INSURANCE

CONSTANTINO VS ASIA LIFE

FACTS:
Case 1:
The life of Arcadio Constantino was
insured with Asia Life Insurance
Company (Asia) for a term of 20 years
with Paz Lopez de Constantino as
beneficiary. The first premium covered
the period up to September 26, 1942.
After the first premium, no further
premiums were paid. The insured died on
September 22, 1944.
Asia Life Insurance Company, being an
American Corp., had to close its branch
office in Manila by reason of the Japanese
occupation, i.e. from January 2, 1942,
until the year 1945.
Case 2:
Spouses Tomas Ruiz and Agustina Peralta.
Their premium were initially annually but
subsequently changed to quarterly. The
last quarterly premium was delivered on
on November 18, 1941 and it covered the
period until January 31, 1942.
Upon the Japanese occupation, the insurer
and insured were not able to deal with
each other
Because the insured had borrowed on the
policy P234.00 in January, 1941, the cash
surrender value of the policy was
sufficient to maintain the policy in force
only up to September 7, 1942.
Tomas Ruiz died on February 16, 1945
with Agustina Peralta as beneficiary. Her
demand for payment was refused on the
ground of non-payment of the premiums.
Plaintiffs: As beneficiaries, they are

entitled to receive the proceeds of the

policies minus all sums due for premiums
in arrears. The non-payment of the
premiums was caused by the closing of
Asia's offices in Manila during the
Japanese occupation and the impossible
circumstances created by war.
lower court: absolved Asia
ISSUE: W/N the insurers still have a right
to claim.
HELD: YES. lower court affirmed.
it would seem that pursuant to the express
terms of the policy, non-payment of
premium produces its avoidance
Forfeitures of insurance policies are not
favored, but courts cannot for that reason
alone refuse to enforce an insurance
contract according to its meaning.
Nevertheless, inasmuch as the nonpayment of premium was the consequence
of war, it should be excused and should
not cause the forfeiture of the policy
3 Rules in case of war:
Connecticut Rule
2 elements in the consideration for which
the annual premium is paid:
mere protection for the year
privilege of renewing the contract for each
succeeding year by paying the premium
for that year at the time agreed upon
payment of premiums is a condition
precedent, the non-performance would be
illegal necessarily defeats the right to
renew the contract
New York Rule - greatly followed by a
number of cases
war between states in which the parties

reside merely suspends the contracts of

the life insurance, and that, upon tender of
all premiums due by the insured or his
representatives after the war has
terminated, the contract revives and
becomes fully operative
United States Rule
contract is not merely suspended, but is
abrogated by reason of non-payments is
peculiarly of the essence of the contract
it would be unjust to allow the insurer to
retain the reserve value of the policy,
which is the excess of the premiums paid
over the actual risk carried during the
years when the policy had been in force
The business of insurance is founded on
the law of average; that of life insurance
eminently so
contract of insurance is sui generis
Whether the insured will continue it or not
is optional with him. There being no
obligation to pay for the premium, they
did not constitute a debt.
It should be noted that the parties
contracted not only for peacetime
conditions but also for times of war,
because the policies contained provisions
applicable expressly to wartime days. The
logical inference, therefore, is that the
parties contemplated uninterrupted
operation of the contract even if armed
conflict should ensue.
the fundamental character of the
undertaking to pay premiums and the high
importance of the defense of non-payment
thereof, was specifically recognized
adopt the United States Rule: first policy
had no reserve value, and that the
equitable values of the second had been

practically returned to the insured in the

form of loan and advance for premium
INSULAR LIFE VS EBRADO
Facts:
J. Martin:
Cristor Ebrado was issued by The Life
Assurance Co., Ltd., a policy for
P5,882.00 with a rider for Accidental
Death. He designated Carponia T.
Ebrado as the revocable beneficiary in
his policy. He referred to her as his wife.
Cristor was killed when he was hit by a
failing branch of a tree. Insular Life was
made liable to pay the coverage in the
total amount of P11,745.73,
representing the face value of the policy
in the amount of P5,882.00 plus the
additional benefits for accidental death.
Carponia T. Ebrado filed with the insurer
a claim for the proceeds as the
designated beneficiary therein, although
she admited that she and the insured
were merely living as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage.
Pascuala Vda. de Ebrado also filed her
claim as the widow of the deceased
insured. She asserts that she is the one
entitled to the insurance proceeds.
Insular commenced an action for
Interpleader before the trial court as to
who should be given the proceeds. The
court declared Carponia as disqualified.
Issue: WON a common-law wife named
as beneficiary in the life insurance policy
of a legally married man can claim the
proceeds in case of death of the latter?
Held: No. Petition
Ratio:
Section 50 of the Insurance Act which
provides that "the insurance shall be
applied exclusively to the proper
interest of the person in whose name it
is made"
The word "interest" highly suggests that
the provision refers only to the "insured"
and not to the beneficiary, since a
contract of insurance is personal in

character. Otherwise, the prohibitory

laws against illicit relationships
especially on property and descent will
be rendered nugatory, as the same
could easily be circumvented by modes
of insurance.
When not otherwise specifically
provided for by the Insurance Law, the
contract of life insurance is governed by
the general rules of the civil law
regulating contracts. And under Article
2012 of the same Code, any person who
is forbidden from receiving any donation
under Article 739 cannot be named
beneficiary of a fife insurance policy by
the person who cannot make a donation
to him. Common-law spouses are barred
from receiving donations from each
other.
Article 739 provides that void donations
are those made between persons who
were guilty of adultery or concubinage
at the time of donation.
There is every reason to hold that the
bar in donations between legitimate
spouses and those between illegitimate
ones should be enforced in life
insurance policies since the same are
based on similar consideration. So long
as marriage remains the threshold of
family laws, reason and morality dictate
that the impediments imposed upon
married couple should likewise be
imposed upon extra-marital relationship.
A conviction for adultery or concubinage
isnt required exacted before the
disabilities mentioned in Article 739 may
effectuate. The article says that in the
case referred to in No. 1, the action for
declaration of nullity may be brought by
the spouse of the donor or donee; and
the guilty of the donee may be proved
by preponderance of evidence in the
same action.
The underscored clause neatly conveys
that no criminal conviction for the
offense is a condition precedent. The
law plainly states that the guilt of the
party may be proved in the same
acting for declaration of nullity of
donation. And, it would be sufficient if
evidence preponderates.
The insured was married to Pascuala
Ebrado with whom she has six
legitimate children. He was also living in

with his common-law wife with whom he

has two children.
QUA CHEE GAN VS LAW UNION
FACTS:
Qua owned 4 warehouses used for the
storage of copra and hemp. They were
insured with the Law Union.
Fire broke out and completely destroyed
3 bodegas. The plaintiff submitted
claims totalling P398,562.81. The
Insurance Company resisted payment
on the grounds that the fire had been
deliberately caused by the insured or by
other persons in connivance with him.
Que Chee Gan and his brother were
tried for arson, but were acquitted by
the trial court. As regards the insurance
claim, the trial court ruled in favor of
Qua and entitled him to recover more
than Php 300,000 for indemnities from
the insurance company. Hence, the
company appealed to the SC.
In its first assignment of error, the
insurance company alleged that the trial
Court should have held that the policies
were avoided for breach of warranty.
The contract noted that fire hydrants
were required in a particular
measurement of space (every 150 feet).
Hence, they argued that since the
bodegas insured had an external wall
perimeter of 500 meters, the appellee
should have 11 fire hydrants in the
compound, and that he actually had
only 2, with a further pair.
ISSUES:
1. WON the insurance company can void
the policies it had issued
2. WON the insured violated the "Hemp
Warranty" provisions of the policy
against the storage of gasoline
3. WON the insured planned the
destruction of the bodega
HELD: No. No. No.
1. The insurer, who at the time of
issuance, has knowledge of existing
facts which would invalidate the
contract from the beginning, such

constitutes a waiver of conditions in the

contract inconsistent with the facts, and
the insurer is stopped thereafter from
asserting the breach of such conditions.
Also, an insurance company intends to
executed a valid contract in return for
the premium received; and when the
policy contains a condition which
renders it voidable at its inception, and
this result is known to the insurer, it will
be presumed to have intended to waive
the conditions and to execute a binding
contract, rather than to have deceived
the insured into thinking he is insured
when in fact he is not.
The appellant is barred estoppel to claim
violation of the so-called fire hydrants
warranty, because it knew the number
of hydrants demanded therein never
existed from the very beginning and
issued the policies.
To allow a company to accept one's
money for a policy of insurance which it
then knows to be void and of no effect,
though it knows as it must, that the
assured believes it to be valid and
binding, is so contrary to the dictates of
honesty and fair dealing, and so closely
related to positive fraud, as to the
abhorrent to fair-minded men.
The appellant company so worded the
policies that while exacting the greater
number of fire hydrants and appliances,
it kept the premium discount at the
minimum of 2 1/2%, thereby giving the
insurance company a double benefit.
Such abnormal treatment of the insured
strongly points at an abuse of the
insurance company's selection of the
words and terms of the contract, over
which it had absolute control.
Receipt of Premiums or Assessments
after Cause for Forfeiture Other than
Nonpayment. It is a well settled rule
of law that an insurer which with
knowledge of facts entitling it to treat a
policy as no longer in force, receives and
accepts a premium on the policy,
estopped to take advantage of the
forfeiture. It cannot treat the policy as
void for the purpose of defense to an
action to recover for a loss thereafter
occurring and at the same time treat it
as valid for the purpose of earning and
collecting further premiums.

Moreover, taking into account the well

known rule that ambiguities or
obscurities must be strictly interpreted
against the party that caused them, the
"memo of warranty" invoked by
appellant bars the latter from
questioning the existence of the
appliances called for in the insured
premises
2. The ambiguity must be held strictly
against the insurer and liberally in favor
of the insured, specially to avoid a
forfeiture. So long as insurance
companies insist upon the use of
ambiguous, intricate and technical
provisions, which conceal rather than
frankly disclose, their own intentions,
the courts must, in fairness to those who
purchase insurance, construe every
ambiguity in favor of the insured.
Appellee admitted that there were 36
cans of gasoline in the building
designed. It However, gasoline is not
specifically mentioned among the
prohibited articles listed in the so-called
"hemp warranty." The cause relied upon
by the insurer speaks of "oils", and is
uncertain because, "Oils" usually mean
"lubricants" and not gasoline or
kerosene.
If the company intended to rely upon a
condition of that character, it ought to
have been plainly expressed in the
policy.
The contract of insurance is one of
perfect good faith not for the insured
alone, but equally so for the insurer; in
fact, it is mere so for the latter, since its
dominant bargaining position carries
with it stricter responsibility.
Also, the gasoline kept in Bodega No. 2
was only incidental to his business,
being no more than a customary 2 day's
supply for the five or six motor vehicles
used for transporting of the stored
merchandise. "It is well settled that the
keeping of inflammable oils on the
premises though prohibited by the
policy does not void it if such keeping is
incidental to the business."
3. It was unlikely that Qua burned the
warehouse to defraud the company
because he had the resources to pay off
the National Bank in a short time. Also,
no motive appears for attempt to

defraud the insurer. While the acquittal

of the insured in the arson case is not
res judicata on the present civil action,
the insurer's evidence, to judge from the
decision in the criminal case, is
practically identical in both cases and
must lead to the same result, since the
proof to establish the defense of
connivance at the fire in order to
defraud the insurer "cannot be
materially less convincing than that
required in order to convict the insured
of the crime of arson."
As to the defense that the burned
bodegas could not possibly have
contained the quantities of copra and
hemp stated in the fire claims, the
insurer relied on its adjuster investigator
who examined the premises during and
after the fire. His testimony, however,
was based on inferences from the
photographs and traces found after the
fire, and must yield to the contradictory
testimony of those who actually saw the
contents of the bodegas shortly before
the fire, while inspecting them for the
mortgagee Bank.
TY VS FILIPINA CIA DE SEGUROS
FACTS:

October 1, 1941: Christern Huenefeld and

co., inc. (Christern), a company whose
major stockholders are German, paid P1M
and obtained a fire policy fromFilipinas
Cia. de Seguros (Filipinas)
December 10, 1941: U.S. declared a war
against Germany
February 27, 1942 (during the japanese
occupation): the building and insured
merchandise were burned
their claimed from Filipinas and the
salvage goods were auctioned for P92,650
who refused since Christen was organized
under the Philippine laws, it was under
American jurisdiction which is an enemy
of the Germans

April 9, 1943: The Director of Bureau of

Financing ordered Filipinas to pay the
P92,650 to Christen and it did.
Filipinas filed with the CFI the P92,650
paid to Christern
CA affirmed CFI: dismissed the action
Filed a petition for certiorari
ISSUE:
W/N Christern is a public enemy and
therefore ceased to be insured

HELD: YES. Ordered to pay Filipinas

P77,208.33, Philippine currency, less the
amount of the premium, in Philippine
currency, that should be returned by the
Filipinas for the unexpired term of the
policy in question, beginning December
11, 1941
Philippine Insurance Law (Act No. 2427,
as amended,) in section 8, provides that
"anyone except a public enemy may be
insured
Effect of war, generally. All intercourse
between citizens of belligerent powers
which is inconsistent with a state of war is
prohibited by the law of nations. Such
prohibition includes all negotiations,
commerce, or trading with the enemy; all
acts which will increase, or tend to
increase, its income or resources; all acts
of voluntary submission to it; or receiving
its protection; also all acts concerning the
transmission of money or goods; and all
contracts relating thereto are thereby
nullified. It further prohibits insurance
upon trade with or by the enemy, upon the

life or lives of aliens engaged in service

with the enemy; this for the reason that the
subjects of one country cannot be
permitted to lend their assistance to
protect by insurance the commerce or
property of belligerent, alien subjects, or
to do anything detrimental too their
country's interest. The purpose of war is to
cripple the power and exhaust the
resources of the enemy, and it is
inconsistent that one country should
destroy its enemy's property and repay in
insurance the value of what has been so
destroyed, or that it should in such manner
increase the resources of the enemy, or
render it aid, and the commencement of
war determines, for like reasons, all
trading intercourse with the enemy, which
prior thereto may have been lawful. All
individuals therefore, who compose the
belligerent powers, exist, as to each other,
in a state of utter exclusion, and are public
enemies
In the case of an ordinary fire policy,
which grants insurance only from year, or
for some other specified term it is plain
that when the parties become alien
enemies, the contractual tie is broken and
the contractual rights of the parties, so far
as not vested.
However, elementary rules of justice (in
the absence of specific provision in the
Insurance Law) require that the premium
paid by the respondent for the period
covered by its policy from December 11,
1941, should be returned by the petitioner
DEL ROSARIO VS EQUITABLE
INSURANCE

Lessons Applicable: Ambiguous

Provisions Interpreted Against Insurer
(Insurance)
FACTS:
April 13, 1957: Simeon del Rosario, father
of the insured who died from drowning
filed a claim for payment with Equitable
Ins. and Casualty Co., Inc. but it refused
to pay more than P1,000 php so a case
was filed with the RTC for the P2,000
balance stating that under the policy they
are entitled to P1,000 to P3,000 as
indemnity
RTC: entitled to recover P3,000 - policy
does not positively state any definite
amount, there is an ambiguity in this
respect in the policy, which ambiguity
must be interpreted in favor of the insured
and strictly against the insurer so as to
allow greater indemnity
ISSUE: W/N Simeon is entitled to recover
P3,000
HELD: YES.
terms in an insurance policy, which are
ambiguous, equivocal or uncertain are to
be construed strictly against, the insurer,
and liberally in favor of the insured so as
to effect the dominant purpose of
indemnity or payment to the insured,
especially where a forfeiture is involved
reason for this rule is that the "insured
usually has no voice in the selection or
arrangement of the words employed and
that the language of the contract is
selected with great care and deliberation

by expert and legal advisers employed by,

and acting exclusively in the interest of,
the insurance company
MISAMIS LUMBER VS CAPITAL
INSURANCE

Facts:
Misamis Lumber Company insured its
Ford Falcon to Capital Insurance for P
14,000. One day, the cars crank
andflywheel broke when it passed over a
water hole in Aurora Boulevard. Misamis
sent it to be repaired at the cost of 302
pesos. However, Capital did not want to
pay the entire amount because the repair
limit in the contract stipulated up to 150
pesos only. Misamis filed suit.
The lower court ruled against the
insurance corporation because the
company did not show that the cost was
excessive. Also , the court ruled that
absolving the company of the excess
amount would make the contract one
sided.
Issue: Is the insurance company liable for
more than the amount in the repair limit?
Held: No. Insurance company only
ordered to pay 150 pesos.
Ratio:
Paragraph 4, subpar a. of the insurance
contract is clear and specific. It authorizes
up to 150 pesos only as a repair limit.
The lower court did not heed the express
stipulation in the agreement. The policy
specifically noted the mechanics for repair
in par. 2 and the limits of the liability in
par 4. The company didnt notify the
insurance provider before it did the
repairs. Also, even if the contract is
onerous, this doesnt justify its abrogation
VERENDIA VS CA

Facts:
> Fidelity and Surety Insurance
Company (Fidelity) issued Fire Insurance
Policy No. F-18876 effective between
June 23, 1980 and June 23, 1981
covering Rafael (Rex) Verendia's
residential in the amount of
P385,000.00. Designated as beneficiary
was the Monte de Piedad & Savings
Bank.
> Verendia also insured the same
building with two other companies,
namely, The Country Bankers Insurance
for P56,000.00 and The Development
Insurance for P400,000.00.
> While the three fire insurance policies
were in force, the insured property was
completely destroyed by fire.
> Fidelity appraised the damage
amounting to 385,000 when it was
accordingly informed of the loss. Despite
demands, Fidelity refused payment
under its policy, thus prompting
Verendia to file a complaint for the
recovery of 385,000
> Fidelity, averred that the policy was
avoided by reason of over-insurance,
that Verendia maliciously represented
that the building at the time of the fire
was leased under a contract executed
on June 25, 1980 to a certain Roberto
Garcia, when actually it was a Marcelo
Garcia who was the lessee.
Issue:
Whether or not Verendia can claim on
the insurance despite the
misrepresentation as to the lessee and
the overinsurance.
Held:
NOPE.
The contract of lease upon which
Verendia relies to support his claim for
insurance benefits, was entered into
between him and one Robert Garcia, a
couple of days after the effectivity of the
insurance policy. When the rented
residential building was razed to the
ground, it appears that Robert Garcia

was still within the premises. However,

according to the investigation by the
police, the building appeared to have
"no occupants" and that Mr. Roberto
Garcia was "renting on the otherside of
said compound" These pieces of
evidence belie Verendia's
uncorroborated testimony that Marcelo
Garcia whom he considered as the real
lessee, was occupying the building when
it was burned.

Ironically, during the trial, Verendia

admitted that it was not Robert Garcia
who signed the lease contract but it was
Marcelo Garcia cousin of Robert, who
had also been paying the rentals all the
while. Verendia, however, failed to
explain why Marcelo had to sign his
cousin's name when he in fact he was
paying for the rent and why he
(Verendia) himself, the lessor, allowed
such a ruse. Fidelity's conclusions on
these proven facts appear, therefore, to
have sufficient bases: Verendia
concocted the lease contract to deflect
responsibility for the fire towards an
alleged "lessee", inflated the value of
the property by the alleged monthly
rental of P6,500) when in fact, the
Provincial Assessor of Rizal had
assessed the property's fair market
value to be only P40,300.00, insured the
same property with two other insurance
companies for a total coverage of
around P900,000, and created a deadend for the adjuster by the
disappearance of Robert Garcia.

discussion pointing to the fact that

Verendia used a false lease contract to
support his claim under Fire Insurance
Policy, the terms of the policy should be
strictly construed against the insured.
Verendia failed to live by the terms of
the policy, specifically Section 13
thereof which is expressed in terms that
are clear and unambiguous, that all
benefits under the policy shall be
forfeited "if the claim be in any respect
fraudulent, or if any false declaration be
made or used in support thereof, or if
any fraudulent means or devises are
used by the Insured or anyone acting in
his behalf to obtain any benefit under
the policy". Verendia, having presented
a false declaration to support his claim
for benefits in the form of a fraudulent
lease contract, he forfeited all benefits
therein by virtue of Section 13 of the
policy in the absence of proof that
Fidelity waived such provision

Basically a contract of indemnity, an

insurance contract is the law between
the parties. Its terms and conditions
constitute the measure of the insurer's
liability and compliance therewith is a
condition precedent to the insured's
right to recovery from the. As it is also a
contract of adhesion, an insurance
contract should be liberally construed in
favor of the insured and strictly against
the insurer company which usually
prepares it

There is also no reason to conclude that

by submitting the subrogation receipt as
evidence in court, Fidelity bound itself to
a "mutual agreement" to settle
Verendia's claims in consideration of the
amount of P142,685.77. While the said
receipt appears to have been a filled-up
form of Fidelity, no representative of
Fidelity had signed it. It is even
incomplete as the blank spaces for a
witness and his address are not filled up.
More significantly, the same receipt
states that Verendia had received the
aforesaid amount. However, that
Verendia had not received the amount
stated therein, is proven by the fact that
Verendia himself filed the complaint for
the full amount of P385,000.00 stated in
the policy. It might be that there had
been efforts to settle Verendia's claims,
but surely, the subrogation receipt by
itself does not prove that a settlement
had been arrived at and enforced. Thus,
to interpret Fidelity's presentation of the
subrogation receipt in evidence as
indicative of its accession to its "terms"
is not only wanting in rational basis but
would be substituting the will of the
Court for that of the parties

Considering, however, the foregoing

GULF RESORTS VS PHIL CHARTER

INSURANCE CORP
Facts: Gulf Resorts is the owner of the
Plaza Resort situated at Agoo, La Union
and had its properties in said resort
insured originally with the American
Home Assurance Company (AHAC). In
the first 4 policies issued, the risks of
loss from earthquake shock was
extended only to petitioners two
swimming pools. Gulf Resorts agreed to
insure with Phil Charter the properties
covered by the AHAC policy provided
that the policy wording and rates in said
policy be copied in the policy to be
issued by Phil Charter. Phil Charter
issued Policy No. 31944 to Gulf Resorts
covering the period of March 14, 1990 to
March 14, 1991 for P10,700,600.00 for a
total premium of P45,159.92. the breakdown of premiums shows that Gulf
Resorts paid only P393.00 as premium
against earthquake shock (ES). In Policy
No. 31944 issued by defendant, the
shock endorsement provided that In
consideration of the payment by the
insured to the company of the sum
included additional premium the
Company agrees, notwithstanding what
is stated in the printed conditions of this
policy due to the contrary, that this
insurance covers loss or damage to
shock to any of the property insured by
this Policy occasioned by or through or
in consequence of earthquake (Exhs. "1D", "2-D", "3-A", "4-B", "5-A", "6-D" and
"7-C"). In Exhibit "7-C" the word
"included" above the underlined portion
was deleted. On July 16, 1990 an
earthquake struck Central Luzon and
Northern Luzon and plaintiffs properties
covered by Policy No. 31944 issued by
defendant, including the two swimming
pools in its Agoo Playa Resort were
damaged.
Petitioner advised respondent that it
would be making a claim under its
Insurance Policy 31944 for damages on
its properties. Respondent denied
petitioners claim on the ground that its
insurance policy only afforded
earthquake shock coverage to the two
swimming pools of the resort. The trial
court ruled in favor of respondent. In its

ruling, the schedule clearly shows that

petitioner paid only a premium of
P393.00 against the peril of earthquake
shock, the same premium it had paid
against earthquake shock only on the
two swimming pools in all the policies
issued by AHAC.
Issue: Whether or not the policy covers
only the two swimming pools owned by
Gulf Resorts and does not extend to all
properties damaged therein
Held: YES. All the provisions and riders
taken and interpreted together,
indubitably show the intention of the
parties to extend earthquake shock
coverage to the two swimming pools
only. An insurance premium is the
consideration paid an insurer for
undertaking to indemnify the insured
against a specified peril. In fire, casualty
and marine insurance, the premium
becomes a debt as soon as the risk
attaches. In the subject policy, no
premium payments were made with
regard to earthquake shock coverage
except on the two swimming pools.
There is no mention of any premium
payable for the other resort properties
with regard to earthquake shock. This is
consistent with the history of
petitioners insurance policies with
AHAC.
PHILIPPINE HEALTH CARE
PROVIDERS VS COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE
FACTS:
Petitioner is a domestic corporation
whose primary purpose is to establish,
maintain, conduct and operate a prepaid
group practice health care delivery
system or a health maintenance
organization to take care of the sick and
disabled persons enrolled in the health
care plan and to provide for the
administrative, legal, and financial
responsibilities of the organization. On
January 27, 2000, respondent CIR sent
petitioner a formal deman letter and the
corresponding assessment notices
demanding the payment of deficiency

taxes, including surcharges and interest,

for the taxable years 1996 and 1997 in
the total amount of P224,702,641.18.
The deficiency assessment was imposed
on petitioners health care agreement
with the members of its health care
program pursuant to Section 185 of the
1997 Tax Code. Petitioner protested the
assessment in a letter dated February
23, 2000. As respondent did not act on
the protest, petitioner filed a petition for
review in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA)
seeking the cancellation of the
deficiency VAT and DST assessments.
On April 5, 2002, the CTA rendered a
decision, ordering the petitioner to PAY
the deficiency VAT amounting to
P22,054,831.75 inclusive of 25%
surcharge plus 20% interest from
January 20, 1997 until fully paid for the
1996 VAT deficiency and P31,094,163.87
inclusive of 25% surcharge plus 20%
interest from January 20, 1998 until fully
paid for the 1997 VAT deficiency.
Accordingly, VAT Ruling No. [231]-88 is
declared void and without force and
effect. The 1996 and 1997 deficiency
DST assessment against petitioner is
hereby CANCELLED AND SET ASIDE.
Respondent is ORDERED to DESIST from
collecting the said DST deficiency tax.
Respondent appealed the CTA decision
to the (CA) insofar as it cancelled the
DST assessment. He claimed that
petitioners health care agreement was
a contract of insurance subject to DST
under Section 185 of the 1997 Tax Code.
On August 16, 2004, the CA rendered its
decision which held that petitioners
health care agreement was in the nature
of a non-life insurance contract subject
to DST. Respondent is ordered to pay the
deficiency Documentary Stamp Tax.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but
the CA denied it.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Philippine Health
Care Providers, Inc. engaged in
insurance business.
(2) Whether or not the agreements
between petitioner and its members
possess all elements necessary in the

insurance contract.
HELD:
NO. Health Maintenance Organizations
are not engaged in the insurance
business. The SC said in June 12, 2008
decision that it is irrelevant that
petitioner is an HMO and not an insurer
because its agreements are treated as
insurance contracts and the DST is not a
tax on the business but an excise on the
privilege, opportunity or facility used in
the transaction of the business.
Petitioner, however, submits that it is of
critical importance to characterize the
business it is engaged in, that is, to
determine whether it is an HMO or an
insurance company, as this distinction is
indispensable in turn to the issue of
whether or not it is liable for DST on its
health care agreements. Petitioner is
admittedly an HMO. Under RA 7878 an
HMO is an entity that provides, offers
or arranges for coverage of designated
health services needed by plan
members for a fixed prepaid premium.
The payments do not vary with the
extent, frequency or type of services
provided. Section 2 (2) of PD 1460
enumerates what constitutes doing an
insurance business or transacting an
insurance businesswhich are making or
proposing to make, as insurer, any
insurance contract; making or proposing
to make, as surety, any contract of
suretyship as a vocation and not as
merely incidental to any other legitimate
business or activity of the surety; doing
any kind of business, including a
reinsurance business, specifically
recognized as constituting the doing of
an insurance business within the
meaning of this Code; doing or
proposing to do any business in
substance equivalent to any of the
foregoing in a manner designed to
evade the provisions of this Code.
Overall, petitioner appears to provide
insurance-type benefits to its members
(with respect to its curative medical
services), but these are incidental to the
principal activity of providing them
medical care. The insurance-like

aspect of petitioners business is

miniscule compared to its noninsurance
activities. Therefore, since it
substantially provides health care
services rather than insurance services,
it cannot be considered as being in the
insurance business.
PHILAMLIFE VS ANSALDO
Facts:
> Ramon M. Paterno sent a lettercomplaint to the Insurance
Commissioner alleging certain problems
encountered by agents, supervisors,
managers and public consumers of the
Philamlife as a result of certain practices
by said company.
> Commissioner requested petitioner
Rodrigo de los Reyes, in his capacity as
Philamlife's president, to comment on
respondent Paterno's letter.
> The complaint prays that provisions
on charges and fees stated in the
Contract of Agency executed between
Philamlife and its agents, as well as the
implementing provisions as published in
the agents' handbook, agency bulletins
and circulars, be declared as null and
void. He also asked that the amounts of
such charges and fees already deducted
and collected by Philamlife in connection
therewith be reimbursed to the agents,
with interest at the prevailing rate
reckoned from the date when they were
deducted
> Manuel Ortega, Philamlife's Senior
Assistant Vice-President and Executive
Assistant to the President, asked that
the Commissioner first rule on the
questions of the jurisdiction of the
Insurance Commissioner over the
subject matter of the letters-complaint
and the legal standing of Paterno.
> Insurance Commissioner set the case
for hearing and sent subpoena to the
officers of Philamlife. Ortega filed a
motion to quash the subpoena alleging
that the Insurance company has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the case and that there is no complaint

sufficient in form and contents has been

filed.
> The motion to quash was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the insurance
commissioner had jurisdiction over the
legality of the Contract of Agency
between Philamlife and its agents.
Held:
No, it does not have jurisdiction.
The general regulatory authority of the
Insurance Commissioner is described in
Section 414 of the Insurance Code, to
wit:
"The Insurance Commissioner shall have
the duty to see that all laws relating to
insurance, insurance companies and
other insurance matters, mutual benefit
associations and trusts for charitable
uses are faithfully executed and to
perform the duties imposed upon him by
this Code, . . . ."
On the other hand, Section 415
provides:
"In addition to the administrative
sanctions provided elsewhere in this
Code, the Insurance Commissioner is
hereby authorized, at his discretion, to
impose upon insurance companies, their
directors and/or officers and/or agents,
for any willful failure or refusal to
comply with, or violation of any
provision of this Code, or any order,
instruction, regulation or ruling of the
Insurance Commissioner, or any
commission of irregularities, and/or
conducting business in an unsafe or
unsound manner as may be determined
by the Insurance Commissioner, the
following:
a) fines not in excess of five hundred
pesos a day; and
b) suspension, or after due hearing,
removal of directors and/or officers
and/or agents."

A plain reading of the above-quoted

provisions show that the Insurance
Commissioner has the authority to
regulate the business of insurance,
which is defined as follows:
"(2) The term 'doing an insurance
business' or 'transacting an insurance
business,' within the meaning of this
Code, shall include (a) making or
proposing to make, as insurer, any
insurance contract; (b) making, or
proposing to make, as surety, any
contract of suretyship as a vocation and
not as merely incidental of the surety;
(c) doing any kind of business, including
a reinsurance business, specifically
recognized as constituting the doing of
an insurance business within the
meaning of this Code; (d) doing or
proposing to do any business in
substance equivalent to any of the
foregoing in a manner designed to
evade the provisions of this Code.
(Insurance Code, Sec. 2 [2])
Since the contract of agency entered
into between Philamlife and its agents is
not included within the meaning of an
insurance business, Section 2 of the
Insurance Code cannot be invoked to
give jurisdiction over the same to the
Insurance Commissioner. Expressio
unius est exclusio alterius.
PHILAMCARE VS CA
Facts:
Ernani Trinos applied for a health care
coverage with Philam. He answered no
to a question asking if he or his family
members were treated to heart trouble,
asthma, diabetes, etc.
The application was approved for 1 year.
He was also given hospitalization
benefits and out-patient benefits. After
the period expired, he was given an
expanded coverage for Php 75,000.
During the period, he suffered from
heart attack and was confined at MMC.
The wife tried to claim the benefits but

the petitioner denied it saying that he

concealed his medical history by
answering no to the aforementioned
question. She had to pay for the hospital
bills amounting to 76,000. Her husband
subsequently passed away. She filed a
case in the trial court for the collection
of the amount plus damages. She was
awarded 76,000 for the bills and 40,000
for damages. The CA affirmed but
deleted awards for damages. Hence,
this appeal.
Issue: WON a health care agreement is
not an insurance contract; hence the
incontestability clause under the
Insurance Code does not apply.
Held: No. Petition dismissed.
Ratio:
Petitioner claimed that it granted
benefits only when the insured is alive
during the one-year duration. It
contended that there was no
indemnification unlike in insurance
contracts. It supported this claim by
saying that it is a health maintenance
organization covered by the DOH and
not the Insurance Commission. Lastly, it
claimed that the Incontestability clause
didnt apply because two-year and not
one-year effectivity periods were
required.
Section 2 (1) of the Insurance Code
defines a contract of insurance as an
agreement whereby one undertakes for
a consideration to indemnify another
against loss, damage or liability arising
from an unknown or contingent event.
Section 3 states: every person has an
insurable interest in the life and health:
(1)
of himself, of his spouse and of his
children.
In this case, the husbands health was
the insurable interest. The health care
agreement was in the nature of non-life
insurance, which is primarily a contract
of indemnity. The provider must pay for
the medical expenses resulting from
sickness or injury.
While petitioner contended that the
husband concealed materialfact of his
sickness, the contract stated that:
that any physician is, by these

presents, expressly authorized to

disclose or give testimony at anytime
relative to any information acquired by
him in his professional capacity upon
any question affecting the eligibility for
health care coverage of the Proposed
Members.
This meant that the petitioners required
him to sign authorization to furnish
reports about his medical condition. The
contract also authorized Philam to
inquire directly to his medical history.
Hence, the contention of concealment
isnt valid.
They cant also invoke the Invalidation
of agreement clause where failure of
the insured to disclose information was
a grounds for revocation simply because
the answer assailed by the company
was the heart condition question based
on the insureds opinion. He wasnt a
medical doctor, so he cant accurately
gauge his condition.
Henrick v Fire- in such case the insurer
is not justified in relying upon such
statement, but is obligated to make
further inquiry.
Fraudulent intent must be proven to
rescind the contract. This was
incumbent upon the provider.
Having assumed a responsibility under
the agreement, petitioner is bound to
answer the same to the extent agreed
upon. In the end, the liability of the
health care provider attaches once the
member is hospitalized for the disease
or injury covered by the agreement or
whenever he avails of the covered
benefits which he has prepaid.
Section 27 of the Insurance Code- a
concealment entitles the injured party to
rescind a contract of insurance.
As to cancellation procedureCancellation requires certain conditions:
1. Prior notice of cancellation to
insured;
2. Notice must be based on the
occurrence after effective date of the
policy of one or more of the grounds
mentioned;
3. Must be in writing, mailed or
delivered to the insured at the address
shown in the policy;
4. Must state the grounds relied upon
provided in Section 64 of the Insurance

Code and upon request of insured, to

furnish facts on which cancellation is
based
None were fulfilled by the provider.
As to incontestability- The trial court
said that under the title Claim
procedures of expenses, the defendant
Philamcare Health Systems Inc. had
twelve months from the date of issuance
of the Agreement within which to
contest the membership of the patient if
he had previous ailment of asthma, and
six months from the issuance of the
agreement if the patient was sick of
diabetes or hypertension. The periods
having expired, the defense of
concealment or misrepresentation no
longer lie.
WHITE GOLD VS PIONEER
INSURANCE
FACTS:
White Gold Marine Services, Inc. (White
Gold) procured a protection and
indemnity coverage for its vessels from
The Steamship Mutual Underwriting
Association (Bermuda) Limited
(Steamship Mutual) through Pioneer
Insurance and Surety Corporation
(Pioneer). Subsequently, White Gold was
issued a Certificate of Entry and
Acceptance. Pioneer also issued receipts
evidencing payments for the coverage.
When White Gold failed to fully pay its
accounts, Steamship Mutual refused to
renew the coverage.
Steamship Mutual thereafter filed a case
against White Gold for collection of sum
of money to recover the latters unpaid
balance.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) Insurance Commissioner: dismissed
the complaint. There was no violation of
the Insurance Code and the respondents
do not need license as insurer and
insurance agent/broker because it was
not engaged in the insurance business.
It explained that Steamship Mutual was
a Protection and Indemnity Club (P & I
Club). Moreover, Pioneer was already
licensed, hence, a separate license
solely as agent/broker of Steamship
Mutual was already superfluous.

(2) CA: affirmed Insurance

Commissioner.
ISSUES:
(1) Is Steamship Mutual, a P & I Club,
engaged in the insurance business in
the Philippines? (2) Does Pioneer need a
license as an insurance agent/broker for
Steamship Mutual?
RULING:
(1) Yes. To continue doing business here,
Steamship Mutual or through its agent
Pioneer, must secure a license from the
Insurance Commission.
Since a contract of insurance involves
public interest, regulation by the State is
necessary. Thus, no insurer or insurance
company is allowed to engage in the
insurance business without a license or
a certificate of authority from the
Insurance Commission.
The parties admit that Steamship Mutual
is a P & I Club. Steamship Mutual admits
it does not have a license to do business
in the Philippines although Pioneer is its
resident agent. This relationship is
reflected in the certifications issued by
the Insurance Commission.
It cites the definition of a P & I Club in
Hyopsung Maritime Co., Ltd. v. Court of
Appeals as an association composed of
shipowners in general who band
together for the specific purpose of
providing insurance cover on a mutual
basis against liabilities incidental to
shipowning that the members incur in
favor of third parties.
The test to determine if a contract is an
insurance contract or not, depends on
the nature of the promise, the act
required to be performed, and the exact
nature of the agreement in the light of
the occurrence, contingency, or
circumstances under which the
performance becomes requisite. It is not
by what it is called.
Relatedly, a mutual insurance company
is a cooperative enterprise where the
members are both the insurer and
insured. In it, the members all
contribute, by a system of premiums or
assessments, to the creation of a fund
from which all losses and liabilities are
paid, and where the profits are divided

among themselves, in proportion to

their interest. Additionally, mutual
insurance associations, or clubs, provide
three types of coverage, namely,
protection and indemnity, war risks, and
defense costs. A P & I Club is a form of
insurance against third party liability,
where the third party is anyone other
than the P & I Club and the members.
By definition then, Steamship Mutual as
a P & I Club is a mutual insurance
association engaged in the marine
insurance business.
(2) Yes. Although Pioneer is already
licensed as an insurance company, it
needs a separate license to act as
insurance agent for Steamship Mutual.
Section 299 of the Insurance Code
clearly states:
SEC. 299 . . .
No person shall act as an insurance
agent or as an insurance broker in the
solicitation or procurement of
applications for insurance, or receive for
services in obtaining insurance, any
commission or other compensation from
any insurance company doing business
in the Philippines or any agent thereof,
without first procuring a license so to act
from the Commissioner, which must be
renewed annually on the first day of
January, or within six months thereafter.
FILIPINAS CIA DE SEGUROS VS
CHRISTERN HUENFELD
Fact:
On October 1, 1941, the respondent
corporation, Christern Huenefeld and
Co., Inc., after payment of
corresponding premium, obtained from
the petitioner, Filipinas Cia de Seguros
fire policy covering merchandise
contained in a building located at
Binondo, Manila. On February 27, 1942
or during the Japanese military
occupation, the building and insured
merchandise were burned. In due time
the respondent submitted to the
petitioner its claim under the policy. The
petitioner refused to pay the claim on
the ground that the policy in favor of the
respondent that ceased to be a force on
the date the United States declared war
against Germany, the respondent

corporation (through organized under

and by virtue of the laws of Philippines)
being controlled by German subjects
and the petitioner being a company
under American jurisdiction when said
policy was issued on October 1, 1941.
The theory of the petitioner is that the
insured merchandise was burned after
the policy issued in 1941 had ceased to
be effective because the outbreak of the
war between United States and
Germany on December 10, 1941, and
that the payment made by the
petitioner to the respondent corporation
during the Japanese military occupation
was under pressure.
Issue:
W/N a public enemy can be insured.
Ruling:
Since the majority of stockholders of the
respondent corporation were German
subjects, the respondent became an
enemy of the state upon the outbreak of
the war between US and Germany. The
English and American cases relied upon
by the Court of Appeals lost in force
upon the latest decision of the Supreme
Court of US in which the control test has
adopted.
Since World War I, the determination of
enemy nationality of corporations has
been discussed in many countries,
belligerent and neutral. A corporation
was subject to enemy legislation when it
was controlled by enemies, namely
managed under the influence of
individuals or corporations themselves
considered as enemies...
The Philippine Insurance Law (Act No
2427, as amended), in Section 8,
provides that "anyone except a public
enemy may be insured". It stands to
reason that an insurance policy ceases
to be allowable as soon as an insured
becomes a public enemy.
The respondent having an enemy
corporation on December 10, 1941, the
insurance policy issued in its favor on
October 1, 1941, by the petitioner had
ceased to be valid and enforceable, and
since the insured good were burned
during the war, the respondent was not

entitled to any indemnity under said

policy from the petitioner. However,
elementary rule of justice (in the
absence of specific provisions in the
Insurance Law) require that the
premium paid by the respondent for the
period covered by its policy from
December 11, 1941, should be returned
by the petitioner.
SAN MIGUEL VS LAW UNION ROCK

FACTS:
In the contract of mortgage, the owner
P.D. Dunn had agreed, at his own expense,
to insure the mortgaged property for its
full value and to indorse the policies in
such manner as to authorize the Brewery
Company to receive the proceeds in case
of loss and to retain such part thereof as
might be necessary to satisfy the
remainder then due upon the mortgage
debt. Instead, however, of effecting the
insurance himself Dunn authorized and
requested the Brewery Company to
procure insurance on the property in the
amount of P15,000 at Dunn's expense.
San Miguel insured the property only as
mortgagee.
Dunn sold the propert to Henry Harding.
The insurance was not assigned by Dunn
to Harding.
When it was destroyed by fire, the two
companies settled with San Miguelto the
extent of the mortgage credit.
RTC: Absolved the 2 companies from the
difference. Henry Harding is not entitled
to the difference between the mortgage
credit and the face value of the policies.
Henry Harding appealed.
ISSUE:

1. W/N San Miguel has insurable interest

as mortgagor only to the extent of the
mortgage credit - YES
2. W/N Harding has insurable interest as
owner - NO

HELD: affirmed
section 19 of the Insurance Act:
a change of interest in any part of a thing
insured unaccompanied by a
corresponding change of interest in the
insurance, suspends the insurance to an
equivalent extent, until the interest in the
thing and the interest in the insurance are
vested in the same person
section 55:
the mere transfer of a thing insured does
not transfer the policy, but suspends it
until the same person becomes the owner
of both the policy and the thing insured
Undoubtedly these policies of insurance
might have been so framed as to have
been "payable to the San Miguel Brewery,
mortgagee, as its interest may appear,
remainder to whomsoever, during the
continuance of the risk, may become the
owner of the interest insured." (Sec 54,
Act No. 2427.) Such a clause would have
proved an intention to insure the entire
interest in the property, not merely the
insurable interest of the San Miguel
Brewery, and would have shown exactly
to whom the money, in case of loss,
should be paid. But the policies are not so
written.
The blame for the situation thus created
rests, however, with the Brewery rather
than with the insurance companies, and

there is nothing in the record to indicate

that the insurance companies were
requested to write insurance upon the
insurable interest of the owner or intended
to make themselves liable to that extent
If by inadvertence, accident, or mistake
the terms of the contract were not fully set
forth in the policy, the parties are entitled
to have it reformed. But to justify the
reformation of a contract, the proof must
be of the most satisfactory character, and
it must clearly appear that the contract
failed to express the real agreement
between the parties
In the case now before us the proof is
entirely insufficient to authorize
reformation.
SAURA IMPORT VS PHIL
INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE
FACTS:
Saura Import & Export Co Inc.,
mortgaged to the Phil. National Bank, a
parcel of land.
The mortgage was amended to
guarantee an increased amount,
bringing the total mortgaged debt to
P37,000
On the land mortgage is a building
owned by Saura Import & Export Co Inc.
which was insured with Philippine
International Surety (Insurer) even
before the mortgage contract so it was
required to endorse to mortgagee PNB
October 15, 1954: Barely 13 days after
the issuance of the fire insurance policy,
the insurer cancelled it. Notice of the
cancellation was given to PNB
(mortgagee). But Saura (insured) was
not informed.
April 6, 1955: The building and all its
contents worth P40,685.69 were burned
so Saura filed a claim with the Insurer
and mortgagee Bank
RTC: dismissed

ISSUE: W/N Philippine International

Surety should be held liable for the
claim because notice to only the
mortgagee is not substantial
HELD:YES. Appealed from is hereby
reversed. Philippine International Surety
Co., Inc., to pay Saura Import & Export
Co., Inc., P29,000

It was the primary duty of Philippine

International Surety to notify the insured,
but it did not
If a mortgage or lien exists against the
property insured, and the policy contains a
clause stating that loss, if any, shall be
payable to such mortgagee or the holder of
such lien as interest may appear, notice of
cancellation to the mortgagee or
lienholder alone is ineffective as a
cancellation of the policy to the owner of
the property.
liability attached principally the insurance
company, for its failure to give notice of
the cancellation of the policy to Saura
PALILEO VS COSIO
FACTS: Plaintiff obtained from defendant
a loan in the sum of P12,000.
To secure the payment of the aforesaid
loan, defendant required plaintiff to sign
a document known as Conditional Sale
of Residential Building, purporting to
convey to defendant, with right to
repurchase, a two-story building of
strong materials belonging to plaintiff.
This document did not express the true
intention of the parties which was
merely to place said property as security
for the payment of the loan.
After the execution of the aforesaid
document, defendant insured the
building against fire for the sum of
P15,000, the insurance policy having
been issued in the name of defendant.

The building was partly destroyed by fire

and, after proper demand, defendant
collected from the insurance company
an indemnity of P13,107.00. Plaintiff
demanded from defendant that she be
credited with the necessary amount to
pay her obligation out of the insurance
proceeds but defendant refused to do
so.
ISSUE: WON a mortgagor is entitled to
the insurance proceeds of the
mortgaged property independently
insured by the mortgagee? What is the
effect of the insurance?
HELD: NO. The rule is that where a
mortgagee, independently of the
mortgagor, insures the mortgaged
property in his own name and for his
own interest, he is entitled to the
insurance proceeds in case of loss, but
in such case, he is not allowed to retain
his claim against the mortgagor, but is
passed by subrogation to the insurer to
the extent of the money paid. (Vance
on Insurance, 2d ed., p. 654) Or, stated
in another way, the mortgagee may
insure his interest in the property
independently of the mortgagor. In that
event, upon the destruction of the
property the insurance money paid to
the mortgagee will not inure to the
benefit of the mortgagor, and the
amount due under the mortgage debt
remains unchanged. The mortgagee,
however, is not allowed to retain his
claim against the mortgagor, but it
passes by subrogation to the insurer, to
the extent of the insurance money paid.

GREPALIFE VS CA
INSURANCE LAW: Parties in Insurance
Contract
FACTS:
Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation
(Grepalife) executed a contract of group
life insurance with Development Bank of
the Philippines (DBP) wherein Grepalife
agreed to insure the lives of eligible

housing loan mortgagors of DBP.

One such loan mortgagor is Dr. Wilfredo
Leuterio. In an application form, Dr.
Leuterio answered questions concerning
his test, attesting among others that he
does not have any heart conditions and
that he is in good health to the best of his
knowledge.
However, after about a year, Dr. Leuterio
died due to massive cerebral
hemorrhage. When DBP submitted a
death claim to Grepalife, the latter denied
the claim, alleging that Dr. Leuterio did
not disclose he had been suffering from
hypertension, which caused his death.
Allegedly, such non-disclosure constituted
concealment that justified the denial of the
claim.
Hence, the widow of the late Dr. Leuterio
filed a complaint against Grepalife for
Specific Performance with Damages.
Both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals found in favor of the widow and
ordered Grepalife to pay DBP.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in holding
Grepalife liable to DBP as beneficiary in a
group life insurance contract from a
complaint filed by the widow of the
decedent/mortgagor
HELD:
The rationale of a group of insurance
policy of mortgagors, otherwise known as
the mortgage redemption insurance, is a
device for the protection of both the
mortgagee and the mortgagor. On the part
of the mortgagee, it has to enter into such
form of contract so that in the event of the
unexpected demise of the mortgagor
during the subsistence of the mortgage

contract, the proceeds from such insurance

will be applied to the payment of the
mortgage debt, thereby relieving the heirs
of the mortgagor from paying the
obligation. In a similar vein, ample
protection is given to the mortgagor under
such a concept so that in the event of
death, the mortgage obligation will be
extinguished by the application of the
insurance proceeds to the mortgage
indebtedness. In this type of policy
insurance, the mortgagee is simply an
appointee of the insurance fund. Such
loss-payable clause does not make the
mortgagee a party to the contract.
The insured, being the person with whom
the contract was made, is primarily the
proper person to bring suit thereon.
Subject to some exceptions, insured may
thus sue, although the policy is taken
wholly or in part for the benefit of another
person, such as a mortgagee.
And since a policy of insurance upon life
or health may pass by transfer, will or
succession to any person, whether he has
an insurable interest or not, and such
person may recover it whatever the
insured might have recovered, the widow
of the decedent Dr. Leuterio may file the
suit against the insurer, Grepalife.