies may be needed for a particular area
following a disaster.
Modeling is also an essential element of FEMAs planning efforts for different circumstances. FEMA is coordinating with the DHS Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate to adapt modeling tools to large metropolitan areas. For example, many
tools utilize a standard figure for population per square mile, often resulting in
skewed data for areas with high-rise apartment buildings. The work with S&T is
focusing on adapting these modeling tools to urban environments.
As the use of the Hurricane Gap Analysis Tool becomes more mature, FEMA
plans to incorporate additional modeling capabilities to validate the data received
and to forecast needs based on different variables. FEMAs current hurricane planning efforts rely heavily on existing modeling tools such as:
HurrEvac (Hurricane Evacuation) to enable tracking hurricanes and assist in
evacuation decision making;
SLOSH (Sea, Lake and Overland Surges from Hurricanes) to enable estimates of storm surge heights and winds resulting from historical, hypothetical,
or predicted hurricanes by taking into account pressure, size, forward speed,
track, and winds;
HAZUS (Hazards U.S.) established by FEMA to assess risk and forecast
losses based on population characteristics and buildings;
The US Army Corps of Engineers modeling tools which rely on geospatial capabilities to provide estimates of debris volumes; water, ice, and commodity
needs; and the number of people within the households likely within hurricane
force winds; and
NISAC (National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center) advanced
modeling and simulation capabilities to analyze critical infrastructure interdependencies and vulnerabilities.
Gulf Coast State Evacuation Plan
FEMA is helping Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama develop a Gulf Coast Evacuation Plan that extends to adjacent States who may host Gulf Coast evacuees. The
purpose of this effort is to synchronize separate State evacuation plans to create a
more jointly organized effort. Teams are engaging with each State, identifying requirements and capabilities, and then will work to develop a plan that integrates
shelter planning with transportation planning. The result will be a timelier, better
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organized and coordinated evacuation by those with their own transportation and
those who need assistance to evacuate by bus or air.
Coordinating with Louisiana
Recognizing Louisianas continuing fragile situation, we are collaboratively assessing requirements, State capabilities and the potential need for Federal assistance.
Louisiana is better prepared than last yearby applying lessons learned and investing some of their resources, but still needs assistance in finding shelter space in adjacent States, ensuring sufficient transportation resources to conduct a timely and
effective evacuation, pre-positioning commodities, and caring for those with critical
medical needs.
Catastrophic Disaster Planning Initiatives
We are also working with 13 southeastern Louisiana parishes (including the City
of New Orleans), which were selected as the initial geographic focus area for
FEMAs Catastrophic Planning initiative, because of their vulnerability to hurricane disasters. Substantial planning activity continues with the State of Louisiana
and its parishes in planning and preparing for the 2007 Hurricane Season.
In addition, FEMA is using scenario-driven workshops to enhance the State of
Floridas capability to respond to a Category 5 Hurricane making landfall in Southern Florida. This is a two-phased project. Phase 1 focuses on developing regional response and recovery annexes, including evacuation planning, for the counties and
communities surrounding Lake Okeechobee (in the event of failure of the Herbert
Hoover Dike) and will be completed by the beginning of the 2007 Hurricane Season.
Phase two will address the effects of a Category 5 hurricane striking south Florida.
The end product for phase two will be standardized and comprehensive catastrophic
Category 5 hurricane disaster functional response and recovery plans for the State
of Florida and responding Federal agencies. Phase two will be completed by September 30, 2008. These plans will be used as planning templates for other large
urban areas also.
Next, it is important to understand what FEMA is doing to build its operational
capabilities to improve its response and recovery capabilities in support of State and
local efforts.
Building FEMAs Operational Capabilities to Provide Effective Response
and Recovery
In addition to the many action items already described to better prepare for the
2007 Hurricane Season, FEMAs comprehensive strategy for improving its disaster
response efforts includes a 2007 Hurricane Contingency Plan, a new operational
planning unit, an Interagency Agreement with Defense Logistics Agency, Total
Asset Visibility, a new generation of response assistance teams, principal federal officials role, and mass evacuation planning.
2007 Hurricane Contingency Plan (CONPLAN)
The 2007 Hurricane CONPLAN provides the operational incident management
framework to prepare for, respond to, recover from, and mitigate the effects of hurricanes impacting the United States. The CONPLAN provides guidance on actions
that will be executed by Federal Departments and Agencies.
This document was developed in collaboration with all of FEMAs National Response Plan partners for the Emergency Support Functionsor ESFsand addresses the coordinated national-level Federal preparedness, response and initial recovery operations that will be used to support State, local, Territorial and Tribal
government entities impacted by a hurricane or tropical storm.
New Operational Planning Unit Capabilities
FEMA is hiring staff for its new Operational Planning Unit (Planning Unit). Located in FEMAs Headquarters, the Planning Unit will provide sophisticated operational analyses. With the new staff, FEMA is building its core planning competency
that will possess greater depth of experience and more capability to perform critical
disaster response operational analyses, prepare operational plans, and conduct crisis
action planning to ensure that the Agency can lead, coordinate and support a national all-hazard emergency management response.
Specifically, the Operational Planning Unit
Provides National and Regional operational planning guidance and coordination;
Coordinates at the operational level the execution of all hazard contingency
plans;
Provides forecasting and analysis of potential events;
Assists FEMA Regions in operational planning at the regional level; and
Leads the development of DHS and FEMA hazard-specific contingency plans.
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Eventually, planners will also be hired for the Regions to provide this capability
to those specific areas.
FEMA/DLA Interagency Agreement
FEMA and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) have entered into a collaborative
partnership, via an Interagency Agreement, to optimize the planning, ordering, storing and replenishing of certain commodities such as emergency meals and fuel, and
develop a road map for larger scaled supply chain initiatives.
The FEMA/DLA partnership has improved FEMAs immediate response and logistics capabilities by reducing the acquisition and distribution time, as well as the replenishment lead-time. The partnership has also improved FEMAs day-to-day supply chain operations by creating repeatable, sustainable processes for planning and
execution at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Through this agreement
DLA will procure, maintain, transport, and stage commodities. DLA currently provides visibility of all commodities shipped to disaster locations, logistic centers or
other locations as directed, from the initial receipt of the order until ownership
passes to FEMA.
TAV Program
FEMA Logistics has identified areas for improving its end-to-end supply chain to
deliver critical supplies at the right time, in the right quantity and to the right location. FEMA is implementing industry best practices for supply chain management
and an automated system that is improving information flow by providing real-time
visibility into orders and shipment of critical supplies during emergency response
efforts. The Total Asset Visibility (TAV) Program oversees, directs and manages the
design and implementation of an initial capability pilot system to monitor and view
the orders and movement of select commodities which was launched during the 2006
hurricane season.
Currently, the TAV Program provides FEMA with the ability to (1) manage and
view orders and inventory of select commodities and (2) track the location of trailers
carrying the commodities distributed from the FEMA Logistics Centers (LCs) and
select vendors to field sites. The long-term vision for the TAV Program is to engage
external emergency management stakeholdersfrom state, local and tribal governments and other federal agencies to non-government agencies and vendorsin the
entire FEMA supply chain. These activities cover requests for critical supplies to
tracking shipments and delivery to people in need during times of emergency.
Stakeholders would have real-time visibility into the status of requests and locations of shipments in transit.
FEMA recognizes that certain types of resources may be required immediately
after a disaster by State and local governments in order for them to adequately respond.
If State or local governments, and State partners, are unable to supply these resources, then FEMA will coordinate the provision of Federal commodities to ensure
that resources are in place in order to supplement State and local response efforts
during the immediate phase of response activities. FEMA has initiated the Pre-Positioned Disaster Supply (PPDS) program to position life-saving and life sustaining
disaster equipment and supplies in modular containers as close to a potential disaster sites as prudent, in order to substantially reduce the initial response time to
incidents.
Enhanced Response Teams
FEMA is developing the next generation of rapidly deployable interagency emergency response teams, tentatively identified as Incident Management Assistance
Teams (IMATs). These teams will support the emergent needs of State and local
jurisdictions; possess the capability to provide initial situational awareness for Federal decision-makers; and support the initial establishment of a unified command.
These teams will ultimately provide the three national-level response teams and regional-level emergency response strike teams required by the Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006.
The teams are still being designed and decisions on team assets, equipment, and
expected capabilities have not yet been finalized. FEMAs goal is to establish interim Regional and National teams using existing personnel within FEMA. The
teams will subsume the existing mission and capabilities of the Federal Incident Response Support Teams (or FIRSTs) and Emergency Response Teams (or ERTs).
The mission and capabilities will incorporate similar leadership, emergency management doctrine, and operational communications concepts. The national-level and regional-level teams will eventually be staffed with a core of full-time employees, unlike the ERTs, which are staffed on a collateral duty basis; will be fully compliant
with NIMS and ICS; and will train and exercise as a unit.
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Principal Federal Officials
Also, the Secretary of Homeland Security is represented by the Principal Federal
Official (PFO). The PFO ensures that incident management efforts are well coordinated and effective. The PFO does not direct or replace the incident command structure, nor does the PFO have directive authority over other Federal and State officials. For example, during a terrorist incident, the local FBI Special Agent-in
Charge coordinates with other members of the law enforcement community and
works in conjunction with the PFO.
The PFO is one member of the JFO Coordination Group. This group also includes
either an FCO, who manages and coordinates Federal resource support activities related to Stafford Act disasters and emergencies, or a Federal Resource Coordinator,
who performs similar functions for incidents that do not involve Stafford Act declarations. Depending on the incident, other agency officials are added to the Coordination Group, such as the Senior Federal Law Enforcement Official.
Mass Evacuation Incident Annex to the National Response Plan
As part of incorporating lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina, a Mass Evacuation Incident Annex to the NRP is under development. The Mass Evacuation Incident Annex will provide an overview of evacuation functions and agency roles and
responsibilities. It also will provide overall guidelines to enable evacuation of large
numbers of people in incidents requiring a coordinated Federal response through the
NRP ESFs. This annex will describe how Federal support resources are integrated
into State, local, and tribal efforts. Communication linkage to sheltering facilities,
special needs of evacuees, and addressing the need for evacuation of both companion
and service animals are just a few of the issues reflected in this annex.
Improved Delivery of Disaster Assistance
FEMA is making significant progress in improving its disaster assistance as well.
FEMAs Disaster Assistance Directorates planning and capability building initiatives include enhancing mass care capability by improving the National Shelter System and developing better tools for coordinating and tracking donations and volunteers; greatly increasing disaster victim registration capabilities while enhancing
protections against waste, fraud and abuse; developing a national disaster housing
strategy and improving operational planning for providing temporary housing in a
catastrophic disaster; establishing a case management program; updating ESF 6
Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services standard operating procedures; developing debris estimation technology and monitoring methodology and enhancing
state and local debris operations capabilities; and, improving our capability to conduct operations planning for long term disaster operations.
Emergency Evacuation, Shelter, and Housing
FEMAs most pressing priority for planning for Recovery from a catastrophic disaster event has been emergency evacuation, shelter and housing. In 2004, FEMA
completed an initial Catastrophic Disaster Housing Strategy, which proposed several initiatives to increase FEMAs capability to provide assistance to individuals
and households following an extraordinary or catastrophic disaster. The strategy
provided the principles and recommended strategies that establish the framework
for the catastrophic disaster housing recovery planning being done today. Key needs
identified at that time included: an expandable disaster registration intake and applicant assistance process; the ability to provide immediate benefits payments; a
plan for assisting applicants to temporarily relocate to outside the disaster area; and
a strategy and prepared public messages to provide victims with information about
assistance.
Mass Evacuee Support Planning: The 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes caused
several hundred thousand residents to evacuate to over forty States, many for
prolonged time periods. Cities such as Houston, Oklahoma City, Atlanta, and
Baton Rouge received hundreds of thousands of evacuees requiring immediate
shelter, food, other basic assistance, as well as longer term services. In June
2006, FEMA published Recovery Strategy RS001, Mass Sheltering and Housing Assistance. This strategy addresses many contingencies for providing sheltering and housing assistance for declared emergencies and major disasters. In
addition, FEMA is undertaking more detailed mass evacuee support planning.
This will assist State and local governments to plan and prepare for hosting
large displaced populations. The project includes FEMA developing an evacuee
registration and tracking capability, implementation plans for federal evacuation support to states, emergency sheltering guidance and providing direct
planning assistance to potential host States and communities.
The National Emergency Family Registry and Locator System and
National Emergency Child Locator Center: As defined in the Post Katrina
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Act, these capabilities will address the reunification of displaced persons and activity to locate missing children during disasters. For disasters declared by the
President, this tracking capability will assist FEMA, Department of Justice and
the American Red Cross in further developing and implementing methods for
quickly identifying and reunifying missing and separated children and family
members during a disaster.
Improving Shelter Management and Accountability: FEMA and the
American Red Cross, the nations largest operator of major congregate shelters
during disasters. The first phase of the National Shelter System (NSS) was developed through a FEMA/American Red Cross partnership to provide a webbased data system to support shelter management, reporting, and facility identification activities. The system is intended for use by all agencies that provide
shelter services during disasters to ensure a comprehensive understanding of
the shelter populations and available shelter capacity. In addition, this system
will provide visibility on large shelter populations and position FEMA to provide
targeted registration assistance to disaster victims. Outreach and training for
Federal, State, and local authorities in use of the system is being conducted.
Housing Options: The FEMA Housing Portal was developed to consolidate
available rental resources for evacuees from Federal agencies, private organizations, and individuals. The Joint Housing Solutions Group is a dedicated unit
to research and document alternatives to traditional temporary housing. They
are currently conducting initial baseline field tests of a housing option assessment tool.
Expanding Home Inspections Capacity: FEMA has increased the daily
home inspection capacity of FEMA contracted firms from 7,000 per day to
40,000 per day through a new contractual agreement. This added capacity
combined with a newly established third party evaluation of inspections performed on victims damaged homeswill increase the speed and accuracy of
home inspections that determine the FEMA repair and replacement grants for
which a victim may be eligible.
Applicant Registration and Management
In 2006 and 2007 FEMA has focused its Recovery planning and capability building efforts on improving applicant management systems, expanding registration intake and processing capacity, increasing fraud controls, supporting displaced populations, identifying alternative forms of temporary housing, and debris management
planning. FEMA has made significant progress in increasing its capability to provide assistance to individuals particularly in the areas of registration, applicant
processing, and providing assistance.
Doubling Registration Capacity to 200,000 Per Day: During the days
and weeks following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, FEMA surpassed 100,000
registrations a day, shattering all previous records of intake. While call center
capacity was increased to its highest levels ever, FEMA is pursuing even more
robust contract and contingency surge capabilities that will quickly allow for
rapid expansion to a registration intake capacity of up to 200,000 per day.
FEMAs Internet-based registration capability has been increased by improving
accessibility, allowing FEMA to handle more registrations than ever before.
This will help reduce registration wait times and FEMA Helpline information
delays following a major disaster.
Deployable Mobile Registration Intake Centers (MRICs) Pilot: Recognizing many disaster victims may be stranded or in congregate shelters with
no communications, and unable to register for assistance, FEMA has established a new registration pilot program that pushes registration capabilities directly into the field. In the 2007 hurricane season FEMA will have the ability
to deploy Mobile Registrations Intake Centers immediately to congregate shelters and provide an on-site capability to quickly register for FEMA assistance.
Debris Management Planning
Management of contaminated debris is of particular concern for terrorist events,
but is also an issue in most large natural disasters. An Interagency Work Group
to coordinate Federal agency management of contaminated debris began work in
2005 just prior to Hurricane Katrina. The Work Group is further developing Federal
contaminated debris operational procedure guidance. This project is analyzing the
implications of a catastrophic incident on contaminated debris management programs and policies and will assist FEMA, USACE, EPA, USCG, and other federal
stakeholders to better define their operational role and inter-relationships. FEMAs
Public Assistance Program is also undertaking two catastrophic planning initiatives
focusing on increasing State and local debris management capabilities through plan-
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ning and enhancing Federal capabilities to estimate debris volumes following a disaster to assist in operational planning and cost estimation.
Increasing Fraud Controls
FEMA has also taken steps to implement new and stronger controls pertaining
to identity and occupancy verification of applicants for disaster assistance. Examples
of controls implemented include: deployment of a new Internet registration application that disallows any duplicate registrations; added identity proofing to the call
center registration application so that all Individual and Households Program (IHP)
registrations are subjected to the same stringent criteria, including verification of
social security numbers and occupancy requirements; data-marking any applications
in FEMAs database that fail identity proofing so they are flagged for manual review
and denied automated payment; real-time interaction between the FEMA Service
Representative and the applicant during registration to ensure the data entered
that resulted in a failed identity check is correct before accepting the application;
working with FEMAs data contractor to flag any addresses that are not residential
addresses in order to prevent automated payments without an on-site inspection
verification of address and residency; and flagging at-risk social security numbers
to identify potential fraud.
Conclusion
I believe we have made real progress at FEMA and are prepared for the 2007
Hurricane Season. Our efforts will bear fruit across our disaster operations and assistance programs. Today, I have focused on
1. Establishing a heightened posture of hurricane preparedness;
2. Engaging our State and Federal partners in more thorough and informed hurricane planning; and,
3. Building FEMAs operational capabilities to provide effective response and recovery.
But, there is a lot more going on inside FEMA that will contribute to enhanced
performance and organizational success. For example, I hope to announce soon the
selection of our Disabilities Coordinator.
Although all disasters are local, FEMA must play a more proactive role in understanding vulnerabilities so we can assist the localities in being better prepared to
respond. And, as I hope you can see by today?s testimonywe are. By leaning further forward to coordinate the federal response, we can better serve all Americans.
Today, FEMA:
Has created engaged partnerships in support of State and local governments,
Has supported and helped to facilitate an effective unified command
with other Federal agencies, and State and local officials,
Has engaged with hurricane-prone states to gain a better understanding of their vulnerabilities,
Has improved logistics and communications capabilities to improve
response, and
Enhanced Disaster Assistance capabilities for recovery efforts.
Of course, we are not done yet. There is still much work to do.
But if our progress over the past year is any indication, I believe we are on the
right track to fulfilling our vision to become the nations preeminent emergency
management and preparedness agency.
I am especially proud of the men and women who work at FEMA. They have
put their hearts and souls into rebuilding this agency. The men and women of
FEMA are dedicated to the mission of disaster and victim recovery, and staunchly
committed to improving the speed, efficiency, and accountability with which we perform that mission. That commitment is not only to the victims and communities of
those disasters that we expect to face in the future, but to those victims and communities still struggling with the personal, professional, and social consequences and
challenges of past disasters.
Thank you for your continued support and the opportunity to discuss how FEMA
is preparing for the 2007 Hurricane Season. I look forward to answering any questions you may have.
Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Paulison. I

thank you for your testimony.
I will remind each member that he or she will have 5 minutes
to question the witness.
I will now recognize myself for questions.
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Before I do, I would like to make reference that, under the House
rules and this committee, visitors and guests are not permitted to
make undue noise or to applaud or in any way show their pleasure
or displeasure as to the actions of the members of the House.
Mr. Paulison, as you know, with the hurricane season coming on
June 1, when do you think we will have the plan ready?
Mr. PAULISON. Well, the national response plan is actually in
place now, the one we have been using. The concept of how we are
going to operate under that plan is still in place. What we are
doing is trying to rewrite that plan, to build it from the bottom up,
to make it much easier for the local communities to understand
and use and also incorporate some of those things that came out
of the Post-Katrina Reform Act.
We are going to try to get this thing ready before our first hurricane comes. I will not be ready by June 1, I want to tell you that
right now, but it should be done shortly after that. I have had my
staff working on it with the Department of Homeland Security and
also a lot of our users out there are involved in rewriting this plan.
So we do have a plan in place. We have a CONOPS for hurricane
season, we are doing right now multi-state evacuation planning
and working with all the states and their planning efforts to make
sure that we can fill those gaps that they have.
So we have a plan in place. The national response plan you are
speaking of, as far as rewriting it, is not done yet, but we are working very hard to make sure we get done in a timely manner.
Chairman THOMPSON. Can you give us an approximation of when
you think it will be ready?
Mr. PAULISON. I would hate to give you that and have something
happen. Invariably, if I give a date on something, something happens with that. I can tell you that we are working hard to get it
done in the June timeframe and not into July.
Chairman THOMPSON. Well, I think you do understand the need
to present that document.
Mr. PAULISON. Yes, sir, absolutely.
Chairman THOMPSON. Is your testimony to this committee of
such that even though we dont have the plan before us, that it
does not impede FEMAs ability to respond to any particular disaster, especially hurricanes?
Mr. PAULISON. That is correct, sir. That is my testimony. We are
ready to respond. We are working with the states, making sure we
are doing those gap analyses, particularly with the hurricane
states, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands and working with them
very closely. And we are ready to respond should a hurricane come
prior to getting that revised national response plan out; yes, sir.
Chairman THOMPSON. Another issue that came before us in previous testimony is that we authorize FEMA a certain number of
slots from a personnel standpoint. Can you provide the committee
where we are in completing the slots, as authorized by Congress?
Mr. PAULISON. At this point in time, we are just a little bit over
90 percent of our authorized strength, and I think that is remarkable. We will be at 95 percent before hurricane season, that is our
goal. And dont forget we only had 1,700 people when I took over
FEMA, and we lost 500 after Katrina. So we made a remarkable
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recovery of hiring people, getting them aboard, and we are at 90
percent.
If you are talking about the 254 positions converting to full-time,
we are in the process of doing that. Of course, that will drop the
percentage down once we get those in there, but we are doing a remarkable job of hiring, being able to cut through some of the red
tape and being able to get people on board.
Chairman THOMPSON. Can you provide the committee with what
you identify as some of the red tape that perhaps prevented you
from bringing people on as fast as you would like to have?
Mr. PAULISON. I think a lot of it was getting stuck in the mud,
so to speak, with the old way of doing things. I will give you an
example: We have a job fair right there at the Holiday Inn where
FEMA is located, and we had almost 600 people show up for 42
jobs.
So we are going to be doing more things like that, going out and
looking at hiring veterans that have been disabled from the war in
Iraq, going out to colleges and community colleges. I spoke at a
commencement exercise last week and challenged people to come to
work for FEMA. It is a good place to work. Targeting minority
groups and women groups to get them to apply to come to work for
FEMA.
We are looking outside the box, trying to cut through some of the
red tape. One of the things I learned coming from local government, the hiring of the federal government is much more difficult
than at the local level.
Chairman THOMPSON. Well, as you know, one of the workplace
issues for DHS in general is the morale of its employees. Can you
provide us those things that you think that might help Congress
help the department improve morale of its employees?
Mr. PAULISON. I will speak to FEMA directly. The morale of
FEMA when I took over was obviously, by anyones perception, not
good. They had been beat up, they were overworked, shorthanded,
not enough people to do the job. So we are building the morale by
doing a couple of things.
One, the employees see that I am very serious about rebuilding
this organization and they bought into that. Two, we have been
hiring people. Like I said, we are at 90 percent of our authorized
strength now. Three, and maybe as important as the other two, is
bringing people on board who have experience to do the job, bringing in good leadership. We only had two of our 10 regional director
slots filled. Now, they are all 10 filled, and they are people with
25 and 30 years experience dealing with emergency management.
So the employees see that we are serious about it.
I think that what I would ask Congress to do is to continue what
you have been doing, Mr. Chair. You have been supporting me, you
have been supporting this agency, and the employees recognize
that.
Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you.
Last question, Mr. Paulison: Are you aware of an issue with
formaldehyde in certain trailers that FEMA bought and placed in
the Gulf Coast region? And if you are, to what extent have you had
it investigated, and what have you come up with your investigation?
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Mr. PAULISON. The formaldehyde issue was brought to our attention, and we actually went out and investigated. We used EPA and
some other agencies to do testing. We have been told that the formaldehyde does not present a health hazard; however, we do encourage our occupants of those trailers to air those out, keep them open
as much as possible to let the fumes die out. And pretty much any
mobile home you buy has that same issue. Actually, a lot of single
family homes have that.
But we have been very cognizant and are on top of that and are
making sure that we are not doing anything that is going to harm
those people that are living in those travel trailers and mobile
homes.
Chairman THOMPSON. So there is not anything out of the normal?
Mr. PAULISON. That is correct, sir.
Chairman THOMPSON. Okay. Thank you very much.
I now recognize the ranking member of the full committee, the
gentleman from New York, for questions.
Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Paulison, I understand that probably in the next several
weeks the U.S. International Trade Commission may issue a decision in a patent dispute case that would prohibit the importation
of broadband-capable cell phones that allow users to share video
and exchange other data via the Internet. I assume you are aware
of it. I know several first responder groups have come to me, and
they are concerned about the impact that would have.
What impact do you think it would have, and how would FEMA
adapt itself to that decision, if it comes down that way?
Mr. PAULISON. We had a discussion with this yesterday, so your
question is timely.
I wont have a major impact on FEMA itself, because we have
the capability of doing those things already. What it does have an
impact on is the first responders. They need that technology out
there to be able to do the video, the data over one instrument instead of having several.
So without getting into a dispute on who is right, the fact is that
the first responder community can use that technology and can use
it to actually protect themselves and better protect the American
public.
Mr. KING. On to another point, and I realize that no two disasters are alike and no incidents are alike, but based on the leadership you are bringing to FEMA and based on the legislation that
was passed last year, what would be done differently if a Katrinalike event occurred this summer? How do you see FEMA reacting
differently than it did 2 years ago?
Mr. PAULISON. Well, FEMA itself, the difference is some of the
things we have already talked about, about having a better communication system, having the right type of leadership on the ground
who know how to handle disasters, know how to manage these big
disasters, but also having visibility of what is actually happening
in real time as opposed to guessing what is happening and getting
it off some of the television stations.
Also, we have been working with each state, looking at evacuation plans. Are they in place, how are they going to transport peo-
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ple, where are they going to go, who is going to staff the shelters?
We have been working very closely with the Red Cross on the shelter issue, putting a shelter registry in place. We have identified
44,000 shelters across this country that we didnt know that were
there before.
So we are doing a lot of things that you are not going to see the
same type of response. You are going to see a federal government
that is extremely proactive, moving very quickly and making sure
that when the state asks for something it is there on the ground
waiting for them.
Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
We now yield to the gentlelady from California for 5 minutes,
Ms. Sanchez.
Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Mr. Paulison, for being before us today.
In the next couple of weeks, I am planning to introduce legislation to authorize the national urban search and rescue system. And
my question for you is, do you think that the national urban search
and rescue system and its task forces are a successful part in helping FEMA respond to these disasters?
Mr. PAULISON. There is no question about it. They are an outstanding asset for FEMA to use. We have 28 teams out there right
now. In 2007, they received $25 million from FEMA, and the presidents proposed budget for 2008 is another $25 million.
Ms. SANCHEZ. In particular, the legislation I have drafted right
now would allow the urban search and rescue system and task
forces to activate for pre-staging and training activities, and do you
think that this will improve the systems preparedness and ability
to respond when they are needed?
Mr. PAULISON. Well, without seeing the legislation, I will just
speak generally, that any time that the teams exercise and deploy
in practice, it makes them sharper and more able to respond in a
better manner, if that is answering your question. And that is why
we have increased the amount of money they get to $25 million and
again next year to give them the dollars to do some of those things.
Ms. SANCHEZ. In the testimony that we received from the second
panel, Mr. Fugate, the director of the Florida Division of Emergency Management, urges us to increase the funding for the Emergency Management Performance Grant Program. The National
Emergency Management Association estimates that the current national need for that funding is at about $487 million, and yet the
president only put in $200 million for this 2008 budget.
Given that this the only grant that we have of federal funding
for the states and locals to use for planning and preparedness activities for all hazard disasters, do you think that that is enough
money, the fact that the president only put in $200 million in his
budget?
Mr. PAULISON. Well, since Mr. Fugate is sitting behind me, I will
be careful how I answer that.
Actually, the president and the administration does feel that that
is sufficient. There is no amount of money that is ever enough for
anybody to operate under. We know that our state emergency management systems are stretched. Florida has a very robust one, and
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Mr. Fugate is one of our better emergency managers around the
country.
But the president is putting into the budget what he thinks is
sufficient to keep those systems going. It is a state activity, and the
federal government is simply assisting in that area.
Ms. SANCHEZ. Do you think that the Department of Homeland
Security has a sufficient all-hazards approach to emergency preparedness and response?
Mr. PAULISON. I do. I am a firm believe in all-hazards response
and all-hazards preparedness. Any type of disaster that we prepare
for we have to prepare for all of them. We have to prepare for natural disasters, manmade disasters, terrorist disasters, any type of
thing. You can see it in your home state what you have to deal
with, from forest fire to floods, mudslides, earthquakes, all those
types of things.
So we have to have a general perspective of this, and I do feel
like that I get a lot of support as the secretary for an all-hazards
approach to how we respond and how we prepare.
Ms. SANCHEZ. And, lastly, let me ask, my biggest concern right
now, being a Californian and just going out in the community, is
that the first line of response or successfulness with respect to either a terrorist attack or a hazard situation is how the people respond. And what I have seen is really a deterioration in people
even being prepared on an individual, family or unit basis.
What do you think that we can do to increase that knowledge
and really get people to understand that it may be 9 days, like in
Katrina, before the federal government or anybody else gets to
them?
Mr. PAULISON. And I have seen the same thing, and I will talk
about my home state of Florida after Hurricane Andrew came
through. We saw several years where people were prepared and
would get ready for every hurricane season. And as we got further
and further away from that hurricane, it got worse and worse
where people simply did not prepare.
With Hurricane Wilma coming through last year, we ended up
working with the state and simply could not keep up with the
amount of supplies we had to deliver to people because they were
not ready. They didnt have their 3 days supply of food and water
and medicine, flashlights and batteries and all those things that we
know you have to have.
This country has to get back to a culture of preparedness. We
can preach it from here, but it takes people like Mr. Fugate, who
will testify in the next committee, and the local emergency managers and our congressional members and our local elected officials
continuing to preach that we have to be ready for any type of disaster. Because regardless of what state you live in, in this free
country of ours, there is some type of natural disaster that can be
there. Plus we have the threat of terrorism.
So I think we are on the same page. We have got to get that out
there and convince our public out there, our residents, that they
have to prepare and take care of themselves and their families.
Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. I apologize to the
gentlelady. I looked at one red light and it was second.
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We now recognize the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Rogers, for
5 minutes.
Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Those of us who were on this committee last Congress are all
aware of the real difficulty DHS has had in trying to recruit and
retain top management personnel, and we all are also aware how
difficult it was for us when your position came open to recruit topflight personnel to be interested in this job. And as I recall, you
were the only top-flight candidate who didnt run for the hills, and
our nation owes you a debt of gratitude for taking on this job when
nobody else wanted it of your caliber. So I appreciate that.
Also, I appreciate the fact that when we had a tornado in Alabama earlier, a few months ago, FEMA performed exceptionally
well, which was a stark turnaround from what we saw on the Gulf
Coast after Katrina. So I know that didnt happen by accident either, so I appreciate your service in Alabama.
There are several things I want to ask about. First is, on the
coast, in the coastal states, we have, and I know in Mississippi and
in Alabama, primarily rural water systems that provide water to
these small towns. It is my understanding that in Georgia and in
Mississippi there are adequate numbers of mobile generators for
pumping the water when the power goes out, but in Alabama there
are a very small number of those generators.
Is there anything being done by FEMA to address that inadequacy, at least on the southern part of Alabama, toward the Gulf
Coast, in water generation?
Mr. PAULISON. We have quite a few generators that we call 50pack. We have 50 generators on a tractor trailer that we move in
very quickly after a storm. Greensburg, Kansas, had their own
water system and their own power system owned by the city, so we
moved in very quickly with generators, along with the National
Guard, to help them get those things back up and running again.
And we would do the same thing in Alabama.
Mr. ROGERS. Can these local rural water systems apply for grant
assistance to get mobile units that they can move among their own
members and their associations?
Mr. PAULISON. They can after a storm. If there is a storm and
their infrastructure is damaged
Mr. ROGERS. I am thinking ahead of time, pre-positioning these
things, knowing that on the Gulf Coast we are going to have seasonal weather problems that will take the water distribution down.
Because Georgia has an adequate number and because Mississippi,
because of Katrina relief, has them, I want to know if we can do
anything in advance of a disaster to make sure these water systems have these mobile units they can share among each other?
Mr. PAULISON. I am not aware of any off the top of my head,
Congressman, but I will tell you what I will do: I will research and
see if we can find something.
Mr. ROGERS. If you would, I would appreciate it, sir.
The next thing you talked about in response to Congressman
Kings question about what we would do differently. You talked
about anticipating and working better with local governments. One
of the things that our local officials in south Alabama talked about
after Katrina was the debris removal, and they would like the lati-
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tude to go ahead and negotiate ahead of time with companies who
are not in the immediate coastal area, to come in after a hurricane
or tornado and remove debris, pre-negotiated prices along pre-negotiated routes so that we dont get extorted when we have these disasters.
Have you all done anything to allow these local governments
themselves to pre-negotiate these debris removal contracts?
Mr. PAULISON. Yes, sir. In fact, we encourage them to do that.
One thing that we have done is there used to be a disparity between at what percentage rate we reimburse the Corps, if the
Corps did it, or if a local community contracted themselves, and we
have taken that disparity away. That was not the right thing to do,
so we have taken that disparity away.
We encourage local communities and states to have those debris
contracts in place. It makes it much easier. First of all, it puts the
work back at the local community where it needs to be so you can
put local people working. And then, secondly, it takes the burden
off of the Corps also.
Mr. ROGERS. Excellent. My last question is to follow up on Congresswoman Sanchezs issue of search and rescue. Do you all have
within your resources canine detection teams for post-disaster
search and rescue?
Mr. PAULISON. The 20 urban search and rescue teams, most of
those do have canine dogs to search for live victims and also body
recovery. FEMA itself does not own them, but we pay for them
through the local communities that have urban search and rescue
teams, or the states that have them.
Mr. ROGERS. You pay for them?
Mr. PAULISON. We support the urban search and rescue teams,
again, $25 million this year, and part of that the teams will support a dog canine corps at the urban search and rescue level.
Mr. ROGERS. Okay. Thank you very much.
We now recognize the gentlelady from the District of Columbia
for 5 minutes, Ms. Norton.
Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The gentleman from Alabama has raised an issue of the kind
that about a dozen members came to testify before our subcommittee last week. And just for the information of members, we
are preparing a package of legislative fixes really drawn from the
Katrina experience. Sometimes they may apply to states like Alabama, which is also affected, but these would be one time only
fixes, and we had the entire delegation from both states come. And
we would appreciate your continuing input into that discussion.
I am going to limit my question to a single one, particularly since
my subcommittee is having a hearing that comes close to this one.
It is going to be called, Assuring the National Guard is as Ready
at Home as Abroad, and I appreciate that you are appearing at
both of these hearings.
Although I am going to suggest to both chairmen, full chairmen,
that we perhaps have some joint hearings so as to keep FEMA
from running between two committees, which very honestly do
have overlapping jurisdictions. And so we have just got to figure
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that out, and the committees are trying very hard. They each have
a deep interest in your work.
My question really goes to preparing for the coming season and
avoiding what I will call, for lack of a better word, false positives.
We may have scared FEMA into overpreparedness. You will remember, Mr. Paulison, our hearing on the millions of dollars above
what was needed for food, and I know you are fixing that now, but
several million dollars was wasted, some was given away.
We also have asked for an audit of your new management employees. I think much of that came out of both committees.
Mr. Chairman, you will recall that in our committee on the Federal Management Service we discussed, as we had in the other
committee, how the person who became head of this federal police
service that covers the entire federal work force, almost 2 million
people, had never run a police department. I understand some of
these people come out of the military, but that raises that some
questions that I think only an audit will tell us about.
But you have now new people predicting hurricanes, and there
was an internal debate in FEMA last year about this 7-day directive, that there will be 7 days advance warning and so forth, and
a lot of that comes out of the science, but the debate had to do with
keeping mobilizations and deployments from occurring that may
not be necessary. And it appears that a fair number of deployments
were made that were not necessary based on this 7-day warning
when in fact most of those hurricanes peter out and go out to sea,
thank heavens.
I want to know if you feel that you are more actively able to discern which hurricanes are likely to hit land, and you know that in
about 3 days out. In that case, wouldnt that be enough, given advance orders for food and so forth, if needed, to do the necessary
deployments without trying to figure out 7 days out and then deploying people around the country, spending taxpayers money
where it may not be necessary?
Mr. PAULISON. That is a very difficult issue and a very intriguing
question you are asking.
We work very closely with the National Hurricane Center. In
fact, I have a FEMA employee that is stationed down there. We
have a hurricane liaison team actually based in the National Hurricane Center down in Miami. And we know they are working very
hard to give us better predictions. Three-day predictions are pretty
accurate, the 5-day predictions are not quite as accurate, and if you
get out any further than that, it makes it much harder.
We want to be proactive. The states have to move quickly. If we
look at an area like Louisiana or anywhere in the Gulf Coast where
a significant number of people are going to have to be evacuated
and going to have to be evacuated by buses, if we wait too long before we start moving people, then they will be in harms way. Now,
7 days is too early to move people, obviously, but, still, 72 hours
out takes almost that long sometimes to move people.
I know Craig Fugate is here, and he has a lot of experience with
that. I am sure you can ask that same question from a state perspective just to tell you what they think.
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We dont want to move assets needlessly, we dont want to waste
taxpayers dollars, but at the same time, the downside would not
to be there if they needed us.
So it is a tough call. We are trying to make the best judgment
we can. I am on the phone constantly. I was with Max Mayfield
and the new Hurricane Director Proenza. We are developing a good
relationship, and I am on the phone with him constantly, Tell me
what you really think. Where do you think it is going to go? We
are just making the best call we can at the time.
Ms. NORTON. Yes. It would be too bad if an audit then is done
on FEMA going more places than was necessary. There ought to
be someway to somehow do this scientifically. I do understand
what you are up against.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to remind the audience that cell phones should be
in the off or vibrate mode during hearings. We continue to hear
phones going off while questions and witnesses are responding.
I now recognize the gentleman from Florida for 5 minutes, Mr.
Bilirakis.
Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As I am sure you are aware, Director, many experts have predicted that this hurricane season will be a very active one. Obviously, those of us who represent coastal states are very concerned
about the potential of these dangerous forecasts.
I believe it is incumbent upon our states and local governments
to best prepare for major disasters. So with that, I will ask my
questions.
What are the most important steps that states, localities and
even individuals can take to ensure that they are best prepared for
the upcoming hurricane season?
Mr. PAULISON. That is a pretty broad question.
I am from south Florida also. My family is still down there. Individually, I can tell you what we do. We make sure that our home
is prepared, make sure we have hurricane shutters. Every beginning of hurricane season we go out and purchase food and water,
make sure we have batteries for our flashlights. I happen to have
a portable generator. I make sure I have fuel for that and we are
ready to go.
At the local level, the local community definitely has to be prepared, because that is where the response is going to come from.
They have to make sure they have plans in place, they exercise
those plans, make sure they know what their shelters are going to
be, how they are going to evacuate people, when they are going to
call it, how are they going to get there.
And at the state level, the same type of thing. The state needs
to make sure that they are following up on each of those counties
and each of those communities, that they are evaluating those
plans to make sure those are in place and make sure the state is
ready to respond with the assets it has.
It is a team effort. It takes the federal government, the state, the
local community and the individuals all to take it very seriously to
prepare themselves for these types of storms, particularly in the
coastal areas.
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Mr. BILIRAKIS. Okay. I have a question. I introduced a piece of
legislation which was to provide tax incentives for Americans in
their property to better withstand hurricane and tornado-free
winds.
Do you believe that the administration would be interested in
working with me on this proposal to help continue our countrys
commitment to disaster preparedness?
Because I think mitigation is where it is at.
Mr. PAULISON. I can speak for FEMA, particularly. We would be
glad to work with you on any type of legislation that would help
people better prepare themselves and to sit down and talk with you
and talk about what our issues are and how we think we can get
this country all prepared for any type of disaster, quite frankly.
Mr. BILIRAKIS. Okay. Can you specifically discuss againI know
it was touched uponthe adjustments that your agency made postKatrina?
Mr. PAULISON. I will, and I will cover them quickly, because I
know you have another panel behind me. We took very seriously
those things that came out of committees like this, came out of the
White House, came out of the IG report, the GAO reports, and they
boiled down to just a few things that were overall themes.
One, the biggest failure was communications, no communication
between the local community and the state, between the state and
the federal government and inside the federal government itself.
That is why we put this unified command system in place. It has
a better visibility of what is happening on the ground real time. We
have put systems in place to be able to get live videos back where
we can actually see that and have satellite communications.
Having a better logistics system, better handle on how much
stuff do we need on the ground, how do we move it, how do we
track it, and how do we get it to the people. Having better leadership on the ground, people who know what they are doingwe
learned that very clearlyand then also being able to take better
care of our victims, the people who have had to evacuate. Have a
better registration system in place, being able to track people, making sure they get what they need but yet at the same time putting
waste, abuse and fraud systems in place so we dont waste money
like we did during Katrina.
And that is a very quick, short answer, but I would be glad to
sit down with your office and go over it in detail if you would like.
Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you, Director.
I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We now recognize the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Carney,
for 5 minutes.
Mr. CARNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Paulison, once again, I want to commend you for your efforts
in jumping on. It is not easy, and I realize the task you have at
hand.
On February 15 of 2006, February 15, 2006, Secretary Chertoff
testified, and I want to quote this so I get it right, that, It seems
to me the minimum of what we need to do by June 1 is require
that you put on the trucks the kind of communications that allow
you to track where a truck is at any particular point in time.
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Now, the secretary is talking about June 1, 2006. Does FEMA,
in fact, have this capability in place by January 1, 2006?
Mr. PAULISON. We do. We do for the Gulf Coast, and up the Atlantic Coast, anything that flows out of our office in Denton, Texas,
or our offices out of Atlanta, which is our biggest supply depots. We
purchased 20,000 GPS units and we can track our trucks real time,
but it is a bigger system than that.
So nationwide what we can do is our ordering system, where
does the order come from, when is it filled, where is it going, and
when does it get on the road. We have put a system in place like
that.
Mr. CARNEY. And that is nationwide?
Mr. PAULISON. The tracking of the individual trucks is not nationwide. The tracking of the individual trucks is anything that
comes out of Texas or anything that comes out of Atlanta.
But we are looking now at going to more of what we call a 3PL,
third-party logistics where leveraging the private sector out there,
like the UPSs and the FedExes and tying into their system instead
of spending the millions and millions of dollars to purchase our
own. So that is going to be the next phase of this.
Mr. CARNEY. In case of a true catastrophe, are you going to then
be pulling resources from all over the country; is that what you are
telling us?
Mr. PAULISON. Well, the bulk of our supplies are in Texas and
Alabama, although we do have them scattered around the country.
But what we are really doing is develop a partnership with the Defense Logistics Agency where they will be our main supplier and
a backup supplier. So we will be able to rotate stocks, so we dont
have the wasted supplies like we had before, but at the same time
being able to track those through that system also. We really are
developing partnerships.
We have learned a lot of lessons over the last 3 years on how the
logistics systems should work and also to the point of hiring one
of the top officials. I had a DLA to come work for us and run our
logistics, so we are excited about that.
Mr. CARNEY. Thanks. In your prepared testimony, you said that
the guiding principle of the new FEMA is that we are leaning further forward to deliver more effective disaster assistance to individuals and communities impacted by a disaster, and you called it,
engaged partnership. I really commend that approach. I am very
happy to hear that.
Yet last week, when White House Spokesman Tony Snow was
asked about Kansas Governor Sebelius concern over response efforts, he said, If you dont request it, you are not going to get it.
Is this statement consistent with FEMAs principles, or do you
have some education to do at the White House?
[Audience interruption.]
Chairman THOMPSON. Excuse me a minute. We will save your
time, Mr. Carney.
Mr. PAULISON. What was the question again? Sorry?
Mr. CARNEY. Your leaning forward approach, you have engaged
partnership I think is great, but Tony Snow said, If you dont request it, you are not going to get it.
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Mr. PAULISON. I think that was in context to some of the Guard
issues, I am not sure. But I can tell you that the philosophy of this
agency is we are going to try to anticipate what the needs are. We
see thousands of disasters all the time, so we kind of know what
is going to be needed. So we are going to be moving supplies, communications but not without talking to the state and telling them
what we are doing. We are not going to come in and take over. This
is a local response and it is a state response.
But what we did in Greensburg, Kansas, just seeing the magnitude of the disaster of that, we knew that they were going to
have a difficult time asking for things, so we started moving the
stuff that we thought they would need right away, and it worked
extremely well.
Mr. CARNEY. Is Mr. Snow aware of this?
Mr. PAULISON. Yes, he is. He was with us when we went down
there and saw what we were doing. I think that may have been
takenagain, I dont know what the context of what that statement was said, but I know he was very supportive of what we were
doing.
Mr. CARNEY. Good. All right. That is good to hear.
Thank you very much. No further questions.
We now recognize Mr. Davis of Tennessee for 5 minutes.
Mr. DAVIS OF TENNESSEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Director Paulison, for being here. I appreciate
your testimony today.
It is my understanding that FEMA and the national response
plan make it quite clear that FEMAs role is to coordinate federal
resources and to assist in disasters and not actually take over for
local and state governments. Do you agree with that?
Mr. PAULISON. Absolutely. All response is local; that is, we are
not going to take over. We want to be there as a partner from day
one, not wait for people to become overwhelmed before we step in.
But I was a local first responder also. I ran the Miami-Dade Fire
Department, and I would not want somebody to come in and take
over my disaster, but I would want somebody by my side, and that
is the tact we are going to take. We are not going to take over, that
disaster belongs to that state, belongs to that local community. We
just want to make sure they have the tools and the supplies to do
the job.
Mr. DAVIS OF TENNESSEE. You used the word, overwhelmed,
and it appears to me that we are really in a partnership, the federal government and state and local governments, coming together,
working alongside, closer to the people. Local government, state
government really take the lead and then FEMA comes in and follows up.
With that in mind, though, there are people around the country
that watch national TV and they just feel like the federal government should take control and be there quicker. I am not sure that
I agree with that, but what would you say to the people around the
country that have that sense that we should react quicker at a federal level?
Mr. PAULISON. I think we should act quicker than we have in the
past but not to take over. If the state or local community does need
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something, like communications equipment, food, water, blue tarps,
all those types of things that FEMA supplies, they should be there
when they need them, not have to wait 3 or 4 days for us to ship
them across the country.
So we are going to move faster with things that we think they
do need, but we are not going to step on their toes, we are not
going to take over these disaster scenes.
Mr. DAVIS OF TENNESSEE. I know that I have been a state legislator myself, and I understand that at the local level we are closer
to the people, typically, than we are in the Washington level. Do
you believe you even have the constitutional authority to take control or do you still believe that is down there at the local and state
level?
Mr. PAULISON. In a catastrophic event, the president would have
legal authority to take over, invoking Insurrection Act or something
like that. However, in a normal disaster, we are not going to do
that. That is not what we have the authority to do. That is the
local response or a states rights out there.
Again, we want to be a partner. This is not an adversarial at all.
We want to be there with them as soon as we can, standing by
their side, What do you need, how can we help, what can we give
you, and that is the way we want to operate. That is the philosophy this organization is going to operate under as long as I am
in charge.
Mr. DAVIS OF TENNESSEE. Thank you for your partnership, and
I can tell you, being from the mountains of east Tennessee, there
are times that we have floods coming out of the mountains with
rivers and streams and FEMA has always been very responsive.
This is my first term but I hear very good things that you have
been able to do in the past, and thank you for working with us on
the local and state level.
And with that, I yield back.
We now recognize the gentlelady from New York, Ms. Lowey, for
5 minutes.
Mrs. LOWEY. And I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and what a delight
it is for me to welcome Administrator Paulison.
I must tell you that we had a severe noreaster and the subsequent flooding devastated many communities, particularly in Westchester County, which is my community, and Administrator
Paulison joined Senator Clinton and me on a tour of the flooded
areas and FEMA quickly had preliminary damage assessment
teams on the ground, which led to the president issuing a disaster
declaration in a timely manner. I cannot be more effusive. You
were extraordinary, you responded immediately, and I visited every
disaster preparedness center, recovery center, I guess we call it
now in the district, and the response has really been fantastic.
You set up seven disaster recovery centers, nearly 6,000 households and businesses have registered for assistance, $7.25 million
in housing assistance grants have been approved for over 3,000
households. The Small Business Administration has approved 41
loans for a total of $2.24 million, and the majority of those I have
spoken with have really been pleased.
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So congratulations, and we thank you for your very efficient, effective and compassionate response.
On another issue, I wanted to ask you about the Stafford Act,
which limits grants for housing repair to primary residences, and
I certainly understand the intent to not provide assistance for an
individual to repair a second home or vacation house.
This limitation, we have found, can have a negative impact on
landlords who are trying to make repairs so their renters can return home, and affordable housing is very scarce in my district,
and after the recent flooding you and I saw many cases in which
landlords are denied assistance to repair their rental units, because
these are not the owners primary residences.
The landlords must secure a Small Business Administration or
private loan in order to repair their property, and in some cases,
landlords have simply said that it isnt financially viable to take a
loan to fix property that is rented by low or moderate income individuals.
So this exacerbates the affordable housing problems and really
has had a major effect on renters who must find a new place to
live.
So in order to solve this problem, which also remains in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina, I am working on legislation to allow
FEMA to provide direct assistance to landlords of low to moderate
income housing. It would also give FEMA the flexibility to set appropriate conditions to ensure that funding is directed to areas
where it will be most beneficial.
I would appreciate it if you could share with me your thoughts
and whether you could support a change to the Stafford Act to assist landlords who rent to low or moderate income tenants.
Mr. PAULISON. The issue that you saw is why we really encourage people to have flood insurance and insurance on their dwellings, because no matter where you are the potential for flood is always there across this country.
We would sit down and work with you on the issues. Obviously,
I cant commit the administration position on the legislation, but
I would like to look at it and have an opportunity to comment on
it.
Mrs. LOWEY. I thank you very much.
And it is also my understanding that when seeking federal assistance for personal property losses, an applicant must first file for
a Small Business Association loan and if denied, FEMA may offer
the applicant a grant.
Why does an individualoh, I see my red light, I will talk quicklywhy must an individual first apply to the SBA for a loan when
attempting to secure a FEMA grant for personal property damage?
Mr. PAULISON. I am not sure that is totally accurate. When they
apply for individual assistance, if they get turned down by FEMA,
then they can apply for SBA loan, but I think it is the other way
around. Let me have my staff sit down with you and go over that
individualthat is one of the things we are actually going to look
at this next year.
Okay. There is one called, other needs assistance, and that part
is correct, but we are going to look very carefully at the individual
assistance piece this next year, because it doesnt move as quickly
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as want it to, it doesnt move as smoothly as we want it to, and
see how we can streamline that and make it much more user
friendly. And then next year we will do public assistance.
Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you very much.
And thank you for indulging.
We now recognize the gentlelady from Florida, Ms. Brown-Waite,
for 5 minutes.
Ms. BROWN-WAITE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I want to also thank Mr. Shays for relinquishing his time
to me, because I have to be in the Veterans Affairs Committee.
I just wanted to thank you, Mr. Paulison, for proving that you
are taking emergency management seriously. When we had the tornadoes touch down in central Florida, we got absolute great response from FEMA. We were able to have your people and SBA on
the ground helping people, and that is what I think that they expect from government. So let me just commend you very much for
rapid response.
Probably coming from Florida, you have just had a lot of experience in the Miami-Dade area, and, certainly, in Florida, we have
a great state system that I am proud to say I helped put together
after Hurricane Andrew. When I was got elected it was right after
Hurricane Andrew, and we knew that we needed some changes in
Florida and made those necessary changes.
One thing that has concerned local elected officials in my area
is that FEMA will not reimburse in a gated community forthey
will not reimburse the locality for out front of the house pickup of
debris, and why some may think that gated community are just for
the wealthy, I can assure you that I have low and moderate income
mobile home gate communities also.
I would like to ask you if the agency is considering any changes
in that prohibition?
Mr. PAULISON. I need to check with my staff, but I think we have
corrected that where we do do some of those things and the reimburse the communities for that type of pickup. I live in a gated
community too, but let me follow up and make sure. I think we
have put stuff in place to deal with some of these issues. But let
me find out for sure. I dont want to give you a bad answer here.
Ms. BROWN-WAITE. I do believe that what you do is, they have
to haul it out to the front of the gated community, and it will be
taken away from there. But for many elderly homeowners, that is
a problem. And if people are in a gated community, I just dont see
why we should be discriminating against them, either because they
are at the wealthy end of the spectrum, living in a gated community, or at the very poor end of the spectrum, living in a secure senior mobile home park. And I would just ask you to take a look at
that policy.
Mr. PAULISON. I know we dealt with this during Katrina in New
Orleans and some other areas, and we worked around it by getting
a right of entry to do some of those things. But let me give you the
right answer, and I will get back with your staff and brief them
on what those issues are. And if it is still not where you need it
to be, we will work on it some more.
Ms. BROWN-WAITE. I appreciate that.
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Certainly, at a time of an emergency, such as we regularly have
in Florida and other coastal states, tell me how you coordinate with
the National Guard. I know that the issue of the National Guard
has been brought up recently. I wrote to the state National Guard
general asking where Florida is, because that is of course my concern and Mr. Bilirakiss concern.
Tell me how you coordinate with the National Guard.
[Audience interruption.]
Ms. BROWN-WAITE. Excuse me, maam, I didnt ask you. I asked
Mr. Paulison.
Chairman THOMPSON. Excuse me. According to our House rules,
you are out of order, and you are not allowed to speak. I have admonished the audience a couple of times about that. And we are
trying to be tolerant, but understand we do have rules of the committee, and unless you follow those rules, we will have you removed.
Continue, Ms. Brown-Waite.
Mr. PAULISON. The National Guards are a state asset, and we
work very closely with them when we get on the scene. In Greensburg, the adjunct general of the National Guard was the incident
commander and we immediately made contact with him to make
sure that we were coordinating the response.
I know the issue is, as we heard just behind me, about the National Guards asset being overseas, but we do have a system in
this country called, EMAC, the Emergency Management Assistance
Compact, where we move assets from one state to another to assist
a particular state that is going through a disaster, and we do that
with the National Guard asset also.
But we work very closely with the Guard. They are a key player
in our response system, and we have a very good partnership with
them.
Ms. BROWN-WAITE. One other question: When localities contract
with various clean-up companies, they very often will contract with
two or three in case one is not available, which I think is a very
wise thing to do. But during the tornado that struck down, it really
was a feeding frenzy of, Well, I have got the contract, no I have
got the contract, and I am not certain I want the federal government to enter in there but perhaps to advise the localities of one
has to be the primary, one has to be the secondary. Because in this
instance, both of these companies thought that they were the primary. And I am sure you have found this in other locations.
After you respond to that, I will yield back the balance of my
time, but please do respond.
Mr. PAULISON. Yes, I actually have seen that on occasion when
there are several contractors, but that really is a local issue, and
I think you are right, you dont want the federal government stepping into that. We do encourage the communities to have those debris contracts in place. We have the Army Corps of Engineers that
can sometimes come in and referee those types of things, but that
is up to the local community to say, Okay, you are the prime, you
are the backup. We can advise them to do that, but it is really
their contract, not ours.
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We now recognize the gentlelady from the Virgin Islands for 5
minutes, Ms. Christensen.
Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Mr. Paulison, thank you for your testimony. I am encouraged by the progress you are reporting.
I have a question about mass care, because, as I understand it,
the ESF6, the housing, feeding and providing first aid now comes
under FEMA, but I would like you to explain to me what the role
of the Red Cross is then in mass care and how that is being coordinated.
Mr. PAULISON. The Red Cross is one of our major players in that
ESF6 system. We ended up taking it over, because they dont
have the authority to mission assign other federal governments and
we do. But they are partners in that, along with several other
groups, like HHS and others, that fit into that ESF6 position of
mass care. And we take the lead in it, but they are right there with
us as partners.
And, by the way, I just met with your adjunct general and your
state emergency manager recently, a few days ago, exactly and
talked about some of these same issues. And they are doing a great
job for you down there; they really are.
Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Yes, they are. We are very proud of them and
looking forward to have the change of command very soon.
I am also concerned about mitigation, because in my experience
with FEMA, mitigation played a big role for us in the Virgin Islands in being able to prevent the damage with recurrent hurricanes. And if I remember correctly, we could request about 20 percent additional funding for mitigation. And I am hearing that that
is no longer the case.
Could you tell me if there is still a provision for mitigation as
you repair and recover or is that done?
Mr. PAULISON. No. If a disaster is declared, there is a certain
portion of the disaster dollars that can be used by the state or the
local community for mitigation efforts. There is also Hazard Mitigation Grant Program out there that can be used for public assistance, and I think it is 15 percent of whatever the disaster cost is.
And that can be used to raise homes or do other things to mitigate
future damage. But the money is still there. It is 15 percent.
Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Okay. I still have a little more time.
The PFO and FCOs
Mr. PAULISON. Yes?
Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. do they both report to the secretary?
Mr. PAULISON. No. The FCO reports to me. That is our employee.
What we are doing with the PFO, the PFO is the secretarys representative out there to do the high-level coordination with federal
agencies. The FCO is the primary federal person to manage disasters.
Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. But the FCO is the person that I, as the
health person in the Virgin Islands, would go to to ask for whatever assets I needed from the federal government.
Mr. PAULISON. That is correct. You should.
Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. I am surprised the question didnt come up
before, but it just seems to me that we have too many there, and
when that happens, things fall between the cracks. Has that been
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exercised to see how it works and whether we really need those two
officials?
Mr. PAULISON. It has. We just had a major exercise just this last
week, actually, 2 weeks ago, not only to a hurricane but tied into
a terrorist event where the PFO and the FCO worked together. The
FCO, which you normally deal with, is the person that handles
anything to do with the Stafford Act in that disaster. That will continue on.
The PFO is the secretarys representative out there. Doesnt have
operational control; the FCO has that. The PFO is going to help
mitigate issues between different federal agencies, may feed the information back to the secretary. Again, it is his eyes and ears out
there on the ground.
But the FCO is going to be the primary person managing the federal assets on the ground, not running the disaster. That is either,
in your case, the territorial or a state responsibility to manage that
disaster.
Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
We now yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Connecticut, Mr.
Shays.
Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Mr. Paulison, for being here. I think you
have got a very difficult job, and I know you are working very hard
at it.
I dont have the same reaction Ms. Lowey has about the gratitude from FEMA. You left Connecticut out of the businesses and
personal assistance, and we could give you literally hundreds of examples of damage, 2,400 residential units and so on.
What I am puzzled by is, wouldnt you group the area together
andI mean, what does it matter if Greenwich in New York are
divided if it is the same storm in the region? Isnt the whole point
of natural disaster to look at the impact on the region? Why would
you do it next door to the same storm and not Connecticut?
Mr. PAULISON. I have my staff looking at Connecticut right now,
actually. The president did sign off on two counties for public assistance. I have not turned down individual assistance yet. I have
asked the state for more information about individual damage.
We are bringing on a small state and rural advocate into FEMA
to report directly to me also. The public assistance and individual
assistance piece for some of the smaller states like yours, it doesnt
work as smoothly as I want it to. I am just trying to be very candid
here. Fifty homes in Connecticut is much different than 100 or 200
homes in New York or Texas or California. And what it does is, the
whole idea of the Stafford Act is to cover when the state is overwhelmed and cant deal with a disaster.
So it has been very difficult with Connecticut. Your county system is not like the other states.
Mr. SHAYS. No, we dont have a county system.
Mr. PAULISON. And you dont have a county system.
Mr. SHAYS. We have counties only in name, and that is the only
thing that they represent.
Mr. PAULISON. That is what is making it difficult for us, so I sat
my staff down just before I came to this area, actually not even
knowing you would be here, but I want them to look at this very
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carefully as we look at the individual assistance piece and the
amount of damage. We have an area in there that was very low
income that has
Mr. SHAYS. Right. I was going to read you some of the folks, renters, who didnt have flood insurancethese were rivers that hadnt
flooded as long as anyone can remember.
But the same storm that impacted Ms. Loweys district impacted
ours, and there is this artificial boundary in New York and Connecticut. I would think we would look at the region and treat the
region, and if that is not possible, and it seems to me it is a defect
in the law, we should look at us as a region. And I appreciate you
checking that out, and I look forward to having more dialogue with
you about that.
Mr. PAULISON. Yes, sir. I will be glad to do that.
Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. I know you received correspondence from
all five congressmen, two senators and the governor as well.
I would like to ask, in regards to Katrina, we all weep for different reasons. Everything about it, it was a huge storm, 10 miles
inland, 20 feet of water, and Mississippi. It was a biblical storm.
But there were things that were very troubling to me. OneI
want no comment about this, I will just say itthat the head of
Homeland Security chose to only go there by Wednesday with the
president. I would have thought he would have been there Monday,
Tuesday, whatever. I think his reasoning was he wanted to let
FEMA be FEMA and stay out of the way.
But when I helped write the Department of Homeland Security
legislation with others, we wanted the Department of Homeland
Security to be added value to FEMA, not to just like say, Here you
go, you are the experts, do it. We wanted everything to be added
value.
Can you tell me what added value you have by having the Department of Homeland Security and how the department may respond more effectively than it did, not FEMA, per se?
Mr. PAULISON. There is a significant amount of added value by
us being inside Homeland Security, from my perspective. I have assets at my fingertips that we would not have had before. I meet
every week with the seven operational components of Homeland
Security, from the Coast Guard, the Border Patrol, ICE, all of
those, TSA. And those are people that can give me assistance when
we have a disaster or even in the meantime.
I dont have to do a mission assignment. All I have to do is pick
up the phone and call all these people that I know on a first name
basis and say, I need some help or I need this or I need that. Tremendous assistance.
Secretary Chertoff has been personally, I mean personally involved in helping me rebuild this organization. Tremendous
amount of support, making sure that I get the assets that I need,
making sure that I get the support that I need from all the other
agencies inside the organization. So I feel like that there is a significant amount of value added.
Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much.
Do I have time to make a unanimous consent request now, or do
you want me to do that later?
Chairman THOMPSON. We will take it right now.
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Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. I would ask unanimous consent to include, The Mega-Catastrophe: A Call to Action, in the record. And
this is a report produced by the financial services roundtable and
provides 25 recommendations to the public and private sectors for
reducing the economic and human impact, as well as reducing the
cost of rebuilding after mega-catastrophes of not only hurricanes,
the subject of todays hearings, but the earthquakes, floods,
pandemics and terrorist attacks. And I could do that*
Chairman THOMPSON. Without objection.
Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much.
And thank you very much, Mr. Paulison.
Chairman THOMPSON. We now recognize the gentleman from
North Carolina for 5 minutes, Mr. Etheridge.
Mr. ETHERIDGE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Administrator, thank you for being here today, and I appreciate
your comments thus far.
Let me go back to a situation, you know, hurricane season is almost on us, and North Carolina pays a lot of attention to hurricanes, as you know. Florida does as well.
You partially answered this when you spoke to Ms. Lowey earlier. We are going to see some major changes to the national response plan, as you well know, but as you also know, the NPR is
meant to provide standardization for incident managers so that the
federal, state and locals can work effectively together. And, certainly, we know that in response to Katrina that did not happen.
And even though this plan is not ready, it also impacts NGOs as
well, because when you have a major catastrophe, that is an important part of this whole process.
My question to you, you partially answered but would you go into
a little bit more detail, in the absence of that being completed,
number one, when will it be completed, but, number two, in the absence of that, do you feel comfortable that we are going to be ready,
having these pieces in this hurricane season, be it natural or manmade?
Mr. PAULISON. Yes, sir. I am comfortable that we have a good
plan in place. In fact, we are doing gap analysis now in North
Carolina and other states up and down the Atlantic Coast to find
out what those issues are that we have to help the states fill. And
they can recognize themselves sometimes that there is a gap that
they can fill themselves.
We have good solid disaster plans in place. The national response
plan is still there. The new that we are revising is not out yet, and
I want to get that out in June. But before we really get deep into
hurricane season?of course, we have had a storm already this year,
so they are unpredictable when they are going to come usually
but I am comfortable that we are ready to respond. We are working
with the NGOs, the Red Cross is going to testify at the next panel,
and I am sure they will tell you some of the significant things
that
Mr. ETHERIDGE. Do you think we will have it by June of this
year?
* See The Financial Services Roundtable, Blue Ribbon commission on Mega-Catastophes: A
Call to Action, Edward B. Rust, Jr. and Kerry Killenger in the Committees file.
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Mr. PAULISON. It wont be by June 1. I want it out before July
1, though, and we are going to work very hard on that. We have
a good draft outline now, and we are populating that to get it filled
in. I at least have that base plan done; yes, sir.
Mr. ETHERIDGE. Thank you.
Let me ask one question on the National Guard, because we
heard from the Guard in the last meeting this committee held, and,
as you well know, when Floyd struck North Carolina in 1999, it
was a massive storm. They classified it as a 500-year flood plain.
I dont know how you do that when no one was here to measure
it, but be that as it may, we used 6,500 guardsmen with equipment, Fort Bragg, Lejeune, our active military were there with helicopters and others. We lost a lot of lives, but we saved a lot.
Just recently, our governor, Mike Easley said that we only have
enough equipment now to handle a category three. You alluded to
this earlier. Our Guard only has 55 percent of the dual use.
In addition to drawing from other states, here is my question, because I think that is critical: How much does FEMA have the ability to reach out and get equipment if you really need it when it becomes catastrophic like the one we had? And, secondly, given the
state of the equipment, can you pull that resource in in advance
and have it ready and staged to work?
Mr. PAULISON. Yes, sir. We do have the ability to pull equipment
in, not only from other states, but private contractors and also the
Corps of Engineers who has a tremendous amount of equipment.
Mr. ETHERIDGE. Have you pre-entered into those contracts?
Mr. PAULISON. Yes, sir. We have a lot of contracts in place, hundreds of contracts in place and literally hundreds of pre-scripted
mission assignments with different agencies around the country.
And we can move some of those things quickly.
Also, if there is a major storm coming in, and there are certain
guidelines to follow, but we can do a pre-landfall declaration, the
president can do that
Mr. ETHERIDGE. And get it ready.
Mr. PAULISON. that would allow us to move. So if we had a category four or five storm coming into North Carolina and we knew
it was going to hit and you had to do evacuations, we can help you
with all of that, with those dollars, asking the president to do a
pre-landfall declaration.
Mr. ETHERIDGE. Good.
Mr. PAULISON. Yes.
Mr. ETHERIDGE. Good. Thank you, sir.
In the time I have leftthis may be above your pay grade. If it
is, let me know. I am sure it happened prior to your arrival. And
if not, I would like to have it in writing.
I have it from pretty good sources that within the last several
well, in the last bit, previously, when hurricanes hit Florida, we
had to contract out for pre-setting, when people were injured, were
moved, put in mobile homes, to do the pads of water, electrical at
a certain price. That was rewritten so that less than a handful of
contractors in America were eligible to bid, which meant that the
cost of those pads more than doubled.
If that was not written by FEMAI want to know if it was written by Homeland Security. I would like to have that in writing
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when that was rewritten, who wrote it, and I would like to see the
documentation on that, if I may. And if that is not in your jurisdiction, just let me know where it is and I will keep moving up the
chain.
Mr. PAULISON. That does belong in FEMA, and the fact is we
rebid all of those contracts. I dont know about the early ones, but
a lot of those contracts were done in the aftermath of Katrina, and
the contracts were not what we wanted them to be. We have rebid
all of those contracts, and we have a lot more contractors because
they have to use local contractors to do a lot of the work.
But I will tell you what, I will break that whole thing down.
Mr. ETHERIDGE. Please do.
Mr. PAULISON. Yes, sir.
Mr. ETHERIDGE. Because my understanding was it was rewritten
to the point where you had to have so many engineers on staff,
which meant that you only had one or two big contractors take it,
then they subed it out to everyone else, which drove the cost
through the roof for the taxpayers of this country.
Thank you, sir.
Following along that, can you provide the committee with whether or not any no-bid contracts have been awarded for this hurricane
season in anticipation or have all of them gone through the procurement procedure?
Mr. PAULISON. Yes, sir. I will research and give you a definitive
answer, but I can tell you that there were no no-bid contracts that
I am aware of. There may be an occasion to do those in the middle
of a disaster if there is something you hadnt thought of, but what
we dont want to do is we dont want to do no-bid contracts and we
dont want to do contracts after a disaster happens.
That is why we are putting these contracts now. In fact, we already have them on the shelf. You negotiate much better when you
have the upper hand as opposed to after a disaster strikes.
Chairman THOMPSON. Absolutely. Thank you very much.
We now yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Rhode Island,
Mr. Langevin.
Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Director, welcome. Thank you for your testimony today. I
appreciated having the opportunity to meet with you personally a
few months back, and I appreciate what you have had to say today.
Let me just turn to my attention to a couple of issues. Last year,
Congress passed the Katrina Emergency Reform Act, which I believe, as do others, will enhance FEMAs ability to effectively respond to disasters in a timely manner.
Now, as part of this comprehensive legislation, I fought to create
a new and, I believe, much needed position at FEMA, which is a
disability coordinator. We all know that people with disabilities
face unique challenges in their everyday lives, and they range from
ability impairment to communications barriers, and they can certainly become substantial obstacles in an emergency. We saw this
as a result of the attacks on 911, we saw that in Katrina.
And so I believe it is, therefore, critical that the national disability coordinator position be filled immediately, and I am extremely concerned that our 2007 hurricane season starts less than
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a month from now from today, and yet this crucial position remains
vacant still.
So my question is here: How close are you to filling this position?
Will the job be filled by June 1? And, finally, how will this individual be able to effectively implement a national plan for persons
with disabilities when the position has remained vacant for so
long?
My next question is, earlier this month, FEMAs region one held
a mock hurricane preparedness exercise in my home state in Rhode
Islandthis may be the one that you were just referring to in a
previous question and answer with other members. But in carrying
out this event, FEMA effectively partnered with other federal, state
and local entities, such as around emergency management agency
and first responders to test preparedness and response to our hurricane.
The event was highly successful from everything that I could see,
and I think it is critical that each state, city or town have a preapproved plan that has been thoroughly examined before a catastrophic event occurs. Each plan, obviously, has to take into account a regions unique assets and vulnerabilities and must be
properly tested to give the government, first responders and citizens an idea of existing weaknesses.
So my question in this area are: Are other FEMA regions embarking on similar tests, do you believe these simulations should
become annual preparedness exercises, and, finally, what other initiatives are you undertaking to test preparedness and response for
the upcoming hurricane season in regions throughout the country?
You can start with the issue of the disability coordinator first.
Thank you.
Mr. PAULISON. We have interviewed for the disability coordinator. I have made a selection. She is ready to come on board. She
is going through background checks. I suspect that we will have
her on board within a couple of weeks. And I think we made an
excellent, excellent selection. She will report directly to me, so she
will have access to my office to make sure that we can get things
get done. Actually, we are excited about having her on board.
We learned a lot of lessons during Katrina of things that we
didnt do right that we should have done with some of our people
who had had difficulty with access, and she will be a tremendous
asset to us to help us do a better job.
Mr. LANGEVIN. Well, I look forward to that announcement and
hopefully a meeting with this individual.
Mr. PAULISON. As soon as she gets through the process of the
background checks, we should have her on board. She is ready to
come, and we are ready to bring her here. We interviewed a lot of
people and picked out who we think is an excellent person.
The second piece, yes, it was an excellent exercise, and, yes, we
are doing them with all of our regions, and, yes, I do think it
should be an annual type of thing to do those exercises, test our
system and to find out where our gaps are, because they are going
to be different every year. I am very supportive of those types, of
having plans in place and exercising them.
Mr. LANGEVIN. What other initiatives do you have coming up?
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Mr. PAULISON. We are doing catastrophic planning also. We are
picking four areas right now. One is the southeast Louisiana for
catastrophic planning, two in Florida, one around Lake Okeechobee, the Herbert Hoover Dike, working with the state to do
evacuation planning around there, south Florida, category five coming into there. And then the new Madrid fault, doing catastrophic
planning for that and then also for California. We are picking those
because they represent pretty much everything we are going to
have to deal with in putting our catastrophic plans in place.
Mr. LANGEVIN. Well, thank you, Director. I appreciate your answers to that and look forward to continuing to work together.
Thank you for the job you do.
Mr. PAULISON. And I appreciate your support too, by the way.
Thank you.
Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Director.
I yield back the balance of my time.
We now recognize the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee,
for 5 minutes.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me thank the chairman and the ranking
member.
Mr. Paulison, thank you for your presence here today.
I think we can look back over the last couple of years, I think
we can say a couple of years, and applaud the fact that a first responder, firsthand, is in the position that you happen to be in,
which is the director of FEMA. It makes a difference. It is an important first step, I believe, as we have tried to rebuild the building
blocks.
And as we have hindsight, we understand that the whole challenge of FEMA was vertical. It was a combination of many issues,
and it really didnt fall to personalities as much as it fell a lot to
process, particularly, obviously, the angst with the secretary of the
Homeland Security Department, who recognized the enormous
frustration but really loss of life.
And I think that is something that should always be in front of
us, the fact that the debacle of Katrina really focused around the
enormity of the loss of life and how we could have been better
custodians, if you will, better protectors of the American people. We
must always be protectors of the American people.
My questions will focus in that direction.
I know you were not here for 9/11, but I simply want, to your
recollection, a yes or no answer. Your recollection is that after 9/
11 was FEMA on the ground in New York?
PRPEARED STATEMENT
OF THE HONORABLE SHEILA JACKSON LEE, A

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS
REPRESENTATIVE
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for convening this extremely important hearing. As we
near the two year anniversary of one of the most devastating hurricanes in our nations history, I think it is a very appropriate time to examine how we have (or have
not) adequately prepared for further disasters. I would also like to thank the committees Ranking Member, and to welcome our witnesses, the Honorable R. David
Paulison, Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency; William
Jenkins, Director of the Homeland Security and Justice Issues Division of the U.S.
Government Accountability Office; Craig Fugate, Director of the Florida Division of
Emergency Management; and Joe Becker, Senior Vice President of Preparedness
and Response, from the American Red Cross.
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Hurricane Katrina was among the worst storms in American history. Its magnitude was rivaled only by the catastrophic failure of the federal government to adequately respond to the resulting suffering in a manner befitting our great nation.
This years hurricane season officially begins on June 1st, and scientific predictions
do not bode well. Forecasters anticipate a very active year for storms along the
Atlantic coastline, with researchers at Colorado State University anticipating 17
named storms, including 9 hurricanes. According to these predictions, there is a 74%
chance that at least one major hurricane will strike the U.S. coastline. Similarly,
Accuweather forecasts 1317 total storms in the Atlantic Basin. Of those, 35 are
likely to be major hurricanes of Category 3 of Category 3 or greater.
Mr. Chairman, this time we have fair warning. We know how devastating a hurricane can be, and we know we are likely to see another storm of this magnitude.
We know that our disaster prevention, preparedness, and relief mechanisms and
agencies are woefully inadequate. Problems involved lack of staff, the inability to
track assets en route to destinations, lack of sufficient supplies, inefficient delivery
processes, processes, poor communication amongst agencies, ineffective computer
systems for processing requests, lack of credentialing and more.
We can no longer use ignorance as an excuse, and we cannot allow ourselves to
be caught unprepared once again.
Hurricane Katrina struck some of Americas most vulnerable and disadvantaged
communities, communities which are just now beginning to find their feet again
after those two devastating storms. Here in Congress, we must candidly admit that
as a nation, we were derelict in our duty to deliver the lifesaving and life-altering
assistance to many of the Hurricane Katrina victims who literally begged for us to
throw them a lifeline. We have a responsibility to work to ensure that they are not,
once again, left to face natures wrath alone.
Hurricane Katrina was responsible for $81.2 billion in damage, as well as for the
deaths of 1,836 people. Criticism of the federal, state, and local governments reaction to the storm was widespread and resulted in an investigation by the United
States Congress and the resignation of FEMA Director Michael Brown. We now
have an opportunity to do our utmost to ensure that when this years hurricane season arrives, and when the next big storm lands on Americas coastline, we have
done our utmost to ensure adequate protection and response.
Last month, FEMA and the Department of Homeland Security informed us that
they required additional time to revise the National Response Plan, which is designed to integrate federal domestic prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery plans. Due to the complexity of the issues involved, they will not meet the June
1st deadline, and the plan will not be available for the start of hurricane season.
We in Congress have not yet seen a revised timetable for when this plan will be
ready, and I am concerned about FEMAs ability to respond to any disasters that
may occur in the meantime.
Mr. Chairman, the Federal Governments response to Hurricane Katrina was a
disaster. This absolutely must not be allowed to happen again. FEMAs logistical
systems, charged with providing food, water, and other absolutely crucial supplies,
were completely overwhelmed. Long term rebuilding efforts have been plagued with
additional weaknesses, with residents still, nearly two years later, facing an acute
shortage of affordable housing. FEMA has decided to implement a policy that transfers its housing program to the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD). I look forward to learning more about this new program in this hearing.
Disaster response preparedness also means ensuring that the citizens of this
country can rely on the emergency assistance of the National Guard. As we saw just
recently in the aftermath of the Kansas tornado, the citizens of this country were
deprived of much needed emergency assistance because much of the Guards pertinent personnel and emergency equipment was not readily available, but was in Iraq
and Afghanistan. According to Lt. Gen. Steven Blum, Chief of the National Guard
Bureau, deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan have left state governors with roughly
half of the equipment needed to respond to disasters within the United States.
Mr. Chairman, as Members of Congress we have an obligation to inquire how the
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan may impact the nations ability to respond to a major
hurricane or terrorist attack. That is why I have proposed an amendment to the Defense Authorization Bill that requires the Secretary of Defense to study and report
back to Congress the impact that the deployment of more than 40% of a states National Guard personnel for overseas duties has on that states readiness and responsiveness to a natural disaster, or civil disturbance.
We also have an obligation to provide the American people with a disaster response system that works. I have been a strong advocate of creating a contracting
system that awards contracts to local companies when possible and always to those
who can get the job done. By involving members of the community in the rebuilding
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process, we would substantially increase the prospects for long-term sustainability
of any reconstruction effort.
Mr. Chairman, now is the time that we must act. With the onset of hurricane season only a few short weeks away, we must ensure that, should another storm of
Katrinas magnitude make landfall on Americas coastline, we will not have to witness the atrocious suffering that we saw in the summer of 2005. I look forward to
hearing the insights offered by todays panel of witnesses, and to engaging in constructive debate with my colleagues about how best we can secure our nation
against the 2007 hurricane season.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. PAULISON. Yes.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And the reason why I wanted that as a backdrop is because it is important to note that FEMA is an agency
that deals with natural disasters and, tragically, manmade disasters. You have to be holistically prepared.
And so I really want you toMajor General Blum mentioned the
lack of equipment in states, and you had this line of questions. And
we are looking at this threshold of 40 percent of the National
Guard not being available or not being in-state.
Would that not have an impactif 40 percent or more of the National Guard were away, would that not have an impact on response coordination with FEMA?
Mr. PAULISON. I dont think it would have an impact on the coordination with FEMA. I guess, depending on the size of the disaster, it may or may not have an impact on the response.
In Greensburg, Kansas, the lack of resources they said they had
did not have an impact on that particular response. What the adjunct general said, if they had another disaster of that same size,
they would have trouble responding. And what I committed to him
was that if they did have another one, that I would make sure that
we have resources from other states, bring the Corps of Engineers
in with equipment they needed and also access our contracts out
there to bring equipment in.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. I think your answer is very accommodating.
I am not suggesting that you are being forthright, but, frankly, I
think that we would have problems. And one of the issues that I
think is important is coordinating with FEMA and other emergency
entities pre-deployment of National Guard out of different states.
I dont know if we thought about that.
So that means that, one, you have an inventory of who has gone
and what states are gone, because I think my colleagues have
asked the question, how quickly can you get them there. So if the
next-door neighbor state or the next-door neighbor to the right or
the left are down to zero, you have a similar problem.
Let me move forward and comment. I think you made the point
about lack of equipment and a lot of states have a lack of equipment. That has an impact, does it not, yes or no?
Mr. PAULISON. Again, I think that would depend on the size of
the disaster. Something as catastrophic as Katrina I think you
have to say it would have an impact if they are not at the full
speed. We are at war, there is no question about it.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Clearly, but it has a negative impact if you
dont have equipment to meet that disaster.
Let me move on to the question, a particular question that you
always hear about Houston, Texas. One, this is a solution, I guess,
that they attempted, but I do want to put on the record, out of the
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$400 million that came through CDBG monies, Houston got $60
million in Houston and Harris County. And I want to put on the
record that obviously that is an outrage.
I want to move to interoperability. There is $1 billion. We understand that this money is going through the states on the interoperability.
My question to you is, how in the world can the average cities,
major urban cities at riskand I know this is a processfunction
with dollars going through the states, percentages taken off and
the question as to whether or not cities who need this interoperability, the top 50 cities, can get the appropriate amount of dollars
through this process?
Have you all consulted about using a different formula for getting dollars to the at-risk cities, like directly to the cities?
Mr. PAULISON. I am sorry, I didnt understand the question.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. There is $1 billion in interoperability money,
which falls under different aspects of the homeland security but,
clearly, it responds to FEMAs needs. You need cities to be able to
speak to each other or speak inside the city when there is a disaster.
The formula that is being used is a formula that sends the monies to the states. Is it better to send the money directly to the atrisk cities? And this is from your professional opinion, not from the
idea of jurisdiction inside the department. Cities are crying out for
the at-risk cities to get the monies directly.
Mr. PAULISON. And my staff is telling me that by law the funding
has to go through the states. We want that money to flow down
where it needs to go, but most of our interoperability issues in this
country are not equipment per se, it is a governance issue of how
you act interoperably with other units. It can be as simple as exchanging hand-held radios with another city alongside of you. We
have equipment that we can bring in to help with interoperability.
But the money going through the states, the states understand
the entirety of the whole state to help with the interoperable issue,
and we feel that is the right way to go right now.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. If I may finish, Mr. Chairman, I just want to
finish this sentence.
Director Paulison, the question was really from your professional
perspective. I do know that the utilization of this equipment is how
you use it within an area, but the point is if a state has the money
and it doesnt get directly, fully to the impacted area, I can assure
you that your job as a first responder is going to be that much
tougher, and so the local jurisdiction should be the first in line.
And I do know it is law. I am just trying to get your professional
position on the record.
I yield back.
Ms. SANCHEZ. [Presiding.] The gentleladys time has expired.
Mr. Perlmutter from ArizonaColorado, I am sorry, Colorado,
from the great West.
Mr. PERLMUTTER. Director, and I appreciate your answers, do
you know how many states deployed National Guard units to the
Gulf Coast during Katrina?
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Mr. PAULISON. No, sir, I do not. We could probably track that
down, but I dont have any off the top of my head how many actually responded.
Mr. PERLMUTTER. I was just looking at reports that was issued
today, and there are a couple of things that concern me. Looking
at page four, it says, For us, it is difficult to assess the probable
results of these initiatives in improving response to a major or catastrophic disaster, such as a category four or five hurricane.
And it goes on and says, The National Guard has traditionally
been an important component of response to major disasters.
States and governors rely on their National Guard personnel and
equipment for disaster response. However, as we reported in January 2007, the types and quantities of equipment the National
Guard needs to respond to large-scale disasters have not been fully
identified because the multiple federal and states agencies that
would have roles in responding to such events have not completed
and integrated their plans.
So along with what Representative Jackson Lee was saying and
the woman who stood up in the audience and from comments that
various adjutant generals have made, I mean, has your office, your
division looked at the fact that we have a number of our National
Guards deployed in Iraq and what effect it has on being able to respond to a category four or five hurricane in the Gulf Coast?
Mr. PAULISON. I dont know that we have looked at that particular issue. I would like to find out what report that is to know
who it came from. But we depend heavily, the states depend heavily on our EMAC system, Emergency Management Assistance Compact.
No, I believe you, I just didnt know what the name of the report
was. I wasnt questioning your word at all, sir.
Mr. PERLMUTTER. It is a GAO report.
Mr. PAULISON. Okay. Because I wanted to get it and read it myself too.
But we depend heavily on the Emergency Management Assistance Compact between states to share equipment back and forth.
We have done that for years. The system has worked well. It is
more robust now than it ever has been. And that is how we would
respond to these disasters. And we know there is a lot of equipment gone, there is no question about it, nobody can argue that,
but there are still resources in this country to deal with disasters.
Mr. PERLMUTTER. And I appreciate that. And, clearly, a national
disaster is going to require a national response. And I appreciate
the effort that all of you have gone to so that we respond to something like Katrina in a much more thoughtful, methodical manner,
but there is only so many people and contractors and national
guardsmen and women to go around.
And this is a debate for probably with the president and not you,
but if in fact we have something like we had with Katrina or Rita
or the one that Mr. Etheridge was talking about that hit North
Carolina, I mean, the bottom line is you dont know what the real
impact of our deploying National Guard troops and the numbers we
have to Iraq will be on responding to a Katrina.
Yes or no, or answer it however you like.
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Mr. PAULISON. Well, first of all, I am going to work with General
Blum on the issue and talk about some of those issues you just
raised and raised in this committee and raised behind me.
But to say what kind of impact any particular thing is going to
have on a disaster, that would be impossible to answer. I can tell
you that we do have the ability to move equipment around, we do
have the ability to move National Guard around, and we are going
to prepare for whatever storm comes our way or whatever it is with
what we have, and we are going to make the best we can with it.
Mr. PERLMUTTER. I guess, a couple just factual questions. I
would like to know how many National Guard units from across
the country were deployed to the Gulf Coast for Katrina and how
long they stayed. And if in fact, as you are doing this process and
you are preparing for a mega-storm or a mega-emergency, what
kind of National Guard effort you see as part of your plan. Those
would be my questions, and if you could help me with those later
on, I would appreciate it.
Thanks, Madam Chair.
Mr. PAULISON. I would be happy to do that.
Mr. PERLMUTTER. I return the balance of my time.
Ms. SANCHEZ. Submit that for the record. That would be great.
We have some votes on the floor, so what I would like to do is
to try to get Mr. Green and Ms. Clarke in for their questions, and
then we could dismiss the director. And then we will come back
from votes and have the second panel.
So with your concurrence, Mr. Green and Ms. Clarke, instead of
giving each of you 4 minutes, try to keep it closer to maybe 3.5,
because by the time we finish we still need to get running across
to take the vote.
So the next one in line would be Mr. Green of Texas.
Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Madam Chair.
And thank you, Mr. Director, for appearing today.
The title of this hearing is 2007 Hurricane Season: Are We Prepared? So why dont we visit for just a moment with reference to
this topic, are we prepared.
With reference to the ability to determine who is in charge, are
we prepared, and I ask this given the circumstance that developed
with Katrina and some consternation as to whether the federal
government was to make the first move or whether the state government was to. Are we prepared to deal with that?
Mr. PAULISON. Yes, sir. We have a very clear system in place.
The response is local. The local community and the state are in
charge. We are not in charge of a natural disaster. Our role is to
come into a system as best we can to give them the tools and supplies they need to do their job.
We are going to move early, I made that very clear. We may
move even before the state asks for assistance, but I move with
what I think they are going to use
Mr. GREEN. Permit me to intercede quickly. Are we indicating
that the same system that we utilized previously is the one that
we would have in place now for making this determination as to
which entity is going to make the call?
Mr. PAULISON. As far as what?
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Mr. GREEN. The debate last time was whether the governor of
Louisiana or the president of the United States should have done
something immediately, if not sooner. Is that same system still in
place?
Mr. GREEN. Okay. If that same system is still in place, how will
we avoid seeing what we saw on television, persons begging for
help and nobody showing up? No disrespect to you but that is what
the country saw, in fact that is what the world saw. How do we
avoid that is the same system is in place?
Mr. PAULISON. And I meant by the same system is the fact that
the state is in charge, the local government is in charge to respond
to disasters. The federal government there is to assist them, and
that is what we are going to do.
However, there are several things that we can do that we have
in place now that we did not have before. One, we can do a prelandfall declaration if there is a major storm coming into a vulnerable community where we move assets in before the storm comes
in. And we are going to do that anyway.
Mr. GREEN. Is it your belief that we will not see what we saw
previously?
Mr. PAULISON. There is no question in my mind whatsoever that
you are not going to see another Katrina in this country.
Mr. GREEN. Next question, quickly, please, if I may. With reference to pre-hurricane or pre-disaster relief, do we have the vehicles, do we have the gas stations, can we move scores of thousands
of people along the highways and byways, out of harms way immediately?
Mr. PAULISON. That is why we are working with the states to
make sure that there are good solid evacuation plans
Mr. GREEN. Can I assume that your answer is, yes? Because the
reason I say this, sir, is because sometimes when people finish I
dont know whether they said yes or no. So I have to ask.
Mr. PAULISON. Well, I didnt want to say yes or no, because I
wanted to tell you what we are doing.
Mr. GREEN. Well, unfortunately, I have to deal in a world of yes
or noes right now. Will we move scores of thousands of people over
the highways and byways to get them out of harms way?
Mr. PAULISON. Yes.
Mr. GREEN. Next question: Housing post-disaster, can we house
scores of thousands of people such that we will not find ourselves
with people in the streets of life after the hurricane has hit? Can
we do this?
Mr. PAULISON. Do you mean will there be homeless, will they not
have a place to stay?
Mr. GREEN. Will we have the same circumstances we had in
Houston, Texas where we had people who were brought in and we
had to have NGOs trying to find places for people to stay. People
were sheltered in various and sundry places, but we didnt seem to
have a plan to accommodate people, and thank God Houston was
accommodating to the extent that it was. So will we avoid that circumstance?
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Mr. GREEN. And final question is thisthis goes beyond probably
your pay grade, but it does say, are we ready, and I consider myself
a part of the wehow are we going to?and this is rhetorical
going to deal with displaced voters?
We still have a political question that has not been resolved with
reference to people who were forced away from their homes who
could not vote and participate in the political process.
Thank you, Madam Chair. You were gracious with the time.
Ms. SANCHEZ. Ms. Clarke?
Ms. CLARKE. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
And good afternoon to you, Director Paulison. You know me from
Brooklyn, New York. I just wanted to ask three questions very
quickly.
In 2005, some of the greatest in FEMA involved reaching the
many individuals who lived in the inner city, in particular in the
poorer areas. How will your national response plan address this
issue, one?
And, two, were a catastrophic disaster to occur in New York, it
could easily displace many hundreds of thousands, even millions,
of people, potentially far more than New Orleans.
Do you feel FEMA is prepared to successfully reach everyone
necessary in such a larger, more densely populated city? And I am
not thinking just FEMA unto itself but, of course, an incident command structure and everything else that may have been put in
place.
And then, finally, among my concerns is the ability of FEMA to
effectively communicate with victims of a disaster. Not only do you
need to urgently explain to them what they need to do during an
emergency, but afterward FEMA must register everyone and ensure that they understand where to go and what to do in order to
navigate a sometimes complicated bureaucracy and receive assistance. Nowhere else in the world are there more languages spoken
than in New York City and in Brooklyn, and many residents are
not highly proficient in English.
Have you done anything to ensure that FEMA officials would be
able to communicate with people from such a broad range of dialects, particularly during an emergency when family and friends
may be separated?
Mr. PAULISON. Okay. If I remember, the first question was about
being able to reach some of the inner city with directions and how.
We have contracted with some of the predominant black colleges to
come up with how do we effectively communicate with lower income, sometimes minority populations better about personal preparedness, what to do when things happen.
So we are working on that issue, to how do we do that and how
do we better reach people, how do we get to them and tell them
what they are supposed to do, where they are supposed to go and
those types of things.
Ms. CLARKE. Excuse me, Mr. Director. Is that part of your national response plan? Like in New York City, there isnt a historically black college.
Mr. PAULISON. But the philosophy is going to be the same regardless of who does it. I think Texas A&M is one of the colleges
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that is working on some of those issues to come up withand we
had a grant actually from Congress to do that.
The second was that you talked about what happens if we are
going to have a catastrophic event in New York. Joe Bruno, the
state emergency manager for New York, has just probably one of
the most comprehensive disaster plans that I have ever seen. It is
about 300-and-some-odd pages. In fact, we are using that, and he
is working with us, to use that for other states around, but right
now we are doing the hurricane coast.
They have a great plan in place on how to deal with a disaster,
and they have looked at a category four or five hurricane coming
right into Brooklyn. So I am very comfortable with what they are
going to do and how they are going to move people and how they
are going to house them. It is, again, very comprehensive.
And the last piece is the communication really has to come
through the state and local government on where people are supposed to go and what they are supposed to do. That should come
before a disaster happens and also during a disaster. The people
need to listen very carefully to what their local emergency manager
is saying. If they are asked to evacuate, they should do so quickly.
And the individual should have a personal plan in place too. If I
am in an evacuation air zone, where am I going to go if I am told
to evacuate, and how am I going to get there and where am I going
to go.
Ms. SANCHEZ. I thank the director.
I thank you, Ms. Clarke. Your time is expired.
And if there are any other questions from the members for you,
we will get it to you in writing. We hope you get us back an answer
fairly quickly.
And we stand in recess with votes on the floor to come back after
votes for the second panel.
Mr. PAULISON. Thank you, Madam Chair.
[Recess.]
Chairman THOMPSON. [Presiding.] If we could, we would like to
get our panel of witnesses before us. My colleagues will be coming
there shortly. I appreciate your indulgence for allowing us to interrupt so we could take those five votes.
We would like to reconvene the recessed panel. On our second
panel, we have three witnesses.
First witness is Mr. William Jenkins, who is director within
GAOs Security and Justice Issues Division. And Mr. Jenkins has
served as a director for 4 years, and has worked on a wide variety
of issues in his 28 years at GAO.
Second witness is Mr. Craig Fugate, who is director of the Florida Division of Emergency Management. Mr. Fugate has been serving as the director for 7 years.
Our third panelist is Mr. Joe Becker. Mr. Becker is here to represent the American Red Cross, and serves as the senior vice president of the Preparedness and Response Division.
Without objection, the witnesses full statement will be inserted
in the record. I now ask each witness to summarize his statement
for 5 minutes, beginning with Mr. Jenkins.
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STATEMENT OF WILLIAM JENKINS, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND
SECURITY AND JUSTICE ISSUES DIVISION, GOVERNMENT
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. JENKINS. Chairman Thompson and members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss the
important topic of our nations emergency preparedness and response system as we approach the 2007 hurricane season.
Well-planned, well-coordinated, and effective disaster preparation
and response can save lives and mitigate damage while helping set
the stage for recovery. Preparing for and responding effectively to
a major disaster, and particularly a catastrophic disaster, is a difficult task.
There is no magic bullet or easy solution for success. It takes
hard work, attention to details, and effective pre-and post-disaster
cooperation and coordinated actions among all levels of government, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector.
Individuals can also contribute to success through knowing evacuation routes, complying with evacuation orders, and having a disaster preparedness plan and supplies.
FEMA provides assistance in major disasters principally by coordinating and deploying a range of resources from a variety of
government and nongovernmental sources. This requires it to develop effective partnerships with a wide range of organizations.
The Post-Katrina Reform Act includes provisions designed to
strengthen FEMAs organizational capacity to coordinate the preparedness for and response to major and catastrophic disasters, regardless of cause. Effectively implementing the Acts provisions
should address many of the recommendations and concerns we
have had as a result of our work on Katrina.
Although FEMA has formally completed its reorganization under
the Act, it enters the 2007 hurricane season as an organization in
transition, one that is working simultaneously to implement the
Reform Acts provisions while addressing immediate preparedness
needs and capabilities.
FEMA faces a formidable challenge as it works to implement the
Reform Acts provisions, change its culture from one of mostly reactive to more proactive, and quickly build its capacity to effectively
respond to a major disaster that could occur at any time.
It is important that FEMAs approach, preparedness, and response for major disasters is a national system with linked capabilities and responsibilities among all levels of government and
nongovernmental organizations.
Developing these capabilities must be a cooperative effort that
integrates and defines for all major participants what needs to be
done, how it should be done, and how well it should be done.
On the basis of our post-Katrina work, we identified three basic
areas of focus. One, having clear and clearly understood roles and
responsibilities. Two, identifying, developing, and maintaining
needed capabilites. And three, balancing the need for quick, flexible
action with accountability for the use of resources.
We noted that improvements were particularly needed in the
areas of situational awareness, emergency communications, evacuation, search and rescue, logistics, and mass care and shelter. In
each of these areas, the lack of clear and clearly understood roles
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and responsibilities contributed to the problems that were experienced in the Katrina response.
FEMA has initiated reviews and actions in these and other
areas, but their effectiveness has not yet been tested in a major
disaster. Some targeted improvements, such as a completely revamped logistics system, are multiyear efforts. Others, such as
building mobile communications and registration assistance vehicles, have been used already in recent tornado and flood events.
As the principal federal agency now responsible for preparedness
and response, FEMA has a unique opportunity to evaluate how it
can most effectively target the grants it will now administer to enhance the nations disaster preparedness and response system. This
can best be done by viewing the grants collectively rather than individually.
As FEMA and the nation move forward, there are several areas
that we believe deserve congressional oversight. Each of these
areas is part of a considerable ongoing effort and resource investment by both federal and nonfederal agencies.
These areas include: One, the development and implementation
of the National Preparedness System, including preparedness for
all types of major disasters, natural or man-made. Two, needed
state and local capabilities and the use of federal grants in building
and sustaining those capabilities.
Three, regional and multistate planning and preparation. Four,
the role of preparedness exercises in building and maintaining preparedness and response capabilities. And five, the transparency of
DHS policies and the basis for those policies.
It is important that those affected by DHS and FEMA policies
have sufficient information to enable them to understand the basis
for those policies, and for Congress to assess how well DHS and
FEMA are using the billions of dollars of resources that have been
entrusted to it.
We look forward to working constructively with this committee,
the Congress, FEMA, and DHS in the weeks and months to come
as efforts continue to build the National Emergency Preparedness
System that we all want and our nation deserves.
That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. I would be pleased
to respond to any questions you or other members of the subcommittee may have.
[The statement of Mr. Jenkins follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT
OF
WILLIAM O. JENKINS
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss issues associated with the Federal Emergency Management Agencys (FEMA) efforts to address the shortcomings of the
preparation and response to Hurricane Katrina and enhance its capabilities for responding to major disasters, including hurricanes. The 2007 hurricane season begins
in just a few weeks. Hurricane Katrina severely tested disaster management at the
federal, state, and local levels and revealed weaknesses in the basic elements of preparing for, responding, to and recovering from any catastrophic disaster. The goal
of disaster preparedness and response is easy to state but difficult to achieve and
can be stated as follows:
To prevent where possible, prepare for, mitigate, and respond to disasters of
any size or cause with well-planned, well-coordinated, and effective actions that
minimize the loss of life and property and set the stage for a quick recovery.
Achieving this goal for major disasters, and catastrophic disasters in particular,
is difficult because success requires effective pre- and post-disaster coordination and
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cooperation among different levels of government, nongovernmental organizations,
and the private sector. Individuals can also contribute to success through such
things as knowing evacuation routes, complying with evacuation orders, and having
a family and individual disaster preparation plan and supplies.
As the Comptroller General testified in February 2007 on DHSs high-risk status
and specifically disaster preparedness and response, DHS must overcome continuing
challenges, including those related to clearly defining leadership roles and responsibilities, developing necessary disaster response capabilities, and establishing accountability systems to provide effective services while protecting against waste,
fraud, and abuse.1 These issues are enormously complex and challenging for all levels of government. It is important to view preparedness for and response to major
disasters as a national system with linked responsibilities and capabilities. This is
because effective preparedness for and response to major disasters requires the coordinated planning and actions of multiple actors from multiple first responder disciplines, jurisdictions, and levels of government as well as nongovernmental entities.
Parochialism must be put aside and cooperation must prevail before and after an
emergency event. The experience of Hurricane Katrina illustrated why it is important to tackle these difficult issues.
My testimony today (1) summarizes our key findings on leadership, response capabilities, and accountability controls and the efforts made by DHS and FEMA in
their implementation of the Post-Katrina Reform Act 2 and other recommendations
made in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, and (2) highlights several disaster
management issues for continued congressional attention. My comments today are
based on our body of work on disaster and emergency management including more
than 30 reports on the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, our review of recent emergency management reform legislative changes, and materials and statements provided by FEMA. We conducted our audit work in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
Summary
Our analysis of the preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina showed the
need for (1) clearly defined and understood leadership roles and responsibilities; (2)
development of the necessary disaster capabilities; and (3) accountability systems
that effectively balance the need for fast and flexible response against the need to
prevent waste, fraud, and abuse.
A key issue in the response to Hurricane Katrina was the lack of clearly understood roles and responsibilities. One aspect of this issue that continues to be a subject of discussion is the roles and responsibilities of the Federal Coordinating Officer
(FCO), who has the authority to make mission assignments to federal agencies for
response and recovery, and the Principal Federal Official (PFO), whose role was to
provide situational awareness to the Secretary of Homeland Security. DHS has designated a FCO for each region that includes states at risks of hurricanes and a supporting FCO for each of these states. It has also designated a PFO for each of three
regionsthe Gulf Coast, the Northeast Region, and the Mid-Atlantic Regionplus
a separate PFO for the state of Florida and Texas.
It is critically important that the authorities, roles, and responsibilities of these
designated FCOs and PFOs be clear and clearly understood by all. There is still
some question among state and local first responders about the need for both positions and how they will work together in disaster response. One potential benefit
of naming the FCOs and PFOs in advance is that they have an opportunity meet
and discuss expectations, roles and responsibilities with state, local, and nongovernmental officials before an actual disaster, possibly setting the groundwork for improved coordination and communication in an actual disaster.
As we have previously reported, developing the ability to prepare for, respond to,
and recover from major and catastrophic disasters requires an overall national preparedness effort that is designed to integrate and define what needs to be done,
where, and by whom (roles and responsibilities); how it should be done; and how
well it should be donethat is, according to what standards. The principal national
documents designed to address each of these are, respectively, the National Response Plan (NRP), the National Incident Management System (NIMS), and the National Preparedness Goal (NPG). The NRP, NIMS and the NPG are undergoing extensive review and revision by federal, state, and local government officials, tribal
authorities, non-governmental and private sector officials. This effort is intended to
1 GAO, Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security, GAO07452T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 7, 2007).
2 The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 was enacted as Title VI of
the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L. No. 109295, 120 Stat.
1355, 1394 (2006).
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assess the effectiveness of the doctrine embodied in these documents, identify modifications and improvements, and reissue the documents. The results of the review
for the NRP, for example, was initially scheduled for release in June 2007. However,
in April 2007 DHS officials notified stakeholders that some important issues were
more complex and require national-level policy decisions, and stated that additional
time than was expected was needed to complete a comprehensive draft. DHS noted
that the underlying operational principles of the NRP remain intact and that the
current document, as revised in May 2006, still applies. FEMA officials have told
us that the final version of the NPG and its corresponding documents are currently
receiving final reviews by the White House and will be due out shortly. We are concerned, however, that if the revisions are not completed prior to the beginning of
the 2007 hurricane season, it is unlikely that the changes resulting from these revisions could be effectively implemented for the 2007 hurricane season.
In addition to roles and responsibilities, the nations experience with hurricanes
Katrina and Rita reinforced some questions about the adequacy of the nations disaster response capabilities in the context of a catastrophic disasterparticularly in
the areas of (1) situational assessment and awareness, (2) emergency communications, (3) evacuations, (4) search and rescue, (5) logistics, and (6) mass care and
sheltering. Overall, capabilities are built upon the appropriate combination of people, skills, processes, and assets. Ensuring that needed capabilities are available requires effective planning and coordination in conjunction with training and exercises
in which the capabilities are realistically tested and problems identified and subsequently addressed in partnership with other federal, state, and local stakeholders.
In various meetings with GAO, in congressional testimonies, and in some documents
FEMA has described a number of initiatives to address identified deficiencies in
each of these areas and progress is being made on these multiyear efforts. However,
a number of FEMA programs are ongoing and it is too early to evaluate their effectiveness. In addition, none of these initiatives appear to have been tested on a scale
that reasonably simulates the conditions and demand they would face following a
major or catastrophic disaster. Thus, it is difficult to assess the probable results of
these initiatives in improving response to a major or catastrophic disaster, such as
a category 4 or 5 hurricane.3 Additional information on FEMAs efforts can be found
in Appendix I.
The National Guard has traditionally been an important component of response
to major disasters. States and governors rely on their National Guard personnel and
equipment for disaster response, and National Guard personnel are frequently deployed to disaster areas, including those outside their home states. However, as we
reported in January 2007, the types and quantities of equipment the National
Guard needs to respond to large-scale disasters have not been fully identified because the multiple federal and state agencies that would have roles in responding
to such events have not completed and integrated their plans.
With regard to balancing speed and flexibility with accountability, FEMA has
stated it can register up to 200,000 applicants per day for individual assistance
while including safeguards for preventing fraudulent and duplicate applications.
The inability to reliably and efficiently identify fraudulent and duplicate applications was a major problem following Katrina that resulted in millions of dollars in
improper payments. FEMA has also taken actions to revise its debris removal and
contracting policies and to increase the use of advanced contracting for goods and
services. Again, we have no basis to determine the effectiveness of these systems
as they have yet to be tested on a large scale basis.
As FEMA enters the 2007 hurricane season, it is an organization in transition
that is working to implement the reorganization mandated by the Post-Katrina Reform Act as it moves forward on initiatives to implement a comprehensive, riskbased national emergency management system as required by the act. In November
2006, the Comptroller General wrote to the congressional leadership suggesting that
one area needing fundamental reform and oversight was preparing for, responding
to, and rebuilding after catastrophic disasters. Among the topics that Congress
might consider for oversight are:
the development and implementation of the National Preparedness System,
including preparedness for natural disasters, terrorist incidents, and an influenza pandemic;
the assessment of state and local capabilities and the use of federal grants
in building and sustaining those capabilities;
3 Section 602 of the Post-Katrina Reform Act defines catastrophic incident as any natural
disaster, act of terrorism, or other man-made disaster that results in extraordinary levels of casualties or damage or disruption severely affecting the population (including mass evacuations),
infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, or government functions in an area.
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regional and multistate planning and preparedness;
the status and use of preparedness exercises; and
DHS policies that affect the transparency of its efforts to improve the nations
preparedness for and response to major and catastrophic disasters.
Background
Several federal legislative and executive provisions support preparation for and
response to emergency situations. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act) 4 primarily establishes the programs and
processes for the federal government to provide major disaster and emergency assistance to state, local, and tribal governments, individuals, and qualified private
nonprofit organizations. FEMA, within DHS, has responsibility for administering
the provisions of the Stafford Act.
Besides using these federal resources, states affected by a catastrophic disaster
can also turn to other states for assistance in obtaining surge capacitythe ability
to draw on additional resources, such as personnel and equipment, needed to respond to and recover from the incident. One way of sharing personnel and equipment across state lines is through the use of the Emergency Management Assistance Compact, an interstate compact that provides a legal and administrative
framework for managing such emergency requests. The compact includes 49 states,
the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.5 We have ongoing work examining how the Emergency Management Assistance Compact has been
used in disasters and how its effectiveness could be enhanced and expect to report
by this summer.
As the committee is aware, a number of specific recommendations have been
made to improve the nations ability to effectively prepare for and respond to catastrophic disasters following the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Beginning in February 2006, reports by the House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the
Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina,6 the Senate Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs Committee,7 the White House Homeland Security Council,8 the DHS Inspector General,9 and DHS and FEMA 10 all identified a variety of
failures and some strengths in the preparations for, response to, and initial recovery
from Hurricane Katrina. In addition to these reviews, a report from the American
National Standards Institute Homeland Security Standards Panel (ANSIHSSP)
contains recommendations aimed at bolstering national preparedness, response, and
recovery efforts in the event of a natural disaster. A key resource identified in the
document is the American National Standard for Disaster/Emergency Management
and Business Continuity Programs (ANSI/NFPA 1600), which was developed by the
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). The standard defines a common set
of criteria for preparedness, disaster management, emergency management, and
business continuity programs.
Hurricane Katrina severely tested disaster management at the federal, state, and
local levels and revealed weaknesses in the basic elements of preparing for, responding to, and recovering from any catastrophic disaster. Based on our work done during the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, we previously reported that DHS needs to
more effectively coordinate disaster preparedness, response, and recovery efforts,
particularly for catastrophic disasters in which the response capabilities of state and
local governments are almost immediately overwhelmed.11 Our analysis showed the
the development of the necessary disaster capabilities; and (3) accountability sys4 The
Stafford Act is codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.

is currently not a member of EMAC as the states legislation approving its membership in the compact had expired.
6 House of Representatives, House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation
for and Response to Hurricane Katrina. A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the House Select
Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for And Response to Hurricane Katrina
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2006).
7 U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Hurricane Katrina:
A Nation Still Unprepared (Washington, D.C.: May 2006).
8 White House Homeland Security Council. The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 23, 2006).
9 Department of Homeland Securitys Office of Inspector General. A Performance Review of
FEMAs Disaster Management Activities in Response to Hurricane Katrina, OIG0632 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2006).
10 Federal Emergency Management Agency. DHS/FEMA Initial Response Hotwash: Hurricane
Katrina in Louisiana, DR1603LA (Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Feb. 13, 2006).
11 GAO, Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nations Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System,
GAO06618 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2006).
5 California
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tems that effectively balance the need for fast and flexible response against the need
to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse. In line with a recommendation we made following Hurricane Andrew, the nations most destructive hurricane until Katrina, we
recommended that Congress give federal agencies explicit authority to take actions
to prepare for all types of catastrophic disasters when there is warning. We also recommended that DHS
1. rigorously retest, train, and exercise its recent clarification of the roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority for all levels of leadership, implementing
changes needed to remedy identified coordination problems;
2. direct that the NRP base plan and its supporting Catastrophic Incident
Annex be supported by more robust and detailed operational implementation
plans;
3. provide guidance and direction for federal, state, and local planning, training,
and exercises to ensure such activities fully support preparedness, response,
and recovery responsibilities at a jurisdictional and regional basis;
4. take a lead in monitoring federal agencies efforts to prepare to meet their
responsibilities under the NRP and the interim National Preparedness Goal;
and
5. use a risk management approach in deciding whether and how to invest finite resources in specific capabilities for a catastrophic disaster.
The Post-Katrina Reform Act responded to the findings and recommendations in
the various reports examining the preparation for and response to Hurricane
Katrina. While keeping FEMA within DHS, the act enhances FEMAs responsibilities and its autonomy within DHS. FEMA is to lead and support the nation in a
risk-based, comprehensive emergency management system of preparedness, protection, response, recovery, and mitigation. Under the Act, the FEMA Administrator
reports directly to the Secretary of DHS; FEMA is now a distinct entity within DHS;
and the Secretary of DHS can no longer substantially or significantly reduce the authorities, responsibilities, or functions of FEMA or the capability to perform them
unless authorized by subsequent legislation. FEMA has absorbed many of the functions of DHSs Preparedness Directorate (with some exceptions). The statute establishes 10 regional offices with specified responsibilities. The statute also establishes
a National Integration Center responsible for the ongoing management and maintenance of the NIMS and NRP.
The Post-Katrina Reform Act also included provisions for other areas, such as
evacuation plans and exercises and addressing the needs of individuals with disabilities, In addition, the act includes several provisions to strengthen the management
and capability of FEMAs workforce. For example, the statute called for a strategic
human capital plan to shape and improve FEMAs workforce, authorized recruitment and retention bonuses, and established a Surge Capacity Force. Most of the
organizational changes became effective as of March 31, 2007. Others, such as the
increase in organizational autonomy for FEMA and establishment of the National
Integration Center, became effective upon enactment of the Post-Katrina Reform Act
on October 4, 2006.
FEMA Reviewing Its Responsibilities, Capabilities as It Implements Recommendations and Post-Katrina Reform Act
After FEMA became part of DHS in March 2003, its responsibilities were over
time dispersed and redefined. FEMA continues to evolve within DHS as it implements the changes required by the Post-Katrina Reform Act, whose details are discussed later. Hurricane Katrina severely tested disaster management at the federal,
state, and local levels and revealed weaknesses in the basic elements of preparing
for, responding to, and recovering from any catastrophic disaster. According to DHS,
the department completed a thorough assessment of FEMAs internal structure to
incorporate lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina and integrate systematically
new and existing assets and responsibilities within FEMA.
As I stated in March 2007 testimony, the effective implementation of recent recommendations and the Post-Katrina Reform Acts organizational changes and related roles and responsibilities should address many of our emergency management
observations and recommendations. In addition, we previously reported that DHS
needs to more effectively coordinate disaster preparedness, response, and recovery
efforts, particularly for catastrophic disasters in which the response capabilities of
state and local governments are almost immediately overwhelmed. Our analysis
showed the need for (1) clearly defined and understood leadership roles and responsibilities; (2) the development of the necessary disaster capabilities; and (3) accountability systems that effectively balance the need for fast and flexible response
against the need to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse.
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Leadership Is Critical to Prepare for, Respond to, and Recover from Catastrophic
Disasters
In preparing for, responding to, and recovering from any catastrophic disaster, the
legal authorities, roles and responsibilities, and lines of authority at all levels of
government must be clearly defined, effectively communicated, and well understood
to facilitate rapid and effective decision making. Hurricane Katrina showed the need
to improve leadership at all levels of government to better respond to a catastrophic
disaster. As we have previously reported, developing the capabilities needed for catastrophic disasters requires an overall national preparedness effort that is designed
to integrate and define what needs to be done, where, and by whom (roles and responsibilities), how it should be done, and how well it should be donethat is, according to what standards. The principal national documents designed to address
each of these are, respectively, the NRP, NIMS, and the NPG.
All three documents are undergoing extensive review and revision by federal,
state, and local government officials, tribal authorities, non-governmental and private sector officials.12 For example, the review of the NRP is intended to assess the
effectiveness of the NRP, identify modifications and improvements and reissue the
document. This review includes all major components of the NRP including the base
plan, Emergency Support Functions (ESF), annexes such as the Catastrophic Incident Annex and Supplement; as well as the role of the PFO, FCO, and the Joint
Field Office structure. Also during the current NRP review period, FEMA has revised the organizational structure of Emergency Support Function 6 (ESF6), Mass
Care, Housing, and Human Services, and places FEMA as the lead agency for this
emergency support function. The Red Cross will remain as a supporting agency in
the responsibilities and activities of ESF6. According to a February 2007 letter by
the Red Cross, this change will not take place until the NRP review process is complete and all changes are approved.
The revised NRP and NIMS were originally scheduled for release in June 2007.
In April 2007, however, DHS officials notified stakeholders that some important
issues were more complex and require national-level policy decisions, and additional
time was needed to complete a comprehensive draft. DHS noted that the underlying
operational principles of the NRP remain intact and the current document, as revised in May 2006, still applies. FEMA officials have told us that the final version
of the National Preparedness Goal and its corresponding documents like the Target
Capabilities List, are currently receiving final reviews by the White House and are
expected to be out shortly.
A key issue in the response to Hurricane Katrina was the lack of clearly understood roles and responsibilities. One that continues to be a subject of discussion is
the roles and responsibilities of the FCO, who has the authority to make mission
assignments to federal agencies for response and recovery under the Stafford Act,
and the PFO, whose role was to provide situational awareness to the Secretary of
Homeland Security. The May 2006 revisions to the NRP made changes designed to
address this issue. However, as we noted in March 2007, the changes may not have
fully resolved the leadership issues regarding the roles of the PFO and the FCO.
While the Secretary of Homeland Security may avoid conflicts by appointing a single
individual to serve in both positions in non-terrorist incidents, confusion may persist
if the Secretary of Homeland Security does not exercise this discretion to do so. Furthermore, this discretion does not exist for terrorist incidents, and the revised NRP
does not specifically provide a rationale for this limitation.
FEMA has pre-designated five teams of FCOs and PFOs in the Gulf Coast and
eastern seaboard states at risk of hurricanes. This includes FCOs and PFOs for the
Gulf Coast Region,13 Northeast Region,14 and the Mid-Atlantic Region,15 and separate FCOs and PFOs for the states of Florida and Texas. It is critically important
that the authorities, roles, and responsibilities of these pre-designated FCOs and
PFOs be clear and clearly understood by all. There is still some question among
12 On May 25, 2006, DHS released changes to the NRP regarding leadership issues, such as
which situations require secretarial leadership; the process for declaring incidents of national
significance; and the scope of the NRP and its Catastrophic Incident Annex. The revised NRP
clearly states that the Secretary of Homeland Security, who reports directly to the President,
is responsible for declaring and managing incidents of national significance, including catastrophic ones. At the time of Hurricane Katrina, the supplement to the catastrophic incident
annex, which provides more detail on implementing the annex, was still in draft. Subsequent
to Hurricane Katrina, DHS published the final supplement to the Catastrophic Incident Annex,
dated August 2006.
13 Includes Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana.
14 Includes New York, New Jersey, New England, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
15 Includes Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, Virginia, District of Columbia, Maryland,
Delaware, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island.
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state and local first responders about the need for both positions and how they will
work together in disaster response. One potential benefit of naming the FCOs and
PFOs in advance is that they have an opportunity meet and discuss expectations,
roles and responsibilities with state, local, and nongovernmental officials before an
actual disaster, possibly setting the groundwork for improved coordination and communication in an actual disaster.
Enhanced Capabilities Are Needed to Adequately Prepare for and Respond to Major
Disasters
Numerous reports, including those by the House, Senate, and the White House,
and our own work suggest that the substantial resources and capabilities marshaled
by state, local, and federal governments and nongovernmental organizations were
insufficient to meet the immediate challenges posed by the unprecedented degree of
damage and the number of victims caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Developing the ability to prepare for, respond to, and recover from major and catastrophic
disasters requires an overall national preparedness effort that is designed to integrate and define what needs to be done and where, how it should be done, and how
well it should be done?that is, according to what standards. As previously discussed,
the principal national documents designed to address each of these are, respectively,
the NRP, NIMS, and the NPG, and each document is undergoing revision.
Overall, capabilities are built upon the appropriate combination of people, skills,
processes, and assets. Ensuring that needed capabilities are available requires effective planning and coordination in conjunction with training and exercises in which
the capabilities are realistically tested and problems identified and subsequently addressed in partnership with other federal, state, and local stakeholders. In recent
work on FEMA management of day-to-day operations, we found that although shifting resources caused by its transition to DHS created challenges for FEMA, the
agencys management of existing resources compounded these problems.16 FEMA
lacks some of the basic management tools that help an agency respond to changing
circumstances. Most notably, our January 2007 report found that FEMA lacks a
strategic workforce plan and related human capital strategiessuch as succession
planning or a coordinated training effort. Such tools are integral to managing resources, as they enable an agency to define staffing levels, identify the critical skills
needed to achieve its mission, and eliminate or mitigate gaps between current and
future skills and competencies. FEMA officials have said they are beginning to address these and other basic organizational management issues. To this end, FEMA
has commissioned studies of 18 areas, whose final reports and recommendations are
due later this spring.17
An important element of effective emergency response is the ability to identify
and deploy where needed a variety of resources from a variety of sourcesfederal,
state, local or tribal governments; military assets of the National Guard or active
military; nongovernmental entities; and the private sector. One key method of tapping resources in areas not affected by the disaster is the Emergency Management
Assistance Compact (EMAC). Through EMAC about 46,000 National Guard and
19,000 civilian responders were deployed to areas directly affected by the 2005 Gulf
Coast hurricanes. We have ongoing work examining how EMAC has been used in
disasters and how its effectiveness could be enhanced and expect to report by this
summer.
One of the resources accessed through EMAC is the National Guard. States and
governors rely on their National Guard personnel and equipment for disaster response, and National Guard personnel are frequently deployed to disaster areas outside their home states. However, as we reported in January 2007, the types and
quantities of equipment the National Guard needs to respond to large-scale disasters have not been fully identified because the multiple federal and state agencies
that would have roles in responding to such events have not completed and integrated their plans.18 As a liaison between the Army, the Air Force, and the states,
the National Guard Bureau is well positioned to facilitate state planning for National Guard forces. However, until the bureaus charter and its civil support regula16 GAO, Budget Issues: FEMA Needs Adequate Data, Plans, and Systems to Effectively Manage
Resources for Day-to-Day Operations, GAO07139 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 19, 2007).
17 The areas are (1) individual assistance technical assistance contract, (2) contractor management program, (3) facilities; (4) payment process for contractors, (5) finance center operations,
(6) capital planning and investment control, (7) security, (8) human resources, (9) logistics, (10)
acquisition, (11) disaster emergency communications, (12) decision support systems (data resource management), (13) disaster workforce, (14) information technology, (15) federal coordinating officer cadre, (16) financial systems, (17) budget process, and (18) disaster relief fund.
18 GAO, Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Identify National Guard Domestic Equipment Requirements and Readiness, GAO0760 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 26, 2007).
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tion are revised to define its role in facilitating state planning for multistate events,
such planning may remain incomplete, and the National Guard may not be prepared to respond as effectively and efficiently as possible. In addition, questions
have arisen about the level of resources the National Guard has available for domestic emergency response. DOD does not routinely measure the equipment readiness
of nondeployed National Guard forces for domestic civil support missions or report
this information to Congress. Thus, although the deployment of National Guard
units overseas has decreased the supply of equipment available to nondeployed National Guard units in the U.S., there has been no established, formal method of assessing the impact on the Guards ability to perform its domestic missions. Although
DOD has begun to collect data on units preparedness, these efforts are not yet fully
mature.
The nations experience with hurricanes Katrina and Rita reinforces some of the
questions surrounding the adequacy of capabilities in the context of a catastrophic
disasterparticularly in the areas of (1) situational assessment and awareness, (2)
emergency communications, (3) evacuations, (4) search and rescue, (5) logistics, and
(6) mass care and sheltering. According to FEMA, the agency has described a number of actions it has taken or has underway to address identified deficiencies in each
of these areas. Examples include designating national and regional situational
awareness teams; acquiring and deploying mobile satellite communications trucks;
developing an electronic system for receiving and tracking the status of requests for
assistance and supplies; acquiring GPS equipment for tracking the location of supplies on route to areas of need; and working with the Red Cross and others to clarify
roles and responsibilities for mass care, housing, and human services. However, a
number of FEMA programs are ongoing and it is too early to evaluate their effectiveness. In addition, none of these initiatives appear to have been tested on a scale
that reasonably simulates the conditions and demand they would face following a
major or catastrophic disaster. Thus, it is difficult to assess the probable results of
these initiatives in improving response to a major or catastrophic disaster, such as
a category 4 or 5 hurricane. The section below briefly discusses actions taken or underway to make improvements in each of these areas. Additional details can be
found in appendix I.
Situational Awareness. FEMA is developing a concept for rapidly deployable interagency incident management teams, at this time called National Incident Management Team, to provide a forward federal presence on site within 12 hours of notification to facilitate managing the national response for catastrophic incidents. These
teams will support efforts to meet the emergent needs during disasters such as the
capability to provide initial situational awareness for decision-makers and support
the initial establishment of a unified command.
Emergency Communications. Agencies communications systems during a catastrophic disaster must first be operable, with sufficient communications to meet everyday internal and emergency communication requirements. Once operable, systems should have communications interoperability whereby public safety agencies
(e.g., police, fire, emergency medical services, etc.) and service agencies (e.g., public
works, transportation, and hospitals) can communicate within and across agencies
and jurisdictions in real time as needed. DHS officials have identified a number of
programs and activities they have implemented to improve interoperable communications nationally, and FEMA has taken action to design, staff, and maintain a
rapidly deployable, responsive, interoperable, and reliable emergency communications capability, which we discuss further in appendix I.
Logistics. FEMAs inability to effectively manage and track requests for and the
distribution of water, ice, food, and other supplies came under harsh criticism in the
wake of Hurricane Katrina. Within days, FEMA became overwhelmed and essentially asked the military to take over much of the logistics mission.19 In the Post
Katrina Reform Act, Congress required FEMA to make its logistics system more
flexible and responsive. FEMAs ongoing improvements to its logistics strategy and
efforts are designed to initially lean forward and provide immediate support to a
disaster site mainly through FEMA-owned goods and assets, and later on to establish sustained supply chains with the private vendors whose resources are needed
for ongoing response and recovery activities, according to FEMA officials. In addition, we recently examined FEMA logistics issues, taking a broad approach, identifying five areas necessary for an effective logistics system, which are discussed in
appendix I. In short, FEMA is taking action to transition its logistics program to
be more proactive, flexible, and responsive. While these and other initiatives hold
19 GAO, Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the Militarys Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters. GAO06643 (Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2006).
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promise for improving FEMAs logistics capabilities, it will be several years before
they are fully implemented and operational.
Mass Care and Shelter. In GAOs work examining the nations ability to evacuate,
care for, and shelter disaster victims, we found that FEMA needs to identify and
assess the capabilities that exist across the federal government and outside the federal government. In an April testimony, FEMAs Deputy Administrator for Operations said that emergency evacuation, shelter and housing is FEMAs most pressing priority for planning for recovery from a catastrophic disaster. He said that
FEMA is undertaking more detailed mass evacuee support planning; the Department of Justice and Red Cross are developing methods for more quickly identifying
and uniting missing family members; and FEMA and the Red Cross have developed
a web-based data system to support shelter management, reporting, and facility
identification activities.
Balance Needed between Quick Provision of Assistance and Ensuring Accountability to Protect against Waste, Fraud, and Abuse
Controls and accountability mechanisms help to ensure that resources are used
appropriately. Nevertheless, during a catastrophic disaster, decision makers struggle with the tension between implementing controls and accountability mechanisms
and the demand for rapid response and recovery assistance. On one hand, our work
uncovered many examples where quick action could not occur due to procedures that
required extensive, time-consuming processes, delaying the delivery of vital supplies
and other assistance. On the other hand, we also found examples where FEMAs
processes assisting disaster victims left the federal government vulnerable to fraud
and the abuse of expedited assistance payments.
We estimated that through February 2006, FEMA made about $600 million to
$1.4 billion in improper and potentially fraudulent payments to applicants who used
invalid information to apply for expedited cash assistance. DHS and FEMA have reported a number of actions that are to be in effect for the 2007 hurricane season
so that federal recovery programs will have more capacity to rapidly handle a catastrophic incident but also provide accountability. Examples include significantly increasing the quantity of prepositioned supplies, such as food, ice, and water; placing
global positioning systems on supply trucks to track their location and better manage the delivery of supplies; creating an enhanced phone system for victim assistance applications that can handle up to 200,000 calls per day; and improving computer systems and processes for verifying the eligibility of those applying for assistance. Effective implementation of these and other planned improvements will be
critical to achieving their intended outcomes.20
Finally, catastrophic disasters not only require a different magnitude of capabilities and resources for effective response, they may also require more flexible policies
and operating procedures. In a catastrophe, streamlining, simplifying, and expediting decision making should quickly replace business as usual and unquestioned
adherence to long-standing policies and operating procedures used in normal situations for providing relief to disaster victims. At the same time, controls and accountability mechanisms must be sufficient to provide the documentation needed for expense reimbursement and reasonable assurance that resources have been used legally and for the purposes intended.
We have recommended that DHS create accountability systems that effectively
balance the need for fast and flexible response against the need to prevent waste,
fraud, and abuse. Doing so would enable DHS to provide assistance quickly following a catastrophe and keep up with the magnitude of needs to confirm the eligibility of victims for disaster assistance, or assure that there were provisions in contracts for response and recovery services to ensure fair and reasonable prices in all
cases. We also recommended that DHS provide guidance on advance procurement
practices and procedures (precontracting) for those federal agencies with roles and
responsibilities under the NRP. These federal agencies could then better manage
disaster-related procurement and establish an assessment process to monitor agencies continuous planning efforts for their disaster-related procurement needs and
the maintenance of capabilities. For example, we identified a number of emergency
response practices in the public and private sectors that provide insight into how
the federal government can better manage its disaster-related procurements. These
practices include developing knowledge of contractor capabilities and prices, and es20 GAO, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Disaster Relief: Prevention Is the Key to Minimizing
Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Recovery Efforts. GAO07418T. Washington, D.C.: January 29,
2007.
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tablishing vendor relationships prior to the disaster and establishing a scalable operations plan to adjust the level of capacity to match the response with the need.21
In my March 2007 testimony I noted that recent statutory changes have established more controls and accountability mechanisms. For example, The Secretary of
DHS is required to promulgate regulations designed to limit the excessive use of
subcontractors and subcontracting tiers. The Secretary of DHS is also required to
promulgate regulations that limit certain noncompetitive contracts to 150 days, unless exceptional circumstances apply. Oversight funding is specified. FEMA may
dedicate up to one percent of funding for agency mission assignments as oversight
funds. The FEMA Administrator must develop and maintain internal management
controls of FEMA disaster assistance programs and develop and implement a training program to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse of federal funds in response to or
recovery from a disaster. Verification measures must be developed to identify eligible recipients of disaster relief assistance.
Several Disaster Management Issues Should Have Continued Congressional Attention
In November 2006, the Comptroller General wrote to the congressional leadership
suggesting areas for congressional oversight.22 He suggested that one area needing
fundamental reform and oversight was preparing for, responding to, recovering
from, and rebuilding after catastrophic events. Recent eventsnotably Hurricane
Katrina and the threat of an influenza pandemichave illustrated the importance
of ensuring a strategic and integrated approach to catastrophic disaster management. Disaster preparation and response that is well planned and coordinated can
save lives and mitigate damage, and an effectively functioning insurance market
can substantially reduce the governments exposure to post-catastrophe payouts.
Lessons learned from past national emergencies provide an opportunity for Congress to look at actions that could mitigate the effects of potential catastrophic
events. On January 18, 2007, DHS provided Congress a notice of implementation
of the Post-Katrina Reform Act reorganization requirements and additional organizational changes made under the Homeland Security Act of 2002. All of the changes,
according to DHS, were to become effective on March 31, 2007. As stated in our
March 2007 testimony, the effective implementation of the Post-Katrina Reform
Acts organizational changes and related roles and responsibilitiesin addition to
those changes already undertaken by DHSshould address many of our emergency
management observations and recommendations.
The Comptroller General also suggested in November 2006 that Congress could
also consider how the federal government can work with other nations, other levels
of government, and nonprofit and private sector organizations, such as the Red
Cross and private insurers, to help ensure the nation is well prepared and recovers
effectively. Given the billions of dollars dedicated to preparing for, responding to,
recovering from, and rebuilding after catastrophic disasters, congressional oversight
is critical.
A comprehensive and in-depth oversight agenda would require long-term efforts.
Congress might consider starting with several specific areas for immediate oversight, such as (1) evaluating development and implementation of the National Preparedness System, including preparedness for an influenza pandemic, (2) assessing
state and local capabilities and the use of federal grants in building and sustaining
those capabilities, (3) examining regional and multistate planning and preparation,
(4) determining the status of preparedness exercises, and
(5) examining DHS policies regarding oversight assistance.
DHS Has Reorganized Pursuant to the Post-Katrina Reform Act
On January 18, 2007, DHS provided Congress a notice of implementation of the
Post-Katrina Reform Act reorganization requirements and additional organizational
changes made under the Homeland Security Act of 2002. All of the changes, according to DHS, were to become effective on March 31, 2007. According to DHS, the department completed a thorough assessment of FEMAs internal structure to incorporate lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina and integrate systematically new
and existing assets and responsibilities within FEMA. DHS transferred the following DHS offices and divisions to FEMA:
United States Fire Administration,
Office of Grants and Training,
Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Division,
21 GAO, Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security, GAO07452T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 7, 2007).
22 GAO, Suggested Areas for Oversight for the 110th Congress. GAO07235R (Washington,
D.C.: Nov. 17, 2006).
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Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program,
Office of National Capital Region Coordination, and,
Office of State and Local Government Coordination.
DHS officials stated that they have established several organizational elements,
such as a logistics management division, a disaster assistance division, and a disaster operations division. In addition, FEMA expanded its regional office structure
with each region in part by establishing a Regional Advisory Council and at least
one Regional Strike Team. With the recent appointment of the director for region
III, FEMA officials noted that for the first time in recent memory there will be no
acting regional directors and all 10 FEMA regional offices will be headed by experienced professionals.
Further, FEMA will include a new national preparedness directorate intended to
consolidate FEMAs strategic preparedness assets from existing FEMA programs
and certain legacy Preparedness Directorate programs. The National Preparedness
Directorate will contain functions related to preparedness doctrine, policy, and contingency planning. It also will include the National Integration Center that will
maintain the NRP and NIMS and ensure that training and exercise activities reflect
these documents.
Effective Implementation of the Post-Katrina Reform Acts Provisions Should Respond to Many Concerns
As I have previously stated in my March 2007 testimony, the effective implementation of the Post-Katrina Reform Acts organizational changes and related roles and
responsibilitiesin addition to those changes already undertaken by DHSshould
address many of our emergency management observations and recommendations.
As noted earlier, our analysis in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina showed the
the development of the necessary disaster capabilities; and (3) accountability systems that effectively balance the need for fast and flexible response against the need
to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse. The statute appears to strengthen leadership
roles and responsibilities. For example, the statute clarifies that the FEMA Administrator is to act as the principal emergency management adviser to the President,
the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of DHS and to provide recommendations directly to Congress after informing the Secretary of DHS. The incident management responsibilities and roles of the National Integration Center are
now clear. The Secretary of DHS must ensure that the NRP provides for a clear
chain of command to lead and coordinate the federal response to any natural disaster, act of terrorism, or other man-made disaster. The law also establishes qualifications that appointees must meet. For example, the FEMA Administrator must
have a demonstrated ability in and knowledge of emergency management and homeland security and 5 years of executive leadership and management experience.
Many provisions are designed to enhance preparedness and response. For example, the statute requires the President to establish a national preparedness goal and
national preparedness system. The national preparedness system includes a broad
range of preparedness activities, including utilizing target capabilities and preparedness priorities, training and exercises, comprehensive assessment systems, and reporting requirements. To illustrate, the FEMA Administrator is to carry out a national training program to implement, and a national exercise program to test and
evaluate the NPG, NIMS, NRP, and other related plans and strategies.
In addition, FEMA is to partner with nonfederal entities to build a national emergency management system. States must develop plans that include catastrophic incident annexes modeled after the NRP annex in order to be eligible for FEMA emergency preparedness grants. The state annexes must be developed in consultation
with local officials, including regional commissions. FEMA regional administrators
are to foster the development of mutual aid agreements between states. FEMA must
enter into a memorandum of understanding with certain non-federal entities to collaborate on developing standards for deployment capabilities, including
credentialing of personnel and typing of resources. In addition, FEMA must implement several other capabilities, such as (1) developing a logistics system providing
real-time visibility of items at each point throughout the logistics system, (2) establishing a prepositioned equipment program, and (3) establishing emergency support
and response teams.
The National Preparedness System Is Key to Developing Disaster Capabilities
More immediate congressional attention might focus on evaluating the construction and effectiveness of the National Preparedness System, which is mandated
under the Post-Katrina Reform Act. Under Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8, issued in December 2003, DHS was to coordinate the development of a national domestic all-hazards preparedness goal to establish measurable readiness
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priorities and targets that appropriately balance the potential threat and magnitude
of terrorist attacks and large scale natural or accidental disasters with the resources
required to prevent, respond to, and recover from them. The goal was also to include readiness metrics and standards for preparedness assessments and strategies
and a system for assessing the nations overall preparedness to respond to major
events.
To implement the directive, DHS developed the National Preparedness Goal using
15 emergency event scenarios, 12 of which were terrorist related, with the remaining 3 addressing a major hurricane, major earthquake, and an influenza pandemic.
According to DHSs National Preparedness Guidance, the planning scenarios are intended to illustrate the scope and magnitude of large-scale, catastrophic emergency
events for which the nation needs to be prepared and to form the basis for identifying the capabilities needed to respond to a wide range of large scale emergency
events. The scenarios focused on the consequences that first responders would have
to address. Some state and local officials and experts have questioned whether the
scenarios were appropriate inputs for preparedness planning, particularly in terms
of their plausibility and the emphasis on terrorist scenarios.
Using the scenarios, and in consultation with federal, state, and local emergency
response stakeholders, DHS developed a list of over 1,600 discrete tasks, of which
300 were identified as critical. DHS then identified 36 target capabilities to provide
guidance to federal, state, and local first responders on the capabilities they need
to develop and maintain. That list has since been refined, and DHS released a revised draft list of 37 capabilities in December 2005. Because no single jurisdiction
or agency would be expected to perform every task, possession of a target capability
could involve enhancing and maintaining local resources, ensuring access to regional
and federal resources, or some combination of the two. However, DHS is still in the
process of developing goals, requirements, and metrics for these capabilities and the
National Preparedness Goal in light of the Hurricane Katrina experience.
Several key components of the National Preparedness System defined in the PostKatrina Reform Actthe NPG, target capabilities and preparedness priorities, and
comprehensive assessment systemsshould be closely examined. Prior to Hurricane
Katrina, DHS had established seven priorities for enhancing national first responder preparedness, including, for example, implementing the NRP and NIMS;
strengthening capabilities in information sharing and collaboration; and strengthening capabilities in medical surge and mass prophylaxis. Those seven priorities
were incorporated into DHSs fiscal year 2006 homeland security grant program
(HSGP) guidance, which added an eighth priority that emphasized emergency operations and catastrophic planning.
In the fiscal year 2007 HSGP program guidance, DHS set two overarching priorities. DHS has focused the bulk of its available grant dollars on risk-based investment. In addition, the department has prioritized regional coordination and investment strategies that institutionalize regional security strategy integration. In addition to the two overarching priorities, the guidance also identified several others.
These include (1) measuring progress in achieving the NPG, (2) integrating and synchronizing preparedness programs and activities, (3) developing and sustaining a
statewide critical infrastructure/key resource protection program, (4) enabling information/intelligence fusion, (5) enhancing statewide communications interoperability,
(6) strengthening preventative radiological/nuclear detection capabilities, and (7) enhancing catastrophic planning to address nationwide plan review results. Under the
guidance, all fiscal year 2007 HSGP applicants will be required to submit an investment justification that provides background information, strategic objectives and
priorities addressed, their funding/implementation plan, and the impact that each
proposed investment (project) is anticipated to have.
The Particular Challenge of Preparing for an Influenza Pandemic
The possibility of an influenza pandemic is a real and significant threat to the
nation. There is widespread agreement that it is not a question of if but when such
a pandemic will occur. The issues associated with the preparation for and response
to a pandemic flu are similar to those for any other type of disaster: clear leadership
roles and responsibilities, authority, and coordination; risk management; realistic
planning, training, and exercises; assessing and building the capacity needed to effectively respond and recover; effective information sharing and communication; and
accountability for the effective use of resources.
However, a pandemic poses some unique challenges. Hurricanes, earthquakes, explosions, or bioterrorist incidents occur within a short period of time, perhaps a period of minutes, although such events can have long-term effects, as we have seen
in the Gulf region following Hurricane Katrina. The immediate effects of such disasters are likely to affect specific locations or areas within the nation; the immediate
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damage is not nationwide. In contrast, an influenza pandemic is likely to continue
in waves of 6 to 8 weeks for a number of weeks or months and affect wide areas
of the nation, perhaps the entire nation. Depending upon the severity of the pandemic, the number of deaths could be from 200,000 to 2 million. Seasonal influenza
in the United States results in about 36,000 deaths annually. Successfully addressing the pandemic is also likely to require international coordination of detection and
response.
The Department of Health and Human Services estimates that during a severe
pandemic, absenteeism may reach as much as 40 percent in an affected community
because individuals are ill, caring for family members, or fear infection. Such absenteeism could affect our nations economy, as businesses and governments face the
challenge of continuing to provide essential services with reduced numbers of
healthy workers. In addition, our nations ability to respond effectively to hurricanes
or other major disasters during a pandemic may also be diminished as first responders, health care workers, and others are infected or otherwise unable to perform
their normal duties. Thus, the consequences of a pandemic are potentially widespread and effective planning and response for such a disaster will require particularly close cooperation among all levels of government, the private sector, individuals within the United States, as well as international cooperation.
We have engagements under way examining such issues as barriers to implementing the Department of Health and Human Services? National Pandemic Influenza Plan, the national strategy and framework for pandemic influenza, the Department of Defense and Department of Agricultures preparedness efforts and plans,
public health and hospital preparedness, and U.S. efforts to improve global disease
surveillance. We expect most of these reports to be issued by late summer 2007.
Knowledge of the Effects of State and Local Efforts to Improve Their Capabilities
Is Limited
Possible congressional oversight in the short term also might focus on state and
local capabilities. As I testified in February on applying risk management principles
to guide federal investments, over the past 4 years DHS has provided about $14 billion in federal funding to states, localities, and territories through its HSGP grants.
Remarkably, however, we know little about how states and localities finance their
efforts in this area, have used their federal funds, and are assessing the effectiveness with which they spend those funds.
Essentially, all levels of government are still struggling to define and act on the
answers to basic, but hardly simple, questions about emergency preparedness and
response: What is important (that is, what are our priorities)? How do we know
what is important (e.g., risk assessments, performance standards)? How do we
measure, attain, and sustain success? On what basis do we make necessary tradeoffs, given finite resources?
There are no simple, easy answers to these questions. The data available for answering them are incomplete and imperfect. We have better information and a better sense of what needs to be done for some types of major emergency events than
for others. For some natural disasters, such as regional wildfires and flooding, there
is more experience and therefore a better basis on which to assess preparation and
response efforts and identify gaps that need to be addressed. California has experience with earthquakes; Florida, with hurricanes. However, no one in the nation has
experience with such potential catastrophes as a dirty bomb detonated in a major
city. Although both the AIDS epidemic and SARS provide some related experience,
there have been no recent pandemics that rapidly spread to thousands of people
across the nation.
A new feature in the fiscal year 2006 DHS homeland security grant guidance for
the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grants was that eligible recipients must
provide an ?investment justification? with their grant application. States were to
use this justification to outline the implementation approaches for specific investments that will be used to achieve the initiatives outlined in their state Program
and Capability Enhancement Plan. These plans were multiyear global program
management plans for the entire state homeland security program that look beyond
federal homeland security grant programs and funding. The justifications must justify all funding requested through the DHS homeland security grant program. In
the guidance DHS noted that it would use a peer review process to evaluate grant
applications on the basis of the effectiveness of a states plan to address the priorities it has outlined and thereby reduce its overall risk.
For fiscal year 2006, DHS implemented a competitive process to evaluate the anticipated effectiveness of proposed homeland security investments. For fiscal year
2007, DHS will continue to use the risk and effectiveness assessments to inform
final funding decisions, although changes have been made to make the grant allocation process more transparent and more easily understood. DHS officials have said
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that they cannot yet assess how effective the actual investments from grant funds
are in enhancing preparedness and mitigating risk because they do not yet have the
metrics to do so.
Regional and Multistate Planning and Preparation Should Be Robust
Through its grant guidance, DHS has encouraged regional and multistate planning and preparation. Planning and assistance have largely been focused on single
jurisdictions and their immediately adjacent neighbors. However, well-documented
problems with the abilities of first responders from multiple jurisdictions to communicate at the site of an incident and the potential for large-scale natural and terrorist disasters have generated a debate on the extent to which first responders
should be focusing their planning and preparation on a regional and multigovernmental basis.
As I mentioned earlier, an overarching national priority for the National Preparedness Goal is embracing regional approaches to building, sustaining, and sharing capabilities at all levels of government. All HSGP applications are to reflect regional coordination and show an investment strategy that institutionalizes regional
security strategy integration. However, it is not known to what extent regional and
multistate planning has progressed and is effective.
Our limited regional work indicated there are challenges in planning. Our early
work addressing the Office of National Capital Region Coordination (ONCRC) and
National Capital Region (NCR) strategic planning reported that the ONCRC and
the NCR faced interrelated challenges in managing federal funds in a way that
maximizes the increase in first responder capacities and preparedness while minimizing inefficiency and unnecessary duplication of expenditures.23 One of these
challenges included a coordinated regionwide plan for establishing first responder
performance goals, needs, and priorities, and assessing the benefits of expenditures
in enhancing first responder capabilities. In subsequent work on National Capital
Region strategic planning, we highlighted areas that needed strengthening in the
Regions planning, specifically improving the substance of the strategic plan to guide
decision makers.24 For example, additional information could have been provided regarding the type, nature, scope, or timing of planned goals, objectives, and initiatives; performance expectations and measures; designation of priority initiatives to
meet regional risk and needed capabilities; lead organizations for initiative implementation; resources and investments; and operational commitment.
Exercises Must Be Carefully Planned and Deployed and Capture Lessons Learned
Our work examining the preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina highlighted the importance of realistic exercises to test and refine assumptions, capabilities, and operational procedures; build on the strengths; and shore up the limitations revealed by objective assessments of the exercises. The Post-Katrina Reform
Act mandates a national exercise program, and training and exercises are also included as a component of the National Preparedness System. With almost any skill
and capability, experience and practice enhance proficiency. For first responders, exercises-especially of the type or magnitude of events for which there is little actual
experience?are essential for developing skills and identifying what works well and
what needs further improvement. Major emergency incidents, particularly catastrophic ones, by definition require the coordinated actions of personnel from many
first responder disciplines and all levels of government, nonprofit organizations, and
the private sector. It is difficult to overemphasize the importance of effective interdisciplinary, intergovernmental planning, training, and exercises in developing the
coordination and skills needed for effective response.
For exercises to be effective in identifying both strengths and areas needing attention, it is important that they be realistic, designed to test and stress the system,
involve all key persons who would be involved in responding to an actual event, and
be followed by honest and realistic assessments that result in action plans that are
implemented. In addition to relevant first responders, exercise participants should
23 GAO, Homeland Security: Management of First Responder Grants in the National Capital
Region Reflects the Need for Coordinated Planning and Performance Goals, GAO04433 (Washington, D.C.: May 28, 2004); Homeland Security: Coordinated Planning and Standards Needed
to Better Manage First Responder Grants in the National Capital Region, GAO04904T (Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2004); Homeland Security: Effective Regional Coordination Can Enhance
Emergency Preparedness, GAO041009 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 15, 2004); Homeland Security:
Managing First Responder Grants to Enhance Emergency Preparedness in the National Capital
Region, GAO05889T (Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2005); and Homeland Security: The Status
of Strategic Planning in the National Capital Region, GAO06559T (Washington, D.C.: Mar.
29, 2006).
24 GAO, Homeland Security: Assessment of the National Capital Region Strategic Plan, GAO
061096T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 28, 2006).
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include, depending upon the scope and nature of the exercise, mayors, governors,
and state and local emergency managers who would be responsible for such things
as determining if and when to declare a mandatory evacuation or ask for federal
assistance.
DHS Has Provided Limited Transparency for Its Management or Operational Decisions
Congressional oversight in the short term might include DHSs policies regarding
oversight assistance. The Comptroller General has testified that DHS has not been
transparent in its efforts to strengthen its management areas and mission functions.
While much of its sensitive work needs to be guarded from improper disclosure,
DHS has not been receptive toward oversight. Delays in providing Congress and us
with access to various documents and officials have impeded our work.
We need to be able to independently assure ourselves and Congress that DHS has
implemented many of our past recommendations or has taken other corrective actions to address the challenges we identified. However, DHS has not made its management or operational decisions transparent enough so that Congress can be sure
it is effectively, efficiently, and economically using the billions of dollars in funding
it receives annually, and is providing the levels of security called for in numerous
legislative requirements and presidential directives.
Concluding Observations
Since September 11, 2001, the federal government has awarded billions of dollars
in grants and assistance to state and local governments to assist in strengthening
emergency management capabilities. DHS has developed several key national policy
documents, including the NRP, NIMS, and the NPG to guide federal, state, and
local efforts. The aftermath of the 2005 hurricane season resulted in a reassessment
of the federal role in preparing for and responding to catastrophic events. The studies and reports of the past yearby Congress, the White House Homeland Security
Council, the DHS IG, DHS and FEMA, GAO, and othershave provided a number
of insights into the strengths and limitations of the nations capacity to respond to
catastrophic disasters and resulted in a number of recommendations for strengthening that capacity. Collectively, these studies and reports paint a complex mosaic
of the challenges that the nationfederal, state, local, and tribal governments; nongovernmental entities; the private sector; and individual citizensfaces in preparing
for, responding to, and recovering from catastrophic disasters. The Post-Katrina Reform Act directs many organizational, mission, and policy changes to respond to
these findings and challenges.
Assessing, developing, attaining, and sustaining needed emergency preparedness,
response, and recovery capabilities is a difficult task that requires sustained leadership, the coordinated efforts of many stakeholders from a variety of first responder
disciplines, levels of government, and nongovernmental entities. There is a no silver bullet, no easy formula. It is also a task that is never done, but requires continuing commitment and leadership and trade-offs because circumstances change
and we will never have the funds to do everything we might like to do.
That concludes my statement, and I would be pleased to respond to any questions
you and subcommittee members may have.

We now recognize Mr. Fugate to summarize his statement for 5
minutes.
STATEMENT OF CRAIG FUGATE, DIRECTOR, FLORIDA
DIVISION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
Mr. FUGATE. Thank you, Chairman Thompson, ranking members, and distinguished members of the committee for the opportunity to testify.
My name is Craig Fugate, and I serve Governor Crist as his director of emergency management, a position I have served for two
governors, Governor Bush and Governor Crist.
My experiences go back 25 years, and I have been involved in numerous disasters, both as a first responder, as a paramedic and
firefighter, later as an emergency manager for Alachua County,
which is home to the University of Florida in Gainesville, as well
as serving the state as state coordinating officer and the governors
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authorized representative for the 2004 hurricane season, 2005, and
currently serving Governor Crist as the state coordinating officer
during the wildfire emergency that is occurring in Florida.
There are several key areas that we would like to present for
consideration as we talk about getting ready for the 2007 hurricane
season. And the first one is all-hazard. When we talk about hurricanes, or we talk about specific disasters, many people, in trying
to describe all-hazards, look for the common elements within the
disaster itself.
I will tell you, Mr. Chairman, there is nothing in common with
a hurricane and the wildfires. They are entirely different creatures.
What is all-hazards is the fact that the governor of the state of
Florida will be the governor in all of those disasters.
It is the team that you build to deal with a variety of threats to
community space, those known and both unknown, that is truly allhazard. And when you try to define all-hazard by talking about disasters, you miss the point. So while we are oftentimes concerned
about hurricane season, understand what we do in Florida isnt
just about hurricanes.
As we are talking about right now, we still have major fires
going in Florida. We have over five fire management grants issued
by FEMA. We have emergency management assistance compact
from other states, from Georgia and South Carolina. Blackhawks
are flying in support of our Division of Forestry and our National
Guard fighting these fires.
And this is not a hurricane, but this is how we do business in
Florida. It is the all-hazard approach. And that is why we have
been so insistent that it needs to be the basis as we look at the
variety of disasters we face in the nation.
The second one, which is really a concern for my peers in other
states and local government, is the Emergency Management Performance Grant. This is a 5050 funding program that has been
authorized by Congress for numerous years, starting back with the
era of civil defense, that builds capability and capacity in our communities to share resources, respond effectively, and manage many
of those local disasters without state or federal assistance, or, in
many disasters, only require federal reimbursement assistance, because we built capacity.
Again, to look at that is a wise investment for our country, to
continue building that capacity. Because when you look around the
nation, I dont know how many fire trucks the federal government
has, but I can tell you the state of Florida doesnt have that many.
They are at local government. And if we dont build the capability to share the unimpacted resources of the nation, we leave too
many resources off the table when the victims are in their time of
need, and we need to support that capability-building.
But you also have to be able to move those resources from state
to state, and that brings us to the Emergency Management Assistance Compact. It was something the late Governor Chiles realized
after Hurricane Andrew, that we needed to have a better way of
bringing assistance from other states, and through the Southern
governors, developed the Southern Governors Compact.
Congress thought that was a great idea, endorsed it, issued a
public law to allow states to enter into that compact, and moved
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it beyond just the Southern states. And now we have the Emergency Management Assistance Compact, which all 50 states are a
member of, as well as several of our territories and commonwealths.
This allowed us in the state of Florida to send over 7,000 responders to Mississippi in their time of need during Hurricane
Katrina. Not only was it sending resources or sending people, we
were actually sending resourcesfood, water, and icethat we did
through our own contracts. As we were prepared to serve our citizens in their time of need, we were able to provide that assistance
to our neighbors in their time of need.
And finally, the last one I want to get to is one that hasnt been
discussed very much, and that is the Temporary Disaster Housing
Program.
Mr. Chairman, you know as well as I do that housing is an issue
before a disaster strikes, and oftentimes it exasperates the program. The Stafford Act was never designed to heal the ills a community has in housing needs before a disaster, and yet we try to
make that disaster program fit the needs.
There has been a lot of talk about moving the Temporary Housing Program to HUD. I would suggest it again. We need swift and
effective means to house people in the immediate aftermath of a
disaster, or we are going to depopulate regions of this country, as
we saw in Katrina.
But I think we need to have a better understanding that FEMAs
role is the emergency, and many of these issues are longer-term,
far beyond ever anticipated under the Stafford Act. There should
be a better system that we can use the FEMA program to do the
immediate housing needs, then realize many of these folks will
have long-term housing issues.
And perhaps the more appropriate will be a hybrid between
FEMA and HUD, where at the end of the emergency, many of
these people that still have long-term housing issues are then
transitioned into HUD programs, versus creating a new program
from scratch in the midst of another hurricane season.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The statement of Mr. Fugate follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT
OF
WILLIAM CRAIG FUGATE
Introduction
Thank you Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King, and distinguished members of the Committee for allowing me the opportunity testify before you on preparedness efforts for the 2007 Hurricane Season. I am Craig Fugate, the Director
of the Florida Division of Emergency Management. I have over 25 years of experience in state and local emergency management, serving in various positions including ten years as the Emergency Management Director for Alachua County, Florida,
Chief of the Bureau of Preparedness for the State of Florida, and the appointment
to my current position in 2001. I continue to serve and have been reappointed to
my position by Governor Charlie Crist. In my time with the State of Florida, I have
served as the Governors authorized representative for major disasters such as the
2004 Hurricane season including Hurricanes Charlie, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne
and coordinated the State Emergency Response Team (SERT)s response for all Florida disasters and for state-to-state mutual aid for Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Emergency management is built upon three very basic concepts: 1) All-hazards
preparedness is the foundation in which readiness is built for all disasters regardless of the cause or size; 2) The emergency management cycle includes preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation; and 3) All disasters are local. There are
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several key areas that I wish to discuss with you today that need to be addressed
in order to secure our preparedness for all disasters:
1. We must maintain an all-hazards approach to emergency management;
2. Funding for the Emergency Management Performance Grant (EMPG)
program should be increased, at least restored to FY 2005 levels;
3. We need federal support of the Emergency Management Assistance
Compact (EMAC); and
4. The FEMA Temporary Disaster Housing Program can be more effective with a transition plan that includes HUD resources.
MAINTAINING THE ALL-HAZARDS APPROACH TO EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT
All-hazards emergency preparedness is the key building block and foundation for
emergency management. Natural hazards continue to be the pervasive disaster that
occurs regularly. In the past several years, major disaster declarations were for
events including severe storms and tornadoes, typhoons, tropical storms, multiple
hurricanes, flooding, ice storms, snowstorms, and wildfires. Natural disaster preparedness must not suffer as a result of homeland security efforts, but rather should
be viewed as the most frequent opportunity to validate domestic preparedness efforts and to also build best practices. We need to start looking at the system in
terms of hazards preparedness. Furthermore, our emergency response system must
be built for all-hazards and terrorism should be a component of the system. We cannot afford to build duplicate systems by hazard or to eliminate programs to support
the homeland security effort. An all-hazards approach should be viewed as building
a single team to deal with a large variety of hazards.
Since I have been with the State of Florida, we have had had 22 major disaster
declarations, five emergency declarations, and 45 fire management assistance declarations. While hurricanes are the most urgent and prevailing threat we have
faced, we do not prepare for hurricanes alone. Florida was the first state with anthrax cases in 2001, the terrorists for 9/11 trained in Florida, we have three commercial nuclear power plant sites, host major sporting events including Superbowls,
and boast three national championships in the past two years in college football
(2006) and basketball (2006 and 2007). We have extensive threats for tornadoes,
flooding, fires, and severe freezing. You will recall the February 2, 2007 tornado
that left 21 people dead and destroyed hundreds of homes with more than $17 million in federal assistance for victims. Additionally, we have done significant influenza pandemic planning for our large special needs populations and planning for
mass migration incidents from the Caribbean.
While every state may not experience a disaster every single year, preparedness
is essential. Florida took the lead in ensuring that localities were prepared for any
disaster when our state legislature made changes after Hurricane Andrew that a
surcharge is set aside for emergency preparedness from every insurance policy written in the state. This fund called the Emergency Management Preparedness and Assistance Trust Fund, which exists only in Florida, helps us to ensure that localities
have the necessary means to prepare for disasters and citizens do their part too.
In addition, we utilize the only all-hazards funding source, the Emergency Management Performance Grants to supplement these funds to build our key preparedness
programs.
Hazards need to be explored in the context of disasters too. A disaster is really
caused by humans as a result of getting in Mother Natures way. Humans build in
harms way, we traditionally build at the cheapest costs, and we build power grids
that are subject to wind damage. When we prepare for terrorism, we harden critical
infrastructure and look for ways to prevent events. We develop strong public health
systems and plans to address pandemics. However, addressing hazards before a natural disaster means stronger building codes, enforcing those codes, heeding warnings ahead of disasters and having business and family plans in place when disaster
does occur. We have to begin looking at the complexities and scale of the consequences of hazards.
The federal government must continue its commitment to ensuring national security through all-hazard preparedness. Without adequate numbers of state and local
personnel to operate the all-hazards emergency management system, the infrastructure used to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from all disasters will collapse. Unfortunately, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita illustrated the need for adequate
emergency management systems from the ground up. Instead of making unbalanced
investments towards terrorism preparedness, we must maintain an all-hazards approach and shore up the foundation of our response system for all disasters regardless of cause.
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EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT INFRASTRUCTURE FUNDING
EMPG is the only program for All-Hazards Preparedness
Natural disasters are certain and often anticipated. Every state must be able to
plan for disasters as well as build and sustain the capability to respond. EMPG is
the only source of funding to assist state and local governments with planning and
preparedness/readiness activities associated with natural disasters. At a time when
our country is continuing long term recovery efforts from one of the largest natural
disasters in history and making strides to improve the nations emergency preparedness/readiness, we cannot afford to have this vital program be just maintained.
EMPG is the backbone of the nations all-hazards emergency management system
and the only source of direct federal funding to state and local governments for
emergency management capacity building. EMPG is used for personnel, planning,
training, and exercises at both the state and local levels. EMPG is primarily used
to support state and local emergency management personnel who are responsible for
writing plans; conducting training, exercises and corrective action; educating the
public on disaster readiness; and maintaining the nations emergency response system. EMPG is being used to help states create and update plans for receiving and
distribution plans for emergency supplies such as water, ice, and food after a disaster; debris removal plans; and plans for receiving or evacuating peopleall of
these critical issues identified in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and the following investigations and reports.
State and Local Match
EMPG is the only all-hazards preparedness program within the Department of
Homeland Security that requires a match at the state and local level. The match
is evidence of the commitment by state and local governments to address the urgent
need for all-hazards emergency planning to include terrorism. EMPG requires a
match of 50 percent from state or local governments. According to the National
Emergency Management Associations (NEMA) 2006 Biennial Report, states were
continuing to over match the federal governments commitment to national security
protection through EMPG by $96 million in FY05, which is an 80 percent state and
20 percent federal contribution. To bring all state and local jurisdictions up to the
fifty percent level, $135 million is needed. This would allow as many as 3,030 additional local jurisdictions to become part of the program. To bring non-participating
jurisdictions into the program at the 50 percent level requires an additional $152
million.
EMPG Helps Ensure Personnel for Mutual Aid
During the 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons, the interdependencies of the nations emergency management system were demonstrated and one of the success stories was the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC). EMAC enabled
48 states, the District of Columbia, the Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico to provide
assistance in the form of more than 2,100 missions of human, military and equipment assets and over 65,000 civilian and military personnel and equipment assets
to support the impacted states. The estimated costs of these missions will exceed
$829 million. Of the personnel providing assistance through EMAC, 46,503 were
National Guard personnel and 19,426 were civilians. Many of the civilians sent to
provide assistance are supported by the EMPG program in their state. The nature
of the nations mutual aid system vividly shows the need for all states to have appropriate capabilities to respond to disasters of all types and sizes. In Florida we
used EMPG to build self-sustained response teams that are able to respond to disasters in our state and in neighboring states when called upon to provide assistance.
The increased reliance on mutual aid for catastrophic disasters means additional resources are needed to continue to build and enhance the nations mutual aid system
through EMAC.
Appropriate Support Needed to Strengthen Program
While EMPG received modest increases in 2003 and 2004 after ten years of
straight-lined funding, the program needs to be adequately resourced based on
building capacity. The increased flexibility of EMPG is offset by funding shortfalls
estimated in the NEMA Biennial Report in 2006 to be over $287 million for all 50
states. The current total need is $487 million. The Post-Katrina FEMA Reform Act
authorized EMPG at $375 million for FY 2008.
Clearly, Congress wants to understand what is being built with these investments, especially in tight fiscal conditions. The 2006 Quick Response Survey found
that if states were to each receive an additional $1 million in EMPG funding for
FY 2007, states would use the following percentages for each of the following activities: 88 percent of states responding would use the funding to support the update
plans including evacuation, sheltering, emergency operations, catastrophic disasters
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and others; 83 percent would provide more training opportunities for state and local
emergency preparedness and response; 88 percent would provide additional preparedness grants to local jurisdictions; 69 percent would conduct more state and
local exercises; and 61 percent would use funding for state and local NIMS compliance. (States were able to respond to multiple activities, as each state has multiple
emergency preparedness priorities.)
Last years Nationwide Plan Review Phase 2 Report completed by the Department
of Homeland Security found that current catastrophic planning is unsystematic and
not linked within a national planning system. The report cites that, This is incompatible with 21st century homeland security challenges, and reflects a systematic
problem: outmoded planning processes, products, and tools are primary contributors
to the inadequacy of catastrophic planning. The results of the Review support the
need for a fundamental modernization of our Nations planning process. The report
goes on to explain that all states do not adequately address special needs populations, continuity of operations, continuity of government, evacuation plans, and resource management. EMPG is the ONLY source of funding that can address these
significant and immediate needs. The current EMPG shortfall does not take into account these findings.
BUILDING OUR NATIONS MUTUAL AID SYSTEM THROUGH EMAC
The response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita resulted in the largest deployment
of interstate mutual aid in the nations history through the Emergency Management
Assistance Compact (EMAC). As mentioned previously, EMAC deployed personnel
comprised of multiple disciplines from all member states to respond to Louisiana,
Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, and Texas. The process enabled National Guard,
search and rescue teams, incident management teams, emergency operations center
support, building inspectors, law enforcement personnel, and other disciplines to immediately assist the requesting states in need of support. The National Guard even
chose to continue under EMAC when deployed under Title 32 because of the organization, liability protections, accountability, and tracking abilities EMAC provides.
EMAC was created after Hurricane Andrew by then-Florida Governor Lawton
Chiles. The system was developed through the member states of the Southern Governors Association to establish mechanisms to enable mutual aid among member
states in emergency situations. The Southern Regional Emergency Management Assistance Compact (SREMAC) was signed by participating Governors in 1993. Following recognition of SREMACs nationwide applicability by the National Governors
Association and FEMA, Congress enacted EMAC in 1996 (P.L. 104321). Currently
all 50 states, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia are
members of EMAC. EMAC requires member states to have an implementation plan
and to follow procedures outlined in the EMAC Operations Manual. EMAC takes
care of issues such as reimbursement, liability protections, and workers compensation issues.
The following is a synopsis of the historical support that the state of Florida provided to Mississippi in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the largest support mission in the history of EMAC. The State of Florida, acting under provisions of the
Emergency Management Assistance Compact and a direct request from the Governor of Mississippi, deployed a self-contained response team on the day of landfall
to the impacted coastal area of Mississippi (3 coastal counties of Hancock, Harrison,
and Jackson; 3 contiguous inland counties to the north consisting of Pearl River,
Stone, and George). By the evening of landfall on August 29, 2005 assets of law enforcement, firefighting, search and rescue, medical, Incident Management Teams,
and others were in the area of operations in coastal Mississippi performing lifesaving, safety, and security missions. Major logistical assets were sent to the area,
as well, to include ice, water, food, fuel, and other commodities to support initial
response operations. Due to the dire situation caused by Hurricane Katrina on the
Mississippi coast, the mission of the Florida Task Force grew significantly and commodities and personnel continued to flow from the State of Florida continuously
until the end of October 2005 (note: some smaller level missions continued with
Florida support up until November 2006). The Florida Task Force set-up a major
command and logistical staging area at Stennis Space Base which became the hub
of the operation. This command communicated with and supported Incident Management Teams from Florida which were located in the 6 assigned counties to support the local Mississippi Emergency Management Directors. In relation to this effort, it must be noted that the State of Florida had itself been impacted by Hurricane Katrina (a weaker storm at that time) prior to its passage into the Gulf of
Mexico. It is a tribute to the entire Florida State Emergency Response Team (state
and local government, private entities, faith based organizations, etc. . .) that they
were able to effectively rise to the challenge of responding to the South Florida im-
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pact of Hurricane Katrina while providing significant and necessary assistance to
our neighbors on the Gulf Coast.
Overview of EMAC Support to the State of Mississippi
COMMODITIES: (Purchased and provided by the State of Florida)
Water768 truckloads3,648,000 gals.
Ice457 truckloads19,194,000 lbs.
Juice16 trucks16,000 cases
Shelf Stable Meals138,000 meals
USDA commodities6,000 cases
Baby food, formula, etc.20,892 cases
Baby supplies (nipples, diapers, wipes)4,962 cases
Adult diapers, wipes376 cases
Children Liquid Supplement10,200 cases
Adult Liquid Supplement5,100 cases
1,304 State Trucks of Commodities
2,057 Trucks Total of Commodities
PERSONNEL and TEAMS:
6,404 Personnel Total
Three Area Command Teams with 115 personnel to manage entire area of responsibility of six counties
Six Incident Management Teams sent to County Emergency Operation Centers
Three Logistics Management Teams
Urban Search and Rescue Teams
Three Type I Teams
Four Type II Teams
Two Water Rescue Teams
One Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Coordination Team
767 Law Enforcement Personnel with vehicles and equipment
207 Fire Fighting Personnel
70 ALS Ambulances and EMS personnel
710 Medical Personnel in various disciplines
30 Elder Care Specialists
1 School Recovery Team
1 FDOT Advance Recon Team (10 personnel)
1 FDOT Bridge Recovery Team (7 personnel)
14 Public Information Officers
497 National Guard Personnel (also sent aircraft and equipment)
3 zodiac boats w/trailers
3 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs)
2 GSA vans
2 UH60 Black Hawk helicopters
1CH47 Chinook
4 Hazmat Teams (8 personnel)
14 Volunteer, Donations and Reception Center Personnel
13 Animal Control Teams (60 personnel)
1 State Animal Response Team (5 personnel)
16 Water/Wastewater Facility Teams (101 personnel)
4 Communications Personnel
38 Recovery Personnel
Continued support of EMAC will allow Florida to focus on the implementation of
lessons learned from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, such as training and education
for all mutual aid stakeholders, resource typing and credentialing, and information
and resource management.
ADDRESSING
TEMPORARY
DISASTER
HOUSING
PROGRAM
CHALLENGES
Housing is often seriously impacted following natural disasters, leaving many
families in the impacted areas with no place to call home. Disaster housing consists
of three phases:
1. The initial phase focuses on retaining citizens in the affected area and providing interim housing solutions for them.
2. The next phase focuses on rebuilding local housing resources.
3. The final phase deals directly with developing long-term redevelopment strategies.
Providing housing assistance following a disaster can not just be based on expiration dates and eviction dates; the focus must be on long term housing solutions for
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the affected area. Disaster case management of survivors that deals with the entire
scope of housing and human needs is necessary throughout all the phase to transition those affected from interim situations into longer term solutions. Typically in
a community where the ability to transition disaster survivors into permanent housing is problematic, there is usually an existing housing problem before the disaster
struck the community.
A disaster housing partnership between the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) and Housing and Urban Development (HUD) would provide a disaster housing solution that is more responsive, flexible and would provide a more
cost effective long term disaster housing solutions. Bringing HUDs financial resources and their subject matter expertise regarding building loans, subsidies and
land management into the fold early on in the disaster housing process, would
greatly improve an impacted communitys ability to recover and develop long-term
housing solutions and strategies. Additionally, HUD is capable of providing case
management experience for permanent solutions for affected citizens that will provide permanent solutions to local situations. Case management will result in accountability on all levels of disaster housing.
CONCLUSION
The first goal the State of Florida looks at when preparing for any sort of disaster
is how we can best serve our citizens. This goes back to my previous statement regarding the fact that all disasters are local and that all groups involved in responding to disasters must use a team approach, regardless of the type of disaster, to prepare for and respond to these events. This team approach is imperative when addressing the federal role in responding to disasters, it is important that the response
from the federal level is one of a supporting role for state and local emergency management, it cannot supplant these efforts.
Florida is successful and is looked to as a leader due to the fact that our leadership has invested in emergency management through the creation of the Florida
Hurricane Catastrophe Fund and Emergency Management Preparedness and Assistance Trust Fund. Additionally, the state has worked to develop strong partnerships that will ultimately insure the states success in affecting positive outcomes
for those impacted when a disaster occurs in our state. This type of investment was
on display recently when the Florida Legislature, based on Governor Crists budget
recommendations, approved an appropriation of $895,000 in the states FY 0708
budget to upgrade Floridas State Warning Point. The Florida State Warning Point
is a function of the Division of Emergency Management and is housed in the Emergency Operations Center. The Florida State Warning Point is responsible, through
Florida Statutes and federal regulations, to be the central clearing house for all
emergencies occurring in the State that require response by or resources from multicounty incidents, multi-State agency incidents or any incident requiring County/
State/Federal communications and/or coordination.
With the passage of the Post-Katrina FEMA Reform Act, Congress has affirmed
their support for ensuring preparedness for our nations continuous vulnerability
against all-hazards. We must continue to build national preparedness efforts with
a multi-hazard approach. We appreciate Congress increased attention and focus on
disaster preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation efforts. We ask that Congress look at ways to immediately influx the system with resources, encourage and
reward innovation in order to face the challenges of the day. We cannot afford to
continue to repeat history as we did with Hurricane Andrew and Hurricane Katrina.
We must, once and for all, learn the lessons of the past and resolve ourselves to
ensure that Federal, State and local governments have adequate funding for baseline emergency preparedness so exercises and training can ensure that plans and
systems are effective before a disaster.
Again, I appreciate the opportunity to testify before your committee today and
want to affirm Governor Crists dedication to continually working with our federal
partners to improve the nations capabilities to respond to all types of hazards that
our communities may face on a daily basis.William Craig Fugate, Director, Florida
Division of Emergency Management

We now will recognize Mr. Becker to summarize his statement
for 5 minutes.
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STATEMENT OF JOE BECKER, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT,
PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE, AMERICAN RED CROSS
NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS
Mr. BECKER. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of the

committee. My name is Joe Becker, and I lead the American Red
Crosss national disaster relief efforts. Thank you for your invitation to speak today.
I was asked to cover three topics: to review what the Red Cross
does for victims of disasters and what we dont do, to share the
steps that we have taken since Katrina, and to discuss our changed
role in the National Response Plan.
What we do in times of disaster for people? We shelter, we feed,
we distribute items that people need, the supplies that they would
need to get through the immediate next few days. We have learned
over the years that there are some supplies where it is difficult to
give the actual item?gas for a car or shoes where sizes matterand
we give some financial assistance so people can obtain those when
their economy recovers.
We provide mental-health counseling. We provide health services
with our nurses and shelters. We provide information to connect
families with lost loved ones, and we work in the longer-term recovery to help families plan and find resourcesour resources and
otherson their longer-term recovery.
What we dont do: We dont evacuate cities. That is a state and
local, particularly local, operation. We dont rescue people. That belongs in the first-response community.
We dont give everybody money who had a loss. We are not a
bank. We are not an insurance company. And we dont build
houses. There are others that do that very well.
You hear of the Red Cross charter to provide a national system
of disaster relief. That means we dont pick and choose which disasters we respond to. We dont think about if it is a big enough one,
that we will come, or if our people are available, or if we have
money in the bank. We respond regardless, to about 200 events a
day, around the country.
If the event is larger than the very small event, such as a multifamily fire, we will be joined by our usual key partners, mainly
faith-based groups. The Southern Baptists will be there to help
feed, Catholic Charities will often serve, Salvation Army would be
there to help feed.
If an event is much larger, or if there is an event that is very
visible in the news, we will be joined by many from the community,
and others who arrive to do good work, mostly faith-based groups,
some businesses and civic groups.
The challenge is for the local quarterback, the local emergency
manager, and whatever structure the community has, to incorporate their good works into a coordinated response. And how that
is done varies community by community.
What did the Red Cross learn from Katrina? I will give you a list
of key learnings. Briefly, we learned instead of moving our supplies
in ahead of a storm, it is better for us to expand our stockpile and
permanently keep them in risk areas. We learned where our systems need to be bigger, especially our systems to use untrained
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spontaneous volunteers, and to move large numbers of people
around the country to help.
A key learning, we learned where our relationships with community groups, particularly faith-based groups, were not as strong as
needed. These are nondisaster organizations who step forward in
a very large disaster and dont know how to plug into the system
and help. We learned which of these community groups, such as
churches, would step forward and didnt know how to get support,
and we learned how we can do that better.
We learned that we needed year-round staff to work with state
government in risk areas, and where we needed a larger team to
work with our federal partners. We learned where our infrastructure, particularly our IT infrastructure, was completely overwhelmed and had to be rebuilt post-Katrina. We learned where our
satellite communications system wasnt big enough, and where we
needed more redundancy.
In short, we learned about our capacity, and we learned about
our relationships, and we learned that we needed to grow both. We
had a large number of projects post-Katrina that just had to be
done by last hurricane season last year.
We gave ourselves 4 months to acquire 1.5 million square feet of
warehouse space, to put in those warehouses additional supplies to
shelter 500,000 people for a 6-day period of time, buying a half million cots, a half million blankets, and those related supplies. We
now have 6 million prepackaged meals ready to go.
We now have 21 cities in risk areas with permanent triple-redundant communications equipment along the coast, and we are adding more cities. We have hired full-time staff for 14 state emergency management offices, such as Mr. Fugates, and staff to work
with partner groups to help national partners, national organizations, become part of the disaster response. We redid our IT systems, and we did a lot of work on our supply chain.
Locally, our chapters have created new partnerships, especially
with faith-based groups, to enable the work, and we even worked
with about 100 national partners. A good example would be the
NAACP, where we trained over 1,000 of their members, and they
helped respond to the tornadoes in Florida and to Alabama and
Georgia.
You might also remember that our role in the National Response
Plan has changed recently. We have a separate team that supports
the federal structure in disaster. They help receive requests from
states for support items for mass care, and help the federal agencies fill those requests.
This team is very different from our operating team. It does not
direct our operating team. It takes information from the operating
team, and gives it to federal partners.
In the new construct, in the new National Response Plan, in a
key learning from Katrina, if you are going to be a primary agency
in the National Response Plan, you need to be able to help make
quick and decisive commitments of federal assets.
It is clear that the Red Cross cant commit federal resources. I
cant sign a contract on behalf of government for water or fuel to
appear. And now that ESF6 is growing to include evacuation plan-
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ning and pet planning, it is appropriate that a federal agency take
that role, and FEMA has agreed to do so.
The key point here is that there will be no change in our service
delivery on the ground. This is a separate team from the people
who feed and shelter and do those seven things that I described.
Are we ready? We are never ready enough. We have made big
strides with our people, in our supplies, in our plans, in our systems, but we work every day and we see the problems at county
level, we see the problems at state level, we see the problems in
our federal family. And we know there is much more to be done.
The Red Cross has learned a lot. We have done a lot, but we
have a lot more to do. Thank you very much.
[The statement of Mr. Becker follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT
OF
JOSEPH C. BECKER
Chairman Thompson, Congressman King, and Members of the Committee on

Homeland Security, thank you for providing me the opportunity to testify before you
today on this important topic: Hurricane Season 2007. I am pleased to inform the
Committee that we have made substantial improvements in our capacity to respond
to the challenges that may come our way.
I would like to start by recognizing the selection of Mark W. Everson as the next
president and chief executive officer of the American Red Cross. Many of you know
Mr. Everson, who has led the Internal Revenue Service for the past four years. We
at the American Red Cross are excited and encouraged about his selection and look
forward to him officially joining the organization on May 29.
I also want to take this opportunity to thank each of you for your support of H.R.
1681, the American National Red Cross Governance Modernization Act of 2007,
which was signed into law by President Bush on May 11. This legislation modernizes the governance structure of the American Red Cross and enhances the Red
Cross Board of Governors ability to support the critical mission of the Red Cross
in the 21st century.
In todays testimony, I will focus on the significant improvements made by the
American Red Cross since Hurricanes Katrina, Rita and Wilma devastated the Gulf
Coast during the 2005 hurricane season. I will also address recent changes to the
National Response Plan (NRP), in which the American Red Cross plays a significant
role.
About the American Red Cross
For more than 125 years, the American Red Cross has been our nations partner
in preventing, preparing for, and responding to disasters. Our past and present Congressional Charter mandates that the Red Cross maintain a domestic and international system of disaster relief. In fact, the Red Cross responds to more than
70,000 disasters each year, ranging from single family home fires to large scale hurricanes and tornadoes. In addition to family home fires and small scale events,
today the Red Cross has 39 large scale disaster operations in 26 states and the
Northern Mariana Islands, including the tornado that struck Kansas earlier this
month and our continuing work to support the tragedy at Virginia Tech.
The Red Cross must function at many levels and across multiple jurisdictions. It
is simultaneously a local responder, a state partner and a national organization. At
the local level, we provide immediate services: food, shelter, immediate and longerterm assistance, for people in all disasters ranging from home fires to large scale
disasters.
While the American Red Cross is the nations largest mass care provider, we are
not the only mass care provider. As an independent, nonprofit organization, we rely
on the generosity of the American people to provide services to victims of disasters.
We also rely on our partners, such as the Southern Baptists, the Salvation Army,
Catholic Charities, and the United Way, to provide their services in larger events.
Since Hurricane Katrina, the Red Cross has reached out to hundreds of organizations across the nation to ensure our partnerships are solid, to find mutual ways
of providing services during times of disasters, and to ensure that the gaps that existed in our response to Katrina are filled.
Hurricane Katrina
In August 2005, our nation awoke to the inconceivable wrath that was Hurricane
Katrina. Millions of people were immediately displaced. The sheer magnitude of
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Katrinas impact was unprecedented, and the American Red Cross, along with all
other response and human services organizations, was not prepared for the magnitude of the response required by such a disaster. In our planning, we failed to
think big enough.
Prior to Hurricane Katrina, the largest domestic events the Red Cross ever responded to were the 2004 hurricanesCharley, Frances, Ivan, and Jeannewhich
crisscrossed their way across the southeast. Our response to these storms easily surpassed anything done in prior disasters, such as Hurricane Andrew in 1992. After
those storms, we made significant strides to increase our feeding, sheltering, and
emergency assistance capacity.
Before Katrina made landfall, we enhanced local Red Cross chapter capacity with
supplies, emergency response vehicles (ERVs), kitchens, communications equipment,
and a first wave of almost two thousand additional volunteersa force that would
ultimately grow to 240,000 workers. But, for Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma,
this was not enough. The 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes were 20 times larger than our
previous largest disaster.
To say that the organization was stretched beyond capacity is an understatement.
Some shelters became exceptionally crowded, we were slow to reach some rural
areas, and when we gave emergency financial assistance our systems became overwhelmed. We responded by creating new systems utilizing our relationships with
some of the best and brightest in corporate America to give aid to people in need.
We also ramped up our workforce and trained tens of thousands of spontaneous volunteers who stepped up to help their neighbors.
It was not perfectit was far from perfectbut we were successful, with the help
of our partners, in getting the critical emergency aid to those who had nothing else
on a scale that was unprecedented.
Hurricane Katrina exposed systemic vulnerabilities for the Red Cross and governmental agencies that respond to disasters. Yet, by bringing them to light, we were
given the opportunity to identify them, fix them, and ensure that we are prepared
for future disasters that may lie ahead.
Lessons Learned and Improvements, 20052007
Mr. Chairman, I shared lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina in preparation
for the 2006 hurricane season with this Committee last June. While we were fortunate as a nation to have a relatively quiet hurricane season last year, that did not
give the Red Cross reason to delay our progress, it simply gave us time to do more
time to ensure that we rebuilt our systems right, and to create the necessary capacity.
Today, I welcome the opportunity to address two specific issues that might have
characterized the Red Cross in years past. The first is a cultural issue, the second
is capacity.
First our culture. The Red Cross had a history of acting as an insular organization too many times and in too many places. As the nations largest mass care provider, we have been successful in responding to disasters for more than a century.
On larger relief efforts, we have worked with key partners over the years, typically
faith based groups like the Southern Baptists and the Salvation Army. In very large
events, like Katrina, many new groups step forward, especially the faith community.
Our ability to work with these non-traditional disaster response organizations was
limited. While overwhelmed providing service, we had difficulty helping them become part of the community response. This was a hard, but valuable lesson for the
Red Cross to learn. In very, very large events, non disaster groups and new partners
come forward to serveand the Red Cross can take a lead role in helping them become part of the response.
Katrina also was a wake up call for the Red Cross that partnering in fact is important in all disasterssmall and medium ones, not just the catastrophes. Since
Katrina, the Red Cross at the national level and our more than 700 chapters nationwide have worked diligently to create and foster strong partnerships with many new
organizations that would typically not be in the disaster response business. From
faith groups and businesses to local civic organizations, our chapters have been
working with local community organizations to ensure that partnerships are in
place so that organizationsthat selflessly step up to help their neighborsknow
in advance how to access supplies, resources, and expertise. Through partnerships,
Red Cross chapters are providing training and supplies to community-based organizations to strengthen response efforts across the nation. If and when a disaster
strikes, these community-based organizations will be better prepared to assist in
their response efforts, and the Red Cross will be better prepared to identify and
reach out to people are that may need assistance. We have seen the benefit of working with these new partners in many significant responses over the last year. The
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Red Cross does not think or act alone. . .our commitment to partnerships is here
to stay.
The second area is capacity. The Red Cross has significantly increased the investment in our capacity to respond. Today, we have six million pre-packaged meals are
at the ready, and sheltering supplies, like blankets, cots, toiletry kits, and clean up
kits for up to a half million people are stored in warehouses spread along the coasts
and in other high risk areas.
For many years we had mobile communications vehicles, complete with interoperable satellite and redundant communications that we would roll in ahead of a storm.
Today we have 21 cities stocked with permanent satellite equipment along the Gulf
Coast, and are working to add more.
We have worked even more effectively with the state and federal governments as
well, hiring full-time Red Cross employees for 14 state emergency management offices, and for each of the FEMA regions. This is in addition to the employees we
have added to work with NGO partner groups to help coordinate relief efforts. We
have trained more than 165 government relations volunteers and have worked hard
to strengthen our relationship with FEMA, clarifying and redefining roles and responsibilities. We have increased our efforts to work with and accommodate people
with disabilities and continue to seek appropriate community partnerships to help
us serve other vulnerable communities. We have changed our information sharing
policies to allow transparency with other organizations and local law enforcement
while respecting client confidentially.
We also have added the following capacity:
A web-based shelter management application developed in conjunction with
FEMA and the Department of Homeland Security. This system has the ability
to track shelter inventory, facility survey data, and population counts of the
shelter population nationwide. Data on our 44,000 shelters is entered in the system.
Improvements to the Disaster Services Human Resources (DSHR) system to
track in real-time staff assigned to relief operations and strengthen the process
used for registering spontaneous volunteers. The DSHR system software has
also been modified to accommodate DSHR ID Smart Card technology. These improvements provide better information about our volunteers, their skills and
availability.
Addition of six on-staff disaster relief operation directors to provide leadership
to major relief operations as well as mentor and coach chapter and multi-chapter relief operation directors. This will improve the skill sets of administrators
and managers in the DSHR system.
Development of national partnerships that chapters can utilize at the local
level to engage underserved groups in their communities.
A Disaster Welfare Information system for chapters to provide safe and
well status information to the families and loved ones of disaster victims.
Response Center Network expansion for a group of chapters that staff the 1
866GETINFO line. We have 250 simultaneous workers in chapters nationwide supporting the information centers work.
An enhanced Volunteer Match Portal to help manage expectations of large
numbers of spontaneous volunteers and provide updated guidance.
All of this was completed by the beginning of the 2006 hurricane season. Since
last fall, we have worked to sharpen our planning, starting with the six of the highest disaster-risk regions of the country. Working with partner organizations, state
and local governments, and our federal partners, we have tried to quantify the
worst case catastrophic scenarios: (1) a hurricane hitting New York City; (2) a terrorist incident in Washington, D.C.; (3) a hurricane on the Carolina coast; (4) multiple hurricane strikes in the Gulf Coast; (5) an earthquake in southern California;
and (6) an earthquake in northern California. Taking these scenarios, we are asking
real-world questions. How many would need shelter and are we prepared to shelter
this many people? How many would need to be fed? How many would need to be
cared for? These numbers are daunting, Mr. Chairman, and the Red Crossand the
countryhave many challenges to be prepared to respond.
Changes to the National Response Plan
As you know, the American Red Cross role in the National Response Plan (NRP)
is evolving. This is the result of an expansion of responsibilities in Emergency Support Function (ESF) 6 (ESF6) and a change in the expectations of the role of the
Primary Agency.
Historically, the Red Cross role in the National Response Plan (and its predecessor, the Federal Response Plan) has been the primary agency for mass care, and
as a support agency for six other functions. In the primary role, the Red Cross has:
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Received, evaluated and forwarded State requests for mass care related support to FEMA for approval and fulfillment by the federal government in time
of disaster;
Assisted in federal planning efforts;
Participated in federal level planning for mass care; and
Provided liaisons to FEMA locations in support of ESF6 Mass Care activities.
Three years ago when the NRP was created, the American Red Cross assumed
the role of the only nongovernmental organization named as a primary agency in
an Emergency Support Function. We were very proud of this important role and approached it with the care and consideration necessary to serve in this function. Nevertheless, over the years, one of the lessons we learned is that this primary agency
role was never fully understood, and for good reason. The American Red Cross is
not a government agency, and we do not have, nor have we ever requested, the federal authority or ability to assign federal assets during times of disaster.
Additionally, our operation as a mass care sheltering service provider is separate
and distinct from our role in the NRP. We have a separate Red Cross NRP team
that supports the federal structure in disaster. This team receives requests from
states for mass care (feeding and sheltering) and helps the federal agencies determine how to best fill the requests. This team is very different from our service provider team operating on the ground running Red Cross shelters and feeding clientsthe Red Cross NRP team does not direct sheltering or other mass care services.
In the new NRP, currently being rewritten, the confusion regarding the Red Cross
roles as a federal surrogate and a NGO mass care services provider is eliminated.
It is imperative that the primary agency in the ESF needs to the authority to make
quick and decisive commitments of federal assets. As I stated above, the Red Cross
is not a federal agency, and does not have the authority to require or commit the
federal resources of several cabinet agencies. The Red Cross is very pleased with
the redesign of the NRP and its designation as a support agency.
For these reasons, and because of the expanded ESF6 role in the post-Katrina reforms implemented in the fiscal year 2007 DHS Appropriations bill, the American
Red Cross and FEMA have concurred that it is imperative that it is much more appropriate for FEMA to perform the federal role of primary agency. The Red Cross
will become a support agency under ESF6, and our support role for the other six
emergency support functions will continue unchanged. We participated significantly
in rewriting the NRP along with FEMA and other federal agencies. In the end, we
believe it is in the best interest of the American people for FEMA to perform the
federal governments role as the Primary Agency for all areas of ESF6. It has the
needed federal statutory authority to commit federal resources of other federal agencies and to ensure a unified command structure during operational response.
While our NRP status has changed, our operationsas a service providerhave
not. The American Red Cross and our partners, regardless of our role in the NRP,
will continue to provide shelter, feeding, bulk distribution, welfare inquiry, recovery
planning, emergency assistance, heath and mental health assistance, and long term
recovery.
Hurricane Season 2007
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I have outlined the steps the Red
Cross has taken to prepare for Hurricane Season 2007. We have made immense
strides in our supplies, plans, systems, and culture. We have learned that what was
unimaginable can, in fact, become reality.
While we have made significant improvements, the fact is that weand federal
government agenciescan never be ready enough.
There are significant national issues that still exist. The NRP is not complete.
While we applaud the work that FEMA, DHS and all the contributors have done
on the NRP, we need to have an operational plan complete.
We also need to see significant improvement in the areas of community and personal preparedness. The greatest defense to surviving a disaster is being prepared.
The American Red Cross works with individuals, communities, states and the federal government to help our nation and our citizens become prepared for any disaster that comes their way. Red Cross programs are configured to disaster risk, that
is, we design programs for individuals and families to prepare for natural disasters
that are conducive to their geographic areas. As we rely on the neighbor helping
neighbor philosophy, we encourage local communities to become more aware of potential hazards that could adversely impact their regions and prepare accordingly.
The Red Cross firmly believes in the importance of preparedness and has developed numerous tools and resources offered in a number of different languages to
help families prepare for any unexpected disasters, from a house fire to a hurricane.
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Over the past several years, organizations that help to prepare communities, as
well as local, state and federal governments, have made efforts to streamline our
messages on preparedness. We know that a single national message helps individuals better understand what they need to do to protect themselves and their loved
ones during times of disaster. It is important that all levels of government and the
Red Cross convey a unified message to the public on preparedness.
We encourage families and individuals across this country to Be Red Cross
Ready. Our campaign, which parallels the Department of Homeland Securitys
Ready Campaign, provides tools for individual households to take three important
steps: (1) Get a Kit; (2) Make a Plan; and (3) Be Informed.
Get a KitEvery household should have prepared and ready to go a disaster kit
that includes enough food and supplies to last each family member for three days.
This could be an old knapsack or backpack with water, basic first aid supplies, any
critical documents (such as photocopies of drivers licenses), necessary medicines, a
change of clothes, and a small amount of cash. This kit should be replenished as
necessary to ensure that food, water, and medicines are fresh. This should be the
one thing that anyone needing to leave in a hurry can grab to take with them. In
addition, families should consider any special needs, including those of loved ones
as well as their family pets.
Make a PlanThis plan should incorporate such things as where an individual
and their loved ones would go in the event of a disaster, how they would communicate with a friend or loved one to let someone know where they are and that they
are safe, particularly when critical infrastructure like phone lines are down. A good
family plan also considers the care of pets.
Be InformedGet information from either your local Red Cross chapter or another organization that offers critical trainings on making a disaster plan, a communications plan, and first aid/CPR. Knowing what to do during a time of disaster is
critical to ensuring ones safety and the safety of their loved ones.
Despite our collective efforts, there has not been a significant improvement in preparedness by individual households. We believe that Members of Congress could
have an impact on this by addressing their constituents on preparedness issues, and
partnering with organizations that promote disaster preparedness.
While we speak today of the upcoming hurricane season, other threats loom. One
threat that continues to merit careful planning and attention is the potential pandemic influenza. In this regard, I come today with a specific request. While the Red
Cross will be sharing vital family care information, providing a safe and adequate
blood supply, and helping to meet the needs of isolated or quarantined people, we
all know that our medical facilities will be overwhelmed. The medical community
will turn to the Red Cross and other organizations for volunteers to help in overflow
facilities. There is great risk in asking for volunteers to serve in support roles for
those providing medical care, particularly in temporary facilities full of contagious
people.
Our efforts on behalf of the Red Cross and other volunteers throughout the United
States, their families and organizations to extend federal protections to them have
been met with no success to date. We need strong health care protections for our
volunteers, either through appropriate amendments to the Federal Volunteer Protection Act or new legislation that affords liability and benefits protections to volunteers who are placed in harms way. We ask your help here. America will need volunteers to help in medical situations. I encourage this Congress to act while we still
have time.
Conclusion
Mr. Chairman, Congressman King, and Members of the Committee, thank you
again for the opportunity to provide testimony on Red Cross improvements leading
up to the 2007 hurricane season. We want to assure you, and the American people,
that you can rely on the American Red Cross to be there whenever, wherever disaster strikes.
I am happy to address any questions you may have.

What I would like to do to start the questioning, Mr. Jenkins, in
your analysis of FEMA, can you capsule what you think, postKatrina, what you have seen FEMA do that is their politics, and
what items if any that cause you pause with respect to FEMA not
being up to what you would consider an acceptable standard?
Mr. JENKINS. Well, as Mr. Paulison pointed out in his testimony
earlier, there is a number of things that FEMA has done in each
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of the areas that I mentioned in terms of situational awareness,
where they now have teams that go out, they have automated
trucks with capacity to do that.
There is the same thing with regard to assistance. They have got
now a greater capacity to do that, and a capacity to be able to do
that in a way that also tries to identify duplicates and fraudulent
applications. So in each of those areas that I mentioned, they have
taken positive steps.
I think with regard to logistics, they have a long way to go. They
can now, as you point out, track trucks that leave from two of their
principal warehouses, but they still have quite a bit to go in terms
of how they are going to refine what their requirements are and
work with the private sector in that area.
They recognize that it is a multiyear effort, that they are not
going to have that implemented for this hurricane season. They
really just need to revamp that system from A to Z, and they are
working on that.
The thing that I think I am a little bit concerned about is, I
think it is important that if in this hurricane season, the new NRP
comes in places he suggested in late June, it is whether or not you
really want to try to implement that plan, that new plan, in the
midst of the hurricane season?
Or do you want to go with what you have got, where that is what
you have trained on, that is what people understand their roles
and responsibilities are. They are not trained in the new system,
whatever it might be? And so, I think that is one question as to
whether or not you want to do that.
I think it is also important that there be a clear understanding
of the roles of the FCO and PFO, and that is not always clear.
Under the existing NRP, the secretary of homeland security can
appoint a single individual to serve as PFO and FO except in the
case of terrorist events, and the reason for that exception is not
clear in the NRP.
But it is, in our view, probably better that that particular person,
one person, serve both roles, as opposed to having it in two roles.
It definitely provides clearer lines of communication and authority.
There is, at least, by having them predesignated, however, that
these positionsnow being predesignated for three regions and two
statesthere is an opportunity for both the FCO and the PFO to
meet with state and local counterparts so that there can be a better
discussion of what their roles would be, how they would interact
with the states, what their individual roles would be in terms of
the federal response. But that is an area of concern for us.
I think the other thing is that FEMA has put a lot of things into
place that potentially are certainly much better than Katrina was.
I think the real issue that we have is the extent to which these initiatives can actually be successfully deployed and implemented on
a very large-scale basis, like a hurricane IV or V strength.
Chairman THOMPSON. Well, I am glad you mentioned that. Mr.
Paulison talked about a hurricane V scenario for Florida, Mr.
Fugate. And part of that, phase one, focused on developing a regional response and recovery in the counties around Lake Okeechobee. Are you familiar with that scenario?
Mr. FUGATE. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. It was at my request.
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Last year, the Army Corps of Engineers responded to Governor
Bush, who had asked for a review of the dike, came back with the
water management district with concerns that the dike may have
a higher percentage chance of failure in certain scenarios. That was
not something we had previously planned for.
So we approached Director Paulison. We knew they were looking
to do catastrophic planning in South Florida, and said, as a part
of that, can we first look at Lake Okeechobee, and what would happen if we had a dike failure there, all along those very small rural
communities, and lack of resources.
So we began there. We are going to shift that focus, as we have
completed that planning, into South Florida. And much of what we
are looking at is building upon the system that is already in place
in Florida, with the state and locals.
Again, our critical issue is not what many people are talking
about. Quite honestly, sir, the National Response Plan doesnt respond. People do.
Here is the challenge I want to talk about: We look at a Category
V hurricane hitting South Florida, similar to the Great Miami Hurricane that actually hit in 1926. Based upon todays population,
that would result in losing over 300,000 housing units in less than
24 hours in a band that will stretch from the Miami-Dade-Broward
County line all the way through Tampa.
I have yet to hear anything in the National Response Plan, or
anything that is being proposed in the Katrina after-action reports,
that tells me how we are going to house 300,000 familiesclose to
1,000,000 peoplewithout having to disperse them all over this
country.
Those are the kind of challenges, when we talk about catastrophic planning, we are trying to get down to, not who is on first
base or who is in charge. We knew that in Florida the day our constitution got written. It is the governor of the state of Florida and
the local official declares the emergency.
Chairman THOMPSON. And I appreciate this line of discussion.
Have you shared any of your concerns with anyone at FEMA, or
anything of this nature?
Mr. FUGATE. Yes, sir, and that is part of why we were very fortunate to receive that catastrophic planning. Our primary emphasis,
as we move into the South Florida areas, will be, again, looking at
our existing plans for evacuation response, but really starting to
challenge some of these things that we dont have answers for.
In Florida, we have moved millions of people in hurricanes. We
have responded after disasters, but there are some challenges that
we have yet to see the impacts of what people term catastrophic.
I tend to still term that a major disaster, but what happens when
you have the challenges of housing loss of that nature, based upon
not theoretical, but actual hurricanes that have hit and applied to
todays population.
Chairman THOMPSON. And I think part of what we saw with
Katrinaeven though we had a scenario run before Katrinait
was whether or not we knew what the outcome would be.
But we did not prepare for the impact on the population, so we
saw that dispersal of people, and to some degree, the abandonment
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of quite a few. But we knew the physical damage, but it was the
human aspect of it that was not included.
And we will probably come back to another round. I see my time
has expired.
I yield to the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Bilirakis.
Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it very
much. And I want to thank you for calling us back. This is really
important, and I am glad you extended the time. I appreciate it
very much.
And thank you for your patience, panel.
And I love these recesses, because my seniority increases every
time we come backclimb the ladder of seniority.
Director Fugate, I would like to thank you for testifying, of
course, before this committee. The state of Florida has been the national leader in disaster prevention and response.
I know I am a little biased, but I think it is true. Mississippi
doesnt do bad either. I want to thank you for your years of service
in making our state a national standard, and under, as you said,
Governor Chiles first, Governor Bush, and now Governor Crist.
Maybe you can elaborate on this, but what do you attribute Floridas success to? I know you touched upon it, but if you can elaborate, we would appreciate it.
Mr. FUGATE. I appreciate the question. And again, I think it is
the leadership that our governors have given us. But more importantly, it is the fact we learned we had to be a team.
Mr. Chairman, I am looking around me, and you have got two
government officials and the Red Cross. That is not the team. We
dont have the private sector here. For a long time, when we talked
about volunteers, we only talked about the Red Cross. We left the
faith-based off the table.
When we talk about disasters and building a team, it has to be
all levels of government as partners. And partners mean you bring
something to the table. You just dont hand your hand out and say,
Give me something.
It means that we have to have our volunteers, and all of our volunteers, both those that deal with disasters as a primary, to those
that step forward with resources that may be emergent during an
emergency. You cant say no when you need the help.
But following the other leg of that stool is the private sector. We
oftentimes find ourselves competing and duplicating with our private sector when what we really should be doing in many disasters
is not ordering up more ice and water, but spending more time
thinking about how we get those local retailers back on line, so
FEMAs disaster assistance can go to people and they can go out
and take care of themselves.
And again, when you talk about building a team, it has to be
something that is not seen as a local issue, a state issue, or a federal issue. It cannot be seen as government solution or volunteer
solutions. You have to look at what works in a community on a
day-to-day basis, and look at those elements.
And from that, that is how you build a team. And the focus is
always going to be on our citizens we serve. But without the private sector, without the volunteers, government is one leg of a broken stool. That was the lesson of Hurricane Andrew.
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Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you, appreciate that. Again, Director
Fugate, would you also address the National Guard issue, if you
would like, with regard to readiness to respond to a natural disaster?
Mr. FUGATE. Yes, sir.
Again, Mr. Chairman, in the state of Florida, we currently have
more National Guardsmen back in Florida with more equipment
than we had in the 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons. Throughout
all of the response to the world terrorism and to the deployments,
we had more National Guardsmen available for deployment than
we had deployed at any time during Hurricane Andrew.
I think there is a clear distinction between the warfighting mission and the long-term impacts on the Guard to carry out that federal mission at the expense of training and equipment. But in the
short term, the disaster response in Florida has not been compromised.
We use our Emergency Management Assistance Compact very effectively. I currently have authorized, and we have EMAC missions
from the state of Georgia and South Carolina supporting us with
firefighting helicopters fighting fires. Those are the types of things
we do every day to get ready for disasters, and I think it is the way
to multiply and maximize our forces.
But I do think long term, the nation needs to look at the role of
the National Guard in the federal mission, and how do you keep
them equipped and trained for the long term. But I am not concerned about the ability of the Florida National Guard to support
Governor Crist and the team this hurricane season.
Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you. Unfortunately, we have been seeing
numerous disasters have plagued our country. Tornadoes, floods,
and recently, wildfires have caused millions of dollars in damage
and tragically, have taken lives. Do you believe that the standards
outlined in EMAC need to be revised to ensure the states are best
prepared for these disasters?
Mr. FUGATE. Well, I think in our process that we are using, the
thing that we lose sight of when we talk about disasters are local
is, we always look at the communitys impact. And we forget about
the communities nearby that werent impacted, and the states that
werent impacted.
Our ability to leverage our responders in those communities is
our biggest force multiplier. They will bring more to the table faster than any federal program or any state program. And so, as we
continue to enhance and develop our Emergency Management Assistance Compact, we have asked for is the National Emergency
Management Association funding to support that.
Again, our goal is, dont leave the resources of this nation off the
table just because they are not part of the federal or state response.
And to do that effectively, we have to have a system across state
lines, get into the areas and serve citizens without the paperwork
becoming so burdensome that it stops a response.
Mr. BILIRAKIS. Okay, thank you. I know I have got 10 more seconds.
Quickly, any additional suggestions you may have, how the federal government can help out the states?
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Mr. FUGATE. Yes, sir. We have got to stop responding to disasters
as our only course of saving the taxpayers dollars and saving lives,
and start mitigating them before they happen. Most of these disasters are well known. The hazards are well known.
And we have a backwards system of dealing with disasters. We
spend billions of dollars after a disaster fixing what would have
cost hundreds of millions to fix beforehand, at the loss of life and
misery that is unimaginable.
I think again, because of our priorities, we need to go back and
look at how do we get citizens to take greater ownership of mitigating their homes, protecting their families, so they are not a burden to you and me when disaster strikes, but we have given them
the tools to make their homes safer and protect their family.
Mr. BILIRAKIS. Very good. I have a couple of suggestions.
Thank you very much, appreciate it.
We have been joined by the gentleman from Colorado for 5 minutes. Mr. Perlmutter?
Mr. PERLMUTTER. Thanks, Mr. Chair.
And Mr. Fugate, I think the comments you made right at the end
is just so on the mark. We can always findwhether it is in business or something elseyou can always find time when the car
breaks down to take it to the shop and get it fixed, most of the time
you can.
And it takes much more time and it takes a lot more in dollars
if you just spend a few bucks early on to prevent it, you have saved
yourself the time and the money. And we always kind of forget
that. And the same thing applies on a much grander scale when
it comes to disasters.
But I want to go back to the National Guard piece, because you
heard my questions earlier, I assume, of Mr. Paulison. So, I am
looking at your testimony, and I apologize, I didnt hear all of you
testimony. But it says that you deployed 497 National Guard personnel to Mississippi during Katrina?
Mr. PERLMUTTER. Did you deploy any to Louisiana?
Mr. FUGATE. No, sir we did not deploy battalion strength. We
provided technical advisor and aircraft to the request we got from
Louisiana.
Mr. PERLMUTTER. Did you retain National Guardsmen and
women in Florida at the same time you deployed to Mississippi?
Mr. FUGATE. Oh, yes, sir. We probably had about 8,000 Guardsmen available. In fact, we were faced with a couple of tropical
storms and hurricanes during that deployment. It did not result in
us having to back off our support to the states when we were facing
other threats, not as severe, of course. And then we were able to
respond full speed to Hurricane Wilma with many of the folks that
had rotated back out of Mississippi when they had been released.
Mr. PERLMUTTER. So you maintained some in Florida, just in
case something bad happened in Florida, but you were able to send
some to Mississippi to assist them?
Mr. FUGATE. Yes, sir. And also, understand that over 7,000 responders went from Florida to the National Guard. In many cases,
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the majority of the resources that came from other states under
EMAC were National Guard.
In the state of Florida, that was actually local governments. Over
half those responders came from local governments through mutual
aid and EMAC. So again, we were able to reach out to all our resources, including the National Guard, and still be ready in Florida
for other disasters.
Mr. PERLMUTTER. Do you know how many in total, in terms of
the National Guard, were deployed to either Mississippi or Louisiana during Katrina?
Mr. FUGATE. No, sir. I believe you can get that information from
General Blum, commander of the National Guard Bureau. It was
in the tens of thousands. I want to say in testimonyI dont want
to guessbut it was in the tens of thousands. He can give you the
best number. And they were coordinated under the Emergency
Management Assistance Compact.
Mr. PERLMUTTER. Do you know whetherand again, this may be
outside of your purview, but how manyyou said in Florida today,
you have more Guardsmen available than you did in 20042005?
Mr. PERLMUTTER. Do you know how many in Florida have been
deployed today to Iraq?
Mr. FUGATE. Actually, sir, the Florida National Guard, in the
war on terror, had been deployed. We had one full brigade. The
53rd Infantry Brigade was deployed to Afghanistan. We have units
that have been deployed to Iraq as well as to Africa, and also Bosnia.
So our Florida National Guard has pretty much been everywhere
in this world that our Department of Defense has called upon
them. I can ask General Burnett to provide that information. But
the Florida National Guard has been in a lot of countries and a lot
of wars since the September 11 attack.
Mr. PERLMUTTER. But today, do you know how many, actually
from Florida, are deployed outside of Florida to another country?
I assume that you dont have anybody deployed to any other state
today?
Mr. FUGATE. No, sir. We actually have other states deployed to
us fighting fires today. One of our main?
Mr. PERLMUTTER. Why?
Mr. FUGATE. The helicopters that fly the firefighting mission, the
Florida National Guard does not haveas organic to their missionsufficient platforms. So it is not an issue of the war on terror
or any other war. It is actually that we dont have that many
Blackhawks, so when we are fighting wildfires, we routinelyand
this is well before September 11reach out to our neighboring
states for more rotary wing.
We had more air defense units, most of our infantry-type units.
We did not have a lot of aviation assets. So, we used the Emergency Management Assistance Compact, which we have been using
since I have been in the division back in 1997, to access those National Guards that have particular units that we did not have. And
that gives us the ability to reach out.
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Mr. PERLMUTTER. All right, because I just want to understand
the system. So the system, what you have in place, basically it is
a national system?
Mr. PERLMUTTER. If you dont have the Blackhawks, they come
in from New York City, or someplace like that, who might have
them. Some National Guard will be deployed to Florida when
called upon, or from Colorado or wherever?
Mr. PERLMUTTER. Let me go back to my other question. My other
question was, from Florida today, how many units, if you know,
have been deployed outside of the United States?
Mr. FUGATE. I would have to defer to General Burnett. I know
we just got back one of our combat engineering unitsthe Red
Horse came back. I think that our Special Forces just came back.
And so, the last count I got, was we actually had our highest number of troops back since we actually engaged in the airport security
missions right after September 11.
Mr. PERLMUTTER. Thank you. I do have one more question, if I
could, Mr. Chairman. When they return, are they bringing their
equipment, or are they leaving some or all of it in Iraq, or wherever it was they were deployed outside the country?
Mr. FUGATE. By and large, when they deploy their equipment,
they dont come back with their equipment. But we have been successful in getting equipment moved back into Florida, and releveling those units.
I think our primary concern isnt being able to respond to disasters in Florida. I think it is the longer-term issue of the federal
mission, of the equipment and training that will be a deficit for the
National Guard, but from what we see in Florida, is not an immediate threat to our ability to respond to disasters, particularly this
hurricane season.
But I think it is nationally a long-term concern that we dont
equip the National Guard for their federal mission, particularly in
the training, as we go in the out years without this equipment.
Mr. PERLMUTTER. Thank you very much.
And I think we will do another round, since we only have these
members present.
Mr. Becker, you referenced some operating agreements that you
have in place, you said Catholic Charities, Southern Baptist Convention, and Salvation Army. Now, those are three agreements you
have?
Mr. BECKER. On a national level, we have about 130 agreements
with national partners. Those are the partners that we know are
going to respond on a larger-scale disaster. A lot of our other partnerships are with the types of partners that Mr. Fugate was referring to. They are not necessarily disaster organizations, but they
have great resources that the country needs in time of disaster.
Chairman THOMPSON. What I am trying to get at is, are you
talking about Tier 1 operating agreements with those three organizations that I talked about? Are all operating agreements the
same?
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Mr. BECKER. We specify what each party can expect of the other,
and what we think they will bring in a disaster, and what they can
expect from us in terms of support. But I think what is important
here is, when it is a very small disaster, when there is going to be
six houses burnt tonight in the Capital area, the Red Cross will be
there at 2 in the morning with our volunteers.
If the disaster is a little bit bigger than that, a small flood or a
tornado, the Salvation Army will most likely be there, Southern
Baptists would most likely be there. And we work nationally and
locally with them. It is a well-oiled machine.
That part worked during Katrina. What didnt work during
Katrina was the local faith-based groups in particular, who stepped
forward and said, I have got a kitchen, or I will be a shelter,
and it was a pastor and a key and an empty building.
And after 2 or 3 days, they fatigued. They didnt know where to
get supplies, they didnt know where to get help. And the local
emergency management didnt know they were there, didnt know
they needed law enforcement, didnt know they needed infrastructure.
What we have done in our local chapters is ask the community,
in a common structure, to say who will be willing to step forward.
And we have sought out partners, partners in hard-to-serve locations, maybe very rural areas, that speak specific languages that
we dont have a competence in. So those are local partnerships
Chairman THOMPSON. Not to cut you off, but let me tell you personal experience, what happened to me. A number of those individuals came to offer help, and was rejected, turned away. They said
that you were not qualified to serve as a volunteer in time
Many of them were people in the faith community. And I am of
the opinion that that is not the time to turn help away. Now, I am
glad to hear that you indicate that that is not the case any more.
But you have not changed the national operating agreement.
One other issue is that in many instances, like in New Orleans
and areas where there is a high percentage of minority populations, you dont have an operating agreement that provides reimbursement for expenditures, to my knowledge. Now, I stand corrected. But you called three organizations.
One of the problems associated with Katrina is, you could not get
individuals to go into the impacted areas for quite some time, fear
of harm or what have you. So a number of people suffered because
of that.
Now, other than the three groups I identified based on your testimony, you talked about NAACP and some other groups. But that
is down the line. Southern Baptist Convention, wonderful group,
but they are not the only religion in America. Catholic Charities is
another, but there are a number of other faith groups that ought
to have a similar operating agreement with the Red Cross. Now,
are you saying that they do have one?
Mr. BECKER. Yes sir, Mr. Chairman. We have operating agreements, particularly with churches, where we will train them ahead
of time, we will give them access to our supplies, our cots and our
blankets, and we will pay their expenses if they are feeding or if
they are sheltering or doing our core work. That is new since
Katrina.
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Chairman THOMPSON. What I would like for you to do for the
committee, and I appreciate you, because that was one of the difficultiesa number of churches offered shelter. They were told,
You are not a qualified shelter.
I had an armory in my district that offered shelter. They were
told, You are not a qualified shelter, even though they housed
men and women who served us every day. So I would hope that
we have bridged the Red Cross bureaucracy, and moved it into the
service bureaucracy for the community, because that was one of the
major criticisms we heard all along. But I would like for you to get
me the new list of people you have operating agreements with.
Mr. BECKER. Mr. Chairman, just to address the one issue you
raised, we need to be clear about who designates a shelter, who declares a building to be a shelter. The local emergency manager
would declare a public building to be a shelter.
The Red Cross just cant show up and take over a school and say,
We are here and we are going to run a shelter. We have about
40,000 shelters in our Red Cross system. We dont own those buildings.
Those are typically high school gyms, and the ones that are
churches now would be typically outside the emergency management system. And that is where we can reimburse, that is where
we can enter into those types of agreements.
Chairman THOMPSON. Well, what I am of the opinion is that my
experience with the Red Cross and the state of Mississippi in trying to get an armory that had a full kitchen, full bathrooms, showers, cots, mattresses, air conditioning, everything you would need,
the Red Cross personnel said, This is not an approved shelter for
us. Do you understand?
Mr. BECKER. Thank you. I would like to look into that, if I can.
Chairman THOMPSON. Greenwood, Mississippi.
I yield to Ranking Member.
Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it very
much. And thanks for bringing that up, too, on the shelters.
Mr. Fugate, following up on your comments regarding the private
sector as an equal partner in disaster preparedness and response,
will you please discuss how Florida encourages the private sector
to participate before, during, and after a disaster?
Mr. FUGATE. Yes, sir. After the Hurricane Wilma response, we
realized that in many cases, we were handing out food, water, and
ice in front of an open store, oftentimes within hours to a day after
the storm had hit. Didnt make sense to us, didnt make sense to
them why we were competing.
So we had individual meetings with all of our major retailers in
the grocery and in the hardware chains, and sat down. And the
first question we began asking was, how they could do more of our
job?
We realized very quickly we asked the wrong question. The question should have been, what can we do to get them open? Because
when you can get the private sector back open in a disaster area,
you put people back to work, you jump-start the economy, and they
are much more effective with their already existing logistical
chains to meet demand.
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We then can focus on our more vulnerable citizens in those areas
the retailers dont serve, which if we go back to Hurricane Wilma,
we should not have been setting up in front of an open grocery
store. We should have been in Belle Glade and Pahokee, where
there were no stores, and where our most vulnerable citizens were
at.
Because quite honestly, the other thing we never talk about in
disasters is, who is the most vulnerable in this nation? And it is
generally the poor. Poverty is the most underestimated impact in
trying to deal with disasters, because without resources ahead of
time, they are not prepared.
They end up in these programs the most vulnerable. The programs were never designed to fit them. And they are the ones that
much later, we find, that are still in need, and there are still challenges.
So we said we should be focusing on those folks, our most vulnerable citizens, and support, and asked a question of how do we get
our retailers back up faster, so they can serve the rest of us?those
of us that can afford to go get our food, water, and ice after a disaster?so that government and volunteer agencies can focus on our
most vulnerable citizens.
Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you very much.
And I yield back the balance of my time, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it.
Mr. GREEN. [Presiding.] Thank you very much.
Mr. Perlmutter is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. PERLMUTTER. Thanks, Mr. Chair.
And Mr. Jenkins, I would like to ask you a couple questions
about the quotation that I read to Mr. Paulison, where it says:
Thus it is difficult to assess the probable results of these initiatives in improving response to major catastrophic disasters, such as
a category IV or V hurricane.
Can you explain what you meant by that sentence, and how you
came to that conclusion that you are concerned there is not a good
plan in place, or I dont know what it is you are saying. Let me
just ask you what you meant by that sentence.
Mr. JENKINS. Well, it is not so much that there is not a good plan
in place. FEMA has taken certain actions. Let me just give you an
example.
They had a major problem in Hurricane Katrina registering people for individual assistance. If you registered by Internet, they
could then check for duplicates and check your address, and so
forth. If you registered by telephone, they couldnt, and a lot of people that registered by telephone who were not eligible or made multiple applications.
They now say that they can register up to 200,000 people a day
with their system, and that they have the ability to check addresses and make sure that those addresses are correct. And the question that we have is it has never been tested for 200,000 people a
day.
In other words, it has never been stressed to that point, and it
is not clear what would happen, and what kind of contingency plan
they have if that system goes down, for being able to register people.
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There is another issue, is a particular file they are using to check
addresses is a file that very often election officials use, and it has
one particular flaw. And that is that it tries to identify residential
addresses, but in that particular file, if you live above your business, the address may be shown to be a business address, not a
residential address.
And therefore, you might not be able to register, because it
doesnt show that this was a residential address. So it is those kind
of issues that we are concerned about.
Mr. PERLMUTTER. In the next paragraph, you talk about the National Guard, and you say, The National Guard needs to respond
to large-scale disasters that have not been fully identified because
the multiple federal and state agenciessuch events have not completed and integrated their plans.
I mean, when you put together your report, what kind of research did you do into the National Guards part of any disaster
response?
Mr. JENKINS. Well, this particular paragraph is actually a very
high-level summary of a much more detailed report that we issued
on the National Guard and domestic preparedness in January.
And that did look at the equipment that the Guard had, how
they were determining what equipment was needed for their domestic missions, what kind of equipment they had, how DOD was
assessing their role in domestic missions.
As we point out in that report that DOD doesnt routinely measure the readiness of the Guard for domestic missions. So this is a
high summary of a much more detailed report which I can send
you that was issued in January of this year.
Mr. PERLMUTTER. Yes, I would appreciate it if you would send
me a copy of that, please.
No further questions, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. GREEN. Thank you.
And I will now recognize myself for 5 minutes. I am the acting
chair, as you can see.
And Chairman Thompson made a salient point that I would like
to revisit just for a moment, if I may. He talked to you about the
relationship between the Red Cross and what I would call other
NGOs.
And I assure you, I was not in his district, so I have no idea as
to what was said, other than what I heard him say. But I heard
similar comments in my district, and I want to help improve the
image that has been somewhat tarnished because of what happened in the aftermath of Katrina.
So my first question to you is this: What is the most important
thing that you have done since Katrina to help you become
proactive as opposed to reactive with reference to your emergency
response?
Mr. BECKER. You are referring to the partnerships or to our capacity to respond in general?
Mr. GREEN. Capacity to respond as well as partnerships.
Mr. BECKER. I would say one of the most significant things we
have done is, rather than roll resources to a hurricane area ahead
of the stormwhich we have done in the past, and prepositioned
items as the storm is coming.
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We now have every state, from here to Texas along the coast,
with at least one prepositioned warehouse with what it takes to
shelter 500,000 people for a 6-day period of time. To have the supplies already in the affected area helps us, because we had problems moving items into the affected areas and through the affected
areas post-Katrina.
I would say of all the action we took, and there were 40-something projects that we undertook before last hurricane season, that
was probably the most significant, to have our capacity there before
the storm, to have it there year-round.
Mr. GREEN. And with reference to the NGOs other than yourself,
your entity?
Mr. BECKER. I would say the most powerful thing that we have
done is to enable each of our chapters to work within their communities on those right relationships, and give them ability to bring
resources and money to the table, to the conversation.
When we go to a church and say Would you like to help this
community in time of disaster?, the answer is typically, Well, call
us when the big one hits and we will come if we can. And we need
to do better than that.
And what we are trying to do is to work with the faith community in particular and say, Would you help the Red Cross, would
you be part of this communitys disaster response? And if you will,
we will give you the training you need so that you can run the
Church X shelter when they have the shelter manager and the
shelter workers and your supplies.
We will train you, we will give access to our supplies. We will
give you our cots. And then more importantly, what they really
wanted to know is, Will you pay my bills at the end of all of this?
Mr. GREEN. How is this message being conveyed to the masses?
Mr. BECKER. I am sorry?
Mr. GREEN. The masses. How is this message penetrating to the
entities that you desire to impact?
Mr. BECKER. What we ask our chapters to do is to look strategically at the community and see who the right partners would be.
Some of it is about geography. Where are we slower to get to because it is very rural, or very far away from where our volunteers
are?
Some of it is demographic. It is language, it is parts of town that
were slower to respond to, or where do we not look like the people
we are saving. So it is asking our chapters to reach out and form
those right partnerships now and ahead of time, as we have done
on the national level.
And then I mentioned before, we have about 130 national partnerships, and some of these are with organizations that arent disaster responders. We trained 1,000 members of the NAACP, and
resourced them. They responded in the Daytona area to tornadoes.
They responded to Alabama with us. They responded to Georgia
with us. They were doing mass care work, but they were representing the NAACP, not the American Red Cross. We all think
that was a significant improvement.
Mr. GREEN. Thank you. Permit me to ask Mr. Jenkins a question
if I may, sir. Mr. Jenkins, sir, with reference to the National Guard
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and your survey, do you have a comparison between when we were
at our peak of readiness at home, as opposed to where we are now?
Mr. JENKINS. The survey that we did really wasnt designed to
do that. What we did is, we asked the various National Guard bureaus what kind of equipment they had, and what they thought
their inventory was compared to what they needed, in other words,
if you have 40 percent, 50 percent, or whatever.
But the survey wasnt really framed in terms of peak readiness
versus current readiness. It was like, what equipment do you have
and what kind of shortages do you have?
Mr. GREEN. Thank you. My time has expired.
Does Mr. Perlmutter have any additional questions?
Mr. PERLMUTTER. No, sir.
Mr. GREEN. All right. Well, we would like to thank all of the witnesses for your valuable testimony today, and the members for
their questions.
The members of the committee may have additional questions for
you, and we will ask that you respond expeditiously to their questions in writing, of course.
And the hearing is going to be adjourned, given that there is no
further business. And I am instructed to strike the gavel.
Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 4:47 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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Appendix I: Enhanced Capabilities for

Catastrophic Response and Recovery
Numerous reports and our own work suggest that the substantial resources and
capabilities marshaled by state, local, and federal governments and nongovernmental organizations were insufficient to meet the immediate challenges posed by
the unprecedented degree of damage and the number of victims caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Developing the capabilities needed for catastrophic disasters should be part of an overall national preparedness effort that is designed to integrate and define what needs to be done and where, how, and how well it should
be donethat is, according to what standards. The principal national documents designed to address each of these are, respectively, the NRP, NIMS, and the NPGs.
The nations experience with Hurricanes Katrina and Rita reinforces some of the
questions surrounding the adequacy of capabilities in the context of a catastrophic
disasterparticularly in the areas of (1) situational assessment and awareness, (2)
emergency communications, (3) evacuations, (4) search and rescue, (5) logistics, and
(6) mass care and sheltering.
FEMA is taking actions to address identified deficiencies in each of these areas.
Examples include designating national and regional situational awareness teams;
acquiring and deploying mobile satellite communications trucks; developing an electronic system for receiving and tracking the status of requests for assistance and
supplies; acquiring GPS equipment for tracking the location of supplies on route to
areas of need; and working with the Red Cross and others to clarify roles and responsibilities for mass care, housing, and human services. This appendix provides
additional details of FEMAs actions in each of these areas.
FEMA Taking Steps to Improve Situational Assessment Capabilities
One of the critical capabilities that FEMA is working to improve is their situational assessment and awareness. FEMA is developing a concept for rapidly
deployable interagency incident management teams, at this time called National Incident Management Team, to provide a forward federal presence to facilitate managing the national response for catastrophic incidents. FEMA is planning to establish three national-level teams and ten regional-level teams, one in each of the ten
FEMA regions. These teams will support efforts to meet the emergent needs during
disasters such as the capability to provide initial situational awareness for decisionmakers and support the initial establishment of a unified command. According to
FEMAs plans, these teams will have a multi-agency composition to ensure that the
multi-disciplinary requirements of emergency management are met. The teams are
envisioned to have the capability to establish an effective federal presence within
12-hours of notification, to support the state, to coordinate federal activities, and to
be self sufficient for a minimum of 48-hours so as not to be a drain on potentially
scarce local resources. National-level and regional-level teams will be staffed with
permanent full-time employees, unlike the ERTs, which are staffed on a collateral
duty basis. Team composition will include representatives from other DHS components, interagency and homeland security partners. When not deployed, the teams
will team-train with federal partners and provide a training capability to elevate
state and local emergency management capabilities. The teams will also engage in
consistent and coordinated operational planning and relationship-building with
state, local, tribal, and other stakeholders.
According to FEMA officials, these teams are still being designed and decisions
on team assets, equipment, and expected capabilities have not yet been finalized.
The new teams are envisioned to eventually subsume the existing FIRST (Federal
Incident Response Teams) and ERTs (FEMAs Emergency Response Teams), and
their mission and capabilities will incorporate similar concepts involving leadership,
emergency management doctrine, and operational competence in communications.
FEMA plans to implement one National Incident Management Team and one Regional Incident Management Team by May 25, 2007.
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Some Progress Has Been Made on Interoperable Communications
As our past work has noted, emergency communications is a critical capability
common across all phases of an incident. Agencies? communications systems during
a catastrophic disaster must first be operable, with sufficient communications to
meet everyday internal and emergency communication requirements. Once operable,
they then should have communications interoperability whereby public safety agencies (e.g., police, fire, emergency medical services, etc.) and service agencies (e.g.,
public works, transportation, and hospitals) can communicate within and across
agencies and jurisdictions in real time as needed.
DHS officials have identified a number of programs and activities they have implemented to improve interoperable communications nationally. DHSs Office for
Interoperability and Compatibility (OIC) was established to strengthen and integrate interoperability and compatibility efforts to improve local, tribal, state, and
federal emergency preparedness and response. SAFECOM, a program of OIC which
is transitioning to the Office of Emergency Communications (OEC)in response to
the Post-Katrina Reform Actis developing tools, templates, and guidance documents, including field tested statewide planning methodologies, online collaboration
tools, coordinated grant guidance, communications requirements, and a comprehensive online library of lessons learned and best practices to improve interoperability
and compatibility across the nation. DHS officials cited the development of the following examples in their efforts to improve interoperable communications:
Statement of Requirements (SoR) to define operational and functional requirements for emergency response communications.
Public Safety Architecture Framework (PSAF) to help emergency response
agencies map interoperable communications system requirements and identify
system gaps.
Project 25 (P25) suite of standards and a Compliance Assessment Program.
This project is in conjunction with the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) to support the efforts of the emergency response community
and industry;
Statewide Communications Interoperability Planning Methodology to offer
states a tangible approach as they initiate statewide interoperability planning
efforts. SAFECOM also collaborated in DHS grant guidance to help states develop statewide interoperability plans by the end of 2007.
According to FEMA officials, the agency is taking actions to design, staff, and
maintain a rapidly deployable, responsive, interoperable, and highly reliable emergency communications capability using the latest commercial off-the-shelf voice,
video, and data technology. FEMAs Response Division is the designated lead for
tactical communications, along with situational awareness information technology
enablers that are provided by FEMAs Chief Information Officer. Mobile Emergency
Response Support (MERS) detachments provide robust, deployable, command, control, and incident communications capabilities to DHS/FEMA elements for catastrophic Incidents of National Significance. The MERS mission supports Emergency
Support Function partners at the federal, state, and local levels of government. The
plan is to utilize enhanced MERS capabilities and leverage commercial technology
to provide real-time connectivity between communications platforms in a manner
consistent with emergency communication deployment doctrine being developed by
DHS and FEMA. According to FEMA officials, emergency managers at the federal,
state, and local levels of government will benefit from an integrated interoperable
emergency communications architecture that includes the Department of Defense,
United States Northern Command and the National Guard Bureau.
Our recent work noted that $2.15 billion in grant funding has been awarded to
states and localities from fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year 2005 for communications interoperability enhancements helped to make improvements on a variety of
interoperability projects.1 However this work noted that the SAFECOM program
has made limited progress in improving communications interoperability at all levels of government. For example, the program has not addressed interoperability
with federal agencies, a critical element to interoperable communications required
by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.2 The SAFECOM
program has focused on helping states and localities improve interoperable communications by developing tools and guidance for their use. However, based on our review of four states and selected localities, SAFECOMs progress in achieving its
goals of helping these states and localities improve interoperable communications
has been limited. Officials from the states and localities we reviewed often found
1 GAO, First Responders: Much Work Remains to Improve Communications Interoperability.
GAO07301 (Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2007).
2 See 6 U.S.C. 194(a).
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that the tools and planning assistance provided by the program were not helpful,
or they were unaware of what assistance the program had to offer. The programs
limited effectiveness can be linked to poor program management practices, including
the lack of a plan for improving interoperability across all levels of government and
inadequate performance measures that would provide feedback to better attune
tools and assistance with public safety needs. Until SAFECOM adopts these key
management practices, its progress is likely to remain limited.
Further, little progress had been made in developing Project 25 standardsa
suite of national standards that are intended to enable interoperability among the
communications products of different vendors. For example, although one of the
eight major subsets of standards was defined in the projects first 4 years (from 1989
to 1993), from 1993 through 2005, no additional standards were completed that
could be used by a vendor to develop elements of a Project 25 system. The privatesector coordinating body responsible for Project 25 has defined specifications for
three additional subsets of standards. However, ambiguities in the published standards have led to incompatibilities among products made by different vendors, and
no compliance testing has been conducted to ensure vendors products are interoperable. Nevertheless, DHS has strongly encouraged state and local agencies to use
grant funding to purchase Project 25 radios, which are substantially more expensive
than non-Project 25 radios. As a result, states and local agencies have purchased
fewer, more expensive radios, which still may not be interoperable and thus may
provide them with minimal additional benefits. Thus, until DHS takes a more strategic approach here, progress by states and localities in improving interoperability
is likely to be impeded.
FEMA Taking Steps to Address Logistics Problems
In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, FEMAs performance in the logistics area came
under harsh criticism. Within days, FEMA became overwhelmed and essentially
asked the military to take over much of the logistics mission.3 In the Post-Katrina
Reform Act, Congress required FEMA to make its logistics system more flexible and
responsive. FEMAs improvements to their logistics strategy and efforts are designed to initially lean forward and provide immediate support to a disaster site
mainly through FEMA-owned goods and assets, and later on to establish sustained
supply chains with the private vendors whose resources are needed for ongoing response and recovery activities, according to FEMA officials.
According to FEMA officials, the agency is building forward-leaning capabilities
that include, for example, its MERS resources designed to support a variety of communications requirementssatellite, land mobile radio, computer and telephone
systems?with the ability to operate from one or more locations (mobile and stationary) within the response area of operations. FEMA has also developed a PrePositioned Disaster Supply (PPDS) program to position containers of life-saving and
life-sustaining disaster equipment and supplies as close to a potential disaster site
as possible, in order to substantially reduce the initial response time to incidents.4
Further, FEMA is developing a Pre-positioned Equipment Program (PEP) that also
consists of standardized containers of equipment to provide state and local governments responding to a range of major disasters such equipment as personal protective supplies, decontamination, detection, technical search and rescue, law enforcement, medical, interoperable communications and other emergency response equipment. According to FEMA officials, currently FEMA has established 8 of the 11 PEP
locations, as mandated by the Post-Katrina Reform Act, and FEMA is currently conducting an analysis to determine where the additional PEP sites should be located.
FEMA has also stated that it has enhanced its relationships with the public sector
with its disaster logistics partners and has worked to utilize the public sectors expertise through Inter-Agency Agreements with the Defense Logistics Agency, the
Department of Transportation and Marine Corps Systems Command.
According to FEMA officials, another critical component of creating an effective
logistics system is based upon FEMAs ability to work collaboratively with and leverage the capabilities of its public and private partners. FEMAs logistics efforts
have identified private sector expertise to improve and develop software systems to
increase logistics program efficiency and effectiveness. For example, the Logistics
Information Management System (LIMS) is FEMAs formal accountability database
system for all property managed within FEMA nation-wide or at disaster field locations. At the same time, FEMA is also developing a multi-phased Total Asset Visi3 GAO, Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the Militarys Response
to Catastrophic Natural Disasters. GAO06643 (Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2006).
4 States participating in the PPDS program sign a Memorandum of Agreement with FEMA
for the use of the containers.
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bility (TAV) program with the assistance of the private sector to leverage the collective resources of the private and public sector to improve emergency response logistics in the areas of transportation, warehousing, and distribution. The current phase
of the program, which is operational at two FEMA logistics centers (Atlanta, Georgia, and Fort Worth, Texas), encompasses two software management packages designed to provide FEMA the ability to inventory disaster response commodities upon
arrival at a warehouse, place the commodities in storage, and track the commodities
while stored in the warehouse. FEMA plans to expand the capabilities of this first
phase of the system to all FEMA Regions during 2007. This will provide FEMA with
sufficient logistics management and tracking capabilities until an expanded phase
two can be implemented. For the second phase, FEMA is currently conducting market research to solicit input from the private sector and other sources to facilitate
final design of the programs second phase. According to FEMA officials, initial operational capabilities for this phase are scheduled to be in place by June 2008, and
fully-operational in June 2009. According to FEMA, the completed product will provide a more comprehensive approach to producing real-time, reliable reporting and
incorporate FEMAs financial resource tracking requirements. It will also be able to
support other federal departments and agencies, non-government organizations, and
state, local and tribal organizations under the guidelines of the NRP.
While FEMA has been working to address its logistics capabilities, it is too early
to evaluate these efforts. We recently examined FEMA logistics issues, taking a
broad approach, identifying five areas necessary for an effective logistics system.
Below, we describe these five areas along with FEMAs ongoing actions to address
each.
Requirements: FEMA does not yet have operational plans in place to address
disaster scenarios, nor does it have detailed information on states? capabilities
and resources. As a result, FEMA does not have information from these sources
to define what and how much it needs to stock. However, FEMA is developing
a concept of operations to underpin its logistics program and told us that it is
working to develop detailed plans and the associated stockage requirements.
However, until FEMA has solid requirements based on detailed plans, the agency will be unable to assess its true preparedness.
Inventory management: FEMAs system accounts for the location, quantity, and
types of supplies, but the ability to track supplies in-transit is limited. FEMA
has several efforts under way to improve transportation and tracking of supplies and equipment, such as expanding its new system for in-transit visibility
from the two test regions to all FEMA regions.Facilities: FEMA maintains nine
logistics centers and dozens of smaller storage facilities across the country.
However, it has little assurance that these are the right number of facilities located in the right places. FEMA officials told us they are in the process of determining the number of storage facilities it needs and where they should be located.
Distribution: Problems persist with FEMAs distribution system, including poor
transportation planning, unreliable contractors, and lack of distribution sites.
FEMA officials described initiatives under way that should mitigate some of the
problems with contractors, and has been working with Department of Defense
and Department of Transportation to improve the access to transportation when
needed.
People: Human capital issues are pervasive in FEMA, including the logistics
area. The agency has a small core of permanent staff, supplemented with contract and temporary disaster assistance staff. However, FEMAs recent retirements and losses of staff, and its difficulty in hiring permanent staff and contractors, have created staffing shortfalls and a lack of capability. According to
a January 2007 study commissioned by FEMA, there are significant shortfalls
in staffing and skill sets of full-time employees, particularly in the planning, advanced contracting, and relationship management skills needed to fulfill the disaster logistics mission. FEMA has recently hired a logistics coordinator and is
making a concerted effort to hire qualified staff for the entire agency, including
logistics.
In short, FEMA is taking many actions to transition its logistics program to be
more proactive, flexible, and responsive. While these and other initiatives hold
promise for improving FEMAs logistics capabilities, it will be years before they are
fully implemented and operational.
Revisions Made to Evacuation Planning, Mass Care, Housing and Human Services
In an April 2007 testimony, FEMAs Deputy Administrator for Operations said
that emergency evacuation, shelter and housing is FEMAs most pressing priority
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for planning for recovery from a catastrophic disaster. He said that FEMA is undertaking more detailed mass evacuee support planning; the Department of Justice and
Red Cross are developing methods for more quickly identifying and uniting missing
family members; and FEMA and the Red Cross have developed a web-based data
system to support shelter management, reporting, and facility identification activities.
Evacuation. Recent GAO work found that actions are needed to clarify the responsibilities and increase preparedness for evacuations, especially for those transportation-disadvantaged populations. We found that state and local governments are
generally not well prepared to evacuate transportation-disadvantaged populations
(i.e. planning, training, and conducting exercises), but some states and localities
have begun to address challenges and barriers. For example, in June 2006, DHS reported that only about 10 percent of the state and about 12 percent of the urban
area emergency plans it reviewed adequately addressed evacuating these populations. Steps being taken by some such governments include collaboration with social service and transportation providers and transportation planning organizationssome of which are Department of Transportation (DOT) grantees and stakeholdersto determine transportation needs and develop agreements for emergency
use of drivers and vehicles. The federal government provides evacuation assistance
to state and local governments, but gaps in this assistance have hindered many of
these governments ability to sufficiently prepare for evacuations. This includes the
lack of any specific requirement to plan, train, and conduct exercises for the evacuation of transportation-disadvantaged populations as well as gaps in the usefulness
of DHSs guidance. We recommended that DHS should clarify federal agencies roles
and responsibilities for providing evacuation assistance when state and local governments are overwhelmed. DHS should require state and local evacuation preparedness for transportation-disadvantaged populations and improve information to assist
these governments. DOT should encourage its grant recipients to share information
to assist in evacuation preparedness for these populations. DOT and DHS agreed
to consider our recommendations, and DHS stated it has partly implemented some
of them.
In his April 26, 2007 testimony statement for the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, FEMAs Deputy Administrator stated that FEMA is undertaking more detailed mass evacuation support planning to help State and local government plan and prepare for hosting large displaced populations. The project is to
include the development of an evacuee registration and tracking capability and implementation plans for federal evacuation support to states.
Mass Care and Shelter. During the current NRP review period, FEMA has revised
the organizational structure of ESF6, Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services,
and places FEMA as the primary agency responsible for this emergency support
function. The Red Cross will remain as a supporting agency in the responsibilities
and activities of ESF6. FEMA continues to maintain a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Red Cross that articulates agency roles and responsibilities
for mass care. The MOU and addendum were recently revised in May 2006 and December 2006, respectively. FEMA is currently working with Red Cross and other
support agencies to revise ESF6 standard operating procedures. According to a
February 2007 letter by the Red Cross, this change will not take place until the
NRP review process is complete and all changes are approved. According to FEMAs
Deputy Administrator, FEMA and the Red Cross have developed the first phase of
a web-based data system to support shelter management, reporting, and facility
identification activities. The system is intended for all agencies that provide shelter
service during disasters to ensure a comprehensive understanding of the shelter
populations and available shelter capacity.
Temporary housing. Other recent GAO work noted that FEMA needs to identify
and assess the capabilities that exist across the federal government and outside the
federal government, including temporary housing. In a recent report on housing assistance we found that the National Response Plans annex covering temporary shelter and housing in ESF 6 clearly described the overall responsibilities of the two
primary responsible agenciesFEMA and the Red Cross.5 However, the responsibilities described for the support agenciesthe Departments of Agriculture, Defense,
Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and Veterans Affairsdid not, and still
do not, fully reflect their capabilities. Further, these support agencies had not, at
the time of our work, developed fact sheets describing their roles and responsibilities, notification and activation procedures, and agency-specific authorities, as
called for by ESF6 operating procedures. Our February 2007 report recommended
5 GAO, Disaster Assistance: Better Planning Needed for Housing Victims of Catastrophic Disasters, GAO0788 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2007).
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that the support agencies propose revisions to the NRP that fully reflect each respective support agencys capabilities for providing temporary housing under ESF
6, develop the needed fact sheets, and develop operational plans that provide details
on how their respective agencies will meet their temporary housing responsibilities.
The Departments of Defense, HUD, Treasury, and the Veterans Administration, and
Agriculture, concurred with our recommendations. The Red Cross did not comment
on our report or recommendations. As part of a housing task force, FEMA is currently exploring ways of incorporating housing assistance offered by private sector
organizations. FEMA says it has also developed a housing portal to consolidate
available rental resources for evacuees from Federal agencies, private organizations,
and individuals.
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Appendix II: Related GAO Products
Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security. GAO07833T. Washington, D.C.: May 10, 2007
First Responders: Much Work Remains to Improve Communications Interoperability.
GAO07301. Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2007.
Emergency Preparedness: Current Emergency Alert System Has Limitations, and Development of a New Integrated System Will be Challenging. GAO07411. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2007
Disaster Preparedness: Better Planning Would Improve OSHAs Efforts to Protect
Workers Safety and Health in Disasters. GAO07193. Washington, D.C.: March 28,
2007.
Public Health and Hospital Emergency Preparedness Programs: Evolution of Performance Measurement Systems to Measure Progress. GAO07485R. Washington,
D.C.: March 23, 2007.
Coastal Barrier Resources System: Status of Development That Has Occurred and
Financial Assistance Provided by Federal Agencies. GAO07356. Washington, D.C.:
March 19, 2007.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Disaster Relief: Continued Findings of Fraud, Waste,
and Abuse. GAO07300. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2007.
Homeland Security: Preparing for and Responding to Disasters. GAO07395T.
Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2007.
Hurricane Katrina: Agency Contracting Data Should Be More Complete Regarding
Subcontracting Opportunities for Small Businesses. GAO07205. Washington, D.C.:
March 1, 2007.
Hurricane Katrina: Allocation and Use of $2 Billion for Medicaid and Other Health
Care Needs. GAO0767. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2007.
Disaster Assistance: Better Planning Needed for Housing Victims of Catastrophic
Disasters. GAO0788. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2007
Highway Emergency Relief: Reexamination Needed to Address Fiscal Imbalance and
Long-term Sustainability. GAO07245. Washington, D.C.: February 23, 2007.
Small Business Administration: Additional Steps Needed to Enhance Agency Preparedness for Future Disasters. GAO07114. Washington, D.C.: February 14, 2007.
Small Business Administration: Response to the Gulf Coast Hurricanes Highlights
Need for Enhanced Disaster Preparedness. GAO07484T. Washington, D.C.: February 14, 2007.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Federal Actions Could Enhance Preparedness of Certain StateAdministered Federal Support Programs. GAO07219. Washington,
D.C.: February 7, 2007.
Homeland Security Grants: Observations on Process DHS Used to Allocate Funds to
Selected Urban Areas. GAO07381R. Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2007.
Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security. GAO07452T. Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2007.
Homeland Security: Applying Risk Management Principles to Guide Federal Investments. GAO07386T. Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2007.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Disaster Relief: Prevention Is the Key to Minimizing
Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Recovery Efforts. GAO07418T. Washington, D.C.:
January 29, 2007
GAO, Reserve Forces: Actions needed to Identify National Guard Domestic Equipment Requirements and Readiness, GAO0760 Washington, D.C.: January 26, 2007
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Budget Issues: FEMA Needs Adequate Data, Plans, and Systems to Effectively Manage Resources for Day-toDay Operations, GAO07139. Washington, D.C.: January
19, 2007.
TransportationDisadvantaged Populations: Actions Needed to Clarify Responsibilities and Increase Preparedness for Evacuations. GAO0744. Washington, D.C.: December 22, 2006.
Suggested Areas for Oversight for the 110th Congress. GAO07235R. Washington,
D.C.: November 17, 2006.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Continued Findings of Fraud, Waste, and Abuse.
GAO07252T. Washington, D.C.: December 6, 2006.
Capital Financing: Department Management Improvements Could Enhance Educations Loan Program for Historically Black Colleges and Universities. GAO0764.
Washington, D.C.: October 18, 2006.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Unprecedented Challenges Exposed the Individuals
and Households Program to Fraud and Abuse; Actions Needed to Reduce Such Problems in Future. GAO061013. Washington, D.C.: September 27, 2006.
Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nations Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System. GAO06618. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2006.
Disaster Relief: Governmentwide Framework Needed to Collect and Consolidate Information to Report on Billions in Federal Funding for the 2005 Gulf Coast Hurricanes. GAO06834. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2006.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Coordination between FEMA and the Red Cross
Should Be Improved for the 2006 Hurricane Season. GAO06712. Washington,
D.C.: June 8, 2006.
Federal Emergency Management Agency: Factors for Future Success and Issues to
Consider for Organizational Placement. GAO06746T. Washington, D.C.: May 9,
2006.
Hurricane Katrina: GAOs Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. GAO06442T. Washington, D.C.: March 8, 2006.
Emergency Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and Challenges Associated with
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House Hearing, 110TH Congress - The 2007 Hurricane Season: Are We Prepared?

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House Hearing, 110TH Congress - The 2007 Hurricane Season: Are We Prepared?

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THE 2007 HURRICANE SEASON:

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

MAY 15, 2007

Serial No. 11035

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

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For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

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THE 2007 HURRICANE SEASON:

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

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Mr. PAULISON. Chair Thompson, I appreciate the invitation.

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Good morning, Chairman Thompson, and Members of the Committee.

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Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Paulison. I

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