SUPREME COURT

Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 172716

November 17, 2010

JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and EVANGELINE
PONCE, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
The petition seeks the review1 of the Orders2 of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City affirming sub-silencio a lower courts ruling finding inapplicable
the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar a second prosecution for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property. This, despite the
accuseds previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight
Physical Injuries arising from the same incident grounding the second
prosecution.
The Facts
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler
(petitioner) was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries
sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2)
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property
(Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent Ponces husband
Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponces vehicle. Petitioner
posted bail for his temporary release in both cases.
On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal
Case No. 82367 and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking

this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case

No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same
offense of reckless imprudence.
The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.3
After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter
to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC), in a petition for
certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803). Meanwhile, petitioner sought from the MeTC the
suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366, including the
arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a prejudicial
question. Without acting on petitioners motion, the MeTC proceeded with
the arraignment and, because of petitioners absence, cancelled his bail and
ordered his arrest.4 Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying
petitioners motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment
until after his arrest.5 Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of
this petition, the motion remained unresolved.
Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce sought in
the RTC the dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803 for petitioners loss of standing to
maintain the suit. Petitioner contested the motion.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803,
narrowly grounding its ruling on petitioners forfeiture of standing to maintain
S.C.A. No. 2803 arising from the MeTCs order to arrest petitioner for his nonappearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366. Thus, without
reaching the merits of S.C.A. No. 2803, the RTC effectively affirmed the
MeTC. Petitioner sought reconsideration but this proved unavailing.6
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner denies absconding. He explains that his petition in S.C.A. No. 2803
constrained him to forego participation in the proceedings in Criminal Case
No. 82366. Petitioner distinguishes his case from the line of jurisprudence
sanctioning dismissal of appeals for absconding appellants because his
appeal before the RTC was a special civil action seeking a pre-trial relief, not
a post-trial appeal of a judgment of conviction.7

Petitioner laments the RTCs failure to reach the merits of his petition in
S.C.A. 2803. Invoking jurisprudence, petitioner argues that his constitutional
right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense
bars his prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366, having been previously
convicted in Criminal Case No. 82367 for the same offense of reckless
imprudence charged in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner submits that the
multiple consequences of such crime are material only to determine his
penalty.
Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTCs decision
forfeiting petitioners standing to maintain his petition in S.C.A. 2803. On the
merits, respondent Ponce calls the Courts attention to jurisprudence holding
that light offenses (e.g. slight physical injuries) cannot be complexed under
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code with grave or less grave felonies (e.g.
homicide). Hence, the prosecution was obliged to separate the charge in
Criminal Case No. 82366 for the slight physical injuries from Criminal Case
No. 82367 for the homicide and damage to property.
In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, we granted the Office of the Solicitor
Generals motion not to file a comment to the petition as the public
respondent judge is merely a nominal party and private respondent is
represented by counsel.
The Issues
Two questions are presented for resolution: (1) whether petitioner forfeited
his standing to seek relief in S.C.A. 2803 when the MeTC ordered his arrest
following his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366;
and (2) if in the negative, whether petitioners constitutional right under the
Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.
The Ruling of the Court
We hold that (1) petitioners non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal
Case No. 82366 did not divest him of personality to maintain the petition in
S.C.A. 2803; and (2) the protection afforded by the Constitution shielding
petitioner from prosecutions placing him in jeopardy of second punishment
for the same offense bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.

Petitioners Non-appearance at the Arraignment in

Criminal Case No. 82366 did not Divest him of Standing
to Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803
Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellants escape from custody or
violation of the terms of his bail bondare governed by the second paragraph
of Section 8, Rule 124,8 in relation to Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure authorizing this Court or the Court of Appeals to
"also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the
appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a
foreign country during the pendency of the appeal." The "appeal"
contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to review judgments of
convictions.
The RTCs dismissal of petitioners special civil action for certiorari to review
a pre-arraignment ancillary question on the applicability of the Due
Process Clause to bar proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 finds no basis
under procedural rules and jurisprudence. The RTCs reliance on People v.
Esparas9 undercuts the cogency of its ruling because Esparas stands for a
proposition contrary to the RTCs ruling. There, the Court granted review to
an appeal by an accused who was sentenced to death for importing
prohibited drugs even though she jumped bail pending trial and was thus
tried and convicted in absentia. The Court in Esparas treated the mandatory
review of death sentences under Republic Act No. 7659 as an exception to
Section 8 of Rule 124.10
The mischief in the RTCs treatment of petitioners non-appearance at his
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 as proof of his loss of standing
becomes more evident when one considers the Rules of Courts treatment of
a defendant who absents himself from post-arraignment hearings. Under
Section 21, Rule 11411 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
defendants absence merely renders his bondsman potentially liable on its
bond (subject to cancellation should the bondsman fail to produce the
accused within 30 days); the defendant retains his standing and, should he
fail to surrender, will be tried in absentia and could be convicted or
acquitted. Indeed, the 30-day period granted to the bondsman to produce
the accused underscores the fact that mere non-appearance does not ipso
facto convert the accuseds status to that of a fugitive without standing.

Further, the RTCs observation that petitioner provided "no explanation why
he failed to attend the scheduled proceeding"12 at the MeTC is belied by the
records. Days before the arraignment, petitioner sought the suspension of
the MeTCs proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 in light of his petition
with the RTC in S.C.A. No. 2803. Following the MeTCs refusal to defer
arraignment (the order for which was released days after the MeTC ordered
petitioners arrest), petitioner sought reconsideration. His motion remained
unresolved as of the filing of this petition.
Petitioners Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367
Bars his Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366
The accuseds negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy
of punishment for the same offense"13protects him from, among others, postconviction prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered
by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid information.14 It is not
disputed that petitioners conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 was
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the
case turns on the question whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and Criminal
Case No. 82367 involve the "same offense." Petitioner adopts the affirmative
view, submitting that the two cases concern the same offense of reckless
imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the
[latter] requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not."15
We find for petitioner.
Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime,
its Consequences on Persons and
Property are Material Only to Determine
the Penalty
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were
prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses. The
text of the provision reads:
Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by reckless imprudence,
shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave
felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to

prision correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less

grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium
periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the
penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act
which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of
arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have
constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum
period shall be imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted
in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a
fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damages to three
times such value, but which shall in no case be less than twenty-five pesos.
A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon
any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some
wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound
discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article sixty-four.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than
those provided in the first two paragraphs of this article, in which case
the court shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that which
should be imposed in the period which they may deem proper to apply.
2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the
Automobile Law, to death of a person shall be caused, in which case
the defendant shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods.
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or
failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing
to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation,
degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding
persons, time and place.

Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those

cases in which the damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the
danger clearly manifest.
The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be
imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties
such help as may be in this hand to give.
Structurally, these nine paragraphs are collapsible into four sub-groupings
relating to (1) the penalties attached to the quasi-offenses of "imprudence"
and "negligence" (paragraphs 1-2); (2) a modified penalty scheme for either
or both quasi-offenses (paragraphs 3-4, 6 and 9); (3) a generic rule for trial
courts in imposing penalties (paragraph 5); and (4) the definition of "reckless
imprudence" and "simple imprudence" (paragraphs 7-8). Conceptually,
quasi-offenses penalize "the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the
dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia
punible,"16 unlike willful offenses which punish the intentional criminal act.
These structural and conceptual features of quasi-offenses set them apart
from the mass of intentional crimes under the first 13 Titles of Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are
distinct species of crime, separately defined and penalized under the
framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. As early as the middle of the
last century, we already sought to bring clarity to this field by rejecting in
Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampanga the proposition that "reckless
imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it x x
x"17 on three points of analysis: (1) the object of punishment in quasi-crimes
(as opposed to intentional crimes); (2) the legislative intent to treat quasicrimes as distinct offenses (as opposed to subsuming them under the
mitigating circumstance of minimal intent) and; (3) the different penalty
structures for quasi-crimes and intentional crimes:
The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that
"reckless imprudence" is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing
it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability is too broad to
deserve unqualified assent. There are crimes that by their structure cannot
be committed through imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, malicious
mischief, etc. In truth, criminal negligence in our Revised Penal Code is
treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately from willful

offenses. It is not a mere question of classification or terminology. In

intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence,
what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the
act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia
punible. x x x x
Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies,
operating only to reduce the penalty therefor, then it would be absorbed in
the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the lack of intent to commit
so grave a wrong as the one actually committed. Furthermore, the theory
would require that the corresponding penalty should be fixed in proportion to
the penalty prescribed for each crime when committed willfully. For each
penalty for the willful offense, there would then be a corresponding penalty
for the negligent variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes
the penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto mayor maximum, to prision
correccional [medium], if the willful act would constitute a grave felony,
notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could range all the way from
prision mayor to death, according to the case. It can be seen that the actual
penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual willful
crime, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series, of crimes.18 (Emphasis
supplied)
This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasi-crimes is to
state that their commission results in damage, either to person or property.19
Accordingly, we found the Justice of the Peace in Quizon without jurisdiction
to hear a case for "Damage to Property through Reckless Imprudence," its
jurisdiction being limited to trying charges for Malicious Mischief, an
intentional crime conceptually incompatible with the element of imprudence
obtaining in quasi-crimes.
Quizon, rooted in Spanish law20 (the normative ancestry of our present day
penal code) and since repeatedly reiterated,21 stands on solid conceptual
foundation. The contrary doctrinal pronouncement in People v. Faller22that
"[r]eckless impudence is not a crime in itself x x x [but] simply a way of
committing it x x x,"23 has long been abandoned when the Court en banc
promulgated Quizon in 1955 nearly two decades after the Court decided
Faller in 1939. Quizon rejected Fallers conceptualization of quasi-crimes by
holding that quasi-crimes under Article 365 are distinct species of crimes and
not merely methods of committing crimes. Faller found expression in post-

Quizon jurisprudence24 only by dint of lingering doctrinal confusion arising

from an indiscriminate fusion of criminal law rules defining Article 365 crimes
and the complexing of intentional crimes under Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code which, as will be shown shortly, rests on erroneous conception of
quasi-crimes. Indeed, the Quizonian conception of quasi-crimes undergirded
a related branch of jurisprudence applying the Double Jeopardy Clause to
quasi-offenses, barring second prosecutions for a quasi-offense alleging one
resulting act after a prior conviction or acquittal of a quasi-offense alleging
another resulting act but arising from the same reckless act or omission upon
which the second prosecution was based.
Prior Conviction or Acquittal of
Reckless Imprudence Bars
Subsequent Prosecution for the Same
Quasi-Offense
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasioffense by itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that
conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for
the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded
this Courts unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to
Article 365 starting with People v. Diaz,25 decided in 1954. There, a full Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Montemayor, ordered the dismissal of a case for
"damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because a prior case against
the same accused for "reckless driving," arising from the same act upon
which the first prosecution was based, had been dismissed earlier. Since
then, whenever the same legal question was brought before the Court, that
is, whether prior conviction or acquittal of reckless imprudence bars
subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of the
consequences alleged for both charges, the Court unfailingly and
consistently answered in the affirmative in People v. Belga26(promulgated in
1957 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.), Yap v. Lutero27 (promulgated in
1959, unreported, per Concepcion, J.), People v. Narvas28 (promulgated in
1960 by the Court en banc, per Bengzon J.), People v. Silva29 (promulgated in
1962 by the Court en banc, per Paredes, J.), People v.
Macabuhay30 (promulgated in 1966 by the Court en banc, per Makalintal, J.),
People v. Buan31 (promulgated in 1968 by the Court en banc, per Reyes,
J.B.L., acting C. J.), Buerano v. Court of Appeals32 (promulgated in 1982 by the
Court en banc, per Relova, J.), and People v. City Court of
Manila33 (promulgated in 1983 by the First Division, per Relova, J.). These

cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally

impermissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
The reason for this consistent stance of extending the constitutional
protection under the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses was best
articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Buan, where, in barring a subsequent
prosecution for "serious physical injuries and damage to property thru
reckless imprudence" because of the accuseds prior acquittal of "slight
physical injuries thru reckless imprudence," with both charges grounded on
the same act, the Court explained:34
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a
specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted
again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal
negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution
of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be
punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act,
not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into
account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the
offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should
affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence)
remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and
prosecutions.35 x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Evidently, the Diaz line of jurisprudence on double jeopardy merely extended
to its logical conclusion the reasoning of Quizon.
There is in our jurisprudence only one ruling going against this unbroken line
of authority. Preceding Diaz by more than a decade, El Pueblo de Filipinas v.
Estipona,36 decided by the pre-war colonial Court in November 1940, allowed
the subsequent prosecution of an accused for reckless imprudence resulting
in damage to property despite his previous conviction for multiple physical
injuries arising from the same reckless operation of a motor vehicle upon
which the second prosecution was based. Estiponas inconsistency with the
post-war Diaz chain of jurisprudence suffices to impliedly overrule it. At any
rate, all doubts on this matter were laid to rest in 1982 in Buerano.37 There,
we reviewed the Court of Appeals conviction of an accused for "damage to
property for reckless imprudence" despite his prior conviction for "slight and
less serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence," arising from the

same act upon which the second charge was based. The Court of Appeals
had relied on Estipona. We reversed on the strength of Buan:38
Th[e] view of the Court of Appeals was inspired by the ruling of this Court in
the pre-war case of People vs. Estipona decided on November 14, 1940.
However, in the case of People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383 (March 29, 1968),
this Court, speaking thru Justice J. B. L. Reyes, held that
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a
specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted
again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal
negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution
of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be
punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act,
not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into
account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the
offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should
affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence)
remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and
prosecutions.
xxxx
. . . the exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan, by the Justice of the Peace
(now Municipal) Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, of the charge of slight physical
injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for
serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in the Court of First
Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from the
consequences of one and the same vehicular accident, because the second
accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same
offense.39 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, for all intents and purposes, Buerano had effectively overruled
Estipona.
It is noteworthy that the Solicitor General in Buerano, in a reversal of his
earlier stance in Silva, joined causes with the accused, a fact which did not
escape the Courts attention:
Then Solicitor General, now Justice Felix V. Makasiar, in his MANIFESTATION
dated December 12, 1969 (page 82 of the Rollo) admits that the Court of

Appeals erred in not sustaining petitioners plea of double jeopardy and

submits that "its affirmatory decision dated January 28, 1969, in Criminal
Case No. 05123-CR finding petitioner guilty of damage to property through
reckless imprudence should be set aside, without costs." He stressed that "if
double jeopardy exists where the reckless act resulted into homicide and
physical injuries. then the same consequence must perforce follow where the
same reckless act caused merely damage to property-not death-and physical
injuries. Verily, the value of a human life lost as a result of a vehicular
collision cannot be equated with any amount of damages caused to a motors
vehicle arising from the same mishap."40 (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, we find merit in petitioners submission that the lower courts erred in
refusing to extend in his favor the mantle of protection afforded by the
Double Jeopardy Clause. A more fitting jurisprudence could not be tailored to
petitioners case than People v. Silva, 41 a Diaz progeny. There, the accused,
who was also involved in a vehicular collision, was charged in two separate
Informations with "Slight Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence" and
"Homicide with Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence."
Following his acquittal of the former, the accused sought the quashal of the
latter, invoking the Double Jeopardy Clause. The trial court initially denied
relief, but, on reconsideration, found merit in the accuseds claim and
dismissed the second case. In affirming the trial court, we quoted with
approval its analysis of the issue following Diaz and its progeny People v.
Belga:42
On June 26, 1959, the lower court reconsidered its Order of May 2, 1959 and
dismissed the case, holding:
[T]he Court believes that the case falls squarely within the doctrine of double
jeopardy enunciated in People v. Belga, x x x In the case cited, Ciriaco Belga
and Jose Belga were charged in the Justice of the Peace Court of Malilipot,
Albay, with the crime of physical injuries through reckless imprudence arising
from a collision between the two automobiles driven by them (Crim. Case No.
88). Without the aforesaid complaint having been dismissed or otherwise
disposed of, two other criminal complaints were filed in the same justice of
the peace court, in connection with the same collision one for damage to
property through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 95) signed by the
owner of one of the vehicles involved in the collision, and another for
multiple physical injuries through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 96)
signed by the passengers injured in the accident. Both of these two

complaints were filed against Jose Belga only. After trial, both defendants
were acquitted of the charge against them in Crim. Case No. 88. Following
his acquittal, Jose Belga moved to quash the complaint for multiple physical
injuries through reckless imprudence filed against him by the injured
passengers, contending that the case was just a duplication of the one filed
by the Chief of Police wherein he had just been acquitted. The motion to
quash was denied and after trial Jose Belga was convicted, whereupon he
appealed to the Court of First Instance of Albay. In the meantime, the case
for damage to property through reckless imprudence filed by one of the
owners of the vehicles involved in the collision had been remanded to the
Court of First Instance of Albay after Jose Belga had waived the second stage
of the preliminary investigation. After such remand, the Provincial Fiscal filed
in the Court of First Instance two informations against Jose Belga, one for
physical injuries through reckless imprudence, and another for damage to
property through reckless imprudence. Both cases were dismissed by the
Court of First Instance, upon motion of the defendant Jose Belga who alleged
double jeopardy in a motion to quash. On appeal by the Prov. Fiscal, the
order of dismissal was affirmed by the Supreme Court in the following
language: .
The question for determination is whether the acquittal of Jose Belga in the
case filed by the chief of police constitutes a bar to his subsequent
prosecution for multiple physical injuries and damage to property through
reckless imprudence.
In the case of Peo[ple] v. F. Diaz, G. R. No. L-6518, prom. March 30, 1954, the
accused was charged in the municipal court of Pasay City with reckless
driving under sec. 52 of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, for having driven an
automobile in a fast and reckless manner ... thereby causing an accident.
After the accused had pleaded not guilty the case was dismissed in that
court for failure of the Government to prosecute. But some time thereafter
the city attorney filed an information in the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
charging the same accused with damage to property thru reckless
imprudence. The amount of the damage was alleged to be P249.50. Pleading
double jeopardy, the accused filed a motion, and on appeal by the
Government we affirmed the ruling. Among other things we there said
through Mr. Justice Montemayor
The next question to determine is the relation between the first offense of
violation of the Motor Vehicle Law prosecuted before the Pasay City Municipal

Court and the offense of damage to property thru reckless imprudence

charged in the Rizal Court of First Instance. One of the tests of double
jeopardy is whether or not the second offense charged necessarily includes
or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or
information (Rule 113, Sec. 9). Another test is whether the evidence which
proves one would prove the other that is to say whether the facts alleged in
the first charge if proven, would have been sufficient to support the second
charge and vice versa; or whether one crime is an ingredient of the other. x x
x
xxxx
The foregoing language of the Supreme Court also disposes of the contention
of the prosecuting attorney that the charge for slight physical injuries
through reckless imprudence could not have been joined with the charge for
homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in this
case, in view of the provisions of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. The prosecutions contention might be true. But neither was the
prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries
through reckless imprudence before pressing the more serious charge of
homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Having
first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the
Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the
prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in this case the more
serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence which arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence of
which the defendant have been previously cleared by the inferior court. 43
Significantly, the Solicitor General had urged us in Silva to reexamine Belga
(and hence, Diaz) "for the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its
application."44 We declined the invitation, thus:
The State in its appeal claims that the lower court erred in dismissing the
case, on the ground of double jeopardy, upon the basis of the acquittal of the
accused in the JP court for Slight Physical Injuries, thru Reckless Imprudence.
In the same breath said State, thru the Solicitor General, admits that the
facts of the case at bar, fall squarely on the ruling of the Belga case x x x,
upon which the order of dismissal of the lower court was anchored. The
Solicitor General, however, urges a re-examination of said ruling, upon
certain considerations for the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its

application. We find, nevertheless, that further elucidation or disquisition on

the ruling in the Belga case, the facts of which are analogous or similar to
those in the present case, will yield no practical advantage to the
government. On one hand, there is nothing which would warrant a
delimitation or clarification of the applicability of the Belga case. It was clear.
On the other, this Court has reiterated the views expressed in the Belga
case, in the identical case of Yap v. Hon. Lutero, etc., L-12669, April 30,
1959.45 (Emphasis supplied)
Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to which the
MeTC succumbed, stems from persistent but awkward attempts to harmonize
conceptually incompatible substantive and procedural rules in criminal law,
namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses and Article 48 on
complexing of crimes, both under the Revised Penal Code. Article 48 is a
procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling
under either of two categories: (1) when a single act constitutes two or more
grave or less grave felonies (thus excluding from its operation light
felonies46); and (2) when an offense is a necessary means for committing the
other. The legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit the accused who,
in lieu of serving multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum of the
penalty for the most serious crime.
In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as
a felony but "the mental attitude x x x behind the act, the dangerous
recklessness, lack of care or foresight x x x,"47 a single mental attitude
regardless of the resulting consequences. Thus, Article 365 was crafted as
one quasi-crime resulting in one or more consequences.
Ordinarily, these two provisions will operate smoothly. Article 48 works to
combine in a single prosecution multiple intentional crimes falling under
Titles 1-13, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, when proper; Article 365
governs the prosecution of imprudent acts and their consequences.
However, the complexities of human interaction can produce a hybrid quasioffense not falling under either models that of a single criminal negligence
resulting in multiple non-crime damages to persons and property with
varying penalties corresponding to light, less grave or grave offenses. The
ensuing prosecutorial dilemma is obvious: how should such a quasi-crime be

prosecuted? Should Article 48s framework apply to "complex" the single

quasi-offense with its multiple (non-criminal) consequences (excluding those
amounting to light offenses which will be tried separately)? Or should the
prosecution proceed under a single charge, collectively alleging all the
consequences of the single quasi-crime, to be penalized separately following
the scheme of penalties under Article 365?
Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. Thus, one line of rulings (none of
which involved the issue of double jeopardy) applied Article 48 by
"complexing" one quasi-crime with its multiple consequences48 unless one
consequence amounts to a light felony, in which case charges were split by
grouping, on the one hand, resulting acts amounting to grave or less grave
felonies and filing the charge with the second level courts and, on the other
hand, resulting acts amounting to light felonies and filing the charge with the
first level courts.49 Expectedly, this is the approach the MeTC impliedly
sanctioned (and respondent Ponce invokes), even though under Republic Act
No. 7691,50 the MeTC has now exclusive original jurisdiction to impose the
most serious penalty under Article 365 which is prision correccional in its
medium period.
Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy will not arise if the
"complexing" of acts penalized under Article 365 involves only resulting acts
penalized as grave or less grave felonies because there will be a single
prosecution of all the resulting acts. The issue of double jeopardy arises if
one of the resulting acts is penalized as a light offense and the other acts are
penalized as grave or less grave offenses, in which case Article 48 is not
deemed to apply and the act penalized as a light offense is tried separately
from the resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave offenses.
The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and sanctions a single
prosecution of all the effects of the quasi-crime collectively alleged in one
charge, regardless of their number or severity,51 penalizing each
consequence separately. Thus, in Angeles v. Jose,52 we interpreted paragraph
three of Article 365, in relation to a charge alleging "reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property and less serious physical injuries," as
follows:
[T]he third paragraph of said article, x x x reads as follows:
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted
in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a

fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damage to three
times such value, but which shall in no case be less than 25 pesos.
The above-quoted provision simply means that if there is only damage to
property the amount fixed therein shall be imposed, but if there are also
physical injuries there should be an additional penalty for the latter. The
information cannot be split into two; one for the physical injuries, and
another for the damage to property, x x x.53(Emphasis supplied)
By "additional penalty," the Court meant, logically, the penalty scheme
under Article 365.
Evidently, these approaches, while parallel, are irreconcilable. Coherence in
this field demands choosing one framework over the other. Either (1) we
allow the "complexing" of a single quasi-crime by breaking its resulting acts
into separate offenses (except for light felonies), thus re-conceptualize a
quasi-crime, abandon its present framing under Article 365, discard its
conception under the Quizon and Diaz lines of cases, and treat the multiple
consequences of a quasi-crime as separate intentional felonies defined under
Titles 1-13, Book II under the penal code; or (2) we forbid the application of
Article 48 in the prosecution and sentencing of quasi-crimes, require single
prosecution of all the resulting acts regardless of their number and severity,
separately penalize each as provided in Article 365, and thus maintain the
distinct concept of quasi-crimes as crafted under Article 365, articulated in
Quizon and applied to double jeopardy adjudication in the Diaz line of
cases.1avvphi1
A becoming regard of this Courts place in our scheme of government
denying it the power to make laws constrains us to keep inviolate the
conceptual distinction between quasi-crimes and intentional felonies under
our penal code. Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes under
Article 365. It is conceptually impossible for a quasi-offense to stand for (1) a
single act constituting two or more grave or less grave felonies; or (2)
anoffense which is a necessary means for committing another. This is why,
way back in 1968 in Buan, we rejected the Solicitor Generals argument that
double jeopardy does not bar a second prosecution for slight physical injuries
through reckless imprudence allegedly because the charge for that offense
could not be joined with the other charge for serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence following Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code:

The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for slight physical
injuries through reckless imprudence could not be joined with the accusation
for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence, because Article 48
of the Revised Penal Code allows only the complexing of grave or less grave
felonies. This same argument was considered and rejected by this Court in
the case of People vs. [Silva] x x x:
[T]he prosecutions contention might be true. But neither was the
prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries
through reckless imprudence before pressing the more serious charge of
homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Having
first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the
Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the
prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in this case the more
serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence which arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence of
which the defendant has been previously cleared by the inferior court.
[W]e must perforce rule that the exoneration of this appellant x x x by the
Justice of the Peace x x x of the charge of slight physical injuries through
reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical
injuries through reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the
province, where both charges are derived from the consequences of one and
the same vehicular accident, because the second accusation places the
appellant in second jeopardy for the same offense.54 (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled choice. By prohibiting the splitting
of charges under Article 365, irrespective of the number and severity of the
resulting acts, rampant occasions of constitutionally impermissible second
prosecutions are avoided, not to mention that scarce state resources are
conserved and diverted to proper use.
Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a
single charge regardless of the number or severity of the consequences. In
imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the penalties under
Article 365 for each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be
no splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one information shall be
filed in the same first level court.55
Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a
stronger and simpler protection of their constitutional right under the Double

Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied the beneficent effect of the
favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus
caused is more than compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for
quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more
serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can
re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of
Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be imposed under a
single prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less
grave or light offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasioffenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365,
befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability, should cushion the
effect of this ruling.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders dated 2
February 2006 and 2 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 157. We DISMISS the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 against
petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar pending with the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Pasig City, Branch 71 on the ground of double jeopardy.
Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR: