EN BANC

[G.R. No. 101978. April 7, 1993.]

EDUARDO P. PILAPIL , petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, FRANCIS
E. GARCHITORENA and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.

Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for public respondents.
SYLLABUS
1.
REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; MOTION TO QUASH; ABSENCE OF
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION, NOT A GROUND. The absence of a preliminary
investigation is not a ground to quash a complaint or information under Section 3,
Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.
2.
ID.; ID.; PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION; ABSENCE THEREOF DOES NOT
AFFECT JURISDICTION OF COURTS NOR IMPAIR VALIDITY OF INFORMATION. The
absence of preliminary investigation does not aect the court's jurisdiction over the
case. Nor do they impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it
defective, but, if there were no preliminary investigations and the defendants,
before entering their plea, invite the attention of the court to their absence, the
court, instead of dismissing the Information, should conduct such investigation,
order the scal to conduct it or remand the case to the inferior court so that the
preliminary investigation may be conducted . . . (Sanciangco, Jr. vs. People, G.R. No.
72830, 149 SCRA 1 [1987] and reiterated in Doromal vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
85468, 177 SCRA 354 [1989]).
3.
ID.; ID.; MOTION TO QUASH; LACK OF JURISDICTION BY THE COURT AS A
GROUND, CONSTRUED. The lack of jurisdiction contemplated in Section 3(b),
Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court refers to the lack of any law conferring upon
the court the power to inquire into the facts, to apply the law and to declare the
punishment for an oense in a regular course of judicial proceeding. When the court
has jurisdiction, as in this case, any irregularity in the exercise of that power is not a
ground for a motion to quash.
4.
ID.; JURISDICTION; ABSENCE THEREOF, NOT SUBJECT TO WAIVER. Lack of
jurisdiction is not waivable but absence of preliminary investigation is waivable. In
fact, it is frequently waived.
5.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; DUE PROCESS; NOT DENIED
WHERE PETITIONER WAS REQUIRED TO ANSWER THE CHARGES AGAINST HIM.
The facts on record show that in an order dated October 3, 1990, Deputy
Ombudsman Domingo required petitioner to answer the charges against him as

stated in the adavits-complaints and supporting documents thereto. Petitioner

fully complied with said order and led his and his witnesses' adavits. In other
words, petitioner was properly apprised of the act complained of and given ample
opportunity to rebut the same. Thus, petitioner could not validly raise violation of
his right to due process because the bases for the information led by the
Ombudsman were all reflected in the complaint and the evidence supporting it.
6.
REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION;
NOTHING MORE THAN THE SUBMISSION OF THE PARTIES' AFFIDAVITS AND
COUNTER-AFFIDAVITS. In Cinco vs. Sandiganbayan, (G.R. Nos. 92362-67, 202
SCRA 727 [1991]) this Court held that preliminary investigation is nothing more
than the submission of the parties' respective adavits, counter-adavits and
evidence to buttress their separate allegations.
7.
ID.; ID.; ID.; MERELY INQUISITORIAL. Preliminary investigation is merely
inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of discovering whether a person may be
reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the prosecutor to prepare his complaint
or information.
8.
ID.; ID.; NATURE OF CRIMINAL CHARGES DETERMINED BY ACTUAL RECITAL
OF FACTS. The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the
caption or preamble of the information nor from the specication of the provision of
law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the actual
recital of facts in the complaint or information. . . . it is not the technical name given
by the Fiscal appearing in the title of the information that determines the character
of the crime but the facts alleged in the body of the Information.
9.
ID.; ID.; PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION; DEEMED WAIVED BY FAILURE TO
SEASONABLY INVOKED RIGHT THERETO. The right to a preliminary investigation
is not a fundamental right and may be waived expressly or by silence. Failure of
accused to invoke his right to a preliminary investigation constituted a waiver of
such right and any irregularity that attended it. The right may be forfeited by
inaction and can no longer be invoked for the first time at the appellate level.
10.
ID.; ID.; ID.; MAY BE AVAILED OF EVEN AFTER THE CASE HAS BEEN FILED.
Under the last paragraph of Section 7, Rule 112 of 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, the right to ask for preliminary investigation is recognized even after the
case has already been filed.
11.
ID.; ID.; PROBABLE CAUSE, DEFINED. Probable cause has been dened in
the leading case of Buchanan vs. Vda. de Esteban (32 Phil. 365) as the existence of
such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting
on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was
guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. Probable cause is a reasonable
ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well founded, such a state of
facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and
prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so.
12.

ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; CERTIORARI; FINDING BY THE SANDIGANBAYAN

OF PROBABLE CAUSE FOR VIOLATION OF ANTI-GRAFT AND PRACTICES ACT, NOT IN

EXCESS OF JURISDICTION NOR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. Having
found that respondent court has not acted in excess of jurisdiction nor with grave
abuse of discretion in nding the existence of probable cause in the case at bar and
consequently, in denying the motion to quash and motion for reconsideration of
petitioner, We dismiss as clearly unfounded the insinuations of petitioner that
Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena used the inuence of his oce in initiating
the complaint against him. We agree with respondent court that the act of bringing
to the attention of appropriate ocials possible transgression of the law is as much
an obligation of the highest ocial of the land as it is the responsibility of any
private citizen.
DECISION
NOCON, J :
p

In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, petitioner seeks to annul the
resolutions of respondent Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 16672, entitled
"People of the Philippines vs. Eduardo P. Pilapil" dated June 27, 1991 denying his
motion to quash the information for Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No.
3019, as amended. as well as the resolution dated September 5, 1991 denying his
motion for reconsideration. Petitioner predicated his motion to quash on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction over his person because the same was led without probable
cause. In addition thereto, petitioner cites the fact that the information for violation
of the Anti-Graft Law was led although the complaint upon which the preliminary
investigation was conducted is for malversation.
LexLib

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

On October 16, 1987, the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Oce (PCSO) donated
one ambulance (a Mitsubishi L-300) to the Municipality of Tigaon, Camarines Sur.
Petitioner, who is the Congressman of the 3rd District of Camarines Sur, received
the ambulance in behalf of the municipality. However, he did not deliver the
ambulance to said municipality.
Unaware of the donation, the Sangguniang Bayan of the municipality passed a
resolution (Resolution No. 16, Series of 1988) requesting PCSO for an ambulance.
Said request was reiterated in their Resolution No. 117, Series of 1988. The mayor
of the municipality, Eleanor P. Lelis, thereafter sought the intercession of
Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena, who is from the said
municipality, regarding said request. Thereafter, Justice Garchitorena contacted the
PCSO and learned about the ambulance previously donated by the latter to Tigaon
through petitioner. He accordingly informed Mayor Lelis that the municipality's
request cannot be favorably acted upon in view of the previous donation.
Mayor Lelis reiterated the municipality's request for an ambulance making

reference to the certication of the municipal treasurer that no vehicle from the
PCSO or from anyone has been received.
Upon verication of the whereabouts of the Mitsubishi L-300 by the PCSO from the
petitioner, the latter indicated his willingness to return the ambulance. In a letter
dated December 22, 1988, he requested that said vehicle be donated instead to the
Municipality of Tinambac, same province. Finally, on December 26. 1988, he
personally returned the ambulance, then already painted to cover the logo of the
PCSO and the other markings thereon.
With the return of the Mitsubishi L-300 to the PCSO, the Municipality of Tigaon,
through Mayor Lelis, nally received a brand new Besta Kia Ambulance unit
complete with all accessories.
On January 2, 1989, Justice Garchitorena wrote the then Chief Justice Marcelo B.
Fernan relating to him the whole story of the ambulance.
On January 25, 1989, Justice Garchitorena also sent Deputy Ombudsman Jose C.
Colayco a letter-complaint against petitioner regarding said ambulance. Said lettercomplaint was referred by Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez to the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon, Manuel C. Domingo, for appropriate action. Thereupon,
Deputy Ombudsman Domingo required Justice Garchitorena to submit all relevant
records and documents, as well as his adavit and those of his witnesses. Failing in
this regard, Justice Garchitorena was requested anew to comply. In his stead,
Anthony D. Jamora, the Regional manager of the Special Projects Department of the
PCSO and Mayor Lelis of Tigaon, Camarines Sur, submitted their respective
affidavits.
On October 3, 1990, Deputy Ombudsman Domingo issued an order requiring
petitioner to submit his counter-adavit, adavits of his witnesses and other
controverting evidence. This order was captioned as Case No. OMB-1-89-0168 for
"Malversation of Public Property under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code."

On October 22, 1990, petitioner submitted his counter-adavit denying the

imputation of said oense claiming that the vehicle was not equipped with any
medical attachments or facilities so he was constrained to request PAGCOR for
assistance to nance its conversion into a medical ambulance which is evidenced by
his letter dated November 15, 1987 to Mrs. Alice Reyes. He claimed that it was only
on April 28, 1988 that PAGCOR acted on his request, but in lieu of nancial
assistance, said oce donated accessories, which can be installed at an estimated
cost of P5,000.00. Thus, he allegedly made personal representations with PAGCOR
for the latter to shoulder the expenses of the installation. While awaiting for the
nancial assistance, petitioner claimed, in explanation why the logo of PCSO and
the other markings on the vehicle were removed, that he acceded to the suggestion
of his sta to include the name of PAGCOR on the sides of the ambulance in view of
the substantial contribution of the latter.
cdphil

On December 5, 1990, Ombudsman Investigator Isaac D. Tolentino issued a

resolution nding no probable cause for malversation and recommended that the
case be dismissed, which recommendation was approved by Deputy Ombudsman
Domingo.
On January 5, 1991, Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo Aportadera, Jr. recommended
the disapproval of the aforesaid resolution and instead, suggested the ling of
criminal information for violation of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. This was
followed by another resolution to the same eect by Special Prosecution Ocer
Wilfredo Orencia dated February 14, 1991.
On April 1, 1991, Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez issued a resolution sustaining the
nding of Ombudsman Investigator Tolentino that there is no malversation but
found in the same resolution, a prima facie case for violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019, the dispositive part of which states:
"WHEREFORE, it is hereby directed that the information to be led against
the respondent should be for a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019." 1

On April 3, 1991, an information for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No.
3019, docketed as Criminal Case No. 16672, against petitioner was filed, to wit:
"The undersigned Special Prosecution Ocer III accuses EDUARDO P.
PILAPIL of the crime for 'Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019,
as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
committed as follows:
'That on or about October 16, 1987 and subsequent thereto, in
the Municipality of Tigaon, Province of Camarines Sur and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused is a public ocer, he
being the Congressman of the Third Congressional District of
Camarines Sur, while in the discharge of his ocial functions and
taking advantage of his public position, acted with manifest partiality
and evident bad faith, did then and there willfully cause undue injury to
the Municipality of Tigaon, Camarines Sur, when he failed to deliver the
ambulance, Mitsubishi Van L-300, received by him on behalf of the
said municipality in a Deed of Donation executed by the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Oce in its favor, to the prejudice and damage
of the said municipal government.
CONTRARY TO LAW." 2

On April 12, 1991, a warrant of arrest was issued against petitioner. On April 18,
1991, he was allowed to deposit the sum of P15,000.00 in court to be considered as
bail bond and the warrant of arrest was recalled.
On May 2, 1991, petitioner led a motion to quash on the ground that respondent
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over his person because the information was filed
without probable cause since there is absolutely no proof adduced in the preliminary
investigation of any of the elements of the crime dened in Section 3(e) of Republic

Act No. 3019. On June 27, 1991, respondent court denied the said motion to quash
holding that the factual and legal issues and/or questions raised are evidentiary in
nature and are matters of defense, the validity of which can be best passed upon
after a full-blown trial on the merits. On September 5, 1991, respondent court
denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said resolution and set the
arraignment of petitioner on October 21, 1991 at 8:30 a.m.
On October 12, 1991, petitioner led the present petition and by reason of such
filing, respondent court ordered that the arraignment be held in abeyance.
Petitioner enumerates the following as his reasons for filing the petition:
"I.
THAT RESPONDENT COURT IS ACTING WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DENYING THE
MOTION TO QUASH.
II.
THAT RESPONDENT COURT IS NEGLECTING A LEGAL DUTY IN NOT
QUASHING THE INFORMATION OR DISMISSING THE CASE.
III.
THAT PETITIONER HAS NO PLAIN, SPEEDY AND ADEQUATE REMEDY
IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF LAW EXCEPT THE PRESENT PETITION." 3

Stated otherwise, the issue in this case is whether or not the Sandiganbayan
committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's motion to quash and
motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner harps on the lack of preliminary investigation on the specic charge of
violation of Sec. 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, led before the
Sandiganbayan. He alleges that the preliminary investigation was conducted for the
charge of malversation.
cdphil

At the outset, this Court bears mention of the rudimentary rule that the absence of
a preliminary investigation is not a ground to quash a complaint or information
under Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. The proper procedure in case of lack
of preliminary investigation is to hold in abeyance the proceedings upon such
information and the case remanded to the Oce of the Provincial Fiscal or the
Ombudsman, for that matter, for him or the Special Prosecutor to conduct a
preliminary investigation. 4 Thus, We enunciated in Sanciangco, Jr. vs. People , 5 and
reiterated in Doromal vs. Sandiganbayan, 6 that:
"The absence of preliminary investigation does not aect the court's
jurisdiction over the case. Nor do they impair the validity of the information
or otherwise render it defective, but, if there were no preliminary
investigations and the defendants, before entering their plea, invite the
attention of the court to their absence, the court, instead of dismissing the
Information, should conduct such investigation, order the fiscal to conduct it
or remand the case to the inferior court so that the preliminary investigation
may be conducted . . ."

Petitioner takes exception to the doctrine and urges this Court to take a second look

arguing that lack of preliminary investigation aects the court's jurisdiction because
it is violative of due process. He reasons out that jurisprudence abounds with the
rule that denial of due process is grave jurisdictional defeat rendering the judgment
void.
We are not persuaded. The lack of jurisdiction contemplated in Section 3(b), Rule
117 of the Revised Rules of Court refers to the lack of any law conferring upon the
court the power to inquire into the facts, to apply the law and to declare the
punishment for an oense in a regular course of judicial proceeding. When the court
has jurisdiction, as in this case, any irregularity in the exercise of that power is not a
ground for a motion to quash. Reason is not wanting for this view. Lack of
jurisdiction is not waivable but absence of preliminary investigation is waivable. In
fact, it is frequently waived.
We now come to the question of whether there was no preliminary investigation
conducted in this case necessitating the suspension of the proceedings in the case
until after the outcome of such preliminary investigation.
The facts on record show that in an order dated October 3, 1990, Deputy
Ombudsman Domingo required petitioner to answer the charges against him as
stated in the adavits-complaints and supporting documents thereto. Petitioner
fully complied with said order and led his and his witnesses' adavits. In other
words, petitioner was properly apprised of the act complained of and given ample
opportunity to rebut the same. Thus, petitioner could not validly raise violation of
his right to due process because the bases for the information led by the
Ombudsman were all reected in the complaint and the evidence supporting it. In
Cinco vs. Sandiganbayan, 7 this Court held that preliminary investigation is nothing
more than the submission of the parties' respective adavits, counter-adavits and
evidence to buttress their separate allegations.
Petitioner attaches signicance to the fact that the preliminary investigation
conducted by the Ombudsman against him was under the title of "malversation."
According to him, this is not sucient to justify the ling of the charge of violation
of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law.
Petitioner loses sight of the fact that preliminary investigation is merely
inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of discovering whether a person may be
reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the prosecutor to prepare his complaint
or information. The preliminary designation of the oense in the directive to le a
counter-adavit and adavits of one's witnesses is not conclusive. Such
designation is only a conclusion of law of Deputy Ombudsman Domingo. The
Ombudsman is not bound by the said qualication of the crime. Rather, he is guided
by the evidence presented in the course of a preliminary investigation and on the
basis of which, he may formulate and designate the oense and direct the ling of
the corresponding information. In fact, even, the designation of the oense by the
prosecutor in the information itself has been held inconclusive, to wit:
". . . the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the
caption or preamble of the information nor from the specication of the

provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law,
but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information . . . it is not
the technical name given by the Fiscal appearing in the title of the
information that determines the character of the crime but the facts alleged
in the body of the Information." 8

Petitioner cites the case of Luciano vs. Mariano, 9 in support of its view that a new
preliminary investigation is needed. In said case, however, the original charge for
falsication was dismissed for being without any factual or legal basis and the
category of the oense was raised as the alleged violation of the Anti-Graft Law was
a graver charge. In the case at bar, there is no dismissal to speak of because under
the rules of procedure of the oce of the Ombudsman, a complaint may be
dismissed only upon the written authority or approval of the Ombudsman. Besides,
even the petitioner admits that the violation of the Anti-Graft law did not raise the
category of the offense of malversation.
LLphil

The case of Doromal vs. Sandiganbayan, 10 also cited by petitioner as another

authority, is likewise inapplicable as in said case, the information was annulled as
the then incumbent Tanodbayan was without authority to conduct preliminary
investigations and to direct the ling of criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan,
except upon orders of the Ombudsman. With the annulment of the information, this
Court held that a new preliminary investigation of the charge was in order not only
because the rst was a nullity but also because the accused demands it as his right.
In the case at bar, there is no old or new information. Only one information was
led as a result of the preliminary investigation conducted by the oce of the
Ombudsman.
Even on the assumption that no preliminary investigation was conducted for the
information led, petitioner waived his right thereto for failure to ask the
Sandiganbayan or the Ombudsman for a new preliminary investigation. On this
score again, petitioner's case is dierent from the Luciano and Doromal cases where
the attention of the lower court was called to the lack of a new preliminary
investigation. Petitioner bewailed the absence of a new preliminary investigation
only before this Court. It is noteworthy that his only basis for quashing the
information is the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the court over his person because
there is no probable cause for the filing of the information.
It is well-settled that the right to a preliminary investigation is not a fundamental
right and may be waived expressly or by silence. 11 Failure of accused to invoke his
right to a preliminary investigation constituted a waiver of such right and any
irregularity that attended it. 12 The right may be forfeited by inaction and can no
longer be invoked for the first time at the appellate level. 13
Petitioner's argument that he could not have asked for a new preliminary
investigation in the Oce of the Ombudsman since he came to know about the
charge only after the information was led in the Sandiganbayan, is not tenable.
Under the last paragraph of Section 7, Rule 112 of 1985 Rules on Criminal

Procedure, the right to ask for preliminary investigation is recognized even after the
case has already been filed, to wit:
"If the case has been led in court without a preliminary Investigation having
been rst conducted, the accused may within ve (5) days from the time he
learns of the ling of the information, ask for a preliminary investigation with
the same right to adduce evidence to his favor in the manner prescribed in
this Rule."

Clearly, the alleged lack of a valid preliminary investigation came only as an

afterthought to gain a reversal of the denial of the motion to quash. Sad to say, this
last ditch eort came a bit late. His failure to invoke this right below constituted a
waiver of such right.
As aforesaid, what was submitted for consideration below was the motion to quash
of petitioner on the ground of want of jurisdiction by the trial court over his person
because of the ling of an information without probable cause. There being no
probable cause, according to petitioner, then there could be no basis to issue a
warrant of arrest and hence, the respondent court had no jurisdiction over his
person.
Contesting the ndings of respondent court that probable cause exists in this case,
petitioner insists that there is no competent proof that all the elements of Section
3(e) of the Anti-Graft law are present, namely: that an act was done (1) causing
undue injury to the government, (2) with manifest partiality or evident bad faith,
and (3) by a public officer in the discharge of his official duties.
Petitioner argues that the injury contemplated under the law is real or actual
damage and since there is absolutely no proof of real or actual damages suered by
the municipality, the nding of undue injury by the Ombudsman has no factual
basis. Concomitantly, he says that since there is no undue injury, then, there can be
no bad faith, as bad faith is inseparable from undue injury for undue injury must be
through bad faith. He claims that failure to inform the mayor of the donation, that
he returned the vehicle after one year; that he kept the vehicle in storage; and that
he caused the repainting to erase the words PCSO are not evidence of bad faith
since they cannot manifest a deliberate intent to do wrong or cause damage.
Finally, petitioner claims that the element of "public office in the discharge of official
duties" is also absent as his acceptance of the vehicle in question from PCSO and its
non-delivery to the municipality of Tigaon was not done in the discharge of his duty
as a congressman tasked with enacting laws. If at all, he admits, the act was done in
his private capacity as political leader in his district.
LLphil

We agree with respondent court that the presence or absence of the elements of
the crime are evidentiary in nature and are matters of defense, the truth of which
can best be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits.
Probable cause has been dened in the leading case of Buchanan vs. Vda. de
Esteban 14 as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the

belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the
prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was
prosecuted.
Probable cause is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be,
well founded, such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a
person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or strong
suspicion, that a thing is so" 15 The term does not mean "actual and positive cause"
nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable
belief. Thus, a nding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether
there is sucient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed
that the act or omission complained of constitutes the oense charged. Precisely,
there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the
charge.
Whether an act was done causing undue injury to the government and whether the
same was done with manifest partiality or evident bad faith can only be made out
by proper and sucient testimony. Necessarily, a conclusion can be arrived at when
the case has already proceeded on sufficient proof.
At the moment, in passing on a motion to set aside an information on the ground
that the accused has been charged without probable cause, the court should not be
guided by the rule that accused must be shown to be guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt, but rather whether there is sucient evidence which inclines the mind to
believe, without necessarily leaving room for doubt, that accused is guilty thereof.
Having thus found that respondent court has not acted in excess of jurisdiction nor
with grave abuse of discretion in nding the existence of probable cause in the case
at bar and consequently, in denying the motion to quash and motion for
reconsideration of petitioner, We dismiss as clearly unfounded the insinuations of
petitioner that Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena used the inuence of his oce
in initiating the complaint against him. We agree with respondent court that the act
of bringing to the attention of appropriate ocials possible transgression of the law
is as much an obligation of the highest official of the land as it is the responsibility of
any private citizen.
prcd

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus is hereby

DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C .J ., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr .,

Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Campos, Jr. and Quiason, JJ ., concur.
Footnotes
1.

Rollo, p. 82.

2.

Ibid., p. 83.

3.

Ibid. p. 6.

4.

People vs. Casiano, G.R. No. L-15309, 1 SCRA 478 (1961); Luciano vs. Mariano,
G.R. No. L-32950, July 30, 1971, 40 SCRA 187 (1971); Ilagan vs. Enrile, G.R. No.
70748, 139 SCRA 349 (1985); Paredes vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 89989, 193
SCRA 464 (1991); Paderanga vs. Drilon, G.R. No. 96080, 196 SCRA 86 (1991), and
People vs. Umbrero, G.R. No. 93021, May 20, 1991.

5.

G.R. No. 72830, 149 SCRA 1 (1987).

6.

G.R. No. 85468, 177 SCRA 354 (1989).

7.

G.R. Nos. 92362-67, 202 SCRA 727 (1991).

8.

People vs. Mendoza, G.R. NO. 67610, 175 SCRA 743 (1989).

9.

G.R. No. L-32950, 40 SCRA 187 (1971).

10.

G.R. No. 85468, 177 SCRA 354 (1989).

11.

People vs. Mabuyo, 63 Phil. 532 91936).

12.

People vs. Umbrero, supra.

13.

People vs. Lazo, G.R. No. 75367, 198 SCRA 274 (1991); People vs. Maghanoy,
G.R. No. 67170, 180 SCRA 111 (1989).

14.

32 Phil. 365.

15.

Words and Phrases, Probable Cause, v. 34, p. 12.