Mcleod vs NLRC

FACTS:
On February 2, 1995, John F. McLeod filed a complaint for retirement benefits, vacation and sick leave
benefits and other benefits against Filipinas Synthetic Corporation (Filsyn), Far Eastern Textile Mills, Inc.,
Sta. Rosa Textiles, Inc., Complainant was the former VP and Plant Manager of Peggy Mills, Inc.; that he was
hired in June 1980 and Peggy Mills closed operations due to irreversible losses but its assets were acquired
by Sta. Rosa Textile Corporation complainant was hired by Sta. Rosa Textile but he resigned and that while
complainant was Vice President and Plant Manager of Peggy Mills, the union staged a strike up to July 1992
resulting in closure of operations due to irreversible losses as per Notice .The complainant was relied upon
to settle the labor problem but due to his lack of attention and absence the strike continued resulting in
closure of the company. Mcleod contends that the corporations are solidarily liable. On 3 April 1998, the
Labor Arbiter rendered his decision in favor of Mcleod The NLRC Reversed decision CA- Modified the
NLRCs decision. Lim was solidarily liable
Issue:
whether there is merger/ consolidation
w/n Patricio Lim must be solidarily liable with PMI
Held:
There was also no merger or consolidation of PMI and SRTI. Consolidation is the union of two or more
existing corporations to form a new corporation called the consolidated corporation. It is a combination by
agreement between two or more corporations by which their rights, franchises, and property are united
and become those of a single, new corporation, composed generally, although not necessarily, of the
stockholders of the original corporations. Merger, on the other hand, is a union whereby one corporation
absorbs one or more existing corporations, and the absorbing corporation survives and continues the
combined business.
The parties to a merger or consolidation are called constituent corporations. In consolidation, all the
constituents are dissolved and absorbed by the new consolidated enterprise. In merger, all constituents,
except the surviving corporation, are dissolved. In both cases, however, there is no liquidation of the
assets of the dissolved corporations, and the surviving or consolidated corporation acquires all their
properties, rights and franchises and their stockholders usually become its stockholders. The surviving or
consolidated corporation assumes automatically the liabilities of the dissolved corporations, regardless of
whether the creditors have consented or not to such merger or consolidation.27 In the present case, there
is no showing that the subject dation in payment involved any corporate merger or consolidation. Neither
is there any showing of those indicative factors that SRTI is a mere instrumentality of PMI.
Moreover, SRTI did not expressly or impliedly agree to assume any of PMIs debts. 2. In the present case,
there is nothing substantial on record to show that Patricio acted in bad faith in terminating McLeods
services to warrant Patricios personal liability. PMI had no other choice but to stop plant operations. The
work stoppage therefore was by necessity. The company could no longer continue with its plant operations
because of the serious business losses that it had suffered. The mere fact that Patricio was president and
director of PMI is not a ground to conclude that he should be held solidarily liable with PMI for McLeods
money claims.
The ruling in A.C. Ransom Labor Union-CCLU v. NLRC,59 which the Court of Appeals cited, does not apply
to this case. We quote pertinent portions of the ruling, thus:
(a) Article 265 of the Labor Code, in part, expressly provides: "Any worker whose employment has been
terminated as a consequence of an unlawful lockout shall be entitled to reinstatement with full
backwages."
Article 273 of the Code provides that: "Any person violating any of the provisions of Article 265 of this
Code shall be punished by a fine of not exceeding five hundred pesos and/or imprisonment for not less
than one (1) day nor more than six (6) months."
(b) How can the foregoing provisions be implemented when the employer is a corporation? The answer is
found in Article 212 (c) of the Labor Code which provides: "(c) Employer includes any person acting in the
interest of an employer, directly or indirectly. The term shall not include any labor organization or any of its
officers or agents except when acting as employer.". The foregoing was culled from Section 2 of RA 602,
the Minimum Wage Law. Since RANSOM is an artificial person, it must have an officer who can be
presumed to be the employer, being the "person acting in the interest of (the) employer" RANSOM. The
corporation, only in the technical sense, is the employer. The responsible officer of an employer

corporation can be held personally, not to say even criminally, liable for non-payment of back wages. That
is the policy of the law.

[G.R. No. 101761. March 24, 1993] NATIONAL SUGAR REFINERIES CORPORATION vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION
FACTS: Petitioner National Sugar Refineries Corporation (NASUREFCO), a corporation which is fully owned
and controlled by the Government, operates three (3) sugar refineries located at Bukidnon, Iloilo and
Batangas. Private respondent union represents the former supervisors of the NASUREFCO Batangas Sugar
Refinery.
On June 1, 1988, petitioner implemented a Job Evaluation (JE) Program affecting all employees, from rankand-file to department heads. As a result, all positions were re-evaluated, and all employees including the
members of respondent union were granted salary adjustments and increases in benefits commensurate
to their actual duties and functions.
For about ten years prior to the JE Program, the members of respondent union were treated in the same
manner as rank-and file employees. As such, they used to be paid overtime, rest day and holiday pay. With
the implementation of the JE Program, the following adjustments among others were made: (1) the
members of respondent union were re-classified under levels S-5 to S-8 which are considered managerial
staff for purposes of compensation and benefits; (2) there was an increase in basic pay of the average of
50% of their basic pay prior to the JE Program, with the union members now enjoying a wide gap
(P1,269.00 per month) in basic pay compared to the highest paid rank-and-file employee. On May 11,
1990, petitioner NASUREFCO recognized herein respondent union as the bargaining representative of all
the supervisory employees at the NASUREFCO Batangas Sugar Refinery.
Two years after the implementation of the JE Program the members of herein respondent union filed a
complaint for non-payment of overtime, rest day and holiday pay allegedly in violation of Article 100 of the
Labor Code.
ISSUE: W/N supervisory employees should be considered as officers or members of the managerial staff
under Article 82, Book III of the same Code, and hence are not entitled to overtime rest day and holiday
pay.
HELD: YES. Article 212(m), Book V of the Labor Code on Labor Relations reads:
(m) Managerial employee is one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute
management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharged, assign or discipline
employees. Supervisory employees are those who, in the interest of the employer effectively recommend
such managerial actions if the exercise of such authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature but
requires the use of independent judgment. All employees not falling within any of those above definitions
are considered rank-and-file employees of this Book.
Respondent NLRC, in holding that the union members are entitled to overtime, rest day and holiday pay,
and in ruling that the latter are not managerial employees, adopted the definition stated in the
aforequoted statutory provision.
A cursory perusal of the Job Value Contribution Statements of the union members will readily show that
these supervisory employees are under the direct supervision of their respective department
superintendents and that generally they assist the latter in planning, organizing, staffing, directing,
controlling communicating and in making decisions in attaining the companys set goals and objectives.

These supervisory employees are likewise responsible for the effective and efficient operation of their
respective departments. The members of respondent union discharge duties and responsibilities which
ineluctably qualify them as officers or members of the managerial staff, as defined in Section 2, Rule I
Book III of the aforestated Rules to Implement the Labor Code, viz.: (1) their primary duty consists of the
performance of work directly related to management policies of their employer; (2) they customarily and
regularly exercise discretion and independent judgment; (3) they regularly and directly assist the
managerial employee whose primary duty consist of the management of a department of the
establishment in which they are employed (4) they execute, under general supervision, work along
specialized or technical lines requiring special training, experience, or knowledge; (5) they execute, under
general supervision, special assignments and tasks; and (6) they do not devote more than 20% of their
hours worked in a work-week to activities which are not directly and clearly related to the performance of
their work hereinbefore described.
Under the facts obtaining in this case, the union members should be considered as officers and members
of the managerial staff and are, therefore, exempt from the coverage of Article 82 hence they are not
entitled to overtime, rest day and holiday.

[G.R. No. 123184. January 22, 1999] SERAFIN QUEBEC, SR.,vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Petitioner Serafin Quebec Sr. was the owner of the Canhagimet Express, a transportation company
plying Oras-Catbalogan (Samar) - the Bicol area - Metro Manila, and vice-versa, before the company was
sold. Canhagimet Express was managed by Serafin Quebec Jr. until he was murdered on 1 September
1981.[2] Petitioner Serafin Quebec Sr. was his father. Serafin Quebec III, obviously the son of Serafin
Quebec Jr. and grandson of petitioner, briefly managed the company thereafter until he fled when he
received serious threats to his life following the death of his father.
In September 1981 private respondent Antonio Quebec, brother of petitioner, was hired by the Company
as inspector and liaison officer with the powers and duties of a supervisor/manager[3] at a monthly salary
of P5,000.00 but without any 13th month pay, overtime pay, service incentive leave pay (SILP) and night
premium pay.[4] Neither was he paid any separation pay when he was dismissed without any notice and
hearing in 1991 by Paciencia Quebec, wife of petitioner, on suspicion of covering up the latter's
womanizing activities.[5]
Meanwhile on 5 November 1981 private respondent Pamfilo Pombo Sr., brother-in-law of petitioner by
reason of his marriage to petitioner's sister Estelita Quebec, was hired as driver-mechanic and co-manager
of Antonio in Catbalogan, Northern Samar, the Bicol Region and Manila, for a monthly salary of P4,000.00.
He was dismissed without notice and hearing in October 1990 allegedly for his failure to help in the repair
of Bus No. 152. Neither was he given any separation pay, overtime pay, 13th month pay nor service
incentive leave pay.[6] Consequently, private respondents Antonio Quebec and Pamfilo Pombo Sr.
separately filed illegal dismissal cases against petitioner which were later consolidated under one Labor
Arbiter.[7]
In his 5 January 1994 decision,[8] the Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaints against petitioner and found
the dismissal of Antonio to be valid on the ground that an employee could be terminated from employment
for lack of confidence due to serious misconduct. The serious misconduct alluded to was the purported
misappropriation of company funds by Antonio. The Labor Arbiter opined that such misconduct was proved
by circumstantial evidence through Antonio's unsatisfactory answers on how he was able to afford a house
and lot within a short time.
Accordingly, private respondents appealed to the NLRC which initially dismissed the appeal for lack of
merit in its 27 February 1995 resolution. However, on 31 August 1995 the NLRC set aside its earlier
resolution and granted the motion for reconsideration by holding that private respondents Quebec and
Pombo were illegally dismissed because (1) there was an employer-employee relationship between the

parties; (2) petitioner did not submit any evidence, e.g., payrolls and vouchers, to rebut the allegations of
unpaid money claims; and, (3) other than petitioners bare denial of respondents employment status in the
Canhagimet Express, no evidence was submitted to refute respondents claim that they were dismissed
without due process.
The remaining issue to be resolved then is whether private respondents were illegally dismissed.
There were various reasons cited for the dismissal of Antonio Quebec, i.e., that he was covering up for the
womanizing activities of petitioner, and that petitioner suspected him of misappropriating Canhagimet
funds by the mere fact that he was unable to explain his wherewithal to buy a house and lot in a short
time. Two reasons were also asseverated on Pamfilo's dismissal, i.e., his non-payment of freightage at the
Canhagimet buses in transporting his rattan and stalagmites, and his inability to help in the repair of a
bus. Both claims however were never substantiated by any evidence other than the barefaced allegations
in the affidavits of petitioner and his witnesses.
When there is no showing of a clear, valid and legal cause for the termination of employment, the law
considers the matter a case of illegal dismissal and the burden is on the employer to prove that the
termination was for a valid or authorized cause.[14] This burden of proof appropriately lies on the
shoulders of the employer and not on the employee because a worker's job has some of the characteristics
of property rights and is therefore within the constitutional mantle of protection. No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws
However, inasmuch as Antonio Quebec and Pamfilo Pombo Sr. have admitted in their counter-affidavits
dated 26 July 1993[23] that they exercised managerial or supervisory powers in their jobs, they cannot
avail of the 13th month pay, overtime pay and service incentive leave pay. Presidential Decree No. 851 as
amended by Memorandum Order No. 88 provides for the 13th month pay to be of mandatory effect only
on all rank-and-file employees.[24] As to the overtime pay and service incentive leave pay, we have
discussed in Salazar v. NLRC

Duterte v. Kingswood Trading Co. [G.R. No. 160325. Oct 4, 2007]

Facts: Petitioner Roque Duterte was hired as truck/trailer driver by respondent Kingswood Trading
Company, Inc. (KTC) of which co-respondent Filemon Lim is the President. Duterte was on the
6:00 a.m. 6:00 p.m. shift. He averaged 21 trips per month, getting P700 per trip. When not
driving, he was assigned to clean and maintain respondent KTCs equipment and vehicles for
which he was paid P125 per day. Regularly, he would be seconded by respondent Filemon Lim to
drive for one of KTCs clients, the Philippine National Oil Corporation, but always subject to
respondents convenience. When Duterte had his first heart attack and was confined for two
weeks at the Philippine Heart Center (PHC), KTC declared him on sick leave with corresponding
notification. After a month from the hospitalization, he returned to work armed with a medical
certificate signed by his attending physician at the PHC, attesting to his fitness to work. However,
said certificate was not honored by the respondents who refused to allow him to work. Two
months later, he suffered a second heart attack and was again confined at the PHC. Upon
release, he stayed home and spent time to recuperate. When he returned to work, KTC refused to
admit him back. Instead, told him to sign a document as proof of his receipt of the amount of
P14,375.00 as first installment of his SSS benefits. Having received no such amount, he refused
to sign and asked for the necessary documents from respondents to enable him to claim his SSS
benefits. They did not heed his request.
Issue: Was the dismissal valid?

Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the law is unequivocal. The employer, before it can legally
dismiss its employee on the ground of disease, must adduce a certification from a competent
public authority that the disease of which its employee is suffering is of such nature or at such a
stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six months even with proper treatment. In the
instant case, the record does not contain the required certification. And when the respondents
asked the petitioner to look for another job because he was unfit to work, such unilateral
declaration, even if backed up by the findings of its company doctors, did not meet the quantum
requirement mandated by the law, i.e., there must be a certification by a competent public
authority. The court is not unmindful of the connection between the nature of petitioners disease
and his job as a truck/trailer driver. It is also fully aware that petitioners job places at stake the
safety of the public. However, the Supreme Court does not agree with the NLRC that petitioner
was validly dismissed because his continued employment was prohibited by the basic legal
mandate that reasonable diligence must be exercised to prevent prejudice to the public, which
justified respondents in refusing work to petitioner. Petitioner could have been admitted back to
work performing other tasks, such as cleaning and maintaining respondent companys machine
and transportation assets.
Not field personnel since he was doing maintenance necessary and desirable for KTC

G.R. Nos. 83380-81 November 15, 1989

Makati Haberdashery Inc., Jorge Ledesma and Cecilio Inocencio, petitioners vs NLRC, etc., respondents.
Ponente: Fernan
Facts:
This is a petition assailing the decision of NLRC affirming the decision of Labor Arbiter finding Haberda
guilty of illegal dismissal and ordering him to reinstate the dismissed workers and in concluding that there
is employer-employee relationship between workers and Haberda.
The complainants were working for Haberda as tailors, seamstress, sewers, basters and plantsadoras. Paid
on a piece-rate basis with allowance when they report for work before 9:30am everyday.(MON-SAT)
July 1984, the labor organization where the complainants are members filed a complaint for underpayment
of basic wage, living allowance, non-payment of overtime work, non-payment of holiday pay, non-payment
of service incentive pay ad other benefits under wage orders.

During the pendency, Haberda dismiss the workers for the alleged job acceptance from another, which was
denied by the workers and countered by filing a complaint for illegal dismissal. Which was granted by
NLRC. Hence, this petition raising the issues on:
Issues: (1) employer-employee relationship? (2) workers entitled to monetary claims? (3) were respondents
illegally dismissed?
Ruling:
(1) There is employer-employee relationship. The facts at bar indubitably reveal that the most important
requisite of control is present. As gleaned from the operations of petitioner, when a customer enters into a
contract with the haberdashery or its proprietor, the latter directs an employee who may be a tailor,
pattern maker, sewer or "plantsadora" to take the customer's measurements, and to sew the pants, coat
or shirt as specified by the customer. Supervision is actively manifested in all these aspects the manner
and quality of cutting, sewing and ironing.
(2) Because the workers were proven to be regular employees, they shall be entitled to minimum wages.
Plus the respondents didn't appealed when the Labor Arbiter granted the minimum wage award to the
workers in the first place. But workers are not entitled to incentive pay and other benefits because piecerate workers are paid at fixed amount for performing work irrespective of the time consumed.
(3) There was no illegal dismissal to the two workers accused of the copied Barong Tagalog design,
because when they were asked to explain to their employer, the workers did not but instead go AWOL.
Imposing disciplinary sanctions upon an employee for just and valid cause is within the rights of the
employer.

Labor Congress v NLRC

The 99 persons named as petitioners in this proceeding were rank-and-file employees of respondent Empire Food
Products, which hired them on various dates (Paragraph 1, Annex "A" of Petition, Annex "B;" Page 2, Annex "F" of
Petition).
Petitioners filed against private respondents a complaint for payment of money claim[s] and for violation of labor
standard[s] laws (NLRC Case No. RAB-111-10-1817-90). They also filed a petition for direct certification of petitioner
Labor Congress of the Philippines as their bargaining representative (Case No. R0300-9010-RU-005).
On October 23, 1990, petitioners represented by LCP President Benigno B. Navarro, Sr. and private respondents
Gonzalo Kehyeng and Evelyn Kehyeng in behalf of Empire Food Products, Inc. entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement which provided, among others, the following:
1. That in connection with the pending Petition for Direct Certification filed by the Labor Congress with the DOLE,
Management of the Empire Food Products has no objection [to] the direct certification of the LCP Labor Congress and is

now recognizing the Labor Congress of the Philippines (LCP) and its Local Chapter as the SOLE and EXCLUSIVE
Bargaining Agent and Representative for all rank and file employees of the Empire Food Products regarding "WAGES,
HOURS Of WORK, AND OTHER TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT;"
In an Order dated October 24, 1990, Mediator Arbiter Antonio Cortez approved the memorandum of agreement and
certified LCP "as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent among the rank-and-file employee of Empire Food Products
for purposes of collective bargaining with respect to wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of
employment" (Annex "B" of Petition).
On November 9, 1990, petitioners through LCP President Navarro submitted to private respondents a proposal for
collective bargaining (Annex "C" of Petition).
On January 23, 1991, petitioners filed a complaint docketed as NLRC Case No. RAB-III-01-1964-91 against private
respondents for:
a. Unfair Labor Practice by way of Illegal Lockout and/or Dismissal; . Union busting thru Harassments [sic], threats, and
interfering with the rights of employees to self-organization; . Violation of the Memorandum of Agreement dated
October 23, 1990; Underpayment of Wages in violation of R.A. No. 6640 and R.A. No. 6727, such as Wages
promulgated by the Regional Wage Board;
After the submission by the parties of their respective position papers and presentation of testimonial evidence, Labor
Arbiter Ariel C. Santos absolved private respondents of the charges of unfair labor practice, union busting, violation of
the memorandum of agreement, underpayment of wages and denied petitioners' prayer for actual, moral and
exemplary damages. Labor Arbiter Santos, however, directed the reinstatement of the individual complainants

LA and NLRC dismissed

Issue: WON abandoned work/ OT pay?
Held: No then Yes
In its Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) sided with
petitioners. It pointed out that the Labor Arbiter, in finding that petitioners abandoned their jobs, relied
solely on the testimony of Security Guard Rolando Cairo that petitioners refused to work on 21 January
1991, resulting in the spoilage of cheese curls ready for repacking. However, the OSG argued, this refusal
to report for work for a single day did not constitute abandonment, which pertains to a clear, deliberate
and unjustified refusal to resume employment, and not mere absence. In fact, the OSG stressed, two days
after allegedly abandoning their work, petitioners filed a complaint for, inter alia, illegal lockout or illegal
dismissal. Finally, the OSG questioned the lack of explanation on the part of Labor Arbiter Santos as to why
he abandoned his original decision to reinstate petitioners.
1.

DECLARING petitioners to have been illegally dismissed by private respondents, thus entitled to
full back wages and other privileges, and separation pay in lieu of reinstatement at the rate of
one month's salary for every year of service with a fraction of six months of service considered
as one year;

Lambo v NLRC
Petitioners Avelino Lambo and Vicente Belocura were employed as tailors by private respondents J.C. Tailor
Shop and/or Johnny Co on September 10, 1985 and March 3, 1985, respectively. They worked from 8:00
a.m. to 7:00 p.m. daily, including Sundays and holidays. As in the case of the other 100 employees of

private respondents, petitioners were paid on a piece-work basis, according to the style of suits they made.
Regardless of the number of pieces they finished in a day, they were each given a daily pay of at least
P64.00.
On January 17, 1989, petitioners filed a complaint against private respondents for illegal dismissal and
sought recovery of overtime pay, holiday pay, premium pay on holiday and rest day, service incentive
leave pay, separation pay, 13th month pay, and attorneys fees.
After hearing, Labor Arbiter Jose G. Gutierrez found private respondents guilty of illegal dismissal and
accordingly ordered them to pay petitioners claims.
On appeal by private respondents, the NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. It found that
petitioners had not been dismissed from employment but merely threatened with a closure of the business
if they insisted on their demand for a straight payment of their minimum wage, after petitioners, on
January 17, 1989, walked out of a meeting with private respondents and other employees. According to the
NLRC, during that meeting, the employees voted to maintain the company policy of paying them according
to the volume of work finished at the rate of P18.00 per dozen of tailored clothing materials. Only
petitioners allegedly insisted that they be paid the minimum wage and other benefits. The NLRC held
petitioners guilty of abandonment of work and accordingly dismissed their claims except that for 13th
month pay.
Issue: WON abandoned work?
No. ever, that petitioners refused to report for work after learning that the J.C. Tailoring and Dress Shop
Employees Union had demanded their (petitioners) dismissal for conduct unbecoming of employees. In
support of their claim, private respondents presented the affidavits[9] of Emmanuel Y. Caballero, president
of the union, and Amado Cabaero, member, that petitioners had not been dismissed by private
respondents but that practically all employees of the company, including the members of the union had
asked management to terminate the services of petitioners. The employees allegedly said they were
against petitioners request for change of the mode of payment of their wages, and that when a meeting
was called to discuss this issue, a petition for the dismissal of petitioners was presented, prompting the
latter to walk out of their jobs and instead file a complaint for illegal dismissal against private respondents
on January 17, 1989, even before all employees could sign the petition and management could act upon
the same.
To justify a finding of abandonment of work, there must be proof of a deliberate and unjustified refusal on
the part of an employee to resume his employment. The burden of proof is on the employer to show an
unequivocal intent on the part of the employee to discontinue employment.[10] Mere absence is not
sufficient. It must be accompanied by manifest acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee
simply does not want to work anymore.[11]
Private respondents failed to discharge this burden. Other than the self-serving declarations in the
affidavits of their two employees, private respondents did not adduce proof of overt acts of petitioners
showing their intention to abandon their work. On the contrary, the evidence shows that petitioners lost no
time in filing the case for illegal dismissal against private respondent. This fact negates any intention on
their part to sever their employment relationship.[12] Abandonment is a matter of intention; it cannot be
inferred or presumed from equivocal acts.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission is SET ASIDE and another one is
RENDERED ordering private respondents to pay petitioners the total amount of One Hundred Eighty-One
Thousand One Hundred Two Pesos and 40/100 (P181,102.40), as computed above.

G.R. No. 94951

April 22, 1991

APEX MINING COMPANY, INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and SINCLITICA
CANDIDO, respondents. GANCAYCO, J.:
Is the househelper in the staff houses of an industrial company a domestic helper or a regular employee of the said
firm? This is the novel issue raised in this petition.
Private respondent Sinclita Candida was employed by petitioner Apex Mining Company, Inc. on May 18, 1973 to
perform laundry services at its staff house located at Masara, Maco, Davao del Norte. In the beginning, she was paid
on a piece rate basis. However, on January 17, 1982, she was paid on a monthly basis at P250.00 a month which was
ultimately increased to P575.00 a month.
On December 18, 1987, while she was attending to her assigned task and she was hanging her laundry, she
accidentally slipped and hit her back on a stone. She reported the accident to her immediate supervisor Mila de la
Rosa and to the personnel officer, Florendo D. Asirit. As a result of the accident she was not able to continue with her
work. She was permitted to go on leave for medication. De la Rosa offered her the amount of P 2,000.00 which was
eventually increased to P5,000.00 to persuade her to quit her job, but she refused the offer and preferred to return to
work. Petitioner did not allow her to return to work and dismissed her on February 4, 1988.
On March 11, 1988, private respondent filed a request for assistance with the Department of Labor and Employment.
After the parties submitted their position papers as required by the labor arbiter assigned to the case on August 24,
1988 the latter rendered a decision, the dispositive part of which reads as follows: WHEREFORE, Conformably With The
Foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the respondent, Apex Mining Company, Inc., Masara, Davao del
Norte, to pay the complainant, to wit: total of FIFTY FIVE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SIXTY ONE PESOS AND 42/100
(P55,161.42). Not satisfied therewith, petitioner appealed to the public respondent National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), wherein in due course a decision was rendered by the Fifth Division thereof on July 20, 1989
dismissing the appeal for lack of merit and affirming the appealed decision. A motion for reconsideration thereof was
denied in a resolution of the NLRC dated June 29, 1990.
Under Rule XIII, Section l(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code, as amended, the terms "househelper" or "domestic servant"
are defined as follows:
The term "househelper" as used herein is synonymous to the term "domestic servant" and shall refer to any person,
whether male or female, who renders services in and about the employer's home and which services are usually
necessary or desirable for the maintenance and enjoyment thereof, and ministers exclusively to the personal comfort
and enjoyment of the employer's family.3
The foregoing definition clearly contemplates such househelper or domestic servant who is employed in the
employer's home to minister exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of the employer's family. Such
definition covers family drivers, domestic servants, laundry women, yayas, gardeners, houseboys and other similar
househelps.
The definition cannot be interpreted to include househelp or laundrywomen working in staffhouses of a company, like
petitioner who attends to the needs of the company's guest and other persons availing of said facilities. By the same
token, it cannot be considered to extend to then driver, houseboy, or gardener exclusively working in the company,
the staffhouses and its premises. They may not be considered as within the meaning of a "househelper" or "domestic
servant" as above-defined by law.
The criteria is the personal comfort and enjoyment of the family of the employer in the home of said employer. While it
may be true that the nature of the work of a househelper, domestic servant or laundrywoman in a home or in a
company staffhouse may be similar in nature, the difference in their circumstances is that in the former instance they
are actually serving the family while in the latter case, whether it is a corporation or a single proprietorship engaged in
business or industry or any other agricultural or similar pursuit, service is being rendered in the staffhouses or within
the premises of the business of the employer. In such instance, they are employees of the company or employer in the
business concerned entitled to the privileges of a regular employee.
Petitioner contends that it is only when the househelper or domestic servant is assigned to certain aspects of the
business of the employer that such househelper or domestic servant may be considered as such as employee. The
Court finds no merit in making any such distinction. The mere fact that the househelper or domestic servant is working
within the premises of the business of the employer and in relation to or in connection with its business, as in its
staffhouses for its guest or even for its officers and employees, warrants the conclusion that such househelper or
domestic servant is and should be considered as a regular employee of the employer and not as a mere family
househelper or domestic servant as contemplated in Rule XIII, Section l(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code, as amended.

Petitioner denies having illegally dismissed private respondent and maintains that respondent abandoned her
work.1wphi1This argument notwithstanding, there is enough evidence to show that because of an accident which
took place while private respondent was performing her laundry services, she was not able to work and was ultimately
separated from the service. She is, therefore, entitled to appropriate relief as a regular employee of petitioner.
Inasmuch as private respondent appears not to be interested in returning to her work for valid reasons, the payment of
separation pay to her is in order. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED