EN BANC

[G.R. No. 56158-64. March 17, 1981.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. MAYOR PABLO
SOLA, SANGGUNIANG BAYAN MEMBER FRANCISCO (ECOT)
GARCIA, RICARDO (CADOY)
GARCIA, JOSE
BETHOVEN
(ATSONG) CABRAL, CAPTAIN FLORENDO BALISCAO, JOHN,
PETER, OSCAR, OMAR, JACK, RICHARD, JAMES, DONALD,
WILLIAM, ROBERT, HOMER, JESSIE, ANDY, PAUL, all surnamed
DOE's, respondents.

Renecio R . Espiritu, Juan Hagad and Francisco Cruz as private prosecutors for
petitioner.
Francisco Tagamolila for respondent P. Sola.
Gregorio Andres for respondent F . Garcia.
Vicente M . Tagac for respondent F . Baliscao.
Cirilo Anigan for respondent R. Garcia.
SYNOPSIS
By virtue of a warrant for the search and seizure of the deceased bodies of seven
persons believed in the possession of accused Pablo Sola in his hacienda at Sta.
Isabel, Kabankalan, Negros Occidental, the 332nd PC/INP company made diggings in
the area that yielded two common graves. Seven separated murder charges were
led against Pablo Sola and his companions at the municipal court of Kabankalan.
An order of their arrest was issued but without giving the prosecution the
opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong, the court
granted them the right to post bail for their temporary release. Meanwhile, the
witnesses in the murder cases informed the prosecution of their fears that if trial is
held at the Court of First Instance branch in Himamaylan, 10 km. from Kabankalan,
their safety could be jeopardized. Hence, this petition to set aside the order granting
bail to the accused and for a change of venue or place of trial of the same criminal
cases to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
The Supreme Court, in a resolution issued the following day, transferred the venue
of the aforesaid criminal cases to Branch V of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental at Bacolod City and after respondents had submitted their comments,
which were considered as Answer, ruled that there was failure to abide by the basic
requirement that the prosecution be heard in a case where the accused is charged
with a capital oense prior to bail being granted necessitating cancellation of the
bail bonds and the remand of the case for such hearing.

The order granting bail was nullied and set aside. The executive Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Negros Occidental to whose sala the cases were transferred was
directed to hear the petitions for bail of private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUDICIARY; POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT TO
CHANGE THE VENUE OF CRIMINAL ACTIONS TO AVOID A MISCARRIAGE OF
JUSTICE. Article X, Sec. 5(4) of the Constitution is quite explicit. The Supreme
Court could order "a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of
justice." In the landmark decision of People v. Gutierrez, L-32282-83, Nov. 26, 1970,
the Supreme Court held: ". . . to compel the prosecution to proceed to trial in a
locality where its witnesses will not be at liberty to reveal what they know is to
make a mockery of the judicial process, and to betray the very purpose for which
courts have been established."
2.
ID.; RIGHT TO LIBERTY; BAIL; GRANT THEREOF MUST BE IN ACCORDANCE
WITH DUE PROCESS. Whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is in
custody for a capital offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of
a regular trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a
reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court
should resolve the motion for bail. If, as in the criminal case involved in the instant
special civil action, the prosecution should be denied such an opportunity, there
would be a violation of procedural due process, and the order of the court granting
bail should be considered void on that ground.
DECISION
FERNANDO, C.J :
p

The power of this Tribunal, constitutionally mandated, 1 to order a change of venue

to avoid any miscarriage of justice as well as the procedure ordained in the
implementation of the right to bail 2 are involved in this petition which, even if not
so denominated, partakes of the nature of a certiorari. It must have been the zeal of
private prosecutors Francisco Cruz and Renecio Espiritu, 3 no doubt under the
conviction that there was no time to lose, that must have led them to devote less
than that full measure of attention to certain fundamentals. They ignored the
principle that the responsibility for the conduct of the prosecution is with the public
ocials concerned. Nonetheless, the importance of the questions raised, the need
for a change of venue and the cancellation of the bail bonds, necessitated that
further action be taken. Accordingly, in a resolution dated February 12, 1981, one
day after the ling of the petition, the Court required the comment of the Solicitor
General as well as of the private respondents, 4 the accused in six pending criminal
cases before the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental.
cdphil

On March 4, 1981, the Comment was submitted by Solicitor General Estelito P.

Mendoza. 5 It opened with this preliminary statement: "The present petition was
led by the private prosecutors in Criminal Cases Nos. 1700-1706, People v. Pablo
Sola, et al., pending trial before the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental.
Rightly, any petition before this Honorable Court on behalf of the People of the
Philippines can, under the law, be instituted only by the Solicitor General. The
assertion of the petitioner private prosecutors that they are instituting the action
`subject to the control and supervision of the Fiscal' will not, therefore, improve
their legal standing." 6 Nonetheless, it did not press the legal point but instead
adopted "the two-pronged thrusts of the petition: 1. the setting aside, by certiorari,
of the order of the Municipal Court of Kabankalan, presided over by Judge Rafael
Gasataya, granting bail to the accused in the criminal cases mentioned above, and
2. the petition for a change of venue or place of trial of the same criminal cases to
avoid a miscarriage of justice." 7
The facts were therein narrated thus: "On September 15, 1980, acting on the
evidence presented by the Philippine Constabulary commander at Hinigaran, Negros
Occidental, the Court of First Instance of that province issued a search warrant for
the search and seizure of the deceased bodies of seven persons believed in the
possession of the accused Pablo Sola in his hacienda at Sta. Isabel, Kabankalan,
Negros Occidental. . . . On September 16, 1980, armed with the above warrant,
elements of the 332nd PC/INP Company proceeded to the place of Sola. Diggings
made in a caneeld yielded two common graves containing the bodies of Fernando
Fernandez, Mateo Olimpos, Alfredo Perez, Custodio Juanica, Arsolo Juanica, Rollie
Callet and Bienvenido Emperado. On September 23 and October 1, 1980, the PC
provincial commander of Negros Occidental led seven (7) separate complaints for
murder against the accused Pablo Sola, Francisco Garcia, Ricardo Garcia, Jose
Bethoven Cabral, Florendo Baliscao and fourteen (14) other persons of unknown
names. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 4129, 4130, 4131, 4137,
4138, 4139 and 4140 of the Municipal Court of Kabankalan. After due preliminary
examination of the complainant's witnesses and his other evidence, the municipal
court found probable cause against the accused. It thus issued an order for their
arrest. However, without giving the prosecution the opportunity to prove that the
evidence of guilt of the accused is strong, the court granted them the right to post
bail for their temporary release. The accused Pablo Sola, Francisco Garcia, and Jose
Bethoven Cabral availed themselves of this right and have since been released from
detention. In a parallel development, the witnesses in the murder cases informed
the prosecution of their fears that if the trial is held at the Court of First Instance
branch in Himamaylan which is but 10 kilometers from Kabankalan, their safety
could be jeopardized. At least two of the accused are ocials with power and
inuence in Kabankalan and they have been released on bail. In addition, most of
the accused remained at large. Indeed, there have been reports made to police
authorities of threats made on the families of the witnesses." 8 The facts alleged
argue strongly for the remedies sought, namely a change of venue and the
cancellation of the bail bonds.
LLpr

On the very next day, March 15, 1981, this Court issued the following resolution:
"The Court Resolved to: (a) [Note] the comment of the Solicitor General on the

urgent petition for change of venue and cancellation of bail bonds, adopting the plea
of the petition, namely, (1) the setting aside, by certiorari, of the order of the
Municipal Court of Kabankalan, presided over by Judge Rafael Gasataya, granting
bail to the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 4129, 4130, 4131, 4137, 4138, 4139 and
4140, all entitled `People of the Philippines v. Mayor Pablo Sola, et al.; (2) the
petition for a change of venue or place of trial of the same criminal cases to avoid a
miscarriage of justice; (b) [Transfer] the venue of the aforesaid criminal cases to
Branch V of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental at Bacolod City,
presided by Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio, considering that District Judge
Ostervaldo Emilia of the Court of First Instance, Negros Occidental, Branch VI at
Himamaylan has an approved leave of absence covering the period from January 12
to March 12, 1981 due to a mild attack of cerebral thrombosis and that the said
Branch V is the nearest court station to Himamaylan; and (c) [Await] the comment
of respondents on the petition to cancel bail, without prejudice to the public ocials
concerned taking the necessary measures to assure the safety of the witnesses of
the prosecution." 9 Thus, the issue of a change of venue has become moot and
academic. The comments respectively submitted by respondent Florendo Baliscao
on March 5, 1981, respondent Francisco Garcia on March 11, 1981 and respondent
Pablo Sola on March 16, 1981, dealt solely with the question of the cancellation of
the bail bonds. Such comments were considered as answers, with the case
thereafter deemed submitted for decision.

The sole remaining issue of the cancellation of the bail bonds of respondents, there
being a failure to abide by the basic requirement that the prosecution be heard in a
case where the accused is charged with a capital oense, prior to bail being granted,
must be decided in favor of petitioner. The bail bonds must be cancelled and the
case remanded to the sala of Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio for such hearing. So
we rule.
1.
It may not be amiss to say a few words on the question of transferring the
place of trial, in this case, from Himamaylan to Bacolod City. The constitution is
quite explicit. The Supreme Court could order "a change of venue or place of trial to
avoid a miscarriage of justice." 10 The Constitutional Convention of 1971 wisely
incorporated the ruling in the landmark decision of People v. Gutierrez, 11 where
Justice J.B.L. Reyes as ponente vigorously and categorically armed: "In the
particular case before Us, to compel the prosecution to proceed to trial in a locality
where its witnesses will not be at liberty to reveal what they know is to make a
mockery of the judicial process, and to betray the very purpose for which courts
have been established." 12 Why a change of venue is imperative was made clear in
the Comment of the Solicitor General. Thus: "The exercise by this Honorable Court
of its above constitutional power in this case will be appropriate. The witnesses in
the case are fearful for their lives. They are afraid they would be killed on their way
to or from Himamaylan during any of the days of trial. Because of this fear, they
may either refuse to testify or testify falsely to save their lives." 13 Respondent
Florendo Baliscao was not averse to such transfer, but his preference is for a court
anywhere in Metro Manila. 14 Respondent Francisco Garcia conned his comment to

the question of the cancellation of the bail bonds. Respondent Pablo Sola made clear
that he had "no objection to the transfer." 15 It may be added that there may be
cases where the fear, objectively viewed, may, to some individuals, be less than
terrifying, but the question must always be the eect it has on the witnesses who
will testify. The primordial aim and intent of the Constitution must ever be kept in
mind. In case of doubt, it should be resolved in favor of a change of venue, As a
matter of fact, there need not be a petition of this character led before this Court.
Such a plea could have been done administratively. In this particular case, however,
there is justication for the procedure followed in view of the fact that along with
the change of venue, the cancellation of the bail bonds was also sought.
LLphil

2.
Equally so the cancellation of the bail bonds is more than justied. Bail was
granted to the accused in the Order of the Municipal Court without hearing the
prosecution. That is to disregard the authoritative doctrine enunciated in People v.
San Diego. 16 As pointed out by Justice Capistrano, speaking for the Court: "The
question presented before us is, whether the prosecution was deprived of procedural
due process. The answer is in the armative. We are of the considered opinion that
whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is in custody for a capital oense be
resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the prosecution
must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence
that it may desire to introduce before the court should resolve the motion for bail.
If, as in the criminal case involved in the instant special civil action, the prosecution
should be denied such an opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due
process, and the order of the court granting bail should be considered void on that
ground." 17 These words of Justice Cardozo come to mind: "The law, as we have
seen, is sedulous in maintaining for a defendant charged with crime whatever forms
of procedure are of the essence of an opportunity to defend. Privileges so
fundamental as to be inherent in every concept of a fair trial that could be
acceptable to the thought of reasonable men will be kept inviolate and inviolable,
however crushing may be the pressure of incriminating proof. But justice, though
due to the accused, is due to the accuser also. The concept of fairness must not be
strained till it is narrowed to a lament. We are to keep the balance true." 18 This
norm which is of the very essence of due process as the embodiment of justice
requires that the prosecution be given the opportunity to prove that there is strong
evidence of guilt. It does not suce, as asserted herein, that the questions asked by
the municipal judge before bail was granted could be characterized as searching. The
fact did not cure an infirmity of a jurisdictional character. 19
WHEREFORE, the assailed order of judge Rafael Gasataya granting bail to private
respondents is nullied, set aside, and declared to be without force and eect.
Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental,
to whose sala the cases had been transferred by virtue of the resolution of this
Court of March 5, 1981, is directed forthwith to hear the petitions for bail of private
respondents, with the prosecution being duly heard on the question of whether or
not the evidence of guilt against the respondents is strong. This decision is
immediately executory. No costs.

Teehankee, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr ., Fernandez, Guerrero, De Castro and

Melencio-Herrera, JJ ., concur.
Barredo and Abad Santos, JJ ., are on official leave.
Footnotes
1.

According to Article X, Section 5(4) of the Constitution: "The Supreme Court shall
have the following powers: (4) Order of a change of venue or place of trial to avoid
a miscarriage of justice."

2.

According to Article IV, Section 18 of the Constitution: "All persons, except those
charged with capital oenses when evidence of guilt is strong, shall before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties. Excessive bail shall not be required."

3.

The name of the highly-experienced counsel Juan Hagad was included in the list of
private prosecutors, but he did not sign the petition.

4.

The private respondents are Francisco (Ecot) Garcia and Ricardo (Cadoy) Garcia.

5.

He was assisted by Assistant Solicitor General Roberto E. Soberano and Solicitor

Roberto A. Abad.

6.

Comment, 1-2.

7.

Ibid., 2.

8.

Ibid., 2-4.

9.

Resolution of the Court dated March 5, 1981.

10.

Article X, Section 5(4) of the Constitution.

11.

L-32282-83, November 26, 1970, 36 SCRA 172.

12.

Ibid., 180.

13.

Comment of Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, 9.

14.

Comment of respondent Florendo Baliscao, erroneously entitled Rejoinder to the

Petition, 1.

15.

Comment of respondent Pablo Sola, erroneously entitled Opposition of

respondent Mayor Sola, 1.

16.

L-29676, December 24, 1968, 26 SCRA 522.

17.

Ibid., 524.

18.

Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1933).

19.

Cf. Inocencio v. Alconcel, G.R. No. 55658, February 5, 1981.