Comments and Suggestions On The 185th Law Commission of India Report - Indian Evidence Act 1872

Comments and Suggestions on the 185th Law Commission of India Report Indian Evidence Act 1872
DRAFT
Comments and Suggestions on the
185 REPORT OF LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA ON INDIAN
EVIDENCE ACT, 1872
th
Research Report
November 2013
Edited By
Bimal N Patel
Student Assistants
Astha Shrivastava
Ritu Singh
Rumani Sheth
Sanyukta Biswas
Shaifali Singh
Shreya Dave
Shyama Nair
Trisha Mittal
Udit Vyas
Urvashi Barman
Presented By
Gujarat National Law University

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INTRODUCTION
The 94th report of the Law Commission of India delves into the arena of evidences
which have been taken illegally or improperly and how such illegality would affect
the admissibility of these evidence. Indeed the report raises the question on
whether such illegality in collecting the evidences actually even affects the
admissibility of the evidence.
The traditional approach of the Indian Courts has been that in absence of a
specific statutory or constitutional provision which provides for the exclusion of
certain type of evidence, the fact that evidence was obtained illegally, does not
affect the admissibility of the evidence. However, in the common law world there
exists four varying models on which the decision regarding the admissibility of
evidence would be considered.
In the first instance, the strictest approach is adopted by certain countries.
India is included within this category. Here the illegality or impropriety of
the evidence does render the evidence legally inadmissible. However, such
admissibility may be questioned if there exists some specific statutory or
constitutional provision which prohibits such evidence from being
considered in a court of law.1
In the second category the admissibility criteria of countries like Australia
and Scotland can be considered where the admissibility of illegal or
improper methods in collecting evidence is decided by the stage at which
the trial is and rests on the discretion of the judge.
An example of this can be Section 123 of the Indian Evidence Act which prohibits unpublished records of the
Government from being called as evidence unless and until prior sanction is taken from the Head of the
Department/Minister.
1
In the third category the evidence is excluded from admissibility by some

specific statutory provision and such admissibility is in violation of some
substantive norm of conduct.2
In the fourth category (where countries like USA are included) a
constitutional guarantee or a judicial construction of a constitutional
guarantee, excludes certain evidence from use at the trial, where the
evidence has been obtained in the violation of such constitutional guarantee.
In the United States the Fourth Amendment (protection against
unreasonable search and service) and the Fourteenth Amendment (the Due
Process Clause) provides for such protection.
The Approach under the Different Jurisdictions
The Indian Law
As mentioned above the Indian Courts and the legal system sway towards the first
approach in judging the admissibility of evidence which has been obtained by
illegal or improper ways, i.e., the admissibility of such evidence is not affected by
such illegality and they are mostly admitted in a Court of law as evidence except
when a statute forbids the admissibility of such evidence. This is because the
codification of substantive and procedural law in India took place quite early,
before the common law principles developed and thus they failed to incorporate
the same into the code. Thus the courts were hesitant to employ principle outside
the preview of the Codes. Further the Privy Council in Lekhraj v Mahipal3 held that
the essence of a Code is to be exhaustive in respect of all matters dealt with by
the Code. This statement by the Privy Council became locus classicus whereby it
was cited on every occasion where an attempt was made to travel outside the code.
This position was only strengthened by the exhaustive provisions regarding the
admissibility of confessions. Judges thus became even more reluctant to delve into
2
3
Reference for the same can be looked into Section 24 of the Indian Evidence Act
ILR 5 Cal. 744 (P.C.)
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common law provisions in the interpretation of the Indian Evidence Act and
instead chose to confine themselves within the four corners of the Code.
The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 lays down the procedure for the carrying
out of searches by the police during the investigation of the offence. These
provisions also lay down a number of safeguards that have to be observed by the
police in carrying out these searches. However, when the question arose about the
admissibility of evidence which contravened these procedures, particularly the
requirement wherein two independent witnesses are required to be present during
the search, the court adopted a legalist approach and held that such evidence
would not be per se inadmissible.4 There rests no discretion with the judge to
exclude evidence obtained through search which has not been conducted with the
accordance of the provisions of law. The only impact that such illegality in
procuring of such evidence may be strictures against the police and can affect the
weight of the evidence but the legality of the evidence remains unaffected by the
defect in the search.5
In the locus classicus case on this point, R.L.Malkhani v State of Maharashtra6 , the
Supreme Court held that illegality in gathering of the evidence did not affect its
admissibility. In this case the admissibility of a tape record conversation that took
place over the telephone was in question. The charge was related to bribery of the
Coroner of Bombay who demanded a bribe of Rs. 20,000 from a Doctor from
Bombay. The conversation was recorded by attaching a recorder to the Doctors
telephone. The Apex Court rejected the argument that the evidence was
inadmissible (on the basis that that it was illegal to tamper with telephone
communication) and held the evidence to be inadmissible. A feeble attempt to
cover this illegality within the scope of Article 21 of the Constitution also failed.
Valayudhan v The State AIR 1961 Ker. 8 (FB); Kau Sain v The State of Punjab AIR 1974 SC 329; Govindhan AIR 1959
Mad.544.
5 Sunder Singh v The State AIR 1956 SC 411
6 AIR 1973 SC 57
4
English and Scottish Law

The English position on the admissibility of such evidence can be gathered from
the classical case of Kurma v R.7 which represents the dicta on such. The evidence of
the accuseds unlawful possession of ammunition was discovered after illegal
search of the accuseds person was held to admissible. The Privy Council relied on
earlier English decisions and held that this evidence was admissible, but the person
against whom such evidence was taken might have civil remedy against the person
who obtained it and may later lead to disciplinary and even criminal proceedings.
However, the case of R. v Sang8 shows a change in this position. The question that
was raised by the Court of Appeal and which was considered by the House of
Lords was: Does a trial court judge have a discretion to refuse to allow evidencebeing evidence other than evidence of admissions-to be given in any circumstances
in which such evidence is relevant and of more than minimal probative value?
The House of Lords gave a decision as under:1. A trial judge at a criminal trial always has the discretion to refuse to admit
evidence if in his opinion its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative.
2. Save with regard to admissions and confessions and generally with regard to
evidence obtained from the accused after his commission of the offence, he
(the trial court judge) has no discretion to refuse to admit relevant
admissible evidence on the ground that it was obtained by improper or
unfair means. The court is not concerned with how it was obtained.
In 1975, a study9 by M.S. Weinberg enumerated the situations in which the judge
can exercise his discretion: Illegally obtained evidence
Improperly obtained evidence
Evidence of similar facts
Cross-examination of the accused as to character
(1995) 1 All ER 236 (PC)
(1979) 3 WLR 263
9 M.S. Weinberg, Judicial discretion to exclude relevant evidence, (1975) 21 McGill Law Journal 1
7
8
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Confessions
Admissions by accused persons
Evidence calculated to prejudice the course of the trial.
In Scotland, the trial judge has the discretion to exclude evidences which have been
obtained illegally. However, the discretion leans more towards inclusion than
exclusion.
Australia and New Zealand
The position taken up by the Australian High Court in Bunning v Cross10 relied on
public policy and held that the judge in a criminal trial has discretion to exclude
evidence. The High Court placing emphasis on the need to protect the right of
citizens, held that, It is not fair play that is called in question...but rather societys right to
insist that those who enforce the law themselves respect it, so that a citizens precious right to
immunity from arbitrary and unlawful intrusion into daily affairs of private life may remain
unimpaired.
The factors that are to be considered by the judge while exercising discretion are: Whether the law was deliberately or recklessly disregarded by those whose duty
it is to enforce it;
Whether the nature of the illegality affected the cogency of the evidence is not
generally a factor to be considered, whether the illegality was deliberate or result
of recklessness;
Case of compliance with the law;
The nature of the offence charged;
Whether there was a violation of statutory procedures;
The urgency of protecting perishable evidence;
The availability of alternate, equally cogent, evidence;
United States of America
10
(1978) 19 ALR 641
As mentioned earlier the United States through its Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees the protection of its citizens against evidences which has
been procured illegally. Evidence which has been obtained as a violation of the
federal Constitutional prohibition against illegal government sponsored searches
and seizures cannot be admitted as substantive evidence in a criminal case as
against the person whose rights were invaded. For the violation of constitutional
rights there are available in the United States not only ordinary civil, criminal and
equitable sanctions but also the privilege to exclude evidence obtained in breach of
such rights. Such a privilege is also granted by some jurisdiction in USA to civil
matters but the Supreme Court does not favour this.11 In the case of Escobedo v
Illinois12 the Supreme Court refused to entertain evidence of the accused who had
not been told about his right to remain silent and had not been provided with a
counsel for his defence. The evidence that he gave upon interrogation was held to
be inadmissible
Latest Approach and Position in India
The Supreme Court constitutional bench in Pooran Mal v Director of
Inspection13discussed the validity of evidence which has been gathered as a result of
illegal search and seizure and presented before the court for admission as valid
evidence. The Court discussed the action taken by Income Tax Authorities under
Section 132 of the Income Tax Act by the way of search and seizure of certain
premises on the authority of the Director of Inspection or the Commissioner.
Here the court entertained 4 writ petitions from various High Courts and
considered whether evidence which has been obtained in violation of Section 132
should be held as admissible evidence. Though various submissions were raised by
the Appellants that the exclusion of the evidence would violate their constitutional
rights, the constitutional bench held that as far an India is concerned, its law of
U.S. v Janis (1976) 428 U.S. 433
(1964) 378 US 473
13 (1974) 93 ITR 505 (SC)
11
12
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evidence is modeled on the rules of evidence which prevailed in English Law, and
the Courts in India and in England have consistently refused to exclude relevant
evidence merely on the ground that it was obtained by illegal search or seizure
However, the court in 199414 did not accept the contention of the respondents and
did not accept this constitutional bench decision of the Supreme Court. Holding
that the judgement in Pooran Mal referred to search and seizure under the Income
Tax Act and not the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, the Apex
court held that a violation of Section 5015 of the NDPS Act would render the
evidence obtained by the police officials as inadmissible.
For the judgment in the Ali Mustaffa case the Supreme Court relied upon the
judgment given by the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v Balbir Singh16 wherein the
Court held that any arrest and search of a person without confirming with the
provisions of the NDPS Act would lead to such evidence not being admissible.
The object of the NDPS Act was to make stringent provisions for control and
regulation of operations relating to those drugs and substances, and to avoid harm
and innocent persons by avoiding the abuse of the provisions by the officers and
insuring that the certain safeguards provided were observed strictly. The Court
held that Section 50 of the NDPS Act was a non-derogable and that in order to
secure a conviction the procedure under Section 50 must be complied with.
A discordant note was however struck by a two-Judge Bench in State of H.P. v.Pirthi
Chand17 relying upon the judgment in Pooran Mat case when it held that the
evidence collected in a search in violation of law did not become inadmissible in
evidence under the Evidence Act. The Court further observed that even if the
search was found to be in violation of law, what weight should be given to the
Ali Mustaffa Abdul Rahman Moosa v State of Kerela (1994) 6 SCC 569
This section mentions that that person of the accused cannot be searched except in the presence of a gazetted
officer or a Magistrate.
16 (1994) 3 SCC 299
17 1996CriLJ1354
14
15
evidence collected was a question to be gone into during trial. The same view was
reiterated by a two-Judge Bench in State of Punjab v. Labh Singh18 with the
observation that any evidence recorded and recovered in violation of the search
and the contraband seized in violation of the mandatory requirement did not ipso
facto invalidate the trial.
As recently as 6th September 2013 the Supreme Court in Umesh Kumar v State of
Andhra Pradesh19 held that it is a settled legal proposition that even if a document is
procured by improper or illegal means, there is no bar to its admissibility if it is
relevant and its genuineness is proved. If the evidence is admissible, it does not
matter how it has been obtained.
18
19
1996CriLJ3996
2013(11) SCALE 28
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SECTION 24
Confession caused by inducement, threat or promise, when irrelevant in criminal
proceeding.A confession made by an accused person is irrelevant in a criminal proceeding, if
the making of the confession appears to the Court to have been caused by any
inducement, threat or promise having reference to the charge against the accused
person, proceeding from a person in authority and sufficient, in the opinion of the
Court, to give the accused person grounds, which would appear to him reasonable,
for supposing that by making it he would gain any advantage or avoid any evil of a
temporal nature in reference to the proceedings against him.20 The 69th Law
Commission Report did not recommend any changes to the said section. However,
in light of the discussion under section 27, the 185th Law Commission Report, has
suggested changes such as addition of words such as coercion, torture and
violence in the body and title of the section. Hence in order to appreciate the
recommendation here, discussion under section 27 must be looked into first.
Conclusion:
It is significant to note that with regards to fact admissible under section 27 as a
result of a certain confession due to inducement, promise or threat and coercion,
torture and violence, the differentiation is being made in section 24 itself. This is
because according to the recommendation of the 185th Report, facts obtained as a
result of confession due to inducement, promise or threat shall be admissible
under section 27 but not facts obtained as a result of confession due to coercion,
torture and violence. I am against this proposition, because of the fact that I do
not see any intelligible differentia operating here.
20
http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/967059/
Firstly, the former reasons shall fall under manipulation alone whereas the latter
shall fall under the category of manipulation along with physical assault. If various
international statutes and domestic legislation are to be referred, it can be noted
that activities performed under inducement, promise or threat are invalid under the
law. For instance, the highly significant Indian Contract Act 1972, invalidates a
contract signed under promise or threat. A more apt comparison would be with a
law governing the criminal justice system. Despite the fact that India is not a
signatory to Rome Statute of International Court of Crime, its provisions regarding
the issue at hand bears mammoth significance when it comes to international
standing on the issue. The point is that even the Rome Statute of International
Court of Crime invalidates a confession obtained as a result of inducement,
promise or threat and coercion.
Apart from that it needs to be noted as has stated in the DK Basu case that rights
of the accused need to be balanced with public interest at large. Similarly, it must
not be forgotten that India is a country with low literacy rate, as a result of which
awareness among public with regards to their legal rights is low and they are more
vulnerable to police and other government officials. In light of the conditions
prevailing in the society, the differentiation should not be made.
However, even then if there seems to be strong justification for adopting the
recommendation of the 185th Report, then I believe that incorporation of the DK
Base guidelines, in the Criminal Procedure Code is not sufficient to protect the
rights of the accused. The legislation immediately needs to incorporate the
safeguards provided in UK in the section 76 of Police and Criminal Evidence Act
1984. The relevant provision shall be discussed at length later, while discussing
another section.
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The recommendation in the 69th Report has been to introduce a new section
namely section 26A instead of making any amendments to section 25. The section
contains that confessions made to the police under subject to certain circumstances
is admissible and on those statements the bar given under section 25 and 26 would
not apply. 185th Report has in the light various judgments and reports analyzed if
the section should be included.
The 48th Law Commission Report with regards to Criminal Procedure had made a
similar suggestion, where it had been recommended the same. It shall be noted that
apart from this particular Report no other document in support of the said
proposition has been referred.
First Report of the Indian Law Commission on the basis of evidence of
Parliamentary Committee on Indian Affairs indicated that there is gross abuse of
powers by the police in order to obtain extortions. On a similar line of thought,
Law Commission in its 113th Report had proposed for the introduction of section
114B, which would raise a presumption against the police officer in case of
custodial death of prisoner. This particular proposal was made in the light of the
judgment given in State of UP vs. Ram Sagar Yadav by the Supreme Court. In
Nandini Satpathy vs. P.L. Dani21, the Supreme Court, while dealing with the
investigation by police in India, stated that Act 20(3) is applicable at the stage of
both investigation and trial. It quoted from the Wickersham Commission Report
and Miranda v Arizona22. It also brought section 161 of Criminal Procedure Code,
section 25 of the Evidence Act and article 22(1) of the Constitution of India into
consideration. Special training and sensitization of constitutional values was
emphasized upon.
21
22
AIR 1978 SC 1025

384 US 436
The Supreme Court also referred to the 4th Report of the National Police
Commission which while admitting the notoriety of the police suggested that such
confessions could at least be taken as a piece of evidence in Kartar Singh v State
Of Punjab23. The plea of indiscriminate distinction under Article 14 was also
rejected in the same case and five guidelines were given to the police for recording
of confessional statements. But as the guidelines were not incorporated in to the
special Act, the Supreme Court, in a recent decision of Lal Singh vs. State of
Gujarat24, was constrained to hold that a confession recorded where the guidelines
were not followed, was not invalid.
The Supreme Court in D.K. Basu case had issued a number of directions which
were later incorporated in section 41 of the Criminal Procedure Code, after making
references to Joginder Kumar vs. State of UP25 and Nilabati Behera vs. State of
Orissa26. It was also stated that a correct balance has to be struck between right to
interrogate and right against self-incrimination. The need for such provisions in
TADA and POTA was also justified on the basis of classification as special class of
serious offenders. It was also held that due to the nature and threat of terrorism,
stringent measures are indeed needed to be taken for public safety. However, such
provisions do not need to be extended to acts with usual crimes. Jurisprudence
developed by the Supreme Court for awarding compensation by the state for
torture by the police was also well appreciated. Experience of Law Commission
with regards to the Law of Arrest and annual human rights commission report also
indicates to widespread affirmation by the police community in favor of use of
force for extracting confession.
The safeguards suggested in the 69th Report are as follows: (in regard to confession
to Superintendents of Police or higher officers).
1994(3) SCC 569
2001(3) SCC 221
25 1994(4) SCC 260
26 1993(2) SCC 746
23
24
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(a) The said police officer must be concerned I

(b) With investigation of the offence;
(c) He must inform the accused of his rights to consult a legal practitioner of
his choice, and he must give the accused an opportunity to consult such
legal practitioner before the confession is recorded;
(d) At the time of making and recording of the confession, the counsel for the
accused, if he has a counsel, must be allowed to remain present. If the
accused has no counsel or if his counsel does not to remain present, this
requirement will not apply;
(e) Police officer must follow all the safeguards as are now provided for by
section 164 Criminal Procedure Code in relation to confessions recorded by
Magistrates. These must be followed whether or not a counsel is present;
(f) The police officer must record that he has followed the safeguards at (b), (c)
and (d) above.
It should be noted that although the conditions are similar, two different
paragraphs are given for confession to police junior to superintendent and above.
The 185th report by citing the following reasons has rejected the recommendation
made by the 69th Report:
1. Recommendation of 69th report is in violation of article 14, 21 and
2. 48th report does not make difference between grave offence and ordinary
offence
3. Till today, the guidelines or precautions indicated in D.K. Basu have not
been implemented by the police. In a pending public interest case when the
Supreme Court asked the States to submit whether D.K. Basu guidelines
were being followed by the police in various States, the amicus curiae is
reported to have stated that the reports from States are that the said
guidelines were not being followed.
4. It would practically put an end to the guarantee in Art. 21 of the

Constitution as to a fair trial and to the principles of liberty enshrined in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 and in the International
Convention on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 to which India is a party and
violate Art. 14 also.
Conclusion:
Human rights of prisoners under Article 21 need to be preserved and the
guidelines given in the Kartar Singh judgment must be condensed in the form of a
statue so that it has an authority of law. However, it also must be noted that the
way there have been more instances of police torture according to the Reports in
the recent years, there has been a rise in crime as well in the country. Moreover, the
documentary evidence used by the Law Commission tilted in favor of protection
of prisoners but no document was used to track the rising crime in the country.
Hence it is suggested that the recommendation of the Law Commission with
regards to Evidence should be incorporated. However, caution must be taken
while drafting the section, so that it does not cause undue hardship to the police
authorities.
If the end result of the recommendation of the 185th Report in section 24 and the
rejection of section 26A proposed by 69th Report are to be read together, the
conclusion is that a confessional statement taken by police in custody is not
admissible in the court of law but the same statement if taken outside extra
judicially by inducement it will be admissible. The implication for the society is that
India largely being a family oriented closely knit structure, the people in authority
would get unbridled powers. Especially institutions such as Khap Panchayat which
are notorious for carrying out a parallel unconstitutional decision making body
would be the most significant beneficiary.
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Thus, it can be stated that since previous attempts to sensitize the police
authorities to constitutional values and human rights have failed, it should now be
made a statutory requirement incorporated in Police Training itself to be trained in
just and humane treatment of prisoners.
SECTION 26
No confession made by any person whilst he is in the custody of a police officer,
unless it be made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate, shall be proved as
against such person. Explanation: In this section, Magistrate does not include the
head of a village discharging magisterial functions in the Presidency of Fort. St.
George or elsewhere, unless such headman is a Magistrate exercising the powers of
a Magistrate under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1882 (10 of 1882)
In the 69th Report, the recommendation was to revise the section as follows, after
omitting the Explanation: Section 26: No confession made by any person whilst
he is in the custody of a police officer, shall be proved as against such person,
unless it is recorded by a Magistrate under section 164 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973.
In view of certain proposals for adding sec. 164A in the 154th Report of the
Commission on Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the Law Commission in its
185th Report found it necessary to omit the words under section 164 and add in
accordance with Ch. XII. With that modification, the section, after omitting the
Explanation, will read as follows:
Section 26: Confession by accused while in custody of Police not to be proved
against him
26. No confession made by any person whilst he is in the custody of a police
officer, shall be proved as against such person, unless it is recorded by a Magistrate
in accordance with Chapter XII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
SECTION 27
How much of information received from accused may be proved.- Provided that,
when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received
from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police- officer, so much
of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly
to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved.
This section affects criminal proceedings and human rights implementation in the
country in a very significant way as has been pointed out even by Sarkar. In both
Pakala Narayan Swamy v Emperor and Udai Bhan v State of UP it has been
categorically held that section 27 is definitely a proviso to section 26. In the latter
case a plea was made that if section 27 is considered proviso only to section 26 and
not section 25, that would be in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. It was
pointed out by the majority that:(a) If there is a surrender under section 46 of Criminal Procedure Code, only
under such a circumstance the statement given by the accused is admissible
under section 27 of the Evidence Act
(b) Information given by a person not in custody to a police officer in the
course of the investigation of an offence is not provable under section 27 as
it is not permissible under section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code
(c) The understanding is that the reason for the plea being rejected lies in the
Criminal Procedure Code and not the Evidence Act. Justice Subba Rao had
given a dissenting opinion and had held that the difference in the approach
of section 27 towards section 25 and 26 is indeed in violation of Article 14
of the Constitution.
However, in later cases such as Chinnaswamy case27, Aghnoo Nagesia vs. State28,
Sanjay vs. State Govt. of Delhi29, Pandurang Kalu Patil & Anr vs. State of
AIR 1962 SC 1788
AIR 1966 SC 119
29 AIR 2001 SC 979
27
28
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Maharashtra30 it was held that discoveries made pursuant to statements falling

under section 25 by people not in custody are also admissible.
According to the 169th Report, section 27 is a proviso to both section 25 and 26.
The second issue is to examine if the word or is required to be introduced in sec.
27 between the words from a person accused of any offence and the words in the
custody of a police officer. In order to answer this, a detailed examination of the
legislative history of the section needs to be made.
In the Criminal Procedure Code, 1861 before the Evidence Act of 1872 was
enacted, there were three sections namely
(a) Section 148 which made confessions or admissions of guilt to police
officers inadmissible
(b) Section 149 to confessions or admissions of guilt whilst a person is in
custody of a police officer, which was inadmissible unless made in the
immediate presence of a Magistrate
(c) The relevant section for our discussion here is section 150 which related
to discoveries and it is reproduced as follows:When any fact is deposed to by a police officer as discovered by him in
consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, so
much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or admission of
guilt or not, as relates distinctly to the fact discovered by it, may be received in
evidence.
Here the phrase in the custody of a police officer is altogether missing, hence it
was interpreted that sec. 150 was wide enough to apply to statements by persons in
custody or not in custody. The reference has been taken from Sarkar. By means of
the Amending Act 8/1869, sec. 150 of the said Criminal Procedure Code came to
30
2002 (1) JT SC 229
be read as follows: Sec. 150: Provided that any fact that is deposed to in evidence
as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of
any offence, or in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information,
whether it amounts to a confession or admission of guilt or not, as relates distinctly
to the fact thereby discovered, may be received in evidence.
This section is clear so as to cover statements by those in custody as well as not in
custody. Moreover, Sir James Stephen himself opined that he based section 25, 26
and 27 of the Evidence Act completely on section 148, 149 and 150 of Criminal
Procedure Code 1861. Sarkar concluded that when the Act was enacted in 1872
(i.e. when sec. 27 was enacted in 1872), sec. 150 was transferred to the Evidence
Act by omitting the word or and putting a comma instead. No possible reason is
however conceivable when the information coming from any person whether in
custody or not in custody satisfied the same test of relevancy in sec. 27, viz., the
discovery of a fact in consequence of information received from the accused. Sec.
27 is based on the theory of confirmation by discovery of subsequent facts. In fact
in the Allahabad High Court in Deoman vs. State of U.P. (AIR 1960 All p.1)
(reversed by the Supreme Court in State of U.P. vs. Deoman Upadhyaya AIR 1960
SC 1283) decided in 1960, the dissenting opinion of Desai J. says that if or was a
deliberate omission, the comma just before it should have also be deleted.
Further, it has been pointed out by Sri Vepa P. Sarathi, if what is admissible under
sec. 27 is (a) the discovery of the material object, (b) the place where it was
discovered and (c) the knowledge of the accused about the object, then such facts
are relevant and admissible even when the accused is not in police custody. This
fact is relevant either under sec. 8 (subsequent conduct) or under 9 (being facts
necessary to explain or introduce relevant facts). Therefore there is no reason
therefore for not applying sec. 27 to statements leading to discovery made under
sec. 25.
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In the 69th Report, it was proposed that the words Notwithstanding anything in
sections 25 and 26, be added at the beginning of sec. 27. That means the
discoveries under sec. 25 will also be admissible. In that proposal, the Commission
also introduced the word or and added some more words. The relevant portion
read:
received from a person accused of any offence, being information given to a
police officer or given whilst such person is in the custody of a police officer
Hence, it can be observed that the 69th Report firmly had the opinion that the
or had been deleted unintentionally and made provisions to rectify the error
by suggesting suitable amendment for the section.
In the 152nd Report of the Commission relating to Custodial Crimes, two
alternatives were suggested. The first one was that sec. 27 should be altogether
repealed while the second alternative was to redraft sec. 27 in the following
manner:
SECTION 27
Discovery of facts at the instance of the accused: When any relevant fact is
deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person
accused of any offence, whether or not such person is in the custody of a police
officer, the fact discovered may be proved, but not the information, whether it
amounts to a confession or not.
This would have purported to have the same effect as would have the amendment
recommended in 69th Report. After the first draft of this Report by us, Sri Vepa P.
Sarathi suggested that the word or be not introduced in sec. 27 and that the
omission of the word or in sec. 27 when the Evidence Act was drafted in 1872 by
Sir James Stephen was deliberate but not accidental. Considering the relevant cases
and the legislative history of the section and in light of the recommendations given
by other reports, 165th Report also supported the addition of the word or in
section 27.
Principle of confirmation of facts was laid down in R v Warickshall, which means
that if a fact exists at all, must exist invariable in the same manner whether the
confession from which it is derived be in other respects be true or false. Justice
Hidayatullah in Deoman Upadhyay case upheld the principle of confirmation even
against those statements given under section 24. In fact the concept was bodily
taken from the judgment of R v Lockhart. The 69th Report in view of public policy
considerations and respect for human rights, has recommended for exclusion of
section 24 from the purview of section 26. It was also done with a motive to not
let the statements of the accused be manipulated by a person in authority and
believed it to be a universal guiding principle. References had also been made to
Durlay vs. Emperor31 and Emperor vs. Misri32
In position in UK is such that, the Revised Judges Rules made by the Judges of the
Queens Bench Division deal with admissibility of such statements as evidence at
the trial of any person. However, these rules do not have the force of law but still
the Court has discretion to admit the evidence as has been held in R vs. Smith33
972 but no cross-examination of the prisoner is permissible. These rules govern
police conduct all professional investigation. The Police and Criminal Evidence
Act, 1984, sec. 76(4) makes admissible any facts discovered as a result of an
excluded confession. Evidence that a fact was discovered as a result of such a
confession is not admissible unless evidence of how it was discovered is given by
or on behalf of the defendant, in which case it would be relevant to the accuseds
credibility as a witness as well.
AIR 1932 Cal 297

(1909) ILR 31 All 592
33 1961(3) All ER
31
32
21 | P a g e
In US it is stated that as per Miranda vs. Arizona, an involuntary confession is

inadmissible, regardless of its truth or falsity and this is so even if there is ample
evidence aside the confession to support the confession and the conviction is
invalid if based on any part of such a confession. However, it is it is not clear, as to
whether facts discovered because of the confession, as distinguished from the
confession itself, are admissible in evidence. Many of the State Courts have
admitted evidence of the inculpatory facts discovered by reason of an inadmissible
confession, but other cases have held or indicated that evidence of such facts is
inadmissible under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. In still other cases, the
courts have established an exception to the admissibility of evidence obtained by
aid of an inadmissible confession to the effect that thing found must be identified
by evidence other than the confession.
In the light of the above discussion, 165th Report has recommend that the words
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in sections 24, 25 and 26 be
placed at the beginning of sec. 27 and that thus the non-obstante clause should
cover sec. 24 also and not merely sec. 25 and 26, as recommended in the 69th
Report. The word or is to be introduced as recommended in the 69th and 152nd
Reports. The word such and distinctively should be dropped. Instead of so
much of the information, the facts discovered will be treated as admissible. A
proviso is proposed to sec. 27 limited to making facts inadmissible if those facts
were discovered from statements made under sec. 24 where the statements were
the result of threats, coercion, violence or torture. Facts discovered from
statements made under sec. 24 by inducement or promise and facts discovered
from statements made under sec. 25 and 26, would also be admissible.
The proposal for sec. 27 should be is as follows:
Discovery of facts at the instance of the accused
27. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in sections 24 to 26,

when any relevant fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information
received from a person accused of any offence, whether or not such person is in
the custody of a police officer, the fact so discovered may be proved, but not the
information, whether it amounts to a confession or not:
Provided that facts so discovered by using any threat, coercion, violence or torture
shall not be provable.
It is suggested that the particular addition of or in section 27 is not justified until
and unless the background of the omission itself is carefully observed with the
omission of or has not been considered in any of the Reports. Moreover, the
concept of constructive police custody as given in the Aghnoo Nageshia judgment
and the reasons given thereof, do indicate a strong tendency of violence being used
against the accused in order to obtain confession. Hence, in order to implement
human rights of the prisoners and at the same time establish an effective criminal
justice system, the kind of safeguards which are given under the American legal
system, to prisoners should be adopted.
In US the law of confession is a conglomeration of constitutional law, federal law,
state laws and traditional practices. Right against self-incrimination is derived out
of the Fifth Amendment. The Fifth Amendment along with the fourteenth
amendment formed the basis of the free and voluntary rule which is a major test in
the law of confession. The voluntariness test takes both objective and subjective
circumstances in order to assess upon how freely the confession was made. The
fruit of poisonous tree doctrine has been reiterated in Miranda v Arizona. A
discussion on relevant judgments in order to substantiate the recommendation is in
order. It has been stated in Lewis and United States34 that to the false statement
and representations to the accused concerning the evidence against him, the
34
(1934, CA9 Idaho) 74 F2d 173

23 | P a g e
generally recognized rule was that to obtain the confession by direct statements of
this sort does not render the confession involuntary. Similarly it was held in People
v Connely35 that while the indulgence in deceptive methods or false statements is
not morally justifiable or a commendable practice, this alone does not render a
confession of guilt inadmissible. In People v Pendarvis36 the court stated that a
deception will not render a confession inadmissible unless the misrepresentations
are of such a nature as would probably result in untrue statements. However in
United States ex rel. Everett v Murphy37, the court said that while the deception of
the accused as to the victim's survival of the attack might be ignored if it stood
alone, it had been used to make more plausible the promise of assistance in order
to induce confession, and concluded that a confession induced by police falsely
promising assistance on a charge far less serious than the police knew would
actually be brought could not be considered a voluntary confession. On the basis
of these judgments it is recommended that a new section be introduced in the
Evidence Act, which is based on the principle of confirmation, where a true
statement obtained by false representation or misrepresentation alone is admissible
in the court of law provided the statement is true.
With regards to section 24 specifically, views are given above. However, Vepa
Sarthis comment that the facts that have been discovered as a result of confession
are relevant under section 7 and 9 of the Act, is highly significant. It shows that the
evidentiary value of the facts would not be lost to the investigating authorities.
SECTION 28
If such a confession as is referred to in sec. 24 is made after the impression caused
by any such inducement, threat or promise has, in the opinion of the court, been
fully removed, it is relevant.
(1925) 195 Cal 584
(1961) 189 Cal App 2d 180
37 (1964, CA2 NY) 329 F2d 68
35
36
The 185th Report recommended that in the light of the amendment proposed in
sec. 24 in this Report, in sec. 28, for the words inducement, threat or promise,
the following words be substituted in the body of sec. 28 and the title, namely,
inducement, promise, threat, coercion, violence or torture. The 185th Report also
stated that sec. 28 should not be renumbered as section 24A and there is no need
to delete sec. 28as had been suggested by the 69th Report.
Conclusion: It is suggested that the title of the section should be amended
according to the changes incorporated in the relevant section. Considering the
close nexus between section 24 and section 28, it is argued that section 28 should
be renumbered as section 24A. The deletion of section 28 is opposed. This is
because this will lead to confusion as regards to if a confessional statement is
admissible in the court after the removal of threat, inducement and promise.
Moreover, if the matter is considered at length later, legislative history would
indicate that such a statement might not be admissible as the section was
intentionally deleted.
SECTION 33
There was a committal procedure in the Old Criminal Procedure Code, 1898.
Where the magistrate examined the witness at the committal stage itself, and could
not be cross examined there. However, the evidence that was produced by the
witness in the committal court should not be used against the accused in the
sessions court. This particular section is applied to both civil and criminal cases. If
before a Magistrate, there was opportunity to cross examine and a defense counsel
did not choose to cross examine a witness, the evidence in the committal
proceeding could be used in the later proceedings and the defense, which did not
avail of its right to cross examine before the Magistrate, would not be able to
complain.
25 | P a g e
The first proviso Provided that the proceedings was between the same parties or
their representatives would lead us to conclude that the parties or their
representatives gave the deposition in earlier proceedings by a witness, should be
the same. There was a question that arose, that can the parties of the latter
proceedings should be a part of earlier proceedings. This elaborate interpretation
became necessary on the assumption that the requirements in the Act are an
inversion of the requirements of the English law, where the parties to the second
proceeding must be the same or legally represent the parties to the first proceeding.
It is submitted that in view of the identical phraseology used by Sir James Stephen,
in Article 33 of his Digest of the Law of Evidence, which refers to the English
law on the subject, the interpretation of sec. 33 should have been that the
inversion was accidental. 38
On the question regarding whether there is any such provision in Hindu Law
where parties to an earlier litigation could claim through manager who is a party to
latter litigation. The position stands clear that no there is no such provision.
There were many problems that were created because inversion and thereafter
court had to stretch meaning up to Representative-In- interest
However in Chandreswar vs. Bisheswar AIR 1927 Pat 61 the court said that
representative-in-interest are not available for all purposes that are synonymous
with the expression the person claiming under as is section 11of CPC. Thus, it is a
suggestion that the section can be amended as per Sir James Stephens Digest as
referred by Veepa Sarthi also. This can be done as similar situation is available
under section 21, 92, 99,115 of the evidence act. Now, if we read sec. 33 again, it
uses the words Evidence given by a witness in a judicial proceeding or before any
authority authorized by law to make it, is relevant for the purpose of proving in a
subsequent judicial proceeding or in a later stage of the same judicial proceedingand the first clause in the proviso uses the word proceeding was between the
38
Veepa Sarthi, Law of Evidence, 5thed. , EBC, 2002, p.155
same parties or their representatives in interest while the third clause of the
proviso uses the words that the questions in issue were substantially the same in
first as in the second proceeding. It will be seen that the main clause uses the
word subsequent proceeding while the third clause in the proviso uses the words
first and second proceeding.
In the first clause of the proviso, the word
proceeding is used without any qualification.

In the 69th Report39, a few other formal changes were proposed, the words in a
judicial proceeding were brought to the beginning of the section and the word
before a court were added thereafter and after the words evidence given the
words previous added. The words or in an earlier stage were added in the
beginning and for the words subsequent judicial proceeding or a later stage of the
same judicial proceeding- the words in a judicial proceeding are substituted.
Before the word before any person authorized by law, the words any proceeding
are added. These are all formal changes in the section and we agree that they make
the section more precise and can remain certain and we accept them.
SECTION 34
Under the present Act, the section states that when the entries of the book of
accounts are not used to charge a person with any kind of liability whether civil or
criminal may be used as an independent evidence without any further
corroboration. However if one sought to make anyone liable, the entries would
require corroboration. The entries can be significant under other provisions of the
act, such as section 32(2) or under section 159. Lack of an entry in the book is not
pertinent under section 34 but can turn out to be pertinent when covered under
sections 9 and 11. The section was in scrutiny L.K. Advani vs. CBI (1997) Crl LJ
2559 (Delhi High Court Judgment) and the decision was then affirmed in Supreme
Court Hawala Case CBI vs. V.C.Shukla AIR 1998 SC 1406 that that it was not
39
69th Law Commission Report

27 | P a g e
necessary that the entry should be made at or about the time the related transaction
took place so as to pass the test of having been regularly kept. Again, activity
carried on continuously in an organized manner with a set purpose to augment
ones own resources may amount to business.
The same have been affirmed in various judgments also previously - State Bank of
India vs. Ramayanapu Krishna Rao: (AIR 1995 SC 244), in Mahasay vs. Narendra:
AIR 1953 SC 431 that No particular form of books of account is generally
prescribed, although books are far more satisfactory when kept in the form of daily
entries of debits and credits in a day book or journal. But it must be a regular
account-book as would explain itself and as appears on its face to create a liability
in an account with the party against whom it is offered, and not to be a mere
memorandum for some other purpose.
This section does not necessitate any considerable amendment apart from for a
verbal change by replacing the words such entries for the words such
statement. The same has been corroborated in 185th Law Commission Report and
69th Law Commission Report.
SECTION 35
This section is relevant to the entries in Public Record that is made in performance
of duty. Public Servant is defined in section 21 of IPC therefore for the section the
entries are supposed to be made by a public servant or by a person so enjoined by
a law. Section 74 deals with acts or records of public functionaries as Public
Documents. This second is laid down under the presumption that the public
officials and the person statutorily enjoined would perform their duties correctly so
that even after lapse of several yearS they would be available to provide evidence.
When the first information is take under Section 154 of Cr.P.C. It would amount
as an entry by a public servant. But it does not act as substantive evidence, it needs
corroboration. Anything that does not fall under this section should necessarily fall
under section 9 or 11. Thus the recommendation is to bring slight modification
that the entry under this section is emphasizes on public and official character of
the entry and not the statutory character & that the entry which must be made in
performance of a statutory duty is applicable only to the latter-half of the section.
SECTION 36
This section is required to see the relevancy of statements in maps, charts and
plans. Firstly, the words maps or plans or charts must appear in the first and
second parts of sec. 36. As at present, in the first part which refers to those
offered for public sale, plans are not included while in the second part which
refers to those made under the authority of Government, charts are not included.
Secondly, that the opening part of the section which refers to statements of facts
in issue or relevant facts is governed by the words in the latter part, namely, as to
matters usually represented or stated and that this idea must be prominently
brought out by suitable amendment40.
However in the case of Ram Kishore Sen vs. Union of India, AIR 1966 SC 644, it was
clearly stated that government has to establish independently the facts stated in
plans or maps or charts.
SECTION 37
This section talks about the statements of Public Nature that are available in
form of Acts or Notifications would be relevant. There is only one suggestions for
this particular section that which involves redrafting of this section for the
convenience of interpretation: The section should be divided in clauses and the
third clause should begin as respect to the period before 15th day August 1957
and then sub clauses referring to Parliament of UK or London Gazette or
Dominion or Crown Representative.
40
185th Law Commission Report.

29 | P a g e
SECTION 38
This section is the last one under the heading Statements made under special
circumstances. This section speaks about Relevancy of statements as to any law
contained in law books. This section has raised an important issue that when
Law of any country is referred the court may require proof as mentioned in the
section or calling of an expert. But with regard to law in force in India the Court is
bound to take judicial notice of the same, it should not be proved under this
section. In the 69th Law Commission report also, it was pointed out that it is an
obligation on our courts to decide any question before them as per the Indian Law
and that it cannot be a matter of proof. The rulingS of Indian courts are not a
matter of evidence. Under section 3 of Indian aw Reports Act it becomes a
question of authority. Thus, it is suggested that we narrow down the scope of the
section, to achieve the objective, so as to exclude Indian Law from its application.
The words Any other country should be added after the words Any country.41
It has also been pointed out that Indian courts take judicial notice of Indian law,
but with respect to foreign law, it must be proved before the court under this
section or calling an expert42. However we can add the words Outside India
rather than Any other country.
SECTION 39
This section is a single section which is dealt under the heading of How much of a
statement is to be proved. This section needs some improvements. This section
put froths two situations:
a) Wasteful or inadmissible parts of a statement, conversation should not be
allowed to place before the court by a party.
b) Also that one does not simply rely on trimmed parts of statements &
conversation etc.
41Sarkar.
42
Law of Evidence, 15th ed. Lexis Nexis, 1999, p. 809.

Sarkar refers to the decision of Abbot CJ in Queens case (1820) 2 B&B 297 where
the learned Judge refers to conversation which a witness may have had with a party
to the suit and one with a third person. In the first case, if the conversation with a
party to the suit is itself evidence against him (the party), then the party has a right
to lay before the court the whole of the conversation and not merely so much as
may explain or qualify the matter introduced by the previous examination, but even
matters not properly connected with the part introduced in the previous
examination, provided it related to the subject matter of the suit.43 There was a
reference made to section 145 and 161 of the Indian Evidence Act in this case.
Therefore, that there needs to be an addition of subsection that whenever there is
a failure on part of one party to give necessary statement, conversation etc. then
the other party can give that part of evidence. Also the as the court considers
necessary which provides courts discretion should be removed and that discretion
should be given to other party.
SECTION 40
This section deals with Previous Judgments Relevant to bar a second suit or trial
Sec. 40 deals with the principle of res judicata in civil cases or autre fois acquit or
autre fois convict, in criminal cases. The section allows whether a court can take
cognizance of a suit or holding a trial when there exists a relevancy of an earlier
judgment, order or decree for deciding. However, the conditions under which a
former judgment, order or decree will prevent a civil or criminal court from taking
cognizance of a suit or holding a trial, do not belong to the Law of Evidence but
are contained in sec. 10-13 and Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 and to principles of autre fois acquit in sec. 300 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973. Sec. 298 of the latter Code prescribes the mode of proving a
previous conviction or acquittal.
It may be noted that in civil cases trial of a
particular issue decided earlier may be barred. Even in criminal cases, there may be
43Sarkar.
Law of Evidence, 15th ed. Lexis Nexis, 1999, p. 814

31 | P a g e
judgments which bar the trial, not of a whole case, but of a particular issue, known
as issue estoppel.44
In the present section 40 it intends to bring up rulings interparty but for which
there is no provision in CPC. Therefore a reference may be made to the recent
judgment of the Supreme Court in K.G. Premshankar v. Inspector of Police: 2002 (6)
SCALE 371: which refers to secs. 40, 41, 42 and 43 and to the relevance of
previous judgment in a civil case, in a subsequent criminal case. It is not always
conclusive though it is always relevant.
Thus the suggestion stands that there should be redrafting that there can be bar of
issues rather than merely to suits and trials. There needs to be addition of words
or determining a question after taking cognizance of a suit or issue or holding a
trial. Also in the end of the section addition or determining such questions after
Court ought to take cognizance of such suit or issue, or to hold such trial.
SECTION 41
This section is lengthy and deals with Relevancy of certain judgments in probate,
etc. jurisdiction (Including matrimonial, admiralty or insolvency jurisdiction). Such
judgments, order, decree is conclusive proof. This section refers to only 4 types
of cases and is based on public policy. This section is not restricted to court in
India but also includes judgments pronounced by foreign courts in respect of these
four matters.
Order refusing probate negative orderdoes not fall within section 41. This
observation was made in Chinnaswami vs. Harihara Badra (1893) 16 Mad 380 that a
refusal to grant probate took away the character of executors or legatees or
beneficiaries under a will and this was also conclusive.
44
185th Law Commission Report
The Bombay High Court in Ganesh vs. Ram Chandra, (1887) ILR 21 Bom 563 in its
probate jurisdiction held that the execution of the will was not proved. The
judgment was held not to block a suit by the same claimant as a person who was a
beneficiary under the will. : From a refusal to grant probate, it by no means
follows that in the opinion of the court, the will is not a genuine will of the
testator. In Kalyan Chand vs. Sita Bai, AIR 1914 Bom 8 (FB). , the probate was
declined on the ground the testator was not of lucid mind. Thus it is recommended
that there should be a clarification in the aspect of refusal to grant a probate and
that it does not fall under this section.
SECTION 42
This section deals with Relevancy and effect of judgments, orders or decrees, other
than those mentioned in Section 41 and declares them as conclusive proof.
However they are they are relevant only in matters of public nature. There is an
illustration below sec. 42 which refers to a suit by A against B alleging existence of
a public right pleaded by B over As land. The fact that in a suit by A against C, C
claimed a public right was relevant but not conclusive proof of the right of way.
This is a principle drawn from English law and is an exception to the general rule
that persons not parties or privies to a judgment shall not be affected or prejudiced
thereby.
Vepa P. Sarathi45 summarises as follows as to the effect of sec. 41 to 44 and sec.
13: The result may be stated thus: (a) If a judgment comes under sec. 41, it is
relevant as well as conclusive even against a third party; (b) If it comes under sec.
42, it is relevant as against a third party; (c) All other judgments are relevant as
between the parties or their representatives only, under sec. 40. The author adds:
The existence of such judgments, i.e. those mentioned in (c) would be relevant as
against third parties, if such existence of a conclusion is relevant under some
45

33 | P a g e
section of the Act relating to relevancy, as a fact in issue, or a motive under sec. 8
or a transaction under sec. 13.
Veepa Sarathi also discusses sec. 40 to 42 and also sec. 43 this aspect (ibid p. 173)
and states as follows: If the judgment of the civil court comes under sec. 41 or
sec. 42, it would be relevant in a criminal case also. But if it does not come under
these two sections, it cannot be relevant, because sec. 40 cannot apply. The
application of sec. 40 depends upon sec. 11 of the Civil Procedure Code and sec.
300 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Under sec. 11, Civil Procedure Code, a
judgment of a civil court in certain circumstances is relevant in another civil court,
and under sec. 300, Criminal Procedure Code, a judgment of one criminal court in
certain circumstances is relevant in another criminal court, but the judgment of a
civil court is not made relevant evidence under either of these two sections in a
criminal court. The existence of a judgment, i.e. the conclusion in a judgment
would, be relevant under the second part of sec. 43 and as shown by illustration
(d). 46
Referring to the converse position, the author says: A judgment of a criminal
court cannot come under sec. 41 and 42. Thus it can never be relevant under these
two sections. Under sec. 40, as shown above, a judgment of a criminal court can
only be relevant in another criminal case and not in a civil case. The existence of a
judgment of a criminal court, however, may be relevant under the second part of
sec. 43.47 Thus, there is no such need to bring any changes in this provision.
Various judgments and precedents are enough for courts to help decide the scope
of this section. Also, to this support is the divergent views of House of Lords and
Privy Council.
46
47

SECTION 43
We have briefly discussed section 43 in section 42, but we are going to look into
this section more specifically now. This section deals with Judgments, etc. other
than those mentioned in Sections 40 to 42, when relevant. The section does not
deal with inter parties but instead judgments. On reading this section, it is clear and
sufficient thus there is no need of change in this section.
SECTION 44
The section deals with Fraud or collusion in obtaining judgment, or incompetence
of Court, may be proved. On referring to various minority views in cases it was
decided that perjured evidence cannot be a ground laid down on the dictum in
Kadirvelu Nainar vs. Kuppuswami Naickar, 1919 Mad 1044 that if such ground is
accepted then there would be no end to litigation in India. Therefore even though
there is a supreme court judgment saying to include negligence as a separate
ground in Bishun Deo vs. Seogem Ray, AIR 1951 SC 280 at 283 (para 23) but merely
because of one judgment it would not be strong and sufficient to add a separate
clause. Thus, no addition is required in this section.
SECTION 45
This section refers to opinion of experts. There are three illustrations set out in this
section they deal with opinion as to poisoning, unsoundness of mind &identity
of handwriting respectively. For this particular section is having a lot of intricacies
we should have to refer 185th Law commission report and the recommendations
given by the draftsmen to include two more sections along with Section 45, that
will be section 45A and Section 45B. The Commission recommended to include
footprints, palm impressions or typewriting, as the case may be in sec. 45 and
further recommended insertion of sec. 45A in regard to the duty of an expert
witness to supply copy of his report to all parties, along with the grounds for
opinion. It may be noted that in State through CBI vs. S.J. Choudhary AIR 1996 SC
35 | P a g e
1491, while holding that experts could be examined with regard to typewriting,
the 69th Report of the Law Commission was quoted.
The proposed section 45A is as under 185th Law Commission Report:
45A. (1) Except by leave of the Court, a witness shall not testify as an expert unless a copy
of his report has, pursuant to subsections (2) and (3), been given to all the parties.
(2) An experts report shall be addressed to the Court and not to the party on whose behalf he
is examined and he shall owe a duty to help the Court and this duty shall override any
obligation to the party on whose behalf he is examined.
(3) An experts report must (a) give details of the experts qualifications;
(b) give details of any literature or other material which the expert has relied on, in
making the report;
(c) state who carried out any test or experiment which the expert has used for the
report and whether or not the test or experiment has been carried out under the
experts supervision and the reasons if any, given by the person who conducted
the test;
(d) give the qualifications of the person who carried out any such test or experiment;
(e) where there is a range of opinion on the matters dealt with in the report
(i) summarize the range of opinion, and
(ii) give reasons for his own opinion;
(f) contain a summary of conclusions reached;
(g) contain a statement that the expert understood his duty to the Court and has
complied with that duty;
(h) Contain a statement setting out the substance of all material instructions
(whether written or oral) of the party on whose behalf he is examined.
(i) be verified by a statement of truth as follows: I believe that the facts I have stated
in the report are true and that the opinion I have expressed are correct; and
(j) contain a statement that the expert is conscious that if the report contained any
false statement without an honest belief about its truth, proceedings may be
brought for prosecution or for contempt of Court, with the permission and under
the directions of Court.
Sec. 45B was proposed to cover expert opinion on foreign law as in the British
statutes of 1859, 1861 with two sub sections. The proposed section 45B is to be
the following effect, as per 185th Law Commission Report:
Procedure to prove foreign law and Courts power
45B. (1) A party to a suit or other civil proceeding who intends to raise an issue
concerning the law of a foreign country shall give notice in his pleadings or other
reasonable written notice.
(2) The Court, in determining a question of foreign law, in any particular case may,
after notifying the parties, consider any relevant material or source, including
evidence, whether or not submitted by a party, and the decision of the Court shall
be treated as a decision on a question of law.
Sec. 45 has to be read along with sec. 11 (when facts not otherwise relevant
become relevant), sec. 38 (relevancy of statements as to any law contained in law
books), and also the proviso to sec. 60 which deals with a situation where because
no expert is available, treatises can be quoted. Sec. 45 deals with expert evidence
and not with mechanical evidence such as automatic photographs, computer
printouts etc.
SECTION 46
The section refers to facts bearing upon opinions of expert. This section does not
require any changes, it can be accepted the way it stands.
37 | P a g e
SECTION 47
This section speaks of opinions as to handwriting, when relevant. This section
does not require any changes however in case Section 45A is brought in force
through and an amendment then both of these sections have to be read together.
SECTION 47A
This section was inserted through an amendment in 2000 speaking about the
opinion as to digital signature, when relevant. This section does not require further
amendments.
SECTION 48
This section says where opinion as to existence of right or customs, when relevant.
There needs to be a slight change in this section this section has to be read with
section 32(4) and section 49. . Section 32(4) refers to a public right or custom or
matter of public or general interest, sec.48 speaks of general custom or right (with
an explanation) and sec. 49 speaks (usages and tenets of any body of men or
family). The words used in s. 32(4) are the widest i.e. public right or custom or
matter of public or general interest and should be brought into sec. 48 which
refers to general right and general custom, in as much as s. 48 since the
draftsmen would not have intended this section to be broader than sec. 32(4).
SECTION 49
This section specifically deals with opinions as to usage, tenets etc. where relevant.
This section does not require any changes just have to be read along in the lines of
section 48.
SECTION 50
This section says opinion as to the relationship of one person to another, the
opinion, expressed by conduct, as to the existence of such relationship, of any
person who, as a member of the family of otherwise, has special means of

knowledge on the subject, is a relevant fact. This section refers only to Indian
Divorce Act 1869. However since then the right to divorce has been included in
several family systems, hence now it has become necessary to add any other
enactment providing for dissolution of marriage.
It has been pointed out that There is a presumption against the legislature that it
enacts laws with complete knowledge of all existing laws pertaining to the same
subject, and the failure to bring an amendment to sec. 50, corresponding to the
amendment to sections 304B and 498A IPC indicates that the intent was not to
repeal existing legislation48 (Vadde Rama Rao vs. State of A.P.) (1990) Crl LJ 1666 or
1671 (A.P.). Thus it is important that the new drafting is included stating that all
such opinion shall matter, either in civil or criminal proceedings, where one has to
prove that the marriage existed.
SECTION 51
This section deals with Grounds of opinion, when relevant. As discussed above
that incase section 45A is incorporated this section has to be read in consonance of
section 45A. Hence there are no changes required in this particular section.
SECTION 52
This section refers to the questions as to when in civil cases, character to prove
conduct imputed can be relevant or irrelevant. There are no changes required in
this section since anything that was required has been changed in the 2000
Amendment.
48Sarkar.

39 | P a g e
SECTION 53
Both Section 53 and 54 refer to relevancy of character in criminal cases and are to
be read together. Section 53 refers to relevancy of previous good character in
criminal cases while section 54 refers to relevancy of bad character in reply. This
section does not require any changes. However there is a proposal to add section
53A that is: "53A. In a prosecution for an offence under section 354, section 354A,
section 3548, section 354C, section 3540, section 376, section 376A, section 3768,
section 376C, section 3760 or section 376E of the Indian Penal Code or for
attempt to commit any such offence, where the question of consent is in issue,
evidence of the character of the victim or of such person's previous sexual
experience with any person shall not be relevant on the issue of such consent or
the quality of consent.".49 This is because there was a proviso added to section
146(3), but that proviso covers only section 376 of IPC. Thus adding this section
as proposed in 172nd Law Commission Report. Section 53A will be wider than the
proviso to section 146 (3) that was introduced by the amendment act 2003.
SECTION 54
The main object of the section is not to be disturbed however we need to make
some amendments so that the words unless evidence has been given that he has
good character should concur with Section 315 and 140 of this act (that is
evidence that is extracted during cross examination). Thus, in this case it is
necessary that we include that words in which every case it becomes relevant so
as to provide the opportunity in cross examination to both the defense and
prosecution. There have been guidelines laid down in R vs. Mcleod: 1994(3) All.
ER. 254 as to the nature of questions that may be put in cross examination or
evidence in rebuttal.
49http://www.advocatekhoj.com/library/bareacts/criminallawamendment/25.php?Title=Criminal%20Law%20(Am
endment)%20Act,%202013&STitle=After%20section%2053%20of%20the%20Indian%20Evidence%20Act,%2018
72%20(hereafter%20in%20this%20Chapter%20referred%20%20%20%20to%20as%20the%20Evidence%20Act),%
20the%20following%20section%20shall%20be%20inserted,%20namely (Last referred on 10th November 2013,
17:30 hours)
SECTION 55
This section refers to relevance of Character as affecting damages. There was a
suggestion made in one of the Law commission report to include libel action.
However it becomes the courts duty to elaborate the section and provide the
required judgments and decision. We hereby, believe that there is no need of any
changes in this section.
SECTION 56
This section states Facts Judicially Noticeable need not be proved. This section
does not need any changes.
SECTION 57
This section refers to facts of which the court must take judicial notice. This
particular section is too lengthy and has 13 clauses. But there are a few things that
has to be brought to notice. We would like to concur with the changes made in
69th Law Commission Report and quote the same here. In the 69th Report clause
(1) of sec. 57 was taken up separately and clauses (2) to (6) of sec. 57 were taken up
together, clause (7) of section 57 was taken separately, clauses (8) to (13) were
taken up together. Then the two additional paragraphs were taken up separately.
In the light of the above, we agree with the 69th Report that clauses (2), (4), (5) and
(6) of section 57 be revised as follows:(2) All public Acts passed by Parliament of the United Kingdom before the
fifteenth day of August 1947 and local and personal Acts directed by Parliament
of the United Kingdom before that date, to be judicially noticed;
(4) The course of proceeding of Parliament of the United Kingdom before the
fifteenth day of August 1947, of the Constituent Assembly of India, of Parliament
and of legislatures established under any laws for the time being in force in a
Province before the said date or in the States;
41 | P a g e
(5)
The accession and sign manual of the Sovereign for the time being of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland in relation to any act done
before the fifteenth day of August 1947;
(6)
The following seals, that is to say,

(a)
All seals of which English Court take judicial notice in relation to any
act done before the fifteenth day of August 1947:

(b)
The seals of all Courts in India;
(c)
Seals of all Courts out of India, established by the authority of the
Central Government;
(d)
Seals of law Courts established by the authority of the Crown
Representative in relation to any act done before the fifteenth day of August
1947.
(e)
Seals of Courts of Admiralty and Maritime
Jurisdiction and Notaries Public; and

(f)
All seals which any person is authorized to use by an Act of
Parliament of the United Kingdom in relation to any act done before the
fifteenth day of August 1947 or by the Constitution of India or an Act or
Regulation having the force of law in India;
Clause (7) of Section 57: As clause (7) of section 57 did not refer to offices held in
India, it was recommended in the 69th Report (para 21.50), that the matter should
be added and clause (7) of section 57 be revised as follows to which we agree:
(7) The accession to office, names, titles, functions, and signatures of the persons
filling for the time being any public office in India or any State, if the fact of their
appointment to such office is notified in any Official Gazette;
Clauses (8) to (13) of Section 57: We agree with the 69th Report that no
amendment is called for in these clauses.
Second Para of Section 57: This para is immediately below clause (13) of sec.
57. This para refers to the powers of the court to refer to appropriate
sources for reference and does not require any amendment. We agree with
para 21.53 of the 69th Report.
Third Para of Section 57: This para is immediately below the para mentioned
above.
This para confers discretion upon the court to refuse to take judicial notice
in the absence of sufficient material. We agree that this paragraph does not
also call for any amendment.
SECTION 58
This section talks about the fact that are admitted need not be proved again. The
section does not apply to criminal proceedings. Therefore the change that is
needed is that after the words Any other proceedings on needs to enter Other
than criminal proceedings. In Mota Bhoy vs. Mulji 42 Ind. App. 103 it has been
held that whenever an admission is made it must be accepted subject to the
conditions laid down below or not accepted at all.
Admissions for the purpose of trial may be considered as having been made
(1)
on the record which are

(a) actual, i.e. either on the pleadings (Order 8 Rule 5 CPC) or in
answer to interrogation (Order 11 Rule 22).
(b) implied from the pleadings (Order 8 Rules 3, 4 and 5).
(2)
between the parties

(a) by agreement in writing before the hearing,
(b) by notice (Order 12, Rules 1, 2, 4)
(3)
at the hearing by party or his lawyer (Order 10).
All notices must be in writing (sec. 142 CPC). The Court can even pass a decree on
admissions as stated in Order 12 Rule 6.50
50Sarkar.

43 | P a g e
SECTION 59
This section deals with proof of facts by oral evidence. After having considered the
different provisions enumerated in the Acts of different counties like Singapore,
US and England, Law Commission has recommended including the evidence
through live video/live television links in Indian Evidence Act as such. Going
through the above mentioned provisions and keeping in view the rights of the
accused person that the accused person must be given an opportunity to get the
witness be cross examined by his lawyer. On the other hand it imposes a duty
upon the court to observe the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses. Therefore
it is incumbent upon the court to view the method of operation of live video
meticulously after having obtained the consent of parties.
SECTION 60
Section 60 lays down that oral evidence must be direct. The Law commission has
recommended addition of following proviso to the section and it is agreed that the
given proviso will give the requisite clarity: Provided further that the opinion of
the expert expressed in writing, and the grounds on which such opinion is held,
may be proved without calling the expert as a witness, unless the Court otherwise
directs, having regard to the circumstances of the case, where the expert
(i) is an employee of the Central or State Government or of a local authority or
of a University or other institution engaged in research and has been
consulted by the Court on application of a party or on its own motion;
or
(ii) recorded the opinion in the course of his employment,
Subject however to the right of either party to summon the expert for the purpose
of cross-examination.
SECTION 61
This particular section deals with proof of contents of documents. Document has
been defined in section 3 of the evidence act. It reads, Document means any
matter expressed or described upon any substance by means of letters, figures or
marks, or by more than one of those means, intended to be used, or which may be
used, for the purpose of recording that matter. The most common document
with which we have to deal is a document, which is described by letters. The
contents of the document must be proved either by primary or secondary
evidence. It means that there is no other method allowed by law for proving the
contents of documents. In the view of Law Commission, no amendment as such is
required for Section 61. The view of Law commission is justified in this regard.
SECTION 62
This particular section deals with primary evidence. It signifies physical
presentation of the original document. If the document is executed in
counterparts, each of which is executed by one or some of the parties only, each
counterpart would be considered as primary evidence. As per Phipson, the same
document can be primary as well as secondary depending on the purpose of the
same. The first portion of the first explanation of the section refers to what are
known as duplicate, triplicate or the like original. Sometimes, it is convenient that
each party to transaction should have complete document in his possession. To
fulfil this purpose, the document is written as many times as there are parties and
each document is signed by all the parties and all of them are originals. Copies
made by copying machine are regarded as secondary evidence of the originals. The
185th Law Commission Report agrees with the same and prescribes no change for
the said section and the same is valid in every context.
45 | P a g e
SECTION 63
Secondary evidence of a document is defined in section 63. It includes the
following:
1) Certified copy of the original document
2) Copies, which are made from the original by mechanical process, which in
themselves assure the accuracy of the copy and copies compared with such
copies.
3) Copies made from or compared with the original.
4) Counterpart of a document is a secondary evidence against the party which
didnt sign it.
5) Oral account of the content of the document by the person who has himself
seen it.
The above mentioned types of secondary evidence do not constitute as between
themselves the degree of secondary evidence. All the categories mentioned above
are of equal ranking. Law makes no distinction between one class of secondary
evidence and another.
The Allahabad High Court has held that section 63 is not exhaustive of all kinds of
secondary evidence. The court allowed evidence of draft note from which the final
notice was prepared. The court stated that section 63 leaves enough scope for
other types of cases not enumerated herein. In the case of Quamarul Islam vs. S.K.
Islam,51 the Supreme Court didnt take into account a newspaper report of speech
of a winning candidate. The court said the reporter should have been produced or
at least his original report should have been submitted.
In the case of U Shree. v. U.Srinivas52, it was held by the court that mere admission
of a document in evidence does not amount to its proof-therefore, it is the
obligation of court to decide question of admissibility of a document in secondary
51
52
AIR 1994 SC 1773

(2013) 2 SCC 114
evidence before making endorsement thereon. The question was whether a photo
state copy of a letter alleged to have been written by the wife to her father could
have been admitted as secondary evidence. The high court observed that when the
said letter was summoned from the father, he denied its existence. Thus, the High
court opined that when the efforts were made to get the primary evidence (i.e. the
aforesaid letter) and it could not be obtained, the secondary evidence (i.e. the
photocopy of the letter) could be adduced and that would be admissible under
Section 65 of the Evidence Act.
Mere admission of a document in evidence does not amount to its proof.
Therefore, it is the obligation of the court to decide the question of admissibility of
a document in secondary evidence before making endorsements thereon. In the
present case, the Family Judge (i.e. the trial Judge) has not discussed anything
relating to foundational evidence. The High Court has only mentioned that when
the letter was summoned and there was a denial, the secondary evidence is
admissible. Such a view is neither legally sound nor in consonance with the
pronouncements of the Supreme Court. Hence the said photocopy of the letter
was inadmissible in evidence.
The report agrees with the 69th Report that in clause (3) for the words made from
or compared the words made from and compared shall be substituted.
The report mentions that clause 63(5), which relates to oral account of contents
given by those who have seen the document. In the opinion of the Law
Commission, read is a better word. The commission also recommended deletion
of the word means and in the opening portion of section 63 and substituting the
words read for seen in clause (5) of section 63 and also substituting the words
made from and compared in clause (3) of section 63 for the words made from
or compared.
47 | P a g e
SECTION 64
This section embodies one of the underlying principles that a document must be
proved by its primary evidence. The meaning of the expression primary evidence
has been explained in section 62.
SECTION 65
It refers to cases in which secondary evidence relating to contents of documents
may be given. The circumstances in which secondary evidence can be given are
strictly regulated by the Act. Such circumstances are listed in section 65. The
section provides that secondary evidence can be given in following cases:
1. When the original is shown or appears to have been in the possession or
powera. of a person against whom the document is sought to be proved
b. of any person out of reach of, or not subject to the process of the court, or
c. any person legally bound to produce it, and although due notice has been
given to him in accordance with the terms of section 66, he does not
produce it.
2. When the existence, condition or contents have been proved to be admitted
in writing by the party against whom the document is to be proved or by his
representative-in-interest.
3. When the original has been destroyed or lost, or when the party offering
evidence of its content cannot, for any other reason not arising from his
own default or neglect, produce it in reasonable time
4. When the original is of such nature as not to be easily movable. This would
include case of bulky documents.
5. When the original is a public document within the meaning of section 74.
6. When the original is a document of which the Evidence Act or any other
law of the country permits certified copies to be given in evidence.
7. When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which

cannot be conveniently examined in the court and the fact to be proved is
the general result of the whole collection
Types of secondary evidence in different situations
Where the documents in the possession of a party who does not even after notice
produce it, or when the original has been lost or destroyed or when it is not easily
movable, any kindof secondary evidence can be given. When the contents of the
document have been admitted by the party against whom it has to be proved his
written admission can be given as secondary evidence. Where the original is a
public document or is a document of which the law permits certified copies and no
other secondary evidence is admissible then the certified copies and no other
secondary evidence can be given. Where the original is a bulky document, which
cannot be conveniently examined in the court, the only kind of secondary evidence
allowed is the evidence of the general result of the document given by the person
who has himself examined it and is an expert or is skilled in the examination of
such documents.
In para 30.5 of the 69th Report, it was pointed out that the various clauses of sec.
65 are not mutually exclusive in the sense that if a case does not satisfy the
requirement of one clause, it may still be admissible as secondary evidence under
another clause. It was pointed out that a clarification in this behalf is not necessary
so far as clauses (a) to (d), (g) are concerned, but is necessary because of the
negative words used in the last part of the penultimate para of the section: In case
(e) or (f), a certified copy of the document, but no other kind of secondary
evidence, is admissible.
It was suggested by the 69th Law Commission that the words unless some other
clause of this section applies be added in the penultimate paragraph after the
words is admissible. The 185th Law Commission agreed with the same. The said
49 | P a g e
change is required for the clarity of purpose. Section 65(a) refers to nonproduction of document by a person legally bound to produce it. In such case, the
secondary evidence with respect to its content can be produced. The moot
question that came in front of law commission was whether it intended to cover a
situation in which original document is in possession of person not bound to
produce it. To avoid all types of confusion the Law Commission has rightly
recommended adding the category of the person not bound to produce it to the
section. The commission hasnt recommended any change in section 65(b) to (g).
SECTION 65 A & 65 B
These two sections were added by Information Technology Act, 2000. These two
sections are regarding the rule of admissibility of electronic record. The Law
Commission hasnt recommended any changes for them in its report.
SECTION 66
Clause (a) of section 65 lays down that where the original document is in
possession of an opponent he should be given notice to produce the document
and if he fails to comply with the notice, secondary evidence of the document
becomes admissible. It is in reference to this that Section 66 lays down rules as to
produce original documents. This section requires that the party who has
possession of the original or his attorney or pleader, should be given notice to
produce. Notice should be given in a manner as is prescribed by the law in a
particular case and if there is no law on the point, such notice should be given as
the court considers reasonable under the circumstance of the case.
Exceptions- when notice not necessary
(1) When the document is a notice by itself
Illustration:One K was a director of a company. He was charged for having
wrongfully kept possession of articles belonging to the company. The
defense for K was that a sum of Rs. 29450 was due to him from the
company as arrears of salary, for which he had issued a registered notice to

the directors of company and hence he was prosecuted. At the trial, the
accused filed a certified copy of that notice. He did not give to the company
a notice to produce the original notice. The magistrate refused to admit the
paper on the ground that the original had not been summoned. His
Lordship of the Madras High held,
When a document sought to be summoned is itself a notice sent by one
party to the other and a copy of notice is produced by the sender, it seems
to me that under section 66, it is not obligatory to summon the original
notice.
(2) When the nature of the case itself makes it clear to the party in possession
that he will be required to produce it.
In a prosecution case under Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Sec.112) the owner
and driver know the requirement to produce the original permit. If they do
not care to produce the original, the prosecution is entitled to produce
secondary evidence. The rational is that a party who fails to produce original
is likely to throw light on the point of controversy must be subjected to an
adverse inference that it would have gone against the party`s own
contention on the point.
(3) When it appears or is proved that the other party has obtained possession of
the original by fraud or by force.
(4) When the adverse party or his agent already has the original in the court.
(5) When the original party or his agent has admitted that the original has been
lost.
(6) When the person in possession of the original is out of reach of the Court
or is not subject to the process of the court, for e.g., that he is a foreign
ambassador and, therefore, the court has no jurisdiction over him.
51 | P a g e
Effect of refusal after notice

Subject to the exceptions mentioned above, where the original is in possession of
the opposite party, a notice has to be given to him to produce the original and it is
only upon his refusal to do so that secondary evidence can be given. But, there
may arise a situation, where the opposite party fails to produce the original when
demanded, but at a subsequent stage of trial offers to produce the original one. He
cannot be allowed to do so. This rule was laid down in the case of Doed Thomson vs.
Hodgson53. Therefore, if a person has an opportunity, and had declined to produce
the writing he can`t afterwards bring forward its content.
In the case of Nawab Singh vs. Inderjit J.Kaur54, where the original rent note was
alleged to be in possession of the opposite party and he didnt produce it despite
several notices and adjournments, it was held that the plaintiff`s application for
production of secondary evidence should not have been rejected on the ground
that the copy of the note was of doubtful veracity. No amendment was found
required by the Law commission in its report
SECTION 67
Mere filing of a document in court is not enough to make the document a part of
the record. This is preliminary to be attended to before the contents of the
document can be regarded as evidence. This is called authentication of writing or
the proof of genuineness. This section lays down that when a document filed
before a court, is alleged to have been signed or written wholly or partly by any
person it must be proved, that it was signed or written by that person whose
signature or writing it purports to be. The executants can be called to prove his
own handwriting and signature. Where the document is written by one person and
signed by another, the handwriting of former as well as that of the latter has to be
proved.
53
54
(1860) 9 L.J.Q.B. 327

AIR 1999 SC 1668
The modes of proving a signature are as follows:

(1) By calling a person who signed or wrote a document.
(2) By calling a person in whose presence the document was signed or written
(3) By calling a handwriting expert
(4) By calling a person acquainted with the handwriting of the person by whom
the document is supposed to be signed or written.
The report suggested addition of following explanation to the section which can be
construed necessary for the clarity and the same is as under: Explanation:- In this
section and in sections 68 to 73, the expressions execution or signature in
relation to wills shall have the same meaning assigned to them under section 63 of
the Indian Succession Act, 1925 and the expression attestation shall mean signing
or putting a mark by the attestor.
SECTION 67A
This section was inserted by Act 21/2000 and deals with proof as to digital
signature. It states that except in the case of a secure digital signature, if the
digital signature of any subscriber is alleged to have been affixed to an electronic
record, the fact that such signature is the digital signature of the subscriber must be
proved. No change for this particular section was suggested by the Law
Commission.
SECTION 68
The word execution means that the party by affixing his signature or mark has
signified to the contents of the document in presence of at least two witnesses.
These witnesses are known as attesting witnesses and the document will be signed
with their addresses as the proof that the document has been executed in their
presence. According to Section 68, whenever a document which requires
compulsory attestation and such a document is produced before the court as
documentary evidence, then at least one attesting witness shall be called and
53 | P a g e
examined to prove the execution of the document. The principle will apply only if
at least one of the attesting witness is alive, capable of giving evidence and subject
to the process of the court. The section further provides that no attesting witness
need to be called in the case of document not being a will which has been
registered according to the provisions of Indian Registration Act of 1908. But, if
the party whose signature the document purports to bear has specifically denied it
then at least attesting witness shall have to be called. Thus an examination of
attesting witness is necessary only when the execution of the document has been
specifically denied. If not so denied, the evidence furnished by the registration
certificate under section 63 of the registration act coupled with the presumption
under illustration (e) of Section 114 of the Evidence Act would be more than
sufficient.
In the case of a will the only attesting witness surviving and summoned was able
to prove nothing, the will was held to be not proved.55 Where the defendant
admitted that the mortgage deed was executed but that its purpose was to
circumvent the new Rent control legislation it was held that execution of deed was
not specifically denied and therefore it wasnt necessary to call any attesting
witness.56 The legal requirement is complied with when one of the attesting witness
is produced. Neither it is necessary to produce the other witness even if available,
nor is there any obligation to explain why the other witness has not been
produced. What is to be done if no attesting is available? Section 69 provides the
answer.
In the case of Rasommal I. Fernandez vs. Joosa Mariyan57, the question in proof of
execution in suit for partition was house. Plaintiff denied the execution of gift
deed. It was held that when the execution of gift deed was denied by the
55Rameshwari
Devi v Shyam Lal, AIR 1980 All. 292

of Haryana v Raj Kaur, AIR 2001 P & H 322
57 AIR 2000 SC 2857
56State
executants there was no need of calling the attesting witness but the denial
shouldnt be vague. While recording findings as to denial pleading of the parties
must be considered. But if the defendant denies that execution of deed other than
will the attesting witness must be called but if he plaintiff himself denied the
execution of the deed attesting witness would not be called.
The Law commission has recommended redrafting of the section as follows:
68. (1) If a will is required by law to be attested, it shall not be used as
evidence of any testamentary disposition until one attesting witness at least
has been called for the purpose of proving its execution, if there be an
attesting witness alive and subject to the process of the Court and capable of
giving evidence.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), an attestor need
not be called as a witness to prove the execution of a will if,(a) the attesting witness is incapable of giving evidence; or is kept out of
the way by the opposite party or by another person in collusion with
that party or is one whose presence cannot be obtained without an
amount of delay or expense which, under the circumstances of the
case, the Court considers unreasonable; or
(b) the will is in the possession of the opposite party; or
(c) a party wants to refer to any collateral fact contained in the will; or
(d) the provisions of section 89 or section 90 apply.
This recommendation should be implemented to remove the ambiguities and make
the application of the section easier.
SECTION 69
If no attesting witness is available or if the document is executed in United
Kingdom, two things should be proved, firstly it should be proved that the
55 | P a g e
signature of the person executing the document is in his handwriting and secondly
that the signature of at least one attesting witness is in his handwriting. Where all
the attesting witness of a will were dead, the court allowed the will to be proved in
the manner of any other document.58 The law commission, in order to remove the
anomalies of the section suggested following replacement, 69. If no such attesting
witness can be found as specified under sub-section (1) of section 68, it must be
proved that the attestation of one attesting witness at least is in his handwriting,
and that the signature of the person executing the will is in the handwriting of the
executant of the will.
SECTION 70
Another situation of not calling attesting witness is when the executants himself or
his representative-in-interest has admitted the execution of the document. It means
that when a party admits execution of the document, he also admits the entire
series of facts which would give validity to the document. The admission of
execution means not only admission of signature but also of attestation of
signature. The admission under the section should be clear and unqualified. If
there is any controversy about the execution of the document then this section
would not apply and an attesting witness would be called to prove the execution as
required under section 68. Another condition for the application of section 70 is
that the document must be duly attested and required by law to be attested.
SECTION 71
It provides that if the attesting witness denies or do not recollect the execution of
the document, other independent evidences may be adduced to prove it.
(1) Sometimes it happens that the attesting witness colludes with the opposite
party and denies the attestation of the document, or
(2) The attesting witness does not remember the execution of the document, or
58Balwant
v Minavbai, AIR 1991 MP 11
(3) The attesting witness turns hostile and tries to mislead the court about the
execution of the document.
Then the court may discard his evidence and may direct the party concerned to
prove the execution of the document by any other evidence. By other evidence
includes the calling of second attesting witness, or other person including expert
and non-expert witnesses. Thus this section is another exception to the general
principle laid down in section 68. The revision of the same was recommended by
Law Commission in its report as under: 71. If the attesting witness called for the
purpose of proving execution of a will denies or does not recollect the execution
of the will, its execution shall, subject to the provisions of section 68, be proved,
by calling other attesting witnesses, before other evidence is adduced.
SECTION 72
If a document is not required to be attested by law, but the parties get it attested by
witnesses, it may be proved like a deed which is not required by law to be attested.
The Law Commission recommended the new section in following form which
simplifies the section to a large extent. An attested will or other document not
required by law to be attested may be proved as if it was unattested.
SECTION 73
It lays down that when the court has to satisfy itself about the genuineness of the
seal or signature on a document, it may compare the same with another signature
or seal which is admitted or proved to be that of the person concerned. But it is
necessary that the handwriting with which the comparison is to be attempted
should itself be the original writing and not a photograph of it. The comparison
may be done by the court itself, or it may appoint an expert to do the same.
According to a decision of the Patna High Court, the Court can direct even a
stranger to give a specimen of his handwriting. The Court directed a defendant`s
57 | P a g e
son who was present in the Court to give sample of his handwriting though he was
not a party to the case.
In the case of Garre Mallikharjuna Rao v. Nalabothu Punniah59, the opinion of
handwriting expert is fallible/liable to error like that of any other witness, and yet it
cannot be brushed aside as useless. There is no legal bar to prevent the court from
comparing signatures or hand-writing, by using its own eyes to compare the
disputed writing with the admitted writing and then from applying its own
observation to prove the said handwriting to be same or different, as the case may
be, but in doing so, the court cannot itself become an expert in this expert and
must refrain from playing the role of an expert, for the simple reason that the
opinion of the court may also not be conclusive. Therefore, when the court takes
such a task itself, and findings, are recorded solely on the basis of comparison of
signatures or handwriting, the court must keep in mind the risk involved, as the
opinion formed by the court may not be conclusive and is susceptible to error,
especially when the exercise is conducted by one, not conversant with the subject.
The court therefore, as a matter of prudence and caution should hesitate or be
slow to base its findings solely upon the comparison made by it. However, where
there is an opinion whether of an expert, or of any witness, the court may then
apply its own observation by comparing the signatures, or handwriting for
providing a decisive weight or influence to its decision.
The Law Commission recommended the following amended section:
(1) 73. (1) In order to ascertain whether a signature, writing or seal is that of
the person by whom it is alleged to have been written or made, any
signature, writing or seal admitted or proved to the satisfaction of the Court
to have been written or made by that person may be compared by the Court
or under its orders with the one which is to be proved, although that
59
(2013) 4 SCC 546
signature, writing or seal has not been produced or proved for any other
purpose.
(2) The Court may direct any person present in Court to write any words or
figures for the purpose of comparison of the words or figures so written
with any words or figures alleged to have been written by such person.
(3) This section applies also, with any necessary modifications, to
(4) finger impressions, palm impressions, footprints and type-writing.
(5) Without prejudice to the provisions of any other law for the time being in
force, nothing in this section shall apply to a criminal Court before it has
taken cognizance of an offence.
SECTION 73 A
It was inserted by Information Technology Act, 2013. The Law commission did
not suggest any change for the same.
SECTION 74
As per this section public documents are of two kinds:
(1) Documents forming acts or records of the act of the sovereign authority
namely, the Parliament and the legislative assemblies, or of the official
bodies and tribunals, and of public officers, legislative, judicial and
executive, of any part of India or of common wealth, or of a foreign
country.
(2) Private documents that are registered in public offices also become public
documents. For example, the memorandum and articles of a company.
Public document is prepared by public servant in discharge of his public
duties.
In the case of Smt. Rekha and Ors v. Smt. Ratnashree Jain60, the primary issue to be
determined was whether a sale deed (duly registered) is a public document or a
60
AIR 2006 MP 107

59 | P a g e
private document. In determination of the above issue, the Court observed that a
deed of sale is a conveyance and the deed of conveyance or any other document
being executed by any person is not an act or record of any sovereign authority.
Further, a sale deed( or any other deed or conveyance) when presented for
registration under the registration act, is not retained by government authority but
is returned to the person who presented such document for registration, on
completion of process of registration, and hence an original registered document is
not a public record kept in state of a private document.
In view of the same, a deed of sale or other registered document will not fall in
either of the two classes of documents described in section 74, as public
documents. It was further held that any document which is not a public document
is a private document. The court therefore concluded that a registered sale deed (or
any other registered document) is not a public document but a private document.
The Law Commission proposed a modified explanation to be added to clause 1 of
section 74 using the word deemed. The modified explanation is as follows:
Explanation- Records forming part of a case leading to a judgment of a Court or
an order of a public officer, if the order is pronounced judicially, shall be deemed
to be public documents.
SECTION 75
This section says that all other documents are private. All other documents mean
document other than those mentioned in section 74. The Law commission hasnt
suggested any change to the given section.
SECTION 76
It provides the method of getting a certified copy of public document. It lays down
that if a public document is open to inspection, its copy may be issued to any
person demanding it. The copy of the public document must be issued on payment
of legal fee and there shall be attached a certificate to it containing the following
particulars:
(1) That it is the true copy
(2) The date of issue of the copy
(3) The name of the officer and his official title
(4) The seal of the office, if there any
(5) It must be dated
Whether a person will be entitled to copy of public document will depend on the
question whether he is entitled to inspect it. If a person has right to inspect the
document, he will be entitled to get a copy and if he has no right to inspect it, he
cannot get a copy of it.
The law commission recommended Explanation 2 as per 69th report and
Explanation 3 in the form prescribed by it: Explanation 2: For the purposes of
this section, it is not necessary that the public should have a right to inspect the
document and it is sufficient if the person demanding a copy has a right to inspect
the document of which the copy is demanded. Explanation 3- If a person has a
right to obtain a copy of a document, he shall be deemed to have a right to inspect;
and where a person has been conferred by any law, a right to inspect or a right to
obtain a copy thereof or where a rule or order made by the Government allows a
copy to be given, this section applies notwithstanding any provision of law
requiring that the document shall be treated as confidential as regards other
persons.
SECTION 77
It lays down that when the contents of public documents are to be proved before
the court of law, the original need not be produced before the court. Instead, a
certified copy taken from the office according to section 76 may be produced
before the court and the court will accept it. The idea underlying this principle is
61 | P a g e
that the record of the court should not be taken away from its place of custody
into courts. If public records are summoned in courts, it would make it impossible
for others to use the records. Cases take years to be decided and during the time
the case lingers on in the court, it would become impossible for the other
individual to get access to it if it is deposited in the court. The certified copy of
public document can be received without proof.61 The Law Commission suggested
addition of following explanation to the section: Explanation:- If a certified copy
is in fact issued, the same shall be admissible irrespective of whether it has been
issued pursuant to a right to inspect or a right to obtain a certified copy.
SECTION 78
This section provides the method of proof of the documents mentioned in the
section. A newspaper is not one of the documents mentioned in section 78.
The law commission rightly recommended several changes to this section which
can be enumerated as under:
(1) The reference to the crown representative is to be confined to the period
before 15th August, 1947.
(2) The word legislatures is to be substituted by the word Parliament or of the
legislature of any State.
(3) Add the words before the 15th August, 1947, after the words proclamations,
orders .. Her Majestys Government.
(4) Split up clause (6) as under:
Public document of any other class in a foreign country,
(a) by the original, or
(b) by a copy certified by the legal keeper thereof, with a certificate under
the seal of a Notary Public, or of an Indian Consul or diplomatic officer,
that the copy is duly certified by the officer having the legal custody of the
61Ramanappa
v Bojjappa, AIR 1963 SC 1633
original, and upon proof of the character of the document according to the
law of the foreign country.
(5) As recommended in our discussion under sec. 79, clause (2A) has to be inserted
below clause (2) in 78, as follows: (2A) the unpublished and private proceedings of
a legislature or its Committees, by a certified extract of the proceedings issued
under the signature and seal of the presiding officer of the legislature concerned or
of the Chairman or head of the Committee of the legislature concerned.
SECTION 79
It lays down that a court shall presume the genuineness of a certified copy of a
public documents which is produced before it along with the certificate as
mentioned in section 76. It further says that if the document has been signed or
certified by an officer, it shall be presumed that the person signing the document
held that office at the time when he did so. But these presumptions are permissible
only if the certified copy is in the form and the manner provided by the law. Where
a Patwari issued a certified copy of Khatauni without complying with the
provisions of law governing its issue, it was held that court is not bound to draw
the presumption in regard to its genuineness.62 The following recommendations
were put forth by Law Commission:
(A)We recommend as follows: There must be a provision relating to the
presumption in regard to genuineness of certified copies of documents relating to
legislatures which are not published. These documents fall under section 78(2A) as
proposed.
(B) We recommend that section 79 be amended as follows:
For the words duly certified by any officer of the Central Government or
of a State Government or by any officer in the State of Jammu and
Kashmir, who is duly authorized thereto by the Central Government, the
following shall be substituted, namely:62Bhenka
vs. Charan Singh, AIR 1959 SC 960

63 | P a g e
Duly certified by any officer of the Central Government or of a State

Government or by the presiding officer of the legislature concerned or of the
Chairman or head of the Committee of the legislature concerned.
SECTION 80
This section deals with Presumption as to documents produced as record of
evidence. It reads as follows:
80. Whenever any document is produced before any court, purporting to be a
record or memorandum of the evidence, or of any part of the evidence, given by a
witness in a judicial proceeding or before any officer authorized by law to take
such evidence, or to be a statement or confession by any prisoner or accused
person, taken in accordance with law, and purporting to be signed by any Judge or
Magistrate, or by any such officer as aforesaid, the Court shall presume that the
document is genuine; that any statement as to the circumstances under which it
was taken, purporting to be made by the persons signing it, are true, and that such
evidence, statement or confession was duly taken. The Law Commission gave the
recommendation as under: In sec. 80, after the words taken in accordance with
law, and before the words and purporting to be signed by any Judge, the
following words be added: Or to be a statement recorded by a Magistrate under
section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
SECTION 81
This section provides for presumption of different kinds of Gazettes and
newspapers. Presumptions regarding newspaper under this section cannot be
about the proof of facts published in it the absence of the maker of the statement
appearing as a witness. Judicial notice cannot be taken of the facts stated in
newspapers being in the nature of hearsay evidence unless proved by evidence. It
must be proved by the person giving the statement in the newspaper that the news
is true according to hi perception. The law commission recommended amendment
of the section as follows: For the words, The Court shall presume the
genuineness of every document purporting to be the London Gazette, the words
The Court shall presume the genuineness of every document dated or issued
before the fifteenth day of August 1947,purporting to be the London Gazette,
shall be substituted.
SECTION 81A
Section 81A (as incorporated by Act 21/2000) stands as follows: The section 81A
as incorporated by the Information and Technology Act (Act 21/2000) deals with
presumption as to gazettes in electronic forms. It reads as follows: 81A: The
Court presume the genuineness of every electronic record purporting to be the
Official Gazette, or purporting to be electronic record directed by any law to be
kept by any person, if such electronic record is kept substantially in the form
required by law and is produced from proper custody. The Law commission
hasnt recommended any change for the same
SECTION 82
This section refers to presumption as to document admissible in England without
proof of seal or signatures. The Law Commission has recommended deletion of
the same.
SECTION 83
This section says that the court shall presume that maps or plans purporting to be
made by the authority of central government or any state government were so
made and are accurate but maps or plans made for the purpose of any cause must
be proved to be accurate. The Law commission revised the section as under:
83. The Court shall presume that maps or plans or charts purporting to be made
by the authorities of the Central Government or any State Government were so
65 | P a g e
made and are accurate; but maps or plans or charts made for the purpose of any
particular cause must be proved to be accurate.
SECTION 84
As per this section the court shall presume the genuineness of every book
purporting to be printed or published under the authority of government of any
country, and to contain laws of that country, and of every book purporting to
contain reports of decisions of the Court of such country. The only clarification
provided by law commission with respect to this section is that the words any
country include India also.
SECTION 85, 85A, 85B, 85C and 86
The Law Commission of India has not recommended any amendments to the
given sections which deal with presumption as to power of attorney etc.
SECTION 87
This provision is with regard to presumption as to books, maps and charts. The
Report adequately reviews this provision and its inter-relation with Section 57, 83,
86 and 114 and discusses that while Section 87 raises a presumption of
genuineness, it does not presume complete accuracy like that of Section 83 and 86
and Section 114 which allows presumption of accuracy in certain cases falling
under this provision. It recommends that Section 87 should be redrafted in line of
the proposal given by the 69th LCI Report viz.
(a) addition of the word plans and
(b) clarity with regard to the phrase Statement of facts.
SECTION 88
This provision lays down presumption with regard to telegraphic messages which
enable the court to presume that the message forwarded from the telegraphic
office is the same which is purported to be sent to the concerned person but
contains a bar of making any presumption as to the person by whom the message
was handed in for transmission or set, when the original has not been proved to be
in the handwriting of the alleged sender. This was aptly discussed in Kishore vs.
Ganesh.63 However, such proof of authorship may be given by circumstantial
evidence. For instance in Mobarak vs. State64it was laid down that such proof of
authorship can be afforded by the contents of the message in the context off the
chain of other correspondence. The Report also discusses various case laws which
lay down other instances wherein circumstantial evidence is used to establish such
proof viz. Henkel vs. Pape65, R. vs. Regan66,Mr. Abba vs. Suresh67and British And
American Tel. Co. vs. Colson68. However, the presumption under this provision can
be rebutted by producing messages actually received by the person who wants to
rebut the presumption as laid down in Manchalal vs. Shah Manikchand69. The
relevance of Section 62, Explanation (2) and Section 63 (2) with respect to Section
88 has been aptly considered by the report and concurring with the 69 th Report,
this Report also opines that no amendment is required in this Section. As the
provision is clear on its objective and with landmark case laws on the point, this
view seems to be adequate.
SECTION 88A
The presumption contained in this provision is on similar lines with that of Section
88, the only difference being the presumption is with regards to electronic
messages. This section explains the meaning of the words addressee and
originator which are very important to pinpoint liability when it comes to
electronic correspondence. But as such, the law being clear on the point, the
AIR 1954 SC 316.

AIR 1957 SC 857.
65 LR 6 Ex. 7.
66 16 Cox CC 203.
67 1984 AIR NOC 131 (Del)
68 LR 6 Ex. 122.
69 AIR 1988 Karn. 221.
63
64
67 | P a g e
Report does not suggest any amendment. This seems appropriate except for the
fact that as the provision discusses an intrinsic matter pertaining to information
technology, it can be amended so as include clear references to the Information
Technology Act, 2000.
SECTION 89
This provision read with Section 65(a) and Section 66 is with regard to the
presumption as to due attestation, stamp law conformance and execution in the
manner required by law of documents not produced, in spite of notice to produce.
It is based on the maxim, Omnis praesumuntur contra spoliatoren i.e. nobody shall be
allowed to take the advantage of his own wrong. Though the Court is initially
bound to draw it, it is rebuttable during the proceedings. One essential point to be
noted is that this presumption does not extend to the correctness of the contents
of the documents. In Manilal vs. Surat Mun 70it was held that once the plaintiff
excuses himself from producing on the plea that the document is not traceable or
is lost, the question of giving notice for the production does not arise. The very
same principle is discussed in several English Cases such as Crisp vs. Anderson71 ,
Closmadeuc vs. Carrel72, Marine Investment Co. vs. Haviside73which are duly considered
by the Report. The Report analyses this provision in line with the view of 69th
Report and states that no changes are required to be carried out. But if thought
upon, it can be inferred that Report does not consider the fact of non-extension of
the provision to the correctness of the contents of the documents. If the
correctness is not checked and addressed by amending the provision then the
corollary legal compliance will hold no value.
AIR 1978 Guj 193.

1 Stark 36.
72 18 C.B. 36.
73 L.R.5 HL 624. Also See Raja of Bobbili vs. Inuganti: 26 I.A. 262 (P) and Ahmed Raza vs. Saiyid Abid: 43.IA 264 (PC).
70
71
SECTION 90
This provision is with regard to presumption as to documents thirty years old. It
states that if any document produced before the Court, is purported or proved to
be thirty years old, then the Court can presume that the signature and every such
other part of the document which is purported to be in the handwriting of any
particular person, is in that persons handwriting. The same presumption is
applicable with respect to execution and attestation of a thirty year old document
by any particular person. The Section further contains an explanation as to
meaning of proper custody. The Report considers the amendments made under
UP Act, 1954 while suggesting changes to this provision and on the same line
proposes renumbering Section 90 as Section 90(1) reducing 30 years to 20 years
and an addition of subsection (2) which refers to a certified copy of the original
which was produced, the original having been registered, and the same
presumption as to handwriting of the person, execution, attestation as applicable to
the original under Sec. 90(1) was applicable to the original of the certified copy of
the registered document74 followed by insertion of Section 90A which applies with
respect to presumption as to execution of certain documents(original registered
document or duly certified copy of the same or one certified from a court of
record) less than 20 years old provided the original shows on its face the name of
the person by whom is purports to have been executed. This Section does not
contain any presumption as to handwriting or as to attestation and furthermore,
Sec. 90A (2) excludes application of presumption under Sec. 90A (1) to any
document which is the basis of a suit of suit or of a defense or is relied upon in the
plaint or written statement.
While proposing this amendment attention is drawn towards Section 4 of the
Evidence Act, 1938 of England, wherein the period for presumption of ancient
documents was reduced to 20 years owing to the difficulty of producing witnesses
74Sardaran
vs.Sunderlal AIR 1968 All 363; Babu Nandan vs. Board of Revenue AIR 1972 All 406.
69 | P a g e
connected with ancient documents.75 Emphasizing on the words may presume, it

has been held that that in case the executant or attesting witnesses are alive and
available, the Court can insist on proof by witnesses rather than draw the
presumption under sec. 90.
The Report also discusses various case laws on
important points viz.

In Haradhan Mahatha vs. Dukhu Mahatha76it has been held that if the executants or
attesting witness are dead, the Court can consider whether the document can be
proved by the procedure in Section 69 rather than raising a presumption under
Section 90. In Kartar Singh vs. Collector, Patiala77it was held that entries in revenue
records more than 30 years old can be presumed to be authentic. This presumption
has been applied to wills by the Privy Council in Basant vs. Brijraj78. The
presumption under Section 90 applies only to originals and not to copies as held in
Kalidindi vs. Chintalapati79 . However, in Satyapramoda vs. Mull Gunnayya80, a certified
copy of a special vakalatnaama filed in a proceeding 30 years old was accepted
after it was found that the original which was in the District Court was destroyed
as per rules. A presumption was drawn in respect of the existence of the original
vakalat. Section 57(5) and Sec 60(2) of the Registration Act is resorted to, in case
of certified copies81. If the original copies are lost, then only the certified copies
may be admissible as evidence.
Initially, the period was 40 years. In R vs. Farrington (1788) 2 T.R.466, it was reduced to 30 years and in 1938 to 20
years. Also refer to Halsburys Laws of England, 4th Ed., (Vol.17, para 129) wherein it is stated that such ancient
documents prove themselves notwithstanding the fact that one of the subscribing witnesses is alive.
76 AIR 1993 Pat. 129. Also See D. Ramanatha Gupta vs. S. Razack AIR 1982 Karn. 314 and State of Karnataka vs.
Veeranagouda AIR 1995 Karn. 361, wherein it was held that if the document is not proved to be 30 years old, the
presumption cannot be drawn.
77 1996 AIHC 1538 (P&H).
78 AIR 1935 P.C. 132.
79 AIR 1968 SC 947
80 AIR 1982 A.P 24. Also See Sital Das vs. Sant Ram AIR 1954 S.C. 606; Harihar vs. Deo Narain AIR 1956 SC 305;
Tilak vs. Bhim 1969 (3) SCC 307; Shivlal vs. Chetram AIR 1971 SC 2342.
81Karupanna vs. Kolandaswami AIR 1954 Mad 495; Kashibhai vs. Vinayak AIR 1956 Bom 65: Admission of execution
before the Registrar under Section 60(2) of the Registration Act.
75
Section 90A of the UP Amendment was considered by the Commission owing a

discussion of a landmark case viz. Ram Jos vs. Surendra82wherein Question was
whether even though the registered copy fell within sec. 90(2), as in force in UP,
whether sec. 90A (2) too applied, because the original was registered and whether,
if the document was the basis of the suit, it was excluded by sec. 90A(2) as in force
in UP. The Full Bench held that if the certified copy fell under sec. 90(2) being a
copy of an original more than 20 years old, sec. 90A (2) did not apply but sec. 90(2)
singularly applied. While proposing Section 90A, which corresponds to the Section
90A of the UP Amendment Act, the Commission kept in mind the decision given
in Ram Jos case and a recommendation of the 69th report which proposed a
provision like Section 90A (1) (2) of the UP Amendment with slight changes viz.
with regard to certified copies judicial records referred to Sec 90A(1), the
presumption should be confined to (a) registered document (b) documents
adjudged to be genuine in an earlier case.83 As already discussed, the Report, after
taking the above views into consideration recommends a revised Section 90 and
Section 90A which seems appropriate as it will enable a better and detailed
application.
SECTION 90A
This provision was introduced by Act 21/2000. The Commission recommended
that it shall be renumbered as Section 90B.
SECTION 91
This section and Sections 92 to 100 contained in Chapter VI of the Act deal with
exclusion of oral by documentary evidence. Section 91 bearing the heading
Evidence of terms of contracts, grants and other dispositions of property reduced
to the form of a document lays down the following -When the terms of a contract
or of a grantor of any other disposition of property have been reduced to the form
82
83
AIR 1980 All 385.

Para 41.38 of the 69th LCI Report.
71 | P a g e
of a document, and when any matter is required by law to be reduced to the form
of a docu-ment,
No evidence can be given in proof of the terms of such contract, grant, etc.,
except
(i)The document it-self, or
(ii) Secondary evi-dence of its con-tents, in case in which secondary evidence is
ad-missible.
The first exception to this provision is when a public officer is required by law to
be appointed in writing, and when it is shown that any particular person has acted
as such officer, the writing by which he is appointed need not be proved and the
second exception is with regard to wills admitted to probate in India may be
proved by the probate.84 Explanation 1 states that this section applies equally to
cases, in which the contracts, grants or dispositions of property referred to, are
contained in one document and to cases which they are contained in more
documents than one. Explanation 2 states that where there are more originals than
one, only one original needs to be proved and Explanation 3 states that the
statement, in any documents whatever, of a fact other than the facts referred to in
this section, and does not preclude the admission of oral evidence as to the same
fact.
This provision refers to the primary evidence rule and the secondary evidence
rule and applies to two types of documents:
(1) When the terms of a contract, or of a grant, or of any other disposition of
property, have been reduced to the form of a document, and
(2) In all cases in which any matter is required by law to be reduced to the form
of a document (such as sec. 17 of the Registration Act, 1908).
Probate means the copy of a will certified under the seal of a Court of competent jurisdiction with a grant of
administration to the estate of the testator. Probate of a will is evidence of the contents of the will against all the
parties interested there under. Probate is secondary evidence, but it is made admissible by this section.
84
In such cases, the primary document must be produced; or secondary evidence of

its contents may be adduced in cases in which secondary evidence is admissible
under Section 65 and 66 of the Act. Apart from the two exceptions, Explanation 3
also provides for another exception where a document in writing is not of a fact
in issue and is merely used as evidence to prove some fact, oral evidence is
admissible. Section 91 applies as between persons who are parties or even to nonparties unlike section 92.
The Commission in this Report refers to 69th Report and agrees with its
recommendation that there is no need of amendment in this Section. Nevertheless,
the report discusses this provision at length owing to the fact that Section 91 is
complementary to section 92 (as suggested by the 69th Report.) But as no
amendments were found to be required the Report instead of elaborately
discussing the case laws cites important references such as Sarkar and Vepa Sarathi
and the Apex Court Judgments therein85, which is appropriate as the provision lays
down very clear principles.
SECTION 92
This provision deals with exclusion of evidence of oral agreement. Aside from the
principal part it contains provisos 1 to 6. In order to understand the
recommendations proposed by this Report in consonance with the 69th Report the
provision can be understood as followsWhen a transaction has been reduced to writing, either by requirement of law or by
agreement of the parties, the writing becomes the exclusive memorial thereof, and
no extrinsic evidence is admissible, either to prove the transaction independently
or to contradict, vary, add to or subtract from, the terms of the document, though
85
15th Ed. 1999 p. 1267 to 1305 and 5th Ed., 2002 at p. 299 respectively.
73 | P a g e
the contents of such a document may be proved either by primary or secondary

evidence.
This rule is based on two grounds:
(1) That to admit inferior evidence when the law requires superior evidence would
be to nullify the law; and
(2) That when the parties have deliberately put their agreement into writing, it is
conclusively presumed between themselves that they intended the writing should
be placed beyond the reach of future controversy, bad faith or treacherous
memory.
All parole testimony of conversation held between parties, or declarations made by
either of them, whether before, or after, or at the time of a contract, will be
rejected, because such evidence would tend to substitute a new and different
contract for the one actually agreed upon. This section excludes the evidence of
oral agreements, and it applies to cases where the terms of contracts, grants or
other dispositions of property have been proved by the production of the relevant
documents themselves under S. 91; in other words, it is after the document has
been produced to prove its terms under S. 91, that the provisions of S. 92 come
into operation for the purpose of excluding evidence of any oral agreement or
statement, for the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to or subtracting from
its terms. The application of this rule is limited to cases between parties to the
instrument or their representatives in interest.
The Commission while analyzing this provision referred the recommendations of
69th Report according to which Sec. 92 is to be split up as Section 92(1) (a)
referring to contract, grant or other disposition of property and 92 (b) referring to
documents in which the matter required by law to be reduced to the form of a
document is recorded. Sec. 92(2) is to be added to cover matters required to be
reduced to the form of a document and not constituting a transaction between two
or more parties.This recommendation was the outcome of reference to
observations of Supreme Court in Bai Hira Bai Devi vs. Official Assignee,
Bombay86wherein the Apex Court opined that the prohibition in the latter part of
sec. 92 was confined to issues between the parties to the document or their
representatives and not if the issue as to varying the terms of the document arose
between a party to the document and a non-party. It also referred to sec. 99 of the
Evidence Act which expressly enables persons not parties to the document to give
evidence varying the terms of document. The 69th Report does not suggest that
the effect of the above judgment in Bai Hira Bai has to be corrected. It refers to
that judgment only to show that, according to the Supreme Court, both the former
and latter part of sec. 92 applies to transactions between parties to the document.
From that it follows that sec. 92, as it stands now, does not apply to unilateral
documents such as(i) confessions of the accused
(ii) statements of witnesses,
(iii) Court proceedings (other than decrees or judgments),
(iv) Resolutions of companies when required to be in writing- It is obvious that
such documents, though unilateral, cannot be allowed to be varied or modified
by oral evidence.
The Report agrees with this recommendation proposed by the 69th Report and
further recommends exclusion of oral evidence in the case of certain unilateral
documents over and above the stated format of the provision in 69th Report, as
well as addition of the words- such as confessions of the accused, statements of
witnesses, court proceedings other than judgments, decrees or orders, resolution of
a company required to be in writing. However, instead of bringing it on 92(2), the
Report recommended that this should be laid down in new section 92A and
suggested the draft of amendment in the same lines. As far as the provisos are
concerned the Report does not suggest any amendments for the same, the
86
AIR 1958 SC 448.

75 | P a g e
emphasis clearly being on amendment of the main part. The amendments

suggested are appropriate, as the bifurcation and elaborate explanations make the
application easier.
SECTION 93
This provision deals with exclusion of evidence to explain or amend ambiguous
document and states that when the language used in a document is, on its face,
ambiguous or defective, evidence may not be given of facts which would show its
meaning or supply its defects. This section read with Sections 94-98 deal with
interpretation of documents. The ambiguity or defect on its face as dealt with by
this section is known as patent ambiguity which is distinct from latent ambiguity
separately referred to in sections 95, 96 and 97. Extrinsic evidence is not admissible
to explain patent ambiguity. Parallel analogy is drawn to Section 29 of the Indian
Contract Act, under which agreements the meaning of which is not clear or
capable of being clear are void. The case law discussed on this point is Keshavlal vs.
Lalbhai87 wherein it was held that if, on a fair construction, the condition
mentioned in the document appears to be vague or uncertain; no evidence can be
admitted to remove the said evidence or ambiguity.
The Report in line with the 69th report does not propose any amendment to this
Section. Though the principle expressed is clear, it would been better if an
explanation could be added to the provision by effecting an amendment which
clearly differentiates patent and latent ambiguity.
SECTION 94
This provision deals with exclusion of evidence against application of document
to existing facts and states that if the language is clear and applies correctly or
definitely to facts, no evidence can be allowed to say that the parties intended to
87
AIR 1958 SC 512.
mean something else. It does not refer to any patent or latent ambiguity. The
Report, once again referring to the 69th report on this point does not propose any
change in this section which seems to be appropriate as it seeks to favor clarity
and helps in deterring frivolous evidence.
SECTION 95
This provision refers to evidence as to document in unmeaning reference to
existing facts. This section refers to latent ambiguity of a specific type as referred
to under Section 93. It states that when language used in a document is plain in
itself, but is unmeaning in reference to existing facts, evidence may be given to
show that it was used in a specific / peculiar sense. For instance error in survey
numbers can be disregarded by relying upon the boundaries of the property
covered by a document. The Report further discusses an illustration to clarify the
same. Sections 95, 96, and 97 deal with latent ambiguities and are based on the
maxim Veritas nominis tollit errorem demonstrationem: nihil facit error nominis cum de corpore
constat; falsa demonstratio non nocet cum de corpore constat i.e. A false description does not
vitiate a document. Section 95 is to be read with Section 97 which refers to
language and applies to two sets of facts.
Like that of 69th Report, this Report also does not suggest amending this provision.
The Commission should have considered including a few more illustrations by
amending the provision.
SECTION 96
This provision also dealing with a latent ambiguity refers to evidence as to
application of language which can apply to one only of several persons which is
also known as interpreting an equivocation. It states that when the facts are such
that the language used might have been meant to apply to anyone, and could not
have been meant to apply to more than one, of several persons or things, evidence
77 | P a g e
may be given of facts which show which of these persons or things it was intended
to apply to. The Report discusses the Illustrations appended to the provision to
explain the same88 but concurs with the 69th report that this provision does not
require amendment.
SECTION 97
It deals with evidence as to application of language to one of the two sets of facts,
to neither of which the whole correctly applies. It states that when the language
used applies partly to one set of existing facts, and partly to another set of existing
facts, but the whole of it does not apply correctly to either, evidence may be given
to show to which of the two it was meant to apply. The Report in consonance with
the 69th Report does not recommend any amendment to this provision.
SECTION 98
This Section refers to evidence as to meaning of illegible characters, etc. and states
that Evidence may be given to show the meaning of illegible or not commonly
intelligible characters, of foreign, obsolete, technical, local and provincial
expressions, of abbreviations, and of words used in peculiar sense. The Report,
after analyzing the provision as well as the Illustrations concurred with the 69th
Report that no amendment is required in this provision.
SECTION 99
This provision deals with the question of who may give the evidence of the
agreement varying terms of document. It states that persons, who are not parties to
a document, or their representatives in interest, may give evidence of any facts
tending to show a contemporaneous agreement varying the terms of the
Questions have arisen whether (a) blank space in a document can be filled by extrinsic evidence. Decided cases
show that if the document is incomplete and does not disclose its intention or is blank on essentials, no extrinsic
evidence is permissible (see Sarkar 15th Ed 1999 p. 1429).
88
document. The Report referred to the 69th Report and agreed with the three
suggested amendment with a slight modification.
In accordance with the 69th Report, the amendments suggested and the resulting
revised amendment draft proposed by this Report can be understood as followsFirstly, the section enabling extrinsic evidence must apply where both parties in a
case are strangers to a document or one party is a stranger. Secondly, the section
allows evidence to vary. Herein the Commission in this report suggested addition
of the words contradict, add or subtract which are used in other sections in this
amended provision. Thirdly, so far as the third parties to the document are
involved, there must be an exception, like that of in England.89An illustration is
then appended to the provision for better understanding of the same. The
proposed amendment seems appropriate as any more changes would then vitiate
the purpose of the section.
SECTION 100
This Section lays down saving of provisions of Indian Succession Act, 1865
relating to construction of wills. Referring to the 69th Report which recommended
that the words Indian Succession Act, 1865(10 of 1865) be substituted by the
words Indian Succession Act, 1923 (39 of 1925), and concurring with the same,
this Report does not recommend any further changes. This seems appropriate
because if the substitution is not suggested then the provision will contain a
technical flaw in terms of time-line
SECTION 101
This provision deals with burden of proof and states that whoever desires any
court to give any judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the
The Commission while drafting the 69th Report The Commission accepted the suggestion in Cross on Evidence,
1974, page 540, that contradiction by oral evidence should not be permitted, even between strangers, if the matter
is required by law to be reduced to writing.
89
79 | P a g e
existence of facts which he asserts, must prove those facts exists. When a person is
bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the burden of proof lies on
that person. In Chapter 45 of the 69th Report, the Commission referred to the
broad principle in civil cases with respect to burden of establishing a case, better
known as the legal or persuasive burden which never shifts and the evidentiary
burden which shifts during the trial from one side to another. Though there may
be special statutes requiring the accused to prove certain facts whenever the
prosecution has proved certain other facts.
As these principles are well known and basic, the Commission in this report agreed
with the 69th Report and did not suggest any changes to the provision which seems
appropriate so as to preserve the fundamental principles included therein.
SECTION 102
This Section refers to the question On whom the burden of proof lies. It states
that the burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on that person who would fail
if no evidence at all were given on either side. In concurrence with 69 th Report that
this provision was an elementary provision, the Commission did not see any need
to amend this provision. The pros and cons of the same would depend on the
onset of judicial precedents.
SECTION 103
This provision refers to Burden of proof as to particular fact. It states that the
burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on that person who wishes the Court
to believe in its existence, unless it is provided by any law that the proof of that
fact shall lie on any particular person. The provision is appended by an Illustration
(a). It is not followed by subsequent Illustrations. The Commission does not feel
the need to amend this provision but recommends that the letter (a) can be
dropped in the illustration which is justified in order to eliminate the minor flaw.
SECTION 104
This provision refers to the Burden of proving fact to be proved to make evidence
admissible. It states that the burden of proving any fact necessary to be proved in
order to enable any person to give evidence of any other fact is on the person who
wishes to give such evidence. Concurring with the 69th Report, the Commission
recommended that no change is necessary in Section 104.
SECTION 105
This provision deals with Burden of proving that case of accused comes within
exception. It states that when a person is accused of any offence, then the burden
of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within any of the
General exception in the Indian Penal Code (XLV of 1860), or within any special
exception or proviso contained in any other part of the same Code, or any law
defining the offence, is upon such person, and the Court shall presume the absence
of such circumstances.
The Report discusses a few important case laws on this point- The settled position
as decided by the Apex Court in Dahyabhai vs. State of Gujarat90 is that the burden of
proof is on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused. In Yogengra Morarji vs.
State of Gujarat91and in Periasami vs. State of TN92it has been held that under Sec.
105, where the accused pleads any special defenses open to him, the burden lies on
the accused and he can prove the defense by preponderance of probabilities and
need not prove his defense beyond reasonable doubt. He can rely on oral or
documentary evidence, presumption or admissions or even on prosecution
evidence if it satisfies the tests of a prudent man
AIR 1964 SC 1563.

AIR 1980 SC 660.
92 1996(6) SCC 457.
90
91
81 | P a g e
The Commission discusses the question of burden of proof in criminal matters

where the cases of pleas of insanity have received special consideration and
referred to the 69th Report wherein reference was made to the McNaughtens Case93
which led to the formulation of Mcnaughten Rules. While the English Law is that the
burden to prove insanity would remain on the defense on the basis of balance of
probabilities, reference was made in the 69th Report to the law in most States in
US, to place the burden on the prosecution to prove absence of insanity wherein
in one half of the States in USA, the burden is placed on the prosecution to prove
defendants sanity, beyond reasonable doubt, while the other half (including
Pennsylvania), require the defendant to prove insanity. Other cases like Davis vs.
United States94 and In re Winship95were also referred from which it is evident that the
recent trend is in favor of the former. The English Law, as inferred by the
Commission continues to remain the same.96The 69th Report noticed that Australia
followed the balance of probabilities rule.97 Another important point noted by the
69th Report is that when the defendant raises the issue of either insanity or
diminished responsibility on a charge of murder, the prosecution is allowed to
adduce evidence to prove the other of those issues.98
However, the present report notes that whatever be the position elsewhere, the
Indian Law still continues to be in line with the Dahyabhais case and Periasamis
case, which was further applied to other landmark cases like State of P vs. Gian
Chand99. The Commission in this report has justifiably agreed that it is not desirable
to make any relaxation so far as the defense of insanity is concerned, and suggested
the provision be left as it is.
(1843) 10 cl. &Fn 200.

(1959) US 469.
95 (1970) 397 US 358.
96See R vs. Carr-Briant 1943 KB 607; R vs. Brown (1971) 55 Cr. App. For other case laws refer Phipson, 15th Ed., para
4.33.
97 Reference to the view of the Australian High Court in Sodeman vs. R (1936) 55. C.L.R. 192 (228) which was
affirmed by the Privy Council in R vs. Sodeman 1936 (2) All ER 1138 (PC).
98R vs. Grant (1960) Crl.L. R 424.
99 2001 (6) SCC 71. Also see Laxman vs. State of Karnataka.
93
94
SECTION 106
This provision states that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any
person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. The Report discusses several
case laws and statutes from Indian as well as other Legal systems. In Shambhu Nath
vs. State of Ajmer100the SC pointed out that the section cannot be applied to an
accused guilty of murder on the plea that if he has murdered, he has must know
more.101 That would amount to first presuming that he is the murderer. It must be
a special case, the word especially is important. Hence the emphasis is on the
word especially, which indicates that the person who has the knowledge of a fact
is expected by the law, to discharge the burden. In Seniviratne vs. R102, the Privy
Council pointed out that this section does not cast the burden of proving
innocence on the accused. The Commission, in this report also discusses the Right
to silence of the accused in light of judgment of the European Court Murray vs.
UK103and finds that if the suspect or the accused does not, after certain facts are
proved, answer when he is reasonably expected to speak, the Court may draw such
inference from such failure as it may appear reasonable. However, such an
inference is permitted only if the suspect or accused, if he had been told of his
right to the presence of a lawyer at the time of interrogation.104 The report further
analyses the criticism of the procedure followed in UK for requiring the accused
and his lawyer to give evidence in light of Indian Law wherein it can violate the
guarantee in Art. 20(3) of our Constitution against self-incrimination and refers to
the 180th Report on Right to Silence wherein it was recommended that the right to
silence cannot be diluted. Hence, after thorough analysis, the Commission agreed
with the 69th report and stated that no amendment is required. However, the rights
AIR 1956 SC 404.

SC has further considered this provision in Vishal vs. Veerasamy 1991(2) SCC 375; Jawaharlal Vadi vs. State of J&K
1993 (2) SC 381; Balram vs. State of Bihar 1997 (9) SCC 338; Sanjay Kumar Bajpai vs. Union of India 1997(10) SCC 312.
102 AIR 1938 PC 289.
103 1996 Vol. 22, EHRR 29.
104 Also see Condron vs. UK (2001) 31 EHRR 1, in the year 2001 before the European Court, it re-affirmed this view
but it referred to the answer of the suspect/accused and to the advice of his lawyer.
100
101
83 | P a g e
of the accused being a much debated arena, the Commission could have
deliberated a bit more in this area.
SECTION 107
This Section refers to the Burden of proving death of person known to be alive
within thirty years. It states that when the question is whether a man is alive or
dead, and it is shown that he was alive within thirty years, the burden of proving
that he is dead is on the person who affirms it. The Commission referring to the
69th Report agreed that there is no need to reduce the period as the longer the
period, the lesser the strength of the presumption. Further the 69th report
suggested that a proviso should be added to Section 107 as it stands giving
discretion to the Court where it appeared to the Court likely that the person
concerned was involved in an accident or calamity. The Commission referred to
various cases as discussed in the 69th Report, such as Shankarappa vs.
Shivarudrappa105herein the Mysore High Court suggested deletion of Sec. 107 in as
much as in an age of aero planes and sputniks, death can take place at an unknown
place and under unidentifiable circumstances. The Commission observed106 that
even so, it is difficult for ordinary men not to believe that a person who was earlier
alive is not alive.
It is further examined that Section 108 dealing with presumption of death if a
person is not heard for in seven years is a proviso to Section 107- If Section 108 is
attached to a case, then Section 107 can have no application.107 Discussing so, the
Commission recommended that the proviso as suggested by the 69th Report should
be added to Sec. 107 and suggested a draft of amended section. The Commission
should have considered appending a few more Illustrations explaining the proviso.
AIR 1963 Mys. 115.

Para 48.9, 69th LCI Report.
107Sarojini vs. Sivabandhan AIR 1956 T-C 129.
105
106
SECTION 108
This provision states that if a man is not heard of for seven years, the burden of
proving that he is alive is shifted to the person who affirms it.
The Report examines two questions
1. As to position at the end of the period of seven years and the other and
2. About the burden of proof within the period of seven years.
After due examination of the case-laws in England and in India such as In re
Phenes Trust108in which it was held that there is no presumption that death must
be deemed to have taken place on the date of expiry of the period of seven years
referred to in the section subsequently followed by the Privy Council in Lalchand
vs. Mahant Rup Ram109, and problems regarding succession and re-marriage, in
regard to both these situations, the Commission recommended modifying
Section 108 in a slightly different manner than that of 69th Report which can be
understood as followsAs far as the first situation is concerned, at the end of seven years, a presumption
arises that the person is not alive and the burden shifts then to the party who
claims he is alive after expiry of seven years to prove it failing which, it will be
presumed that the person died at the expiry of seven years. Further, an explanation
covering the second situation was proposed which says that within the period of
seven years, there is no presumption of death and it will be for the person who
says that a person died on a particular day within the seven years to prove that fact.
This proposed draft of Section 108, if accepted will enable clear application of
principles embedded therein.
SECTION 108A
This section relates to presumption in case of death of several persons in a single
catastrophe, like an accident, drowning, air crash, battle, earth quake or the like
108
109
(1869) LR 5 Ch. 139.

AIR 1926 P.C. 4
85 | P a g e
which is usually dealt with by the Courts and Commentators as a part of Section.
108. The presumption here is called as Presumption of survivorship. From Indian
Case laws like K.S Agha Mir Mohamad vs. Mudassirshah110it is inferred that in India,
there has been no presumption of survivorship arising from age or sex, nor was
there any legislative enactment. The Report also observes Section 21 of the Hindu
Succession Act. 1956 in relation to this provision, which states that until the
contrary is proved, it shall be presumed that the younger person survives the elder
one, in such situations. It is solely applicable to Hindus, in respect of testamentary
or intestate succession.
111
The 69th Report sought to repeal Section 21 and
introduce the principle of assumption by means of a new section i.e. Section 108A.
However, the Commission, in this report though agreeing with the views of the
69th Report, sought to make some changes in the latter part of the provision
concerning the death of husband and wife. The Report discusses an example to
clarify the changes that the suggested draft of the amendment of Section
108Aseeks to incorporate viz. For example, under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956,
if a male dies, intestate, the heirs in class I are his wife, mother, sons and daughters.
Let us assume that the male and his wife died in the same accident. Now the claim,
if it relates to the estate of the male, it is to be deemed (no presumption is being
raised here) that his wife predeceased him and she will not get even her share along
with other heirs. It is therefore logical to make a further exception that if she is
also an heir to the estate of the deceased husband, then the fraction of the share
that would have gone to her if she survived the husband shall first devolve on her
and to the extent of that fraction, the further entitlement will be of her heirs. The
reason is that when by statute, in the case of an uncertainty, wants to introduce
some certainty and a deeming fiction not even raise a presumption that one
spouse died earlier to the intestate, we cannot deprive that spouse of her share, and
then her heirs, if she was entitled to a share. That does not mean that the entire
property would go to the spouse other than the one whose estate is in question.
110
AIR 1944 PC 100.

Re Mahabir Singh AIR 1963 Punjab 66.
111In
While suggesting this change the Commission took due consideration of the case
laws and statutes discussed in the 69th Report both with respect to Indian Laws and
English Law and has given a wholesome and practical view of the same.
SECTION 109
This provision deals with the Burden of Proof as to relationship in the case of
partners, landlord and tenant, principal and agent. It is based on the principle of
continuance and is related to Illustration (d) of Section 114.112 It states that when
the question is whether persons are partners, landlord and tenant, or principal and
agent, and it has been shown that they have been acting as such, the burden of
proving that they do not stand, or have ceased to stand, to each other in those
relationships respectively, is on the person who affirms it. The presumption drawn
herein for principal and agent as well as landlord and tenant is similar to
continuance of partnership as provided in Section 256 of the Indian Contract Act,
1872 which later became Section 47 of the Partnership Act, 1932. The
Commission agrees with the 69th Report and recommends that this provision be
left as it is. This seems to be appropriate as the provisions of the Statutes on which
the presumption is based have clear principles embedded in them.
SECTION 110
This section refers to Burden of proof as to ownership. It states that if a person is
in possession and the question arises as to title, the burden to start with, will be on
the person who contends that the person in possession is not the owner i.e.
possession requires prima facie proof of ownership. The Commission referred to
certain related aspects dealt with by the 69th Report including Articles 64 and 65 of
the Limitation Act, 1963 dealing with suits for possession, Section 6 of the Specific
Illustration (d): It says that the Court may presume that (d) a thing or state of things which has been shown to be
in existence within a period shorter than that within which such things or state of things usually cease to exist, is still
in existence.
112
87 | P a g e
Relief Act through the case of Nair Service Society vs. Alexander113, Section 145 of the
Criminal Procedure Code and the principle with respect to vacant lands regarding
possession being with the deemed owner but finally concurred with the 69th Report
that no amendment is required. This view seems appropriate as the section is
supported by clear provisions of ancillary statutes.
SECTION 111
This provision deals with proof of good faith in transactions where one party is in
relation of active confidence. It states that where there is a question as to the good
faith of a transaction between parties, one of whom stands to the other in a
position of active confidence, the burden of proving the good faith of the
transaction is on the party who is in a position of active confidence.This is a
general provision and is not confined to contracts. There is a related provision in
Section 16 of the Indian Contract Act.
The Commission in this Report agreed with the 69th Report that no changes are
required in this provision owing to the following reasonsFirstly, Sec. 111 is general and was applicable to all transactions while Sec. 16 is
confined to contracts. Secondly, Section 111 placed the burden of proof on the
person who was in a position of confidence whereas sec. 16(3) of the Contract Act
defined undue influence and 16(3) thereof required that initially it must be
established that the contract, on the face of it or on the evidence adduced, was
unconscionable, and only then the burden would shift to the other side. This
provision being simple, clear and straightforward, this view seems appropriate.
SECTION 111A
This provision was introduced by the Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts)
Act, 1984 and deals with Presumption as to certain offences. It was not the
AIR 1968 SC 1165. It was held that if a person is dispossessed by the real owner, he may not be able to recover
possession under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, after the period of 6 months has elapsed.
113
subject matter of the 69th Report. This presumption is with regard to offences
under Section 121, 121-A, 122, 123 and criminal conspiracy or attempt to commit,
or abetment of, an offence under Section 122 and 123 of the Indian Penal Code,
1860. Owing to the enactment of the Prevention of Terrorists Act, 2002, the
Commission, in this report does not suggest any amendment to the provision
which seems justified as the separate legislation incorporates the required deterrent
provisions.
SECTION 112
This Section deals with Birth during marriage, conclusive proof of legitimacy. It
states that The fact that any person was born during the continuance of a valid
marriage between his mother and any man, or within two hundred and eighty days
after its dissolution, the mother remaining unmarried, shall be conclusive proof
that he is the legitimate son of that man, unless it can be shown that the parties to
the marriage had no access to each other at any time when it could have been
begotten.
It lays down the rule of conclusive proof as to legitimacy of a child born in the
above mentioned situations. The Commission after continual reference to the 69 th
Report, suggested a draft amendment of the provision with a few more changes
majorly involving exceptions like impotence or sterility, blood tests proving a man
is not the father and DNA tests proving a man is not the father. The reference to
the 69th Report also involved analysis of important case laws of which the a few
significant judgments are- Kanti Devi vs. Poshi Ram114wherein the Court gave priority
to social parentage over biological parentage and thereby rejected DNA evidence
by observing that though the result of a genuine DNA test is said to be
scientifically accurate, it is not enough to escape from the conclusiveness of section
112 of the Evidence Act, 1872 and Goutam Kundu vs. State of West Bengal,115wherein
114
115
(2001) 5 SCC 311.

(1993) 3 SCC 418.
89 | P a g e
while determining the question whether a direction can be given for conducting a
DNA test in proceedings for the issuance of a succession certificate, declined the
same and held that DNA test is not to be directed as a matter of routine. It was
held by the Court that even though the result of a genuine DNA test is said to be
scientifically accurate but it is not enough to escape the conclusiveness of section
112 of the Evidence Act. According to the Court if a husband and wife are living
together during the time of conception but the DNA test revealed that the child
was not born to the husband, the conclusiveness in law would remain unrebuttable. Therefore, in law, this presumption can only be displaced by a strong
preponderance of evidence and not by a mere balance of probabilities.
The suggested draft amendment can be extracted as followsThe fact that any child was born during the continuance of a valid marriage
between its mother and any man, or within two hundred and eighty days, either
after the marriage was declared nullity, the mother remaining unmarried or after
the marriage was avoided by dissolution, the mother remaining unmarried then
such a birth shall be conclusive proof that such person is the legitimate child of
that man. The exceptions to the main provision are 1) Proof that the parties to the
marriage had no access to each other at any time when the child could have been
begotten or 2) the otherwise is conclusively established by tests conducted at the
expense of the concerned man which include medical tests showing impotence or
sterility, blood tests proving a man is not the father and DNA tests proving a man
is not the father. The draft further states that these tests can be considered only if
the Court is satisfied that they have been conducted in a scientific manner and at
least two of the three tests have resulted in the identical verdict that the man is not
the father of the child and if the man refuses to undergo the stated tests then it
would be deemed that he had waived his defense to any claim of paternity made
against him. The draft provision also contains two explanations- the first one
explaining the meaning of DNA Test and the second one explaining the meaning
of valid marriage.
If the above recommendation is accepted and incorporated in the Evidence Act, it
may be the first Indian legislation to give statutory acceptance to DNA
investigations conducted by consent of parties. Furthermore, it will dispel the
existing requirement of proof where other than non-access of parties, even DNA
investigations are not considered conclusive proof to rebut legitimacy.
SECTION 113
This section deals with Proof of cession of territory. It states that a notification in
the Official Gazette that any portion of British territory has before the
commencement of Part III of the Government of India Act, 1935116 has been
ceded to any Native State, Prince or Ruler, shall be conclusive proof that a valid
cession of such territory took place at the date mentioned in such notification.
The purpose of Section 113 is to preclude a judicial inquiry by courts into the
validity of the acts of the Government.
The Commission referring to the 69th Report discusses certain case lawsIn Damodar vs. Deoram117, the Privy Council held that the Governor General, being
precluded by Act 24 and 25 Vict c.67, section 22, from legislating directly as to the
sovereignty or dominion of the Crown over any part of its territories in India, or as
to the allegiance of British subjects, could not, by any legislative Act, purporting to
make a notification in a Government Gazette which is conclusive evidence of a
cession of territory, exclude inquiry as to the nature and lawfulness of that cession.
Hence the PC actually held that inspite of Sec. 113, such notification cannot be
conclusive proof and the courts can inquire into the nature and lawfulness of the
cession i.e. the section is ultra vires of the powers of the Governor-General. The
116
117
26. Geo 5 Ch.2.

ILR 1 Bom 367 (PC).
91 | P a g e
question became moot as post-independence as there was no longer any British

Territory as held in Maganbhai vs. Union of India118. In concurrence with the 69th
Report, the Commission herein agreed that this provision should be deleted which
is justified as its presence does not serves no application in the present cases
pertaining to the Indian Territory and the Acts of the Government thereof.
SECTION 113- A:
The report has very elaborately analysed this Section which deals with
Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman. This Section was
introduced by the Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Act 119 where in the Indian
Penal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and the Evidence Act were
amended keeping in view the dowry death problems in India. This Section puts
forward 2 conditions namely:
(1) Husband or relative subject the woman to cruelty
(2) And woman commits suicide within 7 years of marriage.
If these 2 proofs are adequately established then the court may presume after
taking into consideration all circumstantial evidence that husband or her relatives
abetted her suicide. The report further details about the meaning of cruelty as
having same meaning given in Sec 498-A120 of the Indian Penal Code. It further
justifies this position by citing various precedents like State of Punjab vs. Iqbal
Singh121, State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Nikku Ram122 in which it was laid down that in
absence of any evidence to prove cruelty by husband or relatives the presumption
cannot be raised. The test of standard of proof was very elaborately discussed and
laid down in State of West Bengal vs. Orilal Jaiswal123 which laid down that the charges
AIR 1969 SC 783.

46 of 1983, Sec 7
120Meaning of Cruelty given in Explanation 1(b)-it means any willful conduct to coerce women or her relatives to
meet any unlawful demand.
121AIR 1991 SC 1532
122AIR 1996 SC 67
123AIR 1994 SC 1418
118
119Act
have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt depending upon the facts and
circumstances of each and every case.
The requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not stand altered even
after the introduction of sec. 498-A in the Indian Penal Code and section 113-A in
the Evidence Act. So court should also look into all possibilities whether the
women was hyper sensitive to ordinary differences, discord in domestic married
life and whether any reasonable prudent person in similar circumstances would not
have committed suicide. Also the discretionary power of court to raise
presumption and it is rebuttable was held in Prem Das vs. State of Himachal
Pradesh.124
Current situation: Owing to the Sections adequately representing all the
requirements the Commission has suggested no changes in this Section. The main
observation of this Report regarding this Sec is that it addresses a very rampant
misuse of this Sec that has been witnessed in recent times. It takes into
consideration false complaints that have been made by women against husbands
even after absence of cruelty to falsely claim compensation and amount for
harassment.
Thus the use of the word may presume sufficiently provides protection to the
husband and their relatives too against the exploitation of the protection granted in
this Sec when courts will have to be convinced beyond reasonable doubt about the
cruelty and harassment to charge them under this Section. So no amendment
recommended in this Sec is justified and well explained.
1241996
Crl LJ 951 (HP)

93 | P a g e
SECTION 113- B:
This Sec deals with Presumption as to dowry death. This Sec was introduced in
the Evidence Act by Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 198612543 of
1986 due to the rising incidents of demand of dowry leading to suicide being
committed by women under pressure and coercion by husband and relatives.
This Sec put forwards 3 conditions:
(1) Woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment
(2) Such cruelty should have been or in connection with any demand for dowry
(3) That this must have been soon before her death
When all these conditions are proved the Section provides for a mandatory
presumption on part of court by using the word shall presume that in such
circumstances, such person had caused the dowry death but still the presumption
is rebuttable.
The Report further illustrates and mentions a similar sec 304-B in Indian Penal
Code and Sec 2 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 in which dowry death and
dowryis explained126. The need for insertion of section 113-B as also sec. 304B in
the Penal Code has been stated in the 91st Report of the Law Commission (1983)
on Dowry Deaths and Law Reform. The report explains this position by various
case laws like Shamlal vs. State of Haryana.127
Facts: The brief facts of the case were that there were constant disputes and fights
between the wife and husband regarding demand of dowry owing to which she
was taken by her parents 1.5 years before this incident. Subsequently a Panchayat
was called and she was asked to go back and she went back to her in-laws 10-15
days before the incident. But there was nothing to prove that she was subjected to
125Inserted
by Act 43 of 1986, section 12 (w.e.f. 5-1-1986)

means any property or valuable security given by one party to the other party at time of marriage.
Dowry death means any death caused by burns or bodily injury by a women subjected to cruelty by husband or his
relatives in connection with demand of dowry.
127AIR 1997 SC 1830
126Dowry
cruelty and harassment by husband before her death. So it was held by the court
that legal presumption under Sec 113-B is not attracted.
Case laws where recourse to Sec 113-B was permissible as cited in the report are
Hemchand vs. State of Haryana128,Gurbachan Singh vs. Satpal Singh129, Shanti vs. State of
Haryana130where the facts indicated that wifes death was caused unnaturally by
strangulation, maltreatment and allegation that she is carrying an illegitimate child.
All these incidents happened just before her death. Thus the courts found these
circumstances sufficient enough to raise the legal presumption under this Sec and
hold the husband or her relatives guilty of causing dowry death.
The report has also highlighted few differences between Sec 113-A and Sec 113-B
like may presume is used in earlier section while shall presume in the latter
section. It also justifies the use of shall presume in this Sec because of dowry
deaths occurring as a regular feature in our rural and urban society.
Thus the Commission after analysing various case laws and provisions was of the
view that this Sec is sufficient and addresses all the issues of dowry death
adequately so no amendment is needed which is validly justified.
SECTION 114
This Section explains 9 situations through 9 illustrations (a) to (i) which allows
court to consider various facts whenever it has to presume existence of any fact
which the court thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to (a) the
common course of natural events; (b) human conduct; and(c) public and private
business. The Report has also referred to the observation by Sir James Stephen
while introducing the Bill of Evidence in 1882131 that illustrations given are for the
128AIR
1995 SC 120
Crl LJ 562 (SC)
1301991 Crl LJ 5 1713 (SC)
131Proceedings in Council, Gazette of India, 30 th March, 1872, supplement, pp 234-35
1291990
95 | P a g e
most part, cases of what in English law are called presumptions of law: artificial
rules as to the effect of evidence by which the court is bound to guide its decisions,
subject however, to certain limitations.
The importance of presumption in Evidence is explained by an English Case U.S.
vs. Ross132in which it was held that presumptions even if raised are rebuttable and
no presumption can be inferred from another presumption. Another landmark
English case Mackowik vs. Kansas city St. James & CBR Co133which has been also
quoted by Supreme Court in Indian cases like G. Vasu vs. Syed Yaseen134 and Bharat
Barrel and Druna Mfg. Co. vs. Amin Chand Pyarelal135which has raised an important
question of law on presumption that they have no place in the presence of the
actual facts disclosed to the jury, or where plaintiff should have known the facts
had he exercised ordinary care, as held in many cases.
The report has after explaining the importance of presumption further explained
the words common course of natural events, human conduct and public and
private business. It explains that recourse to such conditions by court will depend
on their own common sense of the Judge acquired from experience of worldly and
human affairs, tradition or convention.
The Report has then explained the relevancy of facts with the 9 illustrations given
in this Section. Ill (a) raises a presumption with regard to possession of stolen
goods with thief who has stolen it unless he accounts for its possession. This
illustration was explained with the help of case laws Tulsiram vs. State136 , Gulabchand
vs. State of M.P137 and Earubhadrappa vs. State of Karnataka.138
13292.
U.S. 281
S.W. 256, 262
134AIR 1987 AP 139
1351999 (3) SCC 35
136AIR 1954 SC.1
137AIR 1995 SC 1598
138AIR 1983 SC 446
13394.
In all these cases, the Supreme Court observed that the presumption permitted to
be drawn under sec. 114, Ill.(a), has to be read along with time factor. If several
months have expired in the interval, the presumption cannot normally apply.
Another aspect which was highlighted in this reference was that the burden of
proving the guilt of accused does not shift but the evidential burden may shift to
the accused. The presumption under this is not confined to only theft but also
applies to other offences like breach of trust etc. So by elaborately explaining this
illustration the Commission also refers to its 69th Report and suggests that no
amendment is required.
Illustration (b): regards to an accomplices unworthiness of credit, unless
corroborated in material particulars. The main discussion has been referred to 69th
Report which has pointed out inconsistency between this illustration and Sec 133 which
establishes accomplice as a competent witness on whose allegations accused can be
convicted. So the former requires corroboration while the latter does not. So 69th
Report suggested that Sec 133 be deleted and Ill(b) should be retained.
Changes Recommended: The Report has thereby brought an important
recommendation of bringing the two aspects together at one place and has
suggested that the correct position will be to delete Ill(b) and amend Se 133. This
recommendation finds it justification in the Commentary of Evidence by Sarkar139
which also suggest insertion of an explanation to sec. 133 in terms of ill.(b) to sec.
114 would have been of more help in understanding the true meaning of sec. 133.
This has also been reiterated in a Supreme Court Judgement S.C. Bahri vs. State of
Bihar140which has suggested a similar proposition. It has also recommended to
Delete both the paragraphs in the later part of sec. 114 starting with the words As
to illustration (b).
13915
th
Ed., 1999, page 2076

1994 S.C. 2420
140AIR
97 | P a g e
Current situation: This has been a very useful recommendation but unfortunately
the legislators have not been very mindful of such a useful change and have still
not made any amendment as per the proposed recommendations.
Illustration (c): This Ill raises a presumption that a bill of exchange, accepted or
endorsed, was accepted or endorsed for good consideration. It has given reference
to the position in Sri Lanka which has deleted this illustration and the relevant
paragraphs related to this Illustration.
In Indian context it highlights the differences this Illustration bears with Sec 118 of
Negotiable Instruments Act which requires that the court shall draw a
presumption that every bill of exchange and promissory note has been executed
for consideration. So while 118 raises presumption against the maker of bill, Ill(c)
raises it against the acceptor.
Changes recommended: So it was recommended by 69th report that Ill(c) be
deleted which was accepted by 185th Report too.
Illustration (d):It raises a presumption that a thing or state of things which has been
shown to be in existence within a period shorter than that within which such
things or state of things usually cease to exist, is still in existence. The Report
analyses that the presumption under this section has been applied to possession.
Once prior presumption is proved with a person, he is presumed to continue in
possession, unless disproved. Case laws by which such position was explained are
A.P. Thakur vs. Kamal Singh141, Anangamanian vs. Tripura Sundari142in which it was
laid down that an inference of the continuity of a thing or state of things
141AIR
14214
1966 SC 605
I.A. 101
backwards may be drawn under this section though on this point there is no
illustration.
Changes recommended: It has mentioned that 69th report hasnt dealt with this
illustration but this Report has suggested a recommendation adding da which
provided that a thing or state of things which has been shown to be in existence at
a point of time, was in existence earlier within a period shorter than within which
such things or state of things usually cease to exist.
Current situation: This suggestion too has not been incorporated and
implemented in the present Indian Evidence Act, 1882.
Illustration (e): It presumes that judicial and official acts have been regularly
performed. This has been explained by giving reference to Sec 80 of Evidence Act
which presumes genuineness of records given as evidence. Also Brooms Legal
Maxims omnia praesumuntur rite at solenniter esse acta donec probetur in contrarium meaning
everything is presumed to be rightly and duly performed until the contrary is shown is also
providing aid to better understand this illustration. It referred to certain cases like
Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. vs. State of UP143it was laid down that the absence of a
recital as to formation of an opinion in an executive order does not lead to the
inference that no such opinion was formed before the order was passed.
Changes recommended: 69th Report does not make any recommendation about
this illustration but this Report has suggested a minor suggestion of introducing
the words or official act have to be added, after the word judicial.
Current situation: Again this recommendation has not been implemented but this
recommendation is extremely important to implement keeping in the mind the
143AIR
1961 SC 1381
99 | P a g e
recent Scams and irregularities being done by Government Officials. So such a

blanket protection should not be available to such official acts even if it is
rebuttable.
Illustration (f): It raises a presumption that the common course of business has been
followed in particular cases. This refers to a very general presumption but the latter
part of sec. 114 refers to a very specific situation where the question is whether a
letter was received. It is shown to have been posted, but the usual course of the
post was interrupted by disturbances. It then also refers to Sec 27 of General
Clauses Act, 1897which deals with a letter sent by registered post with proper
address, prepaid.
Changes recommended: So no change has been recommended in this illustration
as this does not specifically deal with registered posts or letters.
Illustration (g): A presumption raised is that evidence which could be and is not
produced would, if produced, be unfavourable to the person who withholds it.
Changes recommended: In this illustration too by referring to 69th Report no
change was recommended.
Similarly no changes or any suggestion of Amendment has been made in Illustraion
(h) and Illustration (i).
SECTION 114-A:
This section is of significance because it deals with presumption as to absence of
consent in certain prosecutions for rape. This section has been introduced by
Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Act, 1983 and has also been recently
mentioned in the latest Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013144due to the rising
incidents of acquittals of accused in rape cases. The presumption in this case is
144No
13 of 2013(w.e.f from 3rd February 2013)
mandatory but is rebuttable. The two most important Supreme Court Judgements
which have referred to this Sec are Gagan Bihari Savant vs. State of Orissa145in which
this legal presumption was raised and conviction was granted to accused.
However in another recent case of Dilip vs. State of M.P146the legal presumption
though raised was failed because the testimony of the prosecutrix had some
infirmities and irregularity with medical evidence as well as the evidence of the aunt
of the victim to whom she had narrated the incident soon after the commission of
the rape, it was difficult to accept that consent was not there.
Changes recommended: In 172nd Report, an amendment was proposed in sec.
376 of the Indian Penal Code defining sexual assault. Consequent changes were
proposed to be made in sec. 114A, in the 172nd Report. But the said Report is not
yet implemented, so no changes have been proposed by this Report too.
SECTION 114-B:
This Section has been proposed by 113th Report of the Law Commission. The
Report observes that this section is not yet included in the Evidence Act, 1872
though recommended in the 113th Report of this Commission. This Sec raises a
presumption that whenever any bodily injury or harm is caused to an accused while
in custody of a police officer it may be presumed that that police officer has caused
such bodily injury. Such presumption should be considered taking into account
various conditions like period of custody, statement of medical officer, Magistrate
recording evidence etc.
It has been rightly pointed out by this report and has analysed the present scenario
that custodial violence leading to injuries, rape or deaths of suspects or accused has
become very common in our country and the High Courts and the Supreme Court
1451991(3)
1462001(9)
SCC 562
SCC 452
101 | P a g e
have been passing strictures against the police and awarding compensation to the
person concerned or the families of the deceased.
While in police custody, third degree methods are employed to extract information
or confession. In various judgements Supreme Court has diligently dealt with such
incidents and has delivered justice to the victims suffering. Such landmark cases
which have been analysed in this report are Sheela Barse vs. State of Maharashtra.147
Torture and ill-treatment (including rape) in police lock-ups, especially in the case
of women came up for consideration in Sheela Barse vs. State of Maharashtra in which
Torture and ill-treatment (including rape) in police lock-ups, especially in the case
of women came up for consideration. In view of this Supreme Court gave several
guidelines regarding need for presence of lady police officers, excluding other male
accused, grant of legal aid and allowing the detainee to call a friend or a relative.
Judicial officers have to make surprise inspections. In Nilabati Behara vs. State of
Orissa148, it was held that the safety of persons in custody has to be protected and
the wrongdoer is accountable if a person is deprived of his life while in custody.
There can be no plea of sovereign immunity which was the main ruling given in
this landmark case.
One of the most important and landmark cases of the Supreme Court is D.K. Basu
vs. State of WB149 referred to custodial violence as something which breaches basic
human rights and Art. 21 of the Constitution of India. It also laid down that failure
to observe the directives could lead to departmental action as well as contempt and
in regard to contempt, proceedings could be initiated in the High Courts. The
requirements of Art. 21 apply to police as well as para-military forces and the
Revenue intelligence or other governmental agencies.
147AIR
1983 SC 378
1993 SC 1960
149AIR 1997 SC 610
148AIR
In yet another important case of State of MP vs. Shyam Sunder Trivedi150 reference
was made by the Supreme Court to the 113th Report of the Law Commission in
which it was ruled that whoever is responsible for custodial torture it will be
punishable with sentence up to 10 years of imprisonment but convictions, in such
cases, are fewer because of the difficulties in proving evidence.
Changes recommended: It has been observed sadly that even though the 113th
Report was submitted to the Government on 29.7.1985 and even after the
observations of the Supreme Court in the year 1995, the recommended provision
of sec. 114-B has not yet been incorporated in the Evidence Act. It is to be seen
that the section as proposed only used the words may presume and not the words
shall presume. Thus this report also suggests that 114-B be inserted in the Indian
Evidence Act, 1882. It has recommended some minor changes in the proposed
section like insertion of another subsection (3) be added below the proposed sec.
114B that police officer in this section means, officers belonging to police, the
para-military forces and the officers of Revenue Department such as those of the
Customs, Excise and the officers under Revenue Intelligence.
Also it suggests that the words or attempted to record must be deleted at the end
of sec. 114B(2)(d) and must be brought after the word recorded in the same subclause and before the words the victims statement. Thus keeping in view the
dehumanising aspect of the crime it is being hoped that the Government and
legislature would give serious thought to the recommendation of the Law
Commission and bring about appropriate changes in the law.
SECTION 115
The Report has elaborately analysed this Section which deals with a very important
principle of law called Promissory estoppel. This section briefly enumerates that
1501995(4)
SCC 262
103 | P a g e
whenever any person has by his act, declaration etc. has intentionally caused or
permitted another person to believe a thing to be true and to act upon such belief,
neither he nor his representative shall be allowed, in any suit or proceeding
between himself and such person or his representative, to deny the truth of that
thing.
The Report has then referred to U.K laws for describing several types of estoppels
namely-estoppel by deed, estoppel by record or judgment, estoppel by conduct.
But in our system it is only of one kind, estoppel by conduct. The report further
refers to various case laws to explain this doctrine. The principle was first laid
down in the High Trees case viz. Central London Property Trust Ltd. vs. High Trees House
Ltd151. Indian Cases which have widely covered this principle are State of HP vs.
Ganesh Wood Products152, STO vs. Shree Durga Mills153, State of Rajasthan vs. Mahaveer
Oil Industries154.
With regard to application of this Sec to minors 69th report has made an
observation that the the word also means and includes minor within its ambit. In
England this Sec has wide application as the word person also means and includes
a married woman under coverture, or a trustee in bankruptcy or to a Corporation
in regard to acts which are ultra-virus.
Changes recommended: So in order to clear the position regarding minors a
proposal was made for adding an Explanation to include minor or other persons
under disability.
1511947
(1) KB 130.
1996 SC 149
153AIR 1998 SC 591
154AIR 1999 SC 2302
152AIR
The Explanation so proposed to be added read as follows: Explanation: This

section applies to a minor or other person under disability; but nothing in this
section shall affect any provision of law whereby the minor or other person under
disability becomes incompetent to incur a particular liability. But the Current
Report has not considered it correct to introduce such explanation where its first
part which says that this section applies to a minor or other person under disability
is not necessary. It has even considered that it gives a wrong notion about the
proposed Explanation. Therefore the 185th Report has also recommended that the
second part also requires some re-drafting. They have thus recommended that
instead of an Explanation, a proviso be added below sec. 115 as follows:
Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply to minors or
other persons under disability for the purpose of enforcing any liability arising out
of a representation made by such persons, where a contract entered into by such
persons incurring a like liability would have been null and void. The report has
done a brilliant job in critically analysing such Explanation and thereafter
proposing a Proviso instead of an Explanation which now correctly explains and
justifies the position of minors with regard to application of principle of
promissory estoppels.
SECTION 116
This section refers to Estoppel of tenant and of licensee of persons in possession.
This section deals with estoppel against a tenant/licensee that they will not deny
the title of the real owner during the continuance of their tenancy. The
lease/licence may or may not be granted by real owner having a title but once a
person derives his right to possession from either of these persons, he is estopped
from denying the right of the grantor to grant the lease or licence.
An important point of law that was considered by this Report was the question of
limiting the estoppel during the continuance of the tenancy; does this mean that
once a notice of termination is given under sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property
105 | P a g e
Act, the tenant is free to dispute the landlords title? This was answered by
referring to an old case of Md Mujibur vs. Shk IssbBilas vs. Desraj155 and 69th Report
which suggested the position that even after the words during the continuance of
the tenancy, the words or at any time after termination of the tenancy must be
added. But one more point that was considered was that if a tenant has a case that
the lease was vitiated by undue influence, fraud or coercion or mistake, the ban
under this section, does not apply. estoppel should still apply to a person already in
possession. This was explained with the help of an illustration which is as follows:
If a person becomes a tenant of A first and later enters into a tenancy agreement
with B, even so, the estoppel applies against both A and B, whether A or B was the
owner or even if A or B were not the real owners. Having obtained possession
from A under the first lease, he cannot be allowed to get out of the estoppel by
executing a tenancy agreement with B. If A files a suit, the tenant is estopped from
disputing As title and cannot say that it was B who put him later in possession.
Changes recommended: This report has agreed with the recommendation of 69th
report with slight modification that the words or the person claiming through
such tenant should also be added after the proposed words if the tenant.
Another important Recommendation which was elaborately discussed in 69th
Report was cases of attornment. This aspect has been dealt with elaborately in the
69th Report (paras 58.20 to 58.29). The 69th report recommended insertion of new
sub-section (2) for dealing with the issue of attornment. But this report did not
deal with cases arising under Rent Acts where the tenant in possession becomes a
statutory tenant and is permitted a denial of title provided it is bona fide.
So the following recommended and altered Sec 116 as proposed by this report is as
follows:
155AIR
1915 PC 96
Estoppel of tenant and of licensee of person in possession

116 (1). No tenant of immoveable property, or person claiming through such
tenant, shall, during the continuance of the tenancy or any time thereafter, if the tenant
or the person claiming through such tenant, continuous in possession after
termination of the tenancy, be permitted to deny that the landlord of such tenant
had, at the beginning of the tenancy, a title to such property; and no person who
came upon any immoveable property by the licence of the person in possession
thereof shall be permitted to deny that such person had a title to such possession
at the time when such licence was given.
(3) Where a tenant in possession of immoveable property is attorned to
another, the tenant or any person claiming through him shall not, during the
continuance of the tenancy, or at any time thereafter if the tenant or the
person claiming through him continues in possession after termination of
the tenancy, be permitted to deny that the person to whom the tenant was
attorned had, on the date of the attornment, title to such immoveable
property; but nothing in this sub-section shall preclude the tenant or the
person claiming through him from producing evidence to the effect that the
attornment was made under mistake or was procured by fraud.
SECTION 117
This section deals with Estoppel of acceptor of bill of exchange, bailee, or
licensee. This Sec provides that no acceptor of a bill of exchange shall be permitted
to deny that the drawer had authority to draw such bill nor any bailee or licnesee
be permitted to deny that his bailor or licensor had, at the time when the bailment
or licence commenced, authority to make such bailment or grant such licence. Two
Explanations that are appended to such Section are:
Explanation (1) - The acceptor of a bill of exchange may deny that the bill was
really drawn by the person by whom it purports to have been drawn.
107 | P a g e
Explanation (2) - If a bailee delivers the goods bailed to a person other than the
bailor, he may prove that such person had a right to them as against the bailor.
Changes recommended: The 69th Report, (in para 59.5) after referring to 11th
Report of the Commission recommended that the portion of section 117 which
relates to the acceptor of a bill of exchange, be transferred to the Negotiable
Instruments Act as sec. 104. But, in the 69th Report no positive recommendation
for such transfer was made. Therefore in the present Report it is not considered
necessary to shift the first part of sec. 117 to the Negotiable Instruments Act. For
that matter, there are presumptions relating to landlord and tenant and other
relationships of bailees, etc. contained in the Evidence Act and if there is no need
to transfer them to the Transfer of Property Act or the Contract Act, there is
equally no need to transfer the first part of sec. 117 to the Negotiable Instrument
Act
SECTION 118
This Sec deals with the subject who may testify. It provides that all persons shall
be competent to testify unless the Court considers that they are prevented from
understanding the question put to them, or from giving rational answers to those
questions, by tender years, extreme old age, disease, whether of body or mind, or
any other cause of the same kind.
Explanation:- A lunatic is not incompetent to testify, unless he is prevented by his
lunacy from understanding the questions put to him and giving rational answers to
them.
A significant question of considering child witnesses as competent witness was
discussed in Rameshwar vs. State of Rajasthan156 in which it was held that far as
156AIR
1952 SC 54
evidence of children is concerned the ordinary rule is that sec 118 requires
corroboration but it is not to be treated as a rigid rule.
The report has referred to the position in England regarding competency of child
witnesses. It provides that the requirement of corroboration of a child witness has
been abolished by sec. 34(2) of the Criminal Justice Act, 1988. The unsworn
testimony of a child six years old was accepted to convict a person. In the 69th
Report, this section is dealt with in paras 60.1 to 60.9 but none of the paras states
that any amendment is necessary.
In England, the requirement of corroboration of a child witness has been
abolished by sec. 34(2) of the Criminal Justice Act, 1988. The unsworn testimony
of a child six years old was accepted to convict a person in R vs. Z: 1990(2) All
E.R. 971 (A), holding that the child was a competent witness. Another important
point referred was sec. 342A in the Code of Criminal Procedure which provides
that an accused has the option to examine himself as a witness for defence and in
such case he has to take oath. He can then be cross-examined.
Changes recommended: Reference has been made to 69th Report which has not
made any substantial changes. So even this Report has not recommended any
change in this Section and hold it to be self-sufficient.
SECTION 119
This section deals with dumb witnesses and provides that whoever is unable to
speak may give his evidence in a manner in which he can make it intelligible, but
such writing must be written and the signs made in open Court and the evidence
so given shall be deemed to be oral evidence. The report points out that the words
unable to speak can include deaf or dumb persons or persons or signs of a dying
woman or also a body corporate is unable to speak.
109 | P a g e
A reference has been made to the position of dumb witness in UK and USA in
69th Report that in the case of a deaf or dumb witness, an interpreter can be
employed. But such a provision was absent in Indian law but no such difficulty has
been caused by its absence. But in a ruling after 1977, in Kumbhar vs. State157, the
Court held, in view of the words by writing or signs, that the signs must be of
witness and not of the interpreter. But, an opposite view was taken in Kadungothi
Alavi vs. State of Kerala 1982 Crl L.J. 94 (Ker) that, in the case of a deaf and dumb
person, her ideas could be conveyed to the Court by an expert.
Changes recommended: So in view of the conflicting opinions and the
prevailing position in UK and USA, it was proposed in 69th Report that an
Explanation is necessary which was also similarly accepted and agreed in this
report too and which is as follows: Explanation: The interpretation of the signs of
a person unable to speak, by an expert, shall be treated as oral evidence of the
person who made the signs.
SECTION 120
This section deals with the evidence of wives or husbands in civil and criminal
cases. It provides that in both civil and criminal proceedings both the husband or
wife of any party to the suit, shall be competent witnesses. It has been diligently
observed that as far as civil proceedings are concerned, there is no need to make
any amendment in this section but when it comes to criminal proceedings against a
spouse, the need to balance family harmony and the quest for truth has to be
balanced.
So such balance which was proposed to be achieved was made by referring to the
position of England Under their Criminal Evidence Act, 1898. In 1977, when the
69th Report was prepared, the law in England was that the parties and their
157AIR
1966 Gujarat 101
spouses are (subject to privilege) competent and compellable in civil cases. But in
criminal cases the accused is competent, but not compellable. The spouse is not
competent or compellable except in a few cases. So in 69th Report it was stated that
in criminal cases the spouse should not be compelled to give evidence against the
other spouse and, a proviso was drafted for addition below sec. 120. Position after
1977 was also thoroughly observed by referring to position in different countries.
Such as in England in 1994under their Criminal Justice and Public Order Act and
by the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act, 1999 which permitted that
adverse inference can be drawn against an accused if he does not answer certain
questions. But this was not accepted by the Australian Law Commission. Then
Another Report which was referred was 180th Report on Right of Silence which
stated that having regard to Art. 20(3) of the Constitution of India, it guaranteed
fundamental right of an accused against self-incrimination. The Commission did
not think it desirable to follow the alternative suggested by the Australian Law
Commission. That is still the position so far as the accused is concerned.
Changes recommended: The Report held that that they do not want to enact
the long winding provision in the English Act of 1884 and 1999 and recommended
a proviso to be added below sec 120 which is as follows: Provided that the spouse
of the accused in a criminal prosecution shall not be compelled to give evidence in
such prosecution except to prove the fact of marriage unless
(a) such spouse and the accused shall both consent, or
(b) such spouse is the complainant or is the person at whose instance the
first information of the offence was recorded, or
(c) the accused is charged with an offence against such spouse or a child of
the accused or a child of the spouse, or a child to whom the accused or
such spouse stands in the position of a parent.
111 | P a g e
SECTION 121
The above stated section gives immunity to the judges and the magistrates for
giving evidences. The section states that no judge or magistrate will be compelled
to answer any question as to his own conduct in the court in the capacity of judge
or magistrate or regarding any information which came to their knowledge in court
in that capacity except in the cases where there has been an order by a court not
subordinate to that court. However the exception to this general rule being that the
judge and magistrate can be examined in matters that occurred in his presence
whilst he was so acting.
There are three illustrations which highlight below this section which highlights
this point. The first amongst them states a situation where there is an allegation
that the deposition was taken improperly, in which case the magistrate cannot be
asked to give an answer to that except on the order of a superior court. However
the third illustration talks about the exception and says that if there was an attempt
to murder in the court during trial then the judge can be asked to give his
deposition without the permission of the superior court. It was held in Banke v.
Mahadeo158 that while granting the permission or order for compelling a judge or
magistrate to depose the superior court may call for a report from that officer.
It was observed by the commission that the protection also extended to arbitrators
however it was much narrower in scope. According to Phipson Arbitrators have to
give evidence as to what happened in the arbitration but they cannot be asked
questions about their reasons for the award. Some of the cases which reiterate this
are: (Buccleugh vs. MB Works, (1872) L.R. 5 H.L. 418; Ward vs. Shell Mex B.P
1951(2) All ER 904; Falkingham vs. Victoria Rly. Commissioner: 1900 A.C. 452;
Reccher vs. North British Co. 1915(3) KB 277; Leiserach vs. Schalit: 1934(2) KB
353). However, Section 3 of the evidence act does not include arbitrators. In Amir
158AIR
1953 All 97
Begam vs. Badruddin159: on the lines of the English position it was stated by Lord
Parmar that an arbitrator is bound to give evidence when there is a charge of
dishonesty or partiality against him however it should be seen that the evidence is
not used for scrutinising the decision of the arbitrator. The same thing was
repeated in many cases like (Bourgeois vs. Weddell & Co.160) and (Narayanan vs.
Devaki:161). Hence it is clear from the cases that so far as arbitrators are concerned
they dont have the same immunity as judges and magistrates. They can be called
to give evidence in questions of their dishonesty and impartiality but they cannot
be asked to give evidence when the question is regarding the decision they took.
The Commission felt that there is no need for the change in the section to include
arbitrators as there cannot be a straitjacket rule for them. They did not recommend
any changes in this regard.
Also a recent English decision was also discussed by the commission namely
Warren v. Warren Warrenvs. Warren162) where it was held that there is no distinction
between high court and other jusges with respect to this section. It applies to all
judges. The commission agreed with this view. A Sessions Judge while trying a
case, cannot compel a Magistrate to answer questions as to his own conduct in
Court as such magistrate, except under the special order of the Court to which he
is subject (R vs. Chidda Khan:163); (D.J. Vaghelavs. KantibhaiJethabhai: 164
Changes recommended: The Commission also looked into some other aspects
and felt there was no need for change in this section.
159ILR
36 All 336 (PC)

539
161AIR 1945 MAD 230
162: 1996(4) All ER 664 (CA
163ILR 3 All 573
1641985 Crl. LJ 974 (Guj).
1601924.1.KB
113 | P a g e
SECTION 122
This section deals with the protection given to spouses to not give evidence in
respect of any communication done during the time when the marriage was
subsisting. The section briefly states that No person shall be compelled to
disclose any information that he communicated with his spouse during the
marriage unless the other person has given his consent for the same. Also the
same law will not apply in the cases of suits between married persons, or in cases
where one married person is being prosecuted for crime done against the other.
The commission noted that the section does not speak about the communication
of the witness spouse to the other spouse, whereas in the New Jersey rules of
evidence they have included the communications made by the witness spouse to
the other spouse. Similarly American Law Institutes model code of evidence has
also included communication between spouses.
If the reason for including this section is to maintain family harmony then this
section must be amended to include the communication done by the witness
spouse. Another question that arose before the Commission was whether if a third
party overheard the communication between spouses whether that can be given
the privilege under section 122 or not. It was held by the House of Lord in
Rumping v. D.P.P
that the third party will not be entitled to the privilege under
165
section 122. The Supreme Court in M.C. Verghese v. TT Ponnan166 has accepted the
above judgment. However the Commission in its 69th report was of the view that
the third party overhearing a communication should also be brought under section
122. To substantiate their point they have referred to the speeches of Viscount
Radcliff and referred to the principle of conjugal confidence for that. Sarkar167 has
pointed out that under English and American law also the third party is not
1651962(3)
166AIR
16715
th
All ER 256
1970 SC 1876
Ed., 1999, page 1986
entitled to the benefit. This was reiterated in the cases of (R vs. Smithies 5. C & P.
332: R vs. Simmons: 6 C & p. 540; State Bank vs. Hutchinson: 62 Kan 9 (Am).
The Commission also discussed two cases Ram Bharosey v. State168 in which the wife
deposed against the husband for a crime he had committed. The Supreme Court
held that this section will not be attracted because the evidence is not regarding any
communication between them but rather about general conduct of the person.
The Commission made some serious contemplation with regard to the proposal
made in the 69th report regarding the third party overhearing the communication
between the spouses should be brought under section 122. The current
Commission was of the opposite view holding that the third parties evidence
should not be excluded. They also cited that now a days police can hear many
telephonic conversations. Why their evidences should be excluded under section
122. Hence the Commission disagreed with the view of the 69th report. They also
pointed out that between 1977 and 2002 there have been huge changes in
technology and hence there is a need for change in the Evidence Act. The third
change that the 69th report suggested was the inclusion of a third exception that is
the crime committed by one person against the child of the other spouse. After
perusal of all these points the commission suggested the following section 122
instead of the current section.
Changes recommended:
Communication during marriage
122 (1). No person who is or has been married, shall be compelled to disclose any
communication made during marriage, between that person and any person to
whom that person is or has been married; nor shall that person be permitted to
disclose any such communication, unless the person to whom that person is or has
168AIR
1954 SC 704
115 | P a g e
been married or that person`s representative in interest, consents, or unless the

proceedings are of the nature specified in sub section (3).
(2) Any person other than the person referred to in sub-section (1) who has
overheard or has acquired possession of or has intercepted, in accordance with
law, any communication as is referred to in subsection (1), may be permitted to
disclose any such communication without the consent of the spouses or their
representatives in interest.
(3) The proceedings referred to in sub section (1) are(a) proceedings between married persons;
(b) proceedings in which one married person is prosecuted for any offence
committed against the other;
(c) proceedings in which one married person is the complainant or is the person at
whose instance the first information of the offence was recorded, and the
other married person is the accused;
(d) proceedings in which one married person is prosecuted for an offence
committed against a child of the other person or a child of the first
mentioned person or a child to whom either of them stands in the position of
a parent.
SECTIONS 123, 124 & 162
Sections 123,124 and 162 are interrelated and hence are discussed together. Section
123 deals with the privilege in regards to the affairs of state while section 124 deals
with the privilege in regards to official communication while section 162 is a
generic section regarding the production of documents in the court.
Section 123 states that no person will be allowed to give unpublished information
in regard to the affairs of the state except with the prior consent of the head of the
department
Section 124 states that any public servant will not be compelled to disclose any
information which was given to him in official confidence when he feels that the
public interest will suffer because of that.
Both of these sections have to read along with section 162 which states that any
person who is in possession of any document to be produced as evidence shall
bring it to the court notwithstanding any objection which may be given. The
validity of the objection will be decided by the court itself. The second part of the
section states that the court will inspect the documents unless it refers to matters
of state or take any evidence which determines its admissibility. It is to be noted
that Order 16 Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 and sec 91(2) of the
code of criminal Procedure code refer to the procedure to be followed for
summoning of documents.
The 88th Law Commission Report has also been discussed which made several
recommendation in connection with sections 123,124 and 162. One of the most
important issues debated was as to how the court would decide without looking
into the documents that the affairs were indeed in regards to the affairs of the
state. The Commission also pondered over the fact whether the court should have
power to see the documents to ascertain that the documents are indeed in regard
to the affairs of the state. The second part of section 164 puts some restrictions in
cases of documents relating to affairs of the state. In some judgments there has
been made a distinction between some documents which should be deemed to be
documents relating to the affairs of the state and in which there is no requirement
of further inquiry.
The law which precluded court inspection was laid out in Duncan v. Cammell
Laird169 and was followed in India. That law was reversed in Convay v. Rimmer170.
1691942
1701968
A.C. 624
A.C. 910
117 | P a g e
The commission referred to the history of case laws in England and its impact on
the position now. In Duncan vs. Cammell Laird 1942 AC 624, the House of Lords
held that the Court could not refuse the privilege if it was made in the proper
form. However this position was reversed in the case of Glasgow Corporation vs.
Central Land Board171 stating that the court had inherent power to overrule crowns
decision and the court can inspect the documents. In 1968 case of Conway vs.
Rimmer: 1968 AC 910 the same position was reiterated. They also discussed two
classes of public interest which is as follows: It is universally recognized that here
there are two kinds of public interest which may clash. There is the public interest
that harm shall not be done to the nation or the public service by disclosure of
certain documents, and there is the public interest that the administration of justice
shall not be frustrated by the withholding of documents which must be produced
if justice is to be done. He further observed: Courts have and are entitled to
exercise a power and duty to hold a balance between the public interest, as
expressed by a minister, to withhold certain documents or other evidence, and the
public interest in ensuring the proper administration of justice. The following
position was reiterated in the case of Rogers vs. Home Secretary:172. It was also held
that the seal of confidentiality could not be broken if that would endanger public
interest. While disclosure is the normal rule, exclusion can be allowed only if it is
felt that exclusion would serve public interest better than if disclosure was ordered.
It was held in Ex parte Wiley173that the rubber stamp approach should not be
resorted to whenever the plea of public interest is raised.
In India there are two important cases Sukhdevs Case174 and the in S.P. Guptas
case:175. In the Sukhdevs case a judicial officer was removed from his post. In the
court the report of the service commission was asked to be produced. The
1711956
SC 1 (HL)
AC 388
1731995(1) AC 274 (HL)
174AIR 1961 SC 493
1751981. Suppl. SCC 87
1721973
Supreme Court treated the report to be a part of the Minutes of the Minister and
held it to be protected under section 123. But in S.P. Gupta case, the Supreme
Court reversed this position and held that openness of the government functionary
was the basis of democracy. The Court agreed that public interest should be
protected but it does not mean that whenever the question of public interest is
raised the Court should fold its hands. There should be a balancing act. The Court
should generally be allowed to peruse the document to ascertain whether the
document relates to the affairs of the state. The Judge also stated that there are
some documents which are protected and these documents include: It is not
necessary for us for the purpose of this case to consider what documents
legitimately belongs to this class so as to be entitled to immunity from disclosure,
irrespective of what they contain. But, it does appear that cabinet papers, minutes
of discussions of heads of 332 departments and high level documents relating to
the inner working of the government machine or concerned with the framing of
government policies belong to this class which in the public interest must be
regarded as protected against disclosure.
The SC also held that even these documents dont have absolute immunity as they
can also be perused by the court. Judge Bhagwati J further observed that the court
will have residual power to determine whether the documents are relating to the
affairs of the state or not. The Commission also agreed with the views of the SC in
the case and held that there should be a balance of the public interest and the
injury to the administration of justice should not be hampered.
Some other aspects relating to these sections were also discussed as follows:1.
It was found that if courts below High court reject the immunity then it
would amount to leakage of various documents into the public domain which may
not be good. Hence an appeal against this may be allowed and till the appeal is not
satisfied the information should not be leaked into the public domain.
119 | P a g e
2.
Another thing is that the power of reference by the lower court to the
higher court is not available to the criminal court. This should be changed and
there should be a clause in section 123 which would enable such reference.
3.
Also there is some overlap in section 123 and 124 as the affairs of the state
may also be the official communication. For removing this overlap the commission
has recommended a change to section 124 saying that it excludes those official
communications which are not affairs of the state.
4.
The 69th report suggested that the Section 123 should relate to record
deposition while section 124 relates to oral communication. The commission

however did not agree with this.
5.
To make this clear, we recommend adding a separate Explanation in both
sec. 123 and a separate provision in sec.124. In sec.124, it is further to be made

clear by subsection (3) that the communication to a public officer, if it relates to
affairs of State, will fall only under sec.123.
After considering the 69th report and the 88th report and the position in India and
England the Law Commission recommended the sections to changed to this:
Evidence as to Affairs of State
123 (1) Save as otherwise provided in this section, ,(a) no person shall give evidence derived from unpublished official records
relating to any affairs of State; or
(b) no public officer shall be compelled to disclose any oral, written or
electronic communication relating to any affairs of the State made to him in
official confidence, unless the officer at the head of the department
concerned, has given permission for giving such evidence.
Explanation:- For the purposes of clause (a), the expression evidence
derived from unpublished official records includes the oral evidence derived
from such records and the record itself.
(2) The officer at the head of the department concerned referred to in subsection (1), shall not withhold such permission, unless he is satisfied that the
giving of such evidence would be injurious to the public interest; and where
he withholds such permission, he shall file an affidavit in the Court, raising
an objection and such objection shall contain a statement to that effect and
his reasons therefor.
(3) Where the objection referred to in sub-section (2) is raised in a Court
subordinate to the High Court, whether in a civil or criminal proceeding, the
said Court, notwithstanding anything in any other law for the time being in
force, shall have power and shall refer the question as to the validity of such
objection to the High Court for its decision.
(4) The High Court, on a reference under sub-section (3), shall decide upon
the validity of the said objection, in accordance with the provisions of sub
sections (5) to (7) and transmit a copy of the judgment to the Court which
made the reference to enable the said Court to proceed further in
accordance with the Judgment.
(5) Where the High Court, on a reference under sub-section (3) is of the
opinion that the affidavit filed under sub section (2) does not state the facts
or the reasons fully, the High Court may require such officers or, in
appropriate cases, the Minister concerned with the subject, to file a further
affidavit on the subject.
(6) The High Court, after considering the affidavit or further affidavit as the
case may be, and if it thinks fit, after examining such officer or, in
appropriate cases, the Minister, orally, shall
(a) issue summons for the production of the unpublished records in
chambers; and
(b) inspect the records in chambers, and
121 | P a g e
(c) determine the question whether the giving of such evidence would or
would not be injurious to the public interest, recording its reasons
therefor.
(7) Where the High Court determines under clause (c) of subsection (6) that
the giving of such evidence would not be injurious to the public interest and
rejects the objection raised under sub-section (2), the provisions of sub
section (1) shall not apply to such evidence and such evidence shall be
received.
(8) Where the objection referred to in sub section (2) is raised in the High
Court or in the Supreme Court, whether in a civil or criminal proceeding,
the said Court shall decide the validity of such objection in accordance with
the procedure in sub sections (5) to (7), as if the validity of the said
objection had been referred to it.
Section 162: Production of documents
It was suggested that in the second paragraph of section 162 the words
unless it refers to matters of state should be removed.
After perusing some case laws and the 69th and 88th Law Commission report
the Commission suggested the new section 124 to be as such
Official Communications
124. (1) Subject to the provisions of section 123, no public officer shall be
compelled to disclose any oral, written or electronic communication made to him
in official confidence, when the Court considers that public interest would suffer
by such disclosure.
(2) Where a public officer who is a witness is asked a question which might require
the disclosure of any such communication, and he objects to answering the
question on the ground that public interest would suffer by its disclosure, the
Court shall, before rejecting his objection, ascertain from him, in chambers, the
nature of his objection and reasons therefor.
SECTION 125
The section refers to the protection of the informants name and source of
information. It says that any magistrate or police officer shall not be compelled to
give their source of information and also the revenue officer will be compelled to
give the information in regards to the commission of a revenue offence. The
commission referred to the 69th report which suggested a change to this section.
The commission felt that it would be difficult for the plaintiff to produce evidence
if the plaintiff did not know about the name of the informant. It will not be good
for cases where the information is false and given for malicious reasons. The
commission thus suggested a relaxation by giving the discretion to the court to see
if there is no harm in disclosing the informants name. The commission refered to
the English and Indian Law. They saw that in the Thomas Hardys case,
176
it was
stated that the name of the informant should not be unnecessarily disclosed
however if there is a need to disclose the name for justice sake then it should be so
done. Phipson has reiterated the same thing in the case R vs. Hardy177. The
Canadian SC also discussed the question of informants anonymity under the
Canadian charter of rights. However they have also suggested a change to see
whether the informants identification is necessary to prove innocence in which
case it will be revealed. The Commission also referred to various Indian case laws.
The commission concluded that this position has changed and it is not good for
malicious cases and hence the following exception has to be added. It
recommended an exception which stated that the court will have discretion to see
that the disclosure is not a material fact or a fact in issue in which the liability of
the party depends in which case the name will be disclosed.
1761794)
24
24 St. Tr. 199
177(1794)
123 | P a g e
SECTIONS 126, 127, 128, 129

Section 126 states that no barrister attorney or pleader shall be allowed to disclose
any information with regards to any communication that happened between him
and the client or any document that was given by the client to him except with the
prior permission of his client. But there are two exceptions to this:- (1) When the
communication is for illegal purpose. (2) Any fact showing that an illegal act has
been done since his employment. Section 127 states that the provisions of section
126 shall also apply to the servants , pleaders and interpreters of the lawyers.
Section 128 states that this immunity is not waived when the party to a suit gives
the evidence himself. Section 129 states that no one shall be compelled to give
evidence of the communications between him and his lawyer unless he volunteers
himself as the witness in which case he will be compelled to disclose any such
communication related to his evidence and no other. The 69th report has suggested
that the word legal practitioner should be substituted for the words barrister ,
pleader, attorney and vakil. An explanation can be added explaining legal
practitioner. The word employed as used in sec 126 should also be removed.
Except for these two changes as suggested by the 69th report the commission also
looked into whether there was a need to give a discretionary power to the court to
decide whether there is a need to give immunity or not . The commission looked in
various case laws of England and India and decided that there was no need for the
same.
Changes recommended: The commission hence incorporated the two minor
changes as suggested by the 69th report.
SECTION 130
The section states that any witness who is not a party will not be compelled to
produce the title deed of the property if the production of the document will
incriminate him unless he has agreed in writing with the person who seeks such
production. This section should be read with sec. 131 and 132. Section 131
prohibits the production of a document in the possession of a person, which any
other person would be entitled to require producing if they were in his possession.
Under sec. 132 a witness need not answer a question which incriminates him. In
England this rule has been removed. The 69th report also suggested its removal as
now all title deeds are compulsorily registrable and hence there is now no need of
this section. However the commission has observed that not all documents are
registrable. Like the will which is not compulsorily registrable.
The commission therefore held that there is no need to change the section except
for a minor change of substitution of unless such witness has agreed in writing
with the party so requiring him or with a person claiming through such party.
Instead of, unless he has agreed in writing to produce them with the person
seeking the production of such deeds or some person through whom he claims
SECTION 131
The section states that no person who is in possession of any document shall be
compelled to produce them as evidence if the person whose document it is entitled
to refuse to produce that document.
Changes recommended: The commission has proposed few minor changes like
addition of temporary in front of possession and any other person to be replaced
by another.
SECTION 132
The section refers to the subject of witness not to be excused from answering on
ground that answer will criminate, in any civil or criminal proceeding or on the
ground of exposure, direct or indirect, to penalty or forfeiture of any kind. The
125 | P a g e
principle here is that the right against self-incrimination is available only to a

person who is accused of an offence and not to a witness except when the
witness is an accused as provided for in the proviso. In that case his answer which
incriminated him cannot be used against him either for arrest, prosecution or in
any criminal proceeding. The only exception is that such matter will be
incriminating against him in a trial of perjury against him. The protection of
Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India against self-incrimination does not apply
unless the person is one accused of an offence in the criminal case. After 1971,
there are two, one in 1980 and another in 1989. These decisions concern various
aspects of sec. 132 and also interpret Art. 20(3) of the Constitution of India. The
questions with regard to the word Compelled used in proviso to Section 132
have arisen which also invokes Article 20 (3). The report discusses Laxmipat
Choraria v. State of Maharashtra178 where Supreme Court held that under sec. 132 the
witness who was also an accomplice was bound to answer even if the questions
incriminated her but the section gave protection if she later became an accused. A
person who voluntarily answers questions from the witness box waives the
privilege which is against being compelled to be a witness against himself because
he is then not a witness against himself but against others. Sec. 132 of the Indian
Evidence Act sufficiently protects him since his testimony does not go against
himself. It then discusses Tukaram G. Gaokar v. R.N. Shukla,
where it was
179
clarified that the necessity to enter the witness box for substantiating his defense is
not such a compulsion as would attract the protection of Art. 20(3) it may be very
necessary for the accused person to enter the witness box for substantiating his
defense. But this is no reason for saying that the criminal trial compels him to be a
witness against himself and is in violation of Art. 20(3). Compulsion in the conduct
of Art. 20(3) must proceed from another person or authority
178AIR
179AIR
1968 SC 938
1968 SC 1050
Referring to Hira H. Advani v. State of Maharashtra180 where the admissibility of

earlier statements under sec. 171A by the accused before the Customs authorities
fell for consideration, it was observed that sec. 132 main part which refers to the
principle that a witness may be compelled to incriminate, is not applicable to
processes before the Customs authorities as they are not considered Judicial
Proceedings. Such prior statements before Customs authorities containing
incriminating material are admissible in a subsequent criminal prosecution.
Referring to State (Delhi Administration) v. Jagjit Singh181 the report analyzed an
approvers right against self-incrimination as per Article 20(3) once he became an
approver, he would cease to be an accused. Once he ceased to be an accused, he
would lose the protection against self-incrimination. He can be questioned under
sec. 132. Though, he may make a statement which could incriminate him, still sec.
132 proviso would protect him against prosecution. After summarizing the
controversies that have arisen through various Supreme Court cases, the 185th
Report addresses the controversy discussed in the 69th Law Commission Report.
The issue relates to whether the protection of the proviso to sec. 132 is available
only to a witness who objects to an incriminating question and answer to it or to
others who answer an incriminating question because of the statutory directive in
the main part of sec. 132?
The problem arises because the main part of sec. 132 which requires every witness
to answer questions which incriminate him does not use the word compelled
while the protection in the proviso against arrest, prosecution etc. is given only to
those witnesses who are compelled to answer incriminating questions. The 185th
Report concurs with the view in the 69th Report and felt that the directive in the
main clause that every witness was bound to answer incriminating question must
be deemed to be the compulsion in law and no other factual compulsion need be
proved. In the case of witness compulsion, it must be taken to have arisen by
180AIR
181AIR
1971 SC 44.
1989 SC 598
127 | P a g e
force of law. The report added that the main part of sec. 132 is indeed mandatory
and the court has no power to excuse a witness from answering an incriminating
question.
The 185th Report concurs with the 65th Report that the duty to answer applies to
questions incriminating the witness or his spouse but the protection must extend
to the witness as well as his spouse. An important change is with regards the
voluntary evidence given by an accused on oath u/s 315. The report affirms the
65th Reports clarity in that the accused waives his waives the protection so far as
the particular charge is concerned. But, if he is compelled to answer any
incriminating questions not related to the charge, then such evidence cannot be
used against him in any criminal proceedings relating to other charges. However it
adds that now the new subsection (3) will apply not only to a witness but also to an
accused who has volunteered under sec. 315 CrPC i.e. for latter criminal
proceedings. It criticizes the language used for 132(3) which is likely to give an
impression that the incriminating evidence cannot be used even in so far as it
related to the charge in the case in which he waived his privilege under sec. 315. In
its draft for 132(3), it thus specifically excludes 132(2) from the immunity granted
against incriminating evidence which seems appropriate as it will enable a better
and detailed application ridding the Section of the residual ambiguity
SECTION 132A, SECTION 132B, 133, 145 & 146
The 185th Report purports to change the entire subject of 132A as has been
recommended by the 65th Commission Report dealing with privilege of family
counselors. It was stated that the privilege belongs to the family counselor and this
privilege has to be created in the interest of society, so that the family counselor
can function effectively. It was proposed that the privilege should apply to
counselors appointed by the court and not to those counselors who are appointed
by parties.
According to the 185th Report it is not necessary to enact a separate provision in

the Evidence Act with regards a family counselor & 132A as proposed need not be
given effect to. This is because after the 65th Commission Report, we have now the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Part III deals with Conciliation which
provides in depth rules regarding disclosure of information by the conciliator,
admissibility of evidence of conciliation in any other proceeding, role of the
conciliator and confidentiality. Sec. 61(1) applies Part III to conciliation of disputes
arising out of legal relationships whether contractual or not and resulting also to
matrimonial disputes and in view of the elaborate provisions made in the 1996 Act,
it is not necessary to enact a separate provision in the Evidence Act. This
modification is a dynamic one and shows that the 185th Report has kept pace with
time and the latest changes in the legal paradigm have been incorporated while
making the recommendations
Section 132A as proposed by 185th Report
The Report has perused the 93rd Report of the Law Commission (1983) on
Disclosure of source of information by mass media instead of the 65th report.
This was in the wake of Prevention of Terrorism Act which stated that all persons
receiving or in possession of information which he knows or believes to be of
material assistance in prevention of terrorists acts etc., will be permissible if he
withholds the information without reasonable cause. Finally, the Government
acceded to the request of journalist groups that the provision be dropped so as to
enable them to not reveal their sources of information. According to the
commission the dropping of the provision was due to the agitation by the media
but that the law must not provide absolute protection to the journalists anywhere
in the world. And revelation of sources may be done in the event of public interest.
The Report discusses sec. 15(2) of the Press Council Act, 1978, which precludes
information being furnished by a newspaper, news agency, editor or journalist to
disclose the source of any news or information. It analyzes whether such
129 | P a g e
preclusion is applicable to the Courts Power. According to the Commission the

section does not deal with the power of the Court, for purposes of evidence, to ask
a person to reveal the source of publication, in public interest, and it does not limit
the same to that extent.
The Report cited Sec. 10 of the UK Contempt Act which states no court may
require a person to disclose the source of information contained in a publication
for which he is responsible, unless it be established to the satisfaction of the court
that disclosure is necessary in the interests of justice or national security or for the
prevention of disorder or crime.
The commission considered various judgments given by the House of Lords in
Secretary of State for Defence and another v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd.182 The
prohibition against the court making an order requiring disclosure of the source
was subject to some exceptions only, i.e. if the disclosure was necessary in the
interests of justice or national security or for the prevention of disorder or crime.
The onus is on the person who seeks disclosure to make out a case of necessity. The Report
tracing the Judicial evolution of the privilege of non-disclosure in Europe through
a number of cases like the Goodwin Case183& the House of Lords decision in R v.
Derby Magistrates Court Exp184 regarded that it was to be noted that unlike
communication between a lawyer and his client and the requirement of nondisclosure there-in, the privilege of the journalist was not absolute as regards the
sources of his news. The Report analyzed US Supreme Court decisions In
Branzburg v. Hayes
& Associated Press v. NLRB
185
186
where it was reiterated that
journalist was like any other witness and had no special protection.
1821984
(3) All ER 601

vs. Chief Constable of Lancashire(The Times Nov. 3, 1992 (CA);
184B 1995 (4) ALL ER 526
185(1972) 408 US 665
186(1937) 301 US 103
183Goodwin
The Report reviewed the Privacy Protection Act of 1980 where it prohibits a
government officer in pursuance of a criminal investigation to seize or search any
material if such materials are possessed by a person reasonably believed to have a
purpose to disseminate to the public by a public communication (such as
newspaper, book, or broadcast). These restrictions, on seizure power, were not
applicable if the materials relate to national defence, classified information or
restricted data.
The Report also takes into account international literature in the form of Article 19
of Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Right 1966 which provide for freedom of opinion and Expression. It
is to be noted however that these freedoms are subject to reasonable restrictions as
stated in Article 19(3) of ICCPR. These are subject to (a) respect of the rights or
reputations of others; (b) the protection of national security or of public order
(ordre public) or of public health or morals. This privilege is nowhere recognized
in any law, which is why the Report seeks its inclusion as 132A in the Evidence
Act. The Indian Position is shown by the Delhi High Court in Court on its own
motion vs. The Pioneer187where it was held that the court has power to direct
disclosure of the source of information, when considered necessary in the interests
of justice.
D.D. Basus Commentary on Law of the Press188 was recorded the guarantee of
freedom of the Press does not immunize the Press to render assistance to the
investigation of crimes which obligation lies on every citizen. Thus tracing various
international stands on the matter and the Indian viewpoint the Report concludes
by saying that there exists a privilege for the Journalists for non-disclosure of their
source of information but there are exceptions to this privilege. This privilege is
not an absolute one like sec. 3(8) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, exempted
187Vol.
188(3
rd
68 (1997) Delhi Law Times 529
Ed) (1996)
131 | P a g e
the cases of legal practitioner of the accused which excused the legal representative
from any disclosure. The Report moreover subscribes discretion to the Court to
decide if there exists a matter of interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India,
the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order,
decency or morality or in relation to Contempt of Court or incitement to any
offence which allows the privilege to be breached. The emphasis is placed by the
Report on the Courts responsibility while exercising its discretion to balance the
privilege against the necessity of Public Interest. This recommendation is wellbalanced; however care needs to be taken while curbing the social medias rights in
the light of recent events in India and the disputes emerging regarding 66A of the
Information Technology Act. If the discretion given to the Court is exercised in
the wrong hands or my the government in furtherance of its political motivations it
can lead to miscarriage of justice and a collapse of the democratic social values on
which Indian social set up is based.
SECTION 132B & SECTION 132C
Section 132B
Sec. 132B as drafted in the 69th Report of 1977 was based upon sec. 15 of the
(UK) Civil Evidence Act, 1968 (see para 72.5). But, in the light of sections 280 and
284 of the (UK) Copyright Designs and Patent Act, 1988, that were enacted after
65th Report the 185th Report proposes to redraft Sec. 132B, so far as patent-agents
are concerned on the lines of sec. 280 of the UK Copyright Designs and Patent
Act, 1988 and recommends a further provision as Sec. 132C, so far as trademark
agents are concerned.
The provision of sec. 15(1) referred to mention that communications will be
protected before the Comptroller or Appellate Tribunal, while sec. 15(2) refers to
legal proceedings (other than criminal proceedings) and states that the privilege will
be the same as between a solicitor and party in the High Court. Sec. 280(1) of the
(UK) Act of 1988 which applies to patent agents refers to protection of

communications in relation to invention, design, technical information, trademark
or service mark or as to any matter involving passing off. The Information as in
the New UK Act is privileged from disclosure in legal proceedings in the same way
as a communication between a client and his legal practitioner. Moreover the
privilege under the 1988 Act does not exclude criminal proceedings. In the 69th
Report, Sec. 132B as proposed extended the privilege to criminal proceedings also.
The 185th Report too seeks extend the privilege to criminal proceedings also in
view of Art. 20(3) of the Constitution. The extension to criminal proceedings is a
step in the positive direction with sound legal principle of Article 20(3) backing it.
Moreover the superior laws of of the (UK) Act of 1988 have been sought to apply
to Patents in India.
SECTION 132C
A similar addition is sought to be done for the purpose of Communication with a
Trademark Agent and the Party inter-se by creation of Section 132C. Similar
language is adopted as in sec. 284 which deals with privilege of trademark agents.
Since the format remains the same as that of Patents the change is likely to have as
positive an effect as the afore-mentioned Change.
SECTION 133
This section deals with relevancy of accomplice evidence. The relevancy of
Section 133 which makes an Accomplice a competent witness and states a
conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds upon the uncorroborated
testimony of an accomplice. There is material contradiction between S 133 &
Section 114 which states that an accomplice is unworthy of credit, unless he is
corroborated in material particulars. The 185th Report suggests that instead of
deleting sec. 133 and amending the illustration (b) as recommended in the 69 th
Report, it is better if sec. 133 is amended and illustration (b) be deleted from
133 | P a g e
section 114 and be added in Section 133. The suggested Section strikes a fine
chord of balance by first giving the indispensability of material evidence and then
succeeding it with adding subjectivity by allowing Court discretion in case of
accomplices testimony being credit-worthy in the eyes of the Court.
SECTION 134
This Section speaks about the number of witnesses which says that no particular
number of witnesses is required for proof of any fact. An elaborate discussion
about this section was undertaken in Chapter 74 of the 69th Report, where treason
was made an exception otherwise one witness was made enough for other
offences. However the 185th Report seeks no recommendation in the said Section.
This is rightly so since the 69th Report placed too much stake on the earlier law in
sec. 28 of Act 2 of 1855 which cannot be said to be efficient enough to address the
issues of today
SECTION 135
This Section is the first one in Chapter X of the Act which deals with
Examination of Witnesses. The Section refers to Order of Production &
Examination of Witnesses. The Section presently provides the order in which
witnesses are produced and examined to be regulated by the law and practice for
the time being relating to civil and criminal procedure respectively, and, in the
absence of any such law, by the discretion of the Court. The Report clarifies that
authorities in the civil & criminal jurisprudence are well established about these
principles. However if burden of proof on different issues is oscillating, questions
arise as to who should start and on what issue evidence is to be adduced. The
Evidence to be produced in Civil Cases is to be regulated through the procedure in
Order 18 Rules 1 to 3. The report discusses in detail the various provisions of the
CPC that could be relevant. In criminal cases, the prosecution always starts.
The Report ends by stating that in the light of the elaborate provisions in the Civil
and Criminal Procedure Codes, and the guidance available from case law, there is
no chaos now in the procedure and thus seeks no change from the view taken by
the 69th Report. This is perceptively done as in the cases where burden of proof is
oscillating a statutory remedy cannot be provided as it is which will help the Court
decide the presentation of Evidence as this will differ from a case to case basis.
SECTION 136
This Section talks about the Judges power to decide about the admissibility of
Evidence. The Report concurs with the 69th Report in that the powers of Judge to
decide regarding the relevancy of evidence and its effect on the fact in Issue are
entirely upon the objectivity of the Judge and such practicable factors cannot be
statutorily stated. The report does however discusses the various instance of
admissibility of evidence which is good particularly for conceptual clarity
The Report distinguishes between Relevancy and admissibility, where relevancy
depends on facts and logic admissibility is a matter governed by law and reiterates
what is stated in 69th Report that Judge has no discretion to exclude evidence if it is
admissible and not excluded by any provision of law.
SECTION 137
Section 137 deals with Examination-in-chief, cross-examination and reexamination. It defines all these three terms and the 69th Report does not subscribe
for any change. 185th Report concurs but for a change in the definition of ReExamination where the words the further examination of a witness by the party
who called him have been substituted instead of the examination of a witness
This is a good change since it removes the earlier ambiguity left by the Section.
135 | P a g e
SECTION 138
It refers to the Order of Examination. The 185th Report agrees with the 69th
Report in that it advocates the numbering of all three parts of the Section. The first
relates to Order of Examinations. Second that examination and cross-examination
must relate to relevant facts but the cross-examination need not be confined to the
facts to which the witness testified on his examination-in-chief. The third relates to
the direction of re-examination. The Report further seeks to borrow a fourth part
regarding the discretion of a court to call any witness for examination or crossexamination. And further re-examination or cross examination after such a
procedure will be allowed. This too is fine addition as it statutes what already
happens in practice thus validating its existence and giving it a legal backing. Such
an enabling procedural provision goes a long way in cases where trials have
multiple parties or where testimonies are hard to come by.
SECTION 139
The section refers to cross-examination of person called to produce a document.
A person summoned to produce a document does not become a witness by the
mere fact that he produces it, and cannot be cross-examined unless and until he is
called as a witness. The Report concurs with the 69th Report that no change is
required to be incorporated.
SECTION 140
This section refers to evidence of a witness as to character. It states that
Witnesses to character may be cross-examined and re-examined. The Report
points out that the practice in India is different from England in that respect since
there cross-examination as for character is a rare practice. It also points out that in
India too such a practice is not a compulsion since the word may is used. It
concurs with the 69th Report and does not recommend changes.
SECTIONS 141, 142 & 143

These Sections deal with leading Questions
Section 141 defines Leading questions where no amendment is sought.
Section 142 specifies the validity of leading questions; it states that where
the opposite party objects to a leading question, it may not be asked in reexamination or examination in chief without the courts permission. The
Court is instructed to permit those leading questions that are introductory or
undisputed or which have already been sufficiently proved. No amendment
to this Section has been sought.
Section 143 provides for leading questions to be asked in cross examination,
In the 69th Report, there is discussion as to whether in sec. 143, there should
be some provision to control the leading questions that can be put in crossexamination but this view is not supported by the 185th Report because of
Phipsons latter argument189 that though leading questions may be put in
cross-examination, whether the witness is favorable to the cross-examiner or
not, yet where a desire to serve the interrogator is betrayed, it may lessen the
value of the evidence to put the very words into the mouth of the witness
which he is expected to echo back. It thus seeks no change to the Section.
SECTION 144
This section refers to evidence as to matters in writing. It mandates the
requirement of written documentation if any contract, grant or other disposition of
property, as to which witness is giving evidence, was not contained in a document,
and if he says that it was which, in the opinion of the Court, ought to be produced,
the adverse party may object to such evidence being given until such document is
produced, or until facts have been proved which entitle the party who called the
witness to give secondary evidence of it. The explanation however provides that an
189Phipson,
Evidence, 15thEd, 1999, para 11.18

137 | P a g e
oral evidence of statements made by other persons about the contents of

documents if such statements are in themselves relevant facts can be given.
The illustration appended to this section according to the 69th Report, deals with a
declaration about a mental element present contemporaneously it was pointed out
that the section needs some improvement. The proposal was to split up the two
categories of cases mentioned in sec. 144 into two separate subsections, keeping
the Explanation and illustration intact. The 185th Report has suggested
incorporation of these changes. Keeping the illustration intact will enable a
wholesome understanding of the Section and the placement of proof regards two
different situations of evidence and statement can be differentiated now.
SECTION 145
It refers to cross-examination as to previous statements in writing. The Report
distinguishes between Section 145 and Section 155(3). Sec. 155(3) deals with
impeaching the credit of a witness by proof of former statements inconsistent
with any part of his evidence which is liable to be contradicted. The difference is
that under sec. 155(3) the previous statement can be oral and need not be in
writing or reduced to writing. But sec. 155(3) relates only to impeaching credit of
the witness. The report discusses In Balgangadhar Tilak v. Srinivasa190, it was
observed that before proof is given to contradict a witness, he must be told about
the circumstances of the supposed statement and he must be asked whether or not
he has made such a statement. This is an essential step, the omission of which
contravenes not only general principles but the specific provisions of sec. 145.
The Report addressed three crucial issues:
1. Does Section 145 apply to Oral evidence? In other words, on the language as
it stands now, sec. 145 does not apply to oral statements made earlier.
190AIR
1915 PC 7
2. Is the section applicable to tape-recorded statements? In the 69th Report, it

was opined that this view of the Punjab High Court is correct and that
therefore, the sec. 145 should be amended to include a statement recorded
mechanically, however it would be advantageous to add the words statement
recorded mechanically or by electronic record.
3. What is the position regarding documents which are lost? The 69th Report
stated that this aspect is perhaps covered by section 155(3) so far as the use
of secondary evidence. The report also said that the applicability of section
145 is doubtful. They therefore did not include this aspect in their sub
sections (2) and (3) as drafted. 185th Report agrees with para. 81.27 of the
69th Report.
SECTION 146
This section says that during cross-examination, in addition to the questions asked
he may be asked questions in order to test his veracity, test his position in life or
shake his credit by injuring his character. This section is held to share similarities
with section 132. The commission discussed the changes made to this section in
2003 in relation to cases of rape and attempt to rape. The commission discussed
172nd report wherein clause (4) was suggested. The Commission recommended the
addition of the words accuracy and creditability be added after the word veracity
in clause (1). Also the commission recommended that proviso to clause (3) should
be deleted. Along with that an explanation should be added after clause (3). The
explanation says in a prosecution for an offence under section 376, 376A, 376B,
376C or 376D for attempt to commit any such offence, where the question of
consent is in issue, it shall not be permissible to adduce evidence or to put
questions in the cross-examination of the victim as to her general immoral
character, or as to her previous sexual experience with any person for proving such
consent or the quality of consent. The explanation says character includes
reputation and disposition.
139 | P a g e
SECTION 147
This section is with reference to the situation where the witness is compelled to
answer. It says that if any such question relevant to the suit is there, then the
provision of section 132 will follow. It talks about compellability of witness
meaning that the witness cannot take exemption to testifying in the court. The
matter concerns only which is relevant to the issue. The commission
recommended that in section 147, after the words relevant to, the words the
matter in issue in should be added. Under this section one may also refer to the
events of prior conduct of the witness outside the suit. Also if the questions are
outside the purview of the suit they should be proximate enough to affect the
opinion of the court on the credibility of the witness. The commission also
referred to Sir Vepa P. Sarathi who said that section 147 deals with the question
relevant to the suit. Commission considered the 69th Report and decided there is
no need to deviate from it. Commission after thorough discussion said that section
132 completely applies to section 147.
SECTION 148
This section gives discretion to the court to decide whether the witness needs to be
compelled to answer a question when it is not relevant to the matter in the suit. It
affects the credit of the witness though by injuring his character. The court while
deciding will consider whether the question is of such a nature that the truth will
seriously affect the opinion of the court. The question will be improper if the
answer does not affect the opinion of the court, there is great disproportion
between imputation against witnesss character and importance of evidence.
Referring to 69th Report, the Commission said that it did not have any comment
with reference to ordinary witness. The commission recommended addition of
section 148A for the witness-accused on the lines of draft proposal in 69th Report
with a few changes in relation to question of a woman in rape cases in the light of
the Law Commissions 172nd Report. The Commission felt there was a need to
amend the opening lines of section 148. For the words If any such question
relates to a matter not relevant to the suit or proceeding except, the words If
any such question is not material to the issues in the suit or proceeding but is
admissible shall be substituted.
SECTION 148A
An accused if offers himself as victim under section 315 of Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 shall not compelled to answer any question tending to show that
he has committed or convicted of or charged other then the which he is then
charged. The exception can be made in case the proof of his committing the
offence is relevant to the matter in issue, he or his advocate have asked question to
the witness to establish his good character, nature of the offence is such as to
involve imputation on the character of the witnesses for prosecution (prosecutrix
not included) without obtaining the permission of the court or he has given
evidence against any other person charged with the same offence.
SECTION 149
This section says that no question referred to in section 148 should be asked unless
the person asking them has reasonable ground for it. Commission referred to the
69th Report wherein duties of a lawyer while questioning but no amendment was
suggested. Commission recommended revision of the illustration. The questions
can be asked if one legal practitioner informs the other, court informs the legal
practitioner, witness of whom nothing is known then he can be asked or the
witness given unsatisfactory answers of general questions.
SECTION 150
If a lawyer asks a question without any reasonable ground then the court may
report the same to the court to whose jurisdiction he is subjected to. The
141 | P a g e
commission said that the reference under the section should be made to the Bar
Council under the Advocate Act, 1961.
SECTION 151
Under this section, the Court may forbid any indecent or scandalous question apart
from the case here it is necessary to determine a fact or have some bearing on the
question in issue. Commission agreed with 69th Report wherein no
recommendation was made after some discussion.
SECTION 152
This section forbids any question which is intended to annoy or insult the witness
or appears needlessly offensive to the court. The Commission felt that no
amendment was needed.
SECTION 153
Under this section if a witness answers a question relevant to the enquiry then no
evidence shall be given to contradict him as it tends to shake his credit by injuring
his character. Although he gives false answer, he may be later charged with false
evidence. Exception to this section says that if a witness has been asked about his
previous conviction and he denied the same then it can be proved by giving
evidence. He may also be contradicted if he is asked about any question tending to
impeach his impartiality and he denies it. The Commission discussed laws in other
countries in relation to non-consideration of offence committed by a witness
before a long time. Commission held that in India the same is covered by section
148(2) relating to a matter remote in time. Commission also mentioned R v.
Ghulam Mustafa191 wherein the court refused to consider a crime which was
committed 30 years ago. The Commission thus said that no amendment was
required.
191ILR
36 All 371
SECTION 154
This section allows the person who calls the witness to ask a question which may
later be asked during cross-examination by the adverse party. This section refers to
hostile witness. The Commission considered Supreme Court decisions before 69th
Report and after that. The Commission referred to Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai
Thakker v. State of Gujarat192 wherein the court held that section 154 is the
discretion of the court. Also the commission referred to Sat Paul v. Delhi
Admn.,193 wherein the court held that the entire evidence of the hostile witness
need not be discarded and reliance on any part of the statement of such a witness
by both parties is permissible. Commission discussed the recent case of Koli
Lakhmanbhai Chanebhai v. State of Gujarat194 wherein it was held that evidence of
the witness who has turned hostile to the extent it supports the prosecution
version, is admissible in the trial and if corroborated by other reliable evidence.
Commission agreed with 69th Report which stated that a provision should be
added to the section that nothing in the section will disentitle the party to rely on
any other evidence. The same was recommended.
SECTION 155 AND PROPOSED SECTION 155A
This section says that the credit of a witness may be impeached by the adverse
party with the consent of the court by evidence of person who testify that they
believe the witness to be unworthy of character, proof that the witness has
received bribe or any other inducement, proof of former statement being
inconsistent with any part of his evidence. The explanation to the section says that
the witness declaring the unworthiness of credit of another witness may be asked
to give reason during cross-examination. These reasons will not be contradicted
but in case of false response, he may later be charged with false evidence. The
Commission referred to Woodroffe who points out the methods of impeaching
192AIR
1964 SC 1503
(1) SCC 727
1941999 (8) SCC page 624
1931976
143 | P a g e
the credit of a person. The applicable methods are by cross-examination, by calling

other witness to disprove by testimony on material points and by contradiction of
matter affecting credit through other witness. Commission agreed with the
recommendation of 69th Report of using the words impeach his credibility,
accuracy or veracity instead of believe him to be unworthy of credit. With
reference to clause (3), 69th Report makes two recommendations. Firstly this clause
is subject to section 145 and secondly the words his evidence which is liable to be
contradicted need to interpret as per the case. Commission recommended that
addition after the words liable to be contradicted the following words: that is to
say, evidence on a fact in issue or a relevant fact or evidence relating to any matter
referred to in the First or Second Exception to sec. 153. Further it was
recommended that in the beginning the words subject to the provisions of sec.
145 should be added. With reference to clause (4), the commission recommended
deleting it agreeing with 172nd report. The Commission felt a need to create an
additional provision on the same lines as section 148 as regards the crossexamination of the accused on matters affecting his credit. Commission based on
69th report proposed creation of section 155A. This section will apply where the
accused resorts to sec. 315 of the Cr.P.C.
SECTION 156
This section gives the court the power to allow the question in relation to any
other circumstances near the time or place of occurring of the event to the witness
who gives evidence of any relevant fact. The Commission said that this section
does not require any major change except to add the words fact in issue or
before the words relevant facts.
SECTION 157
This section states that in order to corroborate any statement of a witness any
former statement of his in relation to the same fact may be proved. This section
helps determine the truthfulness of the victim. Evidence under this section is not
substantive. The Commission held that the word investigation under the section
should be given a broad meaning. The commission recommended addition of an
explanation. This explanation said The statements made before any authority,
legally competent to investigate the fact include statements made before a Judicial
Magistrate in an identification parade and also statements made before such a
Magistrate under section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
SECTION 157A
The Commission agreed with 69th Report which said that there is, however, no
comprehensive provision permitting independent evidence to be given confirming
the credit of a witness, though there is a provision for impeaching credit.
SECTION 158
This section says that statement relevant under section 32 or 33 when proved then
all matters may be proved either to contradict or corroborate it or impeach or
confirm the credit of a person by whom it was made. The statements herein are by
the persons who are either dead, cannot be found or are incapable of giving
evidence. Commission held that there is no need of any amendment to this section.
SECTION 159
Under this section a witness may refresh his memory by referring to any writing
made by him at any time of the transaction concerning which he is questioned. He
may also refer to the writing by some other person of which he knew would be
correct. Commission recommended the revision of the section. The witness may
refresh his memory by referring to any document made by him at the time of the
transaction or made by any other person read or seen by witness if when he read it
he knew it was correct. He may also refer to the copy of any document if the court
is satisfied that there is sufficient reason for non-production of original. Also an
145 | P a g e
expert may refer to professional treaties or articles published in professional

journals. The word document should be used.
SECTION 160
This section states that a witness may testify any fact mentioned in the writing
referred to in section 159 if he knew that the information entered is correct. The
fact that he does not recollect it now can be ignored. The commission feels that
there is no need for any change in this section.
SECTION 161
This section gives the right to the adverse party to cross-examine the witness in
relation to writings presented under section 159 and 161. Commission
recommended the substitution of the word document for writing in conformity
with section 159, as proposed to be amended, as also in conformity with present
section 160.
SECTION 162
This section provides for summoning of a witness to produce a document shall if
it is in his possession or power notwithstanding any objection. The validity of such
objection will be decided by the court. The Court, if it sees fit, may inspect the
document, unless it refers the matter to state or take other evidence. The court
may also order for translation of document if it deems fit. The Commission held
that it had examined this section along with section 123. Therefore the
recommendation under section 123 should be looked into. Commission
recommended the deletion of the word unless it refers to matter of State from sec.
162. The entire procedure for recording communication related to affairs of the
states should come under section 123.
SECTION 163
This section requires that if a party has given notice to another for production of a
document and such document is produced and inspected by the party calling for it
then he is bound to give it as evidence. Commission says that this section applies
to both civil as well as criminal trials. Commission feels no need for any
amendment in this section.
SECTION 164
This section says that when a party had refused the production of a document
asked under the notice then he cannot later use it as evidence without the consent
of other party or court. Commission does not agree with 69th Report which asked
for confining this section to only criminal proceedings.
SECTION 165
Under this section a judge may in order to discover or obtain proof of any relevant
fact may at any time ask any question to the witness or any party about any fact
relevant or not. The court may order for the production of any document or thing
and no objection can be raised regarding the same without the permission of the
court. The proviso to this section says that judgment must be based on facts
relevant under the act. Also court cannot compel a witness to answer a question or
produce a document for which he is entitled to refuse under section 121 to 131. In
case the documents or questions were asked by the adverse parties then the judge
may not ask any question which would be improper to ask by any other person
other section 148 or 149. Judge will not dispense with primary evidence of any
document except for the cases which are accepted. The commission accepted the
structural changes suggested by 69th Report and also held that he power under sec.
105 cannot be used to put questions which are prohibited by the Evidence act or
any other statute. The commission suggested a proviso to this section which did
not allow any witness to cross-examine upon any answer without the permission of
147 | P a g e
the court. The commission generalized the exceptions and removed the reference
to section 121 to 131. Also the commission recommended that a judge could not
be allowed to dispense with primary evidence of any document except in case of
excepted cases. Also the commission provides for basing judgments on facts
declared relevant under this act.
SECTION 166
In cases of trial by jury or with assessor, the jury may ask any question with the
permission of judge which he might consider proper and put forward. Commission
agreeing with 69th Report said that trial by jury has been abolished in India. Thus
this section should be deleted.
SECTION 167
As per this section, rejection of evidence or improper evidence cannot be taken as
a ground for new trial or reversal of ant decision if the court is satisfied that the
evidence received were considered or that there was sufficient proof for the
decision. Commission held that the word decision applies to both civil as well as
criminal cases. The commission agreed with the report and held that no
amendment was needed.

Comments and Suggestions On The 185th Law Commission of India Report - Indian Evidence Act 1872

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Comments and Suggestions on the 185th Law Commission of India Report Indian Evidence Act 1872

Gujarat National Law University

In the third category the evidence is excluded from admissibility by some

English and Scottish Law

(1978) 19 ALR 641

AIR 1978 SC 1025

(a) The said police officer must be concerned I

4. It would practically put an end to the guarantee in Art. 21 of the

Maharashtra30 it was held that discoveries made pursuant to statements falling

2002 (1) JT SC 229

AIR 1932 Cal 297

In US it is stated that as per Miranda vs. Arizona, an involuntary confession is

27. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in sections 24 to 26,

(1934, CA9 Idaho) 74 F2d 173

Veepa Sarthi, Law of Evidence, 5thed. , EBC, 2002, p.155

In the first clause of the proviso, the word

proceeding is used without any qualification.

69th Law Commission Report

185th Law Commission Report.

Law of Evidence, 15th ed. Lexis Nexis, 1999, p. 809.

It may be noted that in civil cases trial of a

Law of Evidence, 15th ed. Lexis Nexis, 1999, p. 814

185th Law Commission Report

Veepa Sarthi, Law of Evidence, 5thed. , EBC, 2002, p.173

Veepa Sarthi, Law of Evidence, 5thed. , EBC, 2002, p.173

person who, as a member of the family of otherwise, has special means of

Law of Evidence, 15th ed. Lexis Nexis, 1999, p. 959

The following seals, that is to say,

act done before the fifteenth day of August 1947:

The seals of all Courts in India;

Seals of all Courts out of India, established by the authority of the

Seals of law Courts established by the authority of the Crown

Seals of Courts of Admiralty and Maritime

Jurisdiction and Notaries Public; and

All seals which any person is authorized to use by an Act of

on the record which are

between the parties

at the hearing by party or his lawyer (Order 10).

Law of Evidence, 15th ed. Lexis Nexis, 1999, p. 1022

AIR 1994 SC 1773

7. When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which

company as arrears of salary, for which he had issued a registered notice to

Effect of refusal after notice

(1860) 9 L.J.Q.B. 327

The modes of proving a signature are as follows:

Devi v Shyam Lal, AIR 1980 All. 292

v Minavbai, AIR 1991 MP 11

(2013) 4 SCC 546

AIR 2006 MP 107

v Bojjappa, AIR 1963 SC 1633

vs. Charan Singh, AIR 1959 SC 960

Duly certified by any officer of the Central Government or of a State

AIR 1954 SC 316.

AIR 1978 Guj 193.

connected with ancient documents.75 Emphasizing on the words may presume, it

The Report also discusses various case laws on

important points viz.

Section 90A of the UP Amendment was considered by the Commission owing a