Salle Digest

Soliven vs Makasiar
G.R No. 82585 Nov. 14, 1988

G.R. No. 82585
November 14, 1988
MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, ANTONIO V. ROCES, FREDERICK K. AGCAOLI, and GODOFREDO L. MANZANAS, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 35, UNDERSECRETARY
SILVESTRE BELLO III, of the Department of Justice, LUIS C. VICTOR, THE CITY FISCAL OF MANILA and PRESIDENT
CORAZON C. AQUINO, respondents.
G.R. No. 82827
November 14, 1988
LUIS D. BELTRAN, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of Branch 35 of the Regional Trial Court, at Manila, THE HON. LUIS
VICTOR, CITY FISCAL OF MANILA, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SUPERINTENDENT OF THE WESTERN POLICE
DISTRICT, and THE MEMBERS OF THE PROCESS SERVING UNIT AT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA,
respondents.
G.R. No. 83979
November 14, 1988.
LUIS D. BELTRAN, petitioner,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY CATALINO MACARAIG, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE SEDFREY ORDOEZ, UNDERSECRETARY OF
JUSTICE SILVESTRE BELLO III, THE CITY FISCAL OF MANILA JESUS F. GUERRERO, and JUDGE RAMON P. MAKASIAR,
Presiding Judge of Branch 35 of the Regional Trial Court, at Manila, respondents.
FACTS:
This case is a PETITION for certiorari and prohibition to review the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila.
In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised. On March 30, 1988, the
Secretary of Justice denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration and upheld the resolution of the
Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the City Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case against petitioners. A
second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the Secretary of Justice on
April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President, through the Executive Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive
Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these developments, petitioners' contention that they have been denied
the administrative remedies available under the law has lost factual support.
And on the 3rd issue, Petitioner Beltran argues that "the reasons which necessitate presidential
immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to file suit." He contends that if criminal proceedings
ensue by virtue of the President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a
witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's jurisdiction. This, continues Beltran, would
in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she
would be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury. Beltran also contends that he could
not be held liable for libel because of the privileged character of the publication. He also says that to allow
the libel case to proceed would produce a chilling effect on press freedom.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel were filed
against them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the
Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President;
(2) Whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a
warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to
determine probable cause;
(3) Whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal
proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit.
(4) Whether or not there would produce a chilling effect on press freedom.
RULING:
(1) No. The allegation of denial of due process of law in the preliminary investigation is
negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter- affidavits, he filed a "Motion to Declare
Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his right to refute the complaint by filing counter-affidavits.
Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his
counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is
that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded. Moot
and academic na ung first question.
(2) No. What the Art 3, Sec. 2 of the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal
responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In
satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the
judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following
established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the
supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on
the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable
cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. Sound
policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary
examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and
deciding cases filed before their courts
(3) Yes. The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is
to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction,
considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring
all of the office holder's time, also demands undivided attention. But this privilege of immunity
from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder
of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal
case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to
prevent the case from proceeding against such accused. Moreover, there is nothing in our laws
that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may
shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of
whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's prerogative. It is a decision
that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.
(4) Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts. Court finds no basis at this stage to rule on
the chilling effect point.
Note: Nagsimula ang lahat when Pres. Cory Aquino filed a criminal complaint for libel against Beltran kasi sinabi ni Beltran na
nagtago lang daw si Cory sa ilalim ng kama niya during coup detat.

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Soliven vs Makasiar

G.R No. 82585 Nov. 14, 1988

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