The Politics - of Cooperative Forest Management - The Kangra Experience

The Politics of Cooperative
Forest Management
The Kangra Experience, Himachal Pradesh
about ICIMOD
The International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development
(ICIMOD)is an international organisation devoted to development
of the Hindu Kush-Himalayan region covering all or parts of eight
sovereign states. Afghanistan , Bangladesh , Bhutan ,
China , India , Myanmar , Nepal , and Pakistan .
The Centre is located in Kathmandu, Nepal. The primary objective
of the Centre is to promote the development of an economically and
environmentally sound mountain ecosystem and to improve the
living standards of mountain populations.
Talking Points is a new series from ICIMOD that will contain

short presentations of topical, controversial, or problematic themes,
where general consensus has not yet been reached or where action
may be appropriate. They are intended to stimulate thought and
discussion, their contents should not be seen as definitive statements.
The Politics of Cooperative
Forest Management
The Kangra Experience, Himachal Pradesh
Rajeev Ahal
March 2002
International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD)
Kathmandu, Nepal
Copyright 2002
International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development
All rights reserved
Published by
International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development
G.P.O. Box 3226
Kathmandu, Nepal
ISBN 92 9115 474 1
Editorial Team
A.B. Murray Shrestha (Editor)
Rosemary Thapa (Consultant Editor)
Dharma R. Maharjan (Technical Support and Layout)
Printed and bound in Nepal by

Hill Side Press (P) Ltd.
Kathmandu
The views and interpretations in this paper are those of the author(s). They are not attributable
to the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD) and do not imply
the expression of any opinion concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area
of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.
Dedicated to the Countless Community
Forestry Groups Committed to the
Sustainable Management of Their Forest
Resources in the Himalayas
foreword
Across the Hindu Kush-Himalayan region, the way in which forests and other natural resources
are managed is profoundly important for the well being of the people since a large portion of
the population depends on the forests in their day-to-day life. For mountain people the loss of
forest resources can be catastrophic, many are still dependent on forests for fuel, building
materials, fodder, and other products. Healthy forest resources are also essential for the well-
being of the mountain environment. Loss of forest cover is contributing to problems like
increased land degradation, landslides and floods, downstream siltation, loss of habitat, reduced
biodiversity, loss of water resources, and even climate change. Maintaining forest resources has
become a challenge, however, in face of the increasing demands both for land and for forest
products as a result of population growth, increased aspirations, and improved access which
brings with it increased opportunities for exploitation and export.
Historically, in many areas of the HKH, forest management has been centrally directed, and
governments resorted to protection and policing where these resources were to be preserved
generally with limited success. Recently, there has been a paradigm shift in the approach to
forest management. It is now well recognised, that to ensure good forest management the
people most closely concerned the forest users must be actively involved and able to take
decisions, carry out tasks, and also benefit. People-centred forest policies have emerged in
almost all the countries in the region. An increasing area is being brought under community
management in one form or another through different benefit-sharing systems and tenure
arrangements. Participatory forest management (PFM) has emerged as a successful strategy in
almost all of the regions countries.
One of the earliest recorded examples of an attempt to formally involve communities in forest
management took place in Kangra District, now in Himachal Pradesh, India. The Kangra Forest
Cooperative Societies were initiated in 1940. Unlike later initiatives in the same area, these
societies were authorised to manage all types of forest land, not just to rehabilitate degraded
areas although this was clearly the main focus. Looked at from todays perspective, the
cooperatives had serious shortcomings in terms of representation and equity (not a subject of
concern in the 1940s!), but they were successful in regenerating degraded forest areas and
developing a feeling of ownership and pride in the villagers. The cooperatives fell foul of the
organisational changes associated with the establishment of the new state of Himachal Pradesh
in 1971, and of the HP Forest Departments apparent lack of commitment to genuine
community forestry and unwillingness to allow communities to really manage and take decisions
about their forests. The existence of these societies is still a matter of dispute, although many
continue to function in a legal limbo.
The history of the Kangra cooperatives provides fascinating lessons for community forestry
today on what does and doesnt work and why. Analysis of the past, and comparison with other
initiatives in the same district, throws light on many problems: the fundamental attitudes of
government departments and staff; commitment to and distrust of genuine community
involvement; legal definitions of forest, users, and other terms and their implications;
interpretation of the idea of community forestry use of the community to protect and
regenerate government forests for the benefit of the state on the one hand, handing over
management of forest to a community so that community needs can be met and guaranteed in
the long term on the other. All of these and more can be found in this document, which analyses
the history of the cooperatives, the political developments related to them, the state of other
initiatives in Kangra, and the present situation including the future of the cooperatives
themselves. The ideas are not only relevant for decisions now being taken in Himachal Pradesh,
they provide insights that will be useful to foresters and policy-makers across the region.
ICIMOD, through its Natural Resources Division, has taken an active interest over the past years
in the introduction of community forestry in various forms in countries across the Hindu Kush-
Himalayan region, and its contribution to enabling more sustainable use and management of
natural resources. We have endeavoured to collect and disseminate information about different
practices and to bring different groups together to exchange views and to develop partnerships
that contribute to the success of community forestry. This book is a further contribution to this
process.
It is a thought provoking document, and we hope it will stimulate discussion and action that
will help facilitate the successful introduction of community forestry across the region.
Anupam Bhatia
authors preface
This paper examines the Kangra Forest Cooperative Society experience of Himachal Pradesh,
one of the earliest experiments in joint forest management, initiated in 1940, which became a
subject of disagreement and remains in continuing dispute. The historical overview and review
of past processes and milestones is based on a combination of information about the
cooperatives themselves and information on the quality of the forests. Recent policy
developments are also reviewed and critical issues for the future discussed.
While my involvement with the Kangra Forest Cooperative Society scheme began in 1988, it
was only in 1996 that I began to probe into the details that were hidden from the public eye.
When starting work on this study, I realised the paucity of recorded historical data and facts
concerning Himachal Pradesh, especially with regard to the Kangra Forest Cooperative Society
scheme. Furthermore, because Kangra District had been transferred from Punjab State to
Himachal Pradesh, many crucial notifications, records, and items of correspondence were not
traceable, probably lost somewhere in the transfer.
A further constraint resulted from the fact that the Forest Department had maintained no
consolidated records of the Kangra Forest Cooperative Societies. However, the registration files
of some of the societies themselves contained detailed records of correspondence, memos,
inspection notes, and case sheets of conflicts, which were available in the offices of the assistant
registrars of the societies. In addition, some societies have kept, in wooden boxes full of flaking
yellow papers, detailed records of documents, resolutions, and the minutes of their meetings
over the last fifty years. These were an invaluable asset for my research. Many leaders of active
societies provided a rich oral history that I collected in interviews. Based on the above sources, I
have been able to reconstruct and analyse the events in some detail.
During the first stage of the study, I developed an understanding of the history, the systems of
land tenure and the methods of forest management that have prevailed in Kangra over the
centuries. This formed the background against which the detail of the scheme emerged. I
conducted a literature survey, studying crucial authoritative documents and settlement reports,
as well as earlier published works (see Bibliography). After this, I made an extensive tour of the
district. From this I was able to classify the societies into distinct groups. I conducted numerous
interviews with active members of the societies and with the grass roots level staff of the forest
and cooperative departments to identify issues arising from the Kangra Forest Cooperative
Society experiment, and spent a considerable time examining the available records. Based on
these, I was able to identify and prioritise important issues and questions, developing a format of
queries to be addressed to the societies themselves. Using this format, a team toured
representative societies to collect primary information and detailed responses from members
and from the leadership. In putting this information down on paper, I have tried to explore the
larger picture of participatory forest management before offering any suggestions.
My intention is to present this paper in simple, non-technical language in order to make it
accessible to lay people as well as experts, without compromising facts and precision. I have,
moreover, no desire to malign individuals or institutions, but simply to portray them as I have
seen them in the given context.
Rajeev Ahal
Palampur, Himachal Pradesh, India
executive summary
This paper examines the Kangra Forest Cooperative Societies (KFCS) of Himachal Pradesh
(HP), providing an historical overview and reviewing past processes and milestones. An
overview of Kangras prevailing land settlement and revenue system is included to facilitate the
readers understanding of the background of forest management against which the KFCS and
subsequent participatory forest management (PFM) initiatives have been taken.
In the Kangra hills, as elsewhere in the Himalayas, forests play a major role in shaping peoples
socioeconomic destiny and the states political strength, and changes in systems of forest
management radically redefine the relationship of people to their forests. British policies
restricted peoples access to major forest areas and reduced their dependence on them by
turning them into commercial monoculture forests. At the same time, the government inhibited
pastoralism, a major occupation in the hills, forcing people into settled agriculture.
The Forest Department blamed uncontrolled grazing and illegal felling for the deforestation and
soil erosion of undemarcated forests, failing to understand the role its own revenue-oriented
policies played. Concern about forest conservation coupled with poor financial returns led to a
changed management strategy whereby the forest department began to devolve more
responsibility for forest protection to the people and give them a share of the profits of sale.
Following recommendations made by a commission of enquiry in the late 1930s, the Punjab
Government ordered the Forest Department to implement a scheme that would enable villages
to manage their own forest property under the supervision of qualified forest officers. In 1940,
the KFCS scheme was officially sanctioned, and over a 12-year period, 72 societies were
formed, with nearly 2,800 square kilometres of land. In independent India, the political will
supporting the scheme declined after 1956, and in 1961 specific orders were passed against
forming new societies.
When Kangra District became part of Himachal Pradesh (HP) in 1971, the HP Forest
Department refused to recognise the legality of the KFCS claims on their right to manage their
own forests and insisted that the forests be managed by HP Forest Department staff as per the
territorial working plans. Great confusion over the schemes legal status ensued, leading the
different departments involved to withdraw their support for a participatory forest management
initiative they had hitherto accepted and sustained. Notwithstanding this position, many of these
societies have remained active until today, albeit in reduced form, basing their legality on the still
extant registration as cooperatives.
This publication describes the basic principles and rules pertaining to the formation and running
of the KFCS and provides a detailed analysis of their operations. The choice of institutional
form, the criteria for membership and for selection of areas, and the financial systems developed
by the scheme, are all discussed. The paper points out that the initiatives most fundamental
achievement could be the effort to re-establish workable systems of community control by
redefining the balance between rights and responsibilities. While the expression peoples
participation figures nowhere in KFCS notifications, the emphasis on consulting the society and
the villagers in the preparation of the working plans reveals a space for consultative
participation, unlike conventional forest conservancy.
The author stresses the importance of analysing the processes the government set in motion
when organising people into the KFCS scheme in the 1940s, and seeks to determine whether
the newly created institutions were actually community-based or merely convenient instruments
created by the forest and cooperative departments from above to achieve their own objectives.
He also asks which groups within the village accepted the KFCS scheme as a mechanism of
community managed forestry. What were their socioeconomic backgrounds and how
participatory were the structures established?
The KFCS managed many different classes of land in Kangra and operated under various
systems of forest management, the most important objective of which seemed to be closures that
protected the forest areas from open grazing. The quality of KFCS forests supports the stand
taken by members and managing committees of the KFCS that they generally managed forests
better than the forest department, an opinion forest department (FD) staff also echo unofficially.
Nevertheless, since 1973, the roles, rights, and responsibilities of the KFCS and the grass roots
level FD staff have overlapped, and the KFCS forests wealth has been taken without
compensation to the KFCS members. Currently, confusion prevails about the roles, present
status, and the future of the entire KFCS initiative. Before attempting to look for solutions, the
author tries to analyse the roles being played and the positions being taken by each stakeholder
institution: the state governments, the Forest Department, the Cooperatives Department, and
the KFCS themselves.
The study also examines the situation today where, despite the assumption of the HP
Government that the PFM experiment is in a state of suspended animation, the KFCS are quite
alive and active, and angry at their treatment and how the state has sought to unilaterally
appropriate the basis of their rights and their existence. The issue of reviving these KFCS is
important in itself, and is one aspect of the overall fight to ensure an appropriate and enabling
environment for participatory and sustainable forest management in HP.
The studys final chapter begins by reviewing the recent history of PFM in Himachal Pradesh in
order to help us understand what the future might hold. Several specific projects are discussed,
as are the HP Governments draft PFM rules and the forest sector review conducted during
1999 to 2000. Analysing this, the author finds several central themes that run through all PFM
experiments: a temporary or time-bound nature; the formation of new, transient, village
organisations to protect and manage degraded areas through closure and plantation; the
disguised benefit of wage-work for non-forest based asset creation or plantation work that
temporarily relieves pressure from the nearby protected forests; and a concept of jointness that
has the village committees take over the more onerous roles from the FD while leaving true
control as well as major long-term benefits very much with the department itself.
Thus, the FD currently seems to use PFM mainly as a means to attract substantial foreign donor
contributions and to relieve some of the communities pent-up pressure over the alienation of
their forest wealth and their lack of access and control. It seems that the department has not
really incorporated the lessons demonstrated by PFM into forest management systems.
The study concludes with a discussion of the future of the KFCS and emerging lessons for the
future of sustainable forest management in HP. Many fundamental changes are suggested,
including mainstreaming PFM, changing forest land use, reclassifying forest lands, converting
individual rights to community rights, strengthening sustainable forest-based livelihoods, and
rationalising the role of peoples institutions. The KFCS approach demonstrates the competence
of village communities not only to regenerate and manage their forests sustainably, but also to
generate incomes for individual as well as social development.
acknowledgements
Thanks go to Mr. Egbert Pelinck, former Director General of the International Centre for
Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD), for facilitating and supporting this research. I am
also grateful to Mr. Anupam Bhatia, Coordinator in ICIMODs Participatory Natural Resources
Management Division, who believed that research and writing on Kangra Forest Cooperative
Societies was important in order to determine the issues facing participatory forestry in the
Himalayas, and more specifically in the degraded Siwaliks and Himachal. His valuable insights,
comments, and patience were a great help. Mr. Joginder Singh Gulerias in-depth knowledge of
the history of forest societies and the intricate legal aspects were a constant help and his
enthusiasm provided steadfast moral support.
I would like to extend special thanks to Professor Hans Wienold, whose suggestions and
analyses helped me sharpen the focus of the final paper, and to Mr. Pamin Katoch, who
supervised the field research and worked tirelessly to dig out lost information. The staff of the
forest, cooperative, and revenue departments also deserve thanks for their help. I wish to thank
all the members of the KFCS and all the nameless others who contributed to this research and
who have been infinitely patient with my enquiries. Discussions with members of Navrachna
helped clear up the cobwebs of confusion many times. Finally, I would like to thank my wife
Manju for tolerating the frustrations of an activist trying, without any formal background, to be
an academic a husband who always forgot to bring home the vegetables but instead returned
with yet another pile of papers.
I would very much appreciate the comments and criticism of readers.
glossary
antodaya poorest of the poor
bajri gravel
ban maufi concessions given by the government in the 1860s to ten
specific village communities of kangra district when taking over
their land for tea plantations; the soil and trees were owned by
the villagers, under the trusteeship of the deputy commissioner
ban sarkar forest land vested with the forest department
bartandar those who have a right over land or trees in a protected forest
that belongs to someone else, e.g. the government
crore ten million (one hundred lakhs)
demarcated protected forest the trees belonged to the government, subject to the reservation
of the rights of the users, and the soil to the people; no
appropriation of land was permitted in these forests and a
quarter to a third of the total forest area could be closed for
regeneration.
devta committee religious committee
durbar a public audience
gair mumkin uncultivable lands
gharats traditional water-powered mills for grinding grain
gram panchayat elected village level body for local self-governance, often called
simply panchayat
khewatdar (also khetwatdar) persons entitled to a right by virtue of sole or
joint property in the subject of the right, such as a common
property resource
lakh one hundred thousand
lambardar the traditional legal institution for revenue collection in a village,
in return for a commission, the lambardar collected land
revenue on behalf of the government
mahila mandal an official womens organisation with committees in all villages
malkiat shamlat originally common lands which were later converted to private
lands by the revenue department and on which tax is levied
mauza a unit of the revenue department (under British Rule) consisting
of a collection of hamlets with patches of cultivation and
undefined or unrecorded rights of the residents in the
surrounding wastes; the ownership of all soil and forest land was
transferred to a copropriety body formed from the residents; the
revenue for the entire mauza was assessed as a lump sum by the
government, payment was made the joint responsibility of the
body
patwari village land revenue official
rakha forest guard
reserved forest the absolute property of the government, with no rights of users
allowed
sangarsh samiti advocacy group/committee/organisation
Sanjhi Van Yojna a participatory forest management scheme similar to joint forest
management, but financed from Himachal Pradeshs state
budget, launched in 1998/1999
shamlat tika a tika within a mauza that is composed entirely of shamlat lands
shamlat common land in which rights are enjoyed by the bartandars of
the village
tehsil the lowest unit of administration under British rule, consisting of a
certain number of mauzas; the tehsildar was the administrative
and revenue head of the tehsil; a group of tehsils constituted a
district.
tika a hamlet with too few residents to qualify as a village or mauza
unclassed forest the trees belonged to the government and the soil to the people,
no closures could be made except with the peoples consent
undemarcated protected forest both planted trees and those of spontaneous growth belonged to
the government and the soil to the people; cultivation was
permitted with the deputy commissioners consent; closures could
only be made with the consent of the right holding villages. This
type of forest was not closed to grazing.
usufruct the right to enjoy the use of and income from anothers property;
in the Himalayan region used to mean the benefits themselves
(the income and produce)
van andolan forest protest movement by a local community
van panchayat elected local area body for forest management
warisee hereditary right of use that could be mortgaged and recovered
like property
wazib-ul-arz the administrative record of the village kept in the settlement
document
zamindars landowning farmers who pay revenue to the government, and
who also have corresponding rights (bartandars) in the resources
of the mauza, such as forests or flowing water for irrigation
acronyms & abbreviations
AR assistant registrar
BM ban maufi
CD cooperatives department
CF conservator of forests
CPR common property resources
DFID Department for International Development (UK) formerly ODA
DFO district forest office/district forest officer
DPF demarcated protected forest
EC executive committee
FD forest department
FSR Forest Sector Review
GB general body
GO government order
GOI Government of India
GP gram panchayat
GTZ (Deutsche) Gesellschaft fr Technische Zusammenarbeit (German Technical
Cooperation)
HP Himachal Pradesh
HPFP HP Forestry Project
JFM joint forest management
IGCP Indo-German Changer Project
ICIMOD International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development
IGDP Indo German Dhauladhar Project
IRMP integrated resource management plan
KFCS Kangra Forest Cooperative Society/Societies
masl metres above (mean) sea level
MC managing committee
MM mahila mandal
MS malkiat shamlat
NGO non-governmental organisation
NRM natural resources management
NTFP non-timber forest produce
PFM participatory forest management
PW private wasteland
RF reserved forest
Rs rupees
SFM sustainable forest management
SVY Sanjhi Van Yojna
TD timber distribution
TRUCO trust and confidence
UF unclassed forest
UPF undemarcated protected forest
VDC village development committee
VEDS village eco-development society
VFDC village forest development committee
VFDS village forest development society
VLI village level institution
VLRK Van Lagao Rozi Kamao
WP working plan
Contents
Foreword
Authors Preface
Executive Summary
Acknowledgements
Glossary
Acronyms and Abbreviations
one kangra: an overview ....................................................... 1

Background ....................................................................................................... 1
Systems of Forest Management .......................................................................... 2
The Status of Forest Resources ........................................................................... 4
two the kangra forest cooperatives experiment ..................... 7

The Concept ...................................................................................................... 7
Overview of the KFCS Scheme .......................................................................... 8
Policy, Procedures and History ......................................................................... 10
three institutional arrangements ......................................... 15

The Management Principles of the Forest Societies .......................................... 15
Introduction of the KFCS Scheme .................................................................... 18
four analysis of the societies .............................................. 23

Policy and Objectives ....................................................................................... 23
Institutional Analysis ........................................................................................ 23
Financial Systems ............................................................................................ 28
Forest Management Systems ............................................................................ 32
five the standoff between the stakeholder institutions.......... 39

Role of the State Governments ........................................................................ 39
Role of the Forest Department ......................................................................... 41
Role of the Cooperatives Department .............................................................. 44
Role of the KFCS ............................................................................................. 44
six what lies ahead .............................................................. 49

The Present Scenario ....................................................................................... 49
Recent History of Participatory Forest Management in Himachal Pradesh ....... 50
Ongoing Plans and Activities ........................................................................... 53
Lessons from the History of Participatory Forestry Management in Himachal
Pradesh ..................................................................................................... 56
Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 60
bibliography ............................................................................ 61
annexes ................................................................................... 63
/RFDWLRQRI
+

, +LPDFKDO3UDGHVKDQG.DQJUD'LVWULFW
0

$
/
$
<

$

6
Arabian
Sea
HIMACHAL PRADESH
Kangra
SHIMLA
N
one
kangra: an overview
Background
Kangra is the most populous district of Himachal Pradesh (HP). It is bisected by an east-west
valley approximately 128 km long and 58 km wide, with an elevation varying from 350 to
6,975 metres above sea level (masl). The valley is drained by the Beas River, and along its
northern boundary lies the majestic Dhauladhar range, a massive snow-covered wall. The
southern slopes fall precipitously to the valleys lush, fertile fields. Originally, the areas many
different caste groups spoke various dialects of Pahari, the language of the hills.
To understand the background of forest management in Kangra, it is necessary to understand
the prevailing land settlement and revenue systems. Throughout centuries of early rule, formal
ownership of all land was vested with the raja, in the classical model of a Hindu state. Actual
property rights, however, were in the nature of hereditary, customary rights of use called
warisees that could be mortgaged and recovered more or less like property. At the same time,
in addition to their warisees, every household enjoyed customary rights of use in the nearby
forests and pasturage during the monsoon months in the nearby ranges. Thus, while the
property of land was not in the name of tenant farmers, their propriety rights for cultivated
lands were clearly defined and rights in nearby forests were also laid down by centuries of access
and use. This system excluded large areas of forest land and pastures in the hilly uplands that
were only used by long-range graziers.
The structure of governance created by the British Raj and its exploitation of India for Great
Britains revenue requirements required clear ownership of land and the formalisation of
revenue systems. British land policies thus initiated a process of land settlements, demarcating
and classifying lands under individual use as private. Forests and grazing lands to which village
communities had access and defined shares of extraction were called shamlats (common land)
and the traditional customary rights were codified as formal rights. Forests far from a village
which formed a common resource pool for timber and migratory pastoralism were given various
designations with local communities exercising varying degrees of rights over them. Warisee
holders became formal landowners and for the first time the Kangra hills saw private ownership
of property.
The traditional form of revenue assessment and collection had varied from region to region with
the rajas share ranging between one half and one fourth of the produce, depending on land
productivity, irrigation, and other factors. The British made revenue a cash payment, creating
stresses on the hills non-cash based subsistence economy. Given Kangras poorer productivity
one kangra: an overview 1

compared to farm land on the plains, this revenue was not very significant. By the end of the
19th century, the government saw that revenues from farm land in the hill areas could not
provide sufficient profit and meet the cost of governance. Attention turned to the large tracts of
forest land with their rich stands of commercially exploitable devdar, chil (known in most of
India and HP outside Kangra, as chir), khair and other timber trees.
With the change to cash payment of revenue, the British also made all land owning farmers of a
village collectively responsible for paying as a lump sum the revenue assessed for all the now
privately owned cultivated lands in the village. While the revenue system thus required farmers
to act as a co-propriety body, no community based institutional mechanisms were created for
such new community behaviour. Although this privatisation of commons seems egalitarian, the
actual degree of co-propriety in villages divided by caste hierarchies was apparently very poor,
and led to the consolidation of the landed gentrys control over socioeconomically weaker
castes.
Early historical accounts reveal that nomadic pastoralism was another form of natural resource
use evolved in the hills, diversifying communities dependence on fragile and limited agricultural
land. These pastoral tribes kept large flocks, which they grazed on the valley floor during winter
and on alpine and permanent pastures in the mountains at other times. Their grazing rights in
the forests were recognised as customary warisees. In the 19th century, however, the British
became increasingly interested in the higher earnings possible from timber and commercial
forestry. Although the grazing pressure on forests was not heavy, the British required that forest
land be liberated of the burden of grazing. Grazing was discouraged by converting the pasturage
toll into cash, restricting flock sizes, and encouraging pastoralists to settle down and become
cultivators.
Systems of Forest Management

In the Kangra hills, as elsewhere in the Himalayas, forests played a major role in shaping the
peoples socioeconomic destiny and the states political strength. Changes in systems of forest
management radically redefined the relationship of people to their forests. When the British
acquired Kangra in 1846, the complexity of the prevailing land and forest use systems
confounded them. Lands that had belonged to the kings became state property by default and
forests were placed under the deputy commissioner. The basic unit of revenue was defined as a
group of hamlets, a mauza, and ownership of all the lands and forests they used was
transferred to a co-propriety body formed from the residents.
The government initially retained only a general right on forest property in the form of timber,
subject to the villagers right to extract fuel and timber for agricultural purposes. The process of
consolidating the Raj, however, soon led to massive building programmes, in addition to the
network of railway lines being spread across the country. Both required timber urgently, and the
only forests capable of yielding timber of sufficient quality and quantity were on the Himalayan
slopes. The British Government began to prioritise control over forest land. By 1853, while the
soil of all Kangra forests belonged to the people, the government was the de facto owner of trees
of spontaneous growth. With no formal declaration, total control of the management of all
forests other than village commons had been taken over1.
1
The state property in wastes was quietly announced by the Board of Administration in 1852, 26 years before the
statutory enactment of the Forest Act of 1878. The Board proposed: ....after defining the village boundaries and
allowing such reasonable extent of land as may suffice for the wants of the communities being included in each
area, to declare lands beyond these boundaries government property.
2 the kangra experience

The forests of KFCS Arla Saloh
The formation of the Forest Department (FD) in 1870 institutionalised the system of forest
exploitation. The government created more than 6,500 ha of reserved forests (RF), pleading that
some forests had to be unburdened from the rights of the people, in other words, protected
from the people for the people, and ignoring the fact that local communities had been
successfully managing their forests themselves for thousands of years. Local people had no
rights in these RFs; in lieu, affected communities were given forests of equal size near their
villages and special monies and land concessions.
Unlike earlier settlement officers who were sensitive to the relationship of communities with their
forests, the new officers of the nascent FD followed principles of scientific forestry, viewing
forests as resources whose returns, timber and revenue, should be maximised. All forests
composed of non-timber trees were called wastes, their soil-binding, water recharging, and
wildlife aspects being relegated to secondary importance.
New forest acts provided legislative teeth to these intentions and by 1897 nearly 5,500 ha of
forests were notified as demarcated protected forest (DPF) for which the FD was totally
responsible. In this type of forest, the trees belonged to the government, subject to the reservation
of the rights of the users, and the soil belonged to the people. No appropriation of land was
permitted and a quarter to a third of the total forest area could be closed for regeneration. Forests,
as well as grazing and pasture land, were largely converted to commercial timber forests. Forest
contractors became the focus in the village economy for short-term wage labour based on
intensive working of the government forests. Interest in this work divided communities,
suppressing effective opposition to the states interest in commercialising the forests.
Other economic changes included the intensive linking up of the Kangra hills to the vibrant
market economies of the plains and the new livelihoods and opportunities provided by the
infrastructure of local government offices. Kangras affluent classes had developed a diversified
subsistence base in response to the limitations of hill agriculture. Enjoying a high degree of
mobility within the options for off-farm profit making, and a stronger risk-taking ability, they

reaped the maximum benefit of monetisation of the hill economy and thus promoted the states
interests while increasing their hold over the village economy. The mid-level primarily agrarian
castes suffered the most from the shrinkage in forest use and access. Although they comprised
more than three-quarters of the population, they were spread over the district and could not
organise any strong opposition to these policies.
A significant and unique feature of forest management in Kangra was the age-old system of
formalising each familys exact usufruct right, with the specific forests they could access being
recorded. In the 1890s these were accepted as a households legal entitlement, but by 1920 the
orthodox forestry conservancy saw these rights as a burden. State policy declared that they
could not be exercised if they might endanger the existence of the forests over which the rights
are admitted2. Such restructuring of peoples rights limiting those of marginal farmers,
tenants, and sharecroppers used the increasing influence of the upper castes, who shared the
states dominant commercial interests, to redefine forest rights in favour of the commercial
exploitation of forests.
The British period saw great population growth; by the end of 1901, Kangras population
density had reached 322 persons per sq.km of cultivated area. The simultaneous growth in the
needs of livestock, agriculture, and habitation put intense biotic pressure on the village, or
unclassed, forest (UF). Even the existing DPFs proved inadequate. Local systems of grazing
management, whereby livestock were rotated among different sites during different seasons,
were burdened by the shrinkage of buffers due to the contemporary land policy. The limited
common lands crossed the level of sustainable extraction and became degraded, bringing biotic
pressure to bear on both DPF and undemarcated protected forest (UPF).
To counter this deforestation, the FD employed essentially restrictive strategies, as follows.
Reservation: reducing or curtailing peoples rights to forests to conserve the existing stands. The
FD sought to take over unclassed and shamlat lands, which were already inadequate, and close
them as reserved forests. This provoked opposition from the farming castes.
Reduction of flocks by taxation: limiting excessive grazing by taxation of flocks in excess of actual
agricultural, as opposed to pastoral, requirements. Differential taxes were introduced, penalising
goats as opposed to sheep. Grazing fees were levied on migratory animals and a cattle tax was
levied on indigenous flocks. Thus, efforts were made to restrict, in favour of agriculture, the use
of different types of land for cultivation or for pastoralism
Rotational closures: attempting to have village communities voluntarily close their grazing lands
and wastes. These attempts, however, could not provide a solution to the rapidly worsening
condition of the forests and were strongly opposed by most village communities.
The Status of Forest Resources

British policies restricted peoples access to major forest areas, and reduced their dependence on
these forests by turning them into commercial monoculture forests of chil, khair, devdar, and
other species irrelevant to the local communities needs. These policies concentrated biotic
pressure on the few remaining scrub forests left open. Along with privately owned agricultural
land, these became the main sources of fodder and fuelwood.
2
Anderson. Final Report of the Settlement of Kangra District; Article 15 of Kangra Forest Record of Rights.

At the same time, the government inhibited pastoralism, a major occupation in the hills, forcing
people into settled agriculture. By the 1920s, no more land could be cleared for agriculture and
the increasingly fragmented agricultural land could hardly provide for the newly settled families
fodder and fuelwood requirements. Pressure for fodder shifted onto the already stressed scrub
forests, especially those in the rain-fed subsistence areas of Kangras fragile lower Siwalik hills.
These forests had long been providing for local needs, but suddenly faced a rapid increase in
extraction processes. The newly naked and sloping terrain experienced high rainfall, and
unprecedented soil erosion ensued.
The FD blamed uncontrolled grazing and illegal felling for the deforestation and soil erosion of
undemarcated forests, failing to understand the role its own revenue-oriented policies had
played. Removing large forest areas and converting them into commercial forests forced people
to focus extraction on the few remaining buffer forests, leading to rapid deterioration. Such non-
participatory forest management promoted both wasteful and illegal extraction. Some
conservation-oriented foresters in the FD cited the ecological damage brought about by this
system of forest conservancy and built pressure from within to experiment with alternative forms
of forest management and for the FD to shift towards participatory forest management
mechanisms.
The department also began feeling pressure because of its poor financial returns. This
contributed to the decision to experiment with a changed forest management strategy in which
the users were given more responsibility for forest protection and also a share of the profits.
Further, the specific problems of mountain areas like inaccessibility, fragility, marginality, and
diversity (Jodha 1990) also played a role in making centralised and commercial forest
management economically and ecologically unsustainable and were another factor that
encouraged the FD to experiment with alternative management systems.

two
the kangra forest
Cooperatives experiment
The Concept
By the early thirties, the Forest Department (FD) knew that it could not cope with the rapid
deforestation of the forests. After intense discussions at the forest conference of 1935 in Madras,
Mr. H.M. Glover, the FDs Chief Conservator, proposed the following resolution:
That the conference is firmly of the opinion that the state of the undemarcated forests is so
deplorable that the recent policy for their management must be changed. The practicability of
forming village forests should be examined, and Govt. may kindly be asked to appoint a
committee to decide what particular steps should be taken in each district of the outer
Himalayas.
This resolution was unanimously passed and on 28 September 1937 the Punjab Government
appointed a commission of enquiry headed by Sir Colin Garbett to examine the situation and
give recommendations for Kangra District. The Garbett Commissions terms of reference were to
find out:
what difficulties were experienced by those who live in and near the forests as a result of the
then system of forest administration;
how these people might best be encouraged to conserve the forests; and
how their cooperation with the FD could be encouraged and secured.
The commission toured the whole of Kangra District, and observed that except for areas in the
present Kullu, Lahaul, and Spiti districts, only about 20% (163,000 acres) of the forests were
under scientific management, the remaining 80% (648,000 acres) being burdened with heavy
rights of the users and fast deteriorating.
Their recommendations were as follow.3
The villagers should agree to management according to simple working plans approved by
the government involving closures, where closures were demonstrably necessary.
In order that this demonstration would be convincing, the government should make allies of
peoples representatives.
An effort should be made to teach the villagers that whatever profits accrue from the
management of the shamlat and the reserves, shall be to their benefit.
3
Para. 10.6 of the Garbett Commissions report, referred to in Rawal (1968) Volume I

In order that the people may have qualified representatives, panchayats (an elected village
level body) must be formed and the details of forest management of the area in which the
village is situated should be explained to them.
For this purpose, a working scheme of management for each village should be prepared.
The scheme would envisage management of not only the shamlat, but also of the protected
and reserved forests in which the village had rights, in such a way as to secure the
maximum crop of forest produce for the villagers benefit.
If possible, the cost of management should be met from the proceeds of sale, but the value
of securing the catchment area to the province was felt to be far greater than the small
expenditure on staff, which was to be paid for, in part or in whole, by the government.
Thus the commission recommend the immediate appointment of a panchayat officer to
establish panchayats and a forest officer to prepare plans. In the next stage, the panchayat will
be associated in a consultative capacity in respect of the management of the whole village forest
estate and of the execution of the Working Plan. The technical proposals of the plan will be
given effect to by the Forest Department, Divisional Forest Officer being responsible for the
discipline of the staff. But there will be a close liaison between the DFO and the panchayats, and
at reasonable intervals they will meet and discuss any matters in which improvement may
appear to be required.
The ultimate, however distant, goal is that the whole forest property of the village
shall be managed on lines approved by itself and given effect to by its own forest
staff under the supervision of a qualified forest officer acting as Assistant to the
Deputy Commissioner. Then the expense of the staff will be lessened and the profits
of the village increased (emphasis the authors)
These recommendations represented a major shift from the contemporary approach, as they
accepted that maximum priority was to be given to soil and forest conservation and that this was
not possible without the involvement of the communities concerned.
Subsequent to the Garbett Commissions recommendations, the Punjab Government planned
its strategy and issued a notification4 in 1938, passing the following orders and authorising the
FD to study the situation and plan and implement a scheme as recommended:
Principles underlying the proposal are accepted. Before taking further action, Forest
Department should draw up a more detailed scheme conforming with the principles that erosion
shall be prevented and the interests of the province as a whole shall be safeguarded.
It appears that the concerns expressed in the forest conference of 1935 and its resolution drove
the FD to try innovative experiments, and not only in HP. Evidence suggests that similar forest
cooperatives were also set up in the remote areas of Bastar in Madhya Pradesh.
Overview of the KFCS Scheme

As per the order, the FD began work on the recommendations. In Kangra, the conservator of
forests (Eastern Circle) launched the KFCS scheme on 18 July 1938, and in April 1939 a fully-
fledged forest division called the Kangra Village Forest Division (based at Dharamsala) was
created to implement it. The complicated forest settlements and the multiplicity of rights made it
difficult to initiate proper schemes of management. In February 1940, the Punjab Government
4
Punjab Govt. notification No. 1522-C(S) dated 13.8.1938.
two the kangra forest cooperatives experiment 7

officially sanctioned the
KFCS scheme5 proposed
by the FD. The issue of
grant-in-aid was notified
in January 1941.6
Drafting the rules and
by-laws of the societies
was most difficult, and
considerable
correspondence passed
between the FD, the
registrar of the
Cooperatives
Department (CD) and
the legal remembrancer
before the rules were
finally promulgated in
September 1941.7
The FD began the
Kangra Forest Societies
scheme enthusiastically
with complete support
from CD staff. A total of
72 societies were formed
over a 12-year period
covering 2,793 sq.km of
Kangra District. The
largest single acreage,
5,094 ha, was (is)
managed by the KFCS in
Kaniyara, a high altitude
village in the
Dhauladhar, lying in the
Dharamsala Range of
Kangra Forest Division
covering over 4,600 ha
of demarcated protected
forest (DPF) and 440 ha The by-laws signed by the members of KFCS Maranda
undemarcated protected Bhangiar, 29 January 1947
forest (UPF), most of
which is alpine pasture. Some parts of the societys lands have been worked intensively as slate
quarries for decades. The smallest KFCS, with six ha all shamlat land was (is) Ghadoral in
the Palampur range of the present Palampur Forest Division.
5
Letter No.568-Ft. dated 27.2.1940 from Deputy Secretary to Punjab Government, Development Department to
the Chief Conservator of Forests, Punjab.
6
Vide Govt. letter No. 157/Ft. dated 18.1.1941.
7
Govt. letter No.2742-Ft. dated 26.9.1941, from Secretary to Punjab Government, Development Department.

Policy, Procedures
and History
The government
sanctioned the KFCS
scheme in 1940 for five
years, with a total annual
grant-in-aid of Rs 50,000
and a target of 32 KFCS to
be formed. The first KFCS
to be registered was
Bahnala on 16 November
1941; notification of the
transfer of management of
relevant lands to this KFCS
was finalised on 26
October 1941. By 1944/
1945, the end of the
official period of sanction,
40 KFCS, covering 17,500
ha of land, had been set
up with approved working
plans (WPs).
The scheme was reviewed
and extended for another
five years, beginning on 1
April 1945, under the
following conditions.
1. The total amount of
grant-in-aid to be paid to
the societies was restricted
to Rs 50,000 per annum.
Savings of one year could
not be carried forward to
Map of KFCS Maranda Bhangiar attached to its working the next.
plan document 2. No restrictions were to
be made on the number of
societies formed as long as the grant-in-aid did not exceed Rs 50,000 per annum. Thus
targets for KFCS formation were eliminated and the FD was left free to decide the numbers
based on the peoples response.
3. When the amount of grant-in-aid reached the Rs 50,000 limit, either an increase in grant-in-
aid was to be justified, or those societies showing a surplus were to be called upon to bear a
percentage of the cost borne by the government. The government did not accept unlimited
liability in respect of these forests. Thus, non-paying KFCS were induced to become paying
societies, encouraging financial independence.
4. Societies that began earning a profit within five years of formation had to pay 10% of such
profit towards the cost of the FD inspection staff. This meant that the KFCS now had to pay
a fee for the technical services they received from the FD.

KFCS Bhagotla office buildings, housing the village post office in one room
and a government ayurvedic dispensary in another
By 1950, the end of the second period, 63 KFCS covering 21,600 ha had been formed with
operational WPs. The scheme was again reviewed and extended for a further three years to the
end of March, 1953. At the end of this period there were 71 KFCS with operational WPs covering
a total area of 23,100 ha. There were two more reviews and 1-year extensions during which time
the total number of KFCS increased to 72. At the end of March 1955, following termination of
KFCS Khohala for continuous mismanagement, there were 71 KFCS, covering 23,500 ha.
At this juncture, KFCS had been managing forests for 15 years and their work was considered
exemplary. During the 1-year extension to March 31 1956, the annual grant-in-aid was
increased to Rs 90,000, on condition that the additional rupees be spent on introducing KFCS in
Hamirpur Tehsil and further expansion in Nurpur Tehsil.
But the year 1956 saw a withdrawal of the political will supporting the scheme. Despite the
completion of all preliminary procedures, including agreements by the members, two KFCS
formed in Hamirpur were not notified and never came into formal existence. The KFCS
remained static at 71, with grant-in-aid sanctioned at Rs 50,000.
The operation of the scheme for the existing KFCS was extended yearly for the next five years,
to the end of March 1961. The KFCS at Dhuga Bakhshian-Rajpalwan Hauri was denotified
following constant conflicts among the members, reducing the number to 70, 44 in Kangra
Forest Division and 26 in Nurpur Forest Division (Rawal 1968). These KFCS were now
managing 23,600 ha of forest, about 10% of Kangra Districts total forest land.
In the final 10-year extension of the scheme (1961 to 1971), the government cancelled the Rs
50,000 grant-in-aid limit and decided to pay back to the respective KFCS whatever income they
generated. Specific orders were passed against forming new societies. This reduction in the
governments fiscal outlay led to mounting pressure on the FD and acted as the coup-de-grace
for the societies formed between 1950 and1955 that were not yet capable of paying their own
staff, incomes from these still regenerating forests being small.

In 1971 Kangra District became a part of the newly-formed state of Himachal Pradesh (HP).
The HP Forest Department refused to recognise the legality of the KFCS claim that they manage
their own forests and insisted that they be managed as per the territorial WP by its own staff.
What ensued was complete confusion over the schemes legal status, leading the different
departments to withdraw their support of a PFM initiative they had hitherto accepted and
sustained. Notwithstanding this, many of the societies are still functioning, and striving to regain
recognition.
The significant milestones in the development of the KFCS are summarised below. The dates of
formation of individual KFCS, and the areas covered, are listed in Table 1.
Table 1: Significant Milestones in the Evolution of the KFCS

Year Events Significance
1DWLRQDO)RUHVW&RQIHUHQFHSDVVHVUHVROXWLRQRQILQGLQJ
DOWHUQDWLYHPDQDJHPHQWVWUDWHJLHVIRUGHJUDGHGDUHDVRI
.DQJUD'LVWULFW
*DUEHWW&RPPLVVLRQVHWXSE\3XQMDE*RYWWRVXJJHVW
VWUDWHJLHV)LQGLQJV UHFRPPHQGDWLRQVPDGH
3XQMDE*RYWSDVVHVRUGHUDVNLQJ)'WRGUDZXS .)&6
VFKHPHRQUHFRPPHQGDWLRQVRI*DUEHWW&RPPLVVLRQ &21&(37%5,1*6
-XO\ )'ODXQFKHV.)&6VFKHPH 72*(7+(5
)HE 3XQMDE*RYWVDQFWLRQVVFKHPH &20081,7,(6$1'
-DQ 3XQMDE*RYWQRWLILHVFRQGLWLRQVDQGWHUPVRIJUDQWVLQ '(3$570(176
DLGWR.)&6 7$.(6
6HSW 3XQMDE*RYWQRWLILHV.)&6UXOHV 5227
.)&6VFKHPHVDQFWLRQHGIRU\HDUVUHJLVWHUV
.)&6DJDLQVWWDUJHWRI$QQXDOJUDQWLQDLGIL[HGDW
5V
6FKHPHH[WHQGHGIXUWKHU\HDUVWRWDORI.)&6
IRUPHG
6FKHPHH[WHQGHGE\\HDUV.)&6FRYHULQJ
KDDFUHVIRUPHG
6FKHPHH[WHQGHGIRU\HDU.)&6FRYHULQJ
DFUHVQRZH[LVW
6FKHPHH[WHQGHGE\\HDU.)&6.KRKDODWHUPLQDWHG
OHDYLQJ.)&6FRYHULQJKD3XQMDE&KLHI
0LQLVWHU
VOHWWHUH[SUHVVLQJGRXEWVRQ.)&6H[SHULPHQW
UHFHLYHG
6FKHPHH[WHQGHGE\\HDUJUDQWLQDLGLQFUHDVHGE\
5VWRH[WHQG.)&6LQ1XUSXU7HKVLODQGIRUP
QHZRQHVLQ+DPLUSXU7HKVLOGXHWRGRXEWVFDVWE\WKH
&KLHI0LQLVWHUVOHWWHU.)&6IRUPHGLQ+DPLUSXUQRW
QRWLILHG 352%/(06
6FKHPHH[WHQGHGE\\HDUWRWDO.)&6VWD\VDW %(*,1685)$&,1*
6FKHPHH[WHQGHGE\\HDUWRWDO.)&6VWD\VDW *29781685(+2:
6FKHPHH[WHQGHGE\\HDUWRWDO.)&6VWD\VDW 72029($+($'
.)&6DW'KXJD%DNKVKLDQ5DMSDOZDQ+DXULGHQRWLILHG
GXHWRFRQVWDQWLQWHUQDOFRQIOLFWV7RWDO.)&6QRZ
6FKHPHH[WHQGHGE\\HDUWRWDO.)&6VWD\VDW
3XQMDE*RYWH[WHQGVVFKHPHE\\HDUVFDQFHOV
JUDQWLQDLGOLPLWRI5V,QFRPHIURP.)&6WREH
UHWXUQHGDVJUDQWDIWHUQHFHVVDU\VHUYLFHGHGXFWLRQV

7DEOH&RQW
Year Events Significance
3XQMDEUHRUJDQLVDWLRQ.DQJUD'LVWULFWEHFRPHVSDUWRI
+LPDFKDO
)RUHVWVQDWLRQDOLVHG)RUHVW&RUSRUDWLRQVHWXSWR
PDQDJHFROOHFWLRQDQGVDOHRIWLPEHUUHVLQDQGRWKHU
IRUHVWSURGXFWV.)&6ORVHWZRYLWDOVRXUFHVRILQFRPH .)&66+,)7('72+3
5DZDO
V,QWHJUDWHG:RUNLQJ3ODQFRYHULQJ.)&6 1(:(48$7,216$1'
FRPHVLQWRHIIHFW 5(/$7,216
2Q-DQXDU\+LPDFKDO3UDGHVKEHFRPHVDIXOO\ (;3/25('
IOHGJHGVWDWH
6FKHPHQRWH[WHQGHGDQGH[SLUHV)'ZLWKGUDZV
WHFKQLFDOVXSSRUWDQGWDNHVRYHUZRUNLQJRIWKH.)&6
IRUHVWDUHDVEDVHGRQ5DZDO
V:3,QFRPHVRI.)&6
UHGXFHGWRLQVLJQLILFDQWVXPV0DUJLQDOVXSSRUWIURP&'
FRQWLQXHV
+3*RYWSDVVHVRUGHUVH[WHQGLQJVFKHPHIRU\HDUV
EXWDERYHVLWXDWLRQFRQWLQXHVXQFKDQJHG7KHJUDQWV
UHDFK.)&6RQO\LQV
&)'KDUDPVDODUHYLHZVDOO.)&6DQGILQGVLQSRRU
FRQGLWLRQ
+3*RYWRUGHUV)RUHVW8WLOLVDWLRQ&RPPLWWHHWRH[DPLQH
.)&6VFKHPHDQGPDNHUHFRPPHQGDWLRQV 67$1'2))
)RUHVW8WLOLVDWLRQ&RPPLWWHHDEROLVKHGE\+3*RYW :25.,1*$7&5266
EHIRUHLWKDVZRUNHGRQWKHDERYHPDQGDWH 385326(6635($'6
5DZDO
V:3SHULRGH[SLUHV)'QRZLQFOXGHV.)&6 &21)86,21,17+(
IRUHVWDUHDVLQLWVUHYLVHGWHUULWRULDO:3IRUUHVSHFWLYH ),(/':+,/(
GLYLVLRQV $77(037672),1'
&)'KDUDPVDODLVVXHVLQVWUXFWLRQV IRUWDNLQJRYHU :$<62873(56,67
.)&6IRUHVWDUHDVLQWRUHJXODUZRUNLQJSODQ 7KH+3 $7833(5/(9(/6
)RUHVW0LQLVWHUDQGWKH7UDQVSRUW0LQLVWHULQWHUYHQHWR
SUHYHQWWKLV
)RUFHGE\SUHVVXUHIURPWKH.)&6+3*RYWQRWLILHV
DQRWKHUFRPPLWWHHWRORRNLQWRUHKDELOLWDWLQJ.)&6
7KH/HJLVODWLYH$VVHPEO\RI+3GLVVROYHGIRUSROLWLFDO
UHDVRQV&RPPLWWHHXQDEOHWRWDNHXSLWVPDQGDWH
.)&6FRPHWRJHWKHUWRIRUP'LVWULFW)RUHVW
&RRSHUDWLYH6RFLHWLHV8QLRQWRFROOHFWLYHO\ILJKWIRU
MXVWLFH
0DUFK 6WDWH/HYHO6HPLQDURQ3UREOHPVDQG&KDOOHQJHV
EHIRUH.)&6SUHVLGHGRYHUE\0LQLVWHUIRU
&RRSHUDWLYHVEXLOGVEDVLFFRQVHQVXVEHWZHHQ)'&'
.)&6IRUUHYLYLQJ.)&6
8
Memo No.238/Misc. dated 28/10/89, from the office of Conservator Forests, Dharamsala.

three
institutional arrangements
The Management Principles of the Forest Societies

The basic principles and rules pertaining to the formation and running of the KFCS are
summarised in the following.
Objectives
When the scheme began, the objectives of the KFCS were:
to arrange for the plantation, improvement, protection, and management of society forests
as mentioned in the WPs, with special reference to preventing erosion and to utilising the
forest produce to the best advantage of the members;
to work to spread knowledge of cooperative principles and practices; and
to undertake other activities that are incidental or conducive to attaining the above
principles.
Basic conditions
A society was formed only when 75% of the khewatdars (owners of land with rights in the
forest) and occupancy tenants of each mauza or tika (hamlet) that constituted the revenue
estate being taken up, agreed to its formation. The societies were registered with the registrar of
cooperative societies under the Punjab Cooperative Societies Act (II of 1912), and later the
Punjab Cooperative Societies Act of 1954, and are presently governed by the rules of the
Himachal Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act of 1968.
Membership
Any resident within the area of a societys operation who was over 18 years old and was a right
holder in the forests to be administered by the KFCS (as per the revenue records), could pay an
admission fee of one rupee and become a life member of the General Body of the KFCS. He/
she had to individually sign an agreement (Annex 2) binding himself/herself to carry out the
societys WPs and subordinating his/her individual rights in the forest area under society
management to those of the society. Membership could be revoked if the member left the village
to settle elsewhere, was found guilty of dishonesty, ceased to be a right holder in the forest, or
voluntarily chose to withdraw from the KFCS.
three institutional arrangements 13

General body
The general body (GB)
met at least once a year.
The secretary, under
directions from the
managing committee
(MC), generally
convened the meeting.
Under special
circumstances, however,
such as internal disputes,
a signed requisition by at
least one fourth of the
GBs members required
the MC to call a GB
meeting, failing which
the signatories could
refer the matter to the
registrar CD, who could
summon a meeting.
The quorum for the
general meeting was one
third of the total
members. All decisions
and issues, unless
already specified in the
by-laws, were decided by
The early proceedings of KFCS Maranda Bhangiar meetings, a majority vote. Proxy
in Urdu voting was not allowed.
The GB was the ultimate
authority in administrative matters, disposal of profits, decisions about induction/expulsion of
members, adoption of the WP, amendment of by-laws and approval of the scale determined by
the MC for contributions to be made by members. The GB meeting also established a maximum
credit limit, the extent to which the cooperative could receive deposits and loans from members
and non-members (as per the instructions of the registrar).
Managing committee
The MC consisted of not more than seven persons (as per the old rules), including the president,
vice president, and a treasurer, all of whom worked in an honorary capacity. The secretary was
the executive head of the MC and was normally paid a lump sum at the end of the year. The
MC was elected at a special meeting of the GB, which until 1971 was held once a year (under
the Punjab Cooperative Societies Act of 1912) and thereafter once in two years (under the HP
Cooperative Societies Act of 1968). In this meeting, every member had an equal right to speak,
vote, and discuss any matter concerning the management of the village forests. The level of fines
for members caught committing forest offences was also decided at this special meeting.

The MC exercised almost
all powers regarding the
appointment of the
rakha (forest guard),
secretary, treasurer, and
other employees, deciding
their emoluments as well
as the administrative and
financial aspects of the
work. The forest officer
was selected by the
society at the GB meeting;
the CD registrar
confirmed his
appointment. The CD was
responsible for all work
connected with the
formation of the KFCS,
with auditing their
accounts, and with
general information, while
the FD provided technical
guidance and control.
The by-laws also provided
that the area under the
administrative control of
the KFCS should not pass
to the owners, even after The flagstone on the side of the KFCS Bhagotla building
it had been reclaimed and listing the names of the managing committee in 1942
declared fit for cultivation,
unless the KFCS released it through a proper resolution passed in the general meeting and after
the owners paid for these services, at a rate fixed by the GB.
Financial aspects
The government bore the cost of preparing the WPs, of the original demarcation of the village
forest, and of inspection by government forest staff. Depending on their financial standing,
societies could be paying or non-paying. Paying societies received lands that already had forest,
and thus had income almost from the beginning. In these societies, all the costs for work and staff
were paid out of society funds. Societies had to have their accounts audited annually by the CD.
A society could have various sources of income.
Net miscellaneous income This was the name given to all the funds left after receiving and
paying out money from and to different sources. It included
income to which the proprietary body of the mauza constituting the KFCS had exclusive
defined rights, for example grass, fruits, revenue from quarrying, and income from

gharats9 ; the KFCS could collect this but had to distribute it among the khewatdars as per
their rights as recorded in the wazib-ul-arz;
income received from privately owned lands (other than village commons) managed by the
KFCS; after deducting actual expenditures, the KFCS was supposed to pay the income to
the owners;
the net government grant.
The total of the first two points was the net distributable income. Certain allocations from this
income were mandatory, including 1% as reserved funds, 10% as a forest improvement fund,
9% for charitable purposes (as defined in Section 2 of the Charitable Endowment Act of 1890)
or to be put into the KFCS common good fund, up to 5% to the cooperative education fund
(actual amount and instructions on what amount to spend were specified by the registrar), and
portions for creation of a building fund or any other fund required by the KFCS. The allocation
of funds had to be recorded in the society accounts.
The net government grant was the money given by the government to cover running expenses,
as laid down in the WP of each KFCS. The society had to pay the zamindari share (one fourth
of the revenue from trees felled and sold hak chuharam) to the member khewatdars from
this fund. Usually, these were small amounts and instead of distributing them as cash to the
khewatdars, most KFCS would undertake to pay off on their behalf the land revenue payable to
the government. The village patwari, or land revenue official, and the lambardar, or
traditional revenue collector, together received a one-sixteenth share of the revenue. First the
DFO had to certify the amounts as payable to the entitled persons in accordance with the
settlement rules. Then the revenue department would prepare and send a cheque to the KFCS.
The sum remaining after the various payments was the net government grant and constituted
the real income of the KFCS.
Final income The final income was the amount left after the above deductions and the KFCS
working expenses for the year had been deducted. This was distributed among the members in
proportion to their rights in the forest.
The working plans

Before a KFCS was registered, a WP was prepared by a gazetted officer of the FD after
consultation with the KFCS members, formal consent being taken at a general meeting and
recorded in the KFCS register. The society could only be registered after the chief conservator of
forests had sanctioned the WP on behalf of the government. The WP was revised by the FD
after expiry of its working period, again in consultation with the members of the KFCS. The WP
provided for the management of the forests in great detail, particularly with respect to the
closure of parts of the pastures (for the harvest of the hay crop), for conservation of the soil, and
for planting trees of fodder and economic value, both in closure areas and in areas set aside for
grazing.
Introduction of the KFCS Scheme

Initially people were suspicious of the scheme, but intervention by politicians, and wide
dissemination of information about the scheme through special durbars (public receptions) and
by designated forest staff were instrumental in taking the great experiment in democratisation of
9
Traditional water-powered mills for grinding grain

The first rakha of KFCS Arla Saloh (left), now 70 years old. The present
rakha is on the right.
the forest management10 to the people. There are references to almost all important officers of
the district administration, the revenue department, the FD, and the CD making special efforts
to take this scheme to the people of the selected villages.
The Conservator of Forests, North Circle, notified detailed procedures for the organisation of
KFCS.11 Due to a shortage of staff, the area of work was confined to the parts of Kangra north
of the Beas River. Although the basic economic unit was to be a mauza, if any administrative
problems arose, a single or group of tikas could also form a workable unit. The FD preference
was for villages with large and compact areas of unmanaged wasteland undergoing erosion and
denudation. Villages where old cooperative societies already existed were also preferred. The FD
believed that the smaller the number of tikas and rightholders, the easier would be the
organisation work. Easily accessible villages were selected initially to demonstrate the
experiments efficacy.
The case study in Box 1 helps to illustrate the reality of KFCS formation. The history of the
formation of the Bhagotla Forest Cooperative Society illustrates the underplay of social and
caste currents in villages during the KFCS formation process.
10
Speech of His Excellency, the Governor of Punjab, at a special durbar at Palampur, 1941
11
Letter No.1664 dated 17th May 1949

Box 1: Formation of the Bhagotla Forest Cooperative Society
Bhagotla village is in Palampur Tehsil on the right bank of the River Neugal, about six km from
Palampur town. The Mauza Bhagotla (village area) covered 156.4 ha, with the forests contained in
one compact block of 68.4 ha stretching along its northern boundary.
Ban maufi forests were concessions given by the government in the 1860s to ten specific village
communities of Kangra District when taking over their land for tea plantations. In return, the village
zamindars received almost exclusive ownership of an equal area of unclassed forests, to which the FD
surrendered its right of closure. Only the Deputy Commissioner could exercise limited control on the
use of these ban maufi forests. By the 1930s, the FD felt the zamindars were unable to conserve these
forests and that they were rapidly degrading. The practise of giving private contractors the task of
extracting resin from the chil trees was considered the biggest problem. To curb this, the DC passed an
order in 1942 that prohibited the zamindars of Bhagotla from granting resin extraction to contractors,
on the grounds that it was being carried out in an unscientific manner.
The FD had this episode in mind when forming the KFCS in Bhagotla. They selected Bhagotla12 since
it was one of the smallest ban maufi villages and should have been easy to use as an example to all
other such villages, which could then be made into forest cooperative societies. It seems likely, given
the DCs limited legal powers to interfere in peoples management of ban maufis and the FDs total
lack of power, that the government proposed bringing the ban maufi villages under the KFCS scheme
so that KFCS rules would apply, making active intervention by the FD a distinct reality.
The cooperative sub inspector organised

Table 2: Classification of Bhagotla forest lands
Type Class Area (ha) preliminary introductory meetings, the
%DQVDUNDU 8QFODVVHGIRUHVWV outcome of which was a written application
6KDPODWWLND %DQPDXIL (dated 15 October 1941) by the zamindars
3ULYDWHZDVWHODQGV of Bhagotla, requesting the formation of a
*DLUPXPNLQ KFCS in their village. At the next stage, the
727$/ WP officer visited Bhagotla and drew up
the WP to bring all the forests under the
KFCS, prescribing their closure. Most of the
village inhabitants strongly opposed the closure of their forest lands, at least half of which were then
under open grazing. The FD insisted on the closures as important for proper forest management. All
resident khewatdars of Bhagotla, except the lambardar and his brother, now refused to sign the
agreement giving up their rights as a precursor to formal membership of the KFCS, and the CD
dissolved the KFCS.
The lambardars role in the village hierarchy at that time must be understood. The lambardar was,
and to a limited extent still is, the traditional legal institution for revenue collection in the village. In
return for a commission, he collected land revenue on behalf of the government. The chance to be a
lambardar was the domain of the villages most powerful high caste families; the designation was
hereditary and passed on to sons. The lambardar and his family were frequently the villages most
powerful family. Their role in land revenue collection gave them easy access to scarce cash and a
knowledge of the system of written land records (which the illiterate farmers could not decipher) so
they were often able to amass large land holdings. Their proximity to the tehsildar and the
administration generally put the lambardars in a strong position to interpret and use government
schemes to their own advantage. Thus, over half of Bhagotlas cultivable land and half of its shamlat
12
From Registration Report of Bhagotla KFCS by the Assistant Registrar Co-ops Societies, Dharamsala, dated
29.6.1942

lands belonged to the lambardar. The family was also the governments most powerful conduit for
controlling village opinion.
The CD sub inspector of that time noted how they minutely analysed the records of the rights to the
shamlat land (14 ha) which the KFCS was to manage and which was proposed to be closed to grazing.
They found that the lambardar along with his brother owned the rights to more than half of the
shamlat. Until this point, the non-resident khewatdars had been ignored, but by adding the shares of
15 of them to those of the lambardar and his brother a group was constructed that owned a two-thirds
share of the shamlat land. The Conservator of Forests and the Director of Soil Conservation, Punjab,
both organised meetings in Bhagotla in order to convince the opposition and bring them into the
KFCS. The CF was ready to adjust the size of the closures, something the resident khewatdars were
not ready for, wanting the removal of closures at all costs. Since, as per Section 38 of the Forest Act,
the new group mustered a two-thirds majority, it was technically competent to give the necessary
consent for the closures. Thus, closures were carried out without the consent of the majority of resident
khewatdars, through the mobilisation of non-resident khewatdars.
The Bhagotla Forest Cooperative Society was formed at a subsequent meeting of these 17 people,
with 11 khewatdars absent. The lambardar was elected secretary of the KFCS, a position he continued
to occupy until 1950. The WP was adopted on 28 March 1942 with the following distribution.
Chil Shelter Wood Circle = 40 ha of which 10 ha was closed

Grass and Fodder Circle = 12.8 ha all closed
Grazing Circle = 16 ha all closed
Following acceptance of the WP, the Bhagotla KFCS was registered on 5 September 1942 and land for
management was transferred on 2 October 1943. Formation of the KFCS meant that the DCs ban on
resin tapping by zamindars did not apply13, and they could now tap under the DFOs supervision. In
the season of 1942, the KFCS earned Rs 2,000 from resin tapping carried out through a forest
contractor. With unrestricted grazing stopped, grass had also started coming up in the closures, whose
auction brought the society income. The possibility of individual incomes through the society seems to
have convinced many resident khewatdars of the advantages of the KFCS. In a meeting on 3
November 1942, presided over by the Assistant Registrar CD, Dharamsala, four of the opposing ring
leaders joined the KFCS.14
By 1943, the number of members swelled to 24, reaching 41 by 1945 and 103 by 1971. The KFCS
continued to pay the annual land revenue on its members behalf from the zamindari share received
from the FD. It also invested money from its common good fund for construction and repair of two
spring wells, a school building, repair of the temporary bridge across the Neugal River every year, and
Rs 9,603 on a building of its own. The success of the regeneration achieved and plantations done in
the areas managed by the KFCS has been appreciated on record by many visiting officers of the FD
and the administration itself.
However, there does not seem to have been much potential for ownership of the society by the people
themselves or for its functioning as a democratic institution. Numerous complaints were made against
the lambardar for autocratic administration, lack of transparency in accounts, and non-distribution of
benefits to members. As the society secretary, he installed an illiterate person as treasurer, managing
and controlling the accounts himself. The CD considered the lambardar the ideal committed village
13
Report of Sh. M. Gurdas Mohan, E.A.C. Forests, dated 10.4.1942, sent to the Divisional Forest Officer, Kangra
Forest Societies Division
14
Memo No 9653-D dated 3.11.1942 from Additional Registrar Cooperatives Department, Dharamsala to
Divisional Forest Officer, Kangra Forest Societies Division

leader and even gave him a cash prize of Rs 72. But his autocratic ways became increasingly
unacceptable to the members, who complained to the assistant registrar. Eventually in 1948, the AR
found the lambardar guilty of having embezzled one thousand rupees; a case was filed in the police
station. The court fined the lambardar Rs 500, or four months jail on non payment; the KFCS threw
him out and new leadership emerged to control the society. Today the KFCS regularly conducts
elections every two years and has its accounts audited annually. The members are unanimously critical
of the confused situation created by the FD since 1973, but still maintain their commitment to the aims
and objectives of the KFCS and are continuing their work along these lines.
Primary school constructed by KFCS Bhagotla from its own funds

Four
analysis of the societies
Policy and Objectives

The government objectives for the KFCS visualised peoples participation in the protection,
improvement, and management of forests but only of those degraded forests that were not
responding to FD attempts at conservation. This limited participation was in complete
accordance with the general outlook prevalent in the state and the FD in the 1920s. In effect,
the initiative was a PFM process initiated from above. The stress on preventing erosion and the
prescriptions of closures, enforced through working plans designed by FD staff, displays the
limitations inherent in the FD assumption that uncontrolled grazing was the main cause of the
increased erosion of forest areas, especially in the lower Siwalik belt.
Having said this, the emphasis on utilising the forest produce to the best advantage of the
members and the FD practise of sharing income from the sale of timber to rightholders (hak
chuharam), sharing revenue from the sale of timber and resin to traders, and giving the KFCS
the right to profits from the auction of grass, sand, stone, bajri, (gravel) and minerals from the
forest areas, speak of the schemes far-sighted vision. By allowing some profits from the forest
land to flow back to the KFCS, the FD could ensure both the financial viability of the societies
and their continued participation in the scheme.
Institutional Analysis
Some of the major characteristics of the KFCS are summarised in Annex 4.
Choice of the institutional form

The Garbett Commission had recommended that this experiment be initiated through the
involvement of people and their representatives. In order that these demonstrations be tried out
through qualified representatives of the people, panchayats were to be formed and given the
responsibility for managing the forests. Although the Indian Forest Act of 1927 had a separate
section on Village Forests, the FD did not accept that the village-level institutions envisaged by
the commission could be van (forest) panchayats as had been formed in Uttarakhand, not too
distant from Kangra. Thus, at the onset of the scheme, when attempting to implement the
Garbett Commission recommendations, the FD ignored the possibility of organising van
panchayats, saying that since existing panchayats had an administrative role, a separate body
for managing forests would need to be formed of the rightholders only. While this might have
four analysis of the societies 21

Forest on 300 khanals of KFCS Bhagotlas shamlat land. The grass and
other usufructs are shared by consensus between the two villages.
been true of some belts, the actual task of organising villages into panchayats began in earnest
only after the emergence of independent India in 1947 and was not completed in the Punjab hill
areas until 1955. There were no pre-existing panchayats in Kangra in the 1940s and the FDs
reasons for creating a different institution are not clear.
A very different situation prevailed in the hill areas of Kumaun and Garhwal in Uttar Pradesh.
The British policies for timber and revenue had led to widespread peasant revolts and diverse
forms of social protest over restricted access to forests and their over-exploitation by the state.
This period of van andolans or forest protest movements by local communities forced the
British Government in 1925 to set up a grievance committee to suggest ways to fulfil peoples
needs for forest products. The system of van panchayats (elected local area body for forest
management) was suggested and implemented in the 1930s, and they remain operational to
this day. It is not known why panchayats were not formed to manage the forests in Kangra.
Choosing to operate through cooperatives had clear implications as the Cooperatives
Department was brought in in addition to the Forest Department and the revenue department.
The KFCS were helped by regular inputs from CD staff in organisational matters such as
elections, account management, and auditing, while the FD provided the main forestry-related
inputs. But there is evidence of confusion and lack of communication between the different
departments concerning which had the role and responsibility for managing the different aspects
of the new institutions. Government policy at this time seems itself to have confused the issue.
The directions given were that the Deputy Commissioner will be throughout responsible for the
efficient working of the KFCS15 ; the CD was to be responsible for the formation of the KFCS,
and the FD was to monitor and support the forestry aspects of the KFCS functioning. But no
mechanism was developed to integrate and coordinate their work.
15
Kangra Village Forestry Scheme Rules, quoted in Rawal (1968) Volume 2

The other implication for the KFCS was the inherited structure of the cooperative society and its
inflexible, pre-structured organisation. Cooperative by-laws were predefined, the structure
proposed and handed down by the government was based on thirty years of experience in the
process of implementation. This left little space for radical redefinition of the objectives and
procedures. At the same time, registration as a co-propriety body implementing PFM gave the
KFCS a unique strength that could not be undermined by any change of heart and support from
the FD. This is precisely why all FD attempts to liquidate the KFCS failed to dent their autonomy
as CD-recognised cooperatives. Overall, though, the strengths and weaknesses of the KFCS
initiative must be compared with those of the van panchayats formed in other parts of the UP
hills.
The lack of a formal forum for regular coordination between the CD, FD, and the
administration, each of which was responsible for different aspects of the KFCS work, was a
serious institutional weakness. In the initiatives early years, there is evidence in the inspection
reports of the heads of the CD and FD jointly visiting successful KFCS and appreciating the
efforts made. Later, the preferred mode of coordination became consultation through
correspondence, a tedious procedure as a result of the many-layered, inter-departmental
bureaucracy.
Criteria for membership

Apart from the usual qualifications, such as being at least 18 years old and not being bankrupt
or mentally unstable, the main condition for membership was the members prior and legally
recognised share in the forests being given for management to the KFCS. According to the
principles of land settlement, the only people legally entitled to rights over a forest or common
land were those who owned agricultural land in their own name (that is, khewatdars). This
criterion for membership automatically excluded all landless castes of the village, who had no
recorded rights, and most women.
The basic units of PFM were the forest areas being taken up: those with pre-recorded rights to
them did not necessarily include the entire village/hamlet. Further, since only khewatdars with
recorded rights in the specific forest that the KFCS was to manage could be members, those
village khewatdars with rights in nearby forests other than the ones to be managed by the KFCS
were left out. The inspection note for Khalet KFCS16 shows that even after 11 years of operation
only 231 of the villages 364 khewatdars were KFCS members. This exclusion of landless people
and many khewatdars as well as of village bartandars17 caused an in-built lack of equity in the
distribution of benefits resulting from the KFCSs management of the forests, something pointed
out in the Chief Minister of Punjabs note of 1955 (Chapter 5).
Village caste structure at the time the KFCS were formed was rigidly hierarchical, a pattern that
was more or less reflected in the KFCS primary membership. After 1971, however, many KFCS
overcame this inequity in participation, to some extent at least. Zealous implementation of the
various Land Reform and Sharecroppers Acts ensured that almost all resident families in villages
were landed owners of at least 0.4 ha of land. Secondly, families that bought land and settled in
a village after the formation of the KFCS were also considered rightholders and in most cases
were made members of the KFCS with a share in the forest income. In the Nurpur Tehsil KFCS,
many Gujjars and Gaddis (lower caste groups) are members even today, but upper caste
16
Inspection Note dated 9.9.54 of the Deputy Registrar (Development), Co-op Societies, Punjab
17
Persons entitled to a right over the land or trees in a protected forested which are the property of another, for
example, the government.

control, especially by Brahmins and Rajputs (34% of the districts population), was often
manifested by their massive majority in the managing committee. Women were massively under
represented as they rarely owned land in their own name. Typically less than 10% of members
were women, and often there were none at all. Only one KFCS, Gahin Lagore, has a woman on
the managing committee.
Rights
Perhaps this initiatives most fundamental achievement was the effort to re-establish workable
systems of community control by redefining the balance between rights and responsibilities. As a
necessary precondition to inclusion in a KFCS, each member surrendered his/her individual rights
to the society (see agreement form in Annex 2). The society was to manage the forests and ensure
availability of benefits to each member as per his/her rights. The primacy of the exclusive demands
of any one rightholder, often without any bearing on the ability of the forest to provide for the sum
of the recorded rights of all the rightholders staking claims, was thus controlled in favour of the
equal distribution of the actual available and extractable surpluses. This introduced controls for
making extraction sustainable. It also became the members responsibility to work according to the
instructions of the KFCS management to protect, preserve, and enhance the forests so that the
common pool of resources created could provide for his/her needs and those of all the members.
Criteria for selection of areas

Detailed procedures for the organisation of KFCS were notified18 in 1949. A shortage of staff
confined the area of work to the parts of Kangra District north of the Beas River. Although a
mauza was to be the basic economic unit, a single tika or a group of tikas could also form a
workable unit if any administrative problems arose. This flexibility in the choice of a minimum
workable unit depending on the conditions in the field, proved very helpful in making the
scheme workable within the complex system of rights that existed in Kangra.
In selecting areas for forming KFCS, the preference was for villages with large and compact
areas of unmanaged wastes being eroded and denuded. Villages where old cooperative societies
already existed were also preferred. The FD believed smaller numbers of tikas and rightholders
would make the organisation work easier. Initially, to demonstrate the experiments efficacy,
villages with good forest on their lands were selected. For example, Tripal was selected to form a
KFCS, while many villages in the belt with degraded forest land were not selected. This
demonstrates the sensitivity of the approach that made the KFCS popular, despite the farmers
initial suspicion of the government.
Methodology of extending the scheme

The cooperative sub-inspector on forest society duty had primary responsibility for forming the
KFCS. After making his selection, he reported to the DFO and he, or his assistant, visited the
area with the sub-inspector. If they decided to include the village, a meeting was called with FD
staff and the rightholders, who learned the details of the scheme along with the benefits they
would get from it. The sub-inspector would enlist members and have them sign agreement
bonds. Sectional tika-wise meetings were held to admit the rightholders. Absentees were not
ignored; their consent was taken through the prescribed form or their next of kin. Thus the
concerned departments active collaboration was ensured at the field level. Unfortunately, this
level of integration was missing during decision making at higher levels.
18
Letter No.1664 dated 17th May 1949, from the Conservator of Forests, North East Punjab, Shimla

Peoples participation
The expression peoples participation figures nowhere in notifications about the KFCS, but the
stress on consulting the society and the villagers19 during the preparation of the WPs reveals a
space for consultative participation, unlike the conventional forest conservancy being practised
by the FD in the non-KFCS forests at the time. It is important to analyse the processes the
government set in motion when organising people into KFCS in the 1940s. Were these newly
created institutions actually community-based or were they merely convenient instruments
created by the FD and CD from above to achieve their own objectives? Just as crucial is the
issue of which classes within the village accepted the KFCS as a mechanism of community
managed forestry. What were their socioeconomic backgrounds and how participatory were the
structures established?
Finding a concrete factual record to answer these questions is difficult. Most village people were
illiterate in the 1940s. The few who were literate read and wrote only in Urdu, leaving no
independent, non-government documentation of peoples views and perceptions. Details of the
KFCS meetings are largely unavailable, the records of most societies having been misplaced
over the last half-century. Oral accounts of the KFCS early days are equally hard to come by
since the generation of leadership active in those days has mostly passed away. The registration
files of some KFCS in the offices of the assistant registrars of the CD do, however, contain
detailed records of correspondence, memos, inspection notes, case sheets of conflicts and so on.
Detailed analyses of primary data and the meagre secondary data available show that the
government promoted the KFCS scheme through locally acceptable village leaders. Even so, the
early years of the KFCS formation were somewhat chaotic, with villages divided over the
prescriptions of the WPs. The most bitter conflicts emerged over the issue of closures. Evidence
shows various forms of protest by opposing groups, the most common being the boycott and
disruption of government organised meetings held to form the KFCS.
After this initial phase of non-participation, membership picked up once income and benefits
began to flow to the societies. Members undertook free plantation work: for example, every
member of KFCS Paror planted five trees each year. Forest officers and rakhas were paid in cash
and kind for their services. Based on amounts decided by the general meeting, most KFCS
members supported the rakhas with grain payments in kind (ranging from two seer [1.5 kg] at
the time of inception to the current 700 kg per rakha per annum). In some KFCS, the members
donated their share of income to the society, which used these funds for development projects.
KFCS Khalet built a panchayat office in this way.
The FDs favourite prescription of closures to protect the KFCS forests and the plantation of
commercial species (mostly chil) through the KFCS WP demonstrates the rigid control over the
forest conservancy and silvicultural systems used by the KFCS to manage their forest areas.
Along with a revenue orientation based on commercial forestry, this has led to a situation in
which most of the districts KFCS forests contain pure stands of chil. The KFCS thus seem more
like instruments to involve village communities in conventional FD forest conservancy systems.
The khewatdars participated because of the higher shares of income and benefits they derived
from these forests than the same forests under conventional FD plans. The dynamics at work
can be gauged from the example of KFCS Bhagotla (see Box 1).
19
Notification of the Kangra Village Forest Scheme, vide letter No. 568-Ft. dated 27/2/1940 from the Deputy
Secretary of the Punjab Govt. to the Chief Conservator of Forests, Punjab.

Financial Systems
The scheme allowed for both paying and non-paying KFCS. What criteria were used for
deciding whether a society should be one or the other? Did efficiency and good management
make a society financially sound and self-sufficient and thus allow it to become a paying
society? Field studies reveal that where a society had the good fortune to receive areas with
valuable and revenue-yielding forests for management, this made all the difference. A societys
income was largely derived from a share of timber sold, and sale of fuelwood, grass, white
earth, sand and grit, and so on. Societies in the tracts of Kangra with chil, khair, and shisham
trees eventually became paying. Exceptions exist, such as Khaniyara KFCS, which still earns a
large sum from penalties incurred by slate contractors who damage and encroach on its forests
from the adjacent slate mines in the panchayat lands.
For those KFCS that received almost degraded lands with poor forests, regeneration (even after
protection) took time, as would have the eventual flow of income to the society. These societies
were notified as non-paying and for the first ten years of sanction the government bore all
expenditure for work and staff in excess of the societies revenue, as well as paying Rs 600 per
annum as grant-in-aid. Sixteen KFCS were paying societies from inception while the rest slowly
became so over the years. By the 1970s, all but two or three had become paying societies.
The sources of income for the KFCS were as follows.
Grant-in-aid
This crucial form of government support was not really a special grant, but was in major part the
amount the government owed the KFCS zamindar members as their zamindari share. The
distribution of this share through the KFCS should be seen less as income and more as the
timely payment of outstanding dues by the FD, mostly just enough to pay off the members land
revenue. The sums of grant-in-aid payments varied considerably as shown, for example, in the
records of KFCS Tripal (Table 3).
Table 3: Grants-in-aid received

by KFCS Tripal 1947 to 1969
Date Amount (Rs)

Records of grant-in-aid received by KFCS Maranda
Bhangiar to date

Sale of timber Table 4: Average resin collection and average
annual income between 1964 and 1967
Trees were sold standing to petty Kangra Forest Division
contractors (at trader rates, much higher KFCS Resin per year Revenue per
than zamindari rates). These were (average in year
converted into parts for the construction quintals) (average in Rs)
of railway lines like sleepers and either Palampur Range
floated down or transported by truck to %KDJRWOD
*DJJDO
Pathankot. The most eagerly sought
.KDOHW
timber was chil, poor quality compared .XVPDO
to that from higher altitudes of Kangra, 3DQDSUL
but sold at cheaper rates at Pathankot. 3DURU
Total 593 37,600
Dharamsala Range
Sale of resin *KDURK
Resin from chil trees was the most 6UDDK
important item of export and source of 6DGKHG
revenue for many of the 15 KFCS in Total 15 820
Nurpur and Kangra Forest Divisions. The Jwalamukhi Range
FD only charged Rs 55 to 65 per quintal 'DQRD
(100 kg) of extraction. The FD (UOD
*XPEHU
conducted the resin tapping operations
Total 418 22,970
through the offices of the respective Nurpur Forest Division
DFOs and the resin was sold at open Nurpur Range
auction or supplied to the government *DKLQ/DJRUH
Rosin and Turpentine Factory at Nahan /DKUX
at stipulated rates. The FD deducted the Total 230 16,790
expenses incurred for extraction, Indaura Range
collection, and supervision of the tapping 5H\
operations and gave the net profit to the Total 133 8,310
KFCS. Table 4 shows the average annual
amount of resin collected and average
annual revenue for these KFCS between 1964 and 1967.
Copy of Share Certificate of

the Shiwalik Cooperative
Rosin & General Mills
Company Ltd. The company
was made a nominal
member of the KFCS so
that it had representation
on the managing committee
of the KFCS from which it
was purchasing its resin.

The rivulet Maul Khad flows through the KFCS Maniara forest. Until 1980,
the mining lease for the extraction of sand and bajri was given by the KFCS.
Between 1964 and 1967, the 15 KFCS in the Kangra and Nurpur Forest Divisions together
produced an average of 1,390 quintals of resin per year with a total annual revenue of
approximately Rs 86,500.
Income from khair

For some of the KFCS in the Nurpur Division and Dehra Range, income from khair (Acacia
catechu), an abundant species in the scrub forests of the KFCS in the lower Siwaliks, provided a
far more valuable alternative to chil. The khair trees were auctioned and katha, a very
expensive product used widely for health and medicinal purposes, was extracted from them. By
1965, khair coppice coupes had become very profitable for the KFCS, bringing premium prices
of between Rs 2,000 to 3,000 per ha. After 1972 the FD worked most of the khair in the KFCS
forests. Katha reached a market value of Rs 10,000 per kg, but this was no longer paid to the
societies share (more than Rs 150,000 for KFCS Tripal alone).
Miscellaneous
Fuelwood and charcoal were products of coppice coupes of scrub forests and were also sold
standing. They were in heavy demand locally and in military cantonments such as Yol. Stocks of
bamboo, found in the KFCS forests of Nurpur Forest Division, were also sold standing. Other
secondary sources of income included the sale of grass, auctioned each year, of stones for
construction of local houses, of bajri and gravel for government buildings, and of minerals such
as goluan mitti (for coating mud chulhas).
Overall management
Overall, the KFCS provided their members with a stable income from the sale of usufructs. This
provided a strong incentive to conserve and manage the forests wealth, with many KFCS
affixing a minimum quota of trees for each member to plant every year. FD supervision ensured
constant monitoring to check unsustainable extraction.

Funds were kept in bank
accounts in the name of
the KFCS, and
government payments
came directly to the bank,
the accounts for each year
being audited by CD staff.
A copy of the audited
balance sheet was sent to
the DFO concerned, and
only after his verification
and approval could the
next years money flow to
the KFCS. Isolated
examples of financial
mismanagement and Share certificate showing KFCS Bhagotlas membership in
misappropriation did the district cooperative bank where its accounts are held.
occur, especially in the
early years, but these did not involve
large amounts and were not organised
affairs. The accounting system evolved by
the branch of the CD dealing with KFCS
in the days of the Punjab was extremely
complex, seemingly designed for the
needs of the departments and not the
KFCS, who required simpler systems with
built in checks and balances they could
manage themselves.
During the late 1960s and early 1970s,
the government ended this situation
rather abruptly, giving no prior notice and
not negotiating with the KFCS. The
extraction and sale of non-timber forest
products (NTFPs) from Kangras forests
was nationalised and the KFCS were
deprived of the right to a portion of the
profits from the auction of trees on their
lands (hak chuharam). The felling, sale,
and profits from the chil, khair, and
fuelwood trees now went directly and
entirely to the Forest Corporation. The
sale of resin was nationalised, with no
share of profits for the KFCS. Just when
the KFCS were becoming financially
viable and independent, most of their
sources of income and the incentives that
promoted community management of the Audited balance sheet of KFCS Arla Saloh, 31
forests were taken away. March 2000.

Even worse, the scheme was not renotified after 1973, and the KFCS were declared
unauthorised organisations making illegal profits, mostly from the sale of grass from
government lands. The still operational KFCS have average incomes ranging from between Rs
1,500 and Rs 3,000 per annum from the auction of grass, and a management subsidy from the
CD just sufficient to provide a very small salary to their staff, the forest officers, and the rakhas.
Forest Management Systems

Types of lands under the KFCS
Together, the KFCS managed a whole range of land types as shown in Table 5. Details are given
in Annex 1.
Table 5: Forest classes managed by the KFCS Almost all classes of land were
5HVHUYHGIRUHVW 5) KD given to KFCS to manage, even
'HPDUFDWHGSURWHFWHGIRUHVW '3) KD degraded stretches of reserved
8QGHPDUFDWHGSURWHFWHG 83) KD forests, which were supposed to be
IRUHVW 8) KD
free of all rights of users and
8QFODVVHGIRUHVW %0 KD
%DQPDXIL IRUHVW KD generally inviolate. Indicative of
6KDPODWODQG 3: KD the concepts practicality and how
3ULYDWHZDVWHODQG 06 KD much people accepted it,
0DONLDWVKDPODW especially the landed classes, is the
Total 23,363 ha fact that many farmers gave the
KFCS their private wastelands for
management.
Although the KFCS were formed in a prescribed manner and registered with working plans,
there was an oversight that later imposed serious legal and constitutional limitations on the
KFCS concept. This was the failure in most cases to enter the changes in control over the forest
land (kabza) into the land revenue records (andraz), even though the area was clearly
prescribed, demarcated, and defined at the site and marked with boundary pillars. When
Kangra became a part of HP in 1966, under the Land Revenue Act applicable to the territories
of HP, all wastelands and forest areas were vested with the FD which became their manager.
Thus, legal title and control over lands under KFCS management was suddenly superseded.
Confusion over legal interpretations of this persist and are a stumbling block to the process of
the KFCS revival.
Systems of forest management

Separate and detailed working plans (WPs) were prepared for each KFCS by the WP officer.
The individual working plans covered periods of 10 to 15 years in most cases, including a single
revision, before R.D. Rawal prepared an integrated working plan for all the KFCS in 1967
(Rawal 1968). Preparing simple separate plans for each KFCS was a huge effort, given staff
strength in the 1940s. A typical example can be found in the WP for Bhagotla KFCS covering
the period 1942/43 to 1951/52. The plan contained detailed documentation of the area
covered, utilisation of the forest products (methods of exploitation, their cost, agricultural and
social customs of the area, lines of export, and so on), FD staff and labour strengths, past and
proposed systems of management, and planning and implementation details of the working
circles, as well as miscellaneous regulations. It also included a topographical map of the area
under the KFCS at a scale of eight inches to the mile.

In practice, these
individual working plans
were actually small
working schemes
following a standard
pattern, in which the most
important objective
seemed to be closures
that protected the forest
areas from open grazing.
The different plans show
a uniform and limited
prescription of certain
types of closures
summarised below.
The chil working circle Monoculture chil plantations managed by KFCS Maranda
was applied to light to Bhangiar for resin extraction.
open chil forests with interrupted canopies where the standing stock was mostly young but of
varying density. This silvicultural system supported regeneration by enforcing closures against
grazing. With few exceptions, commercial scale felling of coupes was not feasible and only
limited felling was allowed for distribution of timber (TD) among the KFCS members.
The fuel and fodder working circle Charands, open grazing lands close to habitations, were
taken under this working circle. The system left the land needed for local convenience open to
grazing, while the remainder was closed and planted with useful fodder trees of local
importance. Oral evidence suggests that the decision of how much and which section of the
charand to close was often a bone of contention between the FD and the village, and within the
village there was often disagreement between those who objected to the closures and those who
advocated them. Apart from a few KFCS in Nurpur Tehsil, this working circle showed very poor
results as a result of the failure to control grazing during the first five years of plantation.
The plantation working circle Denuded and degraded forests with little or no economically
valuable vegetation were separated and made into plantation working circles to be afforested
with commercial species such as chil, khair, bahera, harar, shisham, amla, and eucalyptus.
Broad-leafed species face a higher risk of being browsed, and the present composition of most
of the KFCS forests indicates that non-browsable species such as chil and eucalyptus or shisham
and khair were the main commercial species planted. The method employed to prepare the
degraded forests for planting did considerable damage, however. The entire coupe was first clear
felled, and usually burnt to the ground during winter to destroy the weeds (all bushes, scrub,
and new saplings of non-commercial species), exposing the soil to winter rains and the
subsequent scorching summer. This is another example of scientific forestry that failed to take
into account the fragile ecology of the Himalayas, and the still more fragile Siwalik formations.
The protection working circles These covered the largest part of the area under KFCS
management and comprised closure of an entire area to grazing, allowing natural regeneration
supplemented by selective planting. The planting generally showed poor results, but the slow,
natural regenerative processes were largely successful.
Rawals Integrated Working Plan for managing KFCS amalgamated the individual working plans
in 1968 and 1969. The FD made a unilateral transition from individual plans drawn up with the

limited involvement of the KFCS but validated in the general meeting, to an integrated WP for
the entire area. There are no records of any suggestions, consent, or approval being sought from
the general bodies of the 70 KFCS about the prescriptions for this integrated working plan.
Quality of the KFCS forests

The average volume of growing stock in FD and KFCS managed forests in Kangra Forest Circle
in the early eighties is shown in the WP for the area for 1981/82 to 1995/96 (Table 6). Given
that most of the forest land the KFCS
Table 6: Average growing stock in forests in Kangra had been given to manage in the
Forest Circle
1940s was degraded and barren,
Felling series Average growing stock
these values show how successful the
m3/ha
approach was, with forest stock at the
Dharamsala Dehra FD
FD end of the seventies on a par with or
)'PDQDJHGIRUHVWVVHULHV, better than the best of the FD
)'PDQDJHGIRUHVWVVHULHV,, managed forests. Another example
8QGHU.)&6PDQDJHPHQW can be found in the forests of KFCS
VHULHV,,, Shahpur, where there is an entire
section of oak in good condition
(Quercus incana, a superior fodder
Table 7: Estimate of capital value of KFCS forests in
tree) the last surviving example of
1967*
Area Rate an oak forest at such a low altitude in
Asset Value (Rs) all of Kangra District.
(ha) Rs/ha
/DQG
In 1967, the FD calculated that the
*URZLQJ
6WRFN
&KLO KFCS forests were worth a total of Rs
2DN 540 million. The breakdown is shown
)XHO RWKHUV in Table 7.
&RSSLFHV
This evidence supports the stand taken
%DPERR
by the members and MCs of the KFCS
3ODQWDWLRQV
that, except for non-functional and
3URWHFWLRQ
defunct KFCS, they managed forests
:LOGOLIH
better than the FD. FD staff echo this
17)3V
opinion unofficially, feeling that in
Total
many respects the control of the forests
by local villagers was more sensitive to
what people actually needed from their
forests. Present FD practice is criticised
by the societies. For example, they blame the FD for using too much acid to speed up the resin
flow on the channels dug into the boles of chil trees, causing the bark to burn. In storms and strong
winds these trees snap, leading to a loss of mature trees in the KFCS forests.
Forest offences
A detailed notification20 clearly states, It has to be made absolutely clear that primarily the
Societies and their officials are responsible for protection work and these duties devolve more
20
Vide Para. VI (v) of Annexure III (a) to the Code of Procedure for KFCS: standing orders regarding procedures
to be adopted in the forest societies of Kangra District in forest offences under section 68 of the Indian Forest Act
and other allied matters.

particularly on the rakha and the
forest officer. DFO and FD staff were
intended to guide KFCS staff.
Elaborate and precise definitions were
laid out of what constituted forest
offences, how they were to be
recorded, and the powers of the KFCS
staff. Where the offender was a
member of the KFCS, the forest officer
or the KFCS rakha had the power to
register a report of the damage, seize
the implements, capture the forest
produce, and arrest and compound
the offender. Where the offender was
a non-member, the report was to be
transmitted to the range officer within
one week along with the statement of
the accused and witnesses and an
application to compound. If the KFCS
wanted to prosecute an offender, the
case was forwarded to the DFO for
prosecution. Thus, while the power to
book offenders rested with the KFCS,
the DFO carried out the actual
punitive action, using the powers
handed down by the Indian Forest
Act.
The physical proximity of the forest
officer and rakha to the KFCS forests Map of KFCS Bhagotla included in a working plan
and their intimate knowledge of the document. It clearly lays out the different cate-
village and its topography meant that gories of land and their management systems.
few offences escaped their notice,
making their monitoring more efficient than that of an FD beat guard whose beat covered
hundreds of hectares. This system only failed where poor monitoring of the rakhas by the forest
officers left them free to reach their own accommodations with offenders.
The procedures and rules for registering offences were elaborate and complicated, however. In
the 1940s, when most forest officers and especially rakhas did not even know Urdu, KFCS staff
must have had a difficult time enforcing the compounding of offences. The tedious procedures
made the bringing to book of all offenders and prosecuting the more hardened ones through the
DFO a difficult process, especially since the forest officers and rakhas received no training to
acquaint them with the written procedures. Further, confusion continued on the part of the FD
throughout the official time of the KFCS about granting the KFCS forest officers and rakhas the
power of legal enforcement. They were notified as forest officers, only to have those powers
revoked time and again. For the offenders, this made the legitimacy of the people implementing
and monitoring forest management in the field questionable.
At present, the FD does not accept the power of KFCS staff to catch and compound forest
offences, resulting in a chaotic field situation. Even now, both FD and KFCS staff are booking

offences, filing damage
reports, and collecting
fines. This favours
hardened offenders and
organised timber
smugglers, who can in
some cases pay and reach
an accommodation with
corrupt FD and KFCS staff.
Once the offence is
booked, the FD blames the
KFCS and the KFCS
blames the FD for allowing
it to happen. In an extreme
case, this led the DFO to
The rakhas and secretary Mr. Anant Kumar (foreground, seize the registers and
right) of KFCS Maranda Bhangiar. permit books from KFCS
Kusmal. Examples can be
found of FD staff seizing and auctioning off forest produce, especially timber, seized from
offenders by KFCS officers, and in some cases, even fallen dead and dry trees auctioned by the
KFCS.21 The FD claims that the auctions are merely mechanisms found by KFCS to give away
expensive illegally felled trees at low rates to members.22 It feels that this encourages illegal
felling of trees, a way of skirting the ban imposed on KFCS not to sanction trees to its members.
For most functional KFCS, the present annual income from compounding forest offences ranges
between Rs 1,500 and Rs 2,000.
Timber distribution
Timber distribution (TD), that is granting trees to rightholders at subsidised rates, was previously
done on the recommendation of the KFCS MCs, even though technically the DFO was the final
sanctioning authority. The members of the MCs state that they considered the applicants need
and the actual availability of standing stock in the forest, and only then recommended
sanctioning a tree to a member. If the member was known to be non-cooperative in putting out
forest fires, some KFCS refused to endorse his request. The rakha and the KFCS forest officer
would accompany an FD staff member and the applicant to the forest, select a mature tree, and
mark it with a hammer. This cross verification by responsible KFCS officers was a check and
balance which thwarted attempts by FD or KFCS staff to grant immature trees or to favour any
applicant over another.
Since 1973, however, there have been overlaps between the KFCS and the grass roots level FD
staff in their roles, rights, and responsibilities, and the FD has largely ignored the KFCS when
selecting applicants for the sanctioning of TD. While in most KFCS, the MCs continue to give
recommendations as per the members requests for TD sanctions, no legal rule binds the DFO
21
In Bahnala KFCS, in May 1995, a fallen mango tree was auctioned by the managing committee to a member.
The FD raided and seized the tree on the charge that the KFCS had no powers to auction trees. The tree was
then auctioned by the FD. The KFCS has now filed a case against this action of the FD in court and has
demanded that the FD produce evidence to support its statement that the KFCS stand dissolved.
22
"These rates do not comply with the compensation rates laid down by the DFO concerned and nor is the amount
deposited in the Treasury. Internal FD Notification, source unknown.

concerned to heed their recommendations. The DFOs style of functioning determines whether
or not the MCs recommendations will be considered. This can mean that KFCS staff, although
still supported by the village community to manage and protect the forests, are not informed by
FD staff and may be unaware why a certain tree in their forests is being cut. Has it been
sanctioned as TD to the said person or is someone cutting it illegally with the collusion of the
guard?
A similar confusion exists over the previous KFCS practise of giving out small, dry trees to
members to cover an urgent need for wood in the event of the death of a family member or any
ritual being performed (khushi or gami), and for marriage ceremonies (cheiye). Most KFCS
now give dry, thorny trees for this purpose against the earlier practice of giving good fuelwood
trees, but the FD may object even to this (as in the case of KFCS Shahpur).
The unclear situation in terms of responsibility and support has had a disastrous impact. Since
1973, the wealth of the KFCS forests has been plundered. There are reports of camels and taxis
being used to smuggle timber out of KFCS Rey, with the non-colluding elements within both the
FD and the KFCS unable to stop it. Village communities have become less interested to help in
putting out forest fires in their forests. Further, emboldened by the situation of continuing flux, in
some places influential villagers have encroached upon KFCS forests. When some KFCS lodged
complaints with the DFO and revenue department (KFCS Bhagotla, for example), teams came
and re-demarcated the forests and marked out the encroachments, but nothing was done to
evict the encroachers. Equally in some cases, KFCS have allocated parts of their UPF areas to
government departments for the construction of badly needed public utilities in the village, such
as schools and dispensaries, and the FD has treated these as encroachments and asked the
KFCS to evict the permanent structures built on them.
Meeting of KFCS Maranda Bhangiar in 2001 to decide the Timber

Distribution (a rightholders share of timber at concessional rates for house
construction/repair). Mahila Mandal representatives were specially invited
as women are members of the KFCS.

five
the standoff between the
stakeholder institutions
Clearly, there is considerable confusion about the roles, present status, and future of the KFCS
initiative. On the one hand, the initiative is considered by some to have ended in 1971 with the
creation of the new state of Himachal Pradesh and cessation of all grant-in-aid or payment of
revenue, on the other many of the cooperatives are actually still functioning, notwithstanding the
adverse situation. Viewed from a strictly legal perspective the cooperatives continue to have a de
jure existence. The de facto position remains more complex as in some areas the cooperatives
continue to manage areas originally under their management in collaboration with the
Department of Forests while in other areas they do not play any active role in forest
management. The roles played and the positions taken by each stakeholder institution are
analysed below before attempting to look for solutions. A brief summary of the present position,
commented by the author, is given in Box 3.
Role of the State Governments

Punjab Government (1937 to 1966)
As early as 1955, in independent India, the political apparatus had misgivings about the
continuation of the KFCS in the given form. On July 1, 1955, the Chief Minister of the Punjab,
Sh. Bhimsen Sachar, made the following observations.23
1. The KFCS scheme in fifteen years of operation had spread to only 73 societies, covering
60,000 acres of a total 600,000 acres of land in Kangra District. This was very
unsatisfactory progress and he thought probably resulted from the Rs 50,000 limit placed on
grants-in-aid to KFCS.
2. Before agreeing to increase the outlay, the scheme should be thoroughly revised under the
following principles.
a) The cooperative societies should be eliminated and management of these forests placed
in the hands of the panchayats. The cooperatives were not sufficiently broad based as
membership was confined to khewatdars, and even they were not fully represented.
The principle that the profits of the natural resources of a village should go to a
restricted group and not the body of the entire village (bartandars) was incorrect.
Secondly, the distribution of profits as dividends to individuals is not correct. Thirdly,
the governments avowed responsibility was to strengthen the development of
panchayats, which now covered the entire territory and so should be utilised.
23
Note dated 1.7.1955 from Sh. Bhim Sen Sachar, Chief Minister, Punjab, reproduced in Rawal (1968) Volume 2,
pp. 125-26

b) The scheme should be given up if it did not cover the entire forest territory. It amounted
to unjustified preferential treatment by the government of those 73 villages with KFCS
as they receive special monies as grants-in-aid while the remaining 513 did not.
c) Reserved forests should be removed from the KFCS purview as the focus of the KFCS
scheme was only to improve the condition of the UPFs.
Based on these considerations and worried over the governments continued financial
commitment to the programme, Sh. Sachar asked the FD to prepare a comprehensive scheme.
No records are available that tell us whether this was done or whether a revised scheme
covering all forest areas was proposed for the entire district. However, in 1955/56, the
department abandoned two societies that had been formed in Hamirpur Tehsil and which were
merely awaiting formal notification, and they never came into existence. The withdrawal of
political will and support for KFCS seems to have developed from this point in 1955. It speaks
of the FDs inability to convince the chief minister of the experiments goals and aims and of its
demonstrated strengths and achievements, and thus to win his political patronage and support
for its continuance.
The government decided not to further expand the KFCS scheme without discussing or
negotiating with the KFCS, which in the authors view demonstrates a lack of political vision and
support within the Punjab Government. Despite this, the KFCS scheme continued and in 1961
the KFCS actually became more autonomous, receiving their revenue receipts back in place of
the grant-in-aid.
Himachal and Himachal Pradesh Government (1967 to 1997)

When the Punjab was reorganised in1966, Kangra District was merged into Himachal.
Himachal Pradesh became a fully-fledged state of the Republic of India in January 1971. Two
factors played against the future of the KFCS. The first was the lack of any knowledge and
experience about an initiative such as the KFCS amongst the new states political establishment.
In some respects, the KFCS can be seen as a casualty of the bitter infighting between the old
and new Himachal. Some people allege that the HP Government of the time, with strong
representation from old Himachal, was not favourably oriented towards funding and
supporting an initiative such as KFCS. Vested interests of local forest contractors in the
considerable standing volume of timber in the KFCS forests are also thought by some to have
played a role in reducing political support for the KFCS initiative.24
The new state of HP inherited a unique institutionalised attempt at PFM from the Punjab, and
had an excellent opportunity to look sensitively at peoples management of forests, and to
develop the approach as a sustainable and viable demonstration model for the hills as a whole.
For whatever reasons, the FD decided instead to use its newly acquired control over the KFCS
to strike a final blow at the initiative. Nevertheless various attempts were made to revive or take
a fresh look at the societies over the next few years. In 1980 the forest minister appointed a
committee25 to give recommendations for renewing financial support to the KFCS. In 1981, the
committee recommended that the KFCS be allowed to carry on their work as before. This issue
came before the legislative assembly, and in a subsequent meeting, the forest minister approved
the resumption of financial aid to the KFCS from 1982 onwards. Nothing came of these
assertions, however. The HP Government notified26 the formation of another committee in
24
According to interviews with senior retired Cooperatives Department officials.
25
Referred to in a report appearing in the newspaper Jansatta, dated 27.9.1996
26
HP Govt. letter no. COP-F/S/-29/89 dated 6.10.1990
five the standoff between the stakeholder institutions 37

1990 to look into the rehabilitation of the KFCS, but the state legislative assembly was dissolved
soon after and the committee could not fulfil its mandate. Then in 1993, acting on instructions
from the registrar of cooperatives, the assistant registrar of cooperatives at Dharamsala selected
five representatives from the KFCS for a state level committee for the revival of KFCS. However,
these members have yet to be called for a formal meeting.
Role of the Forest Department

The role played by the FD in initiating and supporting the KFCS can be divided into four
phases.
Phase 1: 1940/1 to 1954/5

The FD pioneered a very different and unique approach when it started the KFCS, a big
departure from the very conservative system of forest conservancy usually applied at the time.
Separate financial and technical allocations were made and strictly implemented through
independent institutional structures set up to closely support the KFCS initiative. The concept
approach was considered to have achieved its objectives, and it was recommended in early
1955 that it be extended to Hamirpur tehsil and in Nurpur tehsil.
Phase 2: 1955/6 to 1966/7

After 1955 the Punjab Governments support for the scheme dropped sharply, financial
provisions for the initiative were reduced, and the FD stopped extending and expanding the
concept to newer areas. This change became even more marked after Kangra was integrated
into Himachal following the Punjab reorganisation in 1966.
Phase 3: 1967/8 to 1972/3

The originally more or less autonomous functioning of the KFCS was further curtailed through
the introduction of R. D. Rawals centralised Integrated Working Plan, which was published in
1968 and remained in effect until 1985. By then, the fundamental basis of the KFCS initiative
had already been undermined, and the FD had begun to lose interest in managing these forests
through the cooperatives. In effect, the FD appropriated the right of management to itself,
despite a clearly laid out autonomy and the power of each KFCS to approve its own
management plan. In the opinion of the author, the FD was simply interested to regain control
of and profit from forest land that had been successfully rehabilitated and regenerated through
the hard work of the KFCS members.
In 1971 Kangra became a part of the state of Himachal Pradesh and the KFCS experiment
moved to the new Himachal Pradesh FD. The KFCS scheme was initially not sanctioned
beyond 1971, and for almost a year its very foundation was questioned. The HP government
then gave in to pressure from the KFCS and superseded the FD, renotifying27 the societies for
another two years ending March 1973, on the same terms and conditions as before. Among
others, this meant a resumption of the grant-in-aid to the KFCS for 1972 and 1973, but in fact
27
Letter No. 4-55/70-SF dated 31/3/1973 from Forest Secretary to CCF, FD, HP. The same notification however
increased the inspection fees payable by the KFCS as follows:
for first Rs 1,000 surplus income of the KFCS = 10 %
for the next Rs 4,000 = 12 %
for the next Rs 5,000 and above that = 15 %

these funds were not released to them until the 1980s. In 1973, using a legal loophole provided
by the act of transfer of the district to HP, the FD refused to renotify the scheme. This completed
the uncertainty about the KFCS role and confusion over its legal status, as they were co-
operatives they were still registered. The FD and the KFCS now held diametrically opposing
views about their respective legal rights to manage the forest land under dispute. This is
illustrated by the incident in KFCS Gahin Lagore (see Box 2).
Box 2: An Anecdote from Gahin Lagore Forest Cooperative Society
The old men in the village recounted this anecdote, their eyes dim but their memory clear, about the
early days when the DFOs were kings of all they saw. The forest cooperatives had just been formed
and had started working as peoples organisations. I have no way of verifying the truth of this
anecdote, but still feel that the story should be told.
A new DFO who had just joined Nurpur Forest Division came to Gahin Lagore and was met by one of
his forest guards, whose daughter was to be married. The guard requested the sahib to grant him a dry
tree to be used as fuelwood for the ceremonies. As was the fashion in those days, the DFO then and
there sanctioned a tree. FD staff went to the nearby forest, which belonged to the Gahin Lagore Forest
Cooperative Society, marked a suitable tree and chopped it down.
The KFCS president was appalled by this circumvention of all norms and took it as humiliation to the
society, since its permission and concurrence was necessary before the DFO could take such action. He
reached the site along with the societys forest officers, seized the implements from the FD staff and
registered a damage report against the forest guard concerned.
This societys presumption angered the DFO, who felt that his powers were being challenged and he
filed a complaint in the police station against the president, alleging harassment of forest staff intent on
their duty. When the inquiry began, the question arose as to how these powers over forests, which
were under absolute ownership of the DFO, could have been given to some peoples society. The
managing committee explained, but being ignored, checked its own records for the notifications setting
up and empowering the KFCS. Finding nothing, they asked the FD and the CD staff at Nurpur for
copies, which were located. No photocopying machines existed at that time, so the documents were
photographed with a camera and the prints produced as evidence in the police station.
The president and KFCS members requested all the sahibs who had come from Dharamsala to help
them, but nothing came of it. The president felt cheated by the governments behaviour, on one side
creating the society and legally giving it a role, and on the other not forcing its own departments to
honour the concept. He went on to file a case against the DFO for defamation, but after the active
intervention of the CD, he was ultimately convinced to drop it.
Things did not end there as the DFO in question later become Conservator of Forests for Kangra
District. He was responsible for the WPs that were under preparation and included the role of the
KFCS. He had never forgotten his humiliation when a mere society had questioned a forest officers
acts. Holding such a crucial position, this conservator was instrumental in creating the FDs position
that since the grant-in-aid was being paid to the KFCS to manage forest and shamlat lands which were
now once again vested with the department (although technically they were not), the grantin-aid
need not be continued. From that point onwards, the FD used technical excuses to ensure that grant-
in-aid was not available to the KFCS after 1973, and they were left to fend for themselves.

The high level of erosion in one part of KFCS Maranda Bhangiars forest.
For many years members have wanted to plant trees here but have been
prevented by the fact that the forest department does not recognise them
under the law.
Phase 4: 1973/74 to 2000/01

Nationalisation of NTFPs and the states legal takeover of forest management, including the right
to fell timber, led the FD to discontinue, without providing any reason, its old agreement with
the khewatdars to give them their zamindari share of the revenue from timber felling. Thus
within a few years, the KFCS, after successfully regenerating degraded forest land, lost not only
the legal right to manage these lands and the technical advice and backup of the FD, but also
their sources of income grants-in-aid and their zamindari shares. Forests in this belt require a
minimum 30 to 40 year cycle for the trees to reach harvestable maturity. The KFCS lost
authority over their forests almost 30 years after they had first received the degraded lands, at a
time when the decades of KFCS protection, plantation, and controlled extraction had
rehabilitated these forests and brought them close to the peak of their capacity.
Despite the complex inter-institutional linkages and different types of support given to the KFCS,
the main responsibility for the initiation, implementation, technical input, and facilitation of the
KFCS lay with the FD. After 1973, the FD completely disregarded their existence and its
responsibility towards these 70 institutions.
In the early eighties some DFOs entrusted a few societies (such as Bhagotla) with the
responsibility of implementing the activities planned in Rawals WP, essentially planting and
protection of allotted areas. The KFCS were not involved in other forest divisions. Later the FD
discarded the separate integrated working plan for KFCS, and included the individual KFCS
forest areas in the respective plans of the territorial divisions, without seeking the opinions of the
KFCS about this step. The reasons for the position taken by the FD are detailed in Box 3.
The KFCS have had difficulty reconciling themselves with the FDs loss of faith in their ability to
manage and protect their forests, even though many continue to work on management

principles laid down and followed since 1942. In reality, the legal ambiguity and unclear
demarcation of roles seems to be the real basis of the problem.
Role of the Cooperatives Department

The FD and the CD played different roles in supporting the KFCS, and there was often
considerable confusion about who was responsible for what. As the KFCS were registered under
the Cooperatives Act, final responsibility fell on the CD. Staff sensitive to the experiment
provided administrative support (e.g., accounting and auditing of accounts) and organisational
management inputs (monthly meetings of representatives of KFCS to discuss common problems
and plan) through a special wing created at the inception of KFCS called the forest societies
section. With the transfer of Kangra to Himachal Pradesh, these responsibilities were
amalgamated and devolved to the new CD of HP, which neither created a special wing, nor
deputed special staff to provide support to the KFCS. The responsibility for managing the month
to month working of the KFCS, including accounts and audits, which had previously been
handled by specially trained staff of the development branch of the Punjab CD, now fell to the
overburdened staff of the general Cooperatives Department of HP. They were neither trained in
the special accounting heads of the KFCS accounts nor oriented to getting support for these
cooperatives from the FD. Although the CD continued to provide administrative support and
facilitated some irregular meetings, the KFCS were essentially orphaned after 1971 (or even
1966) and the department seems not to have accepted any responsibility for continuing the
scheme.
At the end, the CD found itself the parent department to a set of primary cooperatives that no
longer had any legal assets (forests) from which to generate income. The institutions responsible,
the FD and the state government, have remained insensitive to their pleas despite much
correspondence exchanged over the last 23 years. Files in the office of the additional registrar,
CD, Dharamsala, are full of letters to the CD headquarters at Shimla concerning the revival of
the KFCS. Letters were also written to the conservator of forests in Dharamsala asking him to
involve the KFCS in the implementation of the social forestry scheme, and later in the Van
Lagao Rozi Kamao (VLRK) scheme. Despite their best efforts, and resolutions from the KFCS
demonstrating their readiness to become involved in these schemes, the FD refused, arguing
that the targets given for the Kangra Forest Circle were too small, and that these schemes for
peoples participation were to be carried out through community organisations other than KFCS
as laid down in the schemes, although the guidelines for the social forestry and VLRK schemes
betray no such narrowness. The CD continues to audit the KFCS accounts annually and since
1993 has been providing a management subsidy of Rs 1,200 per annum per society. The role of
the CD is limited, however and the department has not succeeded in supporting the societies in
their struggle.
Role of the KFCS

The KFCS were slowly stripped of the benefits of preserving their forest wealth, losing successively
the zamindari share incomes, the shares of proceeds from resin and timber sales, and the grants-in-
aid. Further the legitimacy of the societies, the root for effective community forest management,
has diminished through confusion over their legal right to control their forests, and the FD taking
over management of the forests and implementation of the working plans.
Although a few KFCS, such as Khalet, Tripal, and Gahin Lagore, possessed strong leadership,
their attempts to oppose the status quo were mostly limited to letters, petitions, and resolutions

sent by individual KFCS to officials of the FD, the CD, and the political hierarchy. Until recently,
KFCS members made few collective efforts, and there was no organised network of KFCS that
could mobilise others to oppose the FD moves to isolate the KFCS from their forests. Long
distances between the KFCS, the relative inaccessibility of the areas in which they lie, and the
lack of institutional mechanisms to bring together the 70 odd societies to discuss common
problems and plan their common future, prevented the KFCS from mounting an effective joint
opposition to the new states approach. The erosion of a feeling of ownership amongst the
members, resulting from the loss of any direct benefit from the onerous task of protecting and
maintaining the forests, also contributed to the inaction.
At present, the average KFCS member distrusts the existing KFCS status and feels that the
forests managed by the KFCS were both far superior to those managed by the FD and infinitely
more beneficial and responsive to peoples needs. When asked whether panchayats should
manage forests, people in KFCS areas say no. They make a clear distinction between the
panchayats, which in practice are run by political parties and groups, and the KFCS, which they
see as central to peoples management because of their apolitical character. The internal
dynamics of the KFCS is an interplay between different sections of a villages forest user groups
and can be designed to ensure equity and sustainability.
Despite being scattered and limited, KFCS leadership did used the states political apparatus
effectively on two occasions. In KFCS Gahin Lagore, in the Nurpur forest range, the land survey
for a link road went through the KFCS forest; it required the felling of 40 khair trees in UP 29.
There was an imperative need for the link, so the KFCS felled the trees and took them under its
control. When the KFCS wrote to the DFO to explain the situation and ask for his advice, he
declared the move illegal, found the number of trees the rakha had recorded were fewer than
those actually felled, and seized the wood and auctioned it causing great resentment within the
KFCS. The FD then publicly auctioned some mature khair trees; these were marked in the KFCS
forest, but the field level FD staff had more trees felled than were marked. The KFCS closely
monitored the felling and immediately complained to the HP forest minister and convinced him
to visit the site. The minister saw both the stumps of the 40 illegally felled trees and the 50 khair
sleepers that had been stored in the local school in collusion with the lower level FD staff. He
ordered the DFO to suspend the range officer and FD staff concerned and called a review
meeting at Dharamsala.28
In the second case, the governments failure to pronounce any clear policy on KFCS prompted
the leadership of a few societies to approach a local member of the legislative assembly (MLA)
to have a question29 raised in the assembly on the KFCSs status and the HP Ministry of Forests
plans for their future. The forest minister went on record to state that the HP Government had
extended the scheme and paid grants-in-aid in 1972 and 1973, and not thereafter. He rejected
the demand for unconditional release of grants-in-aid to all KFCS, saying that the possibility
could be considered for those KFCS that were working properly.
District forest cooperative societies union

In the early 1990s, the active leadership in the district decided that the lack of an organised
platform for concerted action was an important factor limiting their efforts to effect change. A
sangharsh samiti (advocacy committee) was formed to lobby for the revival of the KFCS, but it
was not very active and did not last long. Subsequently, the KFCS formed the Kangra District
28
Reported in the daily newspaper, Dainik Tribune, 5/2/1996.
29
Question No. 799, taken up and answered by the Forest Minister in the HP Legislative Assembly on 5/4/1994.3

Forest Cooperative Societies Union as a union of all KFCS; the Union was registered on 27 July
1996 (Registration No. 418) as a cooperative headquartered in the Ghurkari KFCS. In its first
meeting after registration, the Union decided to seek the intervention of the High Court30 , and if
need be, the Supreme Court of India, to stop the FD from taking over management of their
forests. The KFCS maintain that the government failed to denotify the Kangra Forest Scheme,
and the CD did not liquidate the KFCS. Other demands include reinstating the legal sources of
KFCS income (hak chuharam, resin, grant-in-aid), as well as reviving their power to plan,
implement, and protect their forests and supervise timber allocations, especially for ceremonial
use at home (for cheiyi and other rituals), particularly important now that lack of wood has
become a major problem. The KFCS accept the need to amend their by-laws to ensure that
women and bartandars are more actively involved and they agree with basic joint forestry
management principles. The union believes that community management through the KFCS
concept will stop the degradation of the Himalayan forests; one aim is for KFCS to be expanded
to all of Himachal Pradesh over the coming years.
Local MLA of the area, B.B.L. Butail planting trees in the KFCS forest
during the van mahotsava, organised in 1999.
30
The union has collected funds from all its members and hired the services of an experienced advocate in the High
Court Shimla. At the time of writing, the petition has been filed.

Box 3: The Positions Taken by the Stakeholder Institutions
The various arguments are summarised and commented upon by the author.
The Position Taken by the Forest Department

The FD uses various contradictory arguments for having taken over the management of lands that were
under the KFCS.
1. The FD maintains that the lands given to KFCS were panchayat lands and since the HP Common Land
Vesting and Utilisation Act of 1974 gave legal ownership of shamlat lands to the FD, it sees no reason for
allowing KFCS to manage these lands nor to support the costs of their management in terms of grant-in-
aid.
In reality the KFCS were formed and given ownership of these lands in 1945 whereas the shamlat lands
were given to the panchayats only in 1961. Besides, the proportion of the KFCS land that is shamlat is
less than 1% of the total. Perhaps other factors are simultaneously acting on this state-peoples interface
over rights of access and use of forests. As a part of the Land Reform Acts between 1972 and 1974, the
government transferred to the FD the ownership of all shamlat land, which by its own settlements had
been vested with the khewatdars for more than a century. This seizure, done without any discussions or
granting of compensation to the rightful owners, has further reinforced the idea that the state is non-
participatory and self-seeking, leading to a situation of open access extraction and resulting in a typical
tragedy of the commons situation.
2. The FD claimed that the Govt. of HP was now the owner of all forest land (including KFCS managed
lands) and the legal guardianship of all forest land was vested with the Forest Department31 and
maintains that the amended Indian Forest Act of 1980 puts all categories of forest land in the different
states under the ownership of the respective FDs, and thus that no cooperative can legally claim any right
over such lands.
This is partly the result of the application of the HP Revenue Act to the unique forest management
initiative of KFCS, without consideration for the special order that created them when under Punjab
State. This argument is further extended to say that the KFCS cannot claim any rights (malkiti hakuks)
arising out of ownership of forest/common lands, nor does the KFCS have any right to remove non
timber forest products from the forest areas under their management. The FD refuses to acknowledge
that it was itself responsible, as legalised through a government notification and a special order, for the
creation and sustenance of the KFCS, and for handing over the said forests to them for management.
Lacking clear guidelines from the government, the FD appears to be attempting to hide behind technical
arguments.
3. The FD claims that since the government extension of the KFCS scheme expired in March 1973, these
societies are now illegal, working in an unauthorised manner, and getting revenue from the government
forests by irregular means and the FD has no reason to draw up WPs for them.32
The KFCS legally exist as cooperatives, as they were formed under the Punjab Cooperatives Act (II of
1912) and are presently governed under the HP Cooperative Societies Act of 1968. Even after 1973,
most have continued electing their MCs every two years and having their accounts audited annually by
the CD.
The same FD had drawn up WPs for the same areas to be managed under the KFCS up to 1983,
refuting their own objection that the KFCS were functioning illegally after 1973. Such double standards
demonstrate the FDs lack of a cohesive long-term PFM policy.
31
From Choudhary, CF Dharamsala, Parawise Comments on the Report on Revival of Cooperative Forest
Societies in District Kangra and Cho Reclamation and Soil Conservation Societies of Una District, by the HP
Institute of Public Administration. (undated document, probably 1990)
32
Ibid.

4. Giving a reason for its volte face, the FD asserts that the present situation is totally different from that of
1935. At that time, undemarcated forests were in a deplorable state and the government was short of
funds. These forests have now been planted; no more areas are available for planting and there is no
dearth of funds.33
This seems to imply that the creation of the KFCS and the support the FD extended was simply a device
the FD used since it lacked the funds necessary to manage such badly degraded forest areas. Now that
the forests have, by their own admission, been successfully rehabilitated, they feel compelled to take
them back from the KFCS before the main benefits (timber) can be reaped. There can be no better
admission of the states vested interests in forest resources than this and it suggests that the recent
pronouncements on JFM and peoples participation are not being made with the seriousness they
deserve.
In 1989 a senior forestry professional went on record to say34 that
since the government has not accorded sanction of continuation of the Societies from 31.3.1972
onwards, the forests given to the Societies are no longer under the control of the KFCS. The
management of the forests has been taken over by the FD and henceforth, all activities connected with
these forests (cognisance of forest offences, trees for bartan etc.) will be done by the DFO only, and
under no circumstances by the Society.
During the period 1973 to 1995, the FD seemed to assume that it legally controlled the forest areas that
were under the KFCS. However, CF Dharamsala (district headquarters of Kangra) accepts that the
management of these forests still legally resides with the KFCS. The present CF at Dharamsala believes
that until recently, old colonial thinking prevailed in the FD, which opposed participatory forest
management programmes in general, and KFCS in particular. He maintains that the present thinking in
the department is to rehabilitate the KFCS and empower them once more to manage the forests. It does
seem that the FD previously had a strong commercial interest in forests in terms of timber and the
revenue generated, but after the period of rapid deforestation in HP from 1970 to 1985, when even the
FD lost control over forests which were exploited to an unprecedented degree, the department priority is
now conservation. This assertion, however, has yet to be reflected in a clear policy on PFM in general,
and specifically with regard to the KFCS scheme.
The Position Taken by the Cooperatives Department

The views of the assistant registrar of the CD on KFCS can be gauged from the document Parawise
Comments for Revival of KFCS, brought out by his office. The assistant registrar blames the improper
functioning of the KFCS on the lack of financial and technical assistance to the KFCS by both the FD
and CD. He feels that the policy of extension of the scheme by small, one to five-year increments was
detrimental to a plan for the development of the forests, which is a long-term issue. He suggests a
blanket extension for a thirty-year period.
The Assistant Registrar (AR) states that the KFCS that were financially weak collapsed because of the
non-payment of grant-in-aid since 1973. He recommends that the pending grant-in-aid should be
released immediately to the concerned KFCS so they can revive their forestry operations. He says that
the FD must provide the management and the employees of the KFCS with technical guidance so they
can undertake the improvement, protection and management of the forest lands. He also suggests that
a special cell again be created within the CD to provide support to the KFCS, as was the practice in
Punjab. The AR finds the lack of coordination between the FD and the CD to be one of the reasons the
KFCS received no proper guidance. He recommends the formation of a district-level coordination
committee, consisting of the DFOs, the deputy registrar, and the assistant registrars of the CD (the FD
holding the chair). Thus far not much has come of these suggestions, as meetings and correspondence
have continued to flow between the FD and the CD without any concrete results, the actual decision
making power resting with the politicians. In addition, the CD itself has no clearly stated policy for its
KFCS wards.
33
Ibid.
34
Vide his letter (No.F.9-45/3810, dated 12.6.1989) to all DFOs, and subsequently through Range Officers
Jwalamukhi (15.7.1989), to all KFCS of Dehra Division.

six
what lies ahead
The Present Scenario

The situation at present can be summed
up simply. While the government
technically assumes the KFCS to be in a
state of suspended animation, at ground
level the organisations themselves (at least
some of them) are alive and active. The
people are annoyed and angry at being
sidelined from managing and using their
forests, and at the way in which the state
has sought to unilaterally appropriate the
basis of their rights and their existence.
The issue of reviving these KFCS is
important in itself, as well as being one
aspect of the overall fight to ensure an
appropriate and enabling environment for
participatory and sustainable forest
management in HP.
The KFCS represent one of the oldest
state-led attempts at PFM in HP, but
overall the activities of the state seem
more to have been designed to alienate
local communities from the forests than to
integrate them. Since the 1980s, the FD
in Himachal Pradesh has continued to try
out different forms of PFM, mostly to
similar effect. The recent history of these
attempts may help to forecast what could
lie ahead, and to suggest a better path
forward. Report of the inspector of the Cooperatives
Department for Arla Saloh KFCS 1999
2000.

Recent History of Participatory Forest Management in Himachal Pradesh
Indo German Dhauladhar Project (IGDP)
The IGDP was conceptualised around the assertion that problems in the Himalayas have an
interdependent environmental and socioeconomic character. This multi-sectoral integrated
project covered about 100 villages in the upper catchment of the Binwa River in Kangra, at the
base of the Dhauladhar mountain range, from 1980 to 1989. The project initiated a strategy for
securing peoples participation called TRUCO (Trust and Confidence). A separate social
development section played the main role in reaching out to village communities. The IGDP
accepted village level institutions (VLIs) as the best agents for change in mountain systems and
helped form and strengthen approximately 53 VDCs and 73 youth clubs and mahila mandals
(MMs).
At the beginning, a series of meetings was held in each key village. Thereafter, the local
community had to request the project that it be taken as a partner. With the help of IGDP staff,
each selected village formed a VDC. Gaining trust in itself and confidence in its abilities, the
VDC gradually took up planning and implementing IGDP programmes. The notable
achievements were:
plantation of broad-leafed trees to serve as future fodder banks, and establishment of village
nurseries to provide saplings continuously to communities;
plantation of community orchards and fodder crops;
popularising stall feeding and developing an equitable system for the distribution of grass
from strips within closed and planted belts;
upgrading breeds and reducing non-productive livestock, thus increasing farmers returns;
promoting smokeless dhauladhar chulhas for better kitchen hygiene and womens health;
and
increasing agricultural production due to better agricultural awareness and extension.
Building the trust and confidence of local VLIs in their ability to undertake community-based
management of local resources was a remarkable and significant step for PFM in Himachal
Pradesh. However, no government department (including the FD, IGDPs major partner)
recognised these IGDP-created institutions as focal points for mobilising village communities, so
they were neglected and eventually became defunct after the project ended. The FD, again the
main force behind the experiment, apparently failed to internalise any lessons from the success
of this community-managed forestry.
Social Forestry Project

The National Social Forestry (umbrella) project was implemented in HP between 1985 and
1993 with a total budget of Rs 570 million. Its main aims were to raise income and employment
amongst the rural poor by increasing the production of fuelwood, fodder, and timber, and to
arrest the erosion of the natural environment caused by deforestation. The scheme included tree
tenures for the poor and landless, community woodlots (self-help and rainfed), regeneration of
degraded forests, farmers nurseries and distribution of seedlings, as well as the planting of a
variety of trees on private non-arable lands. The Van Lagao, Rozi Kamao scheme, announced
later, was one of its components.
This project covered all of HPs 12 districts and attempted to implement its activities through
villagers or in consultation with villagers. The FD started the dialogue with the villagers through
six what lies ahead 47

gram panchayats (GP) or other existing VLIs such as MMs. Village forest development
committees (VFDCs) were set up in many villages for the first time to implement the scheme.
However, attempts to seek the active participation of an entire village community by including
one woman (from the MM), one representative from the scheduled castes, and one from the GP,
were not very successful (Sood 1994). The VDCs evolved neither participatory mechanisms nor
bottom-up systems for planning and management. The lack of representation of local forest
users and domination by the elite reduced the experiment to pro forma involvement of the
people. As ex-offico member secretary of the VDC, the FD forest beat guard formulated the
integrated resource management plan (IRMP) for the village, leading to FD rather than
community ownership. While on paper the social forestry programme succeeded in planting
over 100,000 ha of plantations, community participation was limited and the FD continued
choosing the species to be planted (like eucalyptus), without reference to the needs of the
community leading many communities to call it un-social forestry.
Joint Forest Management a national strategy

By the early 1970s, many foresters throughout India were having serious doubts about the
effectiveness of the forest conservancy systems they had inherited and were practising. Instead
of continuing to limit peoples rights and drive them out of forests, they began involving people
in managing and protecting forest land from illicit felling, grazing, fires and encroachment. In
return, the users were granted access to intermediate products and a share of the final harvest.
These approaches were initiated in West Bengal and then spread to Orissa, Gujrat, Haryana,
and later UP and Bihar.
The success of these experiments and movements influenced national policy makers and led to
a new forest policy in 1988. Reversing the previous focus on commercial timber production, it
emphasised the importance of ensuring environmental stability and ecological balance, and
accepted that the first charge on forest produce was that of tribal communities and other poor
people living within or near the forests. In 1990, the Ministry of Environment and Forests GOI
complemented the 1988 policy with a government order (GO) to all states that participatory
forest management of degraded forest land be adopted with communities, through NGOs
wherever possible. The GO provided guidelines for developing mutually binding working
arrangements between the various partners. Called Joint Forest Management (JFM), this
represented a major policy shift from the authoritarian forest management previously practised
by the FD. In 1993, HP passed its government order notifying guidelines for JFM in the state.
The notifications and government orders for the Kangra Forest Cooperatives and for JFM were
separated by almost five decades. On paper the two have somewhat different social, political,
and forest management objectives, but actually when one examines the relevant issues in the
context of the current situation the differences seem less impressive than the similarities. The
comparison between the approaches of the FD and other stakeholder institutions provides useful
insights and lessons related to the PFM approaches that could help future implementation of
PFM in HP to be more successful. The comparison indicates that that the 1993 government
order for JFM was more or less old wine in a new bottle, the positive aspects being the better
provision for ensuring equity in participation and benefit distribution.
In practice, the guidelines for JFM were not passed on in any meaningful way to the territorial
forest divisions of the state. By 2001 less than 1,000 village (or tika) forest development
committees (VFDCs) had reportedly been formed from some 20,000 villages comprising maybe
as many as 120,000 hamlets (tika). The extent to which these institutions are genuinely

participatory is also questionable, since no in-depth training was imparted to FD staff before
they were asked to initiate JFM. Their approach, as in the social forestry programme, continues
to be authoritarian and non-participatory.
The Indo-German Changer Project and the Himachal Pradesh Forestry Project
A more extended joint participatory forest management (JFPM) approach is being tried out in
two bilateral projects. Although both projects have been running since the early nineties, this
experiment is still confined to the pilot areas. The approach emphasises both developing
genuine bottom-up and participatory planning with the emphasis on user communities rather
than on individuals, and large-scale capacity building within the FD itself to reorient staff and
train them in communications and facilitation skills.
The Indo-German Changer Project (IGCP) started in 1993 with a planned implementation
period of 15 years supported by German Technical Cooperation (GTZ). It covers an area in
Kangra district of a little more than 400 sq.km with 570 villages. It is an integrated development
project that includes forestry as one component. The emphasis has been on strengthening
village self-help organizations followed by participatory integrated land use planning.
The Himachal Pradesh Forestry Project (HPFP) is funded by the UK Department for
International Development (DFID formerly ODA). It was launched in 1994 in the Kullu and
Mandi districts and is ongoing in 2002. The project focuses on process learning and monitoring;
the aim was to build peoples participation into the normal functioning of the FD and the project
emphasised changing the attitudes of FD staff at all levels. Compared to the methodology used
for KFCS formation 50 years earlier, the approach is very slow and cautious. An impact
assessment study indicated significant concern about the achievements of the projects first
phase. The process of working with communities proved lengthy and costly; the groups formed
tended to be too large and unrepresentative so that the needs and priorities of the poorest were
not reflected in micro-plan activities; and the micro-plans themselves were too oriented towards
forest enclosure and replanting. Micro-plan funds were effectively providing wage labour
opportunities as temporary compensation for lost grazing, fuelwood, and fodder benefits from
the forest. Despite considerable training in sensitisation and methodology with territorial FD
staff, the perception of DFOs and conservators did not appear to have changed much in favour
of PFM, although ground level staff have found JFM to be very useful and are now committed
to it in principal. Emphasis in the second phase shifted towards sustainable livelihoods as this is
the strongest reason for any community to engage with the FD and undertake any meaningful
and long-term participatory forest management
Overall the FDs emphasis in these two projects was to accumulate examples and gain
experience. Nearly ten years later it seems, in the opinion of the author, that JPFM is becoming
yet another of the FDs oasis experiments, new initiatives being tried out in small spaces while
the mainstream territorial policies and attitudes remain unchanged.
Sanjhi Van Yojna

The Sanjhi Van Yojna scheme is a new effort in PFM somewhat similar to JFM but financed
from the state budget. It was launched between 1998 and 1999 with an initial outlay of 100
million rupees (approximately 1.3 million US dollars). This scheme adds the gram panchayat
(the elected village level body for local self-governance) to the list of social institutions that can
be involved. It aims both to regenerate degraded forest areas and to increase social, non-forest
related, infrastructural assets (up to 25% of the total budget), although these two would seem to

be mutually exclusive. The scheme also promises that the village forest development committees
(VFDCs) to be formed will be registered by the DFO as welfare societies (VFDS)(non-
government organisations) under the Societies Act of 1860. One step forward has been made in
the provision to send the grant money for the approved micro-plan by cheque to the official
joint account of the VFDC. Also new is the usufruct-sharing model at the time of final harvest.
The sale proceeds from plantations on government lands will be distributed as follows.
25% to the VFDS executive committee to be distributed amongst members
25% to be deposited in the joint account of the VFDS and village development fund
10% to the gram panchayat within which the VFDS falls
40% to the government treasury
In practice, however, the Sanjhi Van Yojna scheme suffers from the same shortcomings as the
JFM in the Himachal Pradesh Forestry Project, including imposing the forest guard on the
Village Forest Development Society as ex-officio secretary. It seems likely that this scheme will
also be unsustainable beyond the first five-year micro-planning cycle. Having started PFM in
some 400 villages throughout the state, the programme is already bogged down by a shortage
of funds in the third year of implementation.
Ongoing Plans and Activities

Draft PFM rules
The draft of a new GO to replace the 1993 government order and detailed PFM rules are both
awaiting government approval. The drafts provide for increasing the institutional autonomy of
village forest development committees by registering them and vesting their presidents with the
power of a forest officer for compounding offences. There still seem to be considerable
shortcomings, however. The village forest development societies are expected to play a primarily
policing function on behalf of the FD. The rules propose continuation of contemporary micro-
planning with all its shortcomings. Annual implementation plan formats attached to the rules
imply that the micro-plans will take the form of even more tree plantation and closures than
under HPFP, with little space for integrating the diversity of existing livelihood dependencies on
forest land into the micro-planning process. Grassland and pasture development are not even
mentioned in the micro-plan format. Some of the main features of the draft rules are
summarised in comparison with the characteristics of the KFCS in Annex 3.
A more problematic provision, carried over from the 1993 order, is for sharing 50% of the net
income with the VFDS at the time of final harvest of the crop (of at least 20 years rotation).
This is clearly an inappropriate incentive for livelihood focused PFM, particularly in Himachal
Pradesh where most VFDS members already have legal timber distribution rights and are
unlikely to be willing to share the timber harvest either with the government or with non-right
holding residents. A shift in focus to participatory resource management would seem to be a
more appropriate incentive for making PFM sustainable in HP. This would improve livelihoods
by providing real choices for increasing the continuing flow of multiple benefits to the most
resource poor women and men, irrespective of their legal rights, and devolving management
(and not just protection) authority to the VFDSs.
The draft rules increase inclusivity by opening membership to all adults not just households,
thereby entitling all women and other adults within larger households to independent
membership. Ironically, whereas the current 1993 PFM order provides for 50% of the VFDCs
executive committee members to be women, the new draft rules reduce this to 33%.

At present, even rightholders are not entitled to sell surplus produce such as grass and firewood
from their JFM areas; the rights are for bona fide domestic use only. This has become a major
obstacle for older VFDCs in generating a common fund. Participatory forest management rules
need to clearly empower them to raise income through such means. A more equitable, longer
term goal of PFM should be to create consensus in favour of replacing individual rights with
community rights, thus facilitating genuine needs-based community resource management and
undoing the distortions created by settlements made a century ago. It would be desirable to
explore the idea of declaring village common lands, traditionally used for grazing livestock (and
now legally notified as forests) as village forests under Section 28 of the Indian Forest Act
along the lines of the van panchayats in the UP hills. This would provide a statutory mechanism
for devolving control over their management back to the resource users in line with the move
towards devolution in other fields.
A major shortcoming in the draft rules is that they do not grant the VFDS any security of tenure
over the PFM forest land area in cases of dispute with the Forest Department. Disputes are to be
resolved within the FD structure, making one party to the agreement the ultimate arbiter of any
dispute. In the context of Himachal Pradesh, tenurial security for the VFDS may remain a
problem as the FD itself has no clear jurisdiction over Class III undemarcated protected forest
categories of forest lands as these are still the subject of dispute between the FD and the
revenue department. The draft rules assume, however, that the FD has the authority to enter
into PFM agreements related to UPF lands as well as for other government lands over which it
has no jurisdiction. This anomaly may prove problematic.
The envisaged process for constituting VFDS is too rapid and lacks mechanisms to ensure
informed participation of poor forest-dependent women and men. It is prone to capture by
village elites, as has happened with most of the VFDCs formed so far.
Forest sector review

The Himachal Pradesh Forest Department carried out a comprehensive review of the forest
sector (FSR) in 1999/2000. The review aimed to provide basic information and a consensus on
which to build the future policies and strategies of the department and other key institutions so
that they would meet the needs of key forest stakeholders and ensure sustainable management
of forest resources, integrating forest sector planning with socioeconomic development.
The FSR analysis and discussion raise three groups of related issues:
participation in forest management for livelihood needs,
increasing the goods and services available through improving forest management, and
coherence in governance, law and policy to achieve the above.
The FSR has identified four key principles that need to be adopted in HP as a basis for defining
policies and programmes towards sustainable forest management.
Multiple forest values The many forest values that sustain local livelihoods and economic
growth from energy, food, and fibre production to cultural values and environmental services
should be recognised in order to allow a continuous flow of benefits for different stakeholders.
Multiple forest stakeholders The many stakeholders involved in the forest sector must be
recognised from those dependent on forests for subsistence needs, through state-level
institutions charged with looking after HP forests, to national and international stakeholders.
Good policies and programmes should be implemented to give them access to information and

decision-making processes, and to emphasise
participation in sharing the costs and benefits of
forest use.
Changing conditions Since economic,
environmental, social, and institutional
circumstances and needs are changing rapidly, both
within HP and outside, policies and programmes
need to be capable of regular review and
adaptation, and should include a precautionary
approach to protect important forest assets.
The need for a lead agency to coordinate the
transition to SFM This is necessary because all
stakeholders expect the FD, as the recognised
authority, to coordinate the transition to sustainable
forest management: therefore the department must
be given considerable support. Also necessary is a
regular, equitable, participatory system through
which stakeholders themselves can meet, debate
strategic issues, consider optional solutions, and
form partnerships facilitated by the FD itself.
Ultimately, these principles imply a significant re- Mr. Vasudev, guard to the three
negotiation of forest stakeholder roles that are both KFCS around Maniara.
realistic and acceptable to all. Already a recognised
need, this cannot occur without a shared vision of
SFM, based on a participatory policy process.
This re-negotiation is likely to herald the beginning of significant institutional change over the
coming years, and will possibly be the main outcome of the forest sector review. A process of
decentralisation of forestry is needed to handle local complexities, but there must be enough
centralisation to ensure greater policy coherence both within and outside the state.
The FSR has recognised most of the factors that can help PFM and forest management in
general to become a sustainable and profitable option for the state and the communities
involved. It identifies the fact that this can only happen through policy and institutional change
within the FD, but fails to adequately define what factors would lead to such a change
occurring.
The future of the Kangra Forest Cooperative Societies

On 20 March 2000, the HP State Cooperatives Development Union organised a one-day
seminar called The Problems and Challenges Before the Forest Cooperative Societies in
Dharamsala. Chaired by Sh. Rikhi Ram Kaundal, Honourable Minister for Cooperatives, the
seminar brought together the FD, represented by the conservator (Kangra), and the CD,
represented by the assistant registrar (Kangra). Many representatives of KFCS from throughout
the district also attended. By the end of the seminar, clear consensus had been reached that the
KFCS had been badly treated. The CD accepted its inability to fight for the societies and a
committee was formed under the chairmanship of the additional registrar of the CD to discuss
how to revive them.

The FD accepted that the KFCS are PFM institutions capable in their present extent of managing
up to 9% of the districts forest land and that, with minor changes in the existing PFM schemes,
they could continue this role.
The KFCS accepted that their by-laws harked from an earlier era and must include equity and
gender concerns as well as a broader membership base, and they agreed to undertake these
changes at once. Some of the changes needed are as follows.
Rationalisation of the forest areas The growth and movement in populations over the last fifty
years has put pressure on the forest area under the KFCS. Those that started with one or two
hamlets today have 10 to 15 villages and are large and unwieldy.
Open membership Membership must be opened to all forest users, not just rightholders.
Special provisions for involving women must be included in the by-laws.
Transparency Lack of ordinary members participation and centralised management
committees have made the societies non-transparent, and requires adjustment.
Legal control over forests If the societies are to effectively manage their forests, long-term and
legally clear tenurial systems ensuring their stake are required.
Role vis vis panchayats It is necessary to consider how these cooperatives would coordinate
and benefit from the decentralised governance system of the panchayat. While the autonomy of
forest-based user group forestry has its own strengths, the coordination and support of the
panchayats can strengthen these institutions.
The PFM approach will be vindicated in HP if the cooperative societies are revived. Real PFM,
however, with all its benefits, can only come about when the basic tenets outlined below have
been achieved.
Lessons from the History of Participatory Forestry Management in Himachal

Pradesh
Common themes
Technically, the task of managing HPs official 37,600 sq.km of forest land (67% of the total
geographical area, but only about one third actually forested, see below) falls upon
approximately 4,400 FD field foresters. In reality, the direct day-to-day work of the village
communities 91% of the total state population of 550,000 has the most impact on forest use
in the state. Forests are an integral part of farming systems, including horticultural development
and livestock management, and they provide fuelwood, wood for agricultural implements,
fodder, compost, timber, staking and fencing material, and food for these communities. Studies
have shown that in terms of value forests contribute 19%, 20%, and 26% respectively of the
total production of food grains, fruit, and vegetables in the hills (Gulati 1996). Further, they
contribute 49% of requirements for animal husbandry, and 90% of the domestic energy
requirement of the rural population. According to FD estimates, the direct tangible removals
from HPs forests exceed a value of Rs 10 billion every year.
There are central themes common to all previous attempts at PFM in HP, from the very first
KFCS in the 1940s to more recent schemes. These shared features are as follow.
The attempt at PFM takes the form of a temporary scheme or a time-bound project.
The FD allows the village community to form new, transient village organisations to protect
and manage usually degraded (open access) forest land, with closure and plantation as a
uniform prescription.

The main benefit is disguised wage-work for non-forest based asset creation (footpaths,
spring wells) or plantation work for an initial period of only 2 to 3 years. During this time the
closed-off areas show considerable improvement and benefits in terms of grass production,
but the planted trees need at least 8 to 10 years to grow. Pressure on the demarcated
protected forest nearby is lifted temporarily as a result of the wage-labour and the creation
of non-forest assets.
The jointness has a very clear definition: the village committees (VDCs, VFDCs, Village
Eco-development Committees) take over the most important (protection) roles from the FD:
the removal of encroachments, ensuring the closure of disputed open access grazing lands,
distribution of grass and loppings, conflict resolution, and other vital work. However, legal
recognition of these institutions, their control over the land they manage, their power to fine
offenders, and their right to manage forests as well as enjoy major long-term benefits such
as timber, and high value NTFPs (resin, khair, and so on) are left undefined and very much
in the control of the FD.
To date, mainstream forest management systems attempt to define forest lands as a property
only of the state, the FD is landlord of 66% of HPs geographical area.
On the other hand, the village communities define the forests not merely as resources to be
exploited, but as the very essence of their existence and livelihood. This is asserted through
centuries-old customary systems of community forest management and use that are based on
mutually recognised rights of access and extraction that members of the forest user groups in
each community accept and respect.
These systems, the only systems on which true forest management can really be based, are not
mentioned in the WP documents or other planning and implementation mechanisms of the FD.
Most forest guards admit that when transferred to a new beat, the village community provides
the exact location of the boundary pillars defining forest land under their control. In fact, given
the large size of their forest beats, most learn about illegal felling and timber smuggling only
from the forest users themselves.
The idea behind experimenting with PFM is to develop a new path on which forestry can
develop, but tragically it has become a footpath into the wilderness. The HP Forest Department
currently uses the idea of PFM as a means to attract substantial foreign donor contributions and
also to relieve some of the communities pent-up anger over their alienation from their forest
wealth and their lack of access and control. Unfortunately, the department seems not to have
found it expedient to integrate the lessons learned from the PFM experiment into its forestry
management systems.
The questions the FD should be asking, and which all those concerned with the future of HPs
forests and the well-being of the people of HP should ask are:
What lessons and experiences do these initiatives hold for the future of sustainable forest
management in HP?
What should be the future of the KFCS themselves?
Emerging lessons for the future of sustainable forest management in Himachal

Pradesh
For sustainable forest management to succeed, existing PFM attempts must be transcended.
Fundamental changes are required.

Mainstreaming PFM
Failure to re-notify the KFCS scheme, and experiences from JFM and Sanjhi Van Yojna, suggest
that the FD considers these simply to be trials and experiments to show that PFM is possible. All
these initiatives, however, seem both peripheral to mainstream forest management, and also to
lack any inbuilt sustainability. PFM should now become the forest management system rather than
a single, isolated experiment. Participatory forest management must be how the FD manages all
forest land with a high population-forest interface. The FD should see the community as forest
managers, with the necessary powers deriving from the Forest Act and PFM rules. PFM must be a
system of forest management with clear milestones written into the working plans and designated
forest areas handed over to communities on a long-term lease arrangement.
Changing forest land use
In theory, the FD considers trees to be the
optimum land use for HPs forest lands.
However it must be remembered that the
most recent legal definition of forest land
uses the idea of an ecosystem as the
basis, forest land is by no means
necessarily forested. According to FD
statistics (and although not reflected in
the revenue departments land records) of
the 37,600 sq.km land legally classified as
forest (67% of the states geographic
area), of which 37,000 sq.km is under FD
jurisdiction, only 12,500 sq.km is actually
forested (crown density of more than
10%) and only 9,600 sq.km of this has
dense forest (Bhatia 2000). As much as
11,300 sq.km is actually incapable of
supporting tree cover as it lies above the
tree line at altitudes above 3,000 to
4,000m and is covered by alpine pasture
or permanent snow. This means that
some 24,500 sq.km of forest land is
Maniara has fertile agricultural land irrigated by capable of supporting forest cover and
this kuhl. Maniara KFCS contributes a share about half of this is actually forested.
for the annual maintenance of the kuhl. Much of the forest land consists of
undemarcated protected forest and
traditional village common lands acquired by the state in the mid-70s. Even today, most of these
are heavy-dependence open grazing lands or pastures with bush regimes, many of which the FD
attempts each year to close and plant, with poor survival rates for obvious reasons.
The FD must realise and accept that different areas in the hills have different land uses
supporting local livelihoods. These are being destroyed and resource-dependent groups
alienated from the forests due to bad prescriptions and monoculture plantations. Thus pastures,
rangelands, and others should be considered a correct use of a proportion of the land in the hills
and different management systems should be reflected in the silvicultural prescriptions and
norms in the WPs.

Reclassifying forest lands
It may be both useful and necessary to reclassify forest land on the basis of who has primary
responsibility for its management and the use to which it is put. One suggested classification is as
follows.
Community forest: forests managed exclusively by communities along PFM principles for
local use (with technical expertise and support from the FD). There could be two designated
types.
a) Supply forest: managed to supply fuelwood, fodder, timber, and NTFPs. Livelihood
development for local communities through technical, financial and marketing support
should be provided. Extraction, processing, and export rules will have to be changed to
achieve this.
b) Conservation forest: areas around villages where the primary objectives are land
stabilisation of severely eroded areas, watershed management, and biodiversity
conservation. These areas would become forest resources under long-term rotation.
State forest: managed primarily by the FD, these areas would provide for the nations
ecological, timber and industrial needs. There could be two designated types as follows.
a) Supply forest: forest areas with a minimum of community extraction, devoted to
supplying national needs for timber and NTFPs (including cultivation)
b) Conservation forest: alpine areas and protected areas along peripheries where
community dependence is low and participatory conservation management could
ensure the continuance of biodiversity elements. The preservation of Himalayan
habitats and the benefits thereof to the nation such as water and carbon fixation
could be ensured.
Converting individual rights to community rights
Individual rights are clearly difficult to regulate, especially with a regulatory mechanism that is
external to the community of forest users. One important lesson that emerges from the KFCS
experience is that if the forest resource is community property and extraction a community right;
and if the community institutions are equity-based and supportive to forest dependent groups;
internal regulation leading to sustainable extraction is possible. The FDs role then shifts to one
of external monitoring and conflict resolution.
Strengthening sustainable forest-based livelihoods
Unless forests generate and support short-term benefits and thus strengthen sustainable
livelihoods, communities will have little interest in PFM. Involving people in activities that
rehabilitate and rejuvenate the natural resources that their communities depend on is the most
difficult task that conservation-oriented attempts face. Over the years, community dependence
on, and hence interest in, most common property resources (CPRs) has decreased. To promote
involvement in and eventual community control of CPRs, each individual user group concerned
with a specific natural resource use should be mobilised. Real mobilisation generally has an
economic dimension, it is triggered by a perceived increase in benefits from the resource/asset in
question, thus these benefits must be secured in both the short and the long term. In general,
there needs to be a tangible short-term benefit to push otherwise reluctant vested interest groups
to renegotiate resource use practices and to resolve existing conflicts for long-term investments in
resource conservation and utilisation.
The forest-based livelihoods approach can focus all initial efforts at demonstrating increased
short-term benefits and clear cash incomes to identified stakeholders through production-based
initiatives. This creates interest in each stakeholder to work for that activity, and to settle

differences and organise themselves together into a collective. Once the collective starts earning
sustainable income from a certain resource use, interest in resource conservation and resource
enhancement and management is also created. Thus forest-based livelihoods could bring people
together to take up ecological restoration and management of natural resources.
Rationalising the role of peoples institutions
The present scenario presents a bewildering variety of peoples institutions created or recognised
for PFM by the FD and the government. The state has created village forest development
societies (VFDS), village eco-development societies (VEDS), village development committees
(VDCs) and, significantly, has placed forests among 14 line departments to be managed and
supervised by the gram panchayat. These institutions are distinct from the popular traditional
local institutions that previously played a significant role in forest management, the devta
committees, sudhar sabhas, mahila mandals and others.
JFM and PFM have thus far allocated only superficial and inconsequential legal roles and
powers to the institutions created to implement them. But these institutions have demonstrated
an ability to garner peoples involvement at a time when communities are distancing themselves
from line departments. As demonstrated in the KFCS case, local institutions can play a much
greater role in sustainable forest management, but must be given a clear and central role. Given
the present social and political scenario regarding forests, the FD itself has to initiate such
changes, providing clear-cut milestones and indicators for restructuring and handing over the
agreed functions to village communities.
Conclusion
The history of forest management in HP shows that neither the FD nor any other government
institution changes on its own. Himachal has seen no significant peoples resistance or revolts
against the alienation of the forests for the last 150 years. Modern development agendas, large-
scale government employment between 1970 and 1990, and the opening up of trade and
market opportunities post-1990 have absorbed such pressures. Large-scale investment by the
central government has fuelled a shift from forest-based livelihoods to tertiary options.
As Indias economic scenario is now undergoing a dramatic change, with a shortfall in available
subsidies, economics will force the state to look again at forests and their economic value and to
plan larger community involvement in the co-management of forest wealth for economic and
ecological gain. The HP Government should play the role of change manager, considering these
realities and setting in motion changed policies, institutions, and implementation in order to
achieve these gains.
Many states have taken the other path, bringing in private industry as the facilitator, using
private benefit as the precursor to improved economic management of the state forests. This has
created two problems bringing larger incomes for a few individuals at the cost of entire
communities, especially forest users; and leading to economically productive but ecologically
destructive forest use practices, thus destroying the foundation of a long-term asset base. While
this approach can be followed in state supply forests, in most forests the livelihood options
available to local communities must be developed as the main precursor to creating and
increasing their stake in sustainable management. This will create local incomes as well as self-
perpetuating and self-regulating forest management practices.
Himachal Pradesh must now choose between the two paths. This decision will determine what
will happen to the future of the forests and the people whose lives depend on them.
bibliography 57
bibliography
(references not necessarily cited in the text)
Ahal, R. (1993) A Case Study on Weaker Sections and Women in IGDP. Delhi: Parivartan
Anderson, A. (1975) Report on Forest Settlement Kangra District, 1887. Shimla: HP Forest
Department
ANON (1908, reprinted in 1991) Imperial Gazetteer of India, Provincial Series, Punjab (Volumes
1 & 2). Delhi: Atlantic Publishers & Distributors
Bhatia, A. (ed.) (2000) Participatory Forest Management: Implications for Policy and Human
Resources Development in the Hindu Kush-Himalayas, Volume 4 India. Kathmandu:
ICIMOD
Charak, S.S. (1978) History and Culture of Himalayan States: Himachal Pradesh (Volumes 1 &
2). New Delhi: Light & Life Publishers
Douie, J.M. (1915) Punjab Settlement. Lahore, Punjab: Superintendent, Govt. Printing
GOI (1991) Indian Forest Act, 1927. New Delhi: Orient Law House
Guha, R. (1989) The Unquiet Woods. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Guha, R.; Gadgil, M. (1992) This Fissured Land: an Ecological History of India. New Delhi:
Oxford University Press
Gulati, A.K. (1996) Community Based Strategies for Common Property Resource Management
in the Himalayas. Kathmandu: ICIMOD
HP (1968) Himachal Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act. Shimla: Himachal Pradesh State
Cooperative Printing Press
HP (1971) Himachal Pradesh Cooperative Societies Rules. Shimla: Himachal Pradesh State
Cooperative Printing Press
HP (1972) Himachal Pradesh Ceiling on Land Holdings Act. Shimla: Saraswati Publishing
House
HPFD (1998) Workshop on Formulation of New Community-based, People-oriented
Afforestation Scheme held 27 to 28 August 1998. Shimla: Himachal Pradesh Forest
Department

HPFD (2000) IIED, DFID, Executive Summary: Himachal Pradesh Forest Sector Review.
Shimla: Himachal Pradesh Forest Department
HPRD (1991). Himachal Pradesh Land Code. Shimla: Himachal Pradesh Revenue Department
Hutchison, J.; Vogel, J. (1933) History of the Punjab Hill States, (Volume 1). Lahore, Punjab:
Superintendent, Govt. Printing
Jodha, N.S. (1990) A Framework for Integrated Mountain Development. Kathmandu: ICIMOD
Malhotra, R. (1966) Revised Working Plan for Kangra Forest Division (1966-1967 to 1980-
1981, Volumes 1 & 2) Shimla: HP Forest Department.
Mehta, G.M. (1942) Working Plan for the Bhagotla Cooperative Forest Society Ltd. (1942-1943
to 1951-1952). Kangra: Kangra Forest Cooperative Societies Division
Mohan, V.P. (1998) Briefing document relating to a study on The Amendment of the
Government Order on Participatory Forest Management in Himachal Pradesh. Delhi: DFID,
RDO
Parry, J. (1979) Caste and Kinship in Kangra. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul
Rawal, R.D. (1968) Integrated Working Plan for Kangra Forest Cooperative Societies, Volumes 1
& 2. Shimla: HP Forest Department
Robb, P. (ed) (1992) Rural India Land, Power and Society Under British Rule. Delhi: Oxford
University Press
Singh, R.A. (1981) The Revised Working Plan for Palampur Forest Division for the Period 1981-
1982 to 1995-1996, Volumes 1& 2. Shimla: HP Forest Department
Stebbing, E.P. (1982) The Forests of India, Volumes 1 to 4. New Delhi: A.J. Reprints Agency
Sood, M.P. (1994) New Forestry Initiatives in H.P. Shimla: Department of Forest Farming and
Conservation
The Punjab Gazetteer Kangra District (1883) Calcutta: Calcutta Central Press Co.
Verma, U.S. (1989) Regional Divisions Cartographical Analysis (Series 1, Volume 7) New
Delhi: Census of India, Government of India
annexes 59
annexes

$QQH['HWDLOVRI,QGLYLGXDO.DQJUD)RUHVW&RRSHUDWLYH6RFLHWLHV
annexes
61

$QQH[&RQW

Annex 2: Form of Agreement to be Signed by a Member of the
Cooperative Forest Society Limited (in Urdu)
I ____________________________________son of _________________________________
Village _____________________________Post Office_________________________________
Tehsil ________________________________District _________________________________
being a member of the ____________________________ Cooperative Forest Society Limited,

do hereby agree to abide by the following conditions:
1) I shall be bound by the Working Plan for the management of the forests under the control of
the Society as prepared from time to time, accepted by the Society and approved by the
Punjab Government in the manner provided by the By-laws and Rules framed by the Punjab
Govt. for this purpose, and I undertake that all the rights whatsoever owned by myself in any
property affected by such Working Plan shall be subordinated to the rights of the Society or
Punjab Government, as the case may be, and subject to administrative control of the Society
through its officers in accordance with its By-laws and Rules. I further agree not to transfer,
sale, mortgage, give or otherwise to a non-member any right over any area made over to the
administrative control of the Society.
2) In case of a breach by me of any By-laws of the Society, I agree to pay the Society such fine,
not exceeding one hundred rupees, as may be imposed upon me in accordance with the by-
laws of the Society.
3) In the event of the cessation of my membership, my rights in land shall continue to be in

possession of the Society until released by the General Body through a proper resolution.
Witnessed:
1. ______________________________
2. ______________________________ ______________________________
Signed
annexes 63
$QQH[&RPSDUDWLYH)HDWXUHVRI.DQJUD)RUHVW&RRSHUDWLYHVDQG
-RLQW)RUHVW0DQDJHPHQWLQ+LPDFKDO3UDGHVK
&KDUDFWHULVWLFV .DQJUD)RUHVW&RRSHUDWLYHV -RLQW)RUHVW0DQDJHPHQW
)RUHVW7\SHV 7KH.)&6ZHUHDXWKRULVHGWRSURWHFWDQG %DUUHQRUGHJUDGHGDUHDV
PDQDJHDOOFODVVHVRIIRUHVWUHVHUYHG RQO\
GHPDUFDWHGGHOLPLWHGSURWHFWHG
XQGHPDUFDWHGSURWHFWHGDQGXQFODVVHG
IRUHVWV
8QLWRI 2QHHFRQRPLFXQLWWRJHWKHUZLWKDQ\ODQG 6WUHVVHVWKHRSWLRQRIKDYLQJ
0DQDJHPHQW XQGHUSULYDWHRZQHUVKLSZKLFKWKHRZQHU VPDOODUHDV
ZLVKHGWRHQWUXVWWRWKHPDQDJHPHQWRID
VRFLHW\
5HYHQXHHVWDWHPDX]D&RXOGEHDVLQJOH
WLNDRUDJURXSRIWLNDVIURPWZRRUPRUH
PDX]DV6WUHVVHGDSUHIHUHQFHIRUVPDOOHU
VL]HGPDX]DV
/RQJHYLW\ ,QLWLDOO\VWDUWHGDVDQH[SHULPHQWDOPHDVXUH 2UGHUPDNHVQRPHQWLRQRI
VXEMHFWWRUHYLHZDIWHUILYH\HDUV5HYLHZHG ORQJHYLW\
DQGFRQWLQXHGIURPWR
&ULWHULDIRU 5LJKWKROGHUVDFFRUGLQJWRVHWWOHPHQWV 2QHDGXOWPDOHDQGIHPDOH
3DUWLFLSDWLRQ 1RQULJKWKROGHUVFRXOGEHFRPHPHPEHUV PHPEHURIHDFKIDPLO\FDQ
EXWFRXOGQRWUHFHLYHVKDUHVRILQFRPH EHFRPHD9)'&PHPEHU
ZKLFKZHUHGXHRQO\WRULJKWKROGHUV
%HQHILW6KDULQJ WRULJKWKROGHUVDVSHUIRUHVW RIWKHQHWVDOHSURFHHGV
VHWWOHPHQWV RIWKHILQDOKDUYHVWZLOOEH
RISURILWWR)'DVLQVSHFWLRQIHHV JLYHQWRWKH9)'&DQGNHSWLQ
WRUHVHUYHIXQG DFRPPRQIXQGWREHXWLOLVHG
WRIRUHVWLPSURYHPHQWIXQG IRUYLOODJHGHYHORSPHQWZRUNV
WRFRPPRQJRRGIXQGIRUWKHEHQHILW ZLWKWKHDSSURYDORIWKH
RIWKHFRPPXQLW\ JHQHUDOKRXVHDQGLQ
WRFRRSHUDWLYHHGXFDWLRQIXQG FRQVXOWDWLRQZLWKWKH')2
%DODQFHWREHGLVWULEXWHGWRWKHPHPEHUV FRQFHUQHG
LQSURSRUWLRQWRWKHLUULJKWV7KXV 8VXIUXFWVZLOOEHGLVWULEXWHGDV
LQGLYLGXDOLQFRPHVZHUHSHUPLWWHG SHUIRUHVWVHWWOHPHQWV7KLV
1RWH5LJKWKROGHUVVKDUHZDVGHWHUPLQH LQFOXGHVIXHOZRRGJUDVVHV
HGDFFRUGLQJWRWKHUHYHQXHWKH\SDLGWR 17)3V
WKHUHYHQXHGHSDUWPHQW&DOOHGPDPOD 5HVLQ:KLOHWKHRUGHUPDNHV
WKLVZDVFDOFXODWHGRQWKHEDVLVRITXDQ QRPHQWLRQFXUUHQWSROLF\
WLW\TXDOLW\DQGLQFRPHSRWHQWLDORIWKH GRHVQRWDOORZIRUVKDULQJRI
SULYDWHODQG7KHKLJKHUWKHPDPODWKH LQFRPHVIURPUHVLQZLWKWKH
KLJKHUWKHVKDUHRILQFRPHIURPWKH 9)'&V
VRFLHW\ .KDLU2UGHUPDNHVQR
$OOXVXIUXFWVWREHJLYHQIUHHWRWKH.)&6 PHQWLRQ([FOXGHGIURPVKDUH
5HVLQ$IWHUGHGXFWLQJVHUYLFHFRVWE\WKH DVRQO\GHJUDGHGDUHDVDUH
)'WKHSURILWVIURPWKHDXFWLRQRIUHVLQ HOLJLEOHIRU-)0$UHDVZLWK
ZHQWWRWKH.)&6 NKDLUZLOOQRWEHEURXJKW
.KDLU,QFOXGHGLQ]DPLQGDULVKDUH XQGHU-)0
DIWHUDXFWLRQRIWUHHVE\)'

$QQH[&RQW

3URFHVVRI (ODERUDWHUXOHVSURFHGXUHVDQGJXLGHOLQHV 7KH-)0JRYHUQPHQWRUGHU
)RUPDWLRQ UHODWHGWRWKHIRUPDWLRQRIVRFLHWLHV UHPDLQVWKHRQO\JXLGHOLQH
SURYLGHGDORQJZLWKPHQWLRQWKDWSURFHVV 5XOHVDQGSURFHGXUHVKDYH
PD\QRWEHULJLGO\DGKHUHGWREXWPD\EH QRW\HWEHHQLVVXHGLQWKH
YDULHG+RZHYHULWLVVXJJHVWHGWKDWWKH \HDUVVLQFHQRWLILFDWLRQ
SURFHVVRIDGPLVVLRQPXVWEHILQLVKHGLQ
RQHYLVLWWRWKHYLOODJHZLWKRXWDQ\EUHDN
,QVWLWXWLRQDO 'HSHQGHQWRQFRRSHUDWLRQDQGOLQNDJHV +DUGO\DQ\GHSHQGHQFHRQ
LVVXHV ZLWKFRRSHUDWLYHGHSDUWPHQWDQGUHYHQXH RUGHUGHSDUWPHQWVVSHFLILHG
GHSDUWPHQW
&RQFHUQIRU (TXLW\FRPSURPLVHGLQPHPEHUVKLSDFFHVV 3URYLGHVDIILUPDWLYHVXSSRUW
(TXLW\ DQGVKDULQJRILQFRPH0DPODZDVWKH 0DQGDWRU\WRKDYHPHPEHU
EDVLVIRUGHILQLQJLQFRPHVKDUHIURP IURPDQWRGD\DIDPLO\LQ
VRFLHW\ODUJHODQGRZQHUVWKXVUHFHLYHG H[HFXWLYHFRPPLWWHH
ODUJHVKDUHV 0HPEHUVKLSRSHQWRDOO
KRXVHKROGVUHJDUGOHVVRIODQG
RZQHUVKLS
&RQIOLFW (QYLVDJHVDUROHIRUFRRSHUDWLYH ')2LQFRQVXOWDWLRQZLWK
5HVROXWLRQ GHSDUWPHQWVWDIIZKRZLOOUHVROYH JHQHUDOKRXVHLVWRGHFLGHRQ
GLIIHUHQFHRIRSLQLRQZLWKLQVRFLHWLHVRU VXFKPDWWHUV
EHWZHHQVRFLHWLHVDQGWKH)' )LQDOGHFLVLRQRQDSSHDOVLV
YHVWHGZLWKFRQVHUYDWRUZKR
KDVWRJLYHKLVGHFLVLRQZLWKLQ
RQHPRQWKQRIXUWKHUDSSHDOV
EHLQJSRVVLEOH
'LVVROXWLRQ 7KHVFKHPHZDVQRWLILHGE\)'HYHU\IHZ ')2KDVWRWDOSRZHUVWRGH
\HDUV,WZDVQRWUHQRWLILHGDIWHU$V UHJLVWHUD9)'&
FRRSHUDWLYHVWKH.)&6FDQQRWEH
GLVVROYHGE\WKH)'
*HQGHU,VVXHV 1RPHQWLRQRIZRPHQ
VSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQ 0HPEHUVKLSJXDUDQWHHGWR
PHPEHUVKLSDQGGHFLVLRQPDNLQJ ZRPHQIURPHDFKPHPEHU
3DWULDUFKDOV\VWHPXVXDOO\SODFHGDOOODQGLQ KRXVHKROG3URYLGHVIRU
WKHPHQ
VQDPHV:RPHQ
VPHPEHUVKLS ZRPHQVPHPEHUVKLSRQ
DOPRVWQHJOLJLEOHGXHWRPHPEHUVKLS H[HFXWLYHFRPPLWWHH$OORZV
FULWHULDZKLFKTXDOLI\RQO\PDPODSD\LQJ IRURQHPDKLODPDQGDO
PDOHODQGRZQHUV PHPEHUWREHQRPLQDWHGWR
H[HFXWLYHFRPPLWWHH
)LQDQFLDO 3URYLVLRQIRUJUDQWLQDLGWRVRFLHWLHV 1RSURYLVLRQIRUDQ\ILQDQFLDO
*UDQWV DVVLVWDQFHLVVSHFLILHGLQWKH
*2
)RUHVW 3URYLVLRQWRSUHSDUHD:3IRUWKHDUHDV $PDQDJHPHQWSODQIRUWKH
PDQDJHPHQW EURXJKWXQGHUWKHVRFLHWLHVLQFRQVXOWDWLRQ DUHDVLVWREHSUHSDUHGZLWK
ZLWKWKH6RFLHW\PHPEHUV,QGLYLGXDO:3V WKHSDUWLFLSDWLRQRIFRPPLWWHH
IRUHDFK.)&6DQGDQLQWHJUDWHGRQHIRU PHPEHUV'XUDWLRQRIZRUNLQJ
DOO.)&6ZHUHSUHSDUHGE\WKH)' SODQVQRWVSHFLILHG
annexes 65
$QQH[&RQW

/HJDO6WDWXV /HJDOVWDWXVXQGHUWKHSURYLVLRQRI &RPPLWWHHVUHJLVWHUHGRQO\
&RRSHUDWLYH6RFLHWLHV$FWV ZLWKWKH')2ZKRKDVSRZHU
2ULJLQDOO\XQGHU3XQMDE$FWRI WRGLVVROYHWKH9)'&V1R
1RZXQGHU+3$FWRI SURYLVLRQIRUUHJLVWUDWLRQ
XQGHUDQ\RWKHUVWDWXWH
4XRUXP ([HFXWLYHFRPPLWWHH$PLQLPXPRIWKUHH ([HFXWLYHFRPPLWWHH
(&PHPEHUVDUHGHHPHGWRIRUPD 5HTXLUHGWRPHHWDWOHDVWIRXU
TXRUXPLQDQ(&RIQRWPRUHWKDQ WLPHVD\HDU0LQLPXP
SHUVRQV5HTXLUHGWRPHHWZKHQQHFHVVDU\ TXRUXPPXVWEH(&FDQ
KDYHWRPHPEHUV
*HQHUDO+RXVH 0LQLPXPRQHWKLUGRUPHPEHUV 5HTXLUHGWRPHHWWZLFHD\HDU
ZKLFKHYHULVOHVVLVGHHPHGWRIRUPD ZLWKDPLQLPXPTXRUXPRI
TXRUXP5HTXLUHGWRPHHWDWOHDVWRQFHD
\HDU
5HSUHVHQWDWLRQ 1RVWDWHPHQWWRHQVXUHEURDGEDVHG 3URYLGHVIRUPHHWLQJVZLWK
SDUWLFLSDWLRQRIGLIIHUHQWJURXSVLQWKH VPDOOFOXVWHUVRILQWHUHVW
FRPPLWWHHIRUPDWLRQDQGGHFLVLRQPDNLQJ JURXSVLQWKHYLOODJHWRHQVXUH
WKHLUSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQ
PHPEHUVKLS
0HPEHU $VSHUWKH&RRSHUDWLYH6RFLHWLHV$FWWKH )RUHVWJXDUGZLOOEHWKH
VHFUHWDU\ VHFUHWDU\ZDVWREHDSSRLQWHGE\VRFLHW\ VHFUHWDU\'XWLHVRIWKHIRUHVW
PHPEHUV JXDUGKDYHQRWEHHQPDGH
VSHFLILF

'XWLHVDQG 7RDUUDQJHIRUSODQWDWLRQLPSURYHPHQW 7RDVVLVWWKH)'LQSODQWDWLRQ
UHVSRQVLELOLWLHV SURWHFWLRQDQGPDQDJHPHQWRIVRFLHW\ DFWLYLWLHVDGKHUHWRWKH
RIPHPEHUV IRUHVWVDVPHQWLRQHGLQ:3ZLWKVSHFLILF RSHUDWLRQDOSODQIRUHVW
UHIHUHQFHWRSUHYHQWLRQRIHURVLRQDQG PDQDJHPHQWGLVWULEXWLRQRI
XWLOLVDWLRQRIWKHIRUHVWSURGXFHWRWKHEHVW XVXIUXFWVDVVLVWLQFRQIOLFW
DGYDQWDJHRIWKHPHPEHUV0HDVXUHVWR UHVROXWLRQ
VSUHDGWKHNQRZOHGJHRISULQFLSOHVDQG
SUDFWLFHVZHUHWREHXQGHUWDNHQ

about the author
Rajiv Ahal was born in 1964 in the village of his ancestors,
Paprola in Baijnath Tehsil, Kangra District, Himachal Pradesh.
He graduated as an electrical engineer from Delhi in 1987, and
now works in rural development and for the environment. Since
1994 he has been actively involved in the state level mobilisation
of activists, academics and NGOs through Navrachna, a state-
wide forum of organisations and people working to strengthen
participatory and community-based systems of governance and
sustainable natural resource management. He also helped form
and organise the Samridhi Womens Cooperative, in which
marginalised and poor rural women work to convert their surplus
forest produce into a thriving business that provides
empowerment and a means of livelihood for women in two
districts of Himachal Pradesh.

The Politics - of Cooperative Forest Management - The Kangra Experience

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

The Politics - of Cooperative Forest Management - The Kangra Experience

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

The Politics - of Cooperative Forest Management - The Kangra Experience

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

What are the main topics discussed across the pages?

What are the main topics discussed across the pages?

How do the ideas presented evolve from one page to the next?

How do the ideas presented evolve from one page to the next?

The Politics of Cooperative

Talking Points is a new series from ICIMOD that will contain

ISBN 92 9115 474 1

Printed and bound in Nepal by

one kangra: an overview ....................................................... 1

two the kangra forest cooperatives experiment ..................... 7

three institutional arrangements ......................................... 15

four analysis of the societies .............................................. 23

five the standoff between the stakeholder institutions.......... 39

six what lies ahead .............................................................. 49

one kangra: an overview 1

Systems of Forest Management

2 the kangra experience

one kangra: an overview 3

The Status of Forest Resources

4 the kangra experience

one kangra: an overview 5

6 the kangra experience

Overview of the KFCS Scheme

two the kangra forest cooperatives experiment 7

8 the kangra experience

two the kangra forest cooperatives experiment 9

10 the kangra experience

Table 1: Significant Milestones in the Evolution of the KFCS

two the kangra forest cooperatives experiment 11

12 the kangra experience

The Management Principles of the Forest Societies

three institutional arrangements 13

14 the kangra experience

three institutional arrangements 15

The working plans

Introduction of the KFCS Scheme

16 the kangra experience

three institutional arrangements 17

The cooperative sub inspector organised

18 the kangra experience

Chil Shelter Wood Circle = 40 ha of which 10 ha was closed

three institutional arrangements 19

Primary school constructed by KFCS Bhagotla from its own funds

20 the kangra experience

Policy and Objectives

Choice of the institutional form

four analysis of the societies 21

22 the kangra experience

Criteria for membership

four analysis of the societies 23

Criteria for selection of areas

Methodology of extending the scheme

24 the kangra experience

four analysis of the societies 25

Table 3: Grants-in-aid received

26 the kangra experience

Copy of Share Certificate of

four analysis of the societies 27

Income from khair

Village _Post Office_____

Tehsil District _