Strengthening Nasa'S Technology Development Programs: Hearing

STRENGTHENING NASAS TECHNOLOGY
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND

TECHNOLOGY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
OCTOBER 22, 2009
Serial No. 11158

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COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

HON. BART GORDON, Tennessee, Chair
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
RALPH M. HALL, Texas
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER JR.,
LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California
Wisconsin
DAVID WU, Oregon
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma
DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois
MARCIA L. FUDGE, Ohio
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
N, New Mexico
BEN R. LUJA
RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas
PAUL D. TONKO, New York
BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
PARKER GRIFFITH, Alabama
MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas
MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey
BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California
JIM MATHESON, Utah
ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska
LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee
PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia
BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
PETE OLSON, Texas
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
BARON P. HILL, Indiana
HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona
CHARLES A. WILSON, Ohio
KATHLEEN DAHLKEMPER, Pennsylvania
ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
SUZANNE M. KOSMAS, Florida
GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
VACANCY
SUBCOMMITTEE
ON
SPACE
AND
AERONAUTICS
HON. GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona, Chair

DAVID WU, Oregon
PETE OLSON, Texas
DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER JR.,
MARCIA L. FUDGE, Ohio
Wisconsin
PARKER GRIFFITH, Alabama
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma
BARON P. HILL, Indiana
MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas
CHARLES A. WILSON, Ohio
ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
SUZANNE M. KOSMAS, Florida
BART GORDON, Tennessee
RALPH M. HALL, Texas
RICHARD OBERMANN Subcommittee Staff Director
PAM WHITNEY Democratic Professional Staff Member
ALLEN LI Democratic Professional Staff Member
KEN MONROE Republican Professional Staff Member
ED FEDDEMAN Republican Professional Staff Member
DEVIN BRYANT Research Assistant
(II)
CONTENTS
October 22, 2009
Page
Witness List .............................................................................................................

Hearing Charter ......................................................................................................
2
3
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative Gabrielle Giffords, Chairwoman, Subcommittee
on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science and Technology, U.S.
House of Representatives ....................................................................................
Written Statement ............................................................................................
Statement by Representative Pete Olson, Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ...............................................................
Statement by Representative Charles A. Wilson, Subcommittee on Space and
Aeronautics, Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ...........................................................................................................
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19
20
21
22
22
Witnesses:
Dr. Robert D. Braun, Co-Chair of the Committee To Review the NASA Institute for Advanced Concepts, Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board,
National Research Council
Oral Statement .................................................................................................
Biography ..........................................................................................................
Dr. Raymond S. Colladay, Vice Chair of the Committee on Rationale and
Goals of the U.S. Civil Space Program, Aeronautics and Space Engineering
Board, National Research Council
Oral Statement .................................................................................................
Biography ..........................................................................................................
Mr. Christopher Scolese, Associate Administrator, National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Oral Statement .................................................................................................
Discussion
Program Attributes ..............................................................................................
Public Relations/Student Relations ....................................................................
Collapse of NIAC ..................................................................................................
Manned Spaceflight .............................................................................................
Non-Mission Budget .............................................................................................
Patents ..................................................................................................................
Benefit to Taxpayer .............................................................................................
Space Elevator ......................................................................................................
Finding Water ......................................................................................................
Beaming Energy ...................................................................................................
Sharing Between Military and Commercial Developers ...................................
ITAR ......................................................................................................................
NASA Organizational Structure .........................................................................
(III)
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25
33
34
35
36
37
38
44
45
46
47
48
51
51
51
52
52
53
53
55
IV
Page
Appendix: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions

Dr. Robert D. Braun, Co-Chair of the Committee To Review the NASA Institute for Advanced Concepts, Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board,
National Research Council ..................................................................................
Dr. Raymond S. Colladay, Vice Chair of the Committee on Rationale and
Goals of the U.S. Civil Space Program, Aeronautics and Space Engineering
Board, National Research Council ......................................................................
58
62
STRENGTHENING NASAS TECHNOLOGY

DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 22, 2009
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS,
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:07 a.m., in Room
2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Gabrielle Giffords
[Chairwoman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
(1)
3
HEARING CHARTER
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS
Strengthening NASAs Technology Development

Programs
OCTOBER 22 2009
10 A.M.NOON
2318 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
I. Purpose and Issues:

On October 22, 2009 the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics will hold a
hearing on the National Aeronautics and Space Administrations (NASA) efforts to
define advanced concepts and develop innovative technologies. The hearing will examine (1) the opportunities, challenges, and issues identified in external reviews associated with NASAs analysis of advanced concepts and long-term development of
technology; (2) NASAs progress in responding to the provisions in NASA Authorization Acts and recommendations from external reviews associated with technology
development; and (3) NASAs efforts to collaborate and coordinate with other Federal agencies on technology development issues. The hearing will focus on the following questions and issues:
What are the key findings and recommendations from external critiques of
NASAs efforts to conduct advanced concept analysis and long-term technology
development? Did they find NASAs existing approach for defining advanced
concepts and developing innovative technologies to be effective? What are the
budgetary implications of recommended actions?
What results can an agency expect to achieve by conducting a broadly focused
long-term program dedicated to stimulating innovation and developing new
concepts and capabilities that are not tied to existing requirements? In the absence of a long-term technology program, how can an agency develop and infuse paradigm-shifting technologies that could create opportunities for future
missions?
If an advanced technology entity is established in NASA, what key lessons can
the agency learn from the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agencys
(DARPA) historical evolution in roles, structure, culture, and mission? Is a
separate entity required or could its objectives be achieved within the current
organizational structure?
Are NASAs flight-system development programs exposed to greater uncertainty
and risks when new concepts and technologies are matured within the programs themselves?
Should time horizons be placed on the development of visionary advanced concepts to ensure that projects are not too far out of alignment with the nearerterm horizons of mission programs? How might these time horizons be determined?
Has NASA been responsive to the provisions in authorization legislation directing greater commitment to robust technology research and development initiatives in aeronautics, exploration and space and Earth sciences? Has the
agency implemented the recommendations from external reviews for conducting advanced technology development in the agency?
To what extent does NASA coordinate and collaborate with other Federal
agencies and departments in planning and conducting long-term aeronautics
and space technology development? Have potential overlaps in agency technology research and development activities been identified as a result of such
coordination? Has collaboration resulted in greater; synergy among Federal
agencies conducting long-term technology development?
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II. Scheduled Witnesses:
Dr. Robert D. Braun Co-Chair of the Committee to Review the NASA Institute for Advanced Concepts Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board National Research Council
Dr. Raymond S. Colladay Vice Chair of the Committee on the Rationale
and Goals of the U.S. Civil Space Program Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board National Research Council
Mr. Christopher Scolese Associate Administrator National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
III. Overview
Since its creation in 1958, NASA has been one (if the nations leading technology
development engines through its investments in advanced aeronautics and space research and technology. Concepts and advanced technologies such as high-energy
cryogenic engines, thermal protection for reusable launch vehicles, electric propulsion, solar and nuclear energy power systems, automation and robotics, and sophisticated sensors enabled landing on the moon, travel to other planets, and monitoring
of the Earths environment. These technologies have transformed the way we live
today as evidenced by the ubiquitous presence of and reliance on satellite communications, space-based weather observations, and advanced aviation navigation systems. NASAs technology development efforts and programs have involved several
objectives ranging from soliciting visionary advanced techno0gy concepts to developing technologies for mission-specific requirements, advancing instrument capabilities, and qualifying hardware for space flight, among other technology activities to
support NASA missions and programs.
The critical importance of technology development was emphasized in the Summary Report of the Review of U.S. Human Space Flight Plans Committee which was
tasked to. review the U.S. plans for human spaceflight. The report said:
The Committee strongly believes it is time for NASA to reassume its crucial role
of developing new technologies for space. Today, the alternatives available for exploration systems are severely limited because of the lack of a strategic investment in technology development in past decades. NASA ow has an opportunity
to develop a technology roadmap that is aligned with an exploration mission
that will last for decades. If appropriately funded, a technology development program would re-engage the minds at American universities, in industry and within NASA. The investments should be designed to increase the capabilities and
reduce the costs of future exploration. This will benefit human and robotic exploration, the commercial space community, and other U.S. government users.
With regards to technology development, the summary of key findings included
the following observation:
Technology development for exploration and commercial space: Investment in a
well-designed and adequately funded space technology program is critical to enable progress in exploration. Exploration strategies can proceed more readily and
economically if the requisite technology has been developed in advance. This investment will also benefit robotic exploration, the U.S. commercial space industry
and other U.S. government users.
The need to invest in technology development was also stressed in a recent Space
News interview (August 24, 2009) of Norman Augustine, Chairman of the Review
of U.S. Human Space Flight Plans Committee. Responding to the question of whether he sees a need to reform the way the U.S. government conducts research and
development, he responded:
Developing components of systems during systems development or tests is a very
costly way to do that. Far better to develop components and when theyve been
proven go and develop them and put them into systems. That suggests a need
for very strong technology programs, which are particularly vulnerable to budget
pressures when theyre in the same funding bin as the major programs; so when
the major programs gets a cold, the technology program gets pneumonia. Weve
seen that happen at NASA. So it takes great discipline to continue to invest in
technology programs that wont pay off for five, 10, 15 years. But if you dont
do it, you end up having component failures that stop you in the midst of system
development where the money burn rate is very high.
Another important benefit of technology development lies in its inspirational
value. Visionary advanced technology projects have been noted as attracting young
talent into NASA and the space program. Regarding that point, the National Re-
5
search Council (NRC) report on Fostering Visions for the Future: A Review of the
NASA Institute for Advanced Concepts stated:
One of NASAs roles is to inspire tie public with a spirit of discovery and exploration, and NASA is at its best when it accomplishes this through significant
scientific and technical achievement in aeronautic and space. By fostering the
identification and development of innovative advanced concepts, and by its actions to advertise the results of its projects to the public at large, NIAC [NASA
Institute for Advanced Concepts] served NASA well in support of this inspirational role. A NIAC-like entity facilitates the introduction of valuable products,
intellectual and material, into NASA. It broadens the population that can contribute creative ideas and concepts to NASA, a breadth that has generated significant new ideas. These aspects of the success of the previous NIAC form a
compelling set of reasons to reinstate an organization with this charter.
Conversely, not having a robust technology development program has been shown
to contribute to a greater risk of incorporating immature technologies into flight-system development programs. As was highlighted during the Subcommittees March
4, 2009 hearing on Cost Management Issues in NASAs Acquisitions and Programs,
NASAs attempts to mature technologies during flight-system development programs have resulted in schedule delays and cost growth.
Concerns about technology development in NASA have been raised in two recent
reports by the NRC. The aforementioned report on the NASA Institute for Advanced
Concepts (NIAC) found that the termination in 2007 of the NIAC left the agency
without an advanced concepts entity focused at looking beyond todays known needs.
As a result, it said that NASA lost its only innovation-focused capability for seeking
out fax-reaching, advanced concepts and future capabilities. When NIAC was formed
in 1998, its purpose was to fund research concepts and products deemed to be revolutionary and realizable in no fewer than 10 and no more than 40 years. The expectation was that such a program would allow technology risks to be mitigated. This
in turn would reduce subsequent development costs and enable new aid more ambitious research goals to be pursued. The NIAC was terminated in Fiscal year 2007,
the report said, as part of a general elimination of a majority of the ESMD [Exploration Systems Mission Directorate] elements not directly aligned with the near-term
objectives of the Vision for Exploration. Many of the projects funded by NIAC were
designed for deeper space exploration, or were technologies to be used on Earth,
such as an electromagnetic system for formation flying.
In describing the impact of NIACs termination, the NRC report stated:
The termination of NIAC reflects a larger issue within NASA related to the demise of advanced concepts and technology development programs throughout the
agency. To effectively infuse advanced concepts into its future systems, NASA
needs to become an organization that values and nurtures the creation and maturation of advanced aeronautics and space concepts. Working for NASA, NIAC
helped serve this advanced concepts need for almost 10 years and demonstrated
its success in creating a community of innovators focused on advanced concepts
that may impact future NASA missions.
Another NRC report, entitled Americas Future In Space: Aligning The Civil Space
Program With National Needs, recommended that NASA should revitalize its advanced technology development program by establishing a DARPA-like organization
within NASA as a priority mission area to support preeminent civil, national security
(if dual-use), and commercial space programs. The Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA) is the central high-risk, high reward research and development organization for the Department of Defense. Established as a agency of the
Department of Defense (DOD) in 1958, DARPA funds researchers in industry, universities, government laboratories and elsewhere to conduct high-risk, high-reward
research and development projects that will benefit U.S. national security. The
agencys research runs the gamut from conducting basic, fundamental scientific investigations in a laboratory setting to building full-scale prototypes of military systems.
The absence of an adequate long-term technology development capability in
NASAs science and exploration directorates has been noted by the Congress and addressed in legislation. The NASA Authorization Act of 2008 [P.L. 110422] encouraged NASA to emphasize long-term technology development. Specific to technology
development in exploration, the Act directed the NASA Administrator to carry out
a program of long-term exploration-related technology research and development.
With regards to missions, the Act directed the Administrator toestablish an intraDirectorate long-term technology development program for space and Earth science
within the Science Mission Directorate for the development of new technology.
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Today, technology development is conducted by NASA in four primary areas,
namely (1) exploration, where the agency develops and matures advanced technology, integrates that technology into prototype systems, and transitions knowledge
and technology (some of which requires use of the International Space Station) to
the Constellation Program, (2) science, where technology development is conducted
in conjunction with individual mission development activities such as the James
Webb Space Telescope, (3) aeronautics research, where NASA supports a very broad
spectrum of research and development (R&D) activity, and (4) the Innovative Partnerships Program (IPP) which facilitates both technology infusion and technology
transfer.
Thus, although technology development at NASA is being performed or sponsored
today in several areas, it is not aimed at looking beyond todays known needs and
is primarily focused on satisfying the needs of its mission directorates. As a result,
NASA is not , pursuing breakthrough technologies that are not explicitly focused on
defined requirements. At todays hearing, wee will hear from the Co-Chair and Vice
Chair of the two NRC reviews that were previously referenced. We will also hear
from NASAs Associate Administrator on what the agency is doing in response to
direction and recommendations from authorizing legislation and external reviews as
they pertain to technology development.
BACKGOUND INFORMATION
IV. Technology Development Activities in NASA
At the present time, technology development in NASA is being conducted primarily in these areas:
Exploration. The Exploration Systems Mission Directorates Advanced Capabilities Division (ACD) provides the knowledge, technology, and innovation that
will enable current and future exploration missions. ACD is composed of three
major programs: the Lunar Precursor Robotic Program (LPRP), Human Research Program (HRP), and the Exploration Technology Development Program
(ETDP). Some of that research is performed on the International Space Station.
According to NASA, these ACD programs and their projects provide knowledge
as a result of ground-based research and technology development, research conducted in space, and observations from robotic flight missions. ACD also develops and matures advanced technology, integrates that technology into
pi1ototype systems, and transitions knowledge and technology to the Constellation program. Through its activities, NASA says that ACD provides operational
and technical risk mitigation for Constellation Projects.
Science. Technology development is conducted in the Science Mission Directorate (SMD) in conjunction with individual mission development activities. For
example, NASA took additional time and resources to mature several critical
technologies needed by the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST). The JWST
contains several innovations, including lightweight optics, a deployable
sunshield, and a folding segmented mirror.
Although it is being terminated this fiscal year, SMD has also conducted technology development using the New Millennium Program (NMP) whose objective is
to flight-validate revolutionary spacecraft and instrument technologiesa capability
that could enhance the science return of future missions, while reducing their cost
and risk. Established in 1995, the purpose of NMP was to identify breakthrough
spacecraft and instrument technologies, accelerate the infusion of revolutionary
technologies into NASA science missions by validating them in the hazardous environment of space, and provide new and lower cost capabilities for Earth and space
science missions by reducing the risks to the first users. Validation is needed because, as missions become progressively more difficult, more advanced capabilities
are needed, thus opening new, untried technologies to be used for the first time on
complex exploration missions. The program consisted of a series of Deep-Space and
Earth Orbiting missions that were technology-driven, in contrast to the more traditional science-driven space exploration missions of the past. The first NMP Deep
Space mission, DS1, was launched on October 24, 1998. Since that time, NASA successfully validated a solar-powered ion propulsion system, a miniaturized deep space
transponder, autonomous operations and navigation software, and other capabilities.
NMP funding was eliminated from the FY2009 budget, effectively leading to the
programs cancellation.
Aeronautics Research. In contrast to technology development in exploration
and science where the recipient of the work is almost exclusively a NASA program or mission, technology development in aeronautics benefits a wide range
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of entities. The Aeronautics Research Mission directorate (ARMD) supports a
very broad spectrum of R&D activity and not merely along the continuum of
basic through applied research, development, prototyping, and testing. As was
noted by the 2006 NRC report on Aeronautics Innovation: NASAs Challenges
and Opportunities, ARMD has no institutional responsibility, resources, or capacity to directly implement technologies that the program develops except in
unique prototypes or demonstration vehicles. Rather, implementation in public
or commercial systems is dependent on a host of other stakeholders. The NRC
also noted that the constraints on NASAs aeronaut1cs program budget have
direct and indirect bearings on innovation, adding further that Several participants in the committees workshops expressed the concern that too many
NASA aeronautics projects stopped short of full demonstration of their technical success and utility to users. Experience shows that a potential innovation
must be reduced to practice in the complex environment in which it will function before it will be accepted as credible and adopted by the target user community). Such demonstrations in aeronautics often require large expenditures,
as has been amply demonstrated by prior NASA and DOD advanced technology demonstrations. The costs of such demonstration programs normally
amount to hundreds of millions of dollars. A major part of these demonstration costs is attributable to the systems phenomenon described earlierunless
the technology can be shown to perform as part of the highly integrated system
in which it will be used, the prospective user community is likely to discount
it. In NASAs FY 2010 budget requests, the agency proposes to complement
its fundamental aeronautics research with systems level research starting
with the Environmentally Responsible Aviation (ERA) project.
Innovative Partnerships Program. According to NASA, its Innovative Partnerships Program (IPP) provides the organizational structure for acquiring, maturing, infusing and commercial technology and capabilities for the agencys
Mission Directorates, programs and projects through vestments and partnerships with industry, academia, government agencies and National Laboratories. As such, IPP facilitates both technology infusion and technology transfer. NASA says that in addition to leveraging technology investments, dualuse technology-related partnerships, and technology solutions for NASA, IPP
enables cost avoidance, and accelerates technology maturation. According to
NASA, it uses several elements for doing that, namely Technology Infusion
(using the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program, the Small
Business Technology Transfer (STTR) program, and the IPP Seed Fund), Innovation Incubator (which includes prize competitions such as Centennial
Challenges), and Partnership Development. In its Fiscal Year 2010 budget
submission justification, NASA says that in FY 10, NASAs SBIR/STTR programs will continue to provide high-priority technology needs for NASA with
specific technology needs developed in close coordination with NASAs Mission
Directorates and other NASA-wide efforts to determine priorities for future
technology requirements.
Mr. Christopher Scolese, NASAs Associate Administrator, can provide additional
details at the hearing on the agencys technology development initiatives.
V. Authorizing Legislation
NASAs past two authorizations included reference to technology development.
NASA Authorization Act of 2005
P.L. 109155 [Sec. 421] authorized the NASA Administrator to establish aeronautics research and development initiatives to develop and demonstrate, in a relevant environment, technologies that would enable improvements in several commercial aircraft performance characteristics, namely noise, energy consumption, and
emissions. The Act also authorized the Administrator to (1) develop and demonstrate, in a relevant environment, airframe and propulsion technologies to enable
efficient, economical overland flight of supersonic civil transport aircraft with no significant impact on the environment; (2) establish rotorcraft initiatives that improve
safety, noise, and environmental impact; (3) conduct hypersonics research with the
objective of exploring the science and technology of hypersonic flight using airbreathing propulsion concepts, through a mix of theoretical work, basic and applied
research, and development of flight research demonstration vehicles; (4) develop revolutionary aeronautical concepts with the intent of pushing technology barriers beyond current subsonic technology; (5) conduct fuel cell-powered aircraft research;
and (6) establish a program to conduct Mars aircraft research that would develop
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and test concepts for an uncrewed aircraft that could operate for sustained periods
in the atmosphere of Mars.
NASA Authorization Act of 2008
The NASA Authorization Act of 2008 [P.L. 110-422] emphasized long-team technology development in NASA. Specifically, Sec. 2 of the Act stated that NASA
should make a sustained commitment to a robust long-term technology development
activity. Such investments represent the critically important seed corn on which
NASAs ability to carry out challenging and productive missions in the future will
depend.
Specific to technology development in exploration, the Sec. 405 of the Act stated
that a robust program of long-term exploration related technology research and development will be essential for the success and sustainability of any enduring initiative of human and robotic exploration of the solar system. The Act also directed the
NASA Administrator to carry out a program of long-term exploration-related technology research and development, including such things as in-space propulsion,
power systems, life support, and advanced avionics that are not tied to specific flight
projects. The program shall have the funding goal of ensuring that the technology
research and development can be completed in a timely manner in order to support
the safe, successful, and sustainable exploration, of the solar system. In addition, in
order to ensure that the broadest range of innovative concepts and technologies are
captured, the long-term technology program shall have the goal of having a significant portion of its funding available for external grants and contracts with universities, research institutions, and industry.
With regards to technology development in science missions, Sec. 501 of the Act
directed the Administrator to establish an in a-Directorate long-term technology development program for space and Earth science within the Science Mission Directorate for the development of new technology. The program shall be independent of
the flight projects under development. NASA shall have a goal of funding the intraDirectorate technology development program at a level of 5 percent of the total
Science Mission Directorate annual budget. The program shall be structured to include competitively awarded grants and contracts.
VI. NRC Reviews of Technology Development in NASA
Advanced technology development at NASA has been analyzed in several reports
and surveys conducted by the National Academies National Research Council.
NRCs Report Fostering Visions for the Future: A Review of the NASA Institute for
Advanced Concepts
Congress directed the NRC to conduct a review of the effectiveness of the NASA
Institute for Advanced Concepts (NIAC) and to make recommendations concerning
the importance of such a program to NASA and to the nation as a whole, including
the proper role of NASA and the Federal Government in fostering scientific innovation and creativity and in developing advanced concepts for future systemsNASA
formed NIAC in 1998 to provide an independent source of advanced aeronautical
and space concepts that could dramatically impact how NASA develops and conducts its missions. The institute was terminated in 2007.
The NRC report, entitled Fostering Visions for the Future: A Review of the NASA
Institute for Advanced Conceits, was released on August 7, 2009. The Committee to
Review the NASA Institute for Advanced Concepts found the NIAC to be effective
in developing revolutionary advanced concepts and stated:
Until August 2007, NIAC provided an independent open forum, a high-level
point of entry to NASA for an external community of innovators, and an external
capability for analysis and definition of advanced aeronautics and space concepts to complement the advanced concept activities conducted within NASA.
Throughout its 9-year existence, NIAC inspired an atmosphere for inn, ovation
that stretched the imagination and encouraged creativity. Utilizing an open,
Web-based environment to conduct solicitations, perform peer review, administer
grant awards, and publicize its activities, this small program succeeded in fostering a community of external innovators to investigate advanced concepts that
might have a significant impact on future NASA missions in a 10 to 40 year
time frame. Funded at approximately $4 million per year, NIAC received a total
of $36.2 million in NASA funding, more than 75 percent of which was used directly for grants. NIAC received more than 1300 proposals and awarded 168
grants, for a total of $27.3 million. There were 126 Phase I grants awarded for
6 months of initial study. Upon successful completion of Phase I and based on
the continued promise of the advanced concept, 42 Phase II grants were awarded
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by NIAC for 2 years of additional concept maturation. Many NIAC grantees
went on to receive additional funding for continued development of their concept
from NASA, other government agencies, or private industry. In addition to developing revolutionary advanced concepts, NIAC increased public interest in science
and engineering and provided motivation to the nations youth to study technical
subjects.
However, the NRC report said that frequent organizational changes, the last of
which placed the NIAC in a mission directorate where mission objectives were not
well aligned, preceded termination of the activity:
Originally conceived as reporting to the agencys chief technologist so that infusion across all NASA enterprises could be assured, NIAC operated in an environment of frequent NASA organizational changes. In 2004, NASA management of
NIAC was transferred to the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate, where it
was not well aligned with its sponsors near-term mission objectives. NIAC was
terminated in 2007.
In the course of its review, the committee found:
The NIAC program to be effective in achieving its mission and accomplishing
its stated goals. At present, there is no NASA organization responsible for solicitation, evaluation, and maturation of advanced concepts, defined as those
at technology readiness level (TRL) 1 or 2, or responsible for subsequent infusion of worthy candidate concepts into NASA planning and development activities. Testimony from several sectors confirmed that NASA and the nation
must maintain a mechanism to investigate visionary, far-reaching advanced
concepts in order to achieve NASAs mission. [The measurement of Technology Readiness Levels (TRL) is used by NASA and other agencies to assess
the maturity of evolving technologies prior to incorporating that technology
into a system or subsystem. For example, at the TRL 3 level, active research
and development (R&D) is initiated. This must include both analytical studies
to set the technology into an appropriate context and laboratory-based studies
to physically validate that the analytical predictions are correct. In contrast,
a TRL 7 level requires an actual system prototype demonstration in a space
environment, a much higher level of maturity.]
When it was formed, NIAC was to be managed by a high-level agency executive concerned with the objectives and needs of all NASA enterprises and missions. The committee found that NIAC was most successful as a program with
cross-cutting applicability to NASAs enterprises and missions. When it was
transferred to a mission-specific directorate, NIAC lost its alignment with
sponsor objectives and priorities.
While NIACs internet-based technical review and management processes were
found to be effective and should be continued in NIAC2 [the NRCs characterization of a follow-on effort], the committee found a few policies that may have
hastened NIACs demise. Key among these was (1) the complete focus on revolutionary advanced concepts and (2) the exclusion of NASA personnel from
participation in NIAC awards or research teams. NIACs focus on revolutionary advanced concepts with a time horizon of 10 to 40 years in the future
often put its projects too far out of alignment with the nearer-term 1orizons
of the NASA mission directorates, thereby diminishing the potential for infusion into NASA mission plans.
NIAC was formed to provide an independent, open forum for the external
analysis and definition of space and aeronautics advanced concepts to complement the advanced concepts activities conducted within NASA; hence, NIAC
solicitations were closed to NASA participants. NIAC was formed at a time
when there was adequate funding for development of novel, long-term ideas internal to NASA. As internal funding for advanced concepts and technology diminished or became more focused on flight-system development am( operations, the cultural disconnect between the development activities internal and
external to the agency grew, and transitioning of NIAC concepts to the NASA
miss-on directorates became more difficult.
That 14 NIAC Phase I and Phase II projects, which were awarded $7 million
by NIAC, received an additional $23.8 million in funding from a wide range
of organizations, demonstrating the significance of the nations investment in
NIACs advanced concepts. NIAC matured 12 of the 42 Phase II advanced concepts (29 percent), as measured by receipt of post-NIAC funding; 9 of them (21
percent) received post-NIAC funding from NASA itself. The committee also
found that three NIAC Phase II efforts (7 percent of the Phase II awards) ap-
10
pear to have impacted NASAs long-term plans, and two of these efforts have
either already been incorporated or are currently under consideration by the
NRC Astronomy and Astrophysics Decadal Survey as future NASA missions.
In addition, the committee received much testimony that the potential for receipt of a NIAC Phase III award is needed to aid the transition of the most
highly promising projects.
A persistent NIAC challenge was the lack of a NASA interface to receive the
hand-off of promising project.
The committee recommended that:
NASA should reestablish a NIAC-like entity, referred to in this report as
NIAC2, to seek out visionary, far-reaching, advanced concepts with the potential of significant benefit to accomplishing relevant to NASAs charter and to
begin the process of maturing these advanced concepts for infusion into
NASAs missions.
NIAC2 should report to the Office of the Administrator, be outside mission
directorates, and be chartered to address NASA-wide mission and technology
needs. To increase NIAC2s relevance, NASA mission directorates should contribute thematic areas for consideration The committee also recommends that
a NIAC2 organization should be funded and administered separately from
NASA development programs, mission directorates, and institutional constraints. Future NIAC2 proposal opportunities should continue to be managed
and peer-reviewed outside the agency.
NIAC2 should expand its scope to include concepts that are scientifically
and/or technically innovative and have the potential to provide major benefit
to a future NASA mission in 10 years and beyond.
Future NIAC2 proposal opportunities be open to principal investigators or
teams both internal and external to NASA.
Future NIAC2 proposal opportunities include the potential selection of a
small number of Phase III proof of concept awards for up to $5 million each
for 4 years to demonstrate and resolve fundamental feasibility issues and that
such awards be selected jointly by NIAC2 and NSA management.
NASA consider reestablishing an aeronautics and space systems technology
development enterprise. Its purpose would be to provide maturation opportunities and agency expertise for visionary, far-reaching concepts and technologies.
Identification of center technical champions and provision for the technical
participation of NASA field center personnel in NIAC2 efforts. Participation of
NASA personnel can be expected to increase as NIAC2 projects mature.
In its concluding remarks, the committees report stated:
The termination of NIAC reflects a larger issue within NASA related to the
demise of advanced concepts and technology development programs throughout
the agency. To effectively infuse advanced concepts into its future systems,
NASA needs to become an organization that values and nurtures the creation
and maturation of advanced aeronautics and space concepts. Working for
NASA, NIAC helped serve this advanced concepts need for almost 10 years
and demonstrated its success in creating a community of innovators focused
on advanced concepts that may impact future NASA missions. NIAC2 can look
out for advanced concepts beyond the current development programs. It can
work on the edges where requirements are not yet known, focused on what program managers would want if they knew that they needed it. However, this
independent organization that nurtures technology push must also be balanced
by a meaningful program of technology pull from the mission directorates,
running in parallel and focused on nearer-term phased activities. Towards
this objective, the committee recommends that NASA consider reestablishing
an aeronautics and space systems technology development enterprise. Its purpose would be to provide maturation opportunities and agency expertise for visionary, far-reaching concepts and technologies. NASAs considerations should
include implications for the agencys strategic plan, organizations, resource
distributions, field center foci, and mission selection process. The technology
development approaches used by other Federal agencies can serve as a benchmark in this examination.
Dr. Robert D. Braun, Co-Chair of the Committee to Review the NASA Institute
for Advanced Concepts which produced this report, will be a witness at the hearing
and can provide additional details on the committees review.
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NRCs Report Americas Future in Space: Aligning the Civil Space Program with National Needs
The NRC recently released a report recommending a series of measures to better
align the civil space program with national needs. The report, prepared under the
oversight of both the NRCs Space Studies Board and Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board, is entitled Americas Future In Space: Aligning The Civil Space Program With National Needs. To contribute to realizing national objectives such as
Providing clean and affordable energy and Protecting the environment now and
for future generations, the Committee on the Rationale and Goals of the U.S. Civil
Space Program identified four foundational elements it viewed as critical to a purposeful, effective, strategic U.S. space program, without which U.S. space efforts will
lack robustness, realism, sustainability, and affordability. These are:
1. Coordinated national strategieimplementing national space policy coherently across all civilian agencies in support of national needs and priorities
and aligning attention to shared interests of civil and national security space
activities.
2. A competent technical workforcesufficient in size, talent, and experience to
address difficult and pressing challenges.
3. An effectively sized and structured infrastructurerealizing synergy from the
public and private sectors and from international partnerships.
4. A priority investment in technology and innovationstrengthening and sustaining the U.S. capacity to meet national needs through transformational advances.
The foundational element citing investment in technology and innovation led to
a committee recommendation on advanced space technology. The report recommended that NASA should revitalize its advanced technology development program by establishing a DARPA-like organization within NASA as a priority mission
area to support preeminent civil, national security (if dual-use), and commercial
space programs.
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency is the central high-risk, highreward research and development organization for the Department of Defense. Established as a DOD agency in 1958, DARPA fund researchers in industry, universities, government laboratories and elsewhere to conduct high-risk, high-reward research and development projects that will benefit U.S. national security. The agencys research runs the gamut from conducting basic, fundamental scientific investigations in a laboratory setting to building full-scale prototypes of military systems.
At the Space and Aeronautics Subcommittees hearing on External Perspectives on
the FY 2010 NASA Budget Request and Related Issues held on June 18, 2009, Dr.
Raymond Colladay, Vice Chair of the committee that authored the report, advocated
for a focused, risk reduction technology program in NASA. In his prepared statement, he stated:
Aeronautics is underfunded, but a broad based, innovative advanced space technology development program that is organizationally independent of ongoing
hardware development programs is nonexistent. The downward trend started
soon after aeronautics and space technology, once logically managed together,
were split apart. A decision soon followed to focus technology specifically on
major development program needs by moving the resources to mission areas it
intended to serve. Predictably, once all technology development was placed with
the major development efforts it became near-term oriented as a risk reduction
effort back-stopping hardware development. The Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board sponsored study on the Exploration Technology Development Program for Constellation done last year expressed concern on just that point of the
need for more emphasis on longer-term research. With budget and schedule pressures as demanding as ever, the situation has not improved. Clearly, there is a
need for focused, risk-reduction technology that is defined by explicit mission requirements and funded by the mission office, but it does not fill the need for the
agency on a broader level to pursue long-term technology push well out in front
of requirements and broad in scope supporting civil (not just NASA) and commercial space. An agency that has inspired us with bold missions and spectacular accomplishments needs to be investing in technology that continually seeks
to transform state-of-the-art capabilities and enable future missions that some
day we may want to do, if we only knew how.
In his prepared statement, Dr. Colladay called on NASA to revitalize its advanced
space technology development program:
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NASA should revitalize advanced space technology development as a priority
mission area of the agency. It should engage the best science and engineering talent in the country wherever it resides in universities, industry, NASA centers or
other government labs focused on world-class research and innovation and not
driven by the need to maintain ten healthy centers. It should support not only
future NASA missions, but other government agencies and commercial space.
The customers for its technology products would be industry, NASA itself;
other government agencies like NOAA, and military space where dual-use technology is applicable. Having this broad mandate would make it similar in the
breadth of customers served to the NASA role in aeronautics with its heritage
in NACA going back almost a century.
The responsibility to provide for this advanced technology base for civil space activities rests with NASA, in partnership with universities, other government
agencies, and industry. The customers for the products of technology are
NASA, NOAA, industry, and military space programs in which multiple-use
technology is applicable. Because of budget pressures and institutional priorities,
however, NASA has largely abandoned its role in supporting the broad portfolio
of civil space applications, and the space technology base has thus been allowed
to erode and is now deficient. The former NASA advanced technology development program no longer exists. Most of what remained was moved to the Constellation Program and has become oriented specifically to risk reduction supporting the ongoing internal development program.
To fulfill NASAs broader mandate, an independent advanced technology development effort is required, much like that accomplished by DARPA in the DOD,
focused not so much on technology that todays program managers require, but
on what future program managers would wish they could have if they knew they
needed it, or would want if they knew they could have it. This effort should engage the best science and engineering talent in the country wherever it resides
in universities, industry, NASA centers, or other government laboratoriesindependent of pressures to sustain competency at the NASA centers. A DARPA-like
organization established within NASA should report to NASAs Administrator,
be independent of ongoing NASA development programs, and focus on supporting the broad civil space portfolio through the competitive funding of worldclass technology and innovation projects at universities, federally funded research and development centers, government research laboratories, and NASA
centers.
Dr. Colladay will be a witness at todays hearing and can provide additional details on the committees review. Furthermore, as a former head of DARPA, he can
provide insight into that agencys past activities.
NRCs Report A Constrained Space Exploration Technology Program
In January 2004, President George W. Bush announced the nations new space
policy by issuing the Vision for Space Exploration (VSE), which instructed NASA
to extend human presence across the solar system, starting with a human return to
the Moon by the year 2020, in preparation for human exploration of Mars and other
destinations. NASA was also directed to develop the innovative technologies, knowledge, and infrastructures both to explore and to support decisions about the destinations for human exploration, among other objectives. In response to the direction
regarding the development of innovative technologies, NASA focused its resources
on maturing the technologies necessary for exploration. NASAs Exploration Technology Development Program (ETDP) was implemented to support, develop, and ultimately provide the necessary technologies for the agencys Constellation flight program.
The NRCs Committee to Review NASAs Exploration Technology Development Program was asked to perform an independent assessment of NASAs Exploration Technology Development Program (ETDP) and to offer findings and recommendations related to the relevance of ETDP research to the objectives of the Vision for Space Exploration, to any gaps in the ETDP research portfolio, and to the quality of ETDP
research.
In its report entitled A Constrained Space Exploration Technology Program: A Review of NASAs Exploration Technology Development Program released in 2008, the
committee stated it found the ETDP to be making progress toward the stated goals
of technology development. However, the committee also found the technology development program to be operating within significant constraints that limit its ability
to successfully accomplish those goals. The constraints include the still-dynamic nature of the Constellation Program requirements, the constraints imposed by a limited
13
budget, the aggressive time-scale of early technology deliverables, and the desire
within NASA to fully employ the NASA workforce.
The report noted the limitations in scope of the technology development program:
Because of the constraints cited above, the ETDP as created by NASA is a supporting technology program very closely coupled to the near-term needs of the
Constellation Program. The ETDP is focused on only incremental gains in capability, and it has two programmatic gaps (integration of the human system, and
nuclear thermal propulsion). NASA has in effect suspended research in a number of technology areas traditionally within the agencys scope and has in many
areas essentially ended support for longer-term technology research traditionally
carried out within NASA and with strong university collaboration. These actions
could have important consequences for aspects of the VSE beyond the initial,
short-duration lunar missions-including an extended human presence on the
Moon and human exploration of Mars and beyond.
The findings in the report associated with advanced technology development included the following:
The range of technologies covered in the 22 ETDP projects will, in principle,
enable many of the early endeavors currently imagined in NASAs Exploration
Systems Architecture Study architecture, but not the entire VSE. In examining
the projects and the scope of the ETDP, the committee found two significant
technology gaps and also identified several crosscutting issues that are characteristic of many of the 22 ETDP projects or of the overall management of
the ETDP. A fundamental concern that reflects all of these issues is that the
ETDP is currently focused on the short-term challenges of the VSE and is addressing the near-term technologies needed to meet these challenges. Although
it is clear that much of this focus results from the constraints on the program,
the committee is concerned that the short-term approach characteristic of the
current ETDP will have long-term consequences and result in compromised
long-term decisions. Extensibility to longer lunar missions and to human exploration of Mars is at risk in the current research portfolio.
The ETDP has become NASAs principal space technology program. It is
highly focused and is structured as a supporting technology program to the
Constellation Program, designed to advance technologies at TRL 3 and above
toward TRL 6.
Because of this shift toward the relatively mature end of the technology investment spectrum, which is very closely coupled to the near-term needs of the
Constellation Program, NASA has also in effect suspended research in a number of technology areas traditionally within the agencys scope, and it has in
many areas essentially ended support for longer-term (TRL 12) technology research.
Although the ETDP has a well-conceived process for managing the programmatic risk of its own technology development, the committee found a lack
of clarity in the way that the ETDP accounts for the contributions of its technology developments to reducing exploration (i.e., Constellation) program risk
to reducing operational and human health risks, and to considering humandesign-factor issues in operations.
While the ETDP has a good administrative process for determining the formal mechanics of technology transfer, it could improve the effectiveness of the
human side of the process by reviewing and adopting effective practice in this
area, with the objective of developing a methodology of technology transfer
from the development project to the flight project that ensures the successful
infusion of the technology.
The ETDP is currently focused on technologies at or above TRL 3, a focus
driven by the need to bring together all of the available resources of NASA to
reduce nearer-term Constellation mission risk and at the same time reduce potential Constellation Program schedule slippages within the assigned budget
profile.
Most ETDP projects represent incremental gains in capability, which is not
inconsistent with the focus on projects at TRL 3 and above. NASA has largely
ended investments in longer-term space technologies that will enable later
phases of the VSE, allow technology to support decisions about ... destinations, in the words of the VSE, and in general preserve the technology leadership of the United States. In assessing the balance between near-term and far-
14
term technology investments, the committee found that the current balance of
the ETDP is too heavily weighted toward near-term investments.
The committee recommended that:
Managers in the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate and Exploration
Technology Development Program should review and carefully consider the
committees ratings of the individual ETDP projects and should develop and
implement a plan to improve each project to a level that would be rated by
a subsequent review as demonstrating appropriate capabilities and quality,
accomplishment, and plan.
Exploration Technology Development Program (ETDP) project managers
should clearly identify the interrelationships between human health and
human factor risks and requirements on the one hand and technology development on the other and should ensure that those risks and requirements are addressed in their project plans. Each ETDP project manager should be able to
show clearly where that project fits within the integrated Exploration Systems
Mission Directorate Advanced Capabilities Program (which includes the
ETDP, the Lunar Precursor Robotic Program, and the Human Research Program), and this integrated program plan should include all elements necessary
to achieve the Vision for Space Exploration.
Exploration Technology Development Program (ETDP) project managers
should systematically include representatives of the Human Research Program
on the ETDP technology development teams.
The Exploration Technology Development Program should initiate a technology project to evaluate experimentally candidate nuclear thermal rocket
(NTR) fuels for materials and thermal characteristics. Using these data, the
Exploration Systems Mission Directorate should assess the potential benefit of
using an NTR for lunar missions and should continue to assess the impact
on Mars missions.
The Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (EMSD) should review its process for the management of technology development to ensure the timely delivery
of technologies for seamless integration into its flight programs. In particular,
the ESMD should (1) review and incorporate the considerable expertise in the
management and transfer of technology in the larger aerospace, government,
and industrial communities; (2) strengthen its management approach by, for
instance, appointing a program-level system engineer to ensure that requirements are developed, maintained, and validated in a consistent and complete
manner across the entire program; and (3) address the following three issues
in particular: (a) the need for a careful assessment of the impact of its technologies on human and operational risk, (b) the need for definition and management of technology requirements, and (c) the importance of recognizing the
human elements in the eventual effective transfer and infusion of technology.
The Exploration Systems Mission Directorate should identify longer-term technology needs for the wider Vision for Space Exploration (VSE) that cannot be
met by the existing projects in the Exploration Technology Development Program (ETDP) portfolio, which are currently at technology readiness level
(TRL) 3 or above. To meet longer-term technology needs, the committee recommends that the ETDP seed lower-TRL concepts that target sustainability
and extensibility to long-term lunar and Mars missions, thus opening the TRL
pipeline, re-engaging the academic community, and beginning to incorporate
the innovation in technology development that will be necessary to complete the
VSE.
The Exploration Technology Development Program should institute external
advisory teams for each project that (I) undertake a serious examination of potential external collaborations and identify those that could enhance project efficiency, (2) conduct peer review of existing internal activities, and (3) participate in a number of significant design reviews for the project.
The Exploration Systems Mission Directorate should implement cooperative research programs that support the Exploration Technology Development Program (ETDP) mission with qualified university, industry, or national laboratory researchers, particularly in low-technology-readiness-level projects. These
programs should both support the ETDP mission and develop a pipeline of
qualified and inspired future NASA personnel to ensure the long-term sustainability of U.S. leadership in space exploration.
The Exploration Systems Mission Directorate should evaluate its test capabilities and develop a comprehensive overall integrated test and validation plan
15
for all Exploration Technology Development Program (ETDP) projects. All
ETDP projects should be reviewed for the absence of key tests (ground and/
or flight), especially those that are required to advance key technologies to technology readiness level (TRL) 6. Where new facilities or flight tests are required,
conceptual designs for the facilities or flight tests should be developed in order
to establish plans and resource requirements needed to include the necessary
testing in all ETDP projects.
NRCs Report NASAs Beyond Einstein Program: An Architecture for Implementation
NRC released a report in September 2007 entitled NASAs Beyond Einstein Program: An Architecture for Implementation. Prompted by Congress and the Office of
Science and Technology Policy, NASA and the Department of Energy asked the committee to assess the five proposed mission concepts for achieving the goals of the
Beyond Einstein space-based physics research initiative, and recommend one for
first development and launch.
As part of its charge, the committee was tasked with determining the realism of
preliminary technology and management plans, and cost estimates of the candidate
Beyond Einstein mission set. Five mission areasJoint Dark Energy Mission, Black
Hole Finder Probe, Inflation Probe, and Einstein Great Observatoriescomprised 11
mission candidates. Criteria used by the committee included plans for the maturing
of critical mission technology, technical performance margins, schedule margins,
risk-mitigation plans, and the proposals estimated costs versus independent probable cost estimates prepared by the committee.
The committee worked with an experienced outside contractor to develop independent cost estimates and a probable cost range for each candidate mission. The
probable cost ranges were also compared with those of previous missions of similar
scope and complexity. In all cases, the committee found higher costs and longer
schedules than those estimated by the mission teams. The committee observed that
this is typical of the differences between the estimates developed by mission teams
and by independent cost estimators at this early stage of a program. Given the long
history of missions comparable to the Beyond Einstein mission candidates, the committee said that it believed that the most realistic cost range for each of these missions is significantly more than the current estimates provided by the research
teams.
In discussing its assessment of mission readiness, the committee stressed the importance of technology readiness as a key consideration in the decision to proceed
to mission development. The committee said that ideally, mission development
should not commence until all new technologies necessary for mission success have
reached a certain level of technology readiness. Experience has shown, the committee added, that NASA and other missions pay the price when a mission enters
development prematurely.
NRCs Decadal Surveys of Science Missions
The four completed decadal surveys established by the NRC to recommend ground
and space-based programs in Science missions for the next decadein the areas of
astronomy and astrophysics, solar and space physics research, solar system exploration, and Earth science research and applicationsstrongly endorsed the need for
technology development to enable future missions.
Astronomy and Astrophysics in the New Millennium
With regard to the importance of investing in technology, this decadal survey,
completed in 2001, stated that:
Technological innovation has often enabled astronomical discovery. Most of the
major discoveries listed at the beginning of this chapter were possible only because of the remarkable advances in technology in the past two decades. Continued investment in technology in this decade is required for many of the initiatives recommended in this report.
It is essential to maintain funding for the planned technology development if
NASA is to keep these missions on schedule and within budget. Targeted technology programs involving a joint effort between engineers and scientists will be
essential to success in these projects. As noted above, the committee endorses
NASAs policy of completing the technological development of a mission prior to
starting it.
Longer-range investments in technology in this decade are needed to enable the
major projects in the next decade-and to make them more cost-effective.
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The Sun to the Earthand Beyond: A Decadal Research Strategy in Solar and
Space Physics
Completed in 2003, this decadal survey recommended that NASA:
Assign high priority to the development of advanced propulsion and power
technologies required for the exploration of the outer planets, the inner and
outer heliosphere, and the local interstellar medium. Such technologies include
solar sails, space nuclear power systems, and high-efficiency solar arrays.
Equally high priority should be given to the development of lower-cost launch
vehicles for Explorer-class missions and to the reopening of the radioisotope
thermoelectric generator (RTG) production line.
Continue to give high priority to the development and testing of advanced
spacecraft technologies through such programs as the New Millennium Program and its advanced technology program.
Continue to assign high priority, through its recently established new instrument development programs, to supporting the development of advanced instrumentation for solar and space physics missions and programs.
Accelerate the development of command-and-control and data acquisition
technologies for constellation missions.
New Frontiers in the Solar System: An Integrated Exploration Strategy
With regards to technology development, this decadal survey, completed in 2003,
recommended that NASA:
Commit to significant new investments in advanced technology so that future
high-priority flight missions can succeed Unfortunately, erosion has occurred
in the level of investment in technology in the past several years. Flight-development costs have increased over projections, and investments in advanced
technologies have been redirected to maintain flight-mission development
schedules and performance. For most of the history of planetary exploration,
large-cost flight missions such as Voyager, Viking, Galileo, and Cassini have
carried a large portion of the technology-development burden in their development costs. During the change in the last decade to a larger number of lowercost flight missions, the consequent loss of technology development by large
missions was compensated by adding separate technology-development cost
lines to the planetary exploration portfolio, such as X2000 [NASAs X2000 Program was created in 1997 to infuse new technologies that would enable new,
lower-cost and higher-performance spacecraft], under an understood policy of
no mission start before its technological time. This mechanism was intended
to separate and remove the uncertainties in technological development from
early flight-development costs. However, flight-mission costs have been underestimated, and development plans have been too success-oriented, resulting in
erosion of technology-development lines by transfer to flight-development costs.
This trend needs to be reversed in order to realize the flight missions recommended in this report.
Earth Science and Applications from Space: National Imperatives for the Next Decade and Beyond
Relative to technology development, this decadal survey, completed in 2007, recommended that:
U.S. civil space agencies should aggressively pursue technology development
that supports the missions recommended in the survey; plan for transitions
to continue demonstrably useful research observations on a sustained, or operational, basis; and foster innovative space-based concepts. In particular:
NASA should increase investment in both mission focused and cross-cutting technology development to decrease technical risk in the recommended
missions andpromote cost reduction across multiple missions. Early technology focused investments through extended mission Phase A studies are
essential.
To restore more frequent launch opportunities and to facilitate the demonstration of innovative ideas and higher-risk technologies, NASA should
create a new Venture class of low-cost research and application missions
(100 million to $200 million). These missions should focus on fostering
revolutionary innovation and on training future leaders of space-based
Earth science and applications.
17
NOAA [National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration] should increase investment in identifying and facilitating the transition of demonstrably useful research observations to operational use.
The Venture class of missions, in particular, would replace and be very different
from the current ESSP mission line, which is increasingly a competitive means
for implementing NASAs strategic missions. Priority would be given to cost-effective, innovative missions rather than those with excessive scientific and technological requirements. The Venture class could include stand-alone missions
that use simple, small instruments, spacecraft, and launch vehicles; more complex instruments of opportunity flown on partner spacecraft and launch vehicles;
or complex sets of instruments flown on suitable suborbital platforms to address
focused sets of scientific questions. These missions could focus on establishing
new research avenues or on demonstrating key application-oriented measurements. Key to the success of such a program will be maintaining a steady stream
of opportunities for community participation in the development of innovative
ideas, which requires that strict schedule and cost guidelines be enforced for the
program participants.
NRCs Decadal Survey of Civil Aeronautics
The idea of conducting a decadal survey of aeronautics originated in discussions
among NRCs Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board, the Office of Management
and Budget, and congressional committees with an interest in civil aviation. As a
result, the Congress and NASA requested NRC to undertake a decadal survey of
civil aeronautics research and technology (R&T) priorities that would help NASA
fulfill its responsibility to preserve U.S. leadership in aeronautics technology. Issued
in 2006, the resultant report presented a set of strategic objectives for the next decade of R&T and provided a set of high-priority R&T challengescharacterized by
five common themesfor both NASA and non-NASA researchers, and an analysis
of key barriers that must be overcome to reach the strategic objectives.
The report encouraged NASA to closely coordinate and cooperate with other public
and private organizations to take advantage of advances in cross-cutting technology
funded by Federal agencies and private industry and to develop each new technology to a level of readiness that is appropriate for that technology, given that industrys interest in continuing the development of new technologies varies depending on urgency and expected payoff.
18
Chairwoman GIFFORDS. The hearing will now come to order.
Good morning, everyone. I would like to welcome all of our witnesses here today. We look forward to your testimony and are so
pleased that you are here with us.
Today is a very busy day on the Hill, and I am going to try to
be brief in my opening so that we will have as much time as possible for discussion. However, I think it is important to note right
at the outset that based on all of our witnesses testimony there is
an agreement on the importance of a vital and robust technology
development program at NASA and a need to revitalize NASAs existing technology development activities.
And I think it is fair to say that all three would likely agree that
NASA has been under-investing in technology development in recent years. Given that two of our witnesses represent distinguished
committees of the National Academies and the third is one of the
most senior officials at NASA, I think those views warrant our
close attention.
Yet to some extent our witnesses are preaching to the choir
today. This subcommittee has been concerned for some time about
the state of NASAs long-term technology programs, and we highlighted the need for action in last years NASAs Reauthorization
Act. To quote finding number ten from that act, NASA should
make a sustained commitment to a robust, long-term technology
development activity. Such investments represent critically important seed corn on which NASAs ability to carry out challenging
and productive missions in the future will depend.
I would also note that the summary report of the Augustine
Panel that has been reviewing NASAs human spaceflight plans
also acknowledged the importance of technology development. And
I quote from them. The committee strongly believes it is time for
NASA to reassume its critical role for developing new technologies
for space.
That is a sentiment on the Augustine Panel which I believe that
we all heartedly concur. NASAs technology development activities
are critical not just to NASAs future but to the quality of life for
all of our citizens and for our Nations competitiveness.
Discussions of technology development can wind up sounding
pretty wonky, so let me be clear why I think NASAs efforts are so
important and need to be supported. This is a photograph. Actually, we were having a recent discussion about this photograph. I
know that it is available on the NASA website. It is a picture of
a standard commercial airplane that I believe really makes a
strong point. As you look at it you will see some of the most major
systems and technologies from research undertaken or funded by
NASA. It is an aircraft that many members of Congress, actually
the majority of us, fly every single week to come here to work, and
yet I bet very few of them or even members of the public at large
recognize that NASA R&D has made this airplane and others possible.
This picture is just one illustration of the impact of NASAs research on our society and our economy. I have no doubt that each
of NASAs other enterprises could produce similar examples, and I
hope that they will because it is a story that needs to be told time
and time again. So I dont think any of the members here today
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need to be convinced that NASA should pursue a vigorous program
of technology development. Rather, we want to explore what it will
take to get such a revitalized program in place at the agency.
And in that regard I want to state my strong belief that we dont
revitalize technology development at NASA by robbing Peter to pay
Paul. That is carving out funding from an already under-funded
Constellation program so that the long-term technology program
can be augmented. I believe this would be penny wise and pound
foolish. You dont fix one under-funded program by taking money
from another under-funded program and expect anything good as
a result.
In addition, I suspect that there may not be a one-size-fits-all organizational structure for technology development at NASA, but I
want to hear from our witnesses on that topic, as I know that each
of them have been thinking a lot about this issue.
But it is not just a question of either money or how the organizational deck chairs are arranged. NASA has to be smart and opportunistic in seeking out ways to get its technologies out to the private sector and to other potential government users. That is probably a topic for its own hearing, but perhaps our witnesses here
today will have some thoughts on what NASA could possibly do in
that regard.
So I look forward to an interesting and informative discussion.
I will ask my colleagues today if we can please refrain from asking
our NASA witnesses about NASAs response to the Augustine
Panel, which is scheduled to be released later today. We know that
Mr. Scolese is not going to be able to make a comment at this
point, and we will have other opportunities in the future to get
NASAs perspective in the next coming weeks.
So with that again, I would like to welcome our witnesses.
[The prepared statement of Chairwoman Giffords follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT
OF
CHAIRWOMAN GABRIELLE GIFFORDS
Good morning. I want to welcome each of our witnesses to todays hearing.

We look forward to your testimony.
Today is a very busy day on the Hill, and I will be brief in my opening remarks
so that we have as much time as possible for discussion.
However, I think its important to note right at the outset that, based on their
written testimony, all three of our witnesses agree on the importance of a vital and
robust technology development program at NASA, and the need to revitalize NASAs
existing technology development activities.
And I think it is fair to say that all three would likely agree that NASA has been
under-investing in technology development in recent years.
Given that two of our witnesses represent distinguished committees of the National Academies, and the third is one of the most senior officials at NASA, I think
those views warrant our close attention.
Yet, to some extent, our witnesses are preaching to the choir today.
This Subcommittee has been concerned for some time about the state of NASAs
long-term technology programs, and we highlighted the need for action in last years
NASA Authorization Act.
To quote Finding #10 from that Act:
NASA should make a sustained commitment to a robust long-term technology
development activity. Such investments represent critically important seed
corn on which NASAs ability to carry out challenging and productive missions
in the future will depend.
I would also note that the summary report of the Augustine panel that has been
reviewing NASAs human space flight plans also acknowledged the importance of
technology development:
20
The Committee strongly believes it is time for NASA to reassume its crucial
role of developing new technologies for space.
That is a sentiment of the Augustine panel with which I heartily concur.
NASAs technology development activities are critical not just to NASAs future,
but to the quality of life of our citizens and our nations competitiveness.
Discussions of technology development can wind up sounding pretty wonky, so
let me be clear why I think NASAs efforts are so important and need to be supported.
Heres a picture of a standard commercial aircraft that I think makes my point.
As you look at it, you will see that almost all of its major systems and technologies came from research undertaken or funded by NASA.
Here is an aircraft that probably many Members of Congress get in several times
a week, and yet I bet very few of themor members of the public at largerecognize that NASA R&D made that plane possible.
And this picture is just one illustration of the impact of NASAs research on our
society and our economy.
I have no doubt that each of NASAs other enterprises could provide similar examples and I hope they willits a story that needs telling and re-telling.
So 1 dont think any of the Members here today need to be convinced that NASA
should pursue a vigorous program of technology development.
Rather, we want to explore what it will take to get such a revitalized program
in place at the agency.
In that regard, I want to state my strong belief that we dont revitalize technology
development at NASA by robbing Peter to pay Paul.
That is, carving out funding from an already underfunded Constellation program
so that the long-term technology program can be augmented would be penny-wise
and pound-foolishyou dont fix one underfunded program by taking funding from
another underfunded program and expect anything good to result.
In addition, I suspect that there may not be a one-size-fits-all organizational
structure for technology development at NASA, but I want to hear from our witnesses on that topic, as I know that each of them have been thinking a lot about
that issue.
But its not just a question of either money or how the organizational deck chairs
arearrangedNASA has to be smart and opportunistic in seeking out ways to get
its technologies out to the private sector and to other potential government users.
Thats probably a topic for a hearing in its own right, but perhaps our witnesses
here today will have some thoughts on what NASA might do.
Well, I look forward to an interesting and informative discussion today.
However, in that discussion, I would ask my colleagues to refrain from asking our
NASA witness about NASAs response to the report of the Augustine panel, which
is scheduled to bereleased today.
He is not going to be able to comment on the report at this point, and we will
have other opportunities to get NASAs perspectives on it in the coming weeks.
With that, I again want to welcome our witnesses, and Id now like to turn to Mr.
Olson for any opening remarks he might care to make.
Chairwoman GIFFORDS. And now I would like to turn to Mr.

Olson for any opening comments that he would like to make.
Mr. OLSON. Madam Chairwoman, thank you for calling this
mornings hearing to examine NASAs efforts to foster development
of advanced and innovative technologies. Let me begin by thanking
our witnesses for their appearance today before this subcommittee.
I recognize that each of you spent considerable time and effort preparing for this hearing, and in some cases traveling considerable
distances to be here. Please note that this committee appreciates
the subcommittee appreciates your efforts as well as the wisdom
and experience that you bring and that we will refer to your guidance in the months and years ahead.
In the publics mind NASA is synonymous with highly-innovative, cutting-edge technologies. NASA and its predecessor agency,
NACA [National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics], have
amassed a centurys worth of remarkable achievements that advance the state of the art in aeronautics and astronautics in many
21
extraordinary ways. Collectively, they have directly contributed to
this countrys high standard of living both in terms of directly contributing to a strong industrial base but also through the unanticipated use of technologies and new and creative applications developed by the private sector.
It would be difficult to catalog the number and scope of innovations and the technological spin-offs that have sprung from their
work. But suffice to say that the products springing from NASAs
technological genius permeates our daily lives, most notably the
transportation, communications, propulsion, and medical industries.
In recent years NASA has restructured the way it stimulates development of new technologies, moving away from an independent,
centralized office towards a diverse, less-structured effort influenced more by the needs of individual missions and programs.
Views expressed by the external science community seem to suggest that NASA ought to return to the former model.
I look forward to hearing from this mornings witnesses on the
most appropriate way to perpetuate NASAs record of technology
innovation and development. Issues I hope will be explored include
how to besthow best to broadly reach across the science and engineering communities, to stimulate, develop, and assess the most
creative needs, to what level of maturity should promising concepts
be funded, and how can the most promising technologies be transferred into specific agency projects and missions, as well as benefit
the commercial sector.
And one last issue. What is the best way to ensure that advanced
concepts and technology development efforts have the necessary
funding and management stability. I cant think of any other civilian federal agency that has done more to improve our Nations economic and technical prowess than NASA. And it is not because
NASA is in the business of advancing our social wellbeing. Rather
their technological discoveries and innovations developed in the
pursuit of challenging space and aeronautics missions have been
acquired and adapted by others in many creative products and
services. It is the genius of American people that has made taking
those products and turn them into something for our economy.
And before closing, I want to again recognize and thank Chris
Scolese for his long service and strong leadership at NASA.
Through the first half of this year you have led the agency during
an always-challenging period of transition between Administrations. Your steady hand and candor is appreciated by the Congress
and more importantly by the men and women who work at NASA.
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I yield back my time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Olson follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT
OF
REPRESENTATIVE PETE OLSON
Madam Chairwoman, thank you for calling this mornings hearing to examine
NASAs efforts to foster and manage the development of advanced and innovative
technologies.
Let me begin by thanking our witnesses for their appearance today before this
subcommittee. I recognize that each of you have spent considerable time and effort
preparing for this hearing, and in some cases traveling considerable distance to be
here. Please know that this subcommittee appreciates your efforts, as well as the
wisdom and experience that you bring, and that we will refer to your guidance in
the months and years ahead.
22
In the publics mind, NASA is synonymous with highly innovative, cutting edge
technologies. NASA and its predecessor agency, NACA, have amassed a centurys
worth of remarkable achievements that advanced the state of the art in aeronautics
and astronautics in many extraordinary ways. Collectively, they have directly contributed to this countrys high standard of living, both in terms of directly contributing to a strong industrial base, but also through the unanticipated use of technologies in new and creative applications developed by the private sector. It would
be difficult to catalog the number and scope of innovations, and the technological
spin-offs that have sprung from their work. But suffice it to say that the products
springing from NASAs technical genius permeates our daily lives, most notably in
the transportation, communications, propulsion, and medical industries.
In recent years NASA has restructured the way it stimulates the development of
new technologies, moving away from an independent, centralized office toward a diverse, less-structured effort influenced more by the needs of individual missions and
programs.
Views expressed by the external science community seem to suggest that NASA
ought to return to the former model.
I look forward to hearing from this mornings witnesses on the most appropriate
way to perpetuate NASAs enviable record of technology innovation and development. Issues I hope will be explored include how best to broadly reach across the
science and engineering communities to stimulate, develop and assess the most creative ideas; to what level of maturity should promising concepts be funded; and how
can the most promising technologies be transferred into specific agency projects and
missions, as well as benefit the commercial sector. And one last issue: What is the
best way to ensure that advanced concepts and technology development efforts have
the necessary funding and management stability?
I cant think of any other civilian federal agency that has done more to improve
our nations economic and technical prowess than NASA. And its not because NASA
is in the business of advancing our social well-being; rather, their technological discoveries and innovationsdeveloped in the pursuit of challenging space and aeronautics missionshave been acquired and adapted by others in many creative products and services.
Before closing, I want to again recognize and thank Chris Scolese for his long
service and strong leadership at NASA. Through the first half of this year he led
the agency during an always challenging period of transition between Administrations. His steady hand and candor was appreciated by Congress, and more importantly, by the men and women at NASA.
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I yield back my time.
Chairwoman GIFFORDS. Thank you, Mr. Olson. Very well said. I

am glad you are the Ranking Member. Is there anyone else that
would like to make an opening statement?
Mr. Wilson.
Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Chairman, Chairwoman Giffords.
Thank you for this important hearing, and thank you for the leadership that you have shown on Science and Technology.
NASAs efforts in the field of advanced concepts and technology
development have not only moved the field of space and aeronautics forward but have improved our lives through the use of satellite communications, space-based weather observations, and aviation navigation systems.
In this time of transition and budget constraints I believe it is
important that NASA continue to have a focus on the technologies
necessary for not just the next space mission but the missions that
are in our distant future.
Panelists, thank you for joining us today and providing your
opinions and expertise to this subcommittee. I look forward to
working with each of you, as well as my fellow committee members, as we seek to continue NASAs ability to explore the far
reaches of this universe and inspire our country.
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wilson follows:]
23
PREPARED STATEMENT
OF
REPRESENTATIVE CHARLES A. WILSON
Thank you Chairwoman Giffords for holding this importanthearing.

NASAs efforts in the field of advanced concepts and technology development have
not only moved the field of space and aeronautics forward, but have improved our
lives thoughthe use of satellite communication, spaced-based weather observations,
and aviation navigation systems. In this time of transition and budget constraints,
I believe it isimportant that NASA continue to have a focus on the technologies necessary for not just the next space mission, but the missions that are in the distant
future.
Panelists, thank you for joining us today and providing your opinions and expertise tothis Subcommittee. I look forward to working with each of you, as well as my
fellow Committee members, as we seek to continue NASAs ability to explore the
far reaches of this universe and inspire our country.
Chairwoman GIFFORDS. Anyone else?

Okay. At this time I would like to introduce our witnesses. First
up we have Dr. Robert Braun, who is the Co-Chair of the National
Research Councils Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board Committee to Review the NASA Institute for Advanced Concepts. We
also have with us today Dr. Raymond S. Colladay, who is Vice
Chair of the Committee on the Rationale and Goals of the U.S.
Civil Space Program and Chair of the National Research Councils
Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board. And we have with us
Mr. Christopher Scolese, who is the Associate Administrator at
NASA and who has served with distinction as the Acting NASA
Administrator until Administrator Bolden was confirmed. So welcome all.
As our witnesses know, you will each have 5 minutes for your
spoken testimony. Your written testimony has been included for
the record for this hearing, and when you have completed each of
your testimony, we will begin a round of questions, and all the
members will have 5 minutes to question the panel.
We would like to start today with Dr. Braun.
STATEMENT OF DR. ROBERT D. BRAUN, CO-CHAIR OF THE
COMMITTEE TO REVIEW THE NASA INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED CONCEPTS, AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ENGINEERING BOARD, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL
Dr. BRAUN. Chairwoman Giffords, Ranking Member Olson, and

members of the subcommittee, thank you for the honor of appearing before you today to discuss the approaches to strengthen
NASAs advanced concept and technology development programs.
My name is Robert Braun. The views I express today have been
shaped through a 22-year career in aerospace engineering in both
government and academic positions. Today I speak to you as the
Co-Chair of the National Research Councils committee to review
the NASA Institute for Advanced Concepts.
With your permission I would like to summarize my views this
morning, leaving sufficient time to answer your questions. I would
like to begin with a summary of our NRC report.
NASA established the NASA Institute of Advanced Concepts
[NIAC] in 1998, to provide an independent, open forum for the external analysis and definition of revolutionary space and aeronautics concepts. These were concepts that could impact a NASA
mission 10 to 40 years in the future.
Funded at approximately $4 million per year or roughly .02 percent of NASAs budget, NIAC operated for approximately 9 years
24
and received a total of 1,309 proposals from which they made 126
phase one awards and 42 phase two awards, primarily to small
businesses and universities throughout the country.
At its inception NIAC was envisioned as a cross-cutting program
reporting to the agencys chief technologist. However, in 2004,
NIAC program management within NASA was transferred into one
of the mission directorates, NASAs Exploration Systems Mission
Directorate, and in 2007, NIAC was terminated.
I would like to highlight the following four key findings and recommendations from our committee report. One, NIAC met its mission and accomplished its stated goals. Two, NASA and the Nation
need a NIAC-like organization. Three, the original NASA implementation of NIAC as an external organization managed above and
across the mission directorates was effective, and four, modifications could be made both within NIAC itself and within NASA to
improve the effectiveness of this enterprise. Chief among these
modifications would be potentially reestablishing an aeronautics
and space systems technology development enterprise within NASA
itself.
In my view a NASA strongly positioned for the future should include a brand of mission focused near-term, capability based, midrange, and discipline based, long-term technology investments strategically guided by continuously engaged advanced concepts program.
However, at present there is no NASA organization responsible
for the solicitation, evaluation, and maturation of advanced concepts or for the subsequent infusion of those worthy concepts into
NASAs strategic planning process.
In addition, while mid-range capability-based technology investments are perhaps the most critical for a forward-looking agency
like NASA, within NASA today it is this type of technology investment that is actually minimal. In my opinion this is not appropriate for an agency whose purpose includes demonstrating this
Nations scientific and technological prowess. Or one that is trying
to inspire the next generation of engineers and scientists. A technology-poor NASA greatly hampers our aeronautics and spaceflight
development programs.
As an example, we cannot continue to rely on 1970s era technology to land systems on Mars, particularly if we want to one day
build towards eventual human exploration. Another example, as
stated by both the Aldridge Commission in 2004, and the Augustine Commission this year, we cannot plan a sustainable human
exploration program without strong technology leverage.
Based on these observations I suggest NASA establish a formal
enterprise to continuously evaluate, prioritize, and mature a strategically selected set of technologies in the relevant environments.
Many positive outcomes are likely from a long-term, broadly-focused NASA advanced concepts and technology development program.
Chief among these consequences is the provision of a more exciting aeronautics and space future than our country has today. A
suite of game-changing space and aeronautic discoveries are within
our Nations grasps. Each of these advances would also serve as a
spark to a technology-based economy, an international symbol of
25
our countrys scientific innovation, engineering creativity, and technological skill, and a component of the remedy to our Nations scientific and mathematic literacy challenges.
Our Nation needs to dream big, and achieving large goals is precisely what America has come to expect of NASA. With a stronger
focus on technology development NASA would be well poised to deliver on some of societies grand challenges.
This completes my introductory remarks. I would be happy to respond to any questions you may have. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Braun follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT
OF
ROBERT D. BRAUN
Madame Chairwoman, Ranking Member Olson and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the honor of appearing before you today to discuss approaches to strengthen NASAs advanced concept and technology development programs. My name is Robert D. Braun. The views I express today have been shaped
through a twenty-two year aerospace engineering career in government and academia. For sixteen years, I served on the technical staff of the NASA Langley Research Center. At NASA, I developed advanced space exploration concepts, managed
multiple technology development efforts, and contributed to the design, development, test and operation of several robotic Mars flight systems. For the past 6
years, I have served on the faculty of the Daniel Guggenheim School of Aerospace
Engineering at the Georgia Institute of Technology. As Director of Georgia Techs
Space Systems Design Laboratory, 1 lead an active research and educational program focused on the design of advanced flight systems and technologies for planetary exploration. The advanced space systems concept and technology maturation
skills being developed by the undergraduate and graduate students at Georgia Tech
are of significant interest to NASA, the U.S. Air Force, DARPA, our national labs,
industry, and others in academia. It gives me great pride to work closely with these
students, who are on their way to becoming the space systems engineers of our nations future.
Today, I speak to you as the Co-chair of the National Research Councils Committee to Review the NASA Institute for Advanced Concepts, which recently released our report Fostering Visions for the Future: A Review of the NASA Institute
for Advanced Concepts. The committees twelve members were chosen by the NRC
for their experience with advanced space and aeronautical concepts and their insight into cogent approaches to spark scientific innovation and creativity. They represent a diverse cross-section of aerospace sector experience, including NASA,
DARPA, the SETT Institute, industry, and academia. The committee was co-chaired
by Dianne S. Wiley, a Technical Fellow at Boeing Phantom Works and myself. I
must say that it was a pleasure to work through the NRC with this talented and
experienced group of people.
In response to the first question posed by the subcommittee, I would like to begin
by summarizing our committee report.
Fostering Visions of the Future: A Review of the NASA Institute for Advanced Concepts
NASA established the NASA Institute for Advanced Concepts (NIAC) in 1998 to
provide an independent, open forum for the external analysis and definition of revolutionary space and aeronautics concepts to complement the advanced concepts activities conducted within the Agency. Funded at approximately $4 million per year
(roughly 0.02% of NASAs budget), MIAC received a total of $36.2 million in NASA
funding during the 9 years of its existence. As directed by the NASA SOW, NIAC
focused on revolutionary advanced concept studies that could impact a NASA mission 10 to 40 years in the future. NIAC inspired an atmosphere of innovation that
stretched the imagination and encouraged creativity. In response to its yearly solicitations, NIAC received a total of 1309 proposals, and made 126 Phase I awards and
42 Phase II awards, primarily to small businesses and universities, but also to large
businesses and national laboratories. To reduce costs and maximize public accessibility, NIAC utilized an open, web-based environment to conduct solicitations, perform peer review, administer grant awards, and publicize its activities. NIAC received an Excellent performance rating in each NASA annual review held. Many
NIAC grantees went on to receive additional funding for continued development of
their concept from NASA, other government agencies or private industry. In addi-
26
tion to developing revolutionary concepts, NIAC placed an emphasis on science and
engineering education as well as public outreach. At its inception, NIAC was envisioned as a crosscutting program reporting to the Agencys Chief Technologist. In
2004, when the NASA Office of Aerospace Technology was dissolved, NIAC program
management was transferred into the NASA Exploration Systems Mission Directorate. In 2007, NIAC was terminated.
In 2008, Congress directed the National Research Council (NRC) to conduct a review of the effectiveness of NIAC and to make recommendations concerning the importance of such a program to NASA and to the nation. Our committee was given
the following statement of task:
1) Evaluate NIACs effectiveness in meeting its mission.
2) Evaluate the method by which grantees were selected.
3) Make recommendations on whether NIAC or a successor entity should be
funded by the Federal Government.
4) Make recommendations as to how the Federal Government in general and
NASA in particular should solicit and infuse advanced concepts Into its future systems.
In evaluating NIACs performance, the committee addressed the following questions:
1) To what extent were the NIAC-sponsored advanced concept studies innovative and technically competent?
2) How effective was NIAC in infusing advanced concepts into NASAs strategic
vision, future mission plans, and technology development programs?
3) How relevant were these studies to the aerospace sector at large?
4) How well did NIAC leverage potential partnerships or cost-sharing arrangements?
5) What potential approaches could NASA pursue in the future to generate advanced concepts either internally or from external sources of innovation?
The key findings and recommendations from our report can be summarized in the
following seven statements:
1) NIAC met its mission and accomplished its stated goals. The committee
found that NIACs approach to implementing its functions successfully met NASAdefined objectives, resulted in a cost-effective and timely execution of advanced concept studies, afforded an opportunity for external input of new ideas to the agency,
and subsequently provided broad public exposure of NASA programs. NIAC was
successful in encouraging and supporting a wide community of innovators from diverse disciplines and institutions as evidenced by receipt of 1309 proposals in its 9year lifetime. The 126 NIAC Phase I studies were led by a total of 109 distinct principal investigators, each of whom led a research team of 3-10 personnel, often across
multiple organizations. The majority of the NIAC-supported efforts were highly innovative. Many were successful. in pushing the state of the art. Overall, the efforts
supported produced results commensurate with the funding and risk involved.
2) NIAC had infusion successes and challenges. One important NIAC performance metric defined in the NASA SOW was achievement of 5 to 10 percent infusion of NIAC-developed Phase II concepts into NASAs long-term plans. One way to
gauge such infusion is to look at the receipt of post-NIAC funding for the continued
development of a NIAC-funded concept. The committee found that 14 NIAC Phase
I and Phase II projects, which were awarded $7 million by NIAC, received an additional $23.8 million in funding from a wide range of organizations, demonstrating
the significance of the nations investment in these NIAC advanced concepts. NIAC
matured 12 of the 42 Phase II advanced concepts (29 percent), as measured by receipt of post-NIAC funding. In fact, 9 of these (21 percent) received post-NIAC funding from NASA itself. Over the long term, the ultimate criterion for NIAC success
is the number of funded projects that make their way into the relevant NASA mission directorate decadal survey, strategic plan, or mission stream. The committee
found that three NIAC Phase II efforts (7 percent of the Phase II awards) appear
to have impacted NASAs long-term plans. Of significance, two of these efforts have
either already been incorporated or are currently under consideration by the NRC
Astronomy and Astrophysics Decadal Survey as future NASA missions: the MAXIM
x-ray interferometry concept for black hole imaging and the New Worlds Observer
constellation for exoplanet discovery. Considering the 40-year planning horizon of
NIAC activities coupled with the 9-year existence of MIAC, the committee believes
it is likely that the number of NIAC Phase II projects considered for NASA missions
will continue to increase over time.
27
On the other hand, by design, the maturity of NIAC Phase II products was such
that a substantial additional infusion of resources was needed before these advanced
concepts could be deemed technically viable for implementation as part of a future
NASA mission or flight program. The committee found that this technology readiness immaturity created infusion difficulties for the NIAC program and innovators,
causing promising ideas to wither on the vine.
3) NASA and the nation need a NIAC-like organization. NASA is now an
agency largely oriented toward flight-system development and operations. Priorities
have thus diminished within NASA for long-range research and development efforts.
At present, there is no NASA organization responsible for solicitation, evaluation,
and maturation of advanced concepts (defined as those at technology readiness level
one or two) or responsible for subsequent infusion of worthy concepts into NASA
planning and development activities. Over the past few years, such NASA efforts
have been ad hoc, lacking in long-term stability, and not integrated into the agencys strategic planning process. Managed in this fashion, advanced concept efforts
will rarely produce mature products and the agency is at risk of driving away many
of its most creative personnel. Our committee believes that NASA and the nation
would be well served by maintaining a mechanism to investigate visionary, farreaching advanced concepts as part of NASAs mission.1 Concepts deemed feasible
could be used to inform NASAs strategic planning process. Long-term, these concepts and technologies offer the potential for dramatic improvements in performance
and/or cost of future aeronautical and space systems. As such, the committee recommends that NASA should reestablish a NIAC-like entity, referred to in our report
as NIAC2, to seek out visionary, far-reaching, advanced concepts with the potential
of significant benefit to accomplishing NASAs charter and to begin the process of
maturing these advanced concepts for infusion into NASAs missions. The existence
of such an organization would also demonstrate that NASA continues to be a driver
of innovation and technological competitiveness, potentially serving as a critical element of NASAs public and educational value to the nation.
4) The original NASA implementation of NIAC as an external organization managed above and across the mission directorates was effective.
When it was initially formed, NIAC was managed by a high-level agency executive
concerned with the objectives and needs of all NASA enterprises and missions. The
committee found that NIAC was most successful as a program with crosscutting applicability to NASAs enterprises and missions. When it was transferred to a mission-specific directorate, NIAC lost its alignment with sponsor objectives and priorities. To allow for sustained implementation of NIAC2 infusion objectives, the committee recommends that NIAC2 report to the Office of the Administrator, be outside
mission directorates, and be chartered to address NASA-wide mission and technology needs. To increase NIAC2s relevance, NASA mission directorates should contribute thematic areas for consideration in the proposal solicitation process. The
committee also recommends that this NIAC2 organization be funded and administered separately from NASA development programs, mission directorates, and institutional constraints. Future NIAC2 proposal opportunities should continue to be
managed and peer-reviewed outside the agency.
5) NIAC2 modifications should be made to improve effectiveness. While
NIACs Internet-based technical review and management processes were found to be
effective and should be continued in NIAC2, the committee found a few policies that
may have hastened NIACs demise. Key among these was (1) the exclusive focus on
revolutionary advanced concepts, (2) the exclusion of NASA personnel from participation in NIAC awards or research teams, and (3) the immaturity of NIAC Phase
II products relative to that required for implementation as part of a future NASA
mission or flight program.
By definition, visionary advanced concepts will not be near-term. However, in our
committee discussions, it was felt that NIACs complete focus on revolutionary concepts (as directed in its NASA SOW) was too long-term, creating a cultural mismatch between the NIAC products and its mission-focused sponsors and causing infusion difficulties for the NIAC innovators. As such, the committee recommends that
the key selection requirement for NIAC2 proposal opportunities be that the concept
is scientifically and/or technically innovative and has the potential to provide major
benefit to a future NASA mission of 10 years and beyond. While 10 years and beyond includes concepts that could be 40 years or farther in the future, the com1 Section 102.c.4 of the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 includes provision for the
conduct of the aeronautical and space activities of the United States toward establishment of
long-range studies of the potential benefits to be gained from, the opportunities for, and the
problems involved in the utilization of aeronautical and space activities for peaceful and scientific purposes.
28
mittee felt that these modifications in focus would likely result in NIAC2 efforts
with a higher probability of infusion into NASAs strategic planning process.
NIAC was formed to provide an independent, open forum for the external analysis
and definition of space and aeronautics advanced concepts to complement the advanced concepts activities conducted within NASA; hence, NIAC solicitations were
closed to NASA participants. However, NIAC was formed at a time when there was
adequate funding internal to NASA for development of novel, long-term ideas. As
internal NASA funding for advanced concepts and technology diminished or became
more focused on flight-system development and operations, the cultural disconnect
between the development activities internal and external to the agency grew, and
transitioning of NIAC concepts to the NASA mission directorates became more difficult. The committee recommends that future NIAC2 proposal opportunities be
open to principal investigators or teams both internal and external to NASA.
In addition, the committee believes that the potential for receipt of a NIAC2
Phase III award is needed to aid the transition of the most highly promising
projects. Therefore, the committee recommends that future NIAC2 proposal opportunities include the potential selection of a small number of Phase III proof of concept awards for up to $5 million each over as much as 4 years to demonstrate and
resolve fundamental feasibility issues and that such awards be selected jointly by
NIAC2 and NASA management.
6) NASA modifications should be made to improve effectiveness. The lack
of a NASA interface to receive the hand-off of promising projects was a persistent
NIAC challenge. To improve the manner in which advanced concepts are infused
into its future systems and to build a culture that continuously strives to advance
technology, the committee recommends that NASA consider reestablishing an aeronautics and space systems technology development enterprise.2 Such an organization would serve to preserve the leadership role of the United States in aeronautical
and space systems technology.3 Its NIAC2-oriented purpose would be to provide
maturation opportunities and agency expertise for visionary, far-reaching concepts
and technologies. NASAs considerations for such an enterprise should include implications for the agencys strategic plan, effective organizational approaches, resource
distributions, field center foci, and mission selection process. Increased participation
of NASA field center personnel, beyond review and management functions, should
also significantly enhance advanced concept maturation and infusion into NASA
mission planning. The committee also recommends identification of center technical
champions and provision for the technical participation of NASA field center personnel in NIAC2 efforts. Participation of NASA personnel is expected to increase as
NIAC2 projects mature.
7) The budget requirement for a strong advanced concepts development
activity reaches a steady-state value of approximately $10M per year. Our
committee believes that the NIAC was generally funded appropriately (approximately $4M/year) for its stated Phase I and Phase II objectives. We believe that
NIAC2 proposal opportunities should be defined as follows: Phase I up to $100,000
each for 1 year; Phase II, up to $500,000 each for 2 years; Phase III proof-of-concept
awards for up to $5 million each over as much as 4 years. Clearly, the number of
such awards could be used as a control on the overall program budget. For example,
in the first year of NIAC2, perhaps a dozen Phase I awards would be made for
$1.2M, plus administrative costs. Including 4 Phase II awards in the following year
would push the required yearly budget to approximately $2.2M (plus administrative
costs). As a strawman, note that if NIAC2 funded 12 Phase I awards, 4 Phase II
awards, and 1 Phase Ill award in each subsequent year, the budget requirement
would increase by $1.25M each year until reaching a steady-state value of $8.2M
in year six and beyond (plus administrative costs). In a strategy like this, the overall program budget is largely dependent on selection of the Phase III awards. If
NASA saw value in the potential offered by multiple Phase III proposals, additional
funds could be secured. If funding were tight in a given year, no Phase III awards
would be made.
NIAC2 funding decisions should be made within the context of a well-funded
NASA aeronautics and space systems technology enterprise that is both actively
2 Similar findings are made in A Constrained Space Exploration Technology Program: A Review of NASAs Exploration Technology Development Program, The National Academies Press,
Washington, D.C., 2008; and Americas Future in Space: Aligning the Civil Space Program with
National Needs, The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C., 2009.
3 Section 102.c.5 of the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 includes provision for the
conduct of the aeronautical and space activities of the United States for the preservation of the
role of the United States as a leader in aeronautical and space science and technology and in
the application thereof to the conduct of peaceful activities within and outside the atmosphere.
29
seeking advanced system concepts and maturing the requisite technological solutions. Large-scale technology development aspects of this enterprise were beyond the
committees charter, and would require considerably more funding than the $10M
proposed for NIAC2. These larger funding issues are addressed in my response to
the subcommittees next question.
In addressing the subcommittees remaining questions, I am guided by my personal experience in NASA and academia. Although the NRC NIAC committees discussions touched on these topics, this committee was not specifically tasked to address these broader subjects.
In response to the second question posed by the subcommittee, I would like to define the scope of a broadly focused long-term program dedicated to stimulate innovation and develop new concepts and capabilities, and then describe the results our
nation should expect from such a program.
Three Technology Development Classes and the Need for a Strengthened
Capability-Based Technology Development Effort within NASA
In my experience, there are three general classes of technology development programs: mission-focused (near-term), discipline-based (long-term), and capabilitybased (mid-range). A NASA strongly positioned for the future should sponsor a
blend of these three technology development classes, strategically guided by the results of a continuously engaged advanced concepts program. It is in this way that
an advanced concepts program can be used to inform an organizations strategic
planning process and provide value to its technology investment decisions. The success of such an enterprise will clearly be dependent on the group of program managers and systems engineers making technology readiness assessment and technology investment decisions for the agency. Passionate, hard-charging systems engineers and program managers who remain objectively focused on the long-term development needs of the agency, independent of the agencys institutional constraints,
and out of the proverbial technology sandbox will be required. A series of competitively awarded activities spanning near-term, mid-term and long-term aeronautics
and space systems needs is likely the best means of implementing a successful technology development program. Competitive awards should be made based on an objective assessment of the agencys strategic need, the proposed technical scope and
product realism.
Mission-focused technology programs abound in most current large NASA programs. Consider, for example, NASAs human spaceflight program. In development
of the Constellation architecture, priority was given to near-term systems with the
goal of an early initial operational capabilityexisting technology with low risk was
the Constellation mantra. In fact, funding from a wide range of NASA advanced
technology programs was redirected to enable this capability. However, even with
its near-term focus and budgetary challenges, the Constellation program required
and funded a small number of mission-focused technologies to enable qualification
of the key technologies required for mission success. These mission-focused technology programs include a lunar-return capable heatshield, an autonomous landing
and hazard avoidance system for lunar landing operations, and lunar in-situ resource utilization.4 Without such technological advances, NASAs current approach
to returning humans to the Moon would be dramatically impacted. Similar missionfocused technology investments have allowed NASAs robotic exploration program to
pursue advanced science missions like the Mars Science Laboratory and Webb Space
Telescope. Clearly, these are important investments that require NASA funding.
However, these mission-focused activities are not the only technology investments
that an agency that prides itself on innovation and pushing-the-boundary should
pursue.
Within NASA, the ARMD Fundamental Aeronautics program is the only present
program of which I am aware that is pursuing discipline-based technological solutions. Longer term by nature and generally funded at a much lower level, these
technology advances are often pursued with the promise of enabling dramatic performance improvements in one or more aerospace disciplines, and the potential for
major system advances across multiple future programs. While ARMD funding is
largely directed internal to NASA and its aeronautics challenges, examples of possible discipline-based technology investments include laminar flow control technology, high-temperature materials and structures, hypersonic airbreathing propulsion, advanced in-space propulsion, robust navigation and control algorithms, highefficiency solar power systems, radiation protection systems, and inflatable struc4 A Constrained Space Exploration Technology Program: A Review of NASAs Exploration
Technology Development Program, The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C., 2008.
30
tures. In addition, NASA can now offer unique, discipline-based microgravity research opportunities through effective utilization of the International Space Station.
The United States boasts a tremendously successful robotic Mars program. Continuous orbital observations of the Mars surface have been made for more than a
decade and six robotic systems have now been placed on the surface of Mars. While
each of these six landed missions has been an incredible technological accomplishment in itself, these robotic systems have each landed less than 0.6 metric tons
within landing footprints on the order of hundreds of kilometers. At present, robotic
exploration systems engineers are struggling with the challenges of increasing landed mass capability to just 1 metric ton (less than half the Earth weight of a 2009
Ford Explorer) while improving landed accuracy to 10 kilometers for the Mars
Science Laboratory project. Meanwhile, the planning of subsequent robotic exploration missions under consideration for the 2020 decade may require several metric
tons in landed mass capability and current plans for human exploration of Mars call
for landing 4080 metric ton surface elements within close proximity (tens of meters) of pre-positioned robotic assets. These future mission requirements cannot be
met with NASAs present suite of entry, descent and landing technologies and are
one reason that human Mars exploration is viewed as a bridge too far by many
in the aerospace and public policy communities. However, analysis suggests that
there are a handful of promising entry, descent and landing capabilities that may
prove feasible for these larger landed systems, enabling future Mars exploration
concepts of which today we can only dream. These technologies are termed capabilities because these same general systems may also prove advantageous for Earthreturn missions or missions to other planetssuch developments are not specific to
a single mission. Additional capability-focused technology needs abound in deep
space exploration, astrophysics, aeronautics, and Earth science. In each case, NASA
technology investment is criticalfor without such an investment, these future missions will simply not occur.
Strategic assessment of our nations future spaceflight technology needs was performed by both the Aldridge Commission 5 in 2004 and the Augustine Commission 6
in 2009. Each commission concluded that successful development of a set of enabling
technologies (or capabilities) is critical to attainment of human and robotic exploration objectives within reasonable schedule and affordable cost. The NASA Authorization Act of 2008 furthered this sentiment by codifying it into law. Section 405
of this Act states, A robust program of long-term exploration-related research and
development will be essential for the success and sustainability of any enduring initiative of human and robotic exploration of the solar system. This Act further states
that this program shall not be tied to specific flight projects. I strongly agree with
the capability-based technology sentiment expressed by these two Presidential Commissions and the NASA Authorization Act of 2008.
While mid-term, capability-based technology investments are perhaps the most
critical for a forward-looking Agency like NASA; within NASA today, this type of
technology investment is minimal. NASA presently invests approximately $1.35B on
a range of near-term, mid-range and long-term technologies 7 Approximately twothirds of this investment is directed toward near-term mission-focused technologies
that are strongly coupled to NASAs existing programs. This allocation leaves approximately $0.45B (less than 3% of NASAs total budget) for capability-based technology development and discipline-based fundamental research that is not tied to
existing program requirements. However, at present, a majority of these remaining
funds are allocated to the longer-term ARMD Fundamental Aeronautics program,
leaving little mid-range capability-based technology investment.
Anticipated Results from a Broadly Focused Long-Term NASA Program to
Develop Advanced Concepts and their Associated Technologies
Many positive outcomes are likely from a long-term, broadly focused NASA advanced concepts and technology development program that include mission-focused,
capability-based and discipline-based components. Chief among these consequences
is the provision of a more vital and productive aeronautics and space future than
our country has today. Each year, in the first lecture of my freshman Introduction
to Aerospace Engineering class, I share with these recent high-school graduates a
list of accomplishments that I believe our nations civil aeronautics and space program is capable of achieving in my lifetime:
5 Report on the Presidents Commission on Implementation of U.S. Space Exploration Policy:
A Journey to Inspire, Innovate and Discover, June 2004.
6 Summary Report on the Review of U.S. Human Spaceflight Plans, September 2009.
7 NASA Innovation and Technology Initiative: Enabling NASAs Future and Addressing National Needs, Briefing to NRC ASEB by Dr. Laurie Leshin, NASA, October 2009.
31
Ten Anticipated Paradigm-Changing Civil Aeronautics and Space Advances
1) Quantify Causes, Trends and Effects of Long-Term Earth Climate Change
2) Accurately Forecast the Emergence of Major Storms and Natural Disasters
3) Develop and Utilize Efficient Space-Based Energy Sources
4) Prepare an Asteroid Defense
5) Identify Life Elsewhere in our Solar System
6) Ientify Earth-like Worlds Around Other Stars
7) Initiate Interstellar Robotic Exploration
8) Achieve Reliable Commercial Low-Earth Orbit Transportation
9) Achieve Affordable Supersonic Business Travel
10) Achieve Permanent Human Presence Beyond the Cradle of Earth
Advances of this type are more than a single professors dreamthey are a spark
to a technology-based economy, an international symbol of our countrys scientific
and technological leadership, and a component of the remedy to our nations scientific and mathematics literacy challenges. I genuinely believe that game-changers
like these are within our nations grasp. Capability-based technology investment, focused leadership and stability of purpose are the only elements holding us back.
Landing humans on Mars requires an investment in advanced technology, as does
developing a telescope capable of detecting Earth-size planets around other stars,
flying a new generation of human-rated launch systems, or identifying life elsewhere in our solar system. Our nation needs to dream big, and large goals, like
these, are precisely the kind of objectives that our nation has come to expect of
NASA. It is equally clear that in the absence of sustained, broad-based technology
investments, the United States will not continue to make significant advances in
aeronautics, space, and the associated sectors of our society. Investments of this
scale will not be without cost. I believe that our nation would be well served by investing at least 10% of NASAs budget in support of the technologies required to
dramatically advance entirely new aeronautics and space endeavors (in contrast to
an investment of less than 3% today).
In this same class, I often ask the students why they are choosing to become aerospace engineers. In general, these 18-year olds are motivated by a strong desire to
contribute to humanitys future by solving our nations grand technological challenges. They want to work with others (and in organizations) who feel the same
way. As such, a well managed, broad-based advanced concepts and technology development enterprise can serve as a catalyst to revitalize our nations aerospace workforce with the best and brightest of tomorrow. Such an organization can also serve
to demonstrate that NASA continues to be a driver of scientific innovation, engineering creativity and technological competitiveness for our country and around the
world.
NASA technology innovation efforts are also bound to stimulate the university
and commercial sectors, create new business and increase the number of high-tech
jobs across our nation. As a small-scale example, NIAC efforts contributed to the
launch of a new business division within ENSCO and two entirely new businesses
(Space Elevator: Black Line Ascension and Liftport).
In response to the third question posed by the subcommittee, I would like to briefly discuss the additional uncertainty and risk associated with developing new concepts and technologies within NASAs flight projects.
Technology Development within NASAs Missions Contribute Significant
Cost and Schedule Risk
Implementation of NASA space flight missions is fraught with complex systems
engineering challenges due to the extreme environment in which these systems
must reliably operate. Completing a spaceflight mission within its established budget and schedule constraints is one of the most difficult undertakings in the engineering field. As such, I have great respect for those within NASA who have succeeded
in these endeavors. These missions demand a focus on technical excellence across
the organization, a systems engineering approach to project implementation, technical insight and crisp decision-making from project managers, clear communication
across the organization, and early risk identification, prioritization, and mitigation.
In addition, trades between performance, cost, schedule and risk are generally constrained by program-level decisions and public policy decisions made outside the
projects control. In my view, adding requirements for technology development to a
NASA flight project in the implementation. phase is inherently risky and a poor program management practice.
32
In March 2009, in testimony presented before this subcommittee entitled, NASA
Projects Need More Disciplined Oversight and Management to Address Key Challenges, a GAO representative described her analysis of thirteen NASA flight projects
in the implementation phase. In this project phase, systems design is completed, scientific instruments are integrated, and the flight system is fabricated and prepared
for launch, Prior to entering the implementation phase, it is standard NASA practice to have finalized requirements, concepts and technologies and establish a baseline project plan. Ten of the thirteen NASA projects in the implementation phase
assessed by the GAO experienced significant cost and/or schedule growth from their
project baselines. Of the five causes of cost and/or schedule growth cited by the
GAO, two issues pertain directly to technology development risk: technology immaturity and modifications required to previously considered heritage items. The common symptom of these two causes is a technological readiness considerably below
that estimated by the project. The GAO report concludes, Simply put, projects that
start with mature technologies experience less cost growth than those that start
with immature technologies. I fully agree with this statement.
NASA also knows this lesson. In fact, NASA requires all technologies used in its
competitive missions to be at a technology readiness level of six (system/subsystem
model or prototype demonstration in a relevant environment) or higher by the beginning of the project implementation phase. In a competitive proposal, failure to
have such a technology maturation plan is cited as a major weakness. As such, few,
if any, competed missions begin plementation while still developing technology.
However, this same approach is not generally applied to NASAs larger space flight
programs, which often rely on large technology advancements as part of project implementation due to the significant performance gains that they are attempting to
achieve. As a result, large, non-competed projects tend to encounter significant cost
overruns and/or schedule delays as a result of technology risk. Insisting on an adequate formulation phase in which technology risk is firmly retired, before committing project implementation funding, is the most straightforward means for reducing
the cost and schedule risk of these large NASA missions.
In response to the fourth question posed by the subcommittee, I would like to
briefly discuss the time horizons required for the development of advanced concept
and technology development programs.
Time Horizons on Advanced Concept and Technology Development Programs
A long-term, broadly focused NASA advanced concepts and technology development enterprise should span multiple timeframes in which the maturation plan for
a given technology should be coupled to the agencys strategic planning process
through ongoing NIAC2 advanced concept studies. Within this enterprise, one can
envision a blend of technology development timeframes spanning 25 years for mission-focused technology (moderate $ investment), 515 years for capability-based
technology (large $ investment), and 1540 years for discipline-based technology
(modest $ investment). Competitive awards across these technology classes should
be made on a 23 year cycle depending on the milestones achieved and funding
availability. Technology project development lifecycles spanning 25 years are anticipated. In this scenario, the technology development enterprise should partner
with NASAs existing flight programs such that the mission-focused technologies it
funds benefit from at least a 50% cost contribution from the relevant mission directorate. This strategy should allow for capability-based technologies, which are not
tied to NASAs existing missions, to dominate the investment portfolio of the technology development enterprise. This emphasis on capability-based technology is absent in NASA today. A broad range of discipline-based investments should also be
funded at a lower level.
Use of NIAC2 as a long-term asset to inform NASAs strategic planning process
is a key component of this plan. NIAC2 can look out for advanced concepts beyond
the current development programs. It can work on the edges where requirements
are not yet known, focused on what program managers would want if they knew
that they needed it. However, it is also clear that for this independent organization
that nurtures technology push to succeed, it must be partnered with a substantive
NASA enterprise of technology pull, managed at the agency-level and working in
concert with NASAs existing mission directorates.
Summary
There is little capability-based technology development within NASA today and no
NASA organization responsible for solicitation, evaluation, and maturation of advanced concepts or responsible for subsequent infusion of worthy concepts into
33
NASAs strategic planning process. In my view, this is not acceptable for an agency
whose purpose includes demonstrating this nations scientific and technological
prowess, or one that is trying to Inspire the next generation of engineers and scientists. A technology-poor NASA greatly hampers our aeronautics and space flight
development programs. We cannot continue to rely on 1970s-era technology to land
systems on Mars, particularly if we want to build toward eventual human exploration. We cannot continue to explore the solar system robotically without advanced
in-space propulsion and atmospheric flight technologies as part of our future mission
portfolio. We cannot plan a sustainable human exploration program without strong
technology leverage. Strategic assessment of our nations future spaceflight technology needs was performed by both the Aldridge Commission in 2004 and the Augustine Commission in 2009. Each commission concluded that successful development of a set of enabling technologies (or capabilities) was critical to attainment of
space exploration objectives within a reasonable schedule and affordable cost. The
NASA Authorization Act of 2008 furthered this sentiment by codifying it into law.
Based on these inputs, I suggest NASA establish a formal enterprise to continuously
evaluate, prioritize, and mature these technologies in the relevant environments.
Within this enterprise, a blend of technology development activities spanning mission-focused technology (25 year maturation timeframe, moderate $ investment),
capability-based technology (515 year maturation timeframe, large $ investment),
and discipline-based technology (1540 year maturation timeframe, modest $ investment) should be pursued.
Our nation would be well served by investing at least 10% of NASAs budget in
support of the technologies required to dramatically advance entirely new aeronautics and space endeavors (in contrast to an investment of less than 3% today).
This investment would include a small amount for advanced concepts so difficult to
achieve that their chance of individual success within a decade is less than 10%,
yet concepts so innovative that their success could serve as game-changers for this
vital, national industry. Our nation needs to dream big, and large goals are precisely what our nation has come to expect of NASA. Major breakthroughs are needed to address our societys energy, health, transportation, and environment challenges. While NASA investments alone will not solve these grand challenges, NASA
has proven to have a unique ability to attract and motivate many of the countrys
best young minds into educational programs and careers in engineering and science.
Although it is not possible to predict which advanced aerospace concepts will
produce.paradigm-shifting results, it is certainly true that, in the absence of research on such concepts, the United States will not make revolutionary technological advances in aeronautics and space and long-term societal goals in these and
related areas will remain beyond our reach.
BIOGRAPHY
FOR
ROBERT D. BRAUN
Chairwoman GIFFORDS. Thank you, Dr. Braun.
34
Dr. Colladay.
STATEMENT OF DR. RAYMOND S. COLLADAY, VICE CHAIR OF
THE COMMITTEE ON RATIONALE AND GOALS OF THE U.S.
CIVIL SPACE PROGRAM, AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ENGINEERING BOARD, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL
Dr. COLLADAY. Thank you, Chairwoman Giffords and members of

the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before
you today to address a subject that is very important to the country
and has been particularly in my crosshairs for the last 3 or 4 years
in the National Research Council [NRC] and Aeronautics and
Space Engineering Board.
Aerospace is one sector where the U.S. remains preeminent, and
we have in large part NASA to thank for that, but our future leadership depends on continued investment in long-term, advanced
technology R&D. In our NRC report on Americas Future in Space
we describe the many reasons why space is important to the country, including the recognition that space generates high-end jobs in
science, engineering, and math, supplying the workforce for the
aerospace sector of our economy that remains the envy of the
world.
Beyond that it inspires an interest in technical fields of study
that is and will continue to be of vital importance to our economic
competitiveness. Sustaining U.S. leadership in space depends on
having a sufficiently broad and deep technology base that pushes
the frontiers of our knowledge, leads to innovation and new systems, and challenges conventional wisdom with transformational
technology.
When it comes to truly game-changing technical breakthroughs,
a long-term view is particularly important, and such a perspective
is almost exclusively the domain of the government. Long-term advanced technology R&D does not happen in industry because the
return on investment is years away, and it does not happen in academia without sustained, stable government funding.
With that perspective in mind I would like to make a few observations. To fulfill its broad mandate in civil and commercial space,
NASA should revitalize its advanced technology development program as a priority mission area. Its technology R&D mission
should be independent of the major development programs and report to the administrator or some equivalent management structure of our governments model to give it the stature equal to the
agencys other mission areas. In our report we refer to a DARPA
[Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency]-like organization in
NASA to convey this spot. It should engage the best science and
engineering talent in the country wherever it resides, in universities, industry, NASA centers, and other government laboratories.
It should be relieved of at least the first order of institution requirements to maintain core competencies at the ten NASA centers. In order to ensure that the research can draw on the best
ideas and talent wherever it should reside. It should serve not just
NASA but civil space customers including commercial space and
other government agencies or departments much like its aeronautics program and its predecessor NACA has done for almost 100
years.
35
A comprehensive assessment of the current state of the art of advanced space technology would be helpful to ensure that any new
investment in technology R&D would be building on the most advanced technology base currently available.
Whatever governance model NASA chooses for managing a technology enterprise, it needs to address technology relevance and
transition. The ultimate user community determines the products
of technology R&D remain useful and relevant, and technology
transition is a process that must be managed with all the stakeholders involved.
In summary, the country expects NASA to be a leader, pushing
the frontiers of air and space applications and missions as called
for in the Space Act. But to do so NASA needs to replenish the underpinning technology that makes it possible.
That completes my brief summary of my remarks, and I would
be open, of course, to questions later.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Colladay follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT
OF
RAYMOND S. COLLADAY
Madam Chairwoman and members of the Subcommittee, I am pleased to appear

before you today. My name is Ray Colladay and the personal views I express are
shaped by my 40 years of experience in aerospace, through positions I have held
in government, industry, and academia. I chair the Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board (ASEB) of the National Research Council (NRC) and also served as
Vice Chair of the Academy funded study on AMERICAS FUTURE IN SPACE:
ALIGNING THE CIVIL SPACE PROGRAM WITH NATIONAL NEEDS. Although
I have insights into NASA acquired through those and other positions, my views are
my own and do not represent an official position of the NRC.
With your permission, I would like to submit my prepared testimony for the
record and summarize my views for you here this morning.
In the previously mentioned NRC report on Americas Future In Space, we observed that space has become ubiquitous and permeates nearly every aspect of our
daily lives. We concluded that if properly aligned and coordinated, U.S. civil space
can provide technological, economic, and societal benefits that contribute to solutions to the nations most pressing problems. The study detailed seven recommendations for U.S. leadership in space, but among the most actionable of those recommendationsone that we called foundational in the sense that it was among
those that enabled other goals and recommendations to be metwas that NASA
needs to revitalize its advanced technology development program as a priority mission area in the agency.
Because of budget pressures and institutional priorities, however, NASA has
largely abandoned its role in supporting the broad portfolio of civil space applications, and the space technology base has thus been allowed to erode and is now deficient. The former NASA advanced technology development program no longer exists.
Most of what remained was moved to the Constellation Program and has become
oriented largely to risk reduction supporting the ongoing internal development program. Elements of that former advanced technology R&D focused on space science
missionsprimarily advanced instrument developmentwas also moved. Although
it continues under the science mission directorate, and good work is being done,
there is no longer the broader mandate to enhance the technology base and explore
breakthrough technology that could possibly transform future science missions by
influencing future requirements instead of simply responding to those already established.
The NRC report observed that future U.S. leadership in space requires a foundation of sustained technology advances that can enable the development of more capable, reliable, and lower-cost spacecraft and launch vehicles to achieve space program goals. A strong advanced technology development foundation is needed also to
enhance technology readiness of new missions, mitigate their technological risks,
improve the quality of cost estimates, and thereby contribute to better overall mission cost management. Space research and development efforts can take advantage
of advances from other fieldsand can contribute back to those fields. For example,
civil space programs can benefit from and contribute to the state of the art in advanced materials, computational design and modeling, batteries and other energy
36
storage devices, fuel-cell and compact nuclear power systems, fault-tolerant electronics and software, optics, and robotics. This scientific synergy extends the ability
to accomplish more capable and dramatic missions in space, as well as to contribute
to broader national interests driving innovation in other areas of terrestrial application. The unique challenges of the space environment make demands on technology
in ways that often accelerate the development pace and advance understanding of
the foundations of technologies. The responsibility to provide for this advanced technology base for civil space activities rests with NASA, in partnership with universities, other government agencies, and industry. The customers for the products
of technology are NASA, NOAA, industry, and military space programs in which
multiple-use technology is applicable.
To fulfill NASAs broader mandate, the study concluded that an independent advanced technology development effort is required, much like that accomplished by
DARPA in the DOD, focused not so much on technology that todays program managers require, but on what future program managers would wish they could have
if they knew they needed it, or would want if they knew they could have it. This
effort should engage the best science and engineering talent in the country wherever
it resides in universities, industry, NASA centers, or other government laboratories
independent of pressures to sustain competency at the NASA centers. A DARPAlike organization established within NASA should report to NASAs Administrator,
be independent of ongoing NASA development programs, and focus on supporting
the broad civil space portfolio through the competitive funding of world-class technology and innovation projects at universities, industry, federally-funded research
and development centers, government research laboratories, and NASA centers. The
responsibilities of the organization should be similar to those of NASAs aeronautics
research in the sense that the research activities should be supportive of the needs
of the private sector as well as the governmenta mission well understood and supported by NASA going back to its predecessor, NACA.
Establishing an independent organization focused on broadly enhancing the technology base for civil and commercial space does not mean the development programs
and operational mission areas of NASA do not need their own technology research
and development resources to mature technology ready for transition and for risk
reduction. Furthermore, a technology management process is needed that draws the
interests of all stakeholders to common ground to assure the investment in technology is relevant to the needs of the eventual users and that a plan exists for its
transition. This process creates a healthy tension between technology push and user
pull.
The DARPA-like reference is not to be taken too literally, since what works well
in the Department of Defense needs to be adapted to the NASA culture. But the
reason for the reference is to address the need for an advanced technology mission
to be given priority, be organizationally independent, be authorized to pursue technical excellence and research quality wherever it resides relieved of NASA institutional requirements, and be encouraged to promote and sponsor transformational,
game-changing innovation that is not necessarily formally tied to existing, well-defined requirements.
The country expects NASA to be a leader pushing the frontiers of air and space
applications and missions as called for in the Space Act. But to do so, they need
to replenish the underpinning technology that makes it possible. I believe it is time
to make technology research and development an explicit priority as part of the
agencys broader mission.
Thank you. That completes my prepared remarks and I would be pleased to take
questions you may have.
BIOGRAPHY
FOR
RAYMOND S. COLLADAY
RAYMOND S. COLLADAY is a retired corporate officer of the Lockheed Martin

Corporation and the former President of the Lockheed Martin Astronautics company
in Denver. Before entering the private sector, he held positions of Director of
DARPAthe Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency of the U.S. Department
of Defense and was Associate Administrator of NASA where he had senior executive
responsibility for the agencys aeronautics and space research and technology development including operations oversight of Ames, Langley, Dryden, and Glenn Research Centers. Dr. Colladay started his aerospace career at NASA Glenn Research
Center in propulsion R&D before moving to NASA Headquarters where he held a
number of leadership positions before being appointed Associate Administrator of
the Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology. He has been a member of the Air
Force Scientific Advisory Board and various Defense Science Board summer studies.
Currently, he owns an aerospace consulting company, RC Space Enterprises, Inc.;
37
teaches leadership and ethics for the Colorado School of Mines; and serves on a
number of boards, steering committees, and commissions. He received his B.S., M.S.,
and Ph.D. degrees in mechanical engineering from Michigan State University and
attended the Harvard Business Schools Advanced Management Program. He is a
fellow of the AIAA and of the American Astronautical Society. Dr. Colladay is Chairman of the Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board (ASEB) of the National Academies. He has two daughters and four grandchildren and resides in Golden, Colorado with his wife of 44 years.
Chairwoman GIFFORDS. Thank you, Dr. Colladay.

Mr. Scolese.
STATEMENT OF MR. CHRISTOPHER SCOLESE, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
Mr. SCOLESE. Chairwoman Giffords, Ranking Member Olson, and

members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear today to discuss NASAs technology development programs.
NASA has been at the forefront of aeronautics and space research since the early 20th century. The complex research missions
that NASA is asked to do to explore the unknown serve as stimulus to innovation. As a result, NASA and its predecessor, NACA,
traditionally balanced our technology activities to meet both the
needs of our near-term missions and our long-term plans.
Recent National Academy reviews of NASA innovation and technology development endorsed increased emphasis on innovative
technologies and approaches to achieving broadly defined NASA
and national goals. These reports and others suggested that NASA
should increase emphasis first in disruptive or game-changing technology, and second in maturing technologies for flight.
In answers to the subcommittees question about the timeframe
for technology investment, NASA believes the timeframe from
these early technology activities should be long enough to allow for
revolutionary impact, yet not too long so as to mask clear applicability to NASA or national needs or in the 10 to 20-year timeframe.
Managing all of the investment areas will require a hybrid of management processes, with strong agency-wide planning and coordination. One size does not fit all.
Mission directorate investments focused on mission needs will be
best managed within those directorates. Early-stage innovation,
disruptive, and strongly-crossed cutting investments are best
served by an independent management structure still responsive to
the needs of the mission.
With regard to the committees question on authorization legislation directing greater commitment to robust technology research
and development initiatives, three examples stand out. In aeronautics we formulated the new environmentally-responsible aviation project to develop technologies related to improving the air
space system to be more environmentally friendly. Multiple collaborations are underway with other federal agencies and private entities to make use of the space station as a national laboratory. And
in science the most recent annual competitions for instrument technology development emphasized cross-cutting technologies.
The subcommittee asked how NASA develops and infused gamechanging technology solutions without a dedicated long-term technology program. NASA does invest in a limited number of game-
38
changing technologies through its innovative partnership program
and within our mission and engineering organizations. Examples
include optical communications and large pressurized composite
structures. NASA routinely coordinates with other federal agencies
to develop technologies and concepts of mutual interest.
The NASA aeronautics research portfolio is strongly aligned with
the National Aeronautics R&D policy and plan and the high-level
goals of the NRC decadal survey. And as mentioned, the Space Station National Laboratory has been made available to other U.S.
government agencies, academic institutions, private firms, and nonprofit institutions.
For example, NASA funded approximately 250 investigations related to ISS [International Space Station] life science research and
exploration, many of which leveraged additional funding from the
National Science Foundation, the National Institute of Health, the
Department of Defense, and the Department of Energy. Our Nation
has made great progress throughout its history because of the enormously difficult challenges it has embraced. The grand challenge to
build an intercontinental railway or the Apollo Lunar Program not
only utilized our best talent but also created new technologies, inspired generations to pursue challenging goals, created new industries, and ultimately improved our country and the world. Similar
opportunities are in front of us now, and NASA most assuredly can
contribute.
Chairwoman Giffords, I would be happy to respond to any questions you or the other members of the subcommittee may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Scolese follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT
OF
CHRISTOPHER SCOLESE
Chairwoman Giffords and other Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear today to discuss NASAs technology development programs.
As a research and development Agency, a balanced portfolio of R&D at NASA serves
the Nation directly and is a catalyst for innovation as well. My testimony will address how NASA technology is relevant to the Nation and the communities that
comprise it, and how that might be strengthened.
In your letter inviting me to testify, you asked that I address a number of specific
questions related to technology development at NASA. My statement will address
those questions, as well as provide additional context.
NASA has been at the forefront of aeronautics research and development since
the early 20th Century, and space technology since the mid 20th Century. During
that time, NASA and its predecessor organization, the National Advisory Committee
for Aeronautics (NACA), balanced near-term missions and long-term research to
benefit the Nation and the world. Over the past few years, however, NASA has
prioritized short-term mission needs over long-term research. Much new technology
in terms of materials, systems, components, and software that benefits our missions
as well as others is developed through the NASA Mission Directorates, the Innovative Partnerships Program, and the Centers. The NASA mission focus also serves
technology development by focusing activities on technologies needed to address current and future problems as well as providing the test bed for demonstrating these
new technologies.
NASA Response to Recent External Reviews
Several recent external reviews have addressed the issues of innovation and technology development at NASA, with a strikingly common set of themes. Although the
final report is still pending, the Summary Report of the Review of U.S. Human
Space Flight Plans Committee strongly endorsed increased focus on innovative technologies and approaches to achieving broadly defined NASA and national goals. This
technology and innovation focus was included in all new program options suggested
by the Committee in its Summary Report. The recently released National Research
Council (NRC) report, Americas Future in Space, specifically calls for NASA to
39
create a capability to develop game changing approaches to National challenges.
This recommendation is similar to one made by the Aldridge commission in 2004.
Finally, the recent NRC report Fostering Visions for the Future: A Review of the
NASA Institute for Advanced Concepts is also highly relevant. It suggests re-creating an early stage innovation engine like the NASA Institute for Advanced Concepts (NIAC). These NRC reports especially emphasize the need for some organizational independence from the mission-focused parts of the agency in order to provide
stability to the investment and a more risk-tolerant environment to foster innovation. They recommend a broad reach, across disciplines and organizations, to ensure
the best ideas are brought forth and supported. All suggest that failure to invest
in technology and innovation puts the Agencys future viability at great risk.
In recognition of the need to rebalance near-term mission and far-term technology
and innovation investments, the Agency chartered an internal study team to investigate the barriers to NASA innovation and make suggestions for approaches to address these barriers. The study team had participation from across NASA Mission
Directorates, Centers, and Offices.
The barriers to innovation identified by our internal study team agree with many
of the findings of the external committee reports with respect to both the overall
shortfall and the focus. NASAs investments in innovation and technology have been
focused on the near term, especially in the space-related disciplines. In addition, the
Agency could do a better job in many areas of engaging partners from across academia, industry and other Government agencies in its technology development efforts. This would allow both the most innovative ideas to be brought forward, and
the broadest application of NASA-supported capabilities to address broader National
needs in areas of high priority to the Nation.
Also recognized in multiple studies is the importance of capabilities for taking
technology from the lab bench to demonstration for flight use. This is an area which
has traditionally been left to flight projects which typically cannot assume the risk
and/or cost for technologies that are not enabling the mission, and requires a diversity of approaches to ensure that the needs of the ultimate user community are fully
addressed. Driven by the specifics of the technology and the target use, successful
approaches can be as simple as environmental and life testing or as complex as
demonstration packages on host missions or dedicated flight demonstrations.
NASA is planning to use an integrated portfolio management approach, balancing
needs from across the Agency, balancing near-term and long-term investments, and
ensuring that resources are appropriately leveraged across the various mission
areas to secure the maximum impact for our investments. NASA will examine reward structures and culture to encourage more risk-taking in innovation activities.
Although our failure is not an option ethic is essential in the spaceflight arena
where lives are at stake, innovation demands pushing the envelope, occasionally
failing, and learning from those failures to drive game-changing solutions to NASAs
grand challenges.
NASA Missions Require Technology to Address Extreme Conditions
NASAs missions require technology beyond state-of-the-art, where hardware and
systems meet the extreme conditions of space and high-performance aeronautics.
The environments in which humans, spacecraft, and equipment must work pose
unique challenges, prompting development of unique capabilities.
Science missions face a variety of extreme environments, with over 90 spacecraft
operating or planned to operate throughout the solar system and beyond. For example, the Juno spacecraft being prepared for launch in 2011 must survive a five-year
journey to Jupiter and operate for about a year on solar power in an area where
there is 25 times less sunlight than at Earth and at temperatures that may approach 275 degrees Fahrenheit, requiring some of the most hardy and efficient
solar arrays ever built. The James Webb Space Telescope, a 6.5-meter (21 feet)
space telescope, will need to operate at about 35 degrees above absolute zero or
396 degrees Fahrenheit. Another example is Solar Probe Plus, which is planned
to launch no later than 2018 and will operate just 3.7 million miles above the Suns
surface, some seven times closer than any spacecraft has come before. At its closest approach, Solar Probe Plus shield must withstand temperatures up to 2,600 degrees Fahrenheit, while allowing the payload of science instruments to operate at
or near room temperature.
While more protected inside the Earths magnetic field, NASA and its partners
must enable humans to live and conduct experiments in space on the International
Space Stationa 500 metric ton, football-field sized, permanently crewed, full-service space platform operating at an altitude of 350 kilometers in a 51.6 degree inclination to the Earths equator. Research for flight beyond low-Earth orbit must en-
40
able long-term human health in micro-gravity, under varying radiation conditions,
with remote medical assistance. Lastly, although operating on Earth, aeronautics
research must make air vehicle concepts, such as vertical lift and supersonic flight
practical for commercial use, and enable significant increases in air transportation
capacity while still protecting the environment, ensuring safety, dramatically improving efficiency, and revolutionizing the flow of air traffic.
Relevance of Mission Technology to other Sectors
NASA technology development over the last decade has by and large focused on
the needs of the missions. This situation raised the importance of infusion into
NASA missions of technology developed jointly in partnerships with industry, academia, other Federal agencies, and other external entities. Interestingly, the advanced nature of NASA technology, combined with the emphasis on partnering,
served to increase the likelihood of additional relevance to other market sectors and
communities.
As an example, the Science Mission Directorate (SMD) partners with the Small
Business Innovative Research (SBIR) program to develop key technologies for the
Mars Science Laboratory (MSL). SMD worked with Microwave Power Technology of
Campbell, California, to develop a small-format Carbon Nanotube Field Emission
cathode (CNTFE) X-ray tube for the Chemistry & Mineralogy instrument on MSL.
While a tungsten cathode was ultimately baselined for the flight tube, the form, fit
and function of the flight tube was derived from this SBIR project.
The Innovative Partnerships Program works through its offices at all ten field
centers to facilitate the transfer of Agency-developed technologies for commercial application and other public benefits. Licensing, together with a wide portfolio of innovative partnering mechanisms, results in commercial products that contribute to the
development of services and technologies in health and medicine, transportation,
public safety, consumer goods, agriculture, environmental resources, computer technology, manufacturing, and other key industrial sectors. Each year, NASA documents 40-50 of the best current examples of how mission technology has yielded
public benefit in the annual Spinoff publication.
Game-Changing or Paradigm Shifting Solutions
Due to the near-term program focus of NASAs current technology programs, the
likelihood of developing and infusing mission game-changing technology is reduced. Still, with clear challenges on the demand-side, significant emphasis on
partnering, and continuing programs with universities, such paradigm-shifting solutions do nonetheless occur, often with additional applicability outside of NASA.
NASAs Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD) is developing very highperformance lithium ion battery cells that significantly exceed current state-of-theart, and are highly reliable, self-contained Proton Exchange Membrane (PEM) regenerative fuel cells. Current automotive fuel cells are not regenerative and consume oxygen from the atmosphere plus hydrogen from onboard storage tanks to
generate electricity. The PEM regenerative cell uses electricity to convert water into
hydrogen and oxygen stored in tanks that can later be reconverted back into electricity. In space applications, such advances in energy storage systems would be
useful to human explorers on a terrestrial surface where there is a decreased ability
to create solar energy. This technology also could be useful to farms and businesses
that need large kilowatt power generated during off-peak hours on the grid or from
other sources.
The NASA partnership with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA), industry, universities, the Internet Research Task Force and several
international space agencies has created the new technology of Delay Tolerant Networking (DTN), which enables the extension of the Earths Internet to sustain communications over interplanetary distancesfor example to and from the Moon and
Mars. This technology has been spun-off to enable many new terrestrial applications
where the Internet can be extended into highly stressed communications environments, such as remote villages, battery-powered sensor webs and undersea communications. Military applications of DTN are substantial, allowing the dissemination
of critical battlefield situational awareness information into areas where communications networks are sparse and subject to a high degree of disruption.
NASA, in partnership with the Air Force Research Lab and Boeing, successfully
completed flight experiments of the X48B Blended Wing Body (BWB) advanced aircraft at the NASA Dryden Flight Research Center. The BWB is a hybrid configuration combining the best attributes of a conventional tube-and-wing aircraft with
a flying wing. It has the potential to meet expected future Next Generation Air
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Transportation System requirements for low noise, low emissions, and high efficiency. It is the first time a dynamically scaled BWB was flown. The experiments
demonstrated the basic flying qualities of the X48B and the effectiveness of the onboard flight control system. NASA is continuing to research the BWB concept along
with other unique configurations in order to enable future vehicles that profoundly
improve the efficiency and capabilities of air transportation.
Other examples include optical communications, in-space propulsion, and tools
and techniques such as modeling and simulation for Earth science, or shell buckling
test facility and analysis for significantly reduced weight and cost of next-generation
launch vehicles. A program similar to the NASA Institute for Advanced Concepts
(MIAC) would be valuable in identifying other game changing technologies.
Technology Innovation and Leveraging
The NASA Innovation Partnerships Program (IPP) continues to pioneer the use
of non-traditional approaches such as the Centennial Challenges Program which
uses incentive prizes to spark innovation and drive technology to meet the Agencys
high-performance technology challenges. A key result of the Centennial Challenges
competitions is the demonstration of dramatic efficiencies in the research and development process when compared with typical industry practices.
The Lunar Lander Challenge requires that teams build and fly a reusable rocketpowered vehicle that can mimic a robotic flight to and from the surface of the moon,
but in an Earth-based demonstration. Teams must design, build and test these vehicles without any government support or funding. The return on investment with an
incentive prize can be enormous, and this contest has yielded working prototypes
from multiple sources. Two teams have successfully flown vehicles and qualified for
prizes and others are planning to fly later this month. Additional NASA partnerships and commercial ventures have resulted from this incentive prize.
Another example is the Regolith Excavation Challenge which recently took place
at Moffett Field in California. The goal was to use either a teleoperated or autonomous device to excavate at least 150 kilograms of simulated lunar regolith within
thirty minutes. Nineteen teams competed with working robots, and three teams met
the minimum requirements and claimed prize money, with the winning team from
Worcester Polytechnic Institute excavating over 500 kilograms. The Regolith Excavation Challenge is important because future lunar astronauts may live off the
land by excavating lunar regolith and extracting useful materials from it, such as
oxygen and even recently discovered water molecules that seem to be bound within
lunar topsoil. The competing teams advanced the technology necessary for this kind
of operation without a lot of investment from NASA.
Additionally, the NASA IPP Partnership Seed Fund enhances the Agencys ability
to meet mission technology goals by providing seed funding to overcome technical
barriers with cost-shared, joint-development partnerships between non-NASA partners, NASA Programs and Projects and NASA Centers. Seed Fund projects have
highly leveraged NASAs investment and resulted in many important technologies
including: two different lunar tire designs from partnerships with Michelin and
Goodyear; a prototype inflatable lunar habitat that was field tested in Antarctica
in partnership with the National Science Foundation and ILC Dover; and testing
of alternative fuels for aircraft engines in partnership with Pratt & Whitney and
the Air Force Research Laboratory.
Coordination and Collaboration with Partners
NASA and its partners leverage mutual interest in many technologies across the
missions. For example, ESMD has a research portfolio related to its Exploration
Technology Development Program and Human Research Program that will benefit
future space explorers as well as other organizations on Earth. NASA is funding approximately 250 investigations related to ISS research and exploration that include
approximately 80 active flight investigations. Investigators in the life sciences do
not depend solely on NASA for the totality of their research funding. Most NASA
funded investigators receive funding from other agencies as well, including the National Science Foundation, the National Institute of Health, the Department of Defense, and the Department of Energy for related research efforts. In fact, NASA
often works directly with these agencies through working groups and Space Act
Agreements. The ESMD has nearly 100 agreements in the form of Memoranda of
Agreement and Understanding with other Federal agencies and international partners. The synergy between these Federal agencies is clear and coordinated.
In FY 2008, about half of SMDs investment in technology programs was in mission-specific technology developments tied to NASA flight missions. The remainder
42
was for Principal Investigator-led research investigations, suborbital research programs (which are often used to test new technologies and instruments in suborbital
context before they are manifested on space-borne missions), and a dedicated Earth
science technology program to enable the highest priority missions called for in the
National Research Council Earth Science Decadal Survey. These latter investments
supported 21 instrument incubation projects that are broadly aimed at addressing
science measurement objectives put forward in the Earth Science Decadal Survey.
These new projects include a carbon dioxide (CO2) laser sounder for the Active Sensing of CO2 Emission over Nights, Days, and Seasons (ASENDS) mission (a Tier 2
mission in the decadal survey), a multi-parameter atmospheric profiling radar for
the Aerosol/Cloud/Ecocsystems (ACE) mission (a Tier 2 mission) and a laser ranging
frequency stabilization subsystem for the follow-on Gravity Recovery and Climate
Experiment (GRACEII) mission (a Tier 3 mission). These Earth Science measurements will enable us to better understand how the Earths climate, water cycle, carbon cycle, and living beings interact and how they impact society.
NASA also works with industry partners who can adapt these technologies to
serve broader societal needs. Perhaps the worlds most famous telescope, the Hubble
Space Telescope has given us more than close-up views of our galaxy; it has served
as a technological engine for various industries. Technologies developed for Hubble
have enabled surgeons to perform micro-invasive arthroscopic surgery with increased precision, made breast biopsies less invasive and more accurate using imaging technology, and led to optimized semiconductor manufacturing through precision
optics and advanced scheduling software.
As NASA transitions the ISS from the assembly phase to the full utilization
phase, the ISS will be operated as a U.S. National Laboratory and thus made available to other U.S. government agencies, academic institutions, private firms and
non-profit organizations. At that stage, the research benefits will extend beyond
NASA and begin accruing in areas related to U.S. national needs in such areas as
improvement in human health and energy systems research.
Improvement in human health is the mission of the National Institute of Health
(NIH). The NIH entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with NASA to use
the ISS for research. In Spring 2009, NTH issued a three-year rolling announcement
for research grants in areas including: (I) cancer; (2) heart, lung and blood disorders;
(3) aging; (4) arthritis and musculoskeletal and skin diseases; (5) biomedical imaging and bioengineering; (6) child health and human development; and, (7) neurological disorders and stroke. Research is scheduled to begin by the end of 2010.
In preparation for full utilization phase of the Space Station, NASA has entered
into agreements with private firms such as Astrogenetix, Inc. as pathfinders for the
future. Based on basic research funded by NASA under prior grants, the company
is now pursing vaccine development under microgravity conditions. A vaccine target
for salmonella-induced food poisoning was discovered in 2009, and the company is
seeking investigational new drug status from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration. Follow-on experiments are underway on a variety of bacterial pathogens, including Methicillin Resistant Staphylococcus Aureas (MRSA), which is responsible
for, almost 20,000 human deaths per year.
The NASA Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD) has a research
portfolio, predominately focused on long-term foundational research, which is both
comprehensive and coordinated in order to make substantial improvements to the
future air transportation system. There is strong alignment of NASAs aeronautics
research portfolio with the National Aeronautics Research and Development Policy
and Plan and the high level goals of the National Research Councils Decadal Survey on Civil Aeronautics (2006), which identify short and long-term strategic aeronautics research and technology goals for our Nation. A good example is the development of new vehicle concepts that are much more efficient and exhibit dramatic
reductions of emissions and noise impacts. NASA fundamental research has paved
the way for concepts such as hybrid wing body vehicles that are quite different from
the tube and wing aircraft that are familiar today. Research includes novel propulsion systems and support for the creation of new alternative fuels that show promise
for even more improved environmentally friendly performance.
Similar to the other Mission Directorates, ARMD utilizes a variety of mechanisms
to engage academia and industry, including industry working groups and technical
interchange meetings at the program and project level, Space Act Agreements for
cooperative partnerships with industry, and the NASA Research Announcement
(NRA) process that provides full and open competition for the best and most promising research ideas. Cooperative partnerships with industry consortia result in significant leveraging of resources for all partners and can provide opportunities to test
the value of component-technology advances in full system-level contexts. All research results, whether generated by NASA internally or by its partners through
43
the NRA, are openly disseminated through archival publications and conference proceedings as well as NASA publications to benefit the broad U.S. aeronautics community while ensuring the dissemination policy is consistent with National security
and foreign policy guidelines.
NASA aeronautics research is conducted in a highly collaborative environment
among Federal agencies. The National Aeronautics Research and Development Policy and Plan provides the strategic framework that facilitates coordination among
the Federal agencies. NASA builds upon this framework to coordinate with other
Agencies when appropriate. For example, to facilitate the transition of advanced
ideas and technologies into the aircraft fleet, NASA is partnering with the Federal
Aviation Administrations Continuous Low Emissions, Energy and Noise (CLEEN)
program to guide efforts to mature technologies that have already shown promise
to the point where they can be adopted by the current and future aircraft fleet. Additionally, NASA and the U.S. Air Force have established an Executive Research
Council that meets at least twice a year to ensure close coordination and collaboration. Another example of a significant partnership effort involving NASA that spans
multiple government and commercial organizations is the Commercial Aviation
Safety Team, which was recently honored with the prestigious Collier Trophy for reducing fatal air transport accidents by 83 percent in a decade.
Response to NASA Authorization Act Direction Related to Technology Development
With regard to NASAs response to the provisions in authorization legislation directing greater commitment to robust technology research and development initiatives in aeronautics, exploration, and space and Earth sciences, several examples
stand out.
NASA has responded to authorization language pertaining to further investment
in the development of technologies related to environmentally friendly aircraft by
formulating the new Environmentally Responsible Aviation Project under the new
Integrated Systems Research Program in order to build on recent developments in
the existing research programs. This new effort will include further technology advancement and research in conjunction with academic and commercial partners.
Work is also ongoing to ensure that new vehicles are accurately modeled in air traffic management simulations, but further research can improve the fidelity of these
simulations to facilitate the development of new procedures, processes and techniques for managing air traffic.
While NASA-sponsored investigations on the Space Station are currently focused
largely on enabling future long-duration human space exploration missions, Congress designated the U.S. portion of the Space Station as a National Laboratory
making its facilities available to other federal agencies and private entities. These
collaborations are well underway.
In addition to non-mission focused technology activities previously mentioned,
NASAs Science program continues to emphasize the role of cross-cutting technologies in the annual competitions for its major technology development programs
such as the Planetary Instrument Definition and Development Program and the
Earth Science Instrument Incubator Program. We have already conducted a review
to determine the highest-priority, cross-cutting technologies, and we will use those
priorities in making future selection decisions for technologies. Key cross-cutting
technologies of interest to science include sensors (e.g., Light Detection and Ranging
LIDARs, long-life lasers, in situ sensors and tools), information systems (e.g., data
processing, large-scale numerical simulation/modeling, and data management, mining and visualization tools), platforms (e.g., photovoltaic and radioisotope power systems, chemical and electrical propulsion, radiation-hardened computer processors,
low power/low mass application-specific integrated circuits), suborbital technologies
(including sounding rockets, balloons, and unmanned aircraft systems), large lightweight deployable structures (especially telescopes and antennas), and integrated
modeling techniques (e.g., structural, optical, thermal, and instrument models that
share the same databases).
Conclusion
The National Academy of Sciences issued a warning in its report Rising Above the
Gathering Storm: The United States faces an enormous challenge because of the
disparity it faces in labor costs. Science and technology provide the opportunity to
overcome that disparity by creating scientists and engineers with the ability to create entire new industriesmuch as has been done in the past. The Academy recommended increasing Americas talent pool by vastly improving K12 mathematics
44
and science education; strengthening the Nations commitment to long-term basic
research; developing top students, scientists, and engineers; and, ensuring that the
United States is the premier nation in the world for innovation.
Most assuredly, NASA can contribute. As the Agency pursues demanding missions
in Earth science and climate research, human and robotic exploration, astronomy
and astrophysics, solar physics, and aeronautics, NASA must answer several fundamental questions: Is there water on Mars? Can humans live for extended periods
in space, and if so can they live on the resources they find? What can we do to inform choices on mitigating and adapting to global change? Are there other solar systems like ours in the universe? As noted earlier, the missions created to answer
those questions utilize specialized hardware that must endure extreme environmental conditions and demand functionality beyond that required for Earth-based
applications.
The NASA mission focus and ability to develop technology from infancy to application provides an extraordinary forcing function for innovation. The Agencys technology challenges are multidimensional, requiring multidisciplinary solutions.
Shared with the academic community, these challenges help prepare graduate students by enabling them to work on real-world challenges early in their careers.
NASA technology lends itself to practical collaboration across government, academia, and industry. In addition, technology development linked to exciting NASA
missions can provide a low risk avenue to encourage K12 students. Finally, most
NASA projects require large-scale system engineering. Addressing challenges with
these characteristics has a powerful galvanizing effect on educational institutions
and students, and thus on the aerospace industry, other industries, and on NASA.
Our Nation has made great progress throughout its history because of the enormously difficult challenges it has encountered. The grand challenge to build an
intercontinental railway, or to land a man on the Moon and return him safely to
the Earth, not only utilized our best talent, but also created new technologies, inspired generations to pursue challenging goals, created new industries, and ultimately improved our country and the world. Similar opportunities are in front of
us now.
Chairwoman Giffords, I would be happy to respond to any questions you or the
other Members of the Subcommittee may have.
Chairwoman GIFFORDS. Thank you. At this point we are going to

start our first round of questions, and the Chair recognizes herself
for 5 minutes.
I would like to start with Mr. Scolese. You have heard testimony
from the other panelists about somethe recommendations of why
this is important and the suggestions that this really matters, and
it needs to be reinstituted. We have heard about the importance of
advanced technology development at NASA, but could you speak
more specifically about the attributes of such a program? How
would NASA structure a short-term, a mid-term, and a long-range
term program in terms of the needs of the agency and its various
mission directorates?
And also, should we expect to see any changes in NASAs technology development programs in the fiscal year 2011 budget?
PROGRAM ATTRIBUTES
Mr. SCOLESE. Certainly. In terms of the short-term technologies
and even the mid-term technologies we have our programs largely
aligned with our missions. So they tend to stay within the mission
directorates, and those are moving along fairly well.
As an example, in the science mission directorate we invest
about 10 percent of their budget in technology development. That
is where we go off and look at the instruments that we may need
in the future or entry descent and landing as Dr. Braun mentioned
earlier for going to Mars with different payloads. So for those, as
I mentioned in my testimony, we would expect those to stay within
the mission directorates.
45
The longer-term technologies, typically we would like to look at
things that are cross-cutting, that could affect more than one mission area; aeronautics, science, or human spaceflight programs.
Those dont tend to fit well within a mission directorate, and we
would think that if we went off to do those, we would take a step
back and look at a more coordinated process across our directorates. Whether that would be as Dr. Colladay mentioned an entity that reported to the administrator or it would be put into some
other organization, I couldnt say at this time.
And to your last question or last part of the question, earlier this
year we recognized and we recognized before that our investments
in technology have changed. They have changed their focus to a
more near-term focus as opposed to the longer-term focus for a variety of reasons. So we asked a team to go off and look at what we
could do.
So, yes, I will, you willcan expect to see some changes in how
NASA does technology in the future.
Chairwoman GIFFORDS. The next question I have is something
that is based on what our recent new administrator said to the
general public, and he said that the President tasked him to make
NASA inspire young people again, and in that same vein NRCs report on the NIAC basically went on to talk about that role of
NASAs importance for inspiring the public with a spirit of discovery and exploration.
So I guess I would like to start with Dr. Braun. If you could
elaborate on your committees work in terms of what you regard as
inspirational, educational, the contributions that NIAC has made
and then turning to Mr. Scolese, I would like to hear some of the
elements in this technology program that we could pull that in, and
of course, from Dr. Colladay as well.
PUBLIC RELATIONS/STUDENT RELATIONS
Mr. BRAUN. Okay. In addition to the work that was funded directly by NIAC with the external innovators, NIAC did have a student fellows program and also was very visible in a public outreach
campaign. So to address your question directly I think our committee felt that NIAC did an excellent job of actually earning positive public support for NASA through its actions and of inspiring
students actually around the country to be a little more creative
and to think outside the box. So that was certainly true.
Inif I could add one other point, in my discussions with students on campus, you know, that occurs most days, you know,
when I am not here in Washington, DC, students are really interested in the future much farther beyond say the next 5 or 10 years
in general. You know, they are people that are about to enter the
workforce, and they are going to be in the workforce for 20 to 40
years, and so visionary, far-reaching technology programs, innovation and creativity are things that pull them into engineering and
science in general. Thank you.
Chairwoman GIFFORDS. Mr. Scolese.
Mr. SCOLESE. Well, I would agree with all of that. Engineers and
scientists want to think about the future, and they want to work
on things for the future. So our missions automatically inspire people to want to go off and do that.
46
But specifically some things that we are doing today to help work
that is we have a suborbital program with sounding rockets and
balloons as an example. It is not strictly the technology part, but
it gives students and graduate students, undergraduate students
an opportunity to develop and experiment, test it in a real flighttype environment where there isnt the overwhelming pressure to
succeed as you would have with a mission. So we find those opportunities and in any technology program we would do, we want to
engage, and in fact, any technology program we do today we do engage universities as well as industry, but in particular the universities to get the graduate students and then undergraduate students engaged in these activities. And in some cases even high
school students.
Chairwoman GIFFORDS. Dr. Colladay.
Mr. COLLADAY. NASA has a mission that in itself excites people,
and so in many respects you have one of the easiest jobs I can
imagine to generate the kind of enthusiasm that will lead people
into engineering careers and science careers.
There is two things thatand it starts very early. There is two
at a young age. There is two things that seem to be in our genetic
wiring. Kids love dinosaurs, and they love space, and NASA can
really capture the interest in space because they have real interesting problems to solve. And in many respects defining those problems and then translating them into technical solutions is what engineering students and scientists like to wrestle with.
So I think the mission is there to generate that kind of excitement.
Chairwoman GIFFORDS. Thank you, Dr. Colladay.
The Chair is going to recognize Mr. Olson.
Mr. OLSON. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I have a question
for Dr. Braun and Dr. Colladay.
Your report provides good insight into the demise of NIAC, but
given its unique roll and relatively small cost why was NASA so
indifferent about NIACs fortunes? Why was it allowed to close?
Where were its advocates, and why did they fail?
COLLAPSE
OF
NIAC
Mr. BRAUN. Well, I can only give you my opinion on that, and
I am happy to do so. I, of course, wasnt in NASA at the time. What
happened with the NIAC is that it was envisioned originally as a
cross-cutting program outside the mission directorates that was
seeking advanced technology and infusing them into NASAs missions.
With the dissolution of the aerospace technology enterprise at
NASA, the former Code R in 2004, NIAC got moved into the exploration systems mission directorate, and shortly after that with the
budget crunch if you, you know, to use my words, with the budget
crunch to get the Constellation program going and getting humans
back to the moon, a pretty strong effort was made throughout the
agency to squeeze down and remove many of the technology development programs. Not just the NIAC. NobodyI am fairly certain
that nobody within NASA went directly after the little $4 million
NIAC Program, but in sweeping out a lot of these larger technology
programs, NIAC was also removed in 2007.
47
Mr. OLSON. Dr. Colladay.
Mr. COLLADAY. Well, I would agree with that observation. I
would also say that protecting the resources for really innovative,
far-term, advanced technology requires a champion. It requires a
person that has enough stature at the table in the budget battles
that come every year to defend that investment, because at the end
of the day it is a good-faith investment in the future. And if that
advocate, that champion for advanced technology isnt at the table,
it is pretty hard in budget crunch time with scarce resources as
NASA has faced over the recent years to defend a program, even
though it is only $4 million. It isevery little bit is important.
Mr. OLSON. Thank you for those answers, and I have a question
for you, Mr. Scolese. In your statement you highlight a number of
technology development activities ongoing across the agencys mission directorate, but I notice there were no mention of Ares, Orion,
or Constellation. And for the record could you describe two or three
technology development activities associated with our future
manned spaceflight program?
MANNED SPACEFLIGHT
Mr. SCOLESE. Certainly. There is actually a number of activities
that are in what we term our Exploration Systems Mission Directorate, which is where the Constellation Program is with Orion and
Ares and the ground systems that support that. Some of the farreaching technologies that we are looking at there that can help
not only human spaceflight but others, one is a composite crew
module, and that may sound a little different, but most everything
that we have manufactured for human spaceflight has been made
out of metallics; aluminum or steel of one type or another. And
there is certain benefits if we could go off and use structures that
are made out of essentially plastics.
However, we have been using them on the science missions for
many years because they give us certain benefits that allow us to
make those missions much better, but we havent applied them
broadly to large structures because we havent been able to find
any theory that tells us how to build them.
So we decided that we needed to go off and understand that technology and develop that technology and chose to build a crew module very similar to Orion out of a composite structure. We worked
that with all of our NASA centers basically because our science
centers have lots of experience with composites. Our Langley Research Center has worked on composite structures for aircraft elements, and Marshall Spaceflight Center has worked on composites
for rocket parts. And you can go around to all of our various centers that have analytical techniques, but we needed to be able to
go off and build it.
So we went off and worked with industry and academia to build
it, test it. It has a pressurized system, and we are in the process
now of testing it. The good news is is we are developing a theory.
Our tests are now going to see how well we did with that theory.
The good news is so far with the initial tests that we have done,
theory and application are turning out to match very closely, so
that is very good. The applications are probably not for the crew
module, probably not for Orion, but downstream if we went to send
48
people to Mars or the moon or libration points, wherever it may be,
will allow us to make structures that are more efficient, perhaps
lighter, and better understood.
It has commercial applications. Already the aircraft industry is
looking at what we are doing and talking about large fuselage as
opposed to just segments of the fuselage or the wings. So it has
proven to have a veryit is a very good technology.
Another area to follow on with what Dr. Braun said, is going to
Mars. Ultimately we want to send humans to Mars, and as Dr.
Braun said, all of our technology is based on the 1970s when we
went off and did Viking. The Mars Science Lab is the largest thing
we are going to land on Mars, and we are struggling with the fundamental physics of being able to get that done.
So what we have done partnering with all of our mission directorates is we have instrumented that spacecraft so that we can get
some really good data finally on the atmospheric profile and what
actually happens as we are descending through thatthe Martian
atmosphere.
In addition, if you look at MSL, it is about the same size as the
Orion capsule. So we are also going to use that in helping to improve the design of the Orion capsule as well.
So those are just two examples of what we are doing in or associated with the Constellation program.
Mr. OLSON. Thanks for that answer. I mean, those are pretty impressive examples of what we are doing with that technology.
And finally I would just like to close, one question for all of you.
What percentage of the NASA budget should be devoted to nonmission-oriented technology development in your opinion? Humble
opinions?
NON-MISSION BUDGET
Mr. COLLADAY. Somehow I knew that question would come. I
have said in a number of different forums that I thought an advanced high-tech agency or any organization with a mission like
NASA should fence or protect resources at the level of about 10
percent of the total budget for really advanced, innovative technology development.
Now, the fuzziness comes in how much of that is really nearterm, mid-term, and far-term, because technology development
needs to be mission specific in the mission directorates as well. But
I would say a good starting point in answering that question would
be 10 percent of the budget, at least building to that, and that includes aeronautics, too. I mean, I would put the space technology
and aeronautics together at 10 percent.
Mr. OLSON. Thank you, Dr. Colladay. Dr. Braun.
Mr. BRAUN. Yeah. Well, I wouldI agree completely with Dr.
Colladays assessment. In my written testimony I suggested that at
least 10 percent of NASAs budget should support technologies required to dramatically advance entirely new aeronautics and space
endeavors. And so the way I view this question is that is 10 percent above and beyond mission-focused technologies. NASA obviously needs to be doing mission-focused technology development
work. The examples that Mr. Scolese gave are excellent examples
of that, and that work needs to continue.
49
But in addition to that work, which could be jointly funded by
mission directorates and a cross-cutting technology enterprise, in
addition to that work something like 10 percent of the agencys
budget devoted to new endeavors in aeronautics and space is about
right to an agency whose goal is to push the frontier and to be looking at the boundaries. Thank you.
Mr. OLSON. Thank you for that answer, and Mr. Scolese, if you
feel comfortable answering the question, we would love to hear it.
Mr. SCOLESE. Well, you know there are certain questions that I
have to kind of dance around a little. This is one of them. Clearly
it is hard to disagree with what was said. A research organization
like NASA isdoes need to invest, and we do, and we have to determine those priorities in conjunction with you and the Administration.
What I can say, though, on the very positive side is that in our
aeronautics area most of that budget is research and development.
You can see that sort of with that figure that was shown earlier.
In our other areas we have to go off and look, and the pressures
of the mission often do cause some issues, but that is exactly why
we went off earlier this year to start looking at what we can do,
how can we organize, and how can we, you know, find a better way
to go off and advance technologies.
Mr. OLSON. Thank you very much for your answers, and Mr.
Chairman, I yield back my time.
Mr. GRIFFITH. [Presiding] Thank you, Ranking Member Olson,
and Congresswoman Fudge, would you have some questions?
Ms. FUDGE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank all of you for
being here today. I just have a couple of questions.
The first one for any of the panel members. NASAs funding for
research and technology for spacecraft systems for future missions
has been significantly reduced over more than a decade. A summary report of the review of U.S. Human Space Flight Plans Committee stated that investment in a well-designed and adequatelyfunded space technology program is critical to enable progress in
exploration. NASAs science mission also requires significant advancements in spacecraft technology to enable exciting new missions.
What increases in funding in critical areas such as power, propulsion, communication, and other technologies is needed to assure
that these technologies are developed to support future missions?
And in conjunction with that, how will the research and technology
funding be managed and dispersed?
Mr. SCOLESE. Well, I guess I got voted. All of those things are
critical for both, as you said, both the human spaceflight and the
robotics missions. It is hard to say how much and when. I can tell
you that we are looking at all of those areas today and perhaps
give some examples inof what we are doing, and that should
probably lead to areas of further investigation.
Clearly in communications we are very limited. We are limited
in terrestrial communications because the bandwidth is being used
for other services. So we are moving towards optical communications, and in space that is pretty easy. You dont have to worry
about an atmosphere, you dont have to worry about clouds. So we
are making an investment in optical communications that will
50
allow us to get more data back in a way that will be more stimulating to the public for sure but also get more for the scientific community.
Today at Mars we have a fleet of satellites in orbit around Mars
and on the surface, and we cannot bring back all the data because
we just do not have enough bandwidth with the RF, with the radio
frequency links that we have. So this is an area that we are spending a lot of time in.
Propulsion. If we are ever going to get humans to Mars, if we are
ever going to get our probes to the far reaches of the solar system
efficiently, we need better propulsion techniques. Some of those we
are working on today. Ion propulsion is an area that we are now
relying on. We use it from the early days in our communications
satellites, but we are now relying on it for space missions. The
Dawn Mission that is going to the asteroid belt is entirely dependent on ion propulsion, and that is a very efficient propulsion that
is being developed with industry but at principally the Glenn Research Center and Jet Propulsion Laboratory. And it has now been
adapted by some universities to go off and do missions.
So those are just a couple of examples, but you are exactly right.
We can go further in each of those areas to go off and find newer
technologies and developments of technologies that will enable
those missions. I could add life support, having humans livetoday
we have humans that can spend 6 months on orbit at a time, but
they are close to earth. If things really get bad for whatever reason,
they can come home. When we start sending humans beyond, certainly beyond low-Earth orbit but even beyond the moon, we need
to have systems that will keep humans alive and be reliable for
hundreds of days to years. And those are technologies that we are
all looking at and can do more in.
Ms. FUDGE. Thank you. My last question, NASAs in-house research and technology expertise has been instrumental in both assuring advancement of critical technologies and supporting their
demonstration and utilization in NASA missions. These capabilities
at NASA centers are essential for effectively managing NASAs
technology portfolio.
It is also needed for developing and effectively leading partnerships with industry and universities. What is and can be done further to ensure that these in-house civil service capability is maintained and strengthened, particularly in light of reduced center
civil service complement over the past several years and an aging
workforce with a high percentage of retirement-eligible personnel?
Mr. SCOLESE. Well, certainly having exciting programs, be they
technology or missions, is something that is critical. We believe we
have the legislative authorities and the contracting tools to allow
us to partner appropriately with industry and some examples you
have again on your desk of areas in aeronautics where we have
some very strong relationships with companies and other organizations. On those we can generally speak only in terms of the general
benefit because those companies want to maintain their competitive advantage.
In the space arena it is a little more obvious because there arent
as many organizations that are involved there. But I think we have
some good partnerships there. I think iffurther if you look at our
51
Innovative Partnership Program, what we call IPP, where we do a
lot of work with the small business community, we have a lot of
examples where we have gone off and actually transitioned the
technology to other areas.
One example is an endoscope that is used in heart surgery now
is a spin-off of a NASA activity that we went off and worked ultimately with a small business. So those are just some examples of
some areas that we can do.
Ms. FUDGE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GRIFFITH. Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. This is for anyone on
the panel here. What is the situation where we are doing research,
the Federal Government is paying for this research, and who ends
up with the patents for new discoveries?
PATENTS
Mr. SCOLESE. Well, unfortunately, the answer is it depends.
Thefor things where there is clearlythe government is the lead
on it, the government owns the patent on that or theand of
course, the credit for the patent goes to the individual that developed the technology. And depending on the agreements that are
made, if it is done in conjunction with a university or if it is in conjunction with an industry, whoever those agreements are worked
to and where the majority of the activity comes determines who the
patent owner will ultimately be.
BENEFIT
TO
TAXPAYER
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Do you think that the taxpayers are being

well served and represented in those negotiations as to who owns
if we finance research, I mean, the taxpayers finance research.
Should we not demand that we have the financial benefit, meaning
the patent benefit from financing the research?
Mr. SCOLESE. Well, yes, sir, and that is what I was trying to get
at. In some of our cases where we have agreements it is only for
them to use our test facilities, not to go off where we are putting
in resources, and they may reimburse us for those test facilities.
So that is why I was getting at. It depends if the government
funds it, we own the patent. There is no question about that.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Good. That is what I needed to know.
Mr. SCOLESE. Yeah.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. It seems to me that would be a source of revenue that we could utilize when we talk about expanding the budget for people. Maybe we could make sure that we are receiving the
benefits from that research.
Is there any research being done on the space elevator concept?
SPACE ELEVATOR
Mr. SCOLESE. I would have to answer that one for the record, sir.
I dont know at this time. I know that there is a prizeor not a
prize. There is a technology activity that would allow that to be
proposed to, but I do not know what was proposed this year.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Are weI would imagine we just had
a launch and a hit on the moon to find out if there is ice that is
52
we could utilize. Do we have research going on to find out if there
is ice on the moon, how we can use that ice to further the space
program?
FINDING WATER
Mr. SCOLESE. Well, yes, sir, we do, because while we are not as
sure about the moon, we are very sure about Mars. We have
touched ice on Mars, and we know there is a lot of water there.
So we do have activities that are related to what we call in-situ resource utilization, where we can take advantage of the resources
that are available to us and then go off and use them. And in the
case of water in particular, if we have fuel cells, we separate the
water into hydrogen and oxygen and then ultimately combine it to
use it either as a rocket fuel or to use it as a fuel to generate electricity.
BEAMING ENERGY
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. Theis there much being done on
beaming energy, or is that something that we did 10 years ago or
15 years ago and not doing it anymore?
Mr. SCOLESE. We actually have an experiment that we are looking at for doing on the space station to do that. I dont know what
the current manifest is, but low-power beaming to get some idea
of what we can do there and what the practical limitations are. So
it has not gone away. It is
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Good.
Mr. SCOLESE. still with us.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. It would seem to me that that is one thing
that people justI have talked about this about 10 years ago I remember, and it just seemed to me to have a lot of potential but a
lot ofmost other people dont think it has much potential, but if
we can beam energy, can wethat could actually enable us to put
heavier objects into space because we dont have to carry its own,
their own fuel.
Mr. SCOLESE. Yes, sir.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thelet me see. Got to mention something
about children and dinosaurs and space. I havemy wife and I
were blessed with triplets 5-1/2 years ago, one boy and two girls.
I just wanted to reconfirm that they are excited about dinosaurs
and space. So with that said thank you very much.
Mr. GRIFFITH. Congressman, thank you. Congressman Miller.
Edwards. Excuse me.
Ms. EDWARDS. Donna Edwards from Maryland. Thank you for
your testimony. I actually wanted to follow up on a couple of
things.
One is I do think it isand I appreciate your testimony toas
to the difficulty balancing long and near-term goals, and I guess
there is stuff in-between and investments and strategies in those
because although I think a lot of the public really thinks about
NASA as sort of the one place in government where people really
are thinking well out into the future, that because of budget and
other kinds of pressures and performance pressures that we perhaps are not looking as much into the future as we need to be, and
53
that means in terms of investment in research and advanced technologies.
And so I wanted to actually follow up from Mr. Rohrabachers
question regarding intellectual property and intellectual property
rights, because I think that, again, is a tough balance to strike. If
you are trying to, you know, if you want to put out, you know, requests for really innovative research, then, you know, a scientist
and researcher or an investigator wants to have some skin in the
game, and part of that skin is potentially that, you know, great
patent down the line.
And so I wonder if you could comment for me about how we can
strike that balance of intellectual property rights and sharing so
that we get, you know, the greatest bang for the buck and benefit
as taxpayers but also incentivize some of our researchers to do that
cutting-edge, risk-taking investigative work that we know should
continue into the future.
And then I am also very interested to know on that question
there are technologies and research going on in commercial
spaceflight, in military space, and it seems that there are lots of
walls and barriers in terms of sharing that innovative, intellectual
property that is developed in each one of these spheres that I think
gets in the way. You know, for example, if a technology is developed on the military space side, then we have, you know, some
competitors around the world who are actually using some of those
technologies and sharing them and commercializing them, but right
here in this country those same technologies cant be shared on our
civilian and commercial side. And that is a real downer when it
comes to making investments in research.
And so I wonder if you can give me some thoughts about that
and what we might think about in the Congress to try to mitigate
that.
SHARING BETWEEN MILITARY AND COMMERCIAL
DEVELOPERS
Mr. SCOLESE. Certainly. If I can take the last question first, the
barriers for us to work with thewith our colleagues in other agencies in the government are not so great. We typically can do that
quite well, and oftentimes when you are doing a research or a technology activity, it is not always known in the agencies which ones
are there. So we have to have much stronger dialogues and that
is something that I think we are all working on much more diligently now than we have in the past.
But even in the past we had, for instance, a technology, I forget
the exact name because it keeps on changing, but a technology
working group where our NASA chief engineer and before that our
chief technologist would work with their DARPA colleagues and
other colleagues from the Department of Defense or Department of
Energy to go off and find areas of common interest.
ITAR
Further on that second part, the area where we really find that
we hurt ourselves and we could really use help is with the ITAR,
the International Traffic in and Arms Regulations, because that
54
really limits our ability to take U.S. developed capabilities and
bring those overseas where it could bring benefit to our companies.
And even in the government, it is very difficult in government-togovernment interactions for us to take technologies that we have
and make them available so that it is a U.S.-developed technology
and a U.S.-managed technology.
Instead, we develop it, someone sees it, and they will go off and
invest their resources to go off and make the profit.
Ms. EDWARDS. I have an example of that right in my district.
Mr. SCOLESE. I am sure you do.
Ms. EDWARDS. And that is why I asked.
Mr. SCOLESE. Yes. Well, we both kind of worked at the same
place at one point, so I figured that was probably the answer. On
the earlier question about the intellectual property rights, it would
probably be better if I took that one for the record and gave you
all of the types of contracts that we have. Some have greater liberties for the inventor to go off and have property rights for those
even if the government is funding it.
But it depends a lot on what that agreement says. So we have
space act agreements and contracts and grants, and they are all a
little bit different. So why dont I take for the record to get you a
summary of what those are and what the intellectual property
rights are associated with those various ones.
Ms. EDWARDS. I would appreciate that. Thank you.
Mr. SCOLESE. Okay.
Mr. GRIFFITH. The Chair is going to ask a few questions or make
a few comments really. I think most of my questions have been answered.
This visual aid that was produced is absolutely impressive. I
would say that you could also put a hospital room with a bed and
a patient on this very page, and there would probably be greater
than 18 improvements that have happened because of NASA, from
the early diagnosis of breast cancer because of the innovations in
the Hubble Telescope, to the miniaturizations of instruments that
you have mentioned, to many, many things that have happened
over the last 2 decades as a direct result of the innovations at
NASA that we did not know were going to occur.
And that is one of the great benefits of research and development, one of the great benefits of science is that science has to prepare to discover, and then after it discovers, it discovers further
what it did not know was there. I think Einstein said that research
is something he does when he doesnt know what he is doing, and
so I think we need to really emphasize the fact that research and
development, whether it is the discovery of the Van Allen radiation
fields, whether it is our continuing effort to improve materials so
that we can further discover whether it be the neutron scattering
and the elastic properties of radiation in material is absolutely critical to the advancement of science.
And NASA has been at the forefront of that, and I might take
just one liberty to say that I think it is the absolute soul of America, both in its intellectual capabilities and equity and also in
Americas future, and I appreciate each and every one of you being
here and coming from the Alabama Fifth District and Marshall
Space Flight Center, you can see that I am a little bit prejudiced.
55
But I think Ranking Member Olson has another question.
Mr. OLSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. One more question for
Dr. Colladay, and Dr. Colladay, you used to run NASAs Office of
Aeronautics and Space Technology. NASA separated those research
fields a few years ago with aeronautics placed in its own mission
directorate and space technology placed into the exploration systems mission directorate.
Was that a good idea, or should the two be reunited into a single
office? And as a follow up, would reuniting them strengthen technology developed by NASA, or is money the issue, not organization?
And finally, would reuniting them suffice rather than creating a
DARPA-like organization? I know it is a lot.
NASA ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
Mr. COLLADAY. Well, there were good and valid reasons for having the two combined when you get to the far-term, long-term base
research, because when you are working computational fluid dynamics and advanced materials and the basic navigation and controls and sort of the basic disciplinary research and it is a long way
from application, the people doing the research didnt always know
they were spending an aeronautics R&D dollar or a space technology dollar. They were working on important and exciting engineering and science problems.
And so there wasthere were certain number of advantages of
having them together. They had to be defended separately. It gave
enough critical mass that that person at the table that wasthat
I had spoke of as the champion defending advanced R&D had a big
enough portfolio to be at the table.
But that is not the only way to do it. Itthere are a lot of different governance models. Whatever governance model you look at,
certain things have to be attended to, and I mention it in my remarks. One is when it is separate organizationally and put together as it was 20 years ago, aeronautics and space technology,
you really have to put a lot of effort into making sure that what
is being done is relevant.
You get criticism that, oh, they are just off playing in the sandbox. That is unfair a lot of times, but it points to the need and the
organization that is responsible for advanced technology to make
sure they are working with the user community, they are working
with the ultimate developers to make sure that what they are
working on has a transition path, it is relevant, and then a management approach or a governance model is in place to manage the
transition of these great things that come out of the research that
have to later be developed.
One thing in being a director of DARPA that I learned, it is, you
know, we quit doing the research when we had proof of concept. If
we proved that something was feasible, that was enough. We were
off doing something else. A lot of work, a lot of hard work and
money goes into taking those ideas and putting them to practice.
And so it is not enough to develop the technology, prove feasibility, create this environment where it is all right to take risks.
You do all those things, and that is important, but there isthe
ultimate user and the developer has to run with the early technology development along and parallel to manage the transition.
56
I dont know that on my watch in NASA that we always did a
good enough job on those two points; relevancy, making sure that
the ultimate user was involved, and that we managed the transition from what was code R into application. And the application
sometimes wasnt with NASA at all. It was with industry.
Mr. OLSON. Thank you very much for that answer, Dr. Colladay.
I see I have run out of my time. I yield back my time. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GRIFFITH. Thank you, Ranking Member Olson. I am reminded before we close that the concept for high-speed CT Scanning was available to us 30 and 40 years ago. The coefficient of absorption and expansion I can remember working out problems with
my slide rule and taking me a great deal of time, and it depended
on our development outside of the concept of high-speed computing
that allowed us to develop the CT Scan or even though we had the
concept proven many, many decades before, so I think as pure
R&D, pure science begins to develop. We serendipitously discover
things over here that apply over here, and we cant always predict
that.
Before we bring the hearing to a close, I want to thank each and
every one of you for being here, and thank the witnesses and also
our participants.
The record will remain open for 2 weeks for additional statements from the members and for answers to any follow-up questions the subcommittee may ask of the witnesses. The witnesses
are excused, and the hearing is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:15 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
Appendix:
ANSWERS
TO
POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
(57)
58
ANSWERS
TO
Responses by Dr. Robert D. Braun, Co-Chair of the Committee To Review the Nasa
Institute for Advanced Concepts, Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board, National Research Council
Questions submitted by Chairwoman Gabrielle Giffords
Disclosure: Since the October 22 hearing, I have had significant interaction with
NASA personnel on this subject. However, the responses provided here to your questions reflect the deliberations of the National Academy Committee to Review the
NASA Institute for Advanced Concepts and my own individual thoughts. I have indicated my personal views as such in the following responses.
Q1. In your prepared statement, you indicate that your panel felt that the former
NIACs complete focus on revolutionary concepts was too long term. As a result,
your committee recommended that the new NIAC2 program should adopt a
standard of technically innovative rather than revolutionary, as was formerly
used. By changing the standard to no longer stress revolutionary capabilities,
would NASA run the risk of missing out on game-changing technologies?
A1. By definition, visionary advanced concepts will not be near-term. However, in
our committee discussions, it was felt that NIACs complete focus on revolutionary
concepts (as directed in its NASA SOW) was too long-term, creating a cultural mismatch between the NIAC products and its mission-focused sponsors and causing infusion difficulties for the MIAC innovators. As such, the committee recommended
that the key selection requirement for NIAC2 proposal opportunities be that the
concept is scientifically and/or technically innovative and has the potential to provide major benefit to a future NASA mission of 10 years and beyond. While 10 years
and beyond includes concepts that could be 40 years or farther in the future and
revolutionary concepts are certainly scientifically and/or technically innovative, the
committee felt that these modifications in focus would likely result in NIAC2 efforts
with a higher probability of infusion into NASAs strategic planning process. In the
committees opinion, these changes would not constrain NASA from receiving and
selecting revolutionary concepts (and their associated game-changing technologies)
through future NIAC2 solicitations. Rather, such a change would also allow consideration of more near-term concepts, still a decade or more away from fruition, that
have a higher likelihood of infusion into future NASA missions. The NIAC2 selection process would have to be designed to provide the appropriate balance between
advanced concepts one decade or multiple decades into the future.
In addition, while NIACs efforts were (and NIAC2s efforts should remain) on advanced concepts, other elements of a broadly focused NASA technology development
program could specifically target proving the feasibility of game-changing technologies. Such demonstrations are likely to cost significantly more than a NIAC2
Phase I or Phase II concept study and require additional schedule. The proper suite
of game-changing technology investments should result from integration of advanced
systems analysis work (e.g., NIAC2 studies) overlaid upon a detailed set of technology roadmapping activities, developed by the knowledgeable technical community
(both NASA and external technologists).
Q2. In your view, what would be an appropriate suite of NASA investments to address near-term, mid-term, and long-term technology needs?
A2. In my experience, there are three general classes of technology development
programs: mission-focused (near-term), discipline-based (long-term), and capabilitybased (mid-range). NASA presently refers to these classes as mission-focused, earlystage and game-changing innovation, and crosscutting capabilities, respectively.
While mid-term, capability-based technology investments are perhaps the most critical for a forward-looking Agency like NASA, within NASA today, this type of technology investment is minimal. In my view, this is not acceptable for an agency
whose purpose includes demonstrating this nations scientific and technological
prowess, or one that is trying to inspire the next generation of engineers and scientists. It is from these capability-based technology developments (crosscutting capabilities) that NASAs next generation of missions will sprout. Today, a technologypoor NASA greatly hampers our aeronautics and space flight development programs. The lack of a crosscutting capability technology maturation program is perhaps the greatest deficiency in NASAs current approach to technology development.
I believe that NASA would be well served through a blend of technology development activities including the mission-focused technology presently performed in the
NASA mission directorates (25 year maturation timeframe, moderate $ invest-
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ment), capability-based technology (515 year maturation timeframe, large $ investment), and discipline-based technology (1540 year maturation timeframe, modest
$ investment). On top of the mission-focused technologies currently being pursued
within the NASA mission directorates, a broadly-focused NASA technology development program should include a large number of small $ value seed-fund awards
for long-term visionary concepts and early stage innovation, a smaller number of
moderate $ value awards to mature a competitively selected set of game-changing
technologies, and a few high $ value awards to mature selected crosscutting technologies to flight readiness status. I believe our nation would be well served by investing at least 10% of NASAs budget in support of the technologies required to
dramatically advance entirely new aeronautics and space endeavors (in contrast to
an investment of less than 3% today). This investment would include a small
amount for advanced concepts so difficult to achieve that their chance of individual
success within a decade is less than 10%, yet concepts so innovative that their success could serve as game-changers for this vital, national industry.
Q3. Your report indicates that the committee considered the model of each NASA Directorate having its own NIAC-like entity.
a. What are the pros and cons of having such sub-NIAC units within each mission directorate?
b. Why did your panel ultimately reject that model?
A3. The committee determined that two aspects that led to NIACs termination
were that (1) its focus was on far-term mission concepts that were not closely
aligned with the lunar exploration architecture, and that (2) NIAC had limited success in infusing advanced concepts into NASAs strategic plans. Recognizing this relevance problem, the committee considered whether or not each NASA directorate
should have its own NIAC-like entity. One potential advantage of such an arrangement is that each sub-NIAC could focus specifically on the advanced system and
mission needs of its associated directorate, which likely would help each such organization to be more relevant to the directorate and would facilitate the infusion of
results obtained. However, there are several disadvantages to such an arrangement,
including (1) the management challenge of multiple mission directorate independent
solicitations, (2) the need for proposers to be able to place their advanced concept
within a specific mission directorate (whereas, many of the advanced concepts pursued by NIAC were at the intersection of multiple mission directorates), and (3) the
integration of these mission-directorate advanced concepts with an eventual crosscutting capabilities demonstration program. In such a scenario, each mission directorate may also need to carry the funds and development programs to mature selected advanced concepts to flight readiness. As such, in the opinion of the committee, the efficiencies resulting from having a single organization solicit and manage advanced concepts for NASA as a whole were significantly compelling.
Q4. You said in your prepared statement that the lack of a NASA interface to receive
the hand-off of promising projects was a persistent MIAC challenge. Consequently, your panel recommended improvement in how advanced concepts are
infused into future systems.
a. Can you elaborate on what reestablishing an aeronautics and space systems
technology development enterprise would entail from an organizational, programmatic, and cultural perspective?
b. What would the relationship between the proposed NIAC2 and this new enterprise?
c. If the enterprise is not established, could you still have a NIAC2 entity? Where
would it reside organizationally?
A4. In the committees opinion, the lack of a NASA interface to receive the handoff of promising projects was a persistent NIAC challenge. To improve the manner
in which advanced concepts are infused into its future systems and to build a culture that continuously strives to advance technology, the committee recommended
that NASA consider reestablishing an aeronautics and space systems technology development enterprise. Such an organization would serve to preserve and increase
the leadership role of the United States in aeronautical and space systems technology. Successfully reestablishing such an enterprise would have significant organizational, programmatic and cultural ramifications for NASA. As such, NASAs considerations for such an enterprise should include implications for the agencys strategic plan, effective organizational approaches, resource distributions, field center
foci, and mission selection process. There are multiple organizational models that
60
NASA could choose to employ. To allow for successful, sustained implementation of
a broadly focused NASA technology development program, such an enterprise
should report to the Office of the Administrator, be outside the existing mission directorates, and be chartered to address NASA-wide mission and technology needs.
In my opinion, the cultural challenges facing such an enterprise, within NASA,
are significant, as NASA has not been organized for the objective of technology development and innovation its development for some time. The reestablishment of
creativity and innovation across the existing NASA workforce, and in the Agencys
hiring practices, must be championed by this organization. Strong interactions with
the academic community, national laboratories and industry research and development centers must be reestablished. Most importantly, this new NASA enterprise
must be given permission to occasionally fail. A program focused on game-changing
technology innovation should not be expected to succeed in each investment. However, on the whole, and over time, dramatic advances in aerospace technology that
enable entirely new NASA missions and potentially, solutions to a wide variety of
our societys grand technological challenges should be both expected and measured.
Programmatically, this new enterprise must invest broadly across a wide range of
innovations, across near-term, mid-range and long-term technology and advanced
concepts efforts. This new enterprise must engage the top science and engineering
talent in our nation, teaming NASA, industry and academic organizations, in coordination with other government agencies, independent of the workforce constraints at
the NASA Centers. For long-term success, the budget stability of this enterprise
must be assured.
If a broadly focused aeronautics and space systems technology development enterprise were farmed within NASA, the committee recommends that NIAC2 be an active element of its program, providing a broad range of advanced concept studies
from both NASA and external innovators. The committee further believes that establishment of a NIAC2 activity is required whether or not a broadly focused aeronautics and space systems technology development enterprise is formed at NASA.
If this new technology and innovation enterprise were not formed, the committee
recommends that NIAC2 should report directly to the Office of the Administrator,
be outside mission directorates, and be chartered to address NASA-wide mission
and technology needs. However, the committee would like to point out that without
establishment of a broadly focused aeronautics and space systems technology development enterprise, NIAC2 infusion objectives will likely continue to be a challenge.
Q5. Your panels report stated that DARPA was the most frequently referenced model
of success for advanced concept development.
a. What other models did your panel discuss?
b. In your opinion, in establishing a follow-on entity such as NIAC2, is it more
important for NASA to have the right structure or the right priority?
A5. The committee spent a significant amount of time investigating and discussing
DARPA and its model for advanced concept development and technology maturation. We also investigated and discussed previous and current NASA approaches including NASAs former Office of Aerospace Technology and former Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology, NASA roadmapping, Decadal Survey process and Vision mission studies conducted within or for the NASA Science Mission Directorate,
and the Exploration Technology Development Program within the NASA Exploration Systems Mission Directorate. NASA Langleys Aerospace Systems Concepts
and Analysis organization was discussed as were related approaches to concept development at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory and NASA Goddard Space Flight Center. Long-term research and innovation models at AFOSR, ARPA-E and NSF were
also discussed as were advanced concept development approaches utilized by universities and industry.
In my opinion, in establishing a NIAC2, it is most important for NASA to give
this advanced concepts organization sufficient priority, Agency-level visibility, freedom to establish the right technical content, and a stable funding level. The right
program structure is an important asset for efficiency, but is not an absolute necessity.
Q6. Your panels report indicates that potential awardees are concerned about investigator retention of rights data and associated intellectual property. How might
NASA address their concern while ensuring the agencys investment is also protected?
A6. The committee heard from some MAC awardees, particularly small businesses
that were uncomfortable with what they understood to be their rights to intellectual
property developed under a NIAC award. While not uniform in these expressions,
61
some NIAC awardees expressed uncertainties about the status of intellectual property for proposals submitted to NIAC and the status of intellectual property rights
for work developed under NIAC support. As such, the committee recommended that
NIAC2 develop and document a policy allowing awardees rights to data and associated intellectual property to address these issues before soliciting any proposals. As
an organization with a focus on the development of new concepts and technologies,
NIAC was and NIAC2 would be in an ideal position to foster an innovative program
of intellectual property management and train its innovators in how to manage intellectual property and their rights in compliance with the law and government policy. The committee also recommended that NASA, through NIAC2, allow awardees
to retain rights to data and associated intellectual property developed under NIAC2
awards. The committee believes that in these matters the financial risk to the government is small, while the potential commercial benefit to our nation is large.
62
ANSWERS
TO
Responses by Dr. Raymond S. Colladay, Vice Chair of the Committee on Rationale

and Goals of the U.S. Civil Space Program, Aeronautics and Space Engineering
Board, National Research Council
Questions submitted by Chairwoman Gabrielle Giffords
Q1. Your committees report states that Space activities provide economic opportunities, stimulate innovation and support services that prove the quality of life. US.
economic competitiveness is directly affected by our ability to perform in this sector and the many sectors enabled and supported by space activities. The report
also says that The United States is now living on the innovation funded in the
past.
Q1a. Is your report suggesting that NASA is no longer in a position of enabling significant technological innovation?
A1,1a. Nothing that a commitment to fund advanced technology research and development would not solve. NASA has the people with the skills and a clear charter
in the Space Act to conduct technology research and development that can lead to
the kind of innovation envisioned in the report. It takes a commitment to invest the
resources to sustain such research over the long haulsomething that has been
missing lately.
Q1b. In todays environment where near term challenges command our attention and
resources, how do we convince the rest of the Congress that the seed corn of
technology development is a critical top priority?
A1,1b. The best rationale for investment in technology research and development is
based on making the case for the importance of maintaining our technological competitiveness. NASAs mission and US prestige that comes with the space program
rests on technological excellenceexcellence which cannot be sustained without upfront investment in technology. Unfortunately, the case is easier to make now, because the consequences of not making the necessary investments are evident today
in cost overruns; less capable missions, fewer good technical options to meet requirements, and a lack of true game-changing opportunities.
Q2. Your report discusses the broad customer base that would benefit from the
multi-use technologies including NASA, NOAA, industry, and military space
programs. Some multi-use technologies might be of more interest and pertinence
to certain users.
Q2a. How would the selection process ensure balance among the users?
A2,2a. If NASA is truly conducting and sponsoring technology research and development at the cutting edge boundaries of science and engineering for space applications, balance among ultimate users of the resulting technology is best addressed
later in the process during transition to application. DOD and/or industry will adapt
whatever technological breakthroughs appear to be in their best interests and they
should pay for it when it reaches that stage. NASA can be a catalyst for innovation
by investing in very advanced concepts where balance is based on competition of the
best ideas from the most talented people with the greatest potential pay-off.
Q2b. How would a DARPA-like entity balance technologies that address long-term
user needs and in supporting highly visionary technology concepts for which
uses are not yet known or defined?
A2,2b. If a DARPA-like entity is created to address technology research and development, then its mission should be weighted primarily towards the highly visionary
technology concepts. That is the part of the R&D spectrum that is most in need of
emphasis in NASA right now.
Q2c. Who should provide the funding for such multi-use technology efforts?
A2,2c. NASA should. It is explicit in their charter and the ultimate user is, as you
say, not yet defined. It will always require orders-of-magnitude more money to transition products of technology research and development to application, which is
when others (e.g. DOD or industry) should expect to carry the funding load.
Q3. Your report notes that one of the goals of the civil space program should be To
provide technological, economic, and societal benefits that contribute to the nations most pressing problems.
63
Q3a. How would the DARPA-like entity discussed in your report address broader,
national needs?
A3,3a. NASA should stay closely bound to their space and aeronautics mission. It
is a very stressing mission that pushes the boundaries of engineering disciplines
that benefit broader national needs when considering potential applications beyond
aviation and space: As such, space and aeronautics is an engine for technological
innovation, but the ultimate application of the technology may be in fields far from
aerospace. DARPA has been most effective when it stays focused on its military mission, but the technology breakthroughs it has enabled have led to advances far beyond just the military. Clearly, however, NASA should partner and collaborate with
their research counterparts in DOD, industry, and other government agencies and
departments in a culture of cooperation in technology R&D.
Q3b. How would technology areas be prioritized, especially if the goal of the DARPAlike organization is to support preeminent civil, national security. . ., and
commercial space programs as your committee recommends?
A3,3b. Priorities should be established through a competition of ideasthe best research, by the best people, with the best ideas. There will always be limited funding,
so the competition should be intense.
Q4. DARPA is often characterized as having a risk -taking culture, one that conducts
long-term, high-risk, high payoff research, is tolerant of failure, and is open to
learning. Is it realistic to expect such risk taking to succeed in NASA in light
of fiscal constraints that emphasize near term mission success?
A4. You raise one the strongest arguments in my opinion to separate an organization within NASA to undertake this very advanced, game-changing technology research and development. As a whole, NASA must and should be risk averse, particularly with human space flight. Mission success is paramount in human space
flight and also in many of the grand space science mission. if the charter for innovative technology research and development is dispersed throughout the agency in all
the mission areas, it can be very confusing to the culture and the workforce to say
safety and mission success is paramount and at the same time parse the message
that there needs to be a high tolerance for risk and failure is acceptable if reaching
for an aggressive goal. it seems to me that the leadership can encourage a DARPAlike organization with NASA to take that high-risk path if it is understood that rest
of the organization, particularly human space flight, stays focused on safety and
mission success where failure cannot be an option. Advanced technology research
and development is precisely where risk should be taken and in so doing, the risk
is wrung out before the technology is applied to an operational mission.
Q5. You note in your prepared statement that DARPA-like organization adapted for
NASA should be relieved of NASA institutional requirements. Could you elaborate on what requirements you would target?
A5. If technology R&D is to promote a competition of the best ideas by the best people wherever they resideNASA Centers, universities, other government labs, or industrythen resources should not be preferred to the particular NASA Centers in
need of institutional support such as building a centers core competency. It may
happen that it accomplishes exactly that, but it should be because the people or the
ideas from that center are best in class.
Q6. Regarding your panels recommendation that NASA revitalize its advanced technology development program by establishing a DARPA-like organization within
NASA, can you clarify what would happen to the advanced aeronautics research
currently conducted in ARMD under your approach?
A6. There are many organizational models and most have been tried in one form
or another. Aeronautics could be part of it, like it once was, and there are arguments both for and against. Either way, aeronautics in NASA is a vitally important
mission area and needs to be supported either as part of a DARPA-like organization
whose charter is broadly aerospace, or separate.

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STRENGTHENING NASAS TECHNOLOGY

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND

OCTOBER 22, 2009

Serial No. 11158

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

HON. GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona, Chair

Witness List .............................................................................................................

Appendix: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions

STRENGTHENING NASAS TECHNOLOGY

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Strengthening NASAs Technology Development

I. Purpose and Issues:

CHAIRWOMAN GABRIELLE GIFFORDS

Good morning. I want to welcome each of our witnesses to todays hearing.

Chairwoman GIFFORDS. And now I would like to turn to Mr.

REPRESENTATIVE PETE OLSON

Chairwoman GIFFORDS. Thank you, Mr. Olson. Very well said. I

REPRESENTATIVE CHARLES A. WILSON

Thank you Chairwoman Giffords for holding this importanthearing.

Chairwoman GIFFORDS. Anyone else?

Dr. BRAUN. Chairwoman Giffords, Ranking Member Olson, and

Chairwoman GIFFORDS. Thank you, Dr. Braun.

Dr. COLLADAY. Thank you, Chairwoman Giffords and members of

Madam Chairwoman and members of the Subcommittee, I am pleased to appear

RAYMOND S. COLLADAY is a retired corporate officer of the Lockheed Martin

Chairwoman GIFFORDS. Thank you, Dr. Colladay.

Mr. SCOLESE. Chairwoman Giffords, Ranking Member Olson, and

Chairwoman GIFFORDS. Thank you. At this point we are going to

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Do you think that the taxpayers are being

Responses by Dr. Raymond S. Colladay, Vice Chair of the Committee on Rationale

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