AGNE VS DIRECTOR OF LANDS

Facts:
On April 13, 1971, private respondent spouses filed Civil Case No. U-2286 in the Court
of First Instance of Pangasinan for recovery of possession and damages against
petitioners. Their complaint states that they are the registered owners under the
aforesaid Transfer Certificate of Title No. 32209 of the parcel of land situated in Barrio
Bantog, Asingan, Pangasinan which is now in the possession of petitioners.
Petitioners answered that the land which was formerly a part of the river is owned by
them by reason of accretion and accession due to the big flood that happened in 1920.
They contend that since 1920, they and their predecessors in interest occupied and
exercised dominion openly and adversely over said portion of the abandoned river bed
in question abutting their respective riparian lands continuously up to the present to the
exclusion of all other persons, particularly Herminigildo Agpoon and that they have
introduced improvements thereon by constructing irrigation canals and planting trees
and agricultural crops thereon 6 and converted the land into a productive area.
During the pendency of the said case, the petitioners filed a complaint ( Case No. U2649 ) against the Director of Lands and Spouses Agpoon with the CFI of Pangasinan
for annulment of title, reconveyance of and/or action to clear title to a parcel of land.
They allege that the land in question belong to them. They further contend that it was
only on April 13, 1971, when respondent spouses filed a complaint against them, that
they found out that the said land was granted by the Government to Herminigildo
Agpoon under Free Patent No. 23263, pursuant to which Original Certificate of Title No.
2370 was issued in the latter's name and that the said patent and subsequent titles
issued pursuant thereto are null and void since the said land, an abandoned river bed,
is of private ownership and, therefore, cannot be the subject of a public land grant.
On June 21, 1974, the trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case U-2286 in favor of
the Respondents.
On June 24, 1974, Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, acting on the motion to
dismiss filed by respondents Director of Lands and spouses Agpoon, issued an order
dismissing Civil Case No. U-2649 for annulment of title by merely citing the statement in
the case of Antonio, et al. vs. Barroga, et al. 12 that an action to annul a free patent
many years after it had become final and indefeasible states no cause of action.
ISSUE: Whether the action to annul a free patent many years after it had become final
and indefeasible states no cause of action.
Ruling: No
The facts alleged in the complaint, which are deemed hypothetically admitted upon the
filing of the motion to dismiss, constitute a sufficient cause of action against private
respondents. In the case at bar, it was admitted in the stipulation of facts that the land
was formerly an abandoned river bed formed due to natural causes in 1920. It was
likewise admitted that the riparian owners of the lands abutting said abandoned river
bed were the plaintiffs and/or their predecessors in interest and that since then and up
to the present, they have been occupying and cultivating aliquot portions of the said
land proportionate to the respective lengths of their riparian lands and that they are the
real and lawful owners of the said land as decreed by Article 370 of the old Civil Code,
the law then in force that time. With that being said, then, the land in question was and
is of private ownership and, therefore, beyond the jurisdiction of the Director of Lands.
The free patent and subsequent title issued pursuant thereto are null and void. The
indefeasibility and imprescriptibility of a Torrens title issued pursuant to a patent may be

invoked only when the land involved originally formed part of the public domain. If it was
a private land, the patent and certificate of title issued upon the patent are a nullity.
The rule on the incontrovertibility of a certificate of title upon the expiration of one year,
after the entry of the decree, pursuant to the provisions of the Land Registration Act,
does not apply where an action for the cancellation of a patent and a certificate of title
issued pursuant thereto is instituted on the ground that they are null and void because
the Bureau of Lands had no jurisdiction to issue them at all, the land in question having
been withdrawn from the public domain prior to the subsequent award of the patent and
the grant of a certificate of title to another person. Such an action is different from a
review of the decree of title on the ground of fraud.
Although a period of one year has already expired from the time a certificate of title was
issued pursuant to a public grant, said title does not become incontrovertible but is null
and void if the property covered thereby is originally of private ownership, and an action
to annul the same does not prescribe. Moreover, since herein petitioners are in
possession of the land in dispute, an action to quiet title is imprescriptible. 20 Their action
for reconveyance which, in effect, seeks to quiet title to property in one's possession is
imprescriptible. Their undisturbed possession for a number of years gave them a
continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to determine the nature of the
adverse claims of a third party and the effect on her title.

STRAIT TIMES VS CA
G.R. No. 126673, August 28, 1998
FACTS:
Private Respondent Regino Pealosa allegedly lost his owners duplicate of two land titles (TCT No. T3767 and T-28301). He filed a verified petition before the RTC-Tacloban for the issuance of new owners
duplicates. Thereafter, the RTC granted the petition and declared the lost titles (T-3767 and T-28301) as
null and void and ordering the ROD-Tacloban City to issue to Strait times, new owners duplicates of said
titles.
Said judgment became final and executory on June 7, 1994. Subsequently, on October 10, 1994, Strait
Times caused a Notice of Adverse Claim to be annotated on T-28301.
Strait Times claims that it bought the Lot covered by T-28301 from Conrado Callera who, purchased it
from Regino Penalosa in whose name T-28301 was registered. Its duly authorized representative, Atty.
Rafael Iriarte, had been in possession of the said lot with the owners duplicate of T-28301 since August
14, 1984. Strait Times thus seeks to annul and set aside the Order of the RTC with respect to the
issuance of a new owners duplicate of T-28301 on the ground of extrinsic fraud.
Strait Times argues that the allegedly lost duplicate certificate of title has been in the possession of Atty.
Iriarte all the while. They claim that the RTC had no jurisdiction to issue a new title because the original
title was not lost.
Regino Penalosa on the other hand counters that jurisdiction over judicial reconstitution of lost or
destroyed title is vested in the RTC under Sec. 110, BP Blg. 1529, in relation to RA 26.
ISSUE: W/N the RTC has no jurisdiction to issue a new title since the original title was not lost. YES. RTC
HAS NO JURISDICTION. (W/N the RTC had jurisdiction to issue the aforementioned Order. NO.)
HELD:
It has been established in the case of Serra Serra vs CA that if a certificate of title has not been lost, but is
in fact in the possession of another person, then the reconstituted title is void and the court that rendered
the decision had no jurisdiction. In the present case, it is undisputed that the allegedly lost owners
duplicate certificate of title was all the while in the possession of Atty. Iriarte, who even submitted it as
evidence. Indeed, Regino Penalosa has not controverted the genuineness and authenticity of the said
certificate of title. These unmistakably show that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to order the
issuance of a new duplicate, and the certificate issued is itself void.
Indeed, Respondent Court, private respondent and the solicitor general invoke the suspicious nature of
petitioner's claim of title over the land in dispute in order to bar the application of the said cases. The
matter of title, however, will have to be determined in a more appropriate action, not in an action for the
issuance of the lost owner's duplicate certificate of title, or in a proceeding to annul the certificate issued
in consequence of such proceeding.
The reconstitution of a title is simply the reissuance of a new duplicate certificate of title allegedly lost or
destroyed in its original form and condition. It does not pass upon the ownership of the land covered by
the lost or destroyed title. Possession of a lost certificate is not necessarily equivalent to ownership of the
land covered by it. The certificate of title, by itself, does not vest ownership; it is merely an evidence of
title over a particular property.

BUREAU OF FORESTRY vs. COURT OF APPEALS and FILOMENO GALLO

G.R. No. L-37995
August 31, 1987

FACTS:
In 1961, Mercedes Diago applied for the registration of 4 parcels of land situated in Buenavista, Iloilo containing an
approximate area of 30.5 hectares. She alleged she occupied said parcels of land having bought them from the estate of
the late Jose Ma. Nava who, in his lifetime, had bought the lands in turn from Canuto Gustilo in 1934.
The Director of Lands opposed the application on the ground that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-ininterest have sufficient title over the lands applied for, which could be registered under the Torrens systems, and that
they have never been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the said lands for at least 30 years.
The Director of Forestry also opposed on the ground that certain portions of the lands, with an area of approximately
19.4 hectares are mangrove swamps and are within a Timberland Block.
In 1965, Filomeno Gallo purchased the subject parcels of land from Mercedes Diago, and moved to be substituted in
place of the latter, attaching to his motion an Amended Application for Registration of Title.
Philippine Fisheries Commission also moved to substitute petitioner Bureau of Forestry as oppositor, since supervision
and control of said portion have been transferred from the Bureau of Forestry to the PFC.
In April 1966, the trial court rendered its decision ordering the registration of the 4 parcels of land in the name of
Filomeno Gallo. It ruled that although the controverted portion of 19.4 hectares are mangrove and nipa swamps within
a Timberland Block, petitioners failed to submit convincing proof that these lands are more valuable for forestry than
for agricultural purposes, and the presumption is that these are agricultural lands.

ISSUE:
WON the classification of lands of public domain by the Executive Branch of the Government into agricultural, forest or
mineral can be changed or varied by the court. NO

HELD:
Admittedly, the controversial area is within a timberland block classified and certified as such by the Director of
Forestry in 1956. The lands are needed for forest purposes and hence they are portions of the public domain which
cannot be the subject of registration proceedings.
Clearly therefore the land is public land and there is no need for the Director of Forestry to submit convincing proofs
that the land is more valuable for forest purposes than for agriculture.
As provided for under Sec. 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the classification or reclassification of public lands into
alienable or disposable, mineral or forest lands is now a prerogative of the Executive Department and not of the
courts. With these rules, there should be no more room for doubt that it is not the court which determines the
classification of lands of the public domain but the Executive Branch, through the Office of the President.
Furthermore, respondents cannot claim to have obtained their title by prescription since the application filed by them
necessarily implied an admission that the portions applied for are part of the public domain and cannot be acquired
by prescription, unless the law expressly permits it. It is a rule of law that possession of forest lands, however long,
cannot ripen into private ownership.

Republic vs Vera (1983)

Facts:
G.R. No. L-35778:
On May 4, 1972, respondent Luisito Martinez filed with the lower court an application for
registration of title under Act 496 of one (1) parcel of land, situated in the Municipality of
Mariveles, Bataan, containing an area of 323,093 square meters, more or less.
The Republic of the Philippines opposed to the application stating that the parcel of land applied for is
a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic, not subject to private appropriation.
On October 5, 1972, the Commissioner of Land Registration submitted to the lower
court a report stating.
That the parcel of land applied for registration in the above-entitled case is entirely
inside Lot No. 626 of the Cadastral Survey of Mariveles, Province of Bataan, Cad.
Case no. 19, LTC Cad. Record No. 1097.
xxx xxx xxx
Records show that in the hearing of this case in the lower court, applicant Luisito Martinez, 62 years
old, testified that he is the owner of the land applied for, having inherited the same from his parents,
consisting of 32 hectares, more or less; that he started possessing the land in 1938; that about 8
hectares of the land is planted to palay, and there are about 42 mango trees; that kamoteng kahoy is
also planted thereon; that he declared the land for taxation purposes only in 1969 because all the
records were lost during the war, and that possession was continuous, open, undisturbed and in the
concept of owner. This was corroborated by 2 witnesses.
G.R. No. L-35779:
On March 21, 1972, respondent Thelma Tanalega filed an application for registration under Act No. 496
in the CFI of Bataan, of two (2) parcels of land located in the barrio of Camaya, municipality of
Mariveles, province of Bataan described and Identified as portions of Lot 626, Mariveles
Cadastre.
On March 21, 1972, the lower court ordered the Bureau of Lands to submit a report within ten (10)
days if the land subject of the application has been issued patents or is the subject of any pending
application for the issuance of patents. Likewise, the lower court directed the Commissioner of Land
Registration to submit within the same period his report if the land applied for has been issued a title
or is the subject of a pending decree.
The Chief Surveyor of the Land Registration Commission filed a report in the lower court, stating that
the parcels of land applied for registration "do not appear to have been passed upon and approved by
the Director of Lands as required by Section 1858 of the Revised Administrative Code."
Later, the Chief Surveyor of the Land Registration Commission filed in the lower court another report or
manifestation stating "that the plans, when plotted on the Municipal Index Map on file in the
Commission does not appear to overlap with any previously titled property under Act 496.
On July 7, 1972, the provincial fiscal filed his opposition in behalf of the Directors of Lands and of
Forestry, alleging that the parcels of land applied for are portions of the public domain belonging
to the Republic of the Philippines, not subject to private appropriation.
Thereafter, the case was tried. The applicant, Thelma Tanalega (respondent herein), testified in her
behalf, and presented two (2) witnesses as well as her documentary evidence in support of her
application for registration. Applicant Thelma Tanalega, 27 years old, testified that she had possessed
the land OCENPO since February 2, 1970 when the said land was sold to her by Elisa Llamas who
allegedly possessed this land" in the same manner since 1935; that the applicant had paid for the
taxes of the land for the years 1970-1972.
Fiscal Arsenio Guzman who is appearing for the government, submitted a certification dated July 3,
1972 of Leonides B. Rodriguez, District Forester of Balanga, Bataan which states "that the tract of
land situated at Barrio Camaya, Mariveles, Bataan, as surveyed for Thelma Tanalega, et al.,
was found to be within the Alienable and Disposable Block, Project 4-B, Mariveles, Bataan,
certified by the Director of Forestry as such on February 16, 1972."

In both cases, the Court of First Instance of Bataan in two separate decisions, dated October 9, 1972
and October 16, 1972, confirmed the titles to subject parcels of land and adjudicated them in
favor of applicants Luisito Martinez and Thelma Tanalega, now respondents herein.
In the instant petitions for review the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General,
argued that Lot 626, Mariveles Cadastre was declared public land by the decision of the
Cadastral Court dated October 11, 1937 and such being the case, the lower court is without
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the application for voluntary registration under Act
496.
Petitioner likewise stressed that the lands in question can no longer be subject to registration by
voluntary proceedings, for they have already been subjected to compulsory registration
proceedings under the Cadastral Act.
Issue: WON the subject lots may be registered by respondents. No.
It is noteworthy that as per the report of the Commissioner of Land Registration, 1 the land subject
matter of the instant proceedings "is entirely inside Lot No. 626 of the Cadastral Survey of
Mariveles, Province of Bataan, Cad. Case No. 19, LRC Cad. Record No. 1097"; that some portions of
Lot No. 626 were decreed and titles were issued therefor; and that "portion declared Public Land as per
decision dated October 11, 1937."
In a cadastral proceedings any person claiming any interest in any part of the lands object of the
petition is required by Section 9 of Act No. 2259 to file an answer on or before the return day or within
such further time as may be allowed by the court, giving the details required by law, such as: (1) Age
of the claimant; (2) Cadastral number of lot or lots claimed, or the block and lot numbers, as the case
may be; (3) Name of the barrio and municipality, township or settlement in which the lots are situated;
(4) Names of the owners of adjoining lots; (5) If claimant is in possession of the lots claims and can
show no express grant of the land by the Government to him or to his predecessors-in-interest, the
answer need state the length of time property was held in possession and the manner it was acquired,
giving the length of time, as far as known, during which his predecessors, if any, held possession; (6) If
claimant is not in possession or occupation of the land, the answer shall set forth the interest claimed
by him and the time and manner of its acquisition; (7) If the lots have been assessed for taxation, their
last assessed value; and (8) Encumbrance, if any, affecting the lots and the names of adverse
claimants as far as known. In the absence of successful claimants, the property is declared public land.
In the instant cases, private respondents apparently either did not file their answers in the
aforesaid cadastral proceedings or failed to substantiate their claims over the portions
they were then occupying, otherwise, titles over the portions subject of their respective claims
would have been issued to them. The Cadastral Court must have declared the lands in question public
lands, and its decision had already become final and conclusive.
Respondents are now barred by prior judgment to assert their rights over the subject land, under
the doctrine of res judicata.
A cadastral proceeding is one in rem and binds the whole world. Under this doctrine,
parties are precluded from re-litigating the same issues already determined by final
judgment. 2
Even granting that respondents can still petition for judicial confirmation of imperfect title over the
lands subject matter of the instant cases, the same must necessarily fail. It is to be noted that in the
instant cases evidence for the respondents themselves tend to show that only portions of the entire
area applied for are cultivated. A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does
not constitute possession under claim of ownership. In that sense, possession is not exclusive and
notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the State. The possession of public land
however long the period thereof may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor
because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the State, unless
the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the
required number of years to constitute a grant from the State.
Applicants, therefore, have failed to submit convincing proof actual, peaceful and adverse possession
in the concept of owners of the entire area in question during the period required by law.
Apart from the foregoing, the survey plans submitted by petitioners were not approved by the Director
of Lands but by the Land Registration Commission. The Land Registration Commission has no authority
to approve original survey plans in this particular case. Section 34-A of R.A. No. 6389 relied upon by
respondents applies only to lands subject of tenancy relation which are expropriated and sub-divided
in favor of new amortizing-owner-beneficiaries. The submission of the plan is a statutory requirement
of mandatory character and unless the plan and its technical description are duly approved by the
Director of Lands, the same are not of much value.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SOUTHSIDE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION INC.

FACTS:
The subject matter of these proceedings for declaration of nullity of title are parcels of land with a total area
of 39.99 hectares, more or less, known as the JUSMAG housing area in Fort Bonifacio where, military officers,
both in the active and retired services, and their respective families, have been occupying housing units and facilities
originally constructed by the AFP.
Private respondent SHAI is a non-stock corporation organized mostly by wives of AFP military officers.
Records show that SHAI was able to secure from the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Rizal a title Transfer
Certificate of Title in its name to the bulk of, if not the entire, JUSMAG area.
The Rizal Registry issued TCT No. 15084 on October 30, 1991on the basis of a notarized Deed of Sale
purportedly executed on the same date by then Director Abelardo G. Palad, Jr. of the Lands Management Bureau
(LMB) in favor of SHAI.The total purchase price as written in the conveying deed was P11,997,660.00 or P30.00
per square meter
It appears that in the process of the investigation conducted by the Department of Justice on reported land
scams at the FBMR, a copy of the aforesaid October 30, 1991deed of sale surfaced and eventually referred to the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for examination. The results of the examination undertaken by NBI
Document Examiner Eliodoro Constantino reveals that the puported signatures in the document are forgeries.
On October 16, 1993, then President Fidel V.Ramos issued Memorandum Order No. 173 directing the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to institute action towards the cancellation of TCT No. 15084 and the title
acquired by the Navy Officers Village Association (NOVA) over a bigger parcel within the reservation. A month
later, the OSG, in behalf of the petitioner Republic, filed with the RTC of Pasig City the corresponding nullification
and cancellation of title suit against the private respondent SHAI, purported signature thereon of Palad is a forgery;
b) there are no records with the LMB of (i) the application to purchase and (ii) the alleged payment of the purchase
price; and c) the property in question is inalienable, being part of a military reservation established under
Proclamation No. 423.
On pre-trial the Republic, as plaintiff therein, marked (and later offered in evidence)the Deed of Sale dated October
30, 1991 as its Exhibit "A,"and TCT No. 15084 as Exhibit "B."Respondent, then defendant SHAI adopted Exhibits
"A" and B as its Exhibits "1" and 2, respectively.
During the trial, the Republic presented as expert witness NBI Document Examiner Eliodoro Constantino
who testified on NBI QDR No. 815-1093 and asserted that the signature of Palad in Exhibit A is a forgery. For
his part, Palad dismissed as forged his signature appearing in the same document and denied ever signing the same,
let alone in front of a notary public holding office outside of the LMB premises. Pressing the point, Palad stated that
he could not have had signed the conveying deed involving as it did a reservation area which, apart from its being
outside of the LMBs jurisdiction, is inalienable in the first place.
For its part, then defendant SHAI presented an opposing expert witness in the person of Police Inspector
Redencion Caimbon who testified that Palads signature in Exhibit A is genuine. Mrs. Virginia Santos, then SHAI
president, likewise testified, saying that applications to purchase were signed and then filed with the LMB by one
Engr. Eugenia Balis, followed by the payment in full of the contract price.
Eventually, in a decision dated October 7, 1997, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the Republics
complaint as it considered the parcels covered by the deed in question as no longer part of the FBMR. Therefrom,
the Republic went on appeal to the CA which affirmed in toto that of the trial court.
Hence, this petition of the Republic.
ISSUE: Was the JUSMAG area, during the period material, alienable or inalienable, as the case may be, and,
therefore, can or cannot be subject of a lawful private conveyance?
RULING:
Petitioner Republic, correctly asserts the inalienable character of the JUSMAG area, the same having not
effectively been separated from the military reservation and declared as alienable and disposable.
The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, may
designate by proclamation any tract or tracts of land of the public domain as reservations for the use of the Republic
or any of its branches, or for quasi-public uses or purposes. Such tract or tracts of land thus reserved shall be nonalienable and shall not be subject to sale or other disposition until again declared alienable. Consistent with the
foregoing postulates, jurisprudence teaches that a military reservation, like the FBMR, or a part thereof is not open
to private appropriation or disposition and, therefore, not registrable, unless it is in the meantime reclassified and
declared as disposable and alienable public land. And until a given parcel of land is released from its classification
as part of the military reservation zone and reclassified by law or by presidential proclamation as disposable and
alienable, its status as part of a military reservation remains,even if incidentally it is devoted for a purpose other than
as a military camp or for defense. The same is true in this case.

There is no doubt that the JUSMAG area subject of the questioned October 30, 1991sale formed part of the
FBMR as originally established under Proclamation No. 423. And while private respondent SHAI would
categorically say that the petitioner Republic had not presented evidence that subject land is within military
reservation,and even dared to state that the JUSMAG area is the private property of the government and
therefore removed from the concept of public domain per se its own evidence themselves belie its posture as their
evidence both the TCT and the Deed of Sale technically described the property as situated in Jusmag area located at
Fort Bonifacio which is now renamed Fort Mckinley a declared a military reservation.
The Republic has, since the filing of its underlying complaint, invoked Proclamation No. 423. In the
process, it has invariably invited attention to the proclamations specific area coverage to prove the nullity of TCT
No. 15084, inasmuch as the title embraced a reserved area considered inalienable, and hence, beyond the commerce
of man.
The October 30, 1991 Deed of Sale purportedly executed by Palad, assuming its authenticity, could not
plausibly be the requisite classifying medium converting the JUSMAG area into a disposable parcel. And private
respondent SHAIs unyielding stance that would have the Republic in estoppel to question the transfer to it by the
LMB Director of the JUSMAG area is unavailing. It should have realized that the Republic is not usually estopped
by the mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents.
Since the parcels of land in question allegedly sold to the private respondent are, or at least at the time of
the supposed transaction were, still part of the FBMR, the purported sale is necessarily void ab initio.
Moreover, Article XII, Section 3[of the 1987 Constitution forbids private corporations from acquiring any
kind of alienable land of the public domain, except through lease for a limited period.
The interplay of compelling circumstances and inferences deducible from the case, also cast doubt on the
authenticity of such deed, if not support a conclusion that the deed is spurious.
1. Palad categorically declared that his said signature on the deed is a forgery. The NBI signature expert
corroborated Palads allegation on forgery.Respondent SHAIs expert witness from the PNP, however, disputes the
NBIs findings. In net effect, both experts from the NBI and the PNP cancel each other out.
2.Palad signed the supposed deed of sale in Manila, possibly at the LMB office at Plaza Cervantes, Binondo. Even
if he acted in an official capacity, Palad nonetheless proceeded on the same day to Pasig City to appear before the
notarizing officer. The deed was then brought to the Rizal Registry and there stamped Received by the entry clerk.
That same afternoon, or at 3:14 p.m. of October 30, 1991to be precise, TCT No. 15084 was issued. In other words,
the whole conveyance and registration process was done in less than a day. The very unusual dispatch is quite
surprising. Stranger still is why a bureau head, while in the exercise of his functions as the bureaus authorized
contracting officer, has to repair to another city just to have a deed notarized.
3. There is absolutely no record of the requisite public land application to purchase required under Section 89 of the
Public Land Act. There is also no record of the deed of sale and of documents usually accompanying an application
to purchase, inclusive of the investigation report and the property valuation. The Certification under the seal of the
LMB bearing date November 24, 1994 and issued/signed by Alberto Recalde, OIC, Records Management Division
of the LMB pursuant to a subpoena issued by the trial court attest to this fact of absence of records. Atty. Alice B.
Dayrit, then Chief, Land Utilization and Disposition Division, LMB, testified having personally looked at the bureau
record book, but found no entry pertaining to SHAI.
4. In its Answer as defendant a quo, respondent SHAI states that the deed of sale specifically meritorious Official
Receipt No. 6030203 as evidence of full payment of the agreed purchase price An official receipt (O.R.) is
doubtless the best evidence to prove payment. While it kept referring to O.R. No. 6030203 as its evidence of the
required payment, it failed to present and offer the receipt in evidence. We can thus validly presume that no such OR
exists or, if it does, that its presentation would be adverse to SHAI.
A contract of sale is void where the price, which appears in the document as paid has, in fact, never been paid.
5. The purchase price was, according to the witnesses for SHAI, paid in full in cash to the cashier of the LMB the
corresponding amount apparently coming in a mix of P500 and P100 denominations. Albeit plausible, SHAIs
witnesses account taxes credulity to the limit.
TCT No. 15084 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal issued on the basis of such Deed are declared void and
cancelled