Defendant Irving Independent School District's Motion To Dismiss and Motion To Strike and Brief in Support

Case 3:16-cv-02283-L Document 10 Filed 10/11/16
Page 1 of 34 PageID 87
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
MOHAMED ELHASSAN
MOHAMED a/n/f for
AHMED MOHAMED, a minor
Plaintiff,
v.
IRVING INDEPENDENT SCHOOL
DISTRICT; DANIEL CUMMINGS,
in his individual capacity,
and CITY OF IRVING,
Defendants.
Civil Action No. 3:16-CV-02283-L
DEFENDANT IRVING INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICTS MOTION TO DISMISS

AND MOTION TO STRIKE AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT
Kathryn E. Long
[email protected]
State Bar No. 24041679
Carlos G. Lopez
[email protected]
THOMPSON & HORTON LLP
Ross Tower
500 North Akard Street, Suite 2550
Dallas, Texas 75201
(972) 853-5115 Telephone
(972) 692-8334 Facsimile
OF COUNSEL:
Melisa E. Meyler
[email protected]
3200 Southwest Freeway, Suite 2000
Houston, Texas 77027
(713) 554-6767 Telephone
(713) 583-8884 Facsimile
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT
IRVING INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT
TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS................................................................................................................ ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................................................... iii
OVERVIEW ................................................................................................................................... 1
SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFFS ALLEGATIONS ........................................................................ 2
STANDARD OF REVIEW ............................................................................................................ 4
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES ............................................................................................. 5
I.
The Complaint Does Not Allege a Plausible Title VI Claim.............................................. 5

A.
Plaintiffs religious discrimination claims are not actionable under Title VI. ........... 5
B.
Irving ISD is not vicariously liable for discrimination by administrators. ................ 6

1. Overview of entity liability under Title VI .......................................................... 6
2. Plaintiffs allegations do not demonstrate improper motive. ............................... 7
3. Plaintiffs allegations do not demonstrate deliberate indifference. ..................... 8
4. Generic disciplinary data do not show intentional discrimination....................... 9
5. Plaintiffs allegations regarding middle school do not support a claim............. 11
II. Plaintiff Fails to Describe Conduct Actionable Under 42 U.S.C. 1983. ....................... 14
A.
Overview of Section 1983 ....................................................................................... 14
B.
Plaintiff does not state a 14th Amendment equal protection claim. ........................ 16
C. Plaintiff does not state a claim for entity liability. ................................................... 20

MOTION TO STRIKE ................................................................................................................. 24
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 25
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Page(s)
Alexander v. Sandoval,
532 U.S. 275 (2001) .........................................................................................................6, 7, 11
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662 (2009) .........................................................................................................5, 8, 17
Barnes v. Gorman,
536 U.S. 181 (2002) .............................................................................................................7 n.3
Beattie v. Madison Cnty. Sch. Dist.,
254 F.3d 595 (5th Cir. 2001) ...................................................................................................15
Becerra v. Asher,
105 F.3d 1042 (5th Cir. 1997) ...........................................................................................14, 20
Birabil v. Martinez,
Civ. Action No. 3:15-cv-2255-M, 2016 WL 4402259 (N.D. Tex. July 7, 2016) ..............21, 22
Bolton v. City of Dallas,
541 F.3d 545 (5th Cir. 2008) ...................................................................................................16
Broaders v. Polk Cnty. Sch. Bd.,
No. 8:10CV2411T27EAJ, 2011 WL 2610185 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 19, 2011) ......................17
Bustos v. Martini Club Inc.,
599 F.3d 458 (5th Cir. 2010) ...................................................................................................20
Carter v. Target Corp.,
541 F. Appx 413 (5th Cir. 2013) ........................................................................................3 n.3
Cesarani v. Graham,
25 F.3d 1044 (5th Cir. 1994) ...................................................................................................24
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,
473 U.S. 432 (1985) .................................................................................................................16
City of Houston v. Piotrowski,
237 F.3d 567 (5th Cir. 2001) .................................................................................14, 15, 16, 22
City of St. Louis v. Prapotnik,
485 U.S. 112 (1988) .................................................................................................................15
Clayton v. Tate Cnty. Sch. Dist.,
560 Fed. Appx 293 (5th Cir. Mar. 25, 2014) ....................................................................19, 23
iii
Coggin v. Longview Indep. Sch. Dist.,

337 F.3d 459 (5th Cir. 2003) ...................................................................................................23
Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter,
224 F.3d 496 (5th Cir. 2000) ...............................................................................................3 n.3
Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ.,
526 U.S. 629 (1999) ...........................................................................................................11, 12
Dean v. Gladney,
621 F.2d 1331 (5th Cir. 1980) .................................................................................................23
Doe v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist.,
153 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1998) ...................................................................................................16
Edwards v. High Desert State Prison,
No. 2:10cv3461, 2011 WL 1135910 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2011) .........................................25
Fennell v. Marion Indep. Sch. Dist.,
804 F.3d 398 (5th Cir. 2015) ...................................................................................................17
Florance v. Buchmeyer,
500 F. Supp. 2d 618 (N.D. Tex. 2007) ....................................................................................23
Gabrielle M. v. Park Forest-Chicago Heights Sch. Dist.,
315 F.3d 817 (7th Cir. 2003) ...................................................................................................12
Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist.,
524 U.S. 274 (1998) .....................................................................................................7, 8, 9, 13
Gil Ramirez Group LLC v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist.,
786 F.3d 400 (5th Cir. 2015) .............................................................................................18, 19
Gonzalez v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist.,
996 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1993) ...................................................................................................20
Groden v. City of Dallas,
826 F.3d 280 (5th Cir. 2016) ...................................................................................................15
Harper v. Albert,
400 F.3d 1052 (7th Cir. 2005) .................................................................................................23
Harris v. U.S. Dept of Justice,
680 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1982) .................................................................................................25
Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist.,
7 F.3d 1241 (5th Cir. 1993) .....................................................................................................15
iv
Johnson v. Rodriguez,
110 F.3d 299 (5th Cir. 1997) ...................................................................................................19
Karasek v. Regents of the Univ. of Ca.,
Case No. 15-cv-03717-WHO, 2016 WL 4036104 (N.D. Cal. July 28, 2016) .........................10
Kelly v. Allen Indep. Sch. Dist.,
602 Fed. Appx 949 (5th Cir. 2015) ........................................................................................10
McHenry v. Renne,
84 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 1996) ...................................................................................................25
Milligan v. City of Slidell,
226 F.3d 652 (5th Cir. 2000) .....................................................................................................2
Monell v. New York City Dept of Social Servs.,
436 U.S. 658 (1978) ...........................................................................................................15, 20
Muthukumar v. Univ. of Tex. at Dallas,
2010 WL 5287530 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2010) ..........................................................................7
New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325 (1985) ...................................................................................................................2
Pathria v. Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr.,
531 Fed. Appx 454 (5th Cir. June 20, 2013) ....................................................................6, 7, 8
Personnel Administrator v. Feeney,
442 U.S. 256 (1979) .................................................................................................................17
Peterson v. City of Fort Worth,
588 F.3d 838 (5th Cir. 2009) .............................................................................................14, 21
Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202 (1982) .................................................................................................................16
Price v. La. Dept of Educ.,
329 Fed. Appx 559 (5th Cir. July 21, 2009) ...........................................................................11
Priester v. Lowndes Cnty.,
354 F.3d 414 (5th Cir. 2004) ...................................................................................................20
Real v. Rescue Mission,
No. 214cv729FtM38MRM, 2015 WL 4935627
(M.D. Fla., Aug. 15, 2015) ........................................................................................................6
Rivera v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist.,
349 F.3d 244 (5th Cir. 2003) .............................................................................................14, 15
v
Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist.,

106 F.3d 648 (5th Cir. 1997) ...................................................................................................13
Rosario de Leon v. Natl Coll. of Bus. & Tech.,
663 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.P.R. 2009) ..............................................................................................6
Rubio v. Turner Unif. Sch. Dist.,
475 F. Supp. 2d 1092 (D. Kan. 2007) ..................................................................................9, 13
Sanches v. Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist.,
647 F.3d 156 (5th Cir. 2011) ...................................................................................................12
Sorens v. Estate of Mohr,
No. Civ.A. H-05-1195, 2005 WL 1965957 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2005) ..................................19
Spight v. Davidson,
No. 3:14mc0793, 2014 WL 2811829 (M.D. Tenn. June 23, 2014) .......................................6
Spiller v. City of Texas City,
130 F.3d 162 (5th Cir. 1997) .............................................................................................15, 21
Tafuto v. New Jersey Inst. of Tech.,
Civ. Action No. 10-452120, 2011 WL 3163240 (D.N.J. July 26, 2010) .................................17
Turner v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist.,
Civ. Action No. H-13-0867, 2013 WL 3353956 (S.D. Tex. 2013) .........................................17
U.S. v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598 (2000) .................................................................................................................17
Valle v. City of Houston,
613 F.3d 536 (5th Cir. 2010) ...................................................................................................21
Vouchides v. Houston Comm. Coll.,
No. H-10-2559, 2011 WL 4592057 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2011) ............................................7, 9
Wilson v. Garcia,
471 U.S. 261 (1985) .................................................................................................................14
Statutes
42 U.S.C. 1983 .................................................................................................................... passim
42 U.S.C. 2000d .................................................................................................................. passim
FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2 ............................................................................................................................1
FED. R. CIV. P. 8 .............................................................................................................................24
vi
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) ...........................................................................................................1, 2, 5

FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f) .......................................................................................................................25
TEX. CODE. CRIM. P., art. 2.13 .......................................................................................................23
TEX. CODE. CRIM. P., art. 14.01 .....................................................................................................23
TEX. CODE. CRIM. P., art. 14.03 .....................................................................................................23
TEX. EDUC. CODE 11.151 ............................................................................................................15
TEX. EDUC. CODE 11.1511 ....................................................................................................15, 23
TEX. EDUC. CODE 11.202 ............................................................................................................23
TEX. EDUC. CODE 37.081 ............................................................................................................23
vii
Defendant Irving Independent School District (Irving ISD) moves to dismiss the
Plaintiffs claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Rules of Civil Procedure as follows:
OVERVIEW
A.M. is a former student at MacArthur High School in Irving, Texas.1 A.M. alleges that
he was subjected to discriminatory discipline on the basis of his race and religion. He alleges
that his high school principal acted pursuant to an unconstitutional policy or practice sanctioned
by the Irving ISD Board of Trustees. A.M. has asserted a claim under Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000d, and a claim for an alleged violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983.
Although Irving ISD vigorously denies Plaintiffs allegations regarding A.M.s
experiences at Irving ISD, even Plaintiffs version of events demonstrates that A.M. engaged in
disruptive conduct and that school officials were well within their authority to question him and
ultimately impose a temporary suspension pending a parent conference. A.M. alleges that he
brought a box to school containing a 7 segment display, a pcb board, a 9 volt battery, some
wires, a 120-240 volt transformer, and a button board. (Orig. Compl. 54, ECF No. 1.)
The device was disturbing enough that a teacher directed him to keep the device in his
backpackan instruction that A.M. promptly disobeyed in his English class when he removed
the wired device from his backpack and showed it to another student. The device beeped,
distracting others, and caught the attention of the English teacher who, after seeing the device,
asked A.M. is that a bomb? (Id.) She was concerned enough about potential disruption to
confiscate the contraption. Subsequently, when interviewed by the principal, A.M. declined to
answer his questions, leading to a temporary suspension and the request for a parent conference.
1
Although the students full name is contained in the caption of the lawsuit, the rules of civil procedure require
parties to refer to minors by their initials. Accordingly, this motion refers to the student by his initials. See
FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2.
Public schools have a substantial interest in maintaining discipline in the classroom

and on school grounds. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985). Maintaining order in
the classroom has never been easy, but in recent years, school disorder has often taken
particularly ugly forms.
Id.
Even in schools that have been spared the most severe
disciplinary problems, the preservation of order and a proper educational environment requires
close supervision of schoolchildren, as well as the enforcement of rules against conduct that
would be perfectly permissible if undertaken by an adult. Id. at 340. The public schools
substantial interest in maintaining discipline and order means that schools need not wait for the
occurrence of actual crime or disruption before intervening. See generally Milligan v. City of
Slidell, 226 F.3d 652, 655-56 (5th Cir. 2000).
Here, Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible claim because there are no allegations giving
rise to any reasonable inference that A.M. was questioned or disciplined because of his race or
religion. He also has failed to plead other essential facts in support of plausible claim. In
particular, Plaintiffs well-pleaded allegations, assumed to be true, fail to demonstrate that Irving
ISD maintained an unconstitutional custom, practice, or policy of disciplining students because
of their race or religiona mandatory requirement under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Irving ISD moves to
dismiss all claims.
SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFFS ALLEGATIONS
The following summary is based on the Plaintiffs allegations, which, under Rule
12(b)(6), are assumed to be true for purposes of this motion.
A.M. alleges that he built a device that included a 7 segment display, a pcb board, a 9
volt battery, some wires, a 120-240 volt transformer, a button board. (ECF No. 1 53.)
He calls this homemade device a clock in a pencil box. (Id.) On September 14, 2015, A.M.
showed the device to a teacher who advised A.M. to keep it in his backpack. (Id. 54.) Later
that day, during 4th period English, A.M. defied the teachers instruction by showing the device
to another student during class. (Id.) The device made a beeping noise, which caught the
attention of the English teacher, Erin West. (Id.) After class, A.M. showed the device to
Ms. West, who, upon seeing it, asked is that a bomb? (Id.) A.M. states that he told her it was
an alarm clock. Ms. West took the contraption from him. (Id.)
A.M. alleges that several hours after Ms. West confiscated the device, Principal Daniel
Cummings and a City of Irving police officer escorted him from class to a room with four more
Irving police officers and a school counselor. (ECF No. 1 56.) A.M. alleges that he was
questioned for almost an hour and a half by the Irving police. (Id. 57.)
During the
questioning, Principal Cummings told A.M. to write a statement and allegedly threatened to
expel him if he did not. (Id. 59.) A.M. alleges that he wrote that he made an alarm clock and
that the authorities thought it was a bomb. (Id.) A.M.s statement contains several lines.2
(Defs. Joint Appendix (J.A.) at 3, Ex. A.) The first line is scratched out: [A.M.] has refused
to write down his intent for making device. (Id.) A.M. then wrote: I Built a Clock. Cops
think Its a Bomb. (Id.) The statement concludes with: I asked [A.M.] again What was your
intent for building the clock? [A.M.] still will not tell me his intent for building a clock and
bringing it to school. (Id.) The statement was prepared around 3:01 p.m. (Id.)
That evening, an assistant principal, Patrick Smith, telephoned A.M.s father and sent
him an email stating that A.M. would be suspended for three days. (ECF No. 1 68; J.A. at 5,
Ex. B.) The email stated that a parent conference would be scheduled. (Id.)
2
The Court may consider documents referenced in the pleadings if those documents provide information central
to the claims and helpful in determining whether a claim has been stated. See generally Carter v. Target Corp.,
541 Fed. Appx 413, 416-17 (5th Cir. 2013) (unreported) (citing Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224
F.3d 496, 498-99 (5th Cir. 2000)).
A.M. alleges that the Irving police handcuffed him and arrested him, but that the Irving
police eventually dropped the charges. (ECF No. 1 57, 60, 68.) The Complaint does not
allege that Irving ISD or its personnel made the decision to arrest or to charge A.M.
Plaintiff alleges that Irving ISD has a history of race struggles and a history of
discrimination against Muslims in Texas curriculum and schools. (Id. 9.) Plaintiff alleges
that state data show racial disparities in student discipline. (Id. 15-22.) Eight years ago, the
Districts then-superintendent entered into a memorandum of understanding with a parent
group in which the District agreed to review discipline data. The District hired a consultant to
provide professional development to teachers regarding engagement of African-American
students. (Id. 24-25.) The consultant allegedly opined that there was dysconcsious [sic]
racism in which individuals knowingly or unknowingly discriminate. (Id. 28.) Plaintiff
alleges that the school board received the consultants report and determined that the consultant
had exceeded the scope of his assignment and had failed to use proper methodologies. (Id. 30.)
The Complaint further alleges that, in 2011, a candidate for school board ran against a
black incumbent and allegedly made racially charged statements. (Id. 29.) The candidate,
Steven Jones, won and allegedly encouraged an investigation into alleged Islamic bias in the
curriculum. The Complaint alleges that, in 2013, Dr. Jones was censured for purportedly
threatening to fire those who supported the prior superintendent and for saying that Spanish
accents had to go and that schools needed to be English only. (Id. 31-32.) Plaintiff alleges
that school board elections resulted in like-minded board members being elected. (Id. 34.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the plaintiffs complaint must
provide sufficient factual allegations that, when assumed to be true, state a claim for relief that
is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citations omitted). The
plausibility standard asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully. Id. When a complaint pleads acts that are merely consistent with a defendants
liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility. Id. (citations omitted).
Although the court must accept well-pleaded facts as true, conclusory allegations are not entitled
to a presumption of truth. Id. at 678-79. Other than Principal Cummingss and Ms. Wests
actions on September 14, 2015, the Complaint contains no allegations regarding actions by the
school district on that day.
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
I.
The Complaint Does Not Allege a Plausible Title VI Claim.

Plaintiff claims that alleged ongoing discrimination within Irving ISD on the basis of
race and religion (Muslim) caused the purportedly unlawful discipline of A.M. on September 14,
2015.
(ECF No. 1 106.)
Plaintiffs claims fail because religious discrimination is not
actionable under Title VI and because, as a matter of law, Irving ISD cannot be held vicariously
liable for discriminatory acts of school employees. Plaintiffs allegations fail to state a plausible
claim under Title VI.
A.
Plaintiffs religious discrimination claims are not actionable under Title VI.
Title VI provides that [n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race,
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
42 U.S.C. 2000d (emphasis added). The statute on its face does not prohibit discrimination on
the basis of religion; therefore, these claims are not actionable under Title VI. See Rosario de
Leon v. Natl Coll. of Bus. & Tech., 663 F. Supp. 2d 25, 34 (D.P.R. 2009); Spight v. Davidson,
No. 3:14mc0793, 2014 WL 2811829, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. June 23, 2014); Real v. Rescue
Mission, No. 214cv729FtM38MRM, 2015 WL 4935627, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 15, 2015).
Lower courts may not recognize a cause of action when a statute has not created them.
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 291 (2001) (plaintiff could not sue to enforce Title VI
regulations which addressed conduct not prohibited by the statutory language of Title VI)
(internal quotations omitted); see, e.g., Pathria v. Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr., 531 Fed. Appx
454 (5th Cir. June 20, 2013) (allegation that supervisor said he could get plaintiffs visa
cancelled and send him back to India suggested discrimination on the basis of immigration
status, not national origin, and therefore was not actionable under Title VI).
Accordingly, because Title VI does not proscribe discrimination on the basis of religion,
any Title VI claim based on religious discrimination must be dismissed.
B.
Irving ISD is not vicariously liable for discrimination by administrators.
Although Irving ISD denies that A.M. was subjected to race-based discrimination by
District employees, even if his allegations were assumed to be true, this claim fails on its face.
As shown below, the cause of action under Title VI is a limited one, and schools may not be held
vicariously liable for the independent discriminatory acts of school employees.
1. Overview of entity liability under Title VI
To state a claim for damages under Title VI, the plaintiff must establish intentional
discrimination. See Alexander, 532 U.S. at 281. A complaint that does not set forth specific
allegations of acts that were taken with discriminatory intent does not state a claim.
Muthukumar v. Univ. of Tex. at Dallas, 2010 WL 5287530, at *5 (N.D. Tex., Dec. 27, 2010);
see, e.g., Pathria, 531 Fed. Appx at *456 (affirming dismissal because there were no allegations
that, if true, would create a reasonable inference that the supervisors conduct was motivated by
[plaintiffs] national origin).
6
Moreover, even if an employee discriminates against a student, the nature of this federal
civil rights statute requires that the entity/employer have notice before it may be held vicariously
liable for the discrimination. See Vouchides, 2011 WL 4592057, *5 (citation omitted). Congress
adopted Title VI pursuant to its authority under the Spending Clause, which necessarily limits
the remedies that are available for violations. See generally Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch.
Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 286-87 (1998).3 When Congress acts pursuant to its spending power, the
offer of federal funds is in the nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the funding
recipient agrees to certain conditions. Id. This contractual nature has implications for the
scope of available remedies. Id. at 287. The recipient of federal funds must have notice that it
could be liable for a monetary award. Id.
In Gebser, the Court held that, in cases that do not involve an official policy, damages are
not available unless an appropriate personan official authorized to institute corrective
measureshad actual knowledge of the discrimination and responded with deliberate
indifference. Id. at 290. The Court imposed a high standard precisely to avoid the risk that the
school would be liable in damages not for its own official decision but instead for its
employees independent actions. Id. Gebser expressly rejected liability standards based on
negligence, constructive notice, and respondeat superior. Id. at 285-88. Thus, in Gebser, the
Court held that a Texas school district could not be held liable in damages for a teachers sexual
molestation of a child because no one in authority knew about the molestation. Id. at 291-92.
2. Plaintiffs allegations do not demonstrate improper motive.
As pleaded, the Plaintiffs Title VI claim is based on the events of September 14, 2015.
(ECF No. 1 106.) However, Plaintiffs allegations about these events do not state a plausible
3
Although Gebser addressed Title IX rather than Title VI, the two statutes have similar wording and operate in
the same manner. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 287. Therefore, the Court has interpreted the two statutes
consistently. See Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181,185 (2002).
claim for relief. There are no allegations giving rise to any inference that Principal Cummings
acted with a discriminatory motive. This deficiency alone warrants dismissal. See generally
Pathria, 531 Fed. Appx at *456 (affirming dismissal because there were no allegations that, if
true, would create a reasonable inference that the supervisors conduct was motivated by
[plaintiffs] national origin).
There are no allegations that Principal Cummings made any
discriminatory comments or that he had any prior negative dealings with A.M.
Further, the
Plaintiff pleads no facts that similarly situated students engaging in similar conduct were treated
differently. There are no facts suggesting that the three-day suspension was based on A.M.s
membership in a protected class. Likewise, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to impose liability
based on Ms. Wests conduct, Plaintiff again fails to state a claim because there are similarly no
allegations that Ms. West took any action because of A.M.s race. Instead, the allegations in the
Complaint indicate that all actions taken by Ms. West resulted from her hearing and seeing the
device. Further, there are no allegations that she treated A.M. differently than students in similar
disciplinary situations. The plausibility standard asks for more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
3. Plaintiffs allegations do not demonstrate deliberate indifference.
Moreover, even if one were to assume for arguments sake that some District employee
had an improper motive, Irving ISD may not be held vicariously liable for that employees
actions. Just as the school district in Gebser could not be held directly liable for the sexually
harassing behavior of a teacher, Irving ISD may not be held directly liable for the allegedly
discriminatory decision of a principal or a teacher. There are no allegations that any appropriate
person was aware of unlawful discrimination by Principal Cummings or anyone else and
responded with deliberate indifference.
Recent decisions are instructive. In Vouchides v. Houston Community College, No. H10-2559, 2011 WL 4592057, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2011), for example, a college police
officer used force against a student and made threats while saying you look like a terrorist.
The court held that the college defendant could not be held liable for the officers alleged
discrimination. Id. at *6. Similarly, in Rubio v. Turner Unified School District, 475 F. Supp. 2d
1092, 1099 (D. Kan. 2007), the court held that a school district could not be liable for the actions
of a principal who allegedly prohibited students from speaking Spanish because the school
district did not know that the principal had engaged in discriminatory behavior. These rulings
flow from Gebser itself, which expressly held that vicarious liability is prohibited. Gebser, 524
U.S. at 285-88. Like Title IX, Title VI contains no agency provision that would make the
institution liable for the wrongful acts of its agents. Id., 524 U.S. at 283. Accordingly, in these
cases, it is irrelevant that the employee himself may be aware of his own improper
discriminatory motive. [T]he knowledge of the wrongdoer is not pertinent to the analysis.
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 291 (emphasis added).
4. Generic disciplinary data do not show intentional discrimination.
Nor may Plaintiff dodge the actual knowledge requirement by citing Texas Education
Agency (TEA) data or by referencing a consultants report from six years ago. Plaintiff claims
that the TEA stats show racial disparity in student discipline. He claims further that the
consultants report opined about dysconcsious [sic] racism in which individuals knowingly or
unknowingly discriminate.4 (ECF No. 1 15-22, 28, 101, 104.) Even if the Court assumes the
accuracy of the TEA data, Plaintiff cites the data without any explanation or context.
According to the Complaint, the consultant found that several students on an unidentified campus perceived that
they could not use the restroom when white students could. (ECF No. 1 102.) The school board allegedly
received this report and determined that the consultant had exceeded the scope of his assignment and had failed
to use proper methodologies. (Id. 30.)
Importantly, the data do not purport to show the actual occurrence of intentional discrimination
or even complaints about discrimination. The data do not establish that Irving ISDs leadership
knew about alleged intentional discrimination at MacArthur High School or any specific
unlawful disciplinary practice.
Plaintiffs reliance on raw disciplinary data ignores the fact that damages are available
only for intentional discrimination. To impute the actions of others to Irving ISD there must be
actual knowledge of the alleged discriminatory conduct at issue. Constructive notice of a
general problem will not suffice. Kelly v. Allen Indep. Sch. Dist., 602 Fed. Appx 949, 953
(5th Cir. 2015) (unreported).
An argument similar to Plaintiffs was rejected in Karasek v.
Regents of the University of California, Case No. 15-cv-03717-WHO, 2016 WL 4036104, at *910 (N.D. Cal. July 28, 2016), in which students in a Title IX action cited a state auditors report
to establish that their university had prior knowledge of a problem in the schools handling of
sexual assault claims. The court held that this level of awareness or deficiency of response with
respect to the general problem of sexual violence was insufficient as a matter of law to establish
actual knowledge or deliberate indifference of sexual assault. Id. Similarly, in this case, even if
the data could be interpreted to suggest a deficiency in the disciplinary process, it does not
establish Irving ISDs actual knowledge of or deliberate indifference to the intentional
discrimination alleged by the Plaintiff.
In effect, Plaintiffs Title VI claim is based on an disparate impact theory that certain
disciplinary practices had a negative effect on African-American students. However, disparate
impact, by definition, lacks an intent requirement. Title VI, in contrast, requires the element of
intent. See Alexander, 532 U.S. at 280. Thus, in Price v. Louisiana Department of Education,
329 Fed. Appx 559 (5th Cir. July 21, 2009), the court rejected a Title VI claim brought by
10
parents who claimed that their children were subjected to racial harassment. Although the
plaintiffs alleged that defendants improperly hired, trained, or monitored their employees in
order to prevent discrimination, and failed to inspect and discover instances of discrimination,
their complaint did not contain a single allegation of discriminatory intent on the part of the
institutional defendants.
5. Plaintiffs allegations regarding middle school do not support a claim.
Although the focus of Plaintiffs Title VI claim is September 14, 2015, to the extent that
the Plaintiff seeks to base a claim on his middle school years, this claim, too, would fail. A.M.
alleges that other students called him Sausage Boy and Bacon Boy and made fun of him for
his religion. (ECF No. 1 42.) These bare allegations lack any context and fail to state a claim
as a matter of law.
The Supreme Court has held that a school district may not be held liable in damages for
student-to-student harassment except in certain limited circumstances. Davis v. Monroe Cnty.
Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 643 (1999). Under Davis, the student must have suffered harassment
so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the victim[ ] of
access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school. Id. at 650.
The
school must exercise substantial control over both the harasser and the context in which the
known harassment occurs. Id. at 645 (emphasis added). Next, a school official with authority
to take corrective action must have had actual knowledge of the peer harassment and
responded with deliberate indifference. Id. at 650-51. The deliberate indifference must cause
the student to be subjected to further harassment. Id. at 644-45.
As pleaded, A.M.s allegations are deficient because he does not allege (i) that the
incidents occurred at school or in a context under the control of the District, (ii) facts indicating
that the harassment was severe and pervasive and interfered with his educational opportunities,
11
(iii) that he reported the incidents, or (iv) that the school failed to address them. See, e.g.,
Gabrielle M. v. Park Forest-Chicago Heights Sch. Dist., 315 F.3d 817, 822 (7th Cir. 2003)
(childs vague statement failed to explain when, where, or how often alleged conduct occurred
and whether it was reported); Sanches v. Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist., 647
F.3d 156, 167 (5th Cir. 2011) (the harassment must be more than the sort of teasing and
bullying that generally takes place in school). As a matter of law, Plaintiffs allegations
regarding name-calling by other students are insufficient to state a claim under Davis.
A.M. also complains about Assistant Principal Nguyen at A.M.s middle school. A.M.
alleges that, while in sixth grade (2012-2013), he would leave the cafeteria to go pray during
lunch but that, one day, Assistant Principal Nguyen told him to go back and eat. (ECF No. 1
46.) A.M. alleges that he had to present a permission slip from his parent to leave the cafeteria
to pray. (Id.) These allegations, assumed to be true under Rule (12)(b)(6), relates to religious
discrimination, which is not actionable under Title VI.5
A.M. further complains that, after the sixth-grade cafeteria incident, Assistant Principal
Nguyen and unnamed teachers began disciplining A.M. for horseplay and assigning him
detentions and in-school suspensions. (ECF No. 1 48.) He also alleges that he was unfairly
disciplined for an incident in which he poked a student with a pencil and forced soap down
another kids throat.
(Id.)
However, there are no factual allegations giving rise to any
reasonable inference that any discipline was based on race, and there are no allegations that the
Plaintiff reported any discrimination to the principal or anyone else in authority during sixth
grade. As previously noted, under Gebser, a school district cannot be held vicariously liable for
the allegedly discriminatory acts of assistant principals and teachers. See Rubio, 475 F. Supp. 2d
5
For this reason, Plaintiffs allegation that he is not aware of a Christian student needing permission before they
were allowed to pray in school is irrelevant and off base. Moreover, the question presented by the lawsuit is
not students wanting to pray in school but students wanting to leave the cafeteria.
12
at 1099. Therefore, even assuming arguendo that some employees engaged in discrimination
during A.M.s sixth-grade year, Irving ISD is not liable for it.
A.M. also alleges that, in 8th grade (2014-2015), he was unfairly disciplined by Assistant
Principal Nguyen following an alleged choking incident with another student. Plaintiff alleges
that the parents filed a formal appeal, that the disciplinary consequence for A.M. was dropped,
and that discipline from Assistant Principal Nguyen ceased. (ECF No. 1 49-50.) As a
matter of law, any claim based on these allegations fails because there are no allegations that the
underlying discipline was motivated by unlawful discrimination and because the allegations,
even if true, do not establish deliberate indifference. Plaintiff admits that the discipline was
dropped and that further discipline from the assistant principal ceased. If the conduct has
ceased by the time a supervisory employee of the sort we describe here learns of it, there is no
liability in a private suit for that conduct based on some personal failure to take proper remedial
action thereafter. Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648, 661 (5th Cir. 1997).
Finally, Plaintiff alleges that a teacher allegedly heard Assistant Principal Nguyen say
that his Asian children did not give him any problems and that he urged the black and Hispanic
students to be like his children. (ECF No. 1 47.) According to the complaint, this alleged
comment was made in May 2015 at the end of A.M.s 8th grade year and did not involve A.M.
The allegation does not pertain to any discrimination against A.M. and does not give rise to any
inference that A.M.s prior disciplinary decisions were discriminatory. Moreover, according to
the complaint, all alleged discrimination against A.M. ceased after his earlier appeal. (ECF
No. 1 50.)
For the foregoing reasons, Irving ISD moves for dismissal of Plaintiffs Title VI claims.
13
II.
Plaintiff Fails to Describe Conduct Actionable Under 42 U.S.C. 1983.

Plaintiff seeks damages for alleged violations of the Fourteenth Amendment pursuant to
42 U.S.C. 1983. A.M.s sole constitutional claim against Irving ISD is an alleged violation of
the Equal Protection Clause. As shown below, Plaintiff has failed to allege essential facts in
support of a plausible claim.
A.
Overview of Section 1983
Section 1983 creates no substantive rights, but merely provides a damages remedy for the
deprivation of existing federal constitutional or statutory rights. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S.
261, 278 (1985). The existence of a constitutional violation is a threshold issue and may be
determined before analyzing whether the entity may be held responsible for the violation.
Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 844 (5th Cir. 2009). It necessarily follows that,
without an underlying constitutional violation, there can be no 1983 liability imposed on the
school district or the individual supervisors. Becerra v. Asher, 105 F.3d 1042, 1047-48 (5th Cir.
1997) (emphasis in original).
The standard for suing a school district under Section 1983 is rigorous. In particular,
respondeat superior liability is absolutely prohibited. See Rivera v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist.,
349 F.3d 244, 247 (5th Cir. 2003). A local government may not be held liable merely because its
employees violate the Constitution. See City of Houston v. Piotrowski, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th
Cir. 2001) (citing Monell v. New York City Dept of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)).
Under Monell, a plaintiff must show that:
(i)
the constitutional violation was caused as the direct result of the execution
of an official custom or policy within the meaning of Monell;
(ii)
the custom or policy was approved or sanctioned by the entitys final

policymaker; and
14
(iii)
the final policymaker acted with deliberate difference and the custom or
policy was the moving force behind the violation.
Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 578. The unconstitutional conduct must be directly attributable to the
final policymaker. Rivera, 349 F.3d at 247 (explaining that the plaintiff must do more than
identify misconduct by a school employee).
A custom or policy is a persistent, widespread practice that has become so common
and well-settled as to fairly represent official municipal policy.
Id. at 579.
When prior
unconstitutional incidents are used to show a pattern, they must have occurred for so long or so
frequently that the course of conduct warrants the attribution to the governing body of
knowledge that the objectionable conduct is the expected, accepted practice of city employees.
Id. (citation omitted).
The identification of the final policymaker is a question of state law. See City of
St. Louis v. Prapotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 124 (1988). The final policymaker is the official or
officials whose decisions are unconstrained by policies imposed by a higher authority. See
generally Beattie v. Madison Cnty. Sch. Dist., 254 F.3d 595, 603 (5th Cir. 2001). A plaintiff
must plead facts which establish that the challenged policy was promulgated or ratified by the
citys policymaker. Groden v. City of Dallas, 826 F.3d 280, 285 (5th Cir. 2016). Conclusory
allegations of municipal liability are insufficient to state a claim under Section 1983. See Spiller
v. City of Texas City, 130 F.3d 162, 167 (5th Cir. 1997).
Under Texas law, the final policy-making authority for a school district is the districts
board of trustees. See TEX. EDUC. CODE 11.151 & 11.1511; see generally Rivera, 349 F.3d at
247 (analyzing Texas Education Code). Consequently, it is well established that Texas school
boards are not liable for the unconstitutional acts of even their most high-ranking employees,
including superintendents and principals, because the districts employees ultimately are
15
constrained by the policies set by the school board. See Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d
1241 (5th Cir. 1993). The Supreme Court has cautioned that a court would not be justified
in assuming that municipal policymaking authority lies somewhere other than where the
applicable law purports to put it. Doe v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 153 F.2d 211, 216 (5th Cir.
1998) (quotation omitted); see also Bolton v. City of Dallas, 541 F.3d 545, 551 (5th Cir. 2008)
(When an officials discretionary decisions are constrained by policies not of that officials
making, those policies, rather than the subordinates departures from them, are the act of the
municipality) (citation omitted).
Accordingly, in this case, to state a claim, the Plaintiff must allege specific facts showing
that Irving ISDs school board, as a body corporate, actually adopted an unconstitutional policy
or otherwise knew about or acquiesced in a permanent and deeply imbedded, abusive, and
unconstitutional practice. See Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 578-79.
B.
Plaintiff does not state a 14th Amendment equal protection claim.
The Equal Protection Clause requires that similarly situated persons be treated alike. See
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). If the state disadvantages a
suspect class or impinges upon a fundamental right, the decision is subject to strict scrutiny.
Id. Classifications based on race, national origin, or alienage are suspect categories and are
subject to strict scrutiny. Id. at 440. Rights are fundamental if they have their source, explicitly
or implicitly, in the Constitution. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 n. 15 (1982). Equal
protection claims require invidious and purposeful discrimination. See U.S. v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598 (2000); Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
The plaintiff must show that he received treatment different from that received by
similarly situated individuals and that the unequal treatment stemmed from a discriminatory
16
intent. Fennell v. Marion Indep. Sch. Dist., 804 F.3d 398, 412 (5th Cir. 2015). The plaintiff
must show that the official took a discriminatory action because of, not merely in spite of, the
actions adverse effects upon an identifiable group. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (citation omitted).
Conclusory assertions of discriminatory intent are insufficient to state a claim. Id. For example,
in Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 669-70, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiffs allegation that the
defendants had subjected Arab Muslims to harsh conditions of confinement after 9/11/01 was
conclusory.
Instead, a plaintiff must plead sufficient factual material to show that the
defendants took action for the purpose of discrimination on account of the plaintiffs protected
status. Id. at 677. The factual content must be sufficient to nudg[e] the claim of purposeful
discrimination across the line from conceivable to plausible. Id. at 680.
Here, A.M. has not alleged that any Irving ISD school official treated him differently
from any other similarly situated student involved in similar misconduct. Therefore, he has
failed to state a claim. See, e.g., Broaders v. Polk Cnty. Sch. Bd., No. 8:10CV2411T27EAJ,
2011 WL 2610185, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 19, 2011) (dismissing equal protection claim where
student failed to allege sufficient facts showing that Defendants policies treat minority and
disabled students differently from other students); Tafuto v. New Jersey Inst. of Tech., Civ.
Action No. 10-452120, 2011 WL 3163240, at *5 (D.N.J. July 26, 2010) (dismissing equal
protection claim where students allegations did not show that other students were similarly
situated); Turner v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., Civ. Action No. H-13-0867, 2013 WL 3353956,
at *3 (S.D. Tex. July 3, 2013) (dismissing equal protection claim; plaintiff failed to identify any
non-disabled student was treated differently). In the Complaint, the Plaintiff does not allege any
facts demonstrating differential treatment or discriminatory intent by campus-level decision-
17
makers based on a protected status.6 Plaintiffs own version of events demonstrates that he
engaged in distracting and inappropriate behavior. One teacher told A.M. to keep the device in
his backpack, an instruction that A.M. admittedly disobeyed; the device beeped during English
class and caught the attention of that teacher; and, upon seeing the device, the English teacher
allegedly inquired whether the device was a bomb. (ECF No. 1 54.) The English teacher was
concerned enough to confiscate the device. Indeed, had the device not been confiscated during
fourth period, A.M. could have taken the device into the crowded school cafeteria where
hundreds of students would be eating lunch. Although A.M. disputes the reasonableness of his
discipline, the salient question under the Equal Protection Clause is not the fairness of the
disciplinary decision but whether he was treated differently from similarly situated students. No
allegations support any inference of disparate treatment, and no allegations show that the
discipline was motivated by his race or religion.
Likewise, the Plaintiff cannot establish intentional discrimination as to A.M. by referring
to TEA reports regarding past racial disparity in student discipline or by citing a consultants
report from six years ago regarding dysconcsious [sic] racism in which individuals knowingly
or unknowingly discriminate. (ECF No. 1 15-22, 101, 104, emphasis added.) Awareness of
such information does not establish intent to discriminate. The Fifth Circuit rejected a similar
argument in Gil Ramirez Group LLC v. Houston Independent School District, 786 F.3d 400, 419
(5th Cir. 2015), in which the plaintiff argued that it was required to show only that the
decisionmakers were aware of potential harm to disfavored individuals.
Id.
The court
explained that discriminatory purpose implies more than intent as volition or intent as
awareness of consequences. Id.
6
Irving ISD also incorporates by reference the arguments and authorities cited in Defendant Daniel Cummingss
Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Strike and Brief in Support.
18
Plaintiff in essence is arguing that some unidentified practice was causing a disparate
impact on certain student groups. However, as a matter of law, disparate impact discrimination
will not support an equal protection claim. See Clayton v. Tate Cnty. Sch. Dist., 560 Fed. Appx
293, 297-98 (5th Cir. Mar. 25, 2014) (citing Johnson v. Rodriguez, 110 F.3d 299, 306 (5th Cir.
1997)). If disparate impact claims were allowed, then any law could be challenged on Equal
Protection grounds by whomever it has negatively impacted. Sorens v. Estate of Mohr, No.
Civ.A. H-05-1195, 2005 WL 1965957, at *10 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2005) (citing Johnson, 110
F.3d at 306). For example, in Clayton, a high school student alleged that his school administered
corporal punishment in a gender-biased manner and that male students were disproportionately
punished. Id. at *298. Further, the student argued that this disparate impact stemmed from an
institutionalized bias that male students misbehaved more frequently than female students. Id.
The student also asserted that a school official made a discriminatory comment about male
students in the newspaper. The court rejected the students claim: [G]iven the discretionary
nature of the school districts corporal-punishment policy, there is no allegation that [the
plaintiff] or any other male student was subject to corporal punishment because of a biased belief
that troublesome boys should be punished more and therefore that school officials use gender as
an invidious criterion for determining who should be paddled. Id. (emphasis in original). In
this case, A.M. does not allege any facts indicating that campus administrators used race or
religion as invidious criteria for determining who should be suspended.
Finally, the Plaintiff cannot base his claim on discriminatory remarks allegedly aimed at
A.M. by other students. (ECF No. 1 42.) Plaintiffs in a Section 1983 case must show that their
injuries were caused by state actors acting under color of state law. See Becerra v. Asher, 105
F.3d 1042, 1048 (5th Cir. 1997). A.M.s classmates are not state actors, and Irving ISD cannot
19
be held liable for their misbehavior. Furthermore, the use of a racial epithet without other
harassment does not constitute an equal protection violation.
Priester v. Lowndes Cnty.,
354 F.3d 414, 424 (5th Cir. 2004). Additionally, there are no allegations that the incidents were
reported to campus officials and those campus officials responded in a discriminatory manner.
Compare Priester, 354 F.3d at 424 ([Plaintiff] presents no evidence establishing that the alleged
racial harassment went unpunished while other types of misconduct was punished or that the
school did not document the racial harassment in its records).
Because the Plaintiff has not described a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, the
Court may dismiss the Section 1983 claims without further analysis. See Becerra, 105 F.3d at
1047-48; Bustos v. Martini Club Inc., 599 F.3d 458, 467 (5th Cir. 2010) (Since the Officers did
not violate [plaintiff]s constitutional rights, neither did the City).
C.
Plaintiff does not state a claim for entity liability.
Although the Court may dismiss this claim on the ground that there are no facts giving
rise to any inference of intentional discrimination against A.M. based on his membership in a
protected class, dismissal also is warranted under Monell.
For municipal liability to attach, a Section 1983 plaintiff must allege not simply a
decision, but a decision by the city itself to violate the Constitution. Gonzalez v. Ysleta Indep.
Sch. Dist., 996 F.2d 745, 754-55, 760 (5th Cir. 1993) (The Boards policy may have produced
or caused the constitutional violation but, unlike the policymakers actions in Monell and
Pembaur, it is not itself unconstitutional.). Here, the Plaintiff does not contend that Irving
ISDs Board of Trustees maintained an actual policy of directing employees to suspend students
on the basis of their race or religion. Rather, Plaintiff believes that there is a pattern of
discrimination based on student discipline statistics. (ECF No. 1 75-78.) The Plaintiff
20
alleges that the board was aware of the disparity and that it responded with inaction. He
alleges that this pattern led to the over-discipline of [A.M.]. (Id. 77.)
A pattern requires similarity and specificity. Peterson, 588 F.3d at 851. The plaintiff
cannot simply point to a collection of any and all bad or unwise acts but rather must point to
the specific violation in question. Id. (citation omitted). Here, although Plaintiff refers to
statistics that may suggest a racial disparity in discipline in general, there are no specific factual
allegations of equal protection violations against students. The information that Plaintiff cites
does not purport to show the occurrence of discrimination or even complaints about
discrimination. Cf. Valle v. City of Houston, 613 F.3d 536, 548 (5th Cir. 2010) (although the
plaintiff identified prior instances of the police shooting unarmed mentally ill people, such
evidence merely showed that prior shootings had occurred and did not establish a pattern of
constitutional violations involving excessive force). Further, because the data cited is limited to
race, it says nothing about discrimination on the basis of religion and, thus, lends no support to
Plaintiffs theory of liability.
The Plaintiffs pleading also erroneously conflates a pattern with a custom or practice.
Although a pattern might evince a custom or practice, a pattern is neither. It is incumbent
upon the plaintiff to articulate the specific custom or practice that led to the alleged pattern of
unconstitutional conduct. See generally Spiller, 130 F.3d at 167 (conclusory assertions are
insufficient to state a claim); Birabil v. Martinez, Civ. Action No. 3:15-cv-2255-M, 2016 WL
4402259 (N.D. Tex. July 7, 2016). Here, Plaintiff has not identified a specific custom, policy, or
practice of Irving ISDs Board, nor has he alleged that the custom, policy, or practice was the
moving force that caused A.M.s alleged injury. For example, in Birabil, the plaintiffs in an
excessive force/false arrest case alleged that the officers manufactured fraudulent criminal
21
charges. The plaintiffs alleged that the city had a policy or custom of enabling or training
officers to cover up illegal acts with false statements. However, the plaintiffs failed to describe
any specific policy or custom that was the moving force behind their injury. They merely
claimed that the City of Dallas had a policy or custom in place that enabled its Police
Departments agents and employees to act with deliberate indifference. Id. at *6 (emphasis in
original). Here, A.M.s allegation is equally anemic, claiming that Irving ISDs alleged pattern
led directly to the over-discipline of [A.M.] for showing off his home-made clock-in-a-pencilbox to his teachers. (ECF No. 1 77.) A.M.s allegations do not describe a policy or support
causationi.e., that a specific policy or practice actually caused the discipline of A.M. because
of his membership in a protected class. See Birabil, 2016 WL 4402259, at *6 (no facts alleged in
support of causation that would raise plaintiffs right to relief above the speculative level).
The Plaintiff also alleges that a school board member expressed a discriminatory
attitude toward Spanish-speakers and that this board member encouraged an investigation into
alleged Islamic bias in the curriculum. (ECF No. 1 31.) These allegations do not plausibly
demonstrate an intent by Irving ISD to suspend students from school simply because they are
Muslim or non-white. Moreover, a plaintiff cannot take different types of alleged conduct to
cobble together a single policy.
Under Section 1983, the policies or customs must be
disaggregated. Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 581. Further, the alleged statements or beliefs of a
single board member do not establish unlawful intent to discriminate by the board as a body
corporate. See, e.g., Clayton, 560 Fed. Appx at *298 (that one school official believes this
[view] does not plausibly demonstrate that other school officials believe the same).
Additionally, Plaintiffs assertion that other members of the board censured the board member
22
who made the alleged comments undercuts Plaintiffs argument that the board as a whole
supported discrimination on the basis of race or religion. (ECF No. 1 32.)
Finally, Plaintiff offers no facts or plausible legal theory that would impose liability on
the Irving ISD board of trustees for the acts or decisions of the City of Irving police, a separate
and independent police agency.
When an alleged constitutional deprivation involves two
different state actors, one must look to state law to determine how government functions are
distributed. See Coggin v. Longview Indep. Sch. Dist., 337 F.3d 459, 464 (5th Cir. 2003). In this
case, under Texas law, a school board and its high school principals do not have the power to
arrest or to charge a student with a crime. See TEX. EDUC. CODE 11.1511, 11.202. Police
officers, not high school principals, have the authority to arrest. See TEX. CODE. CRIM. P., arts.
2.13, 14.01, 14.03.7 A.M. offers no facts indicating that Irving ISD caused the decision to arrest
and charge the student or that it maintained an unconstitutional custom, policy, or practice that
was the moving force that caused the arrest.
For similar reasons, Irving ISD cannot be held jointly and severally liable along with
the City. (ECF No. 1 108.) The Plaintiff offers no facts in support of such a claim, which
requires proof that each defendant acted in concert to produce a single, indivisible injury.
Florance v. Buchmeyer, 500 F. Supp. 2d 618, 627 (N.D. Tex. 2007) (quoting Harper v. Albert,
400 F.3d 1052, 106162 (7th Cir. 2005)); see also Dean v. Gladney, 621 F.2d 1331, 1339 (5th
Cir. 1980) (rejecting joint and several liability because discrete injuries could be apportioned
with reasonable certainty to individual police officers). Furthermore, the claims and theories
against the defendants are completely different.
Plaintiff has sued Irving ISD and Daniel
Cummings for race and religion discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause and Title VI,
7
Although a school board is authorized to operate a police force and commission peace officers, see TEX.
EDUC. CODE 37.081, Irving ISD does not maintain its own police force, and there are no allegations to the
contrary in the lawsuit.
23
while the claims against the City are brought under the Fourth and Fifth Amendment and relate
to A.M.s interrogation and arrest. These claims are distinct, are based on discrete facts, and
involved different state actors. Because the complaint does not allege facts in support of a
plausible theory of joint and several liability, dismissal is warranted.
In sum, to state a Section 1983 claim, A.M. must show that he was subjected to unequal
treatment based on a protected class. However, no facts support this element or give rise to a
reasonable inference of unlawful discrimination against A.M. Likewise, Plaintiffs complaint
fails to contain facts sufficient to support entity liability under Section 1983. Although Plaintiff
points to raw statistical data regarding discipline and events in the larger community, there are no
facts that suggest that Irving ISDs final policymakerthe board of trusteesknew about, and
sanctioned, a specific policy, practice, or custom that would cause campus officials to discipline
a student because of his or race or religion. The claims should be dismissed.
MOTION TO STRIKE
Irving ISD urges the Court to order the Plaintiff to strike inflammatory, irrelevant, and
prejudicial material from the Complaint under Rule 8 and Rule 12(f). Rule 8 requires plaintiffs
to file a simple, concise and direct complaint that contains a short and plain statement of the
claim. FED. R. CIV. P. 8. When a plaintiff submits an unnecessarily long complaint, a court
may order the plaintiff to comply with Rule 8. See Cesarani v. Graham, 25 F.3d 1044, at *2 (5th
Cir. 1994); Harris v. U.S. Dept of Justice, 680 F.2d 1109, 1111 (5th Cir. 1982). Similarly, Rule
12(f) permits the court to strike immaterial and impertinent material from a complaint. FED.
R. CIV. P. 12(f).
In this case, Plaintiff, through his father, has filed a 35-page lawsuit containing several
pages of extraneous statements and legal argument. Pages 2-4 of the Complaint purport to
24
provide a history of immigration and discrimination in the United States, beginning with the
English passing of laws to prevent the coming of the Quakers and the arrival of Dutch warships
in 1619. (ECF No. 1 7-8.) The Complaint references profanity-laden messages sent to third
parties and actions taken by other governmental agencies. (Id. 10-12, 105.) It purports to
give a history lesson dating back to the Declaration of Independence. (Id. 73.) The Complaint
concludes with quotations attributed to Abraham Lincoln, John F. Kennedy, and Lyndon
Johnson.
(Id. 96-97, 110.)
These allegations are irrelevant and appear designed to
prejudicially link Principal Cummings to incidents at other times and in other places. Plaintiffs
must not include any preambles, introductions, argument, speeches, explanations, stories,
griping, vouching, evidence, attempts to negate possible defenses, summaries, and the like.
Edwards v. High Desert State Prison, No. 2:10cv3461, 2011 WL 1135910, at *2 (E.D. Cal.
Mar. 25, 2011) (citing McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-78 (9th Cir. 1996)). Instead, [t]he
court (and defendant) should be able to read and understand plaintiffs pleading within minutes.
Id. A complaint that is written more as a press release, prolix in evidentiary detail, yet without
simplicity, conciseness and clarity as to whom plaintiffs are suing for what wrongs, fails to
perform the essential functions of a complaint. McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1180. Should the Court
retain this case on its docket, then Irving ISD urges the Court to order the Plaintiff to file a
concise pleading that omits extraneous and inflammatory material.
CONCLUSION
The Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted and thus the claims
against Irving ISD should be dismissed. Should the Court decline to dismiss Plaintiffs claims in
their entirety, the Court should strike the extraneous and irrelevant assertions in the Complaint.
25
Respectfully submitted,
/s/Kathryn E. Long
[email protected]
Carlos G. Lopez
[email protected]
Ross Tower
500 North Akard Street, Suite 2550
Dallas, Texas 75201
(972) 853-5115 Telephone
(972) 692-8334 Facsimile
OF COUNSEL:
Melisa E. Meyler
[email protected]
3200 Southwest Freeway, Suite 2000
Houston, Texas 77027
(713) 554-6767 Telephone
(713) 583-8884 Facsimile
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT

IRVING INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT
26
CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE
I hereby certify that, as counsel for Defendant Irving Independent School District, I sent
an e-mail on October 9, 2016, to confer with counsel for Plaintiff regarding the substance of the
Motion to Strike and Brief in Support. On October 11, 2016, I corresponded with Plaintiffs
counsel regarding the relief requested in the Motion to Strike. Plaintiffs counsel agreed to
remove paragraphs 7-8 from the Complaint, but could not agree to exclude the other paragraphs
Defendant seeks to strike in its motion. Thus, the Motion to Strike is opposed.
/s/ Kathryn E. Long

Kathryn E. Long
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to Dismiss and
Motion to Strike and Brief in Support has been forwarded to counsel of record for Plaintiff on
October 11, 2016, via the Courts electronic service system properly addressed as follows:
Susan Hutchison
509 Pecan St., Suite 201
Fort Worth, Texas 76102
[email protected]
/s/ Melisa E. Meyler

Melisa E. Meyler
855266_6
093990.000002
27

Defendant Irving Independent School District's Motion To Dismiss and Motion To Strike and Brief in Support

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Defendant Irving Independent School District's Motion To Dismiss and Motion To Strike and Brief in Support

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Defendant Irving Independent School District's Motion To Dismiss and Motion To Strike and Brief in Support

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Case 3:16-cv-02283-L Document 10 Filed 10/11/16

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Civil Action No. 3:16-CV-02283-L