[G.R. No. 189420. March 26, 2014.

]
RAUL V. ARAMBULO AND TERESITA A. DELA CRUZ, petitioners, vs. GENARO
NOLASCO AND JEREMY SPENCER NOLASCO, respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J p:
This is a Petition for Review of the 7 October 2008 Decision 1 and 30 July 2009 Resolution 2 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76449, which reversed and set aside the Decision 3 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 51, dated 19 September 2002.
Petitioners Raul V. Arambulo and Teresita A. Dela Cruz, along with their mother Rosita Vda. de
Arambulo, and siblings Primo V. Arambulo, Ma. Lorenza A. Lopez, Ana Maria V. Arambulo,
Maximiano V. Arambulo, Julio V. Arambulo and Iraida Arambulo Nolasco (Iraida) are co-owners
of two (2) parcels of land located in Tondo, Manila, with an aggregate size of 233 square meters.
When Iraida passed away, she was succeeded by her husband, respondent Genaro Nolasco and
their children, Iris Abegail Nolasco, Ingrid Aileen Arambulo and respondent Jeremy Spencer
Nolasco.
On 8 January 1999, petitioners filed a petition for relief under Article 491 of the Civil Code with
the RTC of Manila, alleging that all of the co-owners, except for respondents, have authorized
petitioners to sell their respective shares to the subject properties; that only respondents are
withholding their consent to the sale of their shares; that in case the sale pushes through, their
mother and siblings will get their respective 1/9 share of the proceeds of the sale, while
respondents will get 1/4 share each of the 1/9 share of Iraida; that the sale of subject properties
constitutes alteration; and that under Article 491 of the Civil Code, if one or more co-owners
shall withhold their consent to the alterations in the thing owned in common, the courts may
afford adequate relief. 4
In their Answer, respondents sought the dismissal of the petition for being premature.
Respondents averred that they were not aware of the intention of petitioners to sell the properties
they co-owned because they were not called to participate in any negotiations regarding the
disposition of the property. 5
After the pre-trial, two (2) issues were submitted for consideration:
1.
Whether or not respondents are withholding their consent in the sale of the subject
properties; and
2.
In the affirmative, whether or not withholding of consent of sale by the respondents is
prejudicial to the petitioners. 6
On 19 September 2002, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioners and ordered respondents to
give their consent to the sale. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioners
and against the respondents:

1.
Directing respondents Genaro Nolasco and Jeremy Spencer A. Nolasco to give their
consent to the sale of their shares on the subject properties;
2.

Allowing the sale of the aforementioned properties;

3.
Directing the petitioners and the co-owners, including the respondents herein to agree
with the price in which the subject properties are to be sold and to whom to be sold; and
4.
Directing the distribution of the proceeds of the sale of the aforementioned properties in
the following proportion:
a.)

Rosita V. Vda. de Arambulo 1/9

b.)

Primo V. Arambulo 1/9

c.)

Maximiano V. Arambulo 1/9

d.)

Ana Maria V. Arambulo 1/9

e.)

Ma. Lorenza A. Lopez 1/9

f.)

Julio V. Arambulo 1/9

g.)

Raul V. Arambulo 1/9

h.)

Teresita A. dela Cruz 1/9

i.)

Genaro Nolasco, Jr. 1/4 of 1/9

j.)

Jeremy Spencer A. Nolasco 1/4 of 1/9

k.)

Iris Abegail A. Nolasco 1/4 of 1/9

l.)

Ingrid Aileen Arambulo 1/4 of 1/9 7

Going along with petitioners' reliance on Article 491 of the Civil Code, the trial court found that
respondents' withholding of their consent to the sale of their shares is prejudicial to the common
interest of the co-owners.
Respondents filed a Notice of Appeal and the trial court gave due course to the appeal and the
entire records of the case were elevated to the Court of Appeals. TIESCA
In a Decision dated 7 October 2008, the Court of Appeals granted the appeal and reversed the
trial court's decision. The Court of Appeals held that the respondents had the full ownership of
their undivided interest in the subject properties, thus, they cannot be compelled to sell their
undivided shares in the properties. It referred to the provisions of Article 493 of the Civil Code.
However, the Court of Appeals, implying applicability of Article 491 also observed that
petitioners failed to show how respondents' withholding of their consent would prejudice the
common interest over the subject properties.
Hence, the instant petition seeking the reversal of the appellate court's decision and praying for
the affirmance of the trial court's decision that ordered respondents to give their consent to the

sale of the subject properties. Petitioners emphasize that under Article 491 of the Civil Code,
they may ask the court to afford them adequate relief should respondents refuse to sell their
respective shares to the co-owned properties. They refute the appellate court's finding that they
failed to show how the withholding of consent by respondents becomes prejudicial to their
common interest. Citing the testimony of petitioner Teresita A. dela Cruz, they assert that one of
the two subject properties has an area of 122 square meters and if they decide to partition, instead
of selling the same, their share would be reduced to a measly 30-square meter lot each. The other
property was testified to as measuring only 111 square meters. Petitioners reiterate that all the
other co-owners are willing to sell the property and give respondents their share of the proceeds
of the sale.
At the core of this petition is whether respondents, as co-owners, can be compelled by the court
to give their consent to the sale of their shares in the co-owned properties. Until it reached this
Court, the discussion of the issue moved around Article 491 of the Civil Code. We have to
remove the issue out of the coverage of Article 491. It does not apply to the problem arising out
of the proposed sale of the property co-owned by the parties in this case.
The Court of Appeals correctly applied the provision of Article 493 of the Civil Code, which
states: ECSHAD
Art. 493.
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even
substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the
effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the
portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
Upon the other hand, Article 491 states:
Art. 491.
None of the co-owners shall, without the consent of the others, make alterations in
the thing owned in common, even though benefits for all would result therefrom. However, if the
withholding of the consent by one or more of the co-owners is clearly prejudicial to the common
interest, the courts may afford adequate relief.
As intimated above, the erroneous application of Article 491 is, in this case, an innate infirmity.
The very initiatory pleading below was captioned Petition for Relief under Article 491 of the
New Civil Code. Petitioners, likewise petitioners before the RTC, filed the case on the
submission that Article 491 covers the petition and grants the relief prayed for, which is to
compel the respondent co-owners to agree to the sale of the co-owned property. The trial court
took up all that petitioners tendered, and it favored the pleading with the finding that:
. . . To this court, the act of respondents of withholding consent to the sale of the properties is not
only prejudicial to the common interest of the co-owners but is also considered as an alteration
within the purview of Article 491 of the New Civil Code. . . . . Hence, it is deemed just and
proper to afford adequate relief to herein petitioners under Article 491 of the New Civil Code. 8
LLjur

That a sale constitutes an alteration as mentioned in Article 491 is an established jurisprudence. It

is settled that alterations include any act of strict dominion or ownership and any encumbrance or
disposition has been held implicitly to be an act of alteration. 9 Alienation of the thing by sale of
the property is an act of strict dominion. 10 However, the ruling that alienation is alteration does
not mean that a sale of commonly owned real property is covered by the second paragraph of
Article 491, such that if a co-owner withholds consent to the sale, the courts, upon a showing of
a clear prejudice to the common interest, may, as adequate relief, order the grant of the withheld
consent. Such is the conclusion drawn by the trial court, and hinted at, if not relied upon, by the
appellate court.
Ruling that the trial court erred in its conclusion, the Court of Appeals correctly relied on Article
493 in support of the finding that respondents cannot be compelled to agree with the sale. We
affirm the reversal by the Court of Appeals of the judgment of the trial court.
1.
There is co-ownership whenever, as in this case, the ownership of an undivided thing,
belongs to different persons. 11 Article 493 of the Code defines the ownership of the co-owner,
clearly establishing that each co-owner shall have full ownership of his part and of its fruits and
benefits.
Pertinent to this case, Article 493 dictates that each one of the parties herein as co-owners with
full ownership of their parts can sell their fully owned part. The sale by the petitioners of their
parts shall not affect the full ownership by the respondents of the part that belongs to them. Their
part which petitioners will sell shall be that which may be apportioned to them in the division
upon the termination of the co-ownership. With the full ownership of the respondents remaining
unaffected by petitioners' sale of their parts, the nature of the property, as co-owned, likewise
stays. In lieu of the petitioners, their vendees shall be co-owners with the respondents. The text
of Article 493 says so.
2.
Our reading of Article 493 as applied to the facts of this case is a reiteration of what was
pronounced in Bailon-Casilao v. Court of Appeals. 12 The rights of a co-owner of a certain
property are clearly specified in Article 493 of the Civil Code. Thus: ECTAHc
Art. 493.
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it[,] and even
substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the
effect of the alienation or [the] mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the
portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
As early as 1923, this Court has ruled that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the
sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to
the sale. 13 This is because under the aforementioned codal provision, the sale or other
disposition affects only his undivided share and the transferee gets only what would correspond
to his grantor in the partition of the thing owned in common. 14 Consequently, by virtue of the
sales made by Rosalia and Gaudencio Bailon which are valid with respect to their proportionate
shares, and the subsequent transfers which culminated in the sale to private respondent Celestino
Afable, the said Afable thereby became a co-owner of the disputed parcel of land as correctly

held by the lower court since the sales produced the effect of substituting the buyers in the
enjoyment thereof. 15
From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided
share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is
not null and void. However, only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby
making the buyer a co-owner of the property. 16 (Italics theirs).
Nearer to the dispute at hand are the pronouncements in the 1944 case of Lopez v. Vda. de
Cuaycong. 17 Citing Manresa on Article 399 which is the present Article 493 of the Civil Code,
the Court said: DEHaTC
. . . Article 399 shows the essential integrity of the right of each co-owner in the mental portion
which belongs to him in the ownership or community.
xxx

xxx

xxx

To be a co-owner of a property does not mean that one is deprived of every recognition of the
disposal of the thing, of the free use of his right within the circumstantial conditions of such
judicial status, nor is it necessary, for the use and enjoyment, or the right of free disposal, that the
previous consent of all the interested parties be obtained. 18 (Underscoring supplied).
The Court in Lopez further cited Scaevola:
2nd. Absolute right of each co-owner with respect to his part or share. With respect to the
latter, each co-owner is the same as an individual owner. He is a singular owner, with all the
rights inherent in such condition. The share of the co-owner, that is, the part which ideally
belongs to him in the common thing or right and is represented by a certain quantity, is his and
he may dispose of the same as he pleases, because it does not affect the right of the others. Such
quantity is equivalent to a credit against the common thing or right and is the private property of
each creditor (co-owner). The various shares ideally signify as many units of thing or right,
pertaining individually to the different owners; in other words, a unit for each owner. 19
(Underscoring supplied).
The ultimate authorities in civil law, recognized as such by the Court, agree that co-owners such
as respondents have over their part, the right of full and absolute ownership. Such right is the
same as that of individual owners which is not diminished by the fact that the entire property is
co-owned with others. That part which ideally belongs to them, or their mental portion, may be
disposed of as they please, independent of the decision of their co-owners. So we rule in this
case. The respondents cannot be ordered to sell their portion of the co-owned properties. In the
language of Rodriguez v. Court of First Instance of Rizal, 20 "each party is the sole judge of
what is good for him." 21
3.
Indeed, the respected commentaries suggest the conclusion that, insofar as the sale of coowned properties is concerned, there is no common interest that may be prejudiced should one or
more of the co-owners refuse to sell the co-owned property, which is exactly the factual situation

in this case. When respondents disagreed to the sale, they merely asserted their individual
ownership rights. Without unanimity, there is no common interest.
Petitioners who project themselves as prejudiced co-owners may bring a suit for partition, which
is one of the modes of extinguishing co-ownership. Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that
no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership, and that each co-owner may
demand at any time partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his share is concerned.
Corollary to this rule, Article 498 of the Civil Code states that whenever the thing is essentially
indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that it be allotted to one of them who shall indemnify
the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds accordingly distributed. This is resorted to (a) when
the right to partition the property is invoked by any of the co-owners but because of the nature of
the property, it cannot be subdivided or its subdivision would prejudice the interests of the coowners, and (b) the co-owners are not in agreement as to who among them shall be allotted or
assigned the entire property upon proper reimbursement of the co-owners. 22 This is the result
obviously aimed at by petitioners at the outset. As already shown, this cannot be done while the
co-ownership exists.
Essentially, a partition proceeding accords all parties the opportunity to be heard, the denial of
which was raised as a defense by respondents for opposing the sale of the subject properties.
The necessity of partition could not be more emphasized than in Rodriguez v. Court of First
Instance of Rizal, 23 to wit: cAaETS
. . . That this recourse would entail considerable time, trouble and expense, unwarranted by the
value of the property from the standpoint of the [respondents], is no legal justification for the
apportionment of the property not agreeable to any of the co-owners. Disagreements and
differences impossible of adjustment by the parties themselves are bound to arise, and it is
precisely with such contingency in view that the law on partition was evolved. 24
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the petition is DENIED without prejudice to the filing of
an action for partition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76449 is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Brion, Del Castillo and Reyes, * JJ., concur.