Senate Hearing, 110TH Congress - Courting Big Business: The Supreme Court's Recent Decisions On Corporate Misconduct and Laws Regulating Corporations
Senate Hearing, 110TH Congress - Courting Big Business: The Supreme Court's Recent Decisions On Corporate Misconduct and Laws Regulating Corporations
Senate Hearing, 110TH Congress - Courting Big Business: The Supreme Court's Recent Decisions On Corporate Misconduct and Laws Regulating Corporations
110783
HEARING
BEFORE THE
(
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON
48144 PDF
2008
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CONTENTS
STATEMENTS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS
Page
Cornyn, Hon. John, a U.S. Senator from the State of Texas, prepared statement ......................................................................................................................
Durbin, Hon. Richard J., a U.S. Senator from the State of Illinois, prepared
statement ..............................................................................................................
Leahy, Hon. Patrick J., a U.S. Senator from the State of Vermont ....................
prepared statement ..........................................................................................
Specter, Hon. Arlen, a U.S. Senator from the State of Pennsylvania .................
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WITNESSES
Bartholet, Elizabeth, Morris Wasserstein Professor of Law, Harvard Law
School, Cambridge, Massachusetts .....................................................................
Millett, Patricia Ann, Partner, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, Washington D.C. ............................................................................................................
Schultz, Osa M., Cordova, Alaska ..........................................................................
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(III)
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U.S. SENATE,
JUDICIARY,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:08 a.m., in room
SD226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Patrick J. Leahy,
Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Leahy, Whitehouse, Specter, and Cornyn.
COMMITTEE
ON THE
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Now we are going to look at a few others where big businesses
have been rewarded. In the Stoneridge case, the Supreme Court
held that pension funds and other investors in companies ruined by
fraudulent managers, like Enron, cannot recoup the money they
lost from those who knowingly facilitated the fraud. They are sending a signal, Now, look, dont go rob banks because they can go to
jail for that; just defraud people because they cannot recover from
you. And that leaves everyday Americans with no place to go.
More than a decade ago, the Exxon Valdez was run aground by
a drunk captain, somebody with a history of drinking problems,
leading to one of the worst environmental disasters to reach American shores. And the tragedy of it was that it was a totally preventable environmental disaster. A jury determined that Exxon Mobil
knowingly and repeatedly allowed a relapsed alcoholic to operate a
ship filled with oil through the Prince William Sound. They found
that for destroying the livelihood of thousands of Americans, they
should be punished by paying at least a small fraction of its annual
profits.
Exxon Mobil paid millions to fight that, all the way up to the Supreme Court. It paid off for them. The Supreme Court protected
them, read into the Constitution a protection for corporations that
simply does not exist in its text or its intent. A very activist Supreme Court helping out Exxon Mobil.
In his powerful dissent, Justice Stevens concluded that Congress, rather than this Court, should make the empirical judgments contained in the Courts decision that slashed the jury
award by $2 billion. Incidentally, that is just one-tenth of 1 percent
of Exxon Mobils revenue in a year. It is the equivalent to an ordinary American who may have created a terrible disaster in a town,
and they say, well, here, we are going to give you a $5 parking
ticket. It is about the same thing. And if Congress had wanted to
cap punitive damages for disasters that impact thousands of Americans, of course, we could have done so. We did not, specifically did
not. This is another line of cases where the Supreme Court has
misconstrued congressional intent.
Then the Supreme Court has eroded the role of civil juries and
shielded corporations from accountability through arbitration decisions. When we passed the Federal Arbitration Act, it was thought
to provide sophisticated business interests an alternative venue to
resolve their disputes. It was not intended to preempt State law or
be a hammer for corporations to use against individual customers.
It was never intended to be used for employment cases, but that
is what they are trying to do, and large corporations have benefited
from these expansive rulings, and they have inserted binding mandatory arbitration clauses in nearly every contract they draft. As
a result, millions of Americans are being found to have somehow
waived their constitutionally guaranteed Seventh Amendment right
to a jury trial, oftentimes either because they had no choice or
without even knowing it.
There are no juries of ones peers in the arbitration industry.
There is no appellate review. There is no transparency, and some
would argue no justice.
A jury found for the victims of the Exxon Valdez disaster. A jury
found for Lilly Ledbetter. But the Supreme Court displaced those
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judgments with their own. In so doing, it has removed the compensation initially awarded to these victims, and it prevents other
victims from redress.
Worse than that, by doing this they do not deter corporations
from the kind of conduct that created this in the first place. And
the significant financial consequences is a deterrent that corporations tend to understand, and that has been taken off the table.
So I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses and thank
them for traveling to be with us today. I know many came from
Alaska, and I note that several others affected by the Exxon Valdez
disaster came here today, and I appreciate your coming here.
Senator Specter.
STATEMENT OF HON. ARLEN SPECTER, A U.S. SENATOR FROM
THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA
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analysis of habeas corpus to John at Runnymede, 1215, and the
Magna Carta. And he also did describe the statutory remedy of habeas corpus.
But it is a very tortured reading of Rasul to say that the Court
did not put habeas corpus on constitutional grounds. And then the
D.C. Circuit, I think, just ignored their duty to follow the Supreme
Court. And the Supreme Court denied cert. There was a lot of speculation as to what was going on, and then when it came out about
how bad these Combat Status Review Boards were, there appeared
to be a change in the attitude of some of the Justices, and the petition for re-argument was granted. It takes five votes, four for cert.
So it is a healthy thing in our society to have this Committee
take a look at these issues. So I commend you, as usual, Mr. Chairman, for going into a very important subject.
Chairman LEAHY. Well, I appreciate your being here and
Senator SPECTER. I want to make one other comment. All these
empty chairs does not mean that people are not very concerned
about this issue or about the testimony. We have a very distinguished line of witnesses. We have multiple hearings all the time.
The Appropriations Committee is meeting as we speak on contracting in Iraq, and the Aging Committee is meeting as we speak
on key issues there. And it is a busy place, and we have people who
will be studying the transcripts and staffers will be. So we thank
you for coming, and I am going to have to excuse myself.
Chairman LEAHY. Thank you for mentioning that about the other
hearings. We all serve on half a dozen committees and subcommittees, and it seems they always meet at once. I especially wanted
to be here for this one.
Ms. Osa Schultz is from Cordova, Alaska. As a result of the
Exxon Valdez disaster, the fishing cooperative, the very successful
fishing cooperative Ms. Schultz and her husband were part of, was
forced into bankruptcy. So she experienced firsthand the devastation that the tragedy wrought on the livelihoods and lives of so
many in Prince William Sound. So we welcome you here today. I
know you are going to speak about the community and how they
were affected by this, and thank you for making the trip to Washington. Please go ahead.
STATEMENT OF OSA M. SCHULTZ, CORDOVA, ALASKA
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less than 10 percent of the oil during their attempted clean-up, and
its victims have not been fully compensated for their losses.
Exxons vast power and influence has tipped the scales of justice.
Now the largest corporation in the world with their inexhaustible
resources, they have managed to draw this case out with appeal
after appeal for over 15 years. For nearly a generation, our community has been the David to their Goliath.
I grew up in Portland, Oregon, and went to college in Eugene at
the State university. In the fall of 1979, I took a quarter off to visit
a friend who had recently moved to Alaska.
I was captivated by the town of Cordova and the incredible wilderness that surrounds it. It was on this trip that I met my future
husband, Ric. Ric took me out gillnetting on his boat, the Hypnotic.
I was hookedon fishing and the skipper! The excitement, the
beauty, and the satisfaction of catching the bright, lively, and often
elusive salmon was addicting. Ric and I fished together for over 10
years and continued to invest in our equipment to improve our
fishing operation.
In 1982, we joined a group of over 75 fisher men and women who
had recently established the Copper River Fishermans Cooperative. The co-op encouraged improved fish handling. Vessels started
to carry ice to chill the fish in advance of delivery and we used the
practice of bleedingcutting the gills to reduce bruising. Both are
now standard methods in the industry. We invested in significant
advertising strategies for our high-quality product and became the
vanguard for fresh salmon provided to a domestic market. By 1989,
over one-third of the gillnet fleet was supporting the Copper River
Co-op.
The Exxon Valdez spill tore that investment to shreds. With the
sound unfishable and so many fishing boats working on the cleanup, the co-op was forced into Chapter 11 and still has a substantial
outstanding loan. If the current ruling stands and the interest is
paid, each investor will stand to receive at most only 45 percent of
their original investmentfor money invested as much as 20 years
ago.
The devastation caused by the Valdez spill continues to this day.
Without fish to send to the market, we lost our niche; salmon from
other sources replaced it. Even with years of marketing strategy,
we still struggle to get back to where we were in 1988. In addition,
one of the four local processors, Chugach, went bankrupt as well
a facility that had the capacity to process more than all of the other
canneries combined. As a result, in the following years when the
fish were being caught in high numbers again, we lacked the processing facilities to handle them, and dollars that would have been
generated in Cordova were taken to other ports. Our lives, the fishing community, and the economy of Cordova have been devastated,
and because compensatory damages were calculated based on only
a few years, Exxon stands to pay pennies on the dollar.
I am not a lawyer, but I have read some of the briefs filed in the
Exxon v. Baker case. I urge the Committee members to read a brief
filed by four former Alaska Governors because it lays out in painful
detail the promises the oil industry made in order to win approval
for drilling in the Arctic and building the Trans-Alaska Pipeline
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and the provisions made by Congress to ensure that oil companies
acted with the highest degree of care.
Well, Exxon did not act with the highest degree of care. Far from
it, they acted recklessly. They knowingly put a relapsed alcoholic
behind the helm of a tanker navigating the treacherous waters of
Prince William Sound. That recklessness ruined the economic lives
of thousands of hard-working fisher men and women. It caused the
loss of traditional subsistence resources that are the cultural backbone of the Native people of Prince William Sound. It resulted in
the total loss of our herring fishery, once a vital keystone species
to the regions economy.
Exxon has delayed justice for nearly 20 years, and it seems likely
now to end up paying just a fraction of the damages they actually
caused. If our highest Court in America fails to hold them accountable, how can they ever be forced to take responsibility for their destructive actions?
I am just one person, but there are countless self-employed people and small business owners like myself that struggle to provide
for our customers and support the infrastructure that keeps America the incredible country that it is. The influence of corporate
power has become corrupt and divisive. Nowhere is this more true
than in the oil industry today. And no other corporation is more accomplished at this corruption than Exxon. The only way to get
their attention is to significantly affect their bottom lineProfit.
In setting a 1:1 ratio between the compensatory and punitive
damages, the high Court sends the wrong message. Punitive damages are the only means by which citizens can punish a corporation
for wrongdoing. In its ruling, the Court has said that the punishment should be equal to the losses of the victims. As great as our
losses areand they are substantialcomparingsorry.
Equating punishment to aequating punishment to a multi-billion dollar corporation with the losses of self-employed fishermen
such as my husband and me is in no way punishment or deterrent.
And it is not justice.
I call upon this Committee to lead the way in ensuring that no
corporation can ever do again what Exxon has done to Prince William Sound. In America, bottom-line corporate interests should
never trump the rights of individual citizens.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Schultz appears as a submission
for the record.]
Chairman LEAHY. Thank you, Ms. Schultz. And from the letters
I have received and others on this Committee have received, I
think you speak for an awful lot of people from that part of Alaska.
Ms. SCHULTZ. I do.
Chairman LEAHY. Our next witness is Professor Bartholet, professor at Harvard Law School. She teaches civil rights and family
law. The professor also has extensive experience as an arbitrator.
She has worked with a number of arbitration organizations, including the National Arbitration Forum. Her experience as an arbitrator was featured in a recent BusinessWeek cover story entitled
Banks vs. Consumers (Guess Who Wins).
Professor, please go ahead, and thank you for taking the time to
be here.
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STATEMENT
OF
ELIZABETH
BARTHOLET,
MORRIS
WASSERSTEIN PROFESSOR OF LAW, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL,
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS
Ms. BARTHOLET. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Senator Whitehouse.
My focus is going to be mandatory pre-dispute arbitration in both
the credit card and the employment areas. As you know, this is a
practice in which the big playersthe banks, the credit card companies, and employersforce upon the little playersthe people
who want credit cards and want jobsso-called agreements to arbitrate. Now, these are not, obviously, real agreements because those
who want and need credit cards and jobs have no real choice.
The practice of mandatory pre-arbitration is something that the
U.S. Supreme Court brought into being by its startling interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act, an interpretation that was a
complete surprise to many of those who had taught or written in
the area. It is an interpretation that Congress is free to correct by
corrective legislation.
I want to talk about two kinds of quite different problems with
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration. One is what I will call the private justice or biased forum problem: the risk that the big player
gets the justice that he pays for, the results that he wants, and the
little player gets no justice at all. The second problem is what I will
call the private law problem: the transformation of our civil rights
regime, designed by Congress to be important public law into something entirely different, something that fails to serve any public
law function.
So, first, the private justice or biased forum problem. This arises
from the nature of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration. The big player selects and pays the arbitration provider. Arbitrators only get
paid if they get selected to decide cases, unlike judges. The big
players, because they are repeat players in the system, are in a position to strike arbitrators who do not decide for them and, thus,
to choose the arbitrator, who is, of course, supposed to be unbiased.
My experience serving as an arbitrator for the National Arbitration Forum, NAF, is telling, but it is only one of several troubling
experiences that I have had as an arbitrator during the nearly
three decades that I have so served. My arbitration experience with
NAF began in 2001, when I agreed to be on a roster of arbitrators,
knowing very little about what they did. I then discovered that
they have locked up basically the credit card arbitration business
of the country.
Out of the first 19 cases that I was assigned by NAF, I decided
18 for the credit card company because it appeared that debts were
indeed owed, and I dismissed one case. After those 19 cases, I decided one case in which the alleged debtor happened to be a lawyer
and asked for a hearing. Not a single person before this case had
asked for a hearing. This alleged debtor also made a counterclaim
against the company, claiming that he had been significantly damaged by the whole process, which included damaging his credit rating.
In the end, after hearing the case on the merits, the first case
I heard on the merits, I ordered the credit card company to pay
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this alleged debtor some $48,000 and, of course, wondered to myself
whether I would ever see another NAF case.
I saw four more apparently because in the next four cases it was
too late for either side to exercise what NAF has in its rules as a
peremptory challengea challenge without cause. Of these cases
already in the works, I decided two that involved the credit card
company which had been involved in all prior 19 cases.
In the next 11 cases after that, all involving the same credit card
company, I was not allowed to decide a single case. The company
removed me by peremptory challenge in seven cases, and they
moved to dismiss in the remaining four cases, dismissal giving
them an opportunity to get the case before another arbitrator. They
simply needed to refile it.
In the first three cases in which I was removed, NAF sent me
copies of a letter that had been sent to the parties falsely informing
the parties that I was unavailable because of a schedule conflict.
Now, if a party is to have any opportunity to challenge the arbitrator for bias, they would like to know if a prior arbitrator has
been dismissed for some reason. So this false information going out
telling people that I had withdrawn because of a schedule conflict
seemed to me a pretty major problem.
At that stage, immediately after getting those misleading letters
and after having been disqualified for several cases, I attempted to
discuss with NAF personneland I discussed with personnel on
two levelsthe problems I saw with the fairness of their system
and got no satisfaction. At that point, I resigned from the NAF roster of arbitrators with a letter stating that the reason for my resignation was my concern about the NAF systems apparent systematic bias in favor of the financial services industry.
After that, NAF did its best to silence me from telling any part
of this story. A party who had a dispute which, by contract again,
was supposed to be in the NAF forum, wanted to prove that the
NAF forum was biased. Now, what the Supreme Court has told us,
of course, as part of the guarantee that arbitration will work okay,
is that people will have an opportunity to prove bias in the forum
if there is any such bias. So this party wanted to prove bias and
felt they needed my testimony because they had heard about my
story. They wanted my testimony to try to prove bias.
At that point, NAF tried to prevent me from testifying. They
moved to quash the discovery deposition. They claimed that the
confidentiality provisions in my original assignment agreement
with NAF, which I had terminated, barred me from testifying, even
as to general matters relating to bias in their arbitration system.
Obviously, I had told them I was not going to testify to anything
with respect to parties or cases.
Although I believed the NAF claim to be entirely frivolous, I felt
forced to hire a lawyer to protect myself. In the end, a Massachusetts court found that nothing in my agreement prevented my testifying about bias in the NAF system and ordered me to testify.
I concluded from my experience that the NAF pool of arbitrators
is likely to be overwhelmingly stacked against the consumer, with
arbitrators either being systematically removed if they rule against
the credit card companies, or arbitrators feeling pressured into always ruling for the credit card companies out of fear of removal.
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This, together with my other experience as an arbitrator and
reading of the literature, leads me to believe that the Supreme
Courts approval of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration has given
banks and credit card companies a private justice system in which
they can purchase the results they want, at the expense of the
debtors forced into the system.
I want, much more briefly, to address the second problem, which
I have called the private law problem. This problem is illustrated
in the employment discrimination area, which is an area where I
have taught for three decades and developed growing concern with
the impact of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration, both because of
the bias problem just discussed and because of the private law
problem. And I want to emphasize that these are two independent
problems. Even if the bias problem were to be solved, arbitration
is incapable of providing the kind of public law that I believe Congress intended when it passed the panoply of civil rights legislation
that includes Title VII, the Age Discrimination Act, and the Disabilities Act.
The Supreme Court in the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s treated
this law as important public law. By important public law, I
mean law intended to have an impact on society in a far-reaching
way. I mean what the Court did when they provided victorious
plaintiffs with attorneys fees, with the idea that they should act as
private attorneys general. I mean the class actions that enabled
thousands of class members to get relief who would have been unable to get relief otherwise. I mean the systemic proof that class
actions and broad discovery enabled. And I mean the systemic
theories like the disparate impact theory. And I mean the public
decisions which educated employers across the land
Chairman LEAHY. Professor?
Ms. BARTHOLET. Yes?
Chairman LEAHY. I am going to put your full statement in the
record because we want to leave time for questions in case we have
to get interrupted by votes. If you want to make a conclusory
Ms. BARTHOLET. I will make a very conclusory statement, which
is simply that in arbitration, none of this public law exists. Arbitration is designed for two individuals to solve little tiny problems
very quietly. And it is incapable ofand this is exactly why employers are flocking to arbitrationit is incapable of implementing
public law.
I think that because of this, these mandatory pre-dispute arbitration decisions of the Supreme Court are the single most important
and devastating decisions issued by the Court in the last three decades in terms of the rights of plaintiffs.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Bartholet appears as a submission for the record.]
Chairman LEAHY. Thank you very much.
Patricia Ann Millett is a partner at Akin Gump Strauss Hauer
& Feld, here in Washington. She co-heads the firms Supreme
Court practice. From August 1996 to September 2007, Ms. Millett
served as assistant to the Solicitor General at the Justice Department, had experience that most lawyers would envy. She has argued 26 cases before the Supreme Court.
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Thank you for being here, Ms. Millett, and please go ahead. Is
your microphone on? There you go.
STATEMENT OF PATRICIA ANN MILLETT, PARTNER, AKIN
GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP, WASHINGTON, D.C.
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of civil rights laws against not just core discrimination, but retaliation by employers against the exercise of those rights. And that is
very important because a right does not mean much if you are not
protected against being punished for asserting your rights.
They also adopted, in a case called Meacham, a strong rule in
support of employees on the burden of proof for the reasonable factor other than age issue in age discrimination cases.
In Federal Express v. Holowecki, they adopted a pro-plaintiff rule
on what it takes to trigger EEOC investigation of a claim.
In a case called Sprint v. Mendelsohn, they essentially said that
there is no per se rule against the introduction of what is known
as me too evidence in discrimination cases. Me too evidence is
when the employee wants to introduce evidence that other employees have been discriminated against by other supervisors, not involving their particular discrimintory event, but obviously showing
a broader atmosphere within a corporation.
The Court also addressed a number of preemption cases, and I
do want to clarify one thing, I think, in my written statement. I
left out the Chamber of Commerce v. Brown case, which was another preemption case the Court addressed this term. The Court
was fairly consistent on ruling in favor of preemption, although it
rejected a preemption argument in the Exxon case, and in that aspect ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. But, again, what is interesting
about the preemption cases is even broader unanimity. One of
them was 72; Riegel v. Medtronic, involving medical devices, was
81; two more were unanimous. And so what that means, I think,
combined with a broad consensus that we saw in the employment
right cases, is that in a lot of these areas of business, this is not
a Court where one or two Justices are going to change anything.
There is a lot of consensus that one does not always see in other
areas from the Court.
In the area of arbitration, which I know this Committee is interested in, the Court decided two cases this term. One was called
Preston v. Ferrer. That was decided 81 by the Court, and all it
held was that, where arbitration has been agreed to by parties,
there would not be a diversion to State administrative procedures.
What the Court did there was simply apply what it had held in
prior cases, holding that you do not get diverted to State courts
when you have an arbitration agreement, and that there would not
be a distinction for State administrative procedures. So, again, the
Court simply applied prior precedent that preceded the Roberts
Court and left it to direction from this body before it would change
course.
And then in a second case called Hall Street Associates v. Mattel,
the Court held that parties to arbitration cannot simply contract
out of the statutory standards of review set by the Congress in the
Federal Arbitration Act. That was a 63 decision. And in so holding, the Court again looked closely at the directive language of the
statute itself, a statute that said that arbitration decisions must be
enforced unless particular categories of exceptions delineated in the
statute were satisfied. And the Court specifically voted that policy
arguments were presented, but said those were for this body and
not for the Court.
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The last case I want to mention, is the Exxon case, the punitive
damages case, which is obviously an incredibly emotional subject
for many Americans. I think it is important to keep in mind what
exactly was decided in that case. What the Supreme Court decided
in a 53 decision written by Justice Souter was that, as a matter
of admiralty common law, there would be a 1:1 ratio for punitive
damages. There was no constitutional ruling, no constitutional
question in the case. The Supreme Court opened this aspect of its
ruling by noting that it had a common law job to do, but Congress
could change the decision.
What the Court emphasized most that it was looking for in the
area of punitive damages was some predictability and consistency
when it adopted the standard for punitive damages, just as Congress itself had required such consistency across criminal defendants in the United States Sentencing Guidelines and has set particular penalty ratios in many statutes. And the Court emphasized
that, because this was a case where the action was found to be
non-intentional, and there was not proof that Exxon had profited
from the activity, that a 1:1 ratio would be appropriate. The Court
left open whether a different ratio would be appropriate in a case
where there was intentional conduct or conduct that was taken
with a specific profit motive in mind.
The conclusion, again, is that this Court in the business area, as
in other areas, is demonstrating broad consensus. This is not the
area of the controversial 54 decisions that one hears about in the
press. And they are taking small steps and following paths that
have already been laid out by prior precedent, deferring substantially to the Congress in statutory areas.
Again, I think one should keep in mind in characterizing the Supreme Court, if I could just say lastly, that slightly over half of the
cases were decided this term in favor of business. They decided
more cases in favor of criminal defendants than they did in favor
of business this term. But no one wants to characterize it as a procriminal defense Supreme Court.
The important message is to look at everything in context and
look at an overall view of the Supreme Courts term, and I think
it shows a fair amount of balance in the business area this term.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Millett appears as a submission
for the record.]
Chairman LEAHY. Thank you very much. I am going to have to
be here, and I know others are going to have to leave, so I am
going to yield first to Senator Whitehouse for questions. But I am
going to put in the hearing record written testimony submitted by
Simon Lazarus of the National Senior Citizens Law Center; Jocelyn
Samuels of the National Womens Law Center; and Doug Kendall
of the Constitutional Accountability Center; and several fishermen
and Native Alaskans affected by the Exxon Valdez disaster.
Senator Whitehouse.
Senator WHITEHOUSE. Thank you, Chairman.
Ms. Schultz, thank you very much for being here. It makes a big
difference to us, dealing with what are often very kind of processy
and legalistic and legislative issues, to hear from people who have
been affected so directly and who, afterhow many years since
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Ms. SCHULTZ. Nineteen and a half.
Senator WHITEHOUSE. Nineteen and a half years, still feel that
the justice system has not served them and has instead been far
more beneficial to the big corporation at fault in this. And the
question of the big corporation being at fault, one of the phrases
that stood out to me in the Supreme Courts opinion was that the
Supreme Court said it found no earmarks of exceptional blameworthiness on the part of Exxon. And it was very much that determination that there were no earmarks of exceptional blameworthiness on the part of Exxon that drove the decision. In fact, it appears that if they had found earmarks of exceptional blameworthiness, the rule might have been different. That is where the standard cuts off.
So I am just wonderingI have not been up to see the damage.
You have lived with it for 1912 years. Did you see any earmarks
of exceptional blameworthiness in what took place and what led to
the destruction of your co-op?
Ms. SCHULTZ. Absolutely. The main thing is the loss of the herring fleet and the loss of the herring fishery, because that was a
keystone species. It started our season in the spring. That is where
the fishing activity started rolling. That is when the town came
alive. The work that was done on that fishery got everything financed because of that income. That was a third of the fin fish collected income for the season. It is gone completely. And it was not
until just recently that science has been able to prove that it was
a result of the spill. So that is why there was not any substantial
evidence for the court case in 1994.
Senator WHITEHOUSE. Professor Bartholet, it strikes me that the
jury system in our governmental structure, our constitutional
structure, has a significant governmental role. It is not just there
as a means for adjudication of disputes, at least in my view. I see
it as a vital part of what the Founders saw as popular Government.
And as I look around Washington and see the extent to which, you
know, money flows in this town and vested interests have huge
throw weight, we have an executive administration that often
seems, at least to me, to be in the pockets of certain industries, and
I doubt that the Founding Fathers were blind to the possibility
that the executive branch or the legislative branch could become
enthralled to special interests. And it strikes me that in that context, the independent jury system of people chosen at random from
the community to stand up for a real sense of justice was sort of
the last bastion of true democracy and a core piece of the popular
input that makes American democracy. And yet I see it constantly
under assault and getting very little of the respect that other institutions of Government ordinarily obtain. And I just wonder if you
would comment on those observations.
Ms. BARTHOLET. Well, certainly one of the many important rights
that mandatory arbitration takes away is the right to the jury trial,
so that when you are forced into arbitration by the kind of agreements that the Supreme Court has now approved, people lose their
right to a jury trial. I do think that is important. However, I would
say it is simply one of a range of hugely important rights that are
lost. I think the right to an unbiased judge is also important, and
I think that is gone with mandatory pre-dispute arbitration. I think
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the right to a judge or an arbitrator who actually understands the
lawyou are not going to get arbitrators who understand sophisticated employment discrimination theory. So
Senator WHITEHOUSE. Before my time runs out, which it is about
to, let me jump into the peremptory challenge rule, which strikes
me as institutionally biased when you are dealing with repeat players. The credit card companies keep coming back and back and
back and back again. They wrote the contract. They set this up.
They are there every time. And the individual litigants, if you will,
the supplicants, if you will, are there just that one time. And they
have no real idea who is for them or who is against them. They
have no institutional or vested interest in striking anybody. And so
it looks as if a very, very significant permanent bias has been deliberately built into the system. And I am wondering if you would
evaluate that in the light of laws that we have, frankly, against
outright rackets and schemes and artifice to defraud. Because it
strikes me that if you deliberately set up a mechanism whereby
one side has the ability to twist the system so that they win, and
you then sell it to people as a fair arbitration, somebody is being
defrauded out there, and I am wondering if you have considered it
from a civil or prosecutive point of view.
Ms. BARTHOLET. I would agree with you that it is a racket. I
think this system is completely stacked to simply benefit the credit
card companies. And peremptory challenge can sound fair to people
because, yes, it is a typical thing that exists in our court system.
But it is very different when, as you say, there is a repeat player
and the little guy does not have a lawyer, does not know the system, does not know who has been disqualified before or who might
have ruled for the credit card company before.
Senator WHITEHOUSE. And does not repeat.
Ms. BARTHOLET. The additional problem here is the financial
pressure that arbitrators are under, so most arbitrators, unlike me,
do arbitration as their main livelihood. Sometimes it is 100 percent
of their income, or it is most of their income. For me, it was 1 percent when I was working for NAF. My NAF income was 1 percent.
If you depend on your livelihood for these cases and you know
one side is going to use its peremptory challenge to get rid of you
if you displease themand that word is out. I mean, I learned it
and can testify about it. But the word is out. I mean, to me, one
of the really shocking things is that when I told my story to people
in the American Bar Association, on arbitration committees,
talkedyou know, people know this system is stacked, but nobody
is doing anything about it.
Senator WHITEHOUSE. My time has expired. Thank you very,
very much.
Chairman LEAHY. Thank you.
Senator Cornyn.
Senator CORNYN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to each
of the witnesses for being here.
I wonder, Ms. Millett, I see that you have argued before the U.S.
Supreme Court as an assistant to the Solicitor General during both
the Clinton and the George W. Bush Administrations. Could you
tell the Committee of your impressions of whether the way the
Court has handled its docket, the way it has conducted its business
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has been, in your view, dramatically different or not as compared
to thosecomparing those two administrations?
Ms. MILLETT. Thank you. I have seen very little change, certainly
no dramatic change at all. There are little things that would be of
no interest to the Committee but that are of interest to people who
argue in the Court about how Chief Justice Roberts conducts the
courtroom. But, overall, if anything, there is, as expressed this
term, really strong allegiance to stare decisis in the statutory area
and to following Congress lead when it writes a statute, giving full
effect to the terms of the statute, and to not jumping ahead and
overruling precedents. They were very firm about that this term.
But, overall, I think statistically is there a big difference? No. If
there is any big difference, it is the fact that they decided 58 percent of their cases in favor of criminal defendants this term, fewer
cases in favor of business. But, overall, there has been no dramatic
change. There are small ups and downs, and that is the way the
Court has always been. It is a reactive institution. It does not go
out like Congress and find issues. It waits for people to bring issues
to it. And some terms it has more of one issue than another, and
that is why it is very important to look over time at the Courts
operation.
Senator CORNYN. Some, including me, have been very pleased
with the elevation of Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito. Have you noticed from any empirical evidence any dramatic changes in the way the Court approaches its business as a
collegial decisionmaking body or the outcomes since those two Justices have been elevated to the Court?
Ms. MILLETT. This term saw a fair amount of unanimity, particularly in the business area. It goes beyond their two votes. As I said,
a number of the cases are coming down 81, 72 in the business
area and elsewhere. But what I saw this term that I think was
most interesting was that you sawon hot button issues like the
death penalty, the lethal injection case, or the voter ID case that
the Court addressed this term, where one might have thought before you would have 54 decisions or splintered decisions, we actually saw broader consensus with 72 and 63 decisions from the
Court. I think part of that is because Chief Justice John Roberts
and Justice Alito have made clear their allegiance to principles of
stare decisis and to a limited role for courts, taking small steps and
incremental measures. And Justice Stevens and some of the other
Justicessometimes Justice Souter, sometimes Justice Breyer
have joined in that.
Now, this is not universal. There are still controversial decisions.
But
Senator CORNYN. That will always be the case, I guess by definition, as those are the cases that make their way to the U.S. Supreme Court. But I agree with your comment about the apparent
influence of Chief Justice Roberts in particular, and not to take
anything away from Justice Alito, but since Chief Justice Roberts
is the Chief, it does appear that there are more consensus decisions
and not as many 54 sharply divided decisions on the Court, or at
least that is my impression.
But I am sure that with any court you are going to find cases
that you agree with, outcomes you agree with, and that you dis-
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agree with. As far as I am concerned, the Court was about batting
.500 over the last few decisions. The Boumediene decision I thought
was moving the goalpost right after the Court told Congress it
needed to be involved in the process of creatingof setting out detainee rights and creating a military commissions process, and
then we did so, and then the Court came back, moved the goalpost,
and Justice Kennedys opinion I thought really represented an
overreach by the judiciary on what should be the job of the executive and legislative branches.
Again, in the Louisiana child rape case, where the Court talked
about emerging consensuses with regard to views of capital punishment and apparently missed the fact that the U.S. Congress had
passed the death penalty for child rape in some instances and just
flat did not even note that fact in talking about its consensus. I
mean, the Court isthere are always going to be decisions that we
agree with and disagree with, which is our right. But ultimately in
our system it is the Court that makes the final decision, at least
until Congress then comes back and changes the statute, if it is a
statutory interpretation, or the people decide then in the Constitution to come out with a different outcome.
I want to askProfessor, I know you are critical of mandatory
arbitration provisions in contracts, but I want to ask you a little
bit about the history of alternative dispute resolution. I remember
that Chief Justice Burger, in particular, was critical of the delay
and the expense to ordinary litigants in litigation and worried that
that might be just as an effective bar to access to justice as anything else. And so the legal profession, working with the judiciary,
came up with a system of alternative dispute resolution, which I
concede is not perfect any more than our system of deciding cases
by litigation, ordinary litigation, is not perfect. But it was an attempt to try to address those concerns about the delays and the
cost of access to at least some impartial tribunal.
Do you agree that that is important to try to find mechanisms,
if we can, that can provide access to an impartial decisionmaker
that costs less money and reduces the time that could be otherwise
consumed in ordinary litigation?
Ms. BARTHOLET. Absolutely. I am a fan of ADR, which is part of
why I have served as an arbitrator for almost 30 years. But there
is an enormous difference between mandatory pre-dispute arbitration and post-dispute arbitration where the two parties genuinely
agree to have arbitration. When they make a genuine agreement
like that, the alternative is to go to court. In mandatory pre-dispute, it is all in the hands of the big player forcing it down the
throat of the other, and it is in the hands of the big player to design the process, pick the arbitration provider, and ensure the kind
of biased outcome that I think my experience with NAF illustrated.
Senator CORNYN. So you just think the fix is in and there is no
such thing as an impartial decision by an arbitration panel?
Ms. BARTHOLET. No. I just said that I believe in ADR, and I
think there is a huge difference between mandatory pre-dispute
ADR and authentic ADR, if you will, that if two parties genuinely
agree to do arbitration, it is a completely different matter.
Senator CORNYN. I see my time is up.
Chairman LEAHY. Thank you.
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Now, Ms. Millett, I should point outSenator Cornyn has mentioned the cases on the military commissions. There are some of
who feel that when the Supreme Court stands up for the Constitution, they are not really moving the goalpost. But I do take your
point that corporations have lost some cases in this term along
with big cases that they have won. My only concern is the trend
and its effect on ordinary Americans. In a lot of terms, the Supreme Court has ruled with the Chamber of Commerce 70 percent
of the time when they filed a brief. Now, that number by itself does
not mean that they are wrong. But I wonder, when you look at the
19-year litigation ordeal that Ms. Schultz went through, or the arbitration process that the professor has talked about, does that
sound fair to you?
Ms. MILLETT. To be clear, this term the Supreme Court ruled in
favor of the Chamber of Commerceonly about 50 percent of the
time, not 78 or 80
Chairman LEAHY. I was talking about the last two terms.
Ms. MILLETT. Well, the last term was aboutI guess if you average them, I supposeI am not good at math. Is that 68 or 60-something percent? It has not been 80 percent over the last two terms.
Chairman LEAHY. Seventy. I said 70.
Ms. MILLETT. I am sorry if I misunderstood, but I want to make
clear that this term business sort of won as much as it lost. And
I think questions of fairness are at some level policy questions.
What the Supreme Court was doing in these cases was applying
statutory text that was enacted by this body, signed by an assortment of Presidents, and adhered to its stare decisis rule in the statutory area, which is that Congress leads and the Court follows. A
lot of these decisions, especially the arbitration decisions, have
their roots back 10 to 20 years. All they did this term in arbitration
were very narrow applications of what had already happened before. So I think
Chairman LEAHY. Of course, there are cases where one would
argue that they did not follow the Congresss lead, the Ledbetter
case being an example of that. Many feel that not only the congressionalnot only the legislation, but the way that legislation has
been interpreted was not followed by the Court.
Ms. MILLETT. The Court does not always get it right. I am not
here to say that they do, and people will think different ones are
wrong and different ones are right. As a woman, I have enormous
sympathy for Mrs. Ledbetter and an understanding of how difficult
it is for someone faced with discrimination to realize it and to have
the courage to bring a complaint. It affects their livelihoods. Part
of that problem may also be it is good to have a Supreme Court
that has people who come from different backgrounds and different
experiences.
Chairman LEAHY. Well, you preach to the converted there. I have
recommended to the last four Presidents that they go outside what
I call the judicial monastery and pick somebodyI have done this
with both Democratic and Republican Presidents, recommend they
go outside the judicial monastery and pick somebody more in the
real world. When I hear members of the Supreme Court talk about,
well, if somebody can just take the time to do this or take the time
to do that, these are people that could plan something for 2:30 on
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June 12th 2 years from now and know they could do it. Most people in real life cannot plan something for 2:30 this afternoon. It is
things like that that are of concern.
The Exxon decision, I was concerned that what they are saying
is that the corporations have to be able to predict punitive damages. I am more concerned about the rights of people. I look at
what Ms. Schultz has said. They found damages after 19 years of
this on something where the Exxon Valdez and the corporation
were totally at fault. I think everybody agreed with that. Your
losses that you have suffered are not covered by that decision. Is
that correct, Ms. Schultz? I am speaking about you. I mean you
and the others in a similar position.
Ms. SCHULTZ. The compensatory damages were calculated for the
first 1 to 3 years, and they did not foresee how long it would take
our fishery to recover or that the herring would not come back at
all. And it also excluded a lot of claims, for instance, the devaluation of vessels and permits owned by fishermen which fell 60% or
more. These investments represented the equity that people had. It
was their retirement. And it just disappeared and it was never in
any way compensated for.
Our attorneys told us the punitive damages will take care of
that, dont worry about it. And now with the reduction not only
from the original case in 1994 being from $5 billion, down half, and
then down to a tenth, it has left us with nothing.
Chairman LEAHY. Professor, is there any doubt in your mind
based upon misleading letters that NAF sent to parties about your
unavailability, as you have testified, the unsatisfactory explanations you got from their legal counsel, that you were prevented
from deciding cases because you ruled once out of 19 cases against
them? In other words, you were not one who could be seen as every
single time ruling with them? I am not trying to put words in your
mouth. I will let you explain it the way you want.
Ms. BARTHOLET. There is no doubt in my mind, and indeed when
I said to the two staff people with NAF that this was what I had
to assume was the reason for my disqualification, one of them
agreed with me, and the other one did not deny it.
Chairman LEAHY. I am thinking when Professor Robert Lawless,
who testified in our first hearing, in this series of hearings on Supreme Court decisions, he talked about the National Arbitration
Forum. He said, Arbitrating a debt collection bypasses the normal
procedural safeguards that a court proceeding will give, and before
the NAF, the debt collector will almost always win. According to
the San Francisco city attorney, in 18,075 cases, the NAF ruled
against consumers in 18,045 of them. Professor Lawless suggested
they are acting more as a debt collector than an arbitrator. Would
you agree?
Ms. BARTHOLET. Well, yes, although I think there is nothing necessarily wrong with debt collection cases, and I will point out that
I myself ruled almost all the time, 18 cases, for the credit card company. So I think there definitely are valid claims that can be
brought to collect debts, and I do think the statistics do not tell the
full story in that sense that it makes it perhaps lookwell, I think
the importance of my story really is that it gets beyond the statistics, because you might well have a fair system in which credit card
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companies would win most of the time. And I think you have to get
beyond just the statistics to understand why the system is intrinsically unfair.
Chairman LEAHY. Might they feel moremight people feel
happier about the arbitration system if they felt they had a real
choice in whether to go before arbitration or not?
Ms. BARTHOLET. I think they would not only feel happier, but
they would get athey should feel happier because they would get
a different brand of justice, that if they were in a position after
they had a dispute to decide whether or not to agree to arbitration,
then the other side would have to be offering them an arbitration
system that was a fair deal as compared to going to court.
I mean, again, I am not a defender of the court system. It is in
many ways too expensive, takes too long; there are lots of problems
with it. So there may well be lots of times when it is better for consumers to have an arbitration system, and that is why, you know,
if you banned pre-dispute arbitration
Chairman LEAHY. What you are saying is give them a choice.
Ms. BARTHOLET. Give them a choice, and then you will get a better brand of justice.
Chairman LEAHY. Thank you.
Any other questions? If not, we have another hearing. Senator
Cornyn?
Senator CORNYN. If I could just ask questions on another brief
area, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman LEAHY. Of course.
Senator CORNYN. Thank you very much. While we are all concerned about the fairness of our justice system, I want to just ask
a couple of questions. I have introduced legislation that would address abuses by securities class action counsel, basically breaching
their fiduciary duty to the members of a class by not keeping them
fully informed or by perhaps even paying kickbacks to the class
counsel. Of course, this followed on the heels of a couple of highprofile scandals involving Melvyn Weiss and William Lerach for
which they ended up going to prison.
What was so shocking, I think, about that was that the Wall
Street Journal reported that Mr. Lerach, when he was confronted
about his conduct, he said, Believe me, it was industry practice.
And the Washington Post editorialized in response to the scandal
that what is needed now is a sober discussion about how best to
achieve a fair, more balanced legal system through comprehensive
tort reform. . . . Smart and ethical businesspeople and lawyers
and, yes, there are many who fit the billwould be wise to start
working together to craft such a fix.
The Dallas Morning News in my home State called the scandal
evidence of one of the dirty little secrets of securities fraud cases
kickbacks and other secret arrangements that provide a pile of
cash to lawyers and far less to the supposedly defrauded ordinary
investors.
And I would just ask Ms. Millett, is this an area that you think
would be worthy of Congresss scrutiny, perhaps even holding hearings to look at whether there are things we might be able to do to
help make sure that when securities class action litigation is initi-
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ated, that it actually benefits the class members, the defrauded investors, and not just the lawyers who bring the lawsuits?
Ms. MILLETT. This is not my area of expertise, but I do not think
anyone, certainly any lawyer, could be opposed to efforts to make
lawyers and the legal system be responsive to the people it is supposed to serve. And it is always an embarrassment to me as a lawyer when things like this come out, because I believe very highly
in the integrity of our profession and of our court system. And so
I think certainly when problems arise, it is very important for this
body to look and to examine those, and those kinds of measures are
what the Supreme Court then follows. The Court cannot solve
these problems alone. It can only deal with the cases that come to
it. It is for this body to deal with the more intrinsic problems. Beyond that, I am not an expert to know the details of it one way
or the other, but no one can be opposed to making lawyers and the
system more responsive to the people it serves.
Senator CORNYN. On the panel, you have two former Attorneys
General and a former prosecutor, and it would be my hope that
you know, certainly we all as members of the profession do not believe that all lawyers are bad.
Ms. MILLETT. I hope not.
Senator CORNYN. Most lawyers in my experience do try to practice in an ethical and upright way, but I think this is an area that
would certainly be worthwhile to make sure that the persons for
whom the litigation is brought actually benefit and not just a lawyer who is engaged in perhaps unethical or even illegal activity.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman LEAHY. Thank you, and we will keep the record open.
You will see your transcript, and if you look at it and think, I
should have added whatever, obviously we will leave it open for
that. I appreciate all three of you taking this time to be here. We
are not trying to play a game of gotcha. If you want to add things
to it, feel free, and I will also hold it open if others want to ask
questions.
I thank you for taking the time. We have hundreds of hearings
going on on the Hill every day, and I always feel so gratified that
people take time from their own busy lives to come here to testify.
It means a lot to all of us.
Senator Cornyn, I thank you, and, of course, Senator Specter and
Senator Whitehouse, and the others and their staffs who will have
questions.
Thank you very much. We stand in recess.
[Whereupon, at 11:20 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
[Questions and answers and submissions follows.]
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