[G.R. No. 96492. November 26, 1992.

]
ROMEO REYES, ANGEL PARAYAO, and EMILIO MANANGHAYA, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
EUFROCINA DELA CRUZ and VIOLETA DELOS REYES, respondents.
FACTS:
Juan Mendoza, father of herein defendant Olympio Mendoza, is the owner of Farm Lots Nos. 46 and 106, Block 2, Psd-38453
of the Bahay Pare Estate, Bahay Pare, Candaba, Pampanga, with an area of 23,000 square meters and 19,000 square meters,
respectively. Devoted to the production of palay, the lots were tenanted and cultivated by Julian dela Cruz, husband of
plaintiff Eufrocina dela Cruz. Julian died on September 25, 1979.
Eufrocinas Allegations in her complaint:
1. That upon the death of Julian, she succeeded him as bona fide tenant of the subject lots;
2. That between July 7 to July 15, 1984, Olympio Mendoza, in conspiracy with the other defendants, prevented her
daughter Violeta and her workers through force, intimidation, strategy and stealth, from entering and working on the
subject premises; and
3. That until the filing of the instant case, defendants had refused to vacate and surrender the lots, thus violating her
tenancy rights.
4. Plaintiff therefore prayed for judgment for the recovery of possession and damages with a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction in the meantime.
Defendants Reyes, Parayao, Aguinaldo and Mananghaya, duly elected and/or appointed barangay officials of Bahay Pare,
Candaba, Pampanga, denied interference in the tenancy relationship existing between plaintiff and defendant Mendoza,
particularly in the cultivation of the latter's farm lots. Claiming that they have always exercised fairness, equity, reason and
impartiality in the discharge of their official functions, they asked for the dismissal of the case and claimed moral damages and
attorney's fees in the total amount of P165,000.00 (Answer with Counterclaim, Records, pp. 48-51).
Defendant Mendozas defenses:
1. Raised abandonment, sublease and mortgage of the farm lots without his consent and approval, and non-payment of
rentals, irrigation fees and other taxes due the government.
2. He also demanded actual and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees.
During the pendency of the case in the lower court, Mendoza was in possession of the subject lots and had cultivated the
same. Upon motion of plaintiff, the court directed its Deputy Sheriff to supervise the harvesting of the palay crops, to cause the
threshing thereof and to deposit the net harvest (after deducting from the gross harvest the seeds used and the expenses
incurred), in a bonded warehouse of the locality subject to the disposition of the court."
Decision of the CA:
Affirmed the appealed agrarian court's decision with the modification that Lot 106 is not covered by it. (Against the Defendant)
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, in favor of plaintiff and against defendants:
On the Mandatory Injunction:
1. Ordering said defendants to restore possession of the landholding subject of the action to the plaintiff and
enjoining said defendants and any person claiming under them to desist from molesting them or interfering with the
possession and cultivation of the landholding descripted in paragraph 3 of the complaint, to wit:
Farm Lots Nos. 46 and 106, Block 2, Psd-38453 of the Bahay Pare Estate, Bahay Pare, Candaba,
Pampanga, with a total area of 23,969 square meters, more or less, owned by a certain Juan Mendoza,
and devoted principally to the production of palay, as evidenced by a Certification from the Ministry of
Agrarian Reform issued on July 30, 1984.
2. a) Ordering the defendants to vacate the premises of the two landholding in question and to respect the tenancy
rights of plaintiff with respect to the same;
b) Ordering defendants, jointly and severally to pay unto plaintiff 220 cavans of palay or its equivalent in cash of
P33,000.00 from the principal crop year of 1984, and every harvest time until defendants finally vacate and
surrender possession and cultivation of the landholding in question to plaintiff.
c) the prayer for moral damages, not having been sufficiently proved, the same is denied.
d) Ordering defendants jointly and severally, to pay the costs of suit.
The awards herein provided should first be satisfied from the deposits of the harvests ordered by the Court from
which the planting and harvesting expenses have been paid to defendant Olympio Mendoza; and if said net
deposits with the Court or the warehouses as ordered by the Court are insufficient, then the balance should be paid
by defendants, jointly and severally."

ISSUE:
Whether or not they can be held liable, jointly and severally, with the other defendants, for the harvests of the litigated property,
Lot No. 46, or the money equivalent thereof starting from the principal crop years of 1984 and every harvest time thereafter
until the possession and cultivation of the aforestated landholding are finally surrendered to the private respondent."
Petitioners Arguments:
1. (As to their Liability) Aguinaldo because the present petition involves Lot No. 46, Block 2, Psd-38453 of the Bahay Pare Estate,
Bahay Pare, Candaba, Pampanga and not Lot No. 106 of the same estate, which lot was purchased by petitioner Romeo
Reyes from Olympio Mendoza's father, Juan, and which he later donated to the Barangay Bahay Pare of Candaba, Pampanga,
for the construction of the Bahay Pare Barangay High School.
2. (As to their supposed participation in the dispossession of private respondent from the disputed landholding) petitioners
present the September 30, 1987 Resolution of Investigating Fiscal Jesus M. Pamintuan, as approved by Pampanga Provincial
Fiscal Villamor I. Dizon. in I.S. No. 8576, wherein private respondent's complaint against petitioners and the other
defendants in the agrarian court for violation of P.D. 583 was dismissed, to show that private respondent's "point is
already settled and considered closed."
3. Lastly, petitioners claim that they were included in the present controversy so that their political career would be destroyed.
Private respondents Contentions:
1. That it was petitioners who conspired with Olympio Mendoza and Severino Aguinaldo in ejecting them not only from Lot No. 46 but
also from Lot No. 106. They maintain that it was in Farmlot No. 46 from where they were ejected and dispossessed, so much so that
even if Farmlot No. 106 was removed by the Court of Appeals from the judgment, as Farmlot No. 46 was harvesting palay worth at least
P33,000.00 per year since 1989, private respondents, who are entitled to the possession and peaceful enjoyment of the farmlot as
provided for in Section 23 of the Agrarian Reform Law, should be compensated for the lost income by the petitioners who are solidarily
liable with Olympio Mendoza and Severino Aguinaldo.
RULING: We find for the private respondents. L
It is clear that petitioners are asking Us to re-examine all the evidence already presented and evaluated by the trial court and reevaluated again by the respondent appellate court. Said evidence served as basis in arriving at the trial court and appellate court's
findings of fact. We shall not analyze such evidence all over again but instead putfinis to the factual findings in this case. Settled is the
rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court absent the
exceptions which do not obtain in the instant case.
We agree with the appellate court in its ratiocination, which We adopt, on why it has to dismiss the appeal. Said the Court:
"In her Complaint, plaintiff-appellee alleged that she 'is the tenant of Farm Lots Nos. 46 and 106, Block 2, Psd38453 of the Bahay Pare Estate, Bahay Pare, Candaba, Pampanga, with a total area of 23,969 square meters,
more or less . . .'. However, during Violeta's testimony, she clarified that actually only Lot No. 46 containing
an area of 23,000 square meters is the one involved in the dispute. Lot No. 106, which contains an area of
19,000 square meters, is not included in this controversy. This statement was corroborated by plaintiff's counsel,
Atty. Arturo Rivera, who informed the court that the 19,000 square meter lot is subject of a pending case before the
MTC of Sta. Ana, Pampanga . The inconsistency between the averment of the complaint and the testimony of the
witness should not be taken against appellee not only because there was no showing that she intended to mislead
defendants and even the trial court on the subject matter of the suit. It would appear that Lot No. 106 had been
included in the complaint since together with Lot 46, it is owned by Olimpio's father.
We also concur with the trial court's finding on the participation of the other appellants in the dispossession of
appellee. They not only knew Olimpio personally, some of them were even asked by Olimpio to help him cultivate
the land, thus lending credence to the allegation that defendant Olimpio, together with his co-defendants, prevented
plaintiff and her workers from entering the land through 'strong arm methods.'
Finally, we rule that the trial court did not err when it favorably considered the affidavits of Eufrocina and Efren
Tecson although the affiants were not presented and subjected to cross-examination. Section 16 of P.D. No.
946 provides that the 'Rules of Court shall not be applicable in agrarian cases even in a suppletory character.' The
same provision states that 'In the hearing, investigation and determination of any question or controversy, affidavits
and counter-affidavits may be allowed and are admissible in evidence.'

Moreover, in agrarian cases, the quantum of evidence required is no more than substantial evidence. This
substantial evidence rule was incorporated in section 18, P.D. No. 946 which took effect on June 17, 1976 (Castro
vs. CA, G.R. No. 34613, January 26, 1989). In Bagsican vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 226, the Supreme
Court defined what substantial evidence is:
'Substantial evidence does not necessarily import preponderant evidence, as is required in an
ordinary civil case. It has been defined to be such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion and its absence is not shown by stressing that there is contrary
evidence on record, direct or circumstantial, for the appellate court cannot substitute its own judgment or
criteria for that of the trial court in determining wherein lies the weight of evidence or what evidence is
entitled to belief.'"
[G.R. No. 127240. March 27, 2000.]
ONG CHIA, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China. In 1932, as a nine-year old boy, he arrived at the port of Manila on board the
vessel "Angking." Since then, he has stayed in the Philippines where he found employment and eventually started his own business,
married a Filipina, with whom he had four children. On July 4, 1989, at the age of 66, he filed a verified petition to be admitted as a
Filipino citizen under C.A. No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, as amended. Petitioner, after stating his
qualifications as required in 2, and lack of the disqualifications enumerated in 3 of the law, stated
17. That he has heretofore made (a) petition for citizenship under the provisions of Letter of Instruction No. 270 with
the Special Committee on Naturalization, Office of the Solicitor General, Manila, docketed as SCN Case No.
031776, but the same was not acted upon owing to the fact that the said Special Committee on Naturalization was
not reconstituted after the February, 1986 revolution such that processing of petitions for naturalization by
administrative process was suspended;
During the hearings, petitioner testified as to his qualifications and presented three witnesses to corroborate his testimony. So
impressed was Prosecutor Isaac Alvero V. Moran with the testimony of petitioner that, upon being asked by the court whether the State
intended to present any witness against him, he remarked: prcd
Actually, Your Honor, with the testimony of the petitioner himself which is rather surprising, in the sense that he
seems to be well-versed with the major portion of the history of the Philippines, so, on our part, we are convinced,
Your Honor Please, that petitioner really deserves to be admitted as a citizen of the Philippines. And for this reason,
we do not wish to present any evidence to counteract or refute the testimony of the witnesses for the petitioner, as
well as the petitioner himself.
The trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner to Philippine citizenship.
The State, however, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed contending that petitioner:
(1) failed to state all the names by which he is or had been known;
(2) failed to state all his former places of residence in violation of C.A. No. 473, 7;
(3) failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his entire stay in the Philippines, in violation of 2;
(4) has no known lucrative trade or occupation and his previous incomes have been insufficient or misdeclared, also in contravention of
2; and
(5) failed to support his petition with the appropriate documentary evidence.
Annexed to the State's appellant's brief was a copy of a 1977 petition for naturalization filed by petitioner with the Special Committee on
Naturalization in SCN Case No. 031767, in which petitioner stated that in addition to his name of "Ong Chia," he had likewise been
known since childhood as "Loreto Chia Ong." As petitioner, however, failed to state this other name in his 1989 petition for
naturalization, it was contended that his petition must fail. The State also annexed income tax returns allegedly filed by petitioner
from 1973 to 1977 to show that his net income could hardly support himself and his family. To prove that petitioner failed to conduct
himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his stay in the Philippines, the State contended that, although petitioner claimed
that he and Ramona Villaruel had been married twice, once before a judge in 1953, and then again in church in 1977, petitioner actually
lived with his wife without the benefit of marriage from 1953 until they were married in 1977. It was alleged that petitioner failed to
present his 1953 marriage contract, if there be any. The State also annexed a copy of petitioner's 1977 marriage contract and a
Joint-Affidavit executed by petitioner and his wife. These documents show that when petitioner married Ramona Villaruel on February
23, 1977, no marriage license had been required in accordance with Art. 76 of the Civil Code because petitioner and Ramona Villaruel

had been living together as husband and wife since 1953 without the benefit of marriage. This, according to the State, belies his claim
that when he started living with his wife in 1953, they had already been married.
The State also argued that, as shown by petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of Residence, petitioner resided at "J.M. Basa Street, Iloilo,"
but he did not include said address in his petition.
Decision of CA: Reversed the trial court and denied petitioner's application for naturalization. It ruled that due to the importance of
naturalization cases, the State is not precluded from raising questions not presented in the lower court and brought up for the
first.
Petitioners Contentions:
That the appellate court erred in considering the documents which had merely been annexed by the State to its appellant's
brief and, on the basis of which, justified the reversal of the trial court's decision. Not having been presented and formally
offered as evidence, they are mere "scrap(s) of paper devoid of any evidentiary value," so it was argued, because under Rule
132, 34 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA was justified in reversing the ruling of the trial court and denying the petitioners
naturalization application.
RULING: YES
1. Petitioners contention has no merit. Petitioner failed to note Rule 143 13 of the Rules of Court which provides that
These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization and insolvency
proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever
practicable and convenient. (italics added)
(GENERAL RULE) Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, 34) now being invoked by petitioner is
clearly not applicable to the present case involving a petition for naturalization. (EXCEPTION) The only instance when said rules may be
applied by analogy or suppletorily in such cases is when it is "practicable and convenient." That is not the case here, since reliance
upon the documents presented by the State for the first time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the more practical and convenient course
of action considering that decisions in naturalization proceedings are not covered by the rule on res judicata.
Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not preclude the State from later on moving for a revocation of the grant of naturalization
on the basis of the same documents.
2. Petitioner claims that as a result of the failure of the State to present and formally offer its documentary evidence before the trial court,
he was denied the right to object against their authenticity, effectively depriving him of his fundamental right to procedural due process.
We are not persuaded. Indeed, the reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not been formally offered is to
afford the opposite party the chance to object to their admissibility. Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived of the right to object to
the authenticity of the documents submitted to the appellate court by the State. He could have included his objections, as he, in fact,
did, in the brief he filed with the Court of Appeals, thus:
The authenticity of the alleged petition for naturalization (SCN Case-No. 031767) which was supposedly filed by
Ong Chia under LOI 270 has not been established. In fact, the case number of the alleged petition for naturalization
. . . is 031767 while the case number of the petition actually filed by the appellee is 031776. Thus, said document is
totally unreliable and should not be considered by the Honorable Court in resolving the instant appeal. 17
Indeed, the objection is flimsy as the alleged discrepancy is trivial, and, at most, can be accounted for as a typographical error on the
part of petitioner himself. That "SCN Case No. 031767," a copy of which was annexed to the petition, is the correct case number is
confirmed by the Evaluation Sheet of the Special Committee On Naturalization which was also docketed as "SCN Case No. 031767."
Other than this, petitioner offered no evidence to disprove the authenticity of the documents presented by the State. prLL
Furthermore, the Court notes that these documents namely, the petition in SCN Case No. 031767, petitioner's marriage contract, the
joint affidavit executed by him and his wife, and petitioner's income tax returns are all public documents. As such, they have been
executed under oath. They are thus reliable. Since petitioner failed to make a satisfactory showing of any flaw or irregularity that may
cast doubt on the authenticity of these documents, it is our conclusion that the appellate court did not err in relying upon them.
4. One last point. The above discussion would have been enough to dispose of this case, but to settle all the issues raised, we
shall briefly discuss the effect of petitioner's failure to include the address "J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" in his petition, in accordance

with 7, C.A. No. 473. This address appears on petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of Residence, a document which forms part
of the records as Annex A of his 1989 petition for naturalization.
Petitioner admits that he failed to mention said address in petition, but argues that since the Immigrant Certificate of Residence
containing it had been fully published, with the petition and the other annexes, such publication constitutes substantial compliance
with 7. This is allegedly because the publication effectively satisfied the objective sought to be achieved by such requirement, i.e.,
to give investigating agencies of the government the opportunity to check on the background of the applicant and prevent
suppression of information regarding any possible misbehavior on his part in any community where he may have lived at one time
or another.
It is settled, however, that naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and
against the applicant. As noted by the State, C.A. No. 473, 7 clearly provides that the applicant for naturalization shall set forth in
the petition his present and former places of residence. This provision and the rule of strict application of the law in naturalization
cases defeat petitioner's argument of "substantial compliance" with the requirement under the Revised Naturalization Law. On this
ground alone, the instant petition ought to be denied.

[G.R. No. 153660. June 10, 2003.]

PRUDENCIO BANTOLINO, NESTOR ROMERO, NILO ESPINA, EDDIE LADICA, ARMAN QUELING, ROLANDO
NIETO,
RICARDO
BARTOLOME,
ELUVER
GARCIA,
EDUARDO
GARCIA
and
NELSON
MANALASTAS, petitioners, vs. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC., respondent.
Facts:
On 15 February 1995 sixty-two (62) employees of respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers, Inc., and its officers, Lipercon Services, Inc., People's
Specialist Services, Inc., and Interim Services, Inc., filed a complaint against respondents for unfair labor practice through illegal
dismissal, violation of their security of tenure and the perpetuation of the "Cabo System." They thus prayed for reinstatement with full
back wages, and the declaration of their regular employment status. aSATHE
For failure to prosecute as they failed to either attend the scheduled mandatory conferences or submit their respective affidavits, the
claims of fifty-two (52) complainant-employees were dismissed. Thereafter, Labor Arbiter Jose De Vera conducted clarificatory hearings
to elicit information from the ten (10) remaining complainants (petitioners herein) relative to their alleged employment with respondent
firm.
Complainants Averments:
1. That in the performance of their duties as route helpers, bottle segregators, and others, they were employees of
respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers, Inc.
2. They further maintained that when respondent company replaced them and prevented them from entering the company
premises, they were deemed to have been illegally dismissed.
Respondents Defense:
1. There was no employer-employee relationship between complainants and Coca-Cola Bottlers, Inc., and
2. That respondents Lipercon Services, People's Specialist Services and Interim Services being bona fide independent
contractors, were the real employers of the complainants.
3. As regards the corporate officers, respondent insisted that they could not be faulted and be held liable for damages as they
only acted in their official capacities while performing their respective duties.
Labor Arbiters Decision:
On 29 May 1998 Labor Arbiter Jose De Vera rendered a decision ordering respondent company to reinstate complainants to their
former positions with all the rights, privileges and benefits due regular employees, and to pay their full back wages which, with the
exception of Prudencio Bantolino whose back wages must be computed upon proof of his dismissal as of 31 May 1998, already
amounted to an aggregate of P1,810,244.00. 4
In finding for the complainants, the Labor Arbiter ruled that in contrast with the negative declarations of respondent company's
witnesses who, as district sales supervisors of respondent company denied knowing the complainants personally, the testimonies of
the complainants were more credible as they sufficiently supplied every detail of their employment, specifically identifying
who their salesmen/drivers were, their places of assignment, aside from their dates of engagement and dismissal.
NLRCs Decision:

On appeal, the NLRC sustained the finding of the Labor Arbiter that there was indeed an employer-employee relationship between
the complainants and respondent company when it affirmed in toto the latter's decision.
Respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers appealed to the Court of Appeals and argued the following:
1. That the affidavits of some of the complainants, namely, Prudencio Bantolino, Nestor Romero, Nilo Espina, Ricardo Bartolome,
Eluver Garcia, Eduardo Garcia and Nelson Manalastas, should not have been given probative value for their failure to affirm
the contents thereof and to undergo cross-examination.
Decision of CA:
As a consequence, the appellate court dismissed their complaints for lack of sufficient evidence.
In the same Decision however, complainants Eddie Ladica, Arman Queling and Rolando Nieto were declared regular employees
since they were the only ones subjected to cross-examination. Thus
. . . (T)he labor arbiter conducted clarificatory hearings to ferret out the truth between the opposing claims of the
parties thereto. He did not submit the case based on position papers and their accompanying documentary
evidence as a full-blown trial was imperative to establish the parties' claims. As their allegations were poles apart, it
was necessary to give them ample opportunity to rebut each other's statements through cross-examination. In fact,
private respondents Ladica, Quelling and Nieto were subjected to rigid cross-examination by petitioner's counsel.
However, the testimonies of private respondents Romero, Espina, and Bantolino were not subjected to
cross-examination, as should have been the case, and no explanation was offered by them or by the labor
arbiter as to why this was dispensed with. Since they were represented by counsel, the latter should have
taken steps so as not to squander their testimonies. But nothing was done by their counsel to that effect. 6
Petitioners now pray for relief from the adverse Decision of the Court of Appeals; that, instead, the favorable judgment of the NLRC be
reinstated.
Petitioners Arguments:
That the Court of Appeals should not have given weight to respondent's claim of failure to cross-examine them. They insist that, unlike
regular courts, labor cases are decided based merely on the parties' position papers and affidavits in support of their allegations and
subsequent pleadings that may be filed thereto. As such, according to petitioners, the Rules of Court should not be strictly applied
in this case specifically by putting them on the witness stand to be cross-examined because the NLRC has its own rules of
procedure which were applied by the Labor Arbiter in coming up with a decision in their favor.
Respondents Defense:
1. That since the other alleged affiants were not presented in court to affirm their statements, much less to be crossexamined, their affidavits should, as the Court of Appeals rightly held, be stricken off the records for being selfserving, hearsay and inadmissible in evidence.
2. With respect to Nestor Romero, respondent points out that he should not have been impleaded in the instant petition since he
already voluntarily executed a Compromise Agreement, Waiver and Quitclaim in consideration of P450,000.00.
3. Finally, respondent argues that the instant petition should be dismissed in view of the failure of petitioners to sign the petition
as well as the verification and certification of non-forum shopping.
ISSUE: The crux of the controversy revolves around the propriety of giving evidentiary value to the affidavits despite the failure of the
affiants to affirm their contents and undergo the test of cross-examination.
RULING: The petition is impressed with merit. The issue confronting the Court is not without precedent in jurisprudence.
1.

2.

3.

The oft-cited case of Rabago v. NLRC squarely grapples a similar challenge involving the propriety of the use of affidavits
without the presentation of affiants for cross-examination. In that case, we held that "the argument that the affidavit is hearsay
because the affiants were not presented for cross-examination is not persuasive because the rules of evidence are not
strictly observed in proceedings before administrative bodies like the NLRC where decisions may be reached on the
basis of position papers only."
In Rase v. NLRC, this Court likewise sidelined a similar challenge when it ruled that it was not necessary for the affiants to
appear and testify and be cross-examined by counsel for the adverse party. To require otherwise would be to negate
the rationale and purpose of the summary nature of the proceedings mandated by the Rules and to make mandatory
the application of the technical rules of evidence.
Southern Cotabato Dev. and Construction Co. v. NLRC succinctly states that under Art. 221 of the Labor Code, the rules of
evidence prevailing in courts of law do not control proceedings before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC.

4.

5.

6.

7.

Further, it notes that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are authorized to adopt reasonable means to ascertain the facts in
each case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law and procedure, all in the interest of due
process. We find no compelling reason to deviate therefrom.
To reiterate, administrative bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the technical niceties of law and procedure and the rules
obtaining in courts of law. Indeed, the Revised Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence may be given only stringent
application, i.e., by analogy or in a suppletory character and effect.
The submission by respondent, citing People v. Sorrel, that an affidavit not testified to in a trial, is mere hearsay evidence and
has no real evidentiary value, cannot find relevance in the present case considering that a criminal prosecution
requires a quantum of evidence different from that of an administrative proceeding.
Under the Rules of the Commission, the Labor Arbiter is given the discretion to determine the necessity of a formal trial or
hearing. Hence, trial-type hearings are not even required as the cases may be decided based on verified position papers, with
supporting documents and their affidavits.

[G.R. No. 176240. October 17, 2008.]

ROLANDO SASAN, SR., LEONILO DAYDAY, MODESTO AGUIRRE, ALEJANDRO ARDIMER, ELEUTERIO
SACIL, WILFREDO JUEGOS, PETRONILO CARCEDO and CESAR PACIENCIA, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION 4TH DIVISION, EQUITABLE-PCI BANK and HELPMATE, INC.,respondents.

FACTS:
Respondent Equitable-PCI Bank (E-PCIBank), a banking entity duly organized and existing under and by virtue of Philippine laws,
entered into a Contract for Services with HI, a domestic corporation primarily engaged in the business of providing janitorial and
messengerial services. Pursuant to their contract, HI shall hire and assign workers to E-PCIBank to perform janitorial/messengerial and
maintenance services. The contract was impliedly renewed year after year. Petitioners Rolando Sasan, Sr., Leonilo Dayday, Modesto
Aguirre, Alejandro Ardimer, Eleuterio Sacil, Wilfredo Juegos, Petronilo Carcedo, and Cesar Peciencia were among those employed
and assigned to E-PCIBank at its branch along Gorordo Avenue, Lahug, Cebu City, as well as to its other branches in the Visayas.
On 23 July 2001, petitioners filed with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC in Cebu City separate complaints against E-PCIBank and HI
for illegal dismissal, with claims for separation pay, service incentive leave pay, allowances, damages, attorney's fees and
costs.
Several conciliation hearings were scheduled by Labor Arbiter Gutierrez but the parties still failed to arrive at a mutually beneficial
settlement; hence, Labor Arbiter Gutierrez ordered that they submit their respective position papers.

Petitioners Contentions: In their position papers, petitioners claimed that they had become regular employees of E-PCIBank with
respect to the activities for which they were employed, having continuously rendered janitorial and messengerial services to the bank for
more than one year; that E-PCIBank had direct control and supervision over the means and methods by which they were to perform
their jobs; and that their dismissal by HI was null and void because the latter had no power to do so since they had become regular
employees of E-PCIBank.
Respondent Banks Defenses: E-PCIBank averred that it entered into a Contract for Services with HI, an independent job contractor
which hired and assigned petitioners to the bank to perform janitorial and messengerial services thereat. It was HI that paid petitioners'
wages, monitored petitioners' daily time records (DTR) and uniforms, and exercised direct control and supervision over the petitioners
and that therefore HI has every right to terminate their services legally. E-PCIBank could not be held liable for whatever misdeed HI had
committed against its employees. TSacCH
Private Respondent HIs Defense: HI asserted that it was an independent job contractor engaged in the business of providing
janitorial and related services to business establishments, and E-PCIBank was one of its clients. Petitioners were its employees, part of
its pool of janitors/messengers assigned to E-PCIBank. The Contract for Services between HI and E-PCIBank expired on 15 July 2000.
E-PCIBank no longer renewed said contract with HI and, instead, bidded out its janitorial requirements to two other job contractors, Able
Services and Puritan. HI designated petitioners to new work assignments, but the latter refused to comply with the same. Petitioners
were not dismissed by HI, whether actually or constructively, thus, petitioners' complaints before the NLRC were without basis.

Decision of Labor Arbiter:

Labor Arbiter Gutierrez rendered a Decision finding that HI was not a legitimate job contractor on the ground that it did not possess the
required substantial capital or investment to actually perform the job, work, or service under its own account and responsibility as
required under the Labor Code. HI is therefore a labor-only contractor and the real employer of petitioners is E-PCIBank which is held
liable to petitioners.
Petitioners were made to perform not only as janitors but also as messengers, drivers and one of them even worked as an electrician.
For us, these jobs are not only directly related to the main business of the principal but are, likewise deemed necessary in the conduct
of respondent Equitable-PCI Bank's principal business. Thus, based on the above, we so declare that the [petitioners] are
employees of respondent Equitable-PCI Bank. And having worked with respondent Equitable-PCI Bank for more than one (1)
year, they are deemed regular employees. They cannot, therefore, be removed from employment without cause and without due
process, which is wanting in this case. Hence, the severance of their employment in the guise of termination of contract is illegal.
Petitioners shall be granted for separation pay, service incentive leave pay, allowances, damages, attorney's fees and costs.

Respondents E-PCIBank and HI appealed the same to the NLRC. In support of its allegation that it was a legitimate job contractor, HI
submitted before the NLRC several documents which it did not present before Labor Arbiter Gutierrez. These are: CDESIA
1. Certificate of Filing of Certificate of Increase of Capital Stock, Certificate of Filing Amended Articles of
Incorporation, and General Information Sheet Stock Corporation of HI showing therein that it increased its
authorized capital stock from P1,500,000.00 to P20,000,000.00 on 12 March 1999 with the Securities and
Exchange Commission;
2. Audited Financial Statement of HI showing therein that it has Total Assets of P20,939,935.72 as of 31 December
2000;
3. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 110173 and Tax Declaration No. GR2K-09-063-00582 registered under the name
of HI showing that it has a parcel of land with Market Value of P1,168,860.00 located along Rizal Avenue
(now Bacalso Avenue), Cebu City, and
4. Tax Declaration No. GR2K-09-063-00583 registered under the name of HI showing that it has a commercial
building constructed on the preceding lot located along Bacalso Avenue, Cebu City with market value of
P2,515,170.00.
Decision of the NLRC: Modifiedthe ruling of Labor Arbiter Gutierrez. The NLRC took into consideration the documentary evidence
presented by HI for the first time on appeal and, on the basis thereof, declared HI as a highly capitalized venture with sufficient
capitalization, which cannot be considered engaged in "labor-only contracting". CAaDSI
On the charge of illegal dismissal, the NLRC ruled that:
The charge of illegal dismissal was prematurely filed. The record shows that barely eight (8) days from 15 July 2001
when the complainants were placed on a temporary "off-detail", they filed their complaints on 23 July 2001 and
amended their complaints on 22 August 2001 against the respondents on the presumption that their services were
already terminated. Temporary "off-detail" is not equivalent to dismissal. . . . .
The NLRC deleted Labor Arbiter Gutierrez's award of backwages and separation pay, but affirmed his award for 13th month pay and
attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the 13th month pay, to the petitioners.
Petitioners sought recourse with the Court of Appeals which affirmed the findings of the NLRC that HI was a legitimate job contractor
and that it did not illegally dismiss petitioners. Petitioners object to the acceptance and consideration by the NLRC of the evidence
presented by HI for the first time on appeal.
PROCEDURAL (EVIDENCE) ISSUE: WON the NLRC was correct in accepting and considering the evidence presented by HI for the
first time on appeal.
RULING: YES
1. Petitioners object to the acceptance and consideration by the NLRC of the evidence presented by HI for the first time on appeal. Our
jurisprudence is already replete with cases allowing the NLRC to admit evidence, not presented before the Labor Arbiter, and submitted
to the NLRC for the first time on appeal. Technical rules of evidence are not binding in labor cases. Labor officials should use every
reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in
the interest of due process.
The submission of additional evidence before the NLRC is not prohibited by its New Rules of Procedure. After all, rules of
evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity are not controlling in labor cases. The NLRC and labor arbiters are directed to
use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to
technicalities of law and procedure all in the interest of substantial justice. In keeping with this directive, it has been held that the
NLRC may consider evidence, such as documents and affidavits, submitted by the parties for the first time on appeal. The submission
of additional evidence on appeal does not prejudice the other party for the latter could submit counter-evidence.
2. For the same reasons, we cannot find merit in petitioners' protestations against the documentary evidence submitted by HI because
they were mere photocopies. Evidently, petitioners are invoking the best evidence rule, espoused in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of

Court which provides that: when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself.
Notably, certified true copies of these documents, acceptable under the Rules of Court were furnished to the petitioners. Even
assuming that petitioners were given mere photocopies, again, we stress that proceedings before the NLRC are not covered
by the technical rules of evidence and procedure as observed in the regular courts. Technical rules of evidence do not apply if
the decision to grant the petition proceeds from an examination of its sufficiency as well as a careful look into the arguments
contained in position papers and other documents.
3. Petitioners had more than adequate opportunity when they filed their motion for reconsideration before the NLRC, their Petition to the
Court of Appeals and even to this Court, to refute or present their counter-evidence to the documentary evidence presented by HI.
Having failed in this respect, petitioners cannot now be heard to complain about these documentary evidences presented by HI upon
which the NLRC and the Court of Appeals based its finding that HI is a legitimate job contractor. Petitioners herein were afforded every
opportunity to be heard and to seek reconsideration of the adverse judgment against them. They had every opportunity to strengthen
their positions by presenting their own substantial evidence to controvert those submitted by E-PCIBank and HI before the NLRC, and
even before the Court of Appeals. It cannot win its case by merely raising unsubstantiated doubt or relying on the weakness of the
adverse parties' evidence. CaASIc
SUBSTANTIVE (LABOR) ISSUE: Whether HI is a labor-only contractor and E-PCIBank should be deemed petitioners' principal
employer; and whether petitioners were illegally dismissed from their employment.
RULING:
HI is a legitimate job contractor. HI has been issued by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Certificate of Registration.
Having been issued by a public officer, this certification carries with it the presumption that it was issued in the regular performance of
official duty. In the absence of proof, petitioner's bare assertion cannot prevail over this presumption. Moreover, the DOLE being the
agency primarily responsible for regulating the business of independent job contractors, we can presume in the absence of evidence to
the contrary that it thoroughly evaluated the requirements submitted by HI as a precondition to the issuance of the Certificate of
Registration.
HI has substantial capital in the amount of P20,939,935.72. It has its own building where it holds office and it has been engaged in
business for more than a decade now. As observed by the Court of Appeals, surely, such a well-established business entity cannot be
considered a labor-only contractor.
Etched in an unending stream of cases are four standards in determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, namely:
(a) the manner of selection and engagement of the putative employee; (b) the mode of payment of wages; (c) the presence or absence
of power of dismissal; and, (d) the presence or absence of control of the putative employee's conduct. Most determinative among these
factors is the so-called "control test".
The presence of the first requisite for the existence of an employer-employee relationship to wit, the selection and engagement of the
employee is shown by the fact that it was HI which selected and engaged the services of petitioners as its employees. This is fortified by
the provision in the contract of services between HI and E-PCIBank which states:
Selection, Engagement, Discharge. [HI] shall have exclusive discretion in the selection, engagement, investigation,
discipline and discharge of its employees.
On the second requisite regarding the payment of wages, it was HI who paid petitioners their wages and who provided their daily time
records and uniforms and other materials necessary for the work they performed. Therefore, it is HI who is responsible for petitioner's
claims for wages and other employee's benefits. Precisely, the contract of services between HI and E-PCIBank reveals the following:
Indemnity for Salaries and Benefits, etc. [HI] shall be responsible for the salaries, allowances, overtime and holiday
pay, and other benefits of its personnel including withholding taxes.
As to the third requisite on the power to control the employee's conduct, and the fourth requisite regarding the power of dismissal,
again E-PCIBank did not have the power to control petitioners with respect to the means and methods by which their work was to be
accomplished. It likewise had no power of dismissal over the petitioners. All that E-PCIBank could do was to report to HI any untoward
act, negligence, misconduct or malfeasance of any employee assigned to the premises. The contract of services between E-PCIBank
and HI is noteworthy. It states: EaScHT
[HI] shall have the entire charge, control and supervision over all its employees who may be fielded to [E-PCIBank].
For this purpose, [HI] shall assign a regular supervisor of its employees who may be fielded to the Bank and which

regular supervisor shall exclusively supervise and control the activities and functions defined in Section 1 hereof. . .
..
All these circumstances establish that HI undertook said contract on its account, under its own responsibility, according to its own
manner and method, and free from the control and direction of E-PCIBank. Where the control of the principal is limited only to the result
of the work, independent job contracting exists. The janitorial service agreement between E-PCIBank and HI is definitely a case of
permissible job contracting.
Considering the foregoing, plus taking judicial notice of the general practice in private, as well as in government institutions and
industries, of hiring an independent contractor to perform special services, ranging from janitorial, security and even technical services,
we can only conclude that HI is a legitimate job contractor. As such legitimate job contractor, the law creates an employeremployee relationship between HI and petitioners which renders HI liable for the latter's claims.
In view of the preceding conclusions, petitioners will never become regular employees of E-PCIBank regardless of how long
they were working for the latter.
We further rule that petitioners were not illegally dismissed by HI. Upon the termination of the Contract of Service between HI and
E-PCIBank, petitioners cannot insist to continue to work for the latter. Their pull-out from E-PCIBank did not constitute illegal
dismissal since, first, petitioners were not employees of E-PCIBank; and second,they were pulled out from said assignment
due to the non-renewal of the Contract of Service between HI and E-PCIBank. At the time they filed their complaints with the Labor
Arbiter, petitioners were not even dismissed by HI; they were only "off-detail" pending their re-assignment by HI to another client. And
when they were actually given new assignments by HI with other clients, petitioners even refused the same. As the NLRC pronounced,
petitioners' complaint for illegal dismissal is apparently premature.

[G.R. No. 190515. June 6, 2011.]

CIRTEK EMPLOYEES LABOR
UNION-FEDERATION
WORKERS, petitioner, vs. CIRTEK ELECTRONICS, INC., respondent.

OF

FREE

FACTS:
Respondents Contentions:
1. That petitioner, in filing the petition for certiorari under Rule 65, availed of the wrong remedy, hence, the Court should have
dismissed the petition outright.
2. That the Court erred in resolving a factual issue whether the August 24, 2005 Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) was
validly entered into , which is not the office of a petition for certiorari.
3. That the MOA signed by the remaining officers of petitioner Union and allegedly ratified by its members should have been
given credence by the Court.
4. Maintains that the Secretary of Labor cannot insist on a ruling beyond the compromise agreement entered into by the parties;
and that, as early as February 5, 2010, petitioner Union had already filed with the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) a resolution of disaffiliation from the Federation of Free Workers resulting in the latter's lack of personality to represent
the workers in the present case.
ISSUE: The findings of the Secretary of Labor and the appellate court on whether the MOA is valid and binding are conflicting, the
former giving scant consideration thereon, and the latter affording it more weight.
RULING:
1.

2.

3.

Respondent indeed availed of the wrong remedy of certiorari under Rule 65. Due, however, to the nature of the case, one
involving workers' wages and benefits, and the fact that whether the petition was filed under Rule 65 or appeal
by certiorari under Rule 45 it was filed within 15 days (the reglementary period under Rule 45) from petitioner's receipt of the
resolution of the Court of Appeals' Resolution denying its motion for reconsideration, the Court resolved to give it due course.
As a general rule. an appeal taken either to the Supreme Court or the CA by the wrong or inappropriate mode shall be
dismissed. This is to prevent the party from benefiting from one's neglect and mistakes. However, there are exceptions.
After all, the ultimate purpose of all rules of procedures is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible.
Respecting the attribution of error to the Court in ruling on a question of fact, it bears recalling that a QUESTION OF FACT
arises when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of alleged fact, while a QUESTION OF LAW exists
when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain set of facts.
In determining arbitral awards then, aside from the MOA, courts considered other factors and documents including, as in this
case, the financial documents submitted by respondent as well as its previous bargaining history and financial outlook and
improvements as stated in its own website.
The appellate court's ruling that giving credence to the "Pahayag" and the minutes of the meeting which were not verified and
notarized would violate the rule on parol evidence is erroneous. The parol evidence rule, like other rules on evidence,
should not be strictly applied in labor cases. Interphil Laboratories Employees Union-FFW v. Interphil Laboratories,
Inc. teaches:
[R]eliance on the parol evidence rule is misplaced. In labor cases pending before the Commission or the
Labor Arbiter, the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity are not controlling. Rules of
procedure and evidence are not applied in a very rigid and technical sense in labor cases. Hence, the
Labor Arbiter is not precluded from accepting and evaluating evidence other than, and even contrary to,
what is stated in the CBA.

4.

On the contention that the MOA should have been given credence because it was validly entered into by the parties,
the Court notes that even those who signed it expressed reservations thereto. A CBA (assuming in this case that the
MOA can be treated as one) is a contract imbued with public interest. It must thus be given a liberal, practical and
realistic, rather than a narrow and technical construction, with due consideration to the context in which it is
negotiated and the purpose for which it is intended.

5.

As for the contention that the alleged disaffiliation of the Union from the FFW during the pendency of the case
resulted in the FFW losing its personality to represent the Union, the same does not affect the Court's upholding of
the authority of the Secretary of Labor to impose arbitral awards higher than what was supposedly agreed upon in the
MOA. Contrary to respondent's assertion, the "unavoidable issue of disaffiliation" bears no significant legal
repercussions to warrant the reversal of the Court's Decision.
En passant, whether there was a valid disaffiliation is a factual issue. Besides, the alleged disaffiliation of the Union from the
FFW was by virtue of a Resolution signed on February 23, 2010 and submitted to the DOLE Laguna Field Office on March 5,
2010 two months after the present petition was filed on December 22, 2009, hence, it did not affect FFW and its Legal
Center's standing to file the petition nor this Court's jurisdiction to resolve the same.

[G.R. No. 177407. February 9, 2011.]

RICO ROMMEL ATIENZA, petitioner, vs. BOARD OF MEDICINE and EDITHA SIOSON, respondents.

FACTS:
Due to her lumbar pains, private respondent Editha Sioson went to Rizal Medical Center (RMC) for check-up on February 4,
1995. Sometime in 1999, due to the same problem, she was referred to Dr. Pedro Lantin III of RMC who, accordingly, ordered
several diagnostic laboratory tests. The tests revealed that her right kidney is normal. It was ascertained, however, that her left
kidney is non-functioning and non-visualizing. Thus, she underwent kidney operation in September, 1999.
On February 18, 2000, private respondent's husband, Romeo Sioson (as complainant), filed a complaint for gross
negligence and/or incompetence before the [BOM] against the doctors who allegedly participated in the fateful kidney
operation, namely: Dr. Judd dela Vega, Dr. Pedro Lantin, III, Dr. Gerardo Antonio Florendo and petitioner Rico
Rommel Atienza.
It was alleged in the complaint that the gross negligence and/or incompetence committed by the said doctors, including
petitioner, consists of the removal of private respondent's fully functional right kidney, instead of the left nonfunctioning and non-visualizing kidney.The complaint was heard by the [BOM]. After complainant Romeo Sioson presented
his evidence, private respondent Editha Sioson, also named as complainant there, filed her formal offer of documentary
evidence. Attached to the formal offer of documentary evidence are her Exhibits "A" to "D," which she offered for the
purpose of proving that her kidneys were both in their proper anatomical locations at the time she was operated. She described
her exhibits, as follows: ADaEIH
"EXHIBIT 'A' the certified photocopy of the X-ray Request form dated December 12, 1996, which is also marked as Annex
'2' as it was actually originally the Annex to . . . Dr. Pedro Lantin, III's counter affidavit filed with the City Prosecutor of Pasig
City in connection with the criminal complaint filed by [Romeo Sioson] with the said office, on which are handwritten entries
which are the interpretation of the results of the ultrasound examination. Incidentally, this exhibit happens to be the same as or
identical to the certified photocopy of the document marked as Annex '2' to the Counter-Affidavit dated March 15, 2000, filed by
. . . Dr. Pedro Lantin, III, on May 4, 2000, with this Honorable Board in answer to this complaint;
"EXHIBIT 'B' the certified photo copy of the X-ray request form dated January 30, 1997, which is also marked as Annex '3'
as it was actually likewise originally an Annex to . . . Dr. Pedro Lantin, III's counter-affidavit filed with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Pasig City in connection with the criminal complaint filed by the herein complainant with the said office, on which
are handwritten entries which are the interpretation of the results of the examination. Incidentally, this exhibit happens to be
also the same as or identical to the certified photo copy of the document marked as Annex '3' which is likewise dated January
30, 1997, which is appended as such Annex '3' to the counter-affidavit dated March 15, 2000, filed by . . . Dr. Pedro Lantin, III
on May 4, 2000, with this Honorable Board in answer to this complaint.
"EXHIBIT 'C' the certified photocopy of the X-ray request form dated March 16, 1996, which is also marked as Annex '4,' on
which are handwritten entries which are the interpretation of the results of the examination.
EXHIBIT 'D' the certified photocopy of the X-ray request form dated May 20, 1999, which is also marked as Annex '16,' on
which are handwritten entries which are the interpretation of the results of the examination. Incidentally, this exhibit appears to
be the draft of the typewritten final report of the same examination which is the document appended as Annexes '4' and '1'
respectively to the counter-affidavits filed by . . . Dr. Judd dela Vega and Dr. Pedro Lantin, III in answer to the complaint. In the
case of Dr. dela Vega however, the document which is marked as Annex '4' is not a certified photocopy, while in the case of Dr.
Lantin, the document marked as Annex '1' is a certified photocopy. Both documents are of the same date and typewritten
contents are the same as that which are written on Exhibit 'D.'
Petitioners Allegations: He alleged that said exhibits are inadmissible because the same are mere photocopies, not properly
identified and authenticated, and intended to establish matters which are hearsay. He added that the exhibits are incompetent
to prove the purpose for which they are offered.

The Board of Medicine admitted the documentary evidence offered by private respondent. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration.The [BOM] denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner in its Order dated October 8, 2004. It concluded
that it should first admit the evidence being offered so that it can determine its probative value when it decides the case.
According to the Board, it can determine whether the evidence is relevant or not if it will take a look at it through the
process of admission. . . . . Disagreeing with the BOM, and as previously adverted to, Atienza filed a petition for certiorari with
the CA, assailing the BOM's Orders which admitted Editha Sioson's (Editha's) Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence. The CA
dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit.
ISSUES:
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE:
WHETHER PETITIONER ATIENZA AVAILED OF THE PROPER REMEDY WHEN HE FILED THE PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI DATED 06 DECEMBER 2004 WITH THE COURTOF APPEALS UNDER RULE
65 OF THE RULES OF COURT TO ASSAIL THE ORDERS DATED 26 MAY 2004 AND 08 OCTOBER
2004 OF RESPONDENT BOARD.
II. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR AND DECIDED A
QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND THE APPLICABLE
DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT UPHELD THE ADMISSION OF INCOMPETENT
AND INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE BY RESPONDENT BOARD, WHICH CAN RESULT IN THE
DEPRIVATION OF PROFESSIONAL LICENSE A PROPERTY RIGHT OR ONE'S LIVELIHOOD. 4
RULING: We find no reason to depart from the ruling of the CA.
1. Petitioner is correct when he asserts that a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy to assail the Orders of the BOM, admitting in
evidence the exhibits of Editha. As the assailed Orders were interlocutory, these cannot be the subject of an appeal separate from the
judgment that completely or finally disposes of the case. At that stage, where there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, the only and remaining remedy left to petitioner is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
However, the writ of certiorari will not issue absent a showing that the BOM has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion. Embedded in the CA's finding that the BOM did not exceed its jurisdiction or act in grave abuse of discretion is the
issue of whether the exhibits of Editha contained in her Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence are inadmissible.
Petitioners Arguments: That the exhibits formally offered in evidence by Editha: (1) violate the best evidence rule; (2) have not been
properly identified and authenticated; (3) are completely hearsay; and (4) are incompetent to prove their purpose. Thus, petitioner
contends that the exhibits are inadmissible evidence.
2. We disagree.
To begin with, it is well-settled that the rules of evidence are not strictly applied in proceedings before administrative bodies
such as the BOM. Although trial courts are enjoined to observe strict enforcement of the rules of evidence, in connection with
evidence which may appear to be of doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or admissibility, we have held that:
[I]t is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful or technical grounds, but admitting them unless
plainly irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that their rejection places them beyond the
consideration of the court, if they are thereafter found relevant or competent; on the other hand, their admission, if
they turn out later to be irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be remedied by completely discarding them or ignoring
them.
From the foregoing, we emphasize the distinction between the admissibility of evidence and the probative weight to be accorded the
same pieces of evidence. PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation v. Court of Appeals teaches:
Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the circumstance (or evidence) is to be
considered at all. On the other hand, the Probative value of evidence refers to the question of whether or not it
proves an issue. CIaHDc

3. Petitioner's insistence that the admission of Editha's exhibits violated his substantive rights leading to the loss of his medical license is
misplaced. Petitioner mistakenly relies on Section 20, Article I of the Professional Regulation Commission Rules of Procedure, which
reads:
Section 20. Administrative investigation shall be conducted in accordance with these Rules. The Rules of Court
shall only apply in these proceedings by analogy or on a suppletory character and whenever practicable and
convenient. Technical errors in the admission of evidence which do not prejudice the substantive rights ofeither
party shall not vitiate the proceedings.
As pointed out by the appellate court, the admission of the exhibits did not prejudice the substantive rights of petitioner
because, at any rate, the fact sought to be proved thereby, that the two kidneys of Editha were in their proper anatomical
locations at the time she was operated on, is presumed under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be
contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
xxx xxx xxx
(y) That things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.
The exhibits are certified photocopies of X-ray Request Forms dated December 12, 1996, January 30, 1997, March 16, 1996, and May
20, 1999, filed in connection with Editha's medical case. The documents contain handwritten entries interpreting the results of the
examination. These exhibits were actually attached as annexes to Dr. Pedro Lantin III's counter affidavit filed with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Pasig City, which was investigating the criminal complaint for negligence filed by Editha against the doctors of Rizal
Medical Center (RMC) who handled her surgical procedure. To lay the predicate for her case, Editha offered the exhibits in evidence to
prove that her "kidneys were both in their proper anatomical locations at the time" of her operation.
The fact sought to be established by the admission of Editha's exhibits, that her "kidneys were both in their proper anatomical locations
at the time" of her operation, need not be proved as it is covered by mandatory judicial notice.
Unquestionably, the rules of evidence are merely the means for ascertaining the truth respecting a matter of fact. Thus, they likewise
provide for some facts which are established and need not be proved, such as those covered by judicial notice, both mandatory and
discretionary. Laws of nature involving the physical sciences, specifically biology, nclude the structural make-up and
composition of living things such as human beings. In this case, we may take judicial notice that Editha's kidneys before, and at the
time of, her operation, as with most human beings, were in their proper anatomical locations.
4. Contrary to the assertion of petitioner, the best evidence rule is inapplicable. Section 3 of Rule 130 provides:
1. Best Evidence Rule
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the
part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and
the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court
without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole;
and CAIaDT
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.
5. Finally, these exhibits do not constitute hearsay evidence of the anatomical locations of Editha's kidneys. To further drive
home the point, the anatomical positions, whether left or right, of Editha's kidneys, and the removal of one or both, may still be
established through a belated ultrasound or x-ray of her abdominal area.
In fact, the introduction of secondary evidence, such as copies of the exhibits, is allowed. Witness Dr. Nancy Aquino testified
that the Records Office of RMC no longer had the originals of the exhibits "because [it] transferred from the previous building, . . . to the
new building." Ultimately, since the originals cannot be produced, the BOM properly admitted Editha's formal offer of evidence
and, thereafter, the BOM shall determine the probative value thereof when it decides the case.

[G.R. No. 153031. December 14, 2006.]

PCL SHIPPING PHILIPPINES, INC. and U-MING MARINE TRANSPORT CORPORATION, petitioners, vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and STEVE RUSEL, respondents.

FACTS:
In April 1996, Rusel was employed as GP/AB seaman by manning agency, PCL Shipping Philippines, Inc. (PCL Shipping) for
and in behalf of its foreign principal, U-Ming Marine Transport Corporation (U-Ming Marine). Rusel thereby joined the vessel
MV Cemtex General (MV Cemtex) for the contract period of twelve (12) months with a basic monthly salary of US$400.00,
living allowance of US$140.00, fixed overtime rate of US$120.00 per month, vacation leave with pay of US$40.00 per month
and special allowance of US$175.00.
On July 16, 1996, while Rusel was cleaning the vessel's kitchen, he slipped, and as a consequence thereof, he suffered a
broken and/or sprained ankle on his left foot. A request for medical examination was flatly denied by the captain of the
vessel. On August 13, 1996, feeling an unbearable pain in his ankle, Rusel jumped off the vessel using a life jacket
and swam to shore. He was brought to a hospital where he was confined for eight (8) days.
On August 22, 1996, a vessel's agent fetched Rusel from the hospital and was required to board a plane bound for the
Philippines.
On September 26, 1996, Rusel filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of wages, overtime pay, claim for
medical benefits, sick leave pay and damages against PCL Shipping and U-Ming Marine before the arbitration branch of the
NLRC. In their answer, the latter alleged that Rusel deserted his employment by jumping off the vessel.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision and found the respondent liable for unjust repatriation of the complainant. Petitioners
appealed to the NLRC. The NLRC affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter but modified the appealed Decision in that the
amount representing three months salary of the complainant due to his illegal dismissal is reduced to US$1,620.00. Further the
award of sick wage benefit is deleted. All other dispositions are AFFIRMED.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the NLRC denied the same in its Decision of May 3, 2000.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. In its Decision dated December 18, 2001, the CA dismissed the petition and
affirmed the NLRC Decision. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated April 10,
2002. Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioners Contentions:
1. That the CA erred in affirming the findings of the NLRC that Rusel's act of jumping ship does not establish any intent on his
part to abandon his job and never return. Petitioners argue that Rusel's very act of jumping from the vessel and swimming to
shore is evidence of highest degree that he has no intention of returning to his job.
2. That if Rusel was indeed suffering from unbearable and unmitigated pain, it is unlikely that he is able to swim two (2) nautical
miles, which is the distance between their ship and the shore, considering that he needed to use his limbs in swimming.
3. That it is error on the part of the CA to disregard the entries contained in the logbook and in the Marine Note Protest
evidencing Rusels' offense of desertion because while these pieces of evidence were belatedly presented, the settled rule is
that additional evidence may be admitted on appeal in labor cases.
4. That Rusel's act of desertion is a grave and serious offense and considering the nature and situs of employment as well as the
nationality of the employer, the twin requirements of notice and hearing before an employee can be validly terminated may be
dispensed with.
5. Petitioners contend that assuming, for the sake of argument, that Rusel is not guilty of desertion, they invoked the alternative
defense that the termination of his employment was validly made pursuant to petitioners' right to exercise their prerogative to
pre-terminate such employment in accordance with Section 19(C) of the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the
Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels, which provision was incorporated in Rusel's Contract of
Employment with petitioners. Petitioners assert that despite the fact that this issue was raised before the CA, the appellate
court failed to resolve the same.

6.

Petitioners argue that it is error on the part of the CA to affirm the award of living allowance, overtime pay, vacation pay and
special allowance for two months because Rusel failed to submit substantial evidence to prove that he is entitled to these
awards.
7. Petitioners further argue that these money claims, particularly the claim for living allowance, should not be granted because
they partake of the nature of earned benefits for services rendered by a seafarer.
8. Petitioners also contend that the balance of Rusel's wages from August 11-22, 1996 should be applied for the payment of the
costs of his repatriation, considering that under Section 19(E) of the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the
Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels, when a seafarer is discharged for any just cause, the
employer shall have the right to recover the costs of his replacement and repatriation from the seafarer's wages and other
earnings.
9. Lastly, petitioners argue that the award of attorney's fees should be deleted because there is nothing in the decision of the
Labor Arbiter or the NLRC which states the reason why attorney's fees are being awarded.
Respondents Contentions:
1. That petitioners are raising issues of fact which have already been resolved by the Labor Arbiter, NLRC and the CA.
2. Private respondent argues that, aside from the fact that the issues raised were already decided by three tribunals against
petitioners' favor, it is a settled rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court. While there are exceptions to this rule, private respondent contends that the instant case does not fall
under any of these exceptions.
3. Private respondent asserts that petitioners failed to substantiate their claim that the former is guilty of desertion.
4. Private respondent further contends that the right to due process is available to local and overseas workers alike, pursuant to
the provisions of the Constitution on labor and equal protection as well as the declared policy contained in the Labor Code.
5. Private respondent argues that petitioners' act of invoking the provisions of Section 19(C) of the POEA Contract as an
alternative defense is misplaced and is inconsistent with their primary defense that private respondent was dismissed on the
ground of desertion.
6. As to the award of attorney's fees, private respondent contends that since petitioners' act compelled the former to incur
expenses to protect his interest and enforce his lawful claims, and because petitioners acted in gross and evident bad faith in
refusing to satisfy private respondent's lawful claims, it is only proper that attorney's fees be awarded in favor of the latter.
7. Anent the other monetary awards, private respondent argues that these awards are all premised on the findings of the Labor
Arbiter, NLRC and the CA that private respondent's dismissal was improper and illegal.
ISSUE: WON Petitioners were able to present substantial evidence to prove there was no illegal dismissal of private respondent.
RULING: The Court finds the petition without merit.
1.

2.

It is a settled rule that under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised in this Court. Judicial review
by this Court does not extend to a re-evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the proper labor tribunal has
based its determination. Firm is the doctrine that this Court is not a trier of facts, and this applies with greater force in labor
cases. Factual issues may be considered and resolved only when the findings of facts and conclusions of law of the Labor
Arbiter are inconsistent with those of the NLRC and the CA. The reason for this is that the quasi-judicial agencies, like the
Arbitration Board and the NLRC, have acquired a unique expertise because their jurisdiction are confined to specific
matters. In the present case, the question of whether private respondent is guilty of desertion is factual. The Labor
Arbiter, NLRC and the CA are unanimous in their findings that private respondent is not guilty of desertion and that
he has been illegally terminated from his employment. After a review of the records of the instant case, this Court
finds no cogent reason to depart from the findings of these tribunals.
Petitioners assert that the entries in the logbook of MV Cemtex General and in the Marine Note Protest which they submitted
to the NLRC confirm the fact that private respondent abandoned the vessel in which he was assigned.
However, the genuineness of the Marine Note Protest as well as the entries in the logbook are put in doubt because aside from
the fact that they were presented only during petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration filed with the NLRC, both the Marine Note
Protest and the entry in the logbook which were prepared by the officers of the vessel were neither notarized nor authenticated
by the proper authorities. Moreover, a reading of these entries simply shows that private respondent was presumed to
have deserted his post on the sole basis that he was found missing while the MV Cemtex General was anchored at
the port of Takehara, Japan. Hence, without any corroborative evidence, these documents cannot be used as bases
for concluding that private respondent was guilty of desertion. aDATHC

3.

Petitioners also question the findings and conclusion of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that what caused private respondent in
jumping overboard was the unmitigated pain he was suffering which was compounded by the inattention of the vessel's captain
to provide him with the necessary treatment inspite of the fact that the ship was moored for about two weeks at the anchorage
of Takehara, Japan; and, that private respondent's act was a desperate move to protect himself and to seek relief for his
physical suffering.
Petitioners contend that the findings and conclusions of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC which were affirmed by the CA are
based on conjecture because there is no evidence to prove that, at the time he jumped ship, private respondent was really
suffering from an ankle injury.
It is true that no substantial evidence was presented to prove that the cause of private respondent's confinement in a hospital
In Takehara, Japan was his ankle injury. The Court may not rely on the letter marked as Annex "B" and attached to private
respondent's Position Paper because it was unsigned and it was not established who executed the same. However, the
result of the x-ray examination conducted by the LLN Medical Services, Inc. on August 26, 1996, right after private
respondent was repatriated to the Philippines, clearly showed that there is a soft-tissue swelling around his ankle
joint. This evidence is consistent with private respondent's claim that he was then suffering from an ankle injury
which caused him to jump off the ship.

4.

5.

As to petitioners' contention that private respondent could not have traversed the distance between the ship and the shore if he
was indeed suffering from unbearable pain by reason of his ankle injury, suffice it to say that private respondent is an ablebodied seaman and that with the full use of both his arms and the help of a life jacket, was able to reach the shore.
For a seaman to be considered as guilty of desertion, it is essential that there be evidence to prove that if he leaves the
ship or vessel in which he had engaged to perform a voyage, he has the clear intention of abandoning his duty and of
not returning to the ship or vessel. In the present case, however, petitioners failed to present clear and convincing
proof to show that when private respondent jumped ship, he no longer had the intention of returning. The fact alone
that he jumped off the ship where he was stationed, swam to shore and sought medical assistance for the injury he
sustained is not a sufficient basis for petitioners to conclude that he had the intention of deserting his post. Settled is
the rule that in termination cases, the burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the dismissal is for a just and valid
cause. The case of the employer must stand or fall on its own merits and not on the weakness of the employee's defense. In
the present case, since petitioners failed to discharge their burden of proving that private respondent is guilty of
desertion, the Court finds no reason to depart from the conclusion of the Labor Arbiter, NLRC and the CA that private
respondent's dismissal is illegal.

[G.R. No. 156284. February 6, 2007.]

AUGUSTO GOMEZ, as Special Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Consuelo Gomez, petitioner, vs.
MARIA RITA GOMEZ-SAMSON, MARCIAL SAMSON, JESUS B. GOMEZ, and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
PASIG and MARIKINA, RIZAL, respondents.
AUGUSTO GOMEZ, as Special Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Consuelo Gomez, petitioner, vs.
ARISTON A. GOMEZ, SR. (who died during the pendency of the cases below and substituted by his
surviving wife, LUZ BAYSON GOMEZ, and children namely: ARISTON B. GOMEZ, JR., MA. RITA GOMEZSAMSON, JESUS B. GOMEZ, MA. TERESA G. BLOOM, MARIANO B. GOMEZ, and CARLOS B. GOMEZ) and
ARISTON B. GOMEZ, JR.,respondents.
FACTS:
CONSUELO, ARISTON, SR. and Angel, all surnamed Gomez, were sister and brothers, respectively. MARIA-RITA GomezSamson, JESUS Gomez and ARISTON Gomez, JR. are the children of ARISTON, SR. while AUGUSTO Gomez is the child of
Angel.
Plaintiffs Allegations:
In Civil Case No. 36089, plaintiff AUGUSTO alleged in his complaint that CONSUELO, who died on November 6, 1979, was
the owner of the following 4 real properties located in Metro Manila and
1. That after the death of Consuelo, defendants Rita and Jesus fraudulently prepared and/or caused to be prepared a
Deed of Donation Intervivos; that in the said document, Consuelo donated the above described properties to
defendants Rita and Jesus;
2. That the said defendants forged or caused to be forged the signature of the donor, Consuelo;
3. That the notarial acknowledgement on the said document was antedated to April 21, 1979;
4. That on the basis of the said document defendants sought the cancellation of the certificates of title in the name of
Consuelo and the issuance of new ones in the names of defendants Rita and Jesus.
On the basis of the foregoing, plaintiff prayed that the Deed of Donation Intervivos be declared false, null and void ab initio,
and/or be nullified; that the TCTs of the parcels of land be reinstated or be replaced by titles in the name of the Intestate Estate
of Consuelo Gomez; and, that defendants be ordered to pay damages, by way of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation plus
costs.
Defendants Answer/ Defenses:
1. Denied the material allegations in the complaint and asserting that a copy of the deed of donation was submitted to
the Notarial Section of the CFI of Quezon City as early as July 2, 1979;
2. That the said document is valid and not a forgery or otherwise subject to similar infirmity;
3. That the said document being valid, the properties covered therein passed in ownership to private defendants, as
early as April 20, 1979;
4. That defendants have the perfect and absolute right to cause the cancellation of TCT Nos. 340233, 353818, and
26839 and request for the issuance of new certificates of titles in their respective names;
5. That they have the right to use, enjoy, possess, dispose and own these properties;
6. That no law was violated by the nominal defendants when the old certificates of title were cancelled and new
certificates were issued in the name of the private defendants, hence, plaintiff has no cause of action against the
nominal defendants neither has the court jurisdiction over the foregoing issue.
Defendants thereafter prayed for moral damages, compensatory damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees and that
individual plaintiff be made jointly and severally liable with the estate of Consuelo Gomez.
In Civil Case No. 36090, the same plaintiff alleged in his complaint that Consuelo was also the sole and absolute owner of the
following personal properties and made the same allegations (forgery, fraud) against the defendants.
(a) Seventy-five (75) common shares of stock of V-Tri Realty, Inc. with a total par value of P75,000.00 and covered
by Stock Certificate No. 003;
(b) Eleven thousand eight hundred fifty three (11,853) common shares of stock of First Philippine Holdings
Corporation with a total par value of P118,530.00 covered by Stock Certificates Nos. A-02614 (7,443 shares) and
A-02613 (2,040 shares) and A-09018 (2,370 shares);

(c) Jewelries and collector's items, contained in Consuelo Gomez's Safe Deposit Box No. 44 at the PCI Bank,
Marikina Branch, which were inventoried on January 9, 1980 per Order of the Court in Special Proceedings No.
9164;
(d) A four-door sedan 1978 Mercedes Benz 200 with Motor No. 11593810-050706, Serial/Chassis No. 12302050069893, Plate No. A6-252 and LTC Registration Certificate No. 0140373 valued at P200,000.00, more or less at the
time Consuelo Gomez died;
(e) A four-door sedan 1979 Toyota Corona with Motor No. 12RM-031643, Serial/Chassis No. RT-130-901150, Plate
No. B-09-373 and LTC Registration Certificate No. 0358757, valued at P50,000.00, more or less at the time
Consuelo Gomez died;
(f) Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) including accrued interests on money market placement with the
BA Finance Corporation per its promissory note No. BAT-0116 dated March 9, 1978.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner was able to prove that the Deeds of Donation were merely intercalated into two sheets of paper signed by
Consuelo Gomez (Consuelo).

RULING:
The only direct evidence presented by petitioner on this matter is the testimony of Zenaida Torres, Document Examiner of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Respondents, on the other hand, presented their own expert witness, Francisco Cruz, Chief of Document
Examination of the PC-INP Crime Laboratory. Other direct evidence presented by respondents includes testimonies positively stating
that the Deeds of Donation were signed by Consuelo in their completed form in the presence of Notary Public Jose Sebastian. These
testimonies are that of Jose Sebastian himself, and that of several of the respondents including Ariston Gomez, Jr. (Ariston, Jr.), who
allegedly drafted said Deeds of Donation.
Petitioners Expert witness testimony:
1. Zenaida Torres's testimony, as noted by the trial court, was that she had examined the two Deeds of Donation, denominated as
Documents No. 401 and No. 402, and her findings were that the signatures therein were indeed those of Consuelo.
2. However, she opined that Documents No. 401 and No. 402 were not typed or prepared in one continuous sitting because
the horizontal lines had some variances horizontally. Nevertheless, she admitted that the vertical lines did not show any
variance. IDSETA
3. That with respect to Document No. 401, the typewritten words "Consuelo C. Gomez" were typed after the handwritten
signature "Consuelo C. Gomez." This is based on her analysis of the letter "o" in the handwritten signature, which touches the
letter "n" in the typewritten name "Consuelo C. Gomez." She could not, however, make any similar findings with respect to
Document No. 402, because the typewritten words "Consuelo C. Gomez" and the handwritten signature "Consuelo C. Gomez"
"do not even touch" in the latter document.
Zenaida Torres failed to convince the trial court that the Deeds of Donation were not prepared in one sitting. For the following reasons:
1. To start with, it is very significant that Torres herself admits that the signatures of Consuelo in the Donations 401 and
402 are genuine.This is contrary to the allegations of Augusto in his complaint; (In effect, Augusto is now trying to shift
the thrust of his attack, to a scenario wherein Consuelo allegedly signed two papers in blank, and thereafter, said
Donations 401 and 402 were typed on top.)
2. Furthermore, Torres fell apart during, cross-examination. Torres admitted that she had not taken any specialized
studies on the matter of "Questioned Documents," except on one or two seminars on "Questioned Documents." She
admitted that she had not passed the Board Exams, as a Chemist; she further admitted that she has not written any
thesis or similar work on the subject matter at issue.
3. Regarding non-typing in one continuous sitting, she admitted that she had never seen the typewriter used to type the
Donations 401 and 402, nor even tried to get hold of it, before she made the report; that there were no variances
insofar as the vertical alignments of the typewritten documents were concerned; that there were only variances
insofar as the horizontal alignments are concerned; she admitted that if anybody had wanted to incorporate a
document into a blank sheet of paper, on top of a signature, the normal step to be taken would be to be careful on
horizontal alignment, which can be seen via the naked eye; and not the vertical alignment. Yet, the vertical alignment,
as admitted by her, was perfect.
In fact, she had to admit that it is possible that if the paper roller is loose, the horizontal alignment will have a
variance; whereas, the vertical alignment would have no variance, and there would be nothing sinister about this. She
had to admit this, because she was confronted with an authority on the matter, more particularly the book of Wilson

Harrison (vide Exhibit "17"). She admitted that she had not used bromide when she took the photographs of the two
(2) Donations 401 and 402, which photographs she later on enlarged. She admitted that when she had taken the
photographs of the two (2) Donations, she had not put the typewritten pitch measure on top. She admitted that when
the photographs were enlarged, the alignment of the typewritten words became distorted; more so when a typewriter
pitch measure is not used, when photographing the documents.
In effect, insofar as the issue of typewriting in one sitting or not, is concerned, the testimony of Torres was completely
discredited.
Testimony of the expert witness of the Respondent: (which the trial court gave weight)
1. Cruz testified on this point that the Donations 401 and 402 were both typed in one continuous sitting. He elucidated clearly on
how he arrived at this conclusion.
To start with, he was able to determine that the typewriter used was the elite typewriter, because as per Cruz, when
his typewriting measuring the instruments were placed over the documents, there were twelve (12) letters that went
inside one inch, which is a characteristic of an elite typewriter.
2. Secondly, he noticed that the color tone of the typewriter ink is the same, thru the entire documents.
As per Cruz, this is another indication that the Donations 401 and 402 were prepared in one continuous sitting,
because, as per Cruz, if the typewriter is used one time and sometime after that, the typewriter is used again, the
color tone will most probably be different.
3. He further concluded that both the horizontal and vertical alignments are in agreement. He explained how he arrived at this
conclusion.
As per Cruz, by using an instrument which is a typewriting measuring instrument produced by the Criminal
Research Co., Inc. in the USA and placing said instrument to test the vertical alignment from the top down to the
bottom, there is a perfect vertical alignment.
In fact, as per Cruz, when he took photographs of the documents, he had already placed the typewriting measuring
instrument over the document and he showed to the court the enlarged photographs, indicating clearly that all the
vertical alignments are all in order.
He also found out that the horizontal and vertical alignments are in agreement.
He explained that the slight variances as to the spacing of the words "Know All Men By These Presents" and the
words "That I Consuelo C. Gomez, single, of legal age, Filipino, and a resident of 24 Pine Street, New Marikina
Subdivision, Marikina", there is a slight disagreement in the spacing, but not in the alignment.
He explained that the normal reason for such discrepancy in the spacing is because the typist sometimes tries to
push the variable spacer; the [button] on the left side of the roller, and if you press that round [button], there will be
a variance spacing namely one space, two spaces, and three spaces; and these are not attached so there is a
variable in the spacing. In short, this was due to the pushing of the variable paper by the typist.
4. Furthermore, he emphasized that the left margins are aligned and this signifies that there was typing in one continuous
sitting, because if you type on a paper and re-insert it again, there are differences in the left hand margin. All of his findings
appear in the blow up photographs which were marked as Exhibits "31" to "34".
He even pointed out the differences in the Jurat wherein admittedly, Judge Sebastian inserted the date "21st" and
"1" (page number), "401" (document number), "I" (book number), and "82" (series); and also his signature "Jose R.
Sebastian" and his "PTR Number" (vide pages 12 to 19, TSN of April 25, 1982).
All attempts by opposite counsel to discredit the testimony of Cruz on this issue, proved futile.
Findings of the Trial Court:
As stated above, petitioner also alleges that the signature "Consuelo C. Gomez" was written before the typewritten name "Consuelo C.
Gomez." In this second round of analysis of the respective testimonies of Zenaida Torres and Francisco Cruz, the trial court arrived at
the same conclusion:
[ZENAIDA TORRES'S] FINDINGS ARE BASED SOLELY ON A SINGLE HANDWRITTEN LETTER "O", WHICH
TOUCHES (DOES NOT EVEN INTERSECT) THE TYPEWRITTEN LETTER "N". BASED ON THIS, WITHOUT
MORE, TORRES CONCLUDED THAT THE TYPEWRITTEN NAME "CONSUELO C. GOMEZ" CAME AFTER THE
HANDWRITTEN SIGNATURE "CONSUELO C. GOMEZ".
The trial court again sided with Francisco Cruz who testified, citing authorities, that it is impossible to determine accurately which came
first, because there were no intersections at all. The trial court added: "[i]n fact, common sense, without more, dictates that if there are
no intersections (between the typewritten and the handwritten words), it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to determine
which came first." The Court of Appeals found nothing erroneous in these findings of the trial court. 22

Petitioners Claims:
1. That the testimony of Zenaida Torres, having positively maintained that the handwritten signatures "Consuelo C. Gomez" in
both Deeds of Donation were affixed before the typewritten name of Consuelo C. Gomez, cannot possibly be overcome by the
opinion of Francisco Cruz that was "neither here not there."
2. Petitioner also puts in issue the fact that Zenaida Torres was a court-appointed expert, as opposed to Francisco Cruz who was
merely designated by respondents. Petitioner also assails the credibility of Francisco Cruz on the ground that he had once
testified in favor of respondent Ariston, Jr.
3. Finally, petitioner stresses that Zenaida Torres conducted her tests on the carbon originals of both Deeds of Donation that were
then in the possession of the Notarial Register of Quezon City. On the other hand, Francisco Cruz conducted his tests, with
respect to Document No. 401, on the original in the possession of Ariston, Jr. cTDaEH

Supreme Court:
1. On the first point, we agree with petitioner that positive evidence is, as a general rule, more credible than negative
evidence. However, the reason for this rule is that the witness who testifies to a negative may have forgotten what actually occurred,
while it is impossible to remember what never existed.
Expert witnesses, though, examine documentary and object evidence precisely to testify on their findings in court. It is, thus, highly
improbable for an expert witness to forget his examination of said evidence. Consequently, whereas faulty memory may be the
reason for the negative testimonies delivered by ordinary witnesses, this is unlikely to be so with respect to expert witnesses. While we,
therefore, cannot say that positive evidence does not carry an inherent advantage over negative evidence when it comes to expert
witnesses, the process by which the expert witnesses arrived at their conclusions should be carefully examined and considered.
On this respect, Prof. Wigmore states that the ordinary expert witness, in perhaps the larger proportion of the topics upon which he may
be questioned, has not a knowledge derived from personal observation. He virtually reproduces, literally or in substance, conclusions of
others which he accepts on the authority of the eminent names responsible for them.
In the case at bar, the expert witnesses cited sources as bases of their observations. Francisco Cruz's statement that "no finding or
conclusion could be arrived at," has basis on the sources presented both by him and by Zenaida Torres. Both sets of authorities speak
of intersecting ink lines. However, the typewritten words "Consuelo C. Gomez" barely touch and do not intersect the handwritten
signature Consuelo C. Gomez in Document No. 401. In Document No. 402, said typewritten words and handwritten signature do not
even touch.
In the case at bar, therefore, the expert testimony that "no finding or conclusion can be arrived at," was found to be more
credible than the expert testimony positively stating that the signatures were affixed before the typing of the Deeds of
Donation. The former expert testimony has proven to be more in consonance with the authorities cited by both experts.
2. As regards the assertion that Zenaida Torres conducted her tests on the carbon originals of both Deeds of Donation found in the
notarial registrar, whereas Francisco Cruz merely examined the original in the possession of Ariston, Jr. with respect to Document No.
401, suffice it to say that this circumstance cannot be attributed to respondents. After the examination of the documents by Zenaida
Torres, fire razed the Quezon City Hall. The carbon originals of said Deeds were among the documents burned in the fire. Petitioner
never rebutted respondents' manifestation concerning this incident, nor accused respondents of burning the Quezon City Hall.
Other than the above allegations, petitioner's attack on the entire testimony of Francisco Cruz (including the part concerning whether the
Deeds were typed in one continuous sitting) rests primarily in the contention that, while Zenaida Torres was court-appointed, Francisco
Cruz's testimony was solicited by respondents, one of whom had previously solicited such testimony for another case.
In United States v. Trono, we held:
Expert testimony no doubt constitutes evidence worthy of meriting consideration, although not exclusive on
questions of a professional character. The courts of justice, however, are not bound to submit their findings
necessarily to such testimony; they are free to weigh them, and they can give or refuse to give them any
value as proof, or they can even counterbalance such evidence with the other elements of conviction which
may have been adduced during the trial.
Similarly, in Espiritu v. Court of Appeals and Salomon v. Intermediate Appellate Court, this Court held:
Although courts are not ordinarily bound by expert testimonies, they may place whatever weight they choose upon
such testimonies in accordance with the facts of the case. The relative weight and sufficiency of expert

testimony is peculiarly within the province of the trial court to decide, considering the ability and character
of the witness, his actions upon the witness stand, the weight and process of the reasoning by which he
has supported his opinion, his possible bias in favor of the side for whom he testifies, the fact that he is a
paid witness, the relative opportunities for study or observation of the matters about which he testifies,
and any other matters which serve to illuminate his statements. The opinion of the expert may not be
arbitrarily rejected; it is to be considered by the court in view of all the facts and circumstances in the case and
when common knowledge utterly fails, the expert opinion may be given controlling effect (20 Am. Jur., 10561058). The problem of the credibility of the expert witness and the evaluation of his testimony is left to the
discretion of the trial court whose ruling thereupon is not reviewable in the absence of an abuse of that
discretion.
Thus, while the expert witness' possible bias in favor of the side for whom he or she testifies, and the fact that he or she is a paid
witness, may be considered by the trial court, the latter should weigh the same with all the other evidence adduced during trial, as well
as with the witness' deportment, actions, ability, and character upon the witness stand. The trial court is consequently given the
discretion in weighing all these circumstances in its determination of the expert witness' credibility, as it is in a better position than the
appellate courts to observe the demeanor of these witnesses. As there is no evidence of abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
court in such determination, the latter is not reviewable by this Court.
I STOPPED HERE!!
Alleged patent irregularities on the
face of the assailed Deeds of
Donation
As previously mentioned, the testimony of Zenaida Torres constitutes the only direct evidence presented by petitioner to prove that the
Deeds of Donation were merely intercalated over the signature of Consuelo. Petitioner, however, also presents the following
circumstantial evidence and arguments to prove the same, claiming that there are patent irregularities on the face of the assailed Deeds
of Donation:
1) Both deeds are each one-page documents contained in a letter size (8" 1/2" x "11") paper, instead of the usual
legal size (8" 1/2" x "14") paper, and typed single spaced, with barely any margin on its four sides; 34
2) In Doc. 401, three parcels of land located in two different municipalities were purportedly donated to two donees
in the same document; 35
3) In Doc. 402, shares of stock in two corporations, jewelries and collector's items in a bank deposit box, two
registered cars, cash and money placement in another bank, and a bodega were donated to three donees
in the same document; 36
4) The bodega mentioned in Doc. No. 402 was not owned by Consuelo. If the Deeds were executed by Consuelo,
she would surely have known this fact as she was the treasurer of V-TRI Realty Corporation; 37
5) If Doc. 401 is superimposed on Doc. 402, the signature of Consuelo on both documents appear almost in the
same place; 38
6) The whole of both Deeds of Donation, including the notarial acknowledgement portion and the TAN Numbers
and Residence Certificates of the signatories, were typed with only one typewriter. The only portions that
seemed to have been typed with a different machine are the date ("21st") below the acknowledgement
and the filled-in numbers of the "Doc. No. ___; Book No. ___; Page No. ___'" portion, the name "Jose R.
Sebastian" above the words NOTARY PUBLIC and the PTR Number with date and place of issue; 39
7) The PTR Number and its date and place of issue appear in the right hand side of the name and signature of
Jose Sebastian, instead of below it; 40
8) The inserted date (which was typed with the same machine used for typing the name of notary public Jose
Sebastian) is different from the date of the clause "In WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereunto set their
hands in Quezon City, on the 20th day of April/1979" (which was typed with another machine; the one
used in typing the body of the deed and the body of the acknowledgment); 41
9) The TAN Numbers and the Residence Certificate Numbers of the purported donor and donees have already
been typed with the same machine that was used in typing the body of the deed and the body of the
acknowledgement; 42
10) It is highly questionable that a supposedly well-educated person like Ariston Gomez, Jr. would not have thought
of preparing at least five copies of each document as there were four donees and one donor. 43
The Court of Appeals ruled:
As to the alleged intercalation of the text of the deeds of donation above the supposedly priorly affixed signature of
CONSUELO on a blank sheet of bond paper, as shown by the one-page document in a letter size paper, typed

single space with barely any room left on the top, bottom and left and right margins, as well as the lack of copies
thereof, it has been explained that the same was due to the fact that the said documents were prepared by
defendant ARISTON, JR., a non-lawyer inexperienced with the way such documents should be executed and in
how many copies. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Accordingly, it is not surprising that someone as unfamiliar and inexperienced in preparing a deed of donation, or
any deed of conveyance for that matter, as ARISTON, JR., prepared the documents that are the subject matter of
the case at bar in the manner that he did. 44
Petitioner counters that the alleged irregularities "do not relate to the proper construction or manner of writing the documents as would
necessitate the expertise of a lawyer. Rather, they relate to matters as basic as observing the proper margins at the top, left, right and
bottom portions of the document, using the appropriate paper size and number of pages that are necessary and observing appropriate
spacing and proper placement of the words in the document."
All these alleged irregularities are more apparent than real. None of these alleged irregularities affects the validity of the subject Deeds
of Donation, nor connotes fraud or foul play. It is true that the condition and physical appearance of a questioned document constitute a
valuable factor which, if correctly evaluated in light of surrounding circumstances, may help in determining whether it is genuine or
forged. 45 However, neither the expert witnesses, nor our personal examination of the exhibits, had revealed such a questionable
physical condition.
Legal documents contained in 8 1/2 x 11 paper are neither unheard of, nor even uncommon. The same is true with regard to singlespaced legal documents; in fact, petitioner's Supplemental Memorandum was actually single-spaced.
That the subject Deeds of Donation appear to have conveyed numerous properties in two sheets of paper does not militate against their
authenticity. Not all people equate length with importance. The simplicity and practicality of organizing the properties to be donated into
real and personal properties, and using one-page documents to convey each category, are clearly appealing to people who value
brevity. The same appeal of conciseness had driven petitioner to make a single-spaced Supplemental Memorandum whose only object
was to summarize the arguments he has laid down in the original twice-as-long Memorandum, 46 an endeavor that we, in fact,
appreciate.
The allegation concerning the use of one typewriter to encode both Deeds of Donation, including the notarial acknowledgment portion,
TAN, and residence certificates, is purely paranoia. Being in the legal profession for many years, we are aware that it is common
practice for the parties to a contract to type the whole document, so that all the notary public has to do is to input his signature, seal,
and the numbers pertaining to his notarial registry.
The use of single-paged documents also provides an explanation as to why the PTR number and the date and place of issue are found
in the right-hand side of the name and signature of Jose Sebastian, instead of below it. We agree with respondents that it is irrational,
impractical, and contrary to human experience to use another page just to insert those minute but necessary details. Such use of
single-paged documents, taken together with the fact that the Deeds of Donation are of almost the same length, are also the reasons
why it does not baffle us that the signatures of Consuelo appear at around the same portions of these Deeds. Indeed, we would have
been suspicious had these documents been of varying lengths, but the signatures still appear on the same portions in both.
The only observations concerning the physical appearance of the subject Deeds of Donation that truly give us doubts as to their
authenticity are the relatively small margins on the sides of the same, the lack of copies thereof, and the alleged inclusion in Document
No. 402 of a bodega allegedly not owned by Consuelo. However, these doubts are not enough to establish the commission of fraud by
respondents and to overturn the presumption that persons are innocent of crime or wrong. 47Good faith is always presumed. 48 It is the
one who alleges bad faith who has the burden to prove the same, 49 who, in this case, is the petitioner.
The small margins in the said Deeds of Donation, while indicative of sloppiness, were not necessarily resorted to because there was
a need to intercalate a long document and, thus, prove petitioner's theory that there were only two pieces of paper signed by Consuelo.
Respondents admit that the use of one sheet of paper for both Deeds of Donation was intentional, for brevity's sake. While the ensuing
litigation could now have caused regrets on the part of Ariston, Jr. for his decision to sacrifice the margins for brevity's sake, there still
appears no indication that he did so maliciously. Indeed, law professors remind bar examinees every year to leave margins on their
booklets. Despite the importance examinees put into such examinations, however, examinees seem to constantly forget these
reminders.
The testimonies of Ariston Gomez, Sr. (Ariston, Sr.), Ariston, Jr., Maria Rita Gomez-Samson (Maria Rita), and Notary Public Jose
Sebastian tend to show that there were one original and two copies each of Documents No. 401 and No. 402. Of these documents, it
was the original of Document No. 402 and a duplicate original of Document No. 401 which were actually presented by petitioner himself
before the trial court, through the representative of the notarial registrar of Quezon City, who testified pursuant to a subpoena. The latter
two documents were submitted to the NBI for examination by petitioner and by the NBI Handwriting Expert, Zenaida Torres.
Petitioner testified that he could not find copies of the two Deeds of Donation with the Bureau of Records Management. He, however,
was able to find certified true copies of these documents with the Register of Deeds and the Land Transportation Commission. 50

According to the testimony of Ariston, Jr., the original of Document No. 401 was separated from the brown envelope, containing the
other copies of the Deeds of Donation, which Jose Sebastian left with respondents, as they were trying to fit the same into a certain red
album. On the other hand, Maria Rita testified that one copy each of the duplicate originals of Documents No. 401 and No. 402 were
lost. Maria Rita explained that when she was about to leave for Spain to visit her sister in Palma de Mallorica, her father, Ariston, Sr.,
gave her the brown envelope, containing duplicate originals of the Deeds of Donation in question, to show to her sister in Palma de
Mallorica. 51 Maria Rita explained in detail how her handbag was stolen as she was praying in a chapel while waiting for the connecting
flight from Madrid to Palma de Mallorica. The handbag allegedly contained not only duplicate originals of the said Deeds of Donation,
but also other important documents and her valuables. Maria Rita presented the police report of the Spanish police authorities 52 and
her letter to the Valley National Bank of U.S.A., 53 regarding these losses.
Notary public Jose Sebastian retained two copies of the Deeds of Donation in his files. Jose Sebastian explained that he did so
because Consuelo wanted two copies of each document. Since Jose Sebastian had to transmit to the Notarial Registrar duplicate
originals of the document, he had to photocopy the same to keep as his own copies, and transmit to the Notarial Registrar whatever
duplicate original copies he had. Jose Sebastian did not notice that, instead of retaining a duplicate original of Document No. 402, what
was left with him was the original. 54
While it cannot be denied that the unfortunate incidents and accidents presented by respondents do arouse some suspicions, the
testimonies of Ariston, Jr., Maria Rita, and Jose Sebastian had been carefully examined by the trial court, which found them to be
credible. Time and again, this Court has ruled that the findings of the trial court respecting the credibility of witnesses are accorded
great weight and respect since it had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses as they testified before the court.
Unless substantial facts and circumstances have been overlooked or misunderstood by the latter which, if considered, would materially
affect the result of the case, this Court will undauntedly sustain the findings of the lower court. 55
All petitioner has succeeded in doing, however, is to instill doubts in our minds. While such approach would succeed if carried out by the
accused in criminal cases, plaintiffs in civil cases need to do much more to overturn findings of fact and credibility by the trial court,
especially when the same had been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. It must be stressed that although this Court may overturn a
conviction of the lower court based on reasonable doubt, overturning judgments in civil cases should be based on preponderance of
evidence, and with the further qualification that, when the scales shall stand upon an equipoise, the court should find for the
defendant. 56
Respondents also point out that Ariston, Jr., the person they claim to have prepared said Deeds of Donation, was never confronted
during the trial with all these alleged irregularities on the face of the Deeds of Donation. As such, the trial court was never given a
chance to determine whether Ariston, Jr. would have given a rational, logical and acceptable explanation for the same.
Respondents are correct. As the alleged irregularities do not, on their faces, indicate bad faith on the part of respondents, it is
necessary for petitioner to confront respondents with these observations. Respondents would not have thought that the Deeds of
Donation would be impugned on the mere basis that they were written on short bond paper, or that their margins are small.
Respondents were thus deprived of a chance to rebut these observations by testimonies and other evidence, and were forced to explain
the same in memoranda and briefs with the appellate courts, where these observations started to crop up. It would have been different
if the date of the documents had been after Consuelo's death, or if there had been obvious alterations on the documents. In the latter
cases, it would have been the responsibility of respondents' counsel to see to it that Ariston, Jr. explain such inconsistencies.
Payment
of
donor's
tax
before
the
death of Consuelo
In ruling that there had been no antedating or falsification of the subject Deeds of Donation, the Court of Appeals was also persuaded
by the following evidence: (1) the finding that it was the deceased CONSUELO herself who paid the donor's tax of the properties subject
of the donation, as evidenced by the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB) check she issued to the Commissioner of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) on 9 October 1979, in the amount of P119,283.63, and (2) the testimony and certification dated 22
November 1979 of Jose Sebastian that the said documents were acknowledged before him on 21 April 1979. 57 Respondents had
presented evidence to the effect that Consuelo made an initial payment of P119,283.63 for the Donor's Tax on 9 October 1979, while
respondent Ariston, Sr., supplied the deficiency of P2,125.82 on 4 December 1979.
Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals seriously erred in its finding of fact that Consuelo herself paid the donor's tax of the
properties subject of the donation on 9 October 1979, as the evidence allegedly shows that the Donor's Tax was paid on 4 December
1979, or a month after Consuelo's death. 58 Petitioner thereby calls our attention to his Exhibit "O," a certificate dated 4 December 1979
issued by Mr. Nestor M. Espenilla, Chief of the Transfer Taxes Division of the BIR, confirming the payment of the donor's tax. The
certificate reads:
LUNGSOD NG QUEZON
December 4, 1979
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that MS. CONSUELO C. GOMEZ of 8059 Honradez St., Makati, Metro Manila, paid donor's tax on
even date in the amount of P121,409.45 inclusive of surcharge, interest and compromise penalties as follows:

RTR No. 2814499, PTC Conf. Receipt No. 2896956 P119,283.63

RTR No. 2814500/PTC Conf. Receipt No. 2896957 2,125.82

Total P121,409.45
This certification is issued upon request of Mr. Ariston Gomez, Sr.
(SGD.) NESTOR M. ESPENILLA
Chief, Financing, Real Estate and Transfer
Taxes Division
TAN E2153-B0723-A-7 59
Petitioner highlights the fact that the Revenue Tax Receipts (RTRs) and the Confirmation Receipts for the payments supposedly made
by Consuelo on 9 October 1979 and by respondent Ariston, Sr. on 4 December 1979 bore consecutive numbers, despite being issued
months apart. Petitioner also points to the fact that the tax was stated in the certification to have been paid "on even date" meaning,
on the date of the certification, 4 December 1979.
Petitioner presented further the check used to pay the Donor's Tax, which, petitioner himself admits, was signed by
Consuelo. 60 Petitioner draws our attention to the words "RECEIVED BIR, P.T.C. CUBAO BR., NON-NEGOTIABLE, T-10 DEC. 4."
Petitioner concludes that Philippine Trust Company Bank, Cubao Branch, received the check on 4 December 1979 as a collection agent
of the BIR.
Respondents, on the other hand, presented the following documents to prove payment of the Donor's Tax before the death of Consuelo
on 6 November 1979:
1) The covering letter to the BIR Commissioner dated 24 September 1979 and prepared by Mariano A. Requija, accountant of Consuelo
and Ariston, Jr., which included the Donor's Tax Return for the properties covered by the two Deeds of Donation. The letter was
stamped received by the BIR Commissioner on 8 October 1979; 61
2) Another letter dated 24 September 1979 executed by Mariano A. Requija containing the breakdown of the donations received by the
BIR on 8 October 1979; 62
3) A schedule of gifts which was also dated 24 September 1979 and which was also received by the BIR on 8 October 1979,
enumerating all the donated properties included in the Deeds of Donation. 63
4) The Donor's Tax Return covering the properties transferred in the two Deeds of Donation filed, received, and receipted by the BIR
Commissioner on 8 October 1979; 64
5) The 9 October 1979 PCIB Personal Check No. A144-73211 issued by Consuelo in favor of the BIR Commissioner in the amount of
P119,283.63. 65
6) An "Authority to Issue Tax Receipt" issued by the BIR Commissioner on 21 October 1979 for a total amount of P119,283.63. 66
Before proceeding further, it is well to note that the factum probandum 67 petitioner is trying to establish here is still the alleged
intercalation of the Deeds of Donation on blank pieces of paper containing the signatures of Consuelo. The factum probans 68 this time
around is the alleged payment of the Donor's Tax after the death of Consuelo.
Firstly, it is apparent at once that there is a failure of the factum probans, even if successfully proven, to prove in turn the factum
probandum. As intimated by respondents, payment of the Donor's Tax after the death of Consuelo does not necessarily prove the
alleged intercalation of the Deeds of Donation on blank pieces of paper containing the signatures of Consuelo.
Secondly, petitioner failed to prove this factum probandum.
Ariston, Jr. never testified that Consuelo herself physically and personally delivered PCIB Check No. A144-73211 to the BIR. He instead
testified that the check was prepared and issued by Consuelo during her lifetime, but that he, Ariston, Jr., physically and personally
delivered the same to the BIR. 69 On the query, however, as to whether it was delivered to the BIR before or after the death of
Consuelo, petitioner and respondents presented all the conflicting evidence we enumerated above.
The party asserting a fact has the burden of proving it. Petitioner, however, merely formulated conjectures based on the evidence he
presented, and did not bother to present Nestor Espenilla to explain the consecutive numbers of the RTRs or what he meant with the
words "on even date" in his certification. Neither did petitioner present any evidence that the records of the BIR Commissioner were
falsified or antedated, thus, letting the presumption that a public official had regularly performed his duties stand. This is in contrast to
respondents' direct evidence attesting to the payment of said tax during the lifetime of Consuelo. With respect to respondents' evidence,
all that petitioner could offer in rebuttal is another speculation totally unsupported by evidence: the alleged fabrication thereof.
Credibility of Jose Sebastian
Petitioner claims that no credence should have been given to the testimony of the notary public, Jose Sebastian, as said Jose Sebastian
is the same judge whom this Court had dismissed from the service in Garciano v. Sebastian. 70 Petitioner posits that the dismissal of
Judge Jose Sebastian from the service casts a grave pall on his credibility as a witness, especially given how, in the course of the
administrative proceedings against him, he had lied to mislead the investigator, as well as employed others to distort the truth.

Petitioner further claims that the reliance by the Court of Appeals on the 22 November 1979 Certification by Jose Sebastian is
misplaced, considering the questionable circumstances surrounding such certification. Said certification, marked as petitioner's Exhibit
"P," reads:
November 22, 1979
HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAO
Executive Judge
CFI Quezon City
Sir:
In connection with the discrepancies noted by the Acting Clerk of Court in my notarial report pertaining to another
document submitted to the Notarial Section last July 2, 1979 I have the honor to certify that documents Nos. 401
and 402 referring to Donations Inter Vivos executed by Donor Consuelo C. Gomez in favor of Donees Ma. Rita
Gomez-Samson et. al. were signed in my presence by all the parties and their instrumental witnesses on April 21,
1979 in my office. I hereby further certify that said two documents among other documents were reported by me in
accordance with law on July 2, 1979, for all legal intents and purposes.
In view of the above, it is respectfully requested that the certified true copies of the said two documents officially
requested by one of the Donees be issued.
Very
respectfully,
(Sgd.)
JOSE
R.
SEBASTIAN
Notary Public 71
Petitioner points out that the Certification was made after the death of Consuelo, and claims that the same appears to be a scheme by
Jose Sebastian to concoct an opportunity for him to make mention of the subject Deeds of Donation intervivos, "despite the plain fact
that the latter had utterly no relation to the matter referred to by Jose Sebastian in the opening phrase of the letter." 72
It is well to note that, as stated by the Court of Appeals, Jose Sebastian was originally a witness for petitioner Augusto. As such, Rule
132, Section 12, of the Rules of Court prohibits petitioner from impeaching him:
SEC. 12. Party may not impeach his own witness. Except with respect to witnesses referred to in paragraphs (d)
and (e) of section 10, the party producing a witness is not allowed to impeach his credibility.
A witness may be considered as unwilling or hostile only if so declared by the court upon adequate showing of his
adverse interest, unjustified reluctance to testify, or his having misled the party into calling him to the witness stand.
The unwilling or hostile witness so declared, or the witness who is an adverse party, may be impeached by the
party presenting him in all respects as if he had been called by the adverse party, except by evidence of his bad
character. He may also be impeached and cross-examined by the adverse party, but such cross-examination must
only be on the subject matter of his examination-in-chief.
This rule is based on the theory that a person who produces a witness vouches for him as being worthy of credit, and that a direct
attack upon the veracity of the witness "would enable the party to destroy the witness, if he spoke against him, and to make him a good
witness, if he spoke for him, with the means in his hands of destroying his credit, if he spoke against him." 73
Neither had there been declaration by the court that Jose Sebastian was an unwilling or hostile witness. Jose Sebastian is also neither
an adverse party, nor an officer, director nor a managing agent of a public or private corporation or of a partnership or association which
is an adverse party. 74
Be that as it may, even if Jose Sebastian had been declared by the court as an unwilling or hostile witness, the third paragraph of
Section 12 as quoted above, in relation to Section 11 75 of the same Rule, only allows the party calling the witness to impeach such
witness by contradictory evidence or by prior inconsistent statements, andnever by evidence of his bad character. Thus, Jose
Sebastian's subsequent dismissal as a judge would not suffice to discredit him as a witness in this case. ETHIDa
We have also ruled in People v. Dominguez, 76 which, in turn cited Cordial v. People, 77 that:
(E)ven convicted criminals are not excluded from testifying in court so long as, having organs of sense,
they "can perceive and perceiving can make known their perceptions to others."
The fact of prior criminal conviction alone does not suffice to discredit a witness; the testimony of such a
witness must be assayed and scrutinized in exactly the same way the testimony of other witnesses must
be examined for its relevance and credibility. . . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
The effect of this pronouncement is even more significant in this case, as Jose Sebastian has never been convicted of a
crime before his testimony, but was insteadadministratively sanctioned eleven years after such testimony. Scrutinizing the testimony of
Jose Sebastian, we find, as the trial court and the Court of Appeals did, no evidence of bias on the part of Jose Sebastian. On top of
this, Jose Sebastian's testimony is supported by the records of the notarial registry, which shows that the documents in question were
received by the Notarial Registrar on 2 July 1979, which was four months before the death of Consuelo on 6 November 1979.
Alleged
unusual
circumstances
relative
to
the
execution
and

notarization
of
the
subject
Deeds
of
Donation
The last set of circumstantial evidence presented by petitioner to prove the alleged intercalation of the subject Deeds of Donation on two
blank papers signed by Consuelo are the following allegedly unusual circumstances relative to the execution and notarization of the said
deeds. According to petitioner:
1. The signing and acknowledgement of the Deeds of Donation on 21 April 1979 is highly improbable and
implausible, considering the fact that Consuelo left the same day for the United States on a pleasure
trip; 78
2. The flight time of Consuelo on 21 April 1979 was 11:00 a.m.. And even assuming that the flight time was 1:00
p.m., as contended by respondents, the ordinary boarding procedures require Consuelo to be at the
airport at least two hours before flight time, or 11:00 a.m.. Petitioner points out that respondents' alleged
time frame (from 7:00 a.m. to 11:00 a.m.) is not enough to accomplish the following acts: respondents and
Consuelo leaving Marikina at 7:00 a.m. and arriving at the notary public Jose Sebastian's house at Pagasa, Q.C. at about 8:00 a.m. to 8:30 a.m.; some "small talk with Jose Sebastian; Jose Sebastian
examining the documents; Jose Sebastian having a closed meeting with Consuelo to discuss the
documents; Jose Sebastian reading the documents to respondents line by line and asking the latter
whether they accepted the donation; Jose Sebastian typing the notarial entries; the parties signing the
deeds; Jose Sebastian talking privately with Consuelo, who paid the former in cash for his services;
Ariston Gomez, Jr. driving Consuelo and other respondents back to Marikina, and dropping the other
respondents at their respective residences; picking up Consuelo's luggage; and Ariston Gomez, Jr.
bringing Consuelo to the Manila International Airport;79
3. It is contrary to human experience for Consuelo and respondents not to make a prior arrangement with the
notary public Jose Sebastian and instead take a gamble on his being in his office; 80
4. It is illogical for Consuelo to rush the execution of the donations when she was in fact planning to come back
from her pleasure trip shortly, as she did; 81
5. The choice of a notary public from Quezon City is highly suspect, when Consuelo and respondents reside in
Marikina. It is also illogical that Consuelo would have chosen a notary public whom she met only on the
same day she executed the Deeds, especially when Consuelo had a regular lawyer whose notarial
services she availed of only two weeks before her death; 82
6. It is improbable that Consuelo paid Jose Sebastian in cash, for there is no reason for her to carry much cash in
peso when she was about to leave for the United States in that same morning; 83
7. Maria Rita's residence certificate was obtained from Manila when she is a resident of Marikina. Also, Maria Rita
obtained said residence certificate on 20 April 1979, and yet Maria Rita testified that she was surprised to
know of the donation only on 21 April 1979. 84 Also suspicious are the circumstances wherein Ariston
Gomez, Jr. obtained a residence certificate on 17 April 1979, when he testified that he knew of the
schedule for signing only on 20 April 1979, and Consuelo had two residence certificates, as she used
different ones in the Deeds of Donation and the document notarized two weeks before her death; 85
8. If Consuelo was really frugal, she could have also made a will; 86
9. All the instrumental witnesses of the Deeds of Donation are biased, being themselves either donees of the other
Deed of Donation, or a relative of a donee; 87and
10. Respondents were not able to sufficiently and substantially explain the belated transfer of the properties
covered by the assailed Deeds of Donation. Petitioner points to Maria Rita's testimony that the real
properties were transferred after the death of Consuelo. While respondents assert that the personal
properties were transferred to them prior to Consuelo's death, evidence shows otherwise. 88
This Court does not find anything suspicious in a person wanting to transfer her properties by donation to her loved ones before leaving
for abroad via an airplane. While many believe these days that taking the plane is the "safest way to travel," this has not always been
the case. The fear that planes sometimes crash, now believed to be irrational, has always been at the back of the minds of air travelers.
Respondents maintain in their testimonies before the RTC that the Deeds were completed to the satisfaction of Consuelo only on 20
April 1979. She allegedly wanted to have the documents signed and notarized before she left for abroad.
The claim that the flight time of Consuelo was at 11:00 a.m. is hearsay thrice removed, and thus cannot be given any weight. Petitioner
claims that he was told by his twelve-year old son that Consuelo was leaving at 11:00 a.m. on 21 April 1979, such son having learned
about this from the maid of Consuelo when the son called Consuelo's house that day. 89 This is in contrast to Maria Rita's positive
testimony that the flight time was at 1:00 p.m. on the same day. 90 Maria Rita joined Consuelo in this flight.

As regards petitioner's claim that respondents' alleged time frame in the morning of 21 April 1979 was insufficient, this Court is not
convinced. As held by the Court of Appeals, petitioner did not present any proof that it had been impossible to perform those alleged
acts within three hours. 91 As argued by respondents, the one-paged documents can be read aloud without difficulty within five to ten
minutes each. We can also take judicial notice of the fact that traffic is usually very minimal on Saturday mornings, and was much less
of a problem in 1979.
Respondents and Consuelo's decision not to make a prior arrangement with notary public Jose Sebastian does not surprise us either.
Respondents explain that, since the telephone lines of Marikina were inefficient in the year 1979, they decided to take a calculated
gamble. It is not at all unreasonable to expect that Jose Sebastian would be at his house on a Saturday, at around 8:00 a.m.
With respect to the choice of a notary public from Quezon City, we find the explanation relative thereto satisfying. We quote:
Moreover, ARISTON, JR. disclosed that they could not have gone to the notary public whom his aunt, CONSUELO,
knew because she did not want to go to said notary public since our cousins whom she didn't like had access to
him and she wanted to keep the execution of the deeds confidential. Thus:
Q: And also you know for a fact that your auntie had a regular Notary Public for the preparation and notarization of
legal documents in the name of Atty. Angeles, now Congressman Angeles of Marikina, is that correct?
A: It depends on the frame of time. Yes and No. He was a regular Notary Public, but way before that date. But after
that, he fall out of graces of my auntie. He was not anymore that regular.
Q: How long before April 30 did he fall out of graces of your auntie, year before that?
A: I don't specifically remember but what I do know is such confidential document like this, we would not really go to
Angeles.
Q: Even for notarization purposes?
xxx xxx xxx
A: Even for notarization purposes, no sir. This confidential nature, no.
ATTY. FERRY:
Are you saying that your auntie trusted more Sebastian than Angeles?
A: No. He is trusting her own experience about Atty. Angeles.
Q: Are you saying that she had sad experience with Atty. Angeles in connection with the latter's performance of his
duty as Notary Public, as a lawyer?
A: That is what she told me.
Q: When was that?
A: She will tell me that regularly.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. FERRY:
Q: Mr. Gomez, you testified last April 6, 1989 that after the execution of the two documents in question dated April
20, 1979, Atty. Angeles fell out of the graces of your auntie and you added that as a consequence, your
auntie did not avail of the notarial services of Atty. Angeles when it comes to confidential matters, is that
correct?
A: Yes. After that particular execution of the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos, Atty. Angeles especially if the documents
are confidential in nature.
Q: You used confidential matters, did your aunt spell out what these confidential matters are?
A: This particular document, Deed of Donation was under the category "confidential".
Q: But did you discuss this, the matter of notarizing this document by Atty. Angeles with your auntie such that she
made known to you this falls under confidential matters?
A: Yes we did.
Q: So in other words, you intimated to your auntie that Atty. Angeles would possibly notarized these documents?
A: No.
Q: How did it come about that your auntie gave that idea or information that these documents should be notarized
by other notary public other than Angeles, because it is confidential?
A: It came from her.
Q: Yes, did she tell you that?
ATTY. GUEVARRA:
That's what he said. "It came from her".
ATTY. FERRY:
My question is, how did it come about your auntie told you that these two documents are of confidential matters?
A: Well, no problem. I said that it has to be notarized, she said more or less, "ayaw ko kay Atty. Angeles".
Q: She said that?

A: That's correct.
Q: And you were curious to know why she told you that?
A: No. I knew why she told me that. She said that Atty. Angeles. . . . well, my cousins whom she didn't like have
access to Atty. Angeles. 92
The Court of Appeals had fully explained that the belated transfer of the properties does not affect the validity or effects of the donations
at all, nor dent the credibility of respondents' factual assertions:
Per our perusal of the records, we find that the defendants were able to sufficiently and substantially explain the
reason for the belated transfer of the pertinent properties, i.e., after the death of CONSUELO. Thus, the testimony
of MA. RITA revealed, insofar as the real properties are concerned, the following:
"Q: Since you were already aware as you claim that as early as when you went to the States in the
company of your auntie, Consuelo Gomez, these 2 parcels of land together with the improvements
consisting of a house were transferred to you, you did not exert efforts after your arrival from the States to
effect the transfer of these properties?
"A: No, I did not.
"Q: Why?
"A: Well, for delicadeza. My auntie was still alive. I am not that aggressive. Tita Elo told me " akin na iyon"
but I did not transfer it in my name. "Siempre nakakahiya."
"Q: That was your reason for not effecting the transfer of the properties in your name?
"A: Yes, that was my reason.
"Q: Did you not know that the deed supposedly executed by Consuelo Gomez was a donation inter vivos,
meaning, it takes effect during her lifetime?
"A: I do not know the legal term donation inter vivos. I have also my sentiment. Tita Elo was very close to
us but I did not want to tell her: "Tita Elo, ibigay mo Na iyan SA akin. Itransfer mo na sa pangalan ko." It is
not my character to be very aggressive."
In addition, Article 712 of the Civil Code provides:
"ART. 712. Ownership is acquired by occupation and by intellectual creation.
"Ownership and other real rights over property are acquired and transmitted by law, by donation, by testate
and intestate succession, and in consequence of certain contracts, by tradition.
"They may also be acquired by means of prescription."
Clearly, the issuance of the titles in the names of the defendants is not the mode by which they acquired ownership
of the properties, but rather the fact that the same were donated to them. The circumstance that aforesaid
properties were actually transferred in the names of the donees only after the death of the donor, although the
deeds of donation were dated April 21, 1979, does not by itself indicate that the said documents were antedated. 93
Petitioner seems to unduly foreclose the possibility one which experience tells us is not a rare occurrence at all that donations are
often resorted to in place of testamentary dispositions, often for the purpose of tax avoidance. Such properties usually remain in the
donor's possession during his or her lifetime, despite the fact that the donations have already taken effect. Nevertheless, the purpose of
utilizing donation as a mode to transfer property is not in issue here.
Finally, the allegations concerning the payment of Jose Sebastian in cash, the suggestion that Consuelo should have also made a will,
and the claim that all the instrumental witnesses of the will are biased, are purely speculative.
In sum, all these circumstantial evidence presented by petitioner had failed to comply with the strict requirements in using circumstantial
evidence, for which Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
While the above provision seems to refer only to criminal cases, it has been pointed out that in some jurisdictions, no distinction is made
between civil and criminal actions as to the quality of the burden of establishing a proposition by circumstantial evidence. In such
jurisdictions the rule is generally stated to be that the circumstances established must not only be consistent with the proposition
asserted but also inconsistent with any other rational theory. 94
In all, what petitioner has succeeded in doing is to raise doubts in our minds. Again, while such approach would succeed if carried out
by the accused in criminal cases, plaintiffs in civil cases need to do much more to overturn findings of fact and credibility by the trial
court, especially when the same had been affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Leniency in the weighing of petitioner's evidence could only produce a mere equipoise:

When the scales shall stand upon an equipoise and there is nothing in the evidence which shall incline it to one
side or the other, the court will find for the defendant.
Under this principle, the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weaknesses of the
defendant's claim. Even if the evidence of the plaintiff may be stronger than that of the defendant, there is no
preponderance of evidence on his side if such evidence is insufficient in itself to establish his cause of
action." 95 (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner's liability for damages
The last part of the trial court's decision, which was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals, involves the award of damages in favor of
Ariston, Jr. The trial court held Augusto Gomez and the estate of the late Consuelo "jointly and solidarily liable" for moral and exemplary
damages, and attorney's fees.
The trial court held:
The records are clear, that plaintiff was so desperate for evidence to support his charges, that he repeatedly
subpoenaed the defendants themselves; at the risk of presenting evidence contradictory to his legal position and
which actually happened, when plaintiff subpoenaed Ariston Gomez Jr., Ariston Gomez Sr., and Maria Rita GomezSamson, as his witnesses.
All told, the court finds plaintiff was motivated not by a sincere desire to insure the totality of the estate of Consuelo,
but rather by his desire to cause injury to defendants, and to appropriate for himself and the rest of the Gomez
brothers and nephews, other than the donees, properties which were clearly validly disposed of by Consuelo, via
Donations Inter Vivos. 96
Our own examination of the records of the case, however, convinces us of the contrary. Respondents never assailed the authenticity of
petitioner's evidence, and merely presented their own evidence to support their assertions. As previously stated, petitioner's evidence
had successfully given us doubts as to the authenticity of the subject Deeds of Donation. While such doubts are not enough to
discharge petitioner's burden of proof, they are enough to convince us that petitioner's institution of the present case was carried out
with good faith. The subpoenas directed against respondents merely demonstrate the zealous efforts of petitioner's counsel to represent
its client, which can neither be taken against the counsel, nor against its clients.
While, as regards the alleged intercalation of the Deeds of Donation on two blank sheets of paper signed by Consuelo, the burden of
proof lies with petitioner, the opposite is true as regards the damages suffered by the respondents. Having failed to discharge this
burden to prove bad faith on the part of petitioner in instituting the case, petitioner cannot be responsible therefor, and thus cannot be
held liable for moral damages.
This Court has also held that, in the absence of moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages, no exemplary damages can be
granted, for exemplary damages are allowed only in addition to any of the four kinds of damages mentioned. 97
The attorney's fees should also be deleted, as it was supposed to be the consequence of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding
by the plaintiff. CaAIES
WHEREFORE, subject to the modification of the assailed Decision, the Petition is DENIED. The Joint Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City in Civil Cases No. 36089 and No. 36090, which was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals, is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION that the following portion be DELETED:
3. That Augusto Gomez and the estate of the late Consuelo Gomez, jointly and solidarily should pay to Ariston
Gomez, Jr. the following amounts:
Moral damages of P1,000,000.00;
Exemplary damages of P250,000.00
Attorney's fees of P200,000.00
And costs of suit; with legal interest on all the amounts, except on costs and attorney's fees, commencing from
February 15, 1980, until fully paid.
||| (Gomez v. Gomez-Samson, G.R. No. 156284, [February 6, 2007], 543 PHIL 436-483)

[G.R. No. 154466. January 28, 2008.]

CLIMACO AMORA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J p:
For review is the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated January 28, 2002 and its Resolution 2 dated July 17, 2002 in CA-G.R.
CR No. 23853. The assailed decision affirmed with modification the Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 47, Tagbilaran
City finding petitioner Climaco Amora guilty of the crime of Destructive Arson defined and penalized under Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 1613. The RTC sentenced petitioner to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as
minimum, to 20 years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The CA, while affirming the conviction, modified the penalty imposed by the
RTC, and sentenced the petitioner to an indeterminate penalty of 12 years, 5 months and 11 days of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to
18 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
Gleaned from the records, the facts are as follows:
On June 27, 1993, a fire broke out in the building used by petitioner as residence and as a bakery. The fire also gutted nearby houses.
Petitioner's edifice was constructed on a lot owned by Adelfa Maslog Tagaytay (Adelfa). Adelfa's father had earlier entered into a
contract of lease with petitioner, whereby the latter was to use the lot and erect a building thereon for a monthly rental of P50.00, for a
period of twenty (20) years. The lease contract provided that, upon the expiration of the contract on July 10, 1993, ownership over the
building shall be transferred to the lessor.
On January 4, 1993, Adelfa informed petitioner that she would no longer renew the contract of lease.
On January 14, 1993, petitioner secured a fire insurance coverage over the subject building from the Malayan Insurance Company for
P150,000.00, then obtained another fire insurance policy from Makati Insurance Company for P300,000.00. It appears that the amounts
of insurance coverage were substantially higher than the building's market value (pegged at P52,590.00 in the 1985 Tax Declaration).
As found by the trial court, during the actual fire, petitioner was within the premises, heard shouts from his neighbor, ignored the same
at first, and only later on did he finally stand up to see what was going on.
The authorities who conducted an investigation submitted an Investigation Report which concluded with the finding that: "(B)ased on the
testimonies of witnesses available and after a meticulous study of the fire incident, the investigation concludes that the cause of fire was
intentionally done." ISTDAH
Thus, petitioner was charged with the crime of Destructive Arson, in an Information 4 which reads:
That, on or about the 27th day of June 1993, in the City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent of gain, that is, of claiming the fire insurance coverage
procured by accused over the building owned by him and located at CPG Ave., Tagbilaran City, and which fire
insurance coverage is substantially more than the actual value of the building, did, then and there set the said
building on fire, causing as a result the burning and complete destruction of the said building and in said manner
also caused the complete burning and destruction of the residential houses owned by Adelfa Maslog Tagaytay,
Fernando C. Maslog and Lucena C. Ganados to their damage and prejudice in the amount to be proved in court.
Act committed contrary to the provision of P.D. No. 1613.
to which petitioner pleaded "not guilty."
After trial on the merits, the RTC found petitioner guilty as charged, and, as earlier stated, this finding was affirmed by the CA which
considered the following circumstances as adequate proof of petitioner's guilt:
First, there is motive on the part of [petitioner] to commit arson, as the contract of lease over the building would
soon be terminated by owner Adelfa Maslog-Tagaytay, against his will. Settled is the rule that a key element in the
web of circumstantial evidence is motive.
Second, [petitioner] insured the property despite the fact that the lease would soon be terminated and in fact, he
had already been advised to vacate the place.
Third, the amount covering the fire insurance was substantially more than its market and assessed value. . . . .
Fourth, [petitioner] was seen in his residence immediately before the fire and subsequently in a neighbor's shop
during the fire.
Fifth, the Fire Investigators concluded in their report that the fire was intentionally done. In the absence of any
showing that these investigators were ill-motivated in testifying against [petitioner], their testimonies are given
weight and credit. . . . . 5
Aggrieved, petitioner comes before us in a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising the sole
question of whether the guilt of petitioner was proven beyond reasonable doubt. 6
We deny the petition for lack of merit.
The applicability of P.D. 1613 is beyond cavil. The facts show that the crime was committed in a place where bakeries, barber shops,
tailoring shops and other commercial and residential buildings were situated. In fact, other structures were razed by the fire that
originated from petitioner's establishment. It is clear that the place of the commission of the crime was a residential and commercial

building located in an urban and populated area. This qualifying circumstance places the offense squarely within the ambit of Section 2
(7) of P.D. 1613, and converts it to "destructive arson," 7 viz.:
Section 2. Destructive Arson. The penalty of Reclusion Temporal in its maximum period to Reclusion Perpetua shall
be imposed if the property burned is any of the following: TIDHCc
xxx xxx xxx
7. Any building, whether used as a dwelling or not, situated in a populated or congested area.
It was also established that the subject building was insured against fire for an amount substantially more than its market value, a fact
that has given rise to the unrebutted prima facie evidence of arson, as provided in Section 6 of P.D. 1613:
Section 6. Prima facie evidence of Arson. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute prima facie evidence
of arson:
xxx xxx xxx
4. If the building or property is insured for substantially more than its actual value at the time of the
issuance of the policy.
Petitioner's only real challenge against the CA decision is the absence of direct evidence to prove his culpability which ostensibly
negates the appellate court's finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
At the outset, it may be well to emphasize that direct evidence is not the sole means of establishing guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. 8 Established facts that form a chain of circumstances can lead the mind intuitively or impel a conscious process of reasoning
towards a conviction. Indeed, rules on evidence and principles in jurisprudence have long recognized that the accused may be
convicted through circumstantial evidence. 9
Circumstantial evidence has been defined as such evidence which goes to prove a fact or series of facts, other than the facts in issue,
which, if proved, may tend by inference to establish the fact in issue. Circumstantial evidence may be resorted to when to insist on direct
testimony would ultimately lead to setting felons free. 10 But for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient for a conviction, the following
requisites must be present, namely: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have
been proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances results in a moral certainty that the accused, to the exclusion of all others,
is the one who has committed the crime. 11
These requisites obtain in the instant case. The trial court found that the circumstances enumerated above sufficiently point to the
petitioner as the author of the crime. Indeed, all these circumstances, taken together, are consistent with the hypothesis that petitioner is
guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent. 12
We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the trial court as affirmed by the appellate court. Case law states that findings of
facts of the trial court, especially if affirmed by the appellate court, are given great respect, if not conclusive effect, by this Court unless
the trial court ignored, misunderstood or misinterpreted facts and circumstances of substance which, if considered, would alter the
outcome of the case. Having had the unique advantage of observing and monitoring at close range the demeanor and conduct of
witnesses, the trial court is in a better position to pass judgment on the credibility of witnesses and the probative weight of their
testimonies.13 cCaATD
As to the penalty to be imposed, the Court of Appeals correctly modified the same. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the maximum term of the penalty shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed, while
the minimum term of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense. 14
The penalty prescribed for the offense is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua. Considering that no mitigating
nor aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the offense, the proper imposable penalty, and thus the maximum term of the
indeterminate penalty, is 18 years, 8 months and 1 day to 20 years. In determining the penalty next lower in degree, Section 3, Article
61 of the Revised Penal Code applies:
Article 61. Rules for graduating penalties.
xxx xxx xxx
3. When the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of one or two indivisible penalties and the maximum
period of another divisible penalty, the penalty next lower in degree shall be composed of the medium and
minimum periods of the proper divisible penalty and the maximum period of that immediately following in
said respective graduated scale.
In the instant case, the penalty lower in degree isprision mayor maximum to reclusion temporal medium. Hence, the minimum term
of the indeterminate penalty shall be within the range of the aforesaid lower degree.
The CA, therefore, correctly meted the indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of reclusion
temporal, as minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated January 28, 2002, and its
Resolution dated July 17, 2002 in CA-G.R. CR No. 23853, are AFFIRMED.
||| (Amora v. People, G.R. No. 154466, [January 28, 2008], 566 PHIL 472-481)

[G.R. No. 127154. July 30, 2002.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROLDAN A. OCHATE, alias "Boy," accusedappellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
SYNOPSIS
On automatic review is appellant's conviction for the rape and killing of 8-year old Rowena Albiso. In convicting the appellant, the trial
court relied mainly on the testimony of the victim's older brother Roseller who was walking with Rowena on their way home from school
on that fateful day. About 20 meters from the school, Rowena stopped at the communal water pump to wash her food container. As he
went ahead on his way home, he passed by the hut of appellant who was tucking a scythe on his waist. Rowena's cadaver was found
the next morning in the ricefield near the appellant's house with incised wounds in the neck and abdomen. Appellant put up alibi as his
defense, but witnesses testified that when they were looking for the victim, he did not participate in the search for the missing girl nor did
he show surprise when he learned that the victim's cadaver was found near his house.
In reversing the trial court's conviction on appeal, the Supreme Court held: that the combination of the foregoing circumstances is
insufficient to convict appellant of rape with homicide; that his indifference to the events that happened in their barangay lends support
to the suspicion that he is the author of the crime but it is not sufficient to sustain a conviction; that there is no evidence to show that
after Roseller left his sister to wash her food container, appellant was seen with her; and that while appellant's alibi is weak, a finding of
guilt must rest on the strength of the prosecution's own evidence. Finally, appellant's confession to the law enforcement officers in the
absence of counsel and without being informed of his constitutional rights are inadmissible.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE; REQUISITES TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION. The requisites to
sustain a conviction of an accused based on circumstantial evidence are: (1) there must be more than one circumstance; (2) the
inference must be based on proven facts; and (3) the combination of all circumstances produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt
of the guilt of the accused. And in the appreciation of circumstantial evidence, there are four basic guidelines: (1) it should be acted
upon with caution; (2) all the essential facts must be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt; (3) the facts must exclude every other theory
but that of guilt; and (4) the facts must establish such a certainty of guilt of the accused as to convince the judgment beyond a
reasonable doubt that the accused is the one who committed the offense.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CIRCUMSTANCES INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH GUILT OF ACCUSED IN CASE AT BAR. After a careful
review of the entire evidence presented, we find that a combination of the circumstances established by the prosecution is insufficient to
convict appellant of rape with homicide. Said circumstances do not lead to a fair and reasonable conclusion that accused-appellant, to
the exclusion of all others, is the person guilty of the offense charged. Appellant's indifference to the events that happened in
their barangay beginning September 26, 1994 up to the time of his arrest on September 29, 1994 may lend support to the suspicion of
the barangayand police authorities that he is the author of the crime. But then, mere suspicion, no matter how strong it may be, is not
sufficient to sustain conviction. Law and jurisprudence demand proof beyond reasonable doubt before any person may be deprived of
his life, liberty, or even property. Enshrined in the Bill of Rights is the right of the accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved, and to overcome the presumption nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt must be established by the prosecution. The
constitutional presumption of innocence requires courts to take "a more than casual consideration" of every circumstances or doubt
proving the innocence of the accused. In his testimony, Crisanto Montano admitted that accused-appellant was considered a suspect
because he did not join the search for the missing girl. Appellant testified that he did not participate in the search because he was busy
drying copra. It cannot be contradicted that such passive reaction is susceptible to different interpretations. Indeed, it may be construed
as an indication of guilt; but, it may also be interpreted as mere indifference or even downright insensibility. Moreover, there was no
evidence presented to show that after Roseller left his sister to wash her food container and slippers at the communal water pump,
appellant was seen with her. Furthermore, the testimony of Roseller that he saw appellant along the road on his way home is not
sufficient to support the conclusion that it was appellant who committed the crime. At best, it is mere conjecture or speculation which the
Court will not subscribe to. Jurisprudence instructs that where the circumstances obtaining in a case are capable of two inferences, one
of which is consistent with the presumption of innocence while the other may be compatible with the finding of guilt, the court must
acquit the accused because the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and, therefore, is insufficient to support a judgment of
conviction. cSDIHT
3. ID.; ID.; PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT; PROSECUTION MUST RELY ON THE STRENGTH OF ITS OWN EVIDENCE
AND NOT ON THE WEAKNESS OR ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE; CASE AT BAR. Doubtless, accusedappellant's defenses of alibi and denial are weak. Nevertheless, it is a settled principle in criminal law that a finding of guilt must rest on
the strength of the prosecution's own evidence and not on the weakness or absence of evidence for the defense. In the present case,
the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution is not sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
4. ID.; ID.; EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSIONS OBTAINED IN CASE AT BAR, INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE. We agree with
appellant that his confessions to Bienvenido Pantallano, Dr. Henry Cawley, and before the barangay captain may not be used in

evidence against him as they are in violation of his constitutional right to remain silent and to counsel while under custodial
investigation. Custodial investigation, as defined in Miranda vs. Arizona is any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. Pantallano and Cawley are law
enforcement officers, the former being a CAFGU member and the latter, an NBI officer. With respect to Pantallano, accused-appellant's
confession was made when the former was pointing his gun at the latter; thus, effectively depriving accused-appellant of his freedom of
action. On the other hand, accused-appellant's confession to Dr. Cawley was made when the former is already under detention. Both
Pantallano and Cawley elicited questions that prompted accused-appellant to confess his guilt in the absence of a counsel and without
being informed of his constitutional rights. Hence, it is clear that his confessions are inadmissible in evidence having been obtained in
violation of the provisions of Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Likewise, appellant's admission of guilt before
the barangay captain is inadmissible in evidence. Montano testified that at the time he heard appellant admit that he committed the
crime because he was possessed by the devil, it was actually in response to the query of the barangay captain as to why he committed
the crime charged. The question and answer transpired in the presence of the chief of police. Appellant had already been singled out as
a suspect, arrested, taken into custody and was being investigated by the police. While it is true that the barangay captain is not a police
officer or a law enforcement agent, it is clear from the records that he asked his question in the course of police interrogation without the
accused-appellant being informed of his rights under the constitution. In People vs. Morada, this Court held that the confession made by
the accused-appellant to the barangay captain is inadmissible because it appeared that the conversation between the two was part of
the then ongoing police investigation.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J p:
On automatic review is the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte (Branch 11) dated September 20,
1996 in Criminal Case No. S-2504 finding accused Roldan A. Ochate guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with homicide, sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of death and ordering him to indemnify the heirs of the victim the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00).
The facts of the case:
Around 5:15 in the afternoon of September 26, 1994, Rowena Albiso and her older brother Roseller were walking together on their way
home from school at Tampilisan, Zamboanga del Norte. Upon reaching the house of the barangay captain, which is about twenty (20)
meters from their school, Rowena stopped and went to the communal water pump to wash her food container and her slippers. Roseller
went home ahead of her sister. 1 On his way home, he passed by the hut of accused Roldan Ochate where he saw the latter in the yard
tucking a scythe on his waist. 2 When Roseller arrived home, their father, Romulo, asked for the whereabouts of Rowena. Roseller told
Romulo that his sister was not yet home. Romulo then went to meet Rowena. However, he was unable to find her. Romulo and Roseller
thereafter went to the house of the accused who is their neighbor but finding no one there, they proceeded to report the incident
to barangay councilman and acting barangaycaptain Crisanto Montano. 3 Montano, in turn, sought the assistance of some of the men in
the barangay in order to find Rowena. The search was conducted the whole evening of September 26, 1994 to no avail. It was only
around eight o'clock the following morning that the group found Rowena in a ricefield about fifty meters from Ochate's house. 4 She was
already dead. The medico-legal officer who later examined the cadaver reported that the cause of death was hemorrhagic shock due to
deep and penetrating incised wounds in the neck and abdomen. 5 Suspecting that Ochate was the culprit, police officers as well as
other members of the barangay went to see Ochate at his house but they were not able to find him. It was only on September 29, 1994
that a certain Bienvenido Pantallano, a member of the CAFGU, was able to locate Ochate and he took Ochate in his custody and
brought him to the Chief of Police of Tampilisan. 6
On January 9, 1995, an Information for Rape with Homicide was filed against Ochate, to wit:
"The undersigned, Provincial Prosecutor, accuses ROLDAN A. OCHATE @ Boy of the crime of RAPE WITH
HOMICIDE, committed as follows:
"That, in the afternoon, on or about the 26th day of September, 1994, in the municipality of Tampilisan, Zamboanga
del Norte, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused armed with a scythe, moved by lewd and
unchaste design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force, violence and
intimidation, have carnal knowledge with one ROWENA ALBISO, 8 year old child, against her will and without her
consent; that in the pursuance of his evil motive and to better accomplish his evil purpose the said accused, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and hack said ROWENA ALBISO, thereby
inflicting upon her injuries on the vital parts of her body which caused her instantaneous death; that as a result of
the commission of the crime the heirs of the herein victim suffered the following damages, viz:
a) Indemnity for victim's death.... P50,000.00
b) Loss of earning capacity......... P20,000.00
P70,000.00
"CONTRARY TO LAW." 7

Ochate entered a plea of "not guilty."

After trial, the lower court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide and meted the penalty
of death.
Hence, this automatic review.
Accused-appellant raises the following Assignment of Errors:
"I
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED ON ALLEGED INCRIMINATORY
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
"II
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TAKING AGAINST THE ACCUSED VERBAL ADMISSIONS ALLEGEDLY MADE
DURING CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION IN VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT AND TO COUNSEL.
"III
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE
CRIME OF RAPE WITH HOMICIDE." 8
Appellant contends that he knew nothing about the rape and the killing of Rowena Albiso; that around three o'clock in the afternoon of
September 26, 1994, he was at his residence, sleeping; that upon waking up at three-thirty in the same afternoon he went to gather
tuba then proceeded to his copra drier which is approximately 100 meters from his house; that he went back home at four o'clock and
later went to sleep at six o'clock in the evening; that he did not notice any unusual incident on the night of September 26, 1994; that on
September 29, 1994, he was arrested without warrant for reasons he was not aware of; that it was only after he was brought to the
public market where he was informed that he was the suspect in the killing of a certain person, the identity of whom he only knew when
he was already brought to the municipal building. TESDcA
As to the first assigned error, we agree with accused-appellant that trial court erred in convicting him based on circumstantial evidence.
The requisites to sustain a conviction of an accused based on circumstantial evidence are: (1) there must be more than one
circumstance; (2) the inference must be based on proven facts; and (3) the combination of all circumstances produces a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused. 9 And in the appreciation of circumstantial evidence, there are four basic
guidelines: (1) it should be acted upon with caution; (2) all the essential facts must be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt; (3) the
facts must exclude every other theory but that of guilt; and (4) the facts must establish such a certainty of guilt of the accused as to
convince the judgment beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is the one who committed the offense. 10
Prosecution evidence established the following circumstances: (1) in the afternoon of September 26, 1994, when the victim was last
seen alive by her brother Roseller, appellant was seen near his house located along the road where the victim and Roseller pass on
their way home; 11 (2) the road passing through accused-appellant's house is the only path coming from the school going to the house
of the victim's family; 12 (3) appellant was the only person seen by Roseller on his way home; 13 (4) appellant, who was alone at that
time, appeared to Roseller as if he was waiting for somebody; 14 (5) upon waking up in the morning of September 27, 1994 and
noticing that people in their barangay were gathering and looking for somebody, appellant did not bother to inquire about the reason for
such activity; 15 (6) he did not participate in the search for the missing girl; 16 (7) the victim's cadaver was found about 50 meters from
appellant's hut; 17 (8) when he was informed by his wife that the victim's cadaver was found near their house, he showed no surprise
and he did nothing; 18 (9) on two occasions, when he was informed by the police that someone was killed in their barangay and that he
is a suspect in the killing, he did not bother to ask who the victim was. 19
After a careful review of the entire evidence presented, we find that a combination of the foregoing circumstances is insufficient to
convict appellant of rape with homicide. Said circumstances do not lead to a fair and reasonable conclusion that accused-appellant, to
the exclusion of all others, is the person guilty of the offense charged. Appellant's indifference to the events that happened in
their barangay beginning September 26, 1994 up to the time of his arrest on September 29, 1994 may lend support to the suspicion of
the barangay and police authorities that he is the author of the crime. But then, mere suspicion, no matter how strong it may be, is not
sufficient to sustain conviction. 20 Law and jurisprudence demand proof beyond reasonable doubt before any person may be deprived
of his life, liberty, or even property. 21 Enshrined in the Bill of Rights is the right of the accused to be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, and to overcome the presumption nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt must be established by the
prosecution. 22 The constitutional presumption of innocence requires courts to take "a more than casual consideration" of every
circumstances or doubt proving the innocence of the accused. 23
In his testimony, Crisanto Montano admitted that accused-appellant was considered a suspect because he did not join the search for
the missing girl. 24 Appellant testified that he did not participate in the search because he was busy drying copra. 25 It cannot be
contradicted that such passive reaction is susceptible to different interpretations. Indeed, it may be construed as an indication of guilt;
but, it may also be interpreted as mere indifference or even downright insensibility.
Moreover, there was no evidence presented to show that after Roseller left his sister to wash her food container and slippers at the
communal water pump, appellant was seen with her. Furthermore, the testimony of Roseller that he saw appellant along the road on his

way home is not sufficient to support the conclusion that it was appellant who committed the crime. At best, it is mere conjecture or
speculation which the Court will not subscribe to.
Jurisprudence instructs that where the circumstances obtaining in a case are capable of two inferences, one of which is consistent with
the presumption of innocence while the other may be compatible with the finding of guilt, the court must acquit the accused because the
evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and, therefore, is insufficient to support a judgment of conviction. 26
Doubtless, accused-appellant's defenses of alibi and denial are weak. Nevertheless, it is a settled principle in criminal law that a finding
of guilt must rest on the strength of the prosecution's own evidence and not on the weakness or absence of evidence for the
defense. 27 In the present case, the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution is not sufficient to establish the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt.
As to the second assignment of error, we agree with appellant that his confessions to Bienvenido Pantallano, Dr. Henry Cawley, and
before the barangay captain may not be used in evidence against him as they are in violation of his constitutional right to remain silent
and to counsel while under custodial investigation.
Custodial investigation, as defined in Miranda vs. Arizona 28 is any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.
Pantallano and Cawley are law enforcement officers, the former being a CAFGU member and the latter, an NBI officer. With respect to
Pantallano, accused-appellant's confession was made when the former was pointing his gun at the latter; 29 thus, effectively depriving
accused-appellant of his freedom of action. On the other hand, accused-appellant's confession to Dr. Cawley was made when the
former is already under detention. 30 Both Pantallano and Cawley elicited questions that prompted accused-appellant to confess his
guilt in the absence of a counsel and without being informed of his constitutional rights. Hence, it is clear that his confessions are
inadmissible in evidence having been obtained in violation of the provisions of Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:
"Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed
of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except
in the presence of counsel.
"xxx xxx xxx
"(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence
against him.
"xxx xxx xxx."
Likewise, appellant's admission of guilt before the barangay captain is inadmissible in evidence. Montano testified that at the time he
heard appellant admit that he committed the crime because he was possessed by the devil, it was actually in response to the query of
the barangay captain as to why he committed the crime charged. The question and answer transpired in the presence of the chief of
police. Appellant had already been singled out as a suspect, arrested, taken into custody and was being investigated by the
police. 31 While it is true that the barangay captain is not a police officer or a law enforcement agent, it is clear from the records that he
asked his question in the course of police interrogation without the accused-appellant being informed of his rights under
the constitution. 32 In People vs. Morada, 33this Court held that the confession made by the accused-appellant to the barangay captain
is inadmissible because it appeared that the conversation between the two was part of the then ongoing police investigation.
The rape and killing of eight-year old Rowena Albiso is beyond question, a dastardly act that every sensible and God-fearing human
being abhors. The assault on the child is tragic and we condemn in the strongest possible terms the beastly act committed against her.
However, we must uphold the primacy of the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused-appellant when the evidence at hand
falls short of the quantum required to support conviction. 34 Here, the prosecution failed to present evidence sufficient to prove the guilt
of the accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the decision under automatic review is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and accused-appellant Roldan A.
Ochate alias "Boy" is hereby ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to
cause the immediate release of accused-appellant unless he is being lawfully held for another cause, and to inform this Court of the
date of his release, or the ground for his continued confinement, within ten (10) days from notice of herein decision.
||| (People v. Ochate, G.R. No. 127154, [July 30, 2002], 434 PHIL 575-587)

[G.R. No. 137757. August 14, 2000.]

THE
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
RODEGELIO
TURCO,
JR., a.k.a "TOTONG", accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Gregorio dela Pea III for accused-appellant.
SYNOPSIS
Appellant appealed from his conviction of the crime of rape of his 13-year-old cousin, claiming: complainant was unable to clearly
identify him since she admitted that immediately upon opening the door, the perpetrator hastily covered her face with a towel;
complainant was forced by her father to implicate the appellant; and no actual proof was presented that the rape of complainant actually
happened because although a medical certificate was presented, the medico-legal officer who prepared the same was not presented in
court to explain the same. TSIDaH
The Supreme Court upheld appellant's conviction on appeal, ruling: declarations on the witness stand of rape victims who are young
and immature deserve full credence; minor lapses in a witness' testimony should be expected when a person recounts details of so
humiliating and painful to recall as rape; if the charge were not true, it is difficult to understand why the victim would charge her own
cousin as the malefactor; the supposed closeness between appellant and the victim, is explained not by an intimate relationship but by
their blood relationship; absence of medical findings by a medico-legal officer does not disprove the occurrence of rape. In the instant
case, the victim's testimony alone is credible and sufficient to convict.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; DECLARATIONS OF YOUNG AND IMMATURE RAPE VICTIMS
DESERVE FULL CREDENCE; CASE AT BAR. At the outset, it should be remembered that the declarations on the witness stand of
rape victims who are young and immature deserve full credence (People vs. Bernaldez, 294 SCRA 317 [1998]). Succinctly, when the
offended parties are young and immature girls from the ages of twelve to sixteen, courts are inclined to lend credence to their version of
what transpired, considering not only their relative vulnerability but also the shame and embarrassment to which they would be exposed
by court trial if the matter about which they testified were not true (People vs. Clopino, 290 SCRA 432 [1998])
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; MINOR LAPSES IN RAPE VICTIM'S TESTIMONY DO NOT DETRACT FROM HER POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF
THE MALEFACTOR; CASE AT BAR. Minor lapses in a witness' testimony should be expected when a person recounts details of an
experience so humiliating and so painful to recall as rape (People vs. Gementiza, 285 SCRA 478 [1998]). Rape, as a harrowing
experience, is usually not remembered in detail. For, such an offense is not something which enhances one's life experience as to be
worth recalling or reliving but, rather, something which causes deep psychological wounds and casts a stigma upon the victim for the
rest of her life, which her conscious or subconscious mind would prefer to forget (People vs. Garcia, 281 SCRA 463 [1997]). These
lapses do not detract from the overwhelming testimony of a prosecution witness positively identifying the malefactor (People vs. Baccay,
284 SCRA 296 [1998]). Further, the testimony of a witness must be considered and calibrated in its entirety and not by truncated
portions thereof or isolated passages therein (People vs. Natan, 193 SCRA 355 [1991]).
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; TESTIMONY OF RAPE VICTIM DESERVES CREDENCE WHERE THERE IS NO MOTIVE TO FALSELY TESTIFY
AGAINST ACCUSED; CASE AT BAR. The Court finds that the victim had no motive to falsely testify against accused-appellant. Her
testimony deserves the credence accorded thereto by the trial court (People vs. Luzorata, 286 SCRA 487 [1998]). Pertinently, no
woman, especially one of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter
pervert herself by being subjected to a public trial if she was not motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit apprehended and
punished (People vs. Taneo, 284 SCRA 251 [1998]).
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROSECUTION OF A RELATIVE OF THE VICTIM REINFORCED CONCLUSION THAT RAPE REALLY HAPPENED.
We reiterate the trial court's observation thereon the mother of accused-appellant being a first degree cousin of the victim's father,
that makes the victim and accused-appellant second degree cousins or sixth civil degree relatives. Filipino culture, particularly in the
provinces, looks at the extended family as closely-knit and recognizes the obligation of an older relative to protect and take care of a
younger one. On the contrary, in the instant case, the victim initiated the prosecution of her cousin. If the charge were not true, it is
indeed difficult to understand why the victim would charge her own cousin as the malefactor. Too, she having no compelling motive to
file said case against accused-appellant, the conclusion that the rape really happened is logically reinforced.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; DELAY IN REPORTING RAPE INCIDENT IS NOT UNCOMMON; CASE AT BAR. As regards the initial delay of the
victim in reporting the rape incident, suffice it to state that the delay and initial reluctance of a rape victim to make public the assault on
her virtue is not uncommon (People vs. Gallo, supra). In the case at bar, the victim's fear of her father who had moral ascendancy over
her, was explicit. She testified that she did not disclose the incident to her father because of fear both of her father as well as of
accused-appellant. Such reaction is typical of a twelve-year-old girl and only strengthens her credibility. DTcACa
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; NECESSITY OF INDEPENDENT PROOF IN SUPPORT OF "SWEETHEART THEORY"; CASE AT BAR. In People
vs. Venerable (290 SCRA 15 [1998]), we held that the sweetheart theory of the accused was unavailing and self-serving where he failed
to introduce love letters, gifts, and the like to attest to his alleged amorous affair with the victim. Hence, the defense cannot just present
testimonial evidence in support of the theory that he and the victim were sweethearts. Independent proof is necessary, such as tokens,

mementos, and photographs. It is likewise remarkable, a confession possibly of the bankruptcy of this theory that accused-appellant
has not insisted on this defense in his brief, seemingly abandoning this line. We, therefore, conclude that whatever familiarity and
supposed closeness there was between accused-appellant and the victim, is explained not by an intimate relationship but by their blood
relationship.
7. ID.; ID.; PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT; MEDICAL EXAMINATION IS NOT INDISPENSABLE IN THE PROSECUTION
OF RAPE; CASE AT BAR. It is well-settled that a medical examination is not indispensable in the prosecution of rape ( People vs.
Lacaba, G.R. No. 130591, November 17, 1999; People vs. Salazar, 258 SCRA 55 [1996]; People vs. Venerable, supra). The absence of
medical findings by a medico-legal officer does not disprove the occurrence of rape (People vs. Taneo, supra). It is enough that the
evidence on hand convinces the court that conviction is proper (People vs. Auxtero, supra). In the instant case, the victim's testimony
alone is credible and sufficient to convict.
8. CRIMINAL LAW; RAPE; CIVIL LIABILITY; AWARD OF P50,000.00 CIVIL INDEMNITY IN ADDITION TO P50,000.00 MORAL
DAMAGES IS PROPER; CASE AT BAR. As a final observation, it must be said that the amount awarded by the trial court in favor of
Escelea Tabada as indemnification (P50,000.00 for moral damages) for the rape is incomplete based on established jurisprudence and
must be modified. In People vs. Betonio (279 SCRA 532 [1977]), we held that the award of P50,000.00 to the victim as indemnity for
rape not committed or qualified by any of the circumstances under the Death Penalty Law, needs no proof other than the conviction of
the accused for the raped proved. This is different from the P50,000.00 awarded as moral damages which also needs no pleading or
proof as basis thereof (People vs. Prades, 293 SCRA 411 [1998]). aHTEIA
DECISION
MELO, J p:
Accused-appellant Rodegelio Turco, Jr. (a.k.a "Totong") was charged with the crime of rape in Criminal Case No. 2349-272, Branch I of
the Regional Trial Court of Basilan of the 9th Judicial Region, stationed in Isabela, Basilan, under the following Information:
That on or about the 8th day of July, 1995, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, viz., at Km. 6, Begang
Barangay, Municipality of Isabela, Province of Basilan, Philippines, the above-named accused, by the use of force,
threat and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously grab the undersigned complainant by
her neck, cover her mouth and forcibly make her lie down, after which the said accused mounted on top of her and
removed her short pant and panty. Thereafter, the said accused, by the use of force, threat and intimidation,
inserted his penis into the vagina of the undersigned complainant and finally succeeded to have carnal knowledge
of her, against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
(p. 6, Rollo.)
At his arraignment on November 8, 1995, accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty, after which trial ensued.
The prosecution's version of the generative facts, as gathered from the testimony of its witnesses Alejandra Tabada, mother of the
victim; PO3 Celso Y. Tan Sanchez, the police officer who investigated the case; Orlando Pioquinto, brother-in-law of the victim; Escelea
Tabada, the 13-year-old victim; and Felicitas delos Santos Timorata, the medical record clerk who used to be the medical officer under
Dr. Rimberto Sanggalang, the physician who physically examined the victim after the incident is abstracted in the Appellee's Brief in
this wise:
Escelea Tabada and appellant Rodegelio Turco were neighbors in lower Begang, Isabela, Basilan, their houses
being only about sixty (60) meters apart (p. 6 and p. 8, t.s.n.; August 19, 1996). Escelea was then staying with her
father, Alejandro and her deaf grandmother, Perseveranda (p. 9, id). She was twelve (12) years and six (6) months
old at the time of incident, having been born on December 3, 1982 (p. 3, id).
The nightmare of Escelea began in the evening of July 1995. At around seven o'clock (7:00 p.m.) in the evening,
Escelea, after (pp. 11-12, id) [sic]. She was accompanied by a certain Cory Macapili, the granddaughter of her
neighbor, Leonora Cabase (p. 13, id).
Cory left upon reaching Escelea's home. Escelea went upstairs to join her grandmother who was already sleeping
in the room. About to enter the said room, Escelea heard a call from outside. She recognized the voice and when
she asked who was it, the party introduced himself as the appellant, viz:
Q. After you heard your named was mentioned, what did you say if any?
A. I answered: "Who is that?"
Q. Did the person calling your name answer you?
A I heard, sir, "me Totong".
Q. When you say the person who called your name "Lea" was "Totong" you are referring to whom?
A. Rodegelio, sir.
(p. 15, id.; Italics supplied)

She recognized appellant Turco immediately as she had known him for four (4) years and appellant is her second
cousin (p. 34, id). Unaware of the danger that was about to befall her, Escelea forthwith opened the door. Appellant
Turco, with the use of towel, covered Escelea's face. Appellant, aside from covering the victim's mouth, even placed
his right hand on the latter's neck.
Appellant bid Escelea to walk. When they reached a grassy part, near the pig pen which was about twelve (12)
meters away from the victim's house, appellant lost no time in laying the victim on the grass, laid on top of the victim
and took off her shortpants and panty (pp. 17-19, id.). Escelea tried to resist by moving her body but to no avail.
Appellant succeeded in pursuing his evil design-by forcibly inserting his penis inside Escelea's private part. The
victim felt terrible pain (p. 20, id.). Still dissatisfied, after consummating the act, appellant kissed and held the
victim's breast. Thereafter, appellant threatened her that he will kill her if she reports the incident to anybody, thus:
"He threatened me, that if you will reveal the incident to anybody I will kill you.
(p. 21, id; Italics supplied)
Finally, after having satisfied his lust, appellant hurriedly went home. Escelea, on the other hand, upon reaching
home, discovered that her shortpants and panty were filled with blood (p. 23, id.). For almost ten (10) days, she just
kept to herself the harrowing experience until July 18, 1995 when she was able to muster enough courage to tell
her brother-in-law, Orlando Pioquinto, about the said incident. Orlando in turn informed Alejandro, the victim's
father, about the rape of his daughter. Alejandro did not waste time and immediately asked Escelea to see a doctor
for medical examination (p. 27, id.). TcAECH
Escelea was accompanied by her sister Clairlyn Pioquinto to the Provincial Hospital. She was examined by Dr.
Rimberto Sanggalang. After the issuance of the medical certificate, they went to Isabela Municipal Station and filed
Escelea's complaint against appellant (pp. 30-33, id).
(pp. 97-100, Rollo.)
The defense presented Leonora Cabase, neighbor of accused-appellant; her granddaughter Corazon Macapili, and accused-appellant
himself. Accused-appellant denied the charge. The defense that the victim and him were sweethearts was also advanced. Leonora
Cabase mentioned this in her direct testimony.
In reaching a moral certainty of guilt, the trial court held:
While the accused denies the charge of rape, his witness, Mrs. Leonora Cabase was trying to project that the
complainant Escelea Tabada and the accused Rodegelio Turco, Jr. are sweethearts. In the case of People vs.
Casil, 241 SCRA 285, the Supreme Court agrees with the trial court that the "sweetheart story" was a mere
concoction of appellant in order to exculpate himself from criminal liability. The claim of voluntary love affair is an
affirmative defense, the allegation of a love affair needed proof. Nowhere in the record of the case that the same
was substantiated, though mentioned by Mrs. Leonora Cabase. The accused and/or his witnesses must present
any token of the alleged relationship like love notes, mementos or pictures and the like. Such bare allegation of the
defense, not to mention its utter lack of proof, is incredulous. It is hard to understand how such a relationship could
exculpate a person from the rape of a terrified young child barely a little over the age of twelve (12) years old.
Indeed, a love relationship, even if true, will not necessarily rule out force (People vs. Sergio Betonio, G.R. No.
119165, September 26, 1997, Case Digests of Supreme Court Decisions, Vol. 36, No. 3, September 1-29, 1997,
pp. 695-697).
There are guiding principles in rape cases as cited in People vs. Victor Abrecinoz, G.R. No. 122474, October 17,
1997, Case Digests of Supreme Court Decisions, Vol. 37, No. 1, October 2-31, 1997, pp. 157-160, and they are: (1)
an accusation for rape can be made with facility, it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused,
though innocent, to disprove it; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where two persons are usually
involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the
prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the
evidence for the defense. Thus, the credibility of the complainant is a paramount importance, and if her testimony
proves credible, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof.
It should be noted that the complainant and the accused are second degree cousin or they are sixth civil degree
relatives. The mother of the accused is a first degree cousin of the father of the complainant. In the culture of the
Filipino family on extended family, the relationship between the complainant and the accused being only second
degree cousin, it becomes the duty of an older relative (the accused) to protect and care for a younger relative (the
complainant). It is very hard to understand or comprehend why a cousin files a case of rape against her cousin,
unless it is true. There is no showing that there was compelling motive why the case be filed against the accused,
except that the rape really happened.
xxx xxx xxx

It is noted that there was no underlying reason why the complainant and/or her father would bring an action against
the accused, except that the accused had raped Escelea Tabada on July 8, 1995, at about 7:00 o'clock in the
evening. If it were not true that she was raped by the accused, why would she expose herself to an embarrassment
and traumatic experience connected with the litigation of this rape case. We are aware of the Filipino culture
especially on virginity. We likened it as a mirror, once dropped and broken, it can no longer be pieced together . . .
not ever. This is true among the Filipino folks that the complainant belonged, poor and helpless and everything is
entrusted to God. The complainant is a young girl, a little over twelve (12) years old and almost illiterate, having
attended school up to Grade III only. So poor that her family cannot even buy the cheapest television set and she
has to go to a house of a neighbor for the meager joy of seeing a television show . . . and expose herself to the
danger of the dark night. All said, it is very difficult to be poor. Going to the court is a shout for help . . . let us try to
hear it.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, under the above circumstances and evaluation, this court finds the accused "GUILTY" of rape and
sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the complainant the amount of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) for moral damages without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
xxx xxx xxx
(pp. 33-37, Rollo.)
In accused-appellant's brief, he assigns the following alleged errors:
I
THAT THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF RAPE
BASED ON THE TESTIMONIES OF THE COMPLAINANT ESCELEA TABADA AND HER WITNESS.
II
THAT THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PROSECUTION, BASED
ON THE AFFIDAVITS AND ORAL TESTIMONIES OF THE COMPLAINANT AND ITS WITNESSES WAS ABLE TO
PROVED [sic] BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE ACCUSED COMMITTED THE CRIME OF RAPE
AGAINST THE COMPLAINANT.
III
THAT THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN SENTENCING THE ACCUSED TO SUFFER
THE PENALTY OF RECLUSION PERPETUA AND TO INDEMNIFY THE COMPLAINANT THE AMOUNT OF
P50,000.00 REPRESENTING MORAL DAMAGES BASED ON THE EVIDENCES PRESENTED BY THE
PROSECUTION.
(p. 101, Rollo.)
He particularly argues that his conviction is not supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt considering that other than the written
statement of the complainant before the Police Station of Isabela and before the Clerk of Court of the Municipal Trial Court, and her
testimony during direct examination, no other evidence was presented to conclusively prove that there was ever rape at all; that she only
presumed that it was accused-appellant who attacked her since she admitted that immediately upon opening the door, the perpetrator
hastily covered her face with a towel; that nothing in her testimony clearly and convincingly shows that she was able to identify accusedappellant as the perpetrator; that complainant implicated accused-appellant only because her father forced her to do so; and lastly, that
no actual proof was presented that the rape of the complainant actually happened considering that although a medical certificate was
presented, the medico-legal officer who prepared the same was not presented in court to explain the same.
We agree with the trial court.
As aptly recalled by the trial court, there are three guiding principles in the review of rape cases, to wit: (1) an accusation of rape can be
made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, although innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the
intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant is scrutinized with
extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution stands or falls on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from
the weakness of the defense (People vs. Gallo, 284 SCRA 590 [1998]; People vs. Balmoria, 287 SCRA 687 [1998]; People vs. Auxtero,
289 SCRA 75 [1998]; People vs. Sta. Ana, 291 SCRA 188 [1998]).
Accordingly, the primordial consideration in a determination concerning the crime of rape is the credibility of complainant's testimony.
The trial court described complainant as "a young girl, a little over twelve (12) years old and almost illiterate, having attended school up
to Grade III only. So poor that her family cannot even buy the cheapest television set and she has to go to a house of a neighbor for the
meager joy of seeing a television show . . . and exposes herself to the danger of the dark night." But verily, age, youth, and poverty are
not guarantees of credibility. Hence, thorough scrutiny must be made by the Court.
Complainant narrated the incident in this wise:
Q While you went upstairs and about to enter the room of your grandmother, did you hear anything?

A Yes, sir.
Q What was that?
A I heard a call, sir.
Q How was the call made?
A It is just by saying: "Lea". SaHTCE
Q After you heard your name was mentioned, what did you say if any?
A I answered: "Who is that?"
Q Did the person calling your name answer you?
A I heard, sir, "me Totong".
Q When you say the person who called your name "Lea" was "Totong", you are referring to whom?
A Rodegelio, sir.
Q When you say "Rodegelio", you are referring to Rodegelio Turco, Jr., the accused in this case?
A Yes, sir.
Q After the person calling your name "Lea" identified himself as "Totong", what did you do?
A I opened the door, sir.
Q And when you opened the door, what happened next?
A Totong with the use of towel covered my face, sir.
Q Aside from covering your face with a towel, what else did he do?
A He covered my mouth, sir.
Q Aside from covering your mouth, what else did he do?
A He placed his right hand on my neck, sir.
Q Aside from placing his right hand . . . when he placed his right hand on your neck, where was he? Was he infront
or behind?
A He was at my back, sir.
Q After placing his right hand on your neck behind you, what did "Totong" do next with that position?
A He covered my mouth, sir.
Q After covering your mouth and face, what did he do next?
A He told me to walk, sir.
Q Where did he bring you?
A I don't know exactly where he brought me, sir.
Q But you know very well that he brought you to a certain place?
A I don't know exactly the place where he brought me, sir.
Q Is it far from your house where you were forcibly taken?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you have a copra kiln?
ATTY. G.V. DELA PEA III:
The witness already answered that she does not know where she was brought, leading, Your Honor.
COURT: (Questioning the witness)
Q According to you, from your house you were brought by the accused to a place which you do not know?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q What place?
A Pig pen, Your Honor.
Q Do you know the owner of that pig pen?
A Our pig pen, Your Honor.
Q Who owned that pig pen?
A My father, Your Honor.
Q How far is that pig pen to your house?
A (From this witness stand to that road outside of this building).
COURT:
It is about 12 meters. Alright, continue.
PROSECUTOR M.L. GENERALAO: (Continuing)
Q You stated in answer to the question of the Honorable Court that you were brought to the pig pen or the place
where you were sexually abused, were you place inside or outside?
ATTY. G.V. DELA PEA III:
Leading, Your Honor.

PROSECUTOR M.L. GENERALAO:

I will withdraw.
Q Will you please explain to the Court what particular place of the pig pen that you were brought by the accused?
A Inside the grasses, sir.
Q When you were already inside the grasses near this pig pen, what did the accused do to you?
A He put me down, sir.
Q When you were already down on the ground, what did the accused do next?
A He mounted on me, sir.
Q And when the accused was already on top of you, what did he do next?
A He molested me, sir.
Q Before he molested you, did he remove anything from your body?
A Yes, sir.
Q What?
A My shortpants and panty, sir.
Q You stated that the accused while on top of you removed your pants and panty, did he totally remove it from your
body?
A Yes, sir.
Q After removing your shortpants and panty, what else did the accused do?
A He abused me, sir.
Q You said that he abused you, how did he abuse you?
A He put his private part inside my private part, sir.
Q When the accused was on top of you and he forcibly abused you, what did you do?
A I tried to move my body, sir.
Q While you were trying to move your body and while the accused was on top of you, what did the accused do?
A He tried to insert his private part to my private part, sir.
Q And was he able to insert his private part?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did you feel when his private part was already inside your private part?
A I felt pain, sir.
Q Will you please explain why you felt when the private part of the accused was already inside your private part?
A I felt pain when he already finished, sir.
Q By the way, before July 8, 1995, were you had been raped? Will you please tell us whether you have already
experienced or you have already your menstruation at that time?
A No, sir.
Q Now you stated to the Honorable Court . . . after the accused had sexually abused you and you said you felt
pains after he consummated the sexual act, after that what did he do next after consummating the act?
A After consummating his desire, he raised my panty and shortpants then he kissed me and hold my nipple, sir.
Q After the accused had raised your shortpants and panty, embraced you, kissed you and hold your breast, did he
tell you anything?
A He threatened me, "that if you will reveal the incident to anybody I will kill you."
Q In what dialect?
A In Chavacano, sir.
Q After the accused embraced you, kissed you and hold your nipple and threatened you in Chavacano dialect, what
happened next after that?
A No more, sir. aSTHDc
(tsn, Aug. 19, 1996, pp. 14-22.)
On cross-examination, the victim did display some apparent confusion when the defense counsel asked her about the events that
transpired before the ill-fated July 8, 1995. The query prompted her to narrate the incident prior to said date when she also watched
television at the home of Leonora Cabase, and that when she arrived home, accused-appellant came and called her "Lea" and when
she asked who was it, he answered "so Totong". When she asked what he wanted, he said he wanted to borrow a guitar. She said that
she could not lend him the guitar since her father was not yet around. He insisted but to no avail, and hence he just went home. She
went to sleep afterwards. On re-direct examination, she clarified that when accused-appellant came to borrow the guitar on July 8,
1995, it was about 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon. Lastly, she said that the incident of the borrowing of the guitar and the incident that
transpired at 7 o'clock in the evening on July 8, 1995 were separate incidents.

Significantly, three things could be perceived: complainant's youth, her apparent confusion concerning the events that transpired, and
her fear of both accused-appellant and her father.
At the outset, it should be remembered that the declarations on the witness stand of rape victims who are young and immature deserve
full credence (People vs. Bernaldez, 294 SCRA 317 [1998]). Succinctly, when the offended parties are young and immature girls from
the ages of twelve to sixteen, courts are inclined to lend credence to their version of what transpired, considering not only their relative
vulnerability but also the shame and embarrassment to which they would be exposed by court trial if the matter about which they
testified were not true (People vs. Clopino, 290 SCRA 432 [1998]). In addition, we take cognizance of the trial court's observation on the
segment of the Filipino society to which the victim belongs almost illiterate, having attended school up to the third grade only, and so
poor that she had to go to a neighbor's house to watch television, yet one who values her virginity which like a "mirror, once dropped
and broken . . . can no longer be pieced together not ever," this being "true among the Filipino folks [to which] complainant belonged,
poor and helpless everything is entrusted to God" (p. 35, Rollo).
The victim's relatively low level of intelligence explains the lapses in her testimony, having intermingled two incidents. Nonetheless, it
can easily be gathered from the record that the defense counsel may have contributed to this confusion when he asked the victim what
transpired "before" the incident (tsn, August 19, 1996, p. 37). Minor lapses in a witness' testimony should be expected when a person
recounts details of an experience so humiliating and so painful to recall as rape (People vs. Gementiza, 285 SCRA 478 [1998]). Rape,
as a harrowing experience, is usually not remembered in detail. For, such an offense is not something which enhances one's life
experience as to be worth recalling or reliving but, rather, something which causes deep psychological wounds and casts a stigma upon
the victim for the rest of her life, which her conscious or subconscious mind would prefer to forget (People vs. Garcia, 281 SCRA 463
[1997]). These lapses do not detract from the overwhelming testimony of a prosecution witness positively identifying the malefactor
(People vs. Baccay, 284 SCRA 296 [1998]). Further, the testimony of a witness must be considered and calibrated in its entirety and not
by truncated portions thereof or isolated passages therein (People vs. Natan, 193 SCRA 355 [1991]).
The Court finds that the victim had no motive to falsely testify against accused-appellant. Her testimony deserves the credence
accorded thereto by the trial court (People vs. Luzorata, 286 SCRA 487 [1998]). Pertinently, no woman, especially one of tender age,
would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter pervert herself by being subjected to a
public trial if she was not motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished (People vs. Taneo, 284 SCRA
251 [1998]).
Another point to consider is the blood relationship between accused-appellant and the victim. At this juncture, we reiterate the trial
court's observation thereon the mother of accused-appellant being a first degree cousin of the victim's father, that makes the victim
and accused-appellant second degree cousins or sixth civil degree relatives. Filipino culture, particularly in the provinces, looks at the
extended family as closely-knit and recognizes the obligation of an older relative to protect and take care of a younger one. On the
contrary, in the instant case, the victim initiated the prosecution of her cousin. If the charge were not true, it is indeed difficult to
understand why the victim would charge her own cousin as the malefactor. Too, she having no compelling motive to file said case
against accused-appellant, the conclusion that the rape really happened is logically reinforced.
As regards the initial delay of the victim in reporting the rape incident, suffice it to state that the delay and initial reluctance of a rape
victim to make public the assault on her virtue is not uncommon (People vs. Gallo, supra). In the case at bar, the victim's fear of her
father who had moral ascendancy over her, was explicit. She testified that she did not disclose the incident to her father because of fear
both of her father as well as of accused-appellant (tsn, August 19, 1996, pp. 23-24). Such reaction is typical of a twelve-year-old girl and
only strengthens her credibility.
The issue of credibility of the victim having been settled, there are a few points presented by the defense that must be passed upon:
1. Other than their blood relationship, was there an intimate relationship between accused-appellant and the victim? The theory initially
advanced by the defense in the proceedings before the court a quo is the "sweetheart theory". In this regard, we agree with the trial
court that the "sweetheart story" was a mere concoction of accused-appellant in order to exculpate himself from criminal liability.
In People vs. Venerable (290 SCRA 15 [1998]), we held that the sweetheart theory of the accused was unavailing and self-serving
where he failed to introduce love letters, gifts, and the like to attest to his alleged amorous affair with the victim. Hence, the defense
cannot just present testimonial evidence in support of the theory that he and the victim were sweethearts. Independent proof is
necessary, such as tokens, mementos, and photographs. It is likewise remarkable, a confession possibly of the bankruptcy of this
theory that accused-appellant has not insisted on this defense in his brief, seemingly abandoning this line.
We, therefore, conclude that whatever familiarity and supposed closeness there was between accused-appellant and the victim, is
explained not by an intimate relationship but by their blood relationship. Hence, it is noticeable that on the day of the incident, when
accused-appellant called upon the victim and the latter asked who he was, the victim knew right away that her caller was accusedappellant when the latter replied "Si Totong".
Accused-appellant, in his direct testimony, tried to deny any blood relation with the victim Escelea Tabada and touched on the apparent
friendship between them, as follows:
Q You mentioned earlier that you know the complainant, why do you know the complainant Escelea Tabada?

A I only know her when I was already in jail, sir.

Q You mean to say that you never knew the complainant before you were arrested?
A I do not know her, sir.
COURT: (Questioning the witness)
Q Why, are you not related to the Tabadas?
A No, Your Honor.
ATTY. G.V. DELA PEA III: (Continuing)
Q Have you ever seen the complainant in Begang?
A The complainant is at Begang, sir.
Q And you mentioned that you were not related with the complainant, Mr. Witness?
A Yes, sir, we are only close.
Q So, in other words, Mr. Witness, you and the complainant Escelea Tabada were already friends?
A Yes, sir.
(tsn, June 16, 1998, pp. 42-43.)
However, on cross-examination, he notably crumbled:
Q Now, you stated in your direct examination that you are not related to the Tabadas in San Antonio Begang,
Isabela, Basilan, is that right?
A Yes, sir, we are only close.
Q Is it not a fact Mr. Witness that your mother is the first cousin of the father of Escelea Tabada?
A They are cousins, sir.
Q So, indeed you are related to the Tabadas?
A Yes, sir.
Q So, when you said that you are not related to the Tabadas, you were not telling the truth?
A Yes, sir.
(ibid., p. 51.)
2. Accused-appellant argues that no actual proof was presented that the rape actually happened since the medico-legal officer who
prepared the medical certificate was not presented in court to explain the same. cCDAHE
In People vs. Bernaldez (supra), the court a quo erred in giving weight to the medical certificate issued by the examining
physician despite the failure of the latter to testify. While the certificate could be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule since
entries in official records (under Section 44, Rule 130, Rules of Court) constitute exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule, since it
involved an opinion of one who must first be established as an expert witness, it could not be given weight or credit unless the
doctor who issued it is presented in court to show his qualifications. We place emphasis on the distinction between admissibility of
evidence and the probative value thereof. Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or
the rules (Section 3, Rule 128, Rules of Court) or is competent. Since admissibility of evidence is determined by its relevance and
competence, admissibility is, therefore, an affair of logic and law. On the other hand, the weight to be given to such evidence, once
admitted, depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided in Rule 133 and the jurisprudence laid down by the Court.
Thus, while evidence may be admissible, it may be entitled to little or no weight at all. Conversely, evidence which may have
evidentiary weight may be inadmissible because a special rule forbids its reception (Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. II,
1998 ed., p. 550).
Withal, although the medical certificate is an exception to the hearsay rule, hence admissible as evidence, it has very little probative
value due to the absence of the examining physician. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the prosecution relied solely on the medical
certificate (stating that there was "[h]ymen rupture, secondary to penile insertion" as well as "foul-smelling discharges." The diagnosis
was "[r]uptured hymen secondary to rape" [p. 68, Record]). In fact, reliance was made on the testimony of the victim herself which,
standing alone even without medical examination, is sufficient to convict (People vs. Topaguen, 369 SCRA 601 [1997]). It is well-settled
that a medical examination is not indispensable in the prosecution of rape (People vs. Lacaba, G.R. No. 130591, November 17,
1999; People vs. Salazar, 258 SCRA 55 [1996]; People vs. Venerable, supra). The absence of medical findings by a medico-legal
officer does not disprove the occurrence of rape (People vs. Taneo, supra). It is enough that the evidence on hand convinces the court
that conviction is proper (People vs. Auxtero, supra). In the instant case, the victim's testimony alone is credible and sufficient to convict.
As a final observation, it must be said that the amount awarded by the trial court in favor of Escelea Tabada as indemnification
(P50,000.00 for moral damages) for the rape is incomplete based on established jurisprudence and must be modified. In People vs.
Betonio (279 SCRA 532 [1977]), we held that the award of P50,000.00 to the victim as indemnity for rape not committed or qualified by
any of the circumstances under the Death Penalty Law, needs no proof other than the conviction of the accused for the raped proved.
This is different from the P50,000.00 awarded as moral damages which also needs no pleading or proof as basis thereof ( People vs.
Prades, 293 SCRA 411 [1998]).

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant Rodegelio Turco, Jr. a.k.a
"Totong" is ordered to indemnify the offended party, Escelea Tabada, in the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos in addition to
the sum of P50,000.00 already awarded by the trial court as moral damages.
||| (People v. Turco, Jr., G.R. No. 137757, [August 14, 2000], 392 PHIL 498-517)

STATE v. BALL
NO. 47575.
339 S.W.2d 783 (1960)
STATE of Missouri, Respondent,v.William Arthur BALL, Appellant.
Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.
November 14, 1960.
Dewey S. Godfrey, St. Louis, for appellant.
John M. Dalton, Atty. Gen., Richard R. Nacy, Jr., Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
BARRETT, Commissioner.
A jury has found William Arthur Ball guilty of robbery in the first degree; the jury also found prior felony convictions
and, therefore, a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment was imposed. V.A.M.S. 560.120, 560.135, 556.280.
The facts, briefly, as the jury could find them were that about 2:30 in the afternoon of October 15, 1958, two colored
men, one of them tall and the other short, entered the Krekeler Jewelry Store at 1651 South 39th Street. The taller man
spent ten or fifteen minutes selecting and buying a cigarette lighter, he also talked about buying and looked at
watches and rings. As the taller man looked at jewelry and made his purchase the shorter man looked in the cases and
moved about in the store. Later in the day, about 5:50, as John Krekeler was placing rings and watches in the safe
preparatory to closing the store two men entered, one of them tall and the other short, and Krekeler immediately
recognized them as the two men who had been in the store at 2:30, especially the taller man. He recognized the taller
man's narrow-brimmed, tall hat, brown jacket, gray stirt and particularly a scar on his face. The shorter man started to
walk behind the counter and as Krekeler intercepted him he "drew a long barreled blue .38 and stuck it in my face."
Both men followed Krekeler, the shorter man with the gun in "his back," directing him to the watch repair department
and finally into the rest room in the rear of the store. He was told not to turn around and stood facing the wall. He
could hear jewelry being dumped into a bag and the "jingle" of the cash register. The two men left Krekeler in the rest
room and after hearing the door slam he called the police. The two men had taken watches and rings of the stipulated
value of $4,455.21 and $140 in cash from the register. Krekeler identified the appellant from pictures, and three weeks
later, after his capture, in a hospital and upon the trial positively identified him as the taller of the two holdup men.
In his motion for a new trial one of the claims is that there was no direct evidence of an injury or any evidence to show
that Krekeler was put "in fear of some immediate injury to his person," one of the essential elements of robbery in the
first degree. V.A.M.S. 560.120. Krekeler did not affirmatively testify that he was in fear but he could well apprehend
injury if he did not comply with their requests and in the circumstances the jury could reasonably find "the fear"
contemplated in the statute. 77 C.J.S. Robbery 16, p. 459; State v. Thompson, Mo., 299 S.W.2d 468, 474. The element
of fear being a reasonable inference from the evidence, the facts and circumstances support and warrant the finding of
robbery in the first degree. State v. Eckenfels, Mo., 316 S.W.2d 532.
Another of the appellant's sufficiently preserved claims in his motion for a new trial (V.A.M.S. 547.030; Supreme Court
Rule 27.20, V.A.M.R.) has to do with his arrest and the testimony of the two arresting officers. On November 4, 1958,
about three weeks after the robbery, police officers in a squad car saw Ball walking on Easton Avenue. The officers
stopped him, told him that they were officers and that he was under arrest. As officer Powell faced and searched Ball
officer Ballard "holstered" his gun and attempted "to cuff" him. Ball shoved Powell over and ran down Easton Avenue,
the officers ran after him, Powell being closest. Powell yelled, "Halt Ball, you're under arrest," and fired one shot high in
the air but Ball continued running and Powell fired four more shots, two at his legs, one at his buttocks, and he finally
fell from a bullet in his back. It is claimed that this evidence was not material or relevant, that it was too remote from
the date of the robbery to indicate a consciousness of guilt and since it was of course prejuducial
that he is entitled to a new trial. But unexplained flight and resisting arrest even thirty days after the supposed
commission of a crime is a relevant circumstance (State v. Duncan, 336 Mo. 600, 611, 80 S.W.2d 147, 153), the
remoteness of the flight goes to the weight of the evidence rather than to its admissibility. 20 Am.Jur., Sec. 293, p. 274.
When Ball was finally subdued and arrested the officers took from his person and impounded a brown felt hat, "a
brownish" windbreaker type jacket, trousers, gray shirt and shoesthese were exhibits one and two, Ball admitted that
they belonged to him although his evidence tended to show that he had purchased the jacket after October 15. In
identifying Ball, in addition to the scar on his face, Krekeler was impressed with and remembered the brown ensemble,
particularly the "tall brown hat." These items were of course relevant and admissible in evidence and there is no
objection to them. State v. Johnson, Mo., 286 S.W.2d 787, 792. The appellant objects, however, in his motion for a new
trial that a police officer was permitted to testify that $258.02 in currency and two pennies were taken from his person.
It is said that the introduction of these exhibits was "immaterial and irrelevant, neither tended to prove nor disprove
any of the issues involved in this case; that said money as seized at the time of the arrest was neither identified by Mr.
Krekeler nor by any other person as the money which was allegedly stolen from the A. L. Krekeler & Sons Jewelry
Company on the 15th day of October, 1958; that said evidence was considered by this jury to the prejudice of this
defendant convincingly."
The circumstances in which this evidence was introduced were these: After the clothes were identified and introduced
as exhibits one and two the prosecuting attorney inquired of officer Powell, "Did you also seize his personal effects?"
Defense counsel immediately objected to any testimony relating to personal effects found on the defendant "at the
time." The court overruled the objection and state's counsel inquired, "Well Officer, what personal effects were
seized?" Defense counsel, evidently knowing and anticipating, objected "to any testimony relevant (sic) to any
personal effects seized upon this Defendant at the time he was arrested by reason of the fact it is immaterial and
irrelevant and tends to neither prove nor disprove any facts involved and ask that the jury be discharged and a mistrial

be declared." The court overruled the objection and the officer said, "Ball's personal effects consisted of two hundred
and fifty eight dollars and two cents in cash, with the denominations of the bill(s), two one hundred dollar bills, a
twentytwo twenties, a ten, a five, three ones and two pennies. He had a ladies ring and a man's wristwatch. He had
a crusifixion along with a small pen knife and a black leather wallet. Maybe one or two other personal articles." All of
these items were then marked as exhibits, from three to nine, offered in evidence and described by the officer, exhibit
three being the bills and pennies comprising the $258.02. According to the officer Mr. Krekeler was unable to identify
any of these articles or the money as having come from the jewelry store robbery and there is no objection in the
motion to any of the items other than the money and some of them were obviously not prejudicial, for example the
keys, a small penknife and wallet.
Unlike the roll of dimes in State v. Hampton, Mo., 275 S.W.2d 356, the testimony as to the $258.02 was not offered in
proof of the substantive fact of the crime. In that case the five-dollar roll of dimes wrapped in a roll of green paper was
found on the defendant the same day of the burglary and while the fact was a circumstance admissible in evidence it
was held to not constitute substantive evidence inconsistent with the hypothesis of the defendant's innocence of
burglary. In State v. Gerberding, Mo., 272 S.W.2d 230, there was no timely or proper objection to the proof but $4,000
was taken in a robbery and
the appellant had $920 in currency in his topcoat pocket when captured the day of the robbery. The proof of the
money here was evidently on the theory that Ball did not have or was not likely to have such a sum of money on his
person prior to the commission of the offense. 1 Wharton, Criminal Evidence, Sec. 204, p. 410. As to this the facts were
that he had been out of the penitentiary about eight months and the inference the state would draw is that he had no
visible means of support and no employment and could not possibly have $258.02 except from robberies. Of course,
there was no such proof and Ball claimed that he had worked intermittently for a custodian or janitor of an apartment
house and that he had won the $258.02 in a series of crap games at a named place. Not only was Krekeler unable to
identify the money or any of the items on Ball's person as having come from the jewelry store so that in fact they were
not admissible in evidence (annotation 3 A.L.R. 1213), the charge here was that Ball and his accomplice took jewelry of
the value of $4,455.21 and $140 in cash from the cash register. There was no proof as to the denomination of the
money in the cash register, it was simply a total of $140. Here nineteen days had elapsed, there was no proof that Ball
had suddenly come into possession of the $258.02 (annotation 123 A.L.R. 119) and in all these circumstances "The
mere possession of a quantity of money is in itself no indication that the possessor was the taker of money charged as
taken, because in general all money of the same denomination and material is alike, and the hypothesis that the
money found is the same as the money taken is too forced and extraordinary to be receivable." 1 Wigmore, Evidence,
Sec. 154, p. 601. In the absence of proof or of a fair inference from the record that the money in Ball's possession at
the time of his arrest came from or had some connection with the robbery and in the absence of a plain showing of his
impecuniousness before the robbery and his sudden affluence (State v. Garrett, 285 Mo. 279, 226 S.W. 4), the evidence
was not in fact relevant and in the circumstances was obviously prejudicial for if it did not tend to prove the offense for
which the appellant was on trial the jury may have inferred that he was guilty of another robbery. State v. Bray, Mo.
App., 278 S.W.2d 49; People v. Orloff, 65 Cal.App.2d 614, 620-621, 151 P.2d 288; annotation 123 A.L.R. loc. cit. 132134 and compare the facts and circumstances in State v. Garrett, supra. The admission of the evidence in the
circumstances of this record infringed the right to a fair trial and for that reason the judgment is reversed and the
cause remanded.
PER CURIAM.
The foregoing opinion by BARRETT, C., is adopted as the opinion of the Court en banc.
WESTHUES, EAGER, STORCKMAN and HOLLINGSWORTH, JJ., concur.
HYDE, C. J., and LEEDY and DALTON, JJ., dissent.

LOPEZ v. HEESEN
NO. 6760.
365 P.2d 448 (1961)
69 N.M. 206
Jesse G. LOPEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant,v.Robert HEESEN and Sears, Roebuck and Company, a corporation,
Defendants-Appellees.
Supreme Court of New Mexico.
August 22, 1961.
Rehearing Denied October 31, 1961.
Smith, Kiker & Kitts, and Ramon Lopez, Albuquerque, for appellant.
Sutin & Jones, Albuquerque, David R. Hardy, Kansas City, Mo., for appellees.

CHAVEZ, Justice.
Appellant, Jesse G. Lopez, originally filed suit against appellee, Robert Heesen, alleging that on October 15, 1958,
Heesen unlawfully, violently, maliciously and feloniously assaulted and shot appellant with a shotgun, thereby inflicting
dangerous and painful wounds and injuries to appellant, causing him great bodily and mental pain and anguish, all to
his damage in the total sum of $80,000, which included $25,000 punitive damages.
Appellee, Heesen, answered denying the allegations of the complaint and thereafter appellant filed a demand for jury
trial. By stipulation of appellant and appellee, Heesen, appellee, Sears, Roebuck and Company was joined as a partydefendant. Appellee, Sears, Roebuck and Company, will hereinafter be referred to as appellee "Sears." Thereafter two
amended complaints followed before the third amended complaint was filed, alleging that appellee, Sears, was
engaged in the design and manufacture of hunting firearms, including the Higgins Model 51, Cal. 30.06 rifle, and was
also engaged in the selling of firearms in Albuquerque.
It was also alleged that on October 14, 1958, appellee, Sears, sold to appellee, Heesen, one of said Higgins Model 51
hunting rifles; that said rifle was negligently designed or manufactured by appellee, Sears, in that the safety
mechanism moved readily and in a dangerous manner from a "safe" to a "fire" position. In addition, it was alleged that
the rifle in this dangerous condition known to appellee, Sears, was sold to appellee, Heesen, with the knowledge that it
would be used for hunting purposes and that appellee, Sears, negligently failed to warn appellee, Heesen, of the
dangerous and defective condition of the rifle.
The complaint further alleged that on the afternoon of October 15, 1958, in Colfax County, New Mexico, appellee,
Heesen, negligently permitted the rifle to discharge while hunting and that as a proximate result of the joint and
concurrent negligence of both appellees, appellant sustained a severe and disabling wound and injury to his chest,
requiring hospital and surgical care. Appellant demanded damages in the amount of $55,000 against both appellees,
jointly and severally.
Appellee, Heesen, answered denying the allegations of the third amended complaint. Appellee, Sears, also answered
denying the allegations and raising additional affirmative defenses, to-wit: That appellant's injuries were caused by an
unavoidable accident; that the negligence of appellee, Heesen, was the sole cause thereof; that the rifle involved was
of a recognized quality and of proper design and functioned properly by all commercial sporting arms standards when
used with reasonable care; that rifles of this type had been manufactured by the millions and used by hunters
generally and by the government of the United States and foreign countries; that the safety mechanism and its
qualities were patent and obvious, and had been seen and inspected by Heesen prior to the accident; that Heesen
knew of the tendency of the safety mechanism to come off safety to "fire" position while hunting in heavy brush and
climbing up and down mountain
terrain when pressure was applied to the safety mechanism; that appellee, Sears, had no duty to warn appellee,
Heesen, of the method of operation and use of the safety mechanism; and that it could not have been foreseen that
appellee, Heesen, would continue to hunt in heavy brush and mountainous terrain knowing that the safety mechanism
would come off safety without taking proper precautions to handle the rifle in a reasonable manner.
The jury returned its verdict finding the issues for both appellees and against appellant. Judgment was entered for
appellees and this appeal followed. Appellant abandoned any contention that the verdict in favor of Heesen was
erroneous and this appeal concerns only appellee, Sears.
The facts are substantially as follows. In the early afternoon of October 14, 1958, appellee, Heesen, an Air Force

officer, purchased a J.C. Higgins Model 51, 30.06 rifle from the store of appellee, Sears. Said rifle has a bolt action
known more particularly as a "Mauser type action" with which Heesen was familar. Heesen, although experienced in
hunting, was not familiar with the Higgins Model 51 and had never used such a rifle. The safety mechanism on the rifle
is what is known as a "Class 1" safety, meaning that it interrupts the firing pin directly. The safety lever is mounted on
the left side of the gun to the rear of the bolt assembly. It is a two-position safety with the action locked when the
safety lever is in a raised position. To release the safety, you push the safety lever to the left and down to a horizontal
position and the gun is then ready to fire.
Heesen first telephoned appellee's store about obtaining a Higgins rifle which they advertised. Later he went to
appellee's store and purchased the rifle. At the time of the purchase Heesen was given an instruction pamphlet which
he read. Said pamphlet explained the composition of the rifle and gave operating instructions, including the method to
be pursued to make the gun "safe," i.e., how the gun is put in a safety position and how it may be released and have
the gun ready to fire. It appears that Heesen first talked to a salesman, John C. Villella, over the telephone and
requested that the rifle be put aside for him. However, another salesman, Roger Perkins made the actual transfer of
the rifle to Heesen. Perkins' whereabouts is unknown and nothing is known as to Perkins' conversation with Heesen.
Villella did not give Heesen any instructions as to the use of the safety mechanism. There was a telescopic sight
advertised for sale for use with this rifle but Heesen did not care for the sight and did not purchase it.
Immediately after the purchase of the rifle, Heesen left for a deer hunting trip in an area known as Ute Park near the
town of Eagle Nest in Colfax County. He arrived at Ute Park that night and began hunting the next morning on October
15, 1958. Heesen hunted without success and had seen no game up until the time his gun discharged and appellant
was wounded shortly after 3:00 P.M.
When Heesen commenced hunting that morning he placed a live cartridge in the chamber and placed the gun on
safety position. He traveled a good deal during the hours before the shooting and on one or two occasions he
discovered the gun off safety position. This was when he had come down a long hill covered with rocks and boulders
and he assumed that he had hit it against a rock or something. Thereafter Heesen checked the safety position on
frequent occasions. Heesen carried the gun on his right shoulder with the sling at port arms or ready position, with his
left hand on the forearm of the gun and his right hand on the stock, and by the forearm of the gun with his right hand
at the "balance" of the rifle. In each of these positions the safety lever was toward Heesen's body or right leg. Heesen
changed the position in which he carried the rifle during the course of his walking up and down mountain slopes. He
also carried it in a different position in going through brush and in climbing or stepping upon rocks. Although the gun
moved from "safe" to "fire" position at least twice during the hours before
the shooting, Heesen was not aware of this occurrence. Shortly before the shooting, Heesen had been sitting on a knoll
for about twenty minutes checking the wind and watching for deer. While sitting on the knoll he checked or observed
the safety lever on the rifle several times and it was on safety position. At a time not more than ten minutes before the
shooting he left the knoll and started down a draw which ran in a southerly or southwesterly direction. Heesen was not
sure whether he checked the safety lever after he left the knoll and he was carrying the gun on his shoulder by the
sling as he proceeded down the draw toward the point where the gun discharged.
At about this time, appellant, Jesse G. Lopez, was sitting next to a tree about fifty yards away from the point where
Heesen's gun subsequently discharged. Appellant in the company of two hunting companions, Bennie Aragon and
Ramon Barela, had gone from Albuquerque to Ute Park on the afternoon of October 14, 1958, and after spending the
night in the area, commenced hunting on the morning of October 15th, the first day of deer season. After hunting all
morning and again in the early afternoon, the party stopped to rest at the location where appellant was shot. It was
then about 3:00 P.M. and appellant, dressed in bright hunting clothes, was sitting about twenty feet away from his two
companions and scanning the area for game. After sitting there about four or five minutes, appellant observed an
object to his right which was moving but which he could not identify. This was shortly before the shooting.
As appellee, Heesen, proceeded down the draw after leaving the knoll, he heard a "rustle" and saw a deer go between
some trees to the left of his line of travel about 50 to 100 yards away. The deer, when observed, was in a direction
about 80 or 90 degrees to the left of where appellant was sitting and Heesen did not observe appellant or his
companions before the shooting. At about this time Heesen removed the rifle from the sling on his shoulder and held it
by his right hand at or near the balance position of the weapon. He then came to a dead log in his path which was
about eight or ten inches in diameter and was lying horizontally a foot or less off the ground with several dead limbs
sticking upward from it. One of these limbs was a dead sapling sticking up about eighteen inches above the log and
had a "fork" shaped like a thumb and forefinger extended. Heesen wanted to cross the log to see the deer better, and
as he stepped across the log his left foot caught on a little limb sticking out and caused him to stumble. His left foot
went down hard on the ground on one side of the log and his right foot slipped on the grass. This brought the gun
down and the gun discharged, the bullet striking appellant. Heesen testified that he had his hand at least six inches
away from the trigger when the gun discharged. Immediately after the gun discharged he observed that the gun was
on "fire" position.
Appellant was sitting on ground higher than Heesen at the time the gun discharged and subsequent investigation
showed that the bullet had gone uphill, hit a dead tree and ricocheted several degrees to the left, and had thereafter

struck some seedlings before hitting appellant in the chest. The bullet traveled approximately fifty yards altogether.
Heesen went quickly to the spot where appellant was sitting, observed the seriousness of his condition, and Heesen
and Lopez' companions made immediate arrangements to care for appellant. Heesen obtained medical aid.
There was testimony at the trial that when Heesen was going to the place of the accident with Dr. E.L. Lindsley, he told
Dr. Lindsley that the gun discharged as he was moving it from "fire" position to the "safe" position.
Under point I, appellant contends that the trial court committed error in permitting testimony as to the general
reputation of other firearms companies who use the same modified leaf safety device as the Higgins Model 51. A
witness for appellee, Sears, Paul A. La Violette, Jr., qualified as an expert in gun designing and testified
that the following companies had an excellent reputation in the small arms field: Fabrique Nationale of Belgium, Marlin
Firearms Company, Weatherby Corporation, Colt Firearms Company, and Jefferson Corporation. Objection was made to
this testimony on the ground that it was wholly immaterial and irrelevant to any issue in the case.
Appellant, in the third amended complaint, alleged that the Higgins Model 51 rifle was in a dangerous and defective
condition due to its negligent manufacture, design, assembly or maintenance, in that the safety mechanism thereof
moved readily and in a dangerous manner from "safe" to "fire" position. This is an allegation of an ultimate issue of
fact which the jury had to decide. Here is an issue, the proper understanding of which by a jury composed of six men
and six ladies, requires specialized knowledge or experience and cannot be determined independently merely from
deductions made and inferences drawn on the basis of ordinary knowledge. The jury was instructed that expert
testimony is intended only to assist them in coming to a correct conclusion upon facts which are of a technical nature,
but that the opinion of experts was not binding upon them and the jury must determine the weight to be given to such
testimony.
Appellant introduced evidence tending to prove that the safety device on the Higgins Model 51 rifle is easy to knock off
safety, making the rifle dangerous. Appellant's witness, Frank Doyle, over appellee's, Sears', objection, expressed the
opinion that the safety device, without the telescopic sight, is not a safe piece, in that the projection is too long and it
is too prone to be knocked from "safe" to "fire" position. There is also testimony of certain tests made with the Higgins
Model 51 and the witness, Ira Kessler, expressed the opinion that the Higgins Model 51 was unsafe without the
telescopic sight. Another witness, Robert Allen, testified as to the manner in which the safety lever of the Higgins
Model 51 moved from "safe" to "fire" position without his knowledge.
Appellee, Sears, introduced testimony of witnesses who were either experts in the small arms field or experts in gun
designing. The witness, Paul A. La Violette, Jr., testified that he is a gun designer employed by High Standard
Manufacturing Company who manufacture the Higgins Model 51 for Sears. He qualified as an expert gun designer with
many years' experience with other rifle manufacturers and in factories designing and building weapons of the small
arms design. La Violette has two gun patents pending. La Violette testified that the safety device on the Higgins Model
51 is supplied to High Standard Manufacturing Company by Fabrique Nationale of Belgium. He also testified
extensively as to the advantages of the safety device of the Higgins Model 51 and stated that six different makes of
guns have the same modified leaf safety device as does the Higgins Model 51. The manufacturers of these guns are
F.N. Mauser, Colt, Marlin, Nato and Weatherby. The evidence also shows that since 1951, 75,572 Higgins Model 51
rifles with the modified leaf safety device have been sold by High Standard Manufacturing Company to appellee,
Sears. High Standard Manufacturing Company has never been sued by reason of the design of the Higgins Model 51
rifle. There is also opinion evidence that the Higgins Model 51 rifle is safe by all commercial sporting goods standards.
Appellant appears to concede that the number of rifles manufactured with the modified leaf safety device, and the fact
that other companies manufacture guns with the same design, is relevant as tending to show that the design is proper.
Appellant also seems to concede that the reputation of Fabrique Nationale of Belgium may be relevant to the issue.
Subsequent to the testimony as to the reputation of the various firearms companies who use a similar safety device as
the Higgins Model 51, the witness, Paul A. La Violette, Jr., testified without objection that the Higgins Model 51 rifle is
safe by all commercial sporting goods standards, and that the design of the safety device of the Higgins
Model 51 was not negligent or defective. He also testified, without objection, that the safety device on the Higgins
Model 51 rifle is excellent for hunting and fulfills the requirements of a good designer. The witness, Thomas Raymond
Robinson, Jr., testified that in his opinion the Higgins Model 51 is good and practical in the field for a prudent hunter,
and is suitable for hunting. Ira L. Kessler, an expert witness called by defendant, Heesen, testified that the Marlin
Firearms Company has a fair reputation, and that the Colt Firearms Company has an excellent reputation.
On an issue such as we have here we believe the applicable rule to be as stated in Wigmore on Evidence, 3d Ed., Vol.
II, 461, p. 489, as follows:
"(1) The conduct of others evidences the tendency of the thing in question; and such conduct e.g. in using chains on

a hill, felt shoes in a powder-factory, railings around a machine, or in not using them is receivable with other
evidence showing the tendency of the thing as dangerous, defective, or the reverse. But this is only evidence. The jury
may find from other evidence that the thing was in fact dangerous, defective, or the reverse, and the maintenance was
or was not negligence, in spite of the above evidence. * * *"
The conduct of others is proper evidence for a jury to consider in determining whether the tendency of the thing is
dangerous, defective, or the reverse. Chicago Great Western Ry. Co. v. McDonough, 8 Cir., 161 F. 657; Wigmore on
Evidence, 3d Ed., Vol. II, 461, p. 495.
Under our Rule, 21-1-1(43) (a), which is the same as the Federal Rule, the rule which favors the reception of the
evidence governs, the basis being that any evidence which throws light on the question in issue should be admitted,
leaving it to the trial court to hold the hearing within reasonable bounds. Mourikas v. Vardianos, 4 Cir., 169 F.2d 53;
Lawrence v. Nutter, 4 Cir., 203 F.2d 540.
Circuit Judge Bratton, in a specially concurring opinion in United States v. Bowman, 10 Cir., 73 F.2d 716, 720, in stating
the rule, quoted from United States Smelting Co. v. Parry, 8 Cir., 166 F. 407, as follows:
"It is true that in trials by jury it is their province to determine the ultimate facts, and that the general rule is that
witnesses are permitted to testify to the primary facts within their knowledge, but not to their opinions. And it is also
true that this has at times led to the statement that witnesses may not give their opinions upon the ultimate facts
which the jury are to decide, because that would supplant their judgment and usurp their province. But such a
statement is not to be taken literally. It but reflects the general rule, which is subject to important qualifications, and
never was intended to close any reasonable avenue to the truth in the investigation of questions of fact. Besides, the
tendency of modern decisions is not only to give as wide a scope as is reasonably possible to the investigation of such
questions, but also to accord to the trial judge a certain discretion in determining what testimony has a tendency to
establish the ultimate facts, and to disturb his decision admitting testimony of that character only when it plainly
appears that the testimony had no legitimate bearing upon the questions at issue and was calculated to prejudice the
minds of the jurors. * * *"
Applying the above principles we hold that the testimony as to the reputation of Fabrique Nationale, who manufacture
the safety device on the Higgins Model 51, and the reputation of Marlin Firearms Company, Weatherby Corporation,
Colt Firearms Company and Jefferson Corporation, who manufacture rifles which have the same modified leaf safety
device as the Higgins Model 51, was relevant to the issue of whether the safety device on the Higgins Model 51 was
unsafe or safe, and
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this testimony.
Under point II appellant also contends that the trial court committed error in permitting evidence to be introduced as
to the poundage pressure required to move the safety levers of various rifles from "safe" to "fire" position. There is no
merit in this contention. Appellant's witness, Frank Doyle, testified fully as to his experience with guns and particularly
with the Higgins Model 51 safety device, which he termed the dangerous feature of the safety mechanism in that it
was "so easy to knock off." Doyle's testimony was introduced under appellant's contention that the Higgins Model 51
rifle was unsafe and thus the issue arose as to the pressure required to move the safety lever from "safe" to "fire"
position. Under the circumstances it was proper for appellee, Sears, to show that the poundage pressure required to
move the safety lever on a Higgins Model 51 from "safe" to "fire" measured two-and-one-half pounds, and also to show
the poundage pressure required in rifles with identical safety devices. The evidence discloses that the pound pressure
required to move the safety lever on other similar devices was sometimes a little less and sometimes more than the
Higgins Model 51.
Under point III appellant claims that the trial court erred in permitting the witnesses, La Violette, Thomas Robinson and
Edwards Brown, to give opinion evidence that the safety mechanism on the Higgins Model 51 rifle was negligently or
defectively designed. Objection was made to this testimony on the ground that this was an opinion upon a subject
which is within the province of the jury to determine and that the question asked calls for an opinion as to a question
of law and fact.
This contention, we think, must be rejected. The testimony of these witnesses, all experts in their field, was upon the
ultimate issue of fact of whether the safety device on the Higgins Model 51 was dangerous and defective or unsafe,
and was properly the subject of expert testimony. Opinion evidence on an ultimate issue of fact does not attempt or
have the power to usurp the functions of the jury, and this evidence could not usurp the jury's function because the
jury may still reject these opinions and accept some other view. Opinion evidence offered by both parties in this case
was not binding upon the jury and they were so instructed. See Wigmore on Evidence, 3d Ed., Vol. VII, 1920, p. 17;
Hooper v. General Motors Corp., 123 Utah. 515, 260 P.2d 549.
In Millers' National Ins. Co., Chicago, Ill. v. Wichita Flour Mills Co., 10 Cir., 257 F.2d 93, 100, the court said:

"The insurance companies assert that McDonald was improperly permitted to invade and usurp the province of the jury
in that the sole issue was whether there was an explosion and McDonald was allowed to testify that there was an
explosion. The controlling rule as stated by the United States Supreme Court is that where the matter under inquiry is
properly the subject of expert testimony, it is no objection that the opinion sought to be elicited is upon the issue to be
decided. That rule has been followed in this circuit and applied in two recent decisions."
See also Eickmann v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 363 Mo. 651, 253 S.W.2d 122; United States Smelting Co. v. Parry, 8
Cir., 166 F. 407; Nelson v. Brames, 10 Cir., 1957, 241 F.2d 256; and Cropper v. Titanium Pigment Co., 8 Cir., 47 F.2d
1038.
In 20 Am.Jur., Evidence, 775, p. 647, the rule is stated as follows:
"* * * In such cases, witnesses possessing requisite training, skill, or knowledge, denominated `experts,' may testify,
not only to the facts, but to their opinions respecting the facts, so far as necessary to enlighten the jury and to enable
it to come to a right verdict. * * * Issues of this kind are said to create a necessity for the admission in evidence of the
opinions or conclusions of witnesses who are
shown to be specially skilled or experienced in the particular field in question."
Appellant's final objection to the opinion testimony is that the question asked of the witnesses calls for an opinion as to
a question of law and fact.
Many of the cases cited by appellant on this point are automobile accident cases which hold that an expert or a nonexpert witness cannot express an opinion that the defendant was negligent. The reasoning behind these cases is that
this is within the field of knowledge and understanding of the jury and is not a matter requiring technical assistance of
persons having unusual knowledge of the subject by reason of skill, experience, or knowledge.
The parties agree that the ultimate issue of liability is for the jury to determine and that a witness cannot express an
opinion on a matter of law, as distinguished from an ultimate fact. The ultimate issue in this case was whether the
safety mechanism on the Higgins Model 51 rifle was in a dangerous and defective condition due to its negligent
design, in that it moved readily and in a dangerous manner from "safe" to "fire" position.
Appellant's witnesses testified at great length in what respect they considered the safety mechanism "dangerous,"
"unsafe," and "defective," and expressed the opinion that the safety mechanism was not a safe piece and was unsafe
without the telescopic sight. Appellees' expert witnesses likewise testified in great detail as to the safety mechanism
and they were of the opinion that the safety mechanism on the Higgins Model 51 rifle was safe by all commercial
sporting goods standards, was suitable for hunting, and was not negligently or defectively designed. Thus the jury was
free to adopt either view and then fix the liability.
The word "negligence" is sometimes used in a broad sense and sometimes in a narrow sense. In the broad sense it
includes the elements of liability. In the narrow sense the element of liability is excluded. Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry.
Co. v. Nichols, 78 Ind.App. 361, 130 N.E. 546, 553.
"* * * An allegation of negligence as applied to the conduct of a party is not a mere conclusion of law, unless made so
by the law, but the statement of an ultimate pleadable and provable fact. * * *"
Peavy v. Hardin, Tex.Civ.App. 1926, 288 S.W. 588, 589. See also Gower v. Lamb, Mo. App. 1955, 282 S.W.2d 867; Ege v.
Born, 212 Iowa 1138, 236 N.W. 75; Cohen v. Swiller, 1959, 17 Misc.2d 921, 186 N.Y.S.2d 844; Louis v. Smith-McCormick
Const. Co., 1917, 80 W.Va. 159, 92 S.E. 249; and Hooper v. General Motors Corp., 123 Utah. 515, 260 P.2d 549.
Beal v. Southern Union Gas Co., 66 N.M. 424, 349 P.2d 337, follows the rule that an expert witness can express an
opinion on an ultimate issue of fact, but cannot testify as to the ultimate issue of liability.
There is much confusion among the decisions due to the language used by the courts in explaining why opinion
testimony should be excluded. Some courts say that the opinion would "usurp the functions of the jury." Other courts
say that the opinion should not be received because "that is the question which the jury must decide." If we are to add
to this, the additional confusion which exists in the decisions as to whether negligence is a question of law or fact, or is
a mixed question of law and fact, we would tend to create more confusion and add to the fine distinctions and
limitations.
Opinion evidence is admissible on the basis that it will aid the jury to understand the problem and lead them to the
truth on the ultimate facts, and opinions may be disregarded by the jury in whole or in part. It is left to the jury to
decide the issue. See Seal v. Blackburn Tank Truck Service, 64 N.M. 282, 327 P.2d 797; and Hooper v. General Motors

Corp., supra.
From a careful consideration of the record, we have come to the conclusion that when we consider all of the testimony
bearing upon the question of whether the rifle was dangerous and defective due to its negligent design, that when
appellee used the term "negligent or defective," he was using the word "negligent" in a narrow sense and as to an
ultimate and provable fact. This excluded the element of liability. It was for the jury to fix the ultimate liability of either
party. All of the facts went to the jury and it is our view that under all of the facts and circumstances of this case, the
expert opinions expressed were not improperly admitted.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the experts to express their opinion. Bunton v. Hull, 51 N.M. 5,
177 P.2d 168; State v. Padilla, 1959, 66 N.M. 289, 347 P.2d 312; and Wells Truckways v. Cebrian, 1954, 122 Cal.App.2d
666, 265 P.2d 557.
Finding no error in the record, the judgment of the district court is affirmed. It is so ordered.
COMPTON, C.J., and CARMODY, J., concur.
MOISE and NOBLE, JJ., not participating.

[G.R. No. 143944. July 11, 2002.]

THE
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
BASHER
BONGCARAWAN
y
MACARAMBON, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PUNO, J p:
This is an appeal from the Decision 1 dated December 27, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 06, in Criminal Case
No. 06-7542, finding accused Basher Bongcarawan y Macarambon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 16, Article III
of Republic Act No. 6425 2 as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to pay a fine of Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. cDAITS
Accused Basher Bongcarawan y Macarambon was charged in an Information which reads, thus: cEaSHC
"That on or about March 13, 1999, in the City of Iligan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, without authority of law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession, custody and control eight (8) packs of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a regulated drug commonly
known as Shabu, weighing approximately 400 grams, without the corresponding license or prescription.
Contrary to and in violation of Section 16, Article III of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, as amended by RA 7659." 3
During the arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued.
Evidence for the prosecution shows that on March 11, 1999, an interisland passenger ship, M/V Super Ferry 5, sailed from Manila to
Iligan City. At about 3:00 a.m. on March 13, 1999, the vessel was about to dock at the port of Iligan City when its security officer, Mark
Diesmo, received a complaint from passenger Lorena Canoy about her missing jewelry. Canoy suspected one of her co-passengers at
cabin no. 106 as the culprit. Diesmo and four (4) other members of the vessel security force accompanied Canoy to search for the
suspect whom they later found at the economy section. 4 The suspect was identified as the accused, Basher Bongcarawan. The
accused was informed of the complaint and was invited to go back to cabin no. 106. With his consent, he was bodily searched, but no
jewelry was found. He was then escorted by two (2) security agents back to the economy section to get his baggage. The accused took
a Samsonite suitcase and brought this back to the cabin. When requested by the security, the accused opened the suitcase, revealing a
brown bag and small plastic packs containing white crystalline substance. Suspecting the substance to be "shabu," the security
personnel immediately reported the matter to the ship captain and took pictures of the accused beside the suitcase and its contents.
They also called the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance. 5 At about 6:00 a.m., Lt. Robert Patrimonio, YN Aurelio Estoque, CD2
Phoudinie Lantao and RM3 Merchardo De Guzman of the Philippine Coast Guard arrived and took custody of the accused and the
seized items the Samsonite suitcase, a brown bag 6 and eight (8) small plastic packs of white crystalline substance. 7 When asked
about the contraband articles, the accused explained that he was just requested by a certain Alican "Alex" Macapudi to bring the
suitcase to the latter's brother in Iligan City. 8 The accused and the seized items were later turned over by the coast guard to the
Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF). Chief Inspector Graciano Mijares and his men brought the accused to the
PAOCTF Headquarters, 9 while the packs of white crystalline substance were sent to the NBI Regional Office in Cagayan de Oro City
for laboratory examination. NBI Forensic Chemist Nicanor Cruz later confirmed the substance to be methamphetamine hydrochloride,
commonly known as "shabu," weighing 399.3266 grams. 10
The accused testified and proffered his own version. On March 11, 1999, at about 10:00 p.m., he was in Quiapo, Manila where he met
Alican "Alex" Macapudi, a neighbor who has a store in Marawi City. He was requested by Macapudi to bring a Samsonite suitcase
containing sunglasses and watches to Iligan City, and to give it to Macapudi's brother at the Iligan port. He boarded the M/V Super Ferry
5 on the same night, carrying a big luggage full of clothes, a small luggage or "maleta" containing the sunglasses and brushes he
bought from Manila, and the Samsonite suitcase of Macapudi. 11 He stayed at cabin no. 106. At about 4:00 a.m. of March 13, 1999, as
the vessel was about to dock at the Iligan port, he took his baggage and positioned himself at the economy section to be able to
disembark ahead of the other passengers. There, he met a friend, Ansari Ambor. While they were conversing, five (5) members of the
vessel security force and a woman whom he recognized as his co-passenger at cabin no. 106 came and told him that he was
suspected of stealing jewelry. He voluntarily went with the group back to cabin no. 106 where he was frisked. Subsequently, he was
asked to get his baggage, so he went back to the economy section and took the big luggage and Macapudi's Samsonite suitcase. He
left the small"maleta" containing sunglasses and brushes for fear that they would be confiscated by the security personnel. When
requested, he voluntarily opened the big luggage, but refused to do the same to the Samsonite suitcase which he claimed was not his
and had a secret combination lock. The security personnel forcibly opened the suitcase and found packs of white crystalline substance
inside which they suspected to be "shabu." They took pictures of him with the merchandise, and asked him to sign a turn over receipt
which was later given to the Philippine Coast Guard, then to the PAOCTF. 12
On December 27, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused Basher Bongcarawan y Macarambon GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt as principal of the offense of violation of Section 16, Art. III, R.A. No. 6425 as amended by R.A. No. 7659 and

hereby imposes upon him the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and a fine of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P500,000.00) PESOS, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Having been under preventive imprisonment since March 13, 1999 until the present, the period of such preventive
detention shall be credited in full in favor of the accused in the service of his sentence.
The 399.3266 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu is hereby ordered delivered to the National
Bureau of Investigation for proper disposition.
SO ORDERED." 13
Hence, this appeal where the accused raises the following assignment of errors:
"I.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN SO HOLDING THAT THE DRUG CONFISCATED IS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE
AGAINST THE ACCUSED/APPELLANT.
II.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN SO HOLDING THAT THE APPELLANT OWNED THE CONFISCATED
EVIDENCE AND THEREFORE ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM." 14
On the first assignment of error, the accused-appellant contends that the Samsonite suitcase containing the methamphetamine
hydrochloride or "shabu" was forcibly opened and searched without his consent, and hence, in violation of his constitutional right
against unreasonable search and seizure. Any evidence acquired pursuant to such unlawful search and seizure, he claims, is
inadmissible in evidence against him. He also contends that People v. Marti 15 is not applicable in this case because a vessel security
personnel is deemed to perform the duties of a policeman.
The contentions are devoid of merit.
The right against unreasonable search and seizure is a fundamental right protected by the Constitution. 16 Evidence acquired in
violation of this right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. 17 Whenever this right is challenged, an individual may
choose between invoking the constitutional protection or waiving his right by giving consent to the search and seizure. It should be
stressed, however, that protection is against transgression committed by the government or its agent. As held by this Court in the case
of People v. Marti, 18 "[i]n the absence of governmental interference, liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against
the State." 19 The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures applies as a restraint directed only against the
government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the
restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed. 20
In the case before us, the baggage of the accused-appellant was searched by the vessel security personnel. It was only after they found
"shabu" inside the suitcase that they called the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance. The search and seizure of the suitcase and the
contraband items was therefore carried out without government intervention, and hence, the constitutional protection against
unreasonable search and seizure does not apply.
There is no merit in the contention of the accused-appellant that the search and seizure performed by the vessel security personnel
should be considered as one conducted by the police authorities for like the latter, the former are armed and tasked to maintain peace
and order. The vessel security officer in the case at bar is a private employee and does not discharge any governmental function. In
contrast, police officers are agents of the state tasked with the sovereign function of enforcement of the law. Historically and until now, it
is against them and other agents of the state that the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures may be invoked.
On the second assignment of error, the accused-appellant contends that he is not the owner of the Samsonite suitcase and he had no
knowledge that the same contained "shabu." He submits that without knowledge or intent to possess the dangerous drug, he cannot be
convicted of the crime charged. 21
We are not persuaded.
In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following facts must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, viz: (1) that the
accused is in possession of the object identified as a prohibited or a regulated drug; (2) that such possession is not authorized by law;
and (3) that the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. 22 The first two elements were sufficiently proven in this case,
and were in fact undisputed. We are left with the third.
As early as 1910 in the case of United States v. Tan Misa, 23 this Court has ruled that to warrant conviction, the possession of
dangerous drugs must be with knowledge of the accused, or that animus possidendi existed together with the possession or control of
such articles. 24 It has been ruled, however, that possession of dangerous drugs constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge
or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of a satisfactory explanation of such possession. 25 Hence, the
burden of evidence is shifted to the accused to explain the absence of knowledge or animus possidendi. 26
In this respect, the accused-appellant has utterly failed. His testimony, uncorroborated, self-serving and incredulous, was not given
credence by the trial court. We find no reason to disagree. Well-settled is the rule that in the absence of palpable error or grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial judge, the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of witnesses will not be disturbed on
appeal. 27 Moreover, evidence must be credible in itself to deserve credence and weight in law. In this case, the accused-appellant

admits that when he was asked to get his baggage, he knew it would be inspected. 28 Why he got the Samsonite suitcase allegedly not
owned by him and which had a combination lock known only to the owner remains unclear. He also claims that he did not present his
small "maleta" for inspection for fear that its contents consisting of expensive sunglasses and brushes would be confiscated, 29 but he
brought the Samsonite suitcase which is not his and also contained expensive sunglasses, and even watches. 30
The things in possession of a person are presumed by law to be owned by him. 31 To overcome this presumption, it is necessary to
present clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. In this case, the accused points to a certain Alican "Alex" Macapudi as the owner
of the contraband, but presented no evidence to support his claim. As aptly observed by the trial judge:
"First, who is Alex Macap[u]di aka Ali[c]an Macap[u]di? Does he really exist or simply a figment of the imagination?
He says that Alex Macap[u]di is a friend and a fellow businessman who has a stall selling sunglasses in Marawi
City. But no witnesses were presented to prove that there is such a living, breathing, flesh and blood person named
Alex Macap[u]di who entrusted the Samsonite to the accused. Surely, if he does exist, he has friends, fellow
businessmen and acquaintances who could testify and support the claim of the accused." 32
Mere denial of ownership will not suffice especially if, as in the case at bar, it is the keystone of the defense of the accusedappellant. Stories can easily be fabricated. It will take more than bare-bone allegations to convince this Court that a courier of
dangerous drugs is not its owner and has no knowledge or intent to possess the same.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 06, in Criminal Case No. 06-7542, convicting accusedappellant Basher Bongcarawan of violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, is AFFIRMED.
Costs against the accused-appellant.
||| (People v. Bongcarawan y Macarambon, G.R. No. 143944, [July 11, 2002], 433 PHIL 918-946)
[G.R. No. 81561. January 18, 1991.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANDRE MARTI, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Reynaldo B . Tatoy and Abelardo E . Rogacion for accused-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; GUARANTEE AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES;
PRONOUNCEMENT OF UNITED STATES FEDERAL SUPREME COURT AND STATE APPELLATE COURTS, DOCTRINAL IN THIS
JURISDICTION. Our present constitutional provision on the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure had its origin in the
1935 Charter which was in turn derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. As such, the
Court may turn to the pronouncements of the United States Federal Supreme Court and State Appellate Courts which are considered
doctrinal in this jurisdiction.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; ADMISSIBILITY; EXCLUSIONARY RULE ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF THE
GUARANTEE AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES. In a number of cases, the Court strictly adhered to the
exclusionary rule and has struck down the admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional safeguard against
unreasonable searches and seizures. (Bache & Co., (Phil.), Inc., v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [1971]; Lim v. Ponce de Leon, 66 SCRA 299
[1975]; People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 [1986]; Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 [1987]; See also Salazar v. Hon. Achacoso, et al., GR
No. 81510, March 14, 1990).
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; LIBERTIES MAY BE INVOKED ONLY AGAINST THE STATE, NOT UPON PRIVATE
INDIVIDUALS. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against
the State. As this Court held in Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345 [1972]: 1. This constitutional right (against unreasonable search
and seizure) refers to the immunity of one's person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by government, included in which is his
residence, his papers, and other possessions . . . That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked against
acts of private individuals finds support in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. The constitutional proscription against
unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the
enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable
exercise of power is imposed.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; GUARANTEE AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE; CASE AT BAR. The contraband in the case at
bar having come into possession of the Government without the latter transgressing appellant's rights against unreasonable search and
seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why the same should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense charged. If
the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of
constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and
private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and
seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against

unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of
alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MERE PRESENCE OF NBI AGENTS TO OBSERVE AND LOOK AT WHICH IS IN PLAIN SIGHT IS NOT A
SEARCH. The mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a warrantless search
and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed
that which is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is not search (Chadwick v. State, 429 SW2d 135). Where the
contraband articles are identified without a trespass on the part of the arresting officer, there is not the search that is prohibited by
the constitution (USv. Lee 274 US 559, 71 L.Ed. 1202 [1927]; Ker v. State of California 374 US 23, 10 L. Ed. 2d. 726 [1963]; Moore v.
State, 429 SW2d 122 [1968]).
6. ID.; CONSTITUTION; DOES NOT GOVERN RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INDIVIDUALS. The constitution, in laying down the
principles of the government and fundamental liberties of the people, does not govern relationships between individuals.
7. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; ADMISSIBILITY; EVIDENCE PROCURED BY INDIVIDUALS EFFECTED THROUGH PRIVATE
SEIZURE, ADMISSIBLE. Similarly, the admissibility of the evidence procured by an individual effected through private seizure
equally applies, in pari passu, to the alleged violation, non-governmental as it is, of appellant's constitutional rights to privacy and
communication.
8. ID.; ID.; CREDIBILITY; SELF-SERVING DENIALS, DESERVE NO WEIGHT IN LAW. Denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, are negative self-serving evidence which deserve no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight
than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters (People v. Esquillo, 171 SCRA 571 [1989]; People vs. Sariol,
174 SCRA 237 [1989]).
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITE FOR EVIDENCE TO BE BELIEVED. Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of
a credible witness, but it must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as
probable under the circumstances.
10. ID.; ID.; BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS; THINGS WHICH A PERSON POSSESSES ARE PRESUMED OWNED BY
HIM; CASE AT BAR. As records further show, appellant did not even bother to ask Michael's full name, his complete address or
passport number. Furthermore, if indeed, the German national was the owner of the merchandise, appellant should have so indicated in
the contract of shipment. On the contrary, appellant signed the contract as the owner and shipper thereof giving more weight to the
presumption that things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him (Sec. 5 [j], Rule 131). At this
point, appellant is therefore estopped to claim otherwise.
DECISION
BIDIN, J p:
This is an appeal from a decision * rendered by the Special Criminal Court of Manila (Regional Trial Court, Branch XLIX) convicting
accused-appellant of violation ofSection 21 (b), Article IV in relation to Section 4, Article II and Section 2 (e)(i), Article I of Republic Act
6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
The facts as summarized in the brief of the prosecution are as follows:
"On August 14, 1987, between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m., the appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, went
to the booth of the "Manila Packing and Export Forwarders" in the Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila,
carrying with them four (4) gift-wrapped packages. Anita Reyes (the proprietress and no relation to Shirley Reyes)
attended to them. The appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich,
Switzerland. Appellant filled up the contract necessary for the transaction, writing therein his name, passport
number, the date of shipment and the name and address of the consignee, namely, "WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II,
8052 Zurich, Switzerland" (Decision, p. 6)
"Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could examine and inspect the packages. Appellant, however, refused,
assuring her that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich. In
view of appellant's representation, Anita Reyes no longer insisted on inspecting the packages. The four (4)
packages were then placed inside a brown corrugated box one by two feet in size (1' x 2'). Styro-foam was placed
at the bottom and on top of the packages before the box was sealed with masking tape, thus making the box ready
for shipment (Decision, p. 8). LLpr
"Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor)
and husband of Anita (Reyes), following standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. When
he opened appellant's box, a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. His curiosity aroused, he squeezed one of the
bundles allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. Opening one of the bundles, he pulled out a
cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the gloves. He made an opening on one of the
cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the contents thereof (tsn, pp. 29-30, October 6, 1987; Emphasis
supplied).

"Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory examination of
the samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper (tsn, pp. 5-6, October 6, 1987).
"He brought the letter and a sample of appellant's shipment to the Narcotics Section of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), at about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon of that date, i.e., August 14, 1987. He was interviewed by
the Chief of Narcotics Section. Job Reyes informed the NBI that the rest of the shipment was still in his office.
Therefore, Job Reyes and three (3) NBI agents, and a photographer, went to the Reyes' office at Ermita, Manila
(tsn, p. 30, October 6, 1987).
"Job Reyes brought out the box in which appellant's packages were placed and, in the presence of the NBI agents,
opened the top flaps, removed the styro-foam and took out the cellophane wrappers from inside the gloves. Dried
marijuana leaves were found to have been contained inside the cellophane wrappers (tsn, p. 38, October 6, 1987;
Emphasis supplied).
"The package which allegedly contained books was likewise opened by Job Reyes. He discovered that the package
contained bricks or cake-like dried marijuana leaves. The package which allegedly contained tabacalera cigars was
also opened. It turned out that dried marijuana leaves were neatly stocked underneath the cigars (tsn, p. 39,
October 6, 1987).
"The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of the contents thereof, after signing a
"Receipt" acknowledging custody of the said effects (tsn, pp. 2-3, October 7, 1987).
Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate appellant but to no avail. Appellant's stated address in his passport being the Manila Central
Post Office, the agents requested assistance from the latter's Chief Security. On August 27, 1987, appellant, while claiming his mail at
the Central Post Office, was invited by the NBI to shed light on the attempted shipment of the seized dried leaves. On the same day the
Narcotics Section of the NBI submitted the dried leaves to the Forensic Chemistry Section for laboratory examination. It turned out that
the dried leaves were marijuana flowering tops as certified by the forensic chemist. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 9-11, Rollo, pp. 132-134).
Thereafter, an Information was filed against appellant for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
After trial, the court a quo rendered the assailed decision.
In this appeal, accused/appellant assigns the following errors, to wit:
"THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE ILLEGALLY SEARCHED AND SEIZED
OBJECTS CONTAINED IN THE FOUR PARCELS.
"THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT DESPITE THE UNDISPUTED FACT THAT HIS
RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION WHILE UNDER CUSTODIAL PROCEEDINGS WERE NOT
OBSERVED. cdphil
"THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE EXPLANATION OF THE APPELLANT ON
HOW THE FOUR PARCELS CAME INTO HIS POSSESSION." (Appellant's Brief, p. 1; Rollo, p. 55)
1. Appellant contends that the evidence subject of the imputed offense had been obtained in violation of his constitutional rights against
unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of communication (Secs. 2 and 3, Art. III, Constitution) and therefore argues that the
same should be held inadmissible in evidence (Sec. 3 (2), Art. III).
Sections 2 and 3, Article III of the Constitution provide:
"Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
"Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of
the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
"(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding."
Our present constitutional provision on the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure had its origin in the 1935 Charter which,
worded as follows:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." (Sec. 1 [3], Article III).
was in turn derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment ** to the United States Constitution. As such, the Court may turn
to the pronouncements of the United States Federal Supreme Court and State Appellate Courts which are considered doctrinal in
this jurisdiction.

Thus, following the exclusionary rule laid down in Mapp v. Ohio by the US Federal Supreme Court (367 US 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.
1081 2d [1961]), this Court, in Stonehill v. Diokno (20 SCRA 383 [1967]), declared as inadmissible any evidence obtained by virtue of a
defective search and seizure warrant, abandoning in the process the ruling earlier adopted in Moncado v. People's Court (80 Phil. 1
[1948]) wherein the admissibility of evidence was not affected by the illegality of its seizure. The 1973 Charter (Sec. 4 [2], Art. IV)
constitutionalized the Stonehill ruling and is carried over up to the present with the advent of the 1987 Constitution.
In a number of cases, the Court strictly adhered to the exclusionary rule and has struck down the admissibility of evidence obtained in
violation of the constitutional safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures. (Bache & Co., (Phil.), Inc., v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823
[1971]; Lim v. Ponce de Leon, 66 SCRA 299 [1975]; People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 [1986]; Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 [1987];
See also Salazar v. Hon. Achacoso, et al., GR No. 81510, March 14, 1990).
It must be noted, however, that in all those cases adverted to, the evidence so obtained were invariably procured by the State acting
through the medium of its law enforcers or other authorized government agencies. LLpr
On the other hand, the case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be excluded was primarily discovered
and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and without the intervention and participation of State authorities. Under
the circumstances, can accused/appellant validly claim that his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizure has been
violated? Stated otherwise, may an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked
against the State?
We hold in the negative. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked
against the State.
As this Court held in Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345 [1972]:
"1. This constitutional right (against unreasonable search and seizure) refers to the immunity of one's person,
whether citizen or alien, from interference by government, included in which is his residence, his papers, and other
possessions . . .
". . . There the state, however powerful, does not as such have the access except under the circumstances above
noted, for in the traditional formulation, his house, however humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed any unwarranted
intrusion by government, which is called upon to refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and to respect the
privacies of his life . . ." (Cf. Schermerber v. California, 384 US 757 [1966] and Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616
[1886]; Emphasis supplied).
In Burdeau v. McDowell (256 US 465 (1921), 41 S Ct. 547; 65 L.Ed. 1048), the Court there in construing the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures declared that:
"(t)he Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful searches and seizures, and as shown in previous
cases, its protection applies to governmental action. Its origin and history clearly show that it was intended as a
restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended to be a limitation upon other than
governmental agencies; as against such authority it was the purpose of the Fourth Amendment to secure the
citizen in the right of unmolested occupation of his dwelling and the possession of his property, subject to the right
of seizure by process duly served."
The above ruling was reiterated in State v. Bryan (457 P.2d 661 [1968]) where a parking attendant who searched the automobile to
ascertain the owner thereof found marijuana instead, without the knowledge and participation of police authorities, was declared
admissible in prosecution for illegal possession of narcotics.
And again in the 1969 case of Walker v. State (429 S.W.2d 121), it was held that the search and seizure clauses are restraints upon the
government and its agents, not upon private individuals, (citing People v. Potter, 240 Cal. App.2d 621, 49 Cap. Rptr, 892 (1966); State v.
Brown, Mo., 391 S.W.2d 903 (1965); State v. Olsen, Or., 317 P.2d 938 (1957).
Likewise appropos is the case of Bernas v. US (373 F.2d 517 (1967). The Court there said:
"The search of which appellant complains, however, was made by a private citizen the owner of a motel in which
appellant stayed overnight and in which he left behind a travel case containing the evidence *** complained of. The
search was made on the motel owner's own initiative. Because of it, he became suspicious, called the local police,
informed them of the bag's contents, and made it available to the authorities.
"The fourth amendment and the case law applying it do not require exclusion of evidence obtained through a
search by a private citizen. Rather, the amendment only proscribes governmental action."
The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the Government without the latter transgressing appellant's rights
against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why the same should not be admitted against him in the
prosecution of the offense charged. LLphil
Appellant, however, would like this court to believe that NBI agents made an illegal search and seizure of the evidence later on used in
prosecuting the case which resulted in his conviction.
The postulate advanced by accused/appellant needs to be clarified in two days. In both instances, the argument stands to fall on its own
weight, or the lack of it.

First, the factual considerations of the case at bar readily foreclose the proposition that NBI agents conducted an illegal search and
seizure of the prohibited merchandise. Records of the case clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding
agency, who made search/inspection of the packages. Said inspection was reasonable and a standard operating procedure on the part
of Mr. Reyes as a precautionary measure before delivery of packages to the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Posts (TSN, October 6
& 7, 1987, pp. 15-18; pp. 7-8; Original Records, pp. 119-122; 167-168).
It will be recalled that after Reyes opened the box containing the illicit cargo, he took samples of the same to the NBI and later
summoned the agents to his place of business. Thereafter, he opened the parcels containing the rest of the shipment and entrusted the
care and custody thereof to the NBI agents. Clearly, the NBI agents made no search and seizure, much less an illegal one, contrary to
the postulate of accused/appellant.
Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and
seizure proscribed by theConstitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that
which is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is not search (Chadwick v. State, 429 SW2d 135). Where the
contraband articles are identified without a trespass on the part of the arresting officer, there is not the search that is prohibited by
the constitution (US v. Lee 274 US 559, 71 L.Ed. 1202 [1927]; Ker v. State of California 374 US 23, 10 L.Ed.2d. 726 [1963]; Moore v.
State, 429 SW2d 122 [1968]).
In Gandy v. Watkins (237 F. Supp. 266 [1964]), it was likewise held that where the property was taken into custody of the police at the
specific request of the manager and where the search was initially made by the owner there is no unreasonable search and seizure
within the constitutional meaning of the term.
That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals finds support in the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. True, the liberties guaranteed by the fundamental law of the land must always be
subject to protection. But protection against whom? Commissioner Bernas in his sponsorship speech in the Bill of Rights answers the
query which he himself posed, as follows:
"First, the general reflections. The protection of fundamental liberties in the essence of constitutional democracy.
Protection against whom? Protection against the state. The Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the
individual and the state. Its concern is not the relation between individuals, between a private individual and other
individuals. What the Bill of Rights does is to declare some forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible to
any power holder." (Sponsorship Speech of Commissioner Bernas; Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol.
1, p. 674; July 17, 1986; Emphasis supplied)
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the
government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the
restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed. cdphil
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of
constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and
private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and
seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of
alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
Appellant argues, however, that since the provisions of the 1935 Constitution has been modified by the present phraseology found in the
1987 Charter, expressly declaring as inadmissible any evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional prohibition against illegal
search and seizure, it matters not whether the evidence was procured by police authorities or private individuals (Appellant's Brief, p. 8,
Rollo, p. 62).
The argument is untenable. For one thing, the constitution, in laying down the principles of the government and fundamental liberties of
the people, does not govern relationships between individuals. Moreover, it must be emphasized that the modifications introduced in the
1987 Constitution (re: Sec. 2, Art. III) relate to the issuance of either a search warrant or warrant of arrest vis-a-vis the responsibility of
the judge in the issuance thereof (See Soliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 [1988]; Circular No. 13 [October 1, 1985] and Circular No. 12
[June 30, 1987]. The modifications introduced deviate in no manner as to whom the restriction or inhibition against unreasonable search
and seizure is directed against. The restraint stayed with the State and did not shift to anyone else.
Corollarily, alleged violations against unreasonable search and seizure may only be invoked against the State by an individual unjustly
traduced by the exercise of sovereign authority. To agree with appellant that an act of a private individual in violation of the Bill of Rights
should also be construed as an act of the State would result in serious legal complications and an absurd interpretation of
the constitution.
Similarly, the admissibility of the evidence procured by an individual effected through private seizure equally applies, in pari passu, to
the alleged violation, non-governmental as it is, of appellant's constitutional rights to privacy and communication.

2. In his second assignment of error, appellant contends that the lower court erred in convicting him despite the undisputed fact that his
rights under theconstitution while under custodial investigation were not observed.
Again, the contention is without merit, We have carefully examined the records of the case and found nothing to indicate, as an
"undisputed fact", that appellant was not informed of his constitutional rights or that he gave statements without the assistance of
counsel. The law enforcers testified that accused/appellant was informed of his constitutional rights. It is presumed that they have
regularly performed their duties (Sec. 5(m), Rule 131) and their testimonies should be given full faith and credence, there being no
evidence to the contrary. What is clear from the records, on the other hand, is that appellant refused to give any written statement while
under investigation as testified by Atty. Lastimoso of the NBI, Thus:
"Fiscal Formoso:
"You said that you investigated Mr. and Mrs. Job Reyes. What about the accused here, did you
investigate the accused together with the girl?
"WITNESS:
"Yes, we have interviewed the accused together with the girl but the accused availed of his
constitutional right not to give any written statement, sir." (TSN, October 8, 1987, p. 62; Original
Records, p. 240)
The above testimony of the witness for the prosecution was not contradicted by the defense on cross-examination. As borne out by the
records, neither was there any proof by the defense that appellant gave uncounselled confession while being investigated. What
is more, we have examined the assailed judgment of the trial court and nowhere is there any reference made to the testimony of
appellant while under custodial investigation which was utilized in the finding of conviction. Appellant's second assignment of error is
therefore misplaced. cdphil
3. Coming now to appellant's third assignment of error, appellant would like us to believe that he was not the owner of the packages
which contained prohibited drugs but rather a certain Michael, a German national, whom appellant met in a pub along Ermita, Manila;
that in the course of their 30-minute conversation, Michael requested him to ship the packages and gave him P2,000.00 for the cost of
the shipment since the German national was about to leave the country the next day (October 15, 1987, TSN, pp. 2-10).
Rather than give the appearance of veracity, we find appellant's disclaimer as incredulous, self-serving and contrary to human
experience. It can easily be fabricated. An acquaintance with a complete stranger struck in half an hour could not have pushed a man to
entrust the shipment of four (4) parcels and shell out P2,000.00 for the purpose and for appellant to readily accede to comply with the
undertaking without first ascertaining its contents. As stated by the trial court, "(a) person would not simply entrust contraband and of
considerable value at that as the marijuana flowering tops, and the cash amount of P2,000.00 to a complete stranger like the Accused.
The Accused, on the other hand, would not simply accept such undertaking to take custody of the packages and ship the same from a
complete stranger on his mere say-so" (Decision, p. 19, Rollo, p. 91). As to why he readily agreed to do the errand, appellant failed to
explain. Denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative self-serving evidence which deserve no weight in
law and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters (People v.
Esquillo, 171 SCRA 571 [1989]; People vs. Sariol, 174 SCRA 237 [1989]).
Appellant's bare denial is even made more suspect considering that, as per records of the Interpol, he was previously convicted of
possession of hashish by the Kleve Court in the Federal Republic of Germany on January 1, 1982 and that the consignee of the
frustrated shipment, Walter Fierz, also a Swiss national, was likewise convicted for drug abuse and is just about an hour's drive from
appellant's residence in Zurich, Switzerland (TSN, October 8, 1987, p. 66; Original Records, p. 244; Decision, p. 21; Rollo, p. 93).
Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in itself such as the
common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances (People v. Alto, 26 SCRA 342
[1968], citing Daggers v. Van Dyke, 37 N.J. Eg. 130; see also People v. Sarda, 172 SCRA 651 [1989]; People v. Sunga, 123 SCRA 327
[1983]); Castaares v. CA, 92 SCRA 567 [1979]). As records further show, appellant did not even bother to ask Michael's full name, his
complete address or passport number. Furthermore, if indeed, the German national was the owner of the merchandise, appellant
should have so indicated in the contract of shipment (Exh. "B", Original Records, p. 40). On the contrary, appellant signed the contract
as the owner and shipper thereof giving more weight to the presumption that things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of
ownership over, are owned by him (Sec. 5 [j], Rule 131). At this point, appellant is therefore estopped to claim otherwise. LexLib
Premises considered, we see no error committed by the trial court in rendering the assailed judgment.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged is hereby AFFIRMED.
No costs.
||| (People v. Marti, G.R. No. 81561, [January 18, 1991], 271 PHIL 51-65)

[G.R. No. 112983. March 22, 1995.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. HECTOR MAQUEDA @ PUTOL, and RENE
SALVAMANTE (at large), accused, HECTOR MAQUEDA @ PUTOL, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; EXTRAJUDICIAL ADMISSION; DISTINGUISHED FROM EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION. A
perusal of the Sinumpaang Salaysay fails to convince us that it is an extrajudicial confession. It is only an extrajudicial admission. There
is a distinction between the former and the latter as clearly shown in Sections 26 and 33, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. In a
confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt. The term admission is usually applied in criminal cases to statements of fact by the
accused which do not directly involve an acknowledgment of his guilt or of the criminal intent to commit the offense with which he is
charged. And under Section 3 of Rule 133, an extrajudicial confession made by the accused is not sufficient for conviction unless
corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT OF ACCUSED TO REMAIN SILENT, TO COUNSEL AND TO BE INFORMED
OF SUCH RIGHT; AVAILABLE EVEN AFTER THE FILING OF CRIMINAL ACTION; SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY ACQUIRED IN
VIOLATION THEREOF, INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE. The exercise of the rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed
thereof under Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution are not confined to that period prior to the filing of a criminal complaint or
information but are available at that stage when a person is "under investigation for the commission of an offense." Ordinarily, once a
criminal complaint or information is filed in court and the accused is thereafter arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest, he must be
delivered to the nearest police station or jail and the arresting officer must make a return of the warrant to the issuing judge, and since
the court has already acquired jurisdiction over his person, it would be improper for any public officer or law enforcement agency to
investigate him in connection with the commission of the offense for which he is charged. If, nevertheless, he is subjected to such
investigation, then Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution and the jurisprudence thereon must be faithfully complied with. In the
case at bar, theSinumpaang Salaysay of Maqueda taken by SPO2 Molleno after the former's arrest was taken in palpable violation of
the said Constitutional provision. As disclosed by a reading thereof, Maqueda was not even told of any of his constitutional rights under
the said section. The statement was also taken in the absence of counsel. Such uncounselled Sinumpaang Salaysay is wholly
inadmissible pursuant to paragraph 3, Section 12, Article III of the Constitution.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; SOURCES OF SAID LAW. The direct and primary source of Section 12(1) of the present Constitution is the second
paragraph of Section 20, Article II of the 1973 Constitution. It was an acceptance of the landmark doctrine laid down by the United
States Supreme Court in Miranda vs. Arizona (384 U.S. 436 [1966]). In that case, the Court explicitly stated that the holding therein "is
not an innovation in our jurisprudence, but is an application of principles long recognized and applied in other settings." It may be
pointed out though that as formulated in the second paragraph of the aforementioned Section 20, the word custodial, which was used
inMiranda with reference to the investigation, was excluded. In view thereof, in Galman vs. Pamaran, (138 SCRA 294, 319-320 [1985])
this Court aptly observed: The fact that the framers of our Constitution did not choose to use the term ''custodial" by having it inserted
between the words ''under" and "investigation," as in fact the sentence opens with the phrase "any person" goes to prove that they did
not adopt in toto the entire fabric of the Miranda doctrine. Clearly then, the second paragraph of Section 20 has even broadened the
application of Miranda by making it applicable to the investigation for the commission of an offense of a person not in custody.
Accordingly, as so formulated, the second paragraph of Section 20 changed the rule adopted in People vs. Jose (37 SCRA 450 [1971])
that the rights of the accused only begin upon arraignment. Applying the second paragraph of Section 20, this Court laid down this rule
in Morales vs. Enrile (121 SCRA 538, 554 [1983]): "7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to
inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional
rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against him, . . ." Note that the first
sentence requires the arresting officer to inform the person to be arrested of the reason for the arrest and show him "the warrant of
arrest, if any." The underscored phrase simply means that a case had been filed against him in a court of either preliminary or original
jurisdiction and that the court had issued the corresponding warrant of arrest. From the foregoing, it is clear that the right to remain silent
and to counsel and to be informed thereof under the second paragraph of Section 20 are available to a person at any time before
arraignment whenever he is investigated for the commission of an offense. This paragraph was incorporated into Section 12 (1). Article
III of the present Constitution with the following additional safeguards: (a) the counsel must be competent and independent, preferably
of his own choice, (b) if the party cannot afford the services of such counsel, he must be provided with one, and (c) the rights therein
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. Then, too, the right to be heard would be a farce if it did not include
the right to counsel. Thus, Section 12(2), Article III of the present Constitution provides that in all criminal prosecutions the accused
shall "enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel.''
4. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; EXTRAJUDICIAL ADMISSION IN CASE AT BAR; ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE. The extrajudicial
admissions of Maqueda to Prosecutor Zarate and to Ray Dean Salvosa are not governed by the exclusionary rules under the Bill of
Rights. Maqueda voluntarily and freely made them to Prosecutor Zarate not in the course of an investigation, but in connection with

Maqueda's plea to be utilized as a state witness; and as to the other admission, it was given to a private person. The provisions of the
Bill of Rights are primarily limitations on government, declaring the rights that exist without governmental grant, that may not be taken
away by government and that government has the duty to protect. or restrictions on the power of government found "not in the particular
specific types of action prohibited, but in the general principle that keeps alive in the public mind the doctrine that governmental power is
not unlimited.'' They are the fundamental safeguards against aggressions of arbitrary power, or state tyranny and abuse of authority. In
laying down the principles of the government and fundamental liberties of the people, theConstitution did not govern the relationships
between individuals. Accordingly, Maqueda's admissions to Ray Dean Salvosa, a private party, are admissible in evidence against the
former under Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. In Aballe vs. People, (183 SCRA 196 [1990]) this Court held that the
declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of the offense may be given in evidence against him and any person,
otherwise competent to testify as a witness, who heard the confession, is competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard if he
heard and understood it. The said witness need not repeat verbatim the oral confession; it suffices if he gives its substance. By analogy,
that rule applies to oral extrajudicial admissions. To be added to Maqueda's extrajudicial admission is his Urgent Motion for Bail wherein
he explicitly stated that "he is willing and volunteering to be a state witness in the above entitled case, it appearing that he is the least
guilty among the accused in this case." In the light of his admissions to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa and his willingness to
be a state witness, Maqueda's participation in the commission of the crime charged was established beyond moral certainty. His
defense of alibi was futile because by his own admission he was not only at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, he
also admitted his participation therein. Even if we disregard his extrajudicial admissions to Prosecutor Zarate and Salvosa, his guilt was,
as correctly ruled by the trial court, established beyond doubt by circumstantial evidence. The following circumstances were duly proved
in this case: (1) He and a companion were seen a kilometer away from the Barker house an hour after the crime in question was
committed there; (2) Rene Salvamante, who is still at large, was positively identified by Mrs. Barker, Norie Dacara, and Julieta
Villanueva as one of two persons who committed the crime; (3) He and co-accused Rene Salvamante are friends; (4) He and Rene
Salvamante were together in Guinyangan, Quezon, and both left the place sometime in September 1991, (5) He was arrested in
Guinyangan, Quezon, on 4 March 1992, and (6) He freely and voluntarily offered to be a state witness stating that "he is the least guilty."
5. ID.; ID.; CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE; WHEN SUFFICIENT. Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that
circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) There is more than one circumstance (b) The facts from which the inferences
are derived are proven; and (c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Or, as jurisprudentially formulated, a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the circumstances
proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion which points to the accused, to the exclusion of
all others, as the guilty person, i.e., the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the
accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilty. We do not hesitate to rule that all the
requisites of Section 2, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court are present in this case.
6. ID.; ID.; ALIBI; WEAK DEFENSE ABSENT PHYSICAL IMPOSSIBILITY TO BE AT THE SCENE OF CRIME AT THE TIME OF
COMMISSION. The defense of alibi put up by the appellant must fail. The trial court correctly rejected such defense. The rule is
settled that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the requirements of time and place must be strictly met. It is not enough to prove that the
accused was somewhere else when the crime was committed, he must demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have
been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Through the unrebutted testimony, it was positively established that
Maqueda and a companion were seen at 7:00 a.m. of 27 August 1991 at the waiting shed in Aguyad, Tuba, Benguet, a place barely a
kilometer away from the house of the Barkers. It was not then impossible for Maqueda and his companion to have been at the Barker
house at the time the crime was committed.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J p:
As against a bustling city life, Britisher Horace William Barker, a consultant of the World Bank, and his Filipino wife,
Teresita Mendoza, chose the peace and quiet of a country home not any near the metropolis of Manila or its environs, but in the
rugged and mountainous terrain of Tuba, Benguet. Perhaps they thought they were in a veritable paradise, beyond the reach of
worldly distractions and trouble. That illusion was shattered when in the early morning of 27 August 1991, in the sanctity of their
own home, Horace was brutally slain and Teresita badly battered with lead pipes on the occasion of a robbery. Sufficient prima
facie evidence pointed to Rene Salvamante, the victims, former houseboy, as one of the perpetrators of the ghastly crime.
As to Rene's co-conspirator, the prosecution initially included one Richard Malig y Severino in the information for robbery
with homicide and serious physical injuries 1 filed on 19 November 1991 with Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Benguet at La Trinidad, Benguet. cdrep
Only Richard Malig was arrested. On 22 January 1992, prior to the arraignment of Richard Malig, the prosecution filed a
motion to amend the information 2 to implead as co-accused Hector Maqueda alias Putol because the evaluation of the evidence
subsequently submitted established his complicity in the crime, and at the hearing of the motion the following day, the Prosecutor

further asked that accused Richard Malig be dropped from the information because further evaluation of the evidence disclosed no
sufficient evidence against him. 3
The motion to drop Malig was granted and warrants for the arrest of accused Salvamante and Maqueda were issued.
Maqueda was subsequently arrested on 4 March 1992, and on 9 April 1992, he filed an application for bail.4 He categorically stated
therein that "he is willing and volunteering to be a State witness in the above-entitled case, it appearing that he is the least guilty
among the accused in this case."
On 22 April 1992, the prosecution filed an Amended Information5 with only Salvamante and Maqueda as the accused. Its
accusatory portion reads as follows:
That on or about the 27th of August, 1991, at Tagadi. Upper Tadiangan, Municipality of Tuba, Province of Benguet,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually aiding one another, armed with lead pipes, and with intent of gain and against the will
and consent of the owners thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the house of
spouses TERESITA and WILLIAM HORACE BARKER and with violence against and intimidation of the persons
therein ransack the place and take and carry away the following articles, to wit:
[An enumeration and description of the articles follow]
all having a total value of TWO HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (P204,250.00).
Philippine Currency, belonging to the said Teresita and William Horace Barker; that on the occasion and by reason
of the said robbery, both accused willfully, unlawfully and feloniously repeatedly strike Teresita Barker and William
Horace Barker with lead pipes on the different parts of their body, leading to the death of William Horace Barker
and inflicting various physical injuries on the former which required medical attendance for a period of more than
thirty (30) days and have likewise incapacitated her from the performance of her customary labor for the same
period of time.
Contrary to Law.
Since Rene Salvamante continues to elude arrest and has remained at large, trial proceeded against Maqueda only, after
he entered a plea of not guilty on 22 April 1992. 6
In its decision 7 promulgated on 31 August 1993, the trial court found accused Hector Maqueda guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide and serious physical injuries and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to "indemnify the victim, Teresita M. Barker in the amount of P50,000.00 for the death of William Horace Barker,
P41,681.00 representing actual expenses, P100,000.00 as moral damages and to pay the costs." LLjur
The prosecution presented as its witnesses Mrs. Teresita Mendoza Barker, househelps Norie Dacara and Julieta
Villanueva, Mike Tayaban, Dr. Francisco Hernandez, Jr., Francisco Cabotaje, Prosecutor Daniel Zarate, Ray Dean Salvosa, Glen
Enriquez, SPO1 Rodolfo Tabadero, and Policarpio Cambod in its evidence in chief and Fredesminda Castrence and SPO3
Armando Molleno on rebuttal. Accused Hector Maqueda took the witness stand and presented SPO1 Aurelio Sagun, Jr. in his
evidence in chief and Myrna Maqueda Katindig as his sur-rebuttal witness.
The version of the prosecution, as culled from the trial court's detailed and meticulous summary thereof, is as follows:
Between 10:30 and 11:00 p.m. of 26 August 1991, the spouses Horace William Barker and Teresita Mendoza Barker
repaired to their bedroom after Teresita had checked as was her wont, the main doors of their house to see if they had been locked
and bolted.
At around 6:00 a.m. of the following day, 27 August 1991, Norie Dacara, a househelp of the Barkers who shared a room
with her cousin and fellow househelp, Julieta Villanueva, got up, opened the door to the garage, went to the lavatory to wash her
face, and proceeded to the toilet. When she opened the door of the toilet and switched on the light, she saw Rene Salvamante. She
knew Salvamante very well because he and his sister Melanie were the former househelps of the Barkers whom she and Julieta
Villanueva had replaced and because Salvamante had acquainted her on her chores. LLphil
Salvamante suddenly strangled her. While she was fighting back, Norie happened to turn her face and she saw a faircomplexioned, tall man with a high-bridged nose at Salvamante's side, whom she identified at the trial as Maqueda. After she broke
free from Salvamante, Norie fled towards the garage and shouted for help. Salvamante chased her and pulled her back inside the
house.
Julieta Villanueva, who was awakened by the shouts of Norie, got out of her bed and upon opening the door of her room,
saw a man clad in maong jacket and short pants with his right hand brandishing a lead pipe standing two meters in front of her. At
the trial, she pointed to accused Maqueda as the man she saw then. She got scared and immediately closed the door. Since the
door knob turned as if someone was forcing his way into the room, she held on to it and shouted for help.
The shouts awakened Teresita Mendoza Barker. She rose from her bed and went out of the room, leaving behind her
husband who was still asleep. She went down the stairs and proceeded to the dining room. She saw Salvamante and a companion
who was a complete stranger to her. Suddenly, the two rushed towards her and beat her up with lead pipes. Despite her pleas to

get what they want and not to hurt her, they continued to beat her up until she lost consciousness. At the trial, she pointed to
accused Maqueda as Salvamante's companion.
Salvamante also hit Norie with the lead pipe on her back and at the back of her right hand. She fell to the concrete floor,
and after she had recovered, she ran to the garage and hid under the car. After a few seconds, she went near the door of the
garage and because she could not open it, she called Julieta. Julieta opened the door and they rushed to their room and closed the
door. When they saw that the door knob was being turned, they braced themselves against the door to prevent anyone from
entering. While locked in their room, they heard the moans of Mrs. Barker and the shouts of Mr. Barker: "That's enough, that's
enough, that's enough." When the noise stopped, Norie and Julieta heard the sound of water flowing from the toilet and the barking
of dogs.
At 7:00 a.m. of that same day, 27, August 1991, Mike Tabayan and Mark Pacio were resting in a waiting shed beside the
Asin road at Aguyad, Tuba, Benguet, which is only a kilometer away from the house of the Barkers. They saw two men approaching
them from a curve. When the two men reached the shed, he and Mark noticed that the taller of the two had an amputated left hand
and a right hand with a missing thumb and index finger. This man was carrying a black bag on his right shoulder.
Speaking in Tagalog, the taller man asked Mike and Mark whether the road they were following would lead to Naguilian,
La Union. Mike replied that it did not. Five minutes later, a passenger jeepney bound for Baguio City and owned and driven by Ben
Lusnong arrived at the waiting shed. The two men boarded it. Mike again noticed that the taller man had the defects above
mentioned because the latter used his right hand with only three fingers to hold on to the bar of the jeepney as he boarded it. In the
investigation conducted by the Tuba police, he identified through a picture the shorter man as Salvamante, and at the hearing, he
pointed to Maqueda as the taller man.
At 9:00 a.m. of 27 August 1991, Norie and Julieta gathered enough courage to leave the room where they had earlier
barricaded themselves and proceed to the kitchen to get the key to the gate of the garage. In the dining room, they saw the Barkers
bathed in their own blood. Norie and Julieta rushed out of the house and ran to the place of Janet Albon to seek help. After
requesting Janet to call the police, they returned to the Barker's house but did not enter it for fear of what they had seen earlier.
They just stayed near the road. LLphil
Soon after, security guards of the Baguio College Foundation (BCF) arrived. A team from the Baguio City Police Station,
headed by police Officer Policarpio Cambod, and which included Dr. Perfecto Micu of the City Health Department, also arrived. The
team conducted an initial investigation only because it found out that the scene of the crime was within the jurisdiction of the Tuba
Police Station, which, however, was difficult to get in touch with at that time. Dr. Perfecto Micu found the body of Mr. Barker inside
the Barker house and Cambod prepared a sketch (Exhibit "JJ") showing its location. They went around the house and found a lead
pipe (Exhibit "AA") at the toilet, a black T-shirt (Exhibit "CC"), and a green hand towel (Exhibit "DD"). He also discovered another
lead pipe (Exhibit "BB") at the back of the door of the house. He then interviewed the two househelps who provided him with
descriptions of the assailants. The team then left, leaving behind BCF Security Officer Glen Enriquez and a security guard.
Cambod prepared a report of his initial investigation (Exhibit "KK"). LibLex
Enriquez conducted his own investigation. At the master's bedroom, he saw several pieces of jewelry scattered on the
floor and an empty inner cabinet. He noticed footprints at the back of the house, particularly at the riprap wall, and observed that
the grass below it was parted as if someone had passed through and created a trail amidst the grass down toward the Asin road of
Tuba, Benguet. Upon his request, a security guard of the BCF, Edgar Dalit, was sent to the Barker house to secure the premises.
Enriquez then left after Dalit's arrival.
At 5:00 p.m. of that same day, members of the Tuba Police Station arrived at the Barker house to conduct their
investigation. Enriquez, who in the meantime was called by Dalit, returned to the Barker house.
The lead pipes, black T-shirt, and the green hand towel recovered from the Barker house by the Baguio City Police were
first brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory Service at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet, and then to the court.
The body of William Horace Barker was taken to the Baguio Funeral Homes at Naguilian Road, Baguio City, where it was
examined by Dr. Francisco P. Cabotaje, Municipal Health Officer of Tuba, Benguet. He found in it twenty-seven injuries, which could
have been caused by a blunt instrument, determined the cause of death as hemorrhagic shock, and then issued a death certificate
(Exhibits "P," "O," and "R"). LexLib
The wounded Teresita Barker was brought to the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center where she was treated and
confined for eight days. The attending physician, Dr. Francisco L. Hernandez, Jr., first saw her at around 11:00 a.m. of 27 August
1991. She was in a comatose state. Dr. Hernandez found that she sustained multiple lacerations primarily on the left side of the
occipital area, bleeding in the left ear, and bruises on the arm. One of the muscles adjoining her eyes was paralyzed. She regained
consciousness only after two days. Dr. Hernandez opined that Mrs. Barker's injuries were caused by a blunt instrument, like a lead
pipe, and concluded that if her injuries had been left unattended, she would have died by noontime of 27 August 1991 due to
bleeding or hemorrhagic shock.

On 1 September 1991, a police team from the Tuba Police Station, Benguet, came to the hospital bed of Mrs. Barker,
showed her pictures of several persons, and asked her to identify the persons who had assaulted her. She pointed to a person who
turned out to be Richard Malig. When informed of the investigation, Dr. Hernandez told the members of the team that it was
improper for them to conduct it without first consulting him since Mrs. Barker had not yet fully recovered consciousness. Moreover,
her eyesight had not yet improved, her visual acuity was impaired, and she had double vision. LexLib
On 3 September 1991, the remains of Mr. Barker were cremated. Mrs. Barker was then discharged from the hospital and
upon getting home, tried to determine the items lost during the robbery. She requested Glen Enriquez to get back the pieces of
jewelry taken by the Tuba PNP (Exhibit "U"). The Tuba PNP gave them to Enriquez (Exhibit "V"). Mrs. Barker discovered that her
Canon camera, radio cassette recorder (Exhibit "W-3"), and some pieces of jewelry (Exhibit "W-2") were missing. The aggregate
value of the missing items was P204,250.00. She then executed an affidavit on these missing items (Exhibit "X").
Mrs. Barker underwent a CT Scan at the St. Luke's Hospital in Quezon City. It was revealed that she sustained a
damaged artery on her left eye which could cause blindness. She then sought treatment at the St. Luke's Roosevelt Hospital in
New York (Exhibit "L") where she underwent an unsuccessful operation. She likewise received treatment at the New York Medical
Center (Exhibit "M").
On 29 November 1991, Ray Dean Salvosa, Executive Vice President of the BCF, ordered Glen Enriquez to go to
Guinyangan, Quezon, to coordinate with the police in determining the whereabouts of accused Rene Salvamante. In Guinyangan,
Enriquez was able to obtain information from the barangay captain, Basilio Requeron, that he saw Salvamante together with a
certain "Putol" in September 1991; however, they already left the place.
On 21 December 1991, Enriquez, Melanio Mendoza, and three others went back to Guinyangan to find out whether
Salvamante and "Putol' had returned. Upon being informed by Barangay Captain Requeron that the two had not, Enriquez
requested Requeron to notify him immediately once Salvamante or "Putol" returned to Guinyangan. cdll
On 4 March 1992, Requeron's daughter called up Enriquez to inform him that "Putol," who is none other than accused
Hector Maqueda, had been arrested in Guinyangan. Enriquez and Maj. Rodolfo Anagaran, Chief of the Tuba Police Station,
together with another policeman, proceeded to Guinyangan. The Guinyangan Police Station turned over Maqueda to Maj.
Anagaran who then brought Maqueda to the Benguet Provincial Jail.
Before Maj. Anagaran's arrival at Guinyangan, Maqueda had been taken to the headquarters of the 235th PNP Mobile
Force Company at Sta. Maria, Calauag, Quezon. Its commanding officer, Maj. Virgilio F. Renton, directed SPO3 Armando Molleno
to get Maqueda's statement. He did so and according to him, he informed Maqueda of his rights under the Constitution. Maqueda
thereafter signed a Sinumpaang Salaysay (Exhibit "LL") wherein he narrated his participation in the crime at the Barker house on
27 August 1991.
On 9 April 1992, while he was under detention, Maqueda filed a Motion to Grant Bail (Exhibit "GG-6"). He stated therein
that "he is willing and volunteering to be a State witness in the above entitled case, it appearing that he is the least guilty among the
accused in this case." Prosecutor Zarate then had a talk with Maqueda regarding such statement and asked him if he was in the
company of Salvamante on 27 August 1991 in entering the house of the Barkers. After he received an affirmative answer,
Prosecutor Zarate told Maqueda that he would oppose the motion for bail since he, Maqueda, was the only accused on trial (Exhibit
"II").
In the meantime, Ray Dean Salvosa arrived at the Office of Prosecutor Zarate and obtained permission from the latter to
talk to Maqueda. Salvosa then led Maqueda toward the balcony. Maqueda narrated to Salvosa that Salvamante brought him to
Baguio City in order to find a job as a peanut vendor; Salvamante then brought him to the Barker house and it was only when they
were at the vicinity thereof that Salvamante revealed to him that his real purpose in going to Baguio City was to rob the Barkers; he
initially objected to the plan, but later on agreed to it; when they were in the kitchen of the Barker house, one of the househelps was
already there; Salvamante hit her with a lead pipe and she screamed; then Mrs. Barker came down, forcing him, Maqueda, to
attack her with the lead pipe provided him by Salvamante. After he felled Mrs. Barker, he helped Salvamante in beating up Mr.
Barker who had followed his wife downstairs. When the Barkers were already unconscious on the floor, Salvamante went upstairs
and a few minutes later came down bringing with him a radio cassette and some pieces of jewelry.
Maqueda further divulged to Salvosa that they then changed clothes, went out of the house, walked toward the road
where they saw two persons from whom they asked directions and when a passenger jeepney stopped and they were informed by
the two persons that it was bound for Baguio City, he and Salvamante boarded it. They alighted somewhere along Albano Street in
Baguio City and walked until they reached the Philippine Rabbit Bus station where they boarded a bus for Manila. 8
Accused Hector Maqueda put up the defense of denial and alibi. His testimony is summarized by the trial court in this
wise:
Accused Hector Maqueda denied having anything to do with the crime. He stated that on August 27, 1991 he was
at the polvoron factory owned by Minda Castrense located at Lot 1, Block 21, Posadas Bayview Subdivision, Sukat,
Muntinlupa. Metro Manila. He was employed as a caretaker since July 5, 1991 and he worked continuously there
up to August 27, 1991. It was his sister, Myrna Katindig, who found him the job as caretaker. As caretaker, it was his

duty to supervise the employees in the factory and whenever his employer was not around, he was in charge of the
sales. He and his 8 co-employees all sleep inside the factory.
On August 26, 1991, he reported for work although he could not recall what he did that day. He slept inside the
factory that night and on August 27, 1991, he was teaching the new employees how to make the seasoning for the
polvoron.
On December 20, 1991, he went home to Gapas, Guinyangan, Quezon Province as it was his vacation time from
his job at the polvoron factory. He was to be back at work after New Year's Day in 1992. Upon alighting from the
bus at Guinyangan, Quezon, he saw accused Rene Salvamante. He knows accused Salvamante as they were
childhood playmates, having gone to the same elementary school. He had no chance to talk to him that day when
he saw him and so they just waved to each other. He again saw accused Salvamante after Christmas day on the
road beside their (Salvamante) house. Salvamante invited him to go to Calauag, Quezon Province and roam
around. He agreed to go as he also wanted to visit his brother, Jose Maqueda who resided at Sabangdos, Calauag,
Quezon. When the two accused were at Calauag, Salvamante asked Maqueda to accompany him (Salvamante) in
selling a cassette recorder which he said came from Baguio City. Accused Maqueda knew that Salvamante worked
in Baguio as the latter's mother told him about it. They were able to sell the cassette recorder to Salvamante's aunt.
They had their meal and then went to visit accused Maqueda's brother. After that occasion, he never saw accused
Salvamante again. After his Christmas vacation, he went back to work at the polvoron factory until February 29,
1992. One of his co-workers Roselyn Merca, who was a townmate of his asked him to accompany her home as she
was hard up in her work at the factory. Hence, he accompanied Roselyn home to Guinyangan, Quezon. He was
supposed to report back for work on March 2, 1992 but he was not able to as he was arrested by members of the
CAFGU at the house of Roselyn Merca when he brought her home. He was then brought to the Guinyangan
municipal jail, then to the Tuba Police Station, Tuba, Benguet. There he was told to cooperate with the police in
arresting Salvamante so he would not stay long in the Province of Benguet. He was also told that if he would point
to accused Salvamante, he would be freed and he could also become a state witness. He told them that he could
attest to the fact that he accompanied accused Salvamante in selling the cassette recorder. prLL
On March 5, 1992, he was brought to the Benguet Provincial Jail at La Trinidad, Benguet where he has remained
under detention up to the present. 9
The prosecution rebutted the testimony of Hector Maqueda by presenting Fredesminda Castrence and SPO3 Armando
Molleno. Castrence, the owner of the polvoron factory where Maqueda worked, testified that she started her business only on 30
August 1991 and thus it was impossible for her to have hired Maqueda on 5 July 1991. SPO3 Molleno declared that he informed
Maqueda of his constitutional rights before Maqueda was investigated and that Maqueda voluntarily and freely gave
his Sinumpaang Salaysay (Exhibit "LL"). 10
Although the trial court had doubts on the identification of Maqueda by prosecution witnesses Teresita Mendoza Barker,
Norie Dacara, and Julieta Villanueva and thus disregarded their testimonies on this matter, it decreed a conviction "based on the
confession and the proof of corpus delicti" as well as on circumstantial evidence. It stated thus:
Since we have discarded the positive identification theory of the prosecution pinpointing accused Maqueda as the
culprit, can we still secure a conviction based on the confession and the proof of corpus delicti as well as on
circumstantial evidence?
In order to establish the guilt of the accused through circumstantial evidence, the following requisites must be
present: 1) there must be more than one circumstance; 2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proved; and 3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt (People vs. Pajarit, G.R. No. 82770, October 19, 1992, 214 SCRA 678). There must be an unbroken chain of
circumstances which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the defendant to the exclusion of all
others, as the author of the crime (People vs. Abuyen, G.R. No. 77285, September 4, 1992, 213 SCRA 569).
The circumstances shown by the prosecution which tend to show the guilt of the accused are:
1. A physical demonstration to which the accused and his counsel did not offer any objection shows that
despite his being handicapped, accused Maqueda could well and easily grip a lead pipe and strike a
cement post with such force that it produced a resounding vibration. It is not farfetched then to conclude
that accused Maqueda could have easily beat Mr. Barker to death.
2. His presence within the vicinity of the crime scene right after the incident in the company of accused
Salvamante was testified to by Mike Tayaban, the only prosecution witness who noticed the defective
hands of the accused. As they had to ask for directions from the witness in the Tagalog dialect shows that
they were strangers to the place.

3. Accused Maqueda knows or is familiar with accused Rene Salvamante as they come from the same
town. By his own testimony, accused Maqueda has established that he and Salvamante are close friends
to the point that they went out together during the Christmas vacation in 1991 and he even accompanied
Salvamante in selling the black radio cassette recorder. LLjur
4. His Motion to Grant Bail (Exhibit "HH") contains this statement "That he is willing and volunteering to be
a State witness in the above-entitled case, it appearing that he is the least guilty among the accused in
this case." This in effect, supports his extrajudicial confession made to the police at Calauag, Quezon
Province. Although he claims that he did not bother to read the motion as he was just told that his
signature would mean his release from detention, this is a flimsy excuse which cannot be given credence.
Had he not understood what the motion meant, he could have easily asked his sister and brother-in-law
what it meant seeing that their signatures were already fixed on the motion.
5. This time, his admission to Prosecutor Zarate that he was at the Barker house that fateful morning and
his even more damaging admissions to Ray Dean Salvosa as to what he actually did can be considered
as another circumstance to already bolster the increasing circumstances against the accused.
6. The accused's defense is alibi. As stated in a long line of cases, alibi is at best a weak defense and
easy of fabrication (People vs. Martinado, G.R. No. 92020, October 19, 1992, 214 SCRA 712). For alibi to
be given credence, it must not only appear that the accused interposing the same was at some other
place but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission (People vs. Pugal, G.R. No. 90637, October 29, 1992, 215 SCRA 247). This defense easily
crumbles down as prosecution witness Mike Tayaban placed accused Maqueda at the vicinity of the crime
scene.
The combination of all these circumstances plus his extrajudicial confession produce the needed proof beyond
reasonable doubt that indeed accused Maqueda is guilty of the crime. 11
The extrajudicial confession referred to is the Sinumpaang Salaysay (Exhibit "LL") of Maqueda taken by SPO2 Molleno immediately
after Maqueda was arrested.
Maqueda seasonably appealed to us his conviction. In his 14-page brief, he pleads that we acquit him because the trial
court committed this lone error:
. . . IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE
CRIME CHARGED. 12
Only three pages of the brief, typed double space, are devoted to his arguments, which are anchored on his alibi that at the time
the crime was committed he was not in Benguet but in Sukat, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, and the failure of the star witnesses for the
prosecution to identify him. He alleges that Mrs. Barker, when investigated at the hospital, pointed to Richard Malig as the
companion of Rene Salvamante, and that when initially investigated, the two housemaids gave a description of Salvamante's
companion that fitted Richard Malig.
We find no merit in this appeal. As hereinafter shown, the defense of alibi is unconvincing.
The accused's arguments which stress the incredibility of the testimonies of Mrs. Barker and the househelps identifying
Maqueda are misdirected and misplaced because the trial court had ruled that Mrs. Teresita Mendoza Barker and the two
housemaids, Norie Dacara and Julieta Villanueva, were not able to positively identify Maqueda. The trial court based his conviction
on his extrajudicial confession and the proof of corpus delicti, as well as on circumstantial evidence. He should have focused his
attention and arguments on these. LibLex
From its ratiocinations, the trial court made a distinction between an extrajudicial confession the Sinumpaang
Salaysay and an extrajudicial admission the verbal admissions to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa. A perusal of
the Sinumpaang Salaysay fails to convince us that it is an extrajudicial confession. It is only an extrajudicial admission. There is a
distinction between the former and the latter as clearly shown in Sections 26 and 33, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which read as
follows:
SEC. 26. Admission of a party. The act, declaration or omission of party as to a relevant fact may be given in
evidence against him.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 33. Confession. The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any
offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against him.
In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt. The term admission is usually applied in criminal cases to
statements of fact by the accused which do not directly involve an acknowledgment of his guilt or of the criminal intent to commit
the offense with which he is charged. 13 Wharton distinguishes a confession from an admission as follows:

A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a criminal case, of his guilt of the crime
charged, while an admission is a statement by the accused, direct or implied, of facts pertinent to the issue and
tending, in connection with proof of other facts, to prove his guilt. In other words, an admission is something less
than a confession, and is but an acknowledgment of some fact or circumstance which in itself is insufficient to
authorize a conviction and which tends only to establish the ultimate fact of guilt. 14
And under Section 3 of Rule 133, an extrajudicial confession made by the accused is not sufficient for conviction unless
corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti.
The trial court admitted the Sinumpaang Salaysay of accused Maqueda although it was taken without the assistance of
counsel because it was of the opinion that since an information had already been filed in court against him and he was arrested
pursuant to a warrant of arrest issued by the court, the Sinumpaang Salaysay was not, therefore, taken during custodial
investigation. Hence, Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution providing as follows:
SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of
his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except
in writing and in the presence of counsel.
is not applicable, 15 i.e., the police investigation was "no longer within the ambit of a custodial investigation." It heavily relied
on People vs. Ayson 16 where this Court elucidated on the rights of a person under custodial investigation and the rights of an
accused after a case is filed in court. The trial court went on to state:
At the time of the confession, the accused was already facing charges in court. He no longer had the right to remain
silent and to counsel but he had the right to refuse to be a witness and not to have any prejudice whatsoever result
to him by such refusal. And yet, despite his knowing fully well that a case had already been filed in court, he still
confessed when he did not have to do so. 17
The trial court then held that the admissibility of the Sinumpaang Salaysay should not be tested under the aforequoted
Section 12(1), Article III of theConstitution, but on the voluntariness of its execution. Since voluntariness is presumed, Maqueda
had the burden of proving otherwise, which he failed to do and, hence, the Sinumpaang Salaysay was admissible against
him. LexLib
As to the admissions made by Maqueda to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa, the trial court admitted their
testimony thereon only to prove the tenor of their conversation but not to prove the truth of the admission because such testimony
was objected to as hearsay. It said:
In any case, it is settled that when testimony is presented to establish not the truth but the tenor of the statement or
the fact that such statement was made, it is not hearsay (People vs. Fule, G.R. No. 83027, February 28, 1992, 206
SCRA 652). 18
While we commend the efforts of the trial court to distinguish between the rights of a person under Section 12(1), Article III
of the Constitution and his rights after a criminal complaint or information had been filed against him, we cannot agree with its
sweeping view that after such filing an accused "no longer, [has] the right to remain silent and to counsel but he [has] the right to
refuse to be a witness and not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal." If this were so, then there would be
a hiatus in the criminal justice process where an accused is deprived of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel and
to be informed of such rights. Such a view would not only give a very restrictive application to Section 12(1); it would also diminish
the said accused's rights underSection 14(2) Article III of the Constitution.
The exercise of the rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed thereof under Section 12(1), Article III of
the Constitution are not confined to that period prior to the filing of a criminal complaint or information but are available at that stage
when a person is "under investigation for the commission of an offense." The direct and primary source of this Section 12(1) is
the second paragraph of Section 20, Article II of the 1973 Constitution which reads:
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to
counsel, and to be informed of such right . . .
The first sentence to which it immediately follows refers to the rights against self-incrimination reading:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
which is now Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The incorporation of the second paragraph of Section 20 in the Bill of
Rights of the 1973 Constitution was an acceptance of the landmark doctrine laid down by the United States Supreme Court
in Miranda vs. Arizona. 19 In that case, the Court explicitly stated that the holding therein "is not an innovation in our jurisprudence,
but is an application of principles long recognized and applied in other settings." It went on to state its ruling:
Our holding will be spelled out with some specificity in the pages which follow but briefly stated, it is this: the
prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of
the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against selfincrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person

has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. As for the
procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of
their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required.
Prior to any questioning the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does
make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained
or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes
to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and
indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact
that he may have answered some question or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the
right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents
to be questioned. 20
It may be pointed out though that as formulated in the second paragraph of the aforementioned Section 20, the
word custodial, which was used in Mirandawith reference to the investigation, was excluded. In view thereof, in Galman vs.
Pamaran, 21 this Court aptly observed:
The fact that the framers of our Constitution did not choose to use the term "custodial" by having it inserted
between the words "under'' and "investigation," as in fact the sentence opens with the phrase "any person" goes to
prove that they did not adopt in toto the entire fabric of the Miranda doctrine. LexLib
Clearly then, the second paragraph of Section 20 has even broadened the application of Miranda by making it applicable
to the investigation for the commission of an offense of a person not in custody. 22 Accordingly, as so formulated, the second
paragraph of Section 20 changed the rule adopted in People vs. Jose 23 that the rights of the accused only begin upon
arraignment. Applying the second paragraph of Section 20, this Court laid down this rule in Morales vs. Enrile: 24
7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the
arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain
silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall
have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means by
telephone if possible or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that
this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged
by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee
himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless
made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down,
whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
Note that the first sentence requires the arresting officer to inform the person to be arrested of the reason for the arrest
and show him "the warrant of arrest, if any." The underscored phrase simply means that a case had been filed against him in a
court of either preliminary or original jurisdiction and that the court had issued the corresponding warrant of arrest. From the
foregoing, it is clear that the right to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed thereof under the second paragraph of Section
20 are available to a person at any time before arraignment whenever he is investigated for the commission of an offense. This
paragraph was incorporated into Section 12(1), Article III of the present Constitution with the following additional safeguards: (a) the
counsel must be competent and independent, preferably of his own choice, (b) if the party cannot afford the services of such
counsel, he must be provided with one, and (c) the rights therein cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
Then, too, the right to be heard would be a farce if it did not include the right to counsel. 25 Thus, Section 12(2), Article III
of the present Constitution provides that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall "enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel." In People vs. Holgado, 26 this Court emphatically declared:
One of the great principles of justice guaranteed by our Constitution is that "no person shall be held to answer for a
criminal offense without due process of law", and that all accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel." In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by
counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the
most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure,
and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish
his innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason
that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so
implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to
have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the

court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure
an attorney of his own.
It was therefore, wrong for the trial court to hold that Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution is strictly limited to
custodial investigation and that it does not apply to a person against whom a criminal complaint or information has already been
filed because after its filing he loses his right to remain silent and to counsel. If we follow the theory of the trial court, then police
authorities and other law enforcement agencies would have a heyday in extracting confessions or admissions from accused
persons after they had been arrested but before they are arraigned because at such stage the accused persons are supposedly not
entitled to the enjoyment of the rights to remain silent and to counsel. cdll
Once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court and the accused is thereafter arrested by virtue of a warrant of
arrest, he must be delivered to the nearest police station or jail and the arresting officer must make a return of the warrant to the
issuing judge, 27 and since the court has already acquired jurisdiction over his person, it would be improper for any public officer or
law enforcement agency to investigate him in connection with the commission of the offense for which he is charged. If,
nevertheless, he is subjected to such investigation, then Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution and the jurisprudence thereon
must be faithfully complied with.
The Sinumpaang Salaysay of Maqueda taken by SPO2 Molleno after the former's arrest was taken in palpable violation of
his rights under Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution. As disclosed by a reading thereof, Maqueda was not even told of any of
his constitutional rights under the said section. The statement was also taken in the absence of counsel. Such
uncounselled Sinumpaang Salaysay is wholly inadmissible pursuant to paragraph 3, Section 12, Article III of the Constitutionwhich
reads:
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence
against him.
However, the extrajudicial admissions of Maqueda to prosecutor Zarate and to Ray Dean Salvosa stand on a different
footing. These are not governed by the exclusionary rules under the Bill of Rights. Maqueda voluntarily and freely made them to
Prosecutor Zarate not in the course of an investigation, but in connection with Maqueda's plea to be utilized as a state witness; and
as to the other admission, it was given to a private person. The provisions of the Bill of Rights are primarily limitations on
government, declaring the rights that exist without governmental grant, that may not be taken away by government and that
government has the duty to protect; 28 or restrictions on the power of government found "not in the particular specific types of
action prohibited, but in the general principle that keeps alive in the public mind the doctrine that governmental power is not
unlimited." 29 They are the fundamental safeguards against aggressions of arbitrary power, 30 or state tyranny and abuse of
authority. In laying down the principles of the government and fundamental liberties of the people, the Constitution did not govern
the relationships between individuals. 31
Accordingly, Maqueda's admissions to Ray Dean Salvosa, a private party, are admissible in evidence against the former
under Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. In Aballe vs. People, 32 this Court held that the declaration of an accused
expressly acknowledging his guilt of the offense may be given in evidence against him and any person, otherwise competent to
testify as a witness, who heard the confession, is competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard if he heard and
understood it. The said witness need not repeat verbatim the oral confession; it suffices if he gives its substance. By analogy, that
rule applies to oral extrajudicial admissions.
To be added to Maqueda's extrajudicial admission is his Urgent Motion for Bail wherein he explicitly stated that "he is
willing and volunteering to be a state witness in the above entitled case, it appearing that he is the least guilty among the accused
in this case."
In the light of his admissions to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa and his willingness to be a state witness,
Maqueda's participation in the commission of the crime charged was established beyond moral certainty. His defense of alibi was
futile because by his own admission he was not only at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, he also admitted his
participation therein. Even if we disregard his extrajudicial admissions to Prosecutor Zarate and Salvosa, his guilt was, as correctly
ruled by the trial court, established beyond doubt by circumstancial evidence. The following circumstances were duly proved in this
case:
(1) He and a companion were seen a kilometer away from the Barker house an hour after the crime in question was
committed there;
(2) Rene Salvamante, who is still at large, was positively identified by Mrs. Barker, Norie Dacara, and Julieta
Villanueva as one of two persons who committed the crime;
(3) He and co-accused Rene Salvamante are friends;
(4) He and Rene Salvamante were together in Guinyangan, Quezon, and both left the place sometime in
September 1991;
(5) He was arrested in Guinyangan, Quezon, on 4 March 1992; and
(6) He freely and voluntarily offered to be a state witness stating that "he is the least guilty."

Section 4, rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Or, as jurisprudentially formulated, a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the
circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion which points to the accused,
to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person, i.e., the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with
the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilty. 33 We do
not hesitate to rule that all the requisites of Section 2, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court are present in this case. cdphil
This conclusion having been reached, the defense of alibi put up by the appellant must fail. The trial court correctly
rejected such defense. The rule is settled that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the requirements of time and place must be strictly
met. It is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else when the crime was committed, he must demonstrate that it
was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.34 Through the unrebutted
testimony of Mike Tayaban, which Maqueda does not controvert in his brief, it was positively established that Maqueda and a
companion were seen at 7:00 a.m. of 27 August 1991 at the waiting shed in Aguyad, Tuba, Benguet, a place barely a kilometer
away from the house of the Barkers. It was not then impossible for Maqueda and his companion to have been at the Barker house
at the time the crime was committed. Moreover, Fredisminda Castrence categorically declared that Maqueda started working in her
polvoron factory in Sukat only on 7 October 1991, thereby belying his testimony that he started working on 5 July 1991 and
continuously until 27 August 1991.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the appealed decision of Branch 10 of the
Regional Trial Court of Benguet in Criminal Case No. 91-CR-1206 is AFFIRMED in toto. LLphil
Costs against accused-appellant HECTOR MAQUEDA @ PUTOL.
||| (People v. Maqueda, G.R. No. 112983, [March 22, 1995], 312 PHIL 646-678)

[G.R. No. 107383. February 20, 1996.]

CECILIA ZULUETA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN, respondents.
Leonides S. Respicio & Associates Law Office for petitioner.
Galileo P. Brion for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION AND CORRESPONDENCE; A PERSON BY
CONTRACTING MARRIAGE, DOES NOT SHED HIS/HER INTEGRITY OR HIS RIGHT TO PRIVACY AS AN INDIVIDUAL AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION IS EVER AVAILABLE TO HIM OR TO HER. Indeed the documents and papers in question are
inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is
no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom
the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a]
court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence
obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding." The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in
breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by
contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever
available to him or to her.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J p:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X)
which ordered petitioner to return documents and papers taken by her from private respondent's clinic without the latter's knowledge
and consent.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her
husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the
drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his
alleged paramours, greeting cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were
seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed
against her husband.
Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against petitioner. The case was filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X, which, after trial, rendered judgment for private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin,
declaring him "the capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in paragraph 3 of plaintiff's Complaint or those further described
in the Motion to Return and Suppress" and ordering Cecilia Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to immediately return the
properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorney's fees; and to pay
the costs of the suit. The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued was made final and petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and
representatives were enjoined from "using or submitting/admitting as evidence" the documents and papers in question. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition.
There is no question that the documents and papers in question belong to private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, and that they were
taken by his wife, the herein petitioner, without his knowledge and consent. For that reason, the trial court declared the documents and
papers to be properties of private respondent, ordered petitioner to return them to private respondent and enjoined her from using them
in evidence. In appealing from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court's decision, petitioner's only ground is that
in Alfredo Martin v. Alfonso Felix, Jr., 1 this Court ruled that the documents and papers (marked as Annexes A-1 to J-7 of respondent's
comment in that case) were admissible in evidence and, therefore, their use by petitioner's attorney, Alfonso Felix, Jr., did not constitute
malpractice or gross misconduct. For this reason it is contended that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial
court instead of dismissing private respondent's complaint.
Petitioner's contention has no merit. The case against Atty. Felix, Jr. was for disbarment. Among other things, private respondent, Dr.
Alfredo Martin, as complainant in that case, charged that in using the documents in evidence, Atty. Felix, Jr. committed malpractice or
gross misconduct because of the injunctive order of the trial court. In dismissing the complaint against Atty. Felix, Jr., this Court took
note of the following defense of Atty. Felix, Jr. which it found to be "impressed with merit:" 2
On the alleged malpractice or gross misconduct of respondent [Alfonso Felix, Jr.], he maintains that:
xxx xxx xxx
4. When respondent refiled Cecilia's case for legal separation before the Pasig Regional Trial Court, there was
admittedly an order of the Manila Regional Trial Court prohibiting Cecilia from using the documents Annex "A-1 to
J-7." On September 6, 1983, however having appealed the said order to this Court on a petition for certiorari, this
Court issued a restraining order on aforesaid date which order temporarily set aside the order of the trial court.
Hence, during the enforceability of this Court's order, respondent's request for petitioner to admit the genuineness

and authenticity of the subject annexes cannot be looked upon as malpractice. Notably, petitioner Dr. Martin finally
admitted the truth and authenticity of the questioned annexes. At that point in time, would it have been malpractice
for respondent to use petitioner's admission as evidence against him in the legal separation case pending in the
Regional Trial Court of Makati? Respondent submits it is not malpractice.
Significantly, petitioner's admission was done not thru his counsel but by Dr. Martin himself under oath. Such
verified admission constitutes an affidavit, and, therefore, receivable in evidence against him. Petitioner became
bound by his admission. For Cecilia to avail herself of her husband's admission and use the same in her action for
legal separation cannot be treated as malpractice.
Thus, the acquittal of Atty. Felix, Jr. in the administrative case amounts to no more than a declaration that his use of the documents and
papers for the purpose of securing Dr. Martin's admission as to their genuineness and authenticity did not constitute a violation of the
injunctive order of the trial court. By no means does the decision in that case establish the admissibility of the documents and papers in
question.
It cannot be overemphasized that if Atty. Felix, Jr. was acquitted of the charge of violating the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the
trial court, it was only because, at the time he used the documents and papers, enforcement of the order of the trial court was
temporarily restrained by this Court. The TRO issued by this Court was eventually lifted as the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner
against the trial court's order was dismissed and, therefore, the prohibition against the further use of the documents and papers became
effective again.
Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of
communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" 3 is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved
by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the
prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed
by law." 4 Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding." 5
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in
ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his
right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify
for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. 6 Neither may be examined without the
consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified
exceptions. 7 But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the
other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.
||| (Zulueta v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107383, [February 20, 1996])

[G.R. No. 113271. October 16, 1997.]

WATEROUS DRUG CORPORATION and MS. EMMA CO, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION and ANTONIA MELODIA CATOLICO, respondents.
Atty. D.P. Mercado & Associates for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Catolico filed before the Office of the Labor Arbiter a case for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal and illegal suspension against the
petitioner Waterous Drug Corporation. Labor Arbiter Alex Lopez decided in favor of private respondent, dismissing the ground of unfair
labor practice, but, however, declared the dismissal and suspension illegal, for failure by petitioners to prove their allegations against
private respondent and to show any investigation was conducted, and was therefore, dismissed without just cause and due
process. cdasia
On September 30, 1993, the NLRC dismissed petitioner's appeal for lack of merit, and affirmed the labor arbiter's findings, but with
modification on the dispositive portion of the appealed decision by deleting the award for illegal suspension as the same was already
included in the computation of the aggregate of the awards in the amount of P35,401.86. Their motion for reconsideration having been
denied, petitioners filed this special civil action for certiorari, with the allegations that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion and
that due process was duly accorded to private respondent. In addition, petitioner further alleged that the Commission gravely erred in
applying Section 3, Article III of the Constitution.
The Supreme Court held that, except as to the third ground, the instant petition must fail. Concededly, Catolico was denied due process.
Even though he was given an opportunity to explain her side in writing, no hearing was ever conducted for the proper investigation of
her allegations against private respondent. It clearly appears that her dismissal was based on hearsay information. Hearsay evidence
carries no probative value. Catolico's dismissal then was obviously grounded on mere suspicion, which in no case can justify an
employee's dismissal. In view thereof, the instant petition is dismissed and the challenged decision and resolution of the NLRC are
affirmed. The NLRC's reason for upholding the Labor Arbiter's decision, i.e., that the evidence against respondent was inadmissible in
evidence for having been obtained in violation of her constitutional rights, was set aside.
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR CODE; TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT; DISMISSAL OF AN EMPLOYEE BASED
ON MERE SUSPICION, NOT VALID; CASE AT BAR. It is settled that the burden is on the employer to prove just and valid cause for
dismissing an employee. and its failure to discharge that burden would result in a finding that the dismissal is unjustified. Here,
WATEROUS proved unequal to the task. It is evident from the Supervisor's memorandum that Catolico was dismissed because of an
alleged anomalous transaction with YSP. Unfortunately for petitioners, their evidence does not establish that there was an overcharge.
Control Clerk Eugenio C. Valdez claims to have discovered Catolico's inappropriate transaction . . . It clearly appears then that
Catolico's dismissal was based on hearsay information. Estelita Reyes never testified nor executed an affidavit relative to this case;
thus, we have to reject the statements attributed to her by Valdez. Hearsay evidence carries no probative value. . . . Catolico's dismissal
then was obviously grounded on mere suspicion, which in no case can justify an employee's dismissal. Suspicion is not among the valid
causes provided by the Labor Code for the termination of employment; and even the dismissal of an employee for loss of trust and
confidence must rest on substantial grounds and not on the employer's arbitrariness, whims, caprices, or suspicion. Besides, Catolico
was not shown to be a managerial employee, to which class of employees the term "trust and confidence" is restricted.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE FACT THAT AN EMPLOYEE WAS GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLAIN HER SIDE, BUT NO HEARING WAS
CONDUCTED, CONSTITUTES DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS; CASE AT BAR. Catolico was denied due process. Procedural due
process requires that an employee be apprised of the charge against him, given reasonable time to answer the charge, allowed ample
opportunity to be heard and defend himself, and assisted by a representative if the employee so desires. Ample opportunity connotes
every kind of assistance that management must accord the employee to enable him to prepare adequately for his defense, including
legal representation. In the case at bar, although Catolico was given an opportunity to explain her side, she was dismissed from the
service in the memorandum of 5 March 1990 issued by her Supervisor after receipt of her letter and that of her counsel. No hearing was
ever conducted after the issues were joined through said letters. The Supervisor's memorandum spoke of "evidences [sic] in
[WATEROUS] possession," which were not, however, submitted. What the "evidences" [sic] other than the sales invoice and the check
were, only the Supervisor knew.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; AWARD OF SEPARATION PAY IN LIEU OF REINSTATEMENT, IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE PARTIES; CASE AT
BAR. Since it has been determined by the Labor Arbiter that Catolico's reinstatement would not be to the best interest of the parties,
he correctly awarded separation pay to Catolico. Separation pay in lieu of reinstatement is computed at one month's salary for every
year of service, In this case, however, Labor Arbiter Lopez computed the separation pay to one-half month's salary for every year of
service. Catolico did not oppose or raise an objection. As such, we will uphold the award of separation pay as fixed by the Labor Arbiter.
4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; 1987 CONSTITUTION, BILL OF RIGHTS; DOES NOT PROTECT CITIZENS FROM. UNREASONABLE
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES PERPETRATED BY PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS. As regards the constitutional violation upon which the
NLRC anchored its decision, we find no reason to revise the doctrine laid down inPeople vs. Marti that the Bill of Rights does not protect

citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by private individuals. It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that
the citizens have no recourse against such assaults. On the contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise to both
criminal and civil liabilities. AEIHCS
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J p:
"Nor is he a true Servant [who] buys dear to share in the Profit with the Seller." 1
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks to declare private respondent Antonia Melodia Catolico (hereafter
Catolico) not a "true Servant," thereby assailing the 30 September 1993 decision 2 and 2 December 1993 Resolution 3 of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC-NCR CA No. 005160-93, which sustained the reinstatement and monetary awards in
favor of private respondent 4 and denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration. 5
The facts are as follows:
Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by petitioner Waterous Drug Corporation (hereafter WATEROUS) on 15 August 1988.
On 31 July 1989, Catolico received a memorandum 6 from WATEROUS Vice President-General Manager Emma R. Co warning her not
to dispense medicine to employees chargeable to the latter's accounts because the same was a prohibited practice. On the same date,
Co issued another memorandum 7 to Catolico warning her not to negotiate with suppliers of medicine without consulting the Purchasing
Department, as this would impair the company's control of purchases and, besides she was not authorized to deal directly with the
suppliers.
As regards the first memorandum, Catolico did not deny her responsibility but explained that her act was "due to negligence," since
fellow employee Irene Soliven "obtained the medicines in bad faith and through misrepresentation when she claimed that she was given
a charge slip by the Admitting Dept." Catolico then asked the company to look into the fraudulent activities of Soliven. 8
In a memorandum 9 dated 21 November 1989, WATEROUS Supervisor Luzviminda E. Bautro warned Catolico against the "rush
delivery of medicines without the proper documents."
On 29 January 1990, WATEROUS Control Clerk Eugenio Valdez informed Co that he noticed an irregularity involving Catolico and Yung
Shin Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (hereafter YSP), which he described as follows:
. . . A case in point is medicine purchased under our Purchase Order (P.O.) No. 19045 with YSP Sales Invoice No.
266 representing purchase of ten (10) bottles of Voren tablets at P384.00 per unit. Previous P.O.'s issued to YSP,
Inc. showed that the price per bottle is P320.00 while P.O. No. 19045 is priced at P384.00 or an over price of
P64.00 per bottle (or total of P640.00). WDRC paid the amount of P3,840.00 thru MBTC Check No. 222832 dated
December 15, 1988, Verification was made to YSP, Inc. to determine the discrepancy and it was found that the cost
per bottle was indeed overpriced. YSP, Inc. Accounting Department (Ms. Estelita Reyes) confirmed that the
difference represents refund of jack-up price of ten bottles of Voren tablets per sales invoice no. 266 as per their
check voucher no. 629552 (shown to the undersigned), which was paid to Ms. Catolico through China Bank check
no. 892068 dated November 9, 1989 . . .
The undersigned talked to Ms. Catolico regarding the check but she denied having received it and that she is
unaware of the overprice. However, upon conversation with Ms. Saldana, EDRC Espana Pharmacy Clerk, she
confirmed that the check amounting to P640.00 was actually received by Ms. Catolico. As a matter of fact, Ms.
Catolico even asked Ms. Saldana if she opened the envelope containing the check but Ms. Saldana answered her
"talagang ganyan, bukas." It appears that the amount in question (P640.00) had been pocketed by Ms.
Catolico. 10 aisadc
Forthwith, in her memorandum 11 dated 31 January 1990, Co asked Catolico to explain, within twenty-four hours, her side of the
reported irregularity. Catolico asked for additional time to give her explanation, 12 and she was granted a 48-hour extension from 1 to 3
February 1990. However, on 2 February 1990, she was informed that effective 6 February 1990 to 7 March 1990, she would be placed
on preventive suspension to protect the interests of the company. 13
In a letter dated 2 February 1990, Catolico requested access to the file containing Sales Invoice No. 266 for her to be able to make a
satisfactory explanation. In said letter she protested Saldaa's invasion of her privacy when Saldaa opened an envelope addressed to
Catolico. 14
In a letter 15 to Co dated 10 February 1990, Catolico, through her counsel, explained that the check she received from YSP was a
Christmas gift and not a "refund of overprice." She also averred that the preventive suspension was ill-motivated, as it sprang from an
earlier incident between her and Co's secretary, Irene Soliven.
On 5 March 1990, WATEROUS Supervisor Luzviminda Bautro, issued a memorandum 16 notifying Catolico of her termination; thus:
We received your letter of explanation and your lawyer's letter dated Feb. 2, 1990 and Feb. 10, 1990 respectively
regarding our imposition of preventive suspension on you for acts of dishonesty. However, said letters failed to rebut
the evidences [sic] in our possession which clearly shows that as a Pharmacist stationed at Espana Branch, you
actually made Purchase Orders at YSP Phils., Inc. for 10 bottles of Voren tablets at P384.00/bottle with previous

price of P320.00/bottle only. A check which you received in the amount of P640.00 actually represents the refund of
over price of said medicines and this was confirmed by Ms. Estelita Reyes, YSP Phils., Inc. Accounting
Department.
Your actuation constitutes an act of dishonesty detrimental to the interest of the company. Accordingly, you are
hereby terminated effective March 8, 1990.
On 5 May 1990, Catolico filed before the Office of the Labor Arbiter a complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal, and illegal
suspension. 17
In his decision 18 of 10 May 1993, Labor Arbiter Alex Arcadio Lopez found no proof of unfair labor practice against petitioners.
Nevertheless, he decided in favor of Catolico because petitioners failed to "prove what [they] alleged as complainant's dishonesty," and
to show that any investigation was conducted. Hence, the dismissal was without just cause and due process. He thus declared the
dismissal and suspension illegal but disallowed reinstatement, as it would not be to the best interest of the parties. Accordingly, he
awarded separation pay to Catolico computed at one-half month's pay for every year of service; back wages for one year; and the
additional sum of P2,000.00 for illegal suspension "representing 30 days work." Arbiter Lopez computed the award in favor of Catolico
as follows:
30 days Preventive Suspension P2,000.00
Backwages 26,858.50
1/12 of P26,858.50 2,238.21
Separation pay (3 years) 4,305.15

TOTAL AWARD: P35,401.86

Petitioners seasonably appealed from the decision and urged the NLRC to set it aside because the Labor Arbiter erred in finding that
Catolico was denied due process and that there was no just cause to terminate her services.
In its decision 19 of 30 September 1993, the NLRC affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter on the ground that petitioners were not
able to prove a just cause for Catolico's dismissal from her employment. It found that petitioner's evidence consisted only of the check of
P640.00 drawn by YSP in favor of complainant, which her co-employee saw when the latter opened the envelope. But, it declared that
the check was inadmissible in evidence pursuant to Sections 2 and 3(1 and 2) of Article III of the Constitution. 20 It concluded:
With the smoking gun evidence of respondents being rendered inadmissible, by virtue of the constitutional right
invoked by complainants, respondents' case falls apart as it is bereft of evidence which cannot be used as a legal
basis for complainant's dismissal.
The NLRC then dismissed the appeal for lack of merit, but modified the dispositive portion of the appealed decision by deleting the
award for illegal suspension as the same was already included in the computation of the aggregate of the awards in the amount of
P35,401.86.
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioners filed this special civil action for certiorari, which is anchored on the
following grounds:
I. Public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in its finding of facts.
II. Due process was duly accorded to private respondent.
III. Public respondent gravely erred in applying Section 3, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
As to the first and second grounds, petitioners insist that Catolico had been receiving "commissions" from YSP, or
probably from other suppliers, and that the check issued to her on 9 November 1989 was not the first or the last. They also
maintained that Catolico occupied a confidential position and that Catolico's receipt of YSP's check, aggravated by her "propensity
to violate company rules," constituted breach of confidence. And contrary to the findings of NLRC, Catolico was given ample
opportunity to explain her side of the controversy.
Anent the third ground, petitioners submit that, in light of the decision in the People v. Marti, 21 the constitutional protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of one's person from interference by government and cannot be extended to
acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
In its Manifestation in Lieu of Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) disagreed with the NLRC's decision, as it was of the
persuasion that (a) the conclusions reached by public respondent are inconsistent with its findings of fact; and (b) the incident involving
the opening of envelope addressed to private respondent does not warrant the application of the constitutional provisions. It observed
that Catolico was given "several opportunities" to explain her side of the check controversy, and concluded that the opportunities
granted her and her subsequent explanation "satisfy the requirements of just cause and due process." The OSG was also convinced
that Catolico's dismissal was based on just cause and that Catolico's admission of the existence of the check, as well as her "lame
excuse" that it was Christmas gift from YSP, constituted substantial evidence of dishonesty. Finally, the OSG echoed petitioners'
argument that there was no violation of the right of privacy of communication in this case, 22 adding that petitioner WATEROUS was

justified in opening an envelope from one of its regular suppliers as it could assume that the letter was a business communication in
which it had an interest.
In its Comment which we required to be filed in view of the adverse stand of the OSG, the NLRC contends that petitioners miserably
failed to proved their claim that it committed grave abuse of discretion in its findings of fact. It then prays that we dismiss this
petition. cda
In her Comment, Catolico assets that petitioners' evidence is too "flimsy" to justify her dismissal. The check in issue was given to her,
and she had no duty to turn it over to her employer. Company rules do not prohibit an employee from accepting gifts from clients, and
there is no indication in the contentious check that it was meant as a refund for overpriced medicines. Besides, the check was
discovered in violation of the constitutional provision on the right to privacy and communication; hence, as correctly held by the NLRC, it
was inadmissible in evidence.
Catolico likewise disputes petitioners' claim that the audit report and her initial response that she never received a check were sufficient
to justify her dismissal. When she denied having received a check from YSP, she meant that she did not receive any refund of overprice,
consistent with her position that what she received was a token gift. All that can be gathered from the audit report is that there was
apparently an overcharge, with no basis to conclude that Catolico pocketed the amount in collusion with YSP. She thus concluded that
her dismissal was based on a mere suspicion.
Finally, Catolico insists that she could not have breached the trust and confidence of WATEROUS because, being merely a pharmacist,
she did not handle "confidential information or sensitive properties." She was doing the task of a saleslady: selling drugs and making
requisitions when supplies were low.
A thorough review of the record leads us to no other conclusion than that, except as to the third ground, the instant petition must fail.
Concededly, Catolico was denied due process. Procedural due process requires that an employee be apprised of the charge against
him, given reasonable time to answer the charge, allowed amply opportunity to be heard and defend himself, and assisted by a
representative if the employee so desires. 23 Ample opportunity connotes every kind of assistance that management must accord the
employee to enable him to prepare adequately for his defense, including legal representation. 24
In the case at bar, although Catolico was given an opportunity to explain her side, she was dismissed from the service in the
memorandum of 5 March 1990 issued by her Supervisor after receipt of her letter and that of her counsel. No hearing was ever
conducted after the issues were joined through said letters. The Supervisor's memorandum spoke of "evidences [sic] in [WATEROUS]
possession," which were not, however, submitted. What the "evidences" [sic] other than the sales invoice and the check were, only the
Supervisor knew.
Catolico was also unjustly dismissed. It is settled that the burden is on the employer to prove just and valid cause for dismissing an
employee, and its failure to discharge that burden would result in a finding that the dismissal is unjustified. 25 Here, WATEROUS proved
unequal to the task.
It is evident from the Supervisor's memorandum that Catolico was dismissed because of an alleged anomalous transaction with YSP.
Unfortunately for petitioners, their evidence does not establish that there was an overcharge. Control Clerk Eugenio C. Valdez, who
claims to have discovered Catolico's inappropriate transaction, stated in his affidavit: 26
4. My findings revealed that on or before the month of July 31, 1989, Ms. Catolico in violation of the [company]
procedure, made an under the table deal with YSP Phils. to supply WDRC needed medicines like Voren tablets at a
jack-up price of P384.00 per bottle of 50 mg. which has a previous price of only P320.00;
5. I verified the matter to YSP Phils. to determine the discrepancy and I found out that the cost per bottle was
indeed overpriced. The Accounting Department of YSP Phils. through Ms. Estelita Reyes confirmed that there was
really an overprice and she said that the difference was refunded through their check voucher no. 629552 which
was shown to me and the payee is Melodia Catolico, through a China Bank Check No. 892068 dated November 9,
1989.
It clearly appears then that Catolico's dismissal was based on hearsay information. Estelita Reyes never testified nor executed an
affidavit relative to this case; thus, we have to reject the statements attributed to her by Valdez. Hearsay evidence carries no probative
value. 27
Besides, it was never shown that petitioners paid for the Voren tablets. While Valdez informed Co, through the former's
memorandum 28 of 29 January 1990, that WATEROUS paid YSP P3,840.00 "thru MBTC Check No. 222832," the said check was
never presented in evidence, nor was any receipt from YSP offered by petitioners.cdrep
Moreover, the two purchase orders for Voren tablets presented by petitioners do not indicate an overcharge. The purchase order dated
16 August 1989 29 stated that the Voren tablets cost P320.00 per box, while the purchase order dated 5 October 1989 30 priced the
Voren tablets at P384.00 per bottle. The difference in price may then be attributed to the different packaging used in each purchase
order.
Assuming that there was an overcharge, the two purchase orders for the Voren tablets were recommended by Director-MMG Mario R.
Panuncio, verified by AVP-MNG Noli M. Lopez and approved by Vice President-General Manager Emma R. Co. The purchase orders

were silent as to Catolico's participation in the purchase. If the price increase was objectionable to petitioners, they or their officers
should have disapproved the transaction. Consequently, petitioners had no one to blame for their predicament but themselves. This set
of facts emphasizes the exceedingly incredible situation proposed by petitioners. Despite the memorandum warning Catolico not to
negotiate with suppliers of medicine, there was no proof that she ever transacted, or that she had the opportunity to transact, with the
said suppliers. Again, as the purchase orders indicate, Catolico was not at all involved in the sale of the Voren tablets. There was no
occasion for Catolico to initiate, much less benefit from, what Valdez called an "under the table deal" with YSP.
Catolico's dismissal then was obviously grounded on mere suspicion, which in no case can justify an employee's dismissal. Suspicion is
not among the valid causes provided by the Labor Code for the termination of employment; 31 and even the dismissal of an employee
for loss of trust and confidence must rest on substantial grounds and not on the employer's arbitrariness, whims, caprices, or
suspicion. 32 Besides, Catolico was not shown to be a managerial employee, to which class of employees the term "trust and
confidence" is restricted. 33
As regards the constitutional violation upon which the NLRC anchored its decision, we find no reason to revise the doctrine laid down
in People vs. Marti 34 that the Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by private
individuals. It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens have no recourse against such assaults. On the contrary, and
as said counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities.
Finally, since it has been determined by the Labor Arbiter that Catolico's reinstatement would not be to the best interest of the parties,
he correctly awarded separation pay to Catolico. Separation pay in lieu of reinstatement is computed at one month's salary for every
year of service. 35 In this case, however, Labor Arbiter Lopez computed the separation pay at one-half month's salary for every year of
service. Catolico did not oppose or raise an objection. As such, we will uphold the award of separation pay as fixed by the Labor Arbiter.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the challenged decision and resolution of the National Labor Relations
Commission dated 30 September 1993 and 2 December 1993, respectively, in NLRC-NCR CA No. 005160-93 are AFFIRMED, except
as to its reason for upholding the Labor Arbiter's decision, viz., that the evidence against private respondent was inadmissible for having
been obtained in violation of her constitutional rights of privacy of communication and against unreasonable searches and seizures
which is hereby set aside.
Costs against petitioners.
||| (Waterous Drug Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 113271, [October 16, 1997], 345 PHIL 983-997)

[G.R. No. 152160. January 13, 2004.]

VIRGILIO BON, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J p:
Testimony of what one heard a party say is not necessarily hearsay. It is admissible in evidence, not to show that the statement was
true, but that it was in fact made. If credible, it may form part of the circumstantial evidence necessary to convict the accused.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the August 22, 2001 Decision 2 and the
February 15, 2002 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CR No. 15673. The dispositive part of the assailed Decision
reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 23, 1993 convicting [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon is hereby AFFIRMED with
modification on the penalty in that [petitioner] is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
ranging from ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum to fourteen (14) years [and] eight (8) months of reclusion
temporal, as maximum. Accused-appellant Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. is hereby ACQUITTED." 4
The assailed Resolution, on the other hand, denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
The Antecedents
The antecedents are summarized by the CA as follows:
"[Petitioner] Virgilio Bon and Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. were charged for violating Section 68 of PD 705, as amended[,]
together with Rosalio Bon under an Information, the accusatory portion of which reads as follows:
'That sometime in the month of January or February, 1990, at Barangay Basud, Municipality of Sorsogon,
Province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, cut, gather and manufacture into lumber four (4) narra trees, one (1) cuyao-yao tree,
and one (1) amugis tree, with an approximate volume of 4,315 bd. ft. and valued at approximately
P25,000.00, without the knowledge and consent of the owner Teresita Dangalan-Mendoza and without
having first obtained from proper authorities the necessary permit or license and/or legal supporting
documents, to the damage and prejudice of the Government and the owner in the aforementioned amount
of P25,000.00.
'Contrary to law.'
"Upon arraignment on May 16, 1991, [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon[,] Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. and Rosalio Bon entered a
plea of 'Not Guilty' to the crime charged. Thereafter, the trial of the case proceeded. The prosecution presented
Nestor Labayan[e], [Private Complainant] Teresita Dangalan-Mendoza, [Barangay] Tanod Julian Lascano,
Alexander Mendones [and] Manuel Dangalan as its witnesses. The defense, on the other hand, presented accused
Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr., Rosalio Bon and Virgilio Bon.SEACTH
"The evidence for the prosecution [w]as synthesized by the trial court, as follows:
'Prosecution's evidence was supplied by Julian Lascano, Oscar Narvaez, Alexander Mendones, Manuel
Dangalan, Nestor Labayan[e] and Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza] which shows that Teresita [DangalanMendoza] owns a titled agricultural land under Title No. 6666 located in Basud, Sorsogon, Sorsogon,
administered by Virgilio Bon. Receiving information that trees inside the land were being stolen, cut [and]
sawed into lumber by her administrator and/or workers, she sent her brother Manuel Dangalan to
investigate the report. On February 7, 1990, Manuel Dangalan sought the help of Barangay Captain
Nestor Labayane, who in turn wrote a letter to one of the [b]arangay [t]anod[s], Julian Lascano, to assist
and investigate Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza's] complaint of Illegal Cutting of Trees. On February 12,
1990, together with Julian Lascano, Manuel Dangalan, Ricardo Valladolid, Natividad Legaspi and Virgilio
Bon repaired to the land of Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza]. During their investigation, the group discovered
six (6) stumps of trees[:] four (4) Narra trees, one cuyao-yao tree and one am[u]gis tree. Pictures were
taken of the stumps . . .. On the land, Virgilio Bon admitted ordering the cutting and sawing of the trees
into lumber. Oscar Narvaez testified that sometime in January, 1990, he sawed the trees into six flitches
upon instruction of Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr.; Alexander Mendones, CENRO Officer, upon complaint of
Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza] for Illegal Cutting of Trees repaired to the land on July 17, 1990, and found
four stumps of trees. Scaling the four stumps, it was his estimate that the lumber produced was 11.97
cubic meters o[r] 4,315 board feet, with a value of P25,376.00 . . ..'
"In their defense, all the three accused took the witness stand and denied the accusation. Their testimonies were
summarized by the trial court, as follows:

'All the accused testified in their defense. Rosalio Bon, the son of Virgilio Bon denied the charge[.] [He
said] that he was in Manila from December 1989 and returned to Sorsogon on March 21, 1990. He
mentioned that the purpose of filing this case was to eject his father as tenant of the land. IcHTCS
'Virgilio Bon testified that he is the tenant of the land of Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza] [and was] instituted
[as such] by Teresita's father. He developed the land[,] planting coconuts, abaca and fruit trees. Teresita
[Dangalan-Mendoza] wanted to eject him as tenant. He and the private complainant [have] an agrarian
case. Since Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza] refused to receive the landowner's share of produce, he
deposited the money in the Rural Bank of Sorsogon in the name of Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza] . . .. He
denied cutting and gathering the trees in the land and pointed to Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza] as the one
who ordered the trees [to be cut] and sawed by Oscar Narvaez. Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza] upon being
confronted about the cutting of trees, ignored his complaint.
'Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr., son-in-law of Virgilio Bon, denied that he hired Oscar Narvaez to saw the lumber.
Oscar Narvaez [indicted] him of the crime because the former had a grudge against him. In a drinking
spree, he happened to box Oscar Narvaez[,] after [which he] heard [the latter threaten him with] revenge.'
"On August 23, 1993, the trial court rendered its decision convicting [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon and Alejandro Jeniebre,
Jr. for the crime charged. Co-accused Rosalio Bon was acquitted. Aggrieved by the said decision, [Petitioner]
Virgilio Bon and Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. interposed [an] appeal [to the CA]." 5
In their appeal to the CA, petitioner and Jeniebre questioned the prosecution witnesses' credibility and the sufficiency of the evidence
proving their guilt.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA sustained the trial court's assessment of the credibility of Prosecution Witnesses Julian Lascano and Manuel Dangalan. Both
testified that petitioner had admitted to having ordered the cutting of trees on Teresita Dangalan-Mendoza's land.
Furthermore, the appellate court held that despite the absence of direct evidence in this case, the circumstantial evidence was sufficient
to convict petitioner. It ruled that the requirements for the sufficiency of the latter type of evidence under Section 4 of Rule 133 6 of the
Rules of Court were amply satisfied by the following established facts: 1) in the presence of Dangalan, Lascano and Natividad Legaspi,
petitioner admitted that he had ordered the cutting of the trees; 2) on February 12, 1990, he and his son Rosalio went to DangalanMendoza, demanding that she pay the value of the trees cut; and 3) on February 13, 1990, petitioner asked her to forgive him for cutting
the trees.
The CA held, however, that the same circumstances did not support the conviction of Jeniebre. Aside from the testimony of Oscar
Narvaez that Jeniebre hired him to cut the trees into flitches, no other evidence was presented to show the latter's participation in the
offense charged. Moreover, the appellate court held that the res inter alios acta rule under Section 28 of Rule 130 7 of the Rules of
Court would be violated by binding Jeniebre to petitioner's admission, which did not constitute any of the exceptions 8 to this provision. It
thus acquitted him.
As to petitioner, the CA modified the penalty imposed, pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Forestry Code as amended, Articles 309
and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, and Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Hence, this Petition. 9
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
"I
Whether hearsay testimony[,] which is denied by the alleged author under oath in open court, is admissible in
evidence against him.
"II
Whether hearsay testimony allegedly made to potential prosecution witnesses who are not police operatives or
media representatives is admissible in evidence against the author because what a man says against himself[,] if
voluntary, is believable for the reason that it is fair to presume that [it] correspond[s] with the truth and it is his fault if
they do not (U.S. v. Ching Po, 23 Phil. 578, 583 (1912).
"III
Whether or not . . . the [testimonies of the] prosecution witnesses . . . that . . . petitioner Bon admitted his guilt to
them should be given high credence by the courts of justice considering that . . . many people who are being
quoted in media today . . . have been found to be . . . lying. In other words, how much probity should we give a lying
witness?
"IV
Assuming arguendo that petitioner Bon ma[d]e the extra-judicial admission to the prosecution witnesses, [whether
or not] . . . the same [is constitutionally] admissible in evidence against him?" 10

Simply put, the points challenged by petitioner are as follows: 1) the admissibility of his purported extrajudicial admission of the
allegation, testified to by the prosecution witnesses, that he had ordered the cutting of the trees; and 2) the credibility and the sufficiency
of the testimonies of those witnesses. acCITS
The Court's Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First Issue:
Admissibility of the Extrajudicial Admission
At the outset, it must be emphasized that the present Petition is grounded on Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Under Section 1 thereof,
"only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth" may be raised. A reading of the pleadings reveals that petitioner actually raised
questions of fact the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and the sufficiency of the evidence against him. Nonetheless, this Court,
in the exercise of its sound discretion and after taking into account the attendant circumstances, opts to take cognizance of and decide
the factual issues raised in the Petition, in the interest of the proper administration of justice. 11
In the main, petitioner contends that Lascano's and Dangalan's separate testimonies 12 regarding his alleged extrajudicial admission
constitute hearsay evidence and are, therefore, inadmissible. He also argues that his supposed admission should not have been
admitted, because it had been taken without the assistance of counsel at a time when he was already regarded as a suspect.
We disagree.
Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states the rule on hearsay evidence as follows:
"Sec. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. A witness can testify only to
those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except
as otherwise provided in these rules."
Under the above rule, any evidence whether oral or documentary is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal
knowledge of the witness, but on that of some other person who is not on the witness stand. 13 Hence, information that is relayed to the
former by the latter before it reaches the court is considered hearsay. 14
In the instant case, Lascano and Dangalan testified that on February 12, 1990, they had heard petitioner admit to having ordered the
cutting of the trees. Their testimonies cannot be considered as hearsay for three reasons. First, they were indisputably present and
within hearing distance when he allegedly made the admission. Therefore, they testified to a matter of fact that had been derived from
their own perception.
Second, what was sought to be admitted as evidence was the fact that the utterance was actually made by petitioner, not necessarily
that the matters stated therein were true. On. this basis, a statement attributed to a person who is not on the witness stand is
admissible; it is not covered by the hearsay rule. 15 Gotesco Investment Corporation v. Chatto 16 ruled that evidence regarding the
making of such statement is not secondary but primary, because the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially
relevant as to the existence of that fact.
Third, even assuming that the testimonies were hearsay, petitioner is barred from questioning the admission of Dangalan's testimony,
because he failed to object to it at the time it was offered. It has been held that when parties fail to object to hearsay evidence, they are
deemed to have waived their right to do so; thus, it may be admitted. 17 The absence of an objection is clearly shown by the transcript
of the stenographic notes, from which we quote:
"Atty. Fajardo:
Q Did you reach the land in question?
A Yes, sir.
Q And upon reaching the land in question, what did you do?
A We were able to see the cut trees.
Q And were you able to see who cut the trees?
A We were not able to see.
Q And how many trees were cut?
A There were newly cut trees and 4 others which have been cut for a long time.
Q What kind of trees were cut according to you?
A Narra, amogis and kuyawyaw.
Q Upon seeing these cut trees, what did you do?
A I asked Virgilio Bon why those trees were [cut] down and he said that he took the liberty of cutting those trees.
Q In your own understanding, [M]r. [W]itness, what did the accused mean when he said that he took [the] liberty of
cutting those trees?
A He caused the cutting of the trees. TAcCDI
Q And during the time you were conversing, were you alone?
A I was with the barangay tanod.

Q And who were the members of the barangay tanod who were with you at that time?
A Julian Lascano, Jr. and Natividad Legaspi." 18
Moreover, a party's verbal admission that is established through the testimonies of the persons who heard it 19 fall under Section 26 of
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. According to this provision, "[t]he act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be
given in evidence against him." This rule is based upon the notion that no man would make any declaration against himself, unless it is
true. 20 The testimony of petitioner may, therefore, be received in evidence against him.
Regarding his alleged uncounselled admission, suffice it to stress that it was not given during a custodial investigation and, certainly, not
to police authorities. Custodial investigation has been defined as any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person
has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of freedom of action in any significant way. 21 We have ruled previously that
constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement that is not elicited through questioning by
the authorities, but is given in an ordinary manner. 22
Verily, the inquiry on the illegal cutting of trees, which with the assistance of the barangay tanods 23 was conducted by the
owner's brother, Manuel Dangalan cannot be deemed a custodial investigation. Consequently, the guarantees of Section 12 (1) of
Article III 24 of the 1987 Constitution, or the so-called Miranda rights, cannot be successfully invoked by petitioner. 25
Furthermore, allegations of impropriety committed during custodial investigation are relevant and material only to cases in which an
extrajudicial admission or confession is the basis of conviction. 26 In the present case, the conviction of petitioner was not deduced
solely from his admission, but from the confluence of circumstantial evidence showing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Second Issue:
Credibility and Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
The time-tested rule is that the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses deserve to be respected
because of its unique advantage of having observed their demeanor as they testified. 27 Equally established is the rule that factual
findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and carry even more weight when such findings affirm those of the trial
court, 28 as in this case. This Court refrains from disturbing the CA's findings, if no glaring errors bordering on a gross misapprehension
of facts can be gleaned from them. 29 We have no reason to depart from this rule. Hence, we affirm the lower courts' assessment of the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
We now come to the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence.
Section 68 of the Forestry Code, as amended, 30 provides:
"SEC. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License. Any person
who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable
or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products
without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the
penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of
partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession
shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further
proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
"The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut,
gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally
used in the area where the timber or forest products are found."
Punishable under the above provision are the following acts: (1) cutting, gathering, collecting or removing timber or other forest products
from the places therein mentioned without any authority; and (b) possessing timber or other forest products without the legal
documents. 31
Petitioner was charged with the first offense. 32 It was thus necessary for the prosecution to prove the alleged illegal cutting, gathering
or manufacture of lumber from the trees.
It is undisputed that no direct evidence was presented. This kind of evidence, however, is not the only matrix from which the trial court
may draw its conclusions and findings of guilt. 33 Conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence, as long as the circumstances
proven constitute an unbroken chain that leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt. 34
To sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is necessary that the following elements concur:
1. There is more than one circumstance.
2. The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven. SAHITC
3. The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 35
Did the circumstances in this case satisfy the above requirements? We rule in the affirmative. In its assessment of the evidence, the
regional trial court (RTC) considered the following proven facts and circumstances:
". . . Accused Virgilio Bon[,] being the tenant is in actual possession and control over the land, fruit trees and big
trees. Virgilio Bon has a better chance to cut and saw the lumber. He admitted before the [b]arangay [t]anod[,]

Julian Lascano[,] with other witnesses present[,] that he ordered the cutting of the trees[, and the] saw[ing thereof]
by his son-in-law, accused Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. His admission was corroborated by Oscar Narvaez, the one hired
by Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr., to saw the lumber. His extrajudicial confession is admissible evidence against him as it
was voluntary and not under custodial investigation." 36
The appellate court, on the other hand, found that the following circumstances sufficiently proved petitioner's culpability:
". . . (1) [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon admitted in the presence of Manuel Dangalan, Julian Lascano and Natividad
Legaspi that he caused the cutting of the questioned trees; (2) [o]n February 12, 1990, [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon and
his son[,] . . . Rosalio Bon[,] went to private complainant[,] demanding [that] the latter . . . pay the value of the
questioned trees which they had cut; (3) [o]n February 13, 1990, [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon went to private
complainant to ask forgiveness for cutting the trees." 37
A review of the records also shows that the fact of the alleged cutting, gathering and manufacture of lumber from the trees was proven
by the prosecution through the following pieces of documentary evidence: photographs of tree stumps, 38 the investigation report of an
officer of the Community Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO) that no permit was secured for the cutting of the trees, 39 and
the CENRO's computation of the value 40 of the timber generated from the felled trees. This fact, together with the circumstantial
evidence, indubitably points to no other conclusion than that petitioner was guilty as charged.
Correct Penalty
We now go to the penalty. We deem it necessary to discuss this matter because of the differing penalties imposed by the appellate and
the trial courts. The RTC imposed an indeterminate sentence of seven (7) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum; to eleven (11) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor as maximum. The CA, however, increased the
penalty to imprisonment ranging from ten (10) years of prision mayor as minimum; to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months
of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Article 68 of the Revised Forestry Law, as amended by Executive Order No. 277, 41 provides that any violation thereof "shall be
punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 42 and 310 43 of Revised Penal Code." This amendment which eliminated
the phrase "shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code" has
already been interpreted by this Court. According to its interpretation, the quoted phrase means that the acts of cutting, gathering,
collecting, removing or possessing forest products without authority constitute distinct offenses that are now independent of the crime of
theft under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), but that the penalty to be imposed is that which is provided under
these articles. 44
Both the trial court 45 and the CA 46 found that the value of the lumber was P12,000. Under Articles 309 and 310 of the RPC, the
statutory penalty should be two degrees higher than prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods; 47 or prision mayor in its
maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period. TheIndeterminate Sentence Law, 48 however, reduces the sentence to an
indeterminate penalty anywhere in the range of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years and eight (8)
months of reclusion temporal as maximum. Clearly, the sentences imposed by the trial court and the CA are within the allowable range.
In view, however, of the finding of the RTC that no mitigating or aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the offense, the
penalty it imposed was more in accord with the liberal spirit of the law towards the accused. Hence, we adopt the trial court's
indeterminate sentence of seven (7) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to eleven (11) years, six (6)
months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner is
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of seven (7) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum; to eleven (11) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days ofprision mayor as maximum. Costs against appellant.
||| (Bon v. People, G.R. No. 152160, [January 13, 2004], 464 PHIL 125-145)

[G.R. No. 145176. March 30, 2004.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. SANTIAGO PERALTA y POLIDARIO (at large), ARMANDO
DATUIN JR. y GRANADOS (at large), ULYSSESGARCIA y TUPAS, MIGUELITO DE LEON y LUCIANO,
LIBRANDO FLORES y CRUZ and ANTONIO LOYOLA y SALISI, accused,
ULYSSES GARCIA y TUPAS, MIGUELITO DE LEON y LUCIANO, LIBRANDO FLORES y CRUZ and ANTONIO
LOYOLA y SALISI, appellants.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J p:
The right of the accused to counsel demands effective, vigilant and independent representation. The lawyer's role cannot be reduced to
being that of a mere witness to the signing of an extra-judicial confession.
The Case
Before the Court is an appeal from the August 21, 2000 Decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila (Branch 18) in Criminal
Case No. 92-112322. AppellantsUlysses Garcia y Tupas, Miguelito de Leon y Luciano, Librando Flores y Cruz and Antonio Loyola y
Salisi, as well as their co-accused Santiago Peralta y Polidario and Armando Datuin Jr. y Granados were convicted therein of
qualified theft. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, the accused, Santiago Peralta y Polidario, Armando Datuin, Jr. y Granados, Ulysses Garcia y
Tupas, Miguelito De Leon y Luciano, Librando Flores y Cruz and Antonio Loyola y Salisi, are hereby convicted of
the crime of qualified theft of P194,190.00 and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the
accessory penalties provided by law, and to pay the costs. Moreover, all the accused are ordered to pay the Central
Bank of the Philippines, now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, actual damages in the sum of P194,190.00 with interest
thereon at the legal rate from the date of the filing of this action, November 9, 1992, until fully paid." 2
In an Information dated November 9, 1992, 3 appellants and their co-accused were charged as follows:
"That sometime in the year 1990 and including November 4, 1992, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, conspiring and confederating with others whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still
unknown and helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to gain and
without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, take, steal and carry away punctured currency notes due
for shredding in the total amount of P194,190.00, belonging to the Central Bank of the Philippines as represented
by Pedro Labita y Cabriga, to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the aforesaid sum of P194,190.00 Philippine
currency;
"That said accused Santiago Peralta y Polidario, Armando Datuin, Jr. y Granados, Ulysses Garcia y Tupas,
Miguelito de Leon y Luciano and Antonio Loyola y Salisi committed said offense with grave abuse of confidence
they being at the time employed as Currency Reviewers, Driver, Currency Assistant I and Money Counter of the
offended party and as such they had free access to the property stolen." 4
Garcia was arrested on November 4, 1992; and his co-accused, on November 9, 1992. Appellants, however, obtained two Release
Orders from RTC Vice Executive Judge Corona Ibay-Somera on November 9 and 10, 1992, upon their filing of a cash bond to secure
their appearance whenever required by the trial court. 5
During their arraignment on May 4, 1993, appellants, assisted by their respective counsels, pleaded not guilty. 6 On September 30,
1998, the trial court declared that Datuin Jr. and Peralta were at large, because they had failed to appear in court despite notice. 7
After trial in due course, they were all found guilty and convicted of qualified theft in the appealed Decision.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presents the prosecution's version of the facts as follows:
"About 10:00 o'clock in the morning of November 4, 1992, Pedro Labita of Central Bank of the Philippines (CBP)
[now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP)] went to the Theft and Robbery Section of Western Police District
Command (WPDC), and filed a complaint for Qualified Theft against Santiago Peralta, Armando Datuin,
Jr., UlyssesGarcia, Miguelito de Leon, Librando Flores and Antonio S. Loyola.
"Pedro Labita submitted to SPO4 Cielito Coronel, the investigating officer at WPDC, punctured currency notes in
P100.00 and P500.00 bills with a face value of Php194,190.00. Said notes were allegedly recovered by the BSP
Cash Department during its cash counting of punctured currency bills submitted by different banks to the latter. The
punctured bills were rejected by the BSP money counter machine and were later submitted to the investigation staff
of the BSP Cash Department. As a result of the investigation, it was determined that said rejected currency bills
were actually punctured notes already due for shredding. These currency bills were punctured because they were
no longer intended for circulation. Before these notes could be shredded, they were stolen from the BSP by the
above-named accused.

"On the basis of the complaint filed by Pedro Labita, Ulysses Garcia was apprehended in front of Golden Gate
Subdivision, Las Pias City, while he was waiting for a passenger bus on his way to the BSP. Garcia was brought to
the police station for investigation.
"On November 4, 5 and 6, 1992, while in the custody of the police officers, Garcia gave three separate statements
admitting his guilt and participation in the crime charged. He also identified the other named accused as his cohorts
and accomplices and narrated the participation of each and everyone of them.
"On the basis of Garcia's sworn statements, the other named accused were invited for questioning at the police
station and were subsequently charged with qualified theft together with Garcia." 8 (Citations omitted)
Version of the Defense
The defense states its version of the facts in the following manner:
"Accused-appellant Garcia served as a driver of the armored car of the Central Bank from 1978 to 1994.
"On November 4, 1992, between 7:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m., a man who had identified himself as a police officer
arrested accused-appellant Garcia while waiting for a passenger bus in front of the Golden Gate Subdivision, Las
Pias City. He was arrested without any warrant for his arrest. The police officer who had arrested accusedappellant Garcia dragged the latter across the street and forced him to ride . . . a car.
"While inside the car, he was blindfolded, his hands were handcuffed behind his back, and he was made to bend
with his chest touching his knees. Somebody from behind hit him and he heard some of the occupants of the car
say that he would be salvaged if he would not tell the truth. When the occupants of the car mentioned perforated
notes, he told them that he does not know anything about those notes.
"After the car had stopped, he was dragged out of the car and . . . up and down . . . the stairs. While being dragged
out of the car, he felt somebody frisk his pocket.
"At a safe house, somebody mentioned to him the names of his co-accused and he told them that he does not
know his co-accused. . . . Whenever he would deny knowing his co-accused, somebody would box him on his
chest. Somebody poured water on accused-appellant Garcia's nose while lying on the bench. He was able to spit
out the water that had been poured on his nose [at first], but somebody covered his mouth. As a result, he could not
breath[e].
"When accused-appellant Garcia realized that he could not bear the torture anymore, he decided to cooperate with
the police, and they stopped the water pouring and allowed him to sit down.
"Accused-appellant Garcia heard people talking and he heard somebody utter, 'may nakikinig.' Suddenly his two
ears were hit with open palm[s]. . . . As he was being brought down, he felt somebody return his personal
belongings to his pocket. Accused-appellant Garcia's personal belongings consisted of [his] driver's license,
important papers and coin purse.
"He was forced to ride . . . the car still with blindfold. His blindfold and handcuffs were removed when he was at the
office of police officer Dante Dimagmaliw at the Western Police District, U.N. Avenue, Manila.
"SPO4 Cielito Coronel asked accused-appellant Garcia about the latter's name, age and address. The arrival of Mr.
Pedro Labita of the Cash Department, Central Bank of the Philippines, interrupted the interview, and Mr. Labita
instructed SPO4 Coronel to get accused-appellant Garcia's wallet and examine the contents thereof. SPO4 Coronel
supposedly found three pieces of P100 perforated bill in accused-appellant Garcia's wallet and the former insisted
that they recovered the said perforated notes from accused-appellant's wallet. SPO4 Coronel took down the
statement of Mr. Labita.
"It was actually Mr. Labita, and not accused-appellant Garcia, who gave the answers appearing in accusedappellant Garcia's alleged three sworn statements dated November 4, 1992, November 5, 1992 and . . . November
6, 1992. cASIED
"At or about 6:00 p.m. on November 5, 1992, accused-appellant Garcia was brought to the cell of the Theft and
Robbery Section of the WPD. At or about 8:00 p.m., he was brought to the office of Col. Alladin Dimagmaliw where
his co-accused were also inside. He did not identify his co-accused, but he merely placed his hands on the
shoulders of each of his co-accused, upon being requested, and Mr. Labita took . . . pictures while he was doing the
said act.
"Accused-appellant Garcia came to know Atty. Francisco Sanchez of the Public Attorney's Office on November 4,
1992, at the office of police officer Dante Dimagmaliw, when SPO4 Coronel introduced Atty. Sanchez to accusedappellant Garcia and told him that Atty. Sanchez would be his lawyer. However, accused-appellant Garcia did not
agree to have Atty. Sanchez to be his lawyer. Atty. Sanchez left after talking to SPO4 Coronel, and accusedappellant Garcia had not met Atty. Sanchez anymore since then. He was not present when Atty. Sanchez allegedly
signed . . . the alleged three (3) sworn statements.

"During the hearing of the case on April 6, 2000, Atty. Sanchez manifested in open court that he did not assist
accused-appellant Garcia when the police investigated accused-appellant Garcia, and that he signed . . . the three
(3) sworn statements only as a witness thereto.
"Accused-appellant Garcia signed the alleged three sworn statements due to SPO4 Coronel's warning that if he
would not do so, he would again be tortured by water cure.
"SPO[4] Coronel caused the arrest without any warrant of accused appellants De Leon, Loyola, [Flores] on the
basis of the complaint of Mr. Pedro Labita, and which arrest was effected on November 5, 1992, by SPO1 Alfredo
Silva and SPO1 Redelico.
"SPO4 Coronel, in his letter dated November 6, 1992, forwarded the case to the Duty Inquest Prosecutor assigned
at the WPDC Headquarters." 9 (Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court found that all the accused used to work for the BSP. Garcia was a driver assigned to the Security and Transport
Department; while Peralta, Datuin Jr., De Leon, Flores and Loyola were laborers assigned to the Currency Retirement Division. Their
main task was to haul perforated currency notes from the currency retirement vault to the basement of the BSP building for shredding.
On several occasions, during the period 1990-1992, they handed to Garcia perforated currency notes placed in a coin sack that he, in
turn, loaded in an armored escort van and delivered to someone waiting outside the premises of the building. The trial court held that
the coordinated acts of all the accused unerringly led to the conclusion that they had conspired to pilfer the perforated currency notes
belonging to the BSP.
The RTC rejected the disclaimer by Garcia of his own confessions, as such disclaimer was "an eleventh hour concoction to exculpate
himself and his co-accused." The trial court found his allegations of torture and coerced confessions unsupported by evidence.
Moreover, it held that the recovery of three pieces of perforated P100 bills from Garcia's wallet and the flight of Peralta and Datuin Jr.
were indicative of the guilt of the accused.
Hence, this appeal. 10
Issues
In his Brief, Garcia raises the following issues:
"1
The trial court erred in admitting in evidence the alleged three Sworn Statements of Accused-appellant Garcia and
the alleged three pieces of P100 perforated notes
"2
The trial court erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of qualified theft." 11
In their joint Brief, De Leon, Loyola and Flores interpose this additional assignment of errors:
"1
The trial court erred in admitting in evidence the alleged three sworn statements of
Accused Ulysses Garcia (Exhibits 'I', 'J' and 'K') and the alleged three pieces of P100 perforated notes (Exhibits 'N'
to 'N-2') over the objections of the accused-appellants.
"2
The trial court erred in denying the demurrer to evidence of Accused-appellants De Leon, Loyola and Flores;
"3
The trial court erred in denying the Motion for Reconsideration of the Order denying the demurrer to evidence;
"4
The trial court erred when it failed to consider the evidence adduced by the accused-appellants, consisting of
exhibits '1', '2' to '2-B', '3' and '4' and the testimony of their witness, State Auditor Esmeralda Elli;
"5
The trial court erred in finding the accused-appellants guilty of qualified theft." 12
Simplified, the issues are as follows: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence against appellants, including the admissibility of Garcia's
confessions and of the three perforated P100 currency notes; and (2) the propriety of the denial of their demurrer to evidence.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal has merit.
First Issue:
Sufficiency of Evidence
The trial court convicted appellants mainly on the strength of the three confessions given by Garcia and the three perforated P100
currency notes confiscated from him upon his arrest. Appellants, however, contend that these pieces of evidence are inadmissible.
Extrajudicial Confessions
Appellants aver that the alleged three Sworn Statements of Garcia were obtained without the assistance of counsel in violation of his
rights under Article III, Section 12 (1) and (2) of the 1987 Constitution, which provides thus:

"SECTION 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice.
If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
"(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used
against him. Secret detention places, solitary,incomunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited."
On the other hand, the OSG contends that counsel, Atty. Francisco Sanchez III of the Public Attorney's Office, duly
assisted Garcia during the custodial investigation.
It is clear from a plain reading of the three extrajudicial confessions 13 that Garcia was not assisted by Atty. Sanchez. The signature of
the latter on those documents was affixed after the word "SAKSI." Moreover, he appeared in court and categorically testified that he had
not assisted Garcia when the latter was investigated by the police, and that the former had signed the Sworn Statement only as a
witness. 14
The written confessions, however, were still admitted in evidence by the RTC on the ground that Garcia had expressed in writing his
willingness and readiness to give the Sworn Statements without the assistance of counsel. The lower court's action is manifest error.
The right to counsel has been written into our Constitution in order to prevent the use of duress and other undue influence in extracting
confessions from a suspect in a crime. The basic law specifically requires that any waiver of this right must be made in
writing and executed in the presence of a counsel. In such case, counsel must not only ascertain that the confession is voluntarily made
and that the accused understands its nature and consequences, but also advise and assist the accused continuously from the time the
first question is asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the confession.
Hence, the lawyer's role cannot be reduced to being that of a mere witness to the signing of a pre-prepared confession, even if it
indicated compliance with the constitutional rights of the accused. 15 The accused is entitled to effective, vigilant and independent
counsel. 16
A waiver in writing, like that which the trial court relied upon in the present case, is not enough. Without the assistance of a counsel, the
waiver has no evidentiary relevance. 17 The Constitution states that "[a]ny confession or admission obtained in violation of [the
aforecited Section 12] shall be inadmissible in evidence. . . ." Hence, the trial court was in error when it admitted in evidence the
uncounseled confessions of Garcia and convicted appellants on the basis thereof. The question of whether he was tortured becomes
moot. CADSHI
Perforated Currency Notes
Appellants contend that the three P100 perforated currency notes (Exhibits "N" to "N-2") allegedly confiscated from Garcia after his
arrest were "fruits of the poisonous tree" and, hence, inadmissible in evidence.
The solicitor general evades the issue and argues, instead, that appellants waived the illegality of their arrest when they entered a plea.
He further contends that the exclusion from the evidence of the three punctured currency bills would not alter the findings of the trial
court.
The police arrested Garcia without a warrant, while he had merely been waiting for a passenger bus after being pointed out by the Cash
Department personnel of the BSP. At the time of his arrest, he had not committed, was not committing, and was not about to commit
any crime. Neither was he acting in a manner that would engender a reasonable ground to suspect that he was committing a
crime. None of the circumstances justifying an arrest without a warrant under Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court was present.
Hence, Garcia was not lawfully arrested. Nonetheless, not having raised the matter before entering his plea, he is deemed to have
waived the illegality of his arrest. Note, however, that this waiver is limited to the arrest. It does not extend to the search made as an
incident thereto or to the subsequent seizure of evidence allegedly found during the search.
The Constitution proscribes unreasonable searches and seizures 18 of whatever nature. Without a judicial warrant, these are allowed
only under the following exceptional circumstances: (1) a search incident to a lawful arrest, (2) seizure of evidence in plain view, (3)
search of a moving motor vehicle, (4) customs search, (5) stop and frisk situations, and (6) consented search. 19
Where the arrest was incipiently illegal, it follows that the subsequent search was similarly illegal. 20 Any evidence obtained in violation
of the constitutional provision is legally inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule. 21 In the present case, the perforated
P100 currency notes were obtained as a result of a search made without a warrant subsequent to an unlawful arrest; hence, they are
inadmissible in evidence.
Moreover, untenable is the solicitor general's argument that Appellants De Leon, Flores and Loyola waived the illegality of the arrest and
seizure when, without raising objections thereto, they entered a plea of guilty. It was Garcia who was unlawfully arrested and searched,
not the aforementioned three appellants. The legality of an arrest can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired
thereby. Objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal, and third parties cannot avail themselves of it. 22
Indeed, the prosecution sufficiently proved the theft of the perforated currency notes for retirement. It failed, however, to present
sufficient admissible evidence pointing to appellants as the authors of the crime.

The evidence presented by the prosecution shows that there were other people who had similar access to the shredding machine area
and the currency retirement vault. 23 Appellants were pinpointed by Labita because of an anonymous phone call informing his superior
of the people allegedly behind the theft; and of the unexplained increase in their spending, which was incompatible with their income.
Labita, however, did not submit sufficient evidence to support his allegation.
Without the extrajudicial confession and the perforated currency notes, the remaining evidence would be utterly inadequate to overturn
the constitutional presumption of innocence.
Second Issue:
Demurrer to Evidence
Appellants contend that the trial court seriously erred when it denied the demurrer to evidence filed by Appellants Loyola, De Leon and
Flores. Not one of the documents offered by the prosecution and admitted in evidence by the RTC established the alleged qualified theft
of perforated notes, and not one of the pieces of evidence showed appellants' participation in the commission of the crime.
On the exercise of sound judicial discretion rests the trial judge's determination of the sufficiency or the insufficiency of the evidence
presented by the prosecution to establish a prima facie case against the accused. Unless there is a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction, the trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss may not be disturbed. 24
As discussed earlier, the inadmissibility of the confessions of Garcia did not become apparent until after Atty. Francisco had testified in
court. Even if the confiscated perforated notes from the person of the former were held to be inadmissible, the confessions would still
have constituted prima facie evidence of the guilt of appellants. On that basis, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying their
demurrer to evidence.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellants are hereby ACQUITTED and ordered immediately
RELEASED, unless they are being detained for any other lawful cause. The director of the Bureau of Corrections is hereby directed to
submit his report on the release of the appellant or the reason for his continued detention within five (5) days from notice of this
Decision. No costs.
||| (People v. Garcia y Tupas, G.R. No. 145176, [March 30, 2004])

[G.R. No. 141137. January 20, 2004.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. VICTOR DIAZ VINECARIO; ARNOLD ROBLE and GERLYN
WATES, appellants.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J p:
From the Decision of July 20, 1999, as amended by Order of September 9, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 16,
finding appellants Victor Vinecario, Arnold Roble and Gerlyn Wates guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Article IV of Republic
Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended byRepublic Act No. 7659), and imposing upon them the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, they lodged the present appeal.
The Information dated April 25, 1995, filed against appellants reads as follows:
The undersigned accuses the above-named accused for VIOLATION OF SECTION 4, ARTICLE II IN RELATION
TO SECTION 21, ARTICLE IV OF R.A. 6425, committed as follows:
That on or about April 10, 1995 in the City of Davao, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-mentioned accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, without being authorized by law,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously transported, delivered and possessed 1.7 kilos dried marijuana leaves which are
prohibited drugs.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 1
Upon arraignment on September 11, 1995, appellants, duly assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.
The facts as established by the prosecution are as follows:
On the night of April 10, 1995, at around 10:45 p.m., as about fifteen police officers were manning a checkpoint at Ulas, Davao City
pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2735, otherwise known as the COMELEC gun ban, a Honda TMX motorcycle with three men on
board sped past them. 2 One of the police officers blew his whistle 3 and ordered them to return to the checkpoint.
Obliging, the three men aboard the motorcycle returned to the checkpoint. SPO1 Haydenburge Goc-ong (SPO1 Goc-ong) of the 11th
Regional Mobile Force 4th Company thereupon asked them why they sped away to which appellant Victor Vinecario (Vinecario), who
was seated behind appellant Arnold Roble (Roble) and in front of appellant Gerlyn Wates (Wates) on the motorcycle, retorted that he is
a member of the army. 4 When asked by the law enforcers to produce an identification card, he could not, however, offer any. At this
point, the police officers noticed that a big military backpack was slung over the right shoulder of Vinecario who was observed, as were
his co-appellants, to be afraid and acting suspiciously. 5 SPO1 Goc-ong thus asked Vinecario what the contents of the backpack were.
Vinecario answered that it merely contained a mat and proceeded to pass it to Wates, who in turn passed it to Roble who, however,
returned it to Vinecario. 6
Suspecting that the backpack contained a bomb, SPO1 Goc-ong instructed his men to disperse, following which he ordered Vinecario
to open the bag. Vinecario did as ordered and as SPO1 Goc-ong noticed something wrapped in paper, he told Vinecario to take the
same out. Again Vinecario obliged, albeit reiterating that it was only a mat.
SPO1 Goc-ong then touched the stuff wrapped in paper upon which Vinecario grabbed it, 7 resulting to the tearing off of the paper
wrapper. Soon the smell of marijuana wafted in the air.
Vinecario thereafter told SPO1 Goc-ong "let us talk about this," 8 but the latter ignored Vinecario and instead called his Commanding
Officer and reported to him that marijuana was found in Vinecario's possession.
On orders of the Commanding Officer, the other police officers brought appellants along with two bundles of marijuana, the backpack
and the motorcycle to the battalion office at Camp Catitipan in Davao City and were turned over to one PO2 Cabalon, an investigator of
Regional Mobile Force 11. Before proceeding to said battalion office, however, the incident was blottered 9 by PO3 Edward Morado at
the Buhangin Police Station. 10
On April 11, 1995, SPO1 Goc-ong, PO1 Vicente Carvajal (PO1 Carvajal) and PO1 Pual Padasay brought the confiscated suspected
marijuana to the camp's crime laboratory for examination 11 which determined it to weigh 1,700 grams 12 and to be indeed positive
therefor. 13
As for appellants, their version of the incident follows:
Vinecario, then a member of the 25th Infantry Battalion of the 6th Infantry Division of the Philippine army stationed at Pagakpak,
Pantukan, 14 approached motorcycle driver Wates at a terminal in Andile, Mawab and requested him to bring him to his elder brother at
Parang, Maguindanao for a fee of P500.00 which he paid. 15 The two thus proceeded to Carmen, Panabo where they picked up Roble
to alternate with Wates as driver, and at 8:00 a.m., the three left for Parang. 16
On reaching Parang at about 1:20 p.m., Vinecario borrowed P3,000.00 from his brother Teofanis to shoulder the medical expenses of
his son. At about 4:30 p.m., after partaking of snacks at Teofanis' residence, appellants left for Davao City. aIDHET
Along Parang Highway, Abdul Karim Datolarta, Vinecario's former co-employee at Emerson Plywood where he previously worked,
blocked the motorcycle. 17 Vinecario thus alighted from the motorcycle and shook hands with Datolarta 18 who asked where they were
headed for and requested that he ride with them. Vinecario turned Datolarta down as there was no longer any room in the motorcycle.

Datolarta then asked if he (Vinecario) could take his bag of clothes and bring it to his cousin, one Merly, in Roxas, Tagum. Without
examining its contents, Vinecario acquiesced, took Datolarta's bag and left with his co-appellants. 19
On reaching Ulas in the evening of the same day, appellants, seeing that there was a checkpoint, 20 sped past it. When they were
about 50 to 60 meters away from the checkpoint, they heard a whistle, prompting Wates to tap Vinecario, telling him that the whistle
came from the checkpoint. Vinecario then told Roble to go back to the checkpoint.
While at the checkpoint, five police officers approached appellants and instructed them to alight from the motorcycle. One of the officers
asked Vinecario who he was, and Vinecario identified himself as a member of the Philippine National Police. 21 The officer asked for
identification and when Vinecario could not produce any, the former got the backpack slung on Vinecario's shoulder.
The same officer then asked Vinecario if they could open the bag, and as Vinecario acquiesced, two officers opened the bag upon
which they shouted that it contained marijuana. Vinecario then grabbed the backpack to confirm if there was indeed marijuana. At that
instant, the police officers held his hands and brought him, together with the other appellants, to the Buhangin Police Station, and later
to Camp Catitipan.
At the camp, appellants were investigated by police officials without the assistance of counsel, following which they were made to sign
some documents which they were not allowed to read. 22
The trial court, by Decision of July 20, 1999, found appellants guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of the decision reads,
quoted verbatim:
WHEREFORE, finding the evidence of the prosecution, more than sufficient to prove the guilt of all three accused
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged, accused PFC Victor Vinecario, Arnold Roble and Gerlyn Wates,
pursuant to Sec. 4, Art. II in relation to Art. IV or (sic) Rep. Act 6425 as amended by Rep. Act 7659, Sec. 20, par. 5
thereof, are jointly sentence (sic) to suffer the supreme penalty of death by lethal injection, under Rep Act 8177 in
the manner and procedure therein provided, in relation to Sec. 24 of Rep. Act 7659, amending Art. 81 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Finally pursuant to Rep. Act 7659 Sec. 22 the Branch Clerk of Court of RTC 16 Davao City, is ordered to elevate
the entire records of this case with the Clerk of Court, Supreme Court Manila, for the automatic review of this
Decision, after its promulgation.
SO ORDERED. 23 (Underscoring supplied)
By Order of September 9, 1999, the trial court set aside its decision of July 20, 1999 and disposed as follows, quoted verbatim:
Accordingly, all accused (sic) motion for reconsideration on this aspect, on the imposition of the penalty against all
accused, even if invoked only be accused Venecaio (sic) through his counsel de oficio, will apply to all accused
since there exists conspiracy of all in the commission of the offense charged.
Judgment of this court, dated July 20, 1999, is accordingly set aside and reconsidered, only insofar as the
imposition of the supreme penalty of death through lethal injection under Republic Act No. 8177, is concerned.
All accused PFC Victor Venecario, Arnold Roble and Gerlyn Wates, are instead sentence (sic) to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Art. IV, Sec. 21, in relation to Art. IV of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended
by Republic Act No. 7659, Sec. 20, par. 5 thereof, in accordance with Art. 63 of the Revised Penal Code, as
decided by the Supreme Court in the recent case of Peope (sic) vs. Ruben Montilla G.R. No. 123872 dated January
30, 1998.
However, the findings of this court for the conviction of all aaccused (sic) of the offense charged, is (sic) sustained.
The corresponding motion (sic) for reconsideration of all accused through their counsel for their acquittal of (sic) the
offense charged, is denied, for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. 24 (Emphasis and Underscoring supplied)
The prosecution then filed a Motion for Reconsideration 25 dated September 14, 1995 of the above-mentioned Order of the trial court, it
arguing that the commission of the offense charged against appellants was attended by an aggravating circumstance in that it was
committed by an organized or syndicated crime group, thus warranting the imposition of the death penalty.
In the meantime, Roble and Wates filed their Notice of Appeal 26 on September 15, 1999. Vinecario followed suit and filed his Notice of
Appeal. 27
The trial court, by Order dated September 22, 1999, denied the prosecution's Motion.
In their brief, Roble and Wates assign the following errors:
1. THE TRIAL COURT'S OBSERVATION THAT APPELLANTS WATES AND ROBLE CONSPIRED WITH VICTOR
VINECARIO IN TRANSPORTING MARIJUANA FROM PARANG, MAGUINDANAO IS NOT BORNE BY
THE EVIDNECE (sic) ON RECORD AND SHOWS THAT THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
MISAPPREHENDING FACTS IF NOT A COMPLETE DISREGARD OF THE EVIDENCE, BOTH
DOCUMENTARY AND TESTIMONIAL.

2. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO AFFORD EVIDENTIARY WEIGHT TO THE
RECANTATION MADE BY POLICE OFFICERS HAYDENBURG GOC-ONG AND VICENTE CARVAJAL
THAT BOTH APPELLANTS WATES AND ROBLE WERE NOT NERVOUS AND APPREHENSIVE AT THE
THE (sic) OF THE OPENING OF THE MILITARY PACK CONTAINING MARIJUANA NEAR THE
CHECKPOINT.
3. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF
APPELLANTS WATES AND ROBLE THAT THEY WERE MERELY HIRED BY VICTOR VINECARIO TO
BRING HIM TO PARANG, MAGUINDANAO FOR A FEE OF P500.00 WITH FREE FOOD AND
GASOLINE.
4. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THE RENTAL OF P500.00 WHICH VINECARIO PAID
TO THE OWNER OF THE [MOTORCYCLE] AS INADEQUATE BY TAKING JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE
BUS FARE OF P268.00 FROM MACO, DAVAO PROVINCE TO SUN WAY CROSSING, MAGUINDANAO
DOWN TO PARANG, MAGUINDANAO. 28
Wates and Roble argue that there is no iota of evidence to prove that they acted with unity of purpose and in the execution of any
unlawful objective with Vinecario. 29They assert that they had no prior knowledge of Vinecario's plan to meet with a man who would
give the backpack containing marijuana; that prosecution witnesses SPO1 Goc-ong and PO1 Carvajal's declaration that they
(appellants Wates and Roble) were not nervous, uneasy or apprehensive when the backpack was opened buttresses their claim that
they did not conspire with Vinecario; and that the prosecution's theory of conspiracy was merely based on the testimony of PO1
Carvajal that they acted nervously when the backpack was ordered opened for inspection; that there was a "great variance" in the
testimonies of SPO1 Goc-ong and PO1 Carvajal in the direct examination and their testimonies on rebuttal as to the events that
transpired on April 10, 1995, thus casting serious doubts on the trial court's findings of guilt.
On September 17, 2001, Vinecario filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal, 30 stating that he is "practically satisfied with the
decision of the trial court"; that "he would not waste anymore the effort of the honorable Supreme Court Justices in further reviewing his
case"; and that as he was "driven by the sincerest desire in renewing his life," he "irrevocably moves for the withdrawal of his appeal."
On even date, Roble and Wates likewise filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal, 31 stating that they admit the commission of the
offense for which they were convicted; that they are satisfied with the decision of the trial court; and that they are already serving the
penalty for their offense and "realize the overt admittance of guilt as the only vehicle in [their] gradual renewal."
By Resolution of November 27, 2001, this Court denied the Motions of appellants and directed Vinecario to file his brief within forty-five
days from notice of the resolution.
In a brief dated January 25, 2002, Vinecario attributes the following errors to the trial court:
I. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SEARCH UPON THE PERSON OF
ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND THE SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED 1,700 GRAMS OF MARIJUANA AS
(sic) VALID. ASHECD
II. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANT
THE ALLEGED 1,700 GRAMS OF MARIJUANA AS IT WAS A PRODUCT OF AN ILLEGAL SEARCH.
III. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF
PROSECUTION WITNESSES AND IN GIVING THE POLICEMEN THE PRESUMPTION OF
REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTY DESPITE THE APPARENT IRREGULARITIES IN
THE MANNER OF ARRESTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
IV. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR
THE CRIME CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 32
Vinecario argues that the prosecution failed to show that the search conducted by the police officers was incident to a lawful arrest; that
he could not have been deemed to have consented to the search as any such consent was given under intimidating or coercive
circumstances; and that there existed no probable cause to justify the search and seizure of the backpack, hence, the marijuana is
inadmissible in evidence, it being a product of illegal search.
Vinecario adds that the police officers who arrested and investigated him failed to inform him of his rights to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel of his choice, thereby violating Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution. 33
The rule is constitutionally enshrined that no search and seizure can lawfully be conducted without a valid warrant issued by a
competent judicial authority. Section 2, Article III of the Constitution so ordains:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose, shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

And Section 3(2), Article III of the same Constitution mandates that any evidence obtained in violation of the right of the people
under Section 2 shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain exceptions, however. Search and/or seizure
may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following instances: (1) search incident
to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5)
when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures; and (6) stop-and-frisk situations. 34
Searches conducted in checkpoints are valid for as long as they are warranted by the exigencies of public order and are conducted in a
way least intrusive to motorists.35 For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the
inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individual's right against
unreasonable search. 36
. . . [C]heckpoints are not illegal per se. Thus, under exceptional circumstances, as where the survival of organized
government is on the balance, or where the lives and safety of the people are in grave peril, checkpoints may be
allowed and installed by the government.
xxx xxx xxx
No one can be compelled, under our libertarian system, to share with the present government its ideological beliefs
and practices, or commend its political, social and economic policies or performance. But, at least, one must
concede to it the basic right to defend itself from its enemies and, while in power, to pursue its program of
government intended for public welfare; and in the pursuit of those objectives, the government has the equal right,
under its police power, to select the reasonable means and methods for best achieving them. The checkpoint is
evidently one of such means it has selected.
Admittedly, the routine checkpoint stop does intrude, to a certain extent, on motorists' right to "free passage without
interruption", but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention of travelers during which the
vehicle's occupants are required to answer a brief question or two. . . .
These routine checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive. As held by the U.S. Supreme Court:
"Routine checkpoint stops do not intrude similarly on the motoring public. First, the potential interference
with legitimate traffic is minimal. Motorists using these highways are not taken by surprise as they know, or
may obtain knowledge of, the location of the checkpoints and will not be stopped elsewhere. Second
checkpoint operations both appear to and actually involve less discretionary enforcement activity. The
regularized manner in which established checkpoints are operated is visible evidence, reassuring to lawabiding motorists, that the stops are duly authorized and believed to serve the public interest. The location
of a fixed checkpoint is not chosen by officers in the field, but by official responsible for making overall
decisions as to the most effective allocation of limited enforcement resources. We may assume that such
officials will be unlikely to locate a checkpoint where it bears arbitrarily or oppressively on motorists as a
class, and since field officers may stop only those cars passing the checkpoint, there is less room for
abusive or harassing stops of individuals than there was in the case of roving-patrol stops. Moreover, a
claim that a particular exercise of discretion in locating or operating a checkpoint is unreasonable is
subject to post-stop judicial review." 37
Judicial notice is taken of the existence of COMELEC Resolution No. 2735 imposing a gun ban during an election period issued
pursuant to Section 52(c) of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881). 38 The national and local elections in 1995 having
been held on May 8, the present incident, which occurred on April 10, 1995, was well within the election period.
Although the general rule is that motorists and their vehicles as well as pedestrians passing through checkpoints may only be subjected
to a routine inspection, vehicles may be stopped and extensively searched when there is probable cause which justifies a reasonable
belief of the men at the checkpoints that either the motorist is a law offender or the contents of the vehicle are or have been instruments
of some offense. 39
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched. The required probable cause that will justify a warrantless search
and seizure is not determined by any fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of each case.
Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court as valid, because of
existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused,
or where the accused was acting suspiciously, and attempted to flee. 40 (Emphasis supplied).
That probable cause existed to justify the search conducted by the police officers at the checkpoint is gathered from the following
testimony of SPO1 Goc-ong:
Q: You said you saw three on board a motorcycle what did your unit do when these three persons approached?

A: We were waiting for them. When they arrived they stopped and speeded away.
Q: What was your reaction when you saw the motor speeding away?
A: One of my men blew his whistle ordering to (sic) return back (sic).
xxx xxx xxx
Q: When they returned back (sic) what happened?
A: When they returned back (sic) I asked them why they speeded away?
Q: What did they answer?
A: One of them said that he is a member of the army.
Q: If that person who said that he is a member of the army is in court, can you point to him?
A: (Witness went down from the witness stand and pointed to a man wearing yellow t-shirt who stood up and when
asked about his name answered that he is Victor Venecario). acADIT
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What was your reaction when Venecario failed to show any identification papers to show that he is really a
member of the army?
A: We saw his big backpack and asked him what was inside.
Q: Who was carrying that big backpack?
A: Venecario.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: You said you asked him what was (sic) the contents of that backpack, can you tell us why did you (sic) ask him?
A: I asked about that because I observed them to be acting suspiciously as if they were afraid and different
reactions (sic).
Q: They were acting suspiciously?
A: Yes.
Q: That is what you have observed from their faces?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did Venecario do when you asked him about the contents of that backpack?
A: He said that it is a mat and passed it on to his companion.
Q: You said he passed it on to his companion, there were two (2) companions, to whom did he pass it on?
A: He passed it on to Wates and Wates passed it on to Roble.
Q: What did Roble do when Wates passed it to him?
A: Roble returned it back (sic) to Venecario.
Q: So what was your reaction when you saw the three passing the bag from one person to another?
A: My suspicion was it was a bomb and ordered my men to scatter.
Q: Tell us why are you (sic) concerned about explosives was there any incident prior to that checkpoint?
A: Election was past (sic) approaching and there was a threat that Davao City will be bombed.
Q: Prior to that was there any incident?
xxx xxx xxx
A: In Ipil, Zamboanga on April 4.
Q: If you recall when was that?
A: April 4 of the same year.
Q: You said the bag was passed to Venecario and you told your men to scatter, what happened next?
A: I ordered Venecario to open the backpack.
Q: What did Venecario do when you ordered him to open?
A: They opened the backpack. 41
SPO1 Goc-ong's testimony was corroborated by PO1 Vicente Carvajal:
Q: At about 10:45 in the evening of that date April 10, 1995 do you recall of any unusual incident while you were
conducting that checkpoint?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was that incident all about?
A: At that time, while we were conducting a checkpoint, we saw this motorcycle passing and flagged them to stop
and there were three (3) persons and one was manning and they briefly stopped but speeded away.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: When these three (3) persons retured (sic) back (sic) what happened?
A: The one riding introduced himself as a member of the army.
xxx xxx xxx

Q: You said these three persons were nervous and one of them introduced himself as an army man, what did you
do?
A: I asked for an ID.
Q: Who among you asked for an ID?
A: Sgt. Goc-ong.
Q: Where were you at that time when Goc-ong asked for his ID?
A: I was behind him because I backed him up.
Q: What was the reaction of Venecario when he was asked to produce an ID?
A: He answered that he has no ID.
Q: What was the reaction of the group when Venecario failed to show any ID that he was an army man?
A: Our other companion moved closer as security.
Q: Why?
A: We were on alert because on April 4 the one who attacked were (sic) in uniform.
Q: At that time what was Venecario wearing?
A: He was in camouflage and wearing sleepers (sic).
xxx xxx xxx
Q: After that what happened?
A: We were able to observe that he was carrying a bag.
Q: What was the reaction of Venecario when he was asked what was (sic) the contents of the bag?
A: He appeared to be hesitant and he said that it contained clothes.
Q: Before that what did Venecario do?
A: He placed it in (sic) his shoulder.
Q: What did he do with the backpack?
A: When asked he passed it to his other companions.
Q: What did Venecario when he passed it to his companion?
A: Venecario passed it to his companion and that companion passed it to his other companion.
Q: After this companion received the backpack from his companion what did he do?
A: He returned back (sic) to Venecario.
Q: They passed it from one person to another until it was returned to Venecario?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: You said that backpack was passed from one person to another and when he got hold of that backpack what
happened?
A: He opened the backpack.
Q: Who told him to open the backpack?
A: Sgt. Goc-ong. 42
In light then of appellants' speeding away after noticing the checkpoint and even after having been flagged down by police officers, their
suspicious and nervous gestures when interrogated on the contents of the backpack which they passed to one another, and the reply of
Vinecario, when asked why he and his co-appellants sped away from the checkpoint, that he was a member of the Philippine Army,
apparently in an attempt to dissuade the policemen from proceeding with their inspection, there existed probable cause to justify a
reasonable belief on the part of the law enforcers that appellants were offenders of the law or that the contents of the backpack were
instruments of some offense. AEHTIC
As to Vinecario's allegation that his constitutional rights were violated during the custodial investigation conducted by the police officers,
the same is relevant and material only when an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from an accused becomes the basis of
his conviction. 43 In the case at bar, the trial court convicted appellants on the basis of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,
particularly those of SPO1 Haydenburge Goc-ong and PO1 Vicente Carvajal.
Finally, Vinecario harps on his defense of denial which he recounted as follows:
Q: After leaving the residence of your brother was there any unusual incident that took place?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: What was that?
A: The moment we arrived there there was a person who blocked us.
Q: Where?
A: Parang Highway.
Q: Coming here to Davao?
A: Yes.

Q: What happened after Crossing Parang?

A: There was a person who blocked us.
Q: A former companion of yours?
A: Yes.
Q: A former soldier?
A: No, Sir.
Q: You said your former companion, am I correct?
A: Before I became a soldier, I worked in Emerson Plywood.
Q: So that person who flagged down you were (sic) your former companion?
A: Yes:
Q: You are familiar with him?
A: I know him very well.
Q: He was your close friend?
A: Yes.
Q: What is the name of that person who stopped you?
A: Abdul Karim Datolarta.
Q: He was alone when he stopped you?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: What happened when your friend Abdul Karin (sic) Datolarta stopped you?
A: When he stopped us, I immediately disembarked from the motor vehicle and shook hands with him.
Q: He was the one who stopped you or you were the one who told the driver to stop?
A: My friend.
Q: You immediately recognized the face of that friend of yours?
A: Not yet.
Q: What else happened aside from shaking hands and greeting?
A: He asked me where I was heading.
Q: What was your answer?
A: I told him that I am going back to Davao.
Q: What else did he tell you?
A: He told me if he can also ride with us.
Q: What did you tell him?
A: I told him we were already three.
Q: What happened next?
A: Since I refused he asked me if I could bring his bag and he mentioned the name of that cousin of his in Tagum.
Q: He mentioned the name?
A: Yes, Merly.
Q: What is the family name?
A: He just mentioned Merly who is residing in Tagum.
Q: Where in Tagum?
A: Roxas, Tagum.
Q: What did you do when he asked you to bring that bag to his cousin in Tagum?
A: I asked him what was (sic) the contents?
Q: What did he answer you?
A: He answered clothes.
Q: What did you do?
A: Because were (sic) were in a hurry I slung it in (sic) my shoulder.
Q: You did not become suspicious?
A: No more because I trusted the person and I have an emergency to take (sic) that time. 44
Vinecario's account that in the evening of April 10, 1995, while he and his co-appellants were cruising along the highway, a person
whom he failed to recognize but who turned out to be an acquaintance, Abdul Karim Datolarta, flagged down 45 the motorcycle, and as
requested by Datolarta, he readily agreed to bring a backpack to Datolarta's cousin without checking its contents is incredible,
contrary to human experience, and taxes credulity. Datolarta was not even apprehended nor presented at the trial, thus further eliciting
serious doubts on Vinecario's tale.

The defense of denial, like alibi, has invariably been viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted and is a
common and standard defense ploy in most prosecutions of the Dangerous Drugs Act. 46
The categorical and consistent testimonies, and the positive identification by prosecution witnesses SPO1 Goc-ong and PO1 Carvajal,
against whom no ill motive to falsely charge appellants was shown, must thus then prevail over the unconvincing alibi and
unsubstantiated denial of appellants.
As for the challenged finding by the trial court of conspiracy among appellants, the same fails.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a crime and decide to commit
it. 47 Where the acts of the accused collectively and individually demonstrate the existence of a common design towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose, conspiracy is evident, and all the perpetrators will be liable as principals. 48 To exempt
himself from criminal liability, the conspirator must have performed an overt act to dissociate or detach himself from the unlawful plan to
commit the crime. 49
In People v. Concepcion, 50 this Court held:
. . . Proof of agreement need not rest on direct evidence as the same may be inferred from the conduct of the
parties indicating a common understanding among them with respect to the commission of the offense. It is not
necessary to show that two or more persons met together and entered into an explicit agreement setting out the
details of an unlawful scheme or the details by which an illegal objective is to be carried out. It may be deduced
from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated or inferred from the acts of the accused evincing a
joint or common purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest.
In the case at bar, as established by the evidence, appellants connived in unlawfully transporting the subject marijuana. Roble, who was
driving the motorcycle at Ulas, did not stop but instead sped away upon seeing the checkpoint in a clear attempt to avoid inspection by
the police officers. When asked as to the contents of the backpack by SPO1 Goc-ong, appellants passed the same to one another,
indicating that they knew its contents. These circumstances manifest appellants' concerted efforts and cooperation towards the
attainment of their criminal objective. ITScHa
Wates and Roble assail the credibility of prosecution witnesses SPO1 Goc-ong and PO1 Carvajal, they contending that these witnesses
contradicted their testimonies-in-chief when they subsequently testified on rebuttal that appellants were not nervous or apprehensive at
all when they were being inspected by the policemen.
It bears noting, however, that the alleged conflicting observations of SPO1 Goc-ong and PO1 Carvajal referred to by Roble and Wates
on their deportment pertain to different stages of the checkpoint inspection as a scrutiny of the records reveals. Thus, in his direct
examination, SPO1 Goc-ong testified as follows:
Q: You said you asked him what was (sic) the contents of that backpack, can you tell us why did you (sic) ask him?
A: I asked about that because I observed them to be acting suspiciously as if they were afraid and different
reactions (sic).
Q: They were acting suspiciously?
A: Yes.
Q: That is what you observed in their faces?
A: Yes, sir. 51
PO1 Carvajal, on cross-examination, echoed Goc-ong's observations on appellants' deportment upon returning to the checkpoint:
Q: You said when these three (3) suspects riding the motorcycle returned and stopped you said you noticed one of
them was nervous, did I get you right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Only one was nervous?
A: All of them.
Q: When you said they appeared to be nervous, could that mean that they were trembling?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: In fact they were pale, is that correct?
A: Yes.
Q: You noticed they were pale despite the fact that it was dark and it was 10:00 o'clock in the evening?
A: There was light.
Q: The place was well-lighted?
A: Yes, sir. 52
On rebuttal, SPO1 Goc-ong stated that appellants were not anxious or apprehensive when he flagged them down as they crossed the
checkpoint. 53
PO1 Carvajal, on the other hand, testified on rebuttal that Wates was not nervous as Vinecario's backpack was being opened. 54
As to the other alleged discrepancies pointed out by Wates and Roble, the following arguments of the Office of the Solicitor General,
which are quoted with approval, should dispose of the same:

It is incorrect to suggest that just because SPO1 Goc-ong testified that other vehicles passed through the
checkpoint before the appellants arrived, the latter could not have sped away from the checkpoint. SPO1 Goc-ong
did not give any testimony that other vehicles were still at the checkpoint at the time the appellants arrived. On the
contrary, he testified there was no other vehicle ahead of the appellants at the checkpoint when the latter arrived on
their motorcycle (TSN, June 17, 1999, p. 7).
It is also incorrect to suggest that appellants may not have noticed the checkpoint just because SPO1 Goc-ong
made no mention of using reflectorized objects at the checkpoint. As described earlier in his Brief, this witness
explained that the checkpoint was visible because it had a sign board at the middle of the road that read,
"COMELEC GUN BAN" (TSN, June 17, 1999, pp. 6 and 8). There is no way for appellants not to have noticed the
checkpoint. 55
In fine, appellants' defenses fail in light of their clearly proven act of delivering or transporting marijuana.
The evidence shows that accused-appellant was apprehended in the act of delivering or transporting illegal
drugs. "Transport" as used under the Dangerous Drugs Actis defined to mean: "to carry or convey from one place
to another." When accused-appellant used his vehicle to convey the package containing marijuana to an unknown
destination, his act was part of the process of transporting the said prohibited substance. Inherent in the crime of
transporting the prohibited drug is the use of a motor vehicle. The very act of transporting a prohibited drug, like in
the instant case, is a malum prohibitum since it is punished as an offense under a special law. The mere
commission of the act constitutes the offense and is sufficient to validly charge and convict an individual committing
the act, regardless of criminal intent. Since the appellant was caught transporting marijuana, the crime being mala
prohibita, accused-appellant's intent, motive, or knowledge, thereof need not be shown.56 (Underscoring supplied)
A word on the penalty. As provided in Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall
transport any prohibited drug. Section 20, Article IV of the same act provides that the penalty imposed in Section 4 shall be applied if
the dangerous drug is, with respect to marijuana, 750 grams or more. In the case at bar, the marijuana involved weighed 1,700
grams. Since the law prescribes two indivisible penalties, a resort to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code 57 is necessary. There being
no mitigating nor aggravating circumstance that attended the commission of the offense, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua was
properly imposed by the trial court. A fine of P500,000.00 should, however, been likewise imposed on the appellants in solidum in
accordance with the law.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Davao City, Branch 16, in Criminal Case No. 35233-95 finding appellants Victor
Vinecario, Arnold Roble and Gerlyn Wates guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegally transporting marijuana under Section 4, Article II
of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, appellants are sentenced to each
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and solidarily pay a fine of P500,000.00.
||| (People v. Vinecario, G.R. No. 141137, [January 20, 2004], 465 PHIL 192-220)

[G.R. No. 147786. January 20, 2004.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ERIC GUILLERMO y GARCIA, appellant.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J p:
For automatic review is the judgment 1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City, Branch 73, dated March 7, 2001, in Criminal
Case No. 98-14724, finding appellant Eric Guillermo y Garcia guilty of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death.
In an Information dated March 23, 1998, appellant was charged by State Prosecutor Jaime Augusto B. Valencia, Jr., of murdering his
employer, Victor Francisco Keyser, committed as follows:
That on or about the 22nd day of March 1998, in the Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a piece of wood and a saw,
with intent to kill, by means of treachery and with evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and hit with a piece of wood and thereafter, cut into pieces using said saw one Victor F.
Keyser, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal injuries which directly caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 2
When arraigned on April 3, 1998, the appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded guilty to the charge. 3
On April 23, 1998, however, appellant moved to withdraw his plea of guilty and prayed for a re-arraignment. The trial court granted the
motion and on April 28, 1998, he was re-arraigned. Assisted by counsel de parte, he entered a plea of not guilty. 4 The case then
proceeded to trial.
The facts, as gleaned from the records, are as follows.
The victim, Victor Francisco Keyser, was the owner and manager of Keyser Plastic Manufacturing Corp. (Keyser Plastics for brevity),
with principal place of business at Sitio Halang, Lornaville, San Roque, Antipolo City. 5 Keyser Plastics shared its building with
Greatmore Corporation, a manufacturer of faucets. 6 Separating the respective spaces being utilized by the two firms in their operations
was a wall, the lower portion of which was made of concrete hollow blocks, while the upper portion was of lawanit boards. 7 The part of
the wall made of lawanit had two large holes, which could allow a person on one side of the wall to see what was on the other side. 8
On March 22, 1998, prosecution witness Romualdo Campos, a security guard assigned to Greatmore was on duty. At around 8:00 a.m.,
he saw appellant Eric G. Guillermo enter the premises of Keyser Plastics. Campos ignored Guillermo, as he knew him to be one of the
trusted employees of Keyser Plastics. An hour later, he saw Victor F. Keyser arrive. Keyser checked the pump motor of the deep well,
which was located in the area of Greatmore, after which he also went inside the part of the building occupied by Keyser
Plastics. 9 Campos paid scant attention to Keyser.
Later, at around 10:00 a.m., Campos was making some entries in his logbook, when he heard some loud noises ( "kalabugan") coming
from the Keyser Plastics area. He stopped to listen, but thinking that the noise was coming from the machines used to make plastics, he
did not pay much attention to the sound. 10
At around noontime, Campos was suddenly interrupted in the performance of his duties when he saw appellant Guillermo look through
one of the holes in the dividing wall. According to Campos, appellant calmly told him that he had killed Victor Keyser and needed
Campos' assistance to help him carry the corpse to the garbage dump where he could burn it. 11 Shocked by this revelation, Campos
immediately dashed off to telephone the police. The police told him to immediately secure the premises and not let the suspect
escape, 12 while a reaction team was being dispatched to the scene.
Ten minutes later, a team composed of SPO4 Felix Bautista, SPO1 Carlito Reyes, and Police Aide Jovenal Dizon, Jr., all from the
Antipolo Philippine National Police (PNP) Station, arrived at the crime scene. With them was Felix Marcelo, an official police
photographer. 13 They were immediately met by Campos, who informed them that Guillermo was still inside the building. The law
enforcers tried to enter the premises of Keyser Plastics, but found the gates securely locked. The officers then talked to Guillermo and
after some minutes, persuaded him to give them the keys. This enabled the police to open the gate. Once inside, SPO4 Bautista and
SPO1 Reyes immediately accosted Guillermo who told them, "Sir, hindi ako lalaban, susuko ako, haharapin ko ito." ("Sir, I shall not fight
you, I am surrendering, and I shall face the consequences.") 14 Guillermo was clad only in a pair of shorts, naked from the waist up.
SPO1 Reyes then asked him where the body of the victim was and Guillermo pointed to some cardboard boxes. On opening the boxes,
the police found the dismembered limbs and chopped torso of Victor F. Keyser. The victim's head was found stuffed inside a cement
bag. 15
When the police asked how he did it, according to the prosecution witness, Guillermo said that he bashed the victim on the head with a
piece of wood, and after Keyser fell, he dismembered the body with a carpenter's saw. He then mopped up the blood on the floor with a
plastic foam. Guillermo then turned over to the police a bloodstained, two-foot long piece of coconut lumber and a carpenter's
saw. 16 Photographs were taken of the suspect, the dismembered corpse, and the implements used in committing the crime. When
asked as to his motive for the killing, Guillermo replied that Keyser had been maltreating him and his co-employees. 17 He expressed
no regret whatsoever about his actions. 18
The police then brought Guillermo to the Antipolo PNP Station for further investigation. SPO1 Carlos conducted the investigation,
without apprising the appellant about his constitutional rights and without providing him with the services of counsel. SPO1 Carlos

requested the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to conduct a post-mortem examination on Keyser's remains. The Antipolo police
then turned over the bloodstained piece of wood and saw, recovered from the locus delicti, to the PNP Crime Laboratory for testing.
Dr. Ravell Ronald R. Baluyot, a medico-legal officer of the NBI, autopsied Keyser's remains. He found that the cadaver had been cut into
seven (7) pieces. 19 He found that the head had sustained thirteen (13) contusions, abrasions, and other traumatic injuries, 20 all of
which had been caused by "forcible contact with hard blunt object," 21 such as a "lead pipe, baseball bat, or a piece of wood." 22 He
found the cause of death to be "traumatic head injury." 23 Dr. Baluyot declared that since the amputated body parts had irregular edges
on the soft tissues, it was most likely that a sharp-edged, toothed instrument, like a saw, had been used to mutilate the corpse. 24 He
further declared that it was possible that the victim was dead when sawn into pieces, due to cyanosis or the presence of stagnant blood
in the body, 25 but on cross-examination, he admitted that he could not discount the possibility that the victim might still have been alive
when mutilated. 26
Dr. Olga Bausa, medico-legal pathologist of the PNP Crime Laboratory, testified that she subjected the bloodstained piece of coco
lumber as well as the saw recovered from the crime scene to a biochemical examination to determine if the bloodstains were of human
origin. Both tested positive for the presence of human blood. 27However, she could not determine if the blood was of the same type as
that of the victim owing to the insufficient amount of bloodstains on the items tested. 28
Keyser's death shocked the nation. Appellant Guillermo, who was then in police custody, was interviewed on separate occasions by two
TV reporters, namely: Augusto "Gus" Abelgas of ABS-CBN News and Kara David of GMA Channel 7. Both interviews were
subsequently broadcast nationwide. Appellant admitted to David that he committed the crime and never gave it second thought. 29 He
disclosed to David the details of the crime, including how he struck Keyser on the head and cut up his body into pieces, which he placed
in sacks and cartons. 30 When asked why he killed his employer, Guillermo stated that Keyser had not paid him for years, did not feed
him properly, and treated him "like an animal." 31 Both Abelgas and David said that Guillermo expressed absolutely no remorse over his
alleged misdeed during the course of their respective interviews with him. 32
At the trial, appellant Guillermo's defense consisted of outright denial. He alleged he was a victim of police "frame-up." He testified that
he had been an employee of Keyser for more than a year prior to the latter's death. On the date of the incident, he was all alone at the
Keyser Plastics factory compound as a "stay-in" employee. Other employees have left allegedly due to Keyser's maltreatment of
them. 33
In the morning of March 22, 1998, appellant said Keyser instructed him to report for overtime work in the afternoon. He proceeded to the
factory premises at one o'clock in the afternoon, but since his employer was not around, he said, he just sat and waited till he fell
asleep. 34 He was awakened sometime later when he heard people calling him from outside. He then looked out and saw persons with
firearms, who told him that they wanted to enter the factory. Once inside, they immediately handcuffed him and looked around the
premises. When they returned, they were carrying boxes and sacks. He said he was then brought to the police station where he was
advised to admit having killed his employer since there was no other person to be blamed. 35 When he was made to face the media
reporters, he said the police instructed him what to say. 36 He claimed that he could no longer recall what he told the reporters. The
appellant denied having any grudge or ill feelings against his employer or his family.
On cross-examination, appellant admitted that he was the shirtless person in the photographs taken at the crime scene, while the
persons with him in the photographs were policemen wearing uniforms. 37 He likewise admitted that the cartons and sacks found by the
police inside the factory premises contained the mutilated remains of his employer. 38 He claimed, however, that he was surprised by
the contents of said cartons and sacks. 39 Appellant admitted that a bloodstained piece of wood and a saw were also recovered by the
police, but he insisted that the police made him hold the saw when they took photographs. 40
The trial court disbelieved appellant's version of the incident, but found the prosecution's evidence against him weighty and worthy of
credence. It convicted the appellant, thus:
The guilt of the accused has been proven beyond reasonable doubt to the crime of murder as charged in [the]
information. WHEREFORE, the accused is meted the maximum penalty and is hereby sentenced to die by lethal
injection.
The accused is also hereby ordered to pay the mother of the victim, Victor Keyser, the following amounts:
1. Death Indemnity P50,000.00
2. Funeral Expenses P50,000.00
3. Compensatory Damages P500,000.00
4. Moral Damages P500,000.00
5. Exemplary Damages P300,000.00
6. Attorney's Fees P100,000.00
plus P3,000.00 per Court appearance.
SO ORDERED. 41
Hence, the case is now before us for automatic review.
In his brief, appellant assigns the following errors:

I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR
THE CRIME OF MURDER HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN IMPOSING THE EXTREME PENALTY OF DEATH.
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN AWARDING THE FOLLOWING DAMAGES: DEATH INDEMNITY
P50,000.00; FUNERAL EXPENSES P50,000.00; COMPENSATORY DAMAGES P500,000.00; MORAL DAMAGES
P500,000.00; EXEMPLARY DAMAGES P300,000.00; AND ATTORNEY'S FEES OF P 100,000.00 PLUS P3,000
PER COURT APPEARANCE. 42
Briefly stated, the issues for resolution concern: (1) the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence to prove the appellant's guilt beyond
.reasonable doubt; (2) the propriety of the death penalty imposed on appellant; and (3) the correctness of the award of damages.
Appellant contends that his conviction was based on inadmissible evidence. He points out that there is no clear showing that he was
informed of his constitutional rights nor was he made to understand the same by the police investigators. In fact, he says, he was only
made to read said rights in printed form posed on the wall at the police precinct. He was not provided with the services of counsel during
the custodial investigation, as admitted by SPO1 Reyes. In view of no showing on record that he had waived his constitutional rights,
appellant argues that any evidence gathered from him, including his alleged confession, must be deemed inadmissible.
For the State, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that the evidence clearly shows that the appellant admitted committing
the crime in several instances, not just during the custodial investigation. First, he admitted having killed his employer to the security
guard, Campos, and even sought Campos' help in disposing of Keyser's body. This admission may be treated as part of the res
gestae and does not partake of uncounselled extrajudicial confession, according to the OSG. Thus, OSG contends said statement is
admissible as evidence against the appellant. Second, the appellant's statements before members of the media are likewise admissible
in evidence, according to the OSG, as these statements were made in response to questions by news reporters, not by police or other
investigating officer. The OSG stresses that appellant was interviewed by media on two separate occasions, and each time he made
free and voluntary statements admitting his guilt before the news reporters. He even supplied the details on how he committed the
crime. Third, the OSG points out that appellant voluntarily confessed to the killing even before the police could enter the premises and
even before any question could be posed to him. Furthermore, after the police investigators had entered the factory, the appellant
pointed to the place where Keyser's corpse was found. The OSG submits that at these points in time, appellant was not yet under
custodial investigation. Rather his statements to the police at the crime scene were spontaneous and voluntary, not elicited through
questioning, and hence must be treated as part of the res gestae and thus, says the OSG, admissible in evidence.
The OSG contends that not every statement made to the police by a suspect in a crime falls within the ambit of constitutional protection.
Hence, if not made under "custodial investigation" or "under investigation for the commission of an offense," the statement is not
protected by the Bill of Rights.
However, in our view, the confession appellant made while he was under investigation by SPO1 Carlito Reyes for the killing of Keyser at
the Antipolo PNP Station, falls short of the protective standards laid down by the Constitution. Under Article III of the Constitution, 43 a
confession to be admissible must satisfy the following requisites: (a) the confession must be voluntary; (b) the confession must be made
with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (c) the confession must be express; and (d) the confession must be in
writing. 44 In the instant case, the testimony of SPO1 Reyes on cross-examination clearly shows the cavalier treatment by the police of
said constitutional guarantees. This can readily be gleaned from the transcript of Reyes' testimony, which we excerpt:
Q: What did you do next upon arriving at the police station?
A: When we arrived at the police station, I pointed to him and asked him to read what was written on the wall which
was his constitutional rights.
Q: Did he read the same?
A: Yes, ma'm.
Q: Did you ask the accused if he did understand what he read?
A: Yes, ma'm.
Q: So Mr. Witness, you did continue your investigation at the police station?
A: Yes, ma'm.
COURT:
What did the accused say when you asked him if he understood what was written on the wall which was his
constitutional rights?
A: He said he understood what was written on the wall and he has no regrets.
COURT:
Proceed.
DEFENSE COUNSEL:

Who were present at the police station during your investigation?

A: There were many people around when I conducted the investigation at the police station. My companions were
there but I do not know the other persons who were present.
Q: How was the investigation that you conducted at the police station?
A: I inquired again from Eric Guillermo why he did it, the reason why he did it.
Q: And was your investigation being recorded in the police station?
A: No, ma'm.
Q: Let me just clarify, I did not mean like a tape recorder. Was it written?
A: I only asked him but it was not written down or recorded.
Q: During the investigation, was there any lawyer or counsel that was called during the investigation?
A: None, ma'm.
Q: Did you inform the accused that he has the right to get a counsel during the investigation?
A: Yes, ma'm.
Q: What did the accused say, Mr. Witness?
A: He did not utter any word.
Q: During the investigation at the police station, did you exert effort to provide him with counsel before you asked
him questions?
A: No, ma'm.
Q: Why?
A: Because during that time, it was Sunday afternoon and there was no counsel around and because he already
admitted that he perpetrated the crime and that was explained to him, his constitutional rights which was
on the wall. We did not provide anymore a counsel.
Q: I would just like to ask the reason why you made the accused read the written rights that was posted on the wall
of your police station?
A: So that he would be apprised of his constitutional rights.
Q: So, you mean that you made him understand his rights?
A: Yes, ma'm.
Q: So, you mean to say before you asked him to read his rights, you presumed that he does not understand what
his constitutional rights are?
A: I think he knows his constitutional rights because he admitted the crime.
Q: And did the accused understand his rights?
A: I believe he understood because he answered, "wala akong dapat pagsisihan." ("I have nothing to regret."). 45
Appellant's alleged confession at the police station lacks the safeguards required by the Bill of Rights. The investigating officer made no
serious effort to make appellant aware of his basic rights under custodial investigation. While the investigating officer was aware of the
appellant's right to be represented by counsel, the officer exerted no effort to provide him with one on the flimsy excuse that it was a
Sunday. Despite the absence of counsel, the officer proceeded with said investigation. Moreover, the record is bare of any showing that
appellant had waived his constitutional rights in writing and in the presence of counsel. As well said in People v. Dano, even if the
admission or confession of an accused is gospel truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it is inadmissible in evidence
regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given. 46
The right of a person under interrogation "to be informed" implies a correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain
and contemplates an effective communication that results in an understanding of what is conveyed. 47 Absent that understanding, there
is a denial of the right "to be informed," as it cannot be said that the person has been truly "informed" of his rights. Ceremonial shortcuts
in the communication of abstract constitutional principles ought not be allowed for it diminishes the liberty of the person facing custodial
investigation.
Be that as it may, however, the inadmissibility of the appellant's confession to SPO1 Reyes at the Antipolo PNP Station as evidence
does not necessarily lead to his acquittal. For constitutional safeguards on custodial investigation (known, also as
the Miranda principles) do not apply to spontaneous statements, or those not elicited through questioning by law enforcement
authorities but given in an ordinary manner whereby the appellant verbally admits to having committed the offense. The rights
enumerated in the Constitution, Article III, Section 12, are meant to preclude the slightest use of the State's coercive power as would
lead an accused to admit something false. But it is not intended to prevent him from freely and voluntarily admitting the truth outside the
sphere of such power.
The facts in this case clearly show that appellant admitted the commission of the crime not just to the police but also to private
individuals. According to the testimony of the security guard, Romualdo Campos, on the very day of the killing the appellant called him
to say that he had killed his employer and needed assistance to dispose of the cadaver. Campos' testimony was not rebutted by the

defense. As the Solicitor General points out, appellant's statements to Campos are admissible for being part of the res gestae. Under
the Rules of Court, 48 a declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule
when the following requisites concur: (1) the principal act, the res gestae is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before
the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately
attending circumstances. 49 All these requisites are present in the instant case. Appellant had just been through a startling and
gruesome occurrence, the death of his employer. His admission to Campos was made while he was still under the influence of said
startling occurrence and before he had an opportunity to concoct or contrive a story. His declaration to Campos concerned the
circumstances surrounding the killing of Keyser. Appellant's spontaneous statements made to a private security guard, not an agent of
the State or a law enforcer, are not covered by the Miranda principles and, as res gestate, admissible in evidence against him.
Further, when interviewed on separate occasions by the media, appellant not only agreed to be interviewed by the news reporters, but
he spontaneously admitted his guilt to them. He even supplied the details regarding the commission of the crime to reporter Kara David
of GMA Channel 7, who testified in court, to wit:
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR:
Q: Could you tell us what you found out in the interview?
A: The first question I think I asked was, if he admits the crime and he gladly said yes he did it, the details about the
crime, how he saw the body and where he put it, and the reason why he did it.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
To what crime did he admit?
A: He said he got mad with (sic) his boss, so he got a piece of wood, "dos por dos," he hit his boss in the back and
then after that, I think he got a saw and sawed the body to eight pieces.
xxx xxx xxx
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR:
You said the interview was done inside the room of Col. Quintana, how many were you inside the room at that
time?
A: I really could not remember but I was with my cameraman, an assistant, Col. Quintana and I think two more
escorts. I could not remember the others.
Q: You mentioned a while ago that he gladly admitted what he did, can you explain gladly admitted?
A: Usually when I interview suspects, either they deny or [are] in hysterics, but Eric seems (sic) calm when I
interviewed him.
I said, "ginawa mo ba ang krimen," and he said, "Oo." "Hindi ka ba nagdalawang isip?" "Hindi." It was kind of eerie.
Q: You also mentioned that he gave details of the crime he committed, aside from what you already mentioned like
his boss being hit in the head and cut to eight pieces, what did he tell you?
A: He told me where he put it, like he looked for sacks and cartons, and he told me where he put the head but I
could not remember.
But I remember him saying he put the head in the bag and he said he asked help from the security guard,
Campos. Basically, that's it. And he told me the reason why he did it.
Q: Why did he do it?
A: Because he was not being paid for what he has done and Mr. Keyser treated him like an animal, things like that.
He said that what he did was just right, just justice. 50
The TV news reporters' testimonies on record show that they were acting as media professionals when they interviewed appellant. They
were not under the direction and control of the police. There was no coercion for appellant to face the TV cameras. The record also
shows that the interviews took place on several occasions, not just once. Each time, the appellant did not protest or insist on his
innocence. Instead, he repeatedly admitted what he had done. He even supplied details of Keyser's killing. As held in Andan,
statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters during a televised interview are voluntary and admissible in
evidence. 51
Thus, we have no hesitation in saying that, despite the inadmissibility of appellant's alleged confession to the police, the prosecution has
amply proven the appellant's guilt in the killing of Victor F. Keyser. The bare denial raised by the appellant in open court pales in contrast
to the spontaneous and vivid out-of-court admissions he made to security guard Campos and the two media reporters, Abelgas and
David. The positive evidence, including the instruments of the crime, together with the medical evidence as well as the testimonies of
credible prosecution witnesses, leaves us no doubt that appellant killed his employer, Victor Francisco Keyser, in the gruesome manner
vividly described before the trial court.
But was appellant's offense murder for which appellant should suffer the death penalty, or only homicide for which a lesser penalty is
appropriate?

Appellant argues that the prosecution failed to prove either treachery or evident premeditation to qualify the killing as murder. He points
out that there was not a single eyewitness to show how the crime was committed and hence, absent an eyewitness to show the manner
in which the crime was committed, he cannot be held liable for murder.
For the appellee, the OSG submits that as recounted by the appellant himself, he repeatedly struck the victim, with a piece of coco
lumber (dos por dos), at the back of his head, while the victim's back was turned towards him. The suddenness of the attack, coupled
with the manner in which it was executed clearly indicates treachery. The OSG agrees with appellant, however, that evident
premeditation was not adequately established. Hence, we shall now deal only with the disputed circumstance, treachery.
Treachery or alevosia is present when the offender commits any crime against persons employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to the offender arising from any defense which the
offended party might make. 52 Two essential requisites must concur for treachery to be appreciated: (a) the employment of means of
execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) the said means of execution was
deliberately or consciously adopted. 53
A qualifying circumstance like treachery changes the nature of the crime and increases the imposable penalties for the offense. Hence,
like the delict itself, it must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. 54 In the instant case, we find insufficient the prosecution's evidence to
prove that the attack on the victim came without warning and that he had absolutely no opportunity to defend himself, or to escape.
None of the prosecution witnesses could know how the attack was initiated or carried out, simply because there was no eyewitness to
the offense. In addition, appellant's narration in his taped interview with Channel 7 is not too clear on this point, thus:
ERIC GUILLERMO:
Mura pa rin ng mura. Nagtataka ako kung bakit ganoon na lamang kainit ito. Bigla niya akong inano dito sa batok
ko tapos itinuturo niya ang dito ko (pointing to his head) itinuturoturo niya ang dito ko.
Ayon mura ng mura, hindi ko napigilan ang sarili ko, dinampot ko iyong kahoy.
ARNOLD CLAVIO:
Sa mga oras na 'yon, nagdilim, napuno ng galit ang kanyang mga mata, nakita niya ang isang dos por dos sa
kanyang tabi at agad dinampot habang nakatalikod ang kanyang amo.
ERIC GUILLERMO:
Nang gawin ko sa sarili ko iyon kalmadong kalmado ako noong ginawa ko 'yon. Nasa sarili ako noong ginawa ko
iyon.
ARNOLD CLAVIO:
Hawak ang mahabang kahoy, hinampas ni Eric si Mr. Keyser, hinampas hanggang sa mawalan ng malay. Tila hindi
pa nakuntento sa kanyang nagawa, napagbalingan naman ni Eric ang isang lagare sa kanyang tabi at
isinagawa na ang karumal-dumal na krimen. 55
From the foregoing, all that can be discerned is that the victim was scolding the appellant, and the victim's back was turned towards the
appellant when the latter picked up the piece of wood. It does not, however, show that there was any deliberate effort on the part of the
appellant to adopt the particular means, method, or form of attack to ensure the commission of the crime without affording the victim
any means to defend himself.
Dr. Ravell Ronald R. Baluyot, the NBI pathologist who autopsied the victim's body, observed that it was difficult to determine the position
of the victim in relation to his assailant. 56 Nor was the expert testimony of Dr. Baluyot definitive as to the relative position of the
assailant and the victim, to wit:
DEFENSE COUNSEL:
I would like also to ask from your medical knowledge thru the blows that the deceased received in his head which
caused the head injury, would you be able to ascertain also in what position was the attacker or where the
attacker was?
A: Based on the location of the injuries at the head, it would be very difficult to determine the relative position of the
victim and assailant as well as the position of the victim when he sustained said injury, because there are
injuries located at the front, at the left and right portions of the head although there were none located at
the back (stress supplied). Based on these injuries, I would say that the position would probably be maybe
in front, maybe to the left or the right in order for him to inflict the injuries to the front, to the left and right
sides of the head. 57
Noteworthy, Dr. Baluyot pointed out that based on the injuries sustained by the victim, there is an indication that he tried to defend
himself against the blows being inflicted upon him, thus:
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR:
Q: The wound that you found at the back of the hand, which is at the back of the right hand, would you characterize
this as [a] defense wound?

A: It is a defense wound. All injuries especially at the upper extremities they could be tagged as defense wounds to
fend off. . . attacks and these upper extremities are usually used to protect the head and the body. 58
The gap in the prosecution's evidence cannot be filled with mere speculation. Treachery cannot be appreciated absent the particulars as
to the manner in which the aggression commenced or how the act unfolded and resulted in the victim's demise. 59 Any doubt as to its
existence must, perforce, be resolved in favor of appellant.
One attendant circumstance, however, is amply proved by the prosecution's evidence which shows that the victim's corpse was sawn by
appellant into seven (7) pieces.Under Art. 248 (6) of the Revised Penal Code, "outraging or scoffing at the corpse" is a qualifying
circumstance. Dismemberment of a dead body is one manner of outraging or scoffing at the corpse of the victim. 60 In the instant case,
the corpse of Victor F. Keyser was dismembered by appellant who sawed off the head, limbs, and torso. The Information categorically
alleges this qualifying circumstance, when it stated that the appellant "thereafter, cut into pieces using said saw one Victor F. Keyser."
This being the case, as proved by the prosecution, appellant is guilty not just of homicide but of murder.
The penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances in the instant case,
the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed upon appellant. 61
Both appellant and appellee claim that the trial court erred in awarding damages. They submit that the trial court's award of P50,000.00
for funeral expenses has insufficient basis, for only receipts amounting to P38,068.00 as proof of funeral expenses were presented in
evidence. Thus, this award should be reduced accordingly. Concerning the award of moral damages in the amount of P500,000,
compensatory damages also for P500,000 and exemplary damages in the amount of P300,000, appellant submits that these cited
sums are exorbitant, and not in accord with prevailing jurisprudence. The OSG agrees, hence modification of said amounts is in order.
The amount of moral damages should be reduced to P50,000, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, as the purpose for such award is to
compensate the heirs of the victim for the injuries to their feelings and not to enrich them. 62 Award of exemplary damages is justified in
view of the gruesome mutilation of the victim's corpse, but the amount thereof should also be reduced to only P25,000, following current
case law.
The award of P500,000 in compensatory damages lacks proof and ought to be deleted. The victim's mother, Remedios Keyser, testified
that the victim was earning around P50,000.00 a month 63 as shown in the receipt issued by Rosetti Electronics Phils. Co. 64 However,
said receipt shows that it was made out to her, and not the victim. Moreover, it does not show what period is covered by the receipt.
Hence, the actual value of the loss of earning capacity was not adequately established. Awards for the loss of earning capacity partake
of the nature of damages, and must be proved not only by credible and satisfactory evidence but also by unbiased proof. 65
Civil indemnity for the victim's death, however, was left out by the trial court, although now it is automatically granted without need of
proof other than the fact of the commission of the crime. 66 Hence, conformably with prevailing jurisprudence, the amount of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity should be awarded in favor of the victim's heirs.
Nothing on the record shows the actual expenses incurred by the heirs of the victim for attorney's fees and lawyer's appearance fees.
Attorney's fees are in the concept of actual or compensatory damages and allowed under the circumstances provided for in Article 2208
of the Civil Code, 67 one of which is when the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees should be recovered. 68 In this
case, we find an award of P25,000 in attorney's fees and litigation expenses reasonable and equitable.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 73, dated March 7, 2001 in Criminal Case No.
98-14724, finding appellant ERIC GUILLERMO y GARCIA GUILTY of the murder of Victor Francisco Keyser is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Appellant's sentence is hereby REDUCED TO RECLUSION PERPETUA. He is also ORDERED to pay the heirs of the
victim, Victor Francisco Keyser, the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P38,068.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as moral
damages, P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P25,000.00 as attorney's fees, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. Costs de oficio.
||| (People v. Guillermo y Garcia, G.R. No. 147786, [January 20, 2004], 465 PHIL 248-275)