Department of Homeland Security Law Enforcement Operations: Hearing

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY LAW
ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, TERRORISM,

AND HOMELAND SECURITY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
MARCH 11, 2008
Serial No. 110135

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
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COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan, Chairman
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
LAMAR SMITH, Texas
RICK BOUCHER, Virginia
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR.,
Wisconsin
JERROLD NADLER, New York
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina
ROBERT C. BOBBY SCOTT, Virginia
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina
BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia
ZOE LOFGREN, California
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California
MAXINE WATERS, California
CHRIS CANNON, Utah
WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
RIC KELLER, Florida
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
NCHEZ, California
DARRELL ISSA, California
LINDA T. SA
MIKE PENCE, Indiana
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
HANK JOHNSON, Georgia
STEVE KING, Iowa
BETTY SUTTON, Ohio
TOM FEENEY, Florida
LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
BRAD SHERMAN, California
LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas
TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
JIM JORDAN, Ohio
ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
ADAM B. SCHIFF, California
ARTUR DAVIS, Alabama
DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida
KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota
PERRY APELBAUM, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
SEAN MCLAUGHLIN, Minority Chief of Staff and General Counsel
SUBCOMMITTEE
ON
CRIME, TERRORISM,
AND
HOMELAND SECURITY
ROBERT C. BOBBY SCOTT, Virginia, Chairman

MAXINE WATERS, California
LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas
WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
JERROLD NADLER, New York
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR.,
Wisconsin
HANK JOHNSON, Georgia
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina
ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California
ARTUR DAVIS, Alabama
TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
BETTY SUTTON, Ohio
BOBBY VASSAR, Chief Counsel
CAROLINE LYNCH, Minority Counsel
(II)
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CONTENTS
MARCH 11, 2008
Page
OPENING STATEMENT
The Honorable Robert C. Bobby Scott, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Virginia, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism,
and Homeland Security .......................................................................................
The Honorable Louie Gohmert, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Security ...............................................................................................
1
3
WITNESSES
Mr. Dana A. Brown, Director, Federal Air Marshall Service, Assistant Administrator, Transportation Security Administration, Department of Homeland
Security, Washington, DC
Oral Testimony .....................................................................................................
Joint Prepared Statement ...................................................................................
Mr. Jeffrey D. Self, Chief, Southwest Border Division, Office of Border Patrol,
Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC
Oral Testimony .....................................................................................................
Mr. Raymond R. Parmer, Deputy Director for Investigations, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC
Oral Testimony .....................................................................................................
Mr. Michael Stenger, Assistant Director, Office of Investigations, United
States Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC
Oral Testimony .....................................................................................................
Rear Admiral Wayne Justice, Assistant Commandant for Capability and Director of Response Policy, U.S. Coast Guard, Department of Homeland
Security, Washington, DC
Oral Testimony .....................................................................................................
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13
6
13
8
13
10
13
11
13
APPENDIX
Material Submitted for the Hearing Record ..........................................................
39
(III)
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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY LAW

ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS
TUESDAY, MARCH 11, 2008
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, TERRORISM,
AND HOMELAND SECURITY
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:11 a.m., in
room 2237, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Robert
C. (Bobby) Scott (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Scott, Delahunt, Nadler, Jackson Lee,
Gohmert, Sensenbrenner, Coble, and Chabot.
Staff present: Bobby Vassar, Subcommittee Chief Counsel; Mario
Dispenza (Fellow), ATF Detailee; Ameer Gopalani, Majority Counsel; Veronica Eligan, Majority Professional Staff Member; Kimani
Little, Minority Counsel; and Kelsey Whitlock, Minority Staff Assistant.
Mr. SCOTT. The Committee will come to order. I am pleased to
welcome you today for the hearing before the Subcommittee on
Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security on the Department of
Homeland Security law enforcement operations.
In 2002 the Department of Homeland Security was created in the
wake of the terrorist attacks of 9/11/2001. The concept was to
transform and realign multiple agencies of various functions into
one department, to streamline intelligence and law enforcement,
and better protect the United States from terrorist attacks.
One of the shortcomings that we had was we were trying to get
all the agencies together, because the FBI wasnt talking to the Department of Defense who wasnt talking to the CIA. And when the
dust settled, we looked up and we had a new department and none
of those agencies were in the Department of Homeland Security. So
instead of three people not talking to each other
Anyway, the concept is the concept, but as part of the creation
of the department, the following law enforcement agencies were either transferred to DHS or created by consolidation: the Transportation Security Administration, Customs and Border Protection,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Secret Service, and the
Coast Guard. These agencies, their functions, their accomplishments, and their challenges are the subject of this hearing.
The TSAs main law enforcement functions are the Federal Air
Marshals and the National Explosives Detection Canine Team programs. Air marshals are deployed on flights around the world and
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the United States to ensure the security of the plane and the passengers during flight. During this hearing, the Subcommittee will
follow up on issues from the 2005 hearing and inquire about the
effectiveness of air travel security.
The TSAs National Explosives Detection Canine Team program
prepares dogs and analysts to locate and identify dangerous materials that may present a threat to transportation systems. Explosives detections canines can be a valuable tool in foiling terrorists
plots, which is why a number of agencies outside the DHS conduct
explosive detections services with canines.
However, the training standards and methods differ among agencies, which has caused controversy among the experts in the field.
The Subcommittee will inquire about whether multiple efforts
among agencies using different methods and standards are the
most effective use of Federal resources, or whether a national
standard should be established by one agency.
The United States Customs and Border Protection is responsible
for protecting our Nations borders from terrorism, human and
drug smuggling, and illegal immigration, while simultaneously facilitating the flow of legitimate travel and trade. This agency must
work a fine line of balancing the urgency of securing the borders
while being the least intrusive on commerce and the liberty rights
of Americans as possible.
Some privacy and civil rights groups have voiced concerns about
the techniques that might violate the first amendment. They have
demanded that CBP disclose its policies when questioning travelers
on first amendment protected activities, photocopying individuals
personal papers, searching laptop computers and other electronic
devices, and we may discuss these policies today.
The Committee will also inquire about the Operation Streamline
initiative, which targets for prosecution those who enter the United
States through high-traffic areas near the United States southwest
border in violation of criminal law. Concerns have been raised
about Operation Streamline being too aggressive, and allegations
that have been raised by some U.S. citizens about being improperly
subject to deportation.
The Immigration and Customs Enforcement, or ICE, is the largest investigative branch of DHS and focuses on targeting unauthorized aliens, people, money, and materials that support terrorism
and other criminal activities in meeting its mission objectives.
Today the Subcommittee will explore issues related to ICE policies
and practices related to investigation and detention and removal of
unauthorized aliens.
In 2007, the Government Accountability Office report about ICE
practices identified problem areas, recommended that ICE update
its policies for alien apprehension and removal, streamline and improve its dissemination of legal updates, and develop a system of
determining comprehensive best practices to uniform supervisory
reviews of officer discretion. The Subcommittee will inquire about
how ICE is responding to the GAOs recommendations.
In addition to its protection responsibilities, the United States
Secret Service also investigates financial crime violations. The Subcommittee will want to know about the investigation of financial
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crimes, which pose a tremendous threat to our national security
and the personal finances of all Americans.
According to the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, more than 150
million records containing sensitive informationpersonal informationhave been involved in data security breaches since 2005.
Since November 2005, there have been at least 436 data security
breaches in the United States affecting millions of American consumers. The Subcommittee will inquire as to how the Secret Service is responding to combat these threats.
The United States Coast Guard law enforcement mission is maritime security, which is to protect Americas maritime borders from
all intrusions hosting the flow of illegal drugs, aliens, and contraband into the United States through maritime routes, preventing
illegal fishing, and suppressing violations of Federal law in maritime areas. The Subcommittee will inquire the Coast Guards success in these areas, and will also explore the Coast Guards plan
for updating its technology. For example, the Coast Guard is developing an important homeland security program called the Automatic Identification System, which will enable the Coast Guard to
employ a nationwide system for identifying, tracking, and communicating with vessels in U.S. harbors.
With that said, it is my pleasure to recognize the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee, the gentleman from Texasfrom the 1st
Congressional District of Texasformer judge Louie Gohmert.
Mr. GOHMERT. Thank you, Chairman Scott. I couldnt tell, are
these microphones working?
Mr. SCOTT. Yes, I believe it is.
Mr. GOHMERT. You would be better off, probably, if mine wasnt.
But I appreciate Chairman Scotts comments.
I wasnt in Congress when Homeland Security was created; as I
recall it was a fairly bipartisan effort, because the 9/11 Commission
recommended it. But in my layman state of ignorance, I sure didnt
think it was a good idea to add another level of bureaucracy. Gee,
if they are not communicating, let us add another level of bureaucracy that everybody will have to communicate through. And it
seems that when I had that opinion in my state of ignorance, that
maybe I wasnt as ignorant as one might have thought.
But I want to thank you for scheduling this hearing. This is the
first hearing the Subcommittee will have on law enforcement agencies in the Department of Homeland Security. This represents an
opportunity to learn more about the vast law enforcement mission
given to DHS.
Last week our full Committee held an oversight hearing on the
entire department. At that hearing, Secretary Chertoff focused his
comments on answering questions on immigration issues. Today we
look forward to hearing from the representatives of the five law enforcement agencies.
We want to hear about your missions, your capabilities, and
what challenges you expect to face in the near future. That also
will tell us what we need to do to help you.
The Department of Homeland Security has wide Federal law enforcement authority to achieve its mission to secure the homeland.
That law enforcement authority is divided among five agenciesof
course, you know this well: the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Secret
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Service, the Federal Air Marshal Service, U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
The United States Coast Guard patrols international waters and
Americas coasts and waterways. With over 43,000 employees,
Coast Guard Service is the lead Federal agency to combat maritime
illegal immigration and for maritime drug interdiction. Each year,
Coast Guard drug interdiction accounts for nearly 52 percent of all
U.S. government seizures of cocaine.
U.S. Secret Service is best known for its mission to protect the
President and other national and foreign leaders; however, the
Service combats the counterfeiting of U.S. currency, and guards
against cyber-attacks on our financial and telecommunications infrastructure. In 2007, the Service seized an estimated $147 million
in counterfeit dollars.
Federal Air Marshal Service is the primary law enforcement
agency within the Transportation Security Administration. Each
year the Air Marshals deploy on thousands of flights, domestically
and internationally, to protect passengers and crew from criminal
and terrorist attacks in the air.
United States Custom and Border Protection is responsible for
securing the U.S. borders and ports, works to prevent terrorists
and terrorist weapons from entering the U.S., and combats drug
trafficking and human smuggling along the border. In 2007, CBP
seized more than 87,000 pounds of cocaine, and more than 307,000
pounds of marijuana in its law enforcement operations.
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement is the largest investigative arm of DHS. With the second-largest cadre of special
agents in the U.S., ICE targets the people, money, and materials
that support terrorists and criminals. Since 2003, ICE has seized
more than $600 million in cash and monetary instruments, and
more than $850 million worth of real property, vessels, aircrafts,
artwork, vehicles, and jewels.
DHS has had an impact in law enforcement, but there is still
more to do, of course. I look forward to working with Chairman
Scott on ensuring effective oversight of DHS law enforcement agenciesand that is why I am pleased you called this hearingand
look forward to this hearing and learning more about the problems
you face, the challenges you have ahead, and how we can work together to solve them.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. SCOTT. Thank you.
I will ask other Members to have their statements in the record.
If there is no objection, we will continue by introducing our panelists.
Our first witness will be Mr. Dana Brown, assistant administrator for law enforcement for the TSA, and director of the Air
Marshal Service. He served with the U.S. Secret Service for 25
years, and is retired as assistant director for the Office of Administration before bringing his expertise and experience to the Federal
Air Marshal Service in 2003. He has a bachelors degree from the
College of William and Mary in Virginia.
Our next witness will be Mr. Jeffrey Self, Southwest Border Division chief, Office of Border Patrol. He is a 19-year veteran of the
Border Patrol, having served in numerous patrol areas in leader-
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ship positions. As Southwest Border Division chief, he is responsible for the activities of nine Southwest Border sectors and over
11,000 Border Patrol agents.
Our next witness will be Raymond Parmer, deputy director of the
Office of Investigations to the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. As deputy director, Mr. Parmer oversees the largest investigative arm of the Department of Homeland Security, is responsible for the policy planning, management, and operations conducted under the five major investigative program divisions within
the Office of Investigations. He has a Bachelor of Arts degree in
criminal justice administration from the University of South Alabama, and a Master of Science degree in criminal justice management from the University of Southern Mississippi.
Our next witness is Michael Stenger, the assistant director, Office of Investigations, United States Secret Service. He is a 31-year
veteran of the Secret Service, and has served in numerous protective, investigative, and staff assignments. For his current assignment, he serves as the senior official overseeing the agencys investigations. In this capacity, he develops and implements policies as
it pertains to the cyber and fraud related crimes that the agency
investigates. He has a Bachelor of Arts degree from Fairleigh Dickinson University in New Jersey.
Our final witness is Rear Admiral Wayne Justice, who serves
currently as the assistant commandant for Capability, and as the
director of Response Policy for the United States Coast Guard. As
the assistant commandant for Capability, he is responsible for the
allocation, distribution, management, and recapitalization of all
Coast Guard operation forces. As the director of Response Policy,
he is responsible for the development of doctrine and policy guidance for all Coast Guard forces to accomplish operational maritime
missions in the areas of search and rescue, law enforcement, defense operations, and incident management. He is a 30-year veteran of the Coast Guard, and has a Bachelor of Science in management from the Coast Guard Academy, 1977, a masters in human
resource management with honors from Nova University, and a
masters in strategic studies from the Naval War CollegeCollege
of Naval Warfarein 1996.
Each of our witnesses written statements will be entered in the
record in its entirety, and I ask each witness to summarize his testimony in 5 minutes or less. And to help you stay within that time,
there is a lighted device in front of us, which will switch from
green to yellow when you have 1 minute left, and we would ask
you to conclude your testimonyfinish your thoughtbut conclude
your testimony when 5 minutes have expired.
We will begin with Mr. Brown.
TESTIMONY OF DANA A. BROWN, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL AIR
MARSHALL SERVICE, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. BROWN. Good morning, Chairman Scott, Representative

Gohmert, distinguished Members of the Committee. I am privileged
to appear before you today to discuss the authority of the Federal
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Air Marshal Service and the Transportation Security Administration of the Department of Homeland Security.
September the 11, 2001, forever transformed our Nation. In one
moment we came face to face with a known enemy on American
soil, on a chance condition threatening to our way of life. However,
on that day something far greater than fear, something much
stronger than despair took root: an unshakeable faith in our fellow
citizens and our ideals in our Nation, and an unwavering determination to protect and preserve what we stand for as a country
on virtue of the destruction, to guide our efforts in the fight against
terrorism and the quest to preserve liberty; and I have my place
of work at the Federal Air Marshal Service due to that set of beliefs.
Over the past 4 years, Air Marshal capability has expanded and
contracted in reaction to hijack activity. Until 9/11, the Air Marshals consisted of less than 50 personnel who operated under the
direction of the Federal Aviation Administration and flew mainly
international missions. In the aftermath of 9/11, the Department of
Homeland Security was envisioned, formed, and is now in operationFederal Air Marshal Service has been a challenging and rewarding undertaking.
While we have come a long way since then, we still have some
distance to go. I was fortunate to be named as the director of the
Federal Air Marshal Service a little over 2 years ago. Since that
time, one of my goals has been to build on the accomplishments of
the former director who did an outstanding job in creating a fullfledged law enforcement organization consisting of thousands of
personnel in less than 1 yearis complete and the old condition
stabilizes, my goal to building successblueprint for the future.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Self?
TESTIMONY OF JEFFREY D. SELF, CHIEF, SOUTHWEST BORDER DIVISION, OFFICE OF BORDER PATROL, DEPARTMENT
OF HOMELAND SECURITY, WASHINGTON, DC
Chief SELF. Chairman Scott, Ranking Member Gohmert, and distinguished Subcommittee Members, it is an honor to have the opportunity to appear before you today. My testimony this morning
focuses on law enforcement operations of CBP as well as partnership with other Federal agencies to guard our Nations borders
against terrorists and their instruments of terror.
Established in 2003, CBP is a consolidated agency brought together to protect Americas front line from terrorism while facilitating legitimate trade and travel along our Nations border. The
agency unites in inspectional work forces and broad border authorities of the U.S. customs, Key West immigration, animal and plant
health and inspections services and the entire U.S. Border Patrol.
The agency manages 326 ports of entry and 144 border patrol
stations within 20 sectors to secure almost 6,000 miles of border
with Canada and Mexico, and 95,000 miles of shoreline. On a typical day in fiscal year 2007, the law enforcement jurisdiction of the
agency executed 70 arrests of criminals at ports of entry, 2,400 illegal aliens between the ports, intercepted 84 fraudulent documents
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and seized over 7,300 pounds of narcotics at and between ports of
entry.
CBP has authority to enforce Federal criminal law, codified in
title 18 and elsewhere in the U.S. Code. CBP works in coordination
with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Coast
Guard, U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, and other
Federal agencies to enforce Federal criminal law at the border.
CBP officers and border patrol agents may arrest without a warrant for any Federal offense, including violations of title 18 and
title 19, if the offense is committed in the officer or agents presence. The officer and agent may also arrest without a warrant for
any Federal felony that occurs outside the officer or agents presence if the officer or agent has reasonable grounds to believe the
person committed the felony.
Common immigration-specific violations of title 18 at the border
include false claim to U.S. citizenship, fraud involving identity documents reproduction and fraud involving citizenship documents
forgery or false use of a passport and false statements to a Federal
officer. Other common violations of title 18 that lead to arrest by
CBP are: for an assault on a Federal officer, andpossession of a
firearm.
CBP has primary responsibility for enforcing the immigration
laws of title 8 and the custom laws of title 19 at the border. The
Immigration and Nationality Act within title 8 has its own criminal
provisions. In addition, violations of title 8 may also form the basis
of a title 18 prosecution. Common prosecution based on violations
of the INA discovered by CBP at the border are: alien smuggling,
illegal entry into the U.S., and illegal reentry into the U.S.
Many prosecutions result from the identification of arrested subjects through the IAPS system. The IAPS system resulted in over
144,000 hits this past fiscal year for crimes ranging from homicide,
sexual assault, robbery, dangerous drugs, and other misdemeanor
crimes.
In order to ensure these laws, CBPin order to enforce these
laws, CBP utilizes partnership with other Federal agencies. A key
example of these partnerships are Integrated Border Enforcement
Teams and Operation Uniforce.
From January 13, 2008 to January 26, 2008 border patrol agents
from the New Orleans sector conducted Operation Uniforce to
interdict alien and narcotic smugglers. These multi-agency operations were conducted utilizing traffic observation units on Interstate 20, operating between the Mississippi River and the city of
Jackson, Mississippi.
Forty border patrol agents and two canine handlers from the
New Orleans Sector conducted operations with the Office of Field
Operations Special Response Team members, agents from the ICE
Detention and Removal Office, CBP Air and Marine, the Mississippi Highway Patrol, the Rankin, Madison, and Hines County
Sheriffs Departments, along with the Pearl and Clinton Police Department.
The intelligence data that was gathered during Operation
Uniforce provided valuable insight into identifying the criminal organizations that use the I-20 corridor for human and narcotic traf-
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ficking. Through law enforcement operations and partnerships with
other local, State, and Federal foreign and international agencies,
CBP front line officers and agents will continue to protect America
from the terrorist threat while also accomplishing our traditional
missions in immigration, customs, and agriculture.
I would like to thank the Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee for the opportunity to present this testimony today and
for your continued support of DHS and CBP. We will be happy to
respond to any questions that you may have.
Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Self.
Mr. Parmer?
TESTIMONY OF RAYMOND R. PARMER, DEPUTY DIRECTOR
FOR INVESTIGATIONS, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. PARMER. Good morning, Chairman Scott, Ranking Member

Gohmert, and distinguished Members of the Committee. It is my
privilege to appear before you today to discuss U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcements criminal law enforcement responsibilities.
ICE has broad responsibilities and we are leveraging them by
aligning our authorities with the risks that face the Nation today.
In this regard, ICE enacted a multi-year strategy of improving immigration enforcement through efficient management, focused enforcement efforts to target the most dangerous illegal aliens, and
worksite enforcement initiatives that target employers who defy
immigration law, thus reducing the pull of jobs magnets that draw
illegal workers across the border in search of employment.
At the same time, ICE stepped up the battle against financial
crime and the exploitation of legitimate financial networks by
criminal organizations using methods to earn, move, and store illicit funding needed to support their criminal enterprises. Our riskbased approach extends from interior immigration enforcement, in
which we are prioritizing criminal aliens and fugitives, to the application of our customs fraud authorities to prevent the importation
of tainted commodities and counterfeit pharmaceuticals.
This approach shapes our methods to target drug and other contraband smuggling with financial authorities and international
partnerships, and it means we continue to thwart the illegal export
of weapons and sensitive technology.
To target some of the most dangerous criminals and sophisticated criminal organizations, ICE has developed robust initiatives
to enforce our immigration laws in the interior, including programs
that specifically target child predators and gang members, ensure
compliance on the part of those who visit the U.S. for school or simply to tour, target alien absconders, who are fugitives who have
failed to comply with a lawful judicial order to leave the country,
and dismantle the infrastructure that supports illicit immigration
such as illegal employment and the fraudulent document trade.
We are also working particularly close with State and local law
enforcement partners. Recognizing that there are more than
775,000 State and local law enforcement officers in the country,
ICE is leveraging our authorities to develop partnerships under the
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ICE ACCESS program, including cross-designation programs such
as 287(g) and customs title 9 authority.
While the immigration authoritiesI am sorry, while the Immigration Enforcement initiatives I have described most often relate
to people wanting to come into our country, another key risk we
guard against is efforts to take sensitive technology and arms out.
In fiscal year 2007, arms and strategic technology investigations resulted in 188 arrests, 178 indictments, and 127 convictions for export-related violationsmore than any other U.S. Federal law enforcement agency.
Other dangers are less obvious. Traditional customs fraud, in
many cases, constitutes serious and unrecognized public health
risks. Take, for example, Operation Guardian, an ongoing ICE-led
operation with CBP, the FDA, and Consumer Product Safety Commission, to investigate imports of substandard, tainted, and dangerous products from China.
The operation to date has resulted in the seizure of more than
59,000 tubes of diethylene glycol and bacteria-laden toothpaste
bound for U.S. markets and the initiation of joint U.S.-Peoples Republic of China investigations. Diethylene glycol, by the way, is a
toxic chemical used to make antifreeze. And this is one of many
similar cases involving tainted goods which would otherwise be on
store shelves just waiting for purchase by American families.
As I mentioned, the risk-based approach also shapes our methods
to target drug and other contraband smuggling. With only 25 percent of our special agents authorized to conduct drug smuggling investigations, ICE conducted investigations resulting in the seizure
of 232,000 pounds of cocaine, 1.3 million pounds of marijuana, as
well as 5,900 narcotics-related convictions.
Using our financial tools and international partnerships, we are
pushing out beyond our borders. Our Trade Transparency Units
represent unique relationships with foreign nations that allow us
to share import and export data to identify trade anomalies that
suggest money laundering. Our agents, thanks to these partnerships, are effectively identifying schemes designed to hide the illicit
proceeds from the drug trade and sale of dangerous consumer
goods, foreign tax fraud, and other transnational criminal activity.
This kind of approachfocusing on risk and going after the
moneyyields real results. Since 2003, ICE has seized more than
$600 million in cash and monetary instruments, and more than
$580 million worth of real property, vessels, aircraft, artwork, vehicles, and jewels.
ICEs Federal Protective Service, responsible for policing, securing, and ensuring a safe environment in which Federal agencies
can conduct their business, seized more than 760,000 prohibited
items last year. They investigated hundreds of threats posed
against the more than 8,800 Federal facilities and millions of visitors to Federal buildings nationwide.
Our work can be dangerous and difficult, but we tackle our responsibilities each day with pride and professionalism. I appreciate
the opportunity to appear before you today on behalf of ICE, and
look forward to answering your questions.
Mr. SCOTT. Thank you very much.
Mr. Stenger?
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TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL STENGER, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS, UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, WASHINGTON,
DC
Mr. STENGER. Yes. Good morning, Chairman Scott, Ranking

Member Gohmert, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. I would like to thank you for the opportunity to testify
today on the investigative responsibilities of the Secret Service.
While the Service is perhaps best known for our protective responsibilities, we have a dual mission.
The Secret Service was established in 1865 to suppress the
rampant counterfeiting of U.S. currency. Throughout our 142-year
history, the Service has evolved and adapted to thwart attempts by
both individuals and criminal organizations to exploit the Nations
financial infrastructure.
Today we investigate criminal violations relating to the counterfeiting of obligations and securities of the United States; financial
crimes such as access device fraud, financial institution fraud, identity theft, and computer-based attacks on the Nations financial
payment systems and critical infrastructure.
To accomplish our mission, we have 139 domestic offices and 21
foreign offices located in 16 countries. We work closely with our
Federal, State, and local law enforcement partners as well as other
U.S. government agencies and foreign counterparts to maximize
our efforts.
The Secret Service is proud of its role and success in protecting
U.S. currency. Last year, more than 2,200 suspects were arrested
for counterfeiting offenses, and over $147 million in counterfeit currency was seized. The agency continues to adapt to the trends in
counterfeiting, which have been influenced in recent years by computer-based technologies.
Widespread use of personal computers and advancements in digital printing technologies have provided more individuals the opportunity to manufacture counterfeit money. Approximately 58 percent of the counterfeit currency passed domestically in 2007 was
produced using digital printing.
In our role of safeguarding the Nations critical financial infrastructure, we have a long history of protecting American consumers
and the financial industry from fraud. With the passage of legislation in 1984, we were provided authority for the investigation of access device fraud and concurrent authority with other law enforcement agencies in identity theft crimes.
In recent years, the combination of the information revolution
and the effects of globalization have caused the investigative mission of the Secret Service to evolve. Through our work in the areas
of financial and electronic crime, we have developed particular expertise in the investigation of financial crimes, cyber crimes and
computer intrusions.
In fiscal year 2007, agents arrested over 4,300 suspects for financial crimes, who were responsible for over $690 million in actual
fraud loss. The most recent trend is the use of computers and the
Internet to launch cyber attacks targeting citizens and financial institutions. Cyber criminals have become adept at stealing victims
personal information through the use of phishing emails, account
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takeovers, malicious software, hacking attacks, and network intrusions resulting in data breaches.
This stolen information is often sold in bulk quantities through
illicit Internet Websites known as carding portals. We have established a national network of 29 financial crimes task forces and 24
electronic crimes task forces in cities throughout the United States.
These task forces leverage the combined resources of law enforcement as well as technical experts from academia and the private
industry.
Further, the Secret Service will have a key role in the implementation of the Administrations cyber-security activities, as outlined
in the recent presidential directive addressing cyber-security policy.
As I have highlighted in my statement, the Secret Service has
adapted to the constantly evolving criminal environment. We continue to aggressively investigate all offenses within our purview,
and are committed to our mission of protecting the integrity of U.S.
currency and safeguarding the Nations critical financial infrastructure and financial payment systems.
This concludes my prepared statement. Thank you again for the
opportunity to testify on behalf of the Secret Service. I am pleased
to answer any questions.
Mr. SCOTT. Thank you very much.
Admiral Justice?
TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL WAYNE JUSTICE, ASSISTANT
COMMANDANT FOR CAPABILITY AND DIRECTOR OF RESPONSE POLICY, U.S. COAST GUARD, DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY, WASHINGTON, DC
Admiral JUSTICE. Good morning, Chairman Scott, Ranking Member Gohmert, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. It
is a privilege for me to testify before you today about the maritime
law enforcement mission of the United States Coast Guard. I feel
passionately about this mission, having spent nearly 30 years deeply involved in it.
While the written testimony covers the full spectrum of Coast
Guards global law enforcement activities, for my oral testimony
today I would like to share with you some highlights of how drug
and alien smugglers continuously adapt their technologies and tactics, and then ask your help in adapting our criminal law to better
counter two of the most dangerous activities facing maritime law
enforcement officers in our Nation: self-propelled semi-submersible
smuggling vessels and maritime alien smuggling.
The influx of illegal drugs remains one of Americas greatest
maritime security threats. One of the emerging and most significant threats we face in transit zones today are manned and unmanned self-propelled semi-submersible, SPSS, vessels that transport multi-ton loads of cocaine and other illicit cargo bound for the
United States.
SPSS vessels are watercraft of unorthodox construction, capable
of putting much of their bulk under the surface of the water, making them difficult to detect. You can see images of recently interdicted SPSS vessels on the posters here, and we have provided the
Committee staff compelling video from a case just 2 weeks ago that
I urge you to watch.
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SPSSs typically carry up to five crew and four to six tons of illegal cargo at speeds up to eight knots. SPSS vessels encountered by
the Coast Guard are stateless vessels built in the jungles of South
America with no legitimate use. Their crews typically abandon and
sink the vessels and contraband when detected by law enforcement
in order to evade U.S. prosecution for drug trafficking.
Although U.S. interdiction forces nearly always capture imagery
of detected SPSS and the crews abandoning them before they sink,
attempting to access and recover contraband before a SPSS scuttles
is very dangerous and almost impossible. The SPSS vessel is an attempt to avoid both detection and consequencesif territorial operation of and embarkation in stateless SPSS vessels was a criminal
offense in title 18 of the United States Code, then U.S. interdiction
forces and U.S. attorneys would have the necessary tools to combat
the SPSS threat even in the absence of recovered drugs or other
contraband. The Coast Guard has closely coordinated with the Department of Justice to draft an amendment to title 18 to address
this concern.
We have briefed Committee staff on this amendment, which is
attached to my written statement, and urge Committee action on,
and House passage of, the amendment as soon as possible. The
Coast Guard projects the possibility of 85 SPSS events, carrying
possibly 340 metric tons of cocaine, during fiscal year 2008. We
need your help now to counter this dangerous emerging threat.
As the lead Federal agency in maritime law enforcement, the
Coast Guard is also responsible for enforcing immigration laws at
sea. Thousands of people try to enter our country illegally every
year using maritime routes in dangerously overloaded,
unseaworthy, or otherwise unsafe vessels. This is why the Coast
Guard migrant-interdiction operations are as much humanitarian
efforts as they are law-enforcement missions.
Although Coast Guard has interdicted migrants of various nationalities through the Western Hemisphere, the primary illegal
immigration threat comes from Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic. In the Mona Pass between Puerto Rico and the Dominican
Republic, deployment of mobile biometrics capability on 110-foot
patrol boats and robust interagency support have contributed significantly to a reduction in the flow of illegal migration by nearly
50 percent.
The referral of 120 cases of criminal aliens identified at sea
through mobile biometrics, including 33 aggravated felons, 77
aliens illegally attempting reentry after deportation, seems to have
stemmed the flow in what was the single largest migrant smuggling vector before biometrics-based prosecutions. This project
would not have been possible without the full partnership of USVISIT, CBP, ICE, Border Patrol, plus the U.S. Attorneys Office in
San Juan, Department of State, and the Dominican Navy.
Like drug traffickers, migrant smugglers profit by adapting their
tactics and acquired technical innovationsparticularly high-speed
multi-engine go-fast vessels. The enterprise brings thousands of
undocumented aliens to the United States for the price of up to
$10,000 a head. Despite a 35 percent increase in the number of cutter and resource hours targeted against migration in the Florida
Straits, migration continues to increase in that vector. The effec-
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tiveness of any interdiction model is dependant on our ability to deliver consequences to smugglers through prosecution and other action.
I would like to thank the House Judiciary Committee for hearing
and acting on our request in 2007 for enhanced offenses involving
maritime alien smuggling. The statutory amendment to 18 U.S.C.
2237, developed by the Committee last fall and now appearing in
title VI of our Auth Act, will be vital to Coast Guard mission accomplishment.
That amendment would be strengthened further by making it
unlawful to smuggle any person or contraband into the United
States and permitting both civil and criminal forfeiture of property.
We would also like the provision to ensure that any sentence under
2237 runs consecutively, not concurrently.
With these additions, title VI, if enacted this year, would also assist us and U.S. attorneys to achieve these operational requirements. With your help, sirs, we can reduce the flow of illegal aliens
and illicit goods into our country by ensuring that the risks and
consequences far outweigh the possible benefits.
Thank you for this opportunity to testify, and I am pleased to answer questions at this time.
[The joint prepared statement of the United States Department
of Homeland Security follows:]
f
JOINT PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Good morning, Chairman Scott, Ranking Member Gohmert, and distinguished
members of the subcommittee. We would like to thank you for the opportunity to
testify today on the law enforcement and investigative responsibilities of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)specifically the responsibilities of the United
States Secret Service, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the United
States Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the United States Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE), and the United States Coast Guard. As you will see,
DHS has utilized its authorities to protect our nation from dangerous people, protect
our critical infrastructure, and protect our nation from dangerous goods.
U.S. SECRET SERVICE
While the Secret Service is perhaps best known for protecting the president, vice
president, and other high-ranking public officials, the Secret Service originated as
an investigative law enforcement agency. The Secret Service was established in
1865 to suppress the rampant counterfeiting of U.S. currency. Since then, the Secret
Services investigative mission has evolved and the agency has adapted to thwart
attempts by both individuals and criminal organizations to exploit the nations financial infrastructure through varied financial crimes. Currently, the Secret Service
investigates criminal violations relating to the counterfeiting of obligations and securities of the United States (18 U.S.C. 470474); financial crimes such as access
device fraud (18 U.S.C. 1029), financial institution fraud (18 U.S.C. 1344), and
identity theft (18 U.S.C. 1028); cyber crime such as network intrusions, malware,
and online organized crime (18 U.S.C. 1030; and computer-based attacks on the
nations financial, banking, and telecommunications infrastructure (18 U.S.C.
1030).
To accomplish its investigative mission, the Secret Service operates 139 domestic
offices (including domicile offices) and 21 foreign offices in 16 countries. The agency
works closely with federal, state, and local law enforcement entities, as well as other
U.S. government agencies and foreign police counterparts to maximize its efforts.
Counterfeiting:
The Secret Service is proud of its role and success in protecting the worldwide
integrity of U.S. currency. Last year, the Secret Service arrested more than 2,200
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suspects for counterfeiting offenses and helped to remove over $147 million in counterfeit U.S. currency from circulation. The agency continues to adapt to the trends
in counterfeiting, which have been influenced in recent years by computer-based
technologies. The widespread use of personal computers and advancements in digital printing technology has provided more individuals the opportunity to manufacture a passable counterfeit note with relative ease. Approximately 58% of the counterfeit currency passed domestically in FY 2007 was produced using digital printing
means, compared with less than 1% in FY 1995.
Financial Fraud and Electronic Crimes:
In our role of safeguarding the nations critical financial infrastructure, the Secret
Service has a long history of protecting American consumers and the financial industry from fraud. With the passage of legislation in 1984, the Secret Service was
provided authority for the investigation of access device fraud, including credit card
and debit card fraud, and parallel authority with other law enforcement agencies
in identity theft cases. In recent years, the combination of the information revolution and the effects of globalization have caused the investigative mission of the Secret Service to evolve.
Through our work in the areas of financial and electronic crime, the Secret Service has developed particular expertise in the investigation of identity theft, false
identification fraud, credit card fraud, debit card fraud, check fraud, bank fraud, online back account and investment portfolio takeovers, cyber crime, malware, and
computer network intrusions. In Fiscal Year 2007, Secret Service agents arrested
over 4,300 suspects for financial crimes violations. These suspects were responsible
for approximately $690 million in actual fraud loss to individuals and financial institutions.
In fact, the Secret Service has observed a marked increase in the quantity and
complexity of financial crimes in recent yearsparticularly offenses involving identity theft and access device fraud. The recent trend observed by law enforcement
is the use of computers and the Internet to launch cyber attacks targeting citizens
and financial institutions. Cyber criminals have become adept at stealing victims
personal information through the use of phishing emails, account takeovers, malicious software, hacking attacks, and network intrusions resulting in data breaches.
This stolen information is often sold in bulk quantities through illicit Internet portals. These portals, or carding websites, can be likened to online bazaars where
the criminal element converges to conduct their business. The websites vary in size,
from just a few dozen members to more popular sites which boast memberships of
approximately 8,000 users. These websites are often composed of separate forums
which are moderated by notorious members of the cyber crime community. Within
these websites, cyber criminals can buy, sell, and trade malicious software;
spamming services; hacking services; credit, debit, and ATM card data; and personal
identification and bank account information. The Secret Service is currently conducting approximately 15 online undercover investigations targeting domestic and
international groups that are using malicious web-based forums to trade stolen information.
The Internet has enabled criminal groups involved in financial crimes to routinely
operate in a multi-jurisdictional environment. By working closely with other federal,
state, and local law enforcement representatives, as well as international police
agencies, the Secret Service is able to provide a comprehensive network of information sharing, resource sharing, and technical expertise that bridges jurisdictional
boundaries. This partnership approach to law enforcement is vital to our criminal
investigative mission.
Financial Crimes/Electronic Crimes Task Forces:
The Secret Service has established a national network of 29 Financial Crimes
Task Forces and 24 Electronic Crimes Task Forces in major metropolitan areas
across the United States. These task forces leverage the combined resources of our
federal, state, and local law enforcement partners, as well as technical experts from
academia and private industry, in an organized effort to combat threats and effectively investigate crimes directed at our critical infrastructure. Collaboration between law enforcement and the private sector is critical to our preventative approach to financial and electronic crimes. We also build partnerships with academia
to ensure that law enforcement is on the cutting edge of technology by leveraging
the research and development capabilities of teaching institutions and technical colleges.
To provide our special agents with the advanced skills needed to identify and address cyber vulnerabilities, the Secret Service established the Electronic Crimes
Special Agent Program (ECSAP) in 1987. Agents trained through ECSAP are com-
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puter specialists, qualified to conduct network intrusion investigations and forensic
examinations of various types of electronic evidence, including computers, personal
data assistants (PDAs), telecommunications devices, electronic organizers, and other
electronic media. Currently, the Secret Service has approximately 770 ECSAPtrained agents assigned to more than 85 offices worldwide. We are continuing to expand this program and, by the end of FY 2008, the Secret Service expects to have
over 1,000 ECSAP-trained agents.
Further, the Secret Service will have a key role in the implementation of the Administrations cybersecurity activities, as out lined in the recent Presidential directive addressing cybersecurity policy.
The Secret Service has adapted to the constantly evolving criminal environment.
We will continue to aggressively investigate all offenses within our jurisdiction to
protect consumers and financial institutions. The Secret Service is committed to our
mission of protecting the worldwide integrity of U.S. currency and safeguarding the
nations critical financial infrastructure.
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Prior to 9/11, the air marshal program consisted of less than 50 personnel who
were classified as civil aviation security specialists rather than law enforcement officers. These personnel operated under the direction of the Federal Aviation Administration and primarily flew international missions. In the aftermath of 9/11, the Administration and Congress agreed that a stronger federal air marshal program was
required. First under the Department of Transportation within TSA, and now within DHS, the Federal Air Marshal program is the largest such program in the world
and has evolved into a critical layer of aviation security. The Federal Air Marshal
Service (FAMS) today has not only expanded in size, but has been enhanced in quality by requiring all air marshals to meet the high standards associated with an 1801
law enforcement series. Today, Federal Air Marshals fly on thousands of domestic
and international missions, conduct valuable surveillance within airport perimeters,
and participate in joint law enforcement efforts with other agencies.
TSAs office of Law Enforcement/FAMS enhanced this operation and promotes
confidence in our Nations civil transportation systems through the effective riskbased strategic deployment of Federal Air Marshals and other law enforcement resources in both air and land-based mission assignments. The organizations primary
focus is to detect, deter, and defeat terrorist or other criminal hostile acts targeting
U.S. air carriers, airports, passengers, crew, and, when necessary, other transportation modes within the Nations general transportation systems.
The authority for the Federal Air Marshals is found in Title 49 USC section
114(q)Law Enforcement; section 44917(a)Deployment of Federal Air Marshals;
section 44903(d)Authorizing Individuals To Carry Firearms and Make Arrests,
and, most recently, PL 11053, section 1303, which authorizes Federal Air Marshals
to participate in Visible Intermodal Prevention And Response (VIPR) Teams.
In addition to the FAMs, the Office of Law Enforcements resources conduct Joint
Vulnerability Assessments (JVA) and Man Portable Air Defense Systems
(MANPADS) assessments. The JVA is a joint effort undertaken by TSA and FBI
with the purpose of assessing current and potential threats to commercial air transportation facilities within the United States. TSA has committed to conducting
MANPADS vulnerability assessmentsevaluations of close-range threats such as
shoulder-fired missilesat all of the largest airports on an annual basis. Also, the
FAMS are full partners with the FBIs Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF). FAMs
are assigned to every FBI field office JTTF (56) and the National JTTF as well.
The OLE/FAMS also operate a robust explosives detection canine program. TSA
has met projections for FY07 with the deployment of a total of 422 canine teams
in the aviation domain. Additionally, there are currently 56 teams deployed in the
mass transit environment for a current total of 478 teams.
FAMs have participated in hundreds of TSA-led VIPR operations, where FAMs,
TSA inspectors, transportation security officers, and any TSA assets assist federal
agencies and local law enforcement responding to specific threats or high-risk situations aimed at the nations transportation network. FAMs also began partnering
with other DHS agencies towards forming and deploying task-organized VIPR teams
utilizing the combined skill sets, resources, and expertise of DHSs seven major operating agencies. The FAMs have participated in all Departmental VIPR teams to
date.
One of FAMS unique deployments includes our response following the unprecedented events surrounding Hurricane Katrina and the relief we provided to thousands of travelers who were trapped at the Louis Armstrong International Airport
in New Orleans, while other residents inundated the airport in the aftermath of the
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storm. With virtually no state or local law enforcement presence on the airport
grounds, the few federal officials and employees of the TSA there were quickly overwhelmed.
The FAMS responded to this dire situation by activating a 24-hour crisis center
during the evening hours of Thursday, September 1. Approximately 500 FAMs were
then activated from 15 Field Offices. These FAMs traveled to New Orleans, restored
and maintained security at Louis Armstrong International Airport for over three
weeks, and ensured the safety of TSA personnel as well as the displaced residents
on hundreds of humanitarian flights out of the stricken city.
The FAMSs unique capabilities were also exhibited in the early morning hours
of August 10, 2006, when the FAMS strategically redeployed significant assets in
reaction to the unfolding terrorist plot to detonate liquid explosives to be carried
onto airplanes traveling to the United States from the United Kingdom. The FAMS
were able to deploy quickly and efficiently to the United Kingdom to provide an additional layer of security onboard airplanes destined for the United States. The
rapid deployment insured that international travelers were protected against any
terrorist act that might be perpetrated in connection with the plot. Over a 30-day
period, the FAMSs surge capacity enabled coverage of over 1500 flights between
major airports in the United States and United Kingdom, utilizing more than 1,000
FAMs.
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) protects our nations borders from terrorism, human and drug smuggling, illegal migration, and agricultural pests while
simultaneously facilitating the flow of legitimate travel and trade.
As the nations single unified border agency, CBPs mission is vitally important
for the protection of the American people and the national economy. Nearly 44,000
CBP employees and law enforcement officers work in a variety of ways to secure
the nations borders both at and between the official ports of entry and also to extend our zone of security. CBP secures Americas borders through three major law
enforcement entities: Field Operations, Border Patrol, and Air and Marine.
CBP officers are responsible for enforcing over 400 laws for 40 agencies at the border, which govern both imports and exports of goods and entry and exit of persons
and conveyances. To that end, CBP officers have the authority to enforce federal
civil and criminal laws, carry firearms, and make arrests for offenses committed in
their presence or for felony offenses where the officer has probable cause to believe
the person committed the crime. CBPs enforcement of border-related laws is wide
ranging, and CBP works closely with various other agencies or departments to enforce these laws, including U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S.
Coast Guard, U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), and other
federal agencies. CBP works most closely with ICE, which acts, in most respects,
as CBPs investigatory arm.
For example, under Title 18 of the U.S. Code, CBP often enforces non-immigration
offenses such as smuggling, money laundering, child pornography, and criminal
trademark infringement. Common immigration-specific violations of Title 18 at the
border include false claims to U.S. citizenship, fraud involving identity documents,
reproduction or fraud involving citizenship documents, forgery or false use of passports, and false statements to a federal officer. CBP is also often involved in arresting individuals for assault on a federal officer and felon in possession of a firearm.
CBP has primary responsibility for enforcing the immigration laws of Title 8 and
the customs laws of Title 19 at the border. The Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA), within Title 8, has its own criminal provisions. For example, under INA section 274, the acts of illegally bringing in, transporting, harboring, or encouraging
someone to enter the United States at someplace other than a port of entry can result in serious felonies. In addition, violations of Title 8 may also form the basis
of a Title 18 prosecution. Common prosecutions based on violations of the INA discovered by CBP at the border include alien smuggling, illegal entry into the U.S.,
illegal re-entry into the U.S., and importation of aliens for immoral purposes. CBP
also enforces criminal provisions under Title 31; administers the currency and monetary instrument reporting requirement of Title 31; interdicts bulk cash smuggling;
and enforces laws relating to imitation firearms in Title 15, Title 17 copyright infringement, exportations contrary to law in Title 22, including Trading with the
Enemy Act violations of Title 50, and Arms Export Control Act violations in Title
22.
In order to enforce these laws, CBP utilizes partnerships with other federal agencies. A few examples of these partnerships are Operations Uniforce, the Public
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Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (BTA),
and operations within the CBP Air and Marine (A&M).
From January 13, 2008 to January 26, 2008, Border Patrol Agents from the New
Orleans Sector conducted Operation Uniforce to interdict alien and narcotic smugglers. This multi-agency operation was conducted utilizing traffic observation units
on I20 operating between the Mississippi River and the city of Jackson, Mississippi. Forty Border Patrol Agents and two canine handlers from the New Orleans
Sector conducted the operation with Office of Field Operations (OFO) Special Response Team Members, agents from ICEs Detention and Removal Officers, CBP Air
and Marine, the Mississippi Highway Patrol, the Rankin, Madison, and Hines County Sheriffs Departments, along with the Pearl and Clinton Police Departments. The
intelligence data that was gathered during Operation Uniforce provided valuable insight into identifying the criminal organizations that use the I20 corridor for
human and narcotic trafficking.
The BTA authorized the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to receive information regarding imports, enabling the agency to target shipments of food for
human or animal consumption prior to arrival at U.S. ports of entry. The BTA provides CBP the opportunity to assist FDA with the prior notice requirements. CBP
works jointly with FDA to augment an existing automated interface to institute a
prior-notice reporting requirement with minimal disruption to the trade.
Under provisions of Title 18, CBP A&M operates in direct support of the Coast
Guard, Secret Service, DEA, FBI, ATF, and other federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. CBP A&M operates in support of DHS operations for CBP,
ICEs Office of Investigation, and Federal Protective Service and Detention and Removal Operations. CBP A&M also provides critical air and marine support to other
federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, including the U.S. Secret Service,
DEA, FBI, ATF, and the Coast Guard.
CBP A&M operates in support of multi-agency and international partnerships to
deter and combat the threat of illegal activity. CBP A&M has developed skills in
air and marine operations by providing training and vessel to vessel operations and
the integration of air and marine assets under the establishment of a joint DEA/
Columbian/CBP command center in Cartagena, Colombia, enabling the interdiction
of maritime targets leaving northern Colombia.
Overall, CBP is responsible for guarding 7,000 miles of land border the United
States shares with Canada and Mexico and 2,000 miles of coastal waters surrounding the Florida peninsula and off the coast of Southern California. The agency
also protects 95,000 miles of maritime border in partnership with the United States
Coast Guard.
To secure this vast terrain, more than 15,500 CBP Border Patrol agents and CBP
Air and Marine agents, and approximately 20,000 CBP officers and agriculture specialists, together with the nations largest law enforcement canine program, stand
guard along Americas front line.
CBP officers protect Americas borders at official ports of entry, while CBPs
Border Patrol agents prevent illegal entry into the United States of people
and contraband between the ports of entry.
CBP Air and Marine, which manages the largest law enforcement air force
in the world, patrols the nations land and sea borders to stop terrorists and
drug smugglers before they enter the United States.
CBP agriculture specialists prevent the entry of exotic plant and animal
pests, and confront emerging threats in agro- and bioterrorism.
While carrying out its priority anti-terrorism mission, CBP must also work to facilitate the movement of legitimate trade and travelers, as the agency processes all
people, vehicles and cargo entering the United States. On a typical day in fiscal year
2007, CBP processed approximately 1.1 million passengers and pedestrians; 70,000
containers; 304,000 privately owned vehicles; and 83,000 shipments of goods approved for entry. Through law enforcement operations and partnerships with other
federal, state, and local agencies, CBPs frontline officers and agents will continue
to protect America from the terrorist threat while also accomplishing our traditional
missions in immigration, customs, and agriculture.
U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is the lead investigative federal agency for enforcing that nations immigration laws under Title 8 of the United
States Code, in addition to specific law enforcement authority found under Titles 18
and 19, among others. Some of the areas included in the enforcement of these laws
are National Security, Public Safety, Commercial and Identity Fraud, Illegal Smug-
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gling of Contraband, and Money Laundering. The merger of the legacy federal authorities now makes ICE the second most diverse law enforcement agency within
the federal government. In 2003, the Office of Investigations started with a total of
5,190 agents. As of today, there are a total of 5,516 agents, although ICE plans to
hire an additional 296 agents in 2008 and the President has asked for an additional
87 in 2009.
Given that ICE has such broad law enforcement and investigatory responsibilities,
we leverage these responsibilities by aligning our authorities with the risks that
face the nation today. ICE protects national security and upholds public safety by
targeting terrorist organizations and other criminal networks that seek to exploit
vulnerabilities in our immigration system, in international trade, in our financial
networks, along our borders, at federal facilities, and elsewhere in order to do harm
to the United States. The end result is a safer, more secure America.
In this regard, ICE enacted a multi-year strategy of improving immigration enforcement through more efficient management, focused enforcement efforts that target the most dangerous illegal aliens, worksite enforcement initiatives that target
employers who defy immigration law, and reducing the pull of the jobs magnet
that draws illegal workers across the border in search of employment. At the same
time, ICE stepped up the battle against financial crime and the exploitation of legitimate financial networks by criminal organizations using methods to earn, move,
and store illicit funding needed to support their criminal enterprises.
ICEs risk-based approach shapes interior immigration enforcement, in which we
are prioritizing everything from criminal aliens and fugitives to the application of
our customs fraud authorities to prevent the importation of tainted commodities and
counterfeit pharmaceuticals. This approach shapes our methods to target drug and
other contraband smuggling with financial authorities and international partnershipsand it means that we continue to work to thwart the illegal export of weapons and sensitive technology.
To target some of the most dangerous criminals and sophisticated criminal organizations, ICE has developed robust initiatives to enforce our immigration laws in the
interior, including programs that specifically target child predators and gang members, ensure compliance on the part of those who visit the U.S., target alien abscondersfugitives whove failed to comply with a lawful judicial order to leave the
countryand dismantle the infrastructure that supports illicit immigration such as
illegal employment and the fraudulent document trade.
For example, ICE created its Detention Enforcement and Processing Offenders by
Remote Technology (DEPORT) Center in FY06, and it has been integral to DHSs
effort to halt criminal activity by aliens. The DEPORT Center conducts interviews
of inmates in remote prisons from a centralized location. Through the combined effort of the DEPORT Center and local ICE resources, coverage is provided to all 114
federal detention facilities. This ensures that criminal aliens are taken into ICE custody upon the completion of their federal sentences rather than being released into
U.S. communities.
While ICEs immigration enforcement initiatives most often relate to people wanting to come in to our country, another key risk we guard against is efforts to take
sensitive technology and arms out. In FY 2007, arms and strategic technology investigations resulted in 188 arrests, 178 indictments, and 127 convictions for exportrelated violationsmore than any other U.S federal law enforcement agency.
ICEs 287(g) program, authorized under the 1996 Immigration and Nationality
Act, has emerged as a key partnership tool in allowing ICE to train state and local
officers in immigration enforcement. Once in place, the 287(g) agreement allows ICE
to delegate enforcement powers to state and local agencies, who serve as force multipliers in immigration enforcement in their communities. In August 2007, ICE announced the launch of the ICE ACCESS (Agreements of Cooperation in Communities to Enhance Safety and Security) program to expand the opportunities for law
enforcement partnerships. Under the ACCESS program, ICE works with local officials to determine specific enforcement challenges and develop partnership plans
that help fight document fraud, illegal immigration, gang activity or other critical
law enforcement challenges.
Recognizing that there are more than 775,000 state and local law enforcement officers in the country, ICE is leveraging our authorities to develop partnerships
under the ACCESS program and the cross designation programs such as 287(g) and
customs.
ICEs risk-based approach also shapes our methods to target drug and other contraband smuggling. ICE has developed a full cadre of investigative expertiseincluding undercover operations, use of confidential informants, wire intercepts, controlled deliveries, consensual monitoring, and electronic surveillanceto combat
smuggling organizations. These smuggling organizations use every imaginable
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method to smuggle contraband into this country, including the use of aircraft, automobiles, trucks, maritime vessels, backpacks, tunnels, and railways. Additionally,
smuggling organizations infiltrate and use legitimate businesses and industries as
mechanisms for smuggling illicit goods and narcotics into the United States.
In FY07, ICE conducted investigations resulting in the seizure of 232,000 pounds
of cocaine and 1.3 million pounds of marijuana, as well as obtained 5,900 narcoticsrelated convictions. Using our financial tools and international partnerships, we are
pushing out beyond our borders. Our Trade Transparency Units represent unique
relationships with foreign nations that allow us to share import and export data to
identify trade anomalies that suggest money laundering. Our agents, thanks to
these partnerships, are effectively identifying schemes designed to hide the illicit
proceeds from the drug trade and sale of dangerous consumer goods, foreign tax
fraud, and other transnational criminal activity.
Other dangers from which ICE protects this nation are less obvious: Traditional
customs fraud, in many cases, constitutes serious and unrecognized public health
risks. Take, for example, Operation Guardian, an ongoing ICE-led operation with
CBP, the FDA, and Consumer Product Safety Commission, to investigate imports
of substandard, tainted, and dangerous products from the Peoples Republic of
China. The operation to date has resulted in the seizure of more than 59,000 tubes
of diethylene glycol- and bacteria-laden toothpaste bound for U.S. markets and the
initiation of joint US/PRC investigations. Diethylene glycol is a toxic chemical used
to make antifreeze. And this is one of many similar cases involving tainted goods
which would otherwise be on store shelves just waiting for purchase by American
families.
The Federal Protective Service, responsible for policing, securing, and ensuring a
safe environment in which federal agencies can conduct their business, seized more
than 760,000 prohibited items last year. They investigated hundreds of threats
posed against the more than 8,800 federal facilities and millions of visitors to federal buildings nationwide.
ICEs approachfocusing on risk and going after the moneyyields real results:
since 2003, ICE has seized more than $600 million in cash and monetary instruments, and more than $580 million worth of real property, vessels, aircraft, artwork,
vehicles, and jewels. ICEs law enforcement and investigatory work can be dangerous and difficult, but we tackle our responsibilities each day with pride and professionalism.
U.S. COAST GUARD
The Coast Guard has served as our nations primary federal maritime law enforcement agency since the first Congress of the United States created the Revenue
Cutter Service in 1790 to enforce maritime laws, interdict smugglers, and protect
American shipping. The Coast Guard is one of the oldest organizations of the federal
government and, until the Navy Department was established in 1798, we served as
the nations only Armed Force afloat. Today, the Coast Guard is the only Armed
Service with statutory responsibility and authority for direct law enforcement action.
Since the beginning of the Republic, Congress has granted our Service expansive
authority to board and inspect vessels at sea without particular suspicion. After the
Civil War, Congress removed geographic limitations on our boarding authority and
directed the Service to enforce or assist in the enforcement of all applicable Federal
laws on, under, and over the high seas, in addition to waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. This worldwide boarding authority, now codified in 14
U.S.C. 2 and 89, is the foundation of the Coast Guards maritime law enforcement
mission. Coast Guard boarding activity is as critical to the national security and
economy of the United States today as it was in 1790. Not unlike the boarding officers of the Revenue Cutter Service over 200 years ago, todays boarding officers lead
teams, usually embarked in boats and sometimes delivered from helicopters, to
make inquiries, examinations, inspections, searches, seizures and arrests upon the
high seas and waters over which the United States has jurisdiction, for the prevention, detection and suppression of violations of laws of the United States.
The Coast Guard conducts an average of 190 boardings each day around the
world. The daily fare of Coast Guard assets and boarding teams includes drug
smuggling, alien smuggling, illegal incursions into the U.S. Exclusive Economic
Zone, breaches of fisheries and living marine resources laws, violations of boating
safety and navigation regulations, substance abuse while operating vessels, and environmental crimes.
The influx of illegal drugs is one of Americas greatest maritime security threats.
The Coast Guard is the lead federal agency for maritime drug interdiction in the
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transit zonea six million square mile area roughly the size of the continental
United States including the Caribbean, Gulf of Mexico, and Eastern Pacificand
shares lead responsibility for maritime threats within U.S. territorial waters with
U.S. Customs and Border Protection. The Coast Guards mission is to reduce the
supply of drugs from the transit zone, originating in South America, by denying
smugglers the use of maritime, as well as air routes and conveyances. In order to
overcome the tyranny of distance, the Coast Guard depends on technological innovation, partnerships with other federal agencies, and countries and actionable intelligence.
One example of technological innovation is the broad expansion of armed
counterdrug helicopter capabilities used to disable fleeing vessels or to compel them
to stop (airborne use of force (AUF)). The Coast Guard operates a special armed helicopter squadron of HH65C helicopters, which has been tremendously effective at
interdicting elusive, high speed go-fast vessels. United Kingdom (U.K.) Royal Navy
ships are also deploying to the Caribbean Sea with U.S. Coast Guard law enforcement detachments who support the U.K.s armed helicopters, and U.S. Navy helicopters operate with Coast Guard gunners on board Navy warships in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific. The overwhelming success of AUF has caused drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) to shift tactics, using smaller go-fasts with contraband
concealed within the construction and avoiding the most direct deep water routes
between departure point and destination. DTOs have also been driven to the
littorals along Central America where they are more susceptible to coastal State
interdiction forces.
The Coast Guard relies on international and interagency partnership to complete
its missions. One example of this is the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF)
South, which is responsible for directing interagency detection, monitoring and sorting of air and maritime drug smuggling events; fusing intelligence activities; and
planning and conducting flexible operations within their respective joint operating
area. This enables the Coast Guard to interdict and disrupt drug smuggling events
in the transit zone. Every department and agency with a drug interdiction responsibility and role participates in making JIATF-South an extremely effective and efficient operation. JIATF South also utilizes foreign liaison officers from 11 different
countries to facilitate transnational cooperative counterdrug efforts.
One of the emerging and most significant threats we face in maritime law enforcement today is manned and unmanned self-propelled semi-submersible (SPSS) vessels that transport multi-ton loads of cocaine and other illicit cargo bound for the
United States. SPSS vessels are watercraft of unorthodox construction capable of
putting much of their bulk under the surface of the water, making them difficult
to detect. SPSS are typically less than 100 feet in length and carry up to five crew
and 12 metric tons of illicit cargo (46 tons typically) at speeds of up to eight knots.
SPSS vessels can travel from the north coast of South America to the southeastern
U.S. without refueling. According to the Consolidated Counter Drug Database
(CCDB), 23 SPSS drug smuggling events occurred between January 2001 and September 2007. Between October 1, 2007 and February 1, 2008, the CCDB reported
an unprecedented 27 SPSS events that successfully delivered an estimated 111 metric tons of cocaine.
The SPSS vessels encountered by the Coast Guard are stateless vessels built in
the jungles of South America with no legitimate use. They are built for stealth and
the capability to rapidly scuttle. Their crews typically abandon and sink the vessels
and contraband when detected by law enforcement in order to evade U.S. prosecution for drug trafficking. Although U.S. interdiction forces nearly always capture imagery of detected SPSS and the crews abandoning them before they sink, attempting
to access and recover contraband before a scuttled SPSS sinks is very dangerous
and often impossible.
If operation and embarkation in an SPSS were illegal, U.S. interdiction forces and
U.S. Attorneys would have the necessary legal tools to combat the SPSS threat even
in the absence of recovered drugs or other contraband. Criminalizing the operation
of SPSS vessels on international voyages would improve officer safety, deter the use
of these inherently dangerous vessels, and facilitate effective prosecution of criminals involved in this treacherous and emerging trend.
The Coast Guard has closely coordinated with the Department of Justice to draft
an amendment to Title 18, United States Code, to address this concern. We have
already briefed committee staff on this amendment, and urge Committee action on,
and House passage of, the amendment as soon as possible. The Coast Guard
projects 85 SPSS events carrying 340 metric tons of cocaine during FY 2008, so we
need your help now to counter this dangerous emerging threat.
Drug trafficking innovation is, of course, not limited to SPSS vessels. In 2007, the
Coast Guard interdicted five separate vessels carrying a combined 21.5 MT of co-
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caine concealed in liquid form. Liquid cocaine consists of cocaine paste and base
dissolved, usually in fuel oil, and concealed within tanks or holds onboard smuggling
vessels. This smuggling tactic allows smugglers to quickly jettison the illicit cargo
into the sea when encountered by law enforcement assets. To combat this threat,
the Coast Guard, with our partners at ICE, the Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA), JIATF South, and PANEX, has developed procedures for the detection, identification, and preservation as evidence of liquid cocaine. Additionally, the Coast
Guard has used advanced interdiction tactics to board and secure smuggling vessels
to prevent the crews from destroying evidence or scuttling vessels.
As we turn to the Coast Guards alien maritime interdiction operations, we would
like to thank the House Judiciary Committee for hearing and acting on our request
in 2007 for enhanced offenses involving maritime alien smuggling. Once enacted,
the statutory amendment to 18 U.S.C. 2237, developed by the Committee last fall
and now appearing in Title VI of the Coast Guard Authorization Act, H.R. 2830,
will be vital to Coast Guard mission accomplishment.
As the lead federal agency for maritime law enforcement, the Coast Guard is responsible for enforcing immigration laws at sea. Thousands of people try to enter
this country illegally every year using maritime routes, many via dangerous smuggling operations in dangerously overloaded, unseaworthy, or otherwise unsafe vessels. The flood of undocumented migrants in boats onto Americas shores is both a
threat to human life and a violation of U.S. and international laws. Coast Guard
migrant-interdiction operations are as much humanitarian efforts as they are lawenforcement missions. In fact, the majority of Coast Guard migrant interdiction
cases begin as search and rescue missions.
The primary illegal migration threat comes from Haiti, the Dominican Republic,
and Cuba; however, the Coast Guard has interdicted migrants of various nationalities throughout the Western Hemisphere. Successful illegal immigration potentially
costs U.S. taxpayers billions of dollars each year in social services. The Coast
Guards mission is to interdict undocumented aliens as far from U.S. shores as possible and return them to their countries of nationality or origin. Swift repatriation
deters many potential migrants and minimizes costly processes arising from illegal
entry into the United States. In addition to relieving our citizens of this financial
burden, the Coast Guards efforts help to support legal immigration systems. Protection from political persecution and torture are also important concerns for the U.S.
During the course of migrant interdictions, Coast Guard crews may encounter migrants requesting protection from persecution or torture. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services and the Department of State Bureau of Population, Refugees and
Migration establish policies in this area and handle all potential protection cases
arising from interdiction at sea.
The Coast Guard relies on technological innovation and partnerships with other
federal agencies and countries to counter illegal alien smuggling. In the Mona Pass
between Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic, the deployment of mobile biometrics capability on 110-foot patrol boats and robust interagency support have resulted in a reduction in the flow of illegal migration by nearly 50 percent. The referral of 118 cases of criminal aliens identified at sea through mobile biometrics, including 33 aggravated felons and 77 aliens attempting to illegally re-enter the U.S.
after deportation, seems to have stemmed the flow in what was the single largest
migrant smuggling vector before biometrics-based prosecutions. This project would
not have been possible without the full partnership of the DHS US-VISIT program,
U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
the U.S. Attorneys Office in San Juan, the Department of State, and the Dominican
Navy.
Similar to drug traffickers, migrant smugglers also profit from technological innovationsparticularly high-speed, multi-engine go-fast boats. Go-fast smuggling vessels are replacing rafts and rusticas as the preferred mode of transportation due to
the increased chance of success. We estimate that the rate of success for a raft or
rustica is generally less than 25 percent, and never better than 50 percent. By comparison, the rate of success for a go-fast is estimated at 70 percent. The multimillion
dollar human smuggling enterprise brings thousands of undocumented aliens to the
U.S. at a price of up to $10,000 a head. Despite a 35 percent increase in the number
of cutter and aircraft resource hours targeted against illegal migration in the Florida Straits, migrant flow continues to increase in that vector. The transition to gofasts constitutes a significant challenge for interdiction assets.
The effectiveness of any alien interdiction model is dependant upon the ability to
deliver consequences to smugglers through prosecution or other action. It is imperative that we secure more effective prosecution tools, including the closure of loopholes that currently impede investigation and consequence delivery, longer sentences, special seizure, and forfeiture provisions for vessels outfitted for smuggling.
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We must also enhance sentences for vessels that fail to stop while engaged in alien
smuggling.
The Presidents Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) Plan provides for
coordinated U.S. Government response to threats against the U.S. and its interests
in the maritime domain by establishing roles and responsibilities enabling rapid and
decisive response. The Coast Guard, as the Nations leading maritime law enforcement agency, fulfills DHSs role as one of the principal MOTR agencies in the maritime domain. The Coast Guard brings broad law enforcement and military authorities, planning, and execution skills to operations requiring interagency coordination
through the MOTR process in support of both maritime law enforcement and homeland security missions. The operations can include the deployment of integrated and
adaptive capabilities (including use of force) required to locate, identify, intercept,
apprehend, exploit, and, when necessary, defeat maritime threats. We use the
MOTR process daily to engage and coordinate with our domestic interagency partners and with our foreign maritime law enforcement partners on drug, migrant, piracy, and fisheries cases.
The links between place, crime, control measures, and national identity are becoming more complicatedespecially at the border. To a greater extent than ever
before, crime and control measures are not always linked to a common national territory. Instead, criminals often exploit international borders, turning the seams between sovereigns into operational barriers for law enforcement. The Coast Guards
unique authorities, capabilities, competencies, and partnerships, foreign and domestic, enable the Coast Guard along with our fellow Department of Homeland Security
agencies, to consistently and effectively enforce maritime laws, interdict smugglers
and drug traffickers, and protect American resources.
CONCLUSION
Thank you again for this opportunity to testify on behalf of the Department of
Homeland Securitys law enforcement and investigatory responsibilities. Due to the
breadth of the hearing, this written statement necessarily only outlines some of the
important responsibilities that DHS fulfills in protecting this great nation. We will
be pleased to answer any questions at this time.
f
Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Admiral Justice. We will now have questions from the members, and I will recognize myself for 5 minutes.
Mr. Brown, you had mentioned the standard for canines. Are you
working with experts to ascertain whether or not a national standard for training canines would be appropriate?
Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir, we are. We have an ongoing program with
the FBI and the National Institute of Justice called the Scientific
Working Group Dog and Orthogonal Detector Guidelines. It is to
establish the best practices to do this.
Mr. SCOTT. You also have a no-fly list. If you believe you are
wrongly on the no-fly list, is there a way to get your name off the
list?
Mr. BROWN. There is a redress process that TSA has, yes, sir.
Mr. SCOTT. Is that very complicated?
Mr. BROWN. Sir, I am not that familiar with it, to be honest with
you. I can give you a little bit of information about it. I know that
you have to apply to it and it takes a littlebut I am not sure how
complicated the process really is. I can find out for you, though,
and get back to you.
Mr. Self, you issued the ID cards for port workers?
Chief SELF. No, sirU.S.
Mr. SCOTT. Who does?
Chief SELF. I believe that would be the Office of Field Operations.
Mr. SCOTT. Office of Field Operations of what?
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Chief SELF. Under CBP, sir.
Mr. SCOTT. Are you involved in port operations at all?
Chief SELF. U.S. Border Patrol, sir, typically are not. We will
help the OFO officers in the field doing certain operations at times.
Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Parmer, if someone is detained at a port of entry
and has dependent children, and they are the only person available, what happens to the children?
Mr. PARMER. We have protocols in place for humanitary concerns. If it is a sole care provider then the totality of the circumstances is taken into consideration, and ordinarily if it is a sole
care provider situation the individual is released with a notice to
appear later in order to take care of the children.
Mr. SCOTT. If you have death of persons in the custody of ICE,
are those deaths reported under the Deaths in Custody Act? Do you
know?
Mr. PARMER. I do not know, sir. I am sorry.
Mr. SCOTT. If you could
Mr. PARMER. We do keep track of the individuals who, within our
custody, who are obviouslydiebut I dont know if it is reported
under that particular act.
Mr. SCOTT. You are coordinating your activities with local law
enforcement?
Mr. PARMER. Yes, sir.
Mr. SCOTT. If local law enforcement begins enforcing immigration
law, is there any potential for problems with community relations
between the local police and the community that may have many
immigrant citizens?
Mr. PARMER. Yes, sir. As we have learned, there arewith the
merger of the agencies within DHS, there arefor those of us who
were unacclimated to the immigration arena before March 1, 2003,
it has been a learning process for all of us. And there are actually
many social and political concerns that relate to the immigration
concerns. But if the State or local authorities implement immigration statutes on their own, as we have learned in the Federal
arena, there are all these implications for relations with the community.
Mr. SCOTT. What training is done to make sure that local police
do not engage in illegal profiling?
Mr. PARMER. Well, in terms of what we do within ICE, we have
as part of title 8287, section 287G, we provide training for the
State and local authorities to look for immigration violations; but
profiling is not a part of thatthat is a no-no within our scope of
order. We dont profile, so
Mr. SCOTT. That is because your agents have been trained. Local
law enforcement may not have the same training.
My time is expired, and I may come back for a second round.
Mr. PARMER. Sure.
Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Gohmert?
Mr. GOHMERT. Thank you. And I appreciate you alls statements.
First of all, let me ask Mr. Parmer: After your agency, ICE, is
notified that an illegal alien is in local custody, does ICE have the
authority to say, Go ahead and detain them, and from that point
forward the Federal Government will reimburse local law enforcement for holding them?
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Mr. PARMER. We have the authority to advise the local authorities to detain them, but I am not sure what the reimbursement
protocols are.
Mr. GOHMERT. Because of course if you advise local law enforcement to detain somebodyand this is a complaint I have heard
from local law enforcementthey can be told to detain somebody
and then hold them for 30 days, and then ICE will come back and
say, Well, we decided not to pursue it, and so they are out all
that money for an individual they have held which, around my jurisdiction is around $50 a day. And that is an awful lot of money
for the Federal Government to ask a local government to be out,
and then not reimburse. If you are not familiar with the answer
to that question, who do you think would be?
Mr. PARMER. Well, sir, we are divided up within ICE into the Office of Investigations, which is the component I am representing
here today, although I am speaking on behalf of all of ICE, but we
also have Detention and Removal Operations, the Federal Protective Service, the Office of International Affairs
Mr. GOHMERT. But my question, who would
Mr. PARMER. The more appropriate entity to answer that question would be Detention and Removal Operations.
Mr. GOHMERT. But you dont know who is in charge of that?
Mr. PARMER. Mr. Gary Mead is the director.
Mr. GOHMERT. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. SCOTT. Since you are representing part of the agency, we
may have good questions that you could have the appropriate personthat would be helpful.
Mr. PARMER. Yes, sir. He is not here today, but
Mr. SCOTT. That is why we include the submitted questions.
Mr. PARMER. Yes, sir. Thank you.
Mr. GOHMERT. Mr. Stenger, when personal identification information is stolen from the Internet, how does and when does the Secret Service become involved in that?
Mr. STENGER. Mr. Congressman, we dont have any specialists
for investigations. If a case is brought to our attention we evaluate
each one on the merits of the case
Mr. GOHMERT. Somebody has to bring it to your attention? See,
you brought that up in your opening statement and I wasnt aware
that you got involved in that, other than the FBI did, but did I understand right? That is something you get involved in if it is
brought to your attention?
Mr. STENGER. That is correct, sir. There are a number of agencies that have cross-cutting jurisdiction, including the FBI, Postal
Inspectors, as well as Secret Service, but if these types of cases
if it is access device or computer fraudone of the violations that
we investigateif brought to our attention, we will take the case
in
Mr. GOHMERT. But someone has to bring itmy time is so limited. I hate to be rude and keep cutting you off, but to go to my
question, at what pointwhat thresholddo you get involved?
That is when somebody brings it to your attention, is that right?
Mr. STENGER. That is correct.
Mr. GOHMERT. Thank you.
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Let me ask about the no-fly list, Mr. Brown. After TSA takes
somebody off that listlike I have got a general,general, served
29 years in the military, and he was on the terrorist watch list. It
took a while to get his name removed by TSA, and yet the airlines
still have trouble recognizing he is not on the list because he is not
off their list yet.
And so it seems kind of absurd to treat a real hero like this, and
I understood from Secretary Chertoff when he testified last week,
you remove them but it doesnt seem like there is any follow-up to
make sure the airlines remove them off. And so it seems almost
like a Seinfeld episode: You remove them off, but nobody gets them
out there in the field off the list, which means what good does it
do?
And so, is there follow up that you do with the airlines to make
sure they take them off the list?
Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir, there is. I am not familiar with the process,
but there is some follow up. I do know that.
Mr. GOHMERT. There is some follow up, but you dont know what
it is?
Mr. BROWN. No, sir, I dont. I am not familiar with that.
Mr. GOHMERT. Think you could find out what it is?
Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir. Certainly.
Mr. GOHMERT. So we can follow up on the follow up.
And then as far as Chief Self, we had a Border Patrol agent from
my district in Henderson, Clint Thrasher, that washis family was
told he was following illegal aliens when hisI believe it was a
Cessnawent down. Of course there was some concern, you know,
was he being fired on? Was there anything like that? I just wondered, did NTSB or any other Federal agency find a reason for that
crash and give a specific reason?
Chief SELF. Yes, sir. NTSB, FBI, OPR, and FAA all investigated
that crash. The finding was pilot error, and he was, of course,
killed in 2007 while in the line of duty.
Mr. GOHMERT. Okay. So they all attributed it to pilot error. Was
there any evidence at all that his plane was ever fired upon?
Chief SELF. No evidence whatsoever, sir.
Mr. GOHMERT. Well, I might encourage you to pass that on to
Secretary Chertoff. He wasnt aware we lost anybody like that.
So, thank you. I see my time has expired.
Mr. Delahunt was next, and I understand you want to defer to
the gentleman from New York.
The gentleman from New York, Mr. Nadler?
Mr. NADLER. Thank you. And I appreciate the gentleman deferring; I have a meeting to go to shortly.
Mr. Parmerthat the ICE has invaded peoples homesICE
agents banging on peoples doorsagents have entered peoples
bedrooms. Assistant Secretary Myers stated, ICE agents only enter
with theconsent. Do you agree with that?
Mr. NADLER. And when the policeyour home brandishingwho
may not be able to understand, how do you get consent?
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Mr. PARMER. Well, we have bilingual agents and officers who are
out on these, and that isthe early morning hours are often the
best time to catch individuals at home, but we always have
Mr. NADLER [continuing]. Many of these people that I have
known, Ithe people banging on my door demanding entrance,
what did I do? Is that informed consent?
Mr. PARMER. I cant speak to anecdotal stories, but I know that
we have a professional and
Mr. NADLER [continuing]. Lawsuits are pending, they are not anecdotal stories.
Mr. PARMER. They are lawsuits pending, and they are still in litigation, so
Mr. NADLER. What standards?
Mr. PARMER. If an individual is asked to allow agents to enter
their residence, then they enter. We have had instances where
in the lawsuit in which you are referring toa great many of the
requested entries werethe agents wound up standing by the residence for hours on end waiting for someone either to come in or
out of the residence so they could conduct their interviews; but
they did not forcibly enter any residence. That is just against the
law.
Mr. NADLER. Let me go further. ICE has statedthere have been
a lot of reportsU.S. citizens are being arrested. What is ICEs policy regarding collateral corrections? What compensation do you give
to people who are illegally arrested?
Mr. PARMER. No one is arrested until their alienage is determined. If someone is
Mr. NADLER. Excuse me, I dont think that is true. U.S. citizens
have been arrested.
Mr. PARMER. If we can determine alienage on the spot then they
are immediately released. As soon as we can reasonably determine
the citizenship of an individual in our custody while we are detaining
Mr. NADLER [continuing]. Five oclock in the morning. How can
you determine alienage? Five oclock in the morning, on the spot?
Mr. PARMER. Any combination of things: documentation, a combinationany reasonable responses to questions, documentation
Mr. NADLER. So you think it is reasonable that anybody, as an
American citizen, should produce his passport or other documentation, on demand, at 5 oclock in the morning?
Mr. PARMER. I do.
Mr. NADLER. You do?
Mr. PARMER. I do think that is reasonable. I mean, if someone
awakened me at 5 oclock in the morning, I would be able to
produce my drivers license or any other document to show that I
was a legitimate citizen. I do.
Mr. NADLER. And what if you didnt drive?
Mr. PARMER. Then most States have identification cards.
Mr. NADLER. How do you know when people dont have these
identification cards
Mr. PARMER. And our agents are not bound by just that particular documentation.
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Mr. NADLER. Are there any guidelines that have been published
to help to show what you would look for?
Mr. PARMER. Yes, sir. We have published guidelines to the field;
we have a checklist that we go down. We take great precaution in
ensuring that no U.S. citizens
Mr. NADLER. Yet, ICE has admittedU.S. citizens have been arrested.
Mr. PARMER. No, sir. I dont acknowledge that
Mr. NADLER. You dont. Then whyas collateral?
Mr. PARMER. Collateral arrest could be individuals who were not
targeted, but who happened to be illegal aliens who were present
at the time of the individual who was targeted
Mr. NADLER. My time has expired, but I would request that you
supply the Committee, please, with all the written guidelines that
are supplied in training, that are supplied to agents so that when
you go to somebodys house at 5 oclock in the morning, what their
instructions are to obtain consent, and what the guidelines are to
determine alienage under those circumstances.
Mr. PARMER. I would be happy to do that
Mr. NADLER [continuing]. Figures for thehow many U.S. citizens have been arrested in the last year
Mr. PARMER. I would be happy to provide that, sir.
Mr. NADLER. Thank you.
Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. The gentlemans time has expired.
The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Coble?
Mr. COBLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It is good to have you all with us, gentlemen.
Admiral, last year, I am told, the Coast Guard confiscated more
than 350,000 pounds of cocaine on the high seas, surpassing all
previous records. How has the interagency efforts between the
United States and our international colleagues contributed to the
Coast Guards interdiction success in transit zones?
Admiral JUSTICE. Sir, we have established, over the past few
years, 27 separate bilateral agreements with foreign nationsvarious foreign nations: Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela, Dominican Republic, et ceteraand we use those bilateral agreements to have
the ability to do law enforcement with the flag-state vessels. And
we exercise those authorities on a daily basis.
Our ability to work with those foreign nationswhich we do, as
I said, dailyhas the ability for us to deliver consequences to those
foreign nations, the peoples.
Mr. COBLE. Are my figures correct: 350,000 pounds?
Admiral JUSTICE. That is correct, sir.
Mr. COBLE. Mr. Stenger, the USA PATRIOT Act mandates Secret
Service to establish a nationwide network of electronic crimes.
Have these task forces been helpful in combating cyber attacks on
the Nations financial and banking infrastructure?
Mr. STENGER. Yes, sir, I believe they have. We have a national
network of 24 of these electronic crimes task forces in conjunction
with 29 financial crimes task forces, and I think the sharing of information and the relationships that have developed therewith
academia, with the private sectorespecially the private sector, because they are, in fact, in most of these incursions and hackings,
are the victims.
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So we are dependent upon them to inform us of this information,
and the electronic crimes task forces really strengthen those relationships, as well as strengthen the relationships with our local
and State partners to develop that sharing of information, that
when they receive information on something like this, we can share
that information and bring all of the appropriate resources to bear.
Mr. COBLE [continuing]. Thank you.
Mr. Self, describe, if you will, ICEs efforts to identify, arrest, and
remove alien gang members.
Chief SELF. Border Patrol really has no interaction with ICE as
it pertains to alien gang members, other than when we apprehend
an alien gang member, at that point in time we will turn it over
to ICE for prosecution. Sir, if you are speaking operationally, as to
what they do in areas such as San Antonio or L.A., we dont take
part in those operations with them.
Mr. COBLE. Anybody? Anybody want to respond to that question?
Mr. PARMER. Yes. We, through Operation Community Shield, we
do target illegal alien gang members. Since inception, we have arrested well over 8,000 illegal gang membersillegal alien gang
memberswithin the last fiscal year, over 3,300. I am not sure,
other thanspecifically what your question is, how we
Mr. COBLE. Yes
Mr. PARMER. Very often, it is referrals from the local constabulariesthe State and local departmentthat they are having a
gang problem in their area, and we respond and try to develop as
much law enforcement intelligence as we can based upon the referral, and then go out and do a sweep of the area in question.
Mr. COBLE. Admiral, before my time expires, let me come back
toAlien Smuggling Act. The amendments were part of the 2008
Coast Guard authorization, generally, tell the Subcommittee, if you
will, why amending the Maritime Alien Smuggling Act is essential
to the Coast Guard anti-smuggling effort.
Admiral JUSTICE. Yes, sir. Right now, when illegal aliens on the
high seas are smuggled, when we catch the boat we have got the
crime in front of us. The current laws, the penalties are misdemeanor-level offenses, they dont have any teeth, and they are
not an inhibitor to the smugglers. In thisthat the 2237 will put
some teeth into our ability to enforce these laws.
Mr. COBLE. Thank you.
My time has expired. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Justice, were you describing one that is on the books, or
the one that you want on the books?
Admiral JUSTICE. The one that is on the books now is the one
that is notit is weak; it is not strong enough. I am describing the
one that we have worked to get on the books, sir.
The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Delahunt?
Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Admiral, for the outstanding work
that the Coast Guard is doing on behalf of the country. You indicated that we have an agreement with Venezuela. How is that
working? What kind of a gradeas far as that particular agreement?
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Admiral JUSTICE. Surprisingly enough, sir, when it comes to
counter-drug operations and counter-drug interactions, there is a
facet of the Venezuelan government that will interact with us and
we will have communications with them. So that is ongoing, sir.
Mr. DELAHUNT. They get a good report card?
Admiral JUSTICE. Yes, sir.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Parmer, are you familiar with the case of
Mahir Arar? How long have you been with thedepartment?
Mr. PARMER. March 1, 2003.
Mr. DELAHUNT. March 1, 2003. Are you familiar
Mr. PARMER. Since its inception.
Mr. DELAHUNT [continuing]. Of Mahir Arar, a dual national Canadian-Syrian?
Mr. PARMER. The name doesnt ring a bell, sir, but the circumstances
Mr. DELAHUNT [continuing]. Factsbecause I am interested if
there is a policy within ICE or its predecessor, INS. On September
26, 2002 this individual, Mr. Arar, was flying from Zurich to Montreal, and he was transiting through JFK Airport in New York, and
there he was detained for hours by FBI, presumably by ICE or its
predecessor
Mr. DELAHUNT [continuing]. And the NYPD. And the next day he
was sent to a detention facility in Brooklyn where he was further
interrogated, and INS officials informed him that they would like
him toreturn to Syria.
This is an individual who was born in Syria; he is around, I
think, around 35 years old. He had spent the last 20 years of his
life in Canadawas a Canadian national. He said no, he didnt
want to return to Syria. He was on the watch list; it was alleged
that he was an Al Qaida associate.
Subsequently that was proven to be correct, but on September
28, he was given a document saying that he was inadmissible
under section 235C of the Immigration and Nationality Act because
he was aof al Qaida. On October 2 he was permitted a 2-minute
phone call; he called his mother-in-law up in Ottawa, and he expressed his concern to her that he would be sent to Syria.
On October 4 he had a visit from the Canadian Counsel who told
him, Dont worry about it; it wont happen. October 6 he was
asked by American officials why he did not want to go to Syria, and
he informed them that he was concerned about being tortured because he hadnt met his military obligation prior to his leaving at
around, I think, 17 or 18 years old. In addition, he was a Sunni,
he indicated.
On October 8 he read a document saying that they decided,
based on classified information, that he was Al Qaida and that the
INS director had decided to send him to Syria. Protestors say that
he would be tortured, but that didnt seem to cause any consternation. And they are saying that if he was taken in change to a private jet, flown to Jordan and then on to Syria, weis there a policy
in termsyou are not familiar with that case, now that I am
Mr. PARMER. Mr. Delahunt, no. I apologize
Mr. DELAHUNT. Dont apologize.
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Mr. PARMER [continuing]. But I am not familiar with it. But my
colleague, Ms. Acom, just passed me a note saying that she is familiar with it, but as you alluded, there is a DHS-OIG report dealing with that particular issue that is classified.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Right. I mean, well, just about everything is classified. But I guess what I am looking for is an unclassified to what
the policy is when they are a dual citizen of another country, and
in this case specifically, why Syria rather than Canada?
Mr. PARMER. That is a very good question, sir, and I dont
knowobviously he was not a U.S. citizen, so he should haveit
would stand to reason that he should have gone back to Canada
before any decision was made, but Ibecause of the nature of the
issue, I cantand my unfamiliarity with itI cant respond to
your question.
Mr. DELAHUNT. But somebody has got to respond at some point
in time.
Mr. PARMER. Perhaps our OIG could meet with you in a different
setting and
Mr. DELAHUNT. But you know, the American people are very concerned about how we are viewed across the world; and it is incidents like this that erode respect for the United States, because if
one had an opportunity to examine the Department of State reports, it was inevitableat least if you can rely on those reports
that he was going to be tortured in Syria, and he was. That doesnt
bespeak well of what occurred, and hopefully there has been a review of that decision, and the American people deserve to know
why he was sent to Syria rather than to Canada.
Mr. PARMER. Yes. Yes, sir. I cant speak to that; it predates the
Department of Homeland Security and Immigration and Customs
Enforcement. But I can assure you, in my tenure with this organization, nothing like that has occurred.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you.
Mr. PARMER. Thank you, sir.
The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Chabot?
Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Last weekand I will address this to anyone who wants to handle itlast week the Washington Post published an article highlighting the very real possibility of a cyber attack on our Nations
infrastructure by cyber terrorists. This article, together with the reports that botnets have invaded more than 5 million computers
across the Nation and are the weapon of choice for criminals, according to FBI director Robert Mueller, illustrate the seriousness
of this issue.
What is the Department of Homeland Security doing to ensure
that our cyberspace is secure, and does law enforcement have the
tool it needs to effectively investigate and prosecute these types of
crimes to keep our Nation safe?
Mr. STENGER. Speaking for the Secret Service, sir, we work very
aggressively on cyber security issues and the various aspects of
cyber security; and some concerns the overall system security. Our
role in the Department of Homeland Security, as an investigative
agency, is to investigate the criminal areas.
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And I think one of the issues that we have found a lot of times
is complementary: terrorism, law enforcement and crime are not
things that dont go well together. Many times we findand I
think the old adage that not every criminal is a terrorist, but every
terrorist is a criminaland we find more and more, the methods
of the criminals that are out there using cyberspace and electronic
crimes actually enable the funding of some of their activities.
So the lessons we learn and the information that we are receiving, both from our law enforcement partners here, from the private
sector, as well as many of our law enforcement and private sector
partners overseas, is really giving us some information, I think,
that is very important to move into the overall cyber security strategy.
Mr. CHABOT. Yes, sir.
Admiral JUSTICE. Sir, I will addI know, even this morning listening to the Coast Guard CIO, you know, briefing our commandant about what he is doing today, DHS is focused and aggressively attending to this issueDHS at large. There is a meeting
today; I think there is a tabletop sort of exercise at that level
where they are talking about these issues.
They are looking at having some sort of a national PFO, similar
to how DHS is attending to the pandemic challenge. You know,
cross-cutting, obviously is, as you know, an interagency, intergovernmental issue. But it is absolutely on the front plate of the DHS.
Mr. CHABOT. Anybody else care to comment? Let me just bring
to your attention a bill that has been introduced called the Cyber
Security Enhancement Act of 2007. It was introduced by Congressman Adam Schiff, who is a Democrat from California, and myself
I happen to be a Republican from Ohioso it is a bipartisan bill;
we have 20 co-sponsors so far. In short, the bill would amend the
Federal Criminal Code to do a number of things.
I will list those just briefly here: Number one, prohibit accessing
a protected computer to obtain unique identification number, address, a routing code, or access device; two, revise the definition of
protected computer to include computers affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communications; three, expand the definition of
racketeering to include computer fraud; four, redefine the crime of
computer-related extortion to include threats to access without authorization or to exceed authorized access of a protected computer;
fiveand there are only sevenimpose criminal penalties for conspiracy to commit computer fraud; six, require forfeiture of property used to commit computer fraud; and seven, impose criminal
penalties for damaging ten or more protected computers during any
1-year period.
And it also directs the U.S. Sentencing Commission to review
and amend its guidelines and policy statements to reflect congressional intent to increase criminal penalties for computer fraud.
Without going into great detail, does that seem like something that
might make itmight be a better tool for law enforcement?
Mr. STENGER. Yes, Congressman, I am familiar with that. We do
support that because I think in todays environment with cyber
crimes, the evolving nature of these types of crimes need to be addressed in evolving legislative initiatives in order to be able to address those appropriately.
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And whether it is new laws or enhancing the existing laws, I
think it is very opportune to be able to do that as these crime types
have developed. So we are very supportive of the Committee looking at new ways to address the evolving criminal nature of what
is taking place.
Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much.
I see my time has expired, so I will yield back.
The gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee?
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, thank you so very much,
and
Admiral JUSTICE. I would say it is a DHS issue, that TSA should
technically be overseeing the TWIC issue. We are supporting it in
the ports, and we feel at this timeit is a phased implementation,
and we feel we are on track to move forward.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Even though
Admiral JUSTICE. Yes.
Ms. JACKSON LEE [continuing]. And the question is, do you have
enough personnel to
Admiral JUSTICE. Yes we do, maam. The 2009 budget request
that we have, that is the right amount.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me just ask
Admiral JUSTICE. Okay. Yes, maam.
Ms. JACKSON LEE [continuing]. I dont ask questions. Let me go
straight to the question?
Mr. BROWN. Well, we work off of a protocol that is dictated by
threaton our ability, and we have assessed all the flights that
weby a risk-based strategic deployment policy. That is how we
identify the flights that we are wanting to address. I am not quite
sure what you mean, maam.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Well, let me stop you
Mr. BROWN. Sure.
Ms. JACKSON LEE [continuing]. What I would like to know is
Mr. BROWN. Yes, maam.
Ms. JACKSON LEE [continuing]. That we are having difficulty
with the children at the border, and I would like to know what
we are doingchildren being heldwhat are you doing to ensure
that that is not happening.
Chief SELF. Yes, maam. Border Patrol is presently working with
the Office of Refugee Resettlement. What happens is, when we apprehend an unaccompanied minor, we will take him in and we will
go through the processing with the minor. At that point, we start
engaging with ORR and trying to find them bed space.
There are times when we cant find bed space; we just revamped
a hold room policy that ensures that that minor is taken care of.
Within the hold policy, it outlines that that minor will have two to
three hot meals a day, and any request for
Ms. JACKSON LEE [continuing]. For 72 hours, that absolutely,
without a doubt.
Chief SELF. I cannot tell you that. But I can tell you that we are
doing everything we can to work with ORR, civil rights, civil liberties, to ensure that they are moved out of our detention space as
quickly as we can.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me pursue that with you.
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Chief SELF. I understand, maam.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. And I thank you.
Mr. PARMER. Yes, maam. I think we will all agree that was a
very unfortunate incident. I did not personally attend the function,
which was intended to be a fundraiser, but I think it is our overall
regret and embarrassment, and this organization is well on the
record. And we have very proactive measures in terms of sensitivities to ethnicity and EEO matters that have been reinvigorated as
a result of that incident. And I
Ms. JACKSON LEE [continuing]. More detail.
Mr. PARMER. Yes, maam.
Ms. JACKSON LEE [continuing]. It affects, if you will
Mr. PARMER. Yes, maam.
Ms. JACKSON LEE [continuing]. I appreciatea more detailed response.
We are going to have a couple more questions, and I would recognize myself.
First, Mr. Parmer, the GAO has a report on ICE practices that
identified some problem areas. Could you provide us with the list
of problem areas that were identified and what you have done since
October 2007 to address them?
Mr. PARMER. Yes, sir. I think the crux of the report had to do
with officers discretion in the field about detentionability to release from detention and humanitarian concerns. And as an organization, we have taken on
Mr. SCOTT. If you could provide us with the report in which you
have got in writing, we would appreciate it.
Mr. PARMER. Yes, sir. I will
Mr. SCOTT. Does ICE have a policy against torture?
Mr. PARMER. We do not torture, no, sir.
Mr. SCOTT. And to follow up on the gentleman from Massachusetts, do you coordinate with other nations to have people tortured?
Mr. PARMER. No, sir. We do not in any form or fashion condone
torture.
Mr. Stenger, there have been reports that some of the government computers were hacked, possibly by people from China. What
is the statuscan you give us any update in open session as to
what the status of that is?
Mr. STENGER. Mr. Chairman, because of, I think, the sensitivity
of it, it is going to be very difficult to comment on it, but I do believe that there are steps being taken to secure the systemsnot
only government systems, but military systems and private sector
systemsfrom malicious malware that is out there to prevent
losses like that could take place.
Mr. SCOTT. In the ID theft, one of the problems with consumer
ID theft is, what usually happens is when someone gets their identification compromised and someone runs up charges on their credit card, what usually happens is the bank writes it off. There, at
that point, are no complaining witnesses and the thief pretty much
gets away. What would it take to set up an operation where routine
ID theft could be actually investigated and prosecuted?
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Mr. STENGER. Mr. Chairman, because of the fact that it really
cross-cuts many jurisdictions, I think the task force model that we
havewe are a very strong proponent of both the electronic crime
and the financial crime task forcesis really, ultimately, the answer to this situation; because we dont have thresholds for investigationsI know there was some discussion about thresholds for
prosecutionbut for us, as an investigative agency, we take everything individually on its merit. So if someone brings forth a case
to us on identity theft, we will take a look at it and try and work
it in the proper context.
Mr. SCOTT. So most of these can be solved, but they are laborintesive?
Mr. STENGER. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. SCOTT. My question is, how much would we need to appropriate? We appropriated a few million dollars when we passed the
last billthat was about 2 years ago. We had in there some funding for ID theft investigations. I assumed it was woefully insufficient. My question is, what would we need to do to have an operation that could routinely track these things down?
Mr. STENGER. I think because of the naturethe evolving nature
of this type of crime in cyberspace, it would be difficult to quantify
an exact amount of money, but I do think that we must maintain
recognition of the evolving nature of these crimes as well as legislation I think that is the right path to take, especially for identity
theft, because it is not only a problem here, it is a problem overseas. And that
Mr. SCOTT. You made a request for funding?
Mr. STENGER. Have we made a request? I would have to go back
specifically to track that, as far as
Mr. SCOTT. We would be looking for that, because we would like
to fund sufficient operation to deter people from committing identity theft.
Admiral Justice, you mentioned the legislation that you wanted.
Could you describe theexactly what conduct you want proscribed
in the new legislation?
Admiral JUSTICE. Yes, sir. We specifically are looking to make it
illegal to just operate one of these vessels in international waters.
A stateless vessel in international waters, if you are operating it,
that is a crime. There is no good
Mr. SCOTT [continuing]. Crime in the United States?
Admiral JUSTICE. It would be a crime punishable in the United
States, yes, sir. There is no reason to have that out there, other
than illicit activity.
Mr. SCOTT [continuing]. Any criminal activitywithout proving
any criminal activity, just the mere operation in international waters
Admiral JUSTICE. That is correct. Yes, sir. What happens is
Mr. SCOTT. A crime prosecutable in the United States?
Admiral JUSTICE. That is correct. Yes, sir. What happens, sir, is
you can see they are going along, and the minute they counter-detect us, they throw one switch, the thing floods, and it goes to the
bottom. And we cant get the cocaine off of it, and they are homefree.
Mr. SCOTT. If there is legitimate use of these
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Admiral JUSTICE. If there is a legitimate use, there would be a
state; there would be a country that owned it, an owner. And if
they could produce some ownership, it is not a crime. I am talking
about a stateless vessel, there is no proof of where they came from
or whose nationality it is. That is the key piece here.
Mr. GOHMERT. Thank you, Chairman. If you want to do something on that, I would be glad to join in with you. It does sound
like if it is a stateless vessel that it is, you know, basicallyspeaks
for itselfthat it is a violation, and that is why they are wanting
to remain anonymous.
Let me ask Admiral Justice, under the 1995 change to the Cuban
Adjustment Act, Cubans who attempt to enter the United States
over water are given parole status for 1 year and allowed to seek
U.S. citizenship if they make it to dry land. If they dont make it
to dry land, they are interdicted by the Coast Guard, detained, and
sent back to Cuba.
As a result of that policy, smugglers engage in dangerous practicesplace migrants in a dangerous situation. I am just wondering, have you ever questioned the wisdom of this wet-feet, dryfeet policy, and have you ever considered whether that policy ought
to be changed? I am just curious to your thoughts on it.
Admiral JUSTICE. It does create an extraordinary challenge to us,
and an incentive for lawlessness and for people to take great risks
as they try to get to our sandto our beach. And thatlaw, and
that constitutes a definite challenge in the Florida Straits; it requires us to have extraordinary amounts of resources dedicated to
the challenge, and it
Mr. GOHMERT. Well, without leaving our country completely unprotected, do you have a policy that would cause less challenge? Of
course, less challenge would be where you dont ever protect us
from anybody coming in, butpolicy like that
Admiral JUSTICE. What we are asking, sirand you supported it
and we ask you just aim at some more definitive supportthe
Interauthorization Act, the law we would like to see as I mentioned
to Congressman Coble, has stiffer penalties for the people we do
catch out there; and we catch people, again, daily running highspeed, overloaded boats. We get them to stop, and we dont have
enough teeth in the law to really make it not worth their time to
do that. We want to make it not worth their time to try to smuggle
people at high speeds, you know, into our Nation.
Mr. GOHMERT. Chief Self, my office was told that I could have
access to the remains of the plane that Clint Thrasher was flying.
Do you know who has possession of those remains?
Admiral JUSTICE. I believe it is going to be Air and Marine under
CBP, sir. The plane is presently located at the El Paso International Airport.
Mr. GOHMERT. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Stenger, who has primary jurisdiction to investigate things
like Congress computer systems being hacked into? Is that you or
FBIwho has primary jurisdiction?
Mr. STENGER. Depending on what kind of crime it iswe share
jurisdiction in many of these things. If it is a criminal attempt, obviously we share jurisdiction with the FBI; so either one of us or
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both of us could work together depending on what the case looked
like when it was initially brought forward. Certainly if it was terrorism, the Bureau would have primary jurisdiction.
Mr. GOHMERT. If it is terrorism; but if it is not for sure that it
is terrorism, then we dont have a delineation as to who takes priority in investigating that?
Mr. STENGER. Unless it is set by MOU, Congressman, it could be
co-worked together.
Mr. GOHMERT. Is there an MOU, or is it just MOUSE?
Mr. STENGER. I am not sure there is an MOU specifically on that
concerning the Capitol, but I do believe that we do have an excellent working relationship with the FBI on this
Mr. GOHMERT. Well, I understand that, but it sometimesI
know how it works: If two entities have the same jurisdiction,
sometimes there is a battle and things get falling in the cracks.
And we do have a problem, and I have been advised thatour
members financial information, some of it has been put online and
made available to anybody out there on the Internet; and that
wasnt even a crime, it was our own people getting it out there.
I am also told that the home address of all of you, all of us, all
of that information is obtainable on the Internet, and I am just
wondering if we dont need more protective laws to allow people to
have greater privacy, because there is so much out there on everybody. I was at a briefing back when I was a judge where we were
shown how people in prison, who may have been mad at us for
sending them there, could get on the Internet, not only find out
where exactly we live, floor plans for many of our homes, get a map
printed out of how to get there and where to go in the home to go
after whoever you want to goit is amazing what is out there.
Do you feel like there ought to be more extensive laws protecting
private information online?
Mr. STENGER. Congressman, I think that the globalization of information is a major problemit is a major issueand it is instantaneous. It is not like it used to be in just being delivered by the
mail; it is instantaneous sharing of information. Specifically for
this location and the Capitol, I believe the Capitol police would
probably have the primary jurisdiction, and depending on their resources and availability, they would work together with us or the
FBI.
But specificallyas mentioned by the congressman concerning
the new legislation, that is an issue. I think existing laws need to
be looked at, resources need to be looked at on a regular basis
Mr. GOHMERT. That is why we are asking you not just, Do we
need to look at it? but, What do you recommend? That is what
I am getting to. You all are supposed to be the experts.
Mr. STENGER. Well, I think the recommendation would be, as
crime evolves we do need to look at enhancing the existing laws.
First off, theglobalizationinternational aspect of it needs to be
addressed because it is continuing
Mr. GOHMERT. Well, I know it needs to be addressed, and we
thought we were doing that by inviting you up here. So we are trying to do that; we just need recommendations on exactly what to
do. So I would ask if you would submit information in writing to
us after the hearing that would give specific recommendations as
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to what we could do to better protect ourselves and everybody out
there, including youyou know if all your private information onlinehave you ever checked?
Mr. STENGER. It probably is, and I am, too, concerned; I think
it has got to be everyones concern. But we will be happy to provide
that to you.
Mr. GOHMERT. Okay, thank you.
Thank you, Chairman, for your indulgence.
This concludes the hearing. I would ask the witnesses toif
there are other questions from the panel, they will be submitted in
writingwould ask the witnesses to respond to those as quickly as
possible so that they can be made part of the record. Without objection, the record will remain open for 1 additional week for additional comments and anything else people want to introduce.
With that, the hearing is now adjourned. Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 11:46 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
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APPENDIX
MATERIAL SUBMITTED
FOR THE
HEARING RECORD
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN CONYERS, JR., A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, AND CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON THE
JUDICIARY
In 2002, we brought a number of agencies together because of their expertise and
capabilities so that we could create our best domestic defense against terrorism. Although no system is perfect, I think that weve had some success and I think that
were making progress. And, I thank Chairman Bobby Scott for holding this hearing
an exchange of information and feedback such as this hearing is crucial for ensuring
that we remain on the cutting edge against terrorism because sadly in todays
world, we cannot afford to let our defenses down.
In todays hearing, I would like to emphasize that in keeping those defenses up,
we also have to be sure that we are working just as hard to safeguard our civil liberties. After all, we could ensure our safety easily enough by clamping down on
rights and liberties but thats not what America is about. If we were to do that, we
would be safe but in effect, it would be a victory for the terrorists because they
would change our way of life. So, we must strike that balance in which were physically safe and safe within our liberties as well.
Today, we will hear from the Transportation Security Administration main law
enforcement function, the Federal Air Marshals, the Customs and Border Protection
(CBP), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Secret Service, and the
Coast Guard. Each has important functions and enormous challenges but mainly I
would like to discuss ICE CPB and their operations.
I have three main concerns that I would like to address and the first is humanitarian. Reports of poor conditions for detainees particularly along the Southwest
border raises some disturbing allegations. ICE and CBP have adopted a zero tolerance policy has pushed detention facilities past their capacities. Food, medicine,
even blankets are apparently hard to come by and people are sleeping on nothing
but concrete slabs. This concerns me because if the allegations are true, we are depriving people of basic necessities and it must be corrected.
The second is the delegation of ICE authority through the section 287(g) of the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA). We need
to be sure that state and local law enforcement officers who enforce ICE responsibilities receive the proper training. They must be trained in the laws pertaining to unauthorized aliens, what constitutes being an unauthorized alien and we also must
ensure and that their detention facilities meet the standards to ensure proper care.
The third concern is whether Due Process rights are being properly protected for
detainees. The zero tolerance approach along the Southwest border is not only causing poor conditions in the holding facilities but apparently, access to adequate counsel is also in doubt. There are so many detainees that one lawyer must handle up
to six or eight clients per day and there is little or no room to meet with clients
confidentially. This raises serious concerns about whether detainees are receiving
adequate counsel and if not, Due Process is not properly awarded in these cases,
which would be unconstitutional.
In addressing these issues, I would like to hear from these witnesses about how
their agencies are addressing the concerns. I should think that if ICE and CBP continue to pursue zero tolerance we would see requests for more and better detention
facilities that would include upgraded health care. We should also see continuous
improvement to their training of state and local officers to whom they delegate authority and requirements for those officers to have continuing education in order to
keep their authority. Finally, I would like to see recommendations for increases to
the federal public defenders offices so that detainees can be adequately represented
in our courts.
(39)
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I am looking forward to discussing these issues today because they are a great
concern to me. Again, I thank Chairman Bobby Scott for holding this important
hearing and I yield back.
f
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE SHEILA JACKSON LEE, A REPRESENTATIVE
IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS, AND MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME,
TERRORISM, AND HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Chairman, thank you for your leadership in convening todays very important
hearing on the oversight of the Department of Homeland Security. I would also like
to thank the ranking member the Honorable Louie Gohmert. Welcome to our distinguished panelists.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was established six years ago. The
National Strategy for Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Act of 2002
served to mobilize and organize our nation to secure the homeland from terrorist
attacks. As part of the creation of DHS, the following law enforcement agencies
were either transformed to DHS or created via consolidation of two or more agencies: the Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the United States Secret Service,
and the U.S. Coast Guard.
The primary reason for the establishment of DHS was to provide the unifying core
for the vast network of organizations and institutions involved in the efforts to secure our nation. In order to better do this and to provide guidance to the 180,000
DHS men and women who work every day on this important task, the Department
developed its own high-level strategic plan. The vision, mission statements, strategic
goals and objectives provide the framework guiding the actions that make up the
daily operations of the Department.
DHSs vision is simple: to preserve our freedoms, protect America, and secure our
homeland. Its mission is to lead the unified national effort to secure America; prevent and deter terrorist attacks and protect against and respond to threats and hazards to the nation; and ensure safe and secure borders, welcome lawful immigrants
and visitors, and promote the free-flow of commerce.
DHS has seven strategic goals and objectives. These include, awareness, prevention, protection, response, recovery, service, and organizational excellence.
DHS has engaged in much good work over the past six years, but more needs to
be done. The five agencies that comprise DHS, their functions, their accomplishments, and their challenges are the subject of this hearing.
I. TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (TSA)
The TSAs main law enforcement functions are carried out through the Federal
Air Marshals and the National Explosives Detection Canine Team Programs. The
Federal Air Marshals are the primary law enforcement entity within the TSA. They
are deployed on flights around the world and in the United States to ensure security
of the plane and the passengers during flight. The Federal Air Marshals staff several positions at different organizations such as the National Couterterrorism Center, the National Targeting Center, and on the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) Joint Terrorism Task Forces. The Federal Marshals also work among other
law enforcement and homeland security liaison assignments during times of heightened alert or special national events.
In its 2005 oversight hearing, the Subcommittee questioned administrators about
several issues including undercover appearance, aircraft boarding procedures, lodging policies and standards of conduct. On March 5, 2008, during a full Committee
hearing, DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff stated that the biggest air threat posed
to the U.S. is by private jets entering U.S. airspace. During this hearing, we plan
to follow-up on these issues and inquire about other aspects of air travel security.
II. UNITED STATES CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION (CBP)
CBP is responsible for protecting our nations borders from terrorism, human and
drug smuggling, illegal immigration, and agricultural pests while simultaneously facilitating the flow of legitimate travel and trade. CBP is responsible for guarding
7 thousand miles of land border of the United States with Canada and Mexico and
2 thousand miles of coastal waters surrounding the Florida peninsula and off the
coast of Southern California. The agency also protects 95,000 miles of maritime border in partnership with the United States Coast Guard. CBP is also responsible for
enforcing trade and tariff laws to ensure that industry operates in a fair and com-
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petitive trade environment. This hearing will examine CBP standards for questioning individuals at the borders, human trafficking and what CBP does to combat
this problem, and various problems associated with detention and removal.
III. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT
Immigration and Customs Enforcement is the largest investigative branch of

DHS. This agency was created after the tragic events of 9/11, by combining the law
enforcement arms of the former Immigration and Naturalization Service and the
former U.S. Customs Service, to more effectively enforce immigration and customs
laws and to protect the United States from terrorist attacks.
Since its creation, ICEs workload has continuously increased. ICE has increased
its worksite enforcement arrests from 510 in fiscal year 2002, to 4,383 in fiscal year
2006. ICEs Office of Detention and Removal Operations more than doubled its fugitive arrests from 7,958 in fiscal year 2005 to 15,467 in fiscal year 2006. In fiscal
year 2006 alone, ICE removed about 182,000 aliens from the United States through
its combined enforcement efforts. Nevertheless, at the end of fiscal year 2006, there
were still an estimated 12 million unauthorized aliens in the United States.
In a report to Representative Lofgren and myself, the Government Accountability
Office recommended several changes for ICE to improve its operations. GAO recognized that given the sheer number of unauthorized aliens, ICE would need to
prioritize workloads and exercise officer discretion. For example, an alien who poses
a threat via terrorism or other crime must be detained. On the other hand, humanitarian situations such as when an alien who poses no immediate threat and is a
primary care giver, may call for the ICE officer issue a notice to appear rather than
detention. Questions have been raised as to whether ICEs policies and training
have been sufficient to impart the necessary expertise to the ICE officer to equip
them to make the proper determination as to whether an alien should be detained
or issued a notice. In addition to needing increased officer discretion, detention
space may also factor into whether to detain an alien. The Subcommittee will request information about alternatives to detention and the acquisition of additional
detention space.
IV. UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE
The United States Secret Service protects the president and the vice-president,
their families, heads of state, and other designated individuals; investigates threats
against these protectees; protects the White House, vice-presidents residence, foreign missions, and other buildings within Washington, D.C.; and plans and implements security for designated National Special Security Events.
The Secret Service also investigates violations of laws relating to counterfeiting
of United States currency and other financial crimes including: access device fraud,
financial institution fraud, identity theft, computer fraud and other computer-based
attacks on our nations banking and telecommunications infrastructure.
The Subcommittee plans to inquire about when the Secret Service gets involved
in state or local identity theft and the resources the Service needs to adequately
combat identity theft and other cybercrimes in the United States and abroad.
V. UNITED STATES COAST GUARD
The United States Coast Guards law enforcement mission is maritime security.
The goal of maritime security is to protect Americas maritime borders from all intrusions by: (a) halting the flow of illegal drugs, aliens, and contraband into the
United States through maritime routes; (b) preventing illegal fishing; and (c) suppressing violations of federal law in the maritime arena. This Subcommittee is concerned about the Coast Guard updating its technology and increasing personnel to
meet its increasingly challenging mission. The Subcommittee will explore whether
the Coast Guard has sufficient resources to carry out its goals.
I am eager to hear testimony from, and question, all of the agencies represented
today. I welcome each of our distinguished panelists to provide insight into the various agencies that comprise DHS. The Department has achieved much over the past
six years in ensuring that America is a safer place; however, much work needs to
be done. I am hopeful that DHS will become more effective and diverse and that
this hearing will help start us along the way. Again, I welcome the testimony from
our distinguished panelists.
Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield the remainder of my time.
f
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Department of Homeland Security Law Enforcement Operations: Hearing

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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY LAW

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, TERRORISM,

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

MARCH 11, 2008

Serial No. 110135

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

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13:49 Nov 20, 2008

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

ROBERT C. BOBBY SCOTT, Virginia, Chairman

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