EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-20387. January 31, 1968.]

JESUS P. MORFE , plainti-appellee, v s . AMELITO R. MUTUC, as
Executive Secretary, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Jesus P. Morfe for his own behalf as plaintiff-appellee.

Solicitor General for defendants-appellants.
SYLLABUS
1.
CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW;
STATUTES;
NULLIFICATION
OF;
FACTUAL
FOUNDATION NECESSARY TO OVERCOME PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY. The lower
court's decision declaring as unconstitutional Section 7, Republic Act No. 3019,
insofar as it required periodical submittal of sworn statements of nancial
conditions, assets and liabilities of an ocial or employee of the government after
he had once submitted such a sworn statement upon assuming oce, contained no
factual foundation on which the nullication of this section of the statute could be
based. In the absence of such a factual foundation, the presumption of validity must
prevail (Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association v. The Mayor of
Manila, L-24693, July 31, 1967). On this ground alone, the lower court decision
could be reversed.
2.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE LESS RIGID IN CONSTITUTIONAL THREATS TO
FREEDOM OF THE MIND. Where the nullity of a statute, executive order, or
ordinance may not be readily apparent and the threat to constitutional rights,
especially those involving the freedom of the mind, is present and ominous, there
should not be a rigid insistence on the requirement that evidence be presented.
3.
ID.; ID.; ANTI-GRAFT ACT OF 1960; PURPOSE THEREOF. The Anti- Graft Act
of 1960 was aimed at curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for ocial
corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service. It is intended
to further promote morality in public administration. A public oce must indeed be
a public trust. Nobody can cavil at its objective; the goal to be pursued commands
the assent of all. The conditions then prevailing called for norms of such character.
The times demanded such a remedial device. By the provisions of the challenged
section, it becomes much more dicult by those disposed to take advantage of their
position to commit acts of graft and corruption. While in the attainment of such
public good, no infringement of constitutional rights is permissible, there must be a
showing, clear, categorical, and undeniable, that what the Constitution condemns,
the statute allows.
4.
ID.; POLICE POWER; DEFINITION OF. Police power is the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, education, good order, safety, or the

general welfare of the people. It has been negatively put forth by Justice Malcolm as
"that inherent and plenary power in the state which enables it to prohibit all things
hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society."
5.
ID.; ID.; STATUTE ENACTED UNDER THE POLICE POWER OF THE STATE;
PUBLIC OFFICIAL ADVERSELY AFFECTED MAY INVOKE THE PROTECTION OF DUE
PROCESS. Any public ocial claiming to be adversely aected by a statute
enacted under the police power of the state to promote morality in public service
and thereby limited in scope to ocialdom may rely on the due process clause to
annul such statute or any portion thereof. Since the police power extends to
regulatory action aecting persons in public or private life, then anyone with an
alleged grievance can invoke the protection of due process or liberty as long as such
requirement is observed. To the extent then that the questioned section of the
statute compels public ocials to do a certain act, there is an infringement on their
liberty. However, under the Constitution, such a restriction is allowable as long as
due process is observed.
6.
ID.; ID.; DUE PROCESS; STANDARD TO BE OBSERVED. The standard of due
process which must exist both as a procedural and as substantive requisite to free a
challenged ordinance, or any governmental action for that matter, from the
imputation of legal inrmity sucient to spell its doom is its responsiveness to the
supremacy of reason, and obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put,
arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due process
requirement, ocial action, to paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of
reason and result in sheer oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any ocial
action marred by lack of reasonableness.
7.
ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION 7, R.A. 3019 NEITHER ARBITRARY NOR OPPRESSIVE.
It would be to dwell in the realm of abstractions and to ignore the harsh and
compelling realities of public service with its ever-present temptation to heed the
call of greed and avarice to condemn as arbitrary and oppressive a requirement as
that imposed on public ocials and employees to le such sworn statement of
assets and liabilities every two years after having done so upon assuming oce. The
due process clause is not susceptible to such a reproach. There was therefore no
unconstitutional exercise of police power.
8.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO PRIVACY NOT VIOLATED. The challenged
statutory provision does not call for disclosure of information which infringes on the
right of a person to privacy. It cannot be denied that the rational relationship such a
requirement possesses with the objective of a valid statute goes very far in
precluding assent to an objection of such character. This is not to say that a public
ocer, by virtue of the position he holds, is bereft of constitutional protection; it is
only to emphasize that in subjecting him to such a further compulsory revelation of
his assets and liabilities, including the statement of the amounts and sources of
income, the amounts of personal and family expenses, and the amount of income
taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year, there is no unconstitutional
intrusion into what would otherwise be a private sphere.

9.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE GUARANTEE AGAINST
UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE. No violation of the guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure has been shown to exist by such requirement of
further periodical submission of one's nancial condition as set forth in the AntiGraft of 1960.
10.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PROTECTION AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION; WHEN IT MAY
BE INVOKED. The protection which the guarantee against self- incrimination
aords will have to await, in the language of Justice J.B.L. Reyes, for the existence
of actual cases, "be they criminal, civil or administrative." Prior to such a stage,
there is no pressing need to pass upon the validity of the fear sincerely voiced that
there is an infringement of the non-incrimination clause.
11.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ITS WISDOM CANNOT BE INQUIRED INTO. The
questioned section of the statute cannot be nullied on the allegation that it
constitutes an insult to the personal integrity and ocial dignity of public ocials.
Such action would in eect question the wisdom of the statute which is not
allowable under the principle of separation of powers. There would be intrusion not
allowable under the Constitution if on a matter left to the discretion of a coordinate
branch, the judiciary would substitute its own.
DECISION
FERNANDO, J :
p

Congress in 1960 enacted the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act 1 to deter public
ocials and employees from committing acts of dishonesty and improve the tone of
morality in public service. It was declared to be the state policy "in line with the
principle that a public oce is a public trust, to repress certain acts of public ocers
and private persons alike which constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may
lead thereto." 2 Nor was it the rst statute of its kind to deal with such a grave
problem in the public service that unfortunately has aicted the Philippines in the
post-war era. An earlier statute decrees the forfeiture in favor of the State of any
property found to have been unlawfully acquired by any public ocer or employee.
3

One of the specic provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act of 1960 is
that every public ocer, either within thirty (30) days after its approval or after his
assumption of oce "and within the month of January of every other year
thereafter," as well as upon the termination of his position, shall prepare and le
with the head of the oce to which he belongs, a "true detailed and sworn
statement of assets and liabilities, including a statement of the amounts and
sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the
amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year: . . ." 4
In this declaratory relief proceeding, the periodical submission "within the month of

January of every other year thereafter" of such sworn statement of assets and
liabilities after an ocer or employee had once bared his nancial condition upon
assumption of once was challenged for being violative of due process as an
oppressive exercise of police power and as an unlawful invasion of the constitutional
right to privacy, implicit in the ban against unreasonable search and seizure
construed together with the prohibition against self-incrimination. The lower court
in the decision appealed from sustained plainti, then as well as now, a judge of
repute of a court of rst instance. For it, such requirement of periodical submission
of such sworn statement of assets and liabilities exceeds the permissible limit of the
police power and is thus offensive to the due process clause.
We do not view the matter thus and accordingly reverse the lower court.
1.
The reversal could be predicated on the absence of evidence to rebut the
presumption of validity. For in this action for declaratory relief led with the Court
of First Instance of Pangasinan on January 31, 1962, plainti, after asserting his
belief "that it was a reasonable requirement for employment that a public ocer
make of record his assets and liabilities upon assumption of oce and thereby make
it possible thereafter to determine whether, after assuming his position in the public
service, he accumulated assets grossly disproportionate to his reported incomes,
(sic) the herein plainti [having] led within the period of time xed in the
aforesaid Administrative Order No. 334 the prescribed sworn statement of nancial
condition, assets. income and liabilities, . . ." 5 maintained that the provision on the
"periodical ling of sworn statement of nancial condition, assets, income and
liabilities after an ocer or employee had once bared his nancial condition, upon
assumption of office, is oppressive and unconstitutional." 6

As earlier noted, both the protection of due process and the assurance of the privacy
of the individual as may be inferred from the prohibition against unreasonable
search and seizure and self-incrimination were relied upon. There was also the
allegation that the above requirement amounts to "an insult to the personal
integrity and ocial dignity" of public ocials, premised as it is "on the
unwarranted and derogatory assumption" that they are "corrupt at heart" and
unless thus restrained by this periodical submission of the statements of "their
nancial condition, income, and expenses, they cannot be trusted to desist from
committing the corrupt practices dened . . ." 7 It was further asserted that there
was no need for such a provision as "the income tax law and the tax census law also
require statements which can serve to determine whether an ocer or employee in
this Republic has enriched himself out of proportion to his reported income." 8
Then on February 14, 1962, came an Answer of the then Executive Secretary and
the then Secretary of Justice as defendants, where after practically admitting the
facts alleged, they denied the erroneous conclusion of law and as one of the special
armative defenses set forth: "1. That when a government ocial, like plainti,
accepts a public position, he is deemed to have voluntarily assumed the obligation
to give information about his personal aair, not only at the time of his assumption

of oce but during the time he continues to discharge public trust. The private life
of an employee cannot be segregated from his public life . . ." 9 The answer likewise
denied that there was a violation of his constitutional rights against selfincrimination as well as unreasonable search and seizure and maintained that "the
provision of law in question cannot be attacked on the ground that it impairs
plainti s normal and legitimate enjoyment of his life and liberty because said
provision merely seeks to adopt a reasonable measure of insuring the interest of
general welfare in honest and clean public service and is therefore a legitimate
exercise of the police power." 10
On February 27, 1962, plainti led a Motion for judgment on the pleadings as in
his opinion all his material allegations were admitted. Then on March 10, 1962, an
order was issued giving the parties thirty days within which to submit memoranda,
but with or without them, the case was deemed submitted for decision the lower
court being of the belief that "there is no question of facts, . . . the defendants
[having admitted] all the material allegations of the complaint." 11
The decision, now on appeal, came on July 19, 1962, the lower court declaring
"unconstitutional, null and void Section 7, Republic Act No. 3019, in so far as it
required periodical submittal of sworn statements of nancial conditions, assets and
liabilities of an ocial or employee of the government after he had once submitted
such a sworn statement upon assuming office; . . ." 12
In Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association v. The Mayor of Manila, 13 it
was the holding of this Court that in the absence of a factual foundation, the lower
court deciding the matter purely "on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the
presumption of validity must prevail." In the present case likewise there was no
factual foundation on which the nullication of this section of the statute could be
based. Hence as noted the decision of the lower court could be reversed on that
ground.
A more extended consideration is not inappropriate however, for as likewise made
clear in the above Ermita-Malate Hotel case: "What cannot be stressed suciently is
that if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for
the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where
the liberty curtailed aects at the most rights of property, the permissible scope of
regulatory measure is wider."
Moreover, in the Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration in the above
case, we expressly armed: "This is not to discount the possibility of a situation
where the nullity of a statute, executive order, or ordinance may not be readily
apparent but the threat to constitutional rights, especially those involving the
freedom of the mind, present and ominous." 14 In such an event therefore, "there
should not be a rigid insistence on the requirement that evidence be presented."
Also, in the same Resolution, Professor Freund was quoted thus: "In short, when
freedom of the mind is imperiled by law, it is freedom that commands a momentum
of respect; when property is imperiled, it is the lawmakers' judgment that
commands respect. This dual standard may not precisely reverse the presumption of

constitutionality in civil liberties cases, but obviously it does set up a hierarchy of

values within the due process clause." 15
2.
We inquire rst whether or not by virtue of the above requirement for a
periodical submission of sworn statement of assets and liabilities, there is an
invasion of liberty protected by the due process clause.
Under the Anti-Graft Act of 1960, after the statement of policy 1 6 and denition of
terms, 17 there is an enumeration of corrupt practices declared unlawful in addition
to acts or omissions of public ocers already penalized by existing law. They include
persuading, inducing, or inuencing another public ocer to perform an act
constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent
authority or an oense in connection with the ocial duties of the latter, or
allowing himself to be persuaded, induced, or inuenced to commit such violation or
oense; requesting or receiving directly or indirectly any gift, present, share,
percentage, or benet, for himself, or for any other person, in connection with any
contract or transaction between the government and any other party, wherein the
public ocer in his ocial capacity, has to intervene under the law; requesting or
receiving directly or indirectly any gift, present, or other pecuniary or material
benet, for himself or for another, from any person for whom the public ocer, in
any manner or capacity, has secured or obtained, or will secure or obtain, any
Government permit or license, in consideration for the help given or to be given;
accepting or having any member of his family accept employment in a private
enterprise which has pending official business with him during the pendency thereof
or within one year after its termination; causing any undue injury to any party,
including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benets,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his ocial administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence; neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without sucient
justication, to act within a reasonable time on any matter pending before him for
the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person interested in the
matter some pecuniary or material benet or advantage, or for the purpose of
favoring his own interest or giving undue advantage in favor of or discriminating
against any other interested party; entering, on behalf of the Government, into any
contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same,
whether or not the public ocer proted or will prot thereby; having directly or
indirectly nancial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in
connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which
he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interests;
becoming interested directly or indirectly, for personal gain, or having a material
interest in any transaction or act requiring the approval of a board, panel or group of
which he is a member, and which exercises discretion in such approval, even if he
votes against the same or does not participate in such action; approving or granting
knowingly any license, permit, privilege or benet in favor of any person not
qualied for or not legally entitled to such license, permit, privilege or advantage, or
of a mere representative or dummy of one who is not so qualied or entitled and
divulging valuable information of a condential character, acquired by his oce or
by him on account of his ocial position to unauthorized persons, or releasing such

information in advance of its authorized release date. 18

After which come the prohibition on private individuals, 19 prohibition on certain
relatives, 20 and prohibition on Members of Congress. 21 Then there is this
requirement of a statement of assets and liabilities, that portion requiring periodical
submission being challenged here. 22 The other sections of the Act deal with
dismissal due to unexplained wealth, reference being made to the previous statute,
23 penalties for violation, 24 the vesting of original jurisdiction in the Court of First
Instance as the competent court, 25 the prescription of oenses, 26 the prohibition
against any resignation or retirement pending investigation, criminal or
administrative or pending a prosecution, 27 suspension and loss of benets, 28
exception of unsolicited gifts or presents of small or insignicant value as well as
recognition of legitimate practice of one's profession or trade or occupation, 29 the
separability clause, 30 and its effectivity. 31
Nothing can be clearer therefore than that the Anti-Graft Act of 1960 like the earlier
statute 32 was precisely aimed at curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for
ocial corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service. It is
intended to further promote morality in public administration. A public oce must
indeed be a public trust. Nobody can cavil at its objective; the goal to be pursued
commands the assent of all. The conditions then prevailing called for norms of such
character. The times demanded such a remedial device.

The statute was framed with that end in view. It is comprehensive in character,
suciently detailed and explicit to make clear to all and sundry what practices were
prohibited and penalized. More than that, an eort was made, so evident from even
a cursory perusal thereof, to avoid evasions and plug loopholes. One such feature is
the challenged section. Thereby it becomes much more dicult by those disposed to
take advantage of their positions to commit acts of graft and corruption.
While in the attainment of such public good, no infringement of constitutional rights
is permissible, there must be a showing, clear, categorical, and undeniable, that
what the Constitution condemns, the statute allows. More specically, since that is
the only question raised, is that portion of the statute requiring periodical
submission of assets and liabilities, after an ocer or employee had previously done
so upon assuming office, so infected with infirmity that it cannot be upheld as valid?
Or, in traditional terminology, is this requirement a valid exercise of the police
power? In the aforesaid Ermita-Malate Hotel decision,33 there is a rearmation of
its nature and scope as embracing the power to prescribe regulations to promote the
health, morals, education, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. It
has been negatively put forth by Justice Malcolm as "that inherent and plenary
power in the state which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort,
safety and welfare of society." 34
Earlier Philippine cases refer to police power as the power to promote the general
welfare and public interest; 35 to enact such laws in relation to persons and property

as may promote public health, public morals, public safety and the general welfare
of each inhabitant; 36 to preserve public order and to prevent oenses against the
state and to establish for the intercourse of citizen with citizen those rules of good
manners and good neighborhood calculated to prevent conict of rights. 37 In his
work on due process, Mott 38 stated that the term police power was rst used by
Chief Justice Marshall. 39
As currently in use both in Philippine and American decisions then, police power
legislation usually has reference to regulatory measures restraining either the rights
to property or liberty of private individuals. It is undeniable however that one of its
earliest denitions, valid then as well as now, given by Marshall's successor, Chief
Justice Taney, does not limit its scope to curtailment of rights whether of liberty or
property of private individuals. Thus: "But what are the police powers of a State?
They are nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every
sovereignty to the extent of its dominions. And whether a State passes a quarantine
law, or a law to punish oenses, or to establish courts of justice, or requiring certain
instruments to be recorded, or to regulate commerce within its own limits, in every
case it exercises the same power; that is to say, the power of sovereignty, the
power to govern men and things within the limits of its domain." 40 Text writers like
Cooley and Burdick were of a similar mind. 41
What is under consideration is a statute enacted under the police power of the state
to promote morality in public service necessarily limited in scope to ocialdom. May
a public ocial claiming to be adversely aected rely on the due process clause to
annul such statute or any portion thereof? The answer must be in the armative. If
the police power extends to regulatory action aecting persons in public or private
life, then anyone with an alleged grievance can invoke the protection of due process
which permits deprivation of property or liberty as long as such requirement is
observed.
While the soundness of the assertion that a public oce is a public trust and as such
not amounting to property in its usual sense cannot be denied, there can be no
disputing the proposition that from the standpoint of the security of tenure
guaranteed by the Constitution the mantle of protection aorded by due process
could rightfully be invoked. It was so implicitly held in Lacson v. Romero, 42 in line
with the then pertinent statutory provisions 43 that procedural due process in the
form of an investigation at which he must be given a fair hearing and an
opportunity to defend himself must be observed before a civil service ocer or
employee may be removed. There was a rearmation of the view in even stronger
language when this Court through Justice Tuason in Lacson v. Roque, 44 declared
that even without express provision of law, "it is established by the great weight of
authority that the power of removal or suspension for cause can not, except by clear
statutory authority, be exercised without notice and hearing." Such is likewise the
import of a statement from the then Justice, now Chief Justice, Concepcion,
speaking for the Court in Meneses v. Lacson; 45 "At any rate, the reinstatement
directed in the decision appealed from does not bar such appropriate administrative
action as the behaviour of petitioners herein may warrant, upon compliance with
the requirements of due process."

To the same eect is the holding of this Court extending the mantle of the security
of tenure provision to employees of government-owned or controlled corporations
entrusted with governmental functions when through Justice Padilla in Tabora v.
Montelibano, 46 it stressed: "That safeguard, guarantee, or feeling of security that
they would hold their oce or employment during good behavior and would not be
dismissed without justiable cause to be determined in an investigation, where an
opportunity to be heard and defend themselves in person or by counsel is aorded
them, would bring about such a desirable condition." Reference was there made to
promoting honesty and eciency through an assurance of stability in their
employment relation. It was to be expected then that through Justice Labrador in
Unabia v. City Mayor, 47 this Court could categorically arm: "As the removal of
petitioner was made without investigation and without cause, said removal is null
and void . . ."
It was but logical therefore to expect an explicit holding of the applicability of due
process guaranty to be forthcoming. It did in Cammayo v. Via, 48 where the
opinion of Justice Endencia for the Court contained the following unmistakable
language: "Evidently, having these facts in view, it cannot be pretended that the
constitutional provision of due process of law for the removal of the petitioner has
not been complied with."
Then came this restatement of the principle from the pen of Justice J.B.L. Reyes:
"We are thus compelled to conclude that the positions formerly held by appellees
were not primarily condential in nature so as to make their terms of oce coterminal with the condence reposed in them. The inevitable corollary is that
respondents-appellees, Leon Piero, et al., were not subject to dismissal or removal,
except for cause specified by law and with due process . . ." 49 In a still later decision,
Abaya v. Subido, 50 this Court, through Justice Sanchez, emphasized "that the
vitality of the constitutional principle of due process cannot be allowed to weaken
by sanctioning cancellation" of an employee's eligibility or "of his dismissal from
service without hearing upon a doubtful assumption that he has admitted his
guilt for an oense against Civil Service rules." Equally emphatic is this observation
from the same case: "A civil service employee should be heard before he is
condemned. Jurisprudence has clung to this rule with such unrelenting grasp that by
now it would appear trite to make citations thereof."
If as is so clearly and unequivocally held by this Court, due process may be relied
upon by public ocial to protect the security of tenure which in that limited sense is
analogous to property, could he not likewise avail himself of such constitutional
guarantee to strike down what he considers to be an infringement of his liberty?
Both on principle, reason and authority, the answer must be in the armative.
Even a public ocial has certain rights to freedom the government must respect. To
the extent then, that there is a curtailment thereof, it could only be permissible if
the due process mandate is not disregarded.
Since under the constitutional scheme, liberty is the rule and restraint the
exception, the question raised cannot just be brushed aside. In a leading Philippine
case, Rubi v. Provincial Board, 51 liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was

defined by Justice Malcolm to include "the right to exist and the right to be free from
arbitrary personal restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere
freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to
embrace the right of man to enjoy the faculties with which he has been endowed by
his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare."
In accordance with this case therefore, the rights of the citizens to be free to use his
facilities in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by
any lawful calling; to pursue any avocation, are all deemed embraced in the concept
of liberty. This Court in the same case, however, gave the warning that liberty as
understood in democracies, is not license. Implied in the term is restraint by law for
the good of the individual and for the greater good, the peace and order of society
and the general well-being. No one can do exactly as he pleases. Every man must
renounce unbridled license. In the words of Mabini as quoted by Justice Malcolm,
"liberty is freedom to do right and never wrong; it is ever guided by reason and the
upright and honorable conscience of the individual."

The liberty to be safeguarded is, as pointed out by Chief Justice Hughes, liberty in a
social organization, 52 implying the absence of arbitrary restraint not immunity from
reasonable regulations and prohibitions imposed in the interest of the community.
53 It was Linton's view that "to belong to a society is to sacrice some measure of
individual liberty, no matter how slight the restraints which the society consciously
imposes." 54 The above statement from Linton, however, should be understood in
the sense that liberty, in the interest of public health, public order or safety, of
general welfare, in other words through the proper exercise of the police power,
may be regulated. The individual though, as Justice Cardozo pointed out, has still
left a "domain of free activity that cannot be touched by government or law at all,
whether the command is specially against him or generally against him and others."
55

Is this provision for a periodical submission of sworn statement of assets and

liabilities after he had led one upon assumption of oce beyond the power of
government to impose? Admittedly without the challenged provision, a public
ocer would be free from such a requirement. To the extent then that there is a
compulsion to act in a certain way, his liberty is aected. It cannot be denied
however that under the Constitution, such a restriction is allowable as long as due
process is observed.
The more crucial question therefore is whether there is an observance of due
process. That leads us to an inquiry into its signicance. "There is no controlling and
precise denition of due process. It furnishes though a standard to which
governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or
property, in each appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard of due
process which must exist both as a procedural and as substantive requisite to free
the challenged ordinance, or any governmental action for that matter, from the
imputation of legal inrmity sucient to spell its doom? It is responsiveness to the
supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put,

arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due process
requirement, ocial action, to paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of
reason and result in sheer oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any ocial
action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly has it been identied as freedom
from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play. It exacts
fealty 'to those strivings for justice' and judges the act of ocialdom of whatever
branch 'in the light of reason drawn from considerations of fairness that reect
[democratic] traditions of legal and political thought.' It is not a narrow or 'technical
conception with xed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances,' decisions
based on such a clause requiring a 'close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental
principles of our society.' Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or
pedantically in slavery to form or phrases." 56
It would be to dwell in the realm of abstractions and to ignore the harsh and
compelling realities of public service with its ever-present temptation to heed the
call of greed and avarice to condemn as arbitrary and oppressive a requirement as
that imposed on public ocials and employees to le such sworn statement of
assets and liabilities every two years after having done so upon assuming oce. The
due process clause is not susceptible to such a reproach. There was therefore no
unconstitutional exercise of the police power.
4.
The due process question touching on an alleged deprivation of liberty as thus
resolved goes a long way in disposing of the objections raised by plainti that the
provision on the periodical submission of a sworn statement of assets and liabilities
is violative of the constitutional right to privacy. There is much to be said for this
view of Justice Douglas: "Liberty in the constitutional sense must mean more than
freedom from unlawful governmental restraint; it must include privacy as well, if it
is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of
all freedom." 57 As a matter of fact, this right to be let alone is, to quote from Mr.
Justice Brandeis "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men." 58
The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel respect
for his personality as a unique individual whose claim to privacy and interference
demands respect. As Laski so very aptly stated: "Man is one among many,
obstinately refusing reduction to unity. His separateness, his isolation, are
indefeasible; indeed, they are so fundamental that they are the basis on which his
civic obligations are built. He cannot abandon the consequences of his isolation,
which are, broadly speaking, that his experience is private, and the will built out of
that experience personal to himself. If he surrenders his will to others, he
surrenders his personality. If his will is set by the will of others, he ceases to be
master of himself. I cannot believe that a man no longer master of himself is in any
real sense free." 59
Nonetheless, in view of the fact that there is an express recognition of privacy,
specically that of communication and correspondence which "shall be inviolable
except upon lawful order of Court or when public safety and order" 60 may
otherwise require, and implicitly in the search and seizure clause, 61 and the liberty

of abode, 62 the alleged repugnancy of such statutory requirement of further

periodical submission of a sworn statement of assets and liabilities deserves to be
further looked into.
In that respect the question is one of rst impression, no previous decision having
been rendered by this Court. It is not so in the United States where, in the leading
case of Griswold v. Connecticut, 63 Justice Douglas, speaking for ve members of the
Court, stated: "Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association
contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen. The
Third Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers 'in any house'
in time of peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy.
The Fourth Amendment explicitly arms the 'right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and eects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures.' The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination clause enables the citizen
to create a zone of privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his
detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: 'The enumeration in the Constitution,
of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people."' After referring to various American Supreme Court decisions, 64 Justice
Douglas continued: "These cases bear witness that the right of privacy which
presses for recognition is a legitimate one."
The Griswold case invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of
contraceptives a criminal oense on the ground of its amounting to an
unconstitutional invasion of the right of privacy of married persons; rightfully it
stressed "a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several
fundamental constitutional guarantees." 65 It has wider implication though. The
constitutional right to privacy has come into its own.
So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as such is accorded
recognition independently of its identication with liberty; in itself, it is fully
deserving of constitutional protection. The language of Prof. Emerson is particularly
apt: "The concept of limited government has always included the idea that
governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the
citizen. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions between absolute and limited
government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his
life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited
government safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individual, rmly
distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can control. Protection of
this private sector protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the
individual has become increasingly important as modern society has developed.
All the forces of a technological age industrialization, urbanization, and
organization operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it.
In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life
marks the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society." 66
Even with due recognition of such a view, it cannot be said that the challenged
statutory provision calls for disclosure of information which infringes on the right of
a person to privacy. It cannot be denied that the rational relationship such a

requirement possesses with the objective of a valid statute goes very far in
precluding assent to an objection of such character. This is not to say that a public
ocer, by virtue of a position he holds, is bereft of constitutional protection; it is
only to emphasize that in subjecting him to such a further compulsory revelation of
his assets and liabilities, including the statement of the amounts and sources of
income, the amounts of personal and family expenses, and the amount of income
taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year, there is no unconstitutional
intrusion into what otherwise would be a private sphere.
5.
Could it be said, however, as plainti contends, that in so far as the challenged
provision requires the periodical ling of a sworn statement of nancial condition, it
would be violative of the guarantees against unreasonable search and seizure and
against self-incrimination?

His complaint cited on this point Davis v. United States. 67 In that case, petitioner
Davis was convicted under an information charging him with unlawfully having in
his possession a number of gasoline ration coupons representing so many gallons of
gasoline, an offense penalized under a 1940 statute. 68 He was convicted both in the
lower court and in the Circuit Court of Appeals over the objection that there was an
unlawful search which resulted in the seizure of the coupons and that their use at
the trial was in violation of Supreme Court decisions. 69 In the District Court, there
was a nding that he consented to the search and seizure. The Circuit Court of
Appeals did not disturb that nding although expressed doubt concerning it,
arming however under the view that such seized coupons were properly
introduced in evidence, the search and seizure being incidental to an arrest, and
therefore reasonable regardless of petitioner's consent.
In arming the conviction the United States Supreme Court, through Justice
Douglas emphasized that the Court was dealing in this case "not with private papers
or documents, but with gasoline ration coupons which never became the private
property of the holder but remained at all times the property of the government
and subject to inspection and recall by it." 70 He made it clear that the opinion was
not to be understood as suggesting "that ocers seeking to reclaim government
property may proceed lawlessly and subject to no restraints. Nor [does it] suggest
that the right to inspect under the regulations subjects a dealer to a general search
of his papers for the purpose of learning whether he has any coupons subject to
inspection and seizure. The nature of the coupons is important here merely as
indicating that the ocers did not exceed the permissible limits of persuasion in
obtaining them." 71
True, there was a strong dissenting opinion by Justice Frankfurter in which Justice
Murphy joined, critical of what it considered "a process of devitalizing interpretation"
which in this particular case gave approval "to what was done by arresting ocers"
and expressing the regret that the Court might be "in danger of forgetting that the
Bill of Rights reflects experience with police excesses."
Even this opinion, however, conceded that the constitutional guarantee against

unreasonable search and seizure "does not give freedom from testimonial
compulsion. Subject to familiar qualications every man is under obligation to give
testimony. But that obligation can be exacted only under judicial sanctions which
are deemed precious to Anglo-American civilization. Merely because there may be
the duty to make documents available for litigation does not mean that police
ocers may forcibly or fraudulently obtain them. This protection of the right to be
let alone except under responsible judicial compulsion is precisely what the Fourth
Amendment meant to express and to safeguard." 72
It would appear then that a reliance on that case for an allegation that this
statutory provision oends against the unreasonable search and seizure clause
would be futile and unavailing. This is the more so in the light of the latest decision
of this Court in Stonehill v. Diokno, 73 where this Court, through Chief Justice
Concepcion, after stressing that the constitutional requirements must be strictly
complied with, and that it would be "a legal heresy of the highest order" to convict
anybody of a violation of certain statutes without reference to any of its
determinate provisions delimited its scope as "one of the most fundamental rights
guaranteed in our Constitution," safeguarding "the sanctity of the domicile and the
privacy of communication and correspondence . . ." Such is precisely the evil sought
to be remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted to outlaw the socalled general warrants.
It thus appears clear that no violation of the guarantee against unreasonable search
and seizure has been shown to exist by such requirement of further periodical
submission of one's financial condition as set forth in the Anti-Graft Act of 1960.
Nor does the contention of plainti gain greater plausibility, much less elicit
acceptance, by his invocation of the non-incrimination clause. According to the
Constitution: "No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself." 74 This
constitutional provision gives the accused immunity from any attempt by the
prosecution to make easier its task by coercing or intimidating him to furnish the
evidence necessary to convict. He may confess, but only if he voluntarily wills it. He
may admit certain facts but only if he freely chooses to. 75 Or he could remain silent,
and the prosecution is powerless to compel him to talk. 76 Proof is not solely
testimonial in character. It may be documentary. Neither then could the accused be
ordered to write, when what comes from his pen may constitute evidence of guilt or
innocence. 77 Moreover, there can be no search or seizure of his house, papers or
effects for the purpose of locating incriminatory matter. 78
In a declaratory action proceeding then, the objection based on the guaranty against
self-incrimination is far from decisive. It is well to note what Justice Tuason stated:
"What the above inhibition seeks to [prevent] is compulsory disclosure of
incriminating facts." 79 Necessarily then, the protection it aords will have to await,
in the language of Justice J.B.L. Reyes, the existence of actual cases, "be they
criminal, civil or administrative." 80 Prior to such a stage there is no pressing need to
pass upon the validity of the fear sincerely voiced that there is an infringement of
the non-incrimination clause. What was said in an American State decision is of
relevance. In that case, a statutory provision requiring any person operating a motor

vehicle, who knows that injury has been caused a person or property, to stop and
give his name, residence, and his license number to the injured party or to a police
ocer was sustained as against the contention that the information thus exacted
may be used as evidence to establish his connection with the injury and therefore
compels him to incriminate himself. As was stated in the opinion: "If the law which
exacts this information is invalid, because such information, although in itself no
evidence of guilt, might possibly lead to a charge of crime against the informant,
then all police regulations which involve identication may be questioned on the
same ground. We are not aware of any constitutional provision designed to protect
a man's conduct from judicial inquiry, or aid him in eeing from justice. But, even if
a constitutional right be involved, it is not necessary to invalidate the statute to
secure its protection. If, in this particular case, the constitutional privilege justied
the refusal to give the information exacted by the statute, that question can be
raised in the defense to the pending prosecution. Whether it would avail, we are not
called upon to decide in this proceeding." 81
6.
Nor could such a provision be nullied on the allegation that it constitutes "an
insult to the personal integrity and ocial dignity" of public ocials. On its face, it
cannot thus be stigmatized. As to its being unnecessary, it is well to remember that
this Court, in the language of Justice Laurel, "does not pass upon questions of
wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation." 82 As expressed by Justice Tuason: "It
is not the province of the courts to supervise legislation and keep it within the
bounds of propriety and common sense. That is primarily and exclusively a
legislative concern." 83 There can be no possible objection then to the observation of
Justice Montemayor: "As long as laws do not violate any Constitutional provision,
the Courts merely interpret and apply them regardless of whether or not they are
wise or salutary." 84 For they, according to Justice Labrador, "are not supposed to
override legitimate policy and . . . never inquire into the wisdom of the law." 85
It is thus settled, to paraphrase Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales v. Commission
on Elections, 86 that only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the
action taken, may be the basis for declaring a statute invalid. This is as it ought to
be. The principle of separation of powers has in the main wisely allocated the
respective authority of each department and conned its jurisdiction to such a
sphere. There would then be intrusion not allowable under the Constitution if on a
matter left to the discretion of a coordinate branch, the judiciary would substitute
its own. If there be adherence to the rule of law, as there ought to be, the last
oender should be courts of justice, to which rightly litigants submit their
controversy precisely to maintain unimpaired the supremacy of legal norms and
prescriptions. The attack on the validity of the challenged provision likewise insofar
as there may be objections, even if valid and cogent, on its wisdom cannot be
sustained.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of July 19, 1962 "declaring
unconstitutional, null and void Section 7, Republic Act No. 3019, insofar as it
requires periodical submittal of sworn statements of nancial conditions, assets and
liabilities of an ocial or employee of the government after he had once submitted
such a sworn statement . . . is reversed." Without costs.

Concepcion, C . J ., Reyes, J .B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J .P., Zaldivar and Angeles, JJ .,

concur.
Sanchez, J ., reserves his vote.
Dizon and Castro, JJ ., concur in the result.
Footnotes

1.

Republic Act No. 3019, approved August 17, 1960.

2.

Section 1, Statement of Policy.

3.

Republic Act 1379, approved June 18, 1955.

4.

Sec. 7.
Statement of assets and liabilities . Every public ocer, within thirty
days after the approval of this Act or after assuming oce, and within the month
of January of every other year thereafter, as well as upon the expiration of his
term of oce, or upon his resignation or separation from oce, shall prepare and
le with the oce of the corresponding Department Head, or in the case of Head
of Department or chief of an independent oce, with the Oce of the President,
or in the case of members of the Congress and the ocials and employees
thereof, with the Oce of the Secretary of the corresponding House, a true
detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities, including a statement of the
accounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family
expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar
year: Provided, That public ocers assuming oce less than two months before
the end of the calendar year, may le their rst statements in the following months
of January.

5.

Complaint, Record on Appeal, p. 4.

6.

Complaint, Record on Appeal, p. 5.

7.

Complaint, Record on Appeal, par. 5, p. 5.

8.

Complaint, Record on Appeal, p. 7.

9.

Record on Appeal, p. 10.

10.

Answer, pars. 4, 6 and 9, Record on Appeal, pp. 12, 14 and 15.

11.

Order of March 10, 1962, Record on Appeal, p. 18.

12.

Decision, of July 19, 1962, Record on Appeal, pp. 36-37.

13.

L-24693, July 31, 1967.

14.

Resolution denying Motion for Reconsideration, L-24693, October 23, 1967, p. 5.

15.

Freund, On Understanding the Supreme Court (1950) p. 11.

16.

Section 1, Rep. Act No. 3019.

17.

Section 2, Rep. Act No. 3019.

18.

Sec. 3, Id.

19.

Sec. 4, Id.

20.

Sec. 5, Id.

21.

Sec. 6, Id.

22.

Sec. 7, Id.

23.

Sec. 8, Id.

24.

Sec. 9, Id.

25.

Sec. 10, Id.

26.

Sec. 11, Id.

27.

Sec. 12, Id.

28.

Sec. 13, Id.

29.

Sec. 14, Id.

30.

Sec. 15, Id.

31.

Sec. 16, Id.

32.

Rep. Act No. 1379.

33.

L-24693, July 31, 1967.

34.

Rubi v. Provincial Board, 39 Phil. 660, 708 (1919).

35.

U.S. v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85, 94 (1910).

36.

U.S. v. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil. 218, 225 (1915).

37.

U.S. v. Pompeya, 31 Phil. 245, 254 (1915).

38.

Due Process of Law, 301.

39.

Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat, 208 (1824) and Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat, 419
(1827).

40.

License Cases, 5 How. 504, 583 (1847).

41.

2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, p. 1223 (1927), Burdick, The Law of the

American Constitution (1922).

42.

84 Phil. 740 (1949).

43.

Secs. 64, 694 Rev. Administrative Code.

44.

92 Phil. 456, 471 (1953).

45.

97 Phil. 857, 865 (1955).

46.

98 Phil. 800, 806 (1956).

47.

99 Phil. 253, 256 (1956).

48.

101 Phil. 1149, 1154 (1957).

49.

Piero v. Hechanova, L-22562, Oct. 22, 1966.

50.

L-25641, December 17, 1966.

51.

39 Phil. 660 (1919).

52.

West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).

53.

Chicago, B. & O. Ry. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549 (1910).

54.

The Individual, Culture and Society, p. 17 (1945).

55.

Paradoxes of Legal Science, p. 98 (1928).

56.

Ermita-Malate Hotel, etc., et al. v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila, L-24693, July 31,
1967.

57.

Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 467 (1952). In this case the
American Supreme Court rejected the claim that radio program on buses and
street cars of a private company regulated by the District Columbia invaded the
rights of privacy of passengers in violation of the due process clause. Mr. Justice
Douglas was the sole dissenter.

58.

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928). In this case Justice Brandeis
along with Justice Holmes dissented.

59.

Laski, Liberty in the Modern State, 44 (1949). Also "Secrecy nevertheless may be
an important component of the core idea of privacy as a public-law concept, and
to this probably should be added the factor of 'solitude' freedom from certain
social impositions and pressures. The meaning of privacy, as thus rened and
separated from a generalized concept of freedom, may be fairly well encompassed
by the twin ideas of secrecy, which protects the nondisclosure interest, and
solitude, which protects against coercions of belief or, derivatively, against actions
designed to make the holding of belief uncomfortable or against any undue social
intrusions on the intimacies and dignities of life. As already noted, however, these
twin ideas are Janus-faced, because secrecy in the context of associational privacy
is an activist concept supporting political action, whereas solitude in the context of

nondisclosure of nonconformity is a passivist, right-to-be-let-alone concept."

Dixon, The Griswold Penumbra, 64 Mich. Law Rev. 197, 205. (1965).
60.

Art. III, Sec. 1, par. 5, Constitution.

61.

Art. III, Sec. 1, par. 3, Constitution.

62.

Art. III, Sec. 1, par. 4, Constitution.

63.

381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).

64.

65.
66.

Boyd v. United States 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Breard v. City of Alexandria 341 U.S.
622 (1951); Public Utilities Comm. v. Pollak 341 U.S. 451 (1952); Frank v. Maryland
359 U.S. 360 (1959); Monroe v. Pape 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Mapp v. Ohio 367 U.S.
643 (1961); Lanza v. New York 370 U.S. 139 (1962).
Id. at p. 485.
Emerson Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 Mich. Law Rev. 219, 229
(1965). But compare the pungent observation of a knowledgeable and highly
literate critic of the social scene: "Privacy? What's that? There is no precise word
for it in Filipino, and as far as I know any Filipino dialect, and there is none because
there is no need for it. The concept and practice of privacy are missing from
conventional Filipino life. The Filipino believes that privacy is an unnecessary
imposition, an eccentricity that is barely pardonable or, at best, an esoteric
Western afterthought smacking of legal trickery." Guerrero-Nakpil, Consensus of
One Sunday Times Magazine, Sept. 24, 1967, at p. 18.

67.

328 U.S. 582 (1946).

68.

54 Stat. 676 as amended by the Act of May 31, 1940; 55 Stat. 236.

69.

Weeks v. United State, 232 U.S. 383 and United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S.
452.

70.

Id. at p. 588.

71.

Id. at p. 591.

72.

Id. at p. 596.

73.

L-19550, June 19, 1967.

74.

Art. III, Sec. 1, Clause 18.

75.

People v. Carillo, 77 Phil. 572 (1946).

76.

77.

U.S. v. Tan Teng, 23 Phil. 145 (1912); U.S. v. Ong Siu Hong, 36 Phil. 735 (1917);
Villaor v. Summers, 41 Phil. 62 (1920); and Jimenez v. Caizares, L-12790, Aug.
31, 1960.
Bermudez v. Castillo, 64 Phil. 483 (1937).

78.

Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), but see Warden v. Hayden, 18 L ed.
2d 182 (1967).

79.

People v. Carillo, 77 Phil. 572 (1946).

80.

Suarez v. Tengco, L-17113, May 23, 1961.

81.

Ex parte Kneedler 147 S.W. 983, 984 (1912).

82.

Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936).

83.

People v. Carlos, 78 Phil. 535, 548 (1947).

84.

Quintos v. Lacson, 97 Phil. 290, 293 (1955).

85.

Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155, 1166 (1957).

86.

L-28196, Nov. 9, 1967. There is nothing in the separate opinion of Justice

Sanchez to which ve other justices concurred that calls for a dierent conclusion,
the point of disagreement being in the earnestly held conviction of this group that
Congress exceeded its legitimate authority under the Constitution.