[G.R. No. 128096.

January 20, 1999]

PANFILO M. LACSON, petitioner vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,

THE
SANDIGANBAYAN,
OFFICE
OF
THE
SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MYRNA
ABALORA, NENITA ALAP-AP, IMELDA PANCHO MONTERO, and
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
ROMEO M. ACOP and FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., petitioners-intervenors.
DECISION
MARTINEZ, J.:

The constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of Republic Act No. 8249 an act which further
defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is being challenged in this petition for prohibition
and mandamus. Petitioner Panfilo Lacson, joined by petitioners-intervenors Romeo Acop and
Francisco Zubia, Jr., also seeks to prevent the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with the trial of
Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057 (for multiple murder) against them on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.
The antecedents of this case, as gathered from the parties pleadings and documentary proofs,
are as follows:
In the early morning of May 18, 1995, eleven (11) persons believed to be members of
theKuratong Baleleng gang, reportedly an organized crime syndicate which had been involve in
a spate of bank robberies in Metro Manila, were slain along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon
City by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG) headed by
Chief Superintendent Jewel Canson of the Philippine National Police (PNP). The ABRITG was
composed of police officers from the Traffic Management Command (TMC) led by petitionerintervenor Senior Superintendent Francisco Zubia, Jr.; Presidential Anti-Crime Commission Task
Force Habagat (PACC-TFH) headed by petitioner Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson;
Central Police District Command (CPDC) led by Chief Superintendent Ricardo de Leon; and the
Criminal Investigation Command (CIC) headed by petitioner-intervenor Chief Superintendent
Romeo Acop.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the CIC, that what
actually transpired at dawn of May 18, 1995 was a summary execution (or a rub out) and not a
shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano
Desierto formed a panel of investigators headed by the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs,
Bienvenido Blancaflor, to investigate the incident. This panel later absolve from any criminal
liability all the PNP officers and personnel allegedly involved in the May 18, 1995 incident, with
a finding that the said incident was a legitimate police operation.[1]

However, a review board led by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa modified the
Blancaflor panels finding and recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twentysix (26) respondents, including herein petitioner and intervenors. This recommendation was
approved by the Ombudsman, except for the withdrawal of the charges against Chief Supt.
Ricardo de Leon.
Thus, on November 2, 1995, petitioner Panfilo Lacson was among those charged as
principal in eleven (11) informations for murder [2] before the Sandiganbayans Second Division,
while intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. were among those charged in the same
informations as accessories after-the-fact.
Upon motion by all the accused in the 11 informations, [3] the Sandiganbayan allowed them
to file a motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsmans action.[4]
After conducting a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed on March 1, 1996 eleven
(11)amended informations[5] before the Sandiganbayan, wherein petitioner was charged only as
an accessory, together with Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. and others. One of the
accused[6]was dropped from the case.
On March 5-6, 1996, all the accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended informations, the cases fall within the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of Republic
Act No. 7975.[7] They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to
cases where one or more of the "principal accused are government officials with Salary Grade
(SG) 27 or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or
higher. The highest ranking principal accused in the amended informations has the rank of only
a Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent of at least SG 27.
Thereafter, in a Resolution[8] dated May 8, 1996 (promulgated on May 9, 1996), penned by
Justice Demetriou, with Justices Lagman and de Leon concurring, and Justices Balajadia and
Garchitorena dissenting,[9] the Sandiganbayan admitted the amended information and ordered the
cases transferred to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court which has original and exclusive
jurisdiction under R.A. 7975, as none of the principal accused has the rank of Chief
Superintendent or higher.
On May 17, 1996, the Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for a reconsideration,
insisting that the cases should remain with the Sandiganbayan. This was opposed by petitioner
and some of the accused.
While these motions for reconsideration were pending resolution, and even before the issue
of jurisdiction cropped up with the filing of the amended informations on March 1, 1996, House
Bill No. 2299[10] and No. 1094[11] (sponsored by Representatives Edcel C. Lagman and Neptali M.
Gonzales II, respectively), as well as Senate Bill No. 844 [12] (sponsored by Senator Neptali
Gonzales), were introduced in Congress, defining/expanding the jurisdiction of
theSandiganbayan. Specifically, the said bills sought, among others, to amend the jurisdiction of
theSandiganbayan by deleting the word principal from the phrase principal accused in Section 2
(paragraphs a and c) of R.A. No. 7975.
These bills were consolidated and later approved into law as R.A. No. 8249 [13]. The law is
entitled, AN ACT FURTHER DEFINING THE JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN,

AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1606, AS AMENDED,

PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. It took effect on February
25, 1997.13 by the President of the Philippines on February 5, 1997.
Subsequently, on March 5, 1997, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution[14] denying
the motion for reconsideration of the Special Prosecutor, ruling that it stands pat in its resolution
dated May 8, 1996.
On the same day,[15] the Sandiganbayan issued an ADDENDUM to its March 5, 1997
Resolution, the pertinent portion of which reads:

After Justice Lagman wrote the Resolution and Justice Demetriou concurred in it,
but beforeJustice de Leon, Jr. rendered his concurring and dissenting opinion, the
legislature enacted Republic Act 8249 and the President of the Philippines approved it
on February 5, 1997.Considering the pertinent provisions of the new law, Justices
Lagman and Demetriou are now in favor of granting, as they are now granting,
the Special Prosecutors motion for reconsideration. Justice de Leon has already
done so in his concurring and dissenting opinion.
xxxxxxxxx

Considering that three of the accused in each of these cases are PNP Chief
Superintendents: namely, Jewel T. Canson, Romeo M. Acop and Panfilo M.
Lacson, and that trial has not yet begun in all these cases in fact, no order of arrest
has been issued this court has competence to take cognizance of these cases.
To recapitulate, the net result of all the foregoing is that by the vote of 3 to 2, the
court admitted the Amended Informations in these cases and by the unanimous
vote of 4 with 1 neither concurring nor dissenting, retained jurisdiction to try
and decide the cases.[16][Emphasis supplied]
Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of Section 4 R.A. No. 8249, including Section
7 thereof which provides that the said law shall apply to all cases pending in any court over
which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof. Petitioner argues that:

a) The questioned provision of the statute were introduced by the authors thereof in
bad faith as it was made to precisely suit the situation in which petitioners cases were
in at theSandiganbayan by restoring jurisdiction thereover to it, thereby violating his
right to procedural due process and the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. Further, from the way theSandiganbayan has foot-dragged for nine (9)
months the resolution of a pending incident involving the transfer of the cases to the
Regional Trial Court, the passage of the law may have been timed to overtake such
resolution to render the issue therein moot, and frustrate the exercise of petitioners
vested rights under the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975)

b) Retroactive application of the law is plain from the fact that it was again made to
suit the peculiar circumstances in which petitioners cases were under, namely, that
trial had not yet commenced, as provided in Section 7, to make certain that those
cases will no longer be remanded to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, as
the Sandiganbayan alone should try them, thus making it an ex post facto legislation
and a denial of the right of petitioner as an accused in Criminal Case Nos. 23047
23057 to procedural due process
c) The title of the law is misleading in that it contains the aforesaid innocuous
provisions in Sections 4 and 7 which actually expands rather than defines the
old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975), thereby violating the one-title-one-subject
requirement for the passage of statutes under Section 26(1), Article VI of the
Constitution.[17]
For their part, the intervenors, in their petition-in-intervention, add that while Republic Act
No. 8249 innocuously appears to have merely expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
the introduction of Sections 4 and 7 in said statute impressed upon it the character of a class
legislation and an ex-post facto statute intended to apply specifically to the accused in
theKuratong Baleleng case pending before the Sandiganbayan.[18] They further argued that if
their case is tried before the Sandiganbayan their right to procedural due process would be
violated as they could no longer avail of the two-tiered appeal to the Sandiganbayan, which they
acquired under R.A. 7975, before recourse to the Supreme Court.
Both the Office of the Ombudsman and the Solicitor General filed separate pleadings in
support of the constitutionality of the challenged provisions of the law in question and praying
that both the petition and the petition-in-intervention be dismissed.
This Court then issued a Resolution[19] requiring the parties to file simultaneously within
anonextendible period of ten (10) days from notice thereof additional memoranda on the
question of whether the subject amended informations filed in Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057
sufficiently alleged the commission by the accused therein of the crime charged within the
meaning Section 4 b of Republic Act No. 8249, so as to bring the said cases within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The parties, except for the Solicitor General who is representing the People of the
Philippines, filed the required supplemental memorandum within the nonextendible
reglementary period.
The established rule is that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality,
and to justify its nullification there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution,
not a doubtful and argumentative one.[20] The burden of proving the invalidity of the law lies with
those who challenge it. That burden, we regret to say, was not convincingly discharged in the
present case.
The creation of the Sandiganbayan was mandated in Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973
Constitution, which provides:

SEC. 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special court, to be known

as Sandiganbayan, which shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases
involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public
officers and employees including those in government-owned or controlled
corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by law."
The said special court is retained in the new (1987) Constitution under the following
provision in Article XI, Section 4:

Section 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to
function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.
Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Presidential Decree No. 1486 [21] created
theSandiganbayan. Thereafter, the following laws on the Sandiganbayan, in chronological order,
were enacted: P.D. No. 1606,[22] Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, [23] P.D. No. 1860,[24]P.D.
No. 1861,[25] R.A. No. 7975,[26] and R.A. No. 8249.[27] Under the latest amendments introduced
by Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following cases:

SEC. 4. Section 4 of the same decree [P.D. No. 1606, as amended] is hereby further
amended to read as follows:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction
in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are
officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher
rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position
of provincial directorand those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in
the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the Judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to
the provisions of the Constitution;
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 or higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes
committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in Subsection a of
this section in relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order
Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary
Grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or military and PNP
officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the
proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and
municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective
jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final
judgment, resolution or orders of the regional trial courts whether in the exercise of
their own original jurisdiction of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.

"The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions of the
issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions,
and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over
petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases
filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in
1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the
Supreme Court.
The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing
rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may hereafter promulgate, relative
to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and
petitions for review filed with theSandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to
the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of
the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the
Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A,
issued in 1986.
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories
with the public officers or employees, including those employed in governmentowned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers
and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over
them.
x x x x x x x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249 states:

SEC. 7. Transitory provision. This act shall apply to all cases pending in any court
over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof. (Emphasis supplied)
The Sandiganbayan law prior to R.A. 8249 was R.A. 7975. Section 2 of R.A. 7975provides:

SEC. 2. Section 4 of the same decree [Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended] is
hereby further amended to read as follows:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction
in allcases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal
accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in
a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of high
rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and Provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors
in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to
the provisions of the Constitution;
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 or higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in Subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order
Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to
salary Grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or PNP
officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent,

exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court,
metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the
case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on appeals from the
final judgments, resolutions or orders of regular courts where all the accused are
occupying positions lower than grade 27, or not otherwise covered by the preceding
enumeration.
xxxxxxxxx

In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories

with the public officers or employees, including those employed in governmentowned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers
and employees in the proper courts which shall have exclusive jurisdiction over them.
x x x x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975 reads:

SEC. 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases which trial has not begun in
the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts.
Under paragraphs a and c, Section 4 of R.A. 8249, the word principal before the word
accused appearing in the above-quoted Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. 7975,
wasdeleted. It is due to this deletion of the word principal that the parties herein are at
loggerheads over the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner and intervenors, relying on
R.A. 7975, argue that the Regional Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction over the
Subject criminal cases since none of the principal accused under the amended information has
the rank of Superintendent[28] or higher. On the other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman,
through the Special Prosecutor who is tasked to represent the People before the Supreme Court
except in certain cases,[29] contends that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction pursuant to R.A.
8249.
A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall under the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must concur: (1) the offense
committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of
the Revised Penal Code (the law on bribery), [30] (d) Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A,
issued in 1986 (sequestration cases),[31] or (e) other offenses or felonies whether simple or
complexed with other crimes; (2) the offender committing the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and
(e) is a public official or employee[32] holding any of the positions enumerated in paragraph a of
Section 4; and (3) the offense committed is in relation to the office.

Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are being charged with murder which is a
felony punishable under Title VIII of the Revised Penal Code, the governing provision on the
jurisdictional offense is not paragraph but paragraph b, Section 4 of R.A. 8249. This paragraph
b pertains to other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes
committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of [Section 4, R.A.
8249] in relation to their office. The phrase other offenses or felonies is too broad as to include
the crime of murder, provided it was committed in relation to the accuseds official
functions.Thus, under said paragraph b, what determines the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction is
the official position or rank of the offender that is, whether he is one of those public officers or
employees enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. The offenses mentioned in paragraphs a, b
and c of the same Section 4 do not make any reference to the criminal participation of the
accused public officer as to whether he is charged as a principal, accomplice or accessory. In
enacting R.A. 8249, the Congress simply restored the original provisions of P.D. 1606 which
does not mention the criminal participation of the public officer as a requisite to determine the
jurisdiction of theSandiganbayan.
Petitioner and intervenors posture that Section 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to
equal protection of the law[33] because its enactment was particularly directed only to
theKuratong Baleleng cases in the Sandiganbayan, is a contention too shallow to deserve
merit. No concrete evidence and convincing argument were presented to warrant a declaration of
an act of the entire Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive
department as unconstitutional. Every classification made by law is presumed reasonable. Thus,
the party who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness.[34]
It is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of
the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. The classification is
reasonable and not arbitrary when there is concurrence of four elements, namely:
(1) it must rest on substantial distinction;
(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class, [35]

all of which are present in this case.

The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 failed to rebut the presumption of
constitutionality and reasonableness of the questioned provisions. The classification between
those pending cases involving the concerned public officials whose trial has not yet commenced
and whose cases could have been affected by the amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction
under R.A. 8249, as against those cases where trial had already started as of the approval of the
law, rests on substantial distinction that makes real differences. [36] In the first instance, evidence
against them were not yet presented, whereas in the latter the parties had already submitted their
respective proofs, examined witness and presented documents. Since it is within the power of
Congress to define the jurisdiction of courts subject to the constitutional limitations, [37] it can be
reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction would necessarily affect pending
cases, which is why it has to provide for a remedy in the form of a transitory provision. Thus,
petitioner and intervenors cannot now claim that Sections 4 and 7 placed them under a different
category from those similarly situated as them. Precisely, paragraph a of Section 4 provides that
it shall apply to all cases involving" certain public officials and, under the transitory provision in

Section 7, to all cases pending in any court. Contrary to petitioner and intervenors arguments, the
law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision
does not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in any court. It just happened
that the Kuratong Baleleng cases are one of those affected by the law. Moreover, those cases
where trial had already begun are not affected by the transitory provision under Section 7 of the
new law (R.A. 8249).
In their futile attempt to have said sections nullified, heavy reliance is premised on what is
perceived as bad faith on the part of a Senator and two Justices of the Sandiganbayan[38] for their
participation in the passage of the said provisions. In particular, it is stressed that the Senator had
expressed strong sentiments against those officials involved in the Kuratong Baleleng cases
during the hearings conducted on the matter by the committee headed by the Senator. Petitioner
further contends that the legislature is biased against him as he claims to have been selected from
among the 67 million other Filipinos as the object of the deletion of the word principal in
paragraph a, Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended, and of the transitory provision of R.A. 8249.
[39]
R.A. 8249, while still a bill, was acted, deliberated, considered by 23 other Senators and by
about 250 Representatives, and was separately approved by the Senate and House of
Representatives and, finally, by the President of the Philippines.
On the perceived bias that the Sandiganbayan Justices allegedly had against petitioner
during the committee hearings, the same would not constitute sufficient justification to nullify an
otherwise valid law. Their presence and participation in the legislative hearings was deemed
necessary by Congress since the matter before the committee involves the graft court of which
one is the head of the Sandiganbayan and the other a member thereof. The Congress, in its
plenary legislative powers, is particularly empowered by the Constitution to invite persons to
appear before it whenever it decides to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.[40]
Petitioner and intervenors further argued that the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 to
theKuratong Baleleng cases constitutes an ex post facto law[41] for they are deprived of their right
to procedural due process as they can no longer avail of the two tiered appeal which they had
allegedly acquired under R.A. 7975.
Again, this contention is erroneous. There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. In Calder v.
Bull,[42] an ex post facto law is one
(a)which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the law and which was innocent
when committed, and punishes such action; or
(b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater that when it was committed; or
(c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the
crime when it was committed,
(d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law
required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant. [43]
(e) Every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the situation of a
person to his disadvantage.[44]

This Court added two more to the list, namely:

(f) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty
or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful;

(g) deprives a person accused of crime of some lawful protection to which he has become
entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of
amnesty.[45]

Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws. [46] R.A. 8249
is not apenal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal
laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their
violations;[47] or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment.
[48]
R.A. 7975, which amended P.D. 1606 as regards the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction, its mode of
appeal and other procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but
clearly a procedural statute, i.e. one which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts
applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice.[49] Not being a penal law, the
retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.
Petitioners and intervenors contention that their right to a two-tiered appeal which they
acquired under R.A. 7975 has been diluted by the enactment of R.A. 8249, is incorrect. The same
contention has already been rejected by the court several times [50] considering that the right to
appeal is not a natural right but statutory in nature that can be regulated by law. The mode of
procedure provided for in the statutory right of appeal is not included in the prohibition againstex
post facto laws.[51] R.A. 8249 pertains only to matters of procedure, and being merely an
amendatory statute it does not partake the nature of an ex post facto law. It does not mete out a
penalty and, therefore, does not come within the prohibition.[52] Moreover, the law did not alter
the rules of evidence or the mode of trial.[53] It has been ruled that adjective statutes may be made
applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage.[54]
In any case, R.A. 8249 has preserved the accuseds right to appeal to the Supreme Court to
review questions of law.[55] On the removal of the intermediate review facts, the Supreme Court
still has the power of review to determine if the presumption of innocence has been convincingly
overcome.[56]
Another point. The challenged law does not violate the one-title-one-subject provisions of
the Constitution. Much emphasis is placed on the wording in the title of the law that it defines
the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction when what it allegedly does is to expand its jurisdiction. The
expansion in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, if it can be considered as such, does not have
to be expressly stated in the title of the law because such is the necessary consequence of the
amendments. The requirement that every bill must only have one subject expressed in the
title[57] is satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough, as in this case, to include subjects related
to the general purpose which the statute seeks to achieve. [58] Such rule is severally interpreted and
should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. There is here sufficient
compliance with such requirement, since the title of R.A. 8249 expresses the general subject
(involving the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the amendment of P.D. 1606, as amended)
and all the provisions of the law are germane to that general subject. [59] The Congress, in
employing the word define in the title of the law, acted within its powers since Section 2, Article
VIII of the Constitution itself empowers the legislative body to define, prescribe,
and apportionthe jurisdiction of various courts.[60]
There being no unconstitutional infirmity in both the subject amendatory provision of
Section 4 and the retroactive procedural application of the law as provided in Section 7 R.A. No.
8249, we shall now determine whether under the allegations in the Informations, it is

theSandiganbayan or Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the multiple murder case
against herein petitioner and intervenors.
The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or statute. The elements of that
definition must appear in the complaint or information so as to ascertain which court has
jurisdiction over a case. Hence the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined
by the allegations in the complaint or information, [61] and not by the evidence presented by the
parties at the trial.[62]
As stated earlier, the multiple murder charge against petitioner and intervenors falls under
Section 4 [paragraph b] of R.A. 8249. Section 4 requires that the offense charged must be
committed by the offender in relation to his office in order for the Sandiganbayan to have
jurisdiction over it.[63] This jurisdictional requirement is in accordance with Section 5, Article XIII
of the 1973 Constitution which mandated that the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over
criminal cases committed by public officers and employees, including those in governmentowned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by law. This
constitutional mandate was reiterated in the new (1987) Constitution when it declared in Section
4 thereof that the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as
now or hereafter may be provided by law.
The remaining question to be resolved then is whether the offense of multiple murder was
committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers.
In People vs. Montejo,[64] we held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation
to the office if it (the offense) is intimately connected with the office of the offender and
perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions. [65] This intimate relation
between the offense charged and the discharge of official duties must be alleged in the
Information.[66]
As to how the offense charged be stated in the information, Section 9, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Court mandates:

SEC. 9. Cause of Accusation. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the

offensemust be stated in ordinary and concise language without repetition not
necessarily in the terms of the statute defining the offense, but in such form as is
sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is
intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper
judgment. (Emphasis supplied)
As early as 1954, we pronounced that the factor that characterizes the charge is the actual
recital of the facts.[67] The real nature of the criminal charges is determined not from the caption
or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have
been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint
or information.[68]
The noble object of written accusations cannot be overemphasized. This was explained
inU.S. v. Karelsen:[69]

The object of this written accusations was First, To furnish the accused with such
a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense,
and second, to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a
further prosecution for the same cause, and third, to inform the court of the facts
alleged so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a
conviction if one should be had. In order that this requirement may be
satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of lawEvery crime is made up
of certain acts and intent these must be set forth in the complaint with
reasonable particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant)and
circumstances. In short, the complaint must
contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to
constitute the crime charged. (Emphasis supplied)
It is essential, therefore, that the accused be informed of the facts that are imputed to him
ashe is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.
[70]

Applying these legal principles and doctrines to the present case, we find the amended
informations for murder against herein petitioner and intervenors wanting of specific
factualaverments to show the intimate relation/connection between the offense charged and
thedischarge of official function of the offenders.
In the present case, one of the eleven (11) amended informations[71] for murder reads:

AMENDED INFORMATION
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III, Office of the Ombudsman hereby
accuses CHIEF INSP MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP ERWIN T.
VILLACORTE SENIOR INSP JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL. INSP RICARDO G.
DANDAN SPO4 VICENTE P. ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON,
SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1
WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, SPO1 OSMUNDO
B. CARINO, CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP,
CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA,
JR., SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO III,
CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INISP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR
INSP. ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY
NUAS, SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, PO2 NORBERTO LASAGA, PO2
LEONARDO GLORIA and PO2 ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG of the crime
of Murder as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code committed as follows:
That on or about May 18, 1995 in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon
City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused

CHIEF INISP. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T. VILLACORTE,

SENIOR INSP. JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4
VICENTE P. ARNADO SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V.
PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C. CUARTERO,
SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, and SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO all taking
advantage of their public and official positions as officers and members of the
Philippine National Police and committing the acts herein alleged in relation to
their public office, conspiring with intent to kill and using firearms with treachery,
evident premeditation and taking advantage of their superior strengths did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot JOEL AMORA, thereby inflicting
upon the latter mortal wounds which caused his instantaneous death to the damage
and prejudice of the heirs of the said victim.
That accused CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP
CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA,
JR. SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO II CHIEF
INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP.
ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN SPO3 WILLY NUAS SPO3
CICERO S. BACOLOD, PO2 ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG committing the acts in
relation to office as officers and members of the Philippine National Police are
charged herein as accessories after-the-fact forconcealing the crime herein above
alleged by among others falsely representing that there were no arrests made
during the raid conducted by the accused herein at Superville Subdivision,
Paraaque, Metro Manila on or about the early dawn of May 18, 1995.
CONTRARY TO LAW
While the above-quoted information states that the above-named principal accused
committed the crime of murder in relation to their public office, there is, however, no specific
allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was intimately
related to the discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended
information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then
killed the latter while in their custody.
Even the allegations concerning the criminal participation of herein petitioner and
intervenors as among the accessories after-the-fact, the amended information is vague on this. It
is alleged therein that the said accessories concealed the crime herein-above alleged by, among
others, falsely representing that there were no arrests made during the raid conducted by the
accused herein at Superville Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro Manila, on or about the early dawn of
May 18, 1995. The sudden mention of the arrests made during the raid conducted by the
accused surprises the reader. There is no indication in the amended information that the
victim was one of those arrested by the accused during the raid. Worse, the raid and arrests
were allegedly conducted at Superville Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro Manila but, as alleged in
the immediately preceding paragraph of the amended information, the shooting of the victim by

the principal accused occurred in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon City. How the raid, arrests
and shooting happened in two places far away from each other is puzzling. Again, while there is
the allegation in the amended information that the said accessories committed the offense in
relation to office as officers and members of the (PNP), we, however, do not see the intimate
connection between the offense charged and the accuseds official functions, which, as earlier
discussed, is an essential element in determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The stringent requirement that the charge be set forth with such particularity as will
reasonably indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have committed in relation
to his office was, sad to say, not satisfied. We believe that the mere allegation in the amended
information that the offense was committed by the accused public officer in relation to his office
is not sufficient. That phrase is merely a conclusion of law, not a factual averment that would
show the close intimacy between the offense charged and the discharge of the accuseds official
duties.
In People vs. Magallanes,[72] where the jurisdiction between the Regional Trial Court and
the Sandiganbayan was at issue, we ruled:

It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the

complaint or information and not by the result of evidence after trial.
In (People vs. ) Montejo (108 Phil 613 [1960] ), where the amended information
alleged
Leroy S. Brown, City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has organized groups of police
patrol and civilian commandos consisting of regular policemen and x x x special
policemen, appointed and provided by him with pistols and high power guns and then
established a camp x x x at Tipo-tipo which is under his command x x x supervision
and control where his co-defendants were stationed, entertained criminal complaints
and conducted the corresponding investigations, as well as assumed the authority to
arrest and detain persons without due process of law and without bringing them to the
proper court, and that in line with this set-up established by said Mayor of Basilan
City as such, and acting upon his orders his co-defendants arrested and maltreated
Awalin Tebag who died in consequence thereof.
we held that the offense charged was committed in relation to the office of the accused
because it was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or
irregular of their official functions and would not have been committed had they not
held their office, besides, the accused had no personal motive in committing the
crime, thus, there was an intimate connection between the offense and the office of the
accused.
Unlike in Montejo, the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 in the
court below do not indicate that the accused arrested and investigated the victims and
then killed the latter in the course of the investigation. The informations merely allege

that the accused, for the purpose of extracting or extorting the sum of P353,000.00
abducted, kidnapped and detained the two victims, and failing in their common
purpose, they shot and killed the said victims. For the purpose of determining
jurisdiction, it is these allegations that shall control, and not the evidence presented
by the prosecution at the trial.
In the aforecited case of People vs. Montejo, it is noteworthy that the phrase committed in
relation to public office does not appear in the information, which only signifies that the said
phrase is not what determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. What is controlling is
thespecific factual allegations in the information that would indicate the close intimacy between
the discharge of the accuseds official duties and the commission of the offense charged, in order
to qualify the crime as having been committed in relation to public office.
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder
was intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the
offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court,[73] not the Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 is hereby
sustained.The Addendum to the March 5, 1997 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is
REVERSED. TheSandiganbayan is hereby directed to transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to
23057 (for multiple murder) to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which has exclusive
original jurisdiction over said cases.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.