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The initial focus was on the role of technology shocks in generating the busi
ness cycle. The model used by Kydland and Prescott was, in essence, the model
of Ramsey; that of Lucas included, in addition, government expenditures and
money. Subsequent work extended the model in various ways in order to exam
ine the eects of other types of shocks. We consider the principal results of
this research in chapter 16. These issues are not, however, the sole concern of
DSGE macroeconomics, or of this book.
A frequent motivation for constructing macroeconomic models, and one of
the rst questions usually asked of a model, is what it implies for economic
policy. (A recent discussion of the usefulness of DSGE models in formulating
policy is Chari and Kehoe (2006).) Nonetheless, it is important to realize that
the aim of macroeconomics is not just to study policy issues. There are prior
questions that should be asked, such as how the economy might behave if it
were in equilibrium, and how it responds to changes in exogenous variables and
to shocks. Finding the answers to these questions is a sucient reason to study
macroeconomics. Although it is common to ask what the policy implications of
a macroeconomic theory are, with the implicit assumption that we are forever
seeking to interfere in the economy, it is not always necessary to search for
policies that alter the equilibrium solution, especially if we are unclear what the
broader consequences might be. Arguably, simply trying to understand how the
economy behaves is sucient justication.
Much of our analysis will be on considering what sort of factors might disturb
an economys equilibrium, and how the economy responds to these. They may
be changes in exogenous variables or shocks. They may be permanent or tempo
rary, anticipated or unanticipated, real or nominal, demand or supply, domestic
or foreign, and the response of the economy may be dierent in each case. The
conclusions we reach are often very dierent from those based on traditional
macroeconomic models. Shocks may be serially uncorrelated, but the intrinsic
dynamic structure of the economy may result in them having persistent eects
on macroeconomic variables. This is the cause of short-term uctuations in the
economy, and hence the basis of business-cycle theory.
DSGE models are forward looking and hence intertemporal. Current decisions
are aected by expectations about the future. As a result, we use intertemporal
dynamic optimization, in which people are treated as if they rationally process
current information about the future when making their decisions. There is a
premium on obtaining the correct information and on deciding how best to use
it. These concerns are linked to the concept of rationalityanother key feature
of DSGE macroeconomics. The willingness of macroeconomists to make the
assumption of rationality rapidly divided professional opinion into two camps.
Traditional macroeconomics was based on the assumption of myopic decision
making in which mistakes, even when realized, were often persisted in. The
central idea behind rational expectations is that people do not make persistent
mistakes once they are identied. This does not necessarily imply, as is often
assumed, that people have more or less complete knowledge, for the mistakes
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economics harder. Because people look forward when making decisions, there
may be opportunities for others to manipulate strategically for their own ben
et the information on which these decisions are based. The inanimate natural
sciences, such as physics and chemistry, do not have such a forward-looking
component in their dynamic structure, and therefore do not have this strategic
dimension.
Stocks, or capital, consist of physical and nancial capital. This provides a nat
ural link between macroeconomics and nance. The theory of nance is largely
concerned with pricing nancial assets, notably bonds and equity. As nancial
assets play a crucial role in macroeconomics, and are sometimes substitutes in
wealth portfolios for physical assets, asset-pricing theory is an essential com
ponent of macroeconomics and not something that may be omitted as in the
past, or allowed to become a dierent discipline from macroeconomics.
A related issue is the unit of time. It is common, in both macroeconomics
and nance, to conduct the analysis in continuous rather than discrete time
the convention we adopt here. Using continuous time does not prevent the
use of discrete lags but it does imply that decisions are taken continuously.
In part, the choice depends on the frequency of observation of the data. Con
tinuous time is often a better approximation for nancial decisions as events
and much of the available data are high frequency, possibly very high fre
quency, such as minute by minute. Discrete time is better suited to most macro
economics as neither the decisions nor the data are usually high frequency:
they may be monthly, quarterly, or, for national income data, even annual. In
practice, both continuous and discrete time are just approximations. It is there
fore important to bear in mind that the unit of time used in our discrete-time
analysis may relate to dierent units of calendar time, depending on the sub
ject matter. For example, the units of time in growth theory or overlappinggenerations models are longer than those in the analysis of oating exchange
rates.
Prompted in part by the nancial crisis of 2008, the DSGE approach to macro
economics has recently come under heavy criticism. Writing in the New York
Times, Krugman (2009) claims that the macroeconomics of the last thirty years
is spectacularly useless at best and positively harmful at worst. He asserts that
we are living through the dark age of macroeconomics in which the hard-won
wisdom of the ancients has been lost. In his view:
The economics profession has gone astray because economists, as a group,
mistook beauty clad in impressive-looking mathematics, for truth. Not only
did few economists see the current crisis coming, but most important was the
professions blindness to the very possibility of catastrophic failures.
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with than the second. However, engineering has found that it is necessary to
nd a way of simplifying matters in order to make progress. There may be a
lesson in this for macroeconomics. It may provide a justication for the use of
models that are designed to capture key features of the economy while retain
ing their simplicity by abstracting from unnecessary detail. The simplicity of
macroeconomic models, commonly seen as a major weakness, may therefore be
a potential strength. It is true that virtually all macroeconomic policy is based on
a simplied model of the economy, and there is an obvious danger in applying
the conclusions obtained from such models to situations where the simplifying
assumptions are too distorting. This makes it advisable to take care to establish
the robustness of the conclusions to departures from the model assumptions.
Nonetheless, as in engineering, the simple models of macroeconomics can often
be remarkably robust and, therefore, useful. DSGE macroeconomic models tend
to be more complex than Keynesian models, but they are still essentially highly
stylized. Given the complexity of the economy and the high level of abstraction
of theory, perhaps the best that one can hope for from theory is something quite
modest: that it provides the intuition necessary to understand why the economy
behaves as it does and what consequences policy might have. In interpreting
our analysis we should, therefore, bear in mind its limitations: that we are only
using models of the economy and that these models are necessarily simplify
ing because to do otherwise would almost certainly mean making the analysis
intractable. For another view of the relationship between macroeconomics and
engineering, see Mankiw (2006).
An assumption often objected to is that of a representative-agent economy.
An interesting argument against this simplication is that it commits the fal
lacy of composition. This asserts that if each individual attempts to do some
thing, they end up achieving the reverse due to the aggregate consequences.
The best-known illustration of this contradiction is Keyness example of house
holds each trying to save more, with the result that aggregate consumption and
outputand hence individual incomesfall, causing savings to decrease rather
than increase.
The problem with this particular example is that it illustrates the dangers of
using a partial rather than a general equilibrium analysis. One might ask what
caused this sudden desire to save more, and whether the aim is a temporary
or a permanent increase in individual savings. If temporary, then, in a general
equilibrium analysis, the additional supply of savings would be expected to
reduce the cost of borrowing temporarily, thereby stimulating borrowing and
consumption, and deterring an increase in savings. If permanent, then the fall
in the cost of borrowing would make the cost of capital lower and so stimulate
additional investment, raising the optimal level of the capital stock and hence
output and income. A temporary shock would not be expected to aect the
optimal level of the capital stock, and therefore investment. Alternatively, if
the cause of the additional saving was the assumption that in the future a tem
porary negative shock would aect output in the economy, this would induce
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It ranges from certain to highly uncertain payos. Assets with certain pay
os have risk-free returns; those with uncertain payos have risky returns that
incorporate risk premia in order to provide compensation for bearing the risk.
A key issue in asset pricing is the problem of determining the size of the risk
premium that is required in order for risk-averse investors to hold a risky asset,
i.e., the expected return on a risky asset in excess of the return on a risk-free
asset.
In our previous discussion of the economy, in eect we treated savings as
being invested in a risk-free asset. It may seem, therefore, that we must rework
many of our previous results in order to allow for investing in risky assets.
This would, of course, greatly complicate the analysis as it would necessitate
the inclusion of risk eects throughout. We show in chapter 11 that this is not,
in fact, necessary as all we need do is risk-adjust all returns, i.e., adjust all risky
returns by subtracting their risk premium. This implies that we can continue to
work with only a risk-free asset and to use nonstochastic optimization. Hence,
most of the time we are able to ignore such uncertainty.
In chapter 7 we treat the nominal exchange rate as given and consider only
the determination of the real exchange rate. In chapter 13 we analyze the deter
mination of nominal exchange rates. As the exchange rate is an asset price (the
relative price of domestic and foreign currency), we must use the asset-pricing
theory developed in chapters 11 and 14. The no-arbitrage condition for FOREX
is the uncovered interest parity condition, which relates the exchange rate to
the interest dierential between domestic and foreign bonds. Macroeconomic
theories of the exchange rate are based on how macroeconomic variables aect
interest rates and, through these, the exchange rate. Before embarking on our
analysis of exchange rates in chapter 13, we discuss the eect of dierent
international monetary arrangements on the determination of exchange rates.
Having covered the principal components of the DSGE model, in chapter 14
we study the use of the model in formulating monetary policy. Our analysis
is based on the New Keynesian model of ination. To bring out its new fea
tures we contrast this with the traditional Keynesian analysis of ination. We
consider alternative ways of conducting monetary policy: via exchange rates,
money-supply targets, and ination targeting. In the process we extend our
discussion of the determination of exchange rates in chapter 13 by developing
a New Keynesian model of exchange rates. We then focus solely on ination
targeting. We examine the optimal way to conduct ination targeting both in
a closed economy and in an open economy with a oating exchange rate. We
conclude our discussion of monetary policy by proposing a simple model of
monetary policy in the eurozone, where there are independent economies but
a single currency, and hence a single interest rate for all economies.
In chapter 15another new chapterwe develop the interconnections be
tween macroeconomics and nance further. We consider several issues: we dis
cuss borrowing constraints and default, the role of the banking and nancial
systems in the nancial crisis of 200811; we examine alternative models of the
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banking sector, their ability to account for the nancial crisis, and how best to
incorporate a banking sector in a DSGE model; and we propose a DSGE model
with default risk.
The nal chapter, chapter 16, presents a brief account of how well simple
DSGE models perform in explaining the main stylized facts of the economy, and
tries to identify some of their shortcomings. We base our discussion on a small
selection of studies of the real business cycle that is designed to illustrate the
principal issues rather than to be fully comprehensive. The main focus in this lit
erature is on the ability of these models, whether they are for a closed or an open
economy, to explain the business cycle solely by productivity shocks. We then
examine a DSGE model of the economy that claims to provide a better explana
tion of economic uctuations by including various market imperfections and
frictions that introduce dierent types of shocks, including monetary-policy
shocks. The attraction of this approach is that monetary shocks may then have
persistent real eects. It has been suggested, however, that such models suer
from a lack of identication as these market imperfections are open to more
than one interpretation. We discuss this issue together with the more general
question of whether DSGE models are identied. Given the diversity of DSGE
models considered in this book, we complete the chapter with some reections
on how one might decide which features to include when constructing a DSGE
model.
Finally, we provide a mathematical appendix in which we explain the main
mathematical results and techniques we have used in this discussion of
contemporary macroeconomic theory based on DSGE models.
There are also exercises (with solutions) for students and these are available
on the Princeton University Press web site at
http: //press.princeton.edu/titles/9743.html