2010 Vol X No 1 IJGFM

Vol.X No.
1 2010
International Consortium on Government Financial
Management
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Consortium on Governmental Financial Management is dedicated to improving financial
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Copyright 2010 by the International Consortium on Governmental Financial Management
International Journal of Governmental Financial Management i

International Journal of
Government Financial
Management
Vol. X, No 1, 2010
Published by
The International Consortium on
Governmental Financial Management
Alexandria, Virginia
United States of America
International Journal of Governmental Financial Management ii

International Consortium on Governmental Financial
Management
General Information
“Working globally with governments, organizations, and individuals, the International
Consortium on Governmental Financial Management is dedicated to improving financial
management so that governments may better serve their citizens.”
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International Journal of Governmental Financial Management iii

Foreword
The world appears as a set of contradictions. High levels of government spending have
prevented, for the present at least, a full-scale economic decline. But it is not clear that
economic revival will be achieved soon nor the jobs and real economic growth which are
needed to eradicate the poverty that still scars the globe. There are also contradictions over
government spending. So, for example, whilst the US, UK and other governments face large
scale opposition to their military interventions, it is social spending which is still questioned
by many of their legislators. Barak Obama faced sustained opposition to the introduction of
health reforms which will eventually give access to modern health-care to around 30million
Americans. In the UK strikes are threatened in universities and the public service as a
reaction to reduced spending whilst the government appears powerless to prevent the
continued payments of bonuses to directors, even in banks which have been taken into public
ownership. In addition, both the main parties in Britain are promising significant reductions
in public spending to bring government debt down to a ‘sustainable’ level.
Greece appears to be the test case, with a series of general strikes in opposition to the
draconian public spending cuts aiming to reduce the level of the government’s budget deficit.
It is ironic that it was the toxic debts of the banks that led to the credit crunch and the
resulting world recession. However, it is these same financial institutions who are now
determining whether government debt, arising from the need to save their own banking and
financial sector, is sustainable.
In this situation it is to be hoped that public sector financial managers and auditors will gain
greater self-confidence. After two or three decades of criticism of so called public sector
inefficiency and exhortations for the public sector to adopt private sector approaches, the
experience of the global recession should lead to some serious re-thinking – a process which
this Journal is attempting to play an active role.
The first paper of this issue, by Petri Vehmanen of the University of Tampere, Finland
provides an insightful critique of the draft conceptual framework recently issued by the
International Public Sector Accounting Standard Board. Petri observes that whilst the prime
aim of private sector financial statements is to provide information for investors to make
decisions about the entity, the prime purpose of public sector financial statements is to
enhance accountability. This should be recognised and would result in the definitions of such
prime elements as assets and liabilities being revised. His paper also recasts the qualitative
characteristics of public sector financial statements. Petri concludes by saying that his
proposals “are by no means radical”. However, they do provide a comprehensive and
damming critique of the work of the International Public Sector Accounting Standard Board
and so it is re-assuring that so few countries have yet to adopt their approaches to accrual
accounting or indeed the cash basis of accounting.
Our second paper is a further part of the series of articles in which Norvald Monsen has
outlined a uniquely public sector approach to accounting and book keeping – cameral
accounting. This was developed in German speaking counties and, until now, has remained
largely unknown to English readers. Norvald provides an overview of the main tasks of
traditional public sector accounting, followed by a detailed exposition of administrative
cameralistics, focusing on the closing of the accounts and budgetary comparisons. A
commentary section then explains how the four tasks of traditional public sector accounting
are taken care of within cameral accounting. This is finally compared with both traditional
International Journal of Governmental Financial Management iv

commercial accounting and the new public sector accounting outlined in the International
Public Sector Accounting Standards.
The next paper, by Hany H. Makhlouf, provides a useful introduction and overview of
sovereign wealth funds. These funds managed by 23 countries, mainly those with significant
income from natural resources, for example, oil, have been of increasing interest in recent
years and are expected to grow in the future if, as expected the price of crude oil triples in
price over the next 20 years. However, the global economic meltdown had a major impact on
their success and led many to a re-think of their strategic approach.
Our next two papers consider two aspects of public sector audit. The first by Hussein
Mohamed El-Nafabi considers the issue of corruption in Sudan and the important role of the
Auditor General in the fight against it. The objective of this study is to address the perverse
incentives for financial corruption and try to provide practical solutions. It is recognised that,
as in many countries, financial corruption is deeply rooted and institutionalized and the fight
against it is likely to be long and difficult. However, the paper ends with a series of
recommendations to assist with this struggle.
In the next paper, Andy Wynne considers the key issue of independence for supreme audit
institutions (auditors general in English speaking countries). Models of public sector
‘external’ audit type institutions are described for English and French speaking African
countries. Neither approach can claim to fully meet international standards for independence,
but different approaches to the provision of audit type services are considered to be
acceptable. This emphasises the need to understand existing systems before external models
are adopted as part of a reform process.
In the next paper Hassan A. G. Ouda returns to the issue of the introduction of accrual
accounting. He describes a comprehensive model of the transition framework that aims at
explaining the whole reform process including all relevant factors. The model takes into
consideration the fact that the transition to accrual accounting is a major cultural,
administrative and technical change and, in order to successfully be adopted, must take place
in phases with a clear plan of progress established from the outset. However, the challenge of
demonstrating the actual (as opposed to the assumed) benefits of moving to accrual
accounting is not taken up in this paper.
In two relatively short articles, Michael Parry first proposes a definition of the modified cash
basis of accounting and then describes the four dimensions of public financial management.
We welcome this approach of relatively short articles addressing key issues in governmental
financial management and would encourage other authors to follow Michael’s example in
future issues.
As initiated in our last issue, we end this issue with a section introducing recent public
financial management publications and other resources which we hope will be of interest to
readers of the Journal. We would be pleased to receive reviews and suggestions of other
resources which we should refer to in future issues.
If you would like to continue the debates raised in this issue please start thinking about
contributions for the next issue of this Journal, the ICGFM blog or attend future ICGFM
events. We look forward to hearing from you!
Andy Wynne Doug Hadden Jim Ebbitt

Editor Vice President: Communications President
International Journal of Governmental Financial Management v

May 2010 Issue
1. A Science-Based Approach to the Conceptual Framework for General Purpose
Financial Reporting by Public Sector Entities………………………………………...1
Petri Vehmanen
2. Public Sector Accounting: Democratic control of public money by using

administrative cameralistics………………………………………………………….20
Norvald Monsen
3. Sovereign Wealth Funds…………………………………………………..…………35

Hany H. Makhlouf
4. Public Financial Management in Sudan……………………………………………...42

Hussein Mohamed El-Nafabi
5. Independence of Supreme Audit Institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa………………..55

Andy Wynne
6. A Prescriptive Model of the Transition to Accrual Accounting in Central

Government…………………………………………………………………………..63
Hassan A. G. Ouda
7. A proposed definition of the Modified Cash Basis…………………………………..95

Michael Parry
8. The Four Dimensions of Public Financial Management……………………………..98

Michael Parry
9. Recent Public Financial Management Publications and other Resources…………..107

Andy Wynne
International Journal of Governmental Financial Management vi

A Science-Based Approach to the Conceptual Framework for
General Purpose Financial Reporting by Public Sector
Entities
Petri Vehmanen - [email protected]
University of Tampere, Finland
Abstract
The International Public Sector Accounting Standards Board (IPSASB) has recently pub-
lished a Consultation Paper on its Conceptual Framework for General Purpose Financial
Reporting by Public Sector Entities. The author considers that there are problems in the
Consultation Paper, and the aim of this paper is to analyze conceptually four of the problems
in detail. These are:
1. the meaning of the term “conceptual framework” in general purpose financial re-
porting by public sector entities
2. the objectives of financial reporting by public sector entities
3. the scope of financial reporting by public sector entities, and
4. the qualitative characteristics of information included in general purpose finan-
cial reports.
Conclusions are derived on each topic. The meaning of the term “conceptual framework” is
understood as a set of coherent principles and underlying concepts that are formulated to
enhance understanding rather than as a deductive conceptual system for which the truth is
established empirically by applying scientific method. The two objectives of financial
reporting (i.e., accountability and decision-usefulness) in the IPSASB Framework should be
prioritized to cope with the tension that is inevitably between them. The scope of financial re-
porting by public sector entities is wider than that of business entities which has implications
for the concept formation. This should be given additional attention. Finally, the most signifi-
cant result of the paper is its revised system of the qualitative characteristics of information
included in general purpose financial reports.
Keywords: Conceptual framework, scientific method, faithful representation, measurement,

relevance, reliability
Introduction
The International Public Sector Accounting Standards Board (IPSASB) has recently pub-
lished a Consultation Paper (IPSASB CP, 2008) covering the following four areas of its
proposed conceptual framework:
• The Objectives of Financial Reporting
• The Scope of Financial Reporting
• The Qualitative Characteristics of Information Included in General Purpose Financial
Reports (GPFRs), and
• The Reporting Entity.
International Journal of Governmental Financial Management 1

The author considers that there are problems with the Consultation Paper and the aim this
paper is to discuss the four most important problems and to propose some revisions. More
specifically, the following four topics are covered:
1. The meaning of the term “conceptual framework” in the phrase “international
conceptual framework for general purpose financial reporting (briefly, financial
reporting) by public sector entities”;
2. The objectives of financial reporting by public sector entities;
3. The scope of financial reporting by public sector entities; and
4. The qualitative characteristics of information included in general purpose
financial reports (GPFRs).
1. A conceptual framework may have two distinct meanings. Each meaning is

communicated using different concepts and terminologies. The problem with the IPSASB
Framework is that it takes the meaning for the conceptual framework from the one
approach but the concepts and terminology from the other approach. This will result in
misunderstandings. The most harmful of these is the illusion of certainty that the IPSASB
Framework is likely to create.
2. The objectives of financial reporting by public sector entities are seen in the IPSASB
Framework as providing information about the reporting entity useful to users of GPFRs
for two kinds of purposes: accountability purposes and decision-making purposes
(IPSASB CP, 2008, p.8). The problem lies with the breadth (or extensiveness) of these
objectives. Accountability is related with the past, or more specifically, with the control
of the managerial actions taken in the past while decision-usefulness is related with the
future, that is, with the usefulness of information in forecasting relevant outcomes of
future phenomena. There is a clear tension between these two perspectives. Financial
statements report past events but may use valuations based on future costs or revenues;
the choice does to some extent influence their usefulness for, respectively, accountability
or decision making. Hence it is difficult to construct the financial statements of an entity
without giving the priority to one perspective or the other. Thus it should be explicitly
said which perspective is used in preparing these “general purpose” financial statements
and which perspective is then accounted for by supplying additional information. Using
the term “general purpose” is actually hiding the problem and the term is therefore
somewhat misleading.
3. The scope of financial reporting encompasses the provision of financial and non-financial
information about a total of five items including the two that are familiar from the
business environment:
(1) economic resources and claims to those resources (the balance sheet) and
(2) the effect of transactions, other events and activities that change the economic
resources and claims to those resources (the income statement and the statement of cash
flows).
The additional three items are:
(3) the reporting entity’s compliance with relevant legislation or regulation and legally
adopted or approved budgets used to justify the raising of monies from taxpayers and
ratepayers;
(4) the reporting entity’s achievement of its service delivery objectives; and

(5) prospective financial and other information about the reporting entity’s future service
delivery activities and objectives, and the resources necessary to support those activities.
The additional items make the scope of public sector financial reporting larger than that for
private sector business entities and reflect the wider range of potential users of the GPFRs of
public sector entities.
The problem is that the proposed conceptual framework does not sufficiently acknowledge
that this wider scope may have implications for the definition and measurement of some key
concepts, particularly the definition and measurement of an asset. In the context of business
entities in the private sector the objective is to provide financial information about the
reporting entity that is useful to present and potential equity investors, lenders and other
creditors in making decisions in their capacity as capital providers. The context of public sec-
tor entities is more diverse (cf. IASB ED, 2008, p.14 and IPSASB CP, 2008, p.18) thus
requiring further analysis of the definition and measurement of an asset.
4. The qualitative characteristics of information included in GPFRs are defined as the attrib-
utes that make that information useful to users for accountability purposes and for making
various decisions. There are at least three problems concerning these attributes. The first
of them, which is also acknowledged in the Consultation Paper, is that in practice all the
given qualitative characteristics may not be fully achieved, and therefore a balance or
trade-off between certain of them may be necessary (IPSASB CP, 2008, p.31). That, of
course, is true and requires no further comment.
The second problem concerns the derivation of the qualitative characteristics. They are
just enumerated in the Consultation Paper without an explicit attempt to derive them from
the concept of usefulness. To describe the process, the Consultation Paper only explains
that these qualitative characteristics have been “developed” after considering the
qualitative characteristics in the IASB Framework (IASB ED, 2008). Obviously some
“development” has been required. As the Consultation Paper indicates, the qualitative
characteristics of information included in GPFRs must:
(a) respond to the objectives of GPFRs of public sector entities (which are to some extent
different from those of the business entities in the private sector), and
(b) reflect a potentially broader scope of financial information than that which the IASB
has currently identified (IPSASB CP, 2008, p.31).
Despite these deficiencies in the process of “developing” the qualitative characteristics, the
process itself will not be further commented on in this paper. Instead the focus will be on the
outcome, that is, on the qualitative characteristics themselves, wherein the third problem lies.
This is the terminology of the qualitative characteristics and the underlying concepts. The
concept of faithful representation that has been borrowed from the theory of measurement
should be replaced with the more familiar concept of reliability. Relevance and reliability
should be regarded as the two fundamental qualitative characteristics of useful financial
reporting information (cf. IASB ED, 2008, pp.35-38). The concept of verifiability should be
considered subordinate to reliability and given its customary, more restricted scientific
meaning (to be explained later). Moreover, to fill the resulting gap, the new concept of
supportability should be introduced and defined. In addition, all the constraining factors
should be regarded as elements of sufficiency (also to be explained later). Therefore, to
ensure usefulness of the reported information, it should have the fundamental qualitative
characteristics of relevance and reliability (or freedom from error, if preferred) under the

general constraint of sufficiency. These three key concepts are hierarchical (as will be
explained later).
The structure of the paper is as follows. After this introduction there will be a more detailed
discussion on each of the four problems mentioned and introduced in the above numbered
list. The discussions will then be summarized in the concluding remarks after which there
will be the list of references and an appendix where the scientific method is briefly reviewed.
The meaning of an international conceptual framework

The Consultation Paper does not define the phrase “international conceptual framework”, but
it says enough to be able to conclude the intended meaning. The Consultation Paper explains
that the IPSASB Framework will establish the concepts that underpin financial reporting by
public sector entities that adopt the accrual basis of financial accounting (IPSASB CP, 2008,
p.6). Generally speaking this description gives the concept of framework about the same
meaning that, for example, Hendriksen and van Breda (1992, p.22) obviously have in mind
when they define the concept of (accounting) theory:
“Accounting theory has been defined as a coherent set of logical principles that:
1. Provides a better understanding of existing practices to practitioners, investors, managers,
and students.
2. Provides a conceptual framework for evaluating existing accounting practices.
3. Guides the development of new practices and procedures.”
Here the word “theory” refers to an agreed-upon coherent set of logical principles expressed
in specific terms. The same applies to the word “framework”. The principles involved are se-
lected to enhance understanding and thus facilitate communication. Such principles can never
be refuted. There is no empirical evidence that could contradict with them. Therefore, the ac-
ceptance of any such theory is a matter of agreement rather than a matter of truth. This is in
sharp contrast to what may be said about the more rigorous empirical theories. Their accep-
tance is based on the truth which must be established using the so called “scientific method”.
Thus the term “theory” has two distinct meanings. It may be understood as a framework
consisting of a set of coherent principles and underlying concepts that are formulated to en-
hance understanding or it may be understood as a deductive conceptual system for which the
truth is established empirically by applying the scientific method. To elaborate the difference
between these two meanings, let us examine the scientific method and its key concepts.
The meaning of the scientific method is a complex matter because there are so many different
techniques at the practical level. However, at the sufficiently general level one can identify a
pattern in any empirical scientific research that may be called the “scientific method” (see,
e.g., Cohen, 1964, p.79). In the heart of this pattern there is the continuing cycle that is illus-
trated in Figure 1 and discussed further in the Appendix using citations from the literature.
The cycle starts from observable empirical facts (phases 1 and 2). It continues with logical ar-
gumentation using those facts (phase 3) and theories or models (phase 4) to derive statements
that are either theoretical propositions (phase 5a) or empirical propositions (i.e., hypotheses)
(phase 5b). They offer a link back to observable real-world phenomena (phases 6 and 7). This
link is crucial in the proper verification of empirical theories.

5a. OUTPUTS
Theoretical proposi-
tions that cannot be
4. EMPIRICAL THEORY directly verified
3. INPUTS
The construction or revision
The first link
of the theory and the deri-
to observation
vation of propositions 5b. OUTPUTS
Propositions that claim
something about the
observable world
9a. CONFIRMATION Agreement

The theory gains support
(but is not proven true)
8. VERIFICATION
Derived propositions
are compared with
measurements
9b. REFUTATION
The theory is proved false
(or the test setting
inadequate) Disagreement
10. REVISIONS
Improvements are
to be continued
indefinitely
2. OBSERVATION 7. OBSERVATION
Measurement refers to Measurement refers to
quantitative observation quantitative observation
1. REAL-WORLD PHENOMENA, 6. REAL-WORLD PHENOMENA,

i.e., empirical facts about the reality i.e., empirical facts about the reality
under study (experience) under study (experience)
Figure 1: The continuing cycle of scientific method

Verification (phase 8) connects theoretical thinking back to observable phenomena. It pro-
vides the observer with empirical evidence that may or may not support the proposed theory.
When the facts and hypotheses agree (phase 9a), the theory is said to be confirmed. It has
gained empirical support. This does not mean, however, that it has been logically proven true
because it is always possible that the very same empirical propositions could have been de-
rived from some competing but different theory. When the facts and hypotheses disagree
(phase 9b), the theory together with the test setting is said to be refuted (or “falsified”). It has
been logically proven that something is wrong in the sense that positive results were not dis-
covered and therefore revisions are needed (phase 10). This process continues indefinitely.
Regarding the implications of the scientific method, a few points are of particular importance.
First, scientific method consists of an endless cycle, where one starts from empirical observa-
tion and ends in empirical observation. Second, from this it follows that the concept of meas-
urement must be inextricably linked to empirical observation. Third, the process of verifica-
tion cannot be properly carried out without true measurements (see phases 8, 9a, and 9b in
Figure 1). Fourth, any attempt to verify without true measurements will lead to speculative
information that does not meet the requirements of empirical science.
Thus it is concluded that the IPSASB Framework is not proposed as an application of the
scientific method. The Framework is not an empirical theory that might be refuted by
appropriate empirical evidence. Therefore it is misleading to adopt terms from the scientific
method but not their meaning. Where scientific terms are being used their accepted meaning
in scientific literature should also be accepted. To follow this principle the qualitative charac-
teristics proposed in the Consultation Paper (IPSASB CP, 2008, pp.31-39) should be modi-
fied. The details will be discussed in the section preceding the concluding remarks.
The objectives of financial reporting by public sector entities

The Consultation Paper (IPSASB CP, 2008, p.18) recognizes that the objectives of financial
reporting are at the core of the Framework and that financial reporting is not an end in itself.
The ultimate purpose is to provide information useful to users of GPFRs which means that
the document should specify (a) who the users are and (b) what kind of information the users
are assumed to require.
(a) The Consultation Paper (IPSASB CP, 2008, p.18) gives a long list of potential users
including taxpayers, citizens and other recipients of services from government as well as the
legislature and oversight bodies. Users such as these are not given as users of general purpose
financial reports by business entities in the private sector. For these reports the list of users is
much shorter consisting typically only of equity investors, lenders and other creditors. More
precisely, the objective of the reports by business entities in the private sector is to provide
financial information about the reporting entity that is useful to present and potential equity
investors, lenders and other creditors in making decisions in their capacity as capital
providers (IASB ED, 2008, p.14).
It is obvious therefore that the number of different users of GPFRs by entities in the public
sector is far greater than the number of different users in the private sector. What is not so ob-
vious, however, is whether this fact has any impact on the kind of information that will be re-
quired by the users. That is, the number of different users of GPFRs would not be so impor-
tant if different users found the same kind of information useful. Is this really the case?
(b) From the perspective of how information should be classified in terms of its usefulness to
users the Consultation Paper identifies two categories of information. The first one consists of

information that is useful for accountability purposes, and the second one consists of
information that is useful for decision making purposes, or more specifically, in making
resource allocation, political and social decisions (IPSASB CP, 2008, p.8).
Two points should be noted. First, it was recognized long ago, in the accounting literature
about private sector business entities, that an accounting theory or framework developed
under the accountability view differs in many respects from a theory based on the decision-
oriented view (e.g., Ijiri, 1975, pp.ix-xi). For example, while the decision-oriented view
emphasizes the usefulness of information to decisions, the accountability view emphasizes
the plausibility to evaluate the past performance of management on the basis of the ac-
counting system as a whole, or while the decision-oriented view emphasizes unbiased infor-
mation for decision making, the accountability view emphasizes such designs of accounting
systems that make it difficult or impossible to produce biased information at all. It is evident
that the potential benefits involved cannot be simultaneously maximized in a single account-
ing system, and therefore one view or the other must be given the priority. This, however, has
not been done in the Consultation Paper. The issue has not even been discussed.
Second, there are many kinds of decisions and many kinds of information need. The Con-
sultation Paper (IPSASB CP, 2008, p.20) claims that some of these needs are similar for en-
tities in the private sector and entities in the public sector. To some extent this claim is proba-
bly true but in general the decision-making model for investors in the public sector is not as
straightforward as it is in the private sector. In the latter the risk-adjusted return on in-
vestment is the overriding criterion (see, e.g., Ross and others, 2002, chapters 10 and 12).
Potential investors in the private sector are typically seen to focus almost exclusively on the
forecast future cash flows and the risk involved.
This model of how investors are assumed to behave in the private sector has been so influen-
tial that it has even effected the definition of an asset which is now typically defined in terms
of “future economic benefits” that “are expected to flow to the entity” (IASB Framework,
par. 49(a)). What is important here is that eventually all the future economic benefits are
assumed to flow to the entity in the form of cash and cash equivalents. The IASB Framework
(par. 53) formulates this as follows: “The future economic benefit embodied in an asset is the
potential to contribute, directly or indirectly, to the flow of cash and cash equivalents to the
entity.”
Are these definitions also appropriate in the conditions where entities operate in the public
sector where the major function is service delivery which by its nature is not expressed in
monetary terms? The answer must be “no”, and this is also acknowledged in the definition of
an asset in IPSAS 1 (paragraph 7) which defines assets somewhat differently as “resources
controlled by an entity as a result of past events and from which future economic benefits or
service potential [emphasis added] are expected to flow to the entity”.
However, the mere addition of the phrase “service potential” into the definition of an asset
does not eliminate the fundamental problem of having assets so closely tied to the future cash
flows. The problem is only transferred from the definition of an asset to its measurement.
This is also evident in IPSAS 1 (paragraph 11), which explains that “assets that are used to
deliver goods and services in accordance with an entity’s objectives but which do not directly
[emphasis added] generate net cash inflows are often described as embodying service
potential.” Does this mean that eventually service potential, too, will generate cash inflows in
terms of which the measurement of service potential should be made? At any rate it is
obvious that in financial statements service potential cannot be reported in its “natural units

of measurement”, for example, in the number of books in a library or in the number of
students educated in an elementary school. Instead, what is typically looked for in the
measurement of service potential is some indirect monetary measure of its value. In Ijiri’s
(1975, p.74) words non-basic resources must be measured in terms of the some basic resource
which is typically cash in any modern economy. This brings the focus back to cash flows.
Whether they are anticipated future cash inflows as indicated in the definition by the IASB
or, for example, current or past outflows is a question that should be further discussed.
To summarize, the objectives of financial reporting by business entities in the private sector
are very closely tied to the forecast future cash flows and the related risk while the objectives
of financial reporting by entities in the public sector are more diverse. This is likely to have
two implications. First, as the Consultation Paper acknowledges, the scope of financial re-
porting by entities in the public sector must be wider than that of business entities in the pri-
vate sector. Second, and this is not acknowledged in the Consultation Paper, for entities in the
public sector the definition and measurement of the key concepts such as economic resources
and claims to those resources may have to be distinguished even more clearly from those for
entities in the private sector. That is, it may be questioned whether it is informative at all to
talk about resources (and consequently assets) in terms of direct or even indirect forecast
future cash flows. It may be preferable to replace these output-based (i.e., benefit-based) defi-
nitions with input-based (i.e., sacrifice-based) definitions where assets would be defined in
terms of unexpired costs. The attribute “unexpired” means that there are future benefits being
expected but the amounts may be unknown or difficult to specify to the extent that is prefer-
able to define and measure the concept of asset in terms of incurred costs rather than expected
future economic benefits or service potential.
The scope of financial reporting by public sector entities

For public sector entities the scope of financial reporting encompasses the provision of finan-
cial and non-financial information about the total of five items (see the third topic in the
introduction). The first one is related to the balance sheet (economic resources and claims to
those resources). The second one is concerned with the income statement and the statement
of cash flows (the effect of transactions, other events and activities that change the economic
resources of the reporting entity and claims to those resources during the reporting period,
including cash inflows and outflows and financial performance). The last three items widen
this traditional scope of financial reporting. They consist of the reporting entity’s compliance
with relevant legislation, the reporting entity’s achievement of its service delivery objectives,
and prospective financial and other information about the reporting entity’s delivery activities
and objectives as well as the resources necessary to support those activities.
Defined in this way the scope is much wider than that of financial reporting for business enti-
ties in the private sector. This is to be expected since it reflects the wider range of potential
users of GPFRs of public sector entities. There is a problem, however, because the proposed
framework does not acknowledge that the wider scope may have implications to the defini-
tion and measurement of some key concepts. For example, as indicated above, the concept of
economic resource and consequently the concept of asset may have to be reconsidered. What
is relevant for an asset in the conditions of business entities in the private sector where the
objective is to provide financial information about the reporting entity that is useful to present
and potential equity investors, lenders and other creditors in making decisions in their capac-
ity as capital providers may not be relevant in the conditions where public sector entities are
operating (cf. IASB ED, 2008, p.14 and IPSASB CP, 2008, p.18).

This problem is closely related to the above concern about the tension between the two major
kinds of accounting systems, that is, systems that are designed to support accountability (and
control) and systems that are designed to support various kinds of decisions. It was claimed
that both kinds of systems may have their benefits but the benefits cannot be simultaneously
maximized in a single accounting system, and therefore one approach or the other must be
given the priority. If this is accepted then one should stop calling these financial statements
“general purpose” financial statements. They would simply be financial statements based on
selected premises. Only financial reporting that also consists of supplementary information
could be labeled as being designed for general purposes.
For entities in the public sector, it may be argued that the priority should be given to the ac-
countability purposes. Assets (being economic resources) and liabilities (being claims to
those resources) should then be defined keeping this priority in mind. Moreover, the
objectives should also be slightly modified to reflect the priority. The formulation could be as
follows:
The objectives of financial reporting by public sector entities are to provide information
in the form of financial statements and supplementary information about the reporting
entity useful to users of this information for: (a) accountability purposes; and (b) mak-
ing resource allocation, political and social decisions. The balance sheet and the income
statement are to be constructed giving priority to the accountability perspective.
What has been said above does not necessarily change the scope of financial reporting. The
scope only establishes the boundary around the transactions, other events, and activities that
may be reported in GPFRs (IPSASB CP, 2008, p.6). It is the implications of the wider scope
of financial reporting by public sector entities that should be acknowledged in one way or the
other. Currently there are no signs of such implications being recognized.
The qualitative characteristics of information included in GPFRs

The qualitative characteristics of information included in GPFRs are defined as the attributes
that make that information useful to users for accountability purposes and for making various
decisions (IPSASB CP, 2008, p.31). Three problems concerning these attributes were men-
tioned in the introduction to this paper (topic 4) but only the third one will be discussed here.
It will be suggested that the terminology of the qualitative characteristics of information and
the underlying concepts should be modified and then portrayed hierarchically as illustrated in
Figure 2. In addition, to evaluate whether the information to be disclosed really has the re-
quired qualitative characteristics, their presence should be considered in a process
comparable to that of the scientific method.
These suggestions are likely to raise some concerns. Why should one apply these qualitative
characteristics rather than the ones proposed by the Consultation Paper? And why should the
application follow the proposed process rather than some other pattern? The answer is simple.
The author proposes the qualitative characteristics and the process as a hypothesis believing
that the hypothesis will stand the test in the sense that its application will eventually result in
information more useful to its users than the information obtained by competing procedures,
for example, the Conceptual Framework proposed by the IPSASB. Admittedly no empirical
evidence is given here to support the hypothesis, but according to the scientific method that is
no obstacle to proposing a hypothesis, or as Homans and Curtis (1970, p.23) put it:

“Hypothesis may mean simply a guess, a hunch, an assumption which points to a
possibly fruitful line of work. Hypothesis may mean a statement of uniformity…
Hypothesis, also, may mean a conceptual scheme.”
Thus, as a hypothetically fruitful set of guidelines, the Consultation Paper (IPSASB CP,
2008, p.7 and p.9) identifies the following qualitative characteristics of information included
in GPFRs of public sector entities: relevance, faithful representation, understandability,
timeliness, comparability, and verifiability. Materiality, cost and achieving an appropriate
balance between the qualitative characteristics are then given as pervasive constraints on that
information. Relevance is considered to encompass confirmatory value, predictive value, or
both (IPSASB CP, 2008, p.32). Faithful representation is claimed to be attained when the
depiction of economic or other phenomena is complete, neutral, and free from material error
(page 33). The only indication of a hierarchy is the distinction between the attributes that are
called the qualitative characteristics of information and the attributes that are called the
constraints on that information.
Here the following system of qualitative characteristics is proposed as a competing
hypothesis. To ensure the usefulness of the information in financial reports, it should
have the fundamental qualitative characteristics of (1) relevance and (2) reliability (or
freedom from error) under the general constraint of (3) sufficiency. The two
fundamental qualitative characteristics may be seen to encompass several enhancing
qualitative characteristics (cf. IASB ED, 2008, pp.38-41). For relevance they are (1a)
confirmatory value, (1b) predictive value, (1c) understandability, (1d) timeliness and
(1e) comparability. Similarly for reliability the enhancing qualitative characteristics are
(2a) verifiability and (2b) supportability. The two fundamental qualitative
characteristics of relevance and reliability are not absolute but show in degrees.
Therefore the general constraint of sufficiency must be introduced and adopted. It
consists of the requirement to achieve a balance between the ideal requirement of (3a)
completeness and the following moderating elements: (3b) neutrality, (3c) materiality
and (3d) cost-benefit-reasonableness.
(1) Relevance
The relevance of information is defined in the Consultation Paper as follows (IPSASB CP,
2008, p.32):
“Information is relevant if it is capable of making a difference in achieving the
objectives of financial reporting  that is, in the discharge of the entity’s
accountability obligations or in the decisions made by users of GPFRs.”
(1a) Confirmatory value and (1b) Predictive value
The above definition is a good one, particularly because it is so comprehensive. It encom-
passes both confirmatory value and predictive value as properly mentioned in the Consulta-
tion Paper. In addition, it encompasses even more making thus redundant (or at least subordi-
nate) the attributes understandability, timeliness and comparability as proposed in the Con-
sultation Paper.

EVALUATION CRITERIA FOR POTENTIALLY USEFUL INFORMATION
Fundamental RELEVANCE RELIABILITY

Qualitative
Characteristics Is information capable Is information
of making a difference in free from error?
achieving the objectives?
- CONFIRMATORY VALUE
Enhancing - VERIFIABILITY
Qualitative - PREDICTIVE VALUE
Characteristics - SUPPORTABILITY
- UNDERSTANDABILITY
- TIMELINESS
Moderating SUFFICIENCY
Factor
Is there a balance in terms of the selected dimensions?
- COMPLETENESS
Dimensions of
Moderation - NEUTRALITY
- MATERIALITY
- COST-BENEFIT-REASONABLENESS
Is the balance achieved?
No Yes
REVISE DISCLOSE
INFORMATION INFORMATION
Figure 2: The qualitative characteristics of information in GPFRs

(1c) Understandability
The understandability of information (defined on page 35 as the quality of information that
enables users to comprehend its meaning) is redundant to relevance. How could information
be relevant to a person without first being understandable to him or her? In precisely the same
way that understandability is dependent on a person’s education and knowledge, relevance,
too, is dependent on such matters. The Consultation Paper (IPSASB CP, 2008, p.35) explains
that understandability may be enhanced in many ways. For example, comparability is said to
enhance understandability. Precisely in the same way it may be said that understandability
enhances relevance. Therefore, relevance may be said to encompass understandability, that is,
understandability may be considered an enhancing qualitative characteristic of relevance.
(1d) Timeliness
The timeliness of information (defined on page 35 in terms of having information available to
users before it loses its capacity to be useful for accountability and decision-making
purposes) is redundant to relevance for the same reason. No matter how potentially useful a
piece of information may be, this potential will be lost if the piece of information is not
available at the proper point in time. Therefore, the attribute of timeliness is also a distinct
feature of relevance rather than a parallel qualitative characteristic of financial information.
In other words, timeliness, too, may be regarded as an enhancing qualitative characteristic of
relevance.
(1e) Comparability
The comparability of information (defined on page 36 as the quality of information that en-
ables users to identify similarities in, and differences between, two sets of phenomena) is also
redundant. In other words, comparability is encompassed by relevance. This should be
evident if one considers the opposite. How could a piece of information be relevant if there
were no way whatsoever to compare it with any other piece of information? For example, the
piece of information saying that X has the value of 20 per cent is meaningless as long as one
is unable to compare it with something else. Therefore it cannot be relevant, either. The situa-
tion would change essentially, if one learned that the value of X is typically less than a half of
the return on investment in the same conditions. This new piece of information would not
only make the first piece of information comparable to a known variable but it would also
make it highly relevant. Consequently, the attribute of comparability should also be consid-
ered a distinct feature of relevance, that is, an enhancing qualitative characteristic of
relevance, rather than a parallel qualitative characteristic of financial information.
Supplementary discussion
Thus the concept of relevance is even more powerful than the Consultation Paper acknowl-
edges. It does not only encompass confirmatory value and predictive value but also such fea-
tures as understandability, timeliness and comparability. Therefore any piece of information
that (a) has either confirmatory value or predictive value and (b) at the same time is under-
standable, available at the proper time, and comparable to some other interesting pieces of in-
formation, is relevant. And conversely, a piece of information is not relevant even if it poten-
tially has confirmatory value or predictive value but it is not in an understandable form, or it
is not available when needed, or it cannot be compared to anything that is meaningful to the
user.
Besides relevance the Consultation Paper also regards faithful representation as a necessary
qualitative characteristic of useful information in financial reporting. It argues that a piece of

information is a faithful representation of the economic or other phenomenon that it purports
to represent when the depiction of the phenomenon is complete, neutral, and free from
material error (IPSASB CP, 2008, p.33). Moreover, the Consultation Paper implies implicitly
(see, e.g., pages 9, 28 and 29) that prospective information about the future might also serve
as a faithful representation of something.
Such arguments and implications are problematic, however, because they give the term
“faithful representation” a totally new meaning that is very different from its established
meaning in the theory of measurement. There faithful representation is related to quantifica-
tion which must be made so that the functional correspondence between the degrees of the
observable property and the numbers assigned to these degrees become a faithful representa-
tion. The issue of how to create a proper functional correspondence is called the representa-
tion problem (Krantz and others, 1971, Scott & Suppes, 1969, Suppes & Zinnes, 1963), and it
is concerned with the isomorphism between the observable degrees of the given property in
an empirical system and the relational numerical system selected to represent the empirical
system.
This means that the property being faithfully represented for measurement purposes must be
observable. However, the future cannot be observed. Therefore there is no way in practice to
achieve a faithful representation of any future phenomenon. Consequently the term “faithful
representation” should not be used in this new context where empirical observation is not re-
quired. Of course, it cannot be required precisely because faithful representation is purport-
edly extended to concern the future. Since future phenomena cannot be currently observed,
talking about faithful representation of such phenomenon is simply misleading.
(2) Reliability
Instead of faithful representation, it is preferable to use the term “reliability” of information.
Reliability refers to freedom from error and nothing else. It is not necessary to say that reli-
ability refers to freedom from material error, since this would make the definition equal to
one of the qualitative characteristics of faithful representation (IPSASB CP, 2008, p.33). It is
just freedom from error, not materiality of it that should be considered fundamental. Material-
ity is thus only a moderating factor, not a distinct feature of the fundamental qualitative char-
acteristic.
(2a) Verifiability
This raises the question of how reliability may be established. How could one know whether
a piece of information is reliable or not? The best answer is to apply the scientific method as
shown in Figure 1. First, attempt to verify the truth of the given empirical statement by com-
paring it with what may be observed. This process is called verification. A statement is veri-
fiable if it can be verified. Hence it is proposed that verifiability in this sense should be the
first enhancing characteristic of reliability. This is nothing new. The meaning of verifiability
in this sense is essentially equivalent to that of direct verifiability in the IASB Exposure Draft
(2008, p.40).
(2b) Supportability
Verifiability is a desirable qualitative characteristic of information but in many cases this
characteristic is too demanding. Therefore, what is the next step if a piece of information
cannot be verified? The answer might be in the process that is familiar from auditing. It may
be required possible to check the inputs and recalculate the corresponding outputs. Such
checking would not be verification but rather auditing that gives support and credibility to

information. A piece of information is supportable if it is possible for different
knowledgeable and independent observers to reach general consensus that the methods used
in producing the information have been properly applied (cf. IASB ED, 2008, pp.39-40 and
IPSASB CP, 2008, pp.36-37). Consequently, one may say that supportability is the second
enhancing characteristic of reliability. Its meaning is essentially equivalent to that of indirect
verifiability in the IASB Exposure Draft (2008, p.40).
Whether even supportability is to be required before a piece of information may be disclosed
is an open question. It is possible that a piece of information that can neither be verified nor
even properly supported is so relevant that it would be useful to users although its reliability
cannot be independently verified or checked. The IASB Exposure Draft (2008, p.52) gives
management’s intentions as an example of a piece of information that can neither be verified
(directly verified) nor supported (indirectly verified). Yet it may be useful to users.
Relevance and reliability are thus the two fundamental qualitative characteristics of financial
information. That is, if the user had all the relevant information and it was completely reli-
able, he or she would need nothing else. Usefulness of information would be secured. How-
ever, relevance and reliability are not absolute concepts but show in degrees. Therefore, as
the first step, it was above stated what the additional qualitative characteristics are that
enhance these fundamental characteristics. The second step will now be to set limits to
enhancing. The question is: when does a user have enough of relevant information that is
reliable to the required degree? In other words: when is the supplied information sufficient to
the user?
(3) Sufficiency
The concept of sufficiency is a moderating concept that aims at an acceptable balance be-
tween the qualitative characteristics in terms of a few selected dimensions. The dimensions of
moderation are completeness, neutrality, materiality and cost-benefit-reasonableness.
Because it is not practicable to produce and disclose every piece of relevant information with
absolute reliability to all potential users, it must then be asked what is practicable and
sufficient. The answer is briefly discussed in terms of the given four dimensions (see Figure
2).
(3a) Completeness
Completeness establishes the fundamental starting point to disclose all the information that is
relevant. That is, if a piece of information is capable of making a difference in achieving the
objectives of financial reporting, then it should be produced and disclosed. This is an extreme
requirement demanding that not only part of relevant information should be available but all
of it. Without moderation this requirement would result in great practical difficulties but it is
a necessary starting point.
(3b) Neutrality
Neutrality is defined in the Consultation Paper typically as “the absence of bias that is in-
tended to attain a predetermined result or to induce a particular behavior” (IPSASB CP, 2008,
p.33). It continues: “Neutral information is free from bias, so that it faithfully represents the
economic and other phenomena that it purports to represent.” Taken literally this means that
neutrality is actually redundant to the proposed system. If it is taken to mean that one is not
allowed to select or present information so that it favors some particular perspective, say, an

interest group then it is simply redundant to requiring that the set of relevant information to
be disclosed should be complete. If pieces of information were left out that are relevant from
some perspective, then the disclosed set would not be complete. On the other hand, if it is
taken to mean that one is not allowed to present information so that it is excessively cautious
or in some other way biased then it is simply redundant to requiring that the set of relevant
information to be disclosed should be reliable. A biased piece of information can never be the
best estimate in terms of reliability. Therefore, the complete set of relevant and reliable
information is necessarily sufficient for making neutral estimates of the financial conditions
and hence, as a distinct qualitative characteristic, neutrality is redundant.
However, if neutrality is interpreted as a moderating characteristic then it has a role to play.
In this role neutrality is taken to mean that it is sufficient to report information for general
purposes instead of tailoring it for the purposes of any particular interest groups. The “general
purpose” implies that the selection and presentation of financial information are not biased to
serve particularly any specific groups or goals but “neutrally” to all groups that are interested
in the financial information of the entity. In this sense neutrality moderates the requirement of
completeness.
(3c) Materiality
Materiality is regarded as a pervasive constraint in the Consultation Paper (IPSASB CP,
2008, p.38). That is a misleading statement in a way. Rather than being a pervasive constraint
materiality is a pervasive moderating factor. Instead of requiring the complete set of relevant
financial information, it is sufficient to require all the relevant information that is material
with respect to the objectives of financial reporting, that is, serving the discharge of account-
ability by the entity for the reporting period and serving the decisions that users make on the
basis of the entity’s GPFRs prepared for that period (cf. IPSASB CP, 2008, p.37). Similarly,
instead of requiring complete freedom from error in the reporting of relevant financial infor-
mation, it is sufficient to require that all the disclosed information is free from material error.
Therefore, materiality is clearly a dimension of sufficiency (cf. IPSASB CP, 2008, p.38).
The Consultation Paper does not acknowledge that materiality is a moderating factor. This
becomes evident in the discussion on faithful representation which is claimed to be “attained
when the depiction of the phenomenon is complete, neutral, and free from material [emphasis
added] error” (IPSASB CP, 2008, p.33). Faithful representation, or reliability, simply refers
to freedom from error, however, not to freedom from material error, and it is a distinct issue
to consider the extent to which this characteristic should be required. Completeness is thus
the starting point and materiality is the factor that moderates this extreme requirement.
(3d) Cost-benefit-reasonableness
Cost-benefit-reasonableness refers to requiring that the benefits of financial reporting should
justify the costs that it imposes (IPSASB CP, 2008, p.38). From the economic perspective
this requirement is clearly acceptable. However, it is also a moderating requirement. It asserts
that rather than requiring the complete set of relevant information with perfect reliability it is
only economically reasonable to require information for which the related benefits justify the
corresponding cost. This means that for economic reasons less than perfect information may
be sufficient. The principle is simple and clear but it may be difficult to apply. Assessing
whether the benefits of providing information really justify the related cost will typically be
more qualitative than quantitative. The question becomes ambiguous by asking whether one

or more qualitative characteristics should be sacrificed to “some degree” in order to reduce
costs.
Figure 2 summarizes the above discussion on the qualitative characteristics of information in
GPFRs. The evaluation of a potentially useful piece of information starts from asking
whether it has the first fundamental qualitative characteristic of being relevant, that is,
whether it is capable of making a difference in achieving the objectives. If the answer is “no”,
the piece of information is useless and no further analysis is needed. If the answer is “yes”,
one must ask if the piece of information has the second fundamental qualitative characteristic
of being reliable, that is, whether it is free from error. Again, if the answer is “no”, the piece
of information is useless and it should not be disclosed. If the answer is “yes”, then this piece
of relevant information has the proper characteristics and should be disclosed.
This is an ideal picture of the evaluation process. In practice it becomes more complicated be-
cause the fundamental qualitative characteristics of relevance and reliability are not absolute
but are applied in degrees. Therefore, one must introduce enhancing qualitative
characteristics for the both of these fundamental characteristics. For relevance they are
confirmatory value, predictive value, understandability, timeliness and comparability. An
increase in the attainment of any of these characteristics enhances relevance. Similarly, for
reliability the enhancing characteristics are verifiability and supportability. An increase in the
attainment of these characteristics enhances reliability.
Enhancing could be performed without an end. Therefore one must ask what amount of en-
hancing is sufficient. Consequently sufficiency becomes the moderating factor. As such it is
too ambiguous and therefore it must be made more specific by introducing some dimensions
to it. Four dimensions of moderation were proposed: completeness, neutrality, materiality and
cost-benefit-reasonableness. Therefore, sufficiency reduces to asking if there is a balance
between the given qualitative characteristics in terms of the selected dimensions of modera-
tion. Assessing whether the balance is in fact achieved will typically be more qualitative than
quantitative.
Concluding remarks
The conclusions on the four problems identified with the proposed IPSASB Conceptual
Framework for General Purpose Financial Reporting by Public Sector Entities are summa-
rized as follows:
1. The meaning of the term “conceptual framework”. The term “conceptual
framework” may have two distinct meanings using different auxiliary
terminologies. The first problem is that the IPSASB Framework takes the meaning
from the one approach but the terminology from the other. This will result in
misunderstandings. The most harmful of them is the illusion of certainty in the
disclosed information.
2. The extensiveness of the two objectives of the framework, that is, to serve both
accountability purposes and decision-making purposes. Accountability is related
with the past while decision-usefulness is related with the future. There is a clear
tension between these two. It is not practicable to construct the financial
statements of an entity without giving the priority to one objective or the other. It
should be explicitly said which objective is given the priority in preparing the

“general purpose” financial statements and which objective is then accounted for
by supplying additional information.
3. The extensiveness of the scope of the IPSASB Framework. The proposed
framework does not acknowledge that the wider scope may have implications to
the definition and measurement of some key concepts, particularly that of an asset.
What is relevant for an asset in the context of business entities in the private sector
where the objective is to provide financial information about the reporting entity
that is useful to present and potential equity investors, lenders and other creditors
in making decisions in their capacity as capital providers may not be relevant in
the context where public sector entities operate. It may be questioned whether it is
informative at all to talk about assets in terms of direct or even indirect forecast
future cash flows. It may be preferable to replace the output-based (i.e., benefit-
based) definitions with input-based (i.e., sacrifice-based) definitions where assets
would be defined in terms of unexpired costs.
4. The final problem with the IPSASB Framework concerns the proposed qualitative
characteristics. In particular, the terms “faithful representation” and “verifiability”
are misleading in this context. They are both adopted from the scientific method
but they are both given a new meaning, too. These homemade constructs give the
illusion of a scientific approach to producing information that in a closer
examination only turns out to be quasi-scientific (for more details, see, e.g.,
Vehmanen, 2007, pp.152-168). Adopting a quasi-scientific framework would only
raise false expectations regarding the certainty of the reported information.
Therefore it is highly recommended here that one should modify the terminology
of the framework to better match the level of certainty that may be achieved in
financial reporting.
The proposed modifications to the Framework are by no means radical. They only replace the
concept of faithful representation with the concept of reliability, redefine the concept of veri-
fiability, introduce the moderating factor of sufficiency and portray the whole set of qualita-
tive characteristics hierarchically as a dynamic process comparable to that of the scientific
method. However, although the approach is comparable to that of the scientific method, the
difference between the two should be evident: supportability of information is far less than
verifiability in terms of how convincing or confirming the provided evidence is.
What may be achieved in practice at best by applying these qualitative characteristics is a
systematic approach to producing information based on hard facts and general consensus.
What may not be achieved, however, is refutable financial information based on observable
empirical evidence. That would make financial reporting a true empirical science.
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Appendix: A summary of the scientific method

Scientists have regarded the endless cycle illustrated in Figure 1 as the distinctive characteris-
tic of the scientific method. Let us take a few quotations. The first relates to the ultimate goal
of any empirical science. The goal is to produce true empirical knowledge. Therefore the cru-
cial question is: When can one say that empirical knowledge is true? The truth of any empiri-
cal statement is said to depend on how well it corresponds to empirical facts. This important
starting point is expressed quite clearly, for example, by Popper (1966, p.369) (see Chambers,
2002, p.761):

“…an assertion, proposition, statement or belief, is true if, and only if, it
corresponds to the facts.”
It should be emphasized, however, that science and theories in general are not concerned with
isolated empirical facts. This is reflected in the typical definition of a scientific theory as a set
of sentences or statements (see, e.g., AAA, 1971, p.54). The idea of a more comprehensive
correspondence with a variety of empirical facts is also evident in the citation from Einstein
(1935, p.133) emphasizing that all knowledge of real-world phenomena must start from em-
pirical experience and also end in it (see Chambers, 2002, p.753):
“Pure logical thinking cannot yield us any knowledge of the empirical world; all
knowledge of reality starts from experience and ends in it. Propositions arrived at
by purely logical means are completely empty as regards reality.”
Besides emphasizing the importance of empirical experience (that is, “real-world
phenomena” in Figure 1) the above citations also reflect the cyclic pattern of the scientific
method. Even more explicitly, however, the endless continuity of this cycle is formulated by
Homans and Curtis (1970, p.21) (see Cambers, 2002, p.765):
“To reach a theory, science observes certain facts and argues logically therefrom.
The theory is submitted again to facts. The cycle is: observation, theory,
verification, more observation, and so on forever.”
The cyclic and self-correcting pattern of the scientific method is obvious in the above
citation. However, it lacks two specific concepts (measurement and prediction) that relate to
phases 2, 5b, and 7 in Figure 1. To indicate their role, let us quote Walker (1963, p.5), who
includes these concepts in his definition of the scientific method:
“The scientific method (1) postulates a model based on existing experimental
observations or measurements; (2) checks the predictions of this model against
further observations or measurements; (3) adjusts or replaces the model as
required by the new observations or measurements. The third step leads back to
the first step, and the process continues without end.”
These citations show clearly how important empirical observation is for the production of
scientific knowledge (phases 2 and 7 in Figure 1). Of course, logical thinking, too, has a role
to play in this process (phases 4, 5a, and 5b in Figure 1) but it can never replace empirical
observation. Therefore, human opinions, too, are of only little value in producing scientific
knowledge. Empirical facts are far more relevant and crucial. A scientist does not have to
persuade anybody to think as he or she does, nor need a group of scientists reach consensus
on matters being researched. It suffices that the empirical facts and the corresponding
propositions agree. For example, Goode and Hatt (1952, p.7) formulate the very same point
as follows (see Chambers, 2002, p. 754):
“Science is a method of approach to the entire empirical world… It is furthermore
an approach which does not aim at persuasion, at the finding of ultimate truth…”

Public Sector Accounting: Democratic Control of Public
Money by Using Administrative Cameralistics
Norvald Monsen - [email protected]
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration
Unfortunately, there are very few scientists and practitioners having any interest in the
development and standardisation of the cameral bookkeeping method, something which is
strongly to regret with a view to the importance of these questions.
(Mülhaupt, 1987, p. 119; translated from German)
Introduction
Public sector accounting has traditionally been different from business sector accounting (i.e.,
commercial accounting), because public sector management traditionally has been different
from business sector management. While there is a ´profitability´ focus in the latter sector,
the focus in the former sector has been on democratic (political) control of public money. In
later years, however, as traditional public sector management (TPM) is being replaced by
business sector management, referred to as new public sector management (NPM), the money
focus is accordingly being replaced with a profitability focus in public sector accounting.
In this article the money focus of traditional public sector accounting will be revisited, by
referring to cameral accounting. Cameral accounting was developed in continental German
speaking European countries (Austria, Germany and Switzerland; se e.g., Buschor, 1994),
and is known to a limited extent only beyond the German speaking countries. In three
previous articles in International Journal of Governmental Financial Management, however,
I have explained this particular accounting model to some extent to a non-German speaking
audience. First, cameral accounting was presented as an alternative to commercial accrual
accounting (often referred to as áccrual accounting´, see Monsen, 2008a). Thereafter, the
two main variants of cameral accounting, namely administrative cameralistics (ACAM; see
Monsen, 2008b) and enterprise cameralistics (ECAM; see Monsen, 2009) were explained,
including the use of numerical examples. The purpose of the present article, however, is to
explain ACAM in more detail than in Monsen (2008b). More specifically, the purpose of the
article is to explain how traditional public sector accounting in the form of ACAM fulfils four
main tasks, aiming at contributing to democratic control of public money.
The article is structured as follows: the next section departs from the main accounting
concepts of revenues and expenditures, and points out that we face two different principles,
which can be used when accruing the revenues and expenditures. Thereafter, an overview of
the main tasks of traditional public sector accounting is given, followed by a brief
introduction to ACAM. ACAM is thereafter explained in more detail, first by focusing on the
closing of the accounts and budgetary comparisons. Thereafter, a numerical example is
provided to illustrating ACAM in more detail. A separate commentary section departs from
the numerical example, explaining how the four tasks of traditional public sector accounting
are taken care of within ACAM. Thereafter, public sector organizations are first compared
with commercial enterprises, focusing on their different ways of acquiring financial
resources. Departing from this comparison, traditional public sector accounting in the form of
ACAM is thereafter compared with new public sector accounting in the form of IPSAS-

standards (IPSAS – International Public Sector Accounting Standard). A conclusion ends the
article.
Revenues and Expenditures

The main accounting concepts are revenues and expenditures (Mülhaupt, 1987). Revenues
represent claims on cash receipt, while expenditures represent obligations for cash payments.
This means that the revenues and expenditures always will have a money effect, either in the
accounting period in question (in the form of present (or actual) cash receipts and present (or
actual) cash payments, respectively) or in later accounting periods (in the form of future cash
receipts and future cash payments, respectively). The revenues and expenditures could also
have another effect (in addition to the money effect), namely a profitability effect in the form
of revenues earned and expenses incurred. As distinct from the money effect of the revenues
and expenditures, which influences the cash deposit of an organization, the profitability effect
of the revenues and expenditures influences the equity of the organization (i.e., the difference
between the assets and liabilities of the organization).
This means that the revenues and expenditures can be accrued according to two different
principles, namely a money accrual principle and a profitability accrual principle. The
former principle could be referred to as the principle of current dues (Oettle, 1990; English
translation of the German term Anordnungsprinzip) and it is used for reporting the money
effect of the revenues and expenditures. The latter principle – often imprecisely referred to as
the accrual principle – is used for reporting the profitability effect of the revenues and
expenditures.
Four Tasks of Traditional Public Sector Accounting

Public sector organizations are juridically accountable for their spending of public money:
“All public sector organizations are accountable for the financial resources, which
they have been allocated for management. In addition to the obligation for
preparing a budget, there are detailed rules regulating the cash accounts, the
bookkeeping and the book closing. The specific characteristics of administrative
cameralistics are reflected in these regulations.” (Wysocki, 1965, p. 17; translated
from German)
It appears from this excerpt that ACAM has been developed for use by public sector
organizations, making it possible for them to fulfil the accountability for their spending of
public money. This means that the accounts must report the expenditures of the public sector
organization, and how they have been financed in the form of revenues. Moreover, it also
means that the revenues and expenditures (as reported in the accounts) are to be compared
with the corresponding budgetary revenues and expenditures:
“The first task of the accounts of a public sector budget-financed administration is
to report numerically correspondence or deviations between plan and execution
for this administration: ´The accounting books must be shaped in such a way that
it is possible to see how the budget execution is compared with the budget.´ ..
Administrative cameralistics shall provide the figures for this comparison,
referred to as ´budgetary accounting´.” (Wysocki, 1965, p. 18-19; translated from
German)

This first public sector accounting task can thus be referred to as ´budgetary control´, since
the accounts should be used for controlling how the budget is implemented. Another import-
ant task for public sector accounting is ´receipt/payment control´, which is related to the basic
separation between receipt/payment instructions and receipt/payment executions (actual
receipts/payments) in the public sector (at least in continental Europe):
“A basic principle for the public sector payment execution consists of the fact that
no payment can be undertaken without a corresponding payment instruction,
issued by another organizational unit with payment instruction authority, and cash
can only be received by the cashier in accordance with a corresponding receipt
instruction. Due to control reasons, the receipt or payment instructions are always
issued by an organizational unit, which is trusted neither with the receipt/payment
executions nor with the bookkeeping.” (Wysocki, 1965, p. 23; translated from
German, italics in the original)
This basic separation between receipt/payment instructions and receipt/payment executions
constitutes a key element of ACAM (see Mülhaupt, 1987). Both receipt/payment instructions
and receipt/payment executions are entered on the cameral account with ACAM, and they are
entered in different columns. In fact, receipt/payment control is integrated within the process
when using the single-entry bookkeeping method of ACAM, by comparing figures entered in
different columns, containing receipt/payment instructions and receipt/payment executions,
respectively (see below for a numerical example). Furthermore, it is not enough to control
that the cashier receives or pays cash after having received receipt or payment instructions,
respectively, from another organizational unit having such an instruction authority. It is also
important to control the cash receipts and payments themselves:
“As a result of focusing on the cash execution of the budget, administrative
cameralistics pays special attention to fulfilling the task of controlling the cash
movements. The objective of the accounts is to keep an overview of the cash
transactions (i.e., the cash receipts and cash payments). The accounting books
shall at any time make it possible to ascertain the cash deposit; moreover, they
shall make it possible to keep an overview of non-budgetary money being
received and given to others.” (Wysocki, 1965, p. 19; translated from German,
italics in the original)
Hence, ćash control´ is the third task of public sector accounting. With regard to the result of
the public sector administration, Wysocki (1965) points out:
“Finally, administrative cameralistics shall report the result of the public
administration. This result can indeed not be an ádministrative result´ in the
meaning profit or loss…; it is rather a matter of reporting to what extent the
revenues in total or for various activities cover the expenditures. It is true that
there is a general agreement saying that the so-called financial (money) result not
only can be reported as the difference between the revenues and expenditures for
a specific period; it must also contain changes of the assets and the liabilities,
caused by the budget execution. However, there is no agreement, either in theory
or in practice, over the way this is to be undertaken. It is considered adequate to
prepare regularly a numerical overview of the assets and the liabilities, in addition
to the systematic accounts themselves.” (Wysocki, 1965, p. 20; translated from
German, italics in the original)

The fourth task of public sector accounting is therefore ´result reporting´. With regard to the
result to be reported, it appears from the excerpt above that it cannot be an ádministrative
result in the meaning profit or loss´. By this Wysocki means that a profitability result,
appearing as the difference between the profitability effect of the revenues and expenditures
(as the difference between revenues earned and expenses incurred) cannot be reported for a
public administration. On the other hand, he argues that ít is rather a matter of reporting to
what extent the revenues in total or for various activities cover the expenditures.´ In other
words: the result of the public administration represents a financial (money) result, reporting
the difference between the money effect of the revenues and expenditures (in the form of
present and future cash receipts and present and future cash payments).
Administrative Cameralistics
ACAM has been developed specifically for fulfilling the four tasks of traditional public
sector accounting, namely budgetary control, receipt/payment control, cash control and
financial (money) result reporting. Since these tasks are related to the money effect, as
opposed to the profitability effect, of the revenues and expenditures, they can be referred to
as ´money tasks´. Moreover, the principle of single-entry bookkeeping is used in ACAM as
well as the cameral account, consisting of a revenues (receipts) side and an expenditures
(payments) side (see Table 1 below). On each side we find the following four columns:
Balances or residual dues brought forward (BD), Current dues (CD), Actuals (A) and
Balances or residual dues carried forward (B). Within ACAM receipt instructions are entered
in the CD-column on the receipts side, and payment instructions are entered in the CD-
column on the payments side. When a receipt instruction is executed, resulting in a cash
receipt, this actual cash receipt is entered in the A-column on the receipts side. An actual cash
payment, representing the cash execution of a payment instruction, is entered in the A-
column on the payments side. In this way, bookkeeping rule (1) is followed, which requires
that no A-entry can be undertaken without an earlier or simultaneous CD-entry. Bookkeeping
rule (2) states that the balance at the end of the period, representing the amount to be carried
forward as the balance at the beginning of the following period, appears as follows: Balances
carried forward = Balances brought forward + Current dues - Actuals (B=BD+CD-A).
Receipts Payments
Bal- Bal- Bal- Bal-
ances or Current Actuals ances or ances or Current Actuals ances or
residual dues residual residual dues residual
dues b/f dues c/f dues b/f dues c/f
(BD) (CD) (A) (B) (BD) (CD) (A) (B)
Table 1: The cameral account.
Since the cameral account consists of a receipts side and a payments side, only one of the two
sides is used when a transaction is entered on the account by using the principle of single-
entry bookkeeping: revenues (receipts) are entered on the receipts side and expenditures
(payments) are entered on the payments side. This implies that the two cameral bookkeeping
rules mentioned above, apply separately to the receipts and payments sides of the cameral
account.

Closing of Accounts and Budgetary Comparisons
At the end of the accounting period, the accounts must be closed:
“As a result of the economic activity of the core part of the public administration,
the financial (money) surplus or deficit for the actual (A) or receipt instructed
(CD) revenues compared with the actual (A) or payment instructed (CD)
expenditures, respectively, can be reported (formal closing). As opposed to total
result accounts (i.e., profitability result accounts) for commercial enterprises,
these net amounts cannot, however, be regarded as a measure of the profitability
of the public administration, as long as, and to the extent that, the public sector
revenues represent one-sided compulsory revenues, while the expenditures in
principle result from public services given free of charge. Since the services given
by the core public sector administration thus cannot be measured or evaluated by
help of the revenues, the attempt at evaluating the profitability of the public
administration as the difference between the revenues and the expenditures (in the
form of revenues earned and expenses incurred) must also fail.” (Wysocki, 1965,
p. 33; translated from German, italics in the original)
Wysocki (1965) states here that we cannot report a similar result in the core budget-financed
part of a public sector organization as in a market-financed commercial enterprise, where a
profit (as the difference between revenues earned and expenses incurred) is reported. Since
we cannot assess the result of the core public sector by matching the profitability effect of the
revenues and expenditures, there is no focus on a profitability result within ACAM. On the
other hand, it is important to compare budgetary and accounting revenues and expenditures,
focusing on the money effect, aiming at assessing whether the core public sector has kept its
activities within the boundaries of the budget adopted by the politicians (budgetary control):
“If the budget and the accounts are prepared in a similar way, it will be easy to
report the result of the public administration as it is defined above (i.e., as the
difference between budgeted and real (accounting) revenues and expenditures).”
(Wysocki, 1965, p. 33; translated from German)
Based on the cameral account, where accounting revenues and expenditures are entered
(referred to as “cash accounts” by Wysocki, 1965), as well as the budgetary revenues and
expenditures, we face the alternative closing possibilities illustrated in Table 2.
1. Cash receipts – cash payments in the cash accounts
= Change in cash deposits
2. Receipt instructions – payment instructions in the cash accounts
= Surplus or deficit for the receipt and payment instructions
3. As differences between the receipt/payment instructions and the actual receipts/payments, the so
called cash rests appear:
a) Receipt instructions – cash received in the cash accounts
= Cash receipt rests (current dues from the payment transactions);
b) Payment instructions – cash paid in the cash accounts
= Cash payment rests (current dues from the payment transactions)
4. As differences between the various estimates in the budget (budgetary amounts) and
receipts/payments executed and receipts/payments instructed in the cash accounts, respectively, on
the revenues (receipts) side revenue surpluses or revenue deficits appear and on the expenditures
(payments) side savings or exceedings appear
Table 2: Closing possibilities (Source: Wysocki, 1965, p. 34; translated from German,
italics in the original)

The closing possibilities under points 1-3 are related to the formal closing of the cash
accounts within ACAM. First, they aim at controlling the cash transfers, that is, the cash
receipts (entered in the A-column on the receipts side) and the cash payments (entered in the
A-column on the payments side). Second, they aim at receipt/payment control, that is,
controlling that receipt instructions are issued before cash is received (i.e., comparing the
CD- and A-columns on the receipts side) and controlling that payment instructions are issued
before payments are carried out (i.e., comparing the CD- and A-columns on the payments
side). With regard to comparisons under point (4), Wysocki (1965) states:
“The comparisons under point 4 aim at matching plan and execution within the
public administration. For this comparison administrative cameralistics only
provide the accounting figures, while the plan figures are extracted from the
budget.” (Wysocki, 1965, p. 35; translated from German)
This means that comparisons of budgetary and accounting figures are based on accounting
figures extracted from the cameral account, while the budgetary figures are extracted from
the budget. Regarding accounting and budgetary comparisons, many misunderstandings
exist:
“As particularly Walb (1926, p. 234 and onwards) and Winckelmann (1950, p. 47 and
onwards) point out, the comparison of the amounts in cameral cash accounting with the
budgetary amounts is the source of many misunderstandings about cameral accounting. The
misunderstandings result from confusing the CD-amounts on the cameral account with the
CD-amounts in the budget. ... Walb (1926, p. 235 and onwards) points out that the amounts
are divided into three parts, namely the budgetary amounts (CD-budgetary figures), the
current due amounts (CD-accounting figures) and the receipt/payment amounts (A-
accounting figures), and in principle, none of these figures are identical with the others. Like
the budgetary current due amount may be different from the accounting current due amount,
the cash receipt and cash payment may be different from the receipt and payment
instructions, respectively (i.e., accounting current due amounts), something which occurs, for
example, by missing payments from debtors.” (Wysocki, 1965, p. 35; translated from
German, italics in the original).
In this excerpt it is emphasised that the current dues (CD) figures on the cameral account
represent accounting figures, namely accounting revenues (receipts) and accounting
expenditures (payments), which have been instructed for receipts and payments, respectively.
Budgetary revenues (receipts) and budgetary expenditures (payments) are, however, found in
the budget. Even though budgetary and accounting comparisons take place outside the
cameral account, they nevertheless are an important part of ACAM, which has budgetary
control as one of its main tasks.
In practice, the term actuals closing (German: Ist-Abschluss) is used when budgetary figures
are compared with actual receipts/payments in the accounts. Wysocki (1965, p. 35) points out
that this particular type of comparison primarily is undertaken in the national public
(governmental) sector (see Table 3).
Receipt instructions in the budget Payment instructions in the budget
- Cash received in the accounts - Cash paid in the accounts
= Revenue surplus / Revenue deficit = Saving / Exceeding
Table 3: Áctuals closing´ (Source: Wysocki, 1965, p. 36; translated from German).

When budgetary figures are compared with the current dues figures (i.e., receipt/payment in-
structions) in the accounts, the term current dues closing (German: Soll-Abschluss) is used
(see Table 4). This particular type of comparison is primarily undertaken in the local public
(governmental) sector (Wysocki, 1965, p. 36).
Receipt instructions in the budget Payment instructions in the budget
- Receipt instructions in the accounts - Payment instructions in the accounts
= Revenue surplus / Revenue deficit = Saving / Exceeding
Table 4: Ćurrent dues closing´ (Source: Wysocki, 1965, p. 36; translated from
German).
These two types of comparisons deviate with regard to the amounts being transferred from
the previous period to the accounting period in question, and from the accounting period in
question to the following period (change in cash rests). Wysocki (1965) continues:
“The method of current dues closing is better than the method of actuals closing
with regard to budgetary control, because control of the budget execution
primarily must be based on the receipt/payment instructions (i.e., current dues
figures). The final task of executing the receipt/payment instructions is a task for
the cashier; it is in any case numerically controlled within administrative
cameralistics.” (Wysocki, 1965, p. 36; translated from German, italics added)
According to the annual principle of the budget, budgetary revenues and expenditures cannot
be transferred to another period. Hence, budgetary amounts not being realized as cash
receipts/payments during the period in question will appear as savings or exceedings. If,
however, a revenue item or an expenditure item is given a special mark, saying that it can be
transferred to a later period, such a transfer is nevertheless possible:
“In the budgetary accounts these amounts will according to this be registered as
so-called budgetary rests in addition to the cash rests. This is done in such a way
that they either will be deducted from the receipt/payment instructions (i.e., the
current dues amounts) or incorporated in the cash accounts.” (Wysocki, 1965, p.
37; translated from German, italics in the original)
Table 5 summarizes the various elements appearing in comparisons of budgetary and accoun-
ting revenues and expenditures.
Revenues (receipts) Expenditures (payments)
1. Receipt instructions in the budget 1. Payment instructions in the budget
2. + budgetary revenue rests transferred from the 2. + budgetary expenditure rests transferred from
previous period the previous period
3. - budgetary revenue rests transferred to the 3. - budgetary expenditure rests transferred to the
following period following period
4. = Budgetary receipt instruction after transfers 4. = Budgetary payment instruction after transfers
5 .- cash received 5 .- cash paid
6. = Revenue surplus/revenue deficit which is not 6. = Exceeding/saving which is not according to
according to plan by actuals closing plan by actuals closing
7. + cash rests transferred from the previous period 7. + cash rests transferred from the previous period
8. - cash rests transferred to the following period 8. - cash rests transferred to the following period
9. = Revenue surplus/revenue deficit which is not 9. = Exceeding/saving which is not according to
according to plan by current dues closing plan by current dues closing
Table 5: Elements of budgetary and accounting comparisons (Source: Wysocki,
1965, Abbildung 9, p. 37-38; translated from German, italics in the original).

Numerical Example
The following budgetary and accounting figures apply to the year in question:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Budgetary Amounts Receipt/ Actual
amounts incurred payment receipts/
instructions payments
(1) Operating revenues 16,500 16,000 15,000 14,500
(2) Operating expenditures 10,500 11,000 10,000 9,900
(3) Interest expenditures 20 20 20 20
(4) Borrowing revenues 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000
(5) Instalment expenditures 200 200 200 200
(6) Investment expenditures 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000
The first column – Budgetary amounts – show budgetary figures in the form of revenues and
expenditures. Here we do not have a distinction between ámounts incurred´,
´receipt/payment instructions´ and áctual receipts/payments´ due to the following two
reasons: First, the budget contains planned (future) revenues and expenditures, not previously
incurred revenues and expenditures. Hence, there are no íncurred amounts´ in the budget.
Second, the budgetary revenues and expenditures are planned both to be instructed for receipt
and payment, respectively, and to be received as cash and paid as cash, respectively. The
three remaining columns, however, contain accounting figures. The column Amounts
incurred reports revenues and expenditures being incurred during the accounting year in
question. The column Receipt/payment instructions reports revenues and expenditures
instructed for receipts and payments, respectively, during the year in question. Finally, the
column Actual receipts/payments reports how much of the receipt and payment instructions,
which have been received or paid, respectively, during this year.
Before illustrating and explaining how some of these figures are entered on the cameral
account by use of the single-entry bookkeeping method of ACAM, it is of interest to revisit
the excerpt from Wysocki (1965, p. 35), referring to many misunderstandings when
comparing budgetary and accounting figures. Wysocki refers to Walb (1926), pointing out
that the amounts are divided into three parts, namely the budgetary amounts (CD-budgetary
figures; see column (1) above), the current dues amounts (CD-accounting figures; see column
(3) above) and actual receipts/payments (A-accounting figures; see column (4) above).
Hence, Walb (1926) does not refer to revenues and expenditures incurred (see column (2)
above; more about this below).

Bookkeeping Within Administrative Cameralistics
In the following, the single-entry bookkeeping method of ACAM is illustrated and explained,
by using the numerical example presented above.
Receipts Payments
Bal- Bal- Bal- Bal-
ances or Current Actuals ances or ances or Current Actuals ances or
residual dues residual residual dues residual
dues b/f dues c/f dues b/f dues c/f
(BD) (CD) (A) (B) (BD) (CD) (A) (B)
1) Op. revenues 15,000 14,500 500
2) Op. expend. 10,000 9,900 100
3) Interest exp. 20 20
4) Borrowing rev. 2,000 2,000
5) Instalment exp. 200 200
6) Investment exp. 3,000 3,000
0 17,000 16,500 500 0 13,220 13,120 100
Table 6: Single-entry bookkeeping of administrative cameralistics.
As pointed out above, the following two cameral bookkeeping rules must always be followed: (1) No A-entry
without an earlier or simultaneous CD-entry and (2) B=BD+CD-A. These two rules apply separately on the
revenues (receipts) side and the expenditures (payments) side of the cameral account (revenues (receipts) are
entered on the revenues (receipts) side and expenditures (payments) are entered on the payments side).
Operating revenues incurred (1) are 16,000, and a receipt instruction has been given for 15,000 (Receipts-
CD=15,000). Of this latter amount, only 14,500 has been received (Receipts-A=14.500), implying an ending
balance amount (i.e., accounts receivable instructed for receipt but not yet received) on the cameral account with
500 (Receipts-B=BD+CD-A=0+15,000-14,500=500). Operating expenditures incurred (2) are 11,000, and a
payment instruction has been given for 10,000 (Payments-CD=10,000). Of this latter amount, only 9,900 has
been paid (Payments-A=9,900), implying an ending balance amount (i.e., debt instructed for payment but not
yet paid) on the cameral account with 100 (Payments-B=BD+CD-A=0+10,000-9,900=100).
Interest expenditures (3) with 20 have been instructed for payment (Payments-CD=20) and paid (Payments-
A=20). Thus, no ending balance amount will appear here (Payments-B=0+20-20=0). Before the borrowing
revenues can be received and entered on the account (4) with 2,000 (Receipts-A=2,000), a receipt instruction for
this amount must first be given and entered on the account (Receipts-CD=2,000). No rest amount will now
appear on the receipts side (Receipts-B=BD+CD-A=0+2,000-2,000=0). Loan instalment expenditures (5) have
been paid with 200 (Payments-CD=200 and Payments-A=200; Payments-B=0+200-200=0). Furthermore, cash
investment expenditures (6) with 3,000 are entered on the cameral account as follows: First, a payment
instruction is given and entered on the account (Payments-CD=3,000), thereafter the cash amount is paid and
entered on the account (Payments-A=3,000). Hence, no ending balance amount will appear here (Payments-
B=BD+CD-A=0+3,000-3,000=0).
Commentary
In this section the four money tasks of ACAM, namely budgetary control, receipt/payment
control, cash control and financial (money) result reporting, will be explained by referring to
the numerical example above.
Budgetary control
The first task of ACAM is to contribute to budgetary control in the form of comparing
accounting figures (extracted from the cameral account) with the corresponding budgetary
figures (extracted from the budget). The focus is on the money effect of the revenues and
expenditures, and with regard to the budget, we do not face alternative amounts to use: the
revenues and expenditures in the budget are namely planned both to be instructed for receipts

and payments, respectively and to be received in cash and paid in cash, respectively, during
the budgetary year. If we turn our attention to the accounting figures, however, the situation
is less obvious. According to the German cameral accounting literature (see e.g., Wysocki,
1965), we have the following two alternatives for the accounting figures, which could be used
for budgetary comparisons: (1) revenues (receipts) and expenditures (payments) which have
been realized in the form of cash receipts and cash payments, respectively (i.e., A-figures on
the cameral account) and (2) revenues (receipts) and expenditures (payments) for which
receipt instructions and payment instructions have been issued, respectively (i.e., CD-figures
on the cameral account).
Let us now return to the numerical example and illustrate various comparisons of budgetary
and accounting figures, referring to the operating revenues and expenditures. We will start
with áctuals closing´, where budgetary amounts are compared with actual cash payments
(see Table 7).
Budgetary operating revenues (16,500) Budgetary operating expenditures (10,500)
- Actual cash receipts (A-figures) (14,500) - Actual cash payments (A-figures) (9,900)
= Revenue deficit (2,000) = Saving (600)
Table 7: Áctuals closing´ for the operating revenues and expenditures.
In Table 8 ćurrent dues closing´ for the operating revenues and expenditures is illustrated.
Budgetary operating revenues (16,500) Budgetary operating expenditures (10,500)
- Payment instructions (CD-figures) (15,000) - Payment instructions (CD-figures) (10,000)
= Revenue deficit (1,500) = Saving (500)
Table 8: Ćurrent dues closing´ for the operating revenues and expenditures.
An argument for using ćurrent dues closing´ is the following: Budgetary control should con-
sist of comparing receipt instructed revenues and payment instructed expenditures, as they
are reported in the accounts (i.e., on the cameral account) with the corresponding budgetary
revenues and expenditures. If, for example, a person on whom a local government has a
money claim does not pay, this is related to the receipt execution (i.e., the person does not
pay the local government), it is not related to the budgetary control process of the local
government (the payment instruction in the accounts corresponds with the budgetary
amount).
Let us now take a closer look at this issue, by referring to the operating expenditures in the
numerical example above. Operating expenditures incurred are 11,000, although the
budgetary operating expenditures were only 10,500. In this case, someone (an administrative
officer) has caused expenditures to be incurred with 500 more than what has been budgeted
(11,000-10,500). The officer did not have the authority to incur these non-budgeted
expenditures. Therefore, the payment instruction should still be in accordance with the
democratic (politically) adopted budgetary expenditures (10,500) and not in accordance with
the expenditures incurred (11,000). A similar reasoning applies to the revenues. This situation
is the reason why Walb (1926), as mentioned above, does not refer to revenues and
expenditures incurred (column (2)), when stating that the amounts are divided into three
parts, namely budgetary amounts (column (1)), receipt/payment instructions (columns (3))
and actual receipts/payments (column (4)).
In summary, budgetary control for the revenues should consist of comparing the receipt
instructions with the budgetary revenues, and budgetary control for the expenditures should
consist of comparing the payment instructions with the budgetary expenditures.

Receipt/payment control
The second task of ACAM is to contribute to receipt/payment control. Both the cameral
account with separate columns for receipt/payment instructions (CD) and actual
receipts/payments (A) and the cameral single-entry bookkeeping method with its two rules
(i.e., no A-entry without an earlier or a simultaneous CD-entry and B=BD+CD-A), have been
specifically developed so receipt/payment control can be an integrated part of the book-
keeping itself (see Mülhaupt, 1987). This appears clearly in the bookkeeping example
illustrated above and will be further explained in the following, referring to the bookkeeping
of operating revenues and expenditures (see Table 6).
In the CD-columns receipt instructed operating revenues (15,000) and payment instructed
operating expenditures (10,000) are entered on the receipts and payments sides, respectively,
while actual cash receipts (14,500) and actual cash payments (9,900) are entered in the A-
columns on the receipts and payments sides, respectively (bookkeeping rule 1). By using
bookkeeping rule (2), it clearly appears that the actual cash receipt has been in accordance
with the receipt instruction (Receipts-B=BD+CD-A=0+15,000-14,500=500) and the actual
cash payment has been in accordance with the payment instruction (Payments-B=BD+CD-
A=0+10,000-9,900=100).
As a result of the focus on receipt/payment control within ACAM, the balance columns on
the cameral account contain revenues (receipts) and expenditures (payments), for which
receipt/payment instructions have been issued, but are not paid yet. In the numerical example
this is as follows (see Table 6):
BD B
Revenue rests (in the form of receipt instructed, but not received revenues) 0 500
Expenditure rests (in the form of payment instructed, but not paid expenditures) 0 100
This means that incurred, but not payment instructed, operating revenues of 1,000 (see the
numerical example above: line (1) Operating revenues: 16,000 in Column (2) minus 15,000
in Column (3)) and incurred, but not payment instructed operating expenditures of 1,000 (see
the numerical example above: line (2) Operating expenditures: 11,000 in Column (2) minus
10,000 in Column (3)) are not entered in the balance columns on the receipts and payments
sides of the cameral account, respectively. Neither is long-term debt (after instalments paid)
of 1,800 (see the numerical example above: line (4) Borrowing revenues of 2,000 minus line
(5) Instalment expenditures of 200) entered on the payments side, because no payment
instruction has been issued for this amount. It is true that investment expenditures of 3,000
are entered in the current dues column on the payments side (when the payment instruction
was given; see the numerical example above: line (6) Investment expenditures, column (3):
Payment instruction of 3.000), but this amount is not reported in the current dues column on
the receipts side (as an asset), because no receipt instruction has been, nor shall be, given for
this amount.
There would be no bookkeeping problem entering non-receipt instructed revenues (in the
example operating revenues (1,000) and investments (3,000)) as well as non-payment
instructed expenditures (operating expenditures (1,000) and long-term debt after instalment
(1,800)) on the cameral account (in the CD-columns and then accordingly in the B-columns;
B=BD+CD-A), when using cameral single-entry bookkeeping. In fact, this is precisely what
has been done, when ACAM was developed to ECAM (see e.g., Monsen, 2009). The
motivation for this development was to allow for focusing on the profitability effect of the

revenues and expenditures, supplemented with complete and integrated balance accounts
(reporting total assets, total liabilities and equity, including non-receipt instructed revenues
and non-payment instructed expenditures) for public sector enterprises (like municipal
electricity companies and municipal bus companies), which are more similar to market-
financed commercial enterprises than to the budget-financed public administration. Entering
non-receipt instructed revenues and non-payment instructed expenditures (in the CD-
columns) on the cameral account (on the receipts and payments sides, respectively) within
ACAM would imply that receipt/payment control, for which the single-entry bookkeeping
method of administrative cameralistics and the cameral account (with separate columns for
receipt/payment instructions (CD) and actual receipts/payments (A) have been specifically
developed), could no longer be an integrated part of the bookkeeping (B=BD+CD-A). Hence,
in order to fulfil the receipt/payment control objective, receipt instructions (as opposed to
revenues incurred) and payment instructions (as opposed to expenditures incurred), are
entered in the CD-columns within ACAM.
Cash control
Controlling the receipt and payment execution (referred to as ćash control´) is also
important, in addition to controlling that the actual receipts/payments are in accordance with
the receipt/payment instructions (referred to as ´receipt/payment control´), as discussed
above. Since the various cash receipts and cash payments are entered in the A-columns on the
cameral account, it is easy to get an overview of the cash receipts and cash payments, by
studying the A-columns vertically. With regard to net cash change during the period, it
appears as the difference between the cash receipts entered in the A-column on the receipts
side and the cash payments entered in the A-column of the payments side. Referring to the
numerical example (see Table 6), we find the following net cash change:
Cash receipts (Receipts-A) (14,500+2,000) 16,500
-Cash payments (Payments-A) (9,900+20+200+3,000) -13,120
Net cash change 3,380
This positive net cash change shows that the cash receipts have exceeded the cash payments
during the year in question.
Financial (money) result reporting
Within ACAM the money effect of the revenues and expenditures is entered on the cameral
account. Hence, a financial (money) result is reported as the difference between receipt
instructions and payment instructions in the CD-columns. Referring to the numerical example
(see Table 6), we find the following financial (money) result:
Receipt instructions (Receipts-CD) (15,000+2,000) 17,000
Payment instructions (Payments-CD) (10,000+20+200+3,000) -13,220
Financial (money) result 3,780
This financial (money) result shows to what extent payment instructions have been financed
by receipt instructions. Since this result in the numerical example is positive (3,780), we learn
that all payment instructions have been financed by receipt instructions.
Discussion
Market-financed vs budget-financed organizations

All organizations incur expenditures, which must be financed by revenues, in order for the
organization to survive. However, different types of organizations acquire revenues in
different ways. And according to Danielsson (1977), we can distinguish between market-
financed and budget-financed organizations, precisely based on how they acquire financial
resources.
Market-financed organizations acquire financial resources via market transactions, where
goods or services are exchanged with money. Commercial enterprises are examples of such
organization, being involved in buying/producing and selling goods and services in order to
generate a profit. Since these organizations have profitability as their objectives, they prepare
profitability accounts, reporting the profitability generated from the market transactions. Or
in other words, in the commercial (business) sector, a profitability accrual principle is used
when bookkeeping revenues and expenditures, focusing on revenues earned and expenses
incurred. National and local governments, however, are examples of budget-financed
organizations. These organizations primarily acquire revenues via óne-way transactions´, as
opposed to via market exchange-transactions. By this I mean that they receive tax revenues
from the inhabitants, without giving a direct service in return to the inhabitants. And in these
organizations the budget plays an important role (hence, the term ´budget-financed
organizations´). The expenditures (from providing services to the inhabitants) are incurred in
the various departments of the organization (like the school department, the health
department etc.), while the tax revenues are received by the central finance department.
Therefore, the budget is used for allocating the tax revenues to the various departments, so
they can finance their expenditures.
Since the budget focuses on the money effect of the revenues and expenditures, traditionally
money accounts in the form of revenues and expenditures accounts have been prepared in the
public sector. This has made it possible to fulfil the four money tasks of traditional public
sector accounting, namely budgetary control, receipt/payment control, cash control and
financial (money) result reporting.
Comparing ACAM with IPSAS-standards
ACAM has been specifically developed for use by public sector organizations, being budget-
financed, while IPSAS-standards represent modified versions of IAS/IFRS-standards (IAS-
International Accounting Standard, IFRS-International Financial Reporting Standard), which
have been specifically developed for use by commercial enterprises, being market-financed.
In ACAM, the focus is on the money effect of the revenues and expenditures, in the form of
receipt instructed revenues and payment instructed expenditures, respectively, including
actual cash receipts and actual cash payments, respectively. In the IPSAS-standards,
however, the focus is on a modified profitability effect of the revenues and expenditures, in
the form of modified revenues earned and modified expenses incurred. It is true that there is
also an IPSAS-standard for the cash basis of accounting, but the International Public Sector
Accounting Standards Board (IPSASB) which issues the IPSAS-standards, clearly shows
preference for the accrual basis, or in other words, for modified profitability accounts.
We also find another important difference between ACAM and IPSAS-standards. While
ACAM uses a specific variant of single-entry bookkeeping (in form of the single-entry
bookkeeping method of administrative cameralistics), IPSAS-standards use a specific variant
of the principle of double-entry bookkeeping (the IPSAS-standards are based on, but not
identical with, the IAS/IFRS-standards, using the principle of double-entry bookkeeping).
Moreover, the accounts used by ACAM and IPSAS-standards are different. ACAM uses the

single-sided cameral account, consisting of a revenues side and an expenditures side. On the
other hand, IPSAS-standards use the double-sided commercial account with a debit side and a
credit side. While the cameral account has four columns on each side (BD-, CD-, A- and B-
columns), the commercial account has only one column on the debit and credit sides,
respectively. Hence, more types of information (such as receipt/payment instructions and
actual receipts/payments) can be entered on the cameral account (in different columns) than
what is possible when using the commercial account (with only one column). In fact, use of
the principle of single-entry bookkeeping, as opposed to the principle of double-entry
bookkeeping, makes it possible with such a registration of more types of information in the
accounts. As pointed out by Wysocki (1965, p. 15), the former principle is more flexible than
the latter principle. Specifically, when using the principle of single-entry bookkeeping, we
may undertake one, two or more single-entries, depending on what information we want to
report. On the other hand, when we use double-entry bookkeeping, we must always undertake
two entries with the same amount on two different accounts (debit=credit).
In summary, although both ACAM and IPSAS-standards are developed for use by public
sector organizations, they represent different types of accounts, namely money accounts and
modified profitability accounts, respectively. The bookkeeping methods used (single-entry
and double-entry, respectively) as well as the accounts used (cameral single-sided and
commercial double-sided accounts, respectively) are also different.
Conclusion
Public sector organizations, being budget-financed, acquire financial resources differently
from commercial enterprises, being marked-financed. Therefore, public sector organizations
need another type of information than the profitability information required by commercial
enterprises with a profit objective. Furthermore, since the IPSAS-standards are modified
versions of the IAS/IFRS-standards, reporting modified profitability information, public
sector organizations need another type of information than the one provided by the IPSAS-
standards.
Public sector organizations need money information to be used for democratic control of
public money. Undertaking this form of control, by using the reported accounting information
to keep public sector organizations accountable for their spending of public money, is of
utmost importance for the survival of the democracy. This article has explored the four
specific money tasks of ACAM and demonstrated their relevance to the modern public sector.
Given this it would seem to have the potential for use by public sector organizations beyond
the continental German speaking European countries where it has its roots. This potential is
worthy of further research.
References
Buschor, E., Introduction: from advanced public accounting via performance measurement to
new public management. In Buschor, E. and Schedler, K. (Eds.) Perspectives on
Performance Measurement and Public Sector Accounting, (Berne/Stuttgart/Vienna:
Paul Haupt Publishers, 1994), pp. VII-XVIII.
Danielsson, A., Företagsekonomi – en översikt (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1977).
Monsen, N., Cameral accounting as an alternative to accrual accounting, International
Journal of Governmental Financial Management (2008a), VIII(1), pp. 51-60.

Monsen, N., Administrative cameralistics, International Journal of Governmental Financial
Management (2008b), VIII(2), pp. 77-89.
Monsen, N., Enterprise Cameralistics, International Journal of Governmental Financial
Management (2009), IX(1), pp. 39-52.
Mülhaupt, L., Theorie und Praxis des öffentlichen Rechnungswesens in der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1987).
Oettle, K., Cameralistics. In Grochla. E. and Gaugler, E. (Eds.), Handbook of German
Business Management (Berlin: C. E. Poeschel Verlag Stuttgart, 1990), p. 345-354.
Walb, E., Die Erfolgsrechnung privater und öffentlicher Betriebe. Eine Grundlegung (Berlin:
Industriverlag Spaeth & Linde, 1926).
Winckelmann, H., Kameralistische und kaufmännische Rechnungslegung in öffentlichen
Verwaltungen und Betrieben (1950).
Wysocki, K., Kameralistisches Rechnungswesen (Stuttgart: C. E. Poeschel Verlag, 1965).

Sovereign Wealth Funds
Hany H. Makhlouf - [email protected]

University of the District of Columbia
Abstract
Sovereign Wealth Funds have been the focus of attention by American and European
politicians and media commentators who suspect that their investment choices are made on
the basis of political or strategic considerations rather than the normal investors’ interest in
financial returns. Because those funds are owned and managed by foreign governments, they
have also aroused nationalistic fears of foreign takeover of iconic corporations and financial
institutions. However, a more objective analysis of the role played by Sovereign Wealth
Funds would indicate the extent to which they can be a force for stability in the global
financial market. Their record so far indicates that their motives are more financial than
strategic, and that they are long-term-oriented and patient investors who don’t shift
strategies due to short- term volatility in stock market indexes, or quarterly declines in sales
or profitability. Their primary goal is to attain reasonable returns rather than establish
managerial control or play active role in the operation of the businesses in which they invest.
Introduction
Sovereign Wealth Funds have generated a great deal of concern as they acquired assets in
American and European corporations and financial institutions. Until the world has become
fully focused on the 2008 financial crisis that threatened the collapse of major American- and
European-based financial institutions, hardly a day passed without some politicians,
economists, or media commentators questioning SWF’s motives and wondering about the
harm that they may cause if they were allowed to acquire controlling interests in large
corporations or major financial institutions. Calls were made to place them under stricter
scrutiny and control. In Italy, foreign minister Franco Frattini expressed his government’s
opposition to Sovereign Wealth Funds “buying more than 5 per cent of individual Italian
companies” (Financial Times, 21 October, 2008). Other European governments have
considered doing the same. Despite lack of evidence, Sovereign Wealth Funds have been
accused of having hidden political and strategic motives. Some analysts have gone as far as
suggesting that such funds not be allowed to have voting rights in the companies in which
they invest (Economist, 20 September, 2008).
As state owned funds that manage governmental budgetary surpluses, revenues from
commodity and other exports, proceeds from privatization, and foreign exchange reserves,
Sovereign Wealth Funds are viewed by those critics as significantly different from private
investors; hence the need to subject them to different regulations and control mechanisms. It
can be safely assumed, however, that the concerns about their motives, hidden or otherwise,
are based on attitudes towards who own them, rather than how they have performed and
impacted the institutions in which they have acquired some assets.
Distinguishing Features
According to the Monitor Group, which is one of the world’s largest consulting firms, and the
Italian Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) research center, a fund must meet six criteria
to be classified as a Sovereign Wealth Fund:

1. It must be state-owned.
2. It must be set aside to be managed separately from other government funds/assets.
3. It must avoid having “explicit pension obligations”.
4. It must invest in a variety of classes of assets.
5. It must direct its investments for the realization of financial returns.
6. It must commit a significant part of its capital to global investments.
These criteria not only show what Sovereign Wealth Funds are, but also what they are not.
Indirectly, they dispel the notion that they are created to serve political, foreign policy or
strategic objectives.
Ownership, Size, and Financial Significance

By the middle of 2009, there were at least 31 Sovereign Wealth Funds owned by 23
countries, holding assets in banks, manufacturing enterprises, service organizations,
agribusinesses, real estate, commodities markets; and in the form of governmental and
institutional securities. According to one estimate, they have holdings in 7,000 companies,
located in 58 countries (Bris and Fernandes, 2009); and contrary to common perception, they
don’t just belong to Arab oil exporting countries. In fact, those countries control only 29 per
cent of SWF’s total holdings .The countries that established one or more of those funds over
approximately a half century include Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, China, East Timor, France,
Iran, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Korea, and the
United Arab Emirates. Evidently, several of those countries neither export oil nor are located
in the Middle East. One common characteristic among most of them, however, is that they
have had current account surpluses, at least at the time their funds were created.
The impact of Sovereign Wealth Funds on the world’s investment picture is a product of their
size, and the location and kinds of investments they make. Estimates of their total value have
ranged from $3 to $4.5 trillion in the middle of 2008. Due to the subsequent financial losses
in the banking and real estate sectors, the drop in world trade and commodity prices, and the
fall of stock values, their assets are believed to have dropped to between $1.8 and $3 trillion
by the middle of 2009, still not an insignificant sum considering that they are owned by a
relatively small number of countries. Accordingly, future growth projections have been
scaled back from $10 trillion by 2016, and $20 trillion by 2020 to $7 trillion by 2019
(Oakley, 2009). Those figures, however, could improve with the speed and scope of the
economic recovery.
Although Kuwait’s $200 billion SWF, known as the Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA), is
the oldest, having been created in 1953, the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) and
other Abu Dhabi-owned funds are the largest, with an estimated capital of $875 billion.
Distant second is Norway’s SWF. It is projected that China’s $300 billion SWF could
eventually surpass all others, thanks to that country’s huge financial reserves and the
continued strength of its economy. In a disclosure statement required by the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission, China’s Investment Corporation revealed that as of January 2010
it had $9.6 billion worth of investments in 60 American corporations and financial
institutions, the largest of which was the $1.7 billion invested in Morgan Stanley. In addition,
it was reported that China had $1.5 billion interest in 14 Index Funds; another $1.5 billion in
an Arlington, Virginia, independent electric power company; $3.5 billion in Vancouver-based
mining company (Teck Resources); and an undisclosed amount in another Arlington-based
firm (Interstate Hotels and Resorts), which manages 232 properties in the United States,
Russia, India, Mexico and other countries (Mufson, 2010; and Ahren, 2009).

The emergence of Sovereign Wealth Funds has, to a great extent, been a product of various
imbalances in foreign trade and governmental budgets. Huge trade surpluses, attained by
China and the key members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) as
well as other oil exporters like Russia represent a transfer of wealth on a grand scale from the
world’s major importers to few major exporters. China’s success as an exporter of a wide
range of products has not only made it one of the leading trading nations (slightly edging
Germany in 2009), but has also created a state of dependence on its low priced exports in
many parts of the world. Even the economies of some of the richest countries, such as the
United States and the members of the European Union, who account for 40 per cent of
China’s exports, have become too dependent on the continued flow of China’s cheap exports.
China’s trade surplus with the United States that is in excess of $200 billion a year (U.S.
Census 2008), and its acquisition of over $540 billion worth of U.S. government treasury
securities, have resulted in the two global competitors becoming economically inter-twined.
As in the case of China that has maintained a surplus in its trade balance through sustained
efforts to increase exports and reduce imports, Middle East oil producers have not reacted to
the recent boom in oil revenues by letting “consumption to rise at the same rate as their trade
surpluses; the governments of the Gulf spent less than 45 per cent of their oil revenues in
2008. The excess revenue filled the coffers of the region’s sovereign wealth funds and central
banks.” (Drezner 2008)
Sovereign Wealth Funds’ Investment Strategies

Although many risk- avert funds have historically committed a good part of their capital to
fixed income securities such as foreign government bonds, an increasing number of them are
diversifying their investments to include private equity, hedge funds, commodities, real
estate, and infrastructural projects. Typically, Sovereign Wealth Funds avoid holding
controlling interests in the companies and financial institutions in which they hold some
assets. “On average, Sovereign Wealth Funds take 0.74 per cent of the shares outstanding in a
company… Their level of control only reaches 50 per cent in less than 1 per cent of their
investments” (Bris and Fernandes, 2009). Sovereign Wealth Funds have also had the
tendency to locate their investments in countries that offer legal protection for foreign
investors. They choose companies that have growth potential although their profits and stock
prices might have fallen in recent years. Because of their emphasis on long term revenues and
their lack of interest in management control, they have been described as passive and patient
investors.
Although they don’t have a history of acting in concert, a number of joint investments have
been started by two or more Sovereign Wealth Funds in 2009, which may signal a new trend.
Examples of such investments include:
1. Abu Dhabi and Malaysia’s Sovereign Wealth Funds joining forces in energy, real
estate, and hospitality related projects.
2. France’s Fonds Strategique d’Investissement fund joining Abu Dhabi’s Mubadala
Fund in a biotechnology industry investment.
3. China, Singapore, and Kuwaiti Sovereign Wealth Funds supporting Blackrock’s
acquisition of Barclays Global Investors.
4. Qatar’s $850 million joint investment with Indonesia to finance agricultural,
touristic, and natural resources development projects in Vietnam (Saigol, 2009).

Governance and Management Style
As Sovereign Wealth Funds differ in their sizes and investments, they also differ in the way
they are managed. Some, as in the case of Qatar’s SWF, are under the control of the ruling
elite. Other Sovereign Wealth Funds are managed by public officials, chosen from
appropriate government agencies. Some others, like Singapore and Norway’s that are known
for good governance are run by professional managers who have gained a reputation as astute
investors. These two funds are also known for their transparency, and are viewed as models
for other funds to follow. Norway’s SWF success record has caused East Timor and Bolivia
to seek its assistance in managing their funds.
In 2007, Singapore indicated that it would not invest in iconic companies that host countries
would rather keep in the hands of individual or non-governmental institutional investors due
to cultural, nationalistic, or political considerations (Financial Times, 12 December, 2007).
Host country worries about possible take-over of those companies, and fear about Sovereign
Wealth Funds’ motives and management integrity have also resulted in the negotiation of a
voluntary Code of Conduct, with the help of the International Monetary Fund. This code,
which has been given the name “the Santiago Principles”, provides Sovereign Wealth Funds
with a framework of accountability, transparency and governance. As an extension of this
code, SWF have been urged to avoid the acquisition of more than 5 per cent of any single
company in order to minimize the political impact of their investments.
Concern for sustainability by Sovereign Wealth Funds is still in its early stages. There is
some evidence, however, that it would become a greater factor in future investment decisions,
as Sovereign Wealth Funds become more concerned about their image and political
acceptance. In one case, Norway’s SWF has decided to sell its interest in the mining
company, Rio Tinto, because of reservations about the environmental damage caused by that
company’s joint venture in Indonesia. Although Rio Tinto claimed that it was not involved
directly in the management of the Indonesian mines, Norway refused to do business with it.
Meanwhile, China has announced that its SWF would favor socially responsible investment
opportunities. The types of businesses it would avoid include some in the tobacco and arms
industries (Anderlini, 2008).
Investment Successes and Failures

The success and failure record of a SWF has been influenced by the types of investments
made, the extent to which professional managers and advisors have been involved in making
investment decisions, and developments and trends in the global economy. Some Sovereign
Wealth Funds have gained over the years from investments in real estate and stock
acquisitions. Some have taken a more conservative stand by purchasing U.S. government
securities; thus, earning consistent but low returns on their investment. This group, which
includes Saudi Arabia and China, has escaped the 2008 shock of declining real estate and
stock market indexes. Sovereign Wealth Funds assets in financial institutions have also taken
a beating. According to McKinsey and Company, of the $60 billion of SWF investments in
western financial and banking institution, about $14 billion have been lost in 2008 alone as
the world faced a near financial meltdown (quoted in Business Week, 29 September, 2008).
The Kuwait Investment Authority has lost $270 million on its $3 billion investment in
Citigroup within an eighteen- month period (The Washington Post, 25 September, 2008) and
eventually decided to sell its remaining stocks in that bank. Overall, Sovereign Wealth Funds
are estimated to have lost up to 18 per cent of their portfolios between 2007 and the
beginning of 2009, according to Deutsche Bank analysts (Saigol 2009).

Shared Benefits
Sovereign Wealth Funds serve three main objectives as far as their owners are concerned:
1. They help them diversify their sources of revenue. In the case of those who are
dependent on one commodity, like the Middle East oil exporters, Sovereign
Wealth Funds are intended, in part, to prepare them for the day when they run out
of oil.
2. Their economies may not be able to absorb all of the revenues realized from their
trade surpluses; hence, the need to invest in other markets.
3. Investments in well established corporations outside their domestic markets could,
over the long term, bring higher returns and carry lower risk.
Sovereign Wealth Funds also bring the following benefits to host countries:
1. As investors, Sovereign Wealth Funds bring in needed capital that some
companies and financial institutions need.
2. Sovereign Wealth Funds are long-term oriented; accordingly, they contribute to
the stability of the firms in which they invest. Unlike short-term investors and
speculators, they don’t withdraw their investments due to short-term fluctuations
in stock values or deterioration in quarterly returns.
3. Investments by Sovereign Wealth Funds contribute to the survival of capital-short
companies and banks that are not able to acquire additional equity due to short-
term financial problems.
4. They help increase long-term share holders’ value since the stocks of the
companies, in which they invest, usually rise in value due to confidence in
Sovereign Wealth Funds investment strategies.
5. They support development projects in capital short developing countries.
Future Direction
The global financial crisis and economic recession that have caused Sovereign Wealth Funds
to lose some of their assets has forced those funds to re-examine their investment strategies,
and make some modifications. Some have started to favor keeping more of their investments
in their home countries or close to home, i.e. in nearby countries. Others decided to sit on
their money in anticipation of a change in business prospects; thus, temporarily reducing the
level of their involvement in global financial transactions. According to the Monitor Group
and Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Sovereign Wealth Funds from the Middle East
and Asian oil exporting countries “made just 26 investments, worth a total $6.8 billion in the
first three months of (2009)…That represents a fall of more than 50 per cent in the number of
investments made in the first quarter last year (2008).” (Saigol 2009)
The International Energy Agency (IEA) has projected that per barrel crude oil prices, which
have a major impact on the future of Sovereign Wealth Funds, are likely to increase at a fast
rate after the world fully recovers from the economic shock and the near financial meltdown
of 2008. A barrel of crude could reach up to $200 by 2030, compared to about $80 in 2010.
Expected rise in demand, accompanied by a declining capacity to raise output, may put
pressure on prices to rise up to that level. To OPEC members, who by then are expected to be
responsible for 51 per cent of world supply, such a price level would raise their revenues to

about $2 trillion per year, a significant increase over the $700 billion they earned in 2007
(Blas and Hoyos 2008). Some analysts estimate that for OPEC members, with the exception
of Venezuela and Nigeria, every dollar in the price per barrel of oil in excess of $50 can add
to their Sovereign Wealth Funds. (The Middle East 2008; and the Washington Post, 19
October, 2008).
Conclusion
The western countries’ concerns about Sovereign Wealth Funds motives and hidden agendas
have so far proven to be based on false assumptions that are more political than financial.
Therefore, as the world economy continues to recover from the deep recession that began in
2008, Sovereign Wealth Funds will find the future investment climate far more friendly, and
their former critics less critical. Some observers believe that host countries and Sovereign
Wealth Funds have begun to adjust to each other. Sovereign Wealth Funds are becoming
increasingly sensitive to host country concerns; and host countries more receptive to the idea
that government-owned funds can behave as responsibly as other institutional investors.
Improvement in host country relations would also be enhanced as Sovereign Wealth Funds
become more transparent and professionally managed. As they gain more experience and
further develop their managerial capabilities, Sovereign Wealth Funds are expected to operate
with more confidence, and seek greater influence and proper representation on the boards of
the corporations in which they invest.
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funds.html.
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Gordon, Michael. 2007. “ Ignore the Murk and Myths on sovereign Funds.” Financial Times.
12 December.
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Mufson, Steven and Faiola, Anthony. 2008. “U.S. Appeals Abroad Fall Flat as Leaders See
no Crisis at Home.” The Washington Post. 23 September.
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July.
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Thornton, Emily, and Reed, Stanley. 2008a. “A Power Player Emerges in the Gulf.” Business
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http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html

Public Financial Management in Sudan
Hussein Mohamed El-Nafabi - [email protected]
College of Technology, Almadina Almunawara, Saudi Arabia
Abstract
Effective public financial management and financial control systems have an important role
in ensuring the accountability of the use of public fund, and safeguarding limited public
resources against corruption and other misuse and unlawful practices. This study aims to
identify and provide a description, assessment and analysis of the role of public sector audit
and other financial controls in safeguarding the country's public resources in the Sudanese
public sector entities at the federal, state, and local levels, and minimizing financial
corruption in the Sudan.
The objective of this study is to address the contexts where perverse incentives for financial
corruption exist, and try to provide practical solutions. The factors that can facilitate
financial corruption in the Sudan include weak and ineffective internal control systems,
deficiencies in the accounting systems, the penalties are not harsh enough, very low salary
levels, backlog of external auditing, and nepotism. The study revealed that financial
corruption in the Sudan is deeply rooted and is institutionalized.
The study will serve to underscore and guide the Sudanese administrative reformers who are
intending to combat financial corruption and introducing practical systems reforms.
Keywords: Public financial management, financial controls, financial corruption, Sudan.
Introduction
Although, the Sudan’s oil sector has grown rapidly over the past ten years, in addition to
many other sources of national wealth, Sudan is classified, according to many international
organizations, amongst the very poor and most corrupt countries in the world (CPI, 2008;
Economic Freedom Index, 2007, World Bank, 2007). In the Open Budget Survey (2008),
which included Sudan and 84 other countries, Sudan was joint bottom with 0 points along
with DR Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome. The existence of poor public financial
management system and financial controls in the Sudan, in addition to the absence of
transparency in the functioning of government, the deficiencies of prosecuting agencies, the
ineffectiveness of procurement and audit, shortage of qualified accounting and auditing staff,
and low salary levels of public sector employees are the major factors which facilitate
corruption and misuse of the limited public funds in the Sudan (Logune, 2006; JAM, 2005).
It is generally recognized that many developing countries have sub-optimal governmental
financial control systems which often became worse in the ‘lost decade’ of the 1980s and
later. The serious deficiency in the financial control systems in the Third World is considered
as the major factor which facilitates the misuse of public resources and financial corruption.
Little attention has been given, at least until recently, to sound accounting and auditing
practices, and comprehensive training programmes for auditing and accounting staff in public
sector organizations (Johnson, 1992, Balkaran, 1993). The supreme audit institutions and
internal check in public sector units in many African countries are ill-equipped and lack an
adequate number of skilled staff members. On the accounting and reporting side, besides the
delays in producing consolidated treasury balances, the reliability of fiscal data is often
questionable. In practice, government auditors are generally not independent from the

executive branch, and auditors' recommendations are rarely implemented. Audit and external
control are the weakest links of the African public revenues and expenditure management
system (Moussa, 2004). The deficiencies in the auditing and accounting systems in African
countries include ineffective internal control and internal check, unqualified auditing and
accounting staff, and unreliable and untimely accounting information systems Giorgis (1998);
Wyk, et al. (1998). This provides inadequate safeguards against fraud, corruption, and
malpractices in public sector organizations (Gwilliam and El-Nafabi, 2002).
Literature Review
In the last decade or so, corruption has attained a high profile in the development, political
economy debate and literature (Tanzi, 1998). It has been seen as the most serious economic
crime endangering the national security economic growth and public safety of any country
(Asis, 2000; Fantaye, 2004; O’Shea, 2004; Kaufmann and Vicente, 2005). In all countries,
and more noticeably in developing countries, corruption is detrimental to state efficiency. It
hampers budget equilibrium, diminishes expenditure efficiency, and distorts its allocation
between different budgetary functions (Delavallade, 2006). Corruption harms many Third
World countries where poverty is prevalent and the economy is poor and supported by
foreign aid and loans. In spite of the presence of oil and vast mineral resources in many
African countries such as Angola, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria and
Sudan, the situation continued to blight rather than enhance people’s lives because of
conflicts, corruption and power struggles (Khan, 2007). Peter Eigen (2005), the former
Chairman of Transparency International (TI), said that corruption is a major cause of poverty
as well as a barrier to overcoming it. However, others have argued that it is poverty which led
to corruption rather than the other way around (Chetwynd et al. 2003, Johnston 2009). To
show how corruption destroyed economy of countries, it is estimated that the annual
corruption industry worldwide is close to US $1 trillion (Kaufmann, 2005; Svensson, 2005).
Corruption results in a major loss of public funds needed for development, education,
healthcare and poverty alleviation, both in developed and developing countries (Peter Eigen,
2004). Gonzales (2000) stated that corruption distorts the allocation of local resources and the
performance of local governments. The TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2009 (CPI) shows
that 131 out of 180 countries (73%) scored less than 5 against a clean score of 10. This
clearly indicates the seriousness of corruption in many countries worldwide. In the paper
“Governance Matters IV” covering significant changes over the six-year period 1998-2004,
the control of corruption was shown to have significantly worsened in a number of African
countries, including Sudan (Kaufmann et al., 2005).
Public financial management usually covers the management of government revenue,
expenditure, and cash (Lubin, 2007). There appears to be a negative correlation between the
quality of public financial management systems and financial corruption (Lubin, 2007).
Reporting on work done by TI and the World Bank, Dorotinsky and Pradhan (2007) consider
that there are five systemic factors which increase the risk of corruption in public financial
management:
a. weak public financial management capacity which include record keeping,
reporting, accounting, and financial management staff;
b. inadequate internal controls;
c. limited internal fiscal transparency;
d. weak management and supervision, and;
e. weak external accountability in public spending.

On the other hand, an effective public financial management and control systems activity
strengthens governance by materially increasing citizens’ ability to hold their governments to
account. Auditors perform an especially important function in those aspects of governance
that are crucial in the public sector for promoting credibility, equity, and appropriate behavior
of government officials, while reducing the risk of public corruption (IIA, 2006). According
to Baltci and Yilmaz (2006), the effort to reform a fiscal system should include internal
control and audit due to crucial role they play in enhancing accountability and effectiveness.
In addition, an effective public sector internal audit could play a useful role in the
investigation process, and the internal auditors can play a vital role in assisting the agencies
responsible for investigation of alleged cases of corruption in public sector organizations
(Khan, 2006). Internal auditing as a control measure does not only minimize the
opportunities for corruption through the verification of procurement process, but also ensures
effective physical monitoring of capital items procured and actual utilization which should
avoid fraud and abuse (Asare, 2008).
The wages paid to civil servants are important in determining the degree of corruption as is
the general level of economic development of a country. The lower the wage level, the higher
is corruption (Tanzi, 1998; Kameir and Kursany, 1985). In addition, the absence of
transparency and ineffective institutional controls are seen as the main factors leading to
corruption (Tanzi, 1998). It is generally noticed that the harshness of penalties imposed on
the perpetrators being caught, plays an important role in preventing or reducing the number
of crimes or illegal acts (Becker, 1968). However, in most developing countries, relatively
few people are punished for acts of corruption, in spite of the extent of the phenomenon.
Furthermore, with the exception of a few countries, there seems to be a wide gap between the
penalties specified in the laws and regulations and the penalties that are effectively imposed
(World Bank, 1998).
Financial Controls and Corruption in the Sudan

According to many international institutions (CPI, Economic Freedom Index, World Bank),
Sudan’s economy is hindered by instability, poor infrastructure, economic mismanagement,
and corruption. The TI Corruption Perceptions Index shows that corruption in Sudan has
deteriorated in recent years. The score for the country reduced from the already poor score of
2.2 out of 10 in 2004, to 2.1 in 2005, 2.0 in 2006, 1.8 in 2007, 1.6 in 2008 and 1.5 in 2009
when it was the fourth most corrupt country included in the survey. This clearly indicates that
the Sudan is moving fast to become the most corrupt nation on earth. The Index of Economic
Freedom 2008 also reveals that Khartoum’s government is rife with corruption, and the
country is one of the world’s twenty most corrupt nations.
Twenty three years ago, Kameir and Kursany (1985, p. 7) stated that "corruption in the
Sudanese context can hardly be avoided. It touches upon the life of every citizen. It has
become a major source of income generation . . . In addition to wages, rent, profits and
interests, corruption could be considered as a fifth factor in determining the distribution of the
national product and perhaps is the most important among them in a Sudanese context".
In post-war, Southern Sudan, besides widespread corruption and institutionalized nepotism,
one of the most widely acknowledged barriers to services delivery and infrastructural
development is the lack of human resources capacity in different units of the government of
Southern Sudan (Koul, 2007). It has been argued that, the underdevelopment in Southern
Sudan has been subjected to high levels of corruption which has affected the proposed
development projects in the entire country (Anhiem, 2009). However, some action has been

taken and, for example, four senior officials of the ministry of finance in Southern Sudan
have been dismissed as a result of allegations of corruption (Kago 2006, Alsahafa Newspaper
2007).
In addition, in June 2006, the Southern Sudan Anti-Corruption Commission (SSACC) was
established by presidential decree to spearhead the Government of Southern Sudan’s fight
against corruption. In addition, the President of the Government of Southern Sudan, Salva
Kiir, has directed in decree No. 1 for 2007 that the SSACC and the Southern Sudan Audit
Chamber, in collaboration with the Ministry of Legal Affairs and Constitutional
Development, should review all major procurement contracts entered into by the Government
of Southern Sudan between 2005 and 2006. It would be helpful in fighting corruption and
strengthening transparency and accountability throughout the whole Sudan if the national
government in Khartoum took the same steps and established a national anti-corruption
commission and an independent committee to review how the government is using the public
funds, and also to review the government contracts.
Like most Arab and African countries, tribalism is strong and deeply rooted in the Sudanese
community. Wakoson (2007), the Sudanese Minister of State for International Cooperation in
the Sudan Government of National Unity, stated that in Southern Sudan, the contradictions
and conflicts between cultural tribalism and public duties are the fundamental reasons for
rampant corruption, inefficiency, nepotism, and what appears to be general irresponsible
conduct in public institutions. He added that "we hear of departments full of same family
members, or people appointing family members to multiple positions. This is clearly is the
ugly face of nepotism. Accordingly, work ethics diminishes because top officials cannot
punish their relatives for corruption or other irregularities. Such a situation is not restricted to
the Southern Sudan, but it is prevalent in all Sudanese communities.
According to the General Audit Chamber Act of 1999, the General Audit Chamber is
responsible for auditing the accounts of all federal and state government organizations, the
National Assembly, the Judicial Authority, public companies, the Bank of Sudan and other
government-owned corporations and banks and in which the government holds not less than
20% of the share capital.
Given the hidden nature of financial corruption and that it is typically operates in the dark and
the perpetrators of corruption are anxious to conceal the true nature of their activities, it is
virtually impossible to obtain even a rough estimate of the size of the corruption industry in
the Sudan. Accordingly, the number and scale of corruption that come to light in the Sudan
each year is much less than the actual level of corruption, and official estimates are
unreliable. The only source of data and information about corruption committed by the public
sector employees in the Sudan are the annual audit reports of the General Auditor Chamber.
This body faces many difficulties that result in many public sector organizations not to being
examined for many years. Thus, external audit uncovers only a fraction of the underlying
corruption. Nevertheless, Table (1) below illustrates the rising trend in the detected financial
corruption in the Sudanese government organizations and public companies over the period
2000-2007.

Table (1) Amounts of Public Funds Stolen in the Sudanese Central Government
Organizations and Public Corporations
Over the Period 2000-2007
Amounts Amounts and % Amounts and % Amounts Amounts and

Fiscal Year of Funds in Central in Central and % in % Stolen from
Stolen in Government Government Public Zakat
SUD Organizations Organizations in Companies
millions in Khartoum States
2000 - 2001(1) 278.7 54 16 199 10
19% 6% 71% 4%
2001- 2002(2) 267.9 113.8 19.7 103.9 30.5

43% 7% 39% 11%
2002-2003(3) 168.2 21.1 21.7 125.4 -

13% 13% 74%
2003 -2004(4) 396 60.9 62.8 273 -

15% 16% 69%
2004 -2005(5) 542.5 63.5 124.8 354.2 -
12% 23% 65%
2005 -2006(6) 904.3 69.3 164.1 670.9 -

8% 18% 74%
2006 -2007(7) 561.2 280.6 -

50% * *
Notes: SUD: Sudanese Dinnar. (US1$ = SUD 250).

* No information available.
Source:
(1) The General Audit Chamber (Sudan), the Annual Audit Report of looting the Public Funds, for the
Period 1.9.2001- 31.8.2002, p. 7
(2) The General Audit Chamber (Sudan), the Annual Audit Report for the Period 1.9.2001- 31.8.2002,
p. 24
Period 1.9.2002- 31.8.2003, p. 6
(4) The General Audit Chamber (Sudan), the Annual Audit Report 2003/2004.
(5) The General Audit Chamber (Sudan), the Annual Audit Report 2004/2005, pp. 21-22
(6) The General Audit Chamber (Sudan), the Annual Audit Report 2005/2006, pp. 23-24
(7) External Information Council, Sudan, January 12, 2008.
The figures in the above table shows that although the amounts stolen from the public funds
detected and reported by the General Audit Chamber decrease from SUD 278.7 in 2000/2001
to SUD 276.9 in 2001/2002 and to SUD 168.2 in 2002/2003, it began to rose in the following
years until reaching SUD 904.3 in 2005/2006. The table reveals that least corrupt sector is
central government organizations located in Khartoum. The reason could be that most of
these organizations are central ministries and institutions, and thus are able to recruit well
qualified accountants who are able to produce their accounts and these are usually audited
and examined every year.
The table also shows that, over the period, the largest portion of detected and reported
corruption occurred in public companies and corporations which amounted to an average

percentage about 70%. This may be attributed, amongst other reasons which will be
discussed later, to the fact that not more than 35% of public companies and corporations are
able to produce accounts every year. Thus, more than 65% of such bodies were not examined
and audited by the General Audit Chamber for many years. This may mean that the employees of
these public companies and corporations feel secure that their corrupt activities would not be
discovered for several years at least. This corruption does not include that identified in state-
owned banks.
In addition to the financial corruption mentioned above, Alsahafa Newspaper (No. 5232,
2008) revealed that the internal auditor of Al-Obiad refinery in Western Sudan, a branch of
the Sudanese Petroleum Corporation, discovered an amount of SUD 400 million (US$ 1.6
million) stolen by the employees in the refinery. The case is still in the court and was not
mentioned in the General Audit Chamber’s report.
Table 2, below, illustrates the accounting classification of public funds stolen from central
government organizations and public corporations during the period 2001-2007.
Table 2: Accounting Classification of Public Funds Stolen from the Central Government
Over the Period 2001-2007 (SUD Millions)
Revenues Expenditure Warehouses Treasures and Cash Other

Fiscal Year (Materials) Movements Theft
2001-2002 (1) 65 161 20 20 3
2002-2003 (2) 130 17 3 18 0.9
2004-2005 (3) 83 65 381 13 11
2005-2006 (4) 217 72 552 63 -
2006-2007 (5) 275 152 107 28 -

Note: No information available for the fiscal year 2003/2004.
Source:
Period 1.9.2001- 31.8.2002, p. 8
Period 1.9.2002- 31.8.2003, p. 7
(3) The General Audit Chamber (Sudan), the Annual Audit Report 2004/2005, p. 22
(4) The General Audit Chamber (Sudan), the Annual Audit Report 2005/2006, p. 24
(5) External Information Council, Sudan, January 12, 2008.
The accounting classification of stolen public funds shows that, during the period, the largest
portion was stolen from revenues. Stealing of materials from warehouses comes second; and,
amounts stolen from expenditure are the third most important.
Table 3, below, shows the amounts recovered from public funds stolen during the period
2001-2007.

Table 3: Amounts Recovered from the Public Funds Stolen from Central Government
Over the Period 2001-2007 (SUD Millions)
Fiscal Year Amounts of Public Amounts Percentage

Funds Stolen Recovered
2001-2002 267.9 19.9 7%
2002-2003 168.2 12.7 8%
2004-2005 542.5 104 19%
2005-2006 904.3 34.6 4%
2006-2007 561.2 25.1 4%
Source: The General Audit Chamber (Sudan), the Annual Audit Reports for the Periods 2001-2007. (No
information available regarding the fiscal year 2003/2004).
The above table shows that, on average, only 8% of public funds stolen from central
government organizations were recovered. This low level of recovery could encourage others
employees to steal public funds.
In the states, the situation was not better than in central government units and public
corporations. In the General Audit Chamber’s report of 2005/2006, the amounts stolen in
Northern states was SUD 187.3 million, from these amounts only 9% was recovered. In its
last report (2006/2007), the General Audit Chamber stated that the amounts stolen were SUD
364.9 million, from these amounts only 6.6% was recovered. The states in Southern Sudan
should be examined and audited by the separate Auditor General Chamber of the
Government of Southern Sudan, which established after the peace agreement of January
2005. Date on administrative corruption detected in southern states is not yet available.
Regarding government-owned banks or those the government has a share of not less than
20% of their capital, the GAC’s report of 2006/2007 revealed that the amounts stolen from
these banks were SUD 40 million (US$ 160000).
The Auditor General in a speech to the National Assembly in January 2008 regarding the
audit report of 2006/2007 mentioned that some government units in the Ministry of Internal
Affairs and at Nahr Alneel State prevented the General Audit Chamber’s auditing teams from
examining and auditing the accounts.
Types of Financial Corruption and the Possible Factors Leading to

Corruption
Audit reports of the General Audit Chamber (2002, 2003, 2005, 2006, and 2007) reveal many
examples of financial corruption in central and state government organizations, and public
companies and corporations. These examples include:
(a) collecting different types of revenue by many government units, especially in the states,
without prior permission from the ministry of finance;
(b) collecting and receiving public revenues in cash without receipts and not paying them to
the treasury of the organization;
(c) paying for items not included in the budget of government unit;
(d) distortion of prices or quality of goods or services purchased by a government
organization;

(e) paying in cash, personal mobile phones bills in some government units, sometimes
without set limits or requiring the bills to be submitted for evidence;
(f) the proposed budgets in many government units, especially in the states, are not rationale
and prepared without relevant standards;
(g) adding names of non-existent employees to the salary forms or giving unlawful
allowances.
The Auditor General's report for 2002 on State Accounts highlights the weak capacity that
exists in many states. Some of the issues highlighted are:
• large discrepancies between amounts reported by the national government as having
been transferred and that reported by the states as having been received;
• unrealistic receipt and expenditure estimates in the budget, large extra-budgetary
funds;
• outdated management principles;
• poor investment planning;
• poor accounting practices.
In addition, the author examined some documents and interviewed the accounts manager of
the main refinery of the Sudanese Petroleum Corporation located near Khartoum and the
senior internal auditor of Nahr Alneel state, the General Audit Chamber highlighted, in its
different audit reports (2002, 2006 and 2007), many factors and reasons which contribute to
and facilitate corruption in the Sudanese public sector. These factors include:
1) Internal control systems and internal check in most public sector units are weak and
ineffective. These are mainly due to:
(a) shortage of qualified and trained accountants which, especially in state
government units, concentrates all the financial activities of the organization in the
hand of one or two employees. Many government units have only one accountant who
undertakes all the financial procedures of payment, receiving revenues and recording
them, and;
(b) absence of internal auditing, an essential part of internal control system, in most
government units, and which when it does exist, it is very weak and ineffective.
Brierley et al. (2001) stated that many government units in different states in the
Sudan, especially the local councils, have no internal audit departments despite the
fact that these councils are responsible for collecting the regional taxes which
comprise a significant portion of the revenue of the state.
2) Deficiencies in the accounting systems of most public sector organizations. These include
inadequate, unreliable, and untimely information systems; improper recording and
classification of different financial transactions, and; incompleteness of records and
supporting documents. Thus, financial statements and reports which are expected to be the
main indicators of financial conditions and present the different financial activities of
organizations fail to disclose material information that can facilitate accountability. This
provides inadequate safeguards against fraud, corruption, and other malpractices. The Joint
Assessment Mission Sudan (2005) reported that there are several challenges facing the public
financial management system in the Sudan including:
(a) the entire accounting system is manual, at both the national level and in the states;
(b) approximately 50 percent of the finance staff have had no formal training in
accounting;

(c) there is no commitment control system;
(d) cash management is very weak;
(e) the public financial management system in Southern Sudan needs to be re-built
from the ground.
3) The penalties imposed for fraud and corruption offences are not harsh enough and are not
proportionate to the amounts involved. While the Auditor General said in 1994 that "I do not
feel that penalties for fraud and corruption are severe enough to deter fraudulent and corrupt
employees", the Attorney General stated that "I do not see that the harshness of the laws is
the solution to the problem, there are many other factors which need to be considered, the
most important of which is to strengthen the regulations governing transactions in public
funds" (Al-Moltagah, 1994).
4) Failure to check the treasuries and warehouses by the accounts managers and internal
auditors either on a scheduled or on a surprise basis encouraged fraud and corruption.
5) Backlog of examining and auditing the accounts of many public sector organizations, by
the General Audit Chamber’s audit teams, for three years, or even more. The absence of an
external audit for many years, together with ineffective internal control systems, makes the
fraudulent and corrupt employees aware that their chances of detection are very small.
6) The General Audit Chamber's audit recommendations are rarely implemented. Many audit
recommendations are repeated in the General Audit Chamber's audit reports every year.
7) The system of collecting different charges and fees imposed by different councils and
states does not facilitate accountability of collectors, especially the itinerant collectors, but
rather, it encourages fraud and corruption.
8) Some public sector employees prefer to keep silent regarding discovered fraud or misuse
of government properties by politicians or senior staff, because they fear to losing their jobs
or facing other unpleasant consequence such as a transfer to a remote area. Other employees
do not know how nor to whom they should report discovered financial offences
independently of their own line management. This is a particular problem when the suspect is
the line manager.
9) Very low public sector salaries among middle and low level civil servants creates a
desperate need for additional sources, many find this in stealing public funds. Some Sudanese
economists revealed that the present minimum monthly salary level of public sector
employees is hardly cover 33% of the necessary costs of living for the medium size family. In
Southern Sudan, Koul (2007) stated that unfortunately, for the skilled majority employed or
not, it has been a plunge into poverty. For example, those who used to be paid around US
$3000 per month in the countries of their exile may now only be paid US $200 a month.
Goudie and Stasavage (1997) stated that "for lower-level officials if, in absolute terms, a
public sector wage is too low for an official to support himself and his dependents above the
poverty level, then the incentives for corruption will be considered greater”.
10) An excessive bureaucratization of public administration and a lack of streamlining and
computerization, renders civil service work extremely slow and increases incentives for
clients to use bribes to ensure their own transactions are dealt with promptly.
11) Petty corruption was part of the administrative operating system of the Ottoman
administration of much of the Sudan and insinuated itself into the culture of the civil service.

12) A weak sense of civic commitment and strong sub-national family, tribal, or religious
identities tie civil servants more closely to their kinship or identity groups than to a civic
polity. This makes civil servants more likely to use their posts to give favors to their
particular group than to serve a larger national community. It may also explain the low level
of reporting of irregularities.
13) There are no laws providing for public access to government information. The
government does not provide such access, even to the General Audit Chamber’s audit reports
(Index of Economic Freedom 2008). This may help to reduce the effective role of the civil
society, the media, and non-governmental organizations in monitoring public funds.
Summary and Recommendations

The research shows the presence of systemic financial corrupt practices in many areas of the
Sudanese public sector organizations. It also revealed that the serious deficiency in public
audit and financial control systems in the Sudanese public sector organizations is generally
recognized as the major factor which facilitates the misuse of public resources and financial
corruption in the country. The deficiencies in public auditing and accounting systems include
ineffective internal control and internal check, unqualified auditing and accounting staff, and
unreliable and untimely accounting information systems.
This study has highlighted a number of recommendations which might help to reduce the
level and amounts of financial corruption in Sudan. These include the following:
1. It is important that any form of economic crime should be identified and punished
severely by an appropriate fine or prison terms in line with the seriousness of the offence.
2. Promote strong coordination among the central and state governments and the civil
society to increase efficiency and sustainability in anti-corruption and good governance
efforts.
3. Fighting corruption could be achieved by the creation of more anti-corruption
commissions and ethics agencies.
4. Internal and external auditing mechanisms can reduce the incentives for high government
officials to abuse of their position and mismanage public resources.
5. The accounting and financial procedures across Sudan should be improved, refined and
rebuilt.
6. Auditors and accountants need to have more formal training in accounting and auditing.
7. Recruiting better qualified civil servants with wage satisfaction can create an environment
where abuses are easier detected.
8. Legislative reform is necessary for any lasting anti-corruption effort. Old laws and
regulations should be reviewed and revised and new legal provisions should be
introduced to enhance transparency and accountability. This should include codes of
conduct and ethical guidance.
9. Procedures for reporting suspected irregularities and corruption need to be improved.
Civil servants should have access to independent reporting mechanisms (whistle blowing)
if they suspect fraud or corruption have occurred. There should be appeal processes for
the public to use if they feel they have not been properly treated with, for example, the
awarding of contracts or tax assessments.

10. Strengthening and activating the role of the Office of the Auditor General and other
control agencies is an important tool in fighting corruption and increase transparency in
the country.
11. For the civil society, the media, and non-governmental organizations to play an effective
role in monitoring public funds, the government should enable greater public access to
information about budgets, revenue, expenditure, and other governmental data and
information. Public financial transparency of central and local budgets would help to
improve governance and reduce financial corruption.
12. Detribalizing public sector institutions is an important element to reduce, if not eliminate,
corruption and nepotism. In addition, this would support the work and findings of the
anti-corruption commissions.
13. Technology can assist public sector officials to easily access information about approved
supply sources; create transparency within the contracting and tendering process, and
monitor performance of goods and services. This can play a major role in ensuring
internal control systems and minimizing the potential for abuse.
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Independence of Supreme Audit Institutions in Sub-Saharan
Africa
Andy Wynne – [email protected]
iDILMAT training solutions, Ghana
Abstract
The INTOSAI Mexico Declaration provides a summary of good practice for public sector
auditors. However, this ideal is not achieved in many Sub-Saharan African countries. This
includes both the English speaking and the French speaking countries. The picture is
complex, especially in Francophone countries where there may be more than one type of
entity which is providing some sort of audit function. The roles and relative strengths of
these different types of audit institution (Accounts Court and General State Inspectorate) need
to be clearly understood. This paper provides an introduction to their roles and relative levels
of independence. Reform programmes need to be built on the strengths of each type of entity
if they are to provide efficient development paths for the countries concerned.
Introduction
Public governance is based on the division of powers and responsibilities. Traditionally, such
a division distinguishes between the executive, the legislative and the judiciary. Public
financial management is undertaken by the executive and the audit of this function is the
responsibility of either the legislature or the judiciary or a combination of the two branches.
There is also a division of responsibilities between the politicians who set government policy
and public sector officials (civil servants) who implement it. However, in many Sub-Saharan
African countries the politicians are closely involved in the implementation of their policies
and may be directly involved, for example, in the authorisation of orders and payments,
especially for larger contracts. One result of this expanded, executive, role of politicians is
that the independence of the Supreme Audit Institution in many Sub-Saharan Africa countries
is not as strong as it should be.
INTOSAI, the international body for Supreme Audit Institutions, has correctly put a lot of
emphasis on independence, but their guidance is recognised as being aspirational rather than
a statement of fact. The Mexico Declaration on Supreme Audit Institution Independence
(INTOSAI 2007) recognises eight core principles as essential requirements of proper public
sector auditing. These include requirements for “independence from the Executive”
(INTOSAI 2007: 2) for the head of the Supreme Audit Institution, but not necessarily that
this post should be appointed by parliament. They also include that “SAIs are free to publish
and disseminate their reports, once they have been formally tabled or delivered to the
appropriate authority—as required by law” (INTOSAI 2007: 3). Again, it is not specified
that these reports should be submitted direct to parliament (although elsewhere the
declaration does say that each Supreme Audit Institution should submit an annual activity
report to parliament).
A Supreme Audit Institution is defined as the member of INTOSAI in a country. It is not
dependent on any qualities of independence or other attributes. There are three main models
of Supreme Audit Institution in Sub-Saharan Africa, each with its own strengths and
weaknesses. However, in each model the head of the institution may be appointed by the
State President; they may have insufficient resources; their annual reports may be sent to the

president rather than parliament and these reports may not be promptly made public once
submitted.
This lack of adequate independence for Supreme Audit Institutions is, of course, not limited
to Sub-Saharan Africa. An INTOSAI survey undertaken in 2000 found that of 113 Supreme
Audit Institutions around 70 had their primary accountability to parliament whilst in nearly
40 cases it was to the head of state. Similarly AFROSAI-E (the regional body for
Anglophone Supreme Audit Institutions) found, in 2001, that only 5% of their members
considered that they had adequate independence.
Models of Supreme Audit Institution in Sub-Saharan Africa

There are individual variations between countries, but in general, there are three approaches
to the institutional arrangements for Supreme Audit Institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa. One
approach is adopted by the Anglophone countries and the other two are adopted by the
Francophone countries and, with minor variations, by the Lusophone and Spanish speaking
countries.
The Anglophone African countries adopt the parliamentary (or Westminster) model – an
individual auditor general heads an office which is, ideally, independent of the executive. Its
work is focused on a review of financial management and the accounts of public entities. If
irregularities are found they are reported to the relevant ministry or other agency for
appropriate action to be taken. The professional staff often have an accounting or audit
background. The auditor general is ideally appointed by and provides an annual report to
Parliament which should be reviewed in detail by the Public Accounts Committee and made
public.
Almost all Francophone Sub-Saharan African countries have two types of institution which
undertake external audit type functions, either of which may be designated as the Supreme
Audit Institution for an individual country:
• the Court of Accounts (Cour or Chambre des Comptes) is a division or separate court
within the judicial system. The individual members of the court (judges or magistrates)
are led by a president who is generally appointed by the president of the relevant country.
The court, with the support of its staff, judges the legality and regularity of the
transactions and accounts of individual public accountants and reports to Parliament on
the overall State Account. There is limited follow up of the Court’s reports by
Parliament. The professional staff traditionally have a legal rather than accounting or
audit backgrounds, but this is expanding in several countries
• the General State Inspectorate (Inspection Généraux d’Etat) reports either to the president
or the country’s prime minister (rather than parliament), but is largely independent of the
state bureaucracy and has access to all state institutions, public servants and their
documents. It may set its own annual programme. Each public institution may not be
visited or reported upon each year. The larger ministries will be reviewed each year, but
different departments will be subject to review each year. The professional staff of the
General State Inspectorate are usually educated in public financial management at
specialist higher education institutions. If irregularities are found they are reported to the
relevant ministry or other agency for appropriate action to be taken.
The Court of Accounts, as part of the judiciary, may be considered to be independent of the
executive, but their members may be appointed by the president or the council of ministers

and their reports may not be submitted direct to parliament. In France, which is the model
broadly adopted by most Franco-phone countries, the first president of the accounts court is
appointed by the council of ministers. The accounts court produces two annual reports. The
first is sent to all members of parliament and reviews the execution of the budget. The
second annual public report is sent to the president rather than to parliament (Bouvier,
Esclassan & Lassale, 2004).
The main thrust of audit reforms in Francophone Sub-Saharan African countries in recent
years has been the move from the Court of Accounts being a chamber of the supreme court
(Chambre des Comptes) to being a court in its own right (Cour des Comptes). However,
unless the appointment of the court’s president and magistrates is changed and the
relationship with parliament is strengthened it is not clear that such reforms will greatly
improve the independence of the Court of Accounts. Of the 12 accounts courts in Sub-
Saharan Africa, eight are independent courts (Cour des Comptes) and five remain as part of
the supreme court (Chambre des Comptes). In a 2010 report, the Economic and Monetary
Union of West Africa said that in only three of its seven member countries did the Accounts
Court have functional financial autonomy (Senegal, Burkina Faso and Guinea Bissau).
As the General State Inspectorate is accountable to the president or the prime minister they
may also have a high degree of independence from the entities (ministries, departments and
agencies) which they audit. A distinction could perhaps be made between independence from
the executive and independence from the entities which are subject to audit. If the General
State Inspectorate has the support of a strong president they may in fact have considerably
more independence from the ministries and other bodies which they audit than an accounts
court whose budget may have to be submitted through the Ministry of Finance before being
agreed by parliament.
It has been argued that General State Inspectorates should not be considered as external
auditors or supreme audit institutions as they are part of the executive. In contrast the Court
of Accounts are claimed to be outside and functionally independent of the executive. General
State Inspectorates are usually appointed by the president or the prime minister and their
annual reports are sent to these offices rather than to parliament. However, this may also be
the case for Court of Accounts and, indeed for Auditors General.
Six of the 18 Francophone members of CREFIAF1 have designated their General State
Inspectorate as their Supreme Audit Institution, whilst the other 12 countries have designated
their Accounts Courts. Thus the following General State Inspectorates are all members of
INTOSAI and are the Supreme Audit Institutions for their countries:
• Burundi - Inspection Générale des Finances
• Cameroun - Contrôle Supérieur de l’Etat
• Centrafrique - Inspection Générale d'État
• Guinée Conakry - Inspection Générale d'État
• Mali - Contrôle Générale des Services Publics
• Togo - Inspection Générale d'État.
1 Conseil Régional de Formation des Institutions Supérieures de Contrôle des Finances Publiques des
Pays Francophones d’Afrique au Sud du Sahara (African Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions –
Francophone countries)

In addition to these institutional arrangements, the broader context of the nature of the
political systems in which audit arrangements are embedded will have a significant impact on
the actual independence enjoyed by the supreme audit institution. In countries with relatively
strong parliamentary authority, especially relative to the presidency, the supreme audit
institution may be expected to be more independent. In addition, where there is a relatively
strong parliamentary opposition this may be able to use the facility of the public accounts
committee to enable a great level of autonomy for the supreme audit institution. It would be
useful for more research to be undertaken around these hypotheses.
Examples from individual countries

In Anglophone countries, the ideal, in terms of independence, is that the Auditor General is
appointed by Parliament, their annual budget is submitted and agreed directly by Parliament
and the Auditor General submits their annual report direct to Parliament. However, in most
Anglophone countries this ideal is not achieved in practice.
The Auditors General in Ghana, Nigeria and Tanzania, for example, are formally appointed
by the country's president. The office of the Auditor General does not usually send its budget
direct to parliament, but this is first subject to scrutiny and possible amendment by the
Ministry of Finance. Similarly, the Auditor General is often not able to submit their annual
reports direct to parliament. For example, in Botswana, Lesotho and Zimbabwe, the Auditor
General’s annual reports are submitted to the Minister of Finance to pass on to parliament,
whilst in Zambia the report is submitted to the president. Similarly, publication of the annual
report of the Auditor General is often delayed and so not available for the public or the media
until some time after it has been formally issued. In Sierra Leone, until recently the Auditor
General’s report could not be published until it had been considered by the parliamentary
Public Accounts Committee. In Nigeria the Auditor General’s report used to be made public
as soon as being submitted to the National Assembly, but now it is not published until after
the Public Accounts Committee has reviewed it which may be some years later.
The Courts of Accounts in many Francophone Sub-Saharan African countries are not strong
nor well established institutions. In Mali (generally considered to be one of the Francophone
countries with the strongest public financial management), for example, for many years the
Court of Accounts was understaffed causing a delay in the execution of its tasks. This
problem was partly resolved by the increase of the number of magistrates from two in 2000 to
nine in 2002 and 15 in 2003. However, the capacity of the Court of Accounts is still largely
insufficient. An institutional analysis carried out in 2002, concluded that 60 magistrates
would be needed to carry out all the tasks assigned to the accounts court (Ecorys 2006: 83).
In 2006 its was concluded that the Parliament of Mali does not effectively control budget
execution and accounting, since the reports of the Court of Accounts are not discussed in
Parliament and the Budget Execution Laws had not been voted on for many years (Ecorys
2006).
Similarly, in February 2005 the parliament of Benin had last received the audit report of the
budgetary years 1999 to 2000 from the Court of Accounts and the performance audit of the
ministries for the year 2001, while the reports of 2001 and 2002 were in the stage of
finalisation (Ecorys, 2006).
In Senegal, the Court of Accounts had 28 magistrates and reporters in 2008 whilst its
strategic plan aimed to have 60 magistrates. Similarly the General State Inspectorate has 30
inspectors. However, the General State Inspectorate has limited operational independence as

the president approves its annual and strategic plans and even nominates the member of staff
to head each mission. But its rights of access, enshrined in law, are superior to many other
African Supreme Audit Institutions. Thus it has access to all documents even if classified as
confidential or secret national defence documents. The General State Inspectorate has
developed a communications strategy which commits it to produce an annual report on the
state of public governance for the citizens of Senegal. Generally the reports are sent to the
State President and may then be made public.
The entity in Mali which is the member of INTOSAI is the “Controleur Général des Services
Publics” (CGSP, General State Inspectorate), reporting to the Prime Minister’s Office.
However, some have argued that the General State Inspectorate should not be the Supreme
Audit Institution for Mali, for example:
Various studies argue that the CGSP is not the right institution to represent Mali
at that level, because the CGSP cannot be considered as an ‘independent external
audit institution’. The CGSP operates under the responsibility of the Prime
Minister and is thus part of the executive (Ecorys 2006: 82/83).
The situation in Mali was further complicated in 2004 as:
the President decided to nominate a Vérificateur Général (Auditor General). His
terms of reference have many similarities with what is and/or should be done by
the ‘Section des Comptes’ [Accounts Court], and also with the terms of reference
of the Controleur Général des Services Publics (reporting to the Prime Minister)
(Ecorys 2006: 82).
As a result, Mali now has three external audit type institutions:
• an accounts court (Chambre des Comptes) as part of the Supreme Court
• the General Inspectorate of Public Services (Contrôle Générale des Services Publics)
which is the member of INTOSAI and reports to the Prime Minister
• the General Inspector/Auditor General (Vérificateur Général) who reports to the
President.
In Cote d’Ivoire the annual report of the General State Inspectorate is addressed to the State
President who publishes it in the Official Journal. General State Inspectors are appointed by
presidential decree.
Similar arrangements are in place in Burkina Faso for the Court of Accounts. This court
provides a public annual report which is submitted to the president and the senior officials of
the court are appointed by presidential decree.
Burkina Faso also has a General State Inspectorate. The 2007 PEFA report states that this
entity has a large measure of independence in determining the work it undertakes:
“The annual work programme (around 90% of controls) is determined by the
General State Inspectorate (GSI). Each year the prime minister sends a formal
letter of instruction to the GSI which does not include detailed plans. The GSI
then develops its annual work programme and sends it to the Prime Minister for

information”2 (page 114).
In Djibouti, despite the existence of an Accounts Court, a General State Inspectorate was
established in 2001. The idea was that the ex post juridical control (after the event legal
control) of the Accounts Court could be complemented by a body which could act during the
implementation of the budget. (General State Inspectorate, Djibouti, 2007). The general state
inspectorate has developed its own approach to audit which takes in to account all
management sub-systems, “this includes:
• evaluating whether the character of new or existing programmes are effective,
appropriate or pertinent considering their objectives and whether the expected results
are achieved
• identifying constraints and performance factors and whether management has
identified alternative solutions or the opportunity costs to achieve the programme’s
objectives effectively and efficiently
• identifying any overlaps or duplications or conflicts with other programmes and
recommending ways of executing programmes in the best manner possible
• evaluating programmes for conformity with laws and regulations, but also the
adequacy of systems of internal control and especially systems to monitor their
success” (page 10/11).
This first annual public report from the general state inspectorate of Djibouti also notes that:
“The general state inspectorate is a concept specific to Africa, with a universal,
general and extended scope. It usually consists of elite staff recruited through
competition from amongst the highest officials of the state (magistrates, national
directors, secretaries general of ministries etc), at least in Sénégal, Burkina Faso,
Côte d'Ivoire etc” (page 24).
The independence of the General State Inspectorate in Cameroon is described in the
following terms on the website of the Presidency:
“In the field, members of the mobile audit teams enjoy total independence from
the administration and the entities subject to audit and have all powers of
investigation. During their investigations auditors should not suffer any
restriction to their freedom without the prior agreement of the President of the
Republic”
Despite this level of independence, such General State Inspectorates are often ignored or
sidelined as was suggested earlier in the case of Mali. A senior public financial management
advisor from the World Bank recently claimed that “there is a huge problem, in some African
countries, of Supreme Audit Institutions which are part of the executive, but still members of
INTOSAI, when there are other bodies in these countries which are outside the executive and
functionally more independent, but are not members of INTOSAI because of political
considerations” (personal communication). Similarly the website of the Association of
French Speaking Superior Control Institutions (AISCCUF) ignores the members of INTOSAI
2 La programmation annuelle (environ 90% des contrôles) ne dépend que de l’IGE ; le premier ministre
envoie chaque année une lettre de mission formelle à l’IGE sans instruction de contrôle précis, l’IGE élabore
son programme de travail et le transmit pour information au Premier ministre.

from, for example, Burundi, and Mali which are General State Inspectorates, in favour of
Court of Accounts from these countries.
Conclusions
Public sector audit is not as independent of the executive as it should be in many Sub-Saharan
African countries. In many cases its capacity was deeply weakened during the lost decade of
the 1980s. Some of this capacity has been re-built in recent years, however, we can still not
afford to dismiss whole organisations which may be playing a key or at least complementary
role as a result of pre-conceived notions of what constitutes public sector audit. In addition, it
should be accepted that changing the nature of the work undertaken by audit institutions is
difficult, challenging and time consuming.
The picture of public sector audit is complex in many Sub-Saharan African countries,
especially in Francophone countries. There may be a range of entities which are providing
some sort of audit function. Many of these organisations may play a complementary role and
the development of the systems of financial control and governance in these countries will be
most efficiently achieved through a balance programme of capacity building for all such
entities. Depending on the circumstances in each country there are a range of possible ways
to develop more effective external audit of the government’s operations. One or both of the
existing entities could be developed to provide an effective Supreme Audit Institution. In
either case legal and possibly constitutional change would be needed to ensure that best
international practice as outlined in the INTOSAI Mexico Declaration is adopted.
However, to be successful, such reforms will require a careful and detailed analysis of the
actual existing situation in each country. This will include the identification of the key
drivers of change and those entities or individuals that are resistant to change. The political
environment has to be considered and understood in addition to the potential complexities of
the institutional arrangements for public audit in the wider sense. Reform of Supreme Audit
Institutions will not be successful if it merely consists of grafting pre-conceived models of
‘international best practice’ on to existing institutional and political arrangements in
particular countries.
Finally it should be remembered that independence of the Supreme Audit Institution is not an
end in itself but a means to improve the transparency, accountability and equity of public
financial management systems. More research is required on the extent to which greater
independence for the Supreme Audit Institution is correlated with more better financial
control and more effective public financial management.
References
Association des Institutions Supérieures de Contrôle ayant en Commun l’Usage du Français
(AISCCUF) website:
http://aisccuf.org/les-institutions-membres/index.html - accessed 11 February 2010
Bouvier, M, Esclassan, M & Lassale, J (2004) Finances Publiques, Montchrestien: LGDJ (7th
edition)
ECORYS (2006) External audit – role and quality of the Supreme Audit Institution, Thematic
Study 2: Synthesis Report, Rotterdam: ECORYS-NEI and SEOR

General State Inspectorate (2007) Annual Report of the General State Inspectorate, Djibouti,
2007
INTOSAI (2007) Mexico Declaration on SAI Independence, Vienna: INTOSAI
http://www.intosai.org/blueline/upload/issai10mexikodekle.pdf - accessed 11
February 2010
PEFA (2007) Mesure de la performance de la gestion des finances publiques au Burkina Faso
- selon la methodologie PEFA, LINPICO
http://www.finances.gov.bf/SiteFinances/documents/autres/rapport-pefa.pdf -
accessed 11 February 2010
Presidency of Cameroon website:
http://www.prc.cm/index_fr.php?link=2_services_du_controle_superieur_de_l_etat
- accessed 11 February 2010

A Prescriptive Model of the Transition to Accrual Accounting
in Central Government
Hassan A G. Ouda – [email protected]
Abstract
This paper proposes a Prescriptive Model of the transition to accrual accounting in the
central government. The main objective of the Prescriptive Model is to present a
comprehensive transition framework that aims at explaining the whole reform process
including all relevant factors and seeking to overcome the shortcomings of the earlier
developed governmental accounting innovation models (e.g., Contingency Model, its variants
and Basic Requirements Model (BRM)) by focusing not only on the contextual and
behavioral variables and on creating a climate fit for the accounting reform process, but also
on the content, technical and capacity variables. The launching point of the Prescriptive
Model is that the explanatory models (such as the Contingency model and its variants) are
not able to explain the whole reform process and to comprise all the relevant factors that are
required for putting the accounting innovations into real practice. It also takes into
consideration the fact that the transition to accrual accounting is a major cultural,
administrative and technical change and in order to successfully be adopted, it must take
place in phases with a clear plan of progress established from the outset. Therefore, the
Prescriptive Model consists of three phases: Reform decision-making phase, Transition
phase, and Post-transition phase, this is in addition to final result and overcoming the
transition barriers.
Introduction
In the last two decades, several models have been developed to address the government
accounting innovations (Lüder 1992, 1994, 2001, Pallot, 1995, Jaruga and Nowak, 1996,
Godfrey et al. 2001, Christensen, 2002, Ouda, 2004 and Hughes, 2004, 2006 and 2007).
Some have focused on the explanatory factors, which explain how and why the government
accounting change process has taken place in some countries and not in others, such as
Lüder’s Contingency Model and its variants (see for example, Lüder 1992, 1994, 2001,
Jaruga and Nowak, 1996, Christensen, 2002), whereas others have paid attention to the
implementation factors, which specify the factors that are required to create a climate fit to
carry out the government accounting change process in the real world, such as the Basic
Requirements Model (Ouda, 2004). However, these models still suffer from shortcomings
such as:
(a) black boxes;
(b) the lack of treatment of government accounting innovations from a comprehensive
perspective;
(c) emphasis of the context of innovations rather than their content;
(d) greater concern with the initiation phase rather than the actual transition phase;
and
(e) being considered as explanatory models rather than prescriptive models.

As the explanatory models have focused more on addressing the contextual and behavioral
variables and their influence on the reform process without going into detail of how to carry
out the reform process itself, in addition, without being affected by the experiences of the
pioneer countries (New Zealand, UK and Australia) regarding the practical transition phase.
Accordingly, there is a need for developing a prescriptive/ comprehensive model which can
go into details of how to initiate and complete an accounting reform process in central
government and to fill a gap in the literature by creating a clear transition framework.
Therefore, the main aim of this paper is to develop “A Prescriptive Model of the Transition to
Accrual Accounting in Central Government”, which takes into consideration the fact that the
innovation/reform process is a result of collaboration of a set of factors such as:
(a) context factors (e.g., culture);
(b) behavioral factors (e.g., willingness to change);
(c) content factors (e.g., treating specific accounting issues); and
(d) capacity factors (e.g., IT).
It also takes into account the fact that the transition to accrual accounting is a major cultural,
administrative and technical change and in order to successfully be adopted, it must take
place in phases with a clear plan of progress established from the outset. From this
perspective, the structure of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 critically reviews the
governmental accounting innovations models. Section 3 deals with shortcomings of the
governmental accounting innovations models. Section 4 addresses the suggested prescriptive
model for successful transition to accrual accounting in the government sector. Finally,
section 5 is dedicated to conclusions.
A critical review of the governmental accounting innovations models

In the early 1990s, a reform movement to innovate government accounting began in many
countries (such as, New Zealand, UK, Australia, Sweden, Finland, Canada, USA, etc.). The
adoption of accrual basis of accounting is taken as a measure of government accounting
innovation (Chan, 1996), because it does represent a qualitative change in governmental
accounting. The accrual basis would require the recognition of nonfinancial assets (e.g., fixed
assets) and long-term liabilities (e.g., pensions). Such information tends to be neglected by an
accounting system whose function is limited to monitoring the execution of the cash budget
(Chan, 1996). The widespread use of accrual accounting in financial reporting of public
entities in different jurisdictions also envisages an era of global revolution in government
accounting (Heald, 2003). The adoption of accrual accounting in the government sector has
been considered as an integral part of New Public Management (NPM). In essence, the NPM
was an umbrella under which many reforms were undertaken (e.g., budgeting reform,
accounting reform, contracting out, etc.). The New Public Management emphasizes the
introduction of private sector management techniques and the application of competitive
market behavior.
Basically, the transition to accrual accounting can take one of the following forms:
i. Accrual reporting only; or
ii. Moving the accounting records and reports to an accrual basis or
iii. Moving the whole financial management (including budgeting) to an accrual basis.

In this paper, the main focus is on the last one, which means that the suggested Prescriptive
Model aims at the transition to full accrual accounting, including the accrual reporting;
moving the accounting records to an accrual basis; and accrual budgeting. In addition, the
transition to full accrual accounting can be based on IPSASs (International Public Sector
Accounting Standards) or IFRSs (International Financial Reporting Standards), as the case in
New Zealand, UK and Australia. Whilst most reform countries (such as New Zealand, UK
and Australia) have used their own, generally commercial accounting standards, the IPSAS
have now been formally adopted by IFAC and are supported by all major inter-governmental
organizations e.g. United Nations, World Bank, IMF and EU. For countries moving to
implement accrual accounting in the future the IPSASs should provide the framework, as
they overcome many of the problems inherent in applying commercial accounting standards
to the public sector. Therefore, in this paper the successful transition to full accrual
accounting can be measured by full IPSAS compliance. This will also assist in facilitating
public sector accounting harmonization.
During the last two decades, a considerable body of studies have been conducted with the aim
of modelling government accounting innovations (Luder, 1992, 1994, 2001, Pallot, 1995,
Jaruga and Nowak, 1996, Godfrey et al, 2001, Christensen, 2002 and Ouda 2001, 2004 and
2005). Most of these models, if not all, have been based on the Lüder’s Contingency Model
(Lüder, 1992) which became known as the Contingency Model of governmental accounting
innovations. The basic Contingency Model identified a set of contextual and behavioral
variables that were found to be potentially relevant in explaining the outcome of the
governmental accounting innovation process (Chan 1996). The contextual variables
comprise:
1. stimuli;
2. characteristics of social environment (structural variables external to the government);
3. characteristics of the politico-administrative system (internal structure variables); and
4. implementation barriers.
It is assumed that the first three types of contextual variables would positively influence the
attitudes and behavior of users and producers of government financial information. A
combination of conducive contextual conditions and favourable attitudes/behavior would
facilitate the innovation process. However, implementation barriers could nevertheless
prevent a successful outcome (Chan et al., 1996b, Monsen and Nasi, 1998). Here a successful
outcome means introduction of a more informative public sector accounting system (accrual
accounting system). However, Lüder’s model has been extensively researched by CIGAR
(Comparative International Governmental Accounting Research) scholars over the last fifteen
years (see, for example, Chan, 1994; Pallot, 1995, Chan, Jones and Lüder, 1996; Godfrey,
Delvin, and Merrouche, 1995, 1996, 2001; Jaruga and Nowak, 1995, 1996; Monsen and Nasi,
1997, Mussari, 1995). The focus of these studies is restricted to the variants of the
contingency model, its applications and its problems. Lüder stated that this seems legitimate
since a great number of active CIGAR members have dealt with the model, either by using it
or extending it or by criticizing it (Lüder, 2001). Lüder also added that the evidence that can
be derived from applying the initial model is rather weak and confined to a statement of
conduciveness of contextual conditions to governmental accounting reform. Conduciveness
of environmental factors to government accounting reform, however, is certainly not
sufficient and may even not be a necessary condition for successful implementation of such
reform (Lüder, 1994, p.3). Furthermore, Christiaens (1999) argued that Contingency Theory

only explain the “why” of the reforms, not the way in which the reforms are implemented,
nor the way in which the reforms result in accounting practices.
Based on empirical evidence from country studies (e.g. Spain, Japan and Italy) and cross-
country comparisons, the Contingency Model has been revised twice, in 1994 and in 2001, by
Lüder himself. The last revision of 2001 has led to the development of Financial
Management Reform Model (known as FMR Model). Despite these revisions, the
Contingency Model still does not address the whole reform process and is considered as an
explanatory model. This has been confirmed by Lüder as he argues that it might be useful to
reiterate the explanatory objective of the Contingency Model, it is exclusively aimed to
permit an assessment of conduciveness of relevant environmental factors prevailing in a
country to governmental innovations. Its aim, however, is not to explain the whole reform
process including all relevant factors (Lüder, 2001). Furthermore, it has been argued that
even though innovations are the focus of the contingency model, the process of innovation
has remained mostly like a black box. Studies have tended to view innovations as an
identifiable event rather than subsequent implementation along with the consequences of
adopting the innovations (Chan, 1996, and Monsen and Nasi, 1997).
As a complement to the Contingency Model and its variants, the Basic Requirements Model
(BRM) for successful implementation of accrual accounting in the public sector has been
developed by Ouda, in 2001 and 2004. The Basic Requirements Model (hereafter the BRM)
has attempted to go a step further by focusing on the implementation factors (instead of
explanatory factors) which specify the factors that are required to bring the government
accounting change process into practice. In other words, to create conditions appropriate for
the introduction of accounting changes and for putting them into practice. The BRM has
concluded that the successful transition to accrual accounting in the public sector and
attaining the target benefits of that transition demands efforts from different parties to create
conditions appropriate for its implementation and to put it into practice. Basically, there is a
need for a set of factors and changes that can support and facilitate the transition to accrual
accounting. These factors and changes can be reflected in the following equation (Ouda,
2004):
AC (ps) = f (MCC + PBS + PAS + CS + WC +CC + BAC+ SAI + ABC + ITC + IFS)
Where:
AC (ps) = Accounting Changes (transition to accrual accounting in the public sector (ps))
f = function
MCC = Management Culture Changes (internal management changes/ NPM);
PBS = Political and Bureaucracy Support (legislative, executive and bureaucracy
support);
PAS = Professional and Academic (advisory) Support (in the accounting field);
CS = Communication Strategy (includes booklet, journal, conferences, seminars, etc);
WC = Willingness to Change (staff motivation, will, training and qualification);
CC = Consultation and Co-ordination (an essential step for central guidance
accounting change);
BAC = Budgeting of Adoption Costs (for the whole implementation period);
SAI = Tackling of Specific Accounting Issues (assets identification and valuation,
assets register, reporting entity, opening balances, etc.);

ABC = Accounting and Budgeting Consistency (integration);
ITC = Information Technology Capability; and
IFS = International Financial Support.
While the main focus of the BRM is on implementation factors, it did not address the whole
reform process and neither did it include all relevant factors. Instead, it has paid attention to
the factors that can create conditions appropriate for the implementation process. In addition,
the BRM did not take into account the fact that the transition to accrual accounting in the
central government must take place in phases with a clear plan of progress established from
the outset. Unlike the contingency Model, the BRM has taken into considerations the
importance of making the reform decision; however, it did not explain how certain countries
came to the reform decision. Therefore, the Contingency model (1992, 1994 and 2001) and
its variants (Jaruga and Nowak, 1996, Monsen and Nasi, 1997, Mussari, 1995, Godfrey et al,
2001and Christensen, 2002) and the Basic Requirements Model (Ouda, 2001, 2004) are still
suffering from several shortcomings.
Shortcomings of the governmental accounting innovations models

Black-Boxes: Emphasis of context of reforms over content of reforms
Contingency studies on governmental accounting reforms have focused on how to enter the
tunnel but not on how to enter the tunnel and reach the end of it. They are directed toward a
better understanding of the context of reforms rather than the content of reforms. They have
addressed the contextual and behavioral variables and their influence on the reform process
without going into details of how to carry out the reform process itself (see for example,
Lüder 1992, 1994, 2000, Jaruga and Nowak, 1996 Hussein, 1981, Godfrey et al. 2001).
Presumably, the emphasis of context of reforms over content of reforms is due to the fact that
a great part of the academics lacks the practical experience with respect to the content of
reform process. As most of the contingency studies on governmental accounting innovation
models have concentrated on the initiation phase (how to initiate an accounting reform
process), the implementation phase remains hidden in a black box. This in turn means that
these studies do not contain much factual knowledge about the content of reforms. Jorge
(2003) argues that while the addition of more variables to the Contingency Model, as is done
in the Financial Management Reform Model (FMR Model), has the great advantage of
improving the model’s explanatory power, there is a risk of creating black-boxes. Although
there are variables that are known to affect the governmental accounting reform process, one
does not know exactly how they do it, to what extent or what precisely they are (e.g.
behavioral variables clusters, reform concept and innovation process are still black-boxes).
Basically, dealing with the context of reforms without going into the details of their content
leads us to agree with James Chan (1996) when he argues that we would be like marine
biologists who know more about the oceans than the creatures living in them.
In fact, after two decades of the CIGAR (Comparative International Government Accounting
Research) conferences and workshops and having practical experience in some countries
concerning government accounting reform (e.g., New Zealand, UK and Australia), it should
be possible to develop a model with respect to government accounting reform which can give
a full picture about how to initiate a government accounting reform process and to go into
details of how to carry out and complete it. Accordingly, government accounting researchers
(e.g., CIGAR scholars) should try to open the black boxes or at least to change the color of
the box from black to white. This in turn requires that the government accounting innovation

models should not focus only on the context of reforms but also on the content of reforms. In
the last two decades, a greater amount of research attention has been paid to contingency
models (explanatory models), therefore, the last two decades can be considered as an era of
explanatory models. Now we have to start the era of prescriptive models through which a full
picture of the government accounting reform can be addressed.
Lack of addressing the Reform Decision-Making Phase

While the Contingency Model of governmental accounting reform and its variants have
considered the stimuli (e.g., financial/economic crisis) as the starting point for the reform
process, the Basic Requirements Model (BRM) has regarded the taking of reform decision as
a starting point of the reform process after some stimuli have taken place. However, the BRM
did not explain: How a certain country can come to the reform decision. The practical
experiences of the pioneer countries such New Zealand, UK and Australia have proved that
the existence of stimuli do not automatically lead to the reform decision. There should be
several stages between the existence of stimuli and taking the reform decision. After the
appearance of stimuli, there must be knowledge and awareness that the accounting innovation
exists. In addition, different groups (e.g., politicians and government administrators, the
public at large, central auditing organizations, etc.) have to be persuaded of the necessity and
importance of the accounting innovation process. If these groups have been persuaded, then
the innovation process has to gain legitimacy through negotiation and agreement between
them. Once the innovation process is legitimized then the reform decision can be taken.
These stages we call the Reform Decision-Making phase (I), which starts with stimuli and
ends with taking the reform decision. In brief, the Reform Decision-Making Phase aims at
creating the government accounting innovation as an issue, setting the government
accounting innovation on the political agenda and continues expanding it until the reform
decision is taken. Consequently, I suggest that the reform decision-making phase should
encompass the following five stages:
1- Stimuli;
2- Knowledge and Awareness;
3- Persuasion;
4- Legitimacy; and
5- Reform Decision.
Lack of addressing the Transition Phase

While the BRM transition framework has focused explicitly on the creation of conditions fit
for the successful transition to accrual accounting, these conditions are neither sufficient nor a
guarantee for putting an accrual accounting system into practice. The transition to accrual
accounting in the central government not only requires the creation of appropriate conditions
for that transition but also demands more efforts to be established in the real world. These
efforts should go beyond the mere creation of a climate fit for its application. In fact, the
transition to accrual accounting is a major cultural, administrative and technical change and
in order to be successfully adopted, it must take place in phases with a clear plan of progress
established from the outset. The dimensions of the task should not be underestimated and
progress should occur in a measured and controlled manner. The costs of not properly
managing the transition to accrual accounting can be significant and go well beyond the price
of the hardware, software and training. Due to the fact that the transition to accrual
accounting entails much more than just the creation of a climate fit for its application, more

than just a technical change in accounting policies and more than just a change in the way we
present and interpret the numbers, I suggest that the transition to accrual accounting in the
central government and putting it into real practice should entail the following two
requirements:
• Creation of conditions fit for the transition to accrual accounting. This comprises the
implementation framework of the basic version of BRM.
• Putting accrual accounting into practice: requires more technical and professional
requirements that go beyond just creating a climate fit for the transition process.
These two requirements represent the second phase which we might call the Transition
Phase (II). Consequently, the Transition Phase (II) should comprise the following four sub-
phases:
a- Initial transition phase:
This phase creates conditions appropriate for the transition to accrual accounting (this phase
is based on the BRM).
b- Establishment Phase
This phase primarily aims at determining the basic technical and professional requirements
that are fundamental for the establishment of accrual accounting in central government, for
instance, asset register, opening balances, accounting policies and practices, accrual general
ledger, chart of accounts, conceptual framework, etc.
c- Conversion Phase: (coupling/transferring phase)
This phase includes transferring data from the cash system and the extra-accounting files
(auxiliary files) which comprise the details of accounts such as debtors and creditors, etc.. to
the accrual system. Where the new accrual system can not start from scratch, the information
available in the current cash system and the auxiliary files will form the starting point for the
accrual system. Therefore, this phase will provide a link for the periodic transfer of data from
the old accounting system to the new accounting system.
d- Testing and Confirmation Phase:
This phase includes testing the workability of the accrual system in the real world (after the
accrual system is completed and the data is transferred from the old system) and will lead to
obtaining approval to switch to the new system. It confirms the validity of the new system
and the base data which is to be used.
Lack of addressing the Post-Transition Phase
The main aim of government accounting innovation is to produce improved financial
information. This information has to be communicated to the right users, otherwise
improving financial information (as a result of an adoption of accrual accounting) will have
no or little meaningful value, since this information may not be used as it should be. Warren
(IFAC, 1996), has argued that “accounting is important and exciting when it generates
information that is used by decision makers. When this information is not communicated to
the decision makers, then, the target benefits from the accounting change will not be
achieved”. So logically, the production of improved information should be accompanied by
developing a new/improved reporting system that is best suited for reporting the improved
financial information. Therefore, in addition to the reform decision-making phase (I) and the

transition phase (II), the transition to accrual accounting requires a complementary phase
which is required to develop a new/improved reporting system that is most suitable for
reporting the information required. This can lead to the third phase which we call Post-
Transition Phase (III). Whilst the Post-Transition phase is considered to be important as a
result of its role of communicating the improved information, it has been entirely neglected
by the earlier governmental accounting innovation models (Luder, 1992, 1994, 2001, Pallot,
1995, Jaruga and Nowak, 1996, Godfrey et al, 2001, Christensen, 2002 and Ouda 2001, 2004
and 2005). Therefore, this phase should be included in the new government accounting
innovation models.
The Suggested Prescriptive Model for Successful Transition to Accrual

Accounting in the Government Sector
Overview and Assumptions
Taking into account the previously discussed shortcomings of governmental accounting
innovation models and how they can be overcome, this is in addition to taking into
consideration the Basic Requirements Model (BRM) (Ouda, 2004), and Contingency Model
(Luder1992, 1994 and 2001), and the experience of the pathfinder countries such as New
Zealand, UK and Australia, it is possible to suggest “A Prescriptive Model of the
Transition to Accrual Accounting in the Central Government” which is illustrated in
figure 1. This model aims at explaining the whole reform process including (to a great extent)
all relevant factors. The prescriptive model seeks to complement and tackle the shortcomings
of both BRM and Contingency Model through focusing not only on the contextual and
behavioral variables and on creating a climate fit for the accounting reform process, but also
on the content, technical and capacity variables. The launching point of the Prescriptive
Model is that the explanatory models (such as the Contingency model and its variants) and
the BRM are not able to explain the whole reform process and do not include all the relevant
factors that are required for putting the accounting innovations into real practice. Therefore,
they need to be complemented by a prescriptive model which can undertake this task.
Accordingly, the Prescriptive Model (hereafter PM) rests on the following assumptions:
1. While the existence of stimuli is important to reveal a need for reform process, this
existence is not a sufficient guarantee for taking the reform decision. Because it can happen
that there is a strong stimulus for the accounting changes but the government does not take
the decision to reform the accounting system. Basically, there should be several stages
between the existence of stimuli and taking the reform decision. Accordingly, the Reform
Decision-Making Phase (I) should encompass the following stages:
1- Stimuli;
3- Persuasion;
4- Legitimacy; and
5- Reform Decision.
2. An emphasis on Contextual and Behavioral variables over the Content, Technical and
Capacities variables will not ensure accounting change and full implementation. The practical
transition to accrual accounting entails the emphasis of the contextual, behavioral, content,
technical and capacity variables.

3. Creating conditions appropriate for the adoption of accrual accounting (as they are
determined by the BRM) is not sufficient for completing the change to accrual accounting in
practice. The transition to accrual accounting demands effort that should go beyond the mere
creation of conditions appropriate for its application.
4. The transition to accrual accounting is a major cultural, administrative and technical
change and in order to be successfully adopted, it must take place in phases with a clear plan
of progress established from the outset. Therefore, the Transition Phase (II) requires the
following four sub-phases:
a- Initial transition phase;
b- Establishment phase;
c- Conversion phase; and
d- Testing and confirmation phase.
5. Taking into consideration the requirements that are included in the four sub-phases of the
Transition Phase will assist, to a great extent, in overcoming the transition barriers that inhibit
the transition process.
6. In order to communicate the improved financial information (as a result of the adoption of
accrual accounting) to the right users, the Prescriptive Model requires one more phase which
is the Post transition Phase (III) which aims at developing a new reporting system that is
best suited for reporting the required information.
Description of the Model

This section deals with the three phases of the Prescriptive Model: Reform Decision-Making
Phase (I); Transition Phase (II) and Post-Transition Phase (III) as follows:
Reform Decision-Making Phase (I)
As noted earlier, the reform decision making phase starts with the stimuli and ends with
taking the reform decision. This phase encompasses the following five stages:
1- Stimuli;
3- Persuasion;
4- Legitimacy; and
5- Reform Decision.
- Stimuli. The governmental accounting innovation models (Luder, 1992, 1994 and 2001,
Jaruga and Nowak, 1996, Monsen and Nasi, 1997, Mussari, 1995, Godfrey et al, 2001and
Christensen, 2002, Ouda, 2001, 2004) agreed that there should be at least one stimulus
(driving force) for the accounting changes. In reality, as it is apparent from the New Zealand
experience, the economic crisis was the main stimulus behind the economic and government
sector reform. However, unlike New Zealand, globalization, financial crisis and scandal,
corruption and fraud, and dominating doctrine are/were the main driving forces (stimuli) for
the government sector reform in some countries such as: USA, UK, Spain ..etc. Moreover,
Godfrey et al. (2001) have added in their model (A Diffusion –Contingency Model for
Government Accounting Innovation) one more stimulus which is the impact of the
international organizations such as International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank
(WB) and other aid donors. These organizations require particular government sector reform

Figure 1: A Prescriptive Model of The Transition to Accrual Accounting in the
Central Government
STIMULI
- Financial/Economic Crisis
- Financial Scandal;
- Corruption and Fraud;
- Dominating Doctrine;
- Requirements of Public Sector Reform;
- Change Agents;
- Full Financial Transparency
- Performance Gap.
REFORM DECISION-MAKING PHASE (I)
KNOWLEDGE PERSUASION LEGITIMACY REFORM

AND DECISION
AWARENESS
TRANSITION PHASE (II) (TRANSITION FRAMEWORK)
INITIAL TRANSITION ESTABLISHMENT CONVERSION

PHASE PHASE PHASE
- Political Support; - Asset Register;

- Bureaucracy Support; - Opening Balances; Transferring the
- Legal Provision; - Chart of Accounts; Data from Cash to
- Professional and Academic - Accrual General Ledger; Accrual
Support; - Setting the government Sector Accounting
- Communication Strategy; Accounting Standards (IPSAS);
- Management Culture Change; - Tackling Specific Accounting
- Willingness to Change; Issues;
- Consultation and Co-ordination; - Accounting and budgeting TESTING AND
- Budgeting of Adoption Cost; Consistency (Integration) CONFIRMATION
- Information Technology - Conceptual Framework; PHASE
Capability; and - Central Guidance Unit; and Testing the
- International Financial Support - Central Help Desk (including Workability of the
(mainly for developing countries). Advisory Board). New System
Post-
Transition
Final Result: Phase (III)
Overcoming the Transition Barriers: Transition to Accrual
- Legal barriers; - Staff qualification; - Bureaucratic Accounting in the Central Developing
management culture; - Lack of internal consistency; - Government New /
Size of jurisdiction.;- Resistance to change; - Improved
Organizational characteristics; - Specific Accounting Financial
Reporting
International Journal of Governmental Financial Management 72 System
to be effected as a sine qua non of assistance being provided (Godfrey et al 2001). This can
be seen, particularly in underdeveloped and transitional economies. Thus, the international
organizations are acting as change agents.
Compared to the Contingency model, its variants and the BRM, new driving forces/triggers
can be added to the stimuli. The practical experience of Australia regarding the introduction
of accrual accounting has given rise to the appearance of a new trigger for government
accounting change, as the Greiner Government pursued a policy of “Comprehensive financial
disclosure to the community” as the main trigger/mechanism for reform (Nick Greiner was
elected as Premier of the State of New South Wales in 1988). In fact, the Comprehensive
financial disclosure to the community is synonymous with full financial transparency. This
means that Full Financial Transparency is supposed to be a relevant stimulus for government
accounting reform. In addition, Hussein’s Model has emphasized that an innovation process
starts as a consequence of a performance gap existing in the current system as to how it
works and how it should work (Hussein, 1981). A “performance gap” exists if there is a
difference between how the present method works and how it actually is supposed to work
(e.g. Zaltman et al., 1973, Jonsson, 1985). According to Jonsson (1985) this can arise when
there is knowledge about a better solution or if the present method does not solve the
problem. The trigger for accounting change in Swedish local governments was the experience
of a performance gap by external stakeholders (Mattisson, et al., 2004). Accordingly, both
Full Financial Transparency and Performance Gap can be added to the stimuli.
- Knowledge and Awareness. After the appearance of stimuli, there must be knowledge and
awareness that the government accounting innovation exists (Hussein, 1981). The existence
of government accounting innovation has to be diffused and communicated by different
groups who can influence the reform decision in a direction deemed desirable by change
policy. This can occur through creating the government accounting innovation as an issue.
Basically, the accounting innovation will never enter into the political agenda before the
government accounting innovation is created as an issue and politicians become aware of that
issue. This can be achieved by bringing the government accounting innovation to the
attention of actors who can influence the political agenda. The reform drivers as identified by
Lüder (2001) in the Financial Management Reform Process Model - FMR Model (Reform
drivers such as: Government Commission, Professional Associations, Audit Institutions,
Standard Setting Bodies, Consulting firms and Scholars Networks) can play a crucial role in
influencing the political agenda. The reform drivers can play an essential role in raising the
awareness of government accounting reform early in its life and “soften up” other actors to
their policy ideas (Kingdon, 1984, p.189). The practical experience of Australia regarding the
development of accrual financial reporting in the Australian government sector has proved
that fact, as the Public Accounts Committees (PACs), Auditors-General and the organized
accounting profession were also major actors who sought to influence the political agenda
(Ryan, 1998).
- Persuasion. The acceptance for government accounting innovation occurs as a result of the
persistent and progressive efforts of actors (reform drivers) working to effect change to the
political agenda (Kingdon, 1984, p.21; Cobb and Elder 1972, p.161, Ryan, 1998). After
creating the government accounting innovation as an issue and when most of the actors are
aware of the accounting issue, the governing bodies (executive bodies), legislative bodies
(Parliament) and government administrators have to be persuaded of the significance and

necessity of the transition process to accrual accounting and assured of its ability to solve the
problems that were behind the stimuli for reform. Namely, they should be well posted with
whether the transition process can match the stimuli. This can take place through examining
the necessity and feasibility of the transition process and whether the transition to accrual
accounting is perceived as a specific improvement to existing practice. In fact, persuading the
executive, legislative bodies and government administrators of the significance of the
transition to accrual accounting is absolutely essential because they have the power to decide
on and launch the transition process. Unless such acceptance exists, the transition process
may not proceed and it is doubtful that the reform decision would be made.
- Legitimacy. After the persuasion stage, the transition process needs to gain legitimacy
through negotiation and agreement between different groups and sub-groups (e.g.
government members and legislative bodies, government administrators, and oversight
bodies) (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978, Hussein, 1981; Jonsson, 1985). The focus of the
negotiation will be on: whether the transition process is perceived as a specific improvement
to the existing stimuli/problems (e.g. financial crisis, financial scandal, etc.); anticipated
consequences (benefits) from the transition process; anticipated costs of the transition
process; capability of the government to make these changes; materiality of the accounting
changes for the rest of the government sector elements; transition barriers; and the degree of
government’s willingness to accept the change. If the negotiation between these different
bodies has resulted in legitimizing the transition process, then the reform decision can be
made. Consequently, the stimuli, knowledge and awareness, persuasion and legitimacy form
the base that will lead to decision making regarding the transition process (innovation
process).
- Reform Decision. The reform decision is the final stage of the Initiation Phase. In the
reform decision stage, the focus is dramatically changed from a situation where various
groups were pressuring (e.g., the Parliament) for the transition process to a commitment to
accrual accounting at the executive government level. Rogers (1995:29) argues that
innovation decisions (reform decisions) can be of three types: optional, which are choices to
adopt or reject an innovation made by individuals independently of other individuals’
decisions: collective, which are decisions made by consensus; and , authority, which are
decisions made by a relatively few individuals within a system who have power, status, or
technical expertise. The reform decision considered in this paper is of the authority type.
Consequently, the Reform Decision-Making Phase (I) can briefly be summarized in the
following equation:
AC (ps) = f (S+ KA + P + L + RD) (1)

Where:
AC (ps) = Accounting Changes (transition to accrual accounting in the government sector
(ps))
f = function
S = Stimuli;
KA = Knowledge and Awareness;
P = Persuasion;
L = Legitimacy; and
RD = Reform Decision.

Transition Phase (II)
The transition phase describes the actual transition activities and starts with the creation of
conditions appropriate for the transition to accrual accounting and ends with putting the
accrual accounting system into real practice and testing its workability. Therefore, this phase
consists of the following four sub-phases:
1- Initial transition phase;
2- Establishment phase;
3- Conversion phase; and
4- Testing and confirmation phase.
These four sub-phases will be dealt with as follows:

Initial Transition Phase: primarily aims at creating conditions appropriate for the transition
to accrual accounting and basically comprises the following basic requirements (Ouda, 2004,
2005):
- Political Support (PS). The experience of the pioneer countries such as New Zealand, UK
and Australia has indicated that the government sector reform (including government
accounting reform) can not succeed without strong support from the politicians. According to
the New Zealand experience, the political commitment for the reforms created a climate in
which chief executives saw little advantage in seeking to delay or impede the reforms, and
instead worked towards their successful implementation (Ball, 2000). The experience of New
Zealand had also proved that political commitment is necessary at key points, as the New
Zealand’s reform relied on the leadership of the finance minister and other key authorities.
They steered the necessary legislation through the government and parliament, and other
critical junctures conveyed their support to the top management of civil service (Scott, 1996).
In addition, Monteiro (2002) states that “political will and effective leadership are absolutely
essential; without these features reform will be a mere formalistic exercise in window-
dressing”. However, the political support does not come from itself. It demands an internal
and external pressure from different parts. Generally, political leaders do not seriously tackle
the root cause of their problems until the situation approaches crisis conditions and the need
for remedial action becomes evident and broadly accepted by the unions and the population at
large (OECD, Paris, 1993). The political commitment is obtained, either through politicians
becoming aware of a problem (awareness of a problem can occur either by a disaster or by
the persistent efforts of actors proactively raising attention to an issue) or through a change of
administration which alters the political priorities (Kingdon, 1984 p. 92). Once political
commitment is obtained, a “policy window” is said to open (Kingdon, 1984, P.173)
- Legal Provision (LP). The earlier conducted empirical studies (e.g., Ouda, 2005) have
indicated that the legal provision is considered to be one of the fundamental requirements for
the successful transition to accrual accounting in the central government, as it provides the
vehicle for compelling recalcitrant bureaucratic and the other participants to carry out the
accounting changes. Furthermore, the absence of an adequate legal provision can result in
that any attempt for adopting accrual accounting will be disregarded. While New Zealand is
considered as pathfinder for government sector reform (including government accounting
reform), the absence of the required legal provision has resulted in the failure of the earlier
attempts for accounting innovation. For example, Pallot (2002) stated that during the early to
mid-1980s there had been attempts, through Treasury guidelines, to encourage departments to
keep asset registers and adopt accrual accounting but a number continued to disregard these

suggestions. On the other hand, when the intended reforms are supported by a passage of new
acts, this expands their chance to be implemented in the real word. Pallot (2002) has further
stated that under the Public Finance Act, and the related State Sector Act, which made chief
executives of government departments responsible for financial management, accounting
reform was forced upon them.
This was not only the case of New Zealand, but also the case of other pioneer countries such
as Australia. The Australian financial management was modernized through three pieces of
legislation designed to improve the quality and clarity of understanding of the
Commonwealth’s financial management framework. These were the Financial Management
and Accountability Act 1997, the Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1997 and
Auditor-General Act 1997. The legislation sharpens accountability and emphasizes
performance and propriety. It also facilitates the subsequent, separate decisions to replace
cash accounting with accrual-based budgeting and output and outcome reporting.
- Bureaucracy Support (BS). While the political support is necessary, it is not a sufficient
condition for the success of the transition to accrual accounting in the central government.
There must also be a sustained commitment by the bureaucracy to the accounting changes.
The sustained political and bureaucracy commitment encourages the most central government
managers to welcome the change. Bureaucracy commitment can be demonstrated by
installing an incentive system that motivates the larger bureaucracy to promote the
introduction of accrual accounting and to use the performance information following
therefrom in decision making. Also there should be an incentive system for the politicians to
obtain their support. This is clear from the New Zealand experience where the government
sector reforms were ordered in such a way as to generate early benefits to both bureaucracy
and Ministers. Early in the process, bureaucrats received (in exchange for increased
accountability for the outputs) the benefits of managing their departments without the need to
comply with the extensive detailed procedural requirements. Ministers saw the benefits
through their capacity to manage the fiscal situation they faced in preparing the 1991 budget
(Warren IFAC, 1996). In addition, the role of bureaucracy is important in the implementation
phase since most of procedural and technical aspects are matters of bureaucracy. Also their
role is important in the initiation phase as it is appeared from the Ireland experience where
the senior civil service has been a fertile source of reform ideas (Schick, 1999). However, it
should be clear what we mean by civil servants. In fact, we mean here the civil servants who
are at senior level and not at operating level, where strategic reforms come from the political
echelons or the top ranks of the public service. The broad scope of reform requires
perspective and power that are held either in central agencies or departmental headquarters
(Schick, 1999).
- Professional and Academic Support (PAS). Basically, the nature of the government sector
and the characteristics of its environment are essential in determining its financial reporting
objectives, and the principles and standards of the governmental accounting should be
understood in the context of the environment within which they operate, and in view of the
objectives that financial reporting is expected to serve (Chan, 1988). This means that the
government accounting system should be consistent with the nature and objectives of the
government sector whether it uses the private sector GAAP or not. The use of the private
sector GAAP in the government sector requires that these GAAP should be adapted where
appropriate to take into account the government sector context (harmonize where appropriate
and differentiate where necessary (Bac, 1994)). This entails that the accounting principles,
standards, procedures, and practices should be adapted to be consistent with the specific

nature and objectives of the government sector. Herein, the professional and academic bodies
can play an essential role in rendering assistance to the central government in the
development and designing of an accounting system that would meet the needs of the
politicians and other users. Consequently, the role of these bodies can facilitate the transition
to accrual accounting in the central government through the undertaking of the following
tasks (Ouda, 2004):
• Proposing of accounting standards and procedures;
• Comment on the accounting standard proposals and supply recommendations;
• Submittal of professional consultancy (advisory role) before and during the
• implementation process; and
• Development and designing of an accounting system consistent with the government
sector context.
This was also clear from the experience of earlier reformer countries (e.g., New Zealand, UK,
Australia and Sweden) that the Professional and Academic bodies within and outside the
central government have shown overwhelming support for creating conditions appropriate for
transition to accrual accounting in the central government and for putting it into practice. For
example, the UK experience, when the treasury published the White Paper in July 1995
which described the progress made in developing resource accounting and the government’s
proposals to introduce resource budgeting, the treasury received many comments from
different parties within and outside the government sector such as: Parliamentary Committee
& Auditors such as: Committee of Public Accounts, and Treasury and Civil Service
Committee; Professional & Regulatory Bodies such as: Accounting Standards Board, and
Chartered Association of Certified Accountants (ACCA); Accountancy Firms and
Consultancies such as: Coopers & Lybrand, and Ernst & Young; Academics such as:
University of Hull, and University of York, and Cranfield University; and Interest Group
such as: Confederation of British Industry (CBI) and Institute of Directors. The comments
and consultations that were received from the above-mentioned bodies were helpful in
confirming that all the main issues had been identified and they had provided valuable input
to further consideration of these issues (White Paper, 1995).
- Communication Strategy (CS). The recent experience of the earlier reformer countries
(e.g., New Zealand, UK and Australia) has proved that the reason for the success of the
change process was the sufficient communication about the change process. Accordingly, not
surprisingly, if we use the marketing language and we consider the introduction of accrual
accounting as a new good that needs a promotion strategy to set forth its characteristics and to
assist the people in changing their behavior towards the change process (Ouda, 2004).
Getting people to change behavior requires communications upon which they would actually
act while influencing behavior via communication requires very targeted content in messages
and careful selection of media. The transition to accrual accounting in the central government
needs a communication program (communication strategy/effort) to disseminate objectives
and requirements of the change process, to clear up the misunderstandings that exist and to
convey a common understanding of the key principles of the accounting changes. In addition,
a continuing day-to-day working relationship with the governmental entity officials and staff
is deemed indispensable to ensure adequate understanding of the new concepts. In reality, the
role of communication is of vital importance for the transition process in different phases
such as the initiating phase; the implementation phase and the evaluating phase (Ouda, 2005).
Before a decision is made about reforms, it is required to inform different parties, such as
stakeholders, the public, interest groups, etc., about the changes that should be brought about

and to consult these parties in advance, to discover the reaction of these parties towards the
changes and to explain the process and the manner in which the public would be affected.
Furthermore, it is more important in the implementation phase to keep all participating parties
informed about the developments, to disseminate objectives and requirements at each stage,
to translate the general objectives of reform into specific details for each governmental entity
and to assist in solving the emerging problems during the implementation phase. In the
evaluation phase, it is important to provide information about the extent to which the
expected benefits are fulfilled (Ouda, 2004).
- Management Culture Change (MCC). In reality, management support for the transition to
the accrual accounting system comes only when the managers feel that they badly need such
a system and understand the role and the benefits of accrual accounting. In the context of
traditional bureaucratic model, the managers have little freedom and less accountability and
they are more concerned with input and compliance with rules than with output, performance
and accountability. The change of bureaucratic culture, which has centered on the fact that it
concerned itself more with proper procedures than with objectives, puts respect for rules
above efficiency; and having little freedom and less accountability, is very intricate. Such a
system is incompatible with a quest for improved performance. In this context, managers see
that accrual accounting has no or little role to play. On the other hand, the transition to
accrual accounting needs to receive a high profile and to have the continued support of senior
management. Also support needs to come from managers responsible for implementing and
operating the accounting system. Accordingly, the change of management culture from
bureaucratic culture to New Public Management (NPM) culture, which centered itself on
increasing the individual responsibility, giving the managers extensive discretion in the use of
resources, on output instead of input and on measuring the performance in terms of efficiency
and effectiveness, will create a vital role for accrual accounting. This way the new public
management system shifts the responsibility for management to managers and they become
personally further responsible for managing strategy, operations, personnel and finance, in
order to achieve the results that they agreed to fulfill, in this context, the manager’s support
for the transition to accrual accounting will be inevitable. Support inevitability stems from the
need that managers have for reliable financial data that can assist them in decision making
process and in using the available resources efficiently. In addition, the previous government
sector accounting reform attempts have indicated that accounting changes not only involve
the adoption of a new accounting system but also a significant culture change in the way
managers understand and use the financial information and in how financial transactions are
handled. Therefore, the change process should comprise a strong component of change
management culture because if accrual accounting would be seen simply as a year-end
reporting requirement, this focus would miss the valuable contribution that accrual
accounting could make to the management of resources.
- Willingness to Change (WC). In addition to the aforementioned requirements, the
willingness to change, comprising the staff motivation, staff will, and staff training and
qualification, is a crucial basic requirement for the transition to accrual accounting. In fact, it
is not imaginable to successfully implement accrual accounting in the central government and
to achieve the target benefits from that implementation without taking into consideration the
following human aspects: appropriately trained and qualified accounting personnel; staff
motivation and will; staff conviction about the benefits that can be reaped from the new
system; and existence of an appropriate incentive systems. Of course, the above-mentioned
human aspects are not confined to the accounting staff in the financial branch, but comprising

all the members of staff that will participate in the change process. For example, there is a
very real need to educate those managers responsible for budgets that they need to have a
financial awareness to enable them to manage the budgets: in particular, it seems that many
do not understand that the placing of an order gives rise to a commitment that reduces the
amount of their budget available in the future, and nor do they understand the importance of
recording the creditors as soon as it occurs (Watkins, 2002). Accordingly, a significant
component of the change process is the training of the accounting staff, managers and the
other users. In other words, the emphasis should be placed on having accounting staff and
management able to understand accrual accounting. So it is very important to have the
appropriate skills to implement and operate an accrual accounting system.
- Consultation and Co-ordination (CC). The practical experiences of the pathfinder countries
such as New Zealand, UK and Australia have indicated that the co-ordination and
consultation with the governmental entities that will implement the accrual accounting is very
important. As these entities are well acquainted with their own problems and constraints that
may impede the transition to accrual accounting (United Nations, 1984). In addition, these
entities should be consulted in order to obtain comments and suggestions from the primary
sources for the required improvements before establishing the new system. Yet, the co-
ordination with these entities and within each other is very important in order to fulfill the
internal consistency (Ouda, 2004). The lack of the internal consistency may result in
development of strongly diversified and non-uniform accounting systems and leads to that
these entities may get into conflict with each other (Luder, 1992). Therefore, the accounting
change process needs to be guided by a central unit in order to achieve the reform process by
a consistent and harmonized way. Furthermore, a continuing day-to day working relationship
with the governmental entity officials and staff is deemed indispensable to ensure adequate
understanding of the new concepts (United Nations, 1984). So in order to implement a
consistent and harmonized accounting system within the governmental entities, the
consultation and co-ordination are considered to be fundamental requirements.
- Budgeting of Adoption Costs (BAC). Whilst the previously stated basic requirements are
considered to fundamental for the transition to accrual accounting, the lack of financial means
required to carry out the adoption process can considerably deter the whole adoption process.
In reality, many countries (particularly, developing countries) have attributed their failure of
getting accrual accounting adopted in their government sector to the lack of financial means.
Therefore, budgeting of the adoption costs is critical in determining the volume of the
financial means that are required for the whole transition process and can assist in
overcoming the future financial problems by having a phased transition to full accrual
accounting and by dividing this budget by a number of years. Of course, the adoption of an
accrual accounting system imposes significant additional costs, in various ways, on the
government sector. These costs comprise the acquisition of specialist skills, development and
installation of financial information systems, staff training and developing of accounting
policies, identification, measurement and recording of assets and liabilities, acquisition of
new ledger systems to accommodate an accrual rather than a cash system and making the
users familiar with a new set of concepts and decision making possibilities. A key lesson
learned from the earlier reformer countries was not to underestimate the costs required to plan
and implement full accrual accounting. It is more efficient to have the necessary resources
from the start in stead of paying extensive overtime to the team. In addition, resources to
support the transition process are still needed during the first years of operation. It is also
evident that a change of systems in the government sector requires more than one year

(almost five years) and the resources for these years (both human and financial) have to be
identified and budgeted for. Accordingly, identification of resources required and budgeting
of these resources for the whole transition period is critical for the successful transition to
accrual accounting. Budgeting of these resources can assist in determining the yearly
financial means required, which in turn can give the opportunity to the government of a
certain country to decide whether to go ahead with the implementation process or to postpone
this process to a later period.
- Information Technology Capability (ITC). The main aim of the transition to accrual
accounting is provide improved financial information which can assist in decision-making
process. This financial information has to be furnished on a relevant time. This will be
difficult in the absence of the availability of appropriate software. Therefore, the transition to
accrual accounting is unthinkable without availability of appropriate and affordable standard
software. Availability of such software or the necessary renewal of existing software also
provides opportunities to renew the accounting system (Luder and Jones, 2003). In addition,
more complex information technology systems will be required to adopt accrual accounting
than those associated with the traditional cash system. Unlike, cash accounting, the transition
to accrual accounting will require changes in the following systems; fixed assets system;
revenue system; purchase acquisition system; human resources and payroll systems; property
management system; inventory system; grant and benefit systems; debt system; budget
system; and non-financial systems (IFAC, 2002).
- International Financial Support (IFS). The earlier conducted empirical studies (e.g.,
Ouda, 2005) has indicated that most of the developing countries are suffering from
insufficiency of financial resources and the availability of domestic financial resources has
actually been reduced by adverse economic developments and natural disasters. While most
of the developing countries have actively participated in international and regional
deliberations on sustainable development and have committed themselves to international and
regional legal instruments and undertaken regional initiatives and arrangements, lack of
resources has seriously undermined their ability to live up to their commitments
(http:/www.unescap.org/ mced2000/pacific/ background/constraints.htm). Many of the
developing countries do not have the financial means to meet their international obligations
without adequate financial and technical support from the international community. This in
turn means that the transition to accrual accounting in the central government of the
developing countries is heavily related to the international financial support.
Consequently, the initial transition phase can briefly be summarized in the following
equation:
AC (ps) = f (PS + LP + BS + PAS + CS + MCC + WC + CC + BAC + ITC+ IFS) (2)
Where:
AC (ps) = Accounting Changes (transition to accrual accounting in the public sector (ps))
f = function
PS = Political Support (political support includes both legislative
and executive);
LP = Legal Provision (adjusting current acts and/or enactment of new acts)
BS = Bureaucracy Support (at senior level)
PAS = Professional and Academic (advisory) Support (in the accounting field);
CS = Communication Strategy (includes booklet, journal, conferences, seminars, etc);

MCC = Management Culture Changes (internal management changes/ NPM);
WC = Willingness to Change (staff motivation, will, and training and qualification);
CC = Consultation and Co-ordination (an essential step for central guidance of
accounting change);
BAC = Budgeting of Adoption Costs (for the whole transition period);
ITC = Information Technology Capability.

IFS = International Financial Support (only for developing countries)
Establishment Phase: which primarily aims at determining the basic technical and
professional requirements that are deemed to be fundamental for the establishment of accrual
accounting in the central government. This phase comprises the following
requirements/factors:
- Asset Register (AS). The use of the cash basis in the governmental accounting for long time
has resulted in that final accounts are nothing more than summarized cash books, and hence,
there are no balance sheets because there are no assets or liabilities in the books (Jones and
Pendlebury, 1984). However, the governmental entities have traditionally accounted for fixed
assets in a way that reflects the financing required to meet their costs rather than their pattern
of use (Rutherford et al, 1992). Accordingly, there are no assets adjustments because the
accounts are not concerned with recording usage, only with the fact that cash has been paid
for acquisition of those assets. Therefore, no information can be provided about the
investment in the total assets and no subsequent accounts are taken of whether the assets are
still in use, whether they have reached the end of their useful life or have been sold. Thus, the
transition to accrual accounting in the central government will require the governmental
entities to identify and value their assets in order to be able to prepare the Assets Register. In
reality, the identification and recognition of the physical assets in the central government is
not an easy task since these assets have been existed for decades and have been acquired by
different ways. This in turn makes the identification and valuation process of those assets
more difficult.
Thus, the main difficulty is that in order to record the physical assets the governmental entity
not only has to know what assets it owns but it must also put a value on them, even if the
value is their historic cost. Therefore, if no assets register exists which records the values,
then the task of taking an inventory of fixed assets and valuing them might be a huge and
expensive one (Jones and Pendlebury, 1984). So in order to have full information about the
fixed assets, the governmental entities have to prepare the assets register. The preparation of
assets register will furnish information that has not available before. For example, the use of
resource accounting (which is based on accrual basis) in the central government of UK has
made available information, which has not been available before (Likierman, 1998). For
instance, in November 1997 a National Assets Register was published, giving, for the first
time, details of what was owned by the central government. Also in the course of year 1998-
1999 a Departmental Assets Register was published which gave full information on the
departmental assets. The information, which is provided by the two registers, enables the
politicians and departmental management to make more informed decisions and to improve
the management of these assets. The effective management of such assets requires sufficient
records to identify the existence of assets and the costs of holding and operating these assets.
- Opening Balance (OB). Similarly, as a result of using the cash basis of accounting in the
governmental entities, there is no information available about the opening balances of both

assets (financial and fixed assets) and liabilities (short and long term liabilities). Namely,
there is no information about financial assets (e.g., debtors); financial liabilities (e.g.,
creditors); fixed assets (e.g., infrastructure assets); and long term liabilities (e.g., pensions).
Accordingly, the transition to accrual accounting entails the preparation of the balance sheet.
This in turn requires the recognition of elements such as fixed assets, stores, liabilities,
debtors, creditors, prepayments, accruals, depreciation. So the shift to accrual accounting
requires the establishment of opening balance sheet through identification and valuation of
such following items:
* Debtors & Creditor
- Stock-take
- Reconcile old “Advances and Deposits” & suspense accounts
* Fixed assets
- Establish asset registers
- Value assets
* Inventory
- Stock-take
* Bank balance
- Working capital allocation
* Liabilities
- Leave accrual (e.g., superannuation)
- Chart of Accounts (CA) and Accrual General Ledger (AGL). Under the cash basis, the
chart of accounts is designed to provide information and report on cash flows and cash
balances (monetary position of governmental entities) in stead of total economic resources of
governmental entities. Accordingly, the chart of accounts is very simple and is not intended
to provide information on items such as fixed assets, stores, liabilities, debtors, creditors,
prepayments, accruals, depreciation. The transition to accrual accounting requires from the
governmental entities to design a comprehensive chart of accounts in order to provide full
information on assets (current and fixed), liabilities (short and long-term liabilities), net
worth, revenues and expenses.
The chart of accounts is a listing of all the accounts in the general ledger, each account
accompanied by a reference number. To set up a chart of accounts, one first needs to define
the various accounts to be used by both individual and central entities. In the government
sector, we have to take into consideration that the chart of accounts of individual entities has
to be consistent with the chart of accounts of central entities. Where a number of individual
entities are required to provide information to a central entity for the preparation of
consolidated financial statements or for other reporting purposes, it is usual to have a central
chart of accounts. This central chart of accounts needs to: IFAC, 2002)
• meet the needs of both individual and central entities;
• provide a uniform coding structure for coding financial transactions; and
• permit flexibility for individual entities to adapt it to their particular requirements.

IFAC (2002) also states that the central chart of accounts needs to be developed early in the
process to allow individual entities time tailor it to their own needs. Individual entities need
to incorporate the requirements of their chart of accounts when specifying the deliverables
required from accounting software. In addition to the aforementioned, the chart of accounts in
the governmental entities may also include codes for recording transactions against budgetary
approvals. In addition, the Chart of Accounts can include many important elements such as:
• Object, Accounting or Transaction Code that corresponds to standard accounting

practice including codes for assets, liabilities, revenue and expenses.
• Organization Code that describes the organization hierarchy including ministries,
agencies and divisions.
• Responsibility Centre that describes approval responsibilities. Sometimes the approval
structure differs from the organizational hierarchy.
• Location Code that describes the physical location of the organizational unit.
• Tier that describes the organizational tier in unitary governments such as provinces or
municipality.
• Economic Code that describes the purpose of any expenditure or program. For
example, other ministries, other than the Ministry of Education, expend money for
educational purposes.
• Programs that describes government programs that could be shared across multiple
ministries. Programs often last more than one year and represents an important
commitment on behalf of the government.
• Projects that describe important government projects.
• Activities that describe the functions being performed for any expenditure.
• Objectives that describes the objective of any expenditure.
• Performance that describes the measurement for any initiative.
• Support of International reporting standards such as Government Financial Statistics
(GFS).
Furthermore, IPSAS provides guidance on Chart of Accounts objectives, reporting needs and
supporting accrual accounting including creating classifications for:
• Calculating financial position and cash flow to enable the creation of financial
statements
• Organization units or segments that can relate to geographic or service entity to
enable comprehensive reporting for any organizational unit
• Depreciation and amortization
• Revenue and expense types to classify revenue streams and expense types
• Salary and benefits recognition
• Finance and borrowing costs
• Any long term contractual agreement like leases
• Contingent liabilities and assets
• Statistical reporting
• Inventories including costs and changing in value including write-downs
• Foreign exchange including accounting for realized and unrealized foreign exchange
gains and losses

In addition, the Accrual General ledger is considered to be the heart of the Chart of
Accounts. Both have to be consistent with each other as the general ledger is a record
containing the accounts needed to reflect an entity’s financial position and results op
operations.
- Accounting Polices and practices (APP) (Accounting Standards). IPSAS 1 identified
accounting policies as the specific principles, bases, conventions, rules and practices adopted
by an entity in preparing and presenting financial statements. Inducing the practice has shown
that the government sector entities follow widely diverse financial reporting practices, and in
many countries, there are no authoritative standards for the government sector. In some
countries where standards do exist, the body of standards may be either at an early stage of
development or limited in application to specific types of entities in the government sector
(IFAC May, 2000). However, the existence of widely diverse financial reporting practices in
the government sector entities is due to the use of different legal systems and the absence of
Generally Accepted Government Accounting Standards. Therefore, the prescribing of
accounting standards, principles and practices (accounting policies) that are consistent with
the central government context is an essential step for the transition to accrual accounting in
the central government. This is because accrual accounting is more judgmental than cash
accounting and requires a more sophisticated regulatory framework. Furthermore, the early
focus on accounting policies is significant as accounting policies can have an impact on the
requirements of information systems, training strategies and communications strategies
(IFAC, 2000). In reality, there are different options for the countries that are intended to
adopt accrual accounting in respect of developing the new accounting polices which are
consistent with accrual accounting.
The first is that these countries can follow the International Public Sector Accounting
Standards (IPSASs) which are developed by IFAC. The IFAC-IPSASB has developed several
Accrual IPSASs, which can be considered as the corner stone of facilitating the transition to
accrual accounting in the public sector. These IPSASs are of particular importance for the
developing countries that are not able to produce their accounting standards, and hence, they
are importing them from the developed countries. Consequently, the availability of IPSASs is
considered as an important factor of the transition to accrual in the central government of the
developing countries.
The second is that they can follow the accounting policies that have been developed by the
earlier reformer countries such New Zealand, UK and Australia.
Finally, they can develop their own accounting policies with the use of the aforementioned
two options as guidance.
- Tackling of Specific Accounting Issues (SAI). Due to the fact that the cash-based
accounting system has been used for centuries in the government sector, specific accounting
issues have been remained unsolved, such as, identification of government reporting entity
and determination of its boundaries, identification and valuation of fixed assets such as:
military assets, heritage assets, infrastructure assets, natural resources, etc. For example, the
reporting entities issues have to be tackled before the transition to accrual accounting. Where
the determination of the boundaries of the government reporting entities is fundamental,
because it determines which entities, transactions and activities will be comprised by a
government’s financial report (IFAC, 2002). The government reporting entity has to be
identified and its boundaries has to be determined before government starts with the real
transition to accrual accounting, as it is recognized that inappropriate delineation of the

boundaries of the government financial reporting entity would have adverse consequences on
the message communicated by the financial report and the discharge of the accountability
obligations of a government (IFAC, 1996). Therefore, the government should try to establish
the reporting entity and its boundaries during the determination of the accounting policies.
- Conceptual Framework (CF). Unlike, the private sector accounting, there is a lack of
conceptual framework for governmental accounting. Fortunately, the International Public
Sector Accounting Standards Board (IPSASB) has recently published a Consultation Paper
(IPSASB, 2008) covering the conceptual framework for general purpose financial reporting.
The conceptual framework has attempted to cover the following issues: the objective and
scope of general-purpose financial reporting, qualitative characteristics of general-purpose
financial reporting and identifying the users and their information needs. While the IPSASB
conceptual framework has tackled the most important issues which are considered to be
essential for the successful transition to accrual accounting, there are still some issues need to
be included in the Conceptual framework. In fact, the conceptual framework should pay
attention to transferring the accrual accounting concepts (which have mainly been designed
for the private sector) into government sector. For instance, accrual accounting is based on
some principles and postulations (e.g. matching principle and going concern postulate) that
have been used for decades as an obstacle in the way of its adoption in the government sector.
These principles and postulations need a further clarification and making clear how they can
be applied to the government sector. Furthermore, the conceptual framework is required to
determine the reporting entity and its boundaries; the scope and the coverage of financial
statements; and the main concepts such as assets, liabilities, financial position, expenses and
revenues. Also, it is required to address the accounting treatment rules and valuation rules.
Consequently, development of the conceptual framework is considered to be an essential step
for the successful transition to accrual accounting in the central government. In addition, the
use of IPSASB conceptual framework by different countries can facilitate the harmonization
of government accounting at the central governments level.
- Accounting and Budgeting Consistency (ABC) (Integration). The experience of the
previous reformer countries (such as New Zealand, UK and Australia) has indicated that the
budgeting system should be integrated with the accounting system which is used to carry out
the budget; therefore, the basis on which the budget is prepared should be consistent with the
basis of accounting utilized. Thus, the accounting reform makes the budget reform inevitable.
This means that the transition to accrual accounting in the central government should be
accompanied by the transition to an appropriate budget system of which its nature and
characteristics are consistent with the nature and characteristics of accrual accounting.
However, in practice there are different bases of budgeting: expenditure-based budgeting and
cost-expense-based budgeting are the most used ones. The expenditure-based budget is
concerned with current period expenditure not expenses or costs incurred. Expenditures are
recognized in the budget only to the extent that claims will be paid-off by the end of the year.
On the other hand, cost-expense-based budget is concerned with costs, which are a measure
of the economic resources utilized for a particular purpose or with providing a particular
service, and expenses which occur when goods and services (including capital assets) are
consumed. Both expenses and costs incurred are measured on an accrual basis since accrual
accounting better reflects underlying economic events (Raman, 1997). Therefore, the
adoption of accrual accounting in the central government should be integrated with budgeting
reform.

- Central Guidance Unit (CGU). In fact, it is important to leave the transition to accrual
accounting in the care of a central guidance unit. Centrally guided reforms are characterized
for example by a uniform terminology, a uniform Chart of Accounts, clear uniform
recognition and valuation rules, and uniform software packages across the government
(Lűder and Jones, 2003). Such a central guidance took place in Australia during the
budgeting reform. In Australia, the Management Advisory Board and its Management
Improvement Advisory Committee provided the central direction to the reform effort.
Additionally, the Australian Department of Finance posted a copious flow of guidelines on
how the system operated. It published studies on the implementation of the reforms in
selected agencies as a means to publicize the experiences of the departments and best
practices in implementing budget reform (Xavier, 1998). The importance of the central
guidance unit stems from the fact that the lack of an effective central coordinating mechanism
between the treasury and governmental entities, which is required to adopt accrual
accounting, will result in expanding the distance between the treasury and those entities. This
in turn can produce a different perception of what accrual accounting practices, procedures
and principles are and creating some confusion among the governmental entities themselves
as well. Accordingly, there should be an effective central coordinating mechanism between
the treasury and the governmental entities, furthermore, among and within the governmental
entities to guide and manage the accounting reform in order to avoid the diversification of
accounting system within the central governmental.
- Central Help Desk (CHD) (including advisory board). During the establishment phase,
which focuses on the technical and professional requirements, many accounting problems
emerge. The Central help desk (including advisory group) can assist in solving the conceptual
and technical accounting problems that emerge during the implementation process. For
example, the establishment of an Accrual Accounting Advisory Group will be valuable for
the transition to accrual accounting, as the knowledge and advice of this group will be
extremely helpful in the deliberations on the various issues that can arise during the
implementation process.
Consequently, the establishment phase can briefly be summarized in the following equation:
AC (ps) = f (AR + OB + COA + AGL + APP + SAI + CF + ABC + CGU + CHD) (3)
Where:
f = function
AR = Asset Register
OB = Opening Balance
COA = Chart Of Accounts
AGL = Accrual General Ledger
APP = Accounting Polices and Practices (Accounting Standards)
SAI = Tackling of Specific Accounting Issues
CF = Conceptual Framework (required for transferring the accrual accounting concepts
into government sector.
ABC = Accounting and Budgeting Consistency (Integration)
CGU = Central Guidance Unit
CHD = Central Help Desk (including advisory board)
Conversion Phase: (coupling/transferring phase) aims at transferring the data from cash
system and the extra-accounting files (auxiliary files) which comprise the details of accounts
such as debtors and creditors, etc.. to the accrual system. Where the new accrual system can

not start from scratch, the information available in the current cash system and the auxiliary
files will form the starting point for the accrual system. Therefore, this phase will provide a
link for the periodic transfer of data from the old accounting system to the new accounting
system. So it is necessary to consider the conversion phase to determine the conversion plan
or steps by which the accounting data can be transferred from cash to accrual system.
Namely, we have to identify in which way can the conversion from cash to accrual
accounting be completed?
This phase can be reflected in the following equation:
Ac (ps) = f ( TD) (4)
Where:
f = function
TD = Transferring of Data
Testing and Confirmation Phase: aims primarily at testing the Workability of the accrual
system in the real world after the accrual system is completed and the data is transferred to it
from the old system. Also this phase will lead to obtaining approval to switch to the new
system. In practice, there is no a specific method to test the workability of accrual accounting,
accordingly, each government has to determine the way by which the workability of accrual
accounting can be tested in practice?
However, we can present the experience of Ireland concerning the testing of workability of
the accrual accounting system in the departments of Transport, Energy and Communications.
The testing process was concerned with a computerized accrual accounting system. The
computerized system chosen to handle the accrual accounting consists of new software and
modifications to the existing cash system. The system has four distinct modules: (Treacy,
1997).
1. Assets register;
2. Accruals general ledger;
3. Enhancements to existing cash based financial management system;
4. Interface link between cash and accruals general ledger.
Testing of Modules: we shall focus only on the first two modules as examples of testing the
workability of accrual accounting system as follows:
- Assets register: in order to make integration between all of the accruals modules, the assets
register should be computerized. The computerized assets register that used by Irish
departments has been consisted of two assets registers, one for items whose value would be
estimated (when all the relevant details were not available) and another assets register listing
those assets for which all the required information was available. The assets register would
facilitate:
(a) The provision of management information on the existence and value of assets;
(b) A reflection of assets usage through a depreciation charge;
(c) Departmental accountability; and
(d) The production of the Statement of Capital Assets for the Appropriation Account.
In addition to the aforementioned information, it was also important that the assets register
would link to the accruals ledger so that the periodic depreciation charges could be reflected

in the ledger and so reflect, within the Department’s financial statements, the estimated cost
of asset use.
Herein the testing of assets register has been conducted in two steps: First, the asset register
has been tested as a separate entity to ensure that the package of the assets register would be
able to store and retrieve the following information such as: a description of the asset; the
cost center at which the asset was located; categories for assets identification, e.g. furniture,
IT, equipment etc.; a unique asset identifier number; a financial history of the asset; notes of
revaluations and disposals, etc. Second, it has been tested together with the accrual general
ledger to ensure that the depreciation charges could be reflected in the ledger.
- Accruals General Ledger: Treacy (1997) stated that the testing of the accruals general
ledger was a more protracted and time-consuming exercise. As many issues had to be
addressed such as transfer mappings (deciding where to map accounts from the cash financial
management system to the accrual general ledger), reporting options and setting up template
batches. In addition to these, numerous code changes required full-scale testing to be repeated
on a number of occasions.
Similarly, the testing and confirmation phase can also be reflected in the following equation:
AC (ps) = f (TW) (5)
Where:
f = function
TW = Testing the Workability
Post-Transition Phase: In addition to the Reform Decision-Making Phase and Transition

Phase, the transition to accrual accounting requires a complementary phase which is required
to develop a new/improved reporting system that is best suitable for reporting the information
required. The transition to accrual accounting entails the establishment of a comprehensive
financial reporting system not only to furnish information on the total assets, liabilities,
changes in net worth, revenues and expenditure but also to furnish information on
borrowings, loans-made, commitments, contingent assets and liabilities, etc. Consequently,
the suggested external financial reporting formats are as follows:
• Statement of Financial Performance (Operating Statement)
• Balance Sheet
• Cash Flow Statement
• Statement of Changes in Net Worth
• Statement of Loans-Made
• Statement of Borrowings
• Statement of Commitments
• Statement of Contingent Liabilities
• Statement of Emergency Financial Transactions
• Statement of Unappropriated Financial Transactions
• Statement of Trust Assets
• Statement of Accounting Policies
• Notes to the Financial Statements
In addition to the aforementioned financial reporting, Parry (2010) has suggested four
dimensions of Public Financial Management (PFM). The proposed four dimensional

framework suggests that public financial management can be viewed as having multiple goals
within four dimensions as follows: (Parry (2010)
• Dimension 1: Aggregate fiscal management. Three specific goals of aggregate fiscal
management are identified:
(1) Fiscal sustainability;
(2) Maximizing resource mobilization; and
(3) Resource allocation in accordance with policy priorities.
• Dimension 2: Operation management: financial management has a significant role in
the operational management of day to day activities of government:
(1) Effective performance management;
(2) Delivering value for money; and
(3) Managing within the budget.
• Dimension 3: Risk management: herein, Parry (2010) stated that the PFM provides
important tools of risk management through the following goals:
(1) Effective financial control;
(2) Compliance with constitutional legal and regulatory requirements; and
(3) Proper oversight of public finances.
• Dimension 4: Governance: The pubic sector governance has to meet the needs of the
public sector primary stakeholder (the people, i.e. civil society) and the external
stakeholder, e.g. lenders, multilateral organizations through the following goals:
(1) Governance structures that reflect the interest of stakeholders;
(2) Transparency; and
(3) Accountability.
Parry (2010) has suggested that the specific sub-systems such as budget, financial reporting
or audit, must be seen in the context of the overall four dimensional framework and their role
within that framework. Hence, the general purpose financial statements can be seen as having
particular relevance to:
• Dimension 1- Fiscal management;
• Dimension 2- Particularly resource mobilization
• Dimension 4- Governance.
Parry concluded that this goal analysis provides the basis for developing a conceptual
framework for financial reporting. In fact, we agree with Parry that the development of
financial reporting for the central government has to be approached in the context of the
above-mentioned three dimensions.
Similarly, this phase can be reflected in the following equation:
AC (ps) = f (DNFRS) (6)
Where f = function
DNFRS = Developing New Financial Reporting System

Conclusion
In the early 1990s, a reform movement to innovate government accounting began in some
countries, such as, New Zealand, UK, Australia, Sweden, Finland, Canada, USA. In this
context, several models have been developed to deal with the government accounting
innovations (Lüder 1992, 1994, 2000, Pallot, 1995, Jaruga and Nowak, 1996, Godfrey et al.
2001, Christensen, 2002 and Ouda, 2004). However, these models are still suffering from
several shortcomings such as:
(a) black boxes;
(b) the failure to treat government accounting innovations from a comprehensive
perspective;
(c) an emphasis of context of innovations over content of innovations;
(d) greater concern with the initiation phase than the real practical transition phase;
and
(e) being considered explanatory models rather than prescriptive models.
These models have focused more on addressing the contextual and behavioral variables and
their influence on the reform process without going into details of how to carry out the reform
process itself. In addition, the practical experience of the pioneer countries (New Zealand,
UK and Australia), regarding the practical transition phase, were not taken into account.
In an attempt to overcome the aforementioned shortcomings, the Prescriptive Model (PM)
has been developed. The PM has not focused only on the context of reforms but also on the
content of reforms. Its aim is to give a full picture of the reform process including all relevant
factors, instead of only addressing the contextual and behavioral factors and their influence
on the reform process. Also the Prescriptive Model pays attention to a comprehensive
approach which deals with the innovation process itself from initiation stage to the final
outcome and focuses on the contextual, behavioral, content, technical and capacities
variables.
Basically, the transition to accrual accounting is a major cultural, administrative and technical
change and in order to successfully be adopted, it must take place in phases with a clear plan
of progress established from the outset. The dimensions of the task should not be
underestimated and progress should occur in a measured and controlled manner. The costs of
not properly managing the transition to accrual accounting can be significant and go well
beyond the price of the hardware, software and training. Consequently, the PM has concluded
that the transition to an accrual accounting system in central government is heavily related to
the following phases and equations:
A- Reform Decision-Making Phase (I):
Ac (ps) = f (S + KA + P + L + RD) (1)
B- Transition Phase (II);
AC (ps) = f (PS + LP + BS + PAS + CS + MCC + WC + CC + BAC + ITC+ IFS) (2)
= f (AR + OB + COA + AGL + APP + SAI + CF + ABC + CGU + CHD) (3)

= f ( TD) (4)
= f (TW) (5)
C- Post-Transition Phase (III):
AC (ps) = f (DNFRS) (6)
The above phases and factors are considered necessary to establish the initial and practical
steps towards the establishment of accrual accounting and its practical implementation.
Note
This article is a revised version of a paper presented at the 12th CIGAR (Comparative
International Government Accounting Research) Conference:“New Challenges for Public
Sector Accounting” University of Modena, Italy, May 28-29, 2009.
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A proposed definition of the Modified Cash Basis
Michael Parry - [email protected]
Michael Parry Consulting
In the article in the January edition of the Public Fund Digest “The Cash Basis IPSAS: an
Alternative View” Michael Parry and Andy Wynne suggested that the modified cash basis of
accounting should be recognised as an intermediate basis, in addition to the simple dichotomy
between the cash basis and full accrual. We also suggested that it is relatively easy to
straightforward to define the cash basis. With the issue of IPSAS 28 through 30 on financial
instruments, which replace the former IPSAS 15, such a definition of the modified cash basis
is made more comprehensive.
In essence the modified cash basis of accounting as proposed captures all financial assets and
liabilities and the flows related to such assets and liabilities. The modified cash basis
excludes physical assets (current and non-current) and also excludes all intangible assets.
Hence non-cash flows such as depreciation and amortisation are excluded and replaced with
the actual cash flows involved in acquiring and disposing of assets.
A proposed definition of the modified cash basis is provided in the box at the end of this
article. The definition draws as far as possible on existing definitions within IPSAS so as to
ensure consistency with all other standards. A modified cash basis can be regarded as either
(i) and intermediate stage on the way to full accrual, or (ii) a terminal stage with no intention
of moving to full accrual.
The financial statements under the modified cash basis would be as defined in IPSAS 1:
(a) A Statement of Financial Position [balance sheet showing only financial assets
and liabilities];
(b) A Statement of Financial Performance;
(c) A Statement of Changes in Net Assets/Equity;
(d) A Cash Flow Statement [however, a format could be devised to combine the Cash
Flow Statement with the Statement of Financial Performance as there will be only
limited differences];
(e) When the entity makes publicly available its approved budget, a comparison of
budget and actual amounts either as a separate additional financial statement or as
a budget column in the financial statements; and
(f) Notes, comprising a summary of significant accounting policies and other
explanatory notes.
The modified cash basis has a number of attractions:
• It is broadly in line with the approach currently adopted by most governments which
record not only cash flows, but also domestic and foreign loans (often as memoranda
records rather than part of the accounting structure). But the modified cash basis
extends common practice by also identifying and disclosing unpaid bills, e.g. utility
bills, a problem for many countries and which are not captured under traditional
government accounting. Furthermore it provides an argument for incorporating all of
this information within the accounting system itself and hence improving control.
• Budgets are usually prepared using the modified cash basis (though without actually
stating any basis); both cash flows and financing flows are part of the budget. Hence

the reconciliation between budget and outturn as required by IPSAS 24 is
straightforward.
• The modified cash basis contains important information not included in the cash
basis. In particular it provides information on government borrowing and lending and
also on current liabilities (e.g. unpaid bills) of the government. In fact the modified
cash basis provides the key information required for fiscal management.
• A modified cash basis can be implemented under most Commercial Off the Shelf
(COTS) computer packages, whereas it is very difficult to implement a pure cash
basis (because such packages are designed to work through sale and purchase ledgers
which have no role when the cash basis is applied).
• At the same time the modified cash basis avoids many of the technically complex
issues of valuation and measuring flows associated with the full accrual (but not all;
there are still some valuation issues).
• Since actual liabilities are included there is a conceptual basis for including
information on contingent liabilities in the notes to the financial statements (under the
cash basis there is no logic in identifying contingent liabilities when actual liabilities
are not disclosed).
Hence recognition in IPSAS of the modified cash basis would provide an opportunity for
governments to implement IPSAS compliant financial statements in a manner which
advances their approach to financial reporting but still avoids the considerable costs and
problems of moving to full accrual. Indeed for many poor countries full accrual would be an
unjustified diversion of resources urgently needed to address issues of poverty and social
deprivation, and anyway is probably infeasible for such environments.
There are disadvantages and limitations to the cash basis. By its nature the modified cash
basis does not include physical assets and hence the benefits of control of such assets through
the accounting system cannot be achieved. This also means that when comparing costs to
outputs one of the objectives of the accrual basis, matching, will not be achieved.
A further issue is that almost inevitably the statement of financial position (balance sheet)
will show an excess of liabilities over assets. This is because borrowings to acquire physical
assets will be recorded as liabilities, but the assets will be expensed as they are acquired.
This problem is inherent in the modified cash basis and the combination of the above factors
may be reasons for governments moving in the longer run to a full accrual basis.
However, the contention of this article is that the modified cash basis:
• Can be defined with sufficient precision.
• Provides key information for fiscal management.
• The modified cash basis a significant advance on the pure cash basis yet remains
feasible for most countries to implement.
• Whilst most countries already operate a form of modified the cash basis a clear
definition enables the basis to be applied consistently within and between countries –
it would be even better if the modified cash basis was formally recognised under
IPSAS.

Proposed definition of the Modified Cash Basis of Accounting
The Modified Cash Basis of Accounting will recognise transactions only when cash, financial assets or
liabilities are paid or received. The Statement of Financial Position (Balance Sheet) will include financial assets
and financial liabilities.
For the purpose of this definition:
• A financial asset is any asset that is:
(a) Cash
(i) Cash comprises cash on hand, demand deposits and cash equivalents
(ii) Cash equivalents are short-term, highly liquid investments that are readily convertible to
known amounts of cash and which are subject to an insignificant risk of changes in value
(b) An equity instrument of another entity;
An equity instrument is any contract that evidences a residual interest in the assets of an entity after deducting
all of its liabilities
(c) A contractual right:
(i) To receive cash or another financial asset from another entity; or
(ii) To exchange financial assets or financial liabilities with another entity under conditions that
are potentially favourable to the entity
(d) A contract that will or may be settled in the entity’s own equity instruments and is:
(i) A non-derivative for which the entity is or may be obliged to receive a variable number of the
entity’s own equity instruments; or
(ii) A derivative that will or may be settled other than by the exchange of a fixed amount of cash
or another financial asset for a fixed number of the entity’s own equity instruments. For this
purpose the entity’s own equity instruments do not include puttable financial instruments
classified as equity instruments in accordance with paragraphs 15 and 16 of IPSAS 28,
instruments that impose on the entity an obligation to deliver to another party a pro rata share
of the net assets of the entity only on liquidation and are classified as equity instruments in
accordance with paragraphs 17 and 18 of IPSAS 28, or instruments that are contracts for the
future receipt or delivery of the entity’s own equity instruments.
• A financial liability is any liability that is
(a) a contractual obligation:
(i) To deliver cash or another financial asset to another entity; or
(ii) To exchange financial assets or financial liabilities with another entity under conditions that
are potentially unfavourable to the entity
(b) A contract that will or may be settled in the entity’s own equity instruments and is:
(i) A non-derivative for which the entity is or may be obliged to deliver a variable number of the
entity’s own equity instruments; or
(ii) A derivative that will or may be settled other than by the exchange of a fixed amount of cash or
another financial asset for a fixed number of the entity’s own equity instruments. For this
purpose the entity’s own equity instruments do not include puttable financial instruments
classified as equity instruments in accordance with paragraphs 15 and 16 of IPSAS 28,
instruments that impose on the entity an obligation to deliver to another party a pro rata share
of the net assets of the entity only on liquidation and are classified as equity instruments in
accordance with paragraphs 17 and 18 of IPSAS 28, or instruments that are contracts for the
future receipt or delivery of the entity’s own equity instruments.
• A payment occurs when there is an outflows of financial assets or an inflow of financial liabilities
• A receipt occurs when there is an inflow of financial assets or an outflow of financial liabilities.

The Four Dimensions of Public Financial Management
Michael Parry - [email protected]
Michael Parry Consulting
Introduction
In all of the discussion of Public Financial Management (PFM) and conceptual frameworks
for financial reporting, there has been only limited discussion of the objectives of public
financial management.
Campos and Pradhani identified three objectives of fiscal management: aggregate fiscal
discipline; strategic prioritisation of expenditure and technical efficiency. Allen Schickii has
identified three different objectives of public budgeting: Strategic Planning; Management
Control and Operational Control. Both of these approaches tend to focus on the budget, but
in fact this is only one aspect of PFM.
By way of contrast, the International Public Sector Accounting Standards Board (IPSASB)
approaches from the perspective of published financial statements. The IPSASB
Consultation Paper considers a conceptual framework for financial reportingiii and identifies
two objectives for financial statements: accountability and resource allocation.
The IPSASB approach views PFM as an information system; but it also a purposive system,
e.g. it does not merely provide information on expenditure but actually manages and controls
such expenditure. The Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accounting (CIPFA) has
recently produced a consultation draft on a whole systems approach to public financial
managementiv which considers PFM as a purposive system: “Public financial management is
the system by which financial aspects of the public services’ business are directly controlled
and influenced to support of the sector’s goals”. The CIPFA model includes a list of goals, or
objectives, for PFM. These are defined as “sustainable social benefits” which are sub-
divided into:
• Funder results
• Public value
• Community value
• Individual value.
Unfortunately the CIPFA draft does not further explain these concepts. However, they do
suggest that whilst CIPFA defines PFM in terms of financial aspects, the target objectives are
more concerned with delivering a range of benefits for civil society. Certainly they appear
very different to any of the other PFM objectives defined above.
What the above approaches indicate is that any attempt to define PFM objectives in terms of
a single approach is too narrow; instead PFM should be seen as an information and a
purposive system with multiple objectives which can usefully be viewed as a series of
dimensions.
This article suggests that the objectives of PFM can be viewed as having four dimensions:
Dimension 1 – aggregate fiscal management
Dimension 2 – operational management
Dimension 3 – fiduciary risk management
Dimension 4 – governance

Furthermore each of these dimensions is reflected in public financial management as an
information system providing both ex ante (budgets, plans) and ex post (financial statements,
performance and other) reporting.
Each of these four dimensional, a primary set of target objectives and the link to the
information systems are summarised in the diagram on the next page. The rest of this article
reviews each of these dimensions and the objectives within the dimensions. The dimensions
are approached in the context of national government, but most of the comments can be
transposed to sub-national public sector organisations. However, this model is proposed as a
framework for identifying objectives rather than a definitive statement of all possible
objectives of all aspects of public financial management.
It should also be noted that this model does not conflict with any of the definitions of
objectives for PFM above. Rather, each of these can be seen as target objectives within
certain dimensions; in fact as sub-sets of the whole PFM model.
Dimension 1 – aggregate fiscal management

A fundamental requirement of every government is to manage its finances at the aggregate
level. The accounting model represents the financial flows and resultant balance sheets and
hence provides basis for monitoring, controlling and ultimately managing public finances.
Three specific objectives of aggregate fiscal management are identified:
1. Fiscal sustainability
One of the most fundamental responsibilities for any entity is aggregate fiscal management so
as to be able to fund its activities from revenues and borrowings whilst remaining solvent –
the objective of fiscal sustainability. For many countries achieving fiscal sustainability has
become an increasing challenge over the last two years when faced with bailing out major
financial institutions. This in turn has posed new issues of aggregate fiscal management of
sovereign entities and the implicit guarantees made by such entities in respect of their
banking sector. Sovereign entity debt is being “rated” in the same way as commercial entities
on the basis of their balance sheet and future cash flows.
Fiscal risk is the problem of potential liabilities which do not at any point in time amount to
actual liabilities, but may under certain conditions “crystallise” and become real liabilities.
Financial reporting has for many years recognised these as “contingent liabilities” and
required information on such contingent liabilities to be managed and reported. The obvious
example are loan guarantees, e.g. on the loans of public enterprise, which will crystallise into
actual liabilities if the borrowing entity fails to meet its loan obligations. But for
governments the problem is more complex because of “implicit” guarantees, i.e. obligations
not spelt out in law but which exist in reality – the obvious recent example is the obligation of
governments around the world to bail out failing banks. This represent a huge fiscal risk that
most governments did not even realise existed. Identifying and reporting such implicit fiscal
risk is a major challenge for accountants.
Another newly recognised issue is the concept of a “structural” fiscal deficit, where current
levels of revenues for some rich countries are inadequate to sustain levels of government
expenditure, and choices have to be made between borrowing, increasing taxation or reducing
expenditure. This problem will become more acute for many countries with aging
populations. These issues in turn raise problems of inter-generational transfers.

These are not just PFM problems, but accounting provides the only comprehensive model of
the relationship between entity revenue and expenditure flows and balances. Traditionally
aggregate fiscal management has focussed on the budget and levels of borrowings. But in the
future governments require more sophisticated tools taking better account in addition of fiscal
risk, equity between social groups, inter generational transfers, and the closer monitoring of
fiscal outturns. This must require increasing and more sophisticated use of PFM tools at the
sovereign government level.
2. Maximising resource mobilisation
Almost all entities are constrained by limited financial resources. PFM has an objective in
managing resource mobilisation within policy fiscal goals. This can operate at several levels:
• Credible financial statements can impact on perceived sovereign debt risk and hence
the capacity for and cost of borrowing. It is likely that in the future audited
government financial statements will play an increasingly important role in assessing
sovereign debt risk and hence in mobilising resources.
• Perceived strong public financial management will be a factor in encouraging both
public and private inward investment. For poor countries this will include
encouraging support from development partners.
• Also for poor countries, enhanced public financial management can be one element in
improving the ability to absorb and utilise external aid, effectively increasing resource
availability.
3. Resource allocation in accordance with policy priorities
As noted above, most governments are constrained by financial resources and need to
allocate limited resources to optimally achieve policy objectives. Resource allocation is at
the heart of the budget planning process, and developments such as medium term budgets are
attempts to more effectively link budgets to policy objectives over a time frame longer than
the traditional annual budget.
It is tempting to see public financial management as “policy neutral”, i.e. providing the
mechanism for implementing whatever policies a government adopts with no responsibility
for the policies. But such a view is naive. By deciding what to measure and how to present
information, the accountant influences policy decisions. For example, a budget that identifies
the poverty or gender impact of expenditure will influence the allocation of resources to
address such issues. On the other hand a budget can hide a particular category of
expenditure, e.g. military spending, by spreading such expenditure over a number of budget
items without specific identification.
Hence decisions about budget allocations and the key policy focus are intertwined with
decisions about budget and financial statement classification, identification and presentation.
Furthermore the effectiveness of civil society participation, in Dimension 4 below, is
dependent on the transparency with which information is presented and resource allocation
decisions identified.
PFM through the budget process should provide a mechanism for linking policy objectives
with the constraint of financial resources. However, whilst the objective of resource
allocation in accordance with policy priorities seems simple, it is in fact difficult to achieve
because of the problem of articulating policy priorities, the interdependence between the

measurement system and the identification of priorities, and the difficulty of making reliable
forecasts extending several years into the future.
Dimension 2 – Operational management

Financial management has a significant role in the operational management of the day to day
activities of government.
1. Effective performance management
A major constraint of PFM is that the accounting model of “not for profit” activities does not
provide an input-output model for the public sector. Inputs are can be expressed in money
units, but outputs are typically service delivery. This contrasts with the commercial sector
where accounting is a universal input-output model using a common measure of money.
Inputs (costs) and outputs (sales) are measured in money units and the difference of profit,
also in money units, providing a comprehensive basis for performance management. The
development in the public sector of performance measures and management is an attempt to
address the gap by developing non-financial measures of performance.
There is extensive literature on the techniques, problems and benefits of performance
management systems. Performance management is often seen as a distinct discipline from
PFM, but to be useful performance measures of objectives must be linked to the financial
resources used to achieve such objectives.
An objective of PFM must be an effective performance management system which links
useful performance measures to the resources used to achieve the performance objectives.
2. Delivering value for money
The value for money objective could be seen as part of the overall performance management
objective, but in fact it has a narrower perspective. Performance measures are concerned
with achieving objectives. Value for money is simply a matter of ensuring that PFM
contributes positively to delivering value for money, which in turn can be sub-divided into
effectiveness, efficiency and economy.
In each of these areas it is possible to consider PFM as a system in its own right, and also
PFM as a system impacting on broader management issues, as summarised in the matrix
below.
Value for Money The PFM system itself Impact of PFM on rest of public sector
Criteria
Effectiveness Using the most appropriate PFM Measures and comparisons can identify
methodology and tools, e.g. appropriate opportunities to improve effectiveness
use of automation
Efficiency Ensuring funds for operations are Information on budgets and resources
available promptly when required available can enable efficient operations
Economy Minimising transaction costs and delays Ensuring minimal resources used to process
transactions
3. Managing within the budget
The public sector is budget driven. Without a budget, governments lack legal authority to
raise revenues or to make expenditures. When a sum is allocated within a budget it is
intended to be spent for the purpose indicated. Over spending is a regulatory issue that will
have to be corrected either by reallocation or by a supplementary budget. On the other hand
under spending represents a failure to utilise allocated resources. The objective of many

public sector managers to spend the budget, neither more nor less, is in fact logically
consistent with a budget driven process.
Thus for the public sector manger operating within the budget is a constant challenge, made
more difficult by the constraint of an annual budget cycle. Managing within the budget
requires timely information on budget allocations, commitments and actual expenditures.
Hence an efficient budget, commitment management and accounting system providing timely
and relevant reports is essential for budget management, which in turn contributes to the
value for money objectives above.
Dimension 3 – Fiduciary risk management

A problem facing all entities is fiduciary risk – the risk of public money being stolen, used for
purposes other than those intended, or used corruptly. There is a balance in fiduciary risk
management between the cost of avoiding risks and the cost of such risks crystallising. PFM
is part of the solution and provides important tools of risk management.
1. Effective financial control
The accounting system should provide a whole system of fiduciary controls, usefully
summarised under European Union (EU) nomenclature as Public Internal Financial Control
(PIFC). This comprises:
• Internal controls within an organisation, e.g. payment authorisation process, managing
against budgets, reconciliation processes, and so on. These controls should be
specifically designed to minimise the risk of loss.
• Internal audit – the oversight system established by the management of an
organisation in accordance with international standards of internal audit
In addition external audit – the independent scrutiny by the Supreme Audit Institution of the
activities of public sector organisations – provides an additional element of risk management.
All public sector entities should have in place a structure of internal and external controls so
as to reduce fiduciary risk to acceptable levels. However, it also needs to be recognised that
some risks extend beyond the financial system and will require other forms of control outside
the ambit of PFM.
2. Compliance with constitutional legal and regulatory requirements
Typically governments operate within a rule bound environment. There is a hierarchy of
regulation starting with the constitution and moving down through laws to the detailed
financial rules, instructions and procedures. This bureaucratic structure is another element of
fiduciary risk management and is designed to minimise the scope for activities which are not
in accordance with public policy, i.e. to minimise fiduciary risk.
PFM both operates within this regulatory environment, and also itself acts as a system for
enforcing the regulations. As with controls, there is a balance between the cost of
bureaucracy and benefits in terms of ensuring consistency and further reduction of fiduciary
risk.
3. Proper oversight of public finances
The last element of fiduciary risk management is oversight, particularly by the legislature.
Typically a committee of the legislature, e.g. a “Public Accounts Committee” will review

financial and audit reports of individual units within Government, e.g. Ministries,
Departments. In many cases the review will be supported by technical staff.
The oversight process varies between countries, but typically will involve:
• Initial “desk reviews” by the Committee of financial information and audit reports
• Follow up meetings with key persons from the Government Ministry concerned,
and/or with the auditors (which may be in public)
• Follow up actions.
An open and powerful oversight process can be a powerful tool in fiduciary risk
management. It can lend power to the auditor, use parliamentary privilege to identify issues
and make pronouncements and the mere existence of the system can be a powerful incentive
for effective control procedures. At a sub-national level a similar system should exist
through local government public account committees, audit committees and similar tools.
Dimension 4 – Governance
The governance dimension has great significance in government because of the concept of
government acting according to the will of the people. Whilst the people, i.e. civil society, are
the primary stakeholder there will also be external stakeholders, e.g. lenders, multilateral
organisations. Thus public sector governance has to meet the needs of all of these groups and
at all levels of government.
1. Governance structures that reflect the interest of stakeholders
In theory a democratic government should reflect the will of the people and hence provides
its own governance. In practice the most democratic systems put intervening barriers
between public will and government policy, and specific mechanisms are required to
overcome such barriers. The issue applies at national government and local government
levels, and particularly to government agencies managed by unelected officials.
Governance issues can be addressed though a number of different approaches, e.g.
• Participation by stakeholder representatives, particularly in the management of
unelected agencies.
• Ex-ante involvement in resource allocation decisions
• Ex post involvement in scrutiny and oversight (see above).
Governance is linked to PFM though the budget and financial reporting processes. Budget
are the ex ante resource mobilisation and management plans. Financial statements are the ex
post reports on delivery. As such they are both tools in the governance process.
2. Transparency
Transparency is broader than financial information, but financial information will be an
important part of transparent government. This includes all of published budgets, financial
statements and audit reports as well as other financial information published by government.
As indicated above, transparency is not just about providing data. The messages within the
data must be made explicit; this requires judgments as to the appropriate messages, and hence
the provision of relevant financial information. This is the same issue as noted above on
budget allocations; there is an interdependent relationship between the information and

judgements based on the information. Financial information will identify specific issues
depending on the way it is classified and aggregated.
3. Accountability
Accountability goes beyond transparency and involves identifying individual responsibility
for actions. Thus it can be seen as the end point of a participative and transparent process.
Again accountability extends beyond accounting issues, but the latter will be a major element
of the accountability process.
The level of accountability interacts with the basis on which budget holders are rewarded,
and affects the level of central control that is necessary. Hence it has a profound effect on the
design of the budget preparation, execution and accounting systems. PFM systems must have
clear inbuilt assumptions about exactly how accountability will work – and they will need to
be progressively redesigned as accountability improves. Therefore they must be either
flexible or inexpensive – an expensive inflexible system will hold up progress.
Information outputs
1. Ex ante information
Ex ante reports are the formal outcomes of the planning processes. They may comprise
annual or multiyear budgets, or plans which extend beyond financial flows, e.g. sectoral plans
based on “real” targets such as poverty reduction, health care, etc. The financial aspect of all
such plans will embrace the four dimensions of objectives as defined above.
Ex ante planning reports will be specifically linked to the fiscal and operational objectives as
reflected in Dimension 1 and 2.
2. Ex post information
For accountants the Financial Statements are a key ex post report. However, in the public
sector the usefulness of purely financial reporting is limited because it provides no measure
of service delivery and hence to be useful must be integrated with some form of performance
reporting indicating how financial resources have been utilised to achieve “real” outcomes.
Ex post information will have a specific role in enabling the governance and fiduciary risk
management objectives in Dimensions 3 and 4. Ex post reporting also provides a feedback
loop to financial and operational planning.
Linkages
The whole model describes a single system of public financial management; as such all
dimensions and objectives within dimensions are linked. But there are some specific
linkages:
• Operational objectives depend on fiscal objectives, for example if funds are not
available when required then operations cannot be conducted as planned and
objectives will not be achieved.
• Fiduciary risk is the control over the operation of PFM as a purposive system
executing a budget to achieve certain operational objectives.
• Governance in the PFM context is governance of the fiscal and operational objectives,
and requires a system of fiduciary risk management as the basis for effective financial
governance.

Some conclusions
The proposed four dimensional framework suggests that public financial management has a
broad role in the whole public governance process. Furthermore specific sub-systems such as
budget, financial reporting or audit, must be seen in the context of the overall four
dimensional framework and their role within that framework. Hence the approach described
in this article provides a basis for conceptualising specific areas within public financial
management. For example general purpose financial statements can be seen as having
particular relevance to:
• Dimension 1 – fiscal management
• Dimension 2 – particularly resource mobilisation
• Dimension 4 – governance.
Thus this objective analysis provides the basis for developing a conceptual framework for
financial reporting.
Finally, it is recognised that this framework should be regarded as a first draft. Within the
basic four dimensions there is scope to refine some of the sub-components, or even move
them between dimensions. It may be that the dimensions themselves require further
consideration. It is expected further discussion will refine and develop the framework as a
useful analytic tool. What is important is the concept of public financial management as both
a purposive and an information system with multiple dimensions and objectives.
References
i
“Budgetary Institutions and Expenditure Outcomes”, Ed Campos and Sanjay Pradhan,
World Bank Policy Research Department, September 1996
ii
“The Federal Budget: Politics, Policy, Process”, Allen Schick, 2007, Brooking Institute
iii
“Conceptual Framework for General Purpose Financial Reporting by Public Sector
Entities” International Federation of Accountants 2008
iv
“Public Financial Management and the PFM architecture – A Whole Systems Approach”,
consultation draft, CIPFA, 20099

Recent Public Financial Management Publications and other
Resources
In this section we review some recent publications which may be of interest to readers of the
Journal. We would be pleased to receive reviews and suggestions of other resources which
we should refer to in future issues.
Fiscal ROSCS and PEFA Assessments: A Comparison of Approaches

Mario Pessoa and Richard Allen (2010)
http://blog-pfm.imf.org/files/note.pdf
This note summarizes the main similarities and differences in approach and coverage of fiscal
ROSCs and PEFA assessments. These are two approaches used by international bodies to
assess the quality public financial management in governments, especially those in the Global
South.
A fiscal ROSC differs from a PEFA assessment in focusing particularly on transparency and
accountability aspects of PFM systems, grouped under four pillars:
• clarity of roles and responsibilities for PFM within government;
• open budget processes, covering all PFM-related processes of government;
• public availability of information, specifying the kinds of PFM information that
should be accessible to the public; and
• finally, assurances of integrity, covering issues of data quality as well as the need for
and quality of external scrutiny of PFM information.
A PEFA assessment focuses primarily on the extent to which PFM systems and procedures
deliver efficient and effective outcomes in the six critical areas. It covers fiscal transparency
issues insofar as they affect PFM effectiveness. The emphasis is on the budget process itself,
particularly in respect of the main PEFA indicator set, although PEFA assessments also
include some description of the legal framework for fiscal management, reforms being
undertaken, and public access to key information. PEFA assessments have also focused
predominantly on low- and middle-income countries, while fiscal ROSCs have also been
carried out in a substantial number of high-income countries.
Achieving Better Value for Money in Health Care

OECD Publishing (November 2009)
http://www.oecdbookshop.org/oecd/display.asp?K=5KSF5CRSGQNS&LANG=EN
Rising public health care spending remains a problem in virtually all OECD and EU member
countries. As a consequence, there is growing interest in policies that will ease this pressure
through improved health system performance. This report examines selected policies that
may help countries better achieve the goal of improved health system efficiency and thus
better value for money. Drawing on multinational data sets and case studies, it examines a
range policy instruments. These include: the role of competition in health markets; the scope
for improving care coordination; better pharmaceutical pricing policies; greater quality
control supported by stronger information and communication technology in health care; and
increased cost sharing.

Strategic Financial Management
http://www.audit-commission.gov.uk/nationalstudies/localgov/Pages/strategic-financial-
management.aspx
This national study from the UK Audit Commission builds on the work done for the World
Class Financial Management, especially financial governance and leadership, financial
planning, and finance for decision making. The study will review how councils develop and
use strategic financial planning tools and will help them to improve strategic financial
management and links to the planning of services and other interventions. It will examine the
costs and benefits of strategic financial planning, determine which approaches, if any, offer
most benefits and identify the key principles of effective strategic financial and risk
management.
No evidence that Public Private Partnerships provide value, says
National Audit Office (UK)
http://www.publicfinance.co.uk/news/2009/11/no-evidence-that-private-funding-schemes-
provide-value-says-nao/
Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) have spread from the UK to many countries, but there is
increasing evidence that they may not provide value for money and the alternatives are not
adequately researched. UK Ministers do not have strong evidence to show that PPPs offer
the best value for money, UK government auditors have warned.
In evidence prepared for a parliamentary inquiry in November 2009, the National Audit
Office warned: ‘Our view is that private finance can deliver benefits, but it is not suitable at
any price or in every circumstance.’ The NAO paper noted that ‘assessing the pros and cons
of alternative procurement routes is especially important in the recession’. Rising costs of
private finance since the credit crunch had ‘implications for their value for money’.
The paper added: ‘We have yet to come across truly robust and systematic evaluation of the
use of private finance built into PPPs at either a project or programme level’ – evidence that
committee chair Lord Vallance described as ‘quite unequivocal’.
Systems to collect comparable data from projects using different procurement routes were
‘not in place’, the paper said. ‘Unless such systems are established, together with robust
evaluation of the overall whole-life costs of alternative forms of procurement, government
cannot satisfy itself that private finance represents the best VFM option.’
In Nigeria the government has also seen PPPs as an important way of acquiring public
investment, but again recently suffered a set-back. Plans to concession airports to private
investors in a public private partnership appear to have been abandoned due to opposition
from the trade unions.
Greater Aid Transparency: crucial for aid effectiveness, ODI Project

Briefings 35, London: ODI
Samuel Moon and Tim Williamson (January 2010)
www.odi.org.uk/resources/details.asp?id=4673
This paper sets out and explores the link between donor aid and recipient country budgets,
and the role greater transparency about aid can play in improving budget transparency, the
quality of budgetary decisions, and accountability systems. The paper goes on to explore how

current initiatives to improve aid transparency can best support better budgets and
accountability in aid dependent countries. These efforts provide an important opportunity to
enhance the effectiveness of both the recipient governments’ own spending and the aid they
receive from donors.
It concludes that publishing better information on aid requires compatibility with recipients’
budgeting and planning systems. The research findings suggest that recipient budgets bear
many similarities, but this is not reflected in current formats for reporting aid. Finally, it
concludes that the poorest countries will lose out if donors do not publish aid information that
is easy to link with recipient government budget systems.
Publishing What We Learned: An Assessment of the Publish What You

Pay Coalition
Mabel van Oranje and Henry Parham (2009)
http://www.publishwhatyoupay.org/en/resources/publishing-what-we-learned
Publish What You Pay (PWYP) is a global civil society coalition that helps citizens of
resource-rich developing countries hold their governments accountable for the management
of revenues from the oil, gas and mining industries. Natural resource revenues are an
important source of income for governments of over 50 developing countries. When properly
managed these revenues should serve as a basis for poverty reduction, economic growth and
development rather than exacerbating corruption, conflict and social divisiveness.
The PWYP coalition was founded in 2002 by a small, ad hoc group of London-based NGO
representatives to tackle the ‘resource curse’ by campaigning for greater transparency and
accountability in the management of revenues from the oil, gas and mining industries. Since
then, the PWYP coalition has grown to become a global network comprised of community
organisations, international NGOs and faith-based groups in more than 70 countries.
The report discusses the origins and evolution of PWYP from 2002 to 2007. It also assesses
the effectiveness of PWYP’s advocacy and policy endeavours and examines how the
Coalition has operated internationally. In this sense, the report is not only a narrative of
PWYP’s history and accomplishments, but a practical tool to shine a light on the strengths
and challenges which face a global civil society coalition.
Carbon Trading: How it works and why it fails

Oscar Reyes and Tamra Gilbertson (November 2009)
Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation
http://www.tni.org/carbon-trade-fails
Carbon trading lies at the centre of global climate policy and is projected to become one of
the world’s largest commodities markets, yet it has a disastrous track record since its
adoption as part of the Kyoto Protocol.
This book outlines the limitations of an approach to tackling climate change which redefines
the problem to fit the assumptions of neoliberal economics. It demonstrates that the EU
Emissions Trading Scheme, the world’s largest carbon market, has consistently failed to cap
emissions, while the UN’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) routinely favours
environmentally ineffective and socially unjust projects. This is illustrated with case studies
of CDM projects in Brazil, Indonesia, India and Thailand.

The UN climate talks in Copenhagen discussed ways to expand the trading experiment, but
the evidence suggests it should be abandoned. From subsidy shifting to regulation, there is a
plethora of ways forward without carbon trading – but there are no short cuts around situated
local knowledge and political organising if climate change is to be addressed in a just and fair
manner.
This accessible, well-researched book provides a devastating critique of both the theory and
practice of carbon trading.
Why Has Domestic Revenue Stagnated in Low-Income Countries? London:

The Centre for Development Policy and Research, Development
Viewpoint 41
Terry McKinley (2009)
http://www.soas.ac.uk/cdpr/publications/dv/file55026.pdf
"There has been miserably slow progress in increasing domestic revenue in low-income
countries since the 1990s. In order to find out why, this publication draws on an extensive
analysis of disaggregated revenue data for low-income countries in sub-Saharan Africa,
South and Southeast Asia, and Central Asia.
Based on this analysis, it is contended that the reigning 'tax consensus' has placed an
inordinate emphasis on boosting domestic indirect taxes, and the value added tax (VAT) in
particular. These taxes cover domestic goods and services in the formal sector.
At the same time, the 'consensus' has advocated eliminating import taxes (in order to
liberalise trade) and lowering tax rates on corporate profits (in order to compete with other
rate-cutting countries).
Consequently, trade taxes have been particularly hard hit while increases in direct taxes,
which cover mainly personal income and corporate profits, have generally been anaemic.
Overall revenue has ended up stagnating because of the resultant reliance on boosting
revenue from only one major component, i.e., taxes on domestic goods and services. The pre-
eminent instrument for this purpose has been the VAT, which has replaced sales taxes (as
well as import duties) in many countries.
ActionAid on Tax
http://www.actionaid.org.uk/doc_lib/accounting_for_poverty.pdf
ActionAid UK has published a report, Accounting for Poverty, to underpin its tax campaign.
The report draws together a wide range of sources, some familiar and some new, to make the
case for tax justice and development.
One new contribution is ActionAid’s calculation that, if every developing country were able
to achieve tax revenues equivalent to just 15% of national income (the OECD average is
37%, while Bangladesh raises just 8%) $198 billion per year of new money would be
available to fight poverty in the poorest countries.
A Study on Gap Analysis of Indian Government Accounting with

International Standards
Government Accounting Standards Advisory Board (November 2008)
http://www.gasab.gov.in/pdf/Gap_Analysis.pdf

The Cash Basis International Public Sector Accounting Standard (IPSAS) may be the
international standards for public sector accounting, but it cannot claim to represent best
practice as it appears that not a single country has implemented this standard since it was first
issued in 2003.
The key problem appears to be the mandatory requirement to produce consolidated accounts
which should include all controlled entities (including government companies, business
enterprises and all parastatal organisations). Many countries have decided that this is not
practically possible, is too onerous or would produce misleading information. This includes a
number of governments who would otherwise like to have implemented the Cash IPSAS
including India, Malaysia, Mongolia, Ghana, Uganda and Malta.
This publication reviews the experience of the Government of India in comparing its
approach to financial reporting to that outlined in the Cash Basis International Public Sector
Accounting Standard. India is attempting to adopt this standard, but it does not accept some
of the Standard’s key requirements, for example, the consolidation of government business
enterprises and the disclosure of third party payments.
On the first issue, the document actively argues against providing such a consolidation.
“Though this is fundamental requirement of Cash IPSAS” it says, “it is likely to cause more
distortion than bringing in clarity in the financial statements of government” (page 9).
It is hope that the current review of the Cash Basis IPSAS will result in the development of a
more practical standard which most governments which are not experimenting with the
accrual basis will be able to use. However, what is really needed is some extensive research
to identify current best practices in public sector accounting and to codify this. We need to
develop international standards, from the bottom up, based on existing good practice not on
pre-conceived ideas borrowed from the private sector.
Gender Budgeting: Practical Implementation Handbook
Sheila Quinn (2009)
http://blog-pfm.imf.org/files/gender-budgeting-practical-implementation-handbook.pdf
The book’s focus is “to act as a guide to the practice of gender budgeting." It is, however, not
really suited for those who have no prior knowledge of gender budgeting; there are many
other publications which articulate the rationale for, the background of, and the history of
gender budgeting, and a sample of these are listed toward the end of the handbook
in the resources section. The handbook assumes an understanding of gender budgeting, of the
objectives of a gender equality strategy, of the ways in which gender inequality manifests
itself, of the need for structural change in order to tackle unintentional gender bias, and of the
basics of gender mainstreaming as a strategy to address gender equality. Gender budgeting,
as a tool of gender mainstreaming, cannot be implemented without a grasp of these
fundamentals.
Gender budget pilot initiatives have over the years brought about a new and deeper
understanding of gender issues. Adopting a gender budgeting strategy requires prior
experience in addressing gender equality. The chapter, "How to do Gender Budgeting" starts
by discussing the type of experience and conditions that need to be in place in order to
engage with gender budgeting. The temptation in using this handbook might be to skip these
sub-sections and move ahead to the text dealing with specific tools and approaches. There is a
considerable demand for specific tools, for the ABC of what to do, so to speak. However, the
fundamentals cannot be by-passed or short-circuited. This is particularly the case if the

practice of gender budgeting is to move beyond an analytic exercise to a mainstreaming
strategy. The experience of many practitioners is that, since the tools need to be adapted, it is
most important to focus on developing an approach based on local circumstances. The actual
tools of analysis, of reformulation, and of mainstreaming will emerge when the goal has been
identified.
What are the real risks of adopting accrual accounting?

Many conference presentations, journal articles and books extol the virtues and benefits of
the public sector adopting accrual accounting, but few provide any real evidence of the actual
experience. Two audit reports from the Auditor General of the Cayman Islands provide a
brutally frank and honest account of what can go wrong.
In July 2008, the Auditor General, Dan Duguay, issued a special report, “describing a very
grim assessment of the state of financial accountability reporting throughout the Cayman
Islands Government”. Ten years after the Cayman Islands agreed to adopt accrual accounting,
the first accrual accounts were 2.5 years late and the Auditor General found the “current
situation deplorable” and he believed that “the legislative assembly has lost control of the
public purse”.
In the second report, issued in April 2010, the Auditor General concluded that, “the state of
financial accountability reporting has gotten worse in the two years since I last reported on
this matter”. Despite the Government spending an additional $1 million in the last fiscal
year to address the problem, the Auditor General assessed these efforts as being, “too limited
and therefore; insufficient to address the situation”. He concluded his second report by
saying, “I believe this situation has become a national crisis that could lead to tremendous
consequences for the Cayman Islands Government if not addressed immediately”.
The Cayman Islands are not a poor country, the per capita income is one of the highest in the
world and, as it is a tax haven and financial services centre, there are many qualified
accountants available locally. If the introduction of accrual accounting can go so horribly
wrong in the Cayman Islands, imagine what could happen in the many developing countries
where accrual accounting is still actively being promoted for the public sector.
The next time you hear a speaker listing the many benefits claimed for accrual accounting ask
what the actual evidence is from the few countries which have adopted this approach. The
objective and authoritative studies, from the UK for example, suggest that the costs are
significant and that the actual benefits are minimal. Now we have reports from the Cayman
Islands of the very real risks involved of adopting this approach to public sector accounting.
The first report of the Auditor General on the State of Financial Accountability Reporting
(July 2008) in the Cayman Islands Government is available from
http://tinyurl.com/accrualcayman1
The second report of the Auditor General of the Cayman Islands, issued in April 2010, is
available from http://tinyurl.com/accrualcayman2

Invitación a posibles Autores
La revista International Journal on Governmental Financial Management (IJGFM) es un
diario con enfoque académico, profesionales y para el debate de las varias disciplinas
involucradas en la gestión financiera gubernamental. El cual incluye la contabilidad, la
auditoría, el proceso presupuestario, la gestión de la deuda, información tecnológica,
capacitación de impuesto y la coordinación de la tesorería.
Nos gustaría publicar artículos y comentarios que:
• alienten la colaboración entre profesionales y otros que estén involucrados en la
gestión financiera.
• contribuyan al avance de los principios y normativas de la gestión financiera
gubernamental, especialmente en colaboración a las buenas prácticas implementadas.
• identifiquen problemas o debilidades. A través de las opiniones dominantes de la
reforma de la gestión financiera en el sector público; y
• ayuden a los gerentes financieros del sector público a identificar sus propias
soluciones a los retos presentados.
Sería de nuestro beneficio, recibir contribuciones de individuos o equipos que trabajan en los
países en desarrollo. Invitamos a los potenciales autores a consultar las previas
publicaciones: http://www.icgfm.org/digest.htm
Los trabajos son aceptados y publicados en ingles, francés o español.
Actualmente la revista no dispone de un sistema de revisión de doble ciego (en que la
identidad tanto del autor como del revisor no se revele) como norma usual. El objetivo es
brindar una opinión o experiencia confidencial de las contribuciones enviadas y ofrecer
sugerencias editoriales (detalla si fuera necesario) para ayudar al autor producir un trabajo
digno de publicación. Sería posible proveer una revisión de doble ciego si un autor
individual la solicita.
Entrega de manuscritos
La entrega o publicación de manuscritos es sin costo alguno.
Los manuscritos deberán ser enviados como anexo a un mensaje electrónico dirigido al
redactor, Andy Wynne ([email protected]) con copia a [email protected].
Ideas de artículos son bienvenidas y pueden ser utilizadas con el editor antes de sumisión del
artículo en su totalidad. El editor estará dispuesto a responder a cualquier pregunta con
respecto a la sostenibilidad del documento para posible publicación.
Los autores deben asegurar que el trabajo no viola cualquier derecho de autor existente y que
no contiene material de una naturaleza difamatoria o escandalosa. Al entregar una redacción
a la revista, el autor exonera a la editora y a los redactores contra cualquier violación de tal
garantía o restricciones de derecho
El material publicado en la revista podrá ser reproducido sin el consentimiento del redactor o
del Consorcio y se alienta la reproducción, traducción y distribución del mismo.

Formato y estilo
Los manuscritos deben incluir:
• no más de 20 páginas en espacio sencillo (o de 10.000 palabras);
• un sinopsis de no más de 150 palabras – que debe resumir el propósito, la
metodología y las conclusiones del artículo;
• el título, el(los) nombre(s) del (de los) autor(es), el cargo que ejerce(n) y la afiliación
institucional que tiene(n) (universidad, ministerio, etc.), su dirección electrónica y
cualquier mención necesaria.
• los autores deberán escribir de una manera no sexista o discriminatoria, utilizando,
por ejemplo, (para) él/ella, él o ella, etc.
• un uso limitado de abreviaturas para facilitar la lectura
• referencias apropiadas (vea abajo) a la literatura sobre el tópico para respaldar los
hechos, las aserciones y las opiniones; todas las citaciones deben venir acompañadas
de una referencia completa.
• las notas de rodapié, identificadas en el texto con un número superescrito no deben
incluir citaciones a la literatura, y deben estar ubicadas al final del trabajo, antes de la
bibliografía.
Referencias en el texto
Las referencias en el texto a libros, artículos, etc. deben incluir el nombre del autor, el año de
publicación y las páginas específicas de las citaciones directas (p. ej., Mickey & Donald,
1968, p. 1). Para más de dos autores, la citación debe ser abreviada así: (Kramdon y otros,
1988, p. 1). Citaciones múltiples al mismo autor en el mismo año deben ser diferenciadas
dentro del texto (y en la bibliografía al final) por las letras a, b, c, etc. después del año de
publicación. Términos en latín, por ejemplo, et al, ibid o op. cit deben evitarse.
Bibliografía
Debe incluirse una bibliografía al final del texto con los detalles de todos los libros, artículos
y otros trabajos que hayan sido referenciados en el texto. Estos deben ser puestos en orden
alfabético de acuerdo al apellido (patronímico) del primer autor. Deben incluirse los
siguientes detalles: nombre (apellido, nombre de pila e/o iniciales), título y subtítulo
completos, lugar de publicación, editora, fecha y referencias a páginas (para citaciones
específicas) Las referencias a artículos de revistas deben incluir el volumen y el número de la
revista.
Donde sea posible, los detalles de la dirección electrónica deben incluirse para el respaldo
adicional en el Internet. En este caso, la fecha de consulta del material debe ser indicada.
La presentación de las referencias debe seguir la siguiente convención:
1. artículos:
Schick, A (1998) ‘Why Most Developing Countries Should Not Try New Zealand Reforms’,
The World Bank Research Observer, Vol.13, No.1, febrero. pp.123-31.
Barrientos, Eduardo Gana (1994) ‘Procesos de integración subregional y coordinación de
políticas macroeconómicas’, Información del Comercio Español. 732:8-9. pp. 131-
142.

Bekinschtein, José A., Maizal, Nélida. (1994) ‘La integración regional en Asia-Pacífico:
Vías de participación.’ Integ. Latinam. 19:1-2. pp. 31-42.
2. libros:
Guthrie, J. Humphrey, C. Jones, L R. & Olson, O., (2005), International Public Financial
Management Reform, Information Age Publishing, Greenwich.
Stolovich, Luis. (1993) El poder económico en el MERCOSUR. Centro Uruguay
Independiente, Montevideo.
3. citaciones de libros compilados:
Flynn, N (2002) ‘Explaining New Public Management: The Importance of Context’, en K
McLaughlin, S Osborne y E Ferlie (eds.) New Public Management: Current Trends
and Future Prospects, Londres, Routledge.
Haug, G. (2005) ‘Pluralidad e intereses compartidos de las Universidades Europeas’, en F.
Toledo, E. Alcón, y F. Michavila. (eds) Introducción a la contabilidad Financiera:
un Enfoque Internacional. Barcelona: Ariel. pp. 35-49.
4. libros traducidos:
Adorno, T. W. Negative Dialektic (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1966). Negative Dialectics, E. B.
Ashton (trad.) (1973) Nueva York: Seabury Press.
5. referencia a un informe:
WCED (World Commission on Environment and Development) (1987) Our Common Future
(‘The Brundtland Report’); Oxford: Oxford University Press.
6. referencias a material del Internet:
Dorotinsky, Bill (2008) Public Financial Management Reform: Trends and Lessons, ICGFM
DC Forum, Junio http://icgfm.blogspot.com (6 Septiembre 2008)
Cuadros, diagramas, figuras e tablas
Todos estos deben denominarse “figuras” y ser numerados consecutivamente en números
arábicos con un breve título en letra mayúscula, con etiquetas, etc. El texto debe indicar
donde aparece la figura.
La Junta Editorial
Femi Aborisade
Ibadan Polytechnic, Nigeria
Pawan Adhikari
Bodø Facultad de Administración al Nivel de Pos-grado, Noruega (de Nepal)
Hugh Coombs
Universidad de Glamorgan, Facultad de Administración, País de Gales, RU
Jérôme Dendura
Consultor sobre la GFP, basado en Gana, (de Francia)
Jerry Gutu

Consultor sobre la Gestión Financiera Pública, anteriormente Contador General de
Zimbabwe, basado en los E.U.
Jesse Hughes,
Consultor sobre la GFP, basado en E.U.
Patrizio Monfardini,
Universidad de Siena, Italia
Norvald Monsen
Facultad Norueguesa de Economía y Administración de Empresas
Ayodeji Ogunyemi
Oficinal Nacional de Auditoría, RU (de Nigeria)
Joseph Onumah
Universidad de Ghana
Hassan Ouda
Universidad del Futuro en Egipto
Michael Parry
Consultor sobre la Gestión Financiera Pública
Zakiah Saleh
Universidad de Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malasia
Carlos Santiso
Banco Africano de Desarrollo, Tunisia
Stewart Smyth
Dublin City University, Ireland
Mathew Tsamenyi
Universidad de Birmingham, RU
Andy Wynne (Editor)
iDILMAT soluciones de formación, Ghana
Owen Zhang
Oficina Nacional de Auditoría de China
Nos complacería también recibir correspondencia de otros que estén dispuestos a ayudar con
el trabajo editorial de la Revista. El trabajo consistiría en revisar potenciales contribuciones,
indicando si deben ser aceptadas para publicación y haciendo recomendaciones editoriales
para mejorar la calidad de los materiales enviados.
Tenga la bondad de contactar al redactor, Andy Wynne ([email protected]) si le
gustaría comentar sobre el papel de la junta editorial y cualesquier sugerencias que usted
pudiera ofrecer.

Invitation aux Auteurs Potentiels
Le Journal International sur La Gestion des Finances Publiques [International Journal on
Governmental Financial Management (IJGFM)] organise un forum pour les praticiens, les
universitaires et le public général pour discuter des différentes disciplines impliquées dans la
gestion des finances publiques. Ces disciplines comprennent la comptabilité, l’audit, la
budgétisation, la gestion des dettes, la technologie de l’information, la fiscalité et la gestion
de la trésorerie.
Nous aimerions être en mesure de publier des articles et des commentaires qui vont :
• encourager la collaboration entre les professionnels et autres concernés par la gestion
des finances publiques
• contribuer à la promotion des principes et normes de la gestion des finances
publiques, en particulier par le biais de la description des bonnes pratiques existantes
• identifier les problèmes ou les faiblesses à travers la critique des points de vue
actuellement dominants dans le domaine des reformes de la gestion des finances
publiques; et
• assister les gestionnaires financiers du secteur public à identifier leurs propres
solutions aux défis courants.
Nous réservons un accueil particulier aux contributions venant de personnes ou groupes de
personnes travaillant dans les pays en développement. Nous invitons les auteurs potentiels à
consulter les anciens numéros du journal à l’adresse : http://www.icgfm.org/digest.htm
Le Journal ne fait pas de commentaires avec identités voilées (où à la fois l’identité de
l’auteur et celle de la revue ne sont pas révélées) comme l’approche standard. L’objectif est
d’offrir des commentaires confidentiels sur les contributions soumises et de faire des
suggestions éditoriales (aussi détaillées que possible) afin d’aider l’auteur à produire un
article pouvant être publié. La revue avec identité voilée peut être offerte à tout auteur
individuel sur demande.
Le Journal publie essentiellement en anglais. Toutefois, pour la période d’essaie tout au
moins, nous allons accepter pour publication des articles en français et en espagnole. Ces
articles ne seront pas traduits. Ils seront publiés dans leur langue d'origine. Tous
commentaires de la part de nos lecteurs sont les bienvenus.
Soumission de manuscrits
Nous ne faisons pas payer la soumission ou la publication d’articles.
Les manuscrits devront être adressés en fichiers attachés au directeur de publication : Andy
Wynne [email protected] avec copie à : [email protected]
Les idées d'articles sont les bienvenues et peuvent être discutées avec le directeur de
publication avant la soumission du texte de l’article. Le directeur de publication est heureux
de répondre aux demandes de renseignements informels sur la pertinence des articles en vue
de leur publication éventuelle.
Les auteurs doivent garantir que le travail ne porte atteinte à aucun droit d'auteur et ne
contient pas de matériel de nature diffamatoire ou scandaleuse. Par la soumission d'un article

au Journal, l'auteur exempte le directeur de publication et les éditeurs contre toute violation
d’une telle garantie ou des restrictions de droit d’auteur.
Les matériels publiés dans le Journal peuvent être reproduits sans le consentement du
directeur de publication ou du Consortium et de la reproduction ; la traduction et la
distribution sont encouragées.
Format et Style
Les manuscrits doivent inclure :
• pas plus de 20 pages à interligne simple (ou 10.000 mots)
• un résumé n’excédant pas 150 mots – il doit récapituler l’objectif, la méthodologie et
les principales conclusions de l’article
• le titre, le(s) nom(s) de(s) auteur(s), la position/le poste et l’institution d’affiliation
(ministère, université, etc.,), l’adresse email et les remerciements éventuels
• l’auteur ne doit pas utiliser des termes ou styles sexistes ou discriminatoires, comme
par exemple "elle/lui" ou "il/elle"
• un usage limité des abréviations pour faciliter la lecture
• des références appropriées (voir ci-dessous) à la littérature sur le sujet pour soutenir
les faits, les affirmations et les opinions ; toutes citations doivent être référencées
correctement
• les notes de bas de page, identifiées dans le texte par un numéro en exposant, ne
doivent pas comprendre des citations, et doivent être listées a la fin de l’article juste
avant la bibliographie
Référencement du texte
Les références aux livres, articles, etc., à l’intérieur du texte doivent inclure les noms des
auteurs, l’année de publication, et le numéro de page s’il s’agit de citation directe (par
exemple : Mickey & Donald, 1968, p.24). Pour les articles dont le nombre d’auteurs est
supérieur á deux, la citation doit être abrégée de manière suivante : (Kramdon et autres, 1988,
p.1). Plusieurs citations du/des même(s) auteur(s) dans la même année doivent être
distinguées dans le texte (et dans la bibliographie) par a, b, c, etc., après l’année de
publication. Les termes latins tels que : et al, ibid, ou op cit doivent être évités.
Bibliographie
Une bibliographie doit être incluse à la fin du texte, et contenant les détails de tous les livres,
articles, etc., dont il a été fait référence dans le texte. La bibliographie doit contenir
uniquement les références citées dans le texte. Ces références doivent être ordonnées
alphabétiquement suivant le nom de famille du premier auteur. Les détails suivants doivent
être inclus : l’auteur et ses initiales, le titre complet et les sous-titres, le lieu de publication,
l’éditeur, la date, et les références des pages (pour les citations directes). Les références aux
articles de journal doivent inclure le volume et le numéro du journal.
Dans la mesure du possible, les détails des adresses internet des matériels disponibles sur
l’internet doivent être fournis. Dans ce cas, la date à laquelle le matériel a été lu doit être
mentionnée.

La présentation doit répondre à la convention suivante :
1. articles :
Corkery, J., (1995) ‘Réforme du service public: Obstacles et aides’ Bulletin DPMN, Vol. 3,
No.1, août, pp.9-11
2. livres :
Conso, P., & Hemici, F., (1999), Gestion Financière de l’entreprise, Paris, Dunod
3. citations provenant de livres publiés :

Verley, P. (1995) ‘Histoire économique et théorie économique’, dans R Boyer et Y Saillard
(eds) Théorie de la régulation. L’état des savoirs, Paris, Éditions La Découverte
4. livres traduits
Carnegie, D. The Leader in You (New York: Dale Carnegie & Associates, 1993). Comment
trouver le leader en vous, D. Weyne (trad) (1994) Paris, Hachette
5. reference à un rapport :
Banque Mondiale (2007) Rapport sur le développement dans le monde 2007 – Aperçus
régionaux : Afrique subsaharienne (‘Rapport sur Développement et Générations
Futures’), Washington DC, The World Bank
6. références aux matériels sur l’Internet
Yahyaoui, Thami (2007) L’économie politique de la réforme des pensions au Maroc,
Conférence de la Banque Mondiale, Décembre
http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/241514/YAHYAOUICHYPRE911dece
mbre2007.pdf (12 mars 2009)
Graphiques, Diagrammes, Figures, Tableaux
Ils doivent être tous appelés figures, numérotés de manière consécutive en chiffre arabique,
avec un bref titre en majuscule, libellés, axes, etc. Le texte doit indiquer le lieu
d’emplacement de la figure.
Comité de Rédaction
Femi Aborisade
The Polytechnic, Ibadan, Nigéria
Pawan Adhikari
Bodø Graduate School of Business, Norvège (du Népal)
Hugh Coombs
University of Glamorgan Business School, Wales, Royaume-Uni
Jérôme Dendura
Consultant en Gestion des Finances Publiques (de la France)
Jerry Gutu
Consultant en Gestion des Finances Publiques, ancien Comptable Général du Zimbabwe,
basé aux Etats-Unis
Jesse Hughes (retraite)
Old Dominion University, Virginia, Etats-Unis

Université de Siena, Italie
Norvald Monsen
Ayodeji Ogunyemi
Bureau d’Audit National, Royaume-Uni (du Nigéria)
Joseph Onumah
University of Ghana
Hassan Ouda
Future University en Egypte
Michael Parry
Consultant en Gestion des Finances Publiques, Royaume-Uni
Zakiah Saleh
University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysie
Carlos Santiso
Banque Africaine de Développement, Tunisie
Stewart Smyth
Dublin City University, Irlande
Sylvia Temu
University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzanie
Mathew Tsamenyi
University of Birmingham, Royaume-Uni
Andy Wynne (Editor)
iDILMAT des solutions de formation, Ghana
Owen Zhang
Bureau National d’Audit de la Chine
Toutes autres personnes disposées à nous assister dans les travaux d’édition du Journal
peuvent nous contacter. Les travaux consistent en la révision des contributions potentielles en
suggérant si elles peuvent être acceptées pour publication et en faisant des recommandations
éditoriales qui permettront d’améliorer la qualité des soumissions.
Veuillez prendre contacte avec Andy Wynne - [email protected] – si vous souhaitez
discuter du rôle du comité de rédaction et de quelque proposition d’amélioration.

Invitation to Potential Authors
The International Journal on Governmental Financial Management (IJGFM) aims to provide
a forum for practitioners, academics and the general public to discuss the many disciplines
involved with governmental financial management. These include accounting, auditing,
budgeting, debt management, information technology, tax management and treasury
management.
We would like to be able to publish articles and comment which will:
• encourage collaboration among professionals and others concerned about public
financial management
contribute to the advancement of government financial management principles and
standards, especially through describing existing good practice
• identify problems or weaknesses through the critique of currently dominant views on
public sector financial management reforms; and
• assist public sector financial managers to identify their own solutions to common
challenges.
We would particularly welcome contributions from individuals or teams working in
developing countries. We invite potential authors to review past issues of the journal at:
http://www.icgfm.org/digest.htm
The Journal does not currently provide double blind reviews (where both the author and the
review’s identities are not disclosed) as the standard approach. The aim is to provide
confidential comment on submitted contributions and to provide editorial suggestions
(detailed as necessary) to help the author to produce a paper which is suitable for publication.
A double blind review facility may be provided if requested by individual authors.
The Journal primarily publishes papers in English. However, for a trial period at least, we
will now also accept articles for publication in French or Spanish. Such articles will not be
translated, but will be published in their original language. We welcome comments on this
initiative from our readers.
Submission of Manuscripts
We do not charge a fee for submission or publication of articles.
Manuscripts should be sent as email attachments to the editor, Andy Wynne
([email protected]), and be copied to [email protected]
Ideas for articles are welcome and may be discussed with the editor before submission of the
full text. The editor is happy to respond to informal enquiries about the suitability of papers
for possible publication.
Authors must warrant that the work does not infringe any existing copyright and does not
contain material of a libellous or scandalous nature. By submission of a paper to the Journal,
the author indemnifies the publisher and editors against any breach of such warranty or
copyright restrictions.
Material published in the Journal may be reproduced without the consent of the editor or the
Consortium and reproduction, translation and distribution is encouraged.

Format and Style
The manuscripts should include:
• no more than 20 single spaced pages (or 10,000 words);
• an abstract not exceeding 150 words - it should summarize the purpose, methodology,
and major conclusions of the article;
the abstract should be followed by four or five key words that will assist in indexing
the paper;
the title, the authors name(s), position/post and institutional affiliation (ministry,
university, etc), email address and any acknowledgements
• authors should write in a non-sexist and non-discriminatory style, using, for example,
"her/him"; or "s/he"
• limited use of abbreviations to improve ease of reading
appropriate references (see below) to the literature on the subject to support facts,
assertions and opinions; all quotations should be fully referenced
• footnotes, identified in the text by a numeral that is superscripted, should not include
literature citations, and should be listed at the end of the paper, before the
bibliography.
Referencing the text
References in the text to books, articles etc should include the authors' names, the year of
publication, and the specific page numbers if direct quotations are provided (e.g. Mickey &
Donald, 1968, p.24). For more than two authors, the citation should be abbreviated as
follows: (Kramdon and others, 1988, p.1). Multiple citations of the same author(s) in the
same year should be distinguished in the text (and in the bibliography) by a, b, c, etc
following the year of publication. Latin terms, for example, et al, ibid or op cit should be
avoided.
Bibliography
A bibliography should be included at the end of the text containing details of all books,
articles papers, etc which have been referred to in the text. The bibliography should only
include references cited in the text. These should be arranged in alphabetical order according
to the surname of the first author. The following details should be included: author and
initials, full title and subtitle, place of publication, publisher, date, and page references (for
direct quotations). References to journal articles must include the volume and number of the
journal.
Where possible, details should be provided of the web address for material which is available
on the Internet. In this case the date the material was read should be provided.
The layout should adhere to the following convention:
1. articles:
Schick, A (1998) ‘Why Most Developing Countries Should Not Try New Zealand Reforms’,
The World Bank Research Observer, Vol.13, No.1, February. pp.123-31
2.books:

Guthrie, J. Humphrey, C. Jones, L R. & Olson, O., (2005), International Public Financial
Management Reform, Greenwich, Information Age Publishing
3. citations from edited books:
Flynn, N (2002) ‘Explaining New Public Management: The Importance of Context’, in K
McLaughlin, S Osborne and E Ferlie (eds.) New Public Management: current trends
and future prospects, London, Routledge
4. translated books
Adorno, T. W. Negative Dialektic (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1966). Negative Dialectics, E. B.
Ashton (trans) (1973) New York, Seabury Press
5. reference to a report.
World Commission on Environment and Development (1987) Our Common Future (‘The
Brundtland Report’) Oxford, Oxford University Press
6. references to material on the Internet

Dorotinsky, Bill (2008) Public Financial Management Reform: Trends and Lessons, ICGFM
DC Forum, June. http://icgfm.blogspot.com (6 September 2008)
Charts, Diagrams, Figures and Tables
These should all be called figures, numbered consecutively in arabic numerals, with a brief
title in capitals, labeled, axes etc. The text should indicate where the figure is to appear.
Editorial Board
Femi Aborisade
The Polytechnic, Ibadan, Nigeria
Pawan Adhikari
Bodø Graduate School of Business, Norway (from Nepal)
Hugh Coombs
University of Glamorgan Business School, Wales, UK
Jérôme Dendura
PFM Consultant, (from France)
Jerry Gutu
Consultant in Public Financial Management, former Accountant General of Zimbabwe, US
based
Jesse Hughes (retired)
Old Dominion University, Virginia, USA
University of Siena, Italy
Norvald Monsen
Ayodeji Ogunyemi
National Audit Office, UK (from Nigeria)

Joseph Onumah
University of Ghana
Hassan Ouda
Future University in Egypt
Michael Parry
Independent Consultant, UK
Zakiah Saleh
University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
Carlos Santiso
African Development Bank, Tunisia
Stewart Smyth
Dublin City University, Ireland
Sylvia Temu
University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
Mathew Tsamenyi
University of Birmingham, UK
Andy Wynne (Editor)
iDILMAT training solutions, Ghana
Owen Zhang
China National Audit Office
We would also like to hear from other individuals who would be willing to assist with the
editorial work of the Journal. The work would consist of reviewing potential contributions,
suggesting whether they should be accepted for publication and making editorial
recommendations to improve the quality of submissions.
Please contact the editor, Andy Wynne ([email protected]), if you would like to
discuss the role of the editorial board and for any input you could provide.

2010 Vol X No 1 IJGFM

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Vol.X No.

“Working globally with governments, organizations, and individuals, the International

International Consortium on Governmental Financial Management

Printed copies of the International Journal on Governmental Financial Management may be

Copyright 2010 by the International Consortium on Governmental Financial Management

International Journal of Governmental Financial Management i

International Journal of Governmental Financial Management ii

International Journal of Governmental Financial Management iii

International Journal of Governmental Financial Management iv

Andy Wynne Doug Hadden Jim Ebbitt

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2. Public Sector Accounting: Democratic control of public money by using

3. Sovereign Wealth Funds…………………………………………………..…………35

4. Public Financial Management in Sudan……………………………………………...42

5. Independence of Supreme Audit Institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa………………..55

6. A Prescriptive Model of the Transition to Accrual Accounting in Central

7. A proposed definition of the Modified Cash Basis…………………………………..95

8. The Four Dimensions of Public Financial Management……………………………..98

9. Recent Public Financial Management Publications and other Resources…………..107

International Journal of Governmental Financial Management vi

Keywords: Conceptual framework, scientific method, faithful representation, measurement,

International Journal of Governmental Financial Management 1

1. A conceptual framework may have two distinct meanings. Each meaning is

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The meaning of an international conceptual framework

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9a. CONFIRMATION Agreement

1. REAL-WORLD PHENOMENA, 6. REAL-WORLD PHENOMENA,

Figure 1: The continuing cycle of scientific method

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The objectives of financial reporting by public sector entities

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The scope of financial reporting by public sector entities

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The qualitative characteristics of information included in GPFRs

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Fundamental RELEVANCE RELIABILITY

Is the balance achieved?

Figure 2: The qualitative characteristics of information in GPFRs

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IASB Framework (2009), in IASB, International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs),

Appendix: A summary of the scientific method

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Revenues and Expenditures

Four Tasks of Traditional Public Sector Accounting

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Table 1: The cameral account.