Case Digest: G.R. No. 174689.

October 22, 2007

Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio, petitioner, vs. Republic of the Philippines,
respondent.
________________________________________________________________
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Facts: Petitioner was born and registered as male. He admitted that he is a male
transsexual, that is, anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female
and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. He
underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment, breast augmentation
and sex reassignment surgery. From then on, petitioner lived as female and was
in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in his birth
certificate changed from Rommel Jacinto to Mely, and his sex from male to
female. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner. Republic of
the Philippines thru the OSG filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals.
CA rendered a decision in favor of the Republic.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to change his name and sex in his
birth certificate.
Ruling: Article 376 of the Civil Code provides that no person can change his
name or surname without judicial authority which was amended by RA 9048
Clerical Error Law which does not sanction a change of first name on the ground
of sex reassignment. Before a person can legally change his given name, he
must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying
such change. In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of
his true and official name. In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any
prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
Article 412 of the Civil Code provides that no entry in the civil register shall be
changed or corrected without a judicial order. The birth certificate of petitioner
contained no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first
name and sex, were all correct. Hence, no correction is necessary. Article 413 of
the Civil Code provides that all other matters pertaining to the registration of civil
status shall be governed by special laws. However, there is no such special law
in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. Under the Civil
Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed
at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually
done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals
of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex
reassignment, the determination of a persons sex made at the time of his or her
birth, if not attended by error is immutable

For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and
appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the
change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no
legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth
certificate. The remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be
addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts. Hence, petition is denied.

Rural Bank of San Miguel v. Monetary Board, 516 SCRA 154 (2007)FACTS:Page 32 of
35 SPCL- BANKINGComia, Antonette Tud-To assist its impaired liquidity and operations, the
RBSM was granted emergency loans ondifferentoccasions in the aggregate amount of P375
[million].-Land Bank of the Philippines(LBP) advised RBSM that it will terminate the clearing of
RBSMs checks inview of the lattersfrequent clearing losses and continuing failure to replenish
its Special ClearingDemandDeposit with LBP. The BSP interceded with LBP not to terminate
the clearingarrangement of RBSM toprotect the interests of RBSMs depositors and creditors.LBPinformed the BSP of the termination of the clearing facility of RSBM in view of the
clearingproblems of RBSM.-MB approved the release of P26.189 [million] which is the last
tranche of the P375 million emergency loanfor the sole purpose of servicing and meeting
thewithdrawals of its depositors. Of the P26.180 million, xxxP12.6 million xxx was not used
toservice withdrawals [and] remains unaccounted for as admitted by[RBSMs Treasury
Officer and Officer-in-Charge of Treasury]. Instead of servicing withdrawals of depositors,
RBSM paidForcecollect Professional Solution, Inc. and Surecollect Professional, Inc.,
entitieswhich areowned and controlled by Hilario P. Soriano and other RBSM officers.-RBSM
declared a bankholiday. RBSM and all of its 15 branches were closed from doing business.Alarmed anddisturbed by the unilateral declaration of bank holiday, [BSP] wanted to examine
thebooksand records of RBSM but encountered problems.-Thereafter, PDIC implemented
the closure order and took over the management of RBSMsassets and affairs.-In their petition
before the CA, petitioners claimed that respondents MBand BSP committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing Resolution No. 105. The petition wasdismissed by the CA on March 28,
2000. It held, amongothers, that the decision of the MB toissue Resolution No. 105 was based
on the findings and recommendations of the Departmentof Rural Banks Supervision and
Examination Sector, the comptroller reports. Such couldbeconsidered as substantial
evidence.-On the basis of reports prepared by PDIC stating thatRBSM could not resume
business with sufficient assuranceof protecting the interest of itsdepositors, creditors and the
general public, the MB passed resolution directing PDICtoproceed with the liquidation of
RBSM.-Hence this petition.HELD:-It is well-settled that the closure of a bank may be
considered as an exercise of police power.The action of the MBon this matter is final and
executory. Such exercise may nonetheless besubject to judicial inquiry and can be setaside if
found to be in excess of jurisdiction or withsuch grave abuse of discretion as to amount to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.-Laying downthe requisites for the closure of a bank under the
law is the prerogative of the legislature andwhat itswisdom dictates. The lawmakers could
have easily retained the word examination(and in the process alsopreserved the
jurisprudence attached to it) but they did not andinstead opted to use the word report.
Theinsistence on an examination is not sanctioned byRA 7653 and we would be guilty of
judicial legislation were we tomake it a requirement whensuch is not supported by the

language of the law.-What is being raised here as grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
respondents wasthe lack of anexamination and not the supposed arbitrariness with which the
conclusions of

the director of the Department of Rural Banks Supervision and Examination Sector had
beenreached in the report which became the basis of Resolution No. 105.-The absence of
anexamination before the closure of RBSM did not mean that there was no basis for
theclosureorder. Needless to say, the decision of the MB and BSP, like any other
administrativebody, must have somethingto support itself and its findings of fact must be
supported bysubstantial evidence. But it is clear under RA 7653 thatthe basis need not arise
from anexamination as required in the old law.-We thus rule that the MB had sufficient basis to
arriveat a sound conclusion that there were grounds that would justify RBSMs closure. It relied
onthe report of Mr. Domo-ong, the head of the supervising or examiningdepartment, with
thefindings that: (1) RBSM was unable to pay its liabilities as they became due in
theordinarycourse of business and (2) that it could not continue in business without
incurringprobable losses to its depositorsand creditors.The report was a 50-page
memorandum detailing the facts supporting those grounds, anextensivechronology of events
revealing the multitude of problems which faced RBSM andthe recommendations based
onthose findings.-In short, MB and BSP complied with all therequirements of RA 7653. By
relying on a report before placing a bankunder receivership, theMB and BSP did not only
follow the letter of the law, they were also faithful to its spirit,whichwas to act expeditiously.
Accordingly, the issuance of Resolution No. 105 was untaintedwith arbitrariness.[G.R. NO.
148208, DECEMBER 15, 2004]CENTRAL BANK (NOW BANGKO SENTRAL NG
PILIPINAS) EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION,INC., PETITIONER, vs. BANGKO SENTRAL
NG PILIPINAS AND THE EXECUTIVESECRETARY,RESPONDENTS.FACTS:On July 3, 1993,
R.A. No. 7653 (the New Central Bank Act) took effect. It abolished the oldCentral Bank of the
Philippines, and created a new BSP.On June 8, 2001, almost eight years after the effectivity of
R.A. No. 7653, petitioner CentralBank (now BSP) Employees Association, Inc., filed a petition
for prohibition against BSP andthe Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, to
restrain respondents from further implementing the last proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of
R.A. No. 7653, on the ground that itis unconstitutional. Article II, Section 15(c) of R.A.
No. 7653 provides:Section 15, Exercise of Authority -In the exercise of its authority, the
Monetary Board shall:(c) Establish a human resource management system which shall
govern the selection,hiring, appointment, transfer, promotion, or dismissal of all personnel.
Such system shall aimto establish professionalism and excellence at all levels of the Bangko
Sentral in accordancewith sound principles of management.A compensation structure, based
on job evaluation studies and wage surveys and subject

to the Boards approval, shall be instituted as an integral component of the Bangko

Sentralshuman resource development program: Provided, That the Monetary Board shall
make itsown system conform as closely as possible with the principles provided for under
Republic Act No. 6758 [Salary Standardization Act]. Provided, however, that
compensation and wagestructure of employees whose positions fall under salary grade 19

and below shall be inaccordance with the rates prescribed under Republic Act No. 6758. The
thrust of petitionerschallenge is that the above proviso makes an unconstitutional cut between
two classes of employees in the BSP, viz: (1) the BSP officers or those exempted from the
coverage of theSalary Standardization Law (SSL) (exempt class); and (2) the rank-and-file
(Salary Grade[SG] 19 and below), or those not exempted from the coverage of the SSL (nonexempt class).It is contended that this classification is a classic case of class legislation,
allegedly notbased on substantial distinctions which make real differences, but solely on the
SG of theBSP personnels position.Petitioner also claims that it is not germane to the purposes
of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, the most important of which is to establish
professionalism and excellence atall levels in the BSP. Petitioner offers the following sub-set of
arguments:a. the legislative history of R.A. No. 7653 shows that the questioned
proviso does notappear in the original and amended versions of House Bill No. 7037, nor in
the originalversion of Senate Bill No. 1235;b. subjecting the compensation of the BSP rankand-file employees to the rate prescribedby the SSL actually defeats the purpose of the law
of establishing professionalism andexcellence eat all levels in the BSP;c. the assailed
proviso was the product of amendments introduced during the deliberation of Senate Bill
No. 1235, without showing its relevance to the objectives of the law, and evenadmitted by one
senator as discriminatory against low-salaried employees of the BSP;d. GSIS, LBP,
DBP and SSS personnel are all exempted from the coverage of the SSL; thuswithin the
class of rank-and-file personnel of government financial institutions (GFIs), the BSPrank-andfile
are
also
discriminated
upon;
ande. the assailed
proviso has caused the demoralization among the BSP rank-and-file andresulted in the
gross disparity between their compensation and that of the BSP officers. In sum, petitioner
posits that the classification is not reasonable but arbitrary andcapricious, and violates the
equal protection clause of the Constitution. Petitioner alsostresses: (a) that R.A. No. 7653 has
a separability clause, which will allow the declaration of the unconstitutionality of the proviso in
question without affecting the other provisions; and (b)the urgency and propriety of the petition,
as some 2,994 BSP rank-and-file employees havebeen prejudiced since 1994 when the
proviso was implemented. Petitioner concludes that: (1)since the inequitable proviso has no
force and effect of law, respondents implementation of such amounts to lack of jurisdiction;
and (2) it has no appeal nor any other plain, speedy andadequate remedy in the ordinary
course except through this petition for prohibition, which thisCourt should take cognizance of,
considering the transcendental importance of the legal issueinvolved.Respondent BSP, in its
comment, contends that the provision does not violate the equalprotection clause and can
stand the constitutional test, provided it is construed in harmonywith other provisions of the
same law, such as fiscal and administrative autonomy of BSP,
David Reyes vs. Jose Lim, G.R. No. 134241, August 11, 2003
Facts: Petitioner David Reyes filed a complaint for annulment of contract and
damages against respondents. The complaint alleged that Reyes as seller and
Lim as buyer entered into a contract to sell a parcel of land located along F.B.
Harrison Street, Pasay City with a monthly rental of P35,000.
The complaint claimed that Reyes had informed Harrison Lumber to vacate the
Property before the end of January 1995. Reyes also informed Keng and
Harrison Lumber that if they failed to vacate by 8 March 1995, he would hold

them liable for the penalty of P400,000 a month as provided in the Contract to
Sell. It was also alleged that Lim connived with Harrison Lumber not to vacate
the Property until the P400,000 monthly penalty would have accumulated and
equaled the unpaid purchase price of P18,000,000.
Keng and Harrison Lumber denied that they connived with Lim to defraud Reyes,
and that Reyes approved their request for an extension of time to vacate the
Property due to their difficulty in finding a new location for their business.
Harrison Lumber claimed that it had already started transferring some of its
merchandise to its new business location in Malabon.
Lim filed his Answer stating that he was ready and willing to pay the balance of
the purchase price. Lim requested a meeting with Reyes through the latters
daughter on the signing of the Deed of Absolute Sale and the payment of the
balance but Reyes kept postponing their meeting. Reyes offered to return the
P10 million down payment to Lim because Reyes was having problems in
removing the lessee from the Property. Lim rejected Reyes offer and proceeded
to verify the status of Reyes title to the Property. Lim learned that Reyes had
already sold the Property to Line One Foods Corporation Lim denied conniving
with Keng and Harrison Lumber to defraud Reyes.Reyes filed a Motion for Leave
to File Amended Complaint due to supervening facts. These included the filing by
Lim of a complaint for estafa against Reyes as well as an action for specific
performance and nullification of sale and title plus damages before another trial
court. The trial court granted the motion.
In his Amended Answer Lim prayed for the cancellation of the Contract to Sell
and for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against Reyes. The trial
court denied the prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment.
Lim requested in open court that Reyes be ordered to deposit the P10 million
down payment with the cashier of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque. The
trial court granted this motion.
Reyes filed a Motion to Set Aside the Order on the ground the Order practically
granted the reliefs Lim prayed for in his Amended Answer. The trial court denied
Reyes motion.
The trial court denied Reyes Motion for Reconsideration. In the same order, the
trial court directed Reyes to deposit the P10 million down payment with the Clerk
of Court.
Reyes filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals and prayed that the
orders of the trial court be set aside for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. But the Court of Appeals dismissed
the petition for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition for review.
Issue: Whether on not the equity jurisdiction is an applicable law on the matter?
Held: The instant case, the Supreme Court held that if this was a case where
there is hiatus in the law and in the Rules of Court. If this case was left alone, the
hiatus will result in unjust enrichment to Reyes at the expense of Lim. Here the
court excercised equity jurisdiction.The purpose of the exercise of equity
jurisdiction in this case is to prevent unjust enrichment and to ensure restitution
so that substantial justice may be attained in cases where the prescribed or

customary forms of ordinary law are inadequate.

The Supreme Court also state that rescission is possible only when the person
demanding rescission can return whatever he may be obliged to restore. A court
of equity will not rescind a contract unless there is restitution, that is, the parties
are restored to the status quo ante.
In this case, it was just, equitable and proper for the trial court to order the
deposit of the P10 million down payment. The decision of the Court of
Appeals.was affirmed.
Floresca vs. Philex Mining Corporation
FACTS:
Several miners, who, while working at the copper mines underground operations
at Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried
them in the tunnels of the mine. The heirs of the deceased claimed their benefits
pursuant to the Workmens Compensation Act before the Workmens
Compensation Commission. They also petitioned before the regular courts and
sue Philex for additional damages, pointing out in the complaint 'gross and
brazen negligence on the part of Philex in failing to take necessary security for
the protection of the lives of its employees working underground'. Philex invoked
that they can no longer be sued because the petitioners have already claimed
benefits under the Workmens Compensation Act, which, Philex insists, holds
jurisdiction over provisions for remedies.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the heirs of the deceased have a right of selection between
availing themselves of the workers right under the Workmens Compensation Act
and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual,
moral and exemplary) from the employers by virtue of that negligence or fault of
the employers or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both
actions.
RULING:
The court held that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under
the Workmens Compensation Act, such may not preclude them from bringing an
action before the regular court because they became cognizant of the fact that
Philex has been remiss in its contractual obligations with the deceased miners
only after receiving compensation under the Act. Had petitioners been aware of
said violation of government rules and regulations by Philex, and of its
negligence, they would not have sought redress under the Workmens
Compensation Commission which awarded a lesser amount for compensation.
The choice of the first remedy was based on ignorance or a mistake of fact,
which nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent choice. The case should

therefore be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. However,

should the petitioners be successful in their bid before the lower court, the
payments made under the Workmens Compensation Act should be deducted
from the damages that may be decreed in their favor.
Republic vs. Orbecido
GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005
FACTS:
Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24, 1981
at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Ozamis City. They had a son
and a daughter named Kristoffer and Kimberly, respectively. In 1986, the wife left
for US bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Orbecido discovered
that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen and learned from his
son that his wife sometime in 2000 had obtained a divorce decree and married a
certain Stanley. He thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to
remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family
Code.
HELD:
The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying
the rule of reason, Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases
involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and
obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to
remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of
the marriage.
Hence, the courts unanimous decision in holding Article 26 Par 2 be interpreted
as allowing a Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had
acquired a citizenship and remarried, also to remarry under Philippine law.
BENJAMIN G. TING, Petitioner, CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING, Respondent

SUBJECT: Stare Decisis (NCC, Art. 8)

FACTS:
Petitioner Benjamin Ting (Benjamin) and respondent Carmen Velez-Ting
(Carmen) wed on July 26, 1975. On October 21, 1993, Ms. Carmen filed a
petition before the RTC praying for the declaration of nullity of their marriage
based on Article 36 of the Family Code. In summation, Carmens basis of
Benjamins psychological incapacity consisted of the following manifestations: (a)
alcoholism; (b) violent nature; (c) his compulsive gambling habit; and (d)
Benjamins irresponsibility and immaturity. Mr. Benjamin denied all these
allegations. On January 28, 1998, RTC declared their marriage null and void.
Petitioner appealed to Courts of Appeal then on October 19, 2000, CA reversed
the trials court ruling. Carmen filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the
Molina case guidelines should not be applied to this case since the Molina
decision was promulgated only on February 13, 1997. She claimed that the
Molina ruling could not be made to apply retroactively, as it would run counter to
the principle of stare decisis. Undaunted, respondent filed a petition for certiorari
with this Court. In a Resolution dated March 5, 2003, this Court granted the
petition and directed the CA to resolve Carmens motion for reconsideration. On
review, the CA decided to reconsider its previous ruling. Thus, on November 17,
2003, it issued an Amended Decision reversing its first ruling and sustaining the
trial courts decision. A motion for reconsideration was filed, this time by
Benjamin, but the same was denied by the CA in its December 13, 2004
Resolution. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused to
follow the guidelines set forth under the Santos and Molina cases;
(2) Whether the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of
psychological incapacity for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
based on Article 36 of the Family Code has been liberalized; and
(3) Whether the CAs decision declaring the marriage between petitioner
and respondent null and void [is] in accordance with law and
jurisprudence.
HELD:

(1) No. respondents argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in Santos
and Molina should not be applied retroactively for being contrary to the principle
of stare decisis is no longer new.
(2) No. Case involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and
judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations
but according to its own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on
a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
(3) No. Evidence adduced by respondent insufficient to prove that petitioner is
psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband, and
more particularly, that he suffered from such psychological incapacity as of the
date of the marriage eighteen (18) years ago.
SC reversed the trial courts and the appellate courts rulings declaring the
marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio.

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and

PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO
G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17,
2010 occurs just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the
forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or
seven days after the presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to
Section 9, Article VIII, that vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the
occurrence thereof from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the
Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Also considering that Section 15,
Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or
Acting President from making appointments within two months immediately
before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except

temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein

will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to
start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice.
Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC automatically considered for the
position of Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the
Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C.
Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero
J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the
last two declined their nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and
January 25, 2010, respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief
Justice, because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution
does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy
in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant
to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the framers intended the
prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily
expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found
in Article VII (Executive Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial
Department); and that the framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample
restrictions or limitations on the Presidents power to appoint members of the
Supreme Court to ensure its independence from political vicissitudes and its
insulation from political pressures, such as stringent qualifications for the
positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the
President shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice.

A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly
initiated the process, there being an insistence from some of the oppositorsintervenors that the JBC could only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that is,
after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may resume its
process until the short list is prepared, in view of the provision of Section 4(1),
Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one from the
short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an
Associate Justice) within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief
Justice Puno upon his retirement.
HELD:
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a
vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15.
Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end
of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein
will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1).
The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate
Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven
Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15,
Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have
explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the
provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made
explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1),
Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition
against the President or Acting President making appointments within two
months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents
or Acting Presidents term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15,
Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have
explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the
provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made
explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1),
Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition
against the President or Acting President making appointments within two
months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents
or Acting Presidents term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in
that they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14
and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department
renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive
Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the
statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must

be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general
intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers
deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if they
intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was
their intention in respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to
be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII,
most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.
Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc vs COMELECG.R. No. 190529Ponente:
Justice BrionFacts:The Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) files a
petition for review and a motion for reconsideration to nullify Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) Resolution No. 8679 dated October 13,2009 insofar as it
relates to PGBI and the Resolution dated December 9, 2009. These resolutions
delistedPGBI from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties,
organizations or coalitions under the party-list system.
According to Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941, known as
Party-List System Act,
COMELEC,upon verified complaint of any interested party, may remove or cancel,
after due notice and hearing, theregistration of any national, regional or sectoral
party, organization or coalition if: (1) it fails to participatein the last two preceding
elections or (2)fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast
under the party-list system in the two preceding elections for the constituency in
which it has registered.For May 2010 Elections, the COMELEC en banc issued
Resolution No. 8679 deleting several party-listgroups or organizations from the
list of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations
or coalitions.Among the party-list organizations affected was PGBI; it was
delisted because it failed to get 2% of thevotes cast in 2004 and it did not
participate in the 2007 elections.PGBI filed its opposition to Resolution No.
8679 and likewise, sought for accreditation as a party-list organization.
One of the arguments cited is that the Supreme Court's ruling in G.R. No. 177548
MINERO(Philippine Mines Safety Environment Association) vs COMELEC
cannot apply in the instant controversy.One of the reasons is because the factual
milieu of the cited case is removed from PGBI's. Additionally, ther e q u i r e m e n t
of Section 6(8) has been relaxed by the Court's ruling
i n G . R . N o . 1 7 9 2 7 1 - B A N AT(Barangay Association for Advancement
and National Transparency) vs COMELEC.COMELEC denied the motion and in
response, pointed out that the MINERO ruling is squarely in point, asMINERO
failed to get 2% of the votes in 2001 and did not participate at all in the 2004
elections.Issue:Whether the MINERO ruling can be use as a legal basis in
delisting PGBI.Held:According to the Court, the MINERO ruling is an erroneous
application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence,it cannot sustain PGBI's

delisting from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral

parties,organizations or coalitions under the party-list system.First the law is
clear in that the word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and
independenceof one thing from the other things enumerated; it should, as a rule,
be construed in the sense in which itordinarily implies, as a disjunctive
word. Thus, the plain, clear and unmistakable language of the
law provides for two separate reasons for delisting.Second, MINERO is
diametrically opposed to the legislative intent of Section 6(8) of RA
7941 andtherefore, simply cannot stand. Its basic defect lies in its
characterization of the non-participation of a party-list organization in
an election as similar to a failure to garner the 2% threshold party-list vote.What
MINERO effectively holds is that a party list organization that does not participate
in an electionnecessarily gets, by default, less than 2% of the party-list votes. To
be sure, this is a confused interpretationof the law, given the law's clear and
categorical language and the legislative intent to treat the two
scenariosdifferently. A delisting based on a mixture or fusion of these
two different and separate grounds for delisting is therefore a strained
application of the law - in jurisdictional terms, it is an interpretation notwithin the
contemplation of the framers of the law and hence is a gravely abusive
interpretation of the law.

Instead, what should be taken into account is the ruling in BANAT vs COMELEC
where the 2% party-listvote requirement provided in RA 7941 is partly
invalidated.The Court rules that, in computing the allocation of additional seats,
the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the
additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b)of R.A. No.
7941 is unconstitutional; it finds that the two percent threshold makes it
mathematicallyimpossible to achieve the maximum number of available party
list seats when the number of available partylist seats exceeds 50.The
continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of
theadditional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of
the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list
representatives.To reiterate, Section 6(8) of RA 7941 provides for two separate
grounds for delisting; these grounds cannot be mixed or combined to support
delisting; and the disqualification for failure to garner 2% party-list votesin two
preceding elections should now be understood, in light of the BANAT
ruling, to mean failure toqualify for a party-list seat in two preceding elections

for the constituency in which it has registered. This ishow Section 6(8) of RA
7941 should be understood and applied under the authority of the Supreme
Courtto state what the law is and as an exception to the application of the
principle of stare decisis (to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle things
which are established).The most compelling reason to abandon MINERO
and strike it out from ruling case law is that it was clearly an erroneous
application of the law - an application that the principle of stability or predictability
of decisions alone cannot sustain. MINERO did unnecessary violence to the
language of the law, the intent of the legislature and to the rule of law in
general.Therefore, the Supreme Court grants PGBIs petition and accordingly,
annul COMELEC Resolution No.8679 dated October 13, 2009 insofar
as the petitioner PGBI is concerned and the Resolution datedDecember
9, 2009 which denied PGBI's motion for reconsideration. PGBI is qualified to be
voted upon asa party-list group or organization in the May 2010 elections

Rodriguez
September
21,
2000
THIRD
Panganiban
DIVISION
J.
FACTS:
is
allegedly
an
alien
entered
who
has
the
Philippines
illegally,
to
Bureau
and
of
Deportation
Petitioner
(BID).
habeas
corpus
for
illegal
Respondent,
detention
Rufus
while
B.
Commissioner
of
Immigration
five
(5)
filed
days
for
after
an
its
receipt
of
Petitioner.
however,
contends
Petitioner
that
the
appeal
was
already
of
Court.
the
pre-1997
Respondent
Rules
on
of
the
other
hand
claim
because
has
such
no
merit
provision
was
abrogated
completely
1997
rules
of
court.
ISSUE:
appeal
respondent
made
should
by
be
HELD:
considered
to
be
late.
revision
thereof
covering
deemed
discarded;
repealed
which
in
and
this
case
is
the
intention
of
declaring
the
appeal
be
not
of
submission
late
to
the
in
court.
its
the
pre-1997
Rules
omitted
Court
is
from
deemed
and
Rules
of
Court,
which
replaces
completely
Rules
1
to
71.
This
is
old
reproduced
law
that
in
were
September
21,
2000
THIRD
Panganiban
DIVISION
J.
FACTS:
is
allegedly
an
alien
entered
who
has
the
Philippines
illegally,
to
Bureau
and
of
Deportation
Petitioner
(BID).
habeas
corpus
for
illegal
Respondent,
detention
Rufus
while
B.
Commissioner
of
Immigration
five
(5)
filed
days
for
after
an
its
receipt
of
Petitioner.
however,
contends
Petitioner
that
the
appeal
was
already
Court.
the
pre-1997
Respondent
Rules
on
of
the
other
hand
claim
because
has
such
no
merit
provision
was
abrogated
completely
rules
of
court.
ISSUE:
appeal
made
should
by
be
HELD:
to
be
late.
of
1997
revision
thereof
covering
deemed
discarded;
repealed
which
in
and
this
case
is
the
intention
of
declaring
respondent
the
appeal
be
not
of
considered
submission
late
to
the
in
court.
its
Rodriguez
the
pre-1997
Rules
omitted
Court
is
from
deemed
and
Rules
of
Court,
which
replaces
completely
Rules
1
to
71.
This
is
old
reproduced
law
that
in
were
September
21,
2000
THIRD
Panganiban
DIVISION
J.
FACTS:
is
allegedly
an
alien
entered
who
has
the
Philippines
illegally,
to
Bureau
and
of
Petitioner.
however,
contends
Petitioner
that
the
appeal
was
already
Court.
the
pre-1997
Respondent
Rules
on
of
the
other
hand
claim
because
has
such
no
merit
provision
was
abrogated
completely
rules
of
court.
ISSUE:
made
should
by
be
HELD:
to
be
late.
1997
revision
thereof
covering
deemed
discarded;
repealed
which
in
and
this
case
is
the
intention
of
declaring
respondent
the
appeal
be
not
of
considered
submission
late
to
the
in
court.
its
Rodriguez
Deportation
Petitioner
(BID).
of
habeas
corpus
for
illegal
Respondent,
detention
Rufus
while
B.
Commissioner
of
Immigration
appeal
five
(5)
filed
days
for
after
an
its
receipt
of
the
pre-1997
Rules
omitted
Court
is
from
deemed
and
Rules
of
Court,
which
replaces
completely
Rules
1
to
71.
This
is
old
reproduced
law
that
in
were
September
21,
2000
THIRD
Panganiban
DIVISION
J.
FACTS:
is
allegedly
an
alien
entered
who
has
the
Philippines
illegally,
to
Bureau
and
of
Petitioner.
however,
contends
Petitioner
that
the
appeal
was
already
Court.
the
pre-1997
Respondent
Rules
on
of
the
other
hand
claim
because
has
such
no
merit
provision
was
abrogated
completely
revision
thereof
covering
deemed
discarded;
repealed
which
in
and
this
case
is
the
intention
of
declaring
the
appeal
be
not
of
submission
late
to
the
in
court.
its
Rodriguez
Deportation
Petitioner
(BID).
habeas
corpus
for
illegal
Respondent,
detention
Rufus
while
B.
Commissioner
of
Immigration
five
(5)
filed
days
for
after
an
its
receipt
of
1997
rules
of
court.
ISSUE:
appeal
respondent
made
should
by
be
considered
HELD:
to
be
late.
the
pre-1997
Rules
of
omitted
Court
is
from
deemed
and
Rules
of
Court,
which
replaces
completely
Rules
1
to
71.
This
is
old
reproduced
law
that
in
were