SECTION 14

CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS

Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70 (1988)
FACTS: The complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed
what he termed "a report" with the Legal Panel of the
Presidential Security Command (PSC) on October 1974,
containing charges of alleged violations of Rep. Act No. 3019
against then Secretary of Public Information Francisco S.
Tatad. The "report" was made to "sleep" in the office of the
PSC until the end of 1979 when it became widely known that
Secretary (then Minister) Tatad had a falling out with
President Marcos and had resigned from the Cabinet. On
December 12, 1979, the 1974 complaint was resurrected in
the form of a formal complaint filed with the Tanodbayan. The
Tanodbayan acted on the complaint onApril 1, 1980 which
was around two months after petitioner Tatad's resignation
was accepted by Pres. Marcos by referring the complaint to
the CIS, Presidential Security Command, for investigation and
report. On June 16, 1980, the CIS report was submitted to the
Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of charges for graft
and corrupt practices against former Minister Tatad and
Antonio L. Cantero. By October 25, 1982, all affidavits and
counter-affidavits were in the case was already for disposition
by the Tanodbayan. However, it was only on June 5,
1985 that a resolution was approved by the Tanodbayan. Five
criminal informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan
on June 12, 1985, all against petitioner Tatad alone. (1)
Section 3, paragraph (e) of RA. 3019 for giving D' Group, a
private corporation controlled by his brother-in-law,
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official functions; (2) Violation of Section 3,
paragraph (b) for receiving a check of P125,000.00 from
Roberto Vallar, President/General Manager of Amity Trading
Corporation as consideration for the release of a check of

P588,000.00 to said corporation for printing services

rendered for the Constitutional Convention Referendum in
1973; (3) Violation of Section 7 on three (3) counts for his
failure to file his Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the
calendar years 1973, 1976 and 1978. A motion to quash the
information was made alleging that the prosecution deprived
accused of due process of law and of the right to a speedy
disposition of the cases filed against him. It was denied
hence the appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as
an
accused.
RULING: YES. Due process (Procedural) and right to speedy
disposition of trial were violated. Firstly, the complaint came
to life, as it were, only after petitioner Tatad had afalling
out with President Marcos. Secondly, departing from
established procedures prescribed by law for preliminary
investigation, which require the submission of affidavits and
counter-affidavits by the complainant and the respondent
and
their
witnesses,
the
Tanodbayan
referred
the complaint to
the Presidential Security
Command for
finding investigation and report. The law (P.D. No. 911)
prescribes a ten-day period for the prosecutor to resolve a
case under preliminary investigation by him from its
termination. While we agree with the respondent court that
this period fixed by law is merely "directory," yet, on the
other hand, it can not be disregarded or ignored completely,
with absolute impunity. A delay of close to three (3) years can
not be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the
circumstance obtaining in the case at bar.

Galman vs. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 43 (1986)

FACTS: Assassination of former Senator Benigno "Ninoy"

Aquino, Jr. He was killed from his plane that had just landed
at the Manila International Airport. His brain was smashed by
a bullet fired point-blank into the back of his head by an
assassin. The military investigators reported within a span of
three hours that the man who shot Aquino (whose identity
was then supposed to be unknown and was revealed only
days later as Rolando Galman) was a communist-hired
gunman, and that the military escorts gunned him down in
turn.
President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board to
investigate due to large masses of people who joined in the
ten-day period of national mourning yearning for the truth,
justice
and
freedom.
The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one
in rejecting the military version stating that "the evidence
shows to the contrary that Rolando Galman had no
subversive affiliations. Only the soldiers in the staircase with
Sen. Aquino could have shot him; that Ninoy's assassination
was the product of a military conspiracy, not a communist
plot. Only difference between the two reports is that the
majority report found all the twenty-six private respondents
above-named in the title of the case involved in the military
conspiracy; " while the chairman's minority report would
exclude
nineteen
of
them.
Then Pres. Marcos stated that evidence shows that Galman
was
the
killer.
Petitioners pray for issuance of a TRO enjoining respondent
court from rendering a decision in the two criminal cases
before it, the Court resolved by nine-to-two votes 11 to issue
the restraining order prayed for. The Court also granted
petitioners a five-day period to file a reply to respondents'

separate comments and respondent Tanodbayan a three-day

period to submit a copy of his 84-page memorandum for the
prosecution.
But ten days later, the Court by the same nine-to-two-vote
ratio in reverse, resolved to dismiss the petition and to lift the
TRO issued ten days earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan
from rendering its decision. The same Court majority denied
petitioners' motion for a new 5-day period counted from
receipt of respondent Tanodbayan's memorandum for the
prosecution (which apparently was not served on them).
Thus, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging
that the dismissal did not indicate the legal ground for such
action and urging that the case be set for a full hearing on
the merits that the people are entitled to due process.
However, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision
acquitting all the accused of the crime charged, declaring
them innocent and totally absolving them of any civil liability.
Respondents submitted that with the Sandiganbayan's
verdict of acquittal, the instant case had become moot and
academic. Thereafter, same Court majority denied
petitioners' motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
Hence, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second
motion for reconsideration alleging that respondents
committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and
resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross violation of the
constitutional rights of the petitioners and the sovereign
people of the Philippines to due process of law.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an
accused.

(2) Whether or not there was a violation of the double

jeopardy
clause.

RULING: Petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is

granted and ordering a re-trial of the said cases which should
be conducted with deliberate dispatch and with careful
regard
for
the
requirements
of
due
process.
Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera (made his expose 15
months later when former Pres. was no longer around)
affirmed the allegations in the second motion for
reconsideration that he revealed that the Sandiganbayan
Justices and Tanodbayan prosecutors were ordered by Marcos
to whitewash the Aquino-Galman murder case. Malacaang
wanted dismissal to the extent that a prepared resolution
was sent to the Investigating Panel. Malacaang Conference
planned a scenario of trial where the former President
ordered then that the resolution be revised by categorizing
the participation of each respondent; decided that the
presiding justice, Justice Pamaran, (First Division) would
personally handle the trial. A conference was held in an inner
room of the Palace. Only the First Lady and Presidential Legal
Assistant Justice Lazaro were with the President. The
conferees were told to take the back door in going to the
room where the meeting was held, presumably to escape
notice by the visitors in the reception hall waiting to see the
President. During the conference, and after an agreement
was reached, Pres. Marcos told them 'Okay, mag moro-moro
na lamang kayo;' and that on their way out of the room Pres.
Marcos expressed his thanks to the group and uttered 'I know
how
to
reciprocate'.
The Court then said that the then President (code-named
Olympus) had stage-managed in and from Malacaang

Palace "a scripted and predetermined manner of handling

and disposing of the Aquino-Galman murder case;" and that
"the prosecution in the Aquino-Galman case and the Justices
who tried and decided the same acted under the compulsion
of some pressure which proved to be beyond their capacity
to resist. Also predetermined the final outcome of the case"
of total absolution of the twenty-six respondents-accused of
all criminal and civil liability. Pres. Marcos came up with a
public statement aired over television that Senator Aquino
was killed not by his military escorts, but by a communist
hired gun. It was, therefore, not a source of wonder that
President Marcos would want the case disposed of in a
manner consistent with his announced theory thereof which,
at the same time, would clear his name and his
administration of any suspected guilty participation in the
assassination. such a procedure would be a better
arrangement because, if the accused are charged in court
and subsequently acquitted, they may claim the benefit of
the doctrine of double jeopardy and thereby avoid another
prosecution if some other witnesses shall appear when
President
Marcos
is
no
longer
in
office.
More so was there suppression of vital evidence and
harassment of witnesses. The disappearance of witnesses
two weeks after Ninoy's assassination. According to J.
Herrera, "nobody was looking for these persons because they
said Marcos was in power. The assignment of the case to
Presiding Justice Pamaran; no evidence at all that the
assignment was indeed by virtue of a regular raffle, except
the uncorroborated testimony of Justice Pamaran himself. The
custody of the accused and their confinement in a military
camp, instead of in a civilian jail. The monitoring of
proceedings and developments from Malacaang and by
Malacaang personnel. The partiality of Sandiganbayan
betrayed by its decision: That President Marcos had wanted
all of the twenty-six accused to be acquitted may not be

denied. In rendering its decision, the Sandiganbayan overdid

itself in favoring the presidential directive. Its bias and
partiality in favor of the accused was clearly obvious. The
evidence presented by the prosecution was totally ignored
and
disregarded.
The record shows that the then President misused the
overwhelming resources of the government and his
authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a mockery of the
judicial process in the Aquino-Galman murder cases. "This is
the evil of one-man rule at its very worst." Our Penal Code
penalizes "any executive officer who shall address any order
or suggestion to any judicial authority with respect to any
case or business coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the
courts
of
justice."
Impartial court is the very essence of due process of law. This
criminal collusion as to the handling and treatment of the
cases by public respondents at the secret Malacaang
conference (and revealed only after fifteen months by Justice
Manuel
Herrera)
completely
disqualified
respondent
Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its verdict. The courts
would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used
as mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert
and suppress the truth. More so, in the case at bar where the
people and the world are entitled to know the truth, and the
integrity
of
our
judicial
system
is
at
stake.
There was no double jeopardy. Courts' Resolution of acquittal
was a void judgment for having been issued without
jurisdiction. No double jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void
judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights
are divested. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts and all
claims
flowing
out
of
it
are
void.
Motion to Disqualify/Inhibit should have been resolved ahead.

In this case, petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the

abrupt dismissal of their petition and lifting of the TRO
enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision had
been taken cognizance of by the Court which had required
the respondents', including the Sandiganbayan's, comments.
Although no restraining order was issued anew, respondent
Sandiganbayan should not have precipitately issued its
decision of total absolution of all the accused pending the
final action of this Court. All of the acts of the respondent
judge manifest grave abuse of discretion on his part
amounting to lack of jurisdiction which substantively
prejudiced
the
petitioner.
With the declaration of nullity of the proceedings, the cases
must now be tried before an impartial court with an unbiased
prosecutor. Respondents accused must now face trial for the
crimes charged against them before an impartial court with
an
unbiased
prosecutor
with
all
due
process.
The function of the appointing authority with the mandate of
the people, under our system of government, is to fill the
public posts. Justices and judges must ever realize that they
have no constituency, serve no majority nor minority but
serve only the public interest as they see it in accordance
with their oath of office, guided only the Constitution and
their own conscience and honor.

Alonte vs. Savellano - GR No. 131652, March 9, 1998

Due Process in Criminal Proceedings Waiver of Right to Due
Process

Facts:

Bayani M. Alonte, incumbent Mayor of Bian, Laguna, was

accused of raping Juvie-Lyn Punongbayan with accomplice
Buenaventura Concepcion. It was alleged that Concepcion
befriended Juvie and had later lured her into Alontes house.
The case was brought before the Regional Trial Court of
Bian. The counsel and the prosecutor later moved for a
change of venue due to alleged intimidation. While the
change of venue was pending, Juvie executed an affidavit of
desistance. The prosecutor continued on with the case and
the change of venue was done notwithstanding opposition
from Alonte. The case was raffled to the Manila Regional Trial
Court under J Savellano. Savellano later found probable cause
and had ordered the arrest of Alonte and Concepcion.
Thereafter, the prosecution presented Juvie and had attested
the voluntariness of her desistance the same being due to
media pressure and that they would rather establish new life
elsewhere. Case was then submitted for decision and
Savellano sentenced both accused to reclusion perpetua.
Savellano commented that Alonte waived his right to due
process when he did not cross examine Juvie when
clarificatory questions were raised about the details of the
rape and on the voluntariness of her desistance.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Alonte has been denied criminal due process.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that Savellano should inhibit
himself from further deciding on the case due to animosity
between him and the parties. There is no showing that Alonte
waived his right. The standard of waiver requires that it not
only must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and
done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances
and likely consequences. Mere silence of the holder of the
right should not be so construed as a waiver of right, and the
courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against

waiver. Savellano has not shown impartiality by repeatedly

not acting on numerous petitions filed by Alonte. The case is
remanded to the lower court for retrial and the decision
earlier promulgated is nullified.

PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
People vs. Dramayo [GR L-21325, 29 October 1971] En
Banc, Fernando (J): 8 concur, 1 took no part
Facts: In the morning of 9 January 1964, Pableo Dramayo and
Paterno Ecubin, in the company of the deceased Estelito
Nogaliza, all of Barrio Magsaysay, of the Municipality of
Sapao, Surigao del Norte, saw its chief of police, to shed light
on a robbery committed in Nogaliza's house 5 days before.
The response was decidedly in the negative as they
themselves were prime suspects, having been implicated by
at least 2 individuals who had confessed. At about 7:00 p.m.
of the same day, while they were in the house of Priolo
Billona, Dramayo invited all those present including Francisco
Billona, Modesto Ronquilla, Crescencio and Savero Savandal,
for a drinking session at a place at the back of the school
house. It was on that occasion that Dramayo brought up the
idea of killing Estelito Nogaliza so that he could not satisfy in
the robbery case. The idea was for Dramayo and Ecubin to
ambush Estelito, who was returning from Sapao. The others
were to station themselves nearby. Soon Nogaliza was
sighted. He was accosted by Dramayo with a request for a
cigarette. It was then that Ecubin hit him with a piece of
wood on the side of the head near the right ear. Dramayo's
participation consisted of repeated stabs with a short pointed

bolo as he lay prostrate from the blow of Ecubin. It was the

former also, who warned the rest of the group to keep their
mouths sealed as to what had just happened. His equanimity
appeared undisturbed for early the next morning, he went to
the house of the deceased and informed the latter's widow
Corazon that he had just seen the cadaver of Estelito. The
barrio lieutenant and the chief of police were duly notified.
The latter, upon noticing blood stains on the trousers of
Dramayo, asked him to explain. The answer was that a skin
ailment of his daughter was the cause thereof. Dramayo, et.
al. were charged for the murder of Estelito Nogaliza. The
lower court found Pableo Dramayo and Paterno Ecubin, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of murder, qualified
by the circumstance of evident premeditation as aggravated
by night time, and imposes upon each of the said accused
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The other accused were
not convicted as, two of them, Crescencio Savandal and
Severo Savandal being utilized as state witnesses, and the
other three, Priolo Billona, Francisco Billona and Modesto
Ronquilla acquitted. Dramayo and Ecubin appealed.
Issue: Whether Dramayo and Ecubin should be acquitted
inasmuch as the other co-accused have been acquitted due
to reasonable doubt.
Held: The starting point is the presumption of innocence,
according to the Constitution, which is a right safeguarded
both Dramayo and Ecubin. Accusation is not, according to the
fundamental law, synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on
the prosecution to demonstrate that culpability lies. Dramayo
and Ecubin were not even called upon then to offer evidence
on their behalf. Their freedom is forfeit only if the requisite
quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in existence.
Their guilt must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. To such
a standard, this Court has always been committed. There is
need, therefore, for the most careful scrutiny of the
testimony of the state, both oral and documentary,

independently of whatever defense is offered by the accused.

Only if the judge below and the appellate tribunal could
arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been committed
precisely by the person on trial under such an exacting test
should the sentence be one of conviction. It is thus required
that every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken
into account. The proof against him must survive the test of
reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to
sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the
defendant could be laid the responsibility for the offense
charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it
amounted to a crime. What is required then is moral
certainty. It cannot be denied that the credible and
competent evidence of record resulted in moral certainty
being entertained not only by the trial judge but by the
Supreme Court as to the culpability of Dramayo and Ecubin.
The force of the controlling doctrines, on the other hand,
required that the other three accused be acquitted precisely
because, unlike in the case of Dramayo and Ecubin, the
requisite quantum of proof to show guilt beyond reasonable
doubt was not present. There is no question as to the other
two who testified for the state being like-vise no longer
subject to any criminal liability. The judgment of conviction
should not have occasioned any surprise on the part of
Dramayo and Ecubin, as from the evidence deserving of the
fullest credence, their guilt had been more than amply
demonstrated. The presumption of innocence could not come
to their rescue as it was more than sufficiently overcome by
the proof that was offered by the prosecution. What would
have been a blot on the law is that if, on the facts as
established, no reasonable doubt being entertained,
Dramayo and Ecubin would have been acquitted likewise just
because the other 5 defendants were not similarly
sentenced. There had been cases where the Supreme Court,
notwithstanding a majority of the defendants being
acquitted, the element of conspiracy likewise being allegedly

present, did hold the party or parties responsible for the

offense guilty of the crime charged, a moral certainly having
arisen as to their culpability.

G.R. No. L-52245 January 22, 1980 PATRICIO DUMLAO,

ROMEO B. IGOT, and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, JR.,
petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION
ON
ELECTIONS,
respondent.
Facts: Petitioner Dumlao, a former governor of Nueva Vizcaya
who has filed a COC for said post for the January 30, 1980
elections, assails the constitutionality of Sec 4 of BP Blg 52
for being discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection
and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Sec. 4.
Special Disqualification in addition to violation of section 10
of Art. XI I-C of the Constitution and disqualification
mentioned in existing laws, which are hereby declared as
disqualification for any of the elective officials enumerated in
section 1 hereof. Any retired elective provincial city or
municipal official who has received payment of the
retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law, and
who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement
of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected shall not
be qualified to run for the same elective local office from
which he has retired. Petitioners Igot, a taxpayer and a
qualified voter and member of the Bar, and Salapantan, a
taxpayer, a qualified voter and a resident of San Miguel,
Iloilo, assail Sec. 7 of said law: Sec 7. Terms of Office
Unless sooner removed for cause, all local elective officials
hereinabove mentioned shall hold office for a term of six (6)
years, which shall commence on the first Monday of March
1980. .... (Batas Pambansa Blg. 51) Sec. 4. Sec. 4. ... Any
person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State,
including acts amounting to subversion, insurrection,
rebellion or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified to be a

candidate for any of the offices covered by this Act, or to

participate in any partisan political activity therein: provided
that a judgment of conviction for any of the aforementioned
crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact and the
filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a
civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation
shall be prima fascie evidence of such fact.
Issues: 1. If the petition suffers from basic procedural
infirmities as petitioner Dumlaos interest (he a former
governor of N. Vizcaya who has filed a COC for the 1980
elections) is alien to the taxpayers suit of petitioners Igot
and Salapantan. 2. If petitioners Dumlao, Igot and Salapantan
are proper parties to the suit. 3. Constitutionality of said
sections of BP Blg 52.
Held: 1. Yes. Procedurally, there is a misjoiner of parties and
actions, as Dumlaos interest is alien to the other petitioners.
There are also standards that have to be followed in the
exercise of the function of judicial review, as held in People
vs Vera (65 Phil 56 [1937]): the existence of an appropriate
case; an interest personal and substantial by the party
raising the constitutional question; an the plea that the
function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and the
necessity that the consti tutional question be assed in order
to decide the case. This petition has complied only with the
requisite that the parties raised the issue early in their
proceedings; the other three criteria are wanting. Thus,
Furthermore, Petitioner Dumlao assails BP Blg 52 as being
contrary to the EPC and seeks to prohibit the Comelec from
implementing it, but he is not adversely affected by said
provision. There is no petition before the Comelec seeking to
disqualify him, and his question is posed in an abstract,
hypothetical issue. 2. Igot and Salapantan cannot claim locus
standi, even as taxpayers. Assailed portions of BP Blg 52
didnt directly involve the disbursement of public funds; even
as election involves the expenditure of public moneys, they

do not seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds

through the enforcement of any invalid or unconstitutional
law. 3. Dumlaos contention that Sec. 4 of BP Blg 52 is
discriminatory or contrary to the safer guard of equal
protection is not well taken. The constitutional guarantee of
equal protection of the laws is subject to rational
classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and
real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated
differently from another class. For purposes of public service,
employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified
differently from younger employees. Employees attaining
that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of
younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable. In respect of
election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require
that candidates should not be more than 65 years of age at
the time they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might
or might not be a reasonable classification although, as the
Solicitor General has intimated, a good policy of the law
would be to promote the emergence of younger blood in our
political elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be
that persons more than 65 years old may also be good
elective local officials. But, in the case of a 65-year old
elective local official, who has retired from a provincial, city
or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from
running for the same office from which he had retired, as
provided for in the challenged provision. The need for new
blood assumes relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for
government work is present, and what is emphatically
significant is that the retired employee has already declared
himself tired and unavailable for the same government work,
but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would like to
assume again. It is for this very reason that inequality will
neither result from the application of the challenged
provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal
protection neither does it permit of such denial (see People
vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1933]). Persons similarly situated are

similarly treated. In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal

protection clause does not forbid all legal classification. What
is proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and
unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is not violated
by a reasonable classification based upon substantial
distinctions, where the classification is germane to the
purpose of the law and applies to all Chose belonging to the
same class (Peralta vs. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30 [1978] citing
Felwa vs. Salas, 18 SCRA 606 [1966]; Rafael v. Embroidery
and Apparel Control and Inspection Board, 21 SCRA 336
[1967]; Inchong etc., et al. vs. Hernandez 101 Phil. 1155
[1957]). The purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of
younger blood in local governments. The classification in
question being pursuant to that purpose, it cannot be
considered invalid "even it at times, it may be susceptible to
the objection that it is marred by theoretical inconsistencies"
Furthermore, to justify the nullification of a law, there must
be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a
doubtful and equivocal breach. Its within the competence of
the legislature to prescribe qualifications for one who desires
to become a candidate for office provided that said
qualifications are reasonable. Said portion of the law is
hereby declared valid. However, second paragraph of Section
4 of BP Blg 52providing that "... the filing of charges for the
commission of such crimes before a civil court or military
tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie
evidence of such fact", is hereby declared null and void, for
being violative of the constitutional presumption of
innocence guaranteed to an accused. In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved, and an accusation is not synonymous
with guilt. Challenged proviso contravenes this policy, it
condemns before it is heard. No distinction is made in this
provisio between a person convicted of acts of disloyalty
from one who is accused of such.

Marquez vs COMELEC GR 112889 (April 18, 1995)

GRNo.112889
243SCRA538
April 18, 1995
FACTS:
Bienvenido Marquez, a defeated candidate in the Province of
Quezon filed a petition for certiorari praying for the reversal
of the COMELEC Resolution which dismissed his petition for
quo warranto against Eduardo Rodriguez, for being allegedly
a fugitive from justice.
It is averred that at the time private respondent filed his
certificate of candidacy, a criminal charge against him for ten
(10) counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal
property was still pending before the Municipal Court of Los
Angeles Judicial District, County of Los Angeles, State of
California, U.S.A. A warrant issued by said court for his arrest,
it is claimed, has yet to be served on private respondent on
account of his alleged flight from that country.
Petitioners subsequent recourse (in G.R. No. 105310) from
the COMELECs May 8, 1992 resolution was dismissed
without prejudice, however, to the filing in due time of a
possible post-election quo warranto proceeding against
private respondent.
Before the 11th May 1992 elections, petitioner filed a petition
with the COMELEC for cancellation of respondents CoC on
account of the candidates disqualification under Sec. 40 (e)
of the LGC.
Private respondent was proclaimed Governor-elect of Quezon
on 29 May 1992. Forthwith, petitioner instituted quo warranto
proceedings (EPC 92-28) against private respondent before
the COMELEC.

ISSUE:
Whether private respondent who, at the time of the filing of
his certificate of candidacy (and to date), is said to be facing
a criminal charge before a foreign court and evading a
warrant for his arrest comes within the term fugitive from
justice contemplated by Section 40(e) of the LGC and is,
therefore, disqualified from being a candidate for, and
thereby ineligible from holding on to, an elective local office.
HELD:
Section 40(e) of the LGC (RA 7160) provide that a Fugitive
from justice in criminal cases here and abroad are
disqualified from running for any elective local position.
It has been held that construction placed upon law by the
officials in charge of its enforcement deserves great and
considerable weight (Atlas Consolidated Mining and
Development Corp. vs. CA, 182 SCRA 166,181). However,
when there clearly is no obscurity and ambiguity in an
enabling law, it must merely be made to apply as it is so
written. An administrative rule or regulation can neither
expand nor constrict the law but must remain congruent to it.
The confinement of the term fugitive from justice in Article
73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC of
1991 to refer only to a person who has been convicted by
final judgment is an inordinate and undue circumscription of
the law.
Unfortunately, the COMELEC did not make any definite
finding on whether or not private respondent is in fact a
fugitive from justice as such term must be interpreted and
applied in the light of the Courts opinion. The omission is
understandable since the COMELEC outrightly dismissed the
petition for quo warranto on the basis instead of Rule 73 of
the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Oversight
Committee. The Court, not being a trier of facts, is thus

constrained to remand the case to the COMELEC for a

determination of this unresolved factual matter.

Corpuz v People 194 SCRA 73 (1991)

Facts: Petitioner seeks reversal of the lower courts decision
finding him guilty for malversation of public funds. The
accused was the acting supervising cashier at the Provincial
Treasurers office. He denied having misused the whole
amount of P72,823.08 which was discovered to be a shortage
from the government funds contending that the P50,000.00
was the unliquidated withdrawal made by their paymaster
Pineda thru the 4 checks he issued while the petitioner was
on leave and that he was forced by their Provincial Treasurer
Aluning to post said amount in his cash book despite not
actually receiving the amount.
Issue: Whether or not the court erred in observing the
presumption of innocence of the accused of the charge
against him

Held: It is held that presumption of innocence of the accused

should yield to the positive findings that he malversed the
government funds considering all the evidences presented
that point out to his guilt on the charge imputed against him.
Records shows that the checks issued for the paymaster
were duly liquidated to the accused and there were
inconsistent entries on his cash books and that he was not
really on leave on the day the said checks were disbursed by
the paymaster.

Feeder International Line PTE, Ltd. vs. Court of

Appeals [GR 94262, 31 May 1991] Second Division,
Regalado (J): 3 concur, 1 on leave
Facts: The M/T "ULU WAI" a foreign vessel of Honduran
registry, owned and operated by Feeder International
Shipping Lines of Singapore, left Singapore on 6 May 1986
carrying 1,100 metric tons of gas oil and 1,000 metric tons of
fuel oil consigned to Far East Synergy Corporation of
Zamboanga, Philippines. On 14 May 1986, the vessel
anchored at the vicinity of Guiuanon Island in Iloilo without
notifying the Iloilo customs authorities. The presence of the
vessel only came to the knowledge of the Iloilo authorities by
information of the civilian informer in the area. Acting on said
information, the Acting District Collector of Iloilo dispatched a
Customs team on 19 May 1986 to verify the report. The
Customs team found out that the vessel did not have on
board the required ship and shipping documents, except for a
clearance from the port authorities of Singapore clearing the
vessel for "Zamboan." In view thereof, the vessel and its
cargo were held and a Warrant of Seizure and Detention over
the same was issued after due investigation. Feeder
International Line PTE Ltd, through its agent Feeder
International (Phils.) Inc. then filed its Motion to Dismiss and
to Quash the Warrants of Seizure and Detention which the
District Collector denied in his Order dated 12 December
1986. In the course of the forfeiture proceedings, the parties,
through their respective counsel, agreed on a stipulation of
facts. On 17 March 1987, the District Collector issued his
decision, finding the M/T "ULU WAI" guilty of violating Section
2530 (a) of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (PD
1464), as amended, while her cargo of 1,100 M/T Gas Oil and
1,000 M/T Fuel Oil are found guilty of violating Section 2530
(a), (f), and (1-1) under the same Code and are hereby
forfeited in favor of the Republic of the Philippines. Feeder
International appealed to the Commissioner of Customs who
rendered a decision dated 13 May 1987, affirming the decisin

of the District Collector of Customs of Iloilo in toto. On 25

June 1987, Feeder International filed a petition for review of
the decisions of the Collector and the Commissioner of
Customs with the Court of Tax Appeals, praying for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or a
restraining order to enjoin the Commissioner from
implementing his decision. On 14 December 1988, the Court
of Tax Appeals issued its decision affirmed the decision of the
Commissioner of Customs. Feeder International, on 19
January 1990, filed a petition for review of the Court of Tax
Appeals' decision with the Supreme Court. On 21 March
1990, the Supreme Court issued a resolution referring the
disposition of the case to the Court of Appeals in view of the
Court's decision in Development Bank of the Philippines vs.
Court of Appeals, et al. holding that final judgments or
decrees of the Court of Tax Appeals are within the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. On 8 May 1990,
the Court of Appeals rendered its questioned decision
affirming the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals. Feeder
International's motion for reconsideration having been denied
on 4 July 1990, it interposed the present petition.
Issue: Whether a forfeiture proceeding is penal in nature,
and whether the corporation can invoke the right to be
presumed innocent.
Held: A forfeiture proceeding under tariff and customs laws is
not penal in nature, contrary to the argument advanced by
Feeder International. In the case of People vs. Court of First
Instance of Rizal, etc., et al., the Court made an exhaustive
analysis of the nature of forfeiture proceedings, in relation to
criminal proceedings, holding therein that "seizure and
forfeiture proceedings under the tariff and customs laws are
not criminal in nature as they do not result in the conviction
of the offender nor in the imposition of the penalty provided
for in Section 3601 of the Code. As can be gleaned from
Section 2533 of the code, seizure proceedings are purely civil

and administrative in character, the main purpose of which is

to enforce the administrative fines or forfeiture incident to
unlawful importation of goods or their deliberate possession.
The penalty in seizure cases is distinct and separate from the
criminal liability that might be imposed against the indicted
importer or possessor and both kinds of penalties may be
imposed. Considering, therefore, that proceedings for the
forfeiture of goods illegally imported are not criminal in
nature since they do not result in the conviction of the
wrongdoer nor in the imposition upon him of a penalty, proof
beyond reasonable doubt is not required in order to justify
the forfeiture of the goods. The degree of proof required is
merely substantial evidence which means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. Further, a corporate entity has no
personality to invoke the right to be presumed innocent
which right is available only to an individual who is an
accused in a criminal case. Herein, the Court finds and so
hold that the Government has sufficiently established that an
illegal importation, or at least an attempt thereof, has been
committed with the use of the vessel M/T "ULU WAI," thus
warranting the forfeiture of said vessel and its cargo pursuant
to the provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code. Feeder
International is guilty of illegal importation, there having
been an intent to unload, is amply supported by substantial
evidence. The findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are in
consonance with the findings of both the Collector and the
Commissioner of Customs, as affirmed by the Court of Tax
Appeals. The Court finds no compelling reason to deviate
from the elementary principle that findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals, and of the administrative and quasi-judicial
bodies for that matter, are entitled to great weight and are
conclusive and binding upon this Court absent a showing of a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

RIGHT TO BE HEARD BY HIMSELF AND COUNSEL

People vs. Holgado [GR L-2809, 22 March 1950] Second

Division, Moran (CJ): 7 concur
Facts: Frisco Holgado was charged in the Court of First
Instance of Romblon with slight illegal detention because
according to the information, being a private person, he did
"feloniously and without justifiable motive, kidnap and detain
one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for
about eight hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of
her personal liberty." On 8 May 1948, the day set for the trial,
Holgado pleaded guilty without the benefit of a lawyer. Two
days later, or on 10 May 1948, the trial court rendered
judgment, finding Holgado guilty and sentencing him the
penalty of prision mayor in its maximum degree to reclusion
temporal in the medium degree, as minimum, or 10 years
and 1 day of prision mayor to 20 years, with the accessory
penalties provided for by law, with costs. Holgado appealed.
Issue: Whether the duties required of the trial court when the
accused has no counsel were complied with.
Held: Under the circumstances, particularly the qualified plea
given by the accused, who was unaided by counsel, it was
not prudent, to say the least, for the trial court to render such
a serious judgment finding the accused guilty of a capital
offense, and imposing upon him such a heavy penalty as ten
years and one day of prision mayor to twenty years, without
absolutely any evidence to determine and clarify the true
facts of the case. Under Section 3, Rule 112 of the the Rules
of Court, when a defendant appears without attorney, the
court has four important duties to comply with: (1) It must
inform the defendant that it is his right to have attorney
before being arraigned; (2) After giving him such information
the court must ask him if he desires the aid of an attorney;

(3) If he desires and is unable to employ attorney, the court

must assign attorney de oficio to defend him; and (4) If the
accused desires to procure an attorney of his own the court
must grant him a reasonable time therefor. Not one of these
duties had been complied with by the trial court. The record
discloses that said court did not inform the accused of his
right to have an attorney nor did it ask him if he desired the
aid of one. The trial court failed to inquire whether or not the
accused was to employ an attorney, to grant him reasonable
time to procure one or to assign an attorney de oficio. One of
the great principles of justice guaranteed by our Constitution
is that "no person shall be held to answer for a criminal
offense without due process of law", and that all accused
"shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel." In
criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the
accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The
right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include
the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or
educated man may have no skill in the science of the law,
particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel,
he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he
does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can
happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or
uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted
by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a
constitutional right and it is so implemented that under our
rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an
accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to
ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is
essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him if
he so desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time
to procure an attorney of his own. Hence, the judgment
appealed from is reversed and the case is remanded to the
Court below for a new arraignment and a new trial after the
accused is apprised of his right to have and to be assisted by
counsel.

People v Agbayani 284 SCRA 315 (1998)

Facts: The appellant was charged for raping his 14-year old
daughter and was found guilty of the crime of rape. A motion
for a new trial was filed before the court by the new counsel
of the accused assailing the irregularities prejudicial to the
substantial rights of the accused invoking the failure of the
court to inform the accused of his right to choose his own
counsel and the violation of the appellants right for a 2 day
preparation for trial.
Issue: Whether or not the failure of the record to disclose
affirmatively that the trial judge advised the accused of the
right to have counsel is sufficient ground to reverse the
judgment of conviction and to send the case back for a new
trial.

thereof constitute reversible error and a ground for new

trial. Further, such right may be waived, expressly or
impliedly. In the instant case, appellant did not ask for time
to prepare for trial, hence, he effectively waived such right. It
is untenable to believe that the counsel who represented the
appellant was not prepared during the trial as records
showed he was able to cross-examine the complainant and
there was no ground to claim he is incompetent to represent
the appellant in court. The SC thereby affirmed the decision
of the lower court.

Amion v Chiongson 301 SCRA 614 (January 22, 1999)

Held: It is settled that the failure of the record to disclose

affirmatively that the trial judge advised the accused of his
right to counsel is not sufficient ground to reverse conviction.
The reason being that the trial court must be presumed to
have complied with the procedure prescribed by law for the
hearing and trial of cases, and that such a presumption can
only be overcome by an affirmative showing to the contrary.
Thus it has been held that unless the contrary appears in the
record, or that it is positively proved that the trial court failed
to inform the accused of his right to counsel, it will be
presumed that the accused was informed by the court of
such right.

Facts: This is an administrative matter filed before the court

charging the respondent judge for ignorance of the law and
oppression for vehemently insisting of appointing the
accused-appellant counsel de officio despite the appellants
opposition because he has his own counsel of choice in the
person of Atty. Depasucat. However, many instances that
Atty. Depasucat did not appear in court which prompted
respondent judge to assign Atty. Lao Ong from the PAO to
represent the accused stating on record that his
representation is without prejudice to the appearance of the
accused own counsel. This was done in order to avoid delay
of the trial since the complainant already expressed
frustration on the so many postponement of the hearing.

Section 9 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court provides that after

a plea of not guilty, the accused is entitled to two (2) days to
prepare for trial unless the court for good cause grants him
further time. It must be pointed out that the right must be
expressly demanded. Only when so demanded does denial

Issue: Whether or not there is merit of invoking the right to

counsel of his own choice as asserted by the accused in the
case at bar.
Held: The court finds the administrative complaint against
respondent judge devoid of merit. An examination of related

provisions in the Constitution concerning the right to counsel,

will show that the "preference in the choice of counsel"
pertains more aptly and specifically to a person under
investigation rather than one who is the accused in a
criminal prosecution. Accused-complainant was not, in any
way, deprived of his substantive and constitutional right to
due process as he was duly accorded all the opportunities to
be heard and to present evidence to substantiate his defense
but he forfeited this right, for not appearing in court together
with his counsel at the scheduled hearings. It was the
strategic machination of delaying the proceeding by the
accused that gave rise to the need of appointing him counsel
de officio by the court as delaying further the hearing is
prejudicial to speedy disposition of a case and causes delay
in the administration of justice.

RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE

OF ACCUSATION
People vs Quitlong
Facts: Two students, Jonathan Calpito and Jonathan Gosil
were involved in an argument with a fishball vendor, who
allegedly short-changed them. During this incident, several
men rushed towards Gosil and Calpito. Calpito was cornered
and stabbed. A witness who knew the victim, identified the
appellants as the ones who assaulted Calpito. The three were
then brought to the police station. Unfortunately, Calpito died
from his injuries. The RTC found appellants guilty of murder.
They moved fo reinvestigation alleging that it was a certain
Jesus Mendoza who stabbed the victim. The trial courtacted
favorably
on
the
motion.
The
information,
as
amended,included Jesus Mendoza among the named
accused. At their arraignment,the accused pleaded not guilty
to the crimecharged. The accused were then declared guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.
Issue: The question is whether or not the herein three
accused participated in, and may be held guilty as coprincipals by reason of conspiracy for, the death of the victim
due to the solitary stab inflicted on him.
Held: Where conspiracy exists, the individual acts done to
perpetrate the felony becomes of secondary importance, the
act of one being imputable to all the others. The information
must state that the accused have confederated to commit
the crime or that there has been a community of design, a
unity of purpose or an agreement to commit the felony
among the accused. Conspiracy must be alleged, not just
inferred, in the information on which basis an accused can
aptly enter his plea, a matter that is not to be confused with
or likened to the adequacy of evidence that may be required
to prove it. In establishing conspiracy when properly alleged,
the evidence to support it need not necessarily be shown by

direct proof but may be inferred from shown acts and

conduct of the accused. There being no conspiracy, the
accomplices must be made to suffer a lower penalty.

Pecho v People 262 SCRA 518 (1996)

Facts: The decision of the Supreme Court for convicting the
accused for the complex crime of attempted estafa thru
falsification of official and commercial document was assailed
with the contention of the defense that the accused may not
be convicted of the crime for double jeopardy. The charge
against the accused was on violation of RA 3019 of which he
was acquitted because it only penalizes consummated crime.
In the absence of evidence that shows that the crime was
consummated the accused was acquitted but the court held
judgment
of
prosecuting
his
conviction
for
attempted estafa thru falsification of official and commercial
document which is necessarily included in the crime charged.
Accused invokes the defense of double jeopardy since his
acquittal from the charge involving RA 3019 is a bar for
prosecution on the crime of attempted estafa thru
falsification of official and commercial document and that the
accused was not informed of this charge against him in the
filing of the information.
Issue: Whether or not the accused was informed of the
nature and cause of the crime to which he is convicted
Held: The court presented the objectives of the right of the
accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the crime
he is charged with as follows:
1. To furnish the accused with such a description of the
charge against him as will enable him to make his
defense;

2. To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for

protection against a further prosecution for the same
cause;
3. To inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may
decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a
conviction, if one should be had.
In order that this requirement may be satisfied facts must be
stated: not conclusions of law. The complaint must contain a
specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary
to constitute the crime. What determines the real nature and
cause of accusation against an accused is the actual recital
of facts stated in the information or complaint and not the
caption or preamble of the information or complaint nor the
specification of the provision of law alleged to have been
violated, they being conclusions of law. It follows then that an
accused may be convicted of a crime which although not the
one charged, is necessarily included in the latter. It has been
shown that the information filed in court is considered as
charging for two offenses which the counsel of the accused
failed to object therefore he can be convicted for both or
either of the charges.
However by reviewing the case at bar the SC finds lack of
sufficient evidence that would establish the guilt of the
accused as conspirator to the crime of estafa beyond
reasonable doubt, the prior decision of the SC was deemed to
be based merely on circumstantial evidence, thus the
accused was acquitted.

SORIANO V. SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE G.R. No. L65952, July 31, 1984, ABAD SANTOS, J.
FACTS: Thomas Tan was accused of qualified theft in a
complaint lodged with the City Fiscal of Quezon City,

assigned for investigation to the petitioner who was then an

Assistant City Fiscal. In the course of the investigation the
petitioner demanded P4,000.00 from Tan as the price for
dismissing the case. Tan reported the demand to the National
Bureau of Investigation which set up an entrapment. The
Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner as guilty for violation of
Section 3, paragraph (b) of R.A. 3019 which penalizes:
"Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift,
present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any
other person, in connection with any contract or transaction
between the Government and any other party, wherein the
public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under
the law." Petitioner contends that the preliminary
investigation of a complaint does not constitute a "contract
or transaction" and thus he cannot be convicted for violation
of R.A. 3019. And if acquitted, he cannot be subsequently
convicted of direct bribery because that would violate his
right to be informed of the nature of the accusation against
him. ISSUES:(1) Whether or not preliminary investigation
constitutes a "transaction or contract." (2) Whether or not, if
previous conviction for violation of R.A. 3019 were wrong, he
can now be convicted for direct bribery without violating his
right to be informed.
HELD: (1) NO. The term 'transaction' as used thereof is not
limited in its scope or meaning to a commercial or business
transaction but includes all kinds of transaction, whether
commercial, civil or administrative in nature, pending with
the government. This must be so, otherwise, the Act would
have so stated in the "Definition of Terms", Section 2 thereof.
But it did not. The investigation was also not a contract.
Neither was it a transaction because this term must be
construed as analogous to the term which precedes it. A
transaction, like a contract, is one which involves some
consideration as in credit transactions and this element
(consideration) is absent in the investigation conducted by
the petitioner. We agree with the petitioner that it was error

for the Sandiganbayan to have convicted him of violating

Sec. 3 (b) of R.A. No. 3019. (2) YES. The petitioner also claims
that he cannot be convicted of bribery under the Revised
Penal Code because to do so would be violative of as
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him. Wrong. A reading of the
information which has been reproduced herein clearly makes
out a case of bribery so that the petitioner cannot claim
deprivation of the right to be informed.

BORJA V. MENDOZA G.R. No. L-45667, June 20, 1977,

FERNANDO, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Manuel Borja, accused of slight physical
injuries, was convicted and sentenced to suffer imprisonment
for a period of twenty days of arresto menor by respondent
Judge Senining, despite the absence of an arraignment.. The
judge proceeded with the trial in absentia and promulgated
the assailed decision. An appeal was duly elevated to the
Court of First Instance of Cebu presided by respondent Judge
Mendoza. Without any notice to petitioner and without
requiring him to submit his memorandum, a decision on the
appealed case was rendered against him. ISSUE: Whether or
not the decision was validly rendered despite the absence of
an arraignment.
HELD: NO. Arraignment is an indispensable requirement in
any criminal prosecution. The Constitution requires that the
accused be arraigned so that he may be informed as to why
he was indicted and what penal offense he has to face. This
duty is an affirmative one which the court, on its own motion,
must perform, unless waived. To emphasize its importance,
no such duty is laid on the court with regard to the rights of
the accused which he may be entitled to exercise during the
trial. Those are rights which he must assert himself and the
benefits of which he himself must demand. In other words, in

the arraignment the court must act of its own volition. It is

imperative that he is thus made fully aware of possible loss
of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the
crime imputed to him. At the very least then, he must be
fully informed of why the prosecuting arm of the state is
mobilized against him. He is thus in a position to enter his
plea with full knowledge of the consequences. He is not even
required to do so immediately. He may move to quash.

RIGHT TO SPEEDY, IMPARTIAL AND PUBLIC TRIAL

People v Tee GR No. 140546-47 (January 20, 2003)
"rights of

the

accused

to

speedy

trial"

Facts
The case involves an automatic review of judgment made
against Tee who was convicted for illegal possession of
marijuana and sentenced to death. The defense assailed the
decision of the court for taking admissible as evidence the
marijuana seized from the accused by virtue of allegedly
general search warrant. They further contend that the
accused was deprived of his right to speedy trial by failure of
the prosecution to produce their witness who failed to appear
during the 20 hearing dates thereby slowing down the trial
procedure.
Issue
Whether or not the substantive right of the accused for a
speedy trial prejudiced during the hearing of the case.
Held
The court ruled that the substantive right of the accused for
a fair and speedy trial was not violated. It held that the
Speedy Trial Act of 1998 provides that the trial period for the
criminal cases should be in general 180 days. However, in
determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, courts
should do more than a mathematical computation of the
number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the
case.The right to a speedy trial is deemed violated only
when: (1) the proceedings are attended by vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays; or (2) when unjustified
postponements are asked for and secured; or (3) when
without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is
allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.

It was shown by the records that the prosecution exerted

efforts in obtaining a warrant to compel the witness to testify.
The concept of speedy trial is necessarily relative where
several factors are weighed such as the length of time of
delay, the reason of such delay, and conduct of prosecution
and the accused and the prejudice and damaged caused to
the accused of such delay. The court did not find the 20 days
of delayed hearing unreasonable length of time as to
constitute deprivation of the constitutional rights of the
accused for a speedy trial in addition to the fact that court
trial may be always subjected to postponement for
reasonable cause of delay. In the absence of showing that the
reason for delay was capricious or oppressive, the State must
not be deprived of reasonable opportunity in prosecuting the
accused.

Flores vs. People

GR L-25769 | December 10, 1974

FACTS:
Petitioners, Francisco Flores and Francisco Angel, were
accused for robbery. Information was filed in December
1951. They were found guilty of the crime charged in
November 1955. Notice of appeal was file in December
1955. It was until February 1958 that action was taken by CA
a resolution remanding the records of the case to the lower
court for a rehearing of the testimony of a certain witness
deemed material for the disposition of the case. Such
resolution was amended dated August 1959 which granted
the petitioners to set aside the decision so that evidence for
the defense on new facts may be received and a new
decision in lieu of the old one may be rendered. The case

was returned to the lower court but nothing was done for
about a year because the offended party failed to appear
despite the 6/7 dates set for such hearing. Furthermore,
when the offended party took the witness stand, his
testimony was characterized as a mere fiasco as he could no
longer remember the details of the alleged crime and even
failed to identify the 2 accused.

The trial court instead of rendering a decision sent back the

records to the appellate tribunal. 5 more years elapsed
without anything being done, petitioners sought dismissal of
the case against them due to inordinate delay in the
disposition (from December 1955- May 1965). CA was
unresponsive notwithstanding the vigorous plea of the
petitioners, its last order being a denial of a second MR dated
January 1966. CAs defense is that the case was not properly
captioned as People of the Philippines and without Court
of Appeals being made a party to the petition.
ISSUE: WON constitutional right to a speedy trial was
violated.
HELD: YES. Petition for certiorari was granted. Orders
denying Motion to dismiss as Motion to Reconsideration are
set aside and nullified. Criminal Case against petitioners
was dismissed.
Constitutional right to a speedy trial means one free from
vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. An accused is
entitled to a trial at the earliest opportunity. He cannot be
oppressed by delaying the commencement of the trial for an
unreasonable length of time. The Constitution does not say
that such right may be availed only where the prosecution of
a crime is commenced and undertaken by the fiscal. It does
not exclude from its operation cases commenced by private
individuals. Where a person is prosecuted criminally, he is

entitled to a speedy trial, irrespective of the nature of the

offense or the manner in which it is authorized to be
commenced.
Technicalities should give way to the realities of the
situation. There should not be too much significance
attached to the procedural defect (refer to CAs defense). CA
failed to accord respect to this particular constitutional right
amounting at the very least to a grave abuse of discretion.

CONDE VS. RIVERA [45 PHIL 650; G.R. NO. 21741; 25

JAN 1924]
Sunday, February 15, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Aurelia Conde, formerly a municipal midwife in
Lucena, Tayabas, has been forced to respond to no less the
five information for various crimes and misdemeanors, has
appeared with her witnesses and counsel athearings no less
than on eight different occasions only to see the cause
postponed, has twice been required to come to the Supreme
Court for protection, and now, after the passage of more than
one year from the time when the first information was filed,
seems as far away from a definite resolution of her troubles
as
she
was
when
originally
charged.
Issue: Whether or Not petitioner has been denied her right
to
a
speedy
and
impartial
trial.
Held: Philippine organic and statutory law expressly
guarantee that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall
enjoy the right to have a speedy trial. Aurelia Conde, like all
other accused persons, has a right to a speedy trial in order
that if innocent she may go free, and she has been deprived

of that right in defiance of law. We lay down the legal

proposition that, where a prosecuting officer, without good
cause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendant
against his protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as in
this instance for more than a year, the accused is entitled to
relief by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of
the information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by
habeas corpus to obtain his freedom.

MATEO VS VILLALUZ
Garcia vs. Domingo [GR L-30104, 25 July 1973] Resolution
En Banc, Fernando (J): 5 concur, 1 took no part, 1 on leave
Facts: In Branch I of the City Court of Manila presided over by
Judge Gregorio N. Garcia, there were commenced, by
appropriate informations all dated 16 January 1968, 8
criminal actions against Edgardo Calo, and Simeon Carbonnel
and Francisco Lorenzana, as follows: a. Against Edgardo Calo
(on complaint of Francisco Lorenzana) (1) Criminal Case F109191, for slight physical injuries; (2) Criminal Case F109192, also for slight physical injuries; and (3) Criminal
Case F-109193, for maltreatment; b. Against Simeon
Carbonnel (id.) (1) Criminal Case F-109197, for maltreatment;
(2) Criminal Case F-109196, for slight physical injuries; and
(3) Criminal Case F-109198 for light threats; (c) Against
Francisco Lorenzana (on complaint of Calo and Carbonnel) (1)
Criminal Case F-109201, for violation of Sec. 887 of the
Revised Ordinances of Manila (resisting an officer); and (2)
Criminal Case F-109200, for slander. The trial of the cases
was jointly held on March 4, 18, 23, and 30; April 17 and 20;
May 4 and 11; June 1, 15, 22, and 29; and August 3 and 10,
1968. All 14 trial dates except March 4 and 18, and April
17, 1968 fell on a Saturday. This was arranged by the
parties and the Court upon the insistence of Calo and
Carbonnel who, as police officers under suspension because

of the cases, desired the same to be terminated as soon as

possible and as there were many cases scheduled for trial on
the usual criminal trial days. The trial of the cases in question
were held, with the conformity of the accused and their
counsel, in the chambers of Judge Garcia. During all 14 days
of trial, spanning a period of several months, the accused
were at all times represented by their respective counsel,
who acted not only in defense of their clients, but as
prosecutors of the accusations filed at their clients' instance.
There was only 1 day when Atty. Consengco, representing
Calo and Carbonnel, was absent. This was on 20 April 1968.
But at the insistence of Pat. Carbonnel, the trial proceeded,
and Carbonnel cross-examined one of the witnesses
presented by the adverse party. At the conclusion of the
hearings the accused, thru counsel, asked for and were
granted time to submit memoranda. Calo and Carbonnel,
thru counsel, Atty. Rafael Consengco, submitted a 14-page
memorandum with not less than 35 citations of relevant
portions of the transcript of stenographic notes in support of
their prayer for exoneration, and for the conviction of
Lorenzana in respect of their countercharges against the
latter. The promulgation of judgment was first scheduled on
23 September 1968. This was postponed to 28 September
1968, at the instance of Atty. Rafael Consengco, as counsel
for respondents Calo and Carbonnel, and again to 1 October
1968, this time at the instance of Atty. Consengco and Atty.
Francisco Koh who had, in the meantime, also entered his
appearance as counsel for Calo and Carbonnel. The
applications for postponement were not grounded upon and
supposed defect or irregularity of the proceedings. Early in
the morning of 1 October 1968, Calo and Carbonnel, thru
their counsel, Atty. Rafael S. Consengco, filed with the Court
of First Instance a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with
application for preliminary prohibitory and mandatory
injunction, alleging jurisdictional defects. After proceedings
duly had, Judge Felix Domingo (CFI Manila) issued an order

declaring that the constitutional and statutory rights of the

accused had been violated, adversely affecting their right to
a free and impartial trial noting that the trial of these cases
lasting several weeks were held exclusively in chambers and
not in the court room open to the public; and ordering the
city court Judge (Garcia) "to desist from reading or causing to
be read or promulgated the decisions he may have rendered
already in the criminal cases in question pending in his Court,
until further orders of the CFI. A motion for reconsideration
proving unavailing, Garcia and Lorenzana on 28 January
1969, elevated the matter to the Supreme Court by means of
a suit for certiorari and prohibition.
Issue: Whether the conduct of the trial inside the Judges airconditioned chambers, rather than the usual open court,
render the proceedings violative of the constitutional
mandate for public trial.
Held: The 1935 Constitution which was in force at the time of
the antecedents of the petition explicitly enumerated the
right to a public trial to which an accused was entitled. Trial
should also be public in order to offset any danger of
conducting it in an illegal and unjust manner, and thus serve
as a deterrence to arbitrariness. There is no ambiguity in the
words employed. The trial must be public. It possesses that
character when anyone interested in observing the manner a
judge conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may do so.
There is to be no ban on such attendance. His being a
stranger to the litigants is of no moment. No relationship to
the parties need be shown. The thought that lies behind this
safeguard is the belief that thereby the accused is afforded
further protection, that his trial is likely to be conducted with
regularity and not tainted with any impropriety. It is
understandable why such a right is deemed embraced in
procedural due process. Where a trial takes place, as is quite
usual, in the courtroom and a calendar of what cases are to
be heard is posted, no problem arises. It is the usual course

of events that individuals desirous of being present are free

to do so. There is the well recognized exception though that
warrants the exclusion of the public where the evidence may
be characterized as "offensive to decency or public morals."
Still, herein, when the trial was held on Saturdays and in the
air-conditioned chambers of the City Judge for the
convenience of the parties and of the Judge, the proceedings
were not violative of the right to public trial. There is no
showing that the public was thereby excluded. It is to be
admitted that the size of the room allotted the Judge would
reduce the number of those who could be present. Such a
fact though is not indicative of any transgression of this right.
Courtrooms are not of uniform dimensions. Some are smaller
than others. It suffices to satisfy the requirement of a trial
being public if the accused could "have his friends, relatives
and counsel present, no matter with what offense he may be
charged." Reference may also be made to the undisputed
fact at least 14 hearings had been held in chambers of the
city court Judge, without objection on the part of policemen.
An objective appraisal of conditions in municipal or city
courts would have gone far in dispelling the apprehension
that there was an evasion of a constitutional command. The
crowded daily calendar, the nature of the cases handled, civil
as well as criminal, the relaxed attitude on procedural rules
not being strictly adhered to all make for a less tense
atmosphere. As a result the attendance of the general public
is much more in evidence; nor is its presence unwelcome.
When it is remembered further that the occupants of such
courts are not chosen primarily for their legal acumen, but
taken from that portion of the bar more considerably attuned
to the pulse of public life, it is not to be rationally expected
that an accused would be denied whatever solace and
comfort may come from the knowledge that a judge, with the
eyes of the persons in court alert to his demeanor and his
rulings, would run the risk of being unjust, unfair, or arbitrary.
Nor does it change matters, just because, it was in the air-

conditioned chambers of a city court judge rather than in the

usual place that the trial took place.
(This is a digest of People vs. Claudio Teehankee, Jr.,
G.R. Nos. 111206-08, 6 October 1995)
The facts:
In 1991, Jussi Olavi Leino was taking Maureen Hultman to her
home at Campanilla Street, Dasmarinas Village, Makati.
Roland John Chapman went with them. When they entered
the village, Maureen asked Leino to stop about a block away
from her house, as she wanted to walk the rest of the way for
she did not want her parents to know that she was going
home that late. Leino offered to walk with her while Chapman
stayed in the car and listened to the radio.
While Leino and Maureen were walking, a light-colored
Mitsubishi box-type Lancer car, driven by accused Claudio
Teehankee, Jr., came up from behind them and stopped on
the middle of the road. Accused alighted from his car,
approached them, and asked: Who are you? (Show me your)
I.D. When Leino handed his I.D., the accused grabbed and
pocketed the I.D., without bothering to look at it.

help. She repeatedly shouted: Oh, my God, hes got a gun.

Hes gonna kill us. Will somebody help us? All the while,
accused was pointing his gun to and from Leino to Maureen,
warning the latter to shut up. Accused ordered Leino to sit
down on the sidewalk. Leino obeyed and made no attempt to
move away. Accused stood 2-3 meters away from him.
Maureen continued to be hysterical. She could not stay still.
She strayed to the side of accuseds car. Accused tried but
failed to grab her. Maureen circled around accuseds car,
trying to put some distance between them. The short chase
lasted for a minute or two. Eventually, accused caught
Maureen and repeatedly enjoined her to shut up and sit down
beside Leino. Maureen finally sat beside Leino on the
sidewalk.
For a moment, the accused turned his back from the two. He
faced them again and shot Leino. Leino was hit on the upper
jaw, fell backwards on the sidewalk, but did not lose
consciousness. Leino heard another shot and saw Maureen
fall beside him. He lifted his head to see what was happening
and saw accused return to his car and drive away. Leino
struggled to his knees and shouted for help. He noticed at
least 3 people who saw the incident.

Chapman saw the incident. He stepped down on the sidewalk

and asked accused: Why are you bothering us? Accused
pushed Chapman, dug into his shirt, pulled out a gun and
fired at him. Chapman felt his upper body, staggered for a
moment, and asked: Why did you shoot me? Chapman
crumpled on the sidewalk. Leino knelt beside Chapman to
assist him but accused ordered him to get up and leave
Chapman alone. Accused then turned his ire on Leino. He
pointed gun at him and asked: Do you want a trouble?
Leino said no and took a step backward.

As a result of the incident, 3 separate criminal cases were

filed against accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr. Initially, he was
charged with: MURDER for the killing of ROLAND CHAPMAN,
and two (2) FRUSTRATED MURDER for the shooting and
wounding of JUSSI LEINO and MAUREEN HULTMAN. When
Hultman subsequently died after 97 days of confinement at
the hospital and during the course of the trial, the
Information for Frustrated Murder was amended to MURDER.

The shooting initially shocked Maureen. When she came to

her senses, she became hysterical and started screaming for

Accused relied on the defense of denial and alibi. Accused

claimed that during the shooting incident, he was not
anywhere near the scene of the crime, but in his house in

The defense:

Pasig. Accused averred that he only came to know the 3

victims in the Dasmarinas shooting when he read the
newspaper reports about it. Accused admitted ownership of a
box-type, silver metallic gray Mitsubishi Lancer, with plate
number PDW 566. He, however, claimed that said car ceased
to be in good running condition after its involvement in an
accident. Until the day of the shooting, his Lancer car had
been parked in the garage of his mothers house in
Dasmarinas Village. He has not used this car since then.
Accused conceded that although the car was not in good
running condition, it could still be used.
The ruling:
Eyewitness identification and out-of-court identification.
The accused was convicted on the strength of the
testimonies of 3 eyewitnesses who positively identified him
as the gunman. However, he vigorously assails his out-ofcourt identification by these eyewitnesses.
He starts by trying to discredit the eyeball account of Leino,
the lone surviving victim of the crimes at bar. Appellant
urges: First, that Leinos identification of him outside an
unoccupied house in Forbes Park was highly irregular;
Second, that Leino saw his pictures on television and the
newspapers before he identified him; Third, that Leinos
interview at the hospital was never put in writing; Fourth,
that the sketch of appellant based on the description given
by Leino to the CIS agents was suppressed by the NBI. It is
surmised that the sketch must have been among the
evidence turned over to the NBI when the latter assumed
jurisdiction over the investigation; and, lastly, that Leino
could not have remembered the face of the accused. The
shooting lasted for only five (5) minutes. During that period,
his gaze could not have been fixed only on the gunmans
face. His senses were also dulled by the five (5) bottles of
beer he imbibed that night.

It is understandable for the accused to assail his out-of-court

identification by the prosecution witnesses in his first
assignment of error. Eyewitness identification constitutes
vital evidence and, in most cases, decisive of the success or
failure of the prosecution. Yet, while eyewitness identification
is significant, it is not as accurate and authoritative as the
scientific forms of identification evidence such as the
fingerprint or DNA testing. Some authors even describe
eyewitness evidence as inherently suspect. The causes of
misidentification are known, thus:
Identification testimony has at least three components. First,
witnessing a crime, whether as a victim or a bystander,
involves perception of an event actually occurring. Second,
the witness must memorize details of the event. Third, the
witness must be able to recall and communicate accurately.
Dangers of unreliability in eyewitness testimony arise at
each of these three stages, for whenever people attempt to
acquire, retain, and retrieve information accurately, they are
limited by normal human fallibilities and suggestive
influences.
Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in
various ways. It is done thru show-ups where the suspect
alone is brought face to face with the witness for
identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs
are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also
done thru line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect
from a group of persons lined up for the purpose. Since
corruption of out-of-court identification contaminates the
integrity of in-court identification during the trial of the case,
courts have fashioned out rules to assure its fairness and its
compliance with the requirements of constitutional due
process. In resolving the admissibility of and relying on outof-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the
totality of circumstances test where they consider the
following factors, viz: (1) the witness opportunity to view the

criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness degree of

attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior
description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the
length of time between the crime and the identification; and,
(6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.
Using the totality of circumstances test, the alleged
irregularities cited by the accused did not result in his
misidentification nor was he denied due process. There is
nothing wrong in Leinos identification of the accused in an
unoccupied house in Forbes Park. The records reveal that this
mode was resorted to by the authorities for security reasons.
The need for security even compelled that Leino be fetched
and escorted from his house in Forbes Park by U.S. embassy
security officials and brought to the house where he was to
make the identification. The Leinos refused to have the
identification at the NBI office as it was cramped with people
and with high security risk. Leinos fear for his safety was not
irrational. He and his companions had been shot in cold blood
in one of the exclusive, supposedly safe subdivisions in the
metropolis.
There is no hard and fast rule as to the place where suspects
are identified by witnesses. Identification may be done in
open field. It is often done in hospitals while the crime and
the criminal are still fresh in the mind of the victim.
Accused cant also gripe that Leino saw his pictures and
heard radio and TV accounts of the shooting before he
personally identified him. The records show that while Leino
was still in the hospital, he was shown 3 pictures of different
men by the investigators. He identified the accused as the
gunman from these pictures. He, however, categorically
stated that, before the mug shot identification, he has not
seen any picture of accused or read any report relative to the
shooting incident. The burden is on accused to prove that his

mug shot identification was unduly suggestive. Failing proof

of impermissible suggestiveness, he cannot complain about
the admission of his out-of-court identification by Leino.
There is no reason to doubt the correctness of the accuseds
identification by Leino. The scene of the crime was welllighted by a lamp post. The accused was merely 2-3 meters
away when he shot Leino. The incident happened for a full 5
minutes. Leino had no ill-motive to falsely testify against the
accusedt. His testimony at the trial was straightforward. He
was unshaken by the brutal cross-examination of the defense
counsels. He never wavered in his identification of the
accused. When asked how sure he was that the accused was
responsible for the crime, he confidently replied: Im very
sure. It could not have been somebody else.
The accused cannot likewise capitalize on the failure of the
investigators to reduce to a sworn statement the information
revealed by Leino during his hospital interviews. It was
sufficiently established that Leinos extensive injuries,
especially the injury to his tongue, limited his mobility. The
day he identified appellant in the line-up, he was still
physically unable to speak. He was being fed through a tube
inserted in his throat. There is also no rule of evidence which
requires the rejection of the testimony of a witness whose
statement has not been priorly reduced to writing.
The SC also rejected the accuseds contention that the NBI
suppressed the sketch prepared by the CIS on the basis of
the description given by Leino. There is nothing on the record
to show that said sketch was turned over by the CIS to the
NBI which could warrant a presumption that the sketch was
suppressed. The suspicion that the sketch did not resemble
the accused is not evidence. It is unmitigated guesswork.
The SC was also not impressed with the contention that it
was incredible for Leino to have remembered the accuseds
face when the incident happened within a span of 5 minutes.

Five minutes is not a short time for Leino to etch in his mind
the picture of the accused. Experience shows that precisely
because of the unusual acts of bestiality committed before
their eyes, eyewitnesses, especially the victims to a crime,
can remember with a high degree of reliability the identity of
criminals. The natural reaction of victims of criminal violence
is to strive to see the appearance of their assailants and
observe the manner the crime was committed. Most often,
the face end body movements of the assailant create an
impression which cannot be easily erased from their memory.
In this case, there is absolutely no improper motive for Leino
to impute a serious crime to the accused. The victims and
the accused were unknown to each other before their chance
encounter. If Leino identified the accused, it must be because
the accused was the real culprit.
The SC also gave credence to the testimony of the other two
witnesses. As to the testimony of Cadenas, his initial
reluctance to reveal to the authorities what he witnessed was
sufficiently explained during the trial he feared for his and
his familys safety. The Court has taken judicial notice of the
natural reticence of witnesses to get involved in the solution
of crimes considering the risk to their lives and limbs. In light
of these all too real risks, the court has not considered the
initial reluctance of fear-gripped witnesses to cooperate with
authorities as an authorities as an indicium of credibility. As
to the testimony of Mangubat, the SC found nothing in the
records to suspect that Mangubat would perjure himself.
2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt
According to the the accused, the trial court erred in not
holding that the prosecution failed to establish his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. First, he claims the trial court erred
in citing in its Decision his involvement in previous shooting
incidents. Second, the NBI failed to conduct an examination
to compare the bullets fired from the gun at the scene of the

crime with the bullets recovered from the body of Chapman.

Third, the prosecution eyewitnesses described the gunmans
car as white, but the trial court found it to be silver metalic
gray. Fourth, the accused could not have been the gunman,
for Mangubat said that he overheard the victim Hultman
plead to the gunman, thus: Please, dont shoot me and
dont kill me. I promise Mommy, Daddy. The accused also
contends that a maid in a house near the scene of the crime
told Makati police Alberto Fernandez that she heard Maureen
say: Daddy dont shoot. Dont. Fifth, the NBI towed
accuseds car from Dasmarinas Village to the NBI office which
proved that the same was not in good running condition.
Lastly, the result of the paraffin test conducted on appellant
showed he was negative of nitrates.
The accused points to other possible suspects, viz:. ANDERS
HULTMAN, since one of the eyewitnesses was quoted in the
newspapers as having overheard Maureen plead to the
gunman: Huwag, Daddy.; and, (b) JOSE MONTAO, another
resident of Dasmarias Village, who had a white Lancer car,
also bearing license plate number 566.
The accused, however, cannot hope to exculpate himself
simply because the trial judge violated the rule on res inter
alios acta when he considered his involvement in previous
shooting incidents. This rule has long been laid to rest. The
harmless error rule is also followed in our jurisdiction. In
dealing with evidence improperly admitted in trial, the court
examines its damaging quality and its impact to the
substantive rights of the litigant. If the impact is slight and
insignificant, the court disregards the error as it will not
overcome the weight of the properly admitted evidence
against the prejudiced party.
In the case at bar, the reference by the trial judge to reports
about the troublesome character of appellant is a harmless
error. The reference is not the linchpin of the inculpatory

evidence appreciated by the trial judge in convicting the

accused. As aforestated, the accused was convicted mainly
because of his identification by 3 eyewitnesses with high
credibility.
The NBI may have also failed to compare the bullets fired
from the fatal gun with the bullets found at the scene of the
crime. The omission, however, cannot exculpate the accused.
The omitted comparison cannot nullify the evidentiary value
of the positive identification of the accused.
There is also little to the contention of the accused that his
Lancer car was not in running condition. Allegedly, this was
vicariously proved when the NBI towed his car from
Dasmarias Village where it was parked to the NBI office.
Again, the argument is negated by the records which show
that said car was towed because the NBI could not get its
ignition key which was then in the possession of the accused.
Clearly, the car was towed not because it was not in running
condition. Even the accuseds evidence show that said car
could run. After its repairs, the accuseds son, Claudio
Teehankee III, drove it from the repair shop in Banawe,
Quezon City to Dasmarinas Village, in Makati, where it was
parked.
Nor was the SC impressed by the alleged discrepancies in the
eyewitnesses description of the color of the gunmans car.
Leino described the car as light-colored; Florece said the car
was somewhat white (medyo puti); Mangubat declared the
car was white; and Cadenas testified it was silver metallic
gray. These alleged discrepancies amount to no more than
shades of differences and are not meaningful, referring as
they do to colors white, somewhat white and silver metallic
gray. Considering the speed and shocking nature of the
incident which happened before the break of dawn, these
slight discrepancies in the description of the car do not make
the prosecution eyewitnesses unworthy of credence.

The accuseds attempt to pin the crimes at bar on Anders

Hultman, the adoptive father of Maureen Hultman, deserves
scant consideration. The accused cites a newspaper item
where Maureen was allegedly overheard as saying to the
gunman: Huwag, Daddy. Huwag, Daddy. The evidence on
record, however, demonstrates that Anders Hultman could
not have been the gunman. It was clearly established that
Maureen could not have uttered said statement for two (2)
reasons: Maureen did not speak Tagalog, and she addressed
Anders Hultman as Papa, not Daddy. Moreover, Leino
outrightly dismissed this suspicion. While still in the hospital
and when informed that the Makati police were looking into
this possibility, Leino flatly stated that Anders Hultman was
NOT the gunman. Leino is a reliable witness.
The accused cannot also capitalize on the paraffin test
showing he was negative of nitrates. Scientific experts
concur in the view that the paraffin test has . . . proved
extremely unreliable in use. The only thing that it can
definitely establish is the presence or absence of nitrates or
nitrites on the hand. It cannot be established from this test
alone that the source of the nitrates or nitrites was the
discharge of a firearm. The person may have handled one or
more of a number of substances which give the same
positive reaction for nitrates or nitrites, such as explosives,
fireworks, fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, and leguminous plants
such as peas, beans, and alfalfa. A person who uses tobacco
may also have nitrate or nitrite deposits on his hands since
these substances are present in the products of combustion
of tobacco. In numerous rulings, we have also recognized
several factors which may bring about the absence of
gunpowder nitrates on the hands of a gunman, viz: when the
assailant washes his hands after firing the gun, wears gloves
at the time of the shooting, or if the direction of a strong
wind is against the gunman at the time of firing. In the case
at bar, NBI Forensic Chemist, Leonora Vallado, testified and
confirmed that excessive perspiration or washing of hands

with the use of warm water or vinegar may also remove

gunpowder nitrates on the skin. She likewise opined that the
conduct of the paraffin test after more than seventy-two (72)
hours from the time of the shooting may not lead to a reliable
result for, by such time, the nitrates could have already been
removed by washing or perspiration. In the Report on the
paraffin test conducted on appellant, Forensic Chemist
Elizabeth Ayonon noted that when the accused was tested for
the presence of nitrates, more than 72 hours has already
lapsed from the time of the alleged shooting.
3. The right to an impartial trial.
The the accused blames the press for his conviction as he
contends that the publicity given to his case impaired his
right to an impartial trial. He postulates there was pressure
on the trial judge for high-ranking government officials avidly
followed the developments in the case (as no less than then
Vice-President Estrada and then DOJ Secretary Drilon
attended some of the hearings and, President Aquino even
visited Hultman while she was still confined at the hospital).
He submits that the trial judge failed to protect him from
prejudicial publicity and disruptive influences which attended
the prosecution of the cases.
The SC did not sustain the accuseds claim that he was
denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity.
Its true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at
bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high
stake criminal trials. Then and now, we rule that the right of
an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press.
To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an accuseds right
to a fair trial for, as well pointed out, a responsible press has
always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial
administration, especially in the criminal field . . . The press
does not simply publish information about trials but guards
against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting in the police,

prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public

scrutiny and criticism.
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an
accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant
was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by
itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the
trial judge and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is
impossible to seal the minds of members of the bench from
pre-trial and other off-court publicity of sensational criminal
cases. The state of the art of our communication system
brings news as they happen straight to our breakfast tables
and right to our bedrooms. These news form part of our
everyday menu of the facts and fictions of life. For another,
our idea of a fair and impartial judge is not that of a hermit
who is out of touch with the world. We have not installed the
jury system whose members are overly protected from
publicity lest they lose their impartiality. Our judges are
learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence
and on-camera performances of parties to a litigation. Their
mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not
per se fatally infect their impartiality.
At best, the accused can only conjure possibility of prejudice
on the part of the trial judge due to the barrage of publicity
that characterized the investigation and trial of the case. The
SC had previously rejected this standard of possibility of
prejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice as we
ruled that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there
must be allegation and proof that the judges have been
unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the
barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, the records do not
show that the trial judge developed actual bias against
appellant as a consequence of the extensive media coverage
of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of
circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge
acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity

which is incapable of change even by evidence presented

during the trial. The accused has the burden to prove this
actual bias and he has not discharged the burden. There is no
evidence showing that the trial judge allowed the
proceedings to turn into a carnival. Nor did he consent to or
condone any manifestation of unruly or improper behavior or
conduct inside the courtroom during the trial of the case at
bar.
Parenthetically, the accused should be the last person to
complain against the press for prejudicial coverage of his
trial. The records reveal he presented in court no less than 7
newspaper reporters and relied heavily on selected portions
of their reports for his defense. The defenses documentary
evidence consists mostly of newspaper clippings relative to
the investigation of the case at bar and which appeared to
cast doubt on his guilt. The press cannot be fair and unfair to
appellant at the same time.
Finally, it would not be amiss to stress that the trial judge
voluntarily inhibited himself from further hearing the case,
but the SC, nothing in the conduct of the proceedings to stir
any suspicion of partiality against the trial judge, directed the
trial judge to proceed with the trial to speed up the
administration of justice.
4. The presence of treachery
The accused claims that treachery was not present in the
killing of Hultman and Chapman, and the wounding of Leino
for it was not shown that the gunman consciously and
deliberately adopted particular means, methods and forms in
the execution of the crime. The accused asserts that mere
suddenness of attack does not prove treachery.
The 3 Informations charged the accused with having
committed the crimes with treachery and evident
premeditation. Evident premeditation was correctly ruled out

by the trial court for, admittedly, the shooting incident was

merely a casual encounter or a chance meeting on the street
since the victims were unknown to the accused and viceversa. It, however, appreciated the presence of the qualifying
circumstance of treachery.
On the other hand, the prosecution failed to prove treachery
in the killing of Chapman. Prosecution witness Leino
established the sequence of events leading to the shooting.
He testified that for no apparent reason, the accused
suddenly alighted from his car and accosted him and
Maureen Hultman who were then walking along the sidewalk.
Appellant questioned who they were and demanded for an
I.D. After Leino handed him his I.D., Chapman appeared from
behind Leino and asked what was going on. Chapman then
stepped down on the sidewalk and inquired from appellant
what was wrong. There and then, the accused pushed
Chapman, pulled a gun from inside his shirt, and shot him.
The gun attack was unexpected. Why did you shoot me?
was all Chapman could utter. Concededly, the shooting of
Chapman was carried out swiftly and left him with no chance
to defend himself. Even then, there is no evidence on record
to prove that the accused consciously and deliberately
adopted his mode of attack to insure the accomplishment of
his criminal design without risk to himself. The accused acted
on the spur of the moment. Their meeting was by chance.
They were strangers to each other. The time between the
initial encounter and the shooting was short and unbroken.
The shooting of Chapman was thus the result of a rash and
impetuous impulse on the part of the accused rather than a
deliberate act of will. Mere suddenness of the attack on the
victim would not, by itself, constitute treachery. Hence,
absent any qualifying circumstance, the accused should only
be held liable for Homicide for the shooting and killing of
Chapman.

As to the wounding of Leino and the killing of Hultman,

treachery clearly attended the commission of the crimes. The
evidence shows that after shooting Chapman in cold blood,
the accused ordered Leino to sit on the pavement. Maureen
became hysterical and wandered to the side of appellants
car. When the accused went after her, Maureen moved
around his car and tried to put some distance between them.
After a minute or two, the accused got to Maureen and
ordered her to sit beside Leino on the pavement. While
seated, unarmed and begging for mercy, the two were
gunned down by the accused . Clearly, the accused
purposely placed his two victims in a completely defenseless
position before shooting them. There was an appreciable
lapse of time between the killing of Chapman and the
shooting of Leino and Hultman a period which the accused
used to prepare for a mode of attack which ensured the
execution of the crime without risk to himself.

(3) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated

Murder, qualified by treachery, for the shooting of Jussi Olavi
Leino, and sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 8
years of prision mayor as minimum, to 14 years and 8
months of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay the
said offended party the following amounts: P30,000 as
indemnity for his injuries; P118,369.84 and equivalent in
Philippine Pesos of U.S.$55,600.00, both as actual damages;
P1,000,000 as moral damages; and, P2,000,000 as
exemplary damages.

Penalties:(Note: Mr. Teehankee was pardoned in 2008)

Re: Request Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial in the

Sandiganbayan of the Plunder Cases against the Former
President Joseph E. Estrada. Perez vs. Estrada [AM 01-4-03SC, 29 June 2001] En Banc, Vitug (J): 4 concur, 1 on leave, 2
file separate concurring opinions, 2 file separate dissenting
opinion, 1 joins separate opinion of one concurring justice

(1) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide

for the shooting of Roland John Chapman. He was sentenced
to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 8
years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 14 years, 8
months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to
pay the heirs of the said deceased the following amounts:
P50,000 as indemnity for the victims death; and, P1,000,000
as moral damages.
(2) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder,
qualified by treachery, for the shooting of Maureen Navarro
Hultman. He was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of
reclusion perpetua, and to pay the heirs of the said deceased
the following amounts: P50,000 as indemnity for her death;
P2,350,461.83 as actual damages; P564,042.57 for loss of
earning capacity of said deceased; P1,000,000 as moral
damages; and P2,000,000 as exemplary damages.

(4) In all three cases, to pay each of the 3 offended parties

the sum of P1,000,000, or a total of P3,000,000, for
attorneys fees and expenses of litigation; and
(5) To pay the costs in all 3 cases.

Facts: On 13 March 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster

ng Pilipinas (KBP), an association representing duly
franchised and authorized television and radio networks
throughout the country, sent a letter requesting the Supreme
Court to allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of
the plunder and other criminal cases filed against former
President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in
order "to assure the public of full transparency in the
proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history." The
request was seconded by Mr. Cesar N. Sarino in his letter of 5
April 2001 to the Chief Justice and, still later, by Senator
Renato Cayetano and Attorney Ricardo Romulo. On 17 April

2001, the Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez formally filed

the petition.
Issue: Whether the press should be allowed to air Estradas
trial to the public.
Held: The press is a mighty catalyst in awakening public
consciousness, and it has become an important instrument in
the quest for truth. Recent history exemplifies media's
invigorating presence, and its contribution to society is quite
impressive. The Court, just recently, has taken judicial notice
of the enormous effect of media in stirring public sentience
during the impeachment trial, a partly judicial and partly
political exercise, indeed the most-watched program in the
boob-tubes during those times, that would soon culminate in
EDSA II. The propriety of granting or denying the petition
involve the weighing out of the constitutional guarantees of
freedom of the press and the right to public information, on
the one hand, and the fundamental rights of the accused, on
the other hand, along with the constitutional power of a court
to control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial
trial. When these rights race against one another, the right of
the accused must be preferred to win. With the possibility of
losing not only the precious liberty but also the very life of an
accused, it behooves all to make absolutely certain that an
accused receives a verdict solely on the basis of a just and
dispassionate judgment, a verdict that would come only after
the presentation of credible evidence testified to by unbiased
witnesses unswayed by any kind of pressure, whether open
or subtle, in proceedings that are devoid of histrionics that
might detract from its basic aim to ferret veritable facts free
from improper influence, and decreed by a judge with an
unprejudiced mind, unbridled by running emotions or
passions. Due process guarantees the accused a
presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved in a
trial that is not lifted above its individual settings nor made
an object of public's attention and where the conclusions

reached are induced not by any outside force or influence but

only by evidence and argument given in open court, where
fitting dignity and calm ambiance is demanded. Thus, an
accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that
belongs to him, more than anyone else, where his life or
liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to
ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly
condemned and that his rights are not compromised in
secrete conclaves of long ago. A public trial is not
synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the
court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in
the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and
observe the trial process. In the constitutional sense, a
courtroom should have enough facilities for a reasonable
number of the public to observe the proceedings, not too
small as to render the openness negligible and not too large
as to distract the trial participants from their proper
functions, who shall then be totally free to report what they
have observed during the proceedings.

RE: Petition for Radio and Television Coverage of the

Multiple Murder Cases Against Maguindanao Governor
Zaldy Ampatuan

PEOPLE VS. MAPALAO

Facts: Eleven (11) people rode in a Ford Fiera going to
Baguio. Namely they are: Felizardo Galvez, Jimmy Jetwani,
Simeon Calama, Rene Salonga, Eduardo Lopez, Adolfo
Quiambao,
Aliman
Bara-akal,
Anwar
HadjiEdris,
GumanakOmpa and defendant-appelants in this case, Omar
Magpalao and Rex Magumnang. After an hour of driving, the
car stopped so that one of the passengers could urinate.
While the car was stopped the Bara-akal, Edris, Ompa,

Magpalao and Magumnang pointed guns and knives at the

other passengers and divested them of their properties. On
of the robbers then ordered Galvez to drive the car towards
the precipice (bangin). When the car was near the precipice,
Galvez then stepped to the brakes. The other passengers
jumped out of the car and went to different directions to
escape. Galvez however, was left in side the car and was
stabbed by one of the robbers. The robbers then escaped.
Quiambao, who owned the car helped Galvez to get to a
hospital. Galvez died in the hospital. The robbers were then
apprehended with the exception of Edris who remain at large.
Mangumnang however escaped while being in detention and
Bara-akal died inside the jail. Since Mangumnang was not
arrested, the trial in absentia continued as to him. Ompa,
Magpalao, and Magumnang were all held guilty as principal
by direct participation of the crime of Robbery with Homicide.
Issue: Whether or Not the lower court erred in failing
applythe Constitutionalmandate on the presumption
innocence and proof beyond reasonable doubt when
allowed the trial in absentia to push through on the part
defendant-appellant Magumnang.

to
of
it
of

Held: The Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. The
reason is that the lower court has jurisdiction over
Magumnang the moment the latter was in custody.
Jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of
parties but until the case is terminated. Since all the
requisites of trial in absentia are complete, the court has
jurisdiction over Magumnang. In addition, Magumnang was
presumed innocent during his trial in absentia. The
prosecution had strong evidence against him as proof beyond
reasonable doubt that he is a principal by direct participation
in the crime of Robbery with Homicide. Thus, the
Constitutional mandate was not violated.

PEOPLE VS VALERIANO

RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION
United States vs. Javier [GR L-12990, 21 January 1918]
First Division, Malcolm (J): 7 concur
Facts: Doroteo Natividad on the afternoon of 22 October
1915, fastened his carabao valued at P150 in his corral
situated in the barrio of Trapiche, municipality of Tananuan,
Province of Batangas. On the following morning when he
went to look after the animal, he found the gate to the corral
open and that the carabao had disappeared. He reported the
matter to the Constabulary, and a patrol of the Constabulary
under the leadership of sergeant Presa (+) on November 20,
encountered Lazaro Javier, Apolinario Mendoza, and Placido
de Chavez leading a carabao. When the ladrones saw the
Constabulary, they scattered in all directions. On the
following day, the Constabulary found the carabao tied in
front of the house of one Pedro Monterola in the barrio of
Santa Clara, municipality of San Pablo. The carabao was
identified by Doroteo Natividad as the one which had been
taken from his corral on the night of 22 October 1915, and by
the Constabulary as the one seen in the possession of Javier.
Javier was charged for stealing the carabao before the justice
of the peace of the municipality of Santo Tomas, Province of
Batangas. During trial, the sworn statement of sergeant
Presca, now deceased, was presented in court by the
prosecution. Presca's signature in the statement was
identified. Javier alleged that the lower court erred in
admitting said sworn statement as evidence.
Issue: Whether the sworn statement, which was executed by
a person now deceased, is inadmissible inasmuch as the
accused is not given the opportunity to cross-examine the
author thereof.
Held: The Philippine Bill of Rights provides "That in all
criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to
meet the witnesses face to face," and the provision of the

Code of Criminal Procedure, section 15 (5), states taht "In all

criminal prosecutions the defendant shall be entitled: to be
confronted at the trial by and to cross-examine the witnesses
against him." With reference to the clause of the Bill of
Rights, it "intends to secure the accused in the right to be
tried, so far as facts provable by witnesses are concerned, by
only such witnesses as meet him face to face at the trial, who
give their testimony in his presence, and give to the accused
an opportunity of cross-examination. It was intended to
prevent the conviction of the accused upon depositions or ex
parte affidavits, and particularly to preserve the right of the
accused to test the recollection of the witness in the exercise
of the right of cross-examination." In other words,
confrontation is essential because cross-examination is
essential. A second reason for the prohibition is that a
tribunal may have before it the deportment and appearance
of the witness while testifying. The sworn statement of Presa
was not made by question and answer under circumstances
which gave the defense an opportunity to cross-examine the
witness. The proviso of the Code of Criminal Procedure as to
confrontation is therefore inapplicable. Presa's statement
again is not the testimony of a witness deceased, given in a
former action between the same relating to the same matter.
Consequently, the exception provided by section 298, No. 8,
of the Code of Civil Procedure and relied upon by the
prosecution in the lower court is also inapplicable. Nor is the
statement of Presca a dying declaration or a deposition in a
former trial or shown to be a part of the preliminary
examination. Under these circumstances, the sworn
statement was improperly received in evidence in the lower
court. Still, although the Court could find this to be reversible
error and, ordinarily, should remand the case for a new trial.
The Court however is convinced that this would gain the
accused nothing except delay for the testimony of the owner
of the carabao and of the two Constabulary soldiers, rebutted

by no reasonable evidence on behalf of the accused, is

deemed sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Talino vs Sandiganbayan G.R. Nos. L-75511-14, March

16, 1987
FACTS:
It is settled that if a separate trial is allowed to one of two or
more defendants, his testimony therein imputing guilt to any
of the co-accused is not admissible against the latter who
was not able to cross-examine him. 1

The petitioner, along with several others, were charged in

four separate informations with estafa through falsification of
public documents for having allegedly conspired to defraud
the government in the total amount of P26,523.00,
representing the cost of repairs claimed to have been
undertaken, but actually not needed and never made, on four
government vehicles, through falsification of the supporting
papers to authorize the illegal payments. 2 Docketed as CC
Nos. 6681, 6682, 6683 and 6684, these cases were tried
jointly for all the accused until after the prosecution had
rested, when Genaro Basilio, Alejandro Macadangdang and
petitioner Talino asked for separate trials, which were
allowed. They then presented their evidence at such trials,
while the other accused continued defending themselves in
the original proceedings, at which one of them, Pio Ulat gave
damaging testimony against the petitioner, relating in detail
his participation in the questioned transactions. 4 In due
time, the Sandiganbayan rendered its decision in all the four
cases finding Talino, Basilio, Macadangdang Ulat and Renato
Valdez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged
while absolving the other defendants for insufficient
evidence. This decision is now challenged by the petitioner
on the ground that it violates his right of confrontation as
guaranteed by the Constitution.
ISSUE:
The issue in this case is whether or not the testimony in a
separate trial was considered by the respondent court
against the petitioner, who claims that it was in fact the sole
basis of his conviction.
DECISION:
NO. It was not considered in its finding of facts but the court
has this to say on the issue.

In its decision, the respondent court * makes the following

remarks about the separate trial:
It would really have been simpler had there been no separate
trial because the accused Pio B. Ulat said so many
incriminatory things against the other accused when he took
the stand in his own defense. But because Basilio, Talino and
Macadangdang were granted separate trials and they did not
cross examine Ulat because, as a matter of fact, they were
not even required to be present when the other accused were
presenting their defenses, the latter's testimonies cannot
now be considered against said three accused.
The grant of a separate trial rests in the sound discretion of
the court and is not a matter of right to the accused,
especially where, as in this case, it is sought after the
presentation of the evidence of the prosecution. 6 While it is
true that Rule 119, Section 8, of the Rules of Court does not
specify when the motion for such a trial should be filed, we
have held in several cases that this should be done before
the prosecution commences presenting its evidence,
although, as an exception, the motion may be granted later,
even after the prosecution shall have rested, where there
appears to be an antagonism in the respective defenses of
the accused. 7 In such an event, the evidence in chief of the
prosecution shall remain on record against an accused, with
right of rebuttal on the part of the fiscal in the separate trial
of the other accused. 8
The rule in every case is that the trial court should exercise
the utmost circumspection in granting a motion for separate
trial, allowing the same only after a thorough study of the
claimed justification therefor, if only to avoid the serious
difficulties that may arise, such as the one encountered and
regretted by the respondent court, in according the accused
the right of confrontation.

The right of confrontation is one of the fundamental rights

guaranteed by the Constitution 9 to the person facing
criminal prosecution who should know, in fairness, who his
accusers are and must be given a chance to cross-examine
them on their charges. No accusation is permitted to be
made against his back or in his absence nor is any
derogatory information accepted if it is made anonymously,
as in poison pen letters sent by persons who cannot stand by
their libels and must shroud their spite in secrecy. That is also
the reason why ex parte affidavits are not permitted unless
the affiant is presented in court 10 and hearsay is barred
save only in the cases allowed by the Rules of Court, like the
dying declaration. 11
We have carefully studied the decision under challenge and
find that the respondent court did not consider the testimony
given by Ulat in convicting the petitioner. The part of that
decision finding Talino guilty made no mention of Ulat at all
but confined itself to the petitioner's own acts in approving
the questioned vouchers as proof of his complicity in the plot
to swindle the government.
The factual findings of the respondent court being supported
by substantial evidence other than Ulat's testimony, we see
no reason to disturb them. It is futile for the petitioner to
invoke his constitutional presumption of innocence because
his guilt has in the view of the trial court been established
beyond reasonable doubt, and we agree.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED, with
costs against the petitioner.

COMPULSORY PROCESS
ROCO v CONTRERAS 461 SCRA 505 GARCIA; June 28, 2005
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court the decision dismissing appeal and resolution
denying motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals
FACTS - Domingo Roco, engaged in buying and selling of
dressed chicken, purchased his supply from private
respondent Cals Poultry Supply Corporation (Cals) - As
payment for his purchase, petitioner drew 5 checks payable
to Cals against his account with PCIB. PCIB dishonored the
checks for having been drawn from a closed account. Cals
then filed a criminal complaint for violation of BP22 - Before
trial could commence, Roco filed with the BIR a denunciation
letter against Cals in that it failed to issue commercial
invoices. BIR found no prima facie evidence of tax evasion. Trial for Rocos violation of BP 22 commenced. After the
prosecution rested, the MTCC declared the cases submitted
for decision on account of petitioners failure to adduce
evidence in his behalf. Later, MTCC rendered a judgment of
conviction against petitioner. - Petitioner went to appeal to
the RTC contending that he was deprived of due process. RTC
agreed and vacated the MTCC decision. - Pending the
remanded cases, petitioner filed with the MTCC a Request
for Issuance of Subpoena Ad Testificandum and Subpoena
Duces Tecum, requiring Vivian Deocampo or Danilo Yap,
both of Cals Corporation or their duly authorized
representatives, to appear and testify in court and to bring
with them certain documents, records and books of accounts
for the years 1993-19991. Prosecution did not object. - Acting
Judge Geomer C. Delfin, issued an order granting petitioners
request and accordingly directed the issuance of the desired
subpoenas. -Cals counsel manifested that it was improper
for the trial court to have directed the issuance of the
requested subpoenas, to which the Roco countered by saying
that Judge Delfins had become final and hence, immutable.

Nonetheless, the trial court issued an order allowing the

prosecution to file its comment or opposition to petitioners
request for the issuance of subpoenas. They argued that
Deocampo had earlier attested that the documents, records
and books of accounts were already burned, they did not
maintain the requested sales ledger and that other
documents could not be produced because of the recent
computerization of records was still in the process of
completion. They also maintained that the documents
requested are immaterial and irrelevant to the crimes for
which the petitioner was being prosecuted. - In a resolution,
the MTCC, thru its Judge Edward B. Contreras, denied
petitioners request on the following grounds: (a) the
requested documents, book ledgers and other records were
immaterial in resolving the issues posed before the court;
and (b) the issuance of the subpoenas will only unduly delay
the hearing of the criminal cases. - Judge Contreras similarly
denied the MFR. RTC denied due course to petition for failure
to prove grave abuse of discretion. Similarly, it denied a2010
page 9 MFR. Petitioner went to CA via certiorari. The petition
was still dismissed. MFR was still dismissed. Petitioners claim
The denial of the request for the issuance of subpoena ad
testificandum and subpoena duces tecum is violative of his
constitutional rights
ISSUE WON the lower courts erred in denying the subpoena
requested by Roco
HELD Ratio NO. Before a subpoena duces tecum may issue,
the court must first be satisfied that the following requisites
are present: (1) the books, documents or other things
requested must appear prima facie relevant to the issue
subject of the controversy (test of relevancy); and (2) such
books must be reasonably described by the parties to be
readily identified (test of definiteness).

Reasoning - A subpoena is a process directed to a person

requiring him to attend and to testify at the hearing or trial of
an action or at any investigation conducted under the laws of
the Philippines, or for the taking of his deposition. The first,
subpoena ad testificandum, is used to compel a person to
testify, while the second, subpoena duces tecum, is used to
compel the production of books, records, things or
documents therein specified. - The books and documents
that petitioner requested to be subpoenaed are designated
and described in his request with definiteness and readily
identifiable. The test of definiteness, therefore, is satisfied in
this case. However, in the matter of relevancy of those books
and documents to the pending criminal cases that petitioner
miserably failed to discharge his burden. - Based on the
records below and as correctly pointed out by the CA,
petitioner had been issued by Cals with temporary receipts
in the form of yellow pad slips of paper evidencing his
payments, which pad slips had been validated by the
corporation itself. It is clear that the production of the books
and documents requested by petitioner are not indispensable
to prove his defense of payment. DISPOSITION the instant
petition is DENIED and the challenged decision and resolution
of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED. Prof. Rowena Daroy
Morales arrived at the scene. The DENR team was then
brought to petitioners house in Daram, where they had
dinner and drinks. The team left at 2:00 a.m. - On the basis
of the foregoing facts, petitioner was charged with and
convicted of Arbitrary Detention by the Sandiganbayan. - SC
affirmed the conconviction of Daram. Defendant filed MFR
denied with finality Filed an Urgent Motion for Leave to File
2nd MFR granted ISSUES Procedural WON filing of 2nd MFR
is proper Substantive WON the guilt of the accused was
proven beyond reasonable doubt HELD Procedural YES Ratio
While a second motion for reconsideration is, as a general
rule, a prohibited pleading, it is within the sound discretion of
the Court to admit the same, provided it is filed with prior

leave whenever substantive justice may be better served

thereby. Reasoning - The rules of procedure are merely tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. They were
conceived and promulgated to effectively aid the court in the
dispensation of justice. Courts are not slaves to or robots of
technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. In rendering
justice, courts have always been, as they ought to be,
conscientiously guided by the norm that on the balance,
technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and
not the other way around. Thus, if the application of the
Rules would tend to frustrate rather than promote justice, it
is always within our power to suspend the rules, or except a
particular case from its operation. Substantive NO Ratio
When the guilt of the accused has not been proven with
moral certainty, the presumption of innocence of the accused
must be sustained and his exoneration be granted as a
matter of right. For the prosecutions evidence must stand or
fall on its own merit and cannot be allowed to draw strength
from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.
Furthermore, where the evidence for the prosecution is
concededly weak, even if the evidence for defense is also
weak, the accused must be duly accorded the benefit of the
doubt in view of the constitutional presumption of innocence
that an accused enjoys. When the circumstances are capable
of two or more inferences, as in this case, one of which is
consistent with the presumption of innocence while the other
is compatible with guilt, the presumption of innocence must
prevail and the court must acquit. It is better to acquit a
guilty man than to convict an innocent man. Reasoning - No
sufficient evidence to show that petitioner instilled fear in the
minds of the private offended parties. It appears that Darma
merely extended his hospitality and entertained the DENR
team in his house. DISPOSITION REVERSED. Petitioner Benito
Astorga is ACQUITTED of the crime of Arbitrary Detention on
the ground of reasonable doubt.

SECTION 15
SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS
Teodosio Lansang vs Garcia (G.R. No. L-33964)
Abandonment of the Doctrine Held in the Barcelon
Case
&
the
Montenegro
Case
FACTS: Due to the throwing of two hand grenades in a Liberal
Party caucus in 1971 causing the death of 8 people, Marcos
issued PP 889 which suspended the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus. Marcos urged that there is a need to curtail
the growth of Maoist groups. Subsequently, Lansang et al
were invited by the PC headed by Garcia for interrogation
and investigation. Lansang et al questioned the validity of
the suspension of the writ averring that the suspension does
not meet the constitutional requisites.
ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension is constitutional.
HELD: The doctrine established in Barcelon and Montenegro
was subsequently abandoned in this case where the SC
declared that it had the power to inquire into the factual
basis of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus by Marcos in Aug 1971 and to annul the same if no
legal ground could be established. Accordingly, hearings
were conducted to receive evidence on this matter, including
two closed-door sessions in which relevant classified
information was divulged by the government to the members
of the SC and 3 selected lawyers of the petitioners. In the
end, after satisfying itself that there was actually a massive
and systematic Communist-oriented campaign to overthrow
the government by force, as claimed by Marcos, the SC
unanimously decided to uphold t5he suspension of the
privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.

Jackson vs. Macalino

Facts: Am information was filed against an American citizen,
Raymond Jackson for violation of Article 176 of the Revised
Penal Code. Summary deportation proceedings were initiated
at the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID)
against the petitioner. However, he could not be deported
because he filed a petition to lift the summary order of
deportation with the CID which had not yet been resolved.
The CID then issued an order for his arrest for being an
undesirable alien, based on the hold departure order in one
of the criminal cases. Jackson filed a petition for habeas
corpus against the Commissioner of the CID. The court
directed its issuance as well as a return of the writ by the
respondents. In their return , the respondents alleged inter
alia that the detention was on the basis of the summary
deportation order issued and the hold departure order of the
Makati RTC.
Issue: WON the Commissioner of the CID can issue warrants
of arrest and if so, WON such warrants can only be issued to
enforce a final order of deportation.
Held: The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to
relieve a person from unlawful restraint. It is essentially a writ
of inquiry and is granted to test the right under which he is
detained. The term court includes quasi-judicial bodies like
the Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration. As a
general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint by the
respondents rests on the petitioner who attaches such
restraints. Whether the return sets forth process where on its
face shows good ground for the detention of the petitioner, it
is incumbent on him to allege and prove new matter that
tends to invalidate the apparent effects of such process. If it

appears that the detained person is in custody under a

warrant of commitment in pursuance of law, the return shall
be considered prima facie evidence of the cause of restraint.
In this case, based on the return of the writ by the
respondents, Jackson was arrested and detained based on
the order of the BOC which had become final and executory.
His passports were also cancelled by the US consul on the
ground that they were tampered with. Based on previous
jurisprudence, such constitute sufficient grounds for the
arrest and deportation of aliens from the Philippines. Hence,
the petition was dismissed.

IN RE: ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS OF DR.

AURORA PARONG
FACTS
The nine of the fourteen detainees were arrested on July 6,
1982 after PC/INP of Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya conducted a
raid at the residence of Dra. Aurora Parong who were then
having a conference in the dining room of Dra. Parong's
residence. The other four detainees were arrested on the
following day. On July 15, 1982, Tom Vasquez was arrested.
The herein fourteen detainees were all detained at the PC/INP
Command Headquarters, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya until
their transfer onthe morning to an undisclosed different
places. It is alleged that the arrest was unlawful and illegal
since there was no warrant of arrest; they were only armed
with a search warrant. A petition for the writ of habeas
corpus and mandamus is filed by Josefina Garcia-Padilla.
II.
ISSUES
Whether or not the detention of the petitioners is legal.

III.
HELD
The decision in the Lansang case was overturned (diluting, if
not abandoning)and the verdict on the Barcelon Case and
Montenegro case was once again recalled. Thecourt held that
the detention as legal and valid as it depends on the
President, who may order to whether release them or not.
The Supreme Court restated that the suspension of the Writ
of Habeas Corpus was a political question only the President
can reso
lve.The suspension of the privilege of the WoHC carrieswith it
the suspension of the right to bail, if the governments
campaign to suppress the rebellion is to be enhanced and
rendered effective. If the right to bail is given upon times of
rebellion, then those who are arrestedcan re-join their
comrades thus risking the governments efforts to end hostile
activities in the country.Since the 13 detainees have been
released, the petition was moot academic. Although for Dr.
Parong, there has been a warrant of arrest against her for
illegal possession of firearms so the petition was also moot
and academic.

SECTION 16 RIGHT TO A SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF

CASES
RIGHT TO A SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES DOMINGO
PADUA, petitioner, vs. VICENTE ERICTA, etc., RUNDIO
ABJAETO, and ANTONIO G. RAMOS, respondents.
FACTS : Domingo Padua, petioner sought to recover damages
for the injures suffered by his eight-year old daughter,
Luzviminda, caused by her being hit by a truck driven by
Rundio Abjaeto and owned by Antonio G. Ramos. Padua was
litigating in forma pauperis. Trial of the case having been set
in due course, Padua commenced presentation of his
evidence on December 6, 1973. He gave testimony on direct
exqmination in the course of which reference was made to
numerous documents. At the close of his examination, and
on motion of defendants' counsel, the previously scheduled
hearing of December 12, 1973 was cancelled, and Padua's
cross-examination was reset on December 17, 1973.
However, the hearing of December 17,1973 was also
cancelled, again at the instance of defendants' counsel, who
pleaded sickness as ground therefor; and trial was once more
slated to "take place on March 6, March 7 and 13, 1974, all at
9:00 o'clock in the morning." After defendants' attorney had
twice sought and obtained cancellation of trial settings, as
narrated, it was plaintiff Padua's counsel who next moved for
cancellation of a hearing date. In a motion dated and filed on
March 1, 1974, Padua's counsel alleged that he had "another
hearing on March 6, 1974 in Tarlac and that the cancellation
would "at any rate ... leave plaintiff and defendants two (2)
hearing dates on March 7 and 13, 1974;" and on these
premises, he asked "that the hearing on March 6, 1974 ... be
ordered cancelled." No opposition was filed by the
defendants to the motion. Apart from filing this motion on
March 1, 1974, plaintiffs counsel took the additional step of
sending his client's wife to the Court on the day of the trial,
March 6,1974, to verbally reiterate his application for

cancellation of the hearing on that day. This, Mrs. Padua did.

The respondent Judge however denied the application and
dismissed the case. Padua moved for reconsideration, but
this was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE : Whether or not the respondent judge erred in
dismissing the case on the ground that it violates the right to
a speedy disposition of cases. RULING: Courts should not
brook undue delays in the ventilation and determination of
causes. It should be their constant effort to assure that
litigations are prosecuted and resolved with dispatch.
Postponements of trials and hearings should not be allowed
except on meritorious grounds; and the grant or refusal
thereof rests entirely in the sound discretion of the Judge. It
goes without saying, however, that that discretion must be
reasonably and wisely exercised, in the light of the attendant
circumstances. Some reasonable deferment of the
proceedings may be allowed or tolerated to the end that
cases may be adjudged only after full and free presentation
of evidence by all the parties, specially where the deferment
would cause no substantial prejudice to any part. The
desideratum of a speedy disposition of cases should not, if at
all possible, result in the precipitate loss of a party's right to
present evidence and either in plaintiff's being non-suited or
the defendant's being pronounced liable under an ex parte
judgment. Judge's action was unreasonable, capricious and
oppressive, and should be as it is hereby annulled.

FLORES VS PEOPLE
Facts: Petitioners plea for their constitutional rights to a
speedy trial by certiorari where the proceeding of the case
for robbery against petitioners dragged on for over a decade
without any final judgment rendered by the court. Petitioners
sought for the dismissal of the case due to inordinate delay in
its disposition. The People in its affirmative defense raised

the facts that the case was not properly captioned, as the
People of the Phils. against whom it is filed was not a tribunal
exercising judicial functions and without the Court of Appeals
being made a part to the petition there are insufficient facts
to constitute a cause of action. Moreover it defends that the
CA took all necessary steps to complete the transcript of
stenographic
notes
of
the
original
trial.
Issue: Whether or not the constitutional rights of the accused
to
a
speedy
trial
was
violated.
Held: The court referred to previous jurisprudence upholding
the constitutional rights of the accused to a speedy trial. It
re-affirmed with emphasis that such right is more significant
than the procedural defects pointed out by the People of the
Philippines that the CA should have been made partyrespondent to the petition. Technicalities should always give
way to the reality of the situation and that in the absence of
a valid decision the stage trial was not completed and the
accused should be accorded with the right to contend that
they had not been accorded their right to be tried as
promptly as circumstances permit. Thus the SC finds merit to
dismiss the case against the petitioners.
SEC. 17 Right Against Self-Incrimination
US vs. Tan Teng
Facts: Oliva Pacomio, a girl 7 years of age, was, on 15
September 1910, staying in the house of her sister, located
on Ilang-Ilang Street, in the city of Manila. On said day, a
number of Chinamen were gambling in or near the said
house. Some of said Chinamen had been in the habit of
visiting the house of Oliva's sister. Oliva Pacomio, on said
day, after having taken a bath, returned to her room. Tan
Teng followed her into her room and asked her for some face
powder, which she gave him. After using some of the face

powder upon his private parts, he threw Oliva upon the floor,
placing his private parts upon hers, and remained in the
position for some little time. Several days later, perhaps a
week or two, the sister of Oliva Pacomio discovered that the
latter was suffering from a venereal disease known as
gonorrhea. It was at the time of this discovery that Oliva
related to her sister what had happened upon the morning of
September 15. The sister at once put on foot an investigation
to find the Chinaman. A number of Chinamen were collected
together. Oliva was called upon to identify the one who had
abused her. The defendant was not present at first. Later he
arrived and Oliva identified him at once as the one who had
attempted to violate her. Upon this information, Tan Teng was
arrested and taken to the police station and stripped of his
clothing and examined. The policeman who examined Tan
Teng swore that his body bore every sign of the fact that he
was suffering from the venereal disease known as gonorrhea.
The policeman took a portion of the substance emitting from
the body of Tan Teng and turned it over to the Bureau of
Science for the purpose of having a scientific analysis made
of the same. The result of the examination showed that Tan
Teng was suffering from gonorrhea. Tan Teng was charged
with the crime of rape. During trial, Tan Teng contended,
among others, that the result of the scientific examination
made by the Bureau of Science of the substance taken from
his body, at or about the time he was arrested, was not
admissible in evidence as proof of the fact that he was
suffering from gonorrhea; as that to admit such evidence was
to compel the defendant to testify against himself. After
hearing the evidence, the Honorable Charles S. Lobingier,
judge, found Tan Teng guilty of the offense of abusos
deshonestos, as defined and punished under article 439 of
the Penal Code, and sentenced him to be imprisoned for a
period of 4 years 6 months and 11 days of prison
correccional, and to pay the costs. Tan Teng appealed.

Issue: Whether the substance taken from Tan Teng, which

indicates that he has gonorrhea, cannot be used as evidence
against Tan Teng on the ground that it is violative of the
constitutional injunction against selfincrimination.
Held: As held in Holt vs. US (218 US 245), the prohibition of
compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against
himself, is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral
compulsion, to extort communications from him, not an
exclusion of his body as evidence, when it may be material.
The objection, in principle, would forbid a court to look at a
person and compare his features with a photograph in proof.
Moreover the Court is not considering how far a court would
go in compelling a man to exhibit himself, for when he is
exhibited, whether voluntarily or by order, even if the order
goes too far, the evidence if material, is competent. Verily,
the prohibition contained in section 5 of the Philippine Bill
that a person shall not be compelled to be a witness against
himself, is simply a prohibition against legal process to
extract from the defendant's own lips, against his will, an
admission of his guilt. The main purpose of the provision of
the Philippine Bill is to prohibit compulsory oral examination
of prisoners before trial, or upon trial, for the purpose of
extorting unwilling confessions or declarations implicating
them in the commission of a crime. Herein, the substance
was taken from the body of Tan Teng without his objection,
the examination was made by competent medical authority
and the result showed that Tan Teng was suffering from said
disease. As was suggested by Judge Lobingier, had Tan Teng
been found with stolen property upon his person, there
certainly could have been no question had the stolen
property been taken for the purpose of using the same as
evidence against him. So also if the clothing which he wore,
by reason of blood stains or otherwise, had furnished
evidence of the commission of a crime, there certainly could
have been no objection to taking such for the purpose of
using the same as proof. No one would think of even

suggesting that stolen property and the clothing in the case

indicated, taken from Tan Teng, could not be used against
him as evidence, without violating the rule that a person
shall not be required to give testimony against himself.

Villaflor vs. Summer

Facts: In a criminal case pending before the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila, Emeteria Villaflor and
Florentino Souingco were charged with the crime of adultery.
On trial before the Hon. Pedro Concepcion, Judge of First
Instance, upon the petition of the assistant fiscal for the city
of Manila, the court ordered Emeteria Villaflor to submit her
body to the examination of one or two competent doctors to
determine if she was pregnant or not. Villaflor refused to
obey the order on the ground that such examination of her
person was a violation of the constitutional provision in
contempt of court and was ordered to be committed to Bilibid
Prison until she should permit the medical examination
required by the court. Villaflor filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus.
Issue: Whether the compelling of a woman to permit her
body to be examined by physicians to determine if she is
pregnant, violates that portion of our Code of Criminal
Procedure, providing that no person shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself.
Held: Obviously a stirring plea can be made showing that
under the due process of law clause of the Constitution every
person has a natural and inherent right to the possession and
control of his own body. It is extremely abhorrent to one's
sense of decency and propriety to have to decide that such
inviolability of the person, particularly of a woman, can be
invaded by exposure to another's gaze. To compel any one,
and especially a woman, to lay bare the body, or to submit to

the touch of a stranger, without lawful authority, is an

indignity, an assault, and a trespass. However, between a
sacrifice of the ascertainment of truth to personal
considerations, between a disregard of the public welfare for
refined notions of delicacy, law and justice cannot hesitate.
Fully conscious that the Court is resolving a most extreme
case in a sense, which on first impression is a shock to one's
sensibilities, it must nevertheless enforce the constitutional
provision in this jurisdiction in accord with the policy and
reason thereof, undeterred by merely sentimental influences.
Once again the Court lays down the rule that the
constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself, is limited
to
a
prohibition
against
compulsory
testimonial
selfincrimination. The corollary to the proposition is that, on a
proper showing and under an order of the trial court, an
ocular inspection of the body of the accused is permissible.
The proviso is that torture or force shall be avoided. Whether
facts fall within or without the rule with its corollary and
proviso must, of course, be decided as cases arise. It is a
reasonable presumption that in an examination by reputable
and disinterested physicians due care will be taken not to use
violence and not to embarrass the patient any more than is
absolutely necessary. Indeed, no objection to the physical
examination being made by the family doctor of the accused
or by doctor of the same sex can be seen.

Beltran vs. Samson [GR 32025, 23 September 1929] First

Division, Romualdez (J): 6 concur
Facts: Felix Samson, Judge of the Second Judicial District
ordered Francisco Beltran to appear before the Provincial
Fiscal of Isabela, Francisco Jose, to take dictations in his own
handwriting from the latter. The purpose for such was for the
fiscal to compare Beltran's handwriting and to determine if it

is he who wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified.

Beltran filed a petition for a writ of prohibition. Issue:
Whether the writing from the fiscal's dictation by Beltran for
the purpose of comparing the latter's handwriting and
determining whether he wrote certain documents supposed
to be falsified, constitutes evidence against himself within
the scope and meaning of the constitutional provision (i.e.
"Nor shall he be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself."). Held: The fiscal under section
1687 of the Administrative Code, and the proper judge, upon
motion of the fiscal, may compel witnesses to be present at
the investigation of any crime of misdemeanor. But this
power must be exercised without prejudice to the
constitutional rights of persons cited to appear. The privilege
is found in the Jones Law, which provides that "Nor shall he
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself." This text is not limited to declaracion but says "to
be a witness." As to its scope, this privilege is not limited
precisely to testimony, but extends to all giving or furnishing
of evidence. Writing is something more than moving the
body, or the hand, or the fingers. Writing is not a purely
mechanical and attention. Herein, writing means that Beltran
is to furnish a means to determine or not he is the falsifier, as
the petition of the provincial fiscal clearly states. Except that
it is more serious, the present case is similar to that of
producing documents of chattels in one's possession. And as
to such production of documents or chattels, which is not so
serious as present, the same eminent Professor Wigmore, in
his work cited, says (volume 4, page 864): "2264, Production
or Inspection of Documents and Chattels. 1. It follows that
the production of documents or chattels by a person
(whether ordinary witness or party-witness) in response to a
subpoena, or to a motion to order production, or to other
form of process treating him as a witness (i. e. as a person
appearing before the tribunal to furnish testimony on his
moral responsibility for truth- telling), may be refused under

the protection of the privilege; and this is universally

conceded." Thus, for the purposes of the constitutional
privilege, there is a similarity between one who is compelled
to produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish
a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness
is required to furnish evidence against himself. The present
case is more serious than that of compelling the production
of documents or chattels, because here the witness is
compelled to write and create, by means of the act of writing,
evidence which does not exist, and which may identify him
as the falsifier. It cannot be contended that if permission to
obtain a specimen of Beltran's handwriting is not granted,
the crime would go unpunished. Considering the
circumstance that Beltran is a municipal treasurer, it should
not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to obtain genuine
specimens of his handwriting. But even supposing it is
impossible to obtain a specimen or specimens without
resorting to the means complained of, that is not reason for
trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the
constitution. It might be true that in some cases criminals
may succeed in evading the hand of justice, but such cases
are accidental and do not constitute the raison d'etre of the
privilege. This constitutional privilege exists for the
protection of innocent persons. Hence, the Court ordered the
judge and the fiscal and those under their orders desist and
abstain absolutely and forever from compelling Beltran to
take down dictation in his handwriting for the purpose of
submitting the latter for comparison. [GR 32025, 23
September 1929] First Division, Romualdez (J): 6 concur
Facts: Felix Samson, Judge of the Second Judicial District
ordered Francisco Beltran to appear before the Provincial
Fiscal of Isabela, Francisco Jose, to take dictations in his own
handwriting from the latter. The purpose for such was for the
fiscal to compare Beltran's handwriting and to determine if it
is he who wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified.
Beltran filed a petition for a writ of prohibition. Issue:

Whether the writing from the fiscal's dictation by Beltran for

the purpose of comparing the latter's handwriting and
determining whether he wrote certain documents supposed
to be falsified, constitutes evidence against himself within
the scope and meaning of the constitutional provision (i.e.
"Nor shall he be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself.").
Held: The fiscal under section 1687 of the Administrative
Code, and the proper judge, upon motion of the fiscal, may
compel witnesses to be present at the investigation of any
crime of misdemeanor. But this power must be exercised
without prejudice to the constitutional rights of persons cited
to appear. The privilege is found in the Jones Law, which
provides that "Nor shall he be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself." This text is not limited to
declaracion but says "to be a witness." As to its scope, this
privilege is not limited precisely to testimony, but extends to
all giving or furnishing of evidence. Writing is something
more than moving the body, or the hand, or the fingers.
Writing is not a purely mechanical and attention. Herein,
writing means that Beltran is to furnish a means to determine
or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the provincial fiscal
clearly states. Except that it is more serious, the present case
is similar to that of producing documents of chattels in one's
possession. And as to such production of documents or
chattels, which is not so serious as present, the same
eminent Professor Wigmore, in his work cited, says (volume
4, page 864): "2264, Production or Inspection of Documents
and Chattels. 1. It follows that the production of
documents or chattels by a person (whether ordinary witness
or party-witness) in response to a subpoena, or to a motion
to order production, or to other form of process treating him
as a witness (i. e. as a person appearing before the tribunal
to furnish testimony on his moral responsibility for truthtelling), may be refused under the protection of the privilege;
and this is universally conceded." Thus, for the purposes of

the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one

who is compelled to produce a document, and one who is
compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in
both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence
against himself. The present case is more serious than that of
compelling the production of documents or chattels, because
here the witness is compelled to write and create, by means
of the act of writing, evidence which does not exist, and
which may identify him as the falsifier. It cannot be
contended that if permission to obtain a specimen of
Beltran's handwriting is not granted, the crime would go
unpunished. Considering the circumstance that Beltran is a
municipal treasurer, it should not be a difficult matter for the
fiscal to obtain genuine specimens of his handwriting. But
even supposing it is impossible to obtain a specimen or
specimens without resorting to the means complained of,
that is not reason for trampling upon a personal right
guaranteed by the constitution. It might be true that in some
cases criminals may succeed in evading the hand of justice,
but such cases are accidental and do not constitute the
raison d'etre of the privilege. This constitutional privilege
exists for the protection of innocent persons. Hence, the
Court ordered the judge and the fiscal and those under their
orders desist and abstain absolutely and forever from
compelling Beltran to take down dictation in his handwriting
for the purpose of submitting the latter for comparison.

Chavez vs. Court of Appeals [GR L-29169, 19 August

1968] En Banc, Sanchez (J): 7 concur
Facts: A few days before 12 November 1962, Roger Chavez
saw Johnson Lee, a Chinese, driving a Thunderbird car. With
Ricardo Sumilang (movie actor Romeo Vasquez) in mind,
whom he knew was in the market for such a car, Chavez
asked Lee whether his car was for sale. Lee answered

affirmatively and left his address with Chavez. Then, on

November 12, Chavez met Sumilang at a barbershop,
informed him about the Thunderbird. But Sumilang said that
he had changed his mind about buying a new car. Instead, he
told Chavez that he wanted to mortgage his Buick car for
P10,000.00 to cover an indebtedness in Pasay City. Upon the
suggestion of Chavez, they went to see Luis Asistio, who he
knew was lending money on car mortgages and who, on one
occasion, already lent Romeo Vasquez P3,000.00 on the
same Buick car. Asistio however told the two that he had a
better idea on how to raise the money. His plan was to
capitalize on Romeo Vasquez' reputation as a wealthy movie
star, introduce him as a buyer to someone who was selling a
car and, after the deed of sale is signed, by trickery to run
away with the car. Asistio would then register it, sell it to a
third person for a profit. Chavez, known to be a car agent,
was included in the plan. He furnished the name of Johnson
Lee who was selling his Thunderbird. In the morning of
November 14, Chavez telephoned Johnson Lee and arranged
for an appointment. Sometime in the afternoon, Chavez and
Sumilang met Lee in his Thunderbird on Highway 54.
Sumilang was introduced as the interested buyer. Sumilang's
driver inspected the car, took the wheel for a while. After
Sumilang and Lee agreed on the purchase price
(P21,000.00), they went to Binondo to Johnson Lee's cousin,
Dy Sun Hiok, in whose name the car was registered.
Thereafter, they went to see a lawyer-notary public in Quezon
City, known to Chavez, for the drafting of the deed of sale.
After the deed of sale was drawn up, it was signed by
Sumilang as the vendee, Dy Sun Hiok the vendor, and
Sumilang's driver and Johnson Lee the witnesses thereto. As
payment was to be made at Eugene's restaurant in Quezon
City, all of them then drove in the Thunderbird car to that
place. The deed of sale and other papers remained in the
pockets of Johnson Lee. At Eugene's, a man approached
Sumilang with a note which stated that the money was ready

at the Dalisay Theater. Sumilang then wrote on the same

note that the money should be brought to the restaurant. At
the same time he requested Lee to exhibit the deed of sale of
the car to the note bearer. Then, the two Chinese were left
alone in the restaurant. For Sumilang, who had left the table
to pose for pictures with some fans and came back, again left
never to return. So did Chavez, who disappeared after he left
on the pretext of buying cigarettes. The two Chinese could
not locate Sumilang and Chavez. They went out to the place
where the Thunderbird was parked, found that it was gone.
They then immediately reported its loss to the police. Much
later, the NBI recovered the already repainted car and
impounded it. Right after the meeting at Eugene's, Chavez,
Sumilang and Asistio converged that same day at Barrio
Fiesta, a restaurant at Highway 54 near the Balintawak
monument in Caloocan. There, Asistio handed to Sumilang
P1,000.00 cash and a golf set worth P800.00 as the latter's
share in the transaction. On November 14, the registration of
the car was transferred in the name of Sumilang in Cavite
City, and three days later, in the name of Asistio in Caloocan.
Roger Chavez, Ricardo Sumilang alias "Romeo Vasquez",
Edgardo P. Pascual alias "Ging" Pascual, Pedro Rebullo alias
"Pita", Luis Asistio alias "Baby" Asistio, Lorenzo Meneses alias
"Lory" Meneses, Peter Doe, Charlie Doe and Paul Doe were
charged with qualified theft of a motor vehicle, a Thunderbird
car (Motor H9YH-143003, Plate H-16648, Pasay City 1962)
together with its accessories worth P22,200.00, belonging to
Dy Sun Hiok y Lim. Upon arraignment, all the accused,
except the three Does who have not been identified nor
apprehended, pleaded not guilty. On 23 July 1963, trial
commenced before the judge presiding Branch IX of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal in Quezon City. When trial
opened, the prosecution called upon Roger Chavez to testify
as an ordinary witness (not a State witness). The trial
proceeded, with "Fiscal Grecia" conducting the "direct
examination" of Roger Chavez. On 1 February 1965, the trial

court rendered judgment which acquitted all other accused

except Roger Chavez, who was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft. He was
accordingly sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
not less than 10 years, 1 day, as minimum and not more than
14 years, 8 months and 1 day as maximum, to indemnify Dy
Sun Hiok and/or Johnson Lee in the sum of P21,000.00
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, to
undergo the accessory penalties prescribed by law, and to
pay the costs. The Thunderbird car then in the custody of the
NBI was ordered to be turned over to Ricardo Sumilang, who
was directed to return to Asistio the sum of P1,000.00 unless
the latter chose to pay P21,500.00, representing the balance
of the contract price for the car. The sentence was
promulgated on 8 March 1965. Roger Chavez appealed to the
Court of Appeals. On 14 May 1967, the Court of Appeals
resolved to dismiss the appeal. A move to reconsider was
unavailing as, on 21 June 1968, the Court of Appeals, through
a per curiam resolution, disposed to maintain its May 14
resolution dismissing the appeal, directed the City Warden of
Manila where Chavez is confined by virtue of the warrant of
arrest issued by the Court of Appeals, to the turn him over to
Muntinglupa Bilibid Prisons pending execution of the
judgment below, and ordered remand of the case to the
Quezon City court for execution of judgment. Chavez filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and in the alternative,
prayed for grant of the alternative remedies of certiorari to
strike down the two resolutions of the Court of Appeals
dismissing his appeal for failure to file brief, and of
mandamus to direct the said court to forward his appeal to
the Supreme Court for the reason that he was raising purely
questions of law.
Issue: Whether a petition for a writ ofhabeas corpus is the
proper remedy for the courts disregard of Chavez
constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination.

Held: The course which Chavez took is correct. Habeas

corpus is a high prerogative writ. It is traditionally considered
as an exceptional remedy to release a person whose liberty is
illegally restrained such as when the accused's constitutional
rights are disregarded. Such defect results in the absence or
loss of jurisdiction and therefore invalidates the trial and the
consequent conviction of the accused whose fundamental
right was violated. That void judgment of conviction may be
challenged by collateral attack, which precisely is the
function of habeas corpus. This writ may issue even if
another remedy which is less effective may be availed of by
the defendant. Thus, failure by the accused to perfect his
appeal before the Court of Appeals does not preclude a
recourse to the writ. The writ may be granted upon a
judgment already final. For the writ of habeas corpus as an
extraordinary remedy must be liberally given effect so as to
protect well a person whose liberty is at stake. Under our own
Rules of Court, to grant the remedy to Chavez whose case
presents a clear picture of disregard of a constitutional right
is absolutely proper. Section 1 of Rule 102 extends the writ,
unless otherwise expressly provided by law, "to all cases of
illegal confinement or detention by which any person is
deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any
person is withheld from the person entitled thereto." Further,
a void judgment is in legal effect no judgment. By it no rights
are divested. From it no rights can be obtained. Being
worthless in itself, all proceedings founded upon it are
equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars any one. All acts
performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void.
The parties attempting to enforce it may be responsible as
trespassers. Still, since Chavez is still serving under a final
and valid judgment of conviction for another offense. he is
entitled to liberty thru habeas corpus only with respect to
Criminal Case Q-5311 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Quezon City Branch, under which he was prosecuted and
convicted.

Pascual vs. Board of Medical Examiners [GR L-25018, 26

May 1969] En Banc, Fernando (J): 6 concur, 2 took no part, 2
on official leave
Facts: Salvador Gatbonton and Enriqueta Gatbonton filed an
administrative case against Arsenio Pascual Jr. for alleged
immorality. At the initial hearing thereof, Gatbontons counsel
announced that he would present Pascual as his first witness.
Thereupon, Pascual, through counsel, made of record his
objection, relying on the constitutional right to be exempt
from being a witness against himself. The Board of
Examiners, took note of such a plea, at the same time stating
that at the next scheduled hearing, on 12 February 1965,
Pascual would be called upon to testify as such witness,
unless in the meantime he could secure a restraining order
from a competent authority. Arsenio Pascual, Jr., filed on 1
February 1965 with the Court of First Instance of Manila an
action for prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction
against the Board of Medical Examiners. On 9 February 1965,
the lower court ordered that a writ of preliminary injunction
issue against the Board commanding it to refrain from
hearing or further proceeding with such an administrative
case, to await the judicial disposition of the matter upon
Pascual posting a bond in the amount of P500.00. There was
a motion for intervention by Salvador Gatbonton and
Enriqueta Gatbonton, asking that they be allowed to file an
answer as intervenors. Such a motion was granted and an
answer in intervention was duly filed by them on 23 March
1965 sustaining the power of Board, which for them is limited
to compelling the witness to take the stand, to be
distinguished from the power to compel a witness to
incriminate himself. A decision was rendered by the lower

court on 2 August 1965, finding the claim of Pascual to be

well-founded and prohibiting the Board "from compelling the
petitioner to act and testify as a witness for the complainant
in said investigation without his consent and against himself."
Hence, the Board and the Gatbontons appealed.
Issue: Whether a medical practitioner charged with
malpractice in administrative case can avail of the
constitutional guarantee not to be a witness against himself.
Held: The constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination
is not limited to allowing a witness to object to questions the
answers to which could lead to a penal liability being
subsequently incurred. It is true that one aspect of such a
right, to follow the language of another American decision, is
the protection against "any disclosures which the witness
may reasonably apprehend could be used in a criminal
prosecution or which could lead to other evidence that might
be so used." If that were all there is then it becomes diluted.
The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to
silence. As far back as 1905, the Court had occasion to
declare: "The accused has a perfect right to remain silent and

his silence cannot be used as a presumption of his guilt."

Recently, in Chavez v. Court of Appeals, the Court reaffirmed
the doctrine anew that is the right of a defendant "to forego
testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the
witness standwith undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own
free genuine will." The constitutional guarantee, along with
other rights granted an accused, stands for a belief that while
crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be
revealed, such desirable objectives should not be
accomplished according to means or methods offensive to
the high sense of respect accorded the human personality.
More and more in line with the democratic creed, the
deference accorded an individual even those suspected of
the most heinous crimes is given due weight. To quote from
Chief Justice Warren, "the constitutional foundation
underlying the privilege is the respect a government must
accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens." Thus, in an
administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for
alleged malpractice, the Board of Medical Examiners cannot,
consistently with the self-incrimination clause, compel the
person proceeded against to take the witness stand without
his consent.