ESTRADA VS DESIERTO; ARROYO

Posted by kaye lee on 2:48 AM

Estrada vs Desierto G.R. No.
146710-15; Estrada vs Arroyo G.R.
No. 146738, March 2 2001
[Immunity from Suit; Resignation of
the President; Justiciable controversy]
FACTS:
It began in October 2000 when
allegations of wrong doings involving
bribe-taking, illegal gambling, and
other forms of corruption were made
against Estrada before the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee. On November 13,
2000, Estrada was impeached by the
Hor
and,
on
December
7,
impeachment
proceedings
were
begun in the Senate during which
more serious allegations of graft and
corruption against Estrada
were
made and were only stopped on
January 16, 2001 when 11 senators,
sympathetic
to
the
President,
succeeded in suppressing damaging
evidence against Estrada. As a result,
the impeachment trial was thrown
into an uproar as the entire
prosecution panel walked out and
Senate President Pimentel resigned
after casting his vote against Estrada.
On January 19, PNP and the AFP also
withdrew their support for Estrada
and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine.
Estrada called for a snap presidential
election to be held concurrently with
congressional and local elections on
May 14, 2001. He added that he will
not run in this election. On January 20,
SC declared that the seat of presidency
was vacant, saying that Estrada
constructively resigned his post. At
noon, Arroyo took her oath of office in
the presence of the crowd at EDSA as

the 14th President. Estrada and his

family later left Malacaang Palace.
Erap, after his fall, filed petition for
prohibition with prayer for WPI. It
sought to enjoin the respondent
Ombudsman from conducting any
further proceedings in cases filed
against him not until his term as
president ends. He also prayed for
judgment confirming Estrada to be
the lawful and incumbent President of
the Republic of the Philippines
temporarily unable to discharge the
duties of his office.
ISSUE(S):
1. WoN the petition presents a
justiciable controversy.
2. WoN Estrada resigned as President.
3. WoN Arroyo is only an acting
President.
4. WoN the President enjoys immunity
from suit.
5. WoN the prosecution of Estrada
should be enjoined due to prejudicial
publicity.
RULING:
1. Political questions"to those
questions
which,
under
the
Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or
in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the
government. It is concerned with
issues dependent upon the wisdom,
not legality of a particular measure."
Legal distinction between EDSA
People Power I EDSA People Power II:
EDSA I
EDSA II
exercise of the people power of
revolution which overthrew the whole
government.

exercise of people power of freedom

of speech and freedom of assembly to
petition the government for redress of
grievances which only affected the
office of the President.
extra constitutional and the legitimacy
of the new government that resulted
from it cannot be the subject of
judicial review
intra
constitutional
and
the
resignation of the sitting President
that it caused and the succession of
the Vice President as President are
subject to judicial review.
presented a political question;
involves legal questions.
The cases at bar pose legal and not
political questions. The principal
issues for resolution require the
proper interpretation of certain
provisions in the 1987 Constitution:
Sec 1 of Art II, and Sec 8 of Art VII, and
the allocation of governmental powers
under Sec 11 of Art VII. The issues
likewise call for a ruling on the scope
of presidential immunity from suit.
They also involve the correct
calibration of the right of petitioner
against prejudicial publicity.
2. Elements of valid resignation: (a)an
intent to resign and (b) acts of
relinquishment. Both were present
when President Estrada left the
Palace.
Totality of prior contemporaneous
posterior facts and circumstantial
evidence bearing material relevant
issuesPresident Estrada is deemed
to have resigned constructive
resignation.
SC declared that the resignation of
President Estrada could not be
doubted as confirmed by his leaving

Malacaan Palace. In the press release

containing his final statement:
1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of
the respondent as President;
2. He emphasized he was leaving the
Palace for the sake of peace and in
order to begin the healing process (he
did not say that he was leaving due to
any kind of disability and that he was
going to reassume the Presidency as
soon as the disability disappears);
3. He expressed his gratitude to the
people for the opportunity to serve
them as President (without doubt
referring to the past opportunity);
4. He assured that he will not shirk
from any future challenge that may
come in the same service of the
country;
5. He called on his supporters to join
him in promotion of a constructive
national spirit of reconciliation and
solidarity.
Intent
to
resignmust
be
accompanied
by
act
of
relinquishmentact or omission
before, during and after January 20,
2001.
3. The Congress passed House
Resolution No. 176 expressly stating
its support to Gloria MacapagalArroyo as President of the Republic of
the Philippines and subsequently
passed H.R. 178 confirms the
nomination of Teofisto T. Guingona Jr.
As Vice President. Senate passed HR
No. 83 declaring the Impeachment
Courts as Functius Officio and has
been terminated. It is clear is that both
houses of Congress recognized Arroyo
as the President. Implicitly clear in
that recognition is the premise that
the inability of Estrada is no longer
temporary as the Congress has clearly
rejected his claim of inability.

The Court therefore cannot exercise

its judicial power for this is political in
nature and addressed solely to
Congress by constitutional fiat. In
fine, even if Estrada can prove that he
did not resign, still, he cannot
successfully claim that he is a
President on leave on the ground that
he is merely unable to govern
temporarily. That claim has been laid
to rest by Congress and the decision
that Arroyo is the de jure, president
made by a co-equal branch of
government cannot be reviewed by
this Court.

the judge unable to perform. Finally,

the Court said that the cases against
Estrada
were
still
undergoing
preliminary investigation, so the
publicity of the case would really have
no permanent effect on the judge and
that the prosecutor should be more
concerned with justice and less with
prosecution.

4. The cases filed against Estrada are

criminal in character. They involve
plunder, bribery and graft and
corruption. By no stretch of the
imagination
can
these
crimes,
especially plunder which carries the
death penalty, be covered by the
alleged mantle of immunity of a nonsitting president. He cannot cite any
decision of this Court licensing the
President to commit criminal acts and
wrapping him with post-tenure
immunity from liability. The rule is
that unlawful acts of public officials
are not acts of the State and the officer
who acts illegally is not acting as such
but stands in the same footing as any
trespasser.

Civil Law Preliminary Title Duty of

Courts
in
Respecting
the
Constitutionality of Laws PAssed By
Congress

Presumption
of
Constitutionality; when not enjoyed

5. No. Case law will tell us that a right

to a fair trial and the free press are
incompatible. Also, since our justice
system does not use the jury system,
the judge, who is a learned and legally
enlightened individual, cannot be
easily manipulated by mere publicity.
The Court also said that Estrada did
not present enough evidence to show
that the publicity given the trial has
influenced the judge so as to render

MANALO V. SISTOZA
312 SCRA 239- Political Law Law
on Public Officers Appointments
Confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments

In 1990, Republic Act No. 6975 was

passed. This law created the
Department of Interior and Local
Government. Said law, under Sections
26 and 31 thereof, also provided on
the manner as to how officers of the
Philippine National Police are to be
appointed. It was provided that the
PNP Chief as well as certain police
officers including Directors and Chief
Superintendents,
after
being
appointed by the President, must be
confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments before said officers can
take their office.
In 1992, then president Corazon
Aquino appointed Pedro Sistoza et al
as
Directors
and
Chief
Superintendents within the PNP. Said
appointments were not confirmed by
the Commission on Appointments
hence, Jesulito Manalo questioned the
validity of the appointments made. He

insists that without the confirmation

by the Commission, Sistoza et al are
acting without jurisdiction, their
appointment being contrary to the
provisions of R.A. 6975.
He then went to the Supreme Court
asking the court to carry out the
provisions of the said law. Manalo also
insists that the law is a valid law, as it
enjoys
the
presumption
of
constitutionality, and hence, it must be
carried out by the courts.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sections 26
and 31 of R.A. No. 6975 are valid.
HELD: No. Said provisions are
unconstitutional. It is true that prior
to this case, as with all other laws, R.A.
6975 enjoys the presumption of
constitutionality. As such, laws
enacted by Congress must be
respected by courts and as much as
possible, courts must avoid delving
into the constitutionality of a law.
However, it is also the duty of the
courts,
as
guardians
of
the
Constitution, to see to it that every law
passed by Congress is not repugnant
to the Constitution.
Under Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution, there are four groups of
officers of the government to be
appointed by the President:
First, the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, officers
of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are
vested in him in this Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the

Government whose appointments are
not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may
be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose
appointments the Congress may by
law vest in the President alone.
The first group are the only ones
whose appointments are required by
the Constitution to be affirmed by the
Commission on Appointments. All
others need not be confirmed. Officers
of the PNP are not included therein.
There is also no merit to the
contention that PNP officers are akin
to officers of the armed forces.
Sections 26 and 31 of R.A. 6975 are
void for amending the provisions set
forth in the Constitution.
Courts have the inherent authority to
determine whether a statute enacted
by the legislature transcends the limit
alienated by the fundamental law.
When it does the courts will not
hesitate to strike down such
unconstitutionality.
MATIBAG V. BENIPAYO
MATIBAG VS. BENIPAYO
G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002
FACTS:
On February 1999, petitioner Matibag
was appointed Acting Director IV of
the Comelecs
EID by then Comelec Chairperson
Harriet Demetriou in a temporary
capacity. On

March 2001, respondent Benipayo

was appointed Comelec Chairman
together with
other commissioners in an ad interim
appointment. While on such ad
interim
appointment, respondent Benipayo in
his capacity as Chairman issued a
Memorandum
address transferring petitioner to the
Law Department. Petitioner requested
Benipayo to
reconsider her relief as Director IV of
the EID and her reassignment to the
Law
Department. She cited Civil Service
Commission Memorandum Circular
No. 7 dated
April 10, 2001, reminding heads of
government offices that transfer and
detail of
employees are prohibited during the
election period. Benipayo denied her
request for
reconsideration on April 18, 2001,
citing COMELEC Resolution No. 3300
dated
November 6, 2000, exempting
Comelec from the coverage of the said
Memo Circular.
Petitioner appealed the denial of her
request for reconsideration to the
COMELEC en
banc. She also filed an administrative
and criminal complaint
Department 17 against Benipayo,
alleging that her reassignment
violated Section 261 (h)
of the Omnibus Election Code,
COMELEC Resolution No. 3258, Civil
Service
Memorandum Circular No. 07, s. 001,
and other pertinent administrative
and civil service
laws, rules and regulations.

During the pendency of her complaint

before the Law Department, petitioner
filed the
instant petition questioning the
appointment and the right to remain
in office of Benipayo,
Borra and Tuason, as Chairman and
Commissioners of the COMELEC,
respectively.
Petitioner claims that the ad interim
appointments of Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason violate
the constitutional provisions on the
independence of the COMELEC.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the assumption of
office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason
on the basis of
the ad interim appointments issued by
the President amounts to a temporary
appointment prohibited by Section 1
(2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.
RULING:
We find petitioners argument without
merit.
An ad interim appointment is a
permanent appointment because it
takes effect
immediately and can no longer be
withdrawn by the President once the
appointee has
qualified into office. The fact that it is
subject to confirmation by the
Commission on
Appointments does not alter its
permanent
character.
The
Constitution itself makes
an ad interim appointment permanent
in character by making it effective
until
disapproved by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next
adjournment of
Congress.

 In the instant case, the President did

in
fact
appoint
permanent
Commissioners to fill the
vacancies in the COMELEC, subject
only to confirmation by the
Commission on
Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason were extended permanent
appointments
during the recess of Congress. They
were not appointed or designated in a
temporary or
acting capacity, unlike Commissioner
Haydee Yorac in Brillantes vs. Yorac
34
and
Solicitor General Felix Bautista in
Nacionalista Party vs. Bautista.
35
The ad
interim appointments of Benipayo,
Borra and Tuason are expressly
allowed by the
Constitution which authorizes the
President, during the recess of
Congress, to make
appointments
that
take
effect
immediately.
While the Constitution mandates that
the COMELEC shall be independent
36
, this
provision should be harmonized with
the Presidents power to extend ad
interim appointments. To hold that
the independence of the COMELEC
requires the
Commission on Appointments to first
confirm ad interim appointees before
the
appointees can assume office will
negate the Presidents power to make
ad
interim appointments. This is contrary
to the rule on statutory construction
to give

meaning and effect to every provision

of the law. It will also run counter to
the clear
intent of the framers of the
Constitution.
IN Re appointment of Valenzuela
and Vallarte
In re: Valenzuela
A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC November 9,
1998
Narvasa, C.J.
Facts:
On March 30, 1998, The
President signed appointments of
Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon.
Placido Vallarta as Judges of RTC-Bago
City
and
Cabanatuan
City,
respectively.
These appointments
were deliberated, as it seemed to be
expressly prohibited by Art 7 Sec 15 of
the Constitution:
Two months immediately before the
next presidential elections and up to
the end of his term, a President or
Acting President shall not make
appointments,
except temporary
appointments to executive positions
when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger
public safety.
A meeting was held on March 9, 1998
by the Judicial and Bar Council to
discuss the constitutionality of
appointments to the Court of Appeals
(CA) in light of the forthcoming 1998
Presidential
elections.
Senior
Associate Justice Florenz Regalado,
Consultant of the Council and Member
of
the
1986
Constitutional
Commission, was in the position that

election ban had no application to the

CA based on the Commissions
records. This hypothesis was then
submitted to the President for
consideration together with the
Councils nominations for 8 vacancies
in the CA.
The Chief Justice (CJ) received
on April 6, 1998, an official
communication from the Executive
Secretary
transmitting
the
appointments of 8 Associate Justices
of CA duly signed on March 11, 1998
(day
immediately
before
the
commencement of the ban on
appointments), which implies that the
Presidents Office did not agree with
the hypothesis.
The President, addressed to
the JBC, requested on May 4, 1998 the
transmission of the list of final
nominees for the vacancy in view of
the 90 days imposed by the
Constitution (from Feb 13, date
present vacancy occurred). In behalf
of the JBC, CJ sent the reply on May 6
that no session has been scheduled
after the May elections for the reason
that they apparently did not share the
same view (hypothesis) proposed by
the JBC shown by the uniformly dated
March 11, 1998 appointments.
However, it appeared that the Justice
Secretary and the other members of
the Council took action without
waiting for the CJ reply.
This
prompted CJ to call for a meeting on
May 7. On this day, CJ received a letter
from the President in reply of the May
6 letter where the President
expressed his view that Article 7 Sec
15 only applied to executive
appointments, the whole article being
entitled EXECUTIVE DEPT.
He

posited that appointments in the

Judiciary have special and specific
provisions, as follows:
Article 8 Sec 4
The Supreme Court shall be
composed of a Chief Justice and
fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit
en banc or in its discretion, in
divisions of three, five, or seven
Members. Any vacancy shall be filled
within ninety days from the
occurrence thereof.
Article 8 Sec 9
The Members of the Supreme Court
and judges in lower courts shall be
appointed by the President from the
list of at least three nominees
prepared by the Judicial and Bar
Council for every vacancy.
Such
appointments need no confirmation.
On May 12, CJ received from
Malacaang, the appointments of the 2
Judges of the RTC mentioned.
Considering the pending proceedings
and deliberations on this matter, the
Court resolved by refraining the
appointees from taking their oaths.
However, Judge Valenzuela took oath
in May 14, 1998 claiming he did so
without knowledge on the on-going
deliberations. It should be noted that
the originals of the appointments for
both judges had been sent to and
received by the CJ on May 12 and is
still in the latters office and had not
been transmitted yet. According to
Judge Valenzuela, he did so because of
the May 7 Malacaang copy of his
appointment.

In construing Article 7 and 8:

when there are no presidential
elections, Art. 8 shall apply where
vacancies in SC shall be filled within
90 days otherwise prohibition in Art.
7 must be considered where the
President shall not make any
appointments.
According to Fr.
Bernas, the reason for prohibition is in
order not to tie the hands of the
incoming Pres through midnight
appointments.
Issue:
whether, during the period of
the ban on appointments imposed by
Section 15, Article VII of the,
Constitution,
the
President
is
nonetheless required to fill vacancies
in the judiciary, in view of Sections
4(1) and 9 of Article VIII; whether he
can make appointments to the
judiciary during the period of the ban
in the interest of public service.
Held:
The
provisions
of
the
Constitution material to the inquiry at
bar read as follows: 3
Sec. 15, Article VII:
Two months immediately before the
next presidential elections and up to
the end of his term, a President or
Acting President shall not make
appointments,
except temporary
appointments to executive positions
when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger
public safety.

Sec. 4 (1), Article VIII :

The Supreme Court shall be composed

of a Chief Justice and fourteen
Associate Justices. It may sit en banc
or in its discretion, in divisions of
three, five, or seven Members. Any
vacancy shall be filled within ninety
days from the occurrence thereof.
Sec. 9, Article VIII :
The members of the Supreme Court
and judges in lower courts shall be
appointed by the President from a list
of at least three nominees prepared by
the Judicial and Bar Council for, every
vacancy. Such appointments need no
confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President
shall issue the appointments within
ninety days from the submission of
the list.
During the period stated in Section 15.
Article VII of the Constitution
(t)wo months immediately before the
next presidential elections and up to
the end his term the President is
neither
required
to
make
appointments to the courts nor
allowed to do so; and that Sections
4(1) and 9 of Article VIII simply mean
that the President is required to fill
vacancies in the courts within the time
frames provided therein unless
prohibited by Section 15 of Article VII.
It is not noteworthy that the
prohibition on appointments comes
into effect only once every six years.
Section 15, Article VI is directed
against two types of appointments: (1)
those made for buying votes and (2)
those
made
for
partisan
considerations. The first refers to

those appointments made within the

two months preceding a Presidential
election and are similar to those which
are declared elections offenses in the
Omnibus Election Code, viz.:
Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. The
following shall be guilty of an election
offense:
(a) Vote-buying and vote-selling.
(1) Any person who gives, offer or
promises money or anything of value
gives or promises any office or
employment, franchise or grant,
public or private, or makes or offers to
make an expenditure, directly or
indirectly, or cause an expenditure to
be made to any person, association,
corporation, entity, or community in
order to induce anyone or the public
in general to vote for or against any
candidate or withhold his vote in the
election, or to vote for or against any
aspirant for the nomination or choice
of a candidate in a convention or
similar selection process of a political
party.
xxx xxx xxx
(g) Appointment of new employees,
creation of new position, promotion,
or giving salary increases. During
the period of forty-five days before a
regular election and thirty days before
a regular election and thirty days
before a special election, (1) any head,
official or appointing officer of a
government
office,
agency
or
instrumentality, whether national or
local, including government-owned or
controlled corporations, who appoints
or hires any new employee, whether
provisional, temporary, or casual, or
creates and fills any new position,

except upon prior authority of the

Commission. The Commission shall
not grant the authority sought unless,
it is satisfied that the position to be
filled is essential to the proper
functioning of the office or agency
concerned, and that the position shall
not be filled in a manner that may
influence the election.
The second type of appointments
prohibited by Section 15, Article VII
consist of the so-called midnight
appointments. There may well be
appointments to important positions
which have to be made even after the
proclamations of a new President.
Such appointments, so long as they
are few and so spaced as to afford
some assurance of deliberate action
and careful consideration of the need
for the appointment and the
appointees qualifications, can be
made by the outgoing President.
Section
15
may
not
unreasonably
be
deemed
to
contemplate not only midnight
appointments

those
made
obviously for partisan reasons as
shown by their number and the time
of their making but also
appointments of the Presidential
election.
The exception in the same Section 15
of Article VII allows only the making of
temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies
will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety. Obviously, the
article greatly restricts the appointing
power of the President during the
period of the ban.

Considering the respective reasons for

the time frames for filling vacancies in
the courts and the restriction on the
Presidents power of appointments, it
is the Supreme Courts view that, as a
general proposition, in case of conflict,
the former should yield to the latter.
Surely, the prevention of vote-buying
and similar evils outweighs the need
for avoiding delays in filling up of
court vacancies or the disposition of
some cases. Temporary vacancies can
abide the period of the ban which,
incidentally and as earlier pointed out,
comes to exist only once in every six
years. Moreover, those occurring in
the lower courts can be filled
temporarily by designation. But
prohibited appointments are longlasting and permanent in their effects.
They may, as earlier pointed out, their
making is considered an election
offense.
To be sure, instances may be
conceived of the imperative need for
an appointment, during the period of
the ban, not only in the executive but
also in the Supreme Court. This may
be the case should the membership of
the Court be so reduced that it will
have no quorum, or should the voting
on a particularly important question
requiring expeditious resolution be
evenly divided. Such a case, however,
is covered by neither Section 15 of
Article VII nor Sections 4 (1) and 9 of
Article VIII.
IBP V. ZAMORA
IBP VS ZAMORA
Posted by kaye lee on 11:27 PM
G.R. No. 141284 August 15 2000
[Judicial Review; Civilian supremacy
clause]

FACTS:
Invoking his powers as Commanderin-Chief under Sec 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, President Estrada, in
verbal directive, directed the AFP
Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to
coordinate with each other for the
proper deployment and campaign for
a temporary period only. The IBP
questioned the validity of the
deployment and utilization of the
Marines to assist the PNP in law
enforcement.
ISSUE:
1. WoN the President's factual
determination of the necessity of
calling the armed forces is subject to
judicial review.
2. WoN the calling of AFP to assist the
PNP in joint visibility patrols violate
the constitutional provisions on
civilian supremacy over the military.
RULING:
1. The power of judicial review is set
forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be
vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which
are
legally
demandable
and
enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
When questions of constitutional
significance are raised, the Court can
exercise its power of judicial review

only if the following requisites are

complied with, namely: (1)
the
existence of an actual and appropriate
case; (2) a personal and substantial
interest of the party raising the
constitutional question; (3) the
exercise of judicial review is pleaded
at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
constitutional question is the lis mota
of the case.
2. The deployment of the Marines
does not constitute a breach of the
civilian supremacy clause. The calling
of the Marines in this case constitutes
permissible use of military assets for
civilian law enforcement.
The
participation of the Marines in the
conduct of joint visibility patrols is
appropriately circumscribed. It is
their responsibility to direct and
manage the deployment of the
Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to
provide the necessary equipment to
the Marines and render logistical
support to these soldiers. In view of
the foregoing, it cannot be properly
argued that military authority is
supreme over civilian authority.
Moreover, the deployment of the
Marines to assist the PNP does not
unmake the civilian character of the
police force. Neither does it amount
to an insidious incursion of the
military in the task of law
enforcement in violation of Section
5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.
KULAYAN V. GOV TAN
http://ustlawreview.org/images/Case
_Digests/Political_Law/Kulayan_v._Ab
dusakur_Tan.pdf

JAMAR KULAYAN, et al. v. GOV.

ABDUSAKUR TAN, in his capacity as
Governor of Sulu, et al.
G.R. No. 187298, 03 July 2012, EN
BANC (Sereno, J.)
The calling-out powers contemplated
under the Constitution is exclusive to
the President. An exercise by another
official, even if he is the local chief
executive, is ultra vires, and may not
be justified by the invocation of
Section 465 of the Local Government
Code.
Three
members
from
the
International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) were kidnapped in the
vicinity of the Provincial Capitol in
Patikul, Sulu. Andres Notter, Eugenio
Vagni, and Marie Jean Lacaba, were
purportedly inspecting a water
sanitation project for the Sulu
Provincial Jail when they were seized
by three armed men who were later
confirmed to be members of the Abu
Sayyaf Group (ASG). A Local Crisis
Committee, later renamed Sulu Crisis
Management Committee (Committee)
was then formed to investigate the
kidnapping incident. The Committee
convened under the leadership of
respondent Abdusakur Mahail Tan,
the Provincial Governor of Sulu.
Governor Tan issued Proclamation No.
1, Series of 2009, declaring a state of
emergency in the province of Sulu.
The
Proclamation
cited
the
kidnapping incident as a ground for
the said declaration, describing it as a
terrorist act pursuant to the Human
Security Act (R.A. 9372). It also
invoked Section 465 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160),
which bestows on the Provincial
Governor the power to carry out
emergency measures during manmade and natural disasters and

calamities, and to call upon the

appropriate national law enforcement
agencies to suppress disorder and
lawless violence. In the Proclamation,
Tan called upon the PNP and the
Civilian Emergency Force (CEF) to set
up checkpoints and chokepoints,
conduct general search and seizures
including arrests, and other actions
necessary to ensure public safety.
Petitioners, Jamar Kulayan, et al.
claimed that Proclamation No. 1-09
was issued ultra vires, and thus null
and void, for violating Sections 1 and
18, Article VII of the Constitution,
which grants the President sole
authority to exercise emergency
powers and calling-out powers as the
chief executive of the Republic and
commander-in-chief of the armed
forces.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a governor can
exercise the calling-out powers of a
President
HELD:
It has already been established that
there is one repository of executive
powers, and that is the President of
the Republic. This means that when
Section 1, Article VII of the
Constitution speaks of executive
power, it is granted to the President
and no one else. Corollarily, it is only
the President, as Executive, who is
authorized to exercise emergency
powers as provided under Section 23,
Article VI, of the Constitution, as well
as what became known as the callingout powers under Section 7, Article VII
thereof.
While the President is still a civilian,
Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution
mandates that civilian authority is, at
all times, supreme over the military,
making the civilian president the

nations supreme military leader. The

net effect of Article II, Section 3, when
read with Article VII, Section 18, is
that a civilian President is the
ceremonial, legal and administrative
head of the armed forces. The
Constitution does not require that the
President must be possessed of
military training and talents, but as
Commander-in-Chief, he has the
power to direct military operations
and to determine military strategy.
Normally, he would be expected to
delegate the actual command of the
armed forces to military experts; but
the ultimate power is his.
Given the foregoing, Governor Tan is
not endowed with the power to call
upon the armed forces at his own
bidding. In issuing the assailed
proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded
his authority when he declared a state
of emergency and called upon the
Armed Forces, the police, and his own
Civilian Emergency Force. The callingout powers contemplated under the
Constitution is exclusive to the
President. An exercise by another
official, even if he is the local chief
executive, is ultra vires, and may not
be justified by the invocation of
Section 465 of the Local Government
Code.
FIDAL V. COMELEC
G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015
ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL VS.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015
ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL, ALFREDO
S. LIM PETITIONER-INTERVENOR,
VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

NATURE:
These are petitions including:
1) a Petition for Certiorari filed by
Atty.
Alicia Risos-Vidal,
which
essentially prays for the issuance of
the writ of certiorari annulling and
setting aside the April 1, 2013 and
April 23, 2013 Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC),
Second Division and En banc,
respectively.
(2) a Petition-in-Intervention[ filed by
Alfredo S. Lim praying to be declared
the 2013 winning candidate for Mayor
of the City of Manila in view of private
respondent former President Joseph
Ejercito Estradas) disqualification to
run for and hold public office
FACTS:
On September 12, 2007, the
Sandiganbayan convicted former
President Estrada, a former President
of the Republic of the Philippines, for
the crime of plunder and was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory
penalties of civil interdiction during
the period of sentence and perpetual
absolute disqualification.
On October 25, 2007, however, former
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
extended executive clemency, by way
of pardon, to former President Estrada
explicitly states that He is hereby
restored to his civil and political
rights.
On November 30, 2009, former
President Estrada filed a Certificate of
Candidacy[7] for the position of
President but was opposed by three
petitions
seeking
for
his
disqualification. None of the cases

prospered and MRs were denied by

Comelec En Banc. Estrada only
managed to garner the second highest
number of votes on the May 10, 2010
synchronized elections.
On October 2, 2012, former President
Estrada once more ventured into the
political arena, and filed a Certificate
of Candidacy,[10] this time vying for a
local elective post, that of the Mayor of
the City of Manila.
Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition
for Disqualification against former
President
Estrada
before
the
COMELEC because of Estradas
Conviction for Plunder by the
Sandiganbayan Sentencing Him to
Suffer the Penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua with Perpetual Absolute
Disqualification. Petitioner relied on
Section 40 of the Local Government
Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of
the Omnibus Election Code (OEC)
In a Resolution dated April 1, 2013,
the COMELEC, Second Division,
dismissed
the
petition
for
disqualification holding that President
Estradas right to seek public office
has been effectively restored by the
pardon vested upon him by former
President Gloria M. Arroyo.
Estrada won the mayoralty race in
May 13, 2013 elections. Petitionerintervenor Alfredo Lim garnered the
second highest votes intervene and
seek to disqualify Estrada for the same
ground as the contention of RisosVidal and praying that he be
proclaimed as Mayor of Manila.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC

committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in ruling that former
President Estrada is qualified to vote
and be voted for in public office as a
result of the pardon granted to him by
former President Arroyo.
HELD:
No. The COMELEC did not commit
grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing the assailed Resolutions. The
arguments forwarded by Risos-Vidal
fail to adequately demonstrate any
factual or legal bases to prove that the
assailed COMELEC Resolutions were
issued in a whimsical, arbitrary or
capricious exercise of power that
amounts to an evasion or refusal to
perform a positive duty enjoined by
law or were so patent and gross as
to constitute grave abuse of
discretion.
Former President Estrada was
granted an absolute pardon that fully
restored all his civil and political
rights, which naturally includes the
right to seek public elective office, the
focal point of this controversy. The
wording of the pardon extended to
former President Estrada is complete,
unambiguous, and unqualified. It is
likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and
41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only
reasonable,
objective,
and
constitutional interpretation of the
language of the pardon is that the
same in fact conforms to Articles 36
and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
The proper interpretation of Articles
36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.

A close scrutiny of the text of the

pardon extended to former President
Estrada shows that both the principal
penalty of reclusion perpetua and its
accessory penalties are included in the
pardon. The sentence which states
that (h)e is hereby restored to his
civil and political rights, expressly
remitted the accessory penalties that
attached to the principal penalty of
reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we
apply Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable
from the text of the pardon that the
accessory
penalties
of
civil
interdiction and perpetual absolute
disqualification
were
expressly
remitted together with the principal
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The disqualification of former
President Estrada under Section 40 of
the LGC in relation to Section 12 of the
OEC was removed by his acceptance of
the absolute pardon granted to him
While it may be apparent that the
proscription in Section 40(a) of the
LGC is worded in absolute terms,
Section 12 of the OEC provides a legal
escape from the prohibition a
plenary pardon or amnesty. In other
words, the latter provision allows any
person who has been granted plenary
pardon or amnesty after conviction by
final judgment of an offense involving
moral turpitude, inter alia, to run for
and hold any public office, whether
local or national position.
BAYAN V. ZAMORA
Bayan v. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570,
October 10, 2000
DECISION

(En Banc)
BUENA, J.:

petitioners did not commit grave

abuse of discretion, and sustained the
constitutionality of the VFA.]

I.

NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional.

THE FACTS

The Republic of the Philippines and

the United States of America entered
into an agreement called the Visiting
Forces
Agreement
(VFA).
The
agreement was treated as a treaty by
the Philippine government and was
ratified by then-President Joseph
Estrada with the concurrence of 2/3
of the total membership of the
Philippine Senate.
The VFA defines the treatment of U.S.
troops and personnel visiting the
Philippines. It provides for the
guidelines to govern such visits, and
further defines the rights of the U.S.
and the Philippine governments in the
matter of criminal jurisdiction,
movement of vessel and aircraft,
importation and exportation of
equipment, materials and supplies.
Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the
VFA violates 25, Article XVIII of the
1987 Constitution, which provides
that foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities shall not be allowed in the
Philippines except under a treaty duly
concurred in by the Senate . . . and
recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting State.
II. THE ISSUE
Was the VFA unconstitutional?
III. THE RULING
[The
Court
DISMISSED
the
consolidated petitions, held that the

Section 25, Article XVIII disallows

foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities in the country, unless the
following conditions are sufficiently
met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty;
(b) the treaty must be duly concurred
in by the Senate and, when so
required by congress, ratified by a
majority of the votes cast by the
people in a national referendum; and
(c) recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting state.
There is no dispute as to the presence
of the first two requisites in the case
of the VFA. The concurrence handed
by the Senate through Resolution No.
18 is in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution . . . the
provision in [in 25, Article XVIII]
requiring ratification by a majority of
the votes cast in a national
referendum being unnecessary since
Congress has not required it.
xxx
xxx

xxx

This Court is of the firm view that the

phrase recognized as a treaty means
that the other contracting party
accepts
or
acknowledges
the
agreement as a treaty. To require the
other contracting state, the United
States of America in this case, to
submit the VFA to the United States
Senate for concurrence pursuant to its
Constitution, is to accord strict
meaning to the phrase.

Well-entrenched is the principle that

the words used in the Constitution are
to be given their ordinary meaning
except where technical terms are
employed, in which case the
significance thus attached to them
prevails. Its language should be
understood in the sense they have in
common use.
Moreover, it is inconsequential
whether the United States treats the
VFA only as an executive agreement
because, under international law, an
executive agreement is as binding as a
treaty. To be sure, as long as the VFA
possesses the elements of an
agreement under international law,
the said agreement is to be taken
equally as a treaty.
xxx
xxx

xxx

The records reveal that the United

States
Government,
through
Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard, has
stated that the United States
government has fully committed to
living up to the terms of the VFA. For
as long as the United States of America
accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a
treaty, and binds itself further to
comply with its obligations under the
treaty, there is indeed marked
compliance with the mandate of the
Constitution.
VINUYA V. ROMULO
VINUYA VS. SEC. ROMULO
MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ
ISABELITA C. VINUYA, VICTORIA C.
DELA
PEA,
HERMINIHILDA,
MANIMBO, LEONOR H. SUMAWANG,
CANDELARIA L. SOLIMAN, MARIA L.

QUILANTANG, MARIA L. MAGISA,

NATALIA M. ALONZO, LOURDES M.
NAVARO, FRANCISCA M. ATENCIO,
ERLINDA MANALASTAS, TARCILA M.
SAMPANG, ESTER M. PALACIO
MAXIMA R. DELA CRUZ, BELEN A.
SAGUM,
FELICIDAD
TURLA,
FLORENCIA M. DELA PEA, FRANCIA
A. BUCO, PASTORA C. GUEVARRA,
VICTORIA M. DELA CRUZ, PETRONILA
O. DELA CRUZ, ZENAIDA P. DELA
CRUZ,
CORAZON
M.
SUBA,
EMERINCIANA A. VINUYA, LYDIA A.
SANCHEZ,
ROSALINA
M.BUCO,
PATRICIA A. ERNARDO, LUCILA H.
PAYAWAL, MAGDALENA LIWAG,
ESTER C. BALINGIT, JOVITA A. DAVID,
EMILIA C. MANGILIT, VERGINIA M.
BANGIT, GUILLERMA S. BALINGIT,
TERECITA PANGILINAN, MAMERTA C.
PUNO, CRISENCIANA C. GULAPA,
SEFERINA S. TURLA, MAXIMA B.
TURLA, LEONICIA G. GUEVARRA,
ROSALINA M. CULALA, CATALINA Y.
MANIO, MAMERTA T. SAGUM,
CARIDAD L. TURLA, et al.
In their capacity and as members of
the Malaya Lolas Organization,
versus
THE
HONORABLE
EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO,
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF
FOREIGNAFFAIRS DELIA DOMINGOALBERT,
THE
HONORABLE
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE MERCEDITAS
N. GUTIERREZ, and THE HONORABLE
SOLICITOR GENERAL ALFREDO L.
BENIPAYO
G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010
FACTS:

This is an original Petition for

Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court with an application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction against the
Office of the Executive Secretary, the
Secretary of the DFA, the Secretary of
the DOJ, and the OSG.
Petitioners are all members of the
MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, nonprofit organization registered with the
SEC, established for the purpose of
providing aid to the victims of rape by
Japanese military forces in the
Philippines during the Second World
War.
Petitioners claim that since 1998, they
have approached the Executive
Department through the DOJ, DFA,
and OSG, requesting assistance in
filing a claim against the Japanese
officials and military officers who
ordered the establishment of the
comfort women stations in the
Philippines. But officials of the
Executive Department declined to
assist the petitioners, and took the
position that the individual claims of
the comfort women for compensation
had already been fully satisfied by
Japans compliance with the Peace
Treaty between the Philippines and
Japan.
Hence, this petition where petitioners
pray for this court to (a) declare that
respondents committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of discretion in refusing to
espouse their claims for the crimes
against humanity and war crimes
committed against them; and (b)
compel the respondents to espouse
their claims for official apology and

other forms of reparations against

Japan before the International Court
of Justice (ICJ) and other international
tribunals.
Respondents maintain that all claims
of the Philippines and its nationals
relative to the war were dealt with in
the San Francisco Peace Treaty of
1951 and the bilateral Reparations
Agreement of 1956.
On January 15, 1997, the Asian
Womens Fund and the Philippine
government signed a Memorandum of
Understanding for medical and
welfare support programs for former
comfort women. Over the next five
years, these were implemented by the
Department of Social Welfare and
Development.
ISSUE:
WON the Executive Department
committed grave abuse of discretion
in not espousing petitioners claims
for official apology and other forms of
reparations against Japan.
RULING:
Petition lacks merit. From a Domestic
Law Perspective, the Executive
Department
has
the
exclusive
prerogative to determine whether to
espouse petitioners claims against
Japan.
Political questions refer to those
questions
which,
under
the
Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or
in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the

government. It is concerned with

issues dependent upon the wisdom,
not legality of a particular measure.
One type of case of political questions
involves questions of foreign relations.
It is well-established that the conduct
of the foreign relations of our
government is committed by the
Constitution to the executive and
legislativethe politicaldepartments
of the government, and the propriety
of what may be done in the exercise of
this political power is not subject to
judicial inquiry or decision. are
delicate, complex, and involve large
elements of prophecy. They are and
should be undertaken only by those
directly responsible to the people
whose welfare they advance or
imperil.
But not all cases implicating foreign
relations present political questions,
and courts certainly possess the
authority to construe or invalidate
treaties and executive agreements.
However, the question whether the
Philippine
government
should
espouse claims of its nationals against
a foreign government is a foreign
relations matter, the authority for
which is demonstrably committed by
our Constitution not to the courts but
to the political branches. In this case,
the Executive Department has already
decided that it is to the best interest of
the country to waive all claims of its
nationals for reparations against
Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951.
The wisdom of such decision is not for
the courts to question.
The President, not Congress, has the
better opportunity of knowing the
conditions which prevail in foreign

countries, and especially is this true in

time of war. He has his confidential
sources of information. He has his
agents in the form of diplomatic,
consular and other officials.
The Executive Department has
determined that taking up petitioners
cause would be inimical to our
countrys foreign policy interests, and
could disrupt our relations with Japan,
thereby creating serious implications
for stability in this region. For the to
overturn the Executive Departments
determination would mean an
assessment of the foreign policy
judgments by a coordinate political
branch to which authority to make
that
judgment
has
been
constitutionally committed.
From a municipal law perspective,
certiorari will not lie. As a general
principle,
where
such
an
extraordinary length of time has
lapsed
between
the
treatys
conclusion and our consideration
the Executive must be given ample
discretion to assess the foreign policy
considerations of espousing a claim
against Japan, from the standpoint of
both the interests of the petitioners
and those of the Republic, and decide
on that basis if apologies are
sufficient, and whether further steps
are appropriate or necessary.
In
the
international
sphere,
traditionally, the only means available
for individuals to bring a claim within
the international legal system has
been when the individual is able to
persuade a government to bring a
claim on the individuals behalf. By
taking up the case of one of its
subjects and by resorting to

diplomatic action or international

judicial proceedings on his behalf, a
State is in reality asserting its own
right to ensure, in the person of its
subjects, respect for the rules of
international law.
Within the limits prescribed by
international law, a State may exercise
diplomatic protection by whatever
means and to whatever extent it
thinks fit, for it is its own right that the
State is asserting. Should the natural
or legal person on whose behalf it is
acting consider that their rights are
not adequately protected, they have
no remedy in international law. All
they can do is resort to national law, if
means are available, with a view to
furthering their cause or obtaining
redress. All these questions remain
within the province of municipal law
and do not affect the position
internationally.
Even the invocation of jus cogens
norms and erga omnes obligations
will not alter this analysis. Petitioners
have not shown that the crimes
committed by the Japanese army
violated jus cogens prohibitions at the
time the Treaty of Peace was signed,
or that the duty to prosecute
perpetrators of international crimes is
an erga omnes obligation or has
attained the status of jus cogens.
The term erga omnes (Latin: in
relation to everyone) in international
law has been used as a legal term
describing obligations owed by States
towards the community of states as a
whole. Essential distinction should be
drawn between the obligations of a
State towards the international
community as a whole, and those

arising vis--vis another State in the

field of diplomatic protection. By their
very nature, the former are the
concern of all States. In view of the
importance of the rights involved, all
States can be held to have a legal
interest in their protection; they are
obligations erga omnes.
The term jus cogens (literally,
compelling law) refers to norms that
command peremptory authority,
superseding conflicting treaties and
custom. Jus cogens norms are
considered peremptory in the sense
that they are mandatory, do not admit
derogation, and can be modified only
by general international norms of
equivalent authority.
GSIS V. HEIRS OF CABALLERO
HE POWER AND AUTHORITY TO
PROMULGATE RULES CONCERNING
PLEADING,
PRACTICE
AND
PROCEDURE IN ALL COURTS NOW
BELONG SOLELY TO THE SUPREME
COURT
In In Re: Petition for
Recognition of the Exemption of the
Government Service Insurance System
from Payment of Legal Fees, A.M. No.
08-2-01-0, February 11, 2010, the
Court ruled that the provision in the
Charter of the GSIS, i.e., Section 39 of
Republic Act No. 8291, which exempts
it from all taxes, assessments, fees,
charges or duties of all kinds, cannot
operate to exempt it from the
payment of legal fees. This was
because, unlike the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions, which empowered
Congress to repeal, alter or
supplement the rules of the Supreme
Court concerning pleading, practice
and procedure, the 1987 Constitution

removed this power from Congress.

Hence, the Supreme Court now has the
sole authority to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts. In said case,
the Court ruled that
The separation of powers among the
three co-equal branches of our
government
has
erected
an
impregnable wall that keeps the
power to promulgate rules of
pleading, practice and procedure
within the sole province of this Court.
The other branches trespass upon this
prerogative if they enact laws or issue
orders that effectively repeal, alter or
modify any of the procedural rules
promulgated by this Court. Viewed
from this perspective, the claim of a
legislative grant of exemption from
the payment of legal fees under
Section 39 of RA 8291 necessarily
fails.
Congress could not have
carved out an exemption for the GSIS
from the payment of legal fees without
transgressing
another
equally
important institutional safeguard of
the Courts independence fiscal
autonomy.
Fiscal
autonomy
recognizes the power and authority of
the Court to levy, assess and collect
fees, including legal fees. Moreover,
legal fees under Rule 141 have two
basic components, the Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF) and the
Special Allowance for the Judiciary
Fund (SAJF). The laws which
established the JDF and the SAJF
expressly declare the identical
purpose of these funds to guarantee
the independence of the Judiciary as
mandated by the Constitution and
public policy. Legal fees therefore do

not only constitute a vital source of

the Courts financial resources but
also comprise an essential element of
the Courts fiscal independence. Any
exemption from the payment of legal
fees granted by Congress to
government-owned or controlled
corporations and local government
units will necessarily reduce the JDF
and the SAJF. Undoubtedly, such
situation is constitutionally infirm for
it impairs the Courts guaranteed fiscal
autonomy
and
erodes
its
independence (emphasis supplied).
In Re: Petition for Recognition of the
Exemption of the Government Service
Insurance System from Payment of
Legal Fees. (GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) vs. HEIRS
OF FERNANDO F. CABALLERO, G.R.
Nos. 158090, October 4, 2010,
PERALTA, J.)
*read corona case online