[G.R. No. 105364*.

June 28, 2001]

PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK EMPLOYEES UNION-N.U.B.E. and PERFECTO V.
FERNANDEZ, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE BENJAMIN VEGA, Presiding Judge of Branch 39 of the
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT of Manila, the CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE LIQUIDATOR
OF THE PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK, respondents
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
May a liquidation court continue with liquidation proceedings of the Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB) when Congress
had mandated its rehabilitation and reopening?
This is the sole issue raised in the instant Petition for Prohibition with Petition for Preliminary Injunction and application
for Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Sometime in 1985, the Central Bank of the Philippines (Central Bank, for brevity) filed with Branch 39 of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila a Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of the Philippine Veterans Bank, the same docketed as
Case No. SP-32311. Thereafter, the Philipppine Veterans Bank Employees Union-N.U.B.E., herein petitioner,
represented by petitioner Perfecto V. Fernandez, filed claims for accrued and unpaid employee wages and benefits
with said court in SP-32311.[1]
After lengthy proceedings, partial payment of the sums due to the employees were made.However, due to the
piecemeal hearings on the benefits, many remain unpaid. [2]
On March 8, 1991, petitioners moved to disqualify the respondent judge from hearing the above case on grounds of
bias and hostility towards petitioners.[3]
On January 2, 1992, the Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7169 providing for the rehabilitation of the Philippine
Veterans Bank.[4]
Thereafter, petitioners filed with the labor tribunals their residual claims for benefits and for reinstatement upon
reopening of the bank.[5]
Sometime in May 1992, the Central Bank issued a certificate of authority allowing the PVB to reopen. [6]
Despite the legislative mandate for rehabilitation and reopening of PVB, respondent judgecontinued with the
liquidation proceedings of the bank. Moreover, petitioners learned that respondents were set to order the payment and
release of employee benefits upon motion of another lawyer, while petitioners claims have been frozen to their
prejudice.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioners argue that with the passage of R.A. 7169, the liquidation court became functus officio, and no longer had
the authority to continue with liquidation proceedings.
In a Resolution, dated June 8, 1992, the Supreme Court resolved to issue a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining
the trial court from further proceeding with the case.
On June 22, 1992, VOP Security & Detective Agency (VOPSDA) and its 162 security guards filed a Motion for
Intervention with prayer that they be excluded from the operation of the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the

Court. They alleged that they had filed a motion before Branch 39 of the RTC of Manila, in SP-No. 32311, praying that
said court order PVB to pay their backwages and salary differentials by authority of R.A. No 6727, Wage Orders No.
NCR-01 and NCR-01-Ad and Wage Orders No. NCR-02 and NCR-02-A; and, that said court, in an Order dated June
5, 1992, approved therein movants case and directed the bank liquidator or PVB itself to pay the backwages and
differentials in accordance with the computation incorporated in the order. Said intervenors likewise manifested that
there was an error in the computation of the monetary benefits due them.
On August 18, 1992, petitioners, pursuant to the Resolution of this Court, dated July 6, 1992, filed their Comment
opposing the Motion for Leave to File Intervention and for exclusion from the operation of the T.R.O. on the grounds
that the movants have no legal interest in the subject matter of the pending action; that allowing intervention would
only cause delay in the proceedings; and that the motion to exclude the movants from the T.R.O. is without legal basis
and would render moot the relief sought in the petition.
On September 3, 1992, the PVB filed a Petition-In-Intervention praying for the issuance of the writs of certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court in connection with the issuance by respondent judge of several orders
involving acts of liquidation of PVB even after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7169. PVB further alleges that respondent
judge clearly acted in excess of or without jurisdiction when he issued the questioned orders.
We find for the petitioners.
Republic Act No. 7169 entitled An Act To Rehabilitate The Philippine Veterans Bank Created Under Republic Act No.
3518, Providing The Mechanisms Therefor, And For Other Purposes, which was signed into law by President Corazon
C. Aquino on January 2, 1992 and which was published in the Official Gazette on February 24, 1992, provides in part
for the reopening of the Philippine Veterans Bank together with all its branches within the period of three (3) years
from the date of the reopening of the head office. [7] The law likewise provides for the creation of a rehabilitation
committee in order to facilitate the implementation of the provisions of the same. [8]
Pursuant to said R.A. No. 7169, the Rehabilitation Committee submitted the proposed Rehabilitation Plan of the PVB
to the Monetary Board for its approval. Meanwhile, PVB filed a Motion to Terminate Liquidation of Philippine Veterans
Bank dated March 13, 1992 with the respondent judge praying that the liquidation proceedings be immediately
terminated in view of the passage of R.A. No. 7169.
On April 10, 1992, the Monetary Board issued Monetary Board Resolution No. 348 which approved the Rehabilitation
Plan submitted by the Rehabilitaion Committee.
Thereafter, the Monetary Board issued a Certificate of Authority allowing PVB to reopen.
On June 3, 1992, the liquidator filed A Motion for the Termination of the Liquidation Proceedings of the Philippine
Veterans Bank with the respondent judge.
As stated above, the Court, in a Resolution dated June 8, 1992, issued a temporary restraining order in the instant
case restraining respondent judge from further proceeding with the liquidation of PVB.
On August 3, 1992, the Philippine Veterans Bank opened its doors to the public and started regular banking
operations.
Clearly, the enactment of Republic Act No. 7169, as well as the subsequent developments has rendered the
liquidation court functus officio. Consequently, respondent judge has been stripped of the authority to issue orders
involving acts of liquidation.
Liquidation, in corporation law, connotes a winding up or settling with creditors and debtors. [9] It is the winding up of a
corporation so that assets are distributed to those entitled to receive them. It is the process of reducing assets to cash,
discharging liabilities and dividing surplus or loss.

On the opposite end of the spectrum is rehabilitation which connotes a reopening or reorganization. Rehabilitation
contemplates a continuance of corporate life and activities in an effort to restore and reinstate the corporation to its
former position of successful operation and solvency.[10]
It is crystal clear that the concept of liquidation is diametrically opposed or contrary to the concept of rehabilitation,
such that both cannot be undertaken at the same time. To allow the liquidation proceedings to continue would
seriously hinder the rehabilitation of the subject bank.
Anent the claim of respondents Central Bank and Liquidator of PVB that R.A. No. 7169 became effective only on
March 10, 1992 or fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette; and, the contention of intervenors VOP
Security, et. al. that the effectivity of said law is conditioned on the approval of a rehabilitation plan by the Monetary
Board, among others, the Court is of the view that both contentions are bereft of merit.
While as a rule, laws take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, the legislature has the authority to provide for
exceptions, as indicated in the clause unless otherwise provided.
In the case at bar, Section 10 of R.A. No. 7169 provides:
Sec. 10. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Hence, it is clear that the legislature intended to make the law effective immediately upon its approval. It is undisputed
that R.A. No. 7169 was signed into law by President Corazon C. Aquino on January 2, 1992. Therefore, said law
became effective on said date.
Assuming for the sake of argument that publication is necessary for the effectivity of R.A. No. 7169, then it became
legally effective on February 24, 1992, the date when the same was published in the Official Gazette, and not on
March 10, 1992, as erroneously claimed by respondents Central Bank and Liquidator.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby GIVEN
DUECOURSE and GRANTED. Respondent Judge is hereby PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from further proceeding
with Civil Case No. SP- 32311.
EN BANC

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR

ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS OF
CAMILO L. SABIO,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 174340

J. ERMIN ERNEST LOUIE R. MIGUEL,

Petitioner-Relator,
- versus HONORABLE SENATOR RICHARD GORDON, in
his capacity as Chairman, and the HONORABLE
MEMBERS
OF
THE
COMMITTEE
ON
GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS AND PUBLIC
ENTERPRISES and THE COMMITTEE ON
PUBLIC SERVICES of the Senate, HONORABLE
SENATOR JUAN PONCE-ENRILE, in his official
capacity as Member, HONORABLE MANUEL
VILLAR,
Senate
President,
SENATE

SERGEANT-AT-ARMS, and the SENATE OF THE

PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.
x ------------------------------------------------ x
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT (PCGG) and CAMILO L. SABIO,
Chairman, NARCISO S. NARIO, RICARDO M.
ABCEDE, TERESO L. JAVIER and NICASIO A.
CONTI, Commissioners, MANUEL ANDAL and
JULIO
JALANDONI,
PCGG
nominees
to Philcomsat Holdings Corporation,
Petitioners,
- versus RICHARD GORDON, in his capacity as
Chairman, and MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE
ON GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS AND
PUBLIC ENTERPRISES, MEMBERS OF THE
COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SERVICES, SENATOR
JUAN PONCE-ENRILE, in his capacity as
member of both said Committees, MANUEL
VILLAR, Senate President, THE SENATE
SERGEANT-AT-ARMS, and SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.
x-------------------------------------------------x
PHILCOMSAT HOLDINGS CORPORATIONS,
PHILIP G. BRODETT, LUIS K. LOKIN, JR.,
ROBERTO V. SAN JOSE, DELFIN P. ANGCAO,
ROBERTO L. ABAD, ALMA KRISTINA ALOBBA,
and JOHNNY TAN,
Petitioners,

- versus SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT

CORPORATIONS and PUBLIC ENTERPRISES,
its
MEMBERS
and
CHAIRMAN,
the
HONORABLE SENATOR RICHARD GORDON
and SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC
SERVICES, its Members and Chairman, the
HONORABLE SENATOR JOKER P. ARROYO,
Respondents.

G.R. No. 174318

G.R. No. 174177

Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J.
PUNO,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
NAZARIO,
GARCIA, and
VELASCO,JJ.
Promulgated:
October 17, 2006

x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Two decades ago, on February 28, 1986, former President Corazon C. Aquino installed her regime by issuing
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 1,[1] creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). She entrusted

upon this Commission the herculean task of recovering the ill-gotten wealth accumulated by the deposed President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, his family, relatives, subordinates and close associates. [2] Section 4 (b) of E.O. No. 1 provides
that: No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial,
legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance. Apparently, the
purpose is to ensure PCGGs unhampered performance of its task.[3]

Today, the constitutionality of Section 4(b) is being questioned on the ground that it tramples upon the Senates power
to conduct legislative inquiry under Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
The facts are undisputed.
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced Philippine Senate Resolution No. 455 (Senate
Res. No. 455),[4] directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas
Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and
PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective
Board of Directors.
The pertinent portions of the Resolution read:
WHEREAS, in the last quarter of 2005, the representation and entertainment expense of the PHC
skyrocketed to P4.3 million, as compared to the previous years mere P106 thousand;
WHEREAS, some board members established wholly owned PHC subsidiary called
Telecommunications Center, Inc. (TCI), where PHC funds are allegedly siphoned; in 18 months, over
P73 million had been allegedly advanced to TCI without any accountability report given to PHC and
PHILCOMSAT;
WHEREAS, the Philippine Star, in its 12 February 2002 issue reported that the executive committee
of Philcomsat has precipitately released P265 million and granted P125 million loan to a relative of an
executive committee member; to date there have been no payments given, subjecting the company to
an estimated interest income loss of P11.25 million in 2004;
WHEREAS, there is an urgent need to protect the interest of the Republic of the Philippines in the
PHC, PHILCOMSAT, and POTC from any anomalous transaction, and to conserve or salvage any
remaining value of the governments equity position in these corporations from any abuses of power
done by their respective board of directors;
WHEREFORE, be it resolved that the proper Senate Committee shall conduct an inquiry in aid
of legislation, on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippine Overseas
Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT), and PhilcomsatHoldings Corporations (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties
in the operations by their respective board of directors.
Adopted.
(Sgd) MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO
On the same date, February 20, 2006, Senate Res. No. 455 was submitted to the Senate and referred to
the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations and Committee on Public Services. However,
on March 28, 2006, upon motion of Senator Francis N. Pangilinan, it was transferred to the Committee on
Government Corporations and Public Enterprises.[5]

On May 8, 2006, Chief of Staff Rio C. Inocencio, under the authority of Senator Richard J. Gordon, wrote
Chairman Camilo L. Sabio of the PCGG, one of the herein petitioners, inviting him to be one of the resource persons
in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and Public

Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. The purpose of the public meeting was to deliberate on Senate Res.
No. 455.[6]

On May 9, 2006, Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment. [7] At the same time, he
invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 earlier quoted.

On August 10, 2006, Senator Gordon issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum,[8]approved by Senate President
Manuel Villar, requiring Chairman Sabio and PCGG
Commissioners Ricardo Abcede, Nicasio Conti, Tereso Javier and NarcisoNario to appear in the public hearing
scheduled on August 23, 2006 and testify on what they know relative to the matters specified in Senate Res. No.
455. Similarsubpoenae were issued against the directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation,
namely: Benito V. Araneta, Philip J. Brodett, Enrique L. Locsin, Manuel D. Andal, Roberto L. Abad, Luis K. Lokin, Jr.,
Julio J. Jalandoni, Roberto V. San Jose, Delfin P. Angcao, Alma Kristina Alloba and Johnny Tan.[9]

Again, Chairman Sabio refused to appear. In his letter to Senator Gordon dated August 18, 2006, he reiterated his
earlier position, invoking Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1. On the other hand, the directors and officers
of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation relied on the position paper they previously filed, which raised issues on the
propriety of legislative inquiry.

Thereafter, Chief of Staff Ma. Carissa O. Coscolluela, under the authority of Senator Gordon, sent another notice [10] to
Chairman Sabio requiring him to appear and testify on the same subject matter set on September 6,
2006. The notice was issued under the same authority of the Subpoena Ad Testificandum previously served upon
(him) last 16 August 2006.

Once more, Chairman Sabio did not comply with the notice. He sent a letter[11] dated September 4, 2006 to Senator
Gordon reiterating his reason for declining to appear in the public hearing.

This prompted Senator Gordon to issue an Order dated September 7, 2006requiring Chairman Sabio and
Commissioners Abcede, Conti, Javier and Nario to show cause why they should not be cited in contempt of the
Senate. On September 11, 2006, they submitted to the Senate their Compliance and Explanation, [12]which partly
reads:
Doubtless, there are laudable intentions of the subject inquiry in aid of legislation. But the rule
of law requires that even the best intentions must be carried out within the parameters of the
Constitution and the law. Verily, laudable purposes must be carried out by legal methods. (Brillantes,
Jr., et al. v. Commission on Elections, En Banc [G.R. No. 163193, June 15, 2004])
On this score, Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 should not be ignored as it explicitly provides:
No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce
evidence in any judicial legislative or administrative proceeding concerning
matters within its official cognizance.
With all due respect, Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 constitutes a limitation on the power of legislative
inquiry, and a recognition by the State of the need to provide protection to the PCGG in order to
ensure the unhampered performance of its duties under its charter. E.O. No. 1 is a law, Section 4(b) of
which had not been amended, repealed or revised in any way.
To say the least, it would require both Houses of Congress and Presidential fiat to amend or repeal
the provision in controversy. Until then, it stands to be respected as part of the legal system in this
jurisdiction. (As held in People v. Veneracion, G.R. Nos. 119987-88, October 12, 1995: Obedience to
the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If judges, under the guise of religious or
political beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are required
by law to exercise the duties of their office, then law becomes meaningless. A government of laws,
not of men excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting under its

authority. Under this system, judges are guided by the Rule of Law, and ought to protect and enforce
it without fear or favor, 4 [Act of Athens (1955)] resist encroachments by governments, political
parties, or even the interference of their own personal beliefs.)
xxxxxx
Relevantly, Chairman Sabios letter to Sen. Gordon dated August 19, 2006 pointed out that the
anomalous transactions referred to in the P.S. Resolution No. 455 are subject of pending cases before
the regular courts, the Sandiganbayan and the Supreme Court (Pending cases include: a. Samuel
Divina v. Manuel Nieto, Jr., et al., CA-G.R. No. 89102; b. Philippine Communications Satellite
Corporation v. Manuel Nieto, et al.; c. Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation v. Manuel
D. Andal, Civil Case No. 06-095, RTC, Branch 61, Makati City; d. Philippine Communications Satellite
Corporation v. PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation, et al., Civil Case No. 04-1049) for which reason
they may not be able to testify thereon under the principle of sub judice. The laudable objectives of
the PCGGs functions, recognized in several cases decided by the Supreme Court, of the PCGG will
be put to naught if its recovery efforts will be unduly impeded by a legislative investigation of cases
that are already pending before the Sandiganbayan and trial courts.
In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, (203 SCRA 767, 784 [1991]) the Honorable
Supreme Court held:
[T]he issues sought to be investigated by the respondent Committee is one over
which jurisdiction had been acquired by the Sandiganbayan. In short, the issue has
been pre-empted by that court. To allow the respondent Committee to conduct its own
investigation of an issue already before the Sandigabayan would not only pose the
possibility of conflicting judgments between a legislative committee and a judicial
tribunal, but if the Committees judgment were to be reached before that of
the Sandiganbayan, the possibility of its influence being made to bear on the ultimate
judgment of the Sandiganbayan can not be discounted.
xxxxxx
IT IS IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS that the Commission decided not to attend
the Senate inquiry to testify and produce evidence thereat.

Unconvinced with the above Compliance and Explanation, the Committee on Government Corporations and Public
Enterprises and the Committee on Public Services issued an Order[13] directing Major General Jose Balajadia (Ret.),
Senate Sergeant-At-Arms, to place Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners under arrest for contempt of the
Senate. The Order bears the approval of Senate President Villar and the majority of the Committees members.

On September 12, 2006, at around 10:45 a.m., Major General Balajadiaarrested Chairman Sabio in his office
at IRC Building, No. 82 EDSA, Mandaluyong City and brought him to the Senate premises where he was detained.

Hence, Chairman Sabio filed with this Court a petition for habeas corpusagainst the Senate Committee on
Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services, their Chairmen, Senators
Richard Gordon and Joker P. Arroyo and Members. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 174340.

Chairman Sabio, Commissioners Abcede, Conti, Nario, and Javier, and the PCGGs nominees to Philcomsat Holdings
Corporation, Manuel Andal and Julio Jalandoni, likewise filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the same
respondents, and also against Senate President Manuel Villar, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, the Sergeant-at-Arms, and
the entire Senate. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 174318.

Meanwhile, Philcomsat Holdings Corporation and its officers and directors, namely: Philip G. Brodett, Luis K. Lokin,
Jr., Roberto V. San Jose, Delfin P. Angcao, Roberto L. Abad, Alma Kristina Alobba and Johnny Tan filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition against the Senate Committees on Government Corporations and Public
Enterprises and Public Services, their Chairmen, Senators Gordon and Arroyo, and Members. The case was docketed
as G.R. No. 174177.

In G.R. No. 174340 (for habeas corpus) and G.R. No. 174318 (for certiorari and prohibition) Chairman Sabio,
Commissioners Abcede, Conti, Nario, and Javier; and
the PCGGs nominees Andal and Jalandoni alleged: first, respondent Senate Committees disregarded Section 4(b) of
E.O. No. 1 without any justifiable reason; second, the inquiries conducted by respondent Senate Committees are not
in aid of legislation; third, the inquiries were conducted in the absence of duly published Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation;and fourth, respondent Senate Committees are not vested with the power of
contempt.

In G.R. No. 174177, petitioners Philcomsat Holdings Corporation and its directors and officers
alleged: first, respondent Senate Committees have no jurisdiction over the subject matter stated in Senate Res. No.
455; second, the same inquiry is not in accordance with the Senates Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation; third, the subpoenae against the individual petitioners are void for having been issued without
authority; fourth, the conduct of legislative inquiry pursuant to Senate Res. No. 455 constitutes undue encroachment
by respondents into justiciable controversies over which several courts and tribunals have already acquired
jurisdiction; and fifth, the subpoenaeviolated petitioners rights to privacy and against self-incrimination.
In their Consolidated Comment, the above-named respondents countered: first, the issues raised in the petitions
involve political questions over which this Court has no jurisdiction; second, Section 4(b) has been repealed by the
Constitution; third,respondent Senate Committees are vested with contempt power; fourth, Senates Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation have been duly published; fifth, respondents have not violated any
civil right of the individual petitioners, such as their (a) right to privacy; and (b) right against self-incrimination;
and sixth, the inquiry does not constitute undue encroachment into justiciable controversies.

During the oral arguments held on September 21, 2006, the parties were directed to submit simultaneously their
respective memoranda within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from date. In the meantime, per agreement
of the parties, petitioner Chairman Sabio was allowed to go home. Thus, his petition for habeas corpus has become
moot. The parties also agreed that the service of the arrest warrants issued against all petitioners and the proceedings
before the respondent Senate Committees are suspended during the pendency of the instant cases. [14]

Crucial to the resolution of the present petitions is the fundamental issue of whether Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 is
repealed by the 1987 Constitution. On this lone issue hinges the merit of the contention of Chairman Sabio and his
Commissioners that their refusal to appear before respondent Senate Committees is justified. With the resolution of
this issue, all the other issues raised by the parties have become inconsequential.
Perched on one arm of the scale of justice is Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution granting respondent
Senate Committees the power of legislative inquiry. It reads:

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The
rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.

On the other arm of the scale is Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limiting such power of legislative inquiry by exempting all
PCGG members or staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding, thus:

No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any
judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official
cognizance.

To determine whether there exists a clear and unequivocal repugnancy between the two quoted provisions that
warrants a declaration that Section 4(b) has been repealed by the 1987 Constitution, a brief consideration of the
Congress power of inquiry is imperative.

The Congress power of inquiry has been recognized in foreign jurisdictions long before it reached our shores
through McGrain v. Daugherty,[15] cited in Arnault v. Nazareno.[16] In those earlier days, American courts considered the
power of inquiry as inherent in the power to legislate. The 1864 case of Briggs v. MacKellar[17] explains the breath and
basis of the power, thus:
Where no constitutional limitation or restriction exists, it is competent for either of the two bodies
composing the legislature to do, in their separate capacity, whatever may be essential to enable
them to legislate.It is well-established principle of this parliamentary law, that either house may
institute any investigationhaving reference to its own organization, the conduct or qualification of its
members, its proceedings, rights, or privileges or any matter affecting the public interest upon
which it may be important that it should have exact information, and in respect to which it
would be competent for it to legislate. The right to pass laws, necessarily implies the right to
obtain information upon any matter which may become the subject of a law. It is essential to
the full and intelligent exercise of the legislative function.In American legislatures the
investigation of public matters before committees, preliminary to legislation, or with the view
of advising the house appointing the committee is, as a parliamentary usage, well established
as it is in England, and the right of either house to compel witnesses to appear and testify before its
committee, and to punish for disobedience has been frequently enforced.The right of inquiry, I think,
extends to other matters, in respect to which it may be necessary, or may be deemed
advisable to apply for legislative aid.

Remarkably, in Arnault, this Court adhered to a similar theory. Citing McGrain, it recognized that the power of inquiry
is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function, thus:
Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with
power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative
functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be
implied. In other words, the power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and
appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or
effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is
intended to affect or change; and where the legislation body does not itself possess the
requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to others who
possess it.

Dispelling any doubt as to the Philippine Congress power of inquiry, provisions on such power made their
maiden appearance in Article VIII, Section 12 of the 1973 Constitution. [18] Then came the 1987 Constitution
incorporating the present Article VI, Section 12. What was therefore implicitunder the 1935 Constitution, as
influenced by American jurisprudence, became explicit under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.[19]

Notably, the 1987 Constitution recognizes the power of investigation, not just of Congress, but also of any of its
committee. This is significant because it constitutes a direct conferral of investigatory power upon the committees
and it means that the mechanisms which the Houses can take in order to effectively perform its investigative function
are also available to the committees.[20]

It can be said that the Congress power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and expansive construal. The
Courts high regard to such power is rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita,[21] where it categorically ruled that the
power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch. Verily, the Court reinforced the
doctrine in Arnault that the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper
subject for investigation and that the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate.

Considering these jurisprudential instructions, we find Section 4(b) directly repugnant with Article VI, Section 21.
Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the Congress power of inquiry. This cannot be
countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any provision granting such exemption. The Congress power of inquiry,
being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or
possibly needed statutes.[22] It even extends to government agencies created by Congress and officers whose
positions are within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish. [23] PCGG belongs to this class.

Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of Congress, in the absence of any
constitutional basis.

Furthermore, Section 4(b) is also inconsistent with Article XI, Section 1 of the Constitution stating that: Public office is
a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

The provision presupposes that since an incumbent of a public office is invested with certain powers and charged with
certain duties pertinent to sovereignty, the powers so delegated to the officer are held in trust for the people and are
to be exercised in behalf of the government or of all citizens who may need the intervention of the
officers. Such trust extends to all matters within the range of duties pertaining to the office. In other words,
public officers are but the servants of the people, and not their rulers. [24]

Section 4(b), being in the nature of an immunity, is inconsistent with the principle of public accountability. It
places the PCGG members and staff beyond the reach of courts, Congress and other administrative bodies. Instead
of encouraging public accountability, the same provision only institutionalizes irresponsibility and nonaccountability. In Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Pea,[25] Justice Florentino P. Feliciano
characterized as obiter the portion of the majority opinion barring, on the basis of Sections 4(a) and (b) of E.O. No. 1,
a civil case for damages filed against the PCGG and its Commissioners. He eloquently opined:

The above underscored portions are, it is respectfully submitted, clearly obiter. It is important to
make clear that the Court is not here interpreting, much less upholding as valid and
constitutional, the literal terms of Section 4 (a), (b) of Executive Order No.1. If Section 4 (a) were
given its literal import as immunizing the PCGG or any member thereof from civil liability for anything
done or omitted in the discharge of the task contemplated by this Order, the constitutionality of
Section 4 (a) would, in my submission, be open to most serious doubt. For so viewed, Section 4 (a)
would institutionalize the irresponsibility and non-accountability of members and staff of the PCGG, a
notion that is clearly repugnant to both the 1973 and 1987 Constitution and a privileged status not
claimed by any other official of the Republic under the 1987 Constitution. x x x.
xxxxxx
It would seem constitutionally offensive to suppose that a member or staff member of the
PCGG could not be required to testify before the Sandiganbayanor that such members were
exempted from complying with orders of this Court.

Chavez v. Sandiganbayan[26] reiterates the same view. Indeed, Section 4(b) has been frowned upon by this Court even
before the filing of the present petitions.

Corollarily, Section 4(b) also runs counter to the following constitutional provisions ensuring the peoples access to
information:

Article II, Section 28

10

Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full
public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

Article III, Section 7

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as
well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the
citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making and in the operations of the
government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to enable them to exercise effectively their
constitutional rights. Armed with the right information, citizens can participate in public discussions leading to the
formulation of government policies and their effective implementation. In Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr.[27] the Court
explained that an informed citizenry is essential to the existence and proper functioning of any democracy, thus:
An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of
communication between the government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that the
channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive and
be responsive to the peoples will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the
citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants in the
discussion are aware of the issues and have access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit.

Consequently, the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation is not only intended to benefit Congress but also the
citizenry. The people are equally concerned with this proceeding and have the right to participate therein in order to
protect their interests. The extent of their participation will largely depend on the information gathered and made
known to them. In other words, the right to information really goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full
public disclosure and honesty in the public service. It is meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in
governmental decision-making as well as in checking abuse in the government. [28] The cases
of Taada v. Tuvera[29] and Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission[30] have recognized a citizens interest and personality to
enforce a public duty and to bring an action to compel public officials and employees to perform that duty.
Section 4(b) limits or obstructs the power of Congress to secure from PCGG members and staff information and other
data in aid of its power to legislate. Again, this must not be countenanced. In Senate v. Ermita,[31] this Court stressed:
To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally conducted in public, however, any
executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in such investigations
necessarily deprives the people of information which, being presumed to be in aid of
legislation, is presumed to be a matter of public concern. The citizens are thereby denied access
to information which they can use in formulating their own opinions on the matter before Congress
opinions which they can then communicate to their representatives and other government officials
through the various legal means allowed by their freedom of expression.

A statute may be declared unconstitutional because it is not within the legislative power to enact; or it creates or
establishes methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; or its purpose or effect violates the Constitution
or its basic principles.[32] As shown in the above discussion, Section 4(b) is inconsistent with Article VI, Section
21 (Congress power of inquiry), Article XI, Section 1 (principle of public accountability), Article II, Section 28 (policy
of full disclosure) and Article III, Section 7 (right to public information).

Significantly, Article XVIII, Section 3 of the Constitution provides:

11

All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions, and other executive
issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed, or
revoked.

The clear import of this provision is that all existing laws, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and
other executive issuances inconsistent or repugnant to the Constitution are repealed.

Jurisprudence is replete with decisions invalidating laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of
instructions and other executive issuances inconsistent with the Constitution. In Pelaez v. Auditor General,[33] the Court
considered repealed Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 authorizing the Executive to change the
seat of the government of any subdivision of local governments, upon the approval of the 1935 Constitution. Section
68 was adjudged incompatible and inconsistent with the Constitutional grant of limited executive supervision over local
governments. In Islamic Dawah Council of the Philippines, Inc., v. Office of the Executive Secretary,[34] the Court
declared Executive Order No. 46, entitled Authorizing the Office on Muslim Affairs to Undertake
Philippine Halal Certification, void for encroaching on the religious freedom of Muslims. In The Province of Batangas v.
Romulo,[35] the Court declared some provisions of the General Appropriations Acts of 1999, 2000 and 2001
unconstitutional for violating the Constitutional precept on local autonomy.And in Ople v. Torres,[36] the Court likewise
declared unconstitutional Administrative Order No. 308, entitled Adoption of a National Computerized Identification
Reference System, for being violative of the right to privacy protected by the Constitution.

These Decisions, and many others, highlight that the Constitution is the highest law of the land. It is the basic and
paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials
of the land, must defer. No act shall be valid, however noble its intentions, if it conflicts with the Constitution.
[37]
Consequently, this Court has no recourse but to declare Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 repealed by the 1987
Constitution.
Significantly, during the oral arguments on September 21, 2006, Chairman Sabioadmitted that should this Court rule
that Section 4(b) is unconstitutional or that it does not apply to the Senate, he will answer the questions of the
Senators, thus:
CHIEF JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
Okay. Now, if the Supreme Court rules that Sec. 4(b) is unconstitutional or that it does not
apply to the Senate, will you answer the questions of the Senators?
CHAIRMAN SABIO:
Your Honor, my father was a judge, died being a judge. I was here in the Supreme Court as
Chief of Staff of Justice Feria. I would definitely honor the Supreme Court and the rule of law.
CHIEF JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
You will answer the questions of the Senators if we say that?
CHAIRMAN SABIO:
Yes, Your Honor. That is the law already as far as I am concerned.
With his admission, Chairman Sabio is not fully convinced that he and his Commissioners are shielded from testifying
before respondent Senate Committees by Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1. In effect, his argument that the said provision
exempts him and his co-respondent Commissioners from testifying before respondent Senate Committees concerning
Senate Res. No. 455 utterly lacks merit.
Incidentally, an argument repeated by Chairman Sabio is that respondent Senate Committees have no power to
punish him and his Commissioners for contempt of the Senate.

The argument is misleading.

12

Article VI, Section 21 provides:

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The
rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.

It must be stressed that the Order of Arrest for contempt of Senate Committees and the Philippine Senate
was approved by Senate President Villar and signed by fifteen (15) Senators. From this, it can be concluded that
the Order is under the authority, not only of the respondent Senate Committees, but of the entire Senate.

At any rate, Article VI, Section 21 grants the power of inquiry not only to the Senate and the House of
Representatives, but also to any of their respective committees. Clearly, there is a direct conferral of power to the
committees. Father Bernas, in his Commentary on the 1987 Constitution, correctly pointed out its significance:

It should also be noted that the Constitution explicitly recognizes the power of investigation not just of
Congress but also of any of its committees. This is significant because it constitutes a direct
conferral of investigatory power upon the committees and it means that the means which the
Houses can take in order to effectively perform its investigative function are also available to
the Committees.[38]
This is a reasonable conclusion. The conferral of the legislative power of inquiry upon any committee of Congress
must carry with it all powers necessary and proper for its effective discharge. Otherwise, Article VI, Section 21 will be
meaningless. The indispensability and usefulness of the power of contempt in a legislative inquiry is underscored in a
catena of cases, foreign and local.
In the 1821 case of Anderson v. Dunn,[39] the function of the Houses of Congress with respect to the contempt power
was likened to that of a court, thus:
But the court in its reasoning goes beyond this, and though the grounds of the decision are not very
clearly stated, we take them to be: that there is in some cases a power in each House of
Congress to punish for contempt; that this power is analogous to that exercised by courts of
justice, and that it being the well established doctrine that when it appears that a prisoner is
held under the order of a court of general jurisdiction for a contempt of its authority, no other
court will discharge the prisoner or make further inquiry into the cause of his
commitment. That this is the general ruleas regards the relation of one court to another must be
conceded.

In McGrain,[40] the U.S. Supreme Court held: Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are
often unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some
means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed. The Court, in Arnaultv. Nazareno,[41] sustained the
Congress power of contempt on the basis of this observation.

In Arnault v. Balagtas,[42] the Court further explained that the contempt power of Congress is founded upon reason and
policy and that the power of inquiry will not be complete if for every contumacious act, Congress has to resort to
judicial interference, thus:

The principle that Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses is
founded upon reason and policy. Said power must be considered implied or incidental to the exercise
of legislative power. How could a legislative body obtain the knowledge and information on
which to base intended legislation if it cannot require and compel the disclosure of such
knowledge and information if it is impotent to punish a defiance of its power and authority?
When the framers of the Constitution adopted the principle of separation of powers, making
each branch supreme within the realm of its respective authority, it must have intended each
departments authority to be full and complete, independently of the others authority or

13

power. And how could the authority and power become complete if for every act of refusal,
every act of defiance, every act of contumacy against it, the legislative body must resort to the
judicial department for the appropriate remedy, because it is impotent by itself to punish or
deal therewith, with the affronts committed against its authority or dignity.[43]

In Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete,[44] the Court characterized
contempt power as a matter of self-preservation, thus:

The exercise by the legislature of the contempt power is a matter of self-preservation as that branch
of the government vested with the legislative power, independently of the judicial branch, asserts its
authority and punishes contemptsthereof. The contempt power of the legislature is, therefore, sui
generis x x x.
Meanwhile, with respect to G.R. No. 174177, the petition of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation and its directors and
officers, this Court holds that the respondent Senate Committees inquiry does not violate their right to privacy and right
against self-incrimination.
One important limitation on the Congress power of inquiry is that the rights of persons appearing in or affected by
such inquiries shall be respected. This is just another way of saying that the power of inquiry must be subject to the
limitations placed by the Constitution on government action. As held in Barenblattv. United States,[45] the Congress, in
common with all the other branches of the Government, must exercise its powers subject to the limitations
placed by the Constitution on governmental action, more particularly in the context of this case, the relevant
limitations of the Bill of Rights.
First is the right to privacy.
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. [46] Within these zones, any form of intrusion is
impermissible unless excused by law and in accordance with customary legal process. The meticulous regard we
accord to these zones arises not only from our conviction that the right to privacy is a constitutional right and the right
most valued by civilized men,[47] but also from our adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which
mandates that, no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy and everyonehas the right to the
protection of the law against such interference or attacks. [48]
Our Bill of Rights, enshrined in Article III of the Constitution, provides at least two guarantees that explicitly create
zones of privacy. It highlights a persons right to be let alone or the right to determine what, how much, to whom and
when information about himself shall be disclosed.[49] Section 2 guarantees the right ofthe people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose.Section 3 renders inviolable the privacy of communication and
correspondenceand further cautions that any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

In evaluating a claim for violation of the right to privacy, a court must determine whether a person has exhibited a
reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that expectation has been violated by unreasonable government
intrusion.[50] Applying this determination to these cases, the important inquiries are: first, did the directors and officers
of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation exhibit a reasonable expectation of privacy?; and second, did the
governmentviolate such expectation?

The answers are in the negative. Petitioners were invited in the Senates public hearing to deliberate on Senate Res.
No. 455, particularly on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippine Overseas Telecommunications
Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT),
and Philcomsat Holdings Corporations (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in the operations by their
respective board of directors.Obviously, the inquiry focus on petitioners acts committed in the discharge of their
duties as officers and directors of the said corporations, particularly PhilcomsatHoldings Corporation. Consequently,

14

they have no reasonable expectation of privacy over matters involving their offices in a corporation where the
government has interest. Certainly, such matters are of public concern and over which the people have the
right to information.

This goes to show that the right to privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding compelling state
interest. In Morfe v. Mutuc,[51] the Court, in line with Whalen v. Roe,[52] employed the rational basis relationship test
when it held that there was no infringement of the individuals right to privacy as the requirement to disclosure
information is for a valid purpose, i.e., to curtail and minimize the opportunities for official corruption, maintain a
standard of honesty in public service, and promote morality in public administration. [53] In Valmontev. Belmonte,[54] the
Court remarked that as public figures, the Members of theformer Batasang Pambansa enjoy a more limited right to
privacy as compared to ordinary individuals, and their actions are subject to closer scrutiny. Taking this into
consideration, the Court ruled that the right of the people to access information on matters of public concern prevails
over the right to privacy of financial transactions.

Under the present circumstances, the alleged anomalies in the PHILCOMSAT, PHC and POTC, ranging in millions of
pesos, and the conspiratorial participation of the PCGG and its officials are compelling reasons for the Senate to
exact vital information from the directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporations, as well as from
Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners to aid it in crafting the necessary legislation to prevent corruption and
formulate remedial measures and policy determination regarding PCGGs efficacy. There being no reasonable
expectation of privacy on the part of those directors and officers over the subject covered by Senate Res. No. 455, it
follows that their right to privacy has not been violated by respondent Senate Committees.

Anent the right against self-incrimination, it must be emphasized that this right maybe invoked by the said directors
and officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation only when the incriminating question is being asked, since they
have no way of knowing in advance the nature or effect of the questions to be asked of them.[55] That this right
may possibly be violated or abused is no ground for denying respondent Senate Committees their power of
inquiry. The consolation is that when this power is abused, such issue may be presented before the courts. At this
juncture, what is important is that respondent Senate Committees have sufficient Rules to guide them when the right
against self-incrimination is invoked. Sec. 19 reads:
Sec. 19. Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
A witness can invoke his right against self-incrimination only when a question tends to elicit an answer
that will incriminate him is propounded to him. However, he may offer to answer any question in an
executive session.
No person can refuse to testify or be placed under oath or affirmation or answer questions before an
incriminatory question is asked. His invocation of such right does not by itself excuse him from his
duty to give testimony.
In such a case, the Committee, by a majority vote of the members present there being a quorum, shall
determine whether the right has been properly invoked. If the Committee decides otherwise, it shall
resume its investigation and the question or questions previously refused to be answered shall be
repeated to the witness. If the latter continues to refuse to answer the question, the Committee may
punish him for contempt for contumacious conduct.
The same directors and officers contend that the Senate is barred from inquiring into the same issues being litigated
before the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan. Suffice it to state that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provide that the filing or pendency of any prosecution of criminal or administrative action
should not stop or abate any inquiry to carry out a legislative purpose.

Let it be stressed at this point that so long as the constitutional rights of witnesses, like Chairman Sabio and his
Commissioners, will be respected by respondent Senate Committees, it their duty to cooperate with them in their
efforts to obtain the facts needed for intelligent legislative action. The unremitting obligation of every citizen is to
respond to subpoenae, to respect the dignity of the Congress and its Committees, and to testify fully with respect to
matters within the realm of proper investigation.

15

In fine, PCGG Chairman Camilo Sabio and Commissioners Ricardo Abcede, Narciso Nario, Nicasio Conti,
and Tereso Javier; and Manuel Andal and Julio Jalandoni, PCGGs nominees to Philcomsat Holdings Corporation, as
well as its directors and officers, must comply with the Subpoenae Ad Testificandum issued by respondent Senate
Committees directing them to appear and testify in public hearings relative to Senate Resolution No. 455.

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 174340 for habeas corpus is DISMISSED, for being moot. The petitions in G.R
Nos. 174318 and 174177 are likewise DISMISSED.
Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 is declared REPEALED by the 1987 Constitution.Respondent Senate Committees power of
inquiry relative to Senate Resolution 455 is upheld. PCGG Chairman Camilo L. Sabio and Commissioners
Ricardo Abcede, Narciso Nario, Nicasio Conti and Tereso Javier; and Manuel Andal and
Julio Jalandoni, PCGGs nominees to Philcomsat Holdings Corporation, as well as its directors and officers, petitioners
in G.R. No. 174177, are ordered to comply with the Subpoenae Ad Testificandum issued by respondent Senate
Committees directing them to appear and testify in public hearings relative to Senate Resolution No. 455.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented

by FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as
Senate President, JUAN M. FLAVIER, in his
capacity as Senate President Pro Tempore,
FRANCIS N. PANGILINAN, in his capacity as
Majority Leader, AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL,
JR., in his capacity as Minority Leader,
SENATORS
RODOLFO
G.
BIAZON,
COMPANERA PIA S. CAYETANO, JINGGOY
EJERCITO ESTRADA, LUISA LOI EJERCITO
ESTRADA, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, RICHARD
J. GORDON, PANFILO M. LACSON,
ALFREDO S. LIM, M. A. MADRIGAL, SERGIO
OSMENA III, RALPH G. RECTO, and MAR
ROXAS,
Petitioners,

G.R. No. 169777*

Present:

PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
PUNO,**
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

- versus -

CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,

EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as

Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and anyone acting in
his stead and in behalf of the President of
the Philippines,
Respondents.
x------------------------------------------x

CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.

16

BAYAN
MUNA
represented
by
DR.
REYNALDO LESACA, JR., Rep. SATUR
OCAMPO, Rep. CRISPIN BELTRAN, Rep.
RAFAEL MARIANO, Rep. LIZA MAZA, Rep.
TEODORO CASINO, Rep. JOEL VIRADOR,
COURAGE represented by FERDINAND
GAITE, and COUNSELS FOR THE DEFENSE
OF LIBERTIES (CODAL) represented by ATTY.
REMEDIOS BALBIN,
Petitioners,

Promulgated:

April 20, 2006

- versus -

EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as

Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,
Respondent.
x------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 169659

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ,
Petitioner,
- versus -

EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as

Executive Secretary, AVELINO J. CRUZ, JR.,
in his capacity as Secretary of Defense, and
GENEROSO S. SENGA, in his capacity as
AFP Chief of Staff,
Respondents.
x------------------------------------------x

ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC. (ALG),

Petitioner,

- versus -

HON. EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity

as Executive Secretary,

17

Respondent.
x-----------------------------------------x

PDP- LABAN,
Petitioner,
G.R. No. 169660
- versus -

EXECUTIVE
ERMITA,

SECRETARY

EDUARDO

R.

Respondent.
x------------------------------------------x

JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, FELICIANO M.

BAUTISTA,ROMULO R. RIVERA, JOSE
AMOR AMORANDO, ALICIA A. RISOS-VIDAL,
FILEMON C. ABELITA III, MANUEL P.
LEGASPI, J. B. JOVY C. BERNABE,
BERNARD L. DAGCUTA, ROGELIO V.
GARCIA, and the INTEGRATED BAR FOR
THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioners,

G.R. No. 169667

- versus -

HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO

R. ERMITA,
Respondent.

G.R. No. 169834

18

G.R. No. 171246

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

A transparent government is one of the hallmarks of a truly republican state. Even in the early history of republican
thought, however, it has been recognized that the head of government may keep certain information confidential in
pursuit of the public interest. Explaining the reason for vesting executive power in only one magistrate, a distinguished
delegate to the U.S. Constitutional Convention said: Decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally
characterize the proceedings of one man, in a much more eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater
number; and in proportion as the number is increased, these qualities will be diminished. [1]
History has been witness, however, to the fact that the power to withhold information lends itself to abuse, hence, the
necessity to guard it zealously.
The present consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused such power by
issuing Executive Order No. 464 (E.O. 464) last September 28, 2005. They thus pray for its declaration as null and
void for being unconstitutional.
In resolving the controversy, this Court shall proceed with the recognition that the issuance under review has come
from a co-equal branch of government, which thus entitles it to a strong presumption of constitutionality. Once the
challenged order is found to be indeed violative of the Constitution, it is duty-bound to declare it so.For the
Constitution, being the highest expression of the sovereign will of the Filipino people, must prevail over any issuance
of the government that contravenes its mandates.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate Committees, conducts
inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the
executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled
Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).
On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials of the
Executive Department for them to appear on September 29, 2005 as resource speakers in a public hearing on the
railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group
(hereinafter North Rail Project). The public hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile
urging the Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the contract covering the
North Rail Project.

19

The Senate Committee on National Defense and Security likewise issued invitations [2] dated September 22, 2005 to
the following officials of the AFP: the Commanding General of the Philippine Army, Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon;
Inspector General of the AFP Vice Admiral Mateo M. Mayuga; Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the AFP Rear
Admiral Tirso R. Danga; Chief of the Intelligence Service of the AFP Brig. Gen. Marlu Q. Quevedo; Assistant
Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) Brig. Gen. Francisco V. Gudani; and Assistant Commandant,
Corps of Cadets of the PMA, Col. Alexander F. Balutan, for them to attend as resource persons in a public hearing
scheduled on September 28, 2005 on the following: (1) Privilege Speech of Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel Jr., delivered
on June 6, 2005 entitled Bunye has Provided Smoking Gun or has Opened a Can of Worms that Show Massive
Electoral Fraud in the Presidential Election of May 2005; (2) Privilege Speech of Senator Jinggoy E. Estrada delivered
on July 26, 2005 entitled The Philippines as the Wire-Tapping Capital of the World; (3) Privilege Speech of Senator
Rodolfo Biazon delivered on August 1, 2005 entitled Clear and Present Danger; (4) Senate Resolution No. 285 filed by
Senator Maria Ana Consuelo Madrigal Resolution Directing the Committee on National Defense and Security to
Conduct an Inquiry, in Aid of Legislation, and in the National Interest, on the Role of the Military in the So-called
Gloriagate Scandal; and (5) Senate Resolution No. 295 filed by Senator Biazon Resolution Directing the Committee
on National Defense and Security to Conduct an Inquiry, in Aid of Legislation, on the Wire-Tapping of the President of
the Philippines.
Also invited to the above-said hearing scheduled on September 28 2005 was the AFP Chief of Staff, General
Generoso S. Senga who, by letter[3] dated September 27, 2005, requested for its postponement due to a pressing
operational situation that demands [his] utmost personal attention while some of the invited AFP officers are currently
attending to other urgent operational matters.
On September 28, 2005, Senate President Franklin M. Drilon received from Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita a
letter[4] dated September 27, 2005 respectfully request[ing] for the postponement of the hearing [regarding the
NorthRail project] to which various officials of the Executive Department have been invited in order to afford said
officials ample time and opportunity to study and prepare for the various issues so that they may better enlighten the
Senate Committee on its investigation.
Senate President Drilon, however, wrote[5] Executive Secretary Ermita that the Senators are unable to accede to [his
request] as it was sent belatedly and [a]ll preparations and arrangements as well as notices to all resource persons
were completed [the previous] week.
Senate President Drilon likewise received on September 28, 2005 a letter [6] from the President of the North Luzon
Railways Corporation Jose L. Cortes, Jr. requesting that the hearing on the NorthRail project be postponed or
cancelled until a copy of the report of the UP Law Center on the contract agreements relative to the project had been
secured.
On September 28, 2005, the President issued E.O. 464, ENSURING OBSERVANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF
SEPARATION OF POWERS, ADHERENCE TO THE RULE ON EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE AND RESPECT FOR THE
RIGHTS OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS APPEARING IN LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLATION UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,[7] which, pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect immediately. The
salient provisions of the Order are as follows:
SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress. In accordance with Article VI,
Section 22 of the Constitution and to implement the Constitutional provisions on the separation of
powers between co-equal branches of the government, all heads of departments of the Executive
Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before
either House of Congress.
When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing,
the appearance shall only be conducted in executive session.
SECTION. 2. Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege.
(a) Nature and Scope. - The rule of confidentiality based on executive privilege is fundamental to the
operation of government and rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution (Almonte vs.
Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995). Further, Republic Act No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and

20

Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides that Public Officials and Employees
shall not use or divulge confidential or classified information officially known to them by reason of their
office and not made available to the public to prejudice the public interest.
Executive privilege covers all confidential or classified information between the President and the
public officers covered by this executive order, including:

i.
ii.

iii.
iv.
v.

Conversations and correspondence between the President and the public official
covered by this executive order (Almonte vs. VasquezG.R. No. 95367, 23 May
1995; Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002);
Military, diplomatic and other national security matters which in the interest of national
security should not be divulged (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May
1995; Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9
December 1998).
Information between inter-government agencies prior to the conclusion of treaties and
executive agreements (Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government,
G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998);
Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings (Chavez v. Presidential Commission on
Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998);
Matters affecting national security and public order (Chavez v. Public Estates
Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002).

(b) Who are covered. The following are covered by this executive order:

i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.

Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the department

heads are covered by the executive privilege;
Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who
in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege;
Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such
other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive
privilege;
Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are
covered by the executive privilege; and
Such other officers as may be determined by the President.

SECTION 3. Appearance of Other Public Officials Before Congress. All public officials enumerated
in Section 2 (b) hereof shall secure prior consent of the President prior to appearing before
either House of Congress to ensure the observance of the principle of separation of powers,
adherence to the rule on executive privilege and respect for the rights of public officials appearing in
inquiries in aid of legislation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Also on September 28, 2005, Senate President Drilon received from Executive Secretary Ermita a copy of E.O. 464,
and another letter[8] informing him that officials of the Executive Department invited to appear at the meeting [regarding
the NorthRail project] will not be able to attend the same without the consent of the President, pursuant to [E.O. 464]
and that said officials have not secured the required consent from the President. On even date which was also the
scheduled date of the hearing on the alleged wiretapping, Gen. Senga sent a letter [9] to Senator Biazon, Chairperson
of the Committee on National Defense and Security, informing him that per instruction of [President Arroyo], thru the
Secretary of National Defense, no officer of the [AFP] is authorized to appear before any Senate or Congressional
hearings without seeking a written approval from the President and that no approval has been granted by the
President to any AFP officer to appear before the public hearing of the Senate Committee on National Defense and
Security scheduled [on] 28 September 2005.
Despite the communications received from Executive Secretary Ermita and Gen. Senga, the investigation scheduled
by the Committee on National Defense and Security pushed through, with only Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudani
among all the AFP officials invited attending.

21

For defying President Arroyos order barring military personnel from testifying before legislative inquiries without her
approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were made to face court
martial proceedings.
As to the NorthRail project hearing scheduled on September 29, 2005, Executive Secretary Ermita, citing E.O. 464,
sent letter of regrets, in response to the invitations sent to the following government officials: Light Railway Transit
Authority Administrator Melquiades Robles, Metro Rail Transit Authority Administrator Roberto Lastimoso, Department
of Justice (DOJ) Chief State Counsel Ricardo V. Perez, then Presidential Legal Counsel Merceditas Gutierrez,
Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) Undersecretary Guiling Mamonding, DOTC Secretary
Leandro Mendoza, Philippine National Railways General Manager Jose Serase II, Monetary Board Member Juanita
Amatong, Bases Conversion Development Authority Chairperson Gen. Narciso Abaya and Secretary Romulo L. Neri.
[10]
NorthRail President Cortes sent personal regrets likewise citing E.O. 464. [11]
On October 3, 2005, three petitions, docketed as G.R. Nos. 169659, 169660, and 169667, for certiorari and
prohibition, were filed before this Court challenging the constitutionality of E.O. 464.

In G.R. No. 169659, petitioners party-list Bayan Muna, House of Representatives Members Satur Ocampo, Crispin
Beltran, Rafael Mariano, Liza Maza, Joel Virador and Teodoro Casino, COURAGE, an organization of government
employees, and Counsels for the Defense of Liberties (CODAL), a group of lawyers dedicated to the promotion of
justice, democracy and peace, all claiming to have standing to file the suit because of the transcendental importance
of the issues they posed, pray, in their petition that E.O. 464 be declared null and void for being unconstitutional; that
respondent Executive Secretary Ermita, in his capacity as Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President Arroyo, be
prohibited from imposing, and threatening to impose sanctions on officials who appear before Congress due to
congressional summons. Additionally, petitioners claim that E.O. 464 infringes on their rights and impedes them from
fulfilling their respective obligations. Thus, Bayan Muna alleges that E.O. 464 infringes on its right as a political party
entitled to participate in governance; Satur Ocampo, et al. allege that E.O. 464 infringes on their rights and duties as
members of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the
implementation of laws; COURAGE alleges that the tenure of its members in public office is predicated on, and
threatened by, their submission to the requirements of E.O. 464 should they be summoned by Congress; and CODAL
alleges that its members have a sworn duty to uphold the rule of law, and their rights to information and to transparent
governance are threatened by the imposition of E.O. 464.
In G.R. No. 169660, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, claiming that his constitutional rights as a citizen, taxpayer and
law practitioner, are affected by the enforcement of E.O. 464, prays in his petition that E.O. 464 be declared null and
void for being unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 169667, petitioner Alternative Law Groups, Inc.[12] (ALG), alleging that as a coalition of 17 legal resource
non-governmental organizations engaged in developmental lawyering and work with the poor and marginalized
sectors in different parts of the country, and as an organization of citizens of the Philippines and a part of the general
public, it has legal standing to institute the petition to enforce its constitutional right to information on matters of public
concern, a right which was denied to the public by E.O. 464, [13] prays, that said order be declared null and void for
being unconstitutional and that respondent Executive Secretary Ermita be ordered to cease from implementing it.
On October 11, 2005, Petitioner Senate of the Philippines, alleging that it has a vital interest in the resolution of the
issue of the validity of E.O. 464 for it stands to suffer imminent and material injury, as it has already sustained the
same with its continued enforcement since it directly interferes with and impedes the valid exercise of the Senates
powers and functions and conceals information of great public interest and concern, filed its petition for certiorari and
prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 169777 and prays that E.O. 464 be declared unconstitutional.
On October 14, 2005, PDP-Laban, a registered political party with members duly elected into the Philippine Senate
and House of Representatives, filed a similar petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R. No.
169834, alleging that it is affected by the challenged E.O. 464 because it hampers its legislative agenda to be
implemented through its members in Congress, particularly in the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation and
transcendental issues need to be resolved to avert a constitutional crisis between the executive and legislative
branches of the government.

22

Meanwhile, by letter[14] dated February 6, 2006, Senator Biazon reiterated his invitation to Gen. Senga for him and
other military officers to attend the hearing on the alleged wiretapping scheduled on February 10, 2005. Gen. Senga
replied, however, by letter[15] dated February 8, 2006, that [p]ursuant to Executive Order No. 464, th[e] Headquarters
requested for a clearance from the President to allow [them] to appear before the public hearing and that they will
attend once [their] request is approved by the President. As none of those invited appeared, the hearing on February
10, 2006 was cancelled.[16]
In another investigation conducted jointly by the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Food and the Blue Ribbon
Committee on the alleged mismanagement and use of the fertilizer fund under the Ginintuang Masaganang
Aniprogram of the Department of Agriculture (DA), several Cabinet officials were invited to the hearings scheduled on
October 5 and 26, November 24 and December 12, 2005 but most of them failed to attend, DA Undersecretary
Belinda Gonzales, DA Assistant Secretary Felix Jose Montes, Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority Executive Director
Norlito R. Gicana,[17] and those from the Department of Budget and Management [18] having invoked E.O. 464.
In the budget hearings set by the Senate on February 8 and 13, 2006, Press Secretary and Presidential
Spokesperson Ignacio R. Bunye,[19] DOJ Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez[20] and Department of Interior and Local
Government Undersecretary Marius P. Corpus[21] communicated their inability to attend due to lack of appropriate
clearance from the President pursuant to E.O. 464. During the February 13, 2005 budget hearing, however, Secretary
Bunye was allowed to attend by Executive Secretary Ermita.
On February 13, 2006, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz and the incumbent members of the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as taxpayers, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines as the official organization of
all Philippine lawyers, all invoking their constitutional right to be informed on matters of public interest, filed their
petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 171246, and pray that E.O. 464 be declared null and void.
All the petitions pray for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining respondents from implementing,
enforcing, and observing E.O. 464.
In the oral arguments on the petitions conducted on February 21, 2006, the following substantive issues were
ventilated: (1) whether respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in implementing E.O. 464 prior to its
publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation; and (2) whether E.O. 464 violates the
following provisions of the Constitution: Art. II, Sec. 28, Art. III, Sec. 4, Art. III, Sec. 7, Art. IV. Sec. 1, Art. VI, Sec. 21,
Art. VI, Sec. 22, Art. XI, Sec. 1, and Art. XIII, Sec. 16. The procedural issue of whether there is an actual case or
controversy that calls for judicial review was not taken up; instead, the parties were instructed to discuss it in their
respective memoranda.
After the conclusion of the oral arguments, the parties were directed to submit their respective memoranda, paying
particular attention to the following propositions: (1) that E.O. 464 is, on its face, unconstitutional; and (2) assuming
that it is not, it is unconstitutional as applied in four instances, namely: (a) the so called Fertilizer scam; (b) the
NorthRail investigation (c) the Wiretapping activity of the ISAFP; and (d) the investigation on the Venable contract. [22]
Petitioners in G.R. No. 169660[23] and G.R. No. 169777[24] filed their memoranda on March 7, 2006, while those in G.R.
No. 169667[25] and G.R. No. 169834[26] filed theirs the next day or on March 8, 2006. Petitioners in G.R. No. 171246 did
not file any memorandum.
Petitioners Bayan Muna et al. in G.R. No. 169659, after their motion for extension to file memorandum [27] was granted,
subsequently filed a manifestation[28] dated March 14, 2006 that it would no longer file its memorandum in the interest
of having the issues resolved soonest, prompting this Court to issue a Resolution reprimanding them. [29]
Petitioners submit that E.O. 464 violates the following constitutional provisions:
Art. VI, Sec. 21[30]
Art. VI, Sec. 22[31]
Art. VI, Sec. 1[32]
Art. XI, Sec. 1[33]

23

Art. III, Sec. 7[34]

Art. III, Sec. 4[35]
Art. XIII, Sec. 16 [36]
Art. II, Sec. 28[37]
Respondents Executive Secretary Ermita et al., on the other hand, pray in their consolidated memorandum [38] on
March 13, 2006 for the dismissal of the petitions for lack of merit.
The Court synthesizes the issues to be resolved as follows:
1. Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress;
2. Whether E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of public concern; and
3. Whether respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion when they implemented E.O. 464 prior to its
publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
Essential requisites for judicial review
Before proceeding to resolve the issue of the constitutionality of E.O. 464, ascertainment of whether the requisites for
a valid exercise of the Courts power of judicial review are present is in order.
Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1)
there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the
act must have standing to challenge the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.[39]
Except with respect to the requisites of standing and existence of an actual case or controversy where the
disagreement between the parties lies, discussion of the rest of the requisites shall be omitted.
Standing
Respondents, through the Solicitor General, assert that the allegations in G.R. Nos. 169659, 169660 and 169667
make it clear that they, adverting to the non-appearance of several officials of the executive department in the
investigations called by the different committees of the Senate, were brought to vindicate the constitutional duty of the
Senate or its different committees to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation or in the exercise of its oversight functions.
They maintain that Representatives Ocampo et al. have not shown any specific prerogative, power, and privilege of
the House of Representatives which had been effectively impaired by E.O. 464, there being no mention of any
investigation called by the House of Representatives or any of its committees which was aborted due to the
implementation of E.O. 464.
As for Bayan Munas alleged interest as a party-list representing the marginalized and underrepresented, and that of
the other petitioner groups and individuals who profess to have standing as advocates and defenders of the
Constitution, respondents contend that such interest falls short of that required to confer standing on them as parties
injured-in-fact.[40]
Respecting petitioner Chavez, respondents contend that Chavez may not claim an interest as a taxpayer for the
implementation of E.O. 464 does not involve the exercise of taxing or spending power.[41]
With regard to the petition filed by the Senate, respondents argue that in the absence of a personal or direct injury by
reason of the issuance of E.O. 464, the Senate and its individual members are not the proper parties to assail the
constitutionality of E.O. 464.
Invoking this Courts ruling in National Economic Protectionism Association v. Ongpin[42] and Valmonte v. Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office,[43] respondents assert that to be considered a proper party, one must have a personal

24

and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury due to the enforcement of
E.O. 464.[44]
That the Senate of the Philippines has a fundamental right essential not only for intelligent public decision-making in a
democratic system, but more especially for sound legislation [45] is not disputed. E.O. 464, however, allegedly stifles the
ability of the members of Congress to access information that is crucial to law-making. [46]Verily, the Senate, including
its individual members, has a substantial and direct interest over the outcome of the controversy and is the proper
party to assail the constitutionality of E.O. 464. Indeed, legislators have standing to maintain inviolate the prerogative,
powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office and are allowed to sue to question the validity of any
official action which they claim infringes their prerogatives as legislators. [47]
In the same vein, party-list representatives Satur Ocampo (Bayan Muna), Teodoro Casino (Bayan Muna), Joel Virador
(Bayan Muna), Crispin Beltran (Anakpawis), Rafael Mariano (Anakpawis), and Liza Maza (Gabriela) are allowed to
sue to question the constitutionality of E.O. 464, the absence of any claim that an investigation called by the House of
Representatives or any of its committees was aborted due to the implementation of E.O. 464 notwithstanding, it being
sufficient that a claim is made that E.O. 464 infringes on their constitutional rights and duties as members of Congress
to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws.
The national political party, Bayan Muna, likewise meets the standing requirement as it obtained three seats in the
House of Representatives in the 2004 elections and is, therefore, entitled to participate in the legislative process
consonant with the declared policy underlying the party list system of affording citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties who lack well-defined political constituencies to contribute to the
formulation and enactment of legislation that will benefit the nation. [48]
As Bayan Muna and Representatives Ocampo et al. have the standing to file their petitions, passing on the standing of
their co-petitioners COURAGE and CODAL is rendered unnecessary.[49]
In filing their respective petitions, Chavez, the ALG which claims to be an organization of citizens, and the incumbent
members of the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP in behalf of its lawyer members, [50] invoke their constitutional right
to information on matters of public concern, asserting that the right to information, curtailed and violated by E.O. 464,
is essential to the effective exercise of other constitutional rights [51] and to the maintenance of the balance of power
among the three branches of the government through the principle of checks and balances. [52]
It is well-settled that when suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner in assailing the constitutionality of laws,
presidential decrees, orders, and other regulations, must be direct and personal. In Franciso v. House of
Representatives,[53]this Court held that when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that
he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.
As for petitioner PDP-Laban, it asseverates that it is clothed with legal standing in view of the transcendental issues
raised in its petition which this Court needs to resolve in order to avert a constitutional crisis. For it to be accorded
standing on the ground of transcendental importance, however, it must establish (1) the character of the funds (that it
is public) or other assets involved in the case, (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or
statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government, and (3) the lack of any
party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised. [54] The first and last determinants
not being present as no public funds or assets are involved and petitioners in G.R. Nos. 169777 and 169659 have
direct and specific interests in the resolution of the controversy, petitioner PDP-Laban is bereft of standing to file its
petition. Its allegation that E.O. 464 hampers its legislative agenda is vague and uncertain, and at best is only a
generalized interest which it shares with the rest of the political parties. Concrete injury, whether actual or threatened,
is that indispensable element of a dispute which serves in part to cast it in a form traditionally capable of judicial
resolution.[55] In fine, PDP-Labans alleged interest as a political party does not suffice to clothe it with legal standing.
Actual Case or Controversy
Petitioners assert that an actual case exists, they citing the absence of the executive officials invited by the Senate to
its hearings after the issuance of E.O. 464, particularly those on the NorthRail project and the wiretapping controversy.
Respondents counter that there is no case or controversy, there being no showing that President Arroyo has actually
withheld her consent or prohibited the appearance of the invited officials. [56] These officials, they claim, merely

25

communicated to the Senate that they have not yet secured the consent of the President, not that the President
prohibited their attendance.[57] Specifically with regard to the AFP officers who did not attend the hearing on September
28, 2005, respondents claim that the instruction not to attend without the Presidents consent was based on its role as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, not on E.O. 464.
Respondents thus conclude that the petitions merely rest on an unfounded apprehension that the President will abuse
its power of preventing the appearance of officials before Congress, and that such apprehension is not sufficient for
challenging the validity of E.O. 464.
The Court finds respondents assertion that the President has not withheld her consent or prohibited the appearance of
the officials concerned immaterial in determining the existence of an actual case or controversy insofar as E.O. 464 is
concerned. For E.O. 464 does not require either a deliberate withholding of consent or an express prohibition
issuing from the President in order to bar officials from appearing before Congress.
As the implementation of the challenged order has already resulted in the absence of officials invited to the hearings of
petitioner Senate of the Philippines, it would make no sense to wait for any further event before considering the
present case ripe for adjudication. Indeed, it would be sheer abandonment of duty if this Court would now refrain from
passing on the constitutionality of E.O. 464.
Constitutionality of E.O. 464
E.O. 464, to the extent that it bars the appearance of executive officials before Congress, deprives Congress of the
information in the possession of these officials.To resolve the question of whether such withholding of information
violates the Constitution, consideration of the general power of Congress to obtain information, otherwise known as
the power of inquiry, is in order.
The power of inquiry
The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution which reads:
SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The
rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. (Underscoring
supplied)
This provision is worded exactly as Section 8 of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution except that, in the latter, it vests
the power of inquiry in the unicameral legislature established therein the Batasang Pambansa and its committees.
The 1935 Constitution did not contain a similar provision. Nonetheless, in Arnault v. Nazareno,[58] a case decided in
1950 under that Constitution, the Court already recognized that the power of inquiry is inherent in the power to
legislate.
Arnault involved a Senate investigation of the reportedly anomalous purchase of the Buenavista and Tambobong
Estates by the Rural Progress Administration. Arnault, who was considered a leading witness in the controversy, was
called to testify thereon by the Senate. On account of his refusal to answer the questions of the senators on an
important point, he was, by resolution of the Senate, detained for contempt.Upholding the Senates power to punish
Arnault for contempt, this Court held:
Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make
investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively,
such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry with
process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body
cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is
intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information which is
not infrequently true recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for
such information are often unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or
complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.[59] . . . (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

26

That this power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch may be deduced from the same
case. The power of inquiry, the Court therein ruled, is co-extensive with the power to legislate. [60] The matters which
may be a proper subject of legislation and those which may be a proper subject of investigation are one. It follows that
the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation.
Thus, the Court found that the Senate investigation of the government transaction involved in Arnault was a proper
exercise of the power of inquiry. Besides being related to the expenditure of public funds of which Congress is the
guardian, the transaction, the Court held, also involved government agencies created by Congress and officers whose
positions it is within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish.
Since Congress has authority to inquire into the operations of the executive branch, it would be incongruous to hold
that the power of inquiry does not extend to executive officials who are the most familiar with and informed on
executive operations.
As discussed in Arnault, the power of inquiry, with process to enforce it, is grounded on the necessity of information in
the legislative process. If the information possessed by executive officials on the operation of their offices is necessary
for wise legislation on that subject, by parity of reasoning, Congress has the right to that information and the power to
compel the disclosure thereof.
As evidenced by the American experience during the so-called McCarthy era, however, the right of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is, in theory, no less susceptible to abuse than executive or judicial power. It may
thus be subjected to judicial review pursuant to the Courts certiorari powers under Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution.
For one, as noted in Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,[61] the inquiry itself might not properly be in aid of
legislation, and thus beyond the constitutional power of Congress. Such inquiry could not usurp judicial
functions. Parenthetically, one possible way for Congress to avoid such a result as occurred in Bengzon is to indicate
in its invitations to the public officials concerned, or to any person for that matter, the possible needed statute which
prompted the need for the inquiry. Given such statement in its invitations, along with the usual indication of the subject
of inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance thereof, there would be less room for speculation on the part
of the person invited on whether the inquiry is in aid of legislation.
Section 21, Article VI likewise establishes crucial safeguards that proscribe the legislative power of inquiry. The
provision requires that the inquiry be done in accordance with the Senate or Houses duly published rules of
procedure, necessarily implying the constitutional infirmity of an inquiry conducted without duly published rules of
procedure. Section 21 also mandates that the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be
respected, an imposition that obligates Congress to adhere to the guarantees in the Bill of Rights.
These abuses are, of course, remediable before the courts, upon the proper suit filed by the persons affected, even if
they belong to the executive branch.Nonetheless, there may be exceptional circumstances, none appearing to obtain
at present, wherein a clear pattern of abuse of the legislative power of inquiry might be established, resulting in
palpable violations of the rights guaranteed to members of the executive department under the Bill of Rights. In such
instances, depending on the particulars of each case, attempts by the Executive Branch to forestall these abuses may
be accorded judicial sanction.
Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the power of inquiry, which
exemptions fall under the rubric of executive privilege. Since this term figures prominently in the challenged order, it
being mentioned in its provisions, its preambular clauses, [62] and in its very title, a discussion of executive privilege is
crucial for determining the constitutionality of E.O. 464.
Executive privilege
The phrase executive privilege is not new in this jurisdiction. It has been used even prior to the promulgation of the
1986 Constitution.[63] Being of American origin, it is best understood in light of how it has been defined and used in the
legal literature of the United States.
Schwartz defines executive privilege as the power of the Government to withhold information from the public, the
courts, and the Congress.[64] Similarly, Rozell defines it as the right of the President and high-level executive branch
officers to withhold information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately the public. [65]

27

Executive privilege is, nonetheless, not a clear or unitary concept. [66] It has encompassed claims of varying kinds.
[67]
Tribe, in fact, comments that while it is customary to employ the phrase executive privilege, it may be more
accurate to speak of executive privileges since presidential refusals to furnish information may be actuated by any of
at least three distinct kinds of considerations, and may be asserted, with differing degrees of success, in the context
of either judicial or legislative investigations.
One variety of the privilege, Tribe explains, is the state secrets privilege invoked by U.S. Presidents, beginning with
Washington, on the ground that the information is of such nature that its disclosure would subvert crucial military or
diplomatic objectives. Another variety is the informers privilege, or the privilege of the Government not to disclose
the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with the enforcement of
that law. Finally, a generic privilege for internal deliberations has been said to attach to intragovernmental
documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which
governmental decisions and policies are formulated. [68]
Tribes comment is supported by the ruling in In re Sealed Case, thus:
Since the beginnings of our nation, executive officials have claimed a variety of privileges to resist
disclosure of information the confidentiality of which they felt was crucial to fulfillment of the unique
role and responsibilities of the executive branch of our government. Courts ruled early that the
executive had a right to withhold documents that might reveal military or state secrets. The courts
have also granted the executive a right to withhold the identity of government informers in some
circumstances and a qualified right to withhold information related to pending investigations. x x
x[69] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The entry in Blacks Law Dictionary on executive privilege is similarly instructive regarding the scope of the doctrine.
This privilege, based on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, exempts the executive from disclosure
requirements applicable to the ordinary citizen or organization where such exemption is necessary to the discharge
of highly important executive responsibilities involved in maintaining governmental operations, and extends not
only to military and diplomatic secretsbut also to documents integral to an appropriate exercise of the executive
domestic decisional and policy making functions, that is, those documents reflecting the frank expression necessary in
intra-governmental advisory and deliberative communications.[70] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
That a type of information is recognized as privileged does not, however, necessarily mean that it would be
considered privileged in all instances. For in determining the validity of a claim of privilege, the question that must be
asked is not only whether the requested information falls within one of the traditional privileges, but also whether that
privilege should be honored in a given procedural setting. [71]
The leading case on executive privilege in the United States is U.S. v. Nixon, [72]decided in 1974. In issue in that case
was the validity of President Nixons claim of executive privilege against a subpoena issued by a district court requiring
the production of certain tapes and documents relating to the Watergate investigations.The claim of privilege was
based on the Presidents general interest in the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondence. The U.S.
Court held that while there is no explicit reference to a privilege of confidentiality in the U.S. Constitution, it is
constitutionally based to the extent that it relates to the effective discharge of a Presidents powers. The Court,
nonetheless, rejected the Presidents claim of privilege, ruling that the privilege must be balanced against the public
interest in the fair administration of criminal justice. Notably, the Court was careful to clarify that it was not there
addressing the issue of claims of privilege in a civil litigation or against congressional demands for information.
Cases in the U.S. which involve claims of executive privilege against Congress are rare.[73] Despite frequent assertion
of the privilege to deny information to Congress, beginning with President Washingtons refusal to turn over treaty
negotiation records to the House of Representatives, the U.S. Supreme Court has never adjudicated the issue.
[74]
However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in a case decided earlier in the same year
as Nixon, recognized the Presidents privilege over his conversations against a congressional subpoena.
[75]
Anticipating the balancing approach adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Nixon, the Court of Appeals weighed
the public interest protected by the claim of privilege against the interest that would be served by disclosure to the
Committee. Ruling that the balance favored the President, the Court declined to enforce the subpoena. [76]

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In this jurisdiction, the doctrine of executive privilege was recognized by this Court in Almonte v. Vasquez.
Almonte used the term in reference to the same privilege subject of Nixon. It quoted the following portion of
the Nixon decision which explains the basis for the privilege:
[77]

The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondences, like the claim
of confidentiality of judicial deliberations, for example, has all the values to which we accord deference for the
privacy of all citizens and, added to those values, is the necessity for protection of the public interest in candid,
objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decision-making. A President and those who assist him
must be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way
many would be unwilling to express except privately. These are the considerations justifying a presumptive privilege
for Presidential communications.The privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably
rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Almonte involved a subpoena duces tecum issued by the Ombudsman against the therein petitioners. It did not
involve, as expressly stated in the decision, the right of the people to information.[78] Nonetheless, the
Court recognized that there are certain types of information which the government may withhold from the public, thus
acknowledging, in substance if not in name, that executive privilege may be claimed against citizens demands for
information.
In Chavez v. PCGG,[79] the Court held that this jurisdiction recognizes the common law holding that there is a
governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other
national security matters.[80] The same case held that closed-door Cabinet meetings are also a recognized limitation on
the right to information.
Similarly, in Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,[81] the Court ruled that the right to information does not extend to
matters recognized as privileged information under the separation of powers, [82] by which the Court meant Presidential
conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings. It also held that information on
military and diplomatic secrets and those affecting national security, and information on investigations of crimes by law
enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused were exempted from the right to information.
From the above discussion on the meaning and scope of executive privilege, both in the United States and in this
jurisdiction, a clear principle emerges. Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the
public, is recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character. While executive privilege is
a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the
context in which it is made.Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials are exempt from the duty to
disclose information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character of the
exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of
disclosure.
Validity of Section 1
Section 1 is similar to Section 3 in that both require the officials covered by them to secure the consent of the
President prior to appearing before Congress. There are significant differences between the two provisions, however,
which constrain this Court to discuss the validity of these provisions separately.
Section 1 specifically applies to department heads. It does not, unlike Section 3, require a prior determination by any
official whether they are covered by E.O. 464.The President herself has, through the challenged order, made the
determination that they are. Further, unlike also Section 3, the coverage of department heads under Section 1 is not
made to depend on the department heads possession of any information which might be covered by executive
privilege. In fact, in marked contrast to Section 3 vis--vis Section 2, there is no reference to executive privilege at
all. Rather, the required prior consent under Section 1 is grounded on Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution on what
has been referred to as the question hour.
SECTION 22. The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the
request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any
matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the
Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall

29

not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the public
interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session.
Determining the validity of Section 1 thus requires an examination of the meaning of Section 22 of Article VI. Section
22 which provides for the question hour must be interpreted vis--vis Section 21 which provides for the power of either
House of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. As the following excerpt of the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission shows, the framers were aware that these two provisions involved distinct functions of
Congress.
MR. MAAMBONG. x x x When we amended Section 20 [now Section 22 on the Question Hour] yesterday, I noticed
that members of the Cabinet cannot be compelled anymore to appear before the House of Representatives or before
the Senate. I have a particular problem in this regard, Madam President, because in our experience in the Regular
Batasang Pambansa as the Gentleman himself has experienced in the interim Batasang Pambansa one of the most
competent inputs that we can put in our committee deliberations, either in aid of legislation or in congressional
investigations, is the testimonies of Cabinet ministers. We usually invite them, but if they do not come and it is a
congressional investigation, we usually issue subpoenas.
I want to be clarified on a statement made by Commissioner Suarez when he said that the fact
that the Cabinet ministers may refuse to come to the House of Representatives or the
Senate [when requested under Section 22] does not mean that they need not come when they
are invited or subpoenaed by the committee of either House when it comes to inquiries in aid
of legislation or congressional investigation. According to Commissioner Suarez, that is allowed
and their presence can be had under Section 21. Does the gentleman confirm this, Madam
President?
MR. DAVIDE. We confirm that, Madam President, because Section 20 refers only to what was
originally the Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of
legislation, under which anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be
held in contempt of the House.[83] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance was
meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. The reference to
Commissioner Suarez bears noting, he being one of the proponents of the amendment to make the appearance of
department heads discretionary in the question hour.
So clearly was this distinction conveyed to the members of the Commission that the Committee on Style, precisely in
recognition of this distinction, later moved the provision on question hour from its original position as Section 20 in the
original draft down to Section 31, far from the provision on inquiries in aid of legislation. This gave rise to the following
exchange during the deliberations:
MR. GUINGONA. [speaking in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee on Style] We now go, Mr.
Presiding Officer, to the Article on Legislative and may I request the chairperson of the Legislative
Department, Commissioner Davide, to give his reaction.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer. I have only one reaction to the Question Hour. I
propose that instead of putting it as Section 31, it should follow Legislative Inquiries.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER. What does the committee say?
MR. GUINGONA. I ask Commissioner Maambong to reply, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. MAAMBONG. Actually, we considered that previously when we sequenced this but we
reasoned that in Section 21, which is Legislative Inquiry, it is actually a power of Congress in
terms of its own lawmaking; whereas, a Question Hour is not actually a power in terms of its
own lawmaking power because in Legislative Inquiry, it is in aid of legislation. And so we put
Question Hour as Section 31. I hope Commissioner Davide will consider this.

30

MR. DAVIDE. The Question Hour is closely related with the legislative power, and it is precisely
as a complement to or a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the members
of Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in the application of check and balance but also, in
effect, in aid of legislation.
MR. MAAMBONG. After conferring with the committee, we find merit in the suggestion of
Commissioner Davide. In other words, we are accepting that and so this Section 31 would now
become Section 22. Would it be, Commissioner Davide?
MR. DAVIDE. Yes.[84] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Consistent with their statements earlier in the deliberations, Commissioners Davide and Maambong proceeded
from the same assumption that these provisions pertained to two different functions of the legislature. Both
Commissioners understood that the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is different from the power to
conduct inquiries during the question hour. Commissioner Davides only concern was that the two provisions on these
distinct powers be placed closely together, they being complementary to each other. Neither Commissioner
considered them as identicalfunctions of Congress.
The foregoing opinion was not the two Commissioners alone. From the above-quoted exchange, Commissioner
Maambongs committee the Committee on Style shared the view that the two provisions reflected distinct functions of
Congress. Commissioner Davide, on the other hand, was speaking in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee on
the Legislative Department. His views may thus be presumed as representing that of his Committee.
In the context of a parliamentary system of government, the question hour has a definite meaning. It is a period of
confrontation initiated by Parliament to hold the Prime Minister and the other ministers accountable for their acts and
the operation of the government,[85] corresponding to what is known in Britain as the question period. There was a
specific provision for a question hour in the 1973 Constitution [86] which made the appearance of ministers
mandatory. The same perfectly conformed to the parliamentary system established by that Constitution, where
the ministers are also members of the legislature and are directly accountable to it.
An essential feature of the parliamentary system of government is the immediate accountability of the Prime Minister
and the Cabinet to the National Assembly.They shall be responsible to the National Assembly for the program of
government and shall determine the guidelines of national policy. Unlike in the presidential system where the tenure of
office of all elected officials cannot be terminated before their term expired, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet remain
in office only as long as they enjoy the confidence of the National Assembly. The moment this confidence is lost the
Prime Minister and the Cabinet may be changed.[87]
The framers of the 1987 Constitution removed the mandatory nature of such appearance during the question hour in
the present Constitution so as to conform more fully to a system of separation of powers. [88] To that extent, the
question hour, as it is presently understood in this jurisdiction, departs from the question period of the parliamentary
system. That department heads may not be required to appear in a question hour does not, however, mean that the
legislature is rendered powerless to elicit information from them in all circumstances. In fact, in light of the absence of
a mandatory question period, the need to enforce Congress right to executive information in the performance of its
legislative function becomes more imperative.As Schwartz observes:
Indeed, if the separation of powers has anything to tell us on the subject under discussion, it is
that the Congress has the right to obtain information from any source even from officials of
departments and agencies in the executive branch. In the United States there is, unlike the
situation which prevails in a parliamentary system such as that in Britain, a clear separation between
the legislative and executive branches. It is this very separation that makes the congressional
right to obtain information from the executive so essential, if the functions of the Congress as
the elected representatives of the people are adequately to be carried out. The absence of close
rapport between the legislative and executive branches in this country, comparable to those which
exist under a parliamentary system, and the nonexistence in the Congress of an institution such as
the British question period have perforce made reliance by the Congress upon its right to obtain
information from the executive essential, if it is intelligently to perform its legislative tasks. Unless
the Congress possesses the right to obtain executive information, its power of oversight of
administration in a system such as ours becomes a power devoid of most of its practical content,

31

since it depends for its effectiveness solely upon information parceled out ex gratia by the executive.
[89] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not be considered as
pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the
power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight
function.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it has
issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such
department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in
keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when
the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is in aid of legislation under Section 21, the appearance
is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.[90]
In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is
performed in pursuit of legislation. This is consistent with the intent discerned from the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission.
Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it
under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal
branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands
for information.
When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves
therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department
heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power the President on whom executive power is
vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the
highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is
sanctioned by a long-standing custom.
By the same token, members of the Supreme Court are also exempt from this power of inquiry. Unlike the Presidency,
judicial power is vested in a collegial body; hence, each member thereof is exempt on the basis not only of separation
of powers but also on the fiscal autonomy and the constitutional independence of the judiciary. This point is not in
dispute, as even counsel for the Senate, Sen. Joker Arroyo, admitted it during the oral argument upon interpellation of
the Chief Justice.
Having established the proper interpretation of Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the Court now proceeds to
pass on the constitutionality of Section 1 of E.O. 464.
Section 1, in view of its specific reference to Section 22 of Article VI of the Constitution and the absence of
any reference to inquiries in aid of legislation, must be construed as limited in its application to appearances
of department heads in the question hour contemplated in the provision of said Section 22 of Article VI. The
reading is dictated by the basic rule of construction that issuances must be interpreted, as much as possible, in a way
that will render it constitutional.
The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in
the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of
department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part.
Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress
is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid
claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.
Validity of Sections 2 and 3
Section 3 of E.O. 464 requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the
President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. The enumeration is broad. It covers all senior officials of

32

executive departments, all officers of the AFP and the PNP, and all senior national security officials who, in the
judgment of the heads of offices designated in the same section(i.e. department heads, Chief of Staff of the AFP, Chief
of the PNP, and the National Security Adviser), are covered by the executive privilege.
The enumeration also includes such other officers as may be determined by the President. Given the title of Section 2
Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege , it is evident that under the rule of ejusdem generis, the
determination by the President under this provision is intended to be based on a similar finding of coverage under
executive privilege.
En passant, the Court notes that Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 virtually states that executive privilege actually covers
persons. Such is a misuse of the doctrine. Executive privilege, as discussed above, is properly invoked in relation to
specific categories of information and not to categories of persons.
In light, however, of Sec 2(a) of E.O. 464 which deals with the nature, scope and coverage of executive privilege, the
reference to persons being covered by the executive privilege may be read as an abbreviated way of saying that the
person is in possession of information which is, in the judgment of the head of office concerned, privileged as defined
in Section 2(a). The Court shall thus proceed on the assumption that this is the intention of the challenged order.
Upon a determination by the designated head of office or by the President that an official is covered by the executive
privilege, such official is subjected to the requirement that he first secure the consent of the President prior to
appearing before Congress. This requirement effectively bars the appearance of the official concerned unless the
same is permitted by the President. The proviso allowing the President to give its consent means nothing more than
that the President may reverse a prohibition which already exists by virtue of E.O. 464.
Thus, underlying this requirement of prior consent is the determination by a head of office, authorized by the President
under E.O. 464, or by the President herself, that such official is in possession of information that is covered by
executive privilege. This determination then becomes the basis for the officials not showing up in the legislative
investigation.
In view thereof, whenever an official invokes E.O. 464 to justify his failure to be present, such invocation must be
construed as a declaration to Congress that the President, or a head of office authorized by the President, has
determined that the requested information is privileged, and that the President has not reversed such
determination. Such declaration, however, even without mentioning the term executive privilege, amounts to an
implied claim that the information is being withheld by the executive branch, by authority of the President, on the basis
of executive privilege. Verily, there is an implied claim of privilege.
The letter dated September 28, 2005 of respondent Executive Secretary Ermita to Senate President Drilon illustrates
the implied nature of the claim of privilege authorized by E.O. 464. It reads:
In connection with the inquiry to be conducted by the Committee of the Whole regarding the Northrail Project
of the North Luzon Railways Corporation on 29 September 2005 at 10:00 a.m., please be informed that
officials of the Executive Department invited to appear at the meeting will not be able to attend the same
without the consent of the President, pursuant to Executive Order No. 464 (s. 2005), entitled Ensuring
Observance Of The Principle Of Separation Of Powers, Adherence To The Rule On Executive Privilege And
Respect For The Rights Of Public Officials Appearing In Legislative Inquiries In Aid Of Legislation Under The
Constitution, And For Other Purposes. Said officials have not secured the required consent from the
President. (Underscoring supplied)
The letter does not explicitly invoke executive privilege or that the matter on which these officials are being requested
to be resource persons falls under the recognized grounds of the privilege to justify their absence. Nor does it
expressly state that in view of the lack of consent from the President under E.O. 464, they cannot attend the hearing.
Significant premises in this letter, however, are left unstated, deliberately or not. The letter assumes that the invited
officials are covered by E.O. 464. As explained earlier, however, to be covered by the order means that a
determination has been made, by the designated head of office or the President, that the invited official possesses
information that is covered by executive privilege. Thus, although it is not stated in the letter that such determination
has been made, the same must be deemed implied. Respecting the statement that the invited officials have not

33

secured the consent of the President, it only means that the President has not reversed the standing prohibition
against their appearance before Congress.
Inevitably, Executive Secretary Ermitas letter leads to the conclusion that the executive branch, either through the
President or the heads of offices authorized under E.O. 464, has made a determination that the information required
by the Senate is privileged, and that, at the time of writing, there has been no contrary pronouncement from the
President. In fine, an implied claim of privilege has been made by the executive.
While there is no Philippine case that directly addresses the issue of whether executive privilege may be invoked
against Congress, it is gathered from Chavez v. PEA that certain information in the possession of the executive may
validly be claimed as privileged even against Congress. Thus, the case holds:
There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by petitioner is privileged information
rooted in the separation of powers. The information does not cover Presidential conversations,
correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings which, like internaldeliberations of the Supreme Court and other collegiate courts, or executive sessions of either
house of Congress, are recognized as confidential. This kind of information cannot be pried
open by a co-equal branch of government. A frank exchange of exploratory ideas and
assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect
the independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative and
Judicial power. This is not the situation in the instant case.[91] (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Section 3 of E.O. 464, therefore, cannot be dismissed outright as invalid by the mere fact that it sanctions claims of
executive privilege. This Court must look further and assess the claim of privilege authorized by the Order to
determine whether it is valid.
While the validity of claims of privilege must be assessed on a case to case basis, examining the ground invoked
therefor and the particular circumstances surrounding it, there is, in an implied claim of privilege, a defect that renders
it invalid per se. By its very nature, and as demonstrated by the letter of respondent Executive Secretary quoted
above, the implied claim authorized by Section 3 of E.O. 464 is not accompanied by any specific allegation of
the basis thereof (e.g., whether the information demanded involves military or diplomatic secrets, closed-door
Cabinet meetings, etc.). While Section 2(a) enumerates the types of information that are covered by the privilege
under the challenged order, Congress is left to speculate as to which among them is being referred to by the
executive. The enumeration is not even intended to be comprehensive, but a mere statement of what is included in
the phrase confidential or classified information between the President and the public officers covered by this
executive order.
Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the requested information privileged. It does
not suffice to merely declare that the President, or an authorized head of office, has determined that it is so, and that
the President has not overturned that determination. Such declaration leaves Congress in the dark on how the
requested information could be classified as privileged. That the message is couched in terms that, on first
impression, do not seem like a claim of privilege only makes it more pernicious. It threatens to make Congress doubly
blind to the question of why the executive branch is not providing it with the information that it has requested.
A claim of privilege, being a claim of exemption from an obligation to disclose information, must, therefore, be clearly
asserted. As U.S. v. Reynolds teaches:
The privilege belongs to the government and must be asserted by it; it can neither be claimed nor
waived by a private party. It is not to be lightly invoked. There must be a formal claim of
privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has control over the matter, after actual
personal consideration by that officer. The court itself must determine whether the circumstances are
appropriate for the claim of privilege, and yet do so without forcing a disclosure of the very thing the
privilege is designed to protect.[92] (Underscoring supplied)
Absent then a statement of the specific basis of a claim of executive privilege, there is no way of determining
whether it falls under one of the traditional privileges, or whether, given the circumstances in which it is made,
it should be respected.[93]These, in substance, were the same criteria in assessing the claim of privilege

34

asserted against the Ombudsman in Almonte v. Vasquez[94] and, more in point, against a committee of the
Senate in Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon.[95]
A.O. Smith v. Federal Trade Commission is enlightening:

[T]he lack of specificity renders an assessment of the potential harm resulting from disclosure
impossible, thereby preventing the Court from balancing such harm against plaintiffs needs to
determine whether to override any claims of privilege. [96] (Underscoring supplied)

And so is U.S. v. Article of Drug:[97]

On the present state of the record, this Court is not called upon to perform this balancing operation. In
stating its objection to claimants interrogatories, government asserts, and nothing more, that the
disclosures sought by claimant would inhibit the free expression of opinion that nondisclosure is designed to protect. The government has not shown nor even alleged that those who
evaluated claimants product were involved in internal policymaking, generally, or in this particular
instance. Privilege cannot be set up by an unsupported claim. The facts upon which the
privilege is based must be established. To find these interrogatories objectionable, this Court would
have to assume that the evaluation and classification of claimants products was a matter of internal
policy formulation, an assumption in which this Court is unwilling to indulge sua sponte.[98] (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Department of Energy[99] similarly emphasizes that an agency must provide precise and certain
reasons for preserving the confidentiality of requested information.
Black v. Sheraton Corp. of America[100] amplifies, thus:
A formal and proper claim of executive privilege requires a specific designation and description of the documents
within its scope as well as precise and certain reasons for preserving their confidentiality. Without this specificity,
it is impossible for a court to analyze the claim short of disclosure of the very thing sought to be protected. As the
affidavit now stands, the Court has little more than its sua sponte speculation with which to weigh the applicability of
the claim. An improperly asserted claim of privilege is no claim of privilege. Therefore, despite the fact that a
claim was made by the proper executive as Reynolds requires, the Court can not recognize the claim in the instant
case because it is legally insufficient to allow the Court to make a just and reasonable determination as to its
applicability. To recognize such a broad claim in which the Defendant has given no precise or compelling
reasons to shield these documents from outside scrutiny, would make a farce of the whole procedure.
[101] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Due respect for a co-equal branch of government, moreover, demands no less than a claim of privilege clearly stating
the grounds therefor. Apropos is the following ruling in McPhaul v. U.S:[102]
We think the Courts decision in United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 70 S. Ct. 724, is highly relevant to these
questions. For it is as true here as it was there, that if (petitioner) had legitimate reasons for failing to produce the
records of the association, a decent respect for the House of Representatives, by whose authority the
subpoenas issued, would have required that (he) state (his) reasons for noncompliance upon the return of the
writ. Such a statement would have given the Subcommittee an opportunity to avoid the blocking of its inquiry by
taking other appropriate steps to obtain the records. To deny the Committee the opportunity to consider the
objection or remedy is in itself a contempt of its authority and an obstruction of its processes. His failure to
make any such statement was a patent evasion of the duty of one summoned to produce papers before a
congressional committee[, and] cannot be condoned. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
Upon the other hand, Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim with such particularity
as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect. [103] A useful analogy in determining

35

the requisite degree of particularity would be the privilege against self-incrimination. Thus, Hoffman v. U.S.
[104]
declares:
The witness is not exonerated from answering merely because he declares that in so doing he would
incriminate himself his say-so does not of itself establish the hazard of incrimination. It is for the court
to say whether his silence is justified, and to require him to answer if it clearly appears to the court
that he is mistaken. However, if the witness, upon interposing his claim, were required to prove the hazard in
the sense in which a claim is usually required to be established in court, he would be compelled to surrender
the very protection which the privilege is designed to guarantee. To sustain the privilege, it need only be
evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive
answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because
injurious disclosure could result. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not asserted. It
is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled
with an announcement that the President has not given her consent. It is woefully insufficient for Congress to
determine whether the withholding of information is justified under the circumstances of each
case. It severely frustrates the power of inquiry of Congress.
In fine, Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 must be invalidated.
No infirmity, however, can be imputed to Section 2(a) as it merely provides guidelines, binding only on the heads of
office mentioned in Section 2(b), on what is covered by executive privilege. It does not purport to be conclusive on the
other branches of government. It may thus be construed as a mere expression of opinion by the President regarding
the nature and scope of executive privilege.
Petitioners, however, assert as another ground for invalidating the challenged order the alleged unlawful delegation of
authority to the heads of offices in Section 2(b). Petitioner Senate of the Philippines, in particular, cites the case of the
United States where, so it claims, only the President can assert executive privilege to withhold information from
Congress.
Section 2(b) in relation to Section 3 virtually provides that, once the head of office determines that a certain
information is privileged, such determination is presumed to bear the Presidents authority and has the effect of
prohibiting the official from appearing before Congress, subject only to the express pronouncement of the President
that it is allowing the appearance of such official. These provisions thus allow the President to authorize claims of
privilege by mere silence.
Such presumptive authorization, however, is contrary to the exceptional nature of the privilege. Executive privilege, as
already discussed, is recognized with respect to information the confidential nature of which is crucial to the fulfillment
of the unique role and responsibilities of the executive branch, [105] or in those instances where exemption from
disclosure is necessary to the discharge of highly important executive responsibilities.[106] The doctrine of executive
privilege is thus premised on the fact that certain informations must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in
pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose
information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in
enforcing that obligation in a particular case.
In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit to the President the power to
invoke the privilege. She may of course authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, in
which case the Executive Secretary must state that the authority is By order of the President, which means that he
personally consulted with her. The privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be wielded only by the highest
official in the executive hierarchy. In other words, the President may not authorize her subordinates to exercise such
power. There is even less reason to uphold such authorization in the instant case where the authorization is not
explicit but by mere silence. Section 3, in relation to Section 2(b), is further invalid on this score.
It follows, therefore, that when an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his own judgment,
might be covered by executive privilege, he must be afforded reasonable time to inform the President or the Executive
Secretary of the possible need for invoking the privilege. This is necessary in order to provide the President or the
Executive Secretary with fair opportunity to consider whether the matter indeed calls for a claim of executive

36

privilege. If, after the lapse of that reasonable time, neither the President nor the Executive Secretary invokes the
privilege, Congress is no longer bound to respect the failure of the official to appear before Congress and may then
opt to avail of the necessary legal means to compel his appearance.
The Court notes that one of the expressed purposes for requiring officials to secure the consent of the President under
Section 3 of E.O. 464 is to ensure respect for the rights of public officials appearing in inquiries in aid of
legislation. That such rights must indeed be respected by Congress is an echo from Article VI Section 21 of the
Constitution mandating that [t]he rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.

In light of the above discussion of Section 3, it is clear that it is essentially an authorization for implied claims of
executive privilege, for which reason it must be invalidated. That such authorization is partly motivated by the need to
ensure respect for such officials does not change the infirm nature of the authorization itself.

Right to Information
E.O 464 is concerned only with the demands of Congress for the appearance of executive officials in the hearings
conducted by it, and not with the demands of citizens for information pursuant to their right to information on matters of
public concern. Petitioners are not amiss in claiming, however, that what is involved in the present controversy is not
merely the legislative power of inquiry, but the right of the people to information.
There are, it bears noting, clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information which underlies the power of
inquiry and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. For one, the demand of a citizen for the
production of documents pursuant to his right to information does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena
duces tecum issued by Congress. Neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony
from government officials. These powers belong only to Congress and not to an individual citizen.
Thus, while Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people, it does not follow, except in a highly
qualified sense, that in every exercise of its power of inquiry, the people are exercising their right to information.
To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally conducted in public, however, any executive
issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in such investigations necessarily deprives the people of
information which, being presumed to be in aid of legislation, is presumed to be a matter of public concern. The
citizens are thereby denied access to information which they can use in formulating their own opinions on the matter
before Congress opinions which they can then communicate to their representatives and other government officials
through the various legal means allowed by their freedom of expression. Thus holds Valmonte v. Belmonte:

It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to
the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the peoples will. Yet, this open
dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to
formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants in the discussion are aware of the issues
and have access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit.[107] (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
The impairment of the right of the people to information as a consequence of E.O. 464 is, therefore, in the sense
explained above, just as direct as its violation of the legislatures power of inquiry.
Implementation of E.O. 464 prior to its publication
While E.O. 464 applies only to officials of the executive branch, it does not follow that the same is exempt from the
need for publication. On the need for publishing even those statutes that do not directly apply to people in
general, Taada v. Tuvera states:

37

The term laws should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking
all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An
example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos who
was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the
public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of such
law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may question in the
political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in courts of justice.[108] (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Although the above statement was made in reference to statutes, logic dictates that the challenged order must be
covered by the publication requirement. As explained above, E.O. 464 has a direct effect on the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern. It is, therefore, a matter of public interest which members of the body politic
may question before this Court. Due process thus requires that the people should have been apprised of this issuance
before it was implemented.
Conclusion
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of
legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it
and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for
information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere
expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is
frustrated. That is impermissible. For [w]hat republican theory did accomplish was to reverse the old presumption in
favor of secrecy, based on the divine right of kings and nobles, and replace it with a presumption in favor of publicity,
based on the doctrine of popular sovereignty.(Underscoring supplied) [109]
Resort to any means then by which officials of the executive branch could refuse to divulge information cannot be
presumed valid. Otherwise, we shall not have merely nullified the power of our legislature to inquire into the operations
of government, but we shall have given up something of much greater value our right as a people to take part in
government.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. Sections 2(b) and 3 of Executive Order No. 464 (series of
2005), ENSURING OBSERVANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS, ADHERENCE TO THE
RULE ON EXECUTIVE
PRIVILEGE AND RESPECT FOR THE RIGHTS OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS APPEARING IN LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES
IN AID OF LEGISLATION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, are declared VOID.
Sections 1 and 2(a) are, however, VALID.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 163193. June 15, 2004]

SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR. petitioner, vs. JOSE CONCEPCION, JR., JOSE DE VENECIA, EDGARDO J.
ANGARA, DR. JAIME Z. GALVEZ, TAN, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, FRISCO SAN JUAN, NORBERTO M.
GONZALES, HONESTO M. ISLETA, AND JOSE A. BERNAS, petitioners-in-intervention, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
DECISION

38

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before us is the petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by Atty. Sixto S.
Brillantes, Jr., a voter and taxpayer, seeking to nullify, for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, Resolution No. 6712 dated April 28, 2004 approved by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) En Banc captioned GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION AND
CONSOLIDATION OF ADVANCED RESULTS IN THE MAY 10, 2004 ELECTIONS.[1] The petitioner, likewise, prays for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and, after due proceedings, a writ of prohibition to permanently enjoin
the respondent COMELEC from enforcing and implementing the questioned resolution.
After due deliberation, the Court resolved to require the respondent to comment on the petition and to require the
parties to observe the status quo prevailing before the issuance by the COMELEC of the assailed resolution. The
parties were heard on oral arguments on May 8, 2004. The respondent COMELEC was allowed during the hearing to
make a presentation of the Electronic Transmission, Consolidation and Dissemination (PHASE III) program of the
COMELEC, through Mr. Renato V. Lim of the Philippine Multi-Media System, Inc. (PMSI).
The Court, thereafter, resolved to maintain the status quo order issued on May 6, 2004 and expanded it to cover any
and all other issuances related to the implementation of the so-called election quick count project. In compliance with
the resolution of the Court, the respondent, the petitioner and the petitioners-in-intervention submitted the documents
required of them.

The Antecedents
On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8436 [2] authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated
election system (AES) for the process of voting, counting of votes and canvassing/consolidating the results of the
national and local elections. It also mandated the COMELEC to acquire automated counting machines (ACMs),
computer equipment, devices and materials; and to adopt new electoral forms and printing materials.
The COMELEC initially intended to implement the automation during the May 11, 1998 presidential elections,
particularly in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The failure of the machines to read correctly
some automated ballots, however, deferred its implementation. [3]
In the May 2001 elections, the counting and canvassing of votes for both national and local positions were also done
manually, as no additional ACMs had been acquired for that electoral exercise because of time constraints.
On October 29, 2002, the COMELEC adopted, in its Resolution No. 02-0170, a modernization program for the 2004
elections consisting of three (3) phases, to wit:
(1) PHASE I Computerized system of registration and voters validation or the so-called biometrics system of
registration;
(2) PHASE II Computerized voting and counting of votes; and
(3) PHASE III Electronic transmission of results.
It resolved to conduct biddings for the three phases.
On January 24, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 172, [4] which allocated the sum
of P2,500,000,000 to exclusively fund the AES in time for the May 10, 2004 elections.
On January 28, 2003, the COMELEC issued an Invitation to Bid [5] for the procurement of supplies, equipment,
materials and services needed for the complete implementation of all three phases of the AES with an approved
budget ofP2,500,000,000.
On February 10, 2003, upon the request of the COMELEC, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive
Order No. 175,[6] authorizing the release of a supplemental P500 million budget for the AES project of the
COMELEC. The said issuance, likewise, instructed the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) to ensure that
the aforementioned additional amount be used exclusively for the AES prescribed under Rep. Act No. 8436,
particularly the process of voting, counting of votes and canvassing/consolidation of results of the national and local
elections.[7]
On April 15, 2003, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 6074 awarding the contract for Phase II of the AES to
Mega Pacific Consortium and correspondingly entered into a contract with the latter to implement the project. On the
same day, the COMELEC entered into a separate contract with Philippine Multi-Media System, Inc. (PMSI)
denominated ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION, CONSOLIDATION & DISSEMINATION OF ELECTION RESULTS
PROJECT CONTRACT.[8] The contract, by its very terms, pertains to Phase III of the respondent COMELECs AES

39

modernization program. It was predicated on a previous bid award of the contract, for the lease of 1,900 units of
satellite-based Very Small Aperture Terminals (VSAT) each unit consisting of an indoor and outdoor equipment, to
PMSI for possessing the legal, financial and technical expertise necessary to meet the projects objectives. The
COMELEC bound and obliged itself to pay PMSI the sum of P298,375,808.90 as rentals for the leased equipment and
for its services.
In the meantime, the Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines (ITFP), filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition in this Court for the nullification of Resolution No. 6074 approving the contract for Phase II of AES to Mega
Pacific Consortium, entitled and docketed as Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines, et al. vs.
COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 159139. While the case was pending in this Court, the COMELEC paid the contract fee to
the PMSI in trenches.
On January 13, 2004, this Court promulgated its Decision nullifying COMELEC Resolution No. 6074 awarding the
contract for Phase II of the AES to Mega Pacific Consortium. Also voided was the subsequent contract entered into by
the respondent COMELEC with Mega Pacific Consortium for the purchase of computerized voting/counting machines
for the purpose of implementing the second phase of the modernization program. Phase II of the AES was, therefore,
scrapped based on the said Decision of the Court and the COMELEC had to maintain the old manual voting and
counting system for the May 10, 2004 elections.
On the other hand, the validation scheme under Phase I of the AES apparently encountered problems in its
implementation, as evinced by the COMELECs pronouncements prior to the elections that it was reverting to the old
listing of voters. Despite the scrapping of Phase II of the AES, the COMELEC nevertheless ventured to implement
Phase III of the AES through an electronic transmission of advanced unofficial results of the 2004 elections for
national, provincial and municipal positions, also dubbed as an unofficial quick count.
Senate President Franklin Drilon had misgivings and misapprehensions about the constitutionality of the proposed
electronic transmission of results for the positions of President and Vice-President, and apprised COMELEC Chairman
Benjamin Abalos of his position during their meeting on January 28, 2004. He also wrote Chairman Abalos on
February 2, 2004. The letter reads:
Dear Chairman Abalos,
This is to confirm my opinion which I relayed to you during our meeting on January 28 ththat the Commission on
Elections cannot and should not conduct a quick count on the results of the elections for the positions of President and
Vice-President.
Under Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution, it is the Congress that has the sole and exclusive authority to
canvass the votes for President and Vice-President. Thus, any quick count to be conducted by the Commission on
said positions would in effect constitute a canvass of the votes of the President and Vice-President, which not only
would be pre-emptive of the authority of the Congress, but also would be lacking of any Constitutional authority. You
conceded the validity of the position we have taken on this point.
In view of the foregoing, we asked the COMELEC during that meeting to reconsider its plan to include the votes for
President and Vice-President in the quick count, to which you graciously consented. Thank you very much.[9]
The COMELEC approved a Resolution on February 10, 2004 referring the letter of the Senate President to the
members of the COMELEC and its Law Department for study and recommendation. Aside from the concerns of the
Senate President, the COMELEC had to contend with the primal problem of sourcing the money for the
implementation of the project since the money allocated by the Office of the President for the AES had already been
spent for the acquisition of the equipment. All these developments notwithstanding, and despite the explicit
specification in the project contract for Phase III that the same was functionally intended to be an interface of Phases I
and II of the AES modernization program, the COMELEC was determined to carry out Phase III of the AES. On April 6,
2004, the COMELEC, in coordination with the project contractor PMSI, conducted a field test of the electronic
transmission of election results.
On April 27, 2004, the COMELEC met en banc to update itself on and resolve whether to proceed with its
implementation of Phase III of the AES.[10] During the said meeting, COMELEC Commissioner Florentino Tuason, Jr.
requested his fellow Commissioners that whatever is said here should be confined within the four walls of this room
and the minutes so that walang masyadong problema.[11]Commissioner Tuason, Jr. stated that he had no objection as
to the Phase III of the modernization project itself, but had concerns about the budget. He opined that other funds of
the COMELEC may not be proper for realignment. Commissioners Resurreccion Z. Borra and Virgilio Garcillano also
expressed their concerns on the budget for the project. Commissioner Manuel Barcelona, Jr. shared the sentiments of
Commissioners Garcillano and Tuason, Jr. regarding personnel and budgetary problems. Commissioner Sadain then
manifested that the consideration for the contract for Phase III had already been almost fully paid even before the
Courts nullification of the contract for Phase II of the AES, but he was open to the possibility of the realignment of

40

funds of the COMELEC for the funding of the project. He added that if the implementation of Phase III would not be
allowed to continue just because Phase II was nullified, then it would be P300,000,000 down the drain, in addition to
the already allocated disbursement on Phase II of the AES. [12] Other concerns of the Commissioners were on the
legality of the project considering the scrapping of Phase II of the AES, as well as the operational constraints related to
its implementation.
Despite the dire and serious reservations of most of its members, the COMELEC, the next day, April 28, 2004, barely
two weeks before the national and local elections, approved the assailed resolution declaring that it adopts the policy
that the precinct election results of each city and municipality shall be immediately transmitted electronically in
advance to the COMELEC, Manila.[13] For the purpose, respondent COMELEC established a National Consolidation
Center (NCC), Electronic Transmission Centers (ETCs) for every city and municipality, and a special ETC at the
COMELEC, Manila, for the Overseas Absentee Voting.[14]
Briefly, the procedure for this electronic transmission of precinct results is outlined as follows:
I. The NCC shall receive and consolidate all precinct results based on the data transmitted to it by each
ETC;[15]
II. Each city and municipality shall have an ETC where votes obtained by each candidate for all positions
shall be encoded, and shall consequently be transmitted electronically to the NCC, through Very Small
Aperture Terminal (VSAT) facilities.[16] For this purpose, personal computers shall be allocated for all cities
and municipalities at the rate of one set for every one hundred seventy-five (175) precincts; [17]
III. A Department of Education (DepEd) Supervisor shall be designated in the area who will be assigned
in each polling center for the purpose of gathering from all Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) therein the
envelopes containing the Copy 3 of the Election Returns (ER) for national positions and Copy 2 of the ER
for local positions, both intended for the COMELEC, which shall be used as basis for the encoding and
transmission of advanced precinct results.[18]
The assailed resolution further provides that written notices of the date, time and place of the electronic transmission
of advanced precinct results shall be given not later than May 5, 2004 to candidates running for local positions, and
not later than May 7, 2004 to candidates running for national positions, as well as to political parties fielding
candidates, and parties, organizations/coalitions participating under the party-list system. [19]
In relation to this, Section 13 of the assailed resolution provides that the encoding proceedings were ministerial and
the tabulations were advanced unofficial results. The entirety of Section 13, reads:
Sec. 13. Right to observe the ETC proceedings. Every registered political party or coalition of parties, accredited
political party, sectoral party/organization or coalition thereof under the party-list, through its representative, and every
candidate for national positions has the right to observe/witness the encoding and electronic transmission of the ERs
within the authorized perimeter.
Provided, That candidates for the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panglungsod or sangguniang
bayan belonging to the same slate or ticket shall collectively be entitled to only one common observer at the ETC.
The citizens arm of the Commission, and civic, religious, professional, business, service, youth and other similar
organizations collectively, with prior authority of the Commission, shall each be entitled to one (1) observer. Such fact
shall be recorded in the Minutes.
The observer shall have the right to observe, take note of and make observations on the proceedings of the
team. Observations shall be in writing and, when submitted, shall be attached to the Minutes.
The encoding proceedings being ministerial in nature, and the tabulations being advanced unofficial results, no
objections or protests shall be allowed or entertained by the ETC.
In keeping with the unofficial character of the electronically transmitted precinct results, the assailed resolution
expressly provides that no print-outs shall be released at the ETC and at the NCC. [20] Instead, consolidated and perprecinct results shall be made available via the Internet, text messaging, and electronic billboards in designated
locations. Interested parties may print the result published in the COMELEC web site. [21]
When apprised of the said resolution, the National Citizens Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL), and the heads
of the major political parties, namely, Senator Edgardo J. Angara of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and
Chairman of the Koalisyon ng mga Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Executive Committee, Dr. Jaime Z. Galvez Tan of
the Aksyon Demokratiko, Frisco San Juan of the Nationalist Peoples Coalition (NPC), Gen. Honesto M. Isleta
of Bangon Pilipinas, Senate President Franklin Drilon of the Liberal Party, and Speaker Jose de Venecia of the Lakas-

41

Christian Muslim Democrats (CMD) and Norberto M. Gonzales of the Partido Demokratiko Sosyalista ng Pilipinas,
wrote the COMELEC, on May 3, 2004 detailing their concerns about the assailed resolution:
This refers to COMELEC Resolution 6712 promulgated on 28 April 2004.
NAMFREL and political parties have the following concerns about Resolution 6712 which arose during consultation
over the past week[:]
a) The Resolution disregards RA 8173, 8436, and 7166 which authorize only the citizens arm to use an election return
for an unofficial count; other unofficial counts may not be based on an election return; Indeed, it may be fairly inferred
from the law that except for the copy of the citizens arm, election returns may only be used for canvassing or for
receiving dispute resolutions.
b) The Commissions copy, the second or third copy of the election return, as the case may be, has always been
intended to be an archived copy and its integrity preserved until required by the Commission to resolve election
disputes. Only the Board of Election Inspectors is authorized to have been in contact with the return before the
Commission unseals it.
c) The instruction contained in Resolution 6712, to break the seal of the envelope containing copies Nos. 2 and 3 will
introduce a break in the chain of custody prior to its opening by the Commission on Election[s]. In the process of
prematurely breaking the seal of the Board of Election Inspectors, the integrity of the Commissions copy is breached,
thereby rendering it void of any probative value.
To us, it does appear that the use of election returns as prescribed in Resolution 6712 departs from the letters and
spirit of the law, as well as previous practice. More importantly, questions of legalities aside, the conduct of an
advanced count by the COMELEC may affect the credibility of the elections because it will differ from the results
obtained from canvassing. Needless to say, it does not help either that Resolution 6712 was promulgated only
recently, and perceivably, on the eve of the elections.
In view of the foregoing, we respectfully request the Commission to reconsider Resolution 6712 which authorizes the
use of election returns for the consolidation of the election results for the May 10, 2004 elections. [22]

The Present Petition

On May 4, 2004, the petition at bar was filed in this Court.
Jose Concepcion, Jr., Jose De Venecia, Edgardo J. Angara, Dr. Jaime Z. Galvez-Tan, Franklin M. Drilon, Frisco San
Juan, Norberto M. Gonzales, Honesto M. Isleta and Jose A. Bernas, filed with this Court their Motion to Admit
Attached Petition-in-Intervention. In their petition-in-intervention, movants-petitioners urge the Court to declare as null
and void the assailed resolution and permanently enjoin the respondent COMELEC from implementing the same. The
Court granted the motion of the petitioners-in-intervention and admitted their petition.
In assailing the validity of the questioned resolution, the petitioner avers in his petition that there is no provision under
Rep. Act No. 8436 which authorizes the COMELEC to engage in the biometrics/computerized system of validation of
voters (Phase I) and a system of electronic transmission of election results (Phase III).Even assuming for the nonce
that all the three (3) phases are duly authorized, they must complement each other as they are not distinct and
separate programs but mere stages of one whole scheme. Consequently, considering the failed implementation of
Phases I and II, there is no basis at all for the respondent COMELEC to still push through and pursue with Phase
III. The petitioner essentially posits that the counting and consolidation of votes contemplated under Section 6 of Rep.
Act No. 8436 refers to the official COMELEC count under the fully automated system and not any kind of unofficial
count via electronic transmission of advanced results as now provided under the assailed resolution.
The petitioners-in-intervention point to several constitutional infractions occasioned by the assailed resolution. They
advance the view that the assailed resolution effectively preempts the sole and exclusive authority of Congress under
Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President. Further, as there has
been no appropriation by Congress for the respondent COMELEC to conduct an unofficial electronic transmission of
results of the May 10, 2004 elections, any expenditure for the said purpose contravenes Article VI, Section 29 (par. 1)
of the Constitution.
On statutory grounds, the petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention contend that the assailed resolution encroaches
upon the authority of NAMFREL, as the citizens accredited arm, to conduct the unofficial quick count as provided
under pertinent election laws. It is, likewise, impugned for violating Section 52(i) of the Omnibus Election Code,

42

relating to the requirement of notice to the political parties and candidates of the adoption of technological and
electronic devices during the elections.
For its part, the COMELEC preliminarily assails the jurisdiction of this Court to pass upon the assailed resolutions
validity claiming that it was promulgated in the exercise of the respondent COMELECs executive or administrative
power. It asserts that the present controversy involves a political question; hence, beyond the ambit of judicial
review. It, likewise, impugns the standing of the petitioner to file the present petition, as he has not alleged any injury
which he would or may suffer as a result of the implementation of the assailed resolution.
On the merits, the respondent COMELEC denies that the assailed resolution was promulgated pursuant to Rep. Act
No. 8436, and that it is the implementation of Phase III of its modernization program. Rather, as its bases, the
respondent COMELEC invokes the general grant to it of the power to enforce and administer all laws relative to the
conduct of elections and to promulgate rules and regulations to ensure free, orderly and honest elections by the
Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, and Rep. Acts Nos. 6646 and 7166. The COMELEC avers that
granting arguendo that the assailed resolution is related to or connected with Phase III of the modernization program,
no specific law is violated by its implementation. It posits that Phases I, II and III are mutually exclusive schemes such
that, even if the first two phases have been scrapped, the latter phase may still proceed independently of and
separately from the others. It further argues that there is statutory basis for it to conduct an unofficial quick count.
Among others, it invokes the general grant to it of the power to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
elections. Finally, it claims that it had complied with Section 52(i) of the Omnibus Election Code, as the political parties
and all the candidates of the 2004 elections were sufficiently notified of the electronic transmission of advanced
election results.
The COMELEC trivializes as purely speculative these constitutional concerns raised by the petitioners-in-intervention
and the Senate President. It maintains that what is contemplated in the assailed resolution is not a canvass of the
votes but merely consolidation and transmittal thereof. As such, it cannot be made the basis for the proclamation of
any winning candidate. Emphasizing that the project is unofficial in nature, the COMELEC opines that it cannot,
therefore, be considered as preempting or usurping the exclusive power of Congress to canvass the votes for
President and Vice-President.

The Issues
At the said hearing on May 8, 2004, the Court set forth the issues for resolution as follows:
1. Whether the petitioner and the petitioners-intervenors have standing to sue;
2. Assuming that they have standing, whether the issues they raise are political in nature over
which the Court has no jurisdiction;
3. Assuming the issues are not political, whether Resolution No. 6712 is void:
(a) for preempting the sole and exclusive authority of Congress under Art. VII, Sec. 4 of
the 1987 Constitution to canvass the votes for the election of President and VicePresident;
(b) for violating Art. VI, Sec. 29 (par. 1) of the 1987 Constitution that no money shall be
paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law;
(c) for disregarding Rep. Acts Nos. 8173, 8436 and 7166 which authorize only the
citizens arm to use an election return for an unofficial count;
(d) for violation of Sec. 52(i) of the Omnibus Election Code, requiring not less than thirty
(30) days notice of the use of new technological and electronic devices; and,
(e) for lack of constitutional or statutory basis; and,
4. Whether the implementation of Resolution No. 6712 would cause trending, confusion and
chaos.

The Ruling of the Court

The issues, as earlier defined, shall now be resolved in seriatim:

43

The Petitioners And Petitioners-InIntervention Possess The Locus

Standi To Maintain The Present
Action
The gist of the question of standing is whether a party has "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. [23] Since the implementation of the assailed
resolution obviously involves the expenditure of funds, the petitioner and the petitioners-in-intervention, as taxpayers,
possess the requisite standing to question its validity as they have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal
expenditure of money raised by taxation.[24] In essence, taxpayers are allowed to sue where there is a claim of illegal
disbursement of public funds, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or where the
petitioners seek to restrain the respondent from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law.[25]
Most of the petitioners-in-intervention are also representatives of major political parties that have participated in the
May 10, 2004 elections. On the other hand, petitioners-in-intervention Concepcion and Bernas represent the National
Citizens Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL), which is the citizens arm authorized to conduct an unofficial quick
count during the said elections. They have sufficient, direct and personal interest in the manner by which the
respondent COMELEC would conduct the elections, including the counting and canvassing of the votes cast therein.
Moreover, the petitioners-in-intervention Drilon and De Venecia are, respectively, President of the Senate and Speaker
of the House of Representatives, the heads of Congress which is exclusively authorized by the Constitution to
canvass the votes for President and Vice-President. They have the requisite standing to prevent the usurpation of the
constitutional prerogative of Congress.

The Issue Raised By The

Petition Is Justiciable
Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution expands the concept of judicial review by providing that:
SEC. 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by
law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
The Court does not agree with the posture of the respondent COMELEC that the issue involved in the present petition
is a political question beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to review. As the leading case of Taada vs. Cuenco[26] put it,
political questions are concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.
The issue raised in the present petition does not merely concern the wisdom of the assailed resolution but focuses on
its alleged disregard for applicable statutory and constitutional provisions. In other words, that the petitioner and the
petitioners-in-intervention are questioning the legality of the respondent COMELECs administrative issuance will not
preclude this Court from exercising its power of judicial review to determine whether or not there was grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the respondent COMELEC in issuing Resolution
No. 6712. Indeed, administrative issuances must not override, supplant or modify the law, but must remain consistent
with the law they intend to carry out.[27] When the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the
issue of whether the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met or the limitations respected, is justiciable
the problem being one of legality or validity, not its wisdom. [28] In the present petition, the Court must pass upon the
petitioners contention that Resolution No. 6712 does not have adequate statutory or constitutional basis.
Although not raised during the oral arguments, another procedural issue that has to be addressed is whether the
substantive issues had been rendered moot and academic. Indeed, the May 10, 2004 elections have come and
gone. Except for the President and Vice-President, the newly- elected national and local officials have been
proclaimed. Nonetheless, the Court finds it necessary to resolve the merits of the substantive issues for future
guidance of both the bench and bar.[29] Further, it is settled rule that courts will decide a question otherwise moot and
academic if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review.[30]

44

The Respondent COMELEC

Committed Grave Abuse Of
Discretion Amounting To Lack Or
Excess Of Jurisdiction In Issuing
Resolution No. 6712
The preliminary issues having been thus resolved, the Court shall proceed to determine whether the respondent
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in promulgating the
assailed resolution.
The Court rules in the affirmative.
An administrative body or tribunal acts without jurisdiction if it does not have the legal power to determine the matter
before it; there is excess of jurisdiction where the respondent, being clothed with the power to determine the matter,
oversteps its authority as determined by law.[31] There is grave abuse of discretion justifying the issuance of the writ of
certiorari when there is a capricious and whimsical exercise of his judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. [32]
First. The assailed resolution usurps, under the guise of an unofficial tabulation of election results based on a copy of
the election returns, the sole and exclusive authority of Congress to canvass the votes for the election of President
and Vice-President. Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution provides in part:
The returns of every election for President and Vice-President duly certified by the board of canvassers of each
province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the
certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election, open
all the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session, and the
Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass
the votes.
As early as January 28, 2004, Senate President Franklin M. Drilon already conveyed to Chairman Benjamin S.
Abalos, Sr. his deep-seated concern that the respondent COMELEC could not and should not conduct any quick
count of the votes cast for the positions of President and Vice-President. In his Letter dated February 2,
2004[33] addressed to Chairman Abalos, Senate President Drilon reiterated his position emphasizing that any quick
count to be conducted by the Commission on said positions would in effect constitute a canvass of the votes of the
President and Vice-President, which not only would be pre-emptive of the authority of Congress, but would also be
lacking of any constitutional authority.[34]
Nonetheless, in disregard of the valid objection of the Senate President, the COMELEC proceeded to promulgate the
assailed resolution. Such resolution directly infringes the authority of Congress, considering that Section 4 thereof
allows the use of the third copy of the Election Returns (ERs) for the positions of President, Vice-President, Senators
and Members of the House of Representatives, intended for the COMELEC, as basis for the encoding and
transmission of advanced precinct results, and in the process, canvass the votes for the President and VicePresident, ahead of the canvassing of the same votes by Congress.
Parenthetically, even the provision of Rep. Act No. 8436 confirms the constitutional undertaking of Congress as the
sole body tasked to canvass the votes for the President and Vice-President. Section 24 thereof provides:
SEC. 24. Congress as the National Board of Canvassers for President and Vice-President. --The Senate and the
House of Representatives, in joint public session, shall compose the national board of canvassers for president and
vice-president. The returns of every election for president and vice-president duly certified by the board of canvassers
of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the president of the Senate. Upon receipt of
the certificates of canvass, the president of the Senate shall, not later than thirty (30) days after the day of the election,
open all the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session, and
the Congress upon determination of the authenticity and the due execution thereof in the manner provided by law,
canvass all the results for president and vice-president by consolidating the results contained in the data storage
devices submitted by the district, provincial and city boards of canvassers and thereafter, proclaim the winning
candidates for president and vice-president.
The contention of the COMELEC that its tabulation of votes is not prohibited by the Constitution and Rep. Act No.
8436 as such tabulation is unofficial, is puerile and totally unacceptable. If the COMELEC is proscribed from
conducting an official canvass of the votes cast for the President and Vice-President, the COMELEC is, with more
reason, prohibited from making an unofficial canvass of said votes.
The COMELEC realized its folly and the merits of the objection of the Senate President on the constitutionality of the
resolution that it decided not to conduct an unofficial quick count of the results of the elections for President and VicePresident. Commissioner Sadain so declared during the hearing:

45

JUSTICE PUNO:
The word you are saying that within 36 hours after election, more or less, you will be able to tell the
people on the basis of your quick count, who won the election, is that it?
COMM. SADAIN:
Well, its not exactly like that, Your Honor. Because the fact of winning the election would really depend
on the canvassed results, but probably, it would already give a certain degree of comfort to certain
politicians to people rather, as to who are leading in the elections, as far as Senator down are
concerned, but not to President and Vice-President.
JUSTICE PUNO:
So as far as the Senatorial candidates involved are concerned, but you dont give this assurance with
respect to the Presidential and Vice-Presidential elections which are more important?
COMM. SADAIN:
In deference to the request of the Senate President and the House Speaker, Your Honor. According to
them, they will be the ones canvassing and proclaiming the winner, so it is their view that we will be preempting their canvassing work and the proclamation of the winners and we gave in to their request. [35]
JUSTICE CALLEJO, [SR.]:
Perhaps what you are saying is that the system will minimize dagdag-bawas but not totally
eradicate dagdag-bawas?
COMM. SADAIN:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CALLEJO, [SR.]:
Now, I heard either Atty. Bernas or Atty. Brillantes say (sic) that there was a conference between the
Speaker and the Senate President and the Chairman during which the Senate President and the
Speaker voice[d] their objections to the electronic transmission results system, can you share with us
the objections of the two gentlemen?
COMM. SADAIN:
These was relayed to us Your Honor and their objection or request rather was for us to refrain from
consolidating and publishing the results for presidential and vice-presidential candidates which we have
already granted Your Honors. So, there is going to be no consolidation and no publication of the
COMM. SADAIN:
Reason behind being that it is actually Congress that canvass that the official canvass for this and
proclaims the winner.[36]
Second. The assailed COMELEC resolution contravenes the constitutional provision that no money shall be paid out
of the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.[37]
By its very terms, the electronic transmission and tabulation of the election results projected under Resolution No.
6712 is unofficial in character, meaning not emanating from or sanctioned or acknowledged by the government or
government body.[38] Any disbursement of public funds to implement this project is contrary to the provisions of the
Constitution and Rep. Act No. 9206, which is the 2003 General Appropriations Act. The use of the COMELEC of its
funds appropriated for the AES for the unofficial quick count project may even be considered as a felony under Article
217 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.[39]
Irrefragably, the implementation of the assailed resolution would entail, in due course, the hiring of additional
manpower, technical services and acquisition of equipment, including computers and software, among others.
According to the COMELEC, it needed P55,000,000 to operationalize the project, including the encoding process.
[40]
Hence, it would necessarily involve the disbursement of public funds for which there must be the corresponding
appropriation.
The COMELEC posited during the hearing that the 2003 General Appropriations Act has appropriated the amount
needed for its unofficial tabulation. We quote the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the hearing:
JUSTICE VITUG:
And you mentioned earlier something about 55 million not being paid as yet?

46

COMM. SADAIN:
This is an extra amount that we will be needing to operationalize.
JUSTICE VITUG:
And this has not yet been done?
COMM. SADAIN:
It has not yet been done, Your Honor.
JUSTICE VITUG:
Would you consider the funds that were authorized by you under the General Appropriations Act as
capable of being used for this purpose?
COMM. SADAIN:
Yes, thats our position, Your Honor.[41]
But then the COMELEC, through Commissioner Sadain, admitted during the said hearing that although it had already
approved the assailed resolution, it was still looking for the P55,000,000 needed to operationalize the project:
JUSTICE CARPIO:
Just a clarification. You stated that you signed already the main contract for 300 million but you have
not signed the 55 million supplemental contract for the encoding?
COMM. SADAIN:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
Because you still dont have the money for that?
COMM. SADAIN:
Well, yes, we are trying to determine where we can secure the money.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
Now, the encoding is crucial; without the encoding, the entire project collapses?
COMM. SADAIN:
Yes.[42]
Inexplicably, Commissioner Sadain contradicted himself when he said that its Financial Department had already found
the money, but that proper documentation was forthcoming:
JUSTICE CARPIO:
Just a clarification. You stated that you signed already the main contract for 300 million but you have
not signed the 55 million supplemental contract for the encoding?
COMM. SADAIN:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
Because you still dont have the money for that?
COMM. SADAIN:
Well, yes, we are trying to determine where we can secure the money.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
Now, the encoding is crucial; without the encoding, the entire project collapses?
COMM. SADAIN:
Yes.
JUSTICE CARPIO:

47

So, you have two (2) days to look for the 55 million, you have signed the contract on the main contract
and if you dont get that 55 million, that 300 million main contract goes to waste, because you cannot
encode?
COMM. SADAIN:
Its just a matter of proper documentation, Your Honor, because I was informed by our Finance
Department that the money is there.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
So, you have found the money already?
COMM. SADAIN:
Yes, Your Honor.[43]
Earlier, during the April 27, 2004 meeting of the COMELEC En Banc, the Commissioners expressed their serious
concerns about the lack of funds for the project, the propriety of using the funds for Phase III of its modernization, and
the possibility of realigning funds to finance the project:
Comm. Tuason:
May I just request all the parties who are in here na whatever is said here should be confined within the
four walls of this room and the minutes so that walang masyadong problema.
Comm. Borra:
Sa akin lang, we respect each others opinion. I will not make any observations. I will just submit my
own memo to be incorporated in the minutes.
Comm. Tuason:
Commissioner Borra will submit a comment to be attached to the minutes but not on the resolution. Ako
naman, I will just make it on record my previous reservation. I do not have any objection as to the
Phase III modernization project itself. My main concern is the budget. I would like to make it on record
that the budget for Phase III should be taken from the modernization program fund because Phase III is
definitely part of the modernization project. Other funds, for instance other funds to be used for national
elections may not be proper for realignment. That is why I am saying that the funds to be used for
Phase III should properly come from the modernization. The other reservation is that the Election
Officers are now plagued with so much work such as the preparation of the list of voters and their
concern in their respective areas. They were saying to me, specially so in my own region, that to
burden them with another training at this point in time will make them loose (sic) focus on what they are
really doing for the national elections and what they are saying is that they should not be subjected to
any training anymore. And they also said that come canvassing time, their priority would be to canvass
first before they prepare the certificate of votes to be fed to the encoders [to be fed to the encoders] for
electronic transmission. I share the sentiments of our people in the field. That is also one of my
reservations. Thank you.
Comm. Garcillano:
I also have my observations regarding the financial restraint that we are facing if the money that is
going to be used for this is taken from the Phase II, I dont think there is money left.
Comm. Borra:
There is no more money in Phase II because the budget for Phase II is 1.3 Billion. The award on the
contract for Phase II project is 1.248 billion. So the remaining has been allocated for additional
expenses for the technical working group and staff for Phase II.
Comm. Garcillano:
I also have one problem. We have to have additional people to man this which I think is already being
taken cared of. Third is, I know that this will disrupt the canvassing that is going to be handled by our
EO and Election Assistant. I do not know if it is given to somebody (inaudible)
Comm. Tuason:
Those are your reservations.
Comm. Barcelona:

48

As far as I am concerned, I also have my reservations because I have the same experience as
Commissioner Tuason when I went to Region IX and Caraga. Our EOs and PES expressed
apprehension over the additional training period that they may have to undergo although, they say, that
if that is an order they will comply but it will be additional burden on them. I also share the concern of
Commissioner Tuason with regard to the budget that should be taken from the modernization budget.
Comm. Borra:
For the minutes, my memo is already prepared. I will submit it in detail. On three counts naman yan
eh legal, second is technical/operational and third is financial.
Comm. Sadain:
Ako naman, for my part as the CIC for Phase III, we were left with no choice but to implement Phase III
inasmuch as expenses has already been incurred in Phase III to the tune of almost 100% at the time
when the Phase II contract was nullified. So if we stop the implementation of Phase III just because
Phase II was nullified, which means that there would be no consolidation and accounting consolidation
for the machines, then it would be again 300 million pesos down the drain. Necessarily there would be
additional expense but we see this as a consequence of the loss of Phase II. I share the view of Comm.
Tuason that as much as possible this should be taken from the modernization fund as much as this is
properly modernization concern. However, I would like to open myself to the possibility na in case wala
talaga, we might explore the possibility of realigning funds although that might not (inaudible). Now with
regards the legality, I think what Commissioner Borra has derived his opinion but I would like to think
the legality issue must have been settled already as early as when we approved the modernization
program involving all three phases although we also grant the benefit of the argument for
Commissioner Borra if he thinks that there is going to be a legal gap for the loss of Phase II. With
regards the concern with the Election Officers, I also share the same concern. In fact, on this matter
alone, we try to make the GI as simple as possible so that whatever burden we will be giving to the EOs
and EAs will be minimized. As in fact, we will be recommending that the EOs will no longer be bothered
to attend the training. They can probably just sit in for the first hour and then they can go on with their
normal routine and then leave the encoders as well as the reception officers to attend the training
because there (sic) are the people who will really be doing the ministerial, almost mechanical, work of
encoding and transmitting the election results. Yun lang.[44]
We have reviewed Rep. Act No. 9206, the General Appropriations Act, which took effect on April 23, 2003 and find no
appropriation for the project of the COMELEC for electronic transmission of unofficial election results. What is
appropriated therein is the amount of P225,000,000 of the capital outlay for the modernization of the electoral system.
B. PROJECTS
I. Locally-Funded Projects
a. For the Modernization of Electoral
System
b. FY 2003 Preparatory Activities for
National Elections
c. Upgrading of Voters Database
d. Conduct of Special Election to
fill the vacancy in the Third District
of Cavite
e. Implementation of Absentee
Voting Act of 2003 (RA 9189)
Sub-Total, Locally-Funded Projects

Maintenance
&
Other Operating
Expenses

Capital
Outlays

Total

225,000,000

225,000,000

250,000,000
125,000,000

250,000,000
125,000,000

6,500,000

6,500,000

300,000,000
==========

=========

300,000,000
==========

681,500,000

225,000,000

300,000,000[45]

Under paragraph 3 of the special provisions of Rep. Act No. 9206, the amount of P225,000,000 shall be used primarily
for the establishment of the AES prescribed under Rep. Act No. 8436, viz:
3. Modernization of Electoral System. The appropriations herein authorized for the Modernization of the Electoral
System in the amount of Two Hundred Twenty-Five Million Pesos (P225,000,000.00) shall be used primarily for the
establishment of the automated election system, prescribed under Republic Act No. 8436, particularly for the process
of voting, counting of votes and canvassing/consolidation of results of the national and local elections. [46]

49

Section 52 of Rep. Act No. 9206 proscribes any change or modification in the expenditure items authorized
thereunder. Thus:
Sec. 52. Modification of Expenditure Components. Unless specifically authorized in this Act, no change or modification
shall be made in the expenditure items in this Act and other appropriations laws unless in cases of augmentation from
savings in appropriations as authorized under Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
Neither can the money needed for the project be taken from the COMELECs savings, if any, because it would be
violative of Article VI, Section 25 (5)[47] of the 1987 Constitution.
The power to augment from savings lies dormant until authorized by law.[48] In this case, no law has, thus, far been
enacted authorizing the respondent COMELEC to transfer savings from another item in its appropriation, if there are
any, to fund the assailed resolution. No less than the Secretary of the Senate certified that there is no law
appropriating any amount for an unofficial count and tabulation of the votes cast during the May 10, 2004 elections:
CERTIFICATION
I hereby certify that per records of the Senate, Congress has not legislated any appropriation intended to defray the
cost of an unofficial count, tabulation or consolidation of the votes cast during the May 10, 2004 elections.
May 11, 2004. Pasay City, Philippines.
What is worrisome is that despite the concerns of the Commissioners during its En Banc meeting on April 27, 2004,
the COMELEC nevertheless approved the assailed resolution the very next day. The COMELEC had not executed
any supplemental contract for the implementation of the project with PMSI. Worse, even in the absence of a
certification of availability of funds for the project, it approved the assailed resolution.
Third. The assailed resolution disregards existing laws which authorize solely the duly-accredited citizens arm to
conduct the unofficial counting of votes. Under Section 27 of Rep. Act No. 7166, as amended by Rep. Act No. 8173,
[49]
and reiterated in Section 18 of Rep. Act No. 8436,[50] the accredited citizens arm - in this case, NAMFREL - is
exclusively authorized to use a copy of the election returns in the conduct of an unofficial counting of the votes,
whether for the national or the local elections. No other entity, including the respondent COMELEC itself, is authorized
to use a copy of the election returns for purposes of conducting an unofficial count. In addition, the second or third
copy of the election returns, while required to be delivered to the COMELEC under the aforementioned laws, are not
intended for undertaking an unofficial count. The aforesaid COMELEC copies are archived and unsealed only when
needed by the respondent COMELEC to verify election results in connection with resolving election disputes that may
be imminent.However, in contravention of the law, the assailed Resolution authorizes the so-called Reception Officers
(RO), to open the second or third copy intended for the respondent COMELEC as basis for the encoding and
transmission of advanced unofficial precinct results. This not only violates the exclusive prerogative of NAMFREL to
conduct an unofficial count, but also taints the integrity of the envelopes containing the election returns, as well as the
returns themselves, by creating a gap in its chain of custody from the Board of Election Inspectors to the COMELEC.
Fourth. Section 52(i) of the Omnibus Election Code, which is cited by the COMELEC as the statutory basis for the
assailed resolution, does not cover the use of the latest technological and election devices for unofficial tabulations of
votes.Moreover, the COMELEC failed to notify the authorized representatives of accredited political parties and all
candidates in areas affected by the use or adoption of technological and electronic devices not less than thirty days
prior to the effectivity of the use of such devices. Section 52(i) reads:
SEC. 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. In addition to the powers and functions conferred
upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all
laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections, and shall :
(i) Prescribe the use or adoption of the latest technological and electronic devices, taking into account the situation
prevailing in the area and the funds available for the purpose:Provided, That the Commission shall notify the
authorized representatives of accredited political parties and candidates in areas affected by the use or adoption of
technological and electronic devices not less than thirty days prior to the effectivity of the use of such devices.
From the clear terms of the above provision, before the COMELEC may resort to and adopt the latest technological
and electronic devices for electoral purposes, it must act in accordance with the following conditions:
(a) Take into account the situation prevailing in the area and the funds available for the purpose; and,

50

(b) Notify the authorized representatives of accredited political parties and candidates in areas affected by the use or
adoption of technological and electronic devices not less than thirty days prior to the effectivity of the use of such
devices.
It is quite obvious that the purpose of this provision is to accord to all political parties and all candidates the
opportunity to object to the effectiveness of the proposed technology and devices, and, if they are so minded not to
object, to allow them ample time to field their own trusted personnel especially in far flung areas and to take other
necessary measures to ensure the reliability of the proposed electoral technology or device.
As earlier pointed out, the assailed resolution was issued by the COMELEC despite most of the Commissioners
apprehensions regarding the legal, operational and financial impediments thereto. More significantly, since Resolution
No. 6712 was made effective immediately a day after its issuance on April 28, 2004, the respondent COMELEC could
not have possibly complied with the thirty-day notice requirement provided under Section 52(i) of the Omnibus
Election Code. This indubitably violates the constitutional right to due process of the political parties and
candidates. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) concedes this point, as it opines that the authorized
representatives of accredited political parties and candidates should have been notified of the adoption of the
electronic transmission of election returns nationwide at the latest on April 7, 2004, April 8 and 9 being Holy Thursday
and Good Friday, pursuant to Section 52(i) of the Omnibus Election Code. [51] Furthermore, during the hearing on May
18, 2004, Commissioner Sadain, who appeared for the COMELEC, unabashedly admitted that it failed to notify all the
candidates for the 2004 elections, as mandated by law:
JUSTICE CARPIO:
You stated that you have notified in writing all the political parties and candidates as required in Section
52 (i)?
COMM. SADAIN:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
Now, how many candidates are there nationwide now?
COMM. SADAIN:
I must admit you Honor we were not able to notify the candidates but we notified the politicians.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
Yes, but what does the law state? Read the law please.
COMM. SADAIN:
Yes, Your Honor. I understand that it includes candidates.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
And there are how many candidates nationwide running in this election?
COMM. SADAIN:
Hundreds of thousands, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
Hundreds of thousands, so you mean you just notified the political parties not the candidates?
COMM. SADAIN:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
And you think that is substantial compliance, you would notify how many political parties as against
hundreds of thousands of candidates?
COMM. SADAIN:
Yes, Your Honor, we notified the major political parties, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
Only the major political parties?

51

COMM. SADAIN:
Including party list?
JUSTICE CARPIO:
But not the candidates, individual candidates?
COMM. SADAIN:
We were not able to do that, Your Honor, I must admit.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
So, you did not notify hundreds of thousands of candidates?
COMM. SADAIN:
No, Your Honors.[52]
The respondent COMELEC has, likewise, failed to submit any resolution or document to prove that it had notified all
political parties of the intended adoption of Resolution No. 6712, in compliance with Section 52(i) of the Omnibus
Election Code. This notwithstanding the fact that even long before the issuance of the assailed resolution, it had
admittedly entered into a contract on April 15, 2003[53]and acquired facilities pertaining to the implementation of the
electronic transmission and official tabulation of election results. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners-inintervention, the invitations dated January 15, 2004 regarding the January 20, 2004 COMELEC Conference with the
political parties on election security measures did not mention electronic transmission of advanced results, much less
the formal adoption of the purpose of the conference. Such notices merely invited the addressee thereof or its/his
authorized representative to a conference where the COMELEC would show a sample of the official ballot to be used
in the elections, discuss various security measures that COMELEC had put in place, and solicit suggestions to
improve the administration of the polls.[54] Further, the invitations purportedly sent out to the political parties regarding
the April 6, 2004 Field Test of the Electronic Transmission, Consolidation and Dissemination System to be conducted
by the COMELEC appear to have been sent out in the late afternoon of April 5, 2004, after office hours. There is no
showing that all the political parties attended the Field Test, or received the invitations. More importantly, the said
invitations did not contain a formal notice of the adoption of a technology, as required by Section 52(i) of the Omnibus
Election Code.[55]
Fifth. The assailed resolution has no constitutional and statutory basis. That respondent COMELEC is the sole body
tasked to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum and recall[56] and to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections [57] is beyond cavil. That it
possesses the power to promulgate rules and regulations in the performance of its constitutional duties is, likewise,
undisputed.However, the duties of the COMELEC under the Constitution, Rep. Act No. 7166, and other election laws
are carried out, at all times, in its official capacity. There is no constitutional and statutory basis for the respondent
COMELEC to undertake a separate and an unofficial tabulation of results, whether manually or electronically.Indeed,
by conducting such unofficial tabulation of the results of the election, the COMELEC descends to the level of a private
organization, spending public funds for the purpose. Besides, it is absurd for the COMELEC to conduct two kinds of
electoral counts a slow but official count, and an alleged quicker but unofficial count, the results of each may
substantially differ.
Clearly, the assailed resolution is an implementation of Phase III of the modernization program of the COMELEC
under Rep. Act No. 8436. Section 2 of the assailed resolution expressly refers to the Phase III-Modernization Project
of the COMELEC. Since this Court has already scrapped the contract for Phase II of the AES, the COMELEC cannot
as yet implement the Phase III of the program. This is so provided in Section 6 of Rep. Act No. 8436.
SEC. 6. Authority to Use an Automated Election System. -- To carry out the above-stated policy, the Commission on
Elections, herein referred to as the Commission, is hereby authorized to use an automated election system, herein
referred to as the System, for the process of voting, counting of votes and canvassing/consolidation of results of the
national and local elections: Provided, however, That for the May 11, 1998 elections, the System shall be applicable in
all areas within the country only for the positions of president, vice-president, senators and parties, organizations or
coalitions participating under the party-list system.
To achieve the purpose of this Act, the Commission is authorized to procure by purchase, lease or otherwise, any
supplies, equipment, materials and services needed for the holding of the elections by an expedited process of public
bidding of vendors, suppliers or lessors:Provided, That the accredited political parties are duly notified of and allowed
to observe but not to participate in the bidding. If in spite of its diligent efforts to implement this mandate in the
exercise of this authority, it becomes evident by February 9, 1998 that the Commission cannot fully implement the
automated election system for national positions in the May 11, 1998 elections, the elections for both national and

52

local positions shall be done manually except in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) where the
automated election system shall be used for all positions.
The AES provided in Rep. Act No. 8436 constitutes the entire process of voting, counting of votes and
canvassing/consolidation of results of the national and local elections corresponding to the Phase I, Phase II and
Phase III of the AES of the COMELEC. The three phases cannot be effected independently of each other. The
implementation of Phase II of the AES is a condition sine qua non to the implementation of Phase III. The nullification
by this Court of the contract for Phase II of the System effectively put on hold, at least for the May 10, 2004 elections,
the implementation of Phase III of the AES.
Sixth. As correctly observed by the petitioner, there is a great possibility that the unofficial results reflected in the
electronic transmission under the supervision and control of the COMELEC would significantly vary from the results
reflected in the COMELEC official count. The latter follows the procedure prescribed by the Omnibus Election Code,
which is markedly different from the procedure envisioned in the assailed resolution.
Under the Omnibus Election Code, after the votes are cast and the polls closed, the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI)
for each precinct is enjoined to publicly count the votes and record the same simultaneously on the tally boards and
on two sets of ERs. Each set of the ER is prepared in eight (8) copies. After the ERs are accomplished, they are
forwarded to the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC), which would canvass all the ERs and proclaim the elected
municipal officials. All the results in the ERs are transposed to the statements of votes (SOVs) by precinct.These
SOVs are then transferred to the certificates of canvass (COCs) which are, in turn, brought to the Provincial Board of
Canvassers (PBC). Subsequently, the PBC would canvass all the COCs from various municipalities and proclaim the
elected provincial officials, including those to the House of Representatives. The PBC would then prepare two sets of
Provincial Certificates of Canvass (PCOCs).One set is forwarded to Congress for its canvassing of the results for the
President and Vice-President. The other set is forwarded to the COMELEC for its canvassing of the results for
Senators.
As the results are transposed from one document to another, and as each document undergoes the procedure of
canvassing by various Boards of Canvassers, election returns and certificates of canvass are objected to and at
times excluded and/or deferred and not tallied, long after the pre-proclamation controversies are resolved by the
canvass boards and the COMELEC.
On the other hand, under the assailed resolution, the precinct results of each city and municipality received by the
ETCs would be immediately electronically transmitted to the NCC. Such data, which have not undergone the process
of canvassing, would expectedly be dissimilar to the data on which the official count would be based.
Resultantly, the official and unofficial canvass, both to be administered by the respondent COMELEC, would most
likely not tally. In the past elections, the unofficial quick count conducted by the NAMFREL had never tallied with that
of the official count of the COMELEC, giving rise to allegations of trending and confusion.With a second unofficial
count to be conducted by the official election body, the respondent COMELEC, in addition to its official count,
allegations of trending, would most certainly be aggravated. As a consequence, the electoral process would be
undermined.
The only intimated utility claimed by the COMELEC for the unofficial electronic transmission count is to avert the socalled dagdag-bawas. The purpose, however, as the petitioner properly characterizes it, is a total sham. The Court
cannot accept as tenable the COMELECs profession that from the results of the unofficial count, it would be able to
validate the credibility of the official tabulation. To sanction this process would in effect allow the COMELEC to
preempt or prejudge an election question or dispute which has not been formally brought before it for quasi-judicial
cognizance and resolutions.
Moreover, the Court doubts that the problem of dagdag-bawas could be addressed by the implementation of the
assailed resolution. It is observed that such problem arises because of the element of human intervention. In the
prevailing set up, there is human intervention because the results are manually tallied, appreciated, and
canvassed. On the other hand, the electronic transmission of results is not entirely devoid of human intervention. The
crucial stage of encoding the precinct results in the computers prior to the transmission requires human
intervention. Under the assailed resolution, encoding is accomplished by employees of the PMSI. Thus, the problem
of dagdag-bawas could still occur at this particular stage of the process.
As it stands, the COMELEC unofficial quick count would be but a needless duplication of the NAMFREL quick count,
an illegal and unnecessary waste of government funds and effort.

Conclusion
The Court is mindful of the salutary goals that the respondent COMELEC had envisioned in promulgating the assailed
resolution, to wit: [t]o renew the publics confidence in the Philippine Electoral System by:

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1. Facilitating transparency in the process;

2. Ensuring the integrity of the results;
3. Reducing election results manipulation;
4. Providing timely, fast and accurate information to provide the public re election results;
5. Enabling the validation of its own official count and other counts;
6. Having an audit trail in its own account.[58]
Doubtless, these are laudable intentions. But the rule of law requires that even the best intentions must be carried out
within the parameters of the Constitution and the law. Verily, laudable purposes must be carried out by legal methods.
[59]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution No. 6712 dated April 28, 2004 issued by the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Bancis hereby declared NULL AND VOID.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-3820

July 18, 1950

JEAN L. ARNAULT, petitioner,

vs.
LEON NAZARENO, Sergeant-at-arms, Philippine Senate, and EUSTAQUIO BALAGTAS, Director of
Prisons,respondents.
J.C. Orendain, Augusto Revilla, and Eduardo Arboleda for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo, Lorenzo Sumulong, Lorenzo Taada, and Vicente J.
Francisco for respondents.
OZAETA, J.:
This is an original petition for habeas corpus to relieve the petitioner from his confinement in the New Bilibid
Prison to which he has been committed by virtue of a resolution adopted by the Senate on May 15, 1950, which
reads as follows:
Whereas, Jean L. Arnault refused to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000, as
well as answer other pertinent questions related to the said amount; Now, therefore, be it.
Resolved, that for his refusal to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000 Jean L.
Arnault be committed to the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms and imprisoned in the New Bilibid Prison,
Muntinlupa, Rizal, until discharged by further order of the Senate or by the special committee created by
Senate Resolution No. 8, such discharge to be ordered when he shall have purged the contempt by
revealing to the Senate or to the said special committee the name of the person to whom he gave the
P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent questions in connection therewith.
The facts that gave rise to the adoption of said resolution, insofar as pertinent here, may be briefly stated as
follows:
In the latter part of October, 1949, the Philippine Government, through the Rural Progress Administration, bought
two estates known as Buenavista and Tambobong for the sums of P4,500,000 and P500,000, respectively. Of
the first sum, P1,000,000 was paid to Ernest H. Burt, a nonresident American, thru his attorney-in-fact in the
Philippines, the Associated Estates, Inc., represented by Jean L. Arnault, for alleged interest of the said Burt in
the Buenavista Estate. The second sum of P500,000 was all paid to the same Ernest H. Burt through his other

54

attorney-in-fact, the North Manila Development Co., Inc., also represented by Jean L. Arnault, for the alleged
interest of the said Burt in the Tambobong Estate.
The original owner of the Buenavista Estate was the San Juan de Dios Hospital. The Philippine Government
held a 25-year lease contract on said estate, with an option to purchase it for P3,000,000 within the same period
of 25 years counted from January 1, 1939. The occupation Republic of the Philippines purported to exercise that
option by tendering to the owner the sum of P3,000,000 and, upon its rejection, by depositing it in court on June
21, 1944, together with the accrued rentals amounting to P3224,000. Since 1939 the Government has remained
in possession of the estate.
On June 29, 1946, the San Juan de Dios Hospital sold the Buenavista Estate for P5,000,000 to Ernest H. Burt,
who made a down payment of P10,000 only and agreed to pay P5000,000 within one year and the remainder in
annual installments of P500,000 each, with the stipulation that failure on his part to make any of said payments
would cause the forfeiture of his down payment of P10,000 and would entitle the Hospital to rescind to sale to
him. Aside from the down payment of P10,000, Burt has made no other payment on account of the purchase
price of said estate.
The original owner of the Tambobong Estate was the Philippine Trust Company. On May 14, 1946, the Philippine
Trust Company sold estate for the sum of P1,200,000 to Ernest H. Burt, who paid P10,000 down and promise to
pay P90,000 within nine months and the balance of P1,100,000 in ten successive installments of P110,000
each. The nine-month period within which to pay the first installment of P90,000 expired on February 14, 1947,
without Burt's having paid the said or any other amount then or afterwards. On September 4, 1947, the
Philippine Trust Company sold, conveyed, and delivered the Tambobong Estate to the Rural Progress
Administration by an absolute deed of sale in consideration of the sum of P750,000. On February 5, 1948, the
Rural Progress Administration made, under article 1504 of the Civil Code, a notarial demand upon Burt for the
resolution and cancellation of his contract of purchase with the Philippine Trust Company due to his failure to
pay the installment of P90,000 within the period of nine months. Subsequently the Court of First Instance of
Rizal ordered the cancellation of Burt's certificate of title and the issuance of a new one in the name of the Rural
Progress Administration, from which order he appealed to the Supreme Court. 1
It was in the face of the antecedents sketched in the last three preceding paragraphs that the Philippine
Government, through the Secretary of Justice as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Rural Progress
Administration and as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine National Bank, from which the money
was borrowed, accomplished the purchase of the two estates in the latter part of October, 1949, as stated at the
outset.
On February 27, 1950, the Senate adopted its Resolution No. 8, which reads as follows:
RESOLUTION CREATING A SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE BUENAVISTA AND THE
TAMBOBONG ESTATES DEAL.
WHEREAS, it is reported that the Philippine government, through the Rural Progress Administration, has
bought the Buenavista and the Tambobong Estates for the aggregate sum of five million pesos;
WHEREAS, it is reported that under the decision of the Supreme Court dated October 31, 1949, the
Buenavista Estate could have been bought for three million pesos by virtue of a contract entered into
between the San Juan de Dios Hospital and Philippine Government in 1939;
WHEREAS, it is even alleged that the Philippine Government did not have to purchase the Buenavista
Estate because the occupation government had made tender of payment in the amount of three million
pesos, Japanese currency, which fact is believed sufficient to vest title of Ownership in the Republic of
the Philippines pursuant to decisions of the Supreme Court sustaining the validity of payments made in
Japanese military notes during the occupation;
WHEREAS, it is reported that the Philippine Government did not have to pay a single centavo for the
Tambobong Estate as it was already practically owned by virtue of a deed of sale from the Philippine
Trust Company dated September 3, 194, for seven hundred and fifty thousand pesos, and by virtue of
the recission of the contract through which Ernest H. Burt had an interest in the estate; Now, therefore,
be it.

55

RESOLVED, That a Special Committee, be, as it hereby is, created, composed of five members to be
appointed by the President of the Senate to investigate the Buenavista and Tambobong Estate deals. It
shall be the duty of the said Committee to determine whether the said purchase was honest, valid, and
proper and whether the price involved in the deal was fair and just, the parties responsible therefor, and
any other facts the Committee may deem proper in the premises. Said Committee shall have the power
to conduct public hearings; issue subpoena or subpoena duces tecum to compel the attendance of
witnesses or the production of documents before it; and may require any official or employee of any
bureau, office, branch, subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the Government to assist or otherwise
cooperate with the Special Committee in the performance of its functions and duties. Said Committee
shall submit its report of findings and recommendations within two weeks from the adoption of this
Resolution.
The special committee created by the above resolution called and examined various witnesses, among the most
important of whom was the herein petitioner, Jean L. Arnault. An intriguing question which the committee sought
to resolve was that involved in the apparent unnecessariness and irregularity of the Government's paying to Burt
the total sum of P1,500,000 for his alleged interest of only P20,000 in the two estates, which he seemed to have
forfeited anyway long before October, 1949. The committee sought to determine who were responsible for and
who benefited from the transaction at the expense of the Government.
Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt aggregating P1,500,000 were delivered to him on the afternoon
of October 29, 1949; that on the same date he opened a new account in the name of Ernest H. Burt with the
Philippine National Bank in which he deposited the two checks aggregating P1,500,000; and that on the same
occasion he draw on said account two checks; one for P500,000, which he transferred to the account of the
Associated Agencies, Inc., with the Philippine National Bank, and another for P440,000 payable to cash, which
he himself cashed. It was the desire of the committee to determine the ultimate recipient of this sum of P440,000
that gave rise to the present case.
At first the petitioner claimed before the Committee:
Mr. ARNAULT (reading from a note). Mr. Chairman, for questions involving the disposition of funds, I take
the position that the transactions were legal, that no laws were being violated, and that all requisites had
been complied with. Here also I acted in a purely functional capacity of representative. I beg to be
excused from making answer which might later be used against me. I have been assured that it is my
constitutional right to refuse to incriminate myself, and I am certain that the Honorable Members of this
Committee, who, I understand, are lawyers, will see the justness of my position.
At as subsequent session of the committee (March 16) Senator De Vera, a member of the committee,
interrogated him as follows:
Senator DE VERA. Now these transactions, according to your own typewritten statement, were legal?
Mr. ARNAULT. I believe so.
Senator DE VERA. And the disposition of that fund involved, according to your own statement, did not
violate any law?
Mr. ARNAULT. I believe so.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Senator DE VERA. So that if the funds were disposed of in such a manner that no laws were violated,
how is it that when you were asked by the Committee to tell what steps you took to have this money
delivered to Burt, you refused to answer the questions, saying that it would incriminate you?
Mr. ARNAULT. Because it violates the rights of a citizen to privacy in his dealings with other people.
xxx

xxx

56

xxx

Senator DE VERA. Are you afraid to state how the money was disposed of because you would be
incriminated, or you would be incriminating somebody?
Mr. ARNAULT. I am not afraid; I simply stand on the privilege to dispose of the money that has been paid
to me as a result of a legal transaction without having to account for any use of it.
But when in the same session the chairman of the committee, Senator Sumulong, interrogated the petitioner, the
latter testified as follows:
The CHAIRMAN. The other check of P440,000 which you also made on October 29, 1949, is payable to
cash; and upon cashing this P440,000 on October 29, 1949, what did you do with that amount?
Mr. ARNAULT. I turned it over to a certain person.
The CHAIRMAN. The whole amount of P440,000?
Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. Who was that certain person to whom you delivered these P440,000 which you cashed
on October 29, 1949?
Mr. ARNAULT. I don't remember the name; he was a representative of Burt.
The CHAIRMAN. That representative of Burt to whom you delivered the P440,000 was a Filipino?
Mr. ARNAULT. I don't know.
The CHAIRMAN. You do not remember the name of that representative of Burt to whom you delivered
this big amount of P440,000?
Mr. ARNAULT. I am not sure; I do not remember the name.
The CHAIRMAN. That certain person who represented Burt to whom you delivered the big amount on
October 29, 1949, gave you a receipt for the amount?
Mr. ARNAULT. No.
The CHAIRMAN. Neither did you ask a receipt?
Mr. ARNAULT. I didn't ask.
The CHAIRMAN. And why did you give that certain person, representative of Burt, this big amount of
P440,000 which forms part of the P1- million paid to Burt?
Mr. ARNAULT. Because I have instructions to that effect.
The CHAIRMAN. Who gave you the instruction?
Mr. ARNAULT. Burt.
The CHAIRMAN. Where is the instruction; was that in writing?
Mr. ARNAULT. No.
The CHAIRMAN. By cable?
Mr. ARNAULT. No.

57

The CHAIRMAN. In what form did you receive that instruction?

Mr. ARNAULT. Verbal instruction.
The CHAIRMAN. When did you receive this verbal instruction from Burt to deliver these P440,000 to a
certain person whose name you do not like to reveal?
Mr. ARNAULT. I have instruction to comply with the request of the person.
The CHAIRMAN. Now, you said that instruction given to you by Burt was verbal?
Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. When was that instruction given to you by Burt?
Mr. ARNAULT. Long time ago.
The CHAIRMAN. In what year did Burt give you that verbal instruction; when Burt was still here in the
Philippines?
Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. But at that time Burt already knew that he would receive the money?
Mr. ARNAULT. No.
The CHAIRMAN. In what year was that when Burt while he was here in the Philippines gave you the
verbal instruction?
Mr. ARNAULT. In 1946.
The CHAIRMAN. And what has that certain person done for Burt to merit receiving these P440,000?
Mr. ARNAULT. I absolutely do not know.
The CHAIRMAN. You do not know?
Mr. ARNAULT. I do not know.
The CHAIRMAN. Burt did not tell you when he gave you the verbal instruction why that certain person
should receive these P440,000?
Mr. ARNAULT. He did not tell me.
The CHAIRMAN. And Burt also authorized you to give this big amount to that certain person without
receipt?
Mr. ARNAULT. He told me that a certain person would represent him and where could I meet him.
The CHAIRMAN. Did Burt know already that certain person as early as 1946?
Mr. ARNAULT. I presume much before that.
The CHAIRMAN. Did that certain person have any intervention in the prosecution of the two cases
involving the Buenavista and Tambobong estates?
Mr. ARNAULT. Not that I know of.

58

The CHAIRMAN. Is that certain person related to any high government official?
Mr. ARNAULT. No, I do not know.
The CHAIRMAN. Why can you not tell us the name of that certain person?
Mr. ARNAULT. Because I am not sure of his name; I cannot remember the name.
The CHAIRMAN. When gave that certain person that P440,000 on October 29, 1949, you knew already
that person?
Mr. ARNAULT. Yes, I have seen him several times.
The CHAIRMAN. And the name of that certain person is a Filipino name?
Mr. ARNAULT. I would say Spanish name.
The CHAIRMAN. And how about his Christian name; is it also a Spanish name?
Mr. ARNAULT. I am not sure; I think the initial is J.
The CHAIRMAN. Did he have a middle name?
Mr. ARNAULT. I never knew it.
The CHAIRMAN. And how about his family name which according to your recollection is Spanish; can
you remember the first letter with which that family name begins?
Mr. ARNAULT. S, D or F.
The CHAIRMAN. And what was the last letter of the family name?
Mr. ARNAULT. I do not know.
The CHAIRMAN. Have you seen that person again after you have delivered this P440,000?
Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. Several times?
Mr. ARNAULT. Two or three times.
The CHAIRMAN. Here in Manila?
Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. And in spite of the fact that you met that person two or three times, you never were
able to find out what was his name?
Mr. ARNAULT. If I knew, I would [have] taken it down. Mr. Peralta knows my name; of course, we have
not done business. Lots of people in Manila know me, but they don't know my name, and I don't know
them. They sa{ I am "chiflado" because I don't know their names.
The CHAIRMAN. That certain person is a male or female?
Mr. ARNAULT. He is a male.

59

The CHAIRMAN. You are sure that he is a male at least?

Mr. ARNAULT. Let us say 38 or 40 years, more or less.
The CHAIRMAN. Can you give us, more or less, a description of that certain person? What is his
complexion: light, dark or light brown?
Mr. ARNAULT. He is like the gentleman there (pointing to Senator Cabili), but smaller. He walks very
straight, with military bearing.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you know the residence of that certain person to whom you gave the P440,000?
Mr. ARNAULT. No.
The CHAIRMAN. During these frequent times that you met that certain person, you never came to know
his residence?
Mr. ARNAULT. No, because he was coming to the office.
The CHAIRMAN. How tall is that certain person?
Mr. ARNAULT. Between 5-2 and 5-6.
On May 15, 1950, the petitioner was haled before the bar of the Senate, which approved and read to him the
following resolution:
Be it resolved by the Senate of the Philippines in Session assembled:
That Jean L. Arnault, now at the bar of the Senate, be arraigned for contempt consisting of contumacious
acts committed by him during the investigation conducted by the Special Committee created by Senate
Resolution No. 8 to probe the Tambobong and Buenavista estates deal of October 21, 1949, and that the
President of the Senate propounded to him the following interrogatories:
1. What excuse have you for persistently refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom you gave
the P440,000 on October 29, 1949, a person whose name it is impossible for you not to remember not
only because of the big amount of money you gave to him without receipt, but also by your own
statements you knew him as early as 1946 when General Ernest H. Burt was still in the Philippines, you
made two other deliveries of money to him without receipt, and the last time you saw him was in
December 1949?
Thereupon petitioner's attorney, Mr. Orendain, submitted for him a written answer alleging that the questions
were incriminatory in nature and begging leave to be allowed to stand on his constitutional right not to be
compelled to be a witness against himself. Not satisfied with that written answer Senator Sumulong, over the
objection of counsel for the petitioner, propounded to the latter the following question:
Sen. SUMULONG. During the investigation, when the Committee asked you for the name of that person
to whom you gave the P440,000, you said that you can [could] not remember his name. That was the
reason then for refusing to reveal the name of the person. Now, in the answer that you have just cited,
you are refusing to reveal the name of that person to whom you gave the P440,000 on the ground that
your answer will be self-incriminating. Now, do I understand from you that you are abandoning your
former claim that you cannot remember the name of that person, and that your reason now for your
refusal to reveal the name of that person is that your answer might be self-incriminating? In other words,
the question is this: What is your real reason for refusing to reveal the name of that person to whom you
gave the P440,000: that you do not remember his name or that your answer would be self-incriminating?
xxx

xxx

60

xxx

Mr. ORENDAIN. Mr. President, we are begging for the rules of procedure that the accused should not be
required to testify unless he so desires.
The PRESIDENT. It is the duty of the respondent to answer the question. The question is very clear. It
does not incriminate him.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Mr. ARNAULT. I stand by every statement that I have made before the Senate Committee on the first,
second, and third hearings to which I was made in my letter to this Senate of May 2, 1950, in which I
gave all the reasons that were in my powers to give, as requested. I cannot change anything in those
statements that I made because they represent the best that I can do , to the best of my ability.
The PRESIDENT. You are not answering the question. The answer has nothing to do with the question.
Sen. SUMULONG. I would like to remind you , Mr. Arnault, that the reason that you gave during the
investigation for not revealing the name of the person to whom you gave the P440,000 is not the same
reason that you are now alleging because during the investigation you told us: "I do not remember his
name." But, now, you are now saying: "My answer might incriminate me." What is your real position?
Mr. ARNAULT. I have just stated that I stand by my statements that I made at the first, second, and third
hearings. I said that I wanted to be excused from answering the question. I beg to be excused from
making any answer that might be incriminating in nature. However, in this answer, if the detail of not
remembering the name of the person has not been included, it is an oversight.
Sen. SUMULONG. Mr. Arnault, will you kindly answer a simple question: Do you remember or not the
name of the person to whom you gave the P440,000?
Mr. ARNAULT. I do not remember .
Sen. SUMULONG. Now, if you do not remember the name of that person, how can you say that your
answer might be incriminating? If you do not remember his name, you cannot answer the question; so
how could your answer be self-incriminating? What do you say to that?
Mr. ARNAULT. This is too complicated for me to explain. Please, I do not see how to answer those
questions. That is why I asked for a lawyer, so he can help me. I have no means of knowing what the
situation is about. I have been in jail 13 days without communication with the outside. How could I
answer the question? I have no knowledge of legal procedure or rule, of which I am completely ignorant.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Sen. SUMULONG. Mr. President, I ask that the question be answered.

The PRESIDENT. The witness is ordered to answer the question. It is very clear. It does not incriminate
the witness.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Mr. ARNAULT. I do not remember. I stand on my constitutional rights. I beg to be excused from making
further answer, please.
Sen. SUMULONG. In that mimeographed letter that you sent addressed to the President of the Senate,
dated May 2, 1950, you stated there that you cannot reveal the name of the person to whom you gave
the P440,000 because if he is a public official you might render yourself liable for prosecution for bribery,
and that if he is a private individual you might render yourself liable for prosecution for slander. Why did
you make those statements when you cannot even tell us whether that person to whom you gave the
P440,000 is a public official or a private individual ? We are giving you this chance to convince the
Senate that all these allegations of yours that your answers might incriminate you are given by you
honestly or you are just trying to make a pretext for not revealing the information desired by the Senate.
61

The PRESIDENT. You are ordered to answer the question.

Mr. ARNAULT. I do not even understand the question. (The question is restated and explained.)
Mr. ARNAULT. That letter of May 2, was prepared by a lawyer for me and signed it. That is all I can say
how I stand about this letter. I have no knowledge myself enough to write such a letter, so I had to secure
the help of a lawyer to help me in my period of distress.
In that same session of the Senate before which the petitioner was called to show cause why he should not be
adjudged guilty of contempt of the Senate, Senator Sumulong propounded to the petitioner questions tending to
elicit information from him as to the identity of the person to whom he delivered the P440,000; but the petitioner
refused to reveal it by saying that he did not remember. The President of the Senate then propounded to him
various questions concerning his past activities dating as far back as when witness was seven years of age and
ending as recently as the post liberation period, all of which questions the witness answered satisfactorily. In
view thereof, the President of the Senate also made an attempt to illicit the desired information from the witness,
as follows:
The PRESIDENT. Now I am convinced that you have a good memory. Answer: Did you deliver the
P440,000 as a gift, or of any consideration?
Mr. ARNAULT. I have said that I had instructions to deliver it to that person, that is all.
The PRESIDENT. Was it the first time you saw that person?
Mr. ARNAULT. I saw him various times, I have already said.
The PRESIDENT. In spite of that, you do not have the least remembrance of the name of that person?
Mr. ARNAULT. I cannot remember.
The PRESIDENT. How is it that you do not remember events that happened a short time ago and, on the
other hand, you remember events that occurred during your childhood?
Mr. ARNAULT. I cannot explain.
The Senate then deliberated and adopted the resolution of May 15 hereinabove quoted whereby the petitioner
was committed to the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms and imprisoned until "he shall have purged the contempt
by revealing to the Senate or to the aforesaid Special Committee the name of the person to whom he gave the
P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent questions in connection therewith."
The Senate also adopted on the same date another resolution (No. 16) , to wit:
That the Special Committee created by Senate Resolution No. 8 be empowered and directed to continue
its investigation of the Tambobong and Buenavista Estates deal of October 21, 1949, more particularly to
continue the examination of Jean L. Arnault regarding the name of the person to whom he gave the
P440,000 and other matters related therewith.
The first session of the Second Congress was adjourned at midnight on May 18, 1950.
The case was argued twice before us. We have given its earnest and prolonged consideration because it is the
first of its kind to arise since the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines was adopted. For the first time
this Court is called upon to define the power of either House of Congress to punish a person not a member for
contempt; and we are fully conscious that our pronouncements here will set an important precedent for the
future guidance of all concerned.
Before discussing the specific issues raised by the parties, we deem it necessary to lay down the general
principles of law which form the background of those issues.

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Patterned after the American system, our Constitution vests the powers of the Government in three independent
but coordinate Departments Legislative, Executive, and Judicial. The legislative power is vested in the
Congress, which consists of the Senate and the House of Representatives. (Section 1, Article VI.) Each house
may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the
concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, expel a Member. (Section 10, Article VI.) The judicial power is
vested in the Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be established by law. (Section 1, Article VIII.)
Like the Constitution of the United States, ours does not contain an express provision empowering either of the
two Houses of Congress to punish nonmembers for contempt. It may also be noted that whereas in the United
States the legislative power is shared by and between the Congress of the United States, on the one hand, and
the respective legislatures of the different States, on the other the powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution nor prohibited by it to States being reserved to the States, respectively, or to the people in
the Philippines, the legislative power is vested in the Congress of the Philippines alone. It may therefore be said
that the Congress of the Philippines has a wider range of legislative field than the Congress of the United States
or any State Legislature. Our form of Government being patterned after the American system the framers of
our Constitution having drawn largely from American institutions and practices we can, in this case, properly
draw also from American precedents in interpreting analogous provisions of our Constitution, as we have done in
other cases in the past. Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of
Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative
functions as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential
and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the
absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to effect or change; and where
the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse
must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are
often unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some
means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed. (McGrain vs. Daugherty, 273 U.S., 135; 71 L. ed.,
580; 50 A.L R., 1.) The fact that the Constitution expressly gives to Congress the power to punish its Members
for disorderly behavior, does not by necessary implication exclude the power to punish for contempt any other
person. (Anderson vs. Dunn, 6, Wheaton, 204; 5 L. ed., 242.) But no person can be punished for contumacy as
a witness before either House, unless his testimony is required in a matter into which that House has jurisdiction
to inquire. (Kilbourn vs.Thompson, 26 L. ed., 377.).
Since, as we have noted, the Congress of the Philippines has a wider range of legislative field than either the
Congress of the United States or a State Legislature, we think it is correct to say that the field of inquiry into
which it may enter is also wider. It would be difficult to define any limits by which the subject matter of its inquiry
can be bounded. It is not necessary to do so in this case. Suffice it to say that it must be coextensive with the
range of the legislative power.
In the present case the jurisdiction of the Senate, thru the Special Committee created by it, to investigate the
Buenavista and Tambobong Estates deal is not challenged by the petitioner; and we entertain no doubt as to the
Senate's authority to do so and as to the validity of Resolution No. 8 hereinabove quoted. The transaction
involved a questionable and allegedly unnecessary and irregular expenditure of no less than P5,000,000 of
public funds, of which Congress is the constitutional guardian. It also involved government agencies created by
Congress to regulate or even abolish. As a result of the yet uncompleted investigation, the investigating
committee has recommended and the Senate approved three bills (1) prohibiting the Secretary of Justice or any
other department head from discharging functions and exercising powers other than those attached to his own
office, without ]previous congressional authorization; (2) prohibiting brothers and near relatives of any President
of the Philippines from intervening directly or indirectly and in whatever capacity in transactions in which the
Government is a party, more particularly where the decision lies in the hands of executive or administrative
officers who are appointees of the President; and (3) providing that purchases of the Rural Progress
Administration of big landed estates at a price of P100,000 or more, shall not become effective without previous
congressional confirmation.2
We shall now consider and pass upon each of the questions raised by the petitioner in support of his contention
that his commitment is unlawful.
First He contends that the Senate has no power to punish him for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of
the person to whom he gave the P440,000, because such information is immaterial to, and will not serve, any
intended or purported legislation and his refusal to answer the question has not embarrassed, obstructed, or
impeded the legislative process. It is argued that since the investigating committee has already rendered its
report and has made all its recommendations as to what legislative measures should be taken pursuant to its

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findings, there is no necessity to force the petitioner to give the information desired other than that mentioned in
its report, to wit: "In justice to Judge Quirino and to Secretary Nepomuceno, this atmosphere of suspicion that
now pervades the public mind must be dissipated, and it can only be done if appropriate steps are taken by the
Senate to compel Arnault to stop pretending that he cannot remember the name of the person to whom he gave
the P440,000 and answer the questions which will definitely establish the identity of that person . . ." Senator
Sumulong, Chairman of the Committee, who appeared and argued the case for the respondents, denied that
that was the only purpose of the Senate in seeking the information from the witness. He said that the
investigation had not been completed, because, due to the contumacy of the witness, his committee had not yet
determined the parties responsible for the anomalous transaction as required by Resolution No. 8; that, by
Resolution No. 16, his committee was empowered and directed to continue its investigation, more particularly to
continue its examination of the witness regarding the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000 and
other matters related therewith; that the bills recommended by his committee had not been approved by the
House and might not be approved pending the completion of the investigation; and that those bills were not
necessarily all the measures that Congress might deem it necessary to pass after the investigation is finished.
Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, we think the
investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer any question pertinent to that inquiry,
subject of course to his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of
the legislative body to make, must be material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the
Constitution, such as to legislate, or to expel a Member; and every question which the investigator is empowered
to coerce a witness to answer must be material or pertinent to the subject of the inquiry or investigation. So a
witness may not be coerced to answer a question that obviously has no relation to the subject of the inquiry. But
from this it does not follow that every question that may be propounded to a witness must be material to any
proposed or possible legislation. In other words, the materiality of the question must be determined by its direct
relation to any proposed or possible legislation. The reason is, that the necessity or lack of necessity for
legislative action and the form and character of the action itself are determined by the sum total of the
information to be gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by a fraction of such information elicited from
a single question.
In this connection, it is suggested by counsel for the respondents that the power of the Court is limited to
determining whether the legislative body has jurisdiction to institute the inquiry or investigation; that once that
jurisdiction is conceded, this Court cannot control the exercise of that jurisdiction; and it is insinuated, that the
ruling of the Senate on the materiality of the question propounded to the witness is not subject to review by this
Court under the principle of the separation of powers. We have to qualify this proposition. As was said by the
Court of Appeals of New York: "We are bound to presume that the action of the legislative body was with a
legitimate object if it is capable of being so construed, and we have no right to assume that the contrary was
intended." (People ex rel. McDonald vs. Keeler, 99 N.Y., 463; 52 Am. Rep., 49; 2 N.E., 615, quoted with approval
by the Supreme Court of the United States in the said case of McGrain vs. Daugherty, it is necessary deduction
from the decision in Re Chapman, 41 L. ed., 1154, that where the questions are not pertinent to the matter
under inquiry a witness rightfully may refuse to answer. So we are of the opinion that where the alleged
immateriality of the information sought by the legislative body from a witness is relied upon to contest its
jurisdiction, the court is in duty bound to pass upon the contention. The fact that the legislative body has
jurisdiction or the power to make the inquiry would not preclude judicial intervention to correct a clear abuse of
discretion in the exercise of that power.
Applying the criterion laid down in the last two preceding paragraphs to the resolution of the issue under
consideration, we find that the question for the refusal to answer which the petitioner was held in contempt by
the Senate is pertinent to the matter under inquiry. In fact, this is not and cannot be disputed. Senate Resolution
No. 8, the validity of which is not challenged by the petitioner, requires the Special Committee, among other
things, to determine the parties responsible for the Buenavista and Tambobong estates deal, and it is obvious
that the name of the person to whom the witness gave the P440,000 involved in said deal is pertinent to that
determination it is in fact the very thing sought to be determined. The contention is not that the question is
impertinent to the subject of the inquiry but that it has no relation or materiality to any proposed legislation. We
have already indicated that it is not necessary for the legislative body to show that every question propounded to
a witness is material to any proposed or possible legislation; what is required is that is that it be pertinent to the
matter under inquiry.
It is said that the Senate has already approved the three bills recommended by the Committee as a result of the
uncompleted investigation and that there is no need for it to know the name of the person to whom the witness
gave the P440,000. But aside from the fact that those bills have not yet been approved by the lower house and

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by the President and that they may be withdrawn or modified if after the inquiry is completed they should be
found unnecessary or inadequate, there is nothing to prevent the Congress from approving other measures it
may deem necessary after completing the investigation. We are not called upon, nor is it within our province, to
determine or imagine what those measures may be. And our inability to do so is no reason for overruling the
question propounded by the Senate to the witness.
The case of Re Chapman , 166 U.S., 661; 41 L. ed., 1154, is in point here. The inquiry there in question was
conducted under a resolution of the Senate and related to charges, published in the press, that senators were
yielding to corrupt influences in considering a tariff bill then before the Senate and were speculating in stocks the
value of which would be affected by pending amendments to the bill. Chapman, a member of a firm of stock
brokers dealing in the stock of the American Sugar Refining Company, appeared before the committee in
response to a subpoena and asked, among others, the following questions:
Had the firm, during the month of March, 1894, bought or sold any stock or securities, known as sugar
stocks, for or in the interest, directly or indirectly, of any United Senate senator?
Was the said firm at that time carrying any sugar stock for the benefit of, or in the interest, directly or
indirectly, of any United Senate senator?
He refused to answer the questions and was prosecuted under an Act of Congress for contempt of the Senate.
Upon being convicted and sent to jail he petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of habeas
corpus. One of the questions decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in that case was whether the
committee had the right to compel the witness to answer said questions, and the Court held that the committee
did have such right, saying:
The questions were undoubtedly pertinent to the subject-matter of the inquiry. The resolution directed the
committee to inquire whether any senator has been, or is, speculating in what are known as sugar stocks
during the consideration of the tariff bill now before the Senate." What the Senate might or might not do
upon the facts when ascertained, we cannot say, nor are we called upon to inquire whether such
ventures might be defensible, as contended in argument, but is plain that negative answers would have
cleared that body of what the Senate regarded as offensive imputations, while affirmative answers might
have led to further action on the part of the Senate within its constitutional powers. (Emphasis supplied.)
It may be contended that the determination of the parties responsible for the deal is incumbent upon the judicial
rather than upon the legislative branch. But we think there is no basis in fact or in law for such assumption. The
petitioner has not challenged the validity of Senate Resolution No. 8, and that resolution expressly requires the
committee to determine the parties responsible for the deal. We are bound to presume that the Senate has
acted in the due performance of its constitutional function in instituting the inquiry, if the act is capable of being
so construed. On the other hand, there is no suggestion that the judiciary has instituted an inquiry to determine
the parties responsible for the deal. Under the circumstances of the case, it appearing that the questioned
transaction was affected by the head of the Department of Justice himself, it is not reasonable to expect that the
Fiscal or the Court of First Instance of Manila will take the initiative to investigate and prosecute the parties
responsible for the deal until and unless the Senate shall determined those parties are and shall taken such
measures as may be within its competence to take the redress the wrong that may have been committed against
the people as a result of the transaction. As we have said, the transaction involved no less than P5,000,000 of
public funds. That certainly is a matter of a public concern which it is the duty of the constitutional guardian of the
treasury to investigate.
If the subject of investigation before the committee is within the range of legitimate legislative inquiry and the
proposed testimony of the witness called relates to that subject, obedience, to its process may be enforced by
the committee by imprisonment. (Sullivan vs. Hill, 73 W. Va., 49; 79 S.E., 670; 40 Ann. Cas. [1916 B.], 1115.)
The decision in the case of Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 26 L. ed., 377, relied upon by the petitioner, is not applicable
here. In that case the inquiry instituted by the House of Representatives of the United States related to a private
real-estate pool or partnership in the District of Columbia. Jay Cook and Company had had an interest in the
pool but become bankrupts, and their estate was in course of administration in a federal bankruptcy court in
Pennsylvania. The United States was one of their creditors. The trustee in the bankruptcy proceeding had
effected a settlement of the bankrupts' interest in the pool, and of course his action was subject to examination
and approval or disapproval by the bankruptcy court. Some of the creditors, including the United States, were
dissatisfied with the settlement. The resolution of the House directed the Committee "to inquire into the nature
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and history of said real-estate pool and the character of said settlement, with the amount of property involve, in
which Jay Cooke and Co. were interested, and the amount paid or to be paid in said settlement, with power to
send for persons and papers, and report to this House." The Supreme Court of the United States, speaking thru
Mr. Justice Miller, pointed out that the resolution contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation; that the
matter was one in respect of which no valid legislation could be had; that the bankrupts' estate and the trustee's
settlement were still pending in the bankruptcy court; and that the United States and other creditors were free to
press their claims in that proceeding. And on these grounds the court held that in undertaking the investigation
"the House of Representatives not only exceeded the limit of its own authority, but assumed a power which could
only be properly exercised by another branch of the government, because the power was in its nature clearly
judicial." The principles announced and applied in that case are: that neither House of Congress possesses a
"general power of making inquiry into the private affairs of the citizen"; that the power actually possessed is
limited to inquires relating to matters of which the particular House has jurisdiction, and in respect of which it
rightfully may take other action; that if the inquiry relates to a matter wherein relief or redress could be had only
by judicial proceeding, it is not within the range of this power , but must be left to the court, conformably to the
constitutional separation of government powers.
That case differs from the present case in two important respects: (1) There the court found that the subject of
the inquiry, which related to a private real-estate pool or partnership, was not within the jurisdiction of either
House of Congress; while here if it is not disputed that the subject of the inquiry, which relates to a transaction
involving a questionable expenditure by the Government of P5,000,000 of public funds, is within the jurisdiction
of the Senate, (2) There the claim of the Government as a creditor of Jay Cooke and Company, which had had
an interest in the pool, was pending adjudication by the court; while here the interposition of the judicial power on
the subject of the inquiry cannot be expected, as we have pointed out above, until after the Senate shall have
determined who the parties responsible are and shall have taken such measures as may be within its
competence to take to redress the wrong that may have been committed against the people as a result of the
transaction.
It is interesting to note that the decision in the case of Killbourn vs. Thompson has evoked strong criticisms from
legal scholars. (See Potts, Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for Contempt [1926], 74 U. Pa. L. Rev., 692699; James L. Land is, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investigation [1926], 40
Harvard L. Rev., 153, 154, 214-220.) We quoted the following from Professor Land is' criticism: "Mr. Justice
Miller saw the case purely as an attempt by the House to secure to the Government certain priority rights as
creditor of the bankrupt concern. To him it assumed the character of a lawsuit between the Government and Jay
Cooke and Co., with the Government, acting through the House, attempting to override the orderliness of
established procedure and thereby prefer a creditors' bill not before the courts but before Congress. That
bankruptcy proceedings had already been instituted against Jay Cooke and Co., in a federal court gave added
impetus to such a conception. The House was seeking to oust a court of prior acquired jurisdiction by an
extraordinary and unwarranted assumption of "judicial power"! The broader aspect of the investigation had not
been disclosed to the Court. That Jay Cooke and Co.'s indebtedness and the particular funds in question were
only part of the great administrative problem connected with the use and disposition of public monies, that the
particular failure was of consequence mainly in relation to the security demanded for all government deposits,
that the facts connected with one such default revealed the possibility of other and greater maladministration,
such considerations had not been put before the Court. Nor had it been acquainted with the every-day nature of
the particular investigation and the powers there exerted by the House, powers whose exercise was customary
and familiar in legislative practice. Instead of assuming the character of an extraordinary judicial proceeding, the
inquiry, place in its proper background, should have been regarded as a normal and customary part of the
legislative process. Detailed definiteness of legislative purpose was thus made the demand of the court in
Killbourn vs. Thompson. But investigators cannot foretell the results that may be achieved. The power of
Congress to exercise control over a real-estate pool is not a matter for abstract speculation but one to be
determined only after an exhaustive examination of the problem. Relationship, and not their possibilities,
determine the extent of congressional power. Constitutionality depends upon such disclosures. Their presence,
whether determinative of legislative or judicial power, cannot be relegated to guesswork. Neither Congress nor
the Court can predict, prior to the event, the result of the investigation."
The other case relied upon by the petitioner is Marshall vs. Gordon, 243 U.S., 521; 61. ed., 881. The question
there was whether the House of Representatives exceeded its power in punishing, as for contempt of its
authority, the District Attorney of the Southern District of New York, who had written, published, and sent to the
chairman of one of its committees an ill-tempered and irritating letter respecting the action and purposes of the
committee in interfering with the investigation by the grand jury of alleged illegal activities of a member of the
House of Representatives. Power to make inquires and obtain evidence by compulsory process was not
involved. The court recognized distinctly that the House of Representatives had implied power to punish a
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person not a member for contempt, but held that its action in this instance was without constitutional justification.
The decision was put on the ground that the letter, while offensive and vexatious, was not calculated or likely to
affect the House in any of its proceedings or in the exercise of any of its functions. This brief statement of the
facts and the issues decided in that case is sufficient to show the inapplicability thereof to the present case.
There the contempt involved consisted in the district attorney's writing to the chairman of the committee an
offensive and vexatious letter, while here the contempt involved consists in the refusal of the witness to answer
questions pertinent to the subject of an inquiry which the Senate has the power and jurisdiction to make . But in
that case, it was recognized that the House of Representatives has implied power to punish a person not a
member of contempt. In that respect the case is applicable here in favor of the Senate's (and not of the
Petitioner's ) contention.
Second. It is next contended for the petitioner that the Senate lacks authority to commit him for contempt for a
term beyond its period of legislative session, which ended on May 18, 1950. This contention is based on the
opinion of Mr. Justice Malcolm, concurred in by Justices Street and Villa-Real, in the case of Lopez vs. De los
Reyes (1930), 55 Phil., 170. In that case it appears that on October 23, 1929, Candido Lopez assaulted a
member of the House of Representatives while the latter was going to the hall of the House of Representatives
to attend the session which was then about to begin, as a result of which assault said representative was unable
to attend the sessions on that day and those of the two days next following by reason of the threats which
Candido Lopez made against him. By the resolution of the House adopted November 6, 1929, Lopez was
declared guilty of contempt of the House of Representatives and ordered punished by confinement in Bilibid
Prison for a period of twenty-four hours. That resolution was not complied with because the session of the
House of Representatives adjourned at midnight on November 8, 1929, and was reiterated at the next session
on September 16, 1930. Lopez was subsequently arrested, whereupon he applied for the writ of habeas
corpus in the Court of First Instance of Manila, which denied the application. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court,
six justices voted to grant the writ: Justice Malcolm, Street, and Villa-real, on the ground that the term of
imprisonment meted out to the petitioner could not legally be extended beyond the session of the body in which
the contempt occurred; and Justices Johns, Villamor, and Ostrand, on the ground that the Philippine Legislature
had no power to punish for contempt because it was a creature merely of an Act of the Congress of the United
States and not of a Constitution adopted by the people. Chief Justice Avancea, Justice Johnson, and Justice
Romualdez wrote separate opinions, concurring with Justice Malcolm, Street, and Villa-Real, that the Legislature
had inherent power to punish for contempt but dissenting from the opinion that the order of commitment could
only be executed during the particular session in which the act of contempt was committed.
Thus, on the question under consideration, the Court was equally divided and no decisive pronouncement was
made. The opinion of Mr. Justice Malcolm is based mainly on the following passage in the case of
Anderson vs.Dunn, supra:
And although the legislative power continues perpetual, the legislative body ceases to exist on the
moment of its adjournment or periodical dissolution. It follows that imprisonment must terminate with that
adjournment.
as well as on the following quotation from Marshall vs. Gordon, supra:
And the essential nature of the power also makes clear the cogency and application of the two limitations
which were expressly pointed out in Anderson vs. Dunn, supra, that is, that the power even when applied
to subjects which justified its exercise is limited to imprisonment and such imprisonment may not be
extended beyond the session of the body in which the contempt occurred.
Interpreting the above quotations, Chief Justice Avancea held:
From this doctrine it follows, in my judgement, that the imposition of the penalty is limited to the
existence of the legislative body, which ceases to function upon its final periodical dissolution. The
doctrine refers to its existence and not to any particular session thereof. This must be so, inasmuch as
the basis of the power to impose such penalty is the right which the Legislature has to self-preservation,
and which right is enforceable during the existence of the legislative body. Many causes might be
conceived to constitute contempt to the Legislature, which would continue to be a menace to its
preservation during the existence of the legislative body against which contempt was committed.

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If the basis of the power of the legislature to punish for contempt exists while the legislative body
exercising it is in session, then that power and the exercise thereof must perforce continue until the final
adjournment and the election of its successor.
Mr. Justice Johnson's more elaborate opinion, supported by quotations from Cooley's Constitutional
Limitationsand from Jefferson's Manual, is to the same effect. Mr. Justice Romualdez said: "In my opinion, where
as in the case before us, the members composing the legislative body against which the contempt was
committed have not yet completed their three-year term, the House may take action against the petitioner
herein."
We note that the quotations from Anderson vs. Dunn and Marshall vs. Gordon relied upon by Justice Malcolm
are obiter dicta. Anderson vs. Dunn was an action of trespass against the Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of
Representatives of the United States for assault and battery and false imprisonment. The plaintiff had been
arrested for contempt of the House, brought before the bar of the House, and reprimanded by the Speaker, and
then discharged from custody. The question as to the duration of the penalty was not involved in that case. The
question there was "whether the House of Representatives can take cognizance of contempt committed against
themselves, under any circumstances." The court there held that the House of Representatives had the power to
punish for contempt, and affirmed the judgment of the lower court in favor of the defendant. In
Marshall vs.Gordon, the question presented was whether the House had the power under the Constitution to
deal with the conduct of the district attorney in writing a vexatious letter as a contempt of its authority, and to
inflict punishment upon the writer for such contempt as a matter of legislative power. The court held that the
House had no such power because the writing of the letter did not obstruct the performance of legislative duty
and did not endanger the preservation of the power of the House to carry out its legislative authority. Upon that
ground alone, and not because the House had adjourned, the court ordered the discharge of the petitioner from
custody.
The case where the question was squarely decided is McGrain vs. Daugherty, supra. There it appears that the
Senate had adopted a resolution authorizing and directing a select committee of five senators to investigate
various charges of misfeasance and nonfeasance in the Department of Justice after Attorney General Harry M.
Daugherty became its supervising head. In the course of the investigation the committee caused to be served on
Mally S. Daugherty, brother of Harry M. Daugherty and president of the Midland National Bank of Washington
Court House, Ohio, a subpoena commanding him to appear before it for the purpose of giving testimony relating
to the subject under consideration. The witness failed to appear without offering any excuse for his failure. The
committee reported the matter to the Senate and the latter adopted a resolution, "That the President of the
Senate pro tempore issue his warrant commanding the Sergeant-at-Arms or his deputy to take into custody the
body of the said M.S. Daugherty wherever found, and to bring the said M.S. Daugherty before the bar of the
Senate, then and there to answer such questions pertinent to the matter under inquiry as the Senate may order
the President of the Senate pro tempore to propound; and to keep the said M.S. Daugherty in custody to await
the further order of the Senate." Upon being arrested, the witness petitioned the federal court in Cincinnati for a
writ of habeas corpus. The federal court granted the writ and discharged the witness on the ground that the
Senate, in directing the investigation and in ordering the arrest, exceeded its power under the Constitution. Upon
appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, one of the contentions of the witness was that the case ha
become moot because the investigation was ordered and the committee was appointed during the Sixty-eighth
Congress, which expired on March 4, 1926. In overruling the contention, the court said:
. . . The resolution ordering the investigation in terms limited the committee's authority to the period of
the Sixty-eighth Congress; but this apparently was changed by a later and amendatory resolution
authorizing the committee to sit at such times and places as it might deem advisable or necessary. It is
said in Jefferson's Manual: "Neither House can continue any portion of itself in any parliamentary
function beyond the end of the session without the consent of the other two branches. When done, it is
by a bill constituting them commissioners for the particular purpose." But the context shows that the
reference is to the two houses of Parliament when adjourned by prorogation or dissolution by the King.
The rule may be the same with the House of Representatives whose members are all elected for the
period of a single Congress: but it cannot well be the same with the Senate, which is a continuing body
whose members are elected for a term of six years and so divided into classes that the seats of one third
only become vacant at the end of each Congress, two thirds always continuing into the next Congress,
save as vacancies may occur through death or resignation.
Mr. Hinds in his collection of precedents, says: "The Senate, as a continuing body, may continue its
committees through the recess following the expiration of a Congress;" and, after quoting the above

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statement from Jefferson's Manual, he says: "The Senate, however being a continuing body, gives
authority to its committees during the recess after the expiration of a Congress." So far as we are
advised the select committee having this investigation in charge has neither made a final report nor been
discharged; nor has been continued by an affirmative order. Apparently its activities have been
suspended pending the decision of this case. But, be this as it may, it is certain that the committee may
be continued or revived now by motion to that effect, and if, continued or revived, will have all its original
powers. This being so, and the Senate being a continuing body, the case cannot be said to have become
moot in the ordinary sense. The situation is measurably like that in Southern P. Terminal
Co. vs. Interstate Commerce Commission, 219 U. S., 498, 514-516; 55 L. ed., 310, 315, 316; 31 Sup. Ct.
Rep., 279, where it was held that a suit to enjoin the enforcement of an order of the Interstate Commerce
Commission did not become moot through the expiration of the order where it was capable of repetition
by the Commission and was a matter of public interest. Our judgment may yet be carried into effect and
the investigation proceeded with from the point at which it apparently was interrupted by reason of
the habeas corpus proceedings. In these circumstances we think a judgment should be rendered as was
done in the case cited.
What has been said requires that the final order in the District Court discharging the witness from
custody be reversed.
Like the Senate of the United States , the Senate of the Philippines is a continuing body whose members are
elected for a term of six years and so divided that the seats of only one-third become vacant every two years,
two-thirds always continuing into the next Congress save as vacancies may occur thru death or resignation.
Members of the House of Representatives are all elected for a term of four years; so that the term of every
Congress is four years. The Second Congress of the Philippines was constituted on December 30, 1949, and
will expire on December 30, 1953. The resolution of the Senate committing the Petitioner was adopted during
the first session of the Second Congress, which began on the fourth Monday of January and ended in May 18,
1950.
Had said resolution of commitment been adopted by the House of Representatives, we think it could be enforced
until the final adjournment of the last session of the Second Congress in 1953. We find no sound reason to limit
the power of the legislative body to punish for contempt to the end of every session and not to the end of the last
session terminating the existence of that body. The very reason for the exercise of the power to punish for
contempt is to enable the legislative body to perform its constitutional function without impediment or obstruction.
Legislative functions may be and in practice are performed during recess by duly constituted committees
charged with the duty of performing investigations or conducting hearing relative to any proposed legislation. To
deny to such committees the power of inquiry with process to enforce it would be to defeat the very purpose for
which that the power is recognized in the legislative body as an essential and appropriate auxiliary to is
legislative function. It is but logical to say that the power of self-preservation is coexistent with the life to be
preserved.
But the resolution of commitment here in question was adopted by the Senate, which is a continuing body and
which does not cease exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress or of the House of Representatives.
There is no limit as to time to the Senate's power to punish for contempt in cases where that power may
constitutionally be exerted as in the present case.
Mere reflection upon the situation at hand convinces us of the soundness of this proposition. The Senate has
ordered an investigation of the Buenavista and Tambobong estates deal, which we have found it is within its
competence to make. That investigation has not been completed because of the refusal of the petitioner as a
witness to answer certain questions pertinent to the subject of the inquiry. The Senate has empowered the
committee to continue the investigation during the recess. By refusing to answer the questions, the witness has
obstructed the performance by the Senate of its legislative function, and the Senate has the power to remove the
obstruction by compelling the witness to answer the questions thru restraint of his liberty until he shall have
answered them. That power subsists as long as the Senate, which is a continuing body, persists in performing
the particular legislative function involved. To hold that it may punish the witness for contempt only during the
session in which investigation was begun, would be to recognize the right of the Senate to perform its function
but at the same time to deny to it an essential and appropriate means for its performance. Aside from this, if we
should hold that the power to punish for contempt terminates upon the adjournment of the session, the Senate
would have to resume the investigation at the next and succeeding sessions and repeat the contempt
proceedings against the witness until the investigation is completed-an absurd, unnecessary, and vexatious
procedure, which should be avoided.

69

As against the foregoing conclusion it is argued for the petitioner that the power may be abusively and
oppressively exerted by the Senate which might keep the witness in prison for life. But we must assume that the
Senate will not be disposed to exert the power beyond its proper bounds. And if, contrary to this assumption,
proper limitations are disregarded, the portals of this Court are always open to those whose rights might thus be
transgressed.
Third. Lastly, the petitioner invokes the privilege against self-incrimination. He contends that he would
incriminate himself if he should reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000 if that person be a
public official be (witness) might be accused of bribery, and if that person be a private individual the latter might
accuse him of oral defamation.
The ground upon which the witness' claim is based is too shaky, in firm, and slippery to afford him safety. At first
he told the Committee that the transactions were legal, that no laws were violated, and that all requisites had
been replied with; but at the time he begged to be excused from making answers "which might later be used
against me." A little later he explained that although the transactions were legal he refused to answer questions
concerning them "because it violates the right of a citizen to privacy in his dealings with other people . . . I simply
stand on my privilege to dispose of the money that has been paid to me as a result of a legal transaction without
having to account for the use of it." But after being apparently convinced by the Committee that his position was
untenable, the witness testified that, without securing any receipt, he turned over the P440,000 to a certain
person, a representative of Burt, in compliance with Burt's verbal instruction made in 1946; that as far as he
know, that certain person had nothing to do with the negotiations for the settlement of the Buenavista and
Tambobong cases; that he had seen that person several times before he gave him the P440,000 on October 29,
1949, and that since then he had seen him again two or three times, the last time being in December, 1949, in
Manila; that the person was a male, 39 to 40 years of age, between 5 feet, 2 inches and 5 feet, 6 inches in
height. Butt the witness would not reveal the name of that person on these pretexts: " I don't remember the
name; he was a representative of Burt." "I am not sure; I don't remember the name."
We are satisfied that those answers of the witness to the important question, what is the name of that person to
whom you gave the P440,000? were obviously false. His insistent claim before the bar of the Senate that if he
should reveal the name he would incriminate himself, necessarily implied that he knew the name. Moreover, it is
unbelievable that he gave the P440,000 to a person to him unknown.
"Testimony which is obviously false or evasive is equivalent to a refusal to testify and is punishable as contempt,
assuming that a refusal to testify would be so punishable." (12 Am. Jur., sec. 15, Contempt, pp. 399-400.) In the
case of Mason vs. U.S., 61 L. ed., 1198, it appears that Mason was called to testify before a grand jury engaged
in investigating a charge of gambling against six other men. After stating that he was sitting at a table with said
men when they were arrested, he refused to answer two questions, claiming so to do might tend to incriminate
him: (1) "Was there a game of cards being played on this particular evening at the table at which you are
sitting?" (2) "Was there a game of cards being played at another table at this time?" The foreman of the grand
jury reported the matter to the judge, who ruled "that each and all of said questions are proper and that the
answers thereto would not tend to incriminate the witness." Mason was again called and refused to answer the
first question propounded to him, but, half yielding to frustration, he said in response to the second question: "I
don't know." In affirming the conviction for contempt, the Supreme Court of the United States among other things
said:
In the present case, the witness certainly were not relieved from answering merely because they
declared that so to do might incriminate them. The wisdom of the rule in this regard is well illustrated by
the enforced answer, "I don't know ," given by Mason to the second question, after he had refused to
reply under a claim of constitutional privilege.
Since according to the witness himself the transaction was legal, and that he gave the P440,000 to a
representative of Burt in compliance with the latter's verbal instruction, we find no basis upon which to sustain
his claim that to reveal the name of that person might incriminate him. There is no conflict of authorities on the
applicable rule, to wit:
Generally, the question whether testimony is privileged is for the determination of the Court. At least, it is
not enough for the witness to say that the answer will incriminate him. as he is not the sole judge of his
liability. The danger of self-incrimination must appear reasonable and real to the court, from all the
circumstances, and from the whole case, as well as from his general conception of the relations of the
witness. Upon the facts thus developed, it is the province of the court to determine whether a direct

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answer to a question may criminate or not. . . . The fact that the testimony of a witness may tend to show
that he has violated the law is not sufficient to entitle him to claim the protection of the constitutional
provision against self-incrimination, unless he is at the same time liable to prosecution and punishment
for such violation. The witness cannot assert his privilege by reason of some fanciful excuse, for
protection against an imaginary danger, or to secure immunity to a third person. ( 3 Wharton's Criminal
Evidence, 11th ed., secs. 1135,1136.)
It is the province of the trial judge to determine from all the facts and circumstances of the case whether
the witness is justified in refusing to answer. (People vs. Gonzo, 23 N.E. [2d], 210 [Ill. App., 1939].) A
witness is not relieved from answering merely on his own declaration that an answer might incriminate
him, but rather it is for the trial judge to decide that question. (Mason vs. U.S., 244 U. S., 362; 61 L. ed.,
1193, 1200.)
As against witness's inconsistent and unjustified claim to a constitutional right, is his clear duty as a citizen to
give frank, sincere, and truthful testimony before a competent authority. The state has the right to exact
fulfillment of a citizen's obligation, consistent of course with his right under the Constitution. The witness in this
case has been vociferous and militant in claiming constitutional rights and privileges but patently recreant to his
duties and obligations to the Government which protects those rights under the law. When a specific right and a
specific obligation conflict with each other, and one is doubtful or uncertain while the other is clear and
imperative, the former must give way to the latter. The right to life is one of the most sacred that the citizen may
claim, and yet the state may deprive him of it if he violates his corresponding obligation to respect the life of
others. As Mr. Justice Johnson said in Anderson vs. Dunn: "The wretch beneath the gallows may repine at the
fate which awaits him, and yet it is not certain that the laws under which he suffers were made for the security."
Paraphrasing and applying that pronouncement here, the petitioner may not relish the restraint of his liberty
pending the fulfillment by him of his duty, but it is no less certain that the laws under which his liberty is
restrained were made for his welfare.
From all the foregoing, it follows that the petition must be denied, and it is so ordered, with costs.
Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
TUASON, J., dissenting:
The estates deal which gave the petitioner's examination by a committee of the Senate was one that aroused
popular indignation as few cases of graft and corruption have. The investigation was greeted with spontaneous
outburst of applause by an outraged citizenry, and the Senate was rightly commended for making the lead in
getting at the bottom of an infamous transaction.
All the more necessary it is that we should approach the consideration of this case with circumspection, lest the
influence of strong public passions should get the batter of our judgment. It is trite to say that public sentiment
fades into insignificance before a proper observance of constitutional processes, the maintenance of the
constitutional structure, and the protection of individual rights. Only thus can a government of laws, the
foundation stone of human liberty, be strengthened and made secure for that very public.
It is with these thoughts in mind that, with sincere regret, I am constrained to dissent.
The power of the legislative bodies under the American system of government to punish for contempt was at the
beginning totally denied by some courts and students of constitutional law, on the ground that this power is
judicial in nature and belongs to the judiciary branch of the government under the constitutional scheme. The
point however is now settled in favor of the existence of the power. This rule is based on the necessity for the
attainment of the ends for which legislative body is created. Nor can the legitimacy of the purpose of the
investigation which the Senate ordered in this case be disputed. As a corollary, it was likewise legitimate and
necessary for the committee to summon the petitioner with a command to produce his books and documents,
and to commit him to prison for his refusal or failure to obey the subpoena. And, finally, there is no question that

71

the arresting officers were fully justified in using necessary bodily force to bring him before the bar of the Senate
when he feigned illness and stalled for time in the mistaken belief that after the closing of the then current
session of Congress he could go scot-free.
At the same time, there is also universal agreement that the power is not absolute. The disagreement lies in the
extent of the power, and such disagreement is to be found even between decisions of the same court.
Andersonvs. Dunn, 6 Wheat., No. 204, may be said to have taken the most liberal view of the legislature's
authority and Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, which partly overruled and qualified the former, the strictest.
By the most liberal standard the power is restricted "by considerations as to the nature of the inquiry, occasion,
or action in connection with which the contemptuous conduct has occurred." Punishment must be resorted to for
the efficient exercise of the legislative function. Even Anderson vs. Dunn speaks of the power as "the least
possible power adequate to the end proposed."
Judged by any test, the question propounded to the witness does not, in my opinion, meet the constitutional
requirement. It is obvious, I think, that the query has nothing to do with any matter within the cognizance of the
Congress. There is, on the contrary, positive suggestion that the question has no relation to the contemplated
legislation. The statement of the committee in its report that the information sought to be obtained would clear
the names of the persons suspected of having received the money, is, on the surface, the most or only plausible
reason that can be advanced. Assuming this to be the motive behind the question, yet little reflection will show
that the same is beyond the scope of legislative authority and prerogatives. It is outside the concern of the
Congress to protect the honor of particular citizens except that of its own members' as a means of preserving
respect and confidence in that body. Moreover, the purported good intention must assume, if it is to materialize,
that the persons under suspicion are really innocent; for if they are not and the witness will tell the truth, the
result will be to augment their disgrace rather than vindicate their honor. This is all the more likely to happen
because one of those persons, is judged from the committee's findings, the most likely one, to say the least, who
got the money.
If the process of deduction is pressed further, the reasonable conclusion seems to be that the object of the
question is, to mention only one, to prepare the way for a court action. The majority, decision indirectly admits or
insinuates this to be the case. It says, "It appearing that the questioned transaction was affected by the head of
the Department of Justice himself, it is not reasonable to expect the fiscal or the Court of First Instance of Manila
will take the initiative to investigate and prosecute the parties responsible for the deal until and unless the
Senate shall have determined who those parties are and shall have taken such measures as may be within its
competence to take, to redress the wrong that may have been committed against the people as a result of the
transaction." So here is an admission, implied if not express, that the Senate wants the witness to give names
because the fiscal or the courts will not initiate an action against parties who should be prosecuted. It is needless
to say that the institution of a criminal or civil suit is a matter that devolves upon other departments of the
government, alien to the duties of the Congress to look after.
The Congress is at full liberty, of course, to make any investigation for the purpose of aiding the fiscal or the
courts, but this liberty does not carry with it the authority to imprison persons who refuse to testify.
In the intricacy and complexity of an investigation it is often impossible to foretell before its close what relation
certain facts may bear on the final results, and experience has shown that investigators and courts would do well
to veer on the liberal side in the resolution of doubtful questions. But the Senate is not now in the midst of an
inquiry with the situation still in a fluid or tentative state. Now the facts are no longer confused. The committee
has finished its investigation and submitted its final report and the Senate has approved a bill on the bases of the
facts found. All the pertinent facts having been gathered, as is to be inferred from that the report and the nature
of the Senate's action, every question, every fact, every bit of testimony has taken a distinct meaning susceptible
of concrete and definite evaluation; the task has been reduced to the simple process of sifting the grain from the
chaffs.
In the light of the committee's report and of the bill introduced and approved in the Senate, it seems quite plain
that the express naming of the recipient or recipients of the money is entirely unessential to anything the Senate
has a right or duty to do in premises. Names may be necessary for the purpose of criminal prosecution,
impeachment or civil suit. In such proceedings, identities are essential. In some legislative investigations it is
important to know the names of public officials involved. But the particular disclosure sought of the petitioner
here is immaterial to the proposed law. It is enough for the Senate, for its own legitimate object, to learn how the
Department of Justice had in the purchase, and to have a moral conviction as to the identity of the person who
benefited thereby. The need for such legislation and translated into the bill approved by the Senate is met by an

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insight into a broad outline of the deal. To paraphrase the U.S. Supreme Court in Anderson vs. Dunn, although
the passage was used in another connection, legislation is a science of experiment and the relation between the
legislator and the end does not have to be so direct as to strike the eye of the former.
One of the proposed laws have prohibits brothers and near relatives of any president of the Philippines from
intervening directly or indirectly in transactions in which the Government is a party. It is stated that this is subject
to change depending on the answer Arnault may give. This statement is wide open to challenge.
If Arnault should Antonio Quirino it must be admitted that the bill would not be altered. But let us suppose that the
witness will point to another man. Will the result be any different? Will the Senate recall the bill? I can not
perceive the slightest possibility of such eventuality. The pending bill was framed on the assumption that Antonio
Quirino was a party to the deal in question. As has been said, the committee entertains a moral conviction that
this brother of the President was the recipient of a share of the proceeds of sale. No amount of assurance by
Arnault to the contrary would be believed for truth. And, I repeat, the proposed legislation does not need for its
justification legal evidence of Antonio Quirino's intervention in the transaction.
All this in the first place. In the second place, it is not to be assumed that the present bill is aimed solely against
Antonio Quirino whose relation to the Administration is but temporary. It is more reasonable to presume that the
proposed enactment is intended for all time and for all brothers of future presidents, for in reality it is no more
than an extension or enlargement of laws already found in the statute book which guard against temptations to
exploit official positions or influence to the prejudice of public interests.
The disputed question is, in fact, not only irrelevant but moot. This is decisive of the irrelevancy of this question.
As has been noticed, the committee has submitted its final report and recommendation, and a bill has been
approved by the Senate calculated to prevent recurrence of the anomalies exposed. For the purpose for which it
was instituted the inquiry is over and the committee's mission accomplished.
It is true that the committee continues to sit during the recess of Congress, but it is obvious from all the
circumstances that the sole and real object of the extension of the committee's sittings is to receive the witness'
answer in the event he capitulates. I am unable to see any new phase of the deal which the Senate could
legitimately wish to know, and the respondents and this Court have not pointed out any. That the committee has
not sat and nothing has been done so far except to wait for Arnault's answer is a convincing manifestation of the
above conclusion.
The order "to continue its investigation" contained in Senate Resolution No. 16 cannot disguise the realities
revealed by the Senate's actions already referred to and by the emphasis given to the instruction "to continue its
(committee's) examination of Jean L. Arnault regarding the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000."
The instruction 'to continue the investigation' is not entitled to the blind presumption that it embraces matters
other than the revelation by the witness of the name of the person who got the money. Jurisdiction to deprive a
citizen of liberty outside the usual process is not acquired by innuendoes or vague assertions of the facts on
which jurisdiction is made to depend. If the judgment of the court of law of limited jurisdiction does not enjoy the
presumption of legality, much less can the presumption of regularity be invoked for a resolution of a deliberative
body whose power to inflict punishment upon private citizens is wholly derived by implication and vehemently
contested by some judges. At any rate, "the stronger presumption of innocence attends accused at the trial",
"and it is incumbent" upon the respondents "to show that the question pertains to some matter under
investigation." (Sinclair vs. U. S., 73 L. ed., 693.) This rule stems from the fact that the power is in derogation of
the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, which presupposes " a trial in which the rights of the parties shall be decided by a tribunal appointed by law,
which tribunal is to governed by rules of law previously established." Powers so dangerous to the liberty of a
citizen can not be allowed except where the pertinence is clear. A Judge who abuses such power may be
impeached and he acts at all times under the sense of this accountability and responsibility. His victims may be
reached by the pardoning power. But if the Congress be allowed this unbounded jurisdiction of discretion, there
is no redress, The Congress may dispoil of a citizen's life, liberty or property and there is no power on earth to
stop its hand. There is, there can be, no such unlimited power in any department of the government of the
Republic. (Loan Association vs.Topeka, 20 Wall, Nos. 662, 663; Taylor vs. Porter, 4 Hill No. N.Y. 140.)
The above rule and discussion apply with equal force to the instruction to the committee in the original
resolution, "to determine the parties responsible for the deal." It goes without saying that the congress cannot
authorize a committee to do what it itself cannot do. In other words, the` Senate could not insist on the

73

disclosure of Arnault's accomplice in the present state of the investigation if the Senate were conducting the
inquiry itself instead of through a committee.
Our attention is called to the fact that "in the Philippines, the legislative power is vested in the Congress of the
Philippines alone, and therefore that the Congress of the Philippines has a wider range of legislative field than
the Congress of the United States or any state legislature." From this premise the inference is drawn that " the
field of inquiry into it (Philippine Congress) may enter is also wider."
This argument overlooks the important fact that congressional or legislative committees both here and in the
Unived States, do not embark upon fishing expeditions in search of information which by chance may be useful
to legislation. Inquiries entrusted to congressional committee, whether here or in the United States, are
necessarily for specific objects within the competence of the Congress to look into. I do not believe any reason,
rule or principle could be found which would sustain the theory that just because the United States Congress or
a state legislature could legislate on, say, only ten subjects and the Philippine Congress on twenty, the latter's
power to commit to prison for contempt is proportionately as great as that of the former. In the consideration of
the legality of an imprisonment for the contempt by each House, the power is gauged not be the greater or
lesser number of subject matters that fall within its sphere of action, but by the answer to the question, has it
jurisdiction over the matter under investigation? Bearing this distinction in mind, it is apparent that the power of a
legislature to punish for contempt can be no greater nor less than that of any other. Were it possible for the
Philippine Senate and the United States Senate to undertake an investigation of exactly identical anomalies in
their respective departments of justice, could it be asserted with any support of logic that one Senate has a wider
authority to imprison for contempt in such investigation simply because it has a "wider range of legislative field?"
It is said that the Senate bill has not been acted upon by the lower house and that even if it should pass in that
chamber it would still have the President's veto to hurdle. It has been expressly stated at the oral argument, and
there is insinuation in this Court's decision, that the revelation of the name or names of the person or persons
who received the money may help in convincing the House of Representatives or the President of the wisdom of
the pending measure. Entirely apart from the discussion that the House of Representatives and the Chief
Executive have their own idea of what they need to guide them in the discharge of their respective duties, and
they have the facilities of their own for obtaining the requisite data.
There is another objection, more fundamental, to the Senate invoking the interest or convenience of the other
House or the President as ground of jurisdiction. The House of Representatives and the President are absolutely
independent of the Senate, in the conduct of legislative and administrative inquiries, and the power of each
House to imprison for contempt does not go beyond the necessity for its own self-preservation or for making its
express powers effective. Each House exercises this power to protect or accomplish its own authority and not
that of the other House or the President. Each House and the President are supposed to take care of their
respective affairs. The two Houses and the Chief Executive act separately although the concurrence of the three
is required in the passage of legislation and of both Houses in the approval of resolutions. As the U.S. Supreme
Court in Kilbourn vs.Thompson, said, "No general power of inflicting punishment by the Congress (as distinct
from a House is found in the Constitution." "An act of Congress it said which proposed to adjudge a man
guilty of a crime and inflict the punishment, will be considered by all thinking men to be unauthorized by the
Constitution."
Kilbourn vs. Thompson, supra, it is said can not be relied on in this case as a precedent because, so it is also
said, "the subject of the inquiry, which related to a private real-estate pool or partnership, was not within the
jurisdiction of either House of Congress; while here it is not disputed that the subject of the inquiry, which relates
to a transaction involving a questionable expenditure by the Government of P5,000,000 of public funds, is within
the Jurisdiction of the Senate." Yet the remarks of Judge Land is which are quoted in the majority decision point
out that the inquiry "was a normal and customary part of the legislative process." Moreover,
Kilbourn vs. Thompson is important, not for the matter it treated but for the principles it enunciated.
It is also said that Kilbourn vs. Thompson did not meet with universal approval as Judge Land is' article above
mentioned shows. The jurist who delivered the opinion in that case, Mr. Justice Miller, was one of the "giants"
who have ever sat on the Supreme Federal Bench, venerated and eminent for the width and depth of his
learning. Subsequent decisions, as far as I have been able to ascertain, have not rejected or criticized but have
followed it, and it still stands as a landmark in this branch of constitutional law.
If we can lean on private opinions and magazine articles for comfort, the petitioner can cite one by a legal
scholar and author no less reknown and respected than Judge Land is. I refer to Judge Wigmore who, referring

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to an investigation of the U.S. Department of Justice said in an article published in 19 (1925) Illinois Law Review,
452:
The senatorial debauch of investigations poking into political garbage cans and dragging the sewers
of political intrigue filled the winter of 1923-24 with a stench which has not yet passed away. Instead of
employing the constitutional, manly, fair procedure of impeachment, the Senate flung self-respect and
fairness to the winds. As a prosecutor, the Senate presented a spectacle which cannot even be dignified
by a comparison with the persecutive scoldings of Coke and Scroggs and Jeffreys, but fell rather in
popular estimate to the level of professional searchers of the municipal dunghills.
It is far from my thought to subscribe to this vituperation as applied to our Senate. Certainly, this august body
said not only do the right thing but is entitled to the lasting gratitude of the people for taking the courageous
stand it did in probing into an anomaly that robbed a depleted treasury of a huge amount. I have tried to make it
clear that my disagreement with the majority lies not in the propriety or constitutionality of the investigation but in
the pertinence to that investigation of a single question. The investigation, as had been said, was legal and
commendable. My objection is that the Senate having started within the bounds of its authority, has, in entire
good faith, overstepped those bounds and trespassed on a territory reserved to other branches of the
government, when it imprisoned a witness for contumacy on a point that is unimportant, useless, impertinent and
irrelevant, let alone moot.
Thus understood, this humble opinion does not conflict with the views of Judge Land is and all other advocates
of wide latitude for congressional investigations. All are agreed, and the majority accept the proposition, that
there is a limit to the legislative power to punish for contempt. The limit is set in Anderson vs. Dunn which Judge
Land is approved "the least possible power adequate to the end proposed."
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-6749

July 30, 1955

JEAN L. ARNAULT, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
EUSTAQUIO BALAGTAS, as Director of Prisons, respondent-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla, Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor
Jaime De Los Angeles for appellant.
Estanislao A. Fernandez and Roman B. Antonio for appellee.
LABRADOR, J.:
This an appeal from judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch, Honorable Jose F.
Flores presiding, in habeas corpus proceeding, declaring that the continued detention and confinement of Jean
L. Arnault in the new Bilibid Prison, in pursuance of Senate Resolution No. 114, dated November 8, 1952, is
illegal, for the reason that the Senate of the Philippines committed a clear abuse of discretion in considering his
answer naming one Jess D. Santos as the person to whom delivery of the sum of P440,000 was made in the
sale of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estate, as a refusal to answer the question directed by the Senate
committee to him, and on the further ground that said Jean L. Arnault, by his answer has purged himself of
contempt and is consequently entitled to be released and discharged.
Petitioner-appellee was an attorney in-fact or Ernest H. Burt in the negotiations for the purchase of the
Buenavista and Tambobong Estates by the Government of the Philippines. The purchase was effected on
October 21, 1949 and the price paid for both estates was P5,000,000. On February 27, 1950, the Senate of the
Philippines adopted Resolution No. 8, whereby it created a Special Committee to determine "whether the said
purchase was honest, valid and proper, and whether the price involved in the deal was fair and just, the parties
responsible therefor, any other facts the Committee may deem proper in the premises." In the investigation
conducted by the Committee in pursuance of said Resolution, petitioner-appellee was asked to whom a part of

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the purchase price, or P440,000, was delivered. Petitioner-appellee refused to answer this question, whereupon
the Committee resolved on May 15, 1950, to order his commitment to the custody of the Sergeant at-arms of the
Philippines Senate and imprisoned in the new Bilibid Prison in Rizal until such time when he shall reveal to the
Senate or to the Special Committee the name of the person who received the P440,000 and to answer
questions pertinent thereto. In G.R. No. L-3820, petitioner-appellee herein questioned the validity of the
confinement so ordered, by a petition forcertiorari filed in this Court. He contended that the Senate of the
Philippines has no power to punish him for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he
delivered P440,000., that the Legislature lacks authority to punish him for contempt beyond the term of the
legislative session, and that the question of the Senate which he refused to answer is an incriminating question
which the appellee is not bound to answer. All the abovementioned contentions were adversely passed upon by
the decision of this Court, so his petition for release was denied.
In the month of December, 1951, while still in confinement in Bilibid, petitioner-appellee executed an affidavit,
Exhibit A, wherein he gives in detail the history of his life, the events surrounding acquisition of the Buenavista
and Tambobong Estates by Gen. Burt, the supposed circumstances under which he met one by the name of
Jess D. Santos. Upon the presentation of the said affidavit to the said Senate Special Committee, the latter
subjected petitioner to questioning regarding the identity of Jess D. Santos, and after said investigation and
questioning the Committee adopted Resolution No. 114 on November 8, 1952. This Resolution reads as follows:
RESOLUTION APPROVING THE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
BUENAVISTA AND TAMBOBONG ESTATES DEAL, AND ORDERING THE DIRECTOR OF PRISON TO
CONTINUE HOLDING JEAN L. ARNAULT IN HIS CUSTODY, AND IN CONFINEMENT AND
DETENTION AT THE NEW BILIBID PRISON AT MUNTINLUPA, RIZAL, UNTIL THE SAID ARNAULT
SHALL HAVE PURGED HIMSELF OF CONTEMPT OF THE SENATE.
WHEREAS, on the 15th May 1950 the Senate of the Philippines, transcending divisions of party and
faction in the national interest, adopted a Resolution ordering the detention and confinement of Jean L.
Arnault at the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa, Rizal, until he should have purged himself of contempt of
the Senate by revealing the person to whom he gave the sum of P440,000 in connection with the
Buenavista and Tambobong Estates deal, and by answering other pertinent questions in connection
therewith;
WHEREAS, after considering the lengthy testimony offered by the said Jean L. Arnault, and the report
thereon rendered by the Senate Special Committee on the said deal, the Senate holds and finds that,
despite numerous and generous opportunities offered to him at his own instance and solicitation, the
said Jean L. Arnault has failed and refused, and continues to fail and refuse, to reveal the person to
whom he gave the said amount of P440,000, and to answer other pertinent questions in connection with
the Buenavista and Tambobong estates deal;
WHEREAS, the Senate holds and finds that the situation of the said Jean L. Arnault has not materially
changed since he was committed to prison for contempt of the Senate, and since the Supreme Court of
the Philippines, in a judgment long since become final, upheld the power and authority of the Senate to
hold the said Jean L. Arnault in custody, detention, and confinement, said power and authority having
been held to be coercive rather than punitive, and fully justified until the said Jean L. Arnault should have
given the information which he had withheld and continues contumaciously to withhold;
WHEREAS, the insolent and manifest untruthful statements made by the said Jean L. Arnault on the
occasions above referred to constitute a continuing contempt of the Senate, and an added affront to its
dignity and authority, such that , were they to be condoned or overlooked, the power and authority of the
Senate to conduct investigations would become futile and ineffectual because they could be defied by
any person of sufficient stubbornness and malice;
WHEREAS, the Senate holds and finds that the identity of the person to whom the said Jean L. Arnault
gave the amount of P440,000 in connection with the Buenavista and Tambobong estates deal, and the
further information which the Senate requires and which the said Jean L. Arnault arrogantly and
contumaciously withholds, is required for the discharge of its legislative functions, particularly so that
adequate measures can be taken to prevent the repetition of similar frauds upon the Government and
the People of the Philippines and to recover said amount; and

76

WHEREAS, while not insensible to the appeal of understanding and mercy, the Senate holds and finds
that the said Jean L. Arnault, by his insolent and contumacious defiance of the legitimate authority of the
Senate, is trifling with its proceedings, renders himself unworthy of mercy, and, in the language of the
Supreme Court, is his own jailer, because he could open the doors of his prison at any time by revealing
the truth; now therefore, be it
Resolved by the Senate of the Philippines, That the Senate hold and find, as it hereby holds and finds,
that Juan L. Arnault has not purged himself of contempt of the Senate, and has in no way altered his
situation since he has committed to coercive not punitive, imprisonment for such contempt on the 15th
day of May, 1950; and that Senate order, as it hereby orders, the Director of Prisons to hold the said
Jean L. Arnault, in his custody, and in confinement and detention at the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa,
Rizal, in coercive imprisonment, until he should have purged himself of the aforesaid contempt to the
satisfaction, and until order to that effect, of the Senate of the Philippines or of its Special Committee to
investigate the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates deal.
Adopted, November 8, 1952 . (Exhibit 0)
In his petition for the writ of habeas corpus in the Court of First Instance, petitioner-appellee alleges: (1) That the
acquisition by the Government, through the Rural Progress Administration, of the Buenavista and Tambobong
Estates was not illegal nor irregular nor scandalous nor malodorous, but was in fact beneficial to the
Government; (2) that the decision of this Court in G. R. No. L-3820 declared that the Senate did not imprison
Arnault "beyond proper limitations", i.e., beyond the period longer than arresto mayor, as this is the maximum
penalty that can be imposed under the provisions of Article 150 of the Revised Penal Code; (3) that petitionerappellee purged himself of the contempt charges when he disclosed the fact that the one to whom he gave the
P440,000 was Jess D. Santos, and submitted evidence in corroboration thereof; (4) that the Senate is not
justified in finding that the petitioner-appellee did tell the truth when he mentioned Jess D. Santos as the person
to whom he gave the P440,000, specially on the basis of the evidence submitted to it; (5) that the legislative
purpose or intention, for which the Senate ordered the confinement may be considered as having been
accomplished, and, therefore, there is no reason for petitioner-appellee's continued confinement.
The claim that the purchase of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates is beneficial to the government and is
neither illegal nor irregular is beside the point. To our minds, two questions are decisive of this case. The first is:
Did the Senate Special Committee believe the statement of the petitioner-appellee that the person to whom he
gave the P440,000 is one by the name of Jess D. Santos and if it did not, may the court review said finding? And
the second is: If the Senate did not believe the statement, is the continued confinement and detention of the
petitioner-appellee, as ordered in Senate Resolution of November 8, 1952, valid?
On the first question, the Senate found as a fact that petitioner "has failed and refused, and continues to fail and
refuse, to reveal the person to whom he gave the amount of P440,000" and that the situation of petitioner "has
not materially charged since he was committed to prison." In the first resolution of the Senate Special Committee
of May 15, 1950, it found that petitioner "refused to reveal the name of the persons to whom he gave the
P440,000, as well as to answer other pertinent questions related to said amount." It is clear and evident that the
Senate Committee did not believe petitioner's statement that the person to whom he delivered the
abovementioned amount is one by the name of Jess D. Santos. The court a quo, however, arrogating unto itself
the power to review such finding, held that the "petitioner has satisfactorily shown that the person of Jess D.
Santos actually and physically existed in the human flesh," that the opinion or conclusion of the Senate
Committee is not borne to out by the evidence produced at the investigation, that the Senate abused its
discretion in making its conclusion and that under these circumstances the only thing that could in justice be
done to petitioner is to order his release and have his case endorsed to the prosecution branch of the judicial
department for investigation and prosecution as the circumstances warrant.
There is an inherent fundamental error in the course of action that the lower court followed. It assumed that
courts have the right to review the findings of legislative bodies in the exercise of the prerogative of legislation, or
interfere with their proceedings or their discretion in what is known as the legislative process.
The courts avoid encroachment upon the legislature in its exercise of departmental discretion in the
means used to accomplish legitimate legislative ends. Since the legislature is given a large discretion in
reference to the means it may employ to promote the general welfare, and alone may judge what means
are necessary and appropriate to accomplish an end which the Constitution makes legitimate, the courts
cannot undertake to decide whether the means adopted by the legislature are the only means or even

77

the best means possible to attain the end sought, for such course would best the exercise of the police
power of the state in the judicial department. It has been said that the methods, regulations, and
restrictions to be imposed to attain results consistent with the public welfare are purely of legislative
cognizance, and the determination of the legislature is final, except when so arbitrary as to be violative of
the constitutional rights of the citizen. Furthermore, in the absence of a clear violation of a constitutional
inhibition, the courts should assume that legislative discretion has been properly exercised. (11 Am. Jur.,
pp. 901-902).
These the judicial department of the government has no right or power or authority to do, much in the same
manner that the legislative department may not invade the judicial realm in the ascertainment of truth and in the
application and interpretation of the law, in what is known as the judicial process, because that would be in direct
conflict with the fundamental principle of separation of powers established by the Constitution. The only
instances when judicial intervention may lawfully be invoke are when there has been a violation of a
constitutional inhibition, or when there has been an arbitrary exercise of the legislative discretion.
Under our constitutional system, the powers of government are distributed among three coordinate and
substantially independent organs: the legislative, the executive and the judicial. Each of these
departments of the government derives its authority from the Constitution which, in turn, is the highest
expression of the popular will. Each has exclusive cognizance of the matters within its jurisdiction, and is
supreme within its own sphere. (People of the Philippine Islands, et al. vs. Vera, et al 65 Phil., 56; See
also Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 139)
All that the courts may do, in relation to the proceedings taken against petitioner prior to his incarceration, is to
determine if the constitutional guarantee of due process has been accorded him before his incarceration by
legislative order, and this because of the mandate of the Supreme Law of the land that no man shall be deprived
life, liberty or property without due process of law. In the case at bar such right has fully been extended the
petitioner, he having been given the opportunity to be heard personally and by counsel in all the proceedings
prior to the approval of the Resolution ordering his continued confinement.
The second question involves in turn the following propositions: Does the Philippine Senate have the power and
authority to pass its resolution ordering the continued confinement of the petitioner? In the supposition that such
power and authority exist, was such power legitimately exercised after the petitioner had given the name Jess D.
Santos? A study of the text of the resolution readily shows that the Senate found that the petitioner-appellee did
not disclose, by the mere giving of the name Jess D. Santos, the identity of the person to whom the sum of
P440, 000 was delivered, and, in addition thereto that petitioner withheld said identity arrogantly and
contumaciously in continued affront of the Senate's authority and dignity. Although the resolution studiously
avoids saying that the confinement is a punishment, but merely seeks to coerce the petitioner into telling the
truth, the intention is evident that the continuation of the imprisonment ordered is in fact partly unitive. This may
be inferred from the confining made in the resolution that petitioner-appellee's acts were arrogant and
contumacious and constituted an affront to the Senate's dignity and authority. In a way, therefore, the petitioner's
assumption that the imprisonment is punitive is justified by the language of the resolution, wherefore the issue
now before Us in whether the Senate has the power to punish the contempt committed against it under the
circumstances of the case. This question is thus squarely presented before Us for determination.
In the previous case of this same petitioner decided by this Court, G. R. No. L-38201, Arnault vs. Nazareno, et
al. (46 Off. Gaz., No. 7, 3100), it was admitted and we had ruled that the Senate has the authority to commit a
witness if he refuses to answer a question pertinent to a legislative inquiry, to compel him to give the information,
i.e., by reason of its coercive power, not its punitive power. It is now contended by petitioner that if he committed
an offense of contempt or perjury against the legislative body, because he refused to reveal the identity of the
person in accordance with the demands of the Senate Committee, the legislature may not punish him, for the
punishment for his refusal should be sought through the ordinary processes of the law, i. e., by the institution of a
criminal action in a court of justice.
American legislative bodies, after which our own is patterned, have the power to punish for contempt if the
contempt has had the effect of obstructing the exercise by the legislature of, or deterring or preventing it from
exercising, its legitimate functions (Annotation to Jurney vs. MacCraken, 79 L. ed. 814). While the power of the
United States Senate to punish for contempt was not clearly recognized in its earlier decision (See Marshal vs.
Gordon, 61 L. ed. 881), the Supreme Court of the United States two decades ago held that such power and
authority exist. In the case of Jurney vs. MacCraken (294 U. S. 123, 79 L. ed. 802), the question before it was

78

whether or not the Senate could order the confinement of a private citizen because of the destruction and
removal by him of certain papers required to be produced. The court said:
First, The main contention of MacCracken is that the so-called power to punish for contempt may never
be exerted, in the case of a private citizen, solely qua punishment. The argument is that the power may
be used by the legislative body merely as a means of removing an existing obstruction to the
performance of its duties; that the power to punish ceases as soon as the obstruction has been
removed, or its removal has become impossible; and hence that there is no power to punish a witness
who, having been requested to produce papers, destroys them after service of the subpoena. The
contention rests upon a misconception of the limitations upon the power of the Houses of Congress to
punish for contempt. It is true that the scope of the power is narrow. No act is so punishable unless it is
of a nature to obstruct the performance of the duties of the legislature. This may be lack of power,
because, as in Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168, 26 L. ed. 377, there was no legislative duty to be
performed; or because, as in Marshall vs. Gordon, 243 U. S. 521, 61 L. ed. 881, 37 S. Ct. 448, L. R. A.
1917F, 279, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 371, the act complained of is deemed not to be of a character to obstruct
the legislative process. But, where the offending act was of a nature to obstruct the legislative process,
the fact that the obstruction has since been removed, or that its removal has become impossible is
without legal significance.
The power to punish a private citizen for a past and completed act was exerted by Congress as early as
1795; and since then it has been exercised on several occasions. It was asserted, before the Revolution,
by the colonial assemblies, in intimation of the British House of Commons; and afterwards by the
Continental Congress and by state legislative bodies. In Anderson vs. Dunn, 6 Wheat, 204, 5 L. ed. 242,
decided in 1821, it was held that the House had power to punish a private citizen for an attempt to bribe
a member. No case has been found in which an exertion of the power to punish for contempt has been
successfully challenged on the ground that, before punishment, the offending act had been
consummated or that the obstruction suffered was irremediable. The statement in the opinion in
Marshall vs. Gordon, 243 U. S. 521, 61 L. ed. 881, 37 S. Ct. 448, L. R. A. 1917F. 279 Ann. Cas. 1918B,
371, supra, upon which MacCracken relies, must be read in the light of the particular facts. It was there
recognized that the only jurisdictional test to be applied by the court is the character of the offense; and
that the continuance of the obstruction, or the likelihood of its repetition, are considerations for the
discretion of the legislators in meting out the punishment.
Here, we are concerned not with an extention of congressional privilege, but with vindication of the
established and essential privilege of requiring the production of evidence. For this purpose, the power to
punish for a past contempt is an appropriate means. Compare Ex parte Nugent (C. C.) 1 Brunner, Col.
Cas. 296, Fed. Cas No. 10375; Steward vs. Bleine, 1 MacArth. 453. The apprehensions expressed from
time to time in congressional debates, in opposition to particular exercise of the contempt power
concerned, not the power to punish, as such, but the broad, undefined privileges which it was believed
might find sanction in that power. The ground for such fears has since been effectively removed by the
decisions of this Court which hold that assertions of congressional privilege are subject to judicial review.
Melbourn vs. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168, 26 L. ed. 377, supra; and that the power to punish for contempt
may not be extended to slanderous attacks which presents no immediate obstruction to legislative
processes. Marshall vs. Gordon, 243 U. S. 521, 61 L. ed. 881, 37 S. Ct. 448, L.R. A. 1917F, Ann. Cas.
1918B, 731 supra.
The principle that Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses is founded upon
reason and policy. Said power must be considered implied or incidental to the exercise of legislative power, or
necessary to effectuate said power. How could a legislative body obtain the knowledge and information on which
to base intended legislation if it cannot require and compel the disclosure of such knowledge and information, if it
is impotent to punish a defiance of its power and authority? When the framers of the Constitution adopted the
principle of separation of powers, making each branch supreme within the realm of its respective authority, it
must have intended each department's authority to be full and complete, independently of the other's authority
and power. And how could the authority and power become complete if for every act of refusal, every act of
defiance, every act of contumacy against it, the legislative body must resort to the judicial department for the
appropriate remedy, because it is impotent by itself to punish or deal therewith, with the affronts committed
against its authority or dignity. The process by which a contumacious witness is dealt with by the legislature in
order to enable it to exercise its legislative power or authority must be distinguished from the judicial process by
which offenders are brought to the courts of justice for the meting of the punishment which the criminal law
imposes upon them. The former falls exclusively within the legislative authority, the latter within the domain of the

79

courts; because the former is a necessary concommitant of the legislative power or process, while the latter has
to do with the enforcement and application of the criminal law.
We must also and that provided the contempt is related to the exercise of the legislative power and is committed
in the course of the legislative process, the legislature's authority to deal with the defiant and contumacious
witness should be supreme, and unless there is a manifest and absolute disregard of discretion and a mere
exertion of arbitrary power coming within the reach of constitutional limitations, the exercise of the authority is
not subject to judicial interference. (Marshall vs. Gordon, supra).
The next question concerns the claim that the petitioner has purged himself of contempt, because he says he
has already answered the original question which he had previously been required to answer. In order that the
petitioner may be considered as having purged himself of the contempt, it is necessary that he should have
testified truthfully, disclosing the real identity of the person subject of the inquiry. No person guilty of contempt
may purge himself by another lie or falsehood; this would be repetition of the offense. It is true that he gave a
name, Jess D. Santos, as that of the person to whom delivery of the sum of P440,000 was made. The Senate
Committee refused to believe, and justly, that is the real name of the person whose identity is being the subject
of the inquiry. The Senate, therefore, held that the act of the petitioner continued the original contempt, or
reiterated it. Furthermore, the act further interpreted as an affront to its dignity. It may well be taken as insult to
the intelligence of the honorable members of the body that conducted the investigation. The act of defiance and
contempt could not have been clearer and more evident. Certainly, the Senate resolution declaring the petitioner
in contempt may not be claimed as an exertion of an arbitrary power.
One last contention of petitioner remains to be considered. It is the claim that as the period of imprisonment has
lasted for a period which exceeded that provided by law punishment for contempt, i. e., 6 months of arresto
mayor,the petitioner is now entitled to be released. This claim is not justified by the record. Petitioner was
originally confined by Resolution No. 17 on May 15, 1950. On December 13, 1951, he executed his affidavit and
thereafter he was called to testify again before the Senate Committee. The latter passed its Resolution No. 114
on November 6, 1952, and he presented the petition for habeas corpus in this case on March 3, 1953, i. e., five
months after the last resolution when the Senate found that the petitioner committed another contempt. It is not
true, therefore, that the petitioner's punishment is beyond the full period prescribed in the criminal law.
Besides, the last resolution of November 8, 1952 is also of a coersive nature, in the sense that the Senate
Committee still demands and requires the disclosure of the fact which the petitioner had obstinately refused to
divulge. While the Philippine Senate has not given up hope that the petitioner may ultimately disclose the record,
it is improper for the courts to declare that the continued confinement is an abuse of the legislative power and
thereby interfere in the exercise of the legislative discretion.
The judgment appealed from should be, as it hereby is, reversed, and the petition for the issuance of the writ
ofhabeas corpus denied. The order of the court allowing the petitioner to give bail is declared null and void and
the petitioner is hereby ordered to be recommitted to the custody of the respondent. With cost against the
petitioner-appellee.
Bengzon, Acting C. J., Padilla, and Reyes, A., JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, and Reyes, J. B. L., JJ., concur in the result.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 89914 November 20, 1991

JOSE F.S. BENGZON JR., ABELARDO TERMULO, JOSE MANTECON, VICENTE MILLS JR., LEONARDO
GAMBOA, KURT BACHMANN JR., JOSE V.E. JIMENEZ, ERNESTO CALUYA, AGERICO UNGSON, SUSAN
ROXAS, ELVIE CASTILLO, and CYNTHIA SABIDO LIMJAP, petitioners,
vs.

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THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE AND ITS MEMBERS, represented by and through the
CHAIRMAN, HON. WIGBERTO TAADA, respondents, JOSE S. SANDEJAS, intervenor.
Bengzon, Zarraga, Narciso, Cudala, Pecson & Bengson for petitioners.
Balgos & Perez for intervening petitioner.
Eddie Tamondong and Antonio T. Tagaro for respondents.

PADILLA, J.:p
This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or injuective
relief, to enjoin the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon committee from requiring the petitioners to testify and
produce evidence at its inquiry into the alleged sale of the equity of Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa
Group in thirty-six (36) or thirty-nine (39) corporations.
On 30 July 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG), assisted by the Solicitor General, filed with the Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0035
(PCGG Case No. 35) entitled "Republic of the Philippines vs. Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez, et al.", for
reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages.
The complaint was amended several times by impleading new defendants and/or amplifying the allegations
therein. Under the Second Amended Complaint, 1 the herein petitioners were impleaded as party defendants.
The complaint insofar as pertinent to herein petitioners, as defendants, alleges among others that:
14. Defendants Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez and Juliette Gomez Romualdez, acting by
themselves and/or in unlawful concert with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R.
Marcos, and taking undue advantage of their relationship, influence and connection with the
latter Defendant spouses, engaged in devices, schemes and strategems to unjuestly enrigh
themselves at the expense of Plaintiff and the Filipino people, among others:
(a) Obatained, with the active collaboration of Defendants Sene J. Gabaldon,
Mario D. Camacho, Mamerto Nepomuceno, Carlos J. Valdez, Cesar C. Zalamea
and Francisco Tantuico, Atty. Jose Bengzon, Jr. and his law partners, namely:
Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr., Jose Vicente E. Jimenez, Amando V. Faustino, Jr., and
Leonardo C. Cruz; Jose S. Sandejas and his fellow senior managers of
FMMC/PNI Holdings groups of companies such as Leonardo Gamboa, Vicente T.
Mills, Jr., Jose M. Mantecon, Abelardo S. Termulo, Rex C. Drilon II and Kurt
Bachmann, Jr., control of some of the biggest business enterprises in the
Philippines, such as the Manila Corporation (MERALCO), Benguet Consolidated
and the Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCI Bank) by employing
devious financial schemes and techniques calculated to require the massive
infusion and hemorrhage of government funds with minimum or negligible
"cashout" from Defendant Benjamin Romualdez...
xxx xxx xxx
(m) manipulated, with the support, assistance and collaboration of Philgurantee
officials led by chairman Cesar E.A. Virata and the Senior managers of
FMMC/PNI Holdings, Inc. led by Jose S. Sandejas, Jr., Jose M. Mantecom and
Kurt S. Bachmann, Jr., among others, the formation of Erectors Holdings, Inc.
without infusing additional capital solely for the purpose of Erectors Incorporated
with Philguarantee in the amount of P527,387,440.71 with insufficient
securities/collaterals just to enable Erectors Inc, to appear viable and to borrow
more capitals, so much so that its obligation with Philgurantee has reached a
total of more than P2 Billion as of June 30, 1987.

81

(n) at the onset of the present Administration and/or within the week following the
February 1986 People's Revolution, in conspiracy with, supoort, assistance and
collaboration of the abovenamed lawyers of the Bengzon Law Offices, or
specifically Defendants Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr., V.E. Jimenez, Amando V.
Faustino, Jr., and Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr., manipulated, shcemed, and/or
executed a series of devices intended to conceal and place, and/or for the
purpose of concealing and placing, beyond the inquiry and jurisdiction of the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) herein Defendant's
individual and collective funds, properties, and assets subject of and/or suited int
he instant Complaint.
(o) manuevered, with the technical know-how and legalitic talents of the FMMC
senior manager and some of the Bengzon law partners, such as Attys. Jose F.S.
Bengzon, Jr., Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr., Amando V. Faustino, Jose Vicente E.
Jimenez and Leonardo C. Cruz, the purported sale of defendant Benjamin
Romualdez's interests in the (i) Professional Managers, (ii) A & E International
Corporation (A & E), (iii) First Manila Managerment Corporation (FMMC), (iv)
Philippine World Travel Inc. (PWTI) and its subsidiaries consisting of 36
corporations in all, to PNI Holdings, Inc. (wjose purported incorporations are all
members of Atty. Jose F.S. Bengzon's law firm) for only P5 million on March 3,
1986 or three days after the creation of the Presidential Commission on Good
Government on February 28, 1986, for the sole purpose of deceiving and
preempting the Government, particularly the PCGG, and making it appear that
defendant Benjamin Romualdez had already divested himself of his ownership of
the same when in truth and in fact, his interests are well intact and being
protected by Atty. Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr. and some of his law partners, together
with the FMMC senior managers who still control and run the affiars of said
corporations, and in order to entice the PCGG to approve the said fictitious sale,
the above-named defendants offered P20 million as "donation" to the
Government;
(p) misused, with the connivance, support and technical assitance of the
Bengzon law firm represented by Atty. Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr. as legal counsel,
together with defendants Cesar Zalamea, Antonio Ozaeta, Mario D. Camacho
amd Senen J. Gabaldon as members of the Board of Directors of the Philippine
Commercial International bank (PCIB), the Meralco Pension Fund (Fund, for
short) in the amount of P25 million by cuasing it to be invested in the PCIB and
through the Bank's TSG, assigned to PCI Development and PCI Equity at 50%
each, the Fund's (a) 8,028.011 common shares in the Bank and (b) "Deposit in
Subscription" in the amount of P4,929.972.50 but of the agreed consideration of
P28 million for the said assignment, PCI Development and PCI Equity were able
to pay only P5,500.00 downpayment and the first amortization of P3,937,500.00
thus prompting the Fund to rescind its assignment, and the consequent reversion
of the assigned brought the total shareholding of the Fund to 11,470,555 voting
shares or 36.8% of the voting stock of the PCIB, and this development (which the
defendants themselves orchestrated or allowed to happen) was used by them as
an excuse for the unlawful dismantling or cancellation of the Fund's 10 million
shares for allegedly exceeding the 30-percent ceiling prescribed by Section 12-B
of the General Banking Act, although they know for a fact that what the law
declares as unlawful and void ab initio are the subscriptions in excess of the 30%
ceiling "to the extent of the excess over any of the ceilings prescribed ..." and not
the whole or entire stockholding which they allowed to stay for six years (from
June 30, 1980 to March 24, 1986);
(q) cleverly hid behind the veil of corporate entity, through the use of the names
and managerial expertise of the FMMC senior manager and lawyers identified as
Jose B. Sandejas, Leonardo Gamboa, Vicente T. Mills, Abelardo S, Termulo,
Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr., Jose M. Mantecon, Rex C. Drilon II, Kurt Bachmann, Jr.
together with the legal talents of corporate lawyers, such as Attys. Jose F.S.
Bengzon, Jr., Jose V.E. Jimenez, Amando V. Faustino, Jr., and Leonardo C. Cruz,
the ill-gotten wealth of Benjamin T. Romualdez including, among others, the
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6,229,177 shares in PCIB registered in the names of Trans Middle East Phils.
Equities, Inc. and Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr. which they refused to surrender to
PCGG despite their disclosure as they tried and continue to exert efforts in
getting hold of the same as well as the shares in Benguet registered in the names
of Palm Avenue Holdings and Palm Avenue Realty Development Corp.
purportedly to be applied as payment for the claim of P70 million of a "merger
company of the First Manila Managerment Corp. group" supposedly owned by
them although the truth is that all the said firms are still beneficially owned by
defendants Benjamin Romualdez.
xxx xxx xxx
On 28 September 1988, petitioner (as defendants) filed their respective answers.

2 Meanwhile, from 2 to 6 August 1988,

conflicting reports on the disposition by the PCGG of the "Romualdez corporations" were carried in various metropolitan newspapers. Thus, one newspaper
reported that the Romuladez firms had not been sequestered because of the opposition of certain PCGG officials who "had worked prviously as lawyers of
the Marcos crony firms." Another daily reported otherwise, while others declared that on 3 March 1986, or shortly after the EDSA February 1986 revolution,
the Romualdez companies" were sold for P5 million, without PCGG approval, to a holding company controlled by Romualdez, and that Ricardo Lopa, the
President's brother-in-law, had effectively taken over the firms, even pending negotiations for the purchase of the corporations, for the same price of P5
million which was reportedly way below the fair value of their assets. 3

On 13 September 1988, the Senate Minority Floor Leader, Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile delivered a speech "on a
matter of personal privilege" before the Senate on the alleged "take-over personal privilege" before the Senate
on the alleged "take-over of SOLOIL Incorporated, the flaship of the First Manila Management of Companies
(FMMC) by Ricardo Lopa" and called upon "the Senate to look into the possible violation of the law in the case,
particularly with regard to Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." 4
On motion of Senator Orlando Mercado, the matter was referred by the Senate to the Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers (Blue Ribbon Committee). 5 Thereafter, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee started its investigation
on the matter. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the Committee to appear before it and testify on "what they know" regarding the "sale of
thirty-six (36) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez."

At the hearing held on 23 May 1989, Ricardo Lopa declined to testify on the ground that his testimony may
"unduly prejudice" the defendants in Civil Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner Jose F.S.
Bengzon, Jr. likewise refused to testify involing his constitutional right to due process, and averring that the
publicity generated by respondents Committee's inquiry could adversely affect his rights as well as those of the
other petitioners who are his co-defendants in Civil Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan.
The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, thereupon, suspended its inquiry and directed the petitioners to file their
memorandum on the constitutional issues raised, after which, it issued a resolution 6 dated 5 June 1989 rejecting the
petitioner's plea to be excused from testifying, and the Committee voted to pursue and continue its investigation of the matter. Senator Neptali Gonzales
dissented. 7

Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to subpoena them and required their attendance and
testimony in proceedings before the Committee, in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose, in clear and
blatant disregard of their constitutional rights, and to their grave and irreparable damager, prejudice and injury,
and that there is no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the
petitioners filed the present petition for prohibition with a prayer for temporary restraning order and/or injunctive
relief.
Meanwhile, one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan, Jose S. Sandejas, filed
with the Court of motion for intervention, 8 which the Court granted in the resolution 9 of 21 December 1989, and required the respondent
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to comment on the petition in intervention. In compliance, therewith, respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee filed its
comment 10 thereon.

Before discussing the issues raised by petitioner and intervenor, we will first tackle the jurisdictional question
raised by the respondent Committee.
In its comment, respondent Committee claims that this court cannot properly inquire into the motives of the
lawmakers in conducting legislative investigations, much less cna it enjoin the Congress or any its regular and
special commitees like what petitioners seek from making inquiries in aid of legislation, under the doctrine
of separation of powers, which obtaines in our present system of government.
The contention is untenable. In Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 11 the Court held:
83

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not
hrough express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters wihtin its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its
own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and
distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of
each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to
secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government...
xxx xxx xxx
But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of
power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government. The
ovelapping and interlacing of funcstions and duties between the several deaprtments, however,
sometimes makes it hard to say just where the political excitement, the great landmarks of the
Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated, in cases of conflict, the
judicial departments is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the
proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or
constituent units thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature,
scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of
the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries; it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not inr eality
nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation
assigned to it by tyhe Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the
Constitution and to established for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that
instrument secures and guarantess to them. This is in thruth all that is involved in what is termed
"judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even
the, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after
full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised
or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren
legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in
this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation. More thatn that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative
enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also
becuase the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the
wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and
legislative departments of the government.
The "allocation of constituional boundaries" is a task that this Court must perfomr under the Constitution.
Moreowever, as held in a recent case, 12 "(t)he political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the rival
claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution,
although said provision by no means does away with kthe applicability of the principle in appropriate cases." 13

The Court is thus of the considered view that it has jurisdiction over the present controversy for the purpose of
determining the scope and extent of the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to conduct inquiries into
private affirs in purported aid of legislation.
Coming to the specific issues raised in this case, petitioners contend that (1) the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee's inquiry has no valid legislative purpose, i.e., it is not done in aid of legislation; (2) the sale or
disposition of hte Romualdez corporations is a "purely private transaction" which is beyond the power of the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to inquire into; and (3) the inquiry violates their right to due process.
The 1987 Constition expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation. 14 Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:

84

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committee may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights
of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. 15
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not, therefore, absolute or
unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as provided
therein, the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure"
and that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It follows then that
the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due process and the right
not to be compelled to testify against one's self.
The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations in specifically provided for in Sec. 1 of the Senate Rules
of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. Such inquiries may refer to the implementation or reexamination of any law or in connection with any proposed legislation or the formulation of future legislation.
They may also extend to any and all matters vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or in the Seante alone.
As held in Jean L. Arnault vs. Leon Nazareno, et al.,

16 the inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body making it, must be
material or necessary to the exervise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate or to expel a member.

Under Sec. 4 of the aforementioned Rules, the Senate may refer to any committee or committees any speech or
resolution filed by any Senator which in tis judgment requires an appropriate inquiry in aid of legislation. In order
therefore to ascertain the character or nature of an inquiry, resort must be had to the speech or resolution under
which such an inquiry is proposed to be made.
A perusal of the speech of Senator Enrile reveals that he (Senator Enrile) made a statement which was
published in various newspapers on 2 September 1988 accusing Mr. Ricardo "Baby" Lopa of "having taken over
the FMMC Group of Companies." As a consequence thereof, Mr. Lopa wrote a letter to Senator Enrile on 4
September 1988 categorically denying that he had "taken over " the FMMC Group of Companies; that former
PCGG Chairman Ramon Diaz himself categorically stated in a telecast interview by Mr. Luis Beltran on Channel
7 on 31 August 1988 that there has been no takeover by him (Lopa); and that theses repeated allegations of a
"takeover" on his (Lopa's) part of FMMC are baseless as they are malicious.
The Lopa reply prompted Senator Enrile, during the session of the Senate on 13 September 1988, to avail of the
privilege hour, 17 so that he could repond to the said Lopa letter, and also to vindicate his reputation as a Member of the Senate of the Philippines,
considering the claim of Mr. Lopa that his (Enrile's) charges that he (Lopa) had taken over the FMMC Group of Companies are "baseless" and "malicious."
Thus, in his speech,18 Senator Enrile said, among others, as follows:

Mr. President, I rise this afternnon on a matter of personal privilege; the privilege being that I
received, Mr. President, a letter dated September 4, 1988, signed by Mr. ricardo A. Lopa, a.k.a.
or Baby Lopa, wherein he denied categorically that he has taken over the First Manila
Management Group of Companies which includes SOLOIL Incorporated.
xxx xxxx xxx
In answer to Mr. Lopa, I will quote pertinent portions from an Official Memorandum to the
Presidential Commission of Good Government written and signed by former Governor, now
Congressman Jose Ramirez, in his capacity as head of the PCGG Task Force for Region VIII. In
his memorandum dated July 3, 1986, then Governor Ramirez stated that when he and the
members of his task force sought to serve a sequestration order on the management of SOLOIL
in Tanauan, Leyte, management officials assured him that relatives of the President of the
Philippines were personally discussing and representing SOLOIL so that the order of
sequestration would be lifted and that the new owner was Mr. Ricardo A. Lopa.
I will quote the pertinent portions in the Ramire's memorandum.
The first paragraph of the memorandum reads as follows and I quote, Mr. President:
"Our sequestration work of SOLOIL in Tanauan, Leyte was not heeded by
management because they said another representation was being made to this
Commission for the ventual lifting of our sequestrationorder. They even assured

85

us that Mr. Ricardo Lopa and Peping Cojunangco were personally discussing and
representing SOLOIL, so the order of sequestration will finally be lifted. While we
attempted to carry on our order, management refused to cooperate and
vehemently turned down our request to make available to us the records of the
company. In fact it was obviously clear that they will meet us with forcethe
moment we insist on doing normally our assigned task. In view of the impending
threat, and to avoid any untoward incident we decided to temporarily suspend our
work until there is a more categorical stand of this Commission in view of the
seemingly influential represetation being made by SOLOIL for us not to continue
our work."
Another pertinent portion of the same memorandum is paragraph five, which reads as follows,
and I quote Mr. President:
"The President, Mr. Gamboa, this is, I understand, the President of SOLOIL, and
the Plant Superintendent, Mr. Jimenez including their chief counsel, Atty.
Mandong Mendiola are now saying that there have been divestment, and that the
new owner is now Mr. Ricardo Lopa who according to them, is the brother-in-law
of the President. They even went further by telling us that even Peping
Cojuangco who we know is the brother of her excellency is also interested in the
ownership and management of SOLOIL. When he demanded for supporting
papers which will indicate aforesaid divestment, Messrs. Gamboa, Jimenez and
Mendiola refused vehemently to submit these papers to us, instead they said it
will be submitted directly to this Commission. To our mind their continuous
dropping of names is not good for this Commission and even to the President if
our dersire is to achieve respectability and stability of the government."
The contents of the memorandum of then Governor and now Congressman Jose Ramirez were
personally confirmed by him in a news interview last September 7, 1988.
xxx xxxx xxx
Also relevant to this case, Mr. President, is a letter of Mr. Ricardo Lopa himself in August 11,
1988 issue of the newspaper Malaya headlined "On Alleged Takeover of Romualdez Firms."
Mr. Lopa states in the last paragraph of the published letter and I quote him:
12. As of this writing, the sales agreement is under review by the PCGG solely to
determine the appropriate price. The sale of these companies and our prior rigtht
to requires them have never been at issue.
Perhaps I could not make it any clearer to Mr. Lopa that I was not really making baseless and
malicious statements.
Senator Enrile concluded his privilege speech in the following tenor:
Mr. President, it may be worthwhile for the Senate to look into the possible violation of the law in
the case particularly with regard to Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, Section 5 of which reads as follows and I quote:
Sec. 5. Prohibition on certain relatives. It shall be unlawful for the spouse or for
nay relative, by consanguinity or affinity, within the third civil degree, of the
President of the Philippines, the Vice-President of the Philippines, the President
of the Senate, or the Speaker of the House of Representatives, to intervene
directly or indirectly, in any business, transaction, contract or application with the
Government: Provided, that this section shall not apply to any person who prior to
the assumption of office of any of the above officials to whom he is related, has
been already dealing with the Government along the same line of business, nor
to any transaction, contract or application filed by him for approval of which is not

86

discretionary on the part of the officials concerned but depends upon compliance
with requisites provided by law, nor to any act lawfully performed in an official
capacity or in the exercise of a profession.
Mr. President, I have done duty to this Senate and to myself. I leave it to this august Body to
make its own conclusion.
Verily, the speech of Senator Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation; he merely called upon
the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act." I other words, the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by respondent Blue Ribbon
commitee was to find out whether or not the relatives of President Aquino, particularly Mr. ricardo Lopa, had
violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy"
Romualdez to the Lopaa Group. There appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation involved.
The Court is also not impressed with the respondent Committee's argument that the questioned inquiry is to be
conducted pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 212. The said resolution was introduced by Senator Jose D. Lina
in view of the representaions made by leaders of school youth, community groups and youth of nongovernmental organizations to the Senate Committee on Youth and Sports Development, to look into the
charges against the PCGG filed by three (3) stockholders of Oriental petroleum, i.e., that it has adopted a "getrich-quick scheme" for its nominee-directors in a sequestered oil exploration firm.The pertinent portion of Senate
Resolution No. 212 reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREAS, recent developments have shown that no less than the Solicitor-General has stated
that the PCGG Chairman and at least three Commissioners should resign and that the agency
should rid itself of "ineptness, incompetence and corruption" and that the Sandiganbayan has
reportedly ordered the PCGG to answer charges filed by three stockholders of Oriental
Petroleum that it has adopted a "get-rich-quick scheme" for its nominee-directors in a
sequestered oil exploration firm;
WHEREAS, leaders of school youth, community groups and youth of non-governmental
organization had made representations to the Senate Committee on Youth and Sports
Development to look into the charges against the PCGG since said agency is a symbol of the
changes expected by the people when the EDSA revolution took place and that the ill-gotten
wealth to be recovered will fund priority projects which will benefit our people such as CARP, free
education in the elementary and secondary levels reforestration, and employment generation for
rural and urban workers;
WHEREAS, the government and the present leadeship must demonstrate in their public and
private lives integrity, honor and efficient management of government services lest our youth
become disillusioned and lose hope and return to an Idelogy and form of government which is
repugnant to true freedom, democratic participation and human rights: Now, therefore, be it.
Resolved by the Senate, That the activities of the Presidential Commission on Good Government
be investigated by the appropriate Committee in connection with the implementation of Section
26, Article XVIII of the Constitution. 19
Thus, the inquiry under Senate Resolution No. 212 is to look into the charges against the PCGG filed by the
three (3) stockholders of Oriental Petroleum in connection with the implementation of Section 26, Article XVIII of
the Constitution.
It cannot, therefore, be said that the contemplated inquiry on the subject of the privilege speech of Senator Juan
Ponce Enrile, i.e., the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to
the Lopa Group is to be conducted pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 212 because, firstly, Senator Enrile did
not indict the PCGG, and, secondly, neither Mr. Ricardo Lopa nor the herein petitioners are connected with the
government but are private citizens.

87

It appeals, therefore, that the contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee is not really "in aid of legislation"
becuase it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to
find out whether or not the ralatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 RA No. 3019,
the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act", a matter that appears more within the province of the courts rather
than of the legislature. Besides, the Court may take judicial notice that Mr. Ricardo Lopa died during the
pendency of this case. In John T. Watkins vs. United States, 20 it was held held:
... The power of congress to conduct investigations in inherent in the legislative process. That
power is broad. it encompasses inquiries concerning the administration of existing laws as well
as proposed, or possibly needed statutes. It includes surveys of defects in our social,economic,
or political system for the purpose of enabling Congress to remedy them. It comprehends probes
into departments of the Federal Government to expose corruption, inefficiency or waste. But
broad asis this power of inquiry, it is not unlimited. There is no general authority to expose the
private affairs ofindividuals without justification in terms of the functions of congress. This was
freely conceded by Solicitor General in his argument in this case. Nor is the Congress a law
enforcement or trial agency. These are functions of the executive and judicial departments of
government. No inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to and in furtherance of a legitimate
task of Congress. Investigations conducted soly for the personal aggrandizement of the
investigators or to "punish" those investigated are indefensible. (emphasis supplied)
It can not be overlooked that when respondent Committee decide to conduct its investigation of the petitioners,
the complaint in Civil No. 0035 had already been filed with the Sandiganbayan. A perusal of that complaint
shows that one of its principal causes of action against herein petitioners, as defendants therein, is the alleged
sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez. Since the issues in said
complaint had long been joined by the filing of petitioner's respective answers thereto, the issue sought to be
investigated by the respondent Commitee is one over which jurisdiction had been acquired by the
Sandiganbayan. In short, the issue had been pre-empted by that court. To allow the respondent Committee to
conduct its own investigation of an issue already before the Sandiganbayan would not only pose the possibility
of conflicting judgments betweena legislative commitee and a judicial tribunal, but if the Committee's judgment
were to be reached before that of the Sandiganbayan, the possibility of its influence being made to bear on the
ultimate judgment of the Sandiganbayan can not be discounted.
In fine, for the rspondent Committee to probe and inquire into the same justiciable controversy already before
the Sandiganbayan, would be an encroachment into the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that had much
earlier set in. In Baremblatt vs. United States, 21 it was held that:
Broad as it is, the power is not, howevern, without limitations. Since congress may only
investigate into those areas in which it may potentially legislate or appropriate, it cannot inquire
into matters which are within the exclusive province of one of the other branches of the
government. Lacking the judicial power given to the Judiciary, it cannot inquire into mattes that
are exclusively the concern of the Judiciary. Neither can it suplant the Executive in what
exclusively belongs to the Executive. ...
Now to another matter. It has been held that "a congressional committee's right to inquire is 'subject to all
relevant limitations placed by the Constitution on governmental action,' including "'the relevant limitations of the
Bill of Rights'." 22
In another case
... the mere semblance of legislative purpose would not justify an inquiry in the face of the Bill of
Rights. The critical element is the exeistence of, and the weight to be ascribed to, the interest of
the Congress in demanding disclosures from an unwilling witness. We cannot simply assume,
however, that every congressional investigation is justified by a public need that over-balances
any private rights affected. To do so would be to abdicate the responsibility placed by the
Constitution upon the judiciary to insure that the Congress does not unjustifiably encroah upon
an individual's right to privacy nor abridge his liberty of speech, press, religion or assembly. 23
One of the basic rights guaranteed by the Constitution to an individual is the right against self-incrimination.

24 Thir
right constured as the right to remain completely silent may be availed of by the accused in a criminal case; but kit may be invoked by other witnesses only as
questions are asked of them.

88

This distinction was enunciated by the Court in Romeo Chavez vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al. 25 thus

Petitioner, as accused, occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness. Whereas
an ordinary witness may be compelled to take the witness stand and claim the privilege as each
question requiring an incriminating answer is hot at him, an accused may altother refuse to take
the witness stand and refuse to answer any all questions.
Moreover, this right of the accused is extended to respondents in administrative investigations but only if they
partake of the nature of a criminal proceeding or analogous to a criminal proceeding. In Galman vs.
Pamaran, 26 the Court reiterated the doctrine in Cabal vs. Kapuanan (6 SCRA 1059) to illustrate the right of witnesses to invoke the right against selfincrimination not only in criminal proceedings but also in all other types of suit

It was held that:

We did not therein state that since he is not an accused and the case is not a criminal case,
Cabal cannot refuse to take the witness stand and testify, and that he can invoke his right against
self-incrimination only when a question which tends to elicit an answer that will incriminate him is
propounded to him. Clearly then, it is not the characeter of the suit involved but the nature of the
proceedings that controls. The privilege has consistenly been held to extend to all proceedings
sanctioned by law and to all cases in which punishment is sought to be visited upon a witness,
whether a party or not.
We do not here modify these doctrines. If we presently rule that petitioners may not be compelled by the
respondent Committee to appear, testify and produce evidenc before it, it is only becuase we hold that the
questioned inquiry is not in aid of legislation and, if pursued, would be violative of the principle of separation of
powers between the legislative and the judicial departments of government, ordained by the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court holds that, under the facts, including the circumtance that
petitioners are presently impleaded as defendants in a case before the Sandiganbayan, which involves issues
intimately related to the subject of contemplated inquiry before the respondet Committee, the respondent Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee is hereby enjoined from compelling the petitioners and intervenor to testify before it and
produce evidence at the said inquiry.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Feliciano, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr. and Romero,
JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PARAS, J., concurring:

I concur principally because any decision of the respondent committee may unduly influence the Sandiganbayan
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
I regret that I must express a strong dissent the Court's opinion in this case.
The Court is asserting a power which I believe we do not possess. We are encroaching on the turf of Congress.
We are prohibiting the Senate from proceeding with a consitutionally vested function. We are stopping the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee from exercising a legislative prerogative investigations in aid of legislation.
We do so becuase we somehow feel that the purported aim is not the real purpose.

89

The Court has no power to second guess the motives behind an act of a House of Congress. Neither can we
substitute our judgment for its judgment on a matter specifically given to it by the Constitution. The scope of the
legislative power is broad. it emcompasses practically every aspect of human or corporate behavior capable of
regulation. How can this Court say that unraveling the tangled and secret skeins behind the acquisition by
Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez of 39 corporations under the past regime and their sudden sale to the Lopa Group
at the outset of the new dispensation will not result in useful legislation?
The power of either House of Congress to conduct investigations is inherent. It needs no textual grant. As stated
inArnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29 (1950)
Our form of government being patterned after the American system the framers of our
Constitution having drawn largely from American institutions and practices we can, in this
case, properly draw also from American precedents in interpreting analogous provisions of our
Constitution, as we have done in other cases in the past.
Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress
with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its
legislative functions advisely and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative
function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry with process to enforce it is
an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot
legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the
legislation is intended to affect or change: and where the legislative body does not itself possess
the requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to others who
do possess it. ... (At p. 45)
The framers of the present Constitution were not content to leave the power inherent, incidental or implied. The
power is now expressed as follows:
Sec. 21 The Senate or the House of Representatives or may of its respective committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legialtion in accordance with its duly published rules of precedure. The
rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
Apart from the formal requirement of publishing the rules of procedure, I agree that there are three queries
which, if answered in the affirmative, may give us cause to intervene.
First, is the matter being investigated one on which no valid legislation could possibly be enacted?
Second, is Congress encroaching on terrain which the Constitution has reserved as the exclusive domain of
another branch of government?
And third, is Congress violating the basic liberties of an individual?
The classic formulation of the power of the Court to interpret the meaning of "in aid of legislation" is expressed
inKilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
The House of Representatives passed a resolution creating a committee to investigate the financial relations
between Jay Cooke and Co., a depositary of federal funds and a real estate pool. A debtor of Jay Cooke and Co,
Kilbourn, general manager of the pool refused to answer questions put to him by the Committee and to produce
certain book sna papers. Consequently, he was ordered jailed for forty-five days. He brought an action for false
imprisonment and the Supreme Court decided in his favor.
Speaking through Justice Miller, the Court ruled:
The resolution adopted as a sequence of this preamble contains no hint of any intention of final
action by Congress on the subject, In all the argument of the case no suggestion has been made
of what the House of Respresentatives or the Congress could have done in the way of
remedying the wrong or securing the creditors of Jay Cooke and Co., or even the United States.
Was it to be simply a fruitless investigation into the personal affiars of individuals? If so the
House of Representatives had no power or authority in the matter more than any other equal

90

number of gentlemen interested for the government of their country. By fruitless we mean that it
could result in no valid legislation on the subject to which the inquiry referrred. (Kilbourn v.
Thompson, Id. at page 388)
The Kilbourn decision is, however, crica 1880. The world has turned over many times since that era. The same
court which validated separate but equal facilities against of racial discrimination and ruled that a private contract
may bar improved labor standards and social justice legislation has reversed itslef on these and many other
questions.
In McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135; 71 L. Ed. 580 [1927], the court went beyond the express terms of the
Senate resolution directing the investigation of a former Attorney General for non-feasance, misfeasance, and
malfeasance in office. It presumed that the action of the Senate was with a legitimate object.
... Plainly the subject was one on which legislation could be had and would be materially aided
by the information which the investigation was calculated to elicit. This becomes manifest when it
is reflected that the functions of the Department of Justice, the powers and duties of the AttorneyGeneral and the duties of his assitants, are all subject to regulation by congressional legislation,
and that the department is maintained and its activitites are carried on under such appropriations
as in the judgment of Congress are needed from year to year.
The only legitimate object the Senate could have in ordering the investigation was to aid it in
legislating, and we think the subject was the real object. An express avowal of the object would
have been better; but in view of the particular subject matter was not indispenable. In People ex
rel. Mc Donald v. Keeler, 99, N.Y. 463, 52 Am. Rep. 49, 2 N.E. 615, where the Court of Appeals
of New york sustained an investigation order by the House of Representatives of that state where
the resolution contained no avowal, but disclosed that it definitely related to the administrative of
public office the duties of which were subject to legislative regulation, the court said (pp. 485,
487): Where public institutions under the control of the State are ordered to be investigated, it is
generally with the view of some legislative action respecting them, and the same may be said in
respect of public officers,' And again "We are bound to presume that the action of the legislative
body was with a legitimate object if it is capable of being so construed, and we have no right to
assume that the contrary was intended." (McGrain v. Daugherty Id., at page 594-595, Emphasis
supplied)
The American Court was more categorical in United States v. Josephson, 333 U.S. 858 (1938). It declared that
declaration of legislative purpose was conclusive on the Courts:
Whatever may be said of the Committee on the un-American activities, its authorizing resolution
recites it is in aid of legislation and that fact is establshed for courts.
And since the matter before us in somethingwe inherited from the American constitutional system, rulings from
the decision of federal courts may be apropos. (Stamler v. Willis, 287 F. Supp. 734 [1968]
The Court cannot probe into the motives of the members of the Congress.
Barsky v. United States, 167 F. 2d 241 [1948]
The measure of the power of inquiry is the potentiality that constitutional legislation might ensue
from information derived from such inquiry.
The possibility that invalid as well as valid legislation might ensue from an inquiry does not limit
the power of inquiry, since invalid legislation might ensue from any inquiry.
United States v. Shelton, 148 F. Supp. 926 [1957]
The contention of the defendant that the hearing at which he testified and from which the
indictment arose was not in furtherance og a legislative purpose proceeds on the assumption
that a failure to have specific legislation in contemplation, or a failure to show that legislation was
in fact enacted, estabished an absence of legislative purpose. This argument is patently

91

unsound. The investigative power of Congress is not subject to the limitation that hearings must
result in legislation or recommendations for legislation.
United States v. Deutch (147 F. Supp. 89 (1956)
Under the Constitution of the U.S., the Federal Government is a government of limited powers.
The Congress, being the legislative branch of the Federal Government, is also clothed with
limited legislative powers. In orders, however, to carry its legislative powers into effect
successfully, it has always been held that Congress has the power to secure information
concerning matters in respect to which it has the authority to legislate. In fact, it would seem that
Congress must secure information in order to legislate intelligently. Beyond that, the Congress
has the right secure information in order to determine whether or not to legislate on a particular
subject matter on which it is within its constitutional powers to act. (Emphasis Supplied)
The even broader scope of legislative investigation in the Philippine context is explained by a member of the
Constitutional Commission.
The requirement that the investigation be "in aid of legislation" is an essential element for
establishing the jurisdiction of the legislative body. It is, however, a requirement which is not
difficult to satisfy becuase, unlike in the United States, where legislative power is shared by the
United State Congress and the states legislatures, the totality of legislative power is possessed
by the Congress nad its legislative field is well-nigh unlimited. "It would be difficult to define any
limits by which the subject matter of its inquiry can be bounded." (Supra, at p. 46) Moreover, it is
not necessary that every question propounded to a witness must be material to a proposed
legislation. "In other words, the materiality of the question must be determined by its direct
relation to the subject of the inquiry and not by its indirect relation to any proposed or possible
legislation. The reason is that the necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action and form
and character of the action itself are determined by the sum total of the information to be
gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by a fraction to be gathered as a result of the
investigation, and not by a fraction of such information elicited from a single question. (Id., at 48)
On the basis of this interpretation of what "in aid of legislation" means, it can readily be seen that
the phrase contributes practically nothing towards protecting witnesses. Practically any
investigation can be in aid of the broad legislative power of Congress. The limitation, therefore
cannot effectively prevent what Kilbourn v. Thompson (103 U.S. 168 [1880]) characterized as
"roving commissions" or what Watkins v. United States (354 U.S. 178, 200 [1957] labeled as
exposure for the sake of exposure. (Bernas, Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol.
II, 1st Ed., page 132).
Applying the above principles to the present casem, it can readily be seen that the Senate is investigating an
area where it may potentially legislate. The ease with which relatives of the President were allegedly able to
amass great wealth under the past regime is a legitimate area of inquiry. And if we tack on the alleged attempts
o f relatives of a succeeding adminsitration to duplicate the feat, the need for remedial legislation becomes more
imperative.
Our second area of concern is congressional encroachment on matters reserved by the Constitution for the
Executive or the Judiciary.
The majority opinion cites the decision in Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936) explaining our
power to determined conflicting claims of authority. It is indeed the function on this Court to allocate
constitutional boundaries but in the exercise of this "umpire" function we have to take care that we do not keep
any of the three great departments of government from performing functions peculiar to each department or
specifically vested to it sby the Constitution. When a power is vested, ti carries with is everything legitimately
neede to exercise it.
It may be argued that the investigation into the Romualdez Lopa transactions is more appropriate for the
Department of Justice and the judiciary. This argument misses the point of legislative inquiry.

92

The prosecution of offenders by the Department of Justice or the Ombudsman and their trial before courts of
justice is intended to punish persons who violate the law. Legislative investigations go further. The aim is to
arrive at policy determinations which may or may not be enacted into legislation. Referral to prosecutors or
courts of justice is an added bonus. For sure, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee knows it cannot sentence any
offender, no matter how overwhelming the proof that it may gatherm to a jail term. But certainly, the Committee
can recommend to Congress how the situation which enabled get-rich-quick schemes to flourish may be
remedied. The fact that the subject of the investigation may currently be undergoing trial does not restrict the
power of Congress to investigate for its own purposes. The legislative purpose is distinctly different from the
judicial purpose.
In Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 73 L ed. 692 (1928), leases of naval reservations to oil companies
were investigated by the United States Senate. On a finding that certain leases were fraudulent, court action was
recommended. In other words, court action on one hand and legislation on the other, are not mutually exclusive.
They may complement each other.
... It may be conceded that Congress is without authority to compel disclosyres for the purpose of
aiding the prosecution of pending suits; but the authority of that body, directly or through it
Committees, to require pertinent disclosures in aid of its own consitutional power is not abridged
because the information sought to be elicited may also be of use in such suits... It is plain that
investigation of the matters involved in suits brought or to be commenced under the Senate
resolution directing the institution of suits for the cancellation of the leases might directly aid in
respect of legislative action... (Sinclair v. United States, Id.at page 698).
In United States v. Orman, 207 F. 2d Ed. 148 (1953), the court declared that it was pertinent for a legislative
committee to seek facts indicating that a witness was linked to unlawful intestate gambling.
The power of a congressional committee to investigate matters cannot be challenged on the
ground that the Committee went beyond the scope of any contemplated legislative and assumed
the functions of a grand jury. Whre the genral subject of investigation is one concerning which
Congress can legislate, and the information sought might aid the congressional consideration, in
such a situation a legitimate legislative purpose must be presumed...
I submit that the filing of indictments or informations or the trial of certain persons cannot, by themselves, half the
intitiation or stop the progress of legislative investigations.
The other ground which I consider the more important one is where the legislative investigation violates the
liberties of the witnesses.
The Constitution expressly provides that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected.
It should be emphasized that the constitutional restriction does not call for the banning or prohibition of
investigations where a violation of a basis rights is claimed. It only requires that in the course of the proceedings,
the right of persons should be respected.
What the majority opinion mandates is a blanket prohibition against a witness testifying at all, simply because he
is already facing charges before the Sandiganbayan. To my mind, the Consitution allows him to interpose
objections whenever an incriminating question is posed or when he is compelled to reveal his ocurt defenses,
but not ot refuse to take the witness stand completely.
Arnault v. Nazareno, supra, illustrates the reticence, with which the court views petitions to curtail legislative
investigations even where an invocation of individual liberties is made.
In Arnault, the entire country already knew the name of the presidential realtive whom the Sentate was trying to
link to the Tambobong-Buenavista estate anomalies. Still, the Court did not interfere when Arnault refused to
answer specific questions directed at him and he was punished for hir refusal. The Court did not restrain the
Senate when Arnault was sent o the national penitentiary for an indefinite visit until the name which the Senate
wanted him to utter was extracted. Only when the imprisonment became ureasonably prolonged and the
situation in Congress had changed was he released.

93

As pointed out by the respondents, not one question has been asked requiring an answer that would incriminate
the petitioners. The allegation that their basic rights are vilolated is not only without basis but is also premature.
I agree with the respondents that the slae of 39 Romualdez corporations to Mr. Lopa is not a purely private
transaction into which the Senate may not inquire. if this were so, much of the work of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) as it seeks to recover illegally acquired wealth would be negated.
Much of what PCGG is trying to recover is the product of arrangements which are not only private but also
secret and hidden.
I therefore, vote to DISMISS the petition.
Narvasa, J., dissents.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I regret I am unable to give my concurrence, I do not agree that the investigation being conducted by the Blue
Ribbon Committee is not in aid of legislation.
In Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29, this Court observed that "we are bound to presume that the action of the
legislative body was with a legitimate object if it is capable of being so construed, and we have no right ot
assume that the contrary was intended." (People ex rel. Mc Donald vs. Keeler, 99 N.Y. 463; 52 Am. Rep., 49; 2
N.E., 615, quoted with approval by the U.S. Supreme Court in McGrain vs. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135). As far as I
know, that is still the rule today.
More importantly, the presumption is supported by the established facts. The inquiry is sustainable as an implied
of power the legislature and even as expressly limited by the Constitution.
The inquiry deals with alleged manipulations of public funds and illicit acquisitions of properties now being
claimed by the PCGG for the Republic of the Philippines. The purpose of the Committee is to ascertain if and
how such anomalies have been committed. It is settled that the legislature has a right to investigate the
disposition of the public funds it has appropriated; indeed, "an inquiry into the expenditure of all public money is
na indispensable duty of the legislature." Moreover, an investigation of a possible violation of a law may be
useful in the drafting of amendatory legislation to correct or strengthen that law.
The ponencia quotes lengthily from Senator Enrile's speech and concludes that it "contained no suggestions of
contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of section 5 of R.A.
No. 3019." However, according to McGrain v. Daugherty, supra:
Primarily, the purpose for which legislative inquiry and investigation is pursued is to serve as an
aid in legislation. Through it, the legislature is able to obtain facts or data in aid fo proposed
legislation. However, it is not necessary that the resolution ordering an investigation should in
terms expressly state that the object of the inquiry is to obtain data in aid of proposed
legislation. It is enough that such purpose appears from a consideration of the entire proceedings
or one in which legislation could be had and would be materially aided by the information which
the investigation was calculated to elicit.An express avowal of the object would be better, but
such is not indispensable. (Emphasis supplied).
The petitioner's contention that the questioned investigation would compel them to reveal their defense in the
cases now pending against them in the Sandigangbayan is untenable. They know or should know that they
cannot be compelled to answer incriminating questions. The case of Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663,
where we held that an accused may refuse at the outset to take the stand on the ground that the questions to be
put by the prosecutor will tend to incriminate him is, of course, not applicable to them. They are not facing
criminal charges before the Blue Ribbon Committee. Like any ordinary witness, they can invoke the right against
self-incrimination only when and as the incriminating question is propounded.
While it is true that the Court is now allowed more leeway in reviewing the traditionally political acts of the
legislative and executive departments, the power must be exercised with the utmost circumspection lest we
unduly trench on their prerogatives and disarrange the constitutional separation of powers. That power is

94

available to us only if there is a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion, which I do not see in the case at
bar.
Guided by the presumption and the facts, I vote to DISMISS the petition.
Narvasa, J., dissents.

# Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., concurring:
I concur principally because any decision of the respondent committee may unduly influence the Sandiganbayan
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
I regret that I must express a strong dissent the Court's opinion in this case.
The Court is asserting a power which I believe we do not possess. We are encroaching on the turf of Congress.
We are prohibiting the Senate from proceeding with a consitutionally vested function. We are stopping the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee from exercising a legislative prerogative investigations in aid of legislation.
We do so becuase we somehow feel that the purported aim is not the real purpose.
The Court has no power to second guess the motives behind an act of a House of Congress. Neither can we
substitute our judgment for its judgment on a matter specifically given to it by the Constitution. The scope of the
legislative power is broad. it emcompasses practically every aspect of human or corporate behavior capable of
regulation. How can this Court say that unraveling the tangled and secret skeins behind the acquisition by
Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez of 39 corporations under the past regime and their sudden sale to the Lopa Group
at the outset of the new dispensation will not result in useful legislation?
The power of either House of Congress to conduct investigations is inherent. It needs no textual grant. As stated
inArnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29 (1950)
Our form of government being patterned after the American system the framers of our
Constitution having drawn largely from American institutions and practices we can, in this
case, properly draw also from American precedents in interpreting analogous provisions of our
Constitution, as we have done in other cases in the past.
Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress
with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its
legislative functions advisely and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative
function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry with process to enforce it is
an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot
legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the
legislation is intended to affect or change: and where the legislative body does not itself possess
the requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to others who
do possess it. ... (At p. 45)
The framers of the present Constitution were not content to leave the power inherent, incidental or implied. The
power is now expressed as follows:
Sec. 21 The Senate or the House of Representatives or may of its respective committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legialtion in accordance with its duly published rules of precedure. The
rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.

95

Apart from the formal requirement of publishing the rules of procedure, I agree that there are three queries
which, if answered in the affirmative, may give us cause to intervene.
First, is the matter being investigated one on which no valid legislation could possibly be enacted?
Second, is Congress encroaching on terrain which the Constitution has reserved as the exclusive domain of
another branch of government?
And third, is Congress violating the basic liberties of an individual?
The classic formulation of the power of the Court to interpret the meaning of "in aid of legislation" is expressed
inKilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
The House of Representatives passed a resolution creating a committee to investigate the financial relations
between Jay Cooke and Co., a depositary of federal funds and a real estate pool. A debtor of Jay Cooke and Co,
Kilbourn, general manager of the pool refused to answer questions put to him by the Committee and to produce
certain book sna papers. Consequently, he was ordered jailed for forty-five days. He brought an action for false
imprisonment and the Supreme Court decided in his favor.
Speaking through Justice Miller, the Court ruled:
The resolution adopted as a sequence of this preamble contains no hint of any intention of final
action by Congress on the subject, In all the argument of the case no suggestion has been made
of what the House of Respresentatives or the Congress could have done in the way of
remedying the wrong or securing the creditors of Jay Cooke and Co., or even the United States.
Was it to be simply a fruitless investigation into the personal affiars of individuals? If so the
House of Representatives had no power or authority in the matter more than any other equal
number of gentlemen interested for the government of their country. By fruitless we mean that it
could result in no valid legislation on the subject to which the inquiry referrred. (Kilbourn v.
Thompson, Id. at page 388)
The Kilbourn decision is, however, crica 1880. The world has turned over many times since that era. The same
court which validated separate but equal facilities against of racial discrimination and ruled that a private contract
may bar improved labor standards and social justice legislation has reversed itslef on these and many other
questions.
In McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135; 71 L. Ed. 580 [1927], the court went beyond the express terms of the
Senate resolution directing the investigation of a former Attorney General for non-feasance, misfeasance, and
malfeasance in office. It presumed that the action of the Senate was with a legitimate object.
... Plainly the subject was one on which legislation could be had and would be materially aided
by the information which the investigation was calculated to elicit. This becomes manifest when it
is reflected that the functions of the Department of Justice, the powers and duties of the AttorneyGeneral and the duties of his assitants, are all subject to regulation by congressional legislation,
and that the department is maintained and its activitites are carried on under such appropriations
as in the judgment of Congress are needed from year to year.
The only legitimate object the Senate could have in ordering the investigation was to aid it in
legislating, and we think the subject was the real object. An express avowal of the object would
have been better; but in view of the particular subject matter was not indispenable. In People ex
rel. Mc Donald v. Keeler, 99, N.Y. 463, 52 Am. Rep. 49, 2 N.E. 615, where the Court of Appeals
of New york sustained an investigation order by the House of Representatives of that state where
the resolution contained no avowal, but disclosed that it definitely related to the administrative of
public office the duties of which were subject to legislative regulation, the court said (pp. 485,
487): Where public institutions under the control of the State are ordered to be investigated, it is
generally with the view of some legislative action respecting them, and the same may be said in
respect of public officers,' And again "We are bound to presume that the action of the legislative
body was with a legitimate object if it is capable of being so construed, and we have no right to

96

assume that the contrary was intended." (McGrain v. Daugherty Id., at page 594-595, Emphasis
supplied)
The American Court was more categorical in United States v. Josephson, 333 U.S. 858 (1938). It declared that
declaration of legislative purpose was conclusive on the Courts:
Whatever may be said of the Committee on the un-American activities, its authorizing resolution
recites it is in aid of legislation and that fact is establshed for courts.
And since the matter before us in somethingwe inherited from the American constitutional system, rulings from
the decision of federal courts may be apropos. (Stamler v. Willis, 287 F. Supp. 734 [1968]
The Court cannot probe into the motives of the members of the Congress.
Barsky v. United States, 167 F. 2d 241 [1948]
The measure of the power of inquiry is the potentiality that constitutional legislation might ensue
from information derived from such inquiry.
The possibility that invalid as well as valid legislation might ensue from an inquiry does not limit
the power of inquiry, since invalid legislation might ensue from any inquiry.
United States v. Shelton, 148 F. Supp. 926 [1957]
The contention of the defendant that the hearing at which he testified and from which the
indictment arose was not in furtherance og a legislative purpose proceeds on the assumption
that a failure to have specific legislation in contemplation, or a failure to show that legislation was
in fact enacted, estabished an absence of legislative purpose. This argument is patently
unsound. The investigative power of Congress is not subject to the limitation that hearings must
result in legislation or recommendations for legislation.
United States v. Deutch (147 F. Supp. 89 (1956)
Under the Constitution of the U.S., the Federal Government is a government of limited powers.
The Congress, being the legislative branch of the Federal Government, is also clothed with
limited legislative powers. In orders, however, to carry its legislative powers into effect
successfully, it has always been held that Congress has the power to secure information
concerning matters in respect to which it has the authority to legislate. In fact, it would seem that
Congress must secure information in order to legislate intelligently. Beyond that, the Congress
has the right secure information in order to determine whether or not to legislate on a particular
subject matter on which it is within its constitutional powers to act. (Emphasis Supplied)
The even broader scope of legislative investigation in the Philippine context is explained by a member of the
Constitutional Commission.
The requirement that the investigation be "in aid of legislation" is an essential element for
establishing the jurisdiction of the legislative body. It is, however, a requirement which is not
difficult to satisfy becuase, unlike in the United States, where legislative power is shared by the
United State Congress and the states legislatures, the totality of legislative power is possessed
by the Congress nad its legislative field is well-nigh unlimited. "It would be difficult to define any
limits by which the subject matter of its inquiry can be bounded." (Supra, at p. 46) Moreover, it is
not necessary that every question propounded to a witness must be material to a proposed
legislation. "In other words, the materiality of the question must be determined by its direct
relation to the subject of the inquiry and not by its indirect relation to any proposed or possible
legislation. The reason is that the necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action and form
and character of the action itself are determined by the sum total of the information to be
gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by a fraction to be gathered as a result of the
investigation, and not by a fraction of such information elicited from a single question. (Id., at 48)

97

On the basis of this interpretation of what "in aid of legislation" means, it can readily be seen that
the phrase contributes practically nothing towards protecting witnesses. Practically any
investigation can be in aid of the broad legislative power of Congress. The limitation, therefore
cannot effectively prevent what Kilbourn v. Thompson (103 U.S. 168 [1880]) characterized as
"roving commissions" or what Watkins v. United States (354 U.S. 178, 200 [1957] labeled as
exposure for the sake of exposure. (Bernas, Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol.
II, 1st Ed., page 132).
Applying the above principles to the present casem, it can readily be seen that the Senate is investigating an
area where it may potentially legislate. The ease with which relatives of the President were allegedly able to
amass great wealth under the past regime is a legitimate area of inquiry. And if we tack on the alleged attempts
o f relatives of a succeeding adminsitration to duplicate the feat, the need for remedial legislation becomes more
imperative.
Our second area of concern is congressional encroachment on matters reserved by the Constitution for the
Executive or the Judiciary.
The majority opinion cites the decision in Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936) explaining our
power to determined conflicting claims of authority. It is indeed the function on this Court to allocate
constitutional boundaries but in the exercise of this "umpire" function we have to take care that we do not keep
any of the three great departments of government from performing functions peculiar to each department or
specifically vested to it sby the Constitution. When a power is vested, ti carries with is everything legitimately
neede to exercise it.
It may be argued that the investigation into the Romualdez Lopa transactions is more appropriate for the
Department of Justice and the judiciary. This argument misses the point of legislative inquiry.
The prosecution of offenders by the Department of Justice or the Ombudsman and their trial before courts of
justice is intended to punish persons who violate the law. Legislative investigations go further. The aim is to
arrive at policy determinations which may or may not be enacted into legislation. Referral to prosecutors or
courts of justice is an added bonus. For sure, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee knows it cannot sentence any
offender, no matter how overwhelming the proof that it may gatherm to a jail term. But certainly, the Committee
can recommend to Congress how the situation which enabled get-rich-quick schemes to flourish may be
remedied. The fact that the subject of the investigation may currently be undergoing trial does not restrict the
power of Congress to investigate for its own purposes. The legislative purpose is distinctly different from the
judicial purpose.
In Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 73 L ed. 692 (1928), leases of naval reservations to oil companies
were investigated by the United States Senate. On a finding that certain leases were fraudulent, court action was
recommended. In other words, court action on one hand and legislation on the other, are not mutually exclusive.
They may complement each other.
... It may be conceded that Congress is without authority to compel disclosyres for the purpose of
aiding the prosecution of pending suits; but the authority of that body, directly or through it
Committees, to require pertinent disclosures in aid of its own consitutional power is not abridged
because the information sought to be elicited may also be of use in such suits... It is plain that
investigation of the matters involved in suits brought or to be commenced under the Senate
resolution directing the institution of suits for the cancellation of the leases might directly aid in
respect of legislative action... (Sinclair v. United States, Id.at page 698).
In United States v. Orman, 207 F. 2d Ed. 148 (1953), the court declared that it was pertinent for a legislative
committee to seek facts indicating that a witness was linked to unlawful intestate gambling.
The power of a congressional committee to investigate matters cannot be challenged on the
ground that the Committee went beyond the scope of any contemplated legislative and assumed
the functions of a grand jury. Whre the genral subject of investigation is one concerning which
Congress can legislate, and the information sought might aid the congressional consideration, in
such a situation a legitimate legislative purpose must be presumed...

98

I submit that the filing of indictments or informations or the trial of certain persons cannot, by themselves, half the
intitiation or stop the progress of legislative investigations.
The other ground which I consider the more important one is where the legislative investigation violates the
liberties of the witnesses.
The Constitution expressly provides that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected.
It should be emphasized that the constitutional restriction does not call for the banning or prohibition of
investigations where a violation of a basis rights is claimed. It only requires that in the course of the proceedings,
the right of persons should be respected.
What the majority opinion mandates is a blanket prohibition against a witness testifying at all, simply because he
is already facing charges before the Sandiganbayan. To my mind, the Consitution allows him to interpose
objections whenever an incriminating question is posed or when he is compelled to reveal his ocurt defenses,
but not ot refuse to take the witness stand completely.
Arnault v. Nazareno, supra, illustrates the reticence, with which the court views petitions to curtail legislative
investigations even where an invocation of individual liberties is made.
In Arnault, the entire country already knew the name of the presidential realtive whom the Sentate was trying to
link to the Tambobong-Buenavista estate anomalies. Still, the Court did not interfere when Arnault refused to
answer specific questions directed at him and he was punished for hir refusal. The Court did not restrain the
Senate when Arnault was sent o the national penitentiary for an indefinite visit until the name which the Senate
wanted him to utter was extracted. Only when the imprisonment became ureasonably prolonged and the
situation in Congress had changed was he released.
As pointed out by the respondents, not one question has been asked requiring an answer that would incriminate
the petitioners. The allegation that their basic rights are vilolated is not only without basis but is also premature.
I agree with the respondents that the slae of 39 Romualdez corporations to Mr. Lopa is not a purely private
transaction into which the Senate may not inquire. if this were so, much of the work of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) as it seeks to recover illegally acquired wealth would be negated.
Much of what PCGG is trying to recover is the product of arrangements which are not only private but also
secret and hidden.
I therefore, vote to DISMISS the petition.
Narvasa, J., dissents.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I regret I am unable to give my concurrence, I do not agree that the investigation being conducted by the Blue
Ribbon Committee is not in aid of legislation.
In Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29, this Court observed that "we are bound to presume that the action of the
legislative body was with a legitimate object if it is capable of being so construed, and we have no right ot
assume that the contrary was intended." (People ex rel. Mc Donald vs. Keeler, 99 N.Y. 463; 52 Am. Rep., 49; 2
N.E., 615, quoted with approval by the U.S. Supreme Court in McGrain vs. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135). As far as I
know, that is still the rule today.
More importantly, the presumption is supported by the established facts. The inquiry is sustainable as an implied
of power the legislature and even as expressly limited by the Constitution.
The inquiry deals with alleged manipulations of public funds and illicit acquisitions of properties now being
claimed by the PCGG for the Republic of the Philippines. The purpose of the Committee is to ascertain if and
how such anomalies have been committed. It is settled that the legislature has a right to investigate the
disposition of the public funds it has appropriated; indeed, "an inquiry into the expenditure of all public money is
99

na indispensable duty of the legislature." Moreover, an investigation of a possible violation of a law may be
useful in the drafting of amendatory legislation to correct or strengthen that law.
The ponencia quotes lengthily from Senator Enrile's speech and concludes that it "contained no suggestions of
contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of section 5 of R.A.
No. 3019." However, according to McGrain v. Daugherty, supra:
Primarily, the purpose for which legislative inquiry and investigation is pursued is to serve as an
aid in legislation. Through it, the legislature is able to obtain facts or data in aid fo proposed
legislation. However, it is not necessary that the resolution ordering an investigation should in
terms expressly state that the object of the inquiry is to obtain data in aid of proposed
legislation. It is enough that such purpose appears from a consideration of the entire proceedings
or one in which legislation could be had and would be materially aided by the information which
the investigation was calculated to elicit.An express avowal of the object would be better, but
such is not indispensable. (Emphasis supplied).
The petitioner's contention that the questioned investigation would compel them to reveal their defense in the
cases now pending against them in the Sandigangbayan is untenable. They know or should know that they
cannot be compelled to answer incriminating questions. The case of Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663,
where we held that an accused may refuse at the outset to take the stand on the ground that the questions to be
put by the prosecutor will tend to incriminate him is, of course, not applicable to them. They are not facing
criminal charges before the Blue Ribbon Committee. Like any ordinary witness, they can invoke the right against
self-incrimination only when and as the incriminating question is propounded.
While it is true that the Court is now allowed more leeway in reviewing the traditionally political acts of the
legislative and executive departments, the power must be exercised with the utmost circumspection lest we
unduly trench on their prerogatives and disarrange the constitutional separation of powers. That power is
available to us only if there is a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion, which I do not see in the case at
bar.
Guided by the presumption and the facts, I vote to DISMISS the petition.
Narvasa, J., dissents.
[G.R. No. 163783. June 22, 2004]
PIMENTEL vs. CONGRESS
EN BANC
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JUN 22 2004.
G. R. No. 163783 (Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. vs. Joint Committee of Congress to Canvass the Votes Cast for President and
Vice-President in the May 10, 2004 Elections.)
RESOLUTION
By the present Petition for Prohibition, petitioner Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. seeks a judgment declaring null and
void the continued existence of the Joint Committee of Congress (Joint Committee) to determine the authenticity and due
execution of the certificates of canvass and preliminarily canvass the votes cast for Presidential and Vice-Presidential
candidates in the May 10, 2004 elections following the adjournment of Congress sine die on June 11, 2004. The petition
corollarily prays for the issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Joint Committee to cease and desist from
conducting any further proceedings pursuant to the Rules of the Joint Public Session of Congress on Canvassing.
Petitioner posits that with "the adjournment sine die on June 11, 2004 by the Twelfth Congress of its last regular session,
[its] term ... terminated and expired on the said day and the said Twelfth Congress serving the term 2001 to 2004
passed out of legal existence." Henceforth, petitioner goes on, "all pending matters and proceedings terminate upon the
expiration of ... Congress." To advance this view, he relies on "legislative procedure, precedent or practice [as] borne
[out] by the rules of both Houses of Congress."

100

Given the importance of the constitutional issue raised and to put to rest all questions regarding the regularity, validity or
constitutionality of the canvassing of votes fro President and Vice-President in the recently concluded national elections,
this Court assumes jurisdiction over the instant petition pursuant to its power and duty "to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government" under Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution and its original jurisdiction over
petitions for prohibition under Section 5 of the same Article.
After a considered and judicious examination of the arguments raised by petitioner as well as those presented in the
Comments filed by the Solicitor General and respondent Joint Committee, this Court finds that the petition has absolutely
no basis under the Constitution and must, therefore, be dismissed.
Petitioner's claim that his arguments are buttressed by "legislative procedure, precedent or practice [as] borne [out] by
the rules of both Houses of Congress" is directly contradicted by Section 42 of Rule XIV of the Rules adopted by the
Senate, of which he is an incumbent member. This section clearly provides that the Senate shall convene in joint
session during any voluntary orcompulsory recess to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President not
later than thirty days after the day of the elections in accordance with Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution.
Moreover, as pointed out in the Comment filed by the Senate Panel for respondent Joint Committee and that of the Office
of the Solicitor General, the precedents set by the 1992 and 1998 Presidential Elections do not support the move to stop
the ongoing canvassing by the Joint Committee, they citing the observations of former Senate President Jovito Salonga.
Thus, during the 1992 Presidential elections, both Houses of Congress adjourned sine die on May 25, 1992. On June 16,
1992, the Joint Committee finished tallying the votes for President and Vice-President. [1] Thereafter, on June 22, 1992,
the Eighth Congress convened in joint public session as the National Board of Canvassers, and on even date proclaimed
Fidel V. Ramos and Joseph Ejercito Estrada as President and Vice-President, respectively.[2]
cralaw

cralaw

Upon the other hand, during the 1998 Presidential elections, both Houses of Congress adjourned sine die on May 25,
1998. The Joint Committee completed the counting of the votes for President and Vice-President on May 27, 1998. [3] The
Tenth Congress then convened in joint public session on May 29, 1998 as the National Board of Canvassers and
proclaimed Joseph Ejercito Estrada as President and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President and Vice-President,
respectively.[4]
cralaw

cralaw

As for petitioner's argument that "the [e]xistence and [p]roceedings [o]f the Joint Committee of Congress [a]re [i]nvalid,
[i]llegal and [u]nconstitutional [f]ollowing the [a]djournment [s]ine [d]ie [o]f [b]oth Houses of Congress [o]f [t]heir
[r]egular [s]essions on June 11, 2004," he cites in support thereof Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution which reads:
Sec. 15. The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday of July for its regular session, unless a
different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session for such number of days as it may determine until thirty
days before the opening of its next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. The President
may call a special session at any time.
Contrary to petitioner's argument, however, the term of the present Twelfth Congress did not terminate and expire upon
the adjournment sine die of the regular session of both Houses on June 11, 2004.
Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution cited by petitioner does not pertain to the term of Congress, but to its regular
annual legislative sessions and the mandatory 30-day recess before the opening of its next regular session (subject to
the power of the President to call a special session at any time).
Section 4 of Article VIII also of the Constitution clearly provides that "[t]he term of office of the Senators shall be six
years and shall commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their
election." Similarly, Section 7 of the same Article provides that "[t]he Members of the House of Representatives shall be
elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of
June next following their election." Consequently, there being no law to the contrary, until June 30, 2004, the present
Twelfth Congress to which the present legislators belong cannot be said to have "passed out of legal existence."
The legislative functions of the Twelfth Congress may have come to a close upon the final adjournment of its regular
sessions on June 11, 2004, but this does not affect its non-legislativefunctions, such as that of being the National Board
of Canvassers. In fact, the joint public session of both Houses of Congress convened by express directive of Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution to canvass the votes for and to proclaim the newly elected President and Vice-President has
not, and cannot, adjourn sine die until it has accomplished its constitutionally mandated tasks. For only when a board of
canvassers has completed its functions is it rendered functus officio. Its membership may change, but it retains its
authority as a board until it has accomplished its purposes. (Pelayo v. Commission on Elections, 23 SCRA 1374, 1385
[1968], citing Bautista v. Fugoso, 60 Phil. 383, 389 [1934] and Aquino v. Commission on Elections, L-28392, January 29
1968)
Since the Twelfth Congress has not yet completed its non-legislative duty to canvass the votes and proclaim the duly
elected President and Vice-President, its existence as the National Board of Canvassers, as well as that of the Joint

101

Committee to which it referred the preliminary tasks of authenticating and canvassing the certificates of canvass, has not
become functus officio.
In sum, despite the adjournment sine die of Congress, there is no legal impediment to the Joint Committee completing
the tasks assigned to it and transmitting its report for the approval of the joint public session of both Houses of Congress,
which may reconvene without need of call by the President to a special session.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Vitug, J., on official leave; Ynares-Santiago and Austria-Martinez, JJ., on leave.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO
Clerk of Court

EN BANC
SENATOR AQUILINO PIMENTEL, JR., G.R. No. 158088
REP. ETTA ROSALES, PHILIPPINE
COALITION FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF THE INTERNATIONAL Present:
CRIMINAL COURT, TASK FORCE
DETAINEES OF THE PHILIPPINES, Davide, Jr., C.J.,
FAMILIES OF VICTIMS OF Puno,
INVOLUNTARY DISAPPEARANCES, Panganiban,
BIANCA HACINTHA R. ROQUE, Quisumbing,
HARRISON JACOB R. ROQUE, Ynares-Santiago,
AHMED PAGLINAWAN, RON P. SALO, *Sandoval-Gutierrez,
LEAVIDES G. DOMINGO, EDGARDO *Carpio,
CARLO VISTAN, NOEL VILLAROMAN, Austria-Martinez,
CELESTE CEMBRANO, LIZA ABIERA, *Corona,
JAIME ARROYO, MARWIL LLASOS, Carpio Morales,
CRISTINA ATENDIDO, ISRAFEL Callejo, Sr.,
FAGELA, and ROMEL BAGARES, Azcuna,
Petitioners, Tinga,
Chico-Nazario, and
- versus - Garcia, JJ.
OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, represented by Promulgated:
HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, and the
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, represented by HON. BLAS OPLE, July 6, 2005
Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION
102

PUNO J.:

This

is

petition

for mandamus filed

by

petitioners

to

compel

the

Office of the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the
signed copy of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to the Senate of the
Philippines for its concurrence in accordance with Section 21, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution.
The Rome Statute established the International Criminal Court which shall have the power to
exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern xxx
and shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions. [1] Its jurisdiction covers the
crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression as
defined in the Statute.[2] The Statute was opened for signature by all states in Rome on July
17, 1998 and had remained open for signature until December 31, 2000 at the United Nations
Headquarters in New York. The Philippines signed the Statute on December 28, 2000
through Charge d Affairs Enrique A. Manalo of the Philippine Mission to the United
Nations.[3] Its provisions, however, require that it be subject to ratification, acceptance or
approval of the signatory states.[4]
Petitioners filed the instant petition to compel the respondents the Office of the Executive
Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed text of the treaty to
the Senate of the Philippines for ratification.
It is the theory of the petitioners that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic law and
international law, is a function of the Senate. Hence, it is the duty of the executive
department to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute to the Senate to allow it to
exercise its discretion with respect to ratification of treaties. Moreover, petitioners submit
that the Philippines has a ministerial duty to ratify the Rome Statute under treaty law and
customary international law. Petitioners invoke the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties enjoining the states to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose
of a treaty when they have signed the treaty prior to ratification unless they have made their
intention clear not to become parties to the treaty.[5]
103

The Office of the Solicitor General, commenting for the respondents, questioned the standing
of the petitioners to file the instant suit. It also contended that the petition at bar violates the
rule on hierarchy of courts. On the substantive issue raised by petitioners, respondents argue
that the executive department has no duty to transmit the Rome Statute to the Senate for
concurrence.
A petition for mandamus may be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. [6] We have held that to be given due course, a
petition for mandamus must have been instituted by a party aggrieved by the alleged inaction
of any tribunal, corporation, board or person which unlawfully excludes said party from the
enjoyment of a legal right. The petitioner in every case must therefore be an aggrieved party
in the sense that he possesses a clear legal right to be enforced and a direct interest in the
duty or act to be performed.[7] The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the
case is brought before it by a party who has the legal standing to raise the constitutional or
legal question. Legal standing means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that
the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the government act that is
being challenged. The term interest is material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected
by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere
incidental interest.[8]
The petition at bar was filed by Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. who asserts his legal standing
to file the suit as member of the Senate; Congresswoman Loretta Ann Rosales, a member of
the House of Representatives and Chairperson of its Committee on Human Rights; the
Philippine Coalition for the Establishment of the International Criminal Court which is
composed of individuals and corporate entities dedicated to the Philippine ratification of the
Rome Statute; the Task Force Detainees of the Philippines, a juridical entity with the avowed
purpose of promoting the cause of human rights and human rights victims in the country; the
Families of Victims of Involuntary Disappearances, a juridical entity duly organized and
existing pursuant to Philippine Laws with the avowed purpose of promoting the cause of
families and victims of human rights violations in the country; Bianca Hacintha Roque and
Harrison Jacob Roque, aged two (2) and one (1), respectively, at the time of filing of the
104

instant petition, and suing under the doctrine of inter-generational rights enunciated in the
case of Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.;[9] and a group of fifth year working law students from the
University of the Philippines College of Law who are suing as taxpayers.
The question in standing is whether a party has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome
of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.[10]
We find that among the petitioners, only Senator Pimentel has the legal standing to file the
instant suit. The other petitioners maintain their standing as advocates and defenders of
human rights, and as citizens of the country. They have not shown, however, that they have
sustained or will sustain a direct injury from the non-transmittal of the signed text of the
Rome Statute to the Senate. Their contention that they will be deprived of their remedies for
the protection and enforcement of their rights does not persuade. The Rome Statute is
intended to complement national criminal laws and courts. Sufficient remedies are available
under our national laws to protect our citizens against human rights violations and petitioners
can always seek redress for any abuse in our domestic courts.
As regards Senator Pimentel, it has been held that to the extent the powers of Congress
are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to
participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution. [11] Thus, legislators have the
standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the
Constitution in their office and are allowed to sue to question the validity of any official
action which they claim infringes their prerogatives as legislators. The petition at bar invokes
the power of the Senate to grant or withhold its concurrence to a treaty entered into by the
executive branch, in this case, the Rome Statute. The petition seeks to order the executive
branch to transmit the copy of the treaty to the Senate to allow it to exercise such authority.
Senator Pimentel, as member of the institution, certainly has the legal standing to assert such
authority of the Senate.
We now go to the substantive issue.
105

The core issue in this petition for mandamus is whether the Executive Secretary and the
Department of Foreign Affairs have a ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate the copy of
the Rome Statute signed by a member of the Philippine Mission to the United Nations even
without the signature of the President.
We rule in the negative.
In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole
organ and authority in external relations and is the countrys sole representative with foreign
nations.[12] As the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the countrys
mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the
authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition,
maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of
foreign relations.[13] In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to
negotiate with other states.
Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into
treaties, the Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of
2/3 of all the members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him. Section
21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that no treaty or international agreement
shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of
the Senate. The 1935 and the 1973 Constitution also required the concurrence by the
legislature to the treaties entered into by the executive. Section 10 (7), Article VII of the
1935 Constitution provided:
Sec. 10. (7) The President shall have the power, with the concurrence of twothirds of all the Members of the Senate, to make treaties xxx.
Section 14 (1) Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution stated:
Sec. 14. (1) Except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, no treaty shall be
valid and effective unless concurred in by a majority of all the Members of the
Batasang Pambansa.
The participation of the legislative branch in the treaty-making process was deemed essential
to provide a check on the executive in the field of foreign relations. [14] By requiring the
106

concurrence of the legislature in the treaties entered into by the President, the Constitution
ensures a healthy system of checks and balance necessary in the nations pursuit of political
maturity and growth.[15]
In filing this petition, the petitioners interpret Section 21, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution to mean that the power to ratify treaties belongs to the Senate.
We disagree.
Justice Isagani Cruz, in his book on International Law, describes the treaty-making process
in this wise:
The usual steps in the treaty-making process are: negotiation, signature,
ratification, and exchange of the instruments of ratification. The treaty may then
be submitted for registration and publication under the U.N. Charter, although
this step is not essential to the validity of the agreement as between the parties.
Negotiation may be undertaken directly by the head of state but he now usually
assigns this task to his authorized representatives. These representatives are
provided with credentials known as full powers, which they exhibit to the other
negotiators at the start of the formal discussions. It is standard practice for one
of the parties to submit a draft of the proposed treaty which, together with the
counter-proposals, becomes the basis of the subsequent negotiations. The
negotiations may be brief or protracted, depending on the issues involved, and
may even collapse in case the parties are unable to come to an agreement on the
points under consideration.
If and when the negotiators finally decide on the terms of the treaty, the same is
opened for signature. This step is primarily intended as a means of
authenticating the instrument and for the purpose of symbolizing the good faith
of the parties; but, significantly, it does not indicate the final consent of the
state in cases where ratification of the treaty is required. The document is
ordinarily signed in accordance with the alternat, that is, each of the several
negotiators is allowed to sign first on the copy which he will bring home to his
own state.
Ratification, which is the next step, is the formal act by which a state confirms
and accepts the provisions of a treaty concluded by its representatives. The
purpose of ratification is to enable the contracting states to examine the
treaty more closely and to give them an opportunity to refuse to be bound
by it should they find it inimical to their interests. It is for this reason that
most treaties are made subject to the scrutiny and consent of a department
of the government other than that which negotiated them.
107

xxx
The last step in the treaty-making process is the exchange of the
instruments of ratification, which usually also signifies the effectivity of the
treaty unless a different date has been agreed upon by the parties. Where
ratification is dispensed with and no effectivity clause is embodied in the treaty,
the instrument is deemed effective upon its signature.[16] [emphasis supplied]
Petitioners arguments equate the signing of the treaty by the Philippine representative
with ratification. It should be underscored that the signing of the treaty and the ratification
are two separate and distinct steps in the treaty-making process. As earlier discussed, the
signature is primarily intended as a means of authenticating the instrument and as a symbol
of the good faith of the parties. It is usually performed by the states authorized representative
in the diplomatic mission. Ratification, on the other hand, is the formal act by which a state
confirms and accepts the provisions of a treaty concluded by its representative. It is generally
held to be an executive act, undertaken by the head of the state or of the government.
[17]

Thus, Executive Order No. 459 issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 25,

1997 provides the guidelines in the negotiation of international agreements and its
ratification. It mandates that after the treaty has been signed by the Philippine representative,
the same shall be transmitted to the Department of Foreign Affairs. The Department of
Foreign Affairs shall then prepare the ratification papers and forward the signed copy of the
treaty to the President for ratification. After the President has ratified the treaty, the
Department of Foreign Affairs shall submit the same to the Senate for concurrence. Upon
receipt of the concurrence of the Senate, the Department of Foreign Affairs shall comply
with the provisions of the treaty to render it effective. Section 7 of Executive Order No. 459
reads:
Sec. 7. Domestic Requirements for the Entry into Force of a Treaty or
an Executive Agreement. The domestic requirements for the entry into force of
a treaty or an executive agreement, or any amendment thereto, shall be as
follows:
A. Executive Agreements.
i. All executive agreements shall be transmitted to the
Department of Foreign Affairs after their signing for the
preparation of the ratification papers. The transmittal shall
108

include the highlights of the agreements and the benefits

which will accrue to the Philippines arising from them.
ii. The Department of Foreign Affairs, pursuant to the
endorsement by the concerned agency, shall transmit the
agreements to the President of the Philippines for his
ratification. The original signed instrument of ratification
shall then be returned to the Department of Foreign Affairs
for appropriate action.
B. Treaties.
i. All treaties, regardless of their designation, shall comply
with the requirements provided in sub-paragraph[s] 1 and 2,
item A (Executive Agreements) of this Section. In addition,
the Department of Foreign Affairs shall submit the treaties to
the Senate of the Philippines for concurrence in the
ratification by the President. A certified true copy of the
treaties, in such numbers as may be required by the Senate,
together with a certified true copy of the ratification
instrument, shall accompany the submission of the treaties to
the Senate.
ii. Upon receipt of the concurrence by the Senate, the
Department of Foreign Affairs shall comply with the
provision of the treaties in effecting their entry into force.
Petitioners submission that the Philippines is bound under treaty law and international law to
ratify the treaty which it has signed is without basis. The signature does not signify the final
consent of the state to the treaty. It is the ratification that binds the state to the provisions
thereof. In fact, the Rome Statute itself requires that the signature of the representatives of
the states be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory states.
Ratification is the act by which the provisions of a treaty are formally confirmed and
approved by a State. By ratifying a treaty signed in its behalf, a state expresses its
willingness to be bound by the provisions of such treaty. After the treaty is signed by the
states representative, the President, being accountable to the people, is burdened with the
responsibility and the duty to carefully study the contents of the treaty and ensure that they
are not inimical to the interest of the state and its people. Thus, the President has the
discretion even after the signing of the treaty by the Philippine representative whether or not
109

to ratify the same. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties does not contemplate to
defeat or even restrain this power of the head of states. If that were so, the requirement of
ratification of treaties would be pointless and futile. It has been held that a state has no legal
or even moral duty to ratify a treaty which has been signed by its plenipotentiaries. [18] There
is no legal obligation to ratify a treaty, but it goes without saying that the refusal must be
based on substantial grounds and not on superficial or whimsical reasons. Otherwise, the
other state would be justified in taking offense.[19]
It should be emphasized that under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the
President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is
limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification.
[20]

Hence, it is within the authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate

or, having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. [21] Although the refusal of
a state to ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf is a serious step that should not
be taken lightly,[22] such decision is within the competence of the President alone, which
cannot be encroached by this Court via a writ of mandamus. This Court has no jurisdiction
over actions seeking to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties. [23] The
Court, therefore, cannot issue the writ of mandamus prayed for by the petitioners as it is
beyond its jurisdiction to compel the executive branch of the government to transmit the
signed text of Rome Statute to the Senate.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 160261

November 10, 2003

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,

NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS
OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE
SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO
110

C. TEODORO, JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, respondents.

JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160262 November 10, 2003
SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR. AND HENEDINA RAZON-ABAD, petitioners,
ATTYS. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL AND PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, petitioners-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING
OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,
REPRESENTA-TIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH
ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160263 November 10, 2003
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO AND SOLEDAD M. CAGAMPANG, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioners-in-intervention,
vs.
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SENATE PRESIDENT, AND JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR., IN
HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160277 November 10, 2003
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
JOSE G. DE VENECIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, GILBERT TEODORO, JR., FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, JULIO LEDESMA IV, HENRY
LANOT, KIM BERNARDO-LOKIN, MARCELINO LIBANAN, EMMYLOU TALIO-SANTOS, DOUGLAS
CAGAS, SHERWIN GATCHALIAN, LUIS BERSAMIN, JR., NERISSA SOON-RUIZ, ERNESTO NIEVA,
EDGAR ERICE, ISMAEL MATHAY, SAMUEL DANGWA, ALFREDO MARAON, JR., CECILIA CARREONJALOSJOS, AGAPITO AQUINO, FAUSTO SEACHON, JR., GEORGILU YUMUL-HERMIDA, JOSE CARLOS
LACSON, MANUEL ORTEGA, ULIRAN JUAQUIN, SORAYA JAAFAR, WILHELMINO SY-ALVARADO,
CLAUDE BAUTISTA, DEL DE GUZMAN, ZENAIDA CRUZ-DUCUT, AUGUSTO BACULIO, FAUSTINO DY III,
AUGUSTO SYJUCO, ROZZANO RUFINO BIAZON, LEOVIGILDO BANAAG, ERIC SINGSON, JACINTO
PARAS, JOSE SOLIS, RENATO MATUBO, HERMINO TEVES, AMADO ESPINO, JR., EMILIO MACIAS,
ARTHUR PINGOY, JR., FRANCIS NEPOMUCENO, CONRADO ESTRELLA III, ELIAS BULUT, JR., JURDIN
ROMUALDO, JUAN PABLO BONDOC, GENEROSO TULAGAN, PERPETUO YLAGAN, MICHAEL DUAVIT,
JOSEPH DURANO, JESLI LAPUS, CARLOS COJUANGCO, GIORGIDI AGGABAO, FRANCIS
ESCUDERRO, RENE VELARDE, CELSO LOBREGAT, ALIPIO BADELLES, DIDAGEN DILANGALEN,
ABRAHAM MITRA, JOSEPH SANTIAGO, DARLENE ANTONIO-CUSTODIO, ALETA SUAREZ, RODOLF
PLAZA, JV BAUTISTA, GREGORIO IPONG, GILBERT REMULLA, ROLEX SUPLICO, CELIA LAYUS, JUAN
MIGUEL ZUBIRI, BENASING MACARAMBON, JR., JOSEFINA JOSON, MARK COJUANGCO, MAURICIO
DOMOGAN, RONALDO ZAMORA, ANGELO MONTILLA, ROSELLER BARINAGA, JESNAR FALCON,
REYLINA NICOLAS, RODOLFO ALBANO, JOAQUIN CHIPECO, JR., AND RUY ELIAS LOPEZ, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
111

x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160292 November 10, 2003
HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, MA. CECILIA PAPA, NAPOLEON C. REYES,
ANTONIO H. ABAD, JR., ALFREDO C. LIGON, JOAN P. SERRANO AND GARY S. MALLARI, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR. AND ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160295 November 10, 2003
SALACNIB F. BATERINA AND DEPUTY SPEAKER RAUL M. GONZALES, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESEN-TATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING
OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH
ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160310 November 10, 2003
LEONILO R. ALFONSO, PETER ALVAREZ, SAMUEL DOCTOR, MELVIN MATIBAG, RAMON MIQUIBAS,
RODOLFO MAGSINO, EDUARDO MALASAGA, EDUARDO SARMIENTO, EDGARDO NAOE, LEONARDO
GARCIA, EDGARD SMITH, EMETERIO MENDIOLA, MARIO TOREJA, GUILLERMO CASTASUS, NELSON
A. LOYOLA, WILFREDO BELLO, JR., RONNIE TOQUILLO, KATE ANN VITAL, ANGELITA Q. GUZMAN,
MONICO PABLES, JR., JAIME BOAQUINA, LITA A. AQUINO, MILA P. GABITO, JANETTE ARROYO,
RIZALDY EMPIG, ERNA LAHUZ, HOMER CALIBAG, DR. BING ARCE, SIMEON ARCE, JR., EL DELLE
ARCE, WILLIE RIVERO, DANTE DIAZ, ALBERTO BUENAVISTA, FAUSTO BUENAVISTA, EMILY SENERIS,
ANNA CLARISSA LOYOLA, SALVACION LOYOLA, RAINIER QUIROLGICO, JOSEPH LEANDRO LOYOLA,
ANTONIO LIBREA, FILEMON SIBULO, MANUEL D. COMIA, JULITO U. SOON, VIRGILIO LUSTRE, AND
NOEL ISORENA, MAU RESTRIVERA, MAX VILLAESTER, AND EDILBERTO GALLOR, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY HON. SPEAKER JOSE C. DE VENECIA, JR.,
THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY HON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HON. FELIX
FUENTEBELLA, ET AL., respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160318 November 10, 2003
PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., CRISPIN T. REYES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, ALL MEMBERS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. SENATE
PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, AND ALL MEMBERS, PHILIPPINE SENATE, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x

112

G.R. No. 160342 November 10, 2003

ATTY. FERNANDO P.R. PERITO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES, MANILA III, AND ENGR. MAXIMO N. MENEZ JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS A TAXPAYER AND
MEMBER OF THE ENGINEERING PROFESSION, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES REPRESENTED BY THE 83 HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE
HOUSE LED BY HON. REPRESENTATIVE WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160343 November 10, 2003
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING
OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES THROUGH
ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160360 November 10, 2003
CLARO B. FLORES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE SPEAKER, AND THE SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, THROUGH THE SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160365 November 10, 2003
U.P. LAW ALUMNI CEBU FOUNDATION, INC., GOERING G.C. PADERANGA, DANILO V. ORTIZ, GLORIA C.
ESTENZO-RAMOS, LIZA D. CORRO, LUIS V. DIORES, SR., BENJAMIN S. RALLON, ROLANDO P.
NONATO, DANTE T. RAMOS, ELSA R. DIVINAGRACIA, KAREN B. CAPARROS-ARQUILLANO, SYLVA G.
AGUIRRE-PADERANGA, FOR THEMSELVES AND IN BEHALF OF OTHER CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES FELIX
FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERTO TEODORO, BY THEMSELVES AND AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
GROUP OF MORE THAN 80 HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES WHO SIGNED AND FILED THE IMPEACHMENT
COMPLAINT AGAINST SUPREME COURT CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160370 November 10, 2003
FR. RANHILIO CALLANGAN AQUINO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, THE HONORABLE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160376 November 10, 2003

113

NILO A. MALANYAON, petitioner,

vs.
HON. FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERT TEODORO, IN REPRESENTATION OF THE 86
SIGNATORIES OF THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.
AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ITS
SPEAKER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160392 November 10, 2003
VENICIO S. FLORES AND HECTOR L. HOFILEA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AND THE SENATE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160397 November 10, 2003
IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE,
JR., ATTY. DIOSCORO U. VALLEJOS, JR., petitioner.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160403 November 10, 2003
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, HON. JOSE
G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B.
FUENTEBELA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT, HON. FRANKLIN
DRILON,respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160405 November 10, 2003
DEMOCRITO C. BARCENAS, PRESIDENT OF IBP, CEBU CITY CHAPTER, MANUEL M. MONZON,
PRESIDING OF IBP, CEBU PROVINCE, VICTOR A. MAAMBONG, PROVINCIAL BOARD MEMBER,
ADELINO B. SITOY, DEAN OF THE COLLEG EOF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF CEBU, YOUNG LAWYERS
ASSOCAITION OF CEBU, INC. [YLAC], REPRSEENTED BY ATTY. MANUEL LEGASPI, CONFEDERATION
OF ACCREDITED MEDIATORS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. [CAMP, INC], REPRESENTED BY RODERIC R.
POCA, MANDAUE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, [MANLAW], REPRESENTED BY FELIPE VELASQUEZ,
FEDERACION INTERNACIONAL DE ABOGADAS [FIDA], REPRESENTED BY THELMA L. JORDAN,
CARLOS G. CO, PRESIENT OF CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY AND CEBU LADY
LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, INC. [CELLA, INC.], MARIBELLE NAVARRO AND BERNARDITO FLORIDO,
PAST PRESIDENT CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES,
CEBU CHAPTER, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, REPRESENTED BY REP. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AS HOUSE
SPEAKER AND THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILON, AS SENATE
PRESIDENT, respondents.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict, no matter how passionate and seemingly
irreconcilable it may appear to be, over the determination by the independent branches of government of the

114

nature, scope and extent of their respective constitutional powers where the Constitution itself provides for the
means and bases for its resolution.
Our nation's history is replete with vivid illustrations of the often frictional, at times turbulent, dynamics of the
relationship among these co-equal branches. This Court is confronted with one such today involving the
legislature and the judiciary which has drawn legal luminaries to chart antipodal courses and not a few of our
countrymen to vent cacophonous sentiments thereon.
There may indeed be some legitimacy to the characterization that the present controversy subject of the instant
petitions whether the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.
with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution, and whether the
resolution thereof is a political question has resulted in a political crisis. Perhaps even more truth to the view
that it was brought upon by a political crisis of conscience.
In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is sufficient to address all the issues which this
controversy spawns that this Court unequivocally pronounces, at the first instance, that the feared resort to
extra-constitutional methods of resolving it is neither necessary nor legally permissible. Both its resolution and
protection of the public interest lie in adherence to, not departure from, the Constitution.
In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the essential truth
that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of
government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the
governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.
At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefully calibrated by the
Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three branches must be given effect without destroying
their indispensable co-equality.
Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines of republican government, intended as they are to insure that
governmental power is wielded only for the good of the people, mandate a relationship of interdependence and
coordination among these branches where the delicate functions of enacting, interpreting and enforcing laws are
harmonized to achieve a unity of governance, guided only by what is in the greater interest and well-being of the
people. Verily, salus populi est suprema lex.
Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XI
Accountability of Public Officers
SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with
patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for,
and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high
crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as
provided by law, but not by impeachment.
SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives
or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in
the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session
days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its
report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding

115

resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days
from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a
favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary
resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the
Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate
shall forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a
period of one year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for
that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on
trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be
convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and
disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall
nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law.
(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of
this section. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of the Constitution, the 12th Congress of the House of
Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House
Impeachment Rules) on November 28, 2001, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules 1 approved by
the 11th Congress. The relevant distinctions between these two Congresses' House Impeachment Rules are
shown in the following tabulation:

11TH CONGRESS RULES

12TH CONGRESS NEW RULES

RULE II

RULE V

INITIATING IMPEACHMENT

BAR AGAINST INITIATION OF

IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS
AGAINST THE SAME OFFICIAL

Section 2. Mode of Initiating

Impeachment. Impeachment shall
be initiated only by a verified
complaint for impeachment filed by
any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen
upon a resolution of endorsement by
any Member thereof or by a verified
complaint or resolution of
impeachment filed by at least onethird (1/3) of all the Members of the
House.

Section 16. Impeachment

Proceedings Deemed Initiated.
In cases where a Member of the
House files a verified complaint of
impeachment or a citizen files a
verified complaint that is endorsed
by a Member of the House through
a resolution of endorsement
against an impeachable officer,
impeachment proceedings against
such official are deemed initiated
on the day the Committee on
Justice finds that the verified
complaint and/or resolution against
such official, as the case may be,

116

is sufficient in substance, or on the

date the House votes to overturn
or affirm the finding of the said
Committee that the verified
complaint and/or resolution, as the
case may be, is not sufficient in
substance.
In cases where a verified
complaint or a resolution of
impeachment is filed or endorsed,
as the case may be, by at least
one-third (1/3) of the Members of
the House, impeachment
proceedings are deemed
initiated at the time of the filing
of such verified complaint or
resolution of impeachment with
the Secretary General.

RULE V
BAR AGAINST IMPEACHMENT
Section 14. Scope of Bar. No
impeachment proceedings shall be
initiated against the same official
more than once within the period of
one (1) year.

Section 17. Bar Against

Initiation Of Impeachment
Proceedings. Within a period of
one (1) year from the date
impeachment proceedings are
deemed initiated as provided in
Section 16 hereof, no
impeachment proceedings, as
such, can be initiated against the
same official. (Italics in the original;
emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, 2 sponsored by Representative Felix
William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of
legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the
Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)."3
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint 4 (first impeachment
complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices 5 of this Court for "culpable
violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." 6 The complaint was endorsed by
Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, 7 and was referred to the
House Committee on Justice on August 5, 20038 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution
which reads:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall
be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee
within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its
Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with
the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within
ten session days from receipt thereof.

117

The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient
in form,"9 but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. 10 To date, the
Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said
Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a
day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint 11 was filed
with the Secretary General of the House12 by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and
Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded
on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second
impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least
one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives. 13
Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend
that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of
Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more
than once within a period of one year."
In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging that he has a duty as a member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines to use all available legal remedies to stop an unconstitutional impeachment,
that the issues raised in his petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus are of transcendental importance,
and that he "himself was a victim of the capricious and arbitrary changes in the Rules of Procedure in
Impeachment Proceedings introduced by the 12th Congress,"14 posits that his right to bring an impeachment
complaint against then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto had been violated due to the capricious and arbitrary
changes in the House Impeachment Rules adopted and approved on November 28, 2001 by the House of
Representatives and prays that (1) Rule V, Sections 16 and 17 and Rule III, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 thereof be
declared unconstitutional; (2) this Court issue a writ of mandamus directing respondents House of
Representatives et. al. to comply with Article IX, Section 3 (2), (3) and (5) of the Constitution, to return the
second impeachment complaint and/or strike it off the records of the House of Representatives, and to
promulgate rules which are consistent with the Constitution; and (3) this Court permanently enjoin respondent
House of Representatives from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et. al., as citizens and taxpayers, alleging that the issues
of the case are of transcendental importance, pray, in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition, the issuance of a
writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from filing any Articles of Impeachment
against the Chief Justice with the Senate; and for the issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondents
Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief
Justice or, in the event that the Senate has accepted the same, from proceeding with the impeachment trial.
In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and Soledad Cagampang, as citizens, taxpayers, lawyers
and members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that their petition for Prohibition involves public
interest as it involves the use of public funds necessary to conduct the impeachment trial on the second
impeachment complaint, pray for the issuance of a writ of prohibition enjoining Congress from conducting further
proceedings on said second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging that this Court has recognized that he has locus
standito bring petitions of this nature in the cases of Chavez v. PCGG15 and Chavez v. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay
Development Corporation,16 prays in his petition for Injunction that the second impeachment complaint be
declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et. al., as taxpayers and members of the legal profession,
pray in their petition for Prohibition for an order prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from drafting,
adopting, approving and transmitting to the Senate the second impeachment complaint, and respondents De
Venecia and Nazareno from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate.
In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners Representatives Salacnib F. Baterina and Deputy Speaker Raul M. Gonzalez,
alleging that, as members of the House of Representatives, they have a legal interest in ensuring that only
constitutional impeachment proceedings are initiated, pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that the
second impeachment complaint and any act proceeding therefrom be declared null and void.

118

In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso et al., claiming that they have a right to be protected against
all forms of senseless spending of taxpayers' money and that they have an obligation to protect the Supreme
Court, the Chief Justice, and the integrity of the Judiciary, allege in their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that
it is instituted as "a class suit" and pray that (1) the House Resolution endorsing the second impeachment
complaint as well as all issuances emanating therefrom be declared null and void; and (2) this Court enjoin the
Senate and the Senate President from taking cognizance of, hearing, trying and deciding the second
impeachment complaint, and issue a writ of prohibition commanding the Senate, its prosecutors and agents to
desist from conducting any proceedings or to act on the impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc., whose members are citizens and taxpayers, and its
co-petitioner Crispin T. Reyes, a citizen, taxpayer and a member of the Philippine Bar, both allege in their
petition, which does not state what its nature is, that the filing of the second impeachment complaint involves
paramount public interest and pray that Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules and the second
impeachment complaint/Articles of Impeachment be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito, as a citizen and a member of the Philippine Bar
Association and of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and petitioner Engr. Maximo N. Menez, Jr., as a
taxpayer, pray in their petition for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Permanent Injunction to
enjoin the House of Representatives from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that it is mandated by the Code of
Professional Responsibility to uphold the Constitution, prays in its petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that
Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V and Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 of Rule III of the House Impeachment Rules be declared
unconstitutional and that the House of Representatives be permanently enjoined from proceeding with the
second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores prays in his petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that
the House Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu Foundation Inc., et. al., in their petition for Prohibition and
Injunction which they claim is a class suit filed in behalf of all citizens, citing Oposa v. Factoran17 which was filed
in behalf of succeeding generations of Filipinos, pray for the issuance of a writ prohibiting respondents House of
Representatives and the Senate from conducting further proceedings on the second impeachment complaint
and that this Court declare as unconstitutional the second impeachment complaint and the acts of respondent
House of Representatives in interfering with the fiscal matters of the Judiciary.
In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio Callangan Aquino, alleging that the issues in his petition
for Prohibition are of national and transcendental significance and that as an official of the Philippine Judicial
Academy, he has a direct and substantial interest in the unhampered operation of the Supreme Court and its
officials in discharging their duties in accordance with the Constitution, prays for the issuance of a writ prohibiting
the House of Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate and the Senate from
receiving the same or giving the impeachment complaint due course.
In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a taxpayer, alleges in his petition for Prohibition that
respondents Fuentebella and Teodoro at the time they filed the second impeachment complaint, were
"absolutely without any legal power to do so, as they acted without jurisdiction as far as the Articles of
Impeachment assail the alleged abuse of powers of the Chief Justice to disburse the (JDF)."
In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Flores and Hector L. Hofilea, alleging that as professors of
law they have an abiding interest in the subject matter of their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition as it pertains
to a constitutional issue "which they are trying to inculcate in the minds of their students," pray that the House of
Representatives be enjoined from endorsing and the Senate from trying the Articles of Impeachment and that
the second impeachment complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr., without alleging his locus standi, but alleging that the
second impeachment complaint is founded on the issue of whether or not the Judicial Development Fund (JDF)
was spent in accordance with law and that the House of Representatives does not have exclusive jurisdiction in
the examination and audit thereof, prays in his petition "To Declare Complaint Null and Void for Lack of Cause of
Action and Jurisdiction" that the second impeachment complaint be declared null and void.

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In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine Bar Association, alleging that the issues raised in the filing of the
second impeachment complaint involve matters of transcendental importance, prays in its petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment complaint and all proceedings arising therefrom be
declared null and void; (2) respondent House of Representatives be prohibited from transmitting the Articles of
Impeachment to the Senate; and (3) respondent Senate be prohibited from accepting the Articles of
Impeachment and from conducting any proceedings thereon.
In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas et. al., as citizens and taxpayers, pray in their petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment complaint as well as the resolution of endorsement and
impeachment by the respondent House of Representatives be declared null and void and (2) respondents
Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon be prohibited from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against
the Chief Justice or, in the event that they have accepted the same, that they be prohibited from proceeding with
the impeachment trial.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262 and 160263, the first three of the eighteen which
were filed before this Court,18 prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or preliminary
injunction to prevent the House of Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment arising from
the second impeachment complaint to the Senate. Petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160261 likewise
prayed for the declaration of the November 28, 2001 House Impeachment Rules as null and void for being
unconstitutional.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277, 160292 and 160295, which were filed on October 28,
2003, sought similar relief. In addition, petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160292 alleged that House
Resolution No. 260 (calling for a legislative inquiry into the administration by the Chief Justice of the JDF)
infringes on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and is a direct violation of the constitutional
principle of fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
On October 28, 2003, during the plenary session of the House of Representatives, a motion was put forth that
the second impeachment complaint be formally transmitted to the Senate, but it was not carried because the
House of Representatives adjourned for lack of quorum,19 and as reflected above, to date, the Articles of
Impeachment have yet to be forwarded to the Senate.
Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
which were filed on or before October 28, 2003, Justices Puno and Vitug offered to recuse themselves, but the
Court rejected their offer. Justice Panganiban inhibited himself, but the Court directed him to participate.
Without necessarily giving the petitions due course, this Court in its Resolution of October 28, 2003, resolved to
(a) consolidate the petitions; (b) require respondent House of Representatives and the Senate, as well as the
Solicitor General, to comment on the petitions not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; (c) set the petitions
for oral arguments on November 5, 2003, at 10:00 a.m.; and (d) appointed distinguished legal experts as amici
curiae.20In addition, this Court called on petitioners and respondents to maintain the status quo, enjoining all the
parties and others acting for and in their behalf to refrain from committing acts that would render the petitions
moot.
Also on October 28, 2003, when respondent House of Representatives through Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr.
and/or its co-respondents, by way of special appearance, submitted a Manifestation asserting that this Court has
no jurisdiction to hear, much less prohibit or enjoin the House of Representatives, which is an independent and
co-equal branch of government under the Constitution, from the performance of its constitutionally mandated
duty to initiate impeachment cases. On even date, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf, filed a
Motion to Intervene (Ex Abudante Cautela)21 and Comment, praying that "the consolidated petitions be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the Court over the issues affecting the impeachment proceedings and that
the sole power, authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as the impeachment court to try and decide impeachment
cases, including the one where the Chief Justice is the respondent, be recognized and upheld pursuant to the
provisions of Article XI of the Constitution."22
Acting on the other petitions which were subsequently filed, this Court resolved to (a) consolidate them with the
earlier consolidated petitions; (b) require respondents to file their comment not later than 4:30 p.m. of November
3, 2003; and (c) include them for oral arguments on November 5, 2003.

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On October 29, 2003, the Senate of the Philippines, through Senate President Franklin M. Drilon, filed a
Manifestation stating that insofar as it is concerned, the petitions are plainly premature and have no basis in law
or in fact, adding that as of the time of the filing of the petitions, no justiciable issue was presented before it since
(1) its constitutional duty to constitute itself as an impeachment court commences only upon its receipt of the
Articles of Impeachment, which it had not, and (2) the principal issues raised by the petitions pertain exclusively
to the proceedings in the House of Representatives.
On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a "Petition for Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262,
160263, 160277, 160292, and 160295, questioning the status quo Resolution issued by this Court on October
28, 2003 on the ground that it would unnecessarily put Congress and this Court in a "constitutional deadlock"
and praying for the dismissal of all the petitions as the matter in question is not yet ripe for judicial determination.
On November 3, 2003, Attorneys Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra filed in G.R. No. 160262 a
"Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and to Admit the Herein Incorporated Petition in Intervention."
On November 4, 2003, Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. filed a
Motion for Intervention in G.R. No. 160261. On November 5, 2003, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the
Philippines, Inc. also filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262,
160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310.
The motions for intervention were granted and both Senator Pimentel's Comment and Attorneys Macalintal and
Quadra's Petition in Intervention were admitted.
On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the views of the amici curiae and the arguments of petitioners,
intervenors Senator Pimentel and Attorney Makalintal, and Solicitor General Alfredo Benipayo on the principal
issues outlined in an Advisory issued by this Court on November 3, 2003, to wit:
Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be invoked; who can invoke it; on what
issues and at what time; and whether it should be exercised by this Court at this time.
In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up:
a) locus standi of petitioners;
b) ripeness(prematurity; mootness);
c) political question/justiciability;
d) House's "exclusive" power to initiate all cases of impeachment;
e) Senate's "sole" power to try and decide all cases of impeachment;
f) constitutionality of the House Rules on Impeachment vis-a-vis Section 3(5) of Article XI of the
Constitution; and
g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original)
In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and substantive issues arising from the instant petitions as well as
the myriad arguments and opinions presented for and against the grant of the reliefs prayed for, this Court has
sifted and determined them to be as follows: (1) the threshold and novel issue of whether or not the power of
judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings; (2) whether or not the essential prerequisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been fulfilled; and (3) the substantive issues yet
remaining. These matters shall now be discussed in seriatim.
Judicial Review
As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the power of judicial review to determine the
validity of the second impeachment complaint.

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This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article
VIII of our present 1987 Constitution:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government. (Emphasis supplied)
Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively expounded upon by Justice Jose P. Laurel in the
definitive 1936 case of Angara v. Electoral Commission23 after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution whose
provisions, unlike the present Constitution, did not contain the present provision in Article VIII, Section 1, par. 2
on what judicial power includes. Thus, Justice Laurel discoursed:
x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt
to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the
only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers
between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much
as it was within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument
which is the expression of their sovereignty however limited, has established a republican government
intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances, and
subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets
forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and
agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the
Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government
along constitutional channels,for then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of
rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good government mere political apothegms.
Certainly, the limitations and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be in any
living constitution. In the United States where no express constitutional grant is found in their
constitution, the possession of this moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its historical
origin and development there, has been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than
one and a half centuries. In our case, this moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear
implication from section 2 of article VIII of our Constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope
and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the
judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or
invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it
by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to
establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which
properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial
review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by
the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any
attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions
unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon
questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption
of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the
Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must
reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive
and legislative departments of the government.24 (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this "moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of powers" of the
different branches of government and "to direct the course of government along constitutional channels" is

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inherent in all courts25 as a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the power of the court to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable." 26
Thus, even in the United States where the power of judicial review is not explicitly conferred upon the courts by
its Constitution, such power has "been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a
half centuries." To be sure, it was in the 1803 leading case of Marbury v. Madison27 that the power of judicial
review was first articulated by Chief Justice Marshall, to wit:
It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what shall be the supreme law of the land,
the constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the laws of the United States generally, but those only
which shall be made in pursuance of the constitution, have that rank.
Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and
strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law
repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by
that instrument.28 (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)
In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its express grant in the 1935 Constitution, the power of
judicial review was exercised by our courts to invalidate constitutionally infirm acts. 29 And as pointed out by noted
political law professor and former Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, 30 the executive and legislative
branches of our government in fact effectively acknowledged this power of judicial review in Article 7 of the Civil
Code, to wit:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be
excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void
and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not
contrary to the laws or the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 judicial review is indeed an integral component of the delicate
system of checks and balances which, together with the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the
bedrock of our republican form of government and insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of
the people for which it serves.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not
through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government
has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it
does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the
Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The
Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. x x x And the
judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other
departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive
and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.32 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "x x x judicial review is
essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers among
the three great departments of government through the definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority
and control between them."33 To him, "[j]udicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation or
instrument of intervention of the judiciary in that balancing operation." 34
To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of discretion by "any branch or
instrumentalities of government," the afore-quoted Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution engraves, for the
first time into its history, into block letter law the so-called "expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of this Court, the
nature of and rationale for which are mirrored in the following excerpt from the sponsorship speech of its
proponent, former Chief Justice Constitutional Commissioner Roberto Concepcion:

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xxx
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established
by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience during martial law.
As a matter of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the
deposed regime was marred considerably by the circumstance that in a number of cases against
the government, which then had no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of
political questions and got away with it. As a consequence, certain principles concerning particularly
the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the release of political detainees, and
other matters related to the operation and effect of martial law failed because the government set up the
defense of political question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is political, we have no authority
to pass upon it." The Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the
questions involved. It did not merely request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but
it, in effect, encouraged further violations thereof during the martial law regime. x x x
xxx
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the
government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the
question whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a
duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter
evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political
question.35(Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court must necessarily turn to the
Constitution itself which employs the well-settled principles of constitutional construction.
First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure
Administration,36 this Court, speaking through Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, declared:
We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of course
stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional
provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. They are to be given
their ordinary meaningexcept where technical terms are employed in which case the significance
thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being
essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people's consciousness, its
language as much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it
says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the
power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they
say. Thus these are the cases where the need for construction is reduced to a minimum. 37 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

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Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in
accordance with the intent of its framers. And so did this Court apply this principle in Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary38 in this wise:
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under
consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the
object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or
remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition
and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason
which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose
sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words
consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose.39 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue40 where, speaking through Madame Justice Amuerfina
A. Melencio-Herrera, it declared:
x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of
constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people
adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and
thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the
Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were
guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.41 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. Thus, in Chiongbian v. De
Leon,42 this Court, through Chief Justice Manuel Moran declared:
x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated a provision of
our Constitution merely for the benefit of one person without considering that it could also affect
others.When they adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not willed, that said provision should
function to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction
with all other provisions of that great document.43 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,44 this Court affirmed that:
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the
Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the
provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted
as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject
should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the
Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable
construction, the two can be made to stand together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction
which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and
nugatory.45 (Emphasis supplied)
If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids is available. In still the
same case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, this Court expounded:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional
convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may
be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the
Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as
showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give
us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow
citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to
construe the constitution from what appears upon its face." The proper interpretation therefore

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depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers's
understanding thereof.46(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It is in the context of the foregoing backdrop of constitutional refinement and jurisprudential application of the
power of judicial review that respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel raise the
novel argument that the Constitution has excluded impeachment proceedings from the coverage of judicial
review.
Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. that impeachment is a political action
which cannot assume a judicial character. Hence, any question, issue or incident arising at any stage of the
impeachment proceeding is beyond the reach of judicial review.47
For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the Senate's "sole power to try" impeachment cases48 (1)
entirely excludes the application of judicial review over it; and (2) necessarily includes the Senate's power to
determine constitutional questions relative to impeachment proceedings. 49
In furthering their arguments on the proposition that impeachment proceedings are outside the scope of judicial
review, respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel rely heavily on American
authorities, principally the majority opinion in the case of Nixon v. United States.50 Thus, they contend that the
exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings is inappropriate since it runs counter to the framers'
decision to allocate to different fora the powers to try impeachments and to try crimes; it disturbs the system of
checks and balances, under which impeachment is the only legislative check on the judiciary; and it would
create a lack of finality and difficulty in fashioning relief.51 Respondents likewise point to deliberations on the US
Constitution to show the intent to isolate judicial power of review in cases of impeachment.
Respondents' and intervenors' reliance upon American jurisprudence, the American Constitution and American
authorities cannot be credited to support the proposition that the Senate's "sole power to try and decide
impeachment cases," as provided for under Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the Constitution, is a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of all issues pertaining to impeachment to the legislature, to the total exclusion of the
power of judicial review to check and restrain any grave abuse of the impeachment process. Nor can it
reasonably support the interpretation that it necessarily confers upon the Senate the inherently judicial power to
determine constitutional questions incident to impeachment proceedings.
Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of dubious application for
these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine
constitutional law is concerned. As held in the case of Garcia vs. COMELEC,52 "[i]n resolving constitutional
disputes, [this Court] should not be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable
because they have been dictated by different constitutional settings and needs." 53 Indeed, although the
Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to that of the United States, their paths of development have long
since diverged. In the colorful words of Father Bernas, "[w]e have cut the umbilical cord."
The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme
Court is that while the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is
discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for
in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the
power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality.
There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect to
the power of the House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows
sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives without limitation, 54 our Constitution, though vesting
in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, 55 provides for several
limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These
limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of
one and the same official.
Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments undermines their finality and may also
lead to conflicts between Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this Court to exercise judicial
statesmanship on the principle that "whenever possible, the Court should defer to the judgment of the people
expressed legislatively, recognizing full well the perils of judicial willfulness and pride." 56

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But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in the
Constitution? This shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole
discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the language of Baker v.
Carr,57"judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through
the power of judicial review.
The cases of Romulo v. Yniguez58 and Alejandrino v. Quezon,59 cited by respondents in support of the argument
that the impeachment power is beyond the scope of judicial review, are not in point. These cases concern the
denial of petitions for writs of mandamus to compel the legislature to perform non-ministerial acts, and do not
concern the exercise of the power of judicial review.
There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review over congressional
action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr.,60 this Court ruled that it is well within the power and jurisdiction of the
Court to inquire whether the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of
discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives. In Tanada v. Angara,61 in seeking to nullify an act of
the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravened the Constitution, it held that the petition raises a
justiciable controversy and that when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. In Bondoc v.
Pineda,62 this Court declared null and void a resolution of the House of Representatives withdrawing the
nomination, and rescinding the election, of a congressman as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal for
being violative of Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra,63 it held that the resolution of
whether the House representation in the Commission on Appointments was based on proportional
representation of the political parties as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution is subject to judicial
review. In Daza v. Singson,64 it held that the act of the House of Representatives in removing the petitioner from
the Commission on Appointments is subject to judicial review. In Tanada v. Cuenco,65 it held that although under
the Constitution, the legislative power is vested exclusively in Congress, this does not detract from the power of
the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress. In Angara v. Electoral Commission,66 it ruled
that confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member, irrespective of whether his election is
contested, is not essential before such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a
member of the National Assembly.
Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over
impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be
interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." 67 Both are integral components of
the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act
beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.
Essential Requisites for Judicial Review
As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the courts' power of judicial review, like almost all powers
conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or controversy calling
for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must
have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity;
and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
x x x Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised
after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or
the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal
questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner,
the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than
that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the
legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of
actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through
their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government. 68 (Italics in the
original)
Standing

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Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that
the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged.
The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.69
Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the petitions, contends that petitioners do not have standing
since only the Chief Justice has sustained and will sustain direct personal injury. Amicus curiae former Justice
Minister and Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza similarly contends.
Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that petitioners have standing since this Court had, in the
past, accorded standing to taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, legislators in cases involving paramount public
interest70 and transcendental importance,71 and that procedural matters are subordinate to the need to determine
whether or not the other branches of the government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution
and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them. 72 Amicus curiae Dean Raul
Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law is of the same opinion, citing transcendental importance and the wellentrenched rule exception that, when the real party in interest is unable to vindicate his rights by seeking the
same remedies, as in the case of the Chief Justice who, for ethical reasons, cannot himself invoke the
jurisdiction of this Court, the courts will grant petitioners standing.
There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-party-in-interest and the rule on standing, for the former
is a concept of civil procedure73 while the latter has constitutional underpinnings.74 In view of the arguments set
forth regarding standing, it behooves the Court to reiterate the ruling in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato75 to clarify what
is meant by locus standi and to distinguish it from real party-in-interest.
The difference between the rule on standing and real party in interest has been noted by authorities thus:
"It is important to note . . . that standing because of its constitutional and public policy underpinnings, is
very different from questions relating to whether a particular plaintiff is the real party in interest or has
capacity to sue. Although all three requirements are directed towards ensuring that only certain parties
can maintain an action, standing restrictions require a partial consideration of the merits, as well as
broader policy concerns relating to the proper role of the judiciary in certain areas.
Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases suits are brought not by
parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or by official action taken, but by
concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. Hence the question in
standing is whether such parties have "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy
as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."
xxx
On the other hand, the question as to "real party in interest" is whether he is "the party who would be
benefited or injured by the judgment, or the 'party entitled to the avails of the suit.'" 76 (Citations omitted)
While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the
House of Representatives, none of the petitioners before us asserts a violation of the personal rights of the Chief
Justice. On the contrary, they invariably invoke the vindication of their own rights as taxpayers; members of
Congress; citizens, individually or in a class suit; and members of the bar and of the legal profession which
were supposedly violated by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives.
In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and legislators when specific requirements have
been met have been given standing by this Court.
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct
and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he
sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely
that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about
to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some

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burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.77 In fine, when the proceeding involves the
assertion of a public right,78 the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.
In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or
that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through
the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.79 Before he can invoke the power of judicial review,
however, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money
raised by taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned
statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the
public.80
At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be entertained. 81 This
Court opts to grant standing to most of the petitioners, given their allegation that any impending transmittal to the
Senate of the Articles of Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the Chief Justice will necessarily involve the
expenditure of public funds.
As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which he claims infringes his
prerogatives as a legislator.82 Indeed, a member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain
inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office. 83
While an association has legal personality to represent its members,84 especially when it is composed of
substantial taxpayers and the outcome will affect their vital interests,85 the mere invocation by the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines or any member of the legal profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more,
although undoubtedly true, does not suffice to clothe it with standing. Its interest is too general. It is shared by
other groups and the whole citizenry. However, a reading of the petitions shows that it has advanced
constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as
precedents.86It, therefore, behooves this Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issues presented
by it.
In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all citizens, persons intervening must be
sufficiently numerous to fully protect the interests of all concerned 87 to enable the court to deal properly with all
interests involved in the suit,88 for a judgment in a class suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to the class, is,
under the res judicata principle, binding on all members of the class whether or not they were before the
court.89 Where it clearly appears that not all interests can be sufficiently represented as shown by the divergent
issues raised in the numerous petitions before this Court, G.R. No. 160365 as a class suit ought to fail. Since
petitioners additionallyallege standing as citizens and taxpayers, however, their petition will stand.
The Philippine Bar Association, in G.R. No. 160403, invokes the sole ground of transcendental importance, while
Atty. Dioscoro U. Vallejos, in G.R. No. 160397, is mum on his standing.
There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following instructive determinants
formulated by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the funds
or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory
prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other
party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised. 90 Applying these determinants,
this Court is satisfied that the issues raised herein are indeed of transcendental importance.
In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the
petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people, as when the issues raised are of
paramount importance to the public.91 Such liberality does not, however, mean that the requirement that a party
should have an interest in the matter is totally eliminated. A party must, at the very least, still plead the existence
of such interest, it not being one of which courts can take judicial notice. In petitioner Vallejos' case, he failed to
allege any interest in the case. He does not thus have standing.
With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of the Rules of Court requires an intervenor to
possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against
both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody
of the court or of an officer thereof. While intervention is not a matter of right, it may be permitted by the courts
when the applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing intervention. 92

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In Intervenors Attorneys Romulo Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra's case, they seek to join petitioners
Candelaria, et. al. in G.R. No. 160262. Since, save for one additional issue, they raise the same issues and the
same standing, and no objection on the part of petitioners Candelaria, et. al. has been interposed, this Court as
earlier stated, granted the Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and Petition-in-Intervention.
Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et. al. sought to join petitioner
Francisco in G.R. No. 160261. Invoking their right as citizens to intervene, alleging that "they will suffer if this
insidious scheme of the minority members of the House of Representatives is successful," this Court found the
requisites for intervention had been complied with.
Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295,
and 160310 were of transcendental importance, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. filed
a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" to raise the additional issue of whether or not the second
impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice is valid and based on any of the grounds prescribed by the
Constitution.
Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et al. and World War
II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation the respective
motions to intervene were hereby granted.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to intervene for the limited purpose of making of record
and arguing a point of view that differs with Senate President Drilon's. He alleges that submitting to this Court's
jurisdiction as the Senate President does will undermine the independence of the Senate which will sit as an
impeachment court once the Articles of Impeachment are transmitted to it from the House of Representatives.
Clearly, Senator Pimentel possesses a legal interest in the matter in litigation, he being a member of Congress
against which the herein petitions are directed. For this reason, and to fully ventilate all substantial issues
relating to the matter at hand, his Motion to Intervene was granted and he was, as earlier stated, allowed to
argue.
Lastly, as to Jaime N. Soriano's motion to intervene, the same must be denied for, while he asserts an interest
as a taxpayer, he failed to meet the standing requirement for bringing taxpayer's suits as set forth in Dumlao v.
Comelec,93 to wit:
x x x While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in
their Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money is "being extracted and spent in violation of
specific constitutional protection against abuses of legislative power," or that there is a misapplication of
such funds by respondent COMELEC, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose.
Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the enforcement of
an invalid or unconstitutional law.94 (Citations omitted)
In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even to allege that the act of petitioners will result in
illegal disbursement of public funds or in public money being deflected to any improper purpose. Additionally, his
mere interest as a member of the Bar does not suffice to clothe him with standing.
Ripeness and Prematurity
In Tan v. Macapagal,95 this Court, through Chief Justice Fernando, held that for a case to be considered ripe for
adjudication, "it is a prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch
before a court may come into the picture."96 Only then may the courts pass on the validity of what was done, if
and when the latter is challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding.
The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity of the filing of the second impeachment complaint
against the Chief Justice in accordance with the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress, the
constitutionality of which is questioned. The questioned acts having been carried out, i.e., the second
impeachment complaint had been filed with the House of Representatives and the 2001 Rules have already
been already promulgated and enforced, the prerequisite that the alleged unconstitutional act should be
accomplished and performed before suit, as Tan v. Macapagal holds, has been complied with.

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Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of whether the instant petitions are premature. Amicus
curiaeformer Senate President Jovito R. Salonga opines that there may be no urgent need for this Court to
render a decision at this time, it being the final arbiter on questions of constitutionality anyway. He thus
recommends that all remedies in the House and Senate should first be exhausted.
Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law who suggests to this Court to take
judicial notice of on-going attempts to encourage signatories to the second impeachment complaint to withdraw
their signatures and opines that the House Impeachment Rules provide for an opportunity for members to raise
constitutional questions themselves when the Articles of Impeachment are presented on a motion to transmit to
the same to the Senate. The dean maintains that even assuming that the Articles are transmitted to the Senate,
the Chief Justice can raise the issue of their constitutional infirmity by way of a motion to dismiss.
The dean's position does not persuade. First, the withdrawal by the Representatives of their signatures would
not, by itself, cure the House Impeachment Rules of their constitutional infirmity. Neither would such a
withdrawal, by itself, obliterate the questioned second impeachment complaint since it would only place it under
the ambit of Sections 3(2) and (3) of Article XI of the Constitution 97 and, therefore, petitioners would continue to
suffer their injuries.
Second and most importantly, the futility of seeking remedies from either or both Houses of Congress before
coming to this Court is shown by the fact that, as previously discussed, neither the House of Representatives nor
the Senate is clothed with the power to rule with definitiveness on the issue of constitutionality, whether
concerning impeachment proceedings or otherwise, as said power is exclusively vested in the judiciary by the
earlier quoted Section I, Article VIII of the Constitution. Remedy cannot be sought from a body which is bereft of
power to grant it.
Justiciability
In the leading case of Tanada v. Cuenco,98 Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion defined the term "political
question,"viz:
[T]he term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a
question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum, it refers to "those
questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of
the Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.99 (Italics in the original)
Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and seemingly without any rhyme or reason, this Court
vacillated on its stance of taking cognizance of cases which involved political questions. In some cases, this
Court hid behind the cover of the political question doctrine and refused to exercise its power of judicial
review.100 In other cases, however, despite the seeming political nature of the therein issues involved, this Court
assumed jurisdiction whenever it found constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon
political bodies.101 Even in the landmark 1988 case of Javellana v. Executive Secretary102 which raised the issue
of whether the 1973 Constitution was ratified, hence, in force, this Court shunted the political question doctrine
and took cognizance thereof. Ratification by the people of a Constitution is a political question, it being a
question decided by the people in their sovereign capacity.
The frequency with which this Court invoked the political question doctrine to refuse to take jurisdiction over
certain cases during the Marcos regime motivated Chief Justice Concepcion, when he became a Constitutional
Commissioner, to clarify this Court's power of judicial review and its application on issues involving political
questions, viz:
MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
I will speak on the judiciary. Practically, everybody has made, I suppose, the usual comment that the judiciary is
the weakest among the three major branches of the service. Since the legislature holds the purse and the
executive the sword, the judiciary has nothing with which to enforce its decisions or commands except the power
of reason and appeal to conscience which, after all, reflects the will of God, and is the most powerful of all other

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powers without exception. x x x And so, with the body's indulgence, I will proceed to read the provisions drafted
by the Committee on the Judiciary.
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established
by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience during martial law. As a
matter of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the deposed
regime was marred considerably by the circumstance that in a number of cases against the
government, which then had no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of
political questions and got away with it. As a consequence, certain principles concerning
particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the release of
political detainees, and other matters related to the operation and effect of martial law failed
because the government set up the defense of political question. And the Supreme Court said:
"Well, since it is political, we have no authority to pass upon it." The Committee on the Judiciary feels
that this was not a proper solution of the questions involved. It did not merely request an
encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further violations
thereof during the martial law regime. I am sure the members of the Bar are familiar with this
situation. But for the benefit of the Members of the Commission who are not lawyers, allow me to
explain. I will start with a decision of the Supreme Court in 1973 on the case of Javellana vs. the
Secretary of Justice, if I am not mistaken. Martial law was announced on September 22, although the
proclamation was dated September 21. The obvious reason for the delay in its publication was that the
administration had apprehended and detained prominent newsmen on September 21. So that when
martial law was announced on September 22, the media hardly published anything about it. In fact, the
media could not publish any story not only because our main writers were already incarcerated, but also
because those who succeeded them in their jobs were under mortal threat of being the object of wrath of
the ruling party. The 1971 Constitutional Convention had begun on June 1, 1971 and by September 21
or 22 had not finished the Constitution; it had barely agreed in the fundamentals of the Constitution. I
forgot to say that upon the proclamation of martial law, some delegates to that 1971 Constitutional
Convention, dozens of them, were picked up. One of them was our very own colleague, Commissioner
Calderon. So, the unfinished draft of the Constitution was taken over by representatives of Malacaang.
In 17 days, they finished what the delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention had been unable to
accomplish for about 14 months. The draft of the 1973 Constitution was presented to the President
around December 1, 1972, whereupon the President issued a decree calling a plebiscite which
suspended the operation of some provisions in the martial law decree which prohibited discussions,
much less public discussions of certain matters of public concern. The purpose was presumably to allow
a free discussion on the draft of the Constitution on which a plebiscite was to be held sometime in
January 1973. If I may use a word famous by our colleague, Commissioner Ople, during the
interregnum, however, the draft of the Constitution was analyzed and criticized with such a telling effect
that Malacaang felt the danger of its approval. So, the President suspended indefinitely the holding of
the plebiscite and announced that he would consult the people in a referendum to be held from January
10 to January 15. But the questions to be submitted in the referendum were not announced until the eve
of its scheduled beginning, under the supposed supervision not of the Commission on Elections, but of
what was then designated as "citizens assemblies or barangays." Thus the barangays came into
existence. The questions to be propounded were released with proposed answers thereto, suggesting
that it was unnecessary to hold a plebiscite because the answers given in the referendum should be
regarded as the votes cast in the plebiscite. Thereupon, a motion was filed with the Supreme Court
praying that the holding of the referendum be suspended. When the motion was being heard before the
Supreme Court, the Minister of Justice delivered to the Court a proclamation of the President declaring
that the new Constitution was already in force because the overwhelming majority of the votes cast in

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the referendum favored the Constitution. Immediately after the departure of the Minister of Justice, I
proceeded to the session room where the case was being heard. I then informed the Court and the
parties the presidential proclamation declaring that the 1973 Constitution had been ratified by the people
and is now in force.
A number of other cases were filed to declare the presidential proclamation null and void. The main
defense put up by the government was that the issue was a political question and that the court had no
jurisdiction to entertain the case.
xxx
The government said that in a referendum held from January 10 to January 15, the vast majority ratified
the draft of the Constitution. Note that all members of the Supreme Court were residents of Manila, but
none of them had been notified of any referendum in their respective places of residence, much less did
they participate in the alleged referendum. None of them saw any referendum proceeding.
In the Philippines, even local gossips spread like wild fire. So, a majority of the members of the Court felt
that there had been no referendum.
Second, a referendum cannot substitute for a plebiscite. There is a big difference between a
referendum and a plebiscite. But another group of justices upheld the defense that the issue was
a political question. Whereupon, they dismissed the case. This is not the only major case in
which the plea of "political question" was set up. There have been a number of other cases in the
past.
x x x The defense of the political question was rejected because the issue was clearly justiciable.
xxx
x x x When your Committee on the Judiciary began to perform its functions, it faced the following
questions: What is judicial power? What is a political question?
The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function: to settle actual controversies involving
conflicts of rights which are demandable and enforceable. There are rights which are guaranteed by law
but cannot be enforced by a judiciary party. In a decided case, a husband complained that his wife was
unwilling to perform her duties as a wife. The Court said: "We can tell your wife what her duties as such
are and that she is bound to comply with them, but we cannot force her physically to discharge her main
marital duty to her husband. There are some rights guaranteed by law, but they are so personal that to
enforce them by actual compulsion would be highly derogatory to human dignity."
This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section I provides that:
Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable or enforceable . . .
The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide, hypothetical questions. In a presidential
system of government, the Supreme Court has, also another important function. The powers of
government are generally considered divided into three branches: the Legislative, the Executive
and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme within its own sphere and independent of the others.
Because of that supremacy power to determine whether a given law is valid or not is vested in
courts of justice.
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the
government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the
question whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a
duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.

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This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter
evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political
question.
I have made these extended remarks to the end that the Commissioners may have an initial food for
thought on the subject of the judiciary.103 (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)
During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Chief Justice Concepcion further clarified the concept
of judicial power, thus:
MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term "judicial power" but judicial power is not vested in
the Supreme Court alone but also in other lower courts as may be created by law.
MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.
MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example?
MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The Gentleman seems to identify political questions
with jurisdictional questions. But there is a difference.
MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression "judicial power"?
MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to ordinary cases but where there is a
question as to whether the government had authority or had abused its authority to the extent of
lacking jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction, that is not a political question. Therefore, the court
has the duty to decide.
xxx
FR. BERNAS. Ultimately, therefore, it will always have to be decided by the Supreme Court according to
the new numerical need for votes.
On another point, is it the intention of Section 1 to do away with the political question doctrine?
MR. CONCEPCION. No.
FR. BERNAS. It is not.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, because whenever there is an abuse of discretion, amounting to a lack of
jurisdiction. . .
FR. BERNAS. So, I am satisfied with the answer that it is not intended to do away with the
political question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, certainly not.
When this provision was originally drafted, it sought to define what is judicial power. But the
Gentleman will notice it says, "judicial power includes" and the reason being that the definition
that we might make may not cover all possible areas.
FR. BERNAS. So, this is not an attempt to solve the problems arising from the political question
doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. It definitely does not eliminate the fact that truly political questions are
beyond the pale of judicial power.104 (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial
power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this

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creature called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that
Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political questions." From this clarification it is
gathered that there are two species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are
not truly political questions."
Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of
powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can
review questions which are not truly political in nature.
As pointed out by amicus curiae former dean Pacifico Agabin of the UP College of Law, this Court has in fact in a
number of cases taken jurisdiction over questions which are not truly political following the effectivity of the
present Constitution.
In Marcos v. Manglapus,105 this Court, speaking through Madame Justice Irene Cortes, held:
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial
inquiry into areas which the Court, under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political
departments to decide.106 x x x
In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,107 through Justice Teodoro Padilla, this Court declared:
The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court must perform under the Constitution.
Moreover, as held in a recent case, "(t)he political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle
to judicial determination of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries
has been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987
Constitution, although said provision by no means does away with the applicability of the
principle in appropriate cases."108(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
And in Daza v. Singson,109 speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, this Court ruled:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The
reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we
would still not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now
covers, in proper cases, even the political question.110 x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Section 1, Article VIII, of the Court does not define what are justiciable political questions and non-justiciable
political questions, however. Identification of these two species of political questions may be problematic. There
has been no clear standard. The American case of Baker v. Carr111 attempts to provide some:
x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without
an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for questioning adherence to a political decision already made; or
thepotentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question.112 (Underscoring supplied)
Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first three: (1) a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; (2) the lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; and (3) the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination
of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion. These standards are not separate and distinct concepts but are
interrelated to each in that the presence of one strengthens the conclusion that the others are also present.
The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that the American concept of judicial review is radically
different from our current concept, for Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution provides our courts with far less
discretion in determining whether they should pass upon a constitutional issue.

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In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political question lies in the
answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred
upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or
instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits. This Court shall thus now apply this standard
to the present controversy.
These petitions raise five substantial issues:
I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid impeachable
offenses under the Constitution.
II. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in accordance with Section 3(4), Article XI of
the Constitution.
III. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice into the Judicial Development
Fund is an unconstitutional infringement of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
IV. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress
are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.
V. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the
Constitution.
The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint over which this Court has no
jurisdiction. More importantly, any discussion of this issue would require this Court to make a
determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political
question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear
from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.113
Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for impeachment, two of these,
namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition. In fact, an examination of the
records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission shows that the framers could find no better way to approximate
the boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other high crimes than by alluding to both positive and negative
examples of both, without arriving at their clear cut definition or even a standard therefor.114 Clearly, the issue
calls upon this court to decide a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial power
under Section 1, Article VIII.
Lis Mota
It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the constitutionality of a governmental act should
be avoided whenever possible. Thus, in the case of Sotto v. Commission on Elections,115 this Court held:
x x x It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a
law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is
raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon which the court may rest its
judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for
consideration until a case arises in which a decision upon such question will be
unavoidable.116 [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
The same principle was applied in Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,117 where this Court invalidated
Sections 13 and 32 of Republic Act No. 6657 for being confiscatory and violative of due process, to wit:
It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question only
if it is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first
satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights
susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional question must have been opportunely raised by
the proper party, and the resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the
case itself.118 [Emphasis supplied]

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Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis
mota or crux of the controversy.
As noted earlier, the instant consolidated petitions, while all seeking the invalidity of the second impeachment
complaint, collectively raise several constitutional issues upon which the outcome of this controversy could
possibly be made to rest. In determining whether one, some or all of the remaining substantial issues should be
passed upon, this Court is guided by the related cannon of adjudication that "the court should not form a rule of
constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is applied."119
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso, et al. argue that, among other reasons, the second
impeachment complaint is invalid since it directly resulted from a Resolution 120 calling for a legislative inquiry into
the JDF, which Resolution and legislative inquiry petitioners claim to likewise be unconstitutional for being: (a) a
violation of the rules and jurisprudence on investigations in aid of legislation; (b) an open breach of the doctrine
of separation of powers; (c) a violation of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary; and (d)
an assault on the independence of the judiciary.121
Without going into the merits of petitioners Alfonso, et. al.'s claims, it is the studied opinion of this Court that the
issue of the constitutionality of the said Resolution and resulting legislative inquiry is too far removed from the
issue of the validity of the second impeachment complaint. Moreover, the resolution of said issue would, in the
Court's opinion, require it to form a rule of constitutional law touching on the separate and distinct matter of
legislative inquiries in general, which would thus be broader than is required by the facts of these consolidated
cases. This opinion is further strengthened by the fact that said petitioners have raised other grounds in support
of their petition which would not be adversely affected by the Court's ruling.
En passant, this Court notes that a standard for the conduct of legislative inquiries has already been enunciated
by this Court in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Commttee,122 viz:
The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries
in aid of legislation. Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries
in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not, therefore absolute
or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as
provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published
rules of procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected." It follows then that the right rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected,
including the right to due process and the right not be compelled to testify against one's self. 123
In G.R. No. 160262, intervenors Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra, while joining the original
petition of petitioners Candelaria, et. al., introduce the new argument that since the second impeachment
complaint was verified and filed only by Representatives Gilberto Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella, the
same does not fall under the provisions of Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution which reads:
Section 3(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all
the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the
Senate shall forthwith proceed.
They assert that while at least 81 members of the House of Representatives signed a Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment, the same did not satisfy the requisites for the application of the afore-mentioned
section in that the "verified complaint or resolution of impeachment" was not filed "by at least one-third of all the
Members of the House." With the exception of Representatives Teodoro and Fuentebella, the signatories to said
Resolution are alleged to have verified the same merely as a "Resolution of Endorsement." Intervenors point to
the "Verification" of the Resolution of Endorsement which states that:
"We are the proponents/sponsors of the Resolution of Endorsement of the abovementioned Complaint of
Representatives Gilberto Teodoro and Felix William B. Fuentebella x x x" 124

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Intervenors Macalintal and Quadra further claim that what the Constitution requires in order for said second
impeachment complaint to automatically become the Articles of Impeachment and for trial in the Senate to begin
"forthwith," is that the verified complaint be "filed," not merely endorsed, by at least one-third of the Members of
the House of Representatives. Not having complied with this requirement, they concede that the second
impeachment complaint should have been calendared and referred to the House Committee on Justice under
Section 3(2), Article XI of the Constitution, viz:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall
be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee
within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its
Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with
the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within
ten session days from receipt thereof.
Intervenors' foregoing position is echoed by Justice Maambong who opined that for Section 3 (4), Article XI of
the Constitution to apply, there should be 76 or more representatives who signed and verified the second
impeachment complaint as complainants, signed and verified the signatories to a resolution of impeachment.
Justice Maambong likewise asserted that the Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least onethird of the members of the House of Representatives as endorsers is not the resolution of impeachment
contemplated by the Constitution, such resolution of endorsement being necessary only from at least one
Member whenever a citizen files a verified impeachment complaint.
While the foregoing issue, as argued by intervenors Macalintal and Quadra, does indeed limit the scope of the
constitutional issues to the provisions on impeachment, more compelling considerations militate against its
adoption as the lis mota or crux of the present controversy. Chief among this is the fact that only Attorneys
Macalintal and Quadra, intervenors in G.R. No. 160262, have raised this issue as a ground for invalidating the
second impeachment complaint. Thus, to adopt this additional ground as the basis for deciding the instant
consolidated petitions would not only render for naught the efforts of the original petitioners in G.R. No. 160262,
but the efforts presented by the other petitioners as well.
Again, the decision to discard the resolution of this issue as unnecessary for the determination of the instant
cases is made easier by the fact that said intervenors Macalintal and Quadra have joined in the petition of
Candelaria, et. al., adopting the latter's arguments and issues as their own. Consequently, they are not unduly
prejudiced by this Court's decision.
In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues, inextricably linked as they are, constitute the very lis mota
of the instant controversy: (1) whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules adopted
by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution;
and (2) whether, as a result thereof, the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI
of the Constitution.
Judicial Restraint
Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on the ground that the Senate, sitting as an
impeachment court, has the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. Again, this Court reiterates
that the power of judicial review includes the power of review over justiciable issues in impeachment
proceedings.
On the other hand, respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. argue that "[t]here is a moral compulsion for the
Court to not assume jurisdiction over the impeachment because all the Members thereof are subject to
impeachment."125 But this argument is very much like saying the Legislature has a moral compulsion not to pass
laws with penalty clauses because Members of the House of Representatives are subject to them.
The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option before this Court. Adjudication may not
be declined, because this Court is not legally disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction be renounced as there is no other
tribunal to which the controversy may be referred."126 Otherwise, this Court would be shirking from its duty vested
under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the Constitution. More than being clothed with authority thus, this Court is duty-bound
to take cognizance of the instant petitions.127 In the august words of amicus curiae Father Bernas, "jurisdiction is

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not just a power; it is a solemn duty which may not be renounced. To renounce it, even if it is vexatious, would
be a dereliction of duty."
Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our system of government cannot inhibit itself and
must rule upon the challenge because no other office has the authority to do so. 128 On the occasion that this
Court had been an interested party to the controversy before it, it has acted upon the matter "not with
officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable duty and, as always, with detachment and fairness." 129 After
all, "by [his] appointment to the office, the public has laid on [a member of the judiciary] their confidence that [he]
is mentally and morally fit to pass upon the merits of their varied contentions. For this reason, they expect [him]
to be fearless in [his] pursuit to render justice, to be unafraid to displease any person, interest or power and to be
equipped with a moral fiber strong enough to resist the temptations lurking in [his] office." 130
The duty to exercise the power of adjudication regardless of interest had already been settled in the case
of Abbas v. Senate Electoral Tribunal.131 In that case, the petitioners filed with the respondent Senate Electoral
Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing and
resolution of SET Case No. 002-87 on the ground that all of them were interested parties to said case as
respondents therein. This would have reduced the Tribunal's membership to only its three Justices-Members
whose disqualification was not sought, leaving them to decide the matter. This Court held:
Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution of any Senator sitting in the
Tribunal by any of his other colleagues in the Senate without inviting the same objections to the
substitute's competence, the proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the
Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no other court or body can perform, but which it cannot
lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Senators.
To our mind, this is the overriding consideration that the Tribunal be not prevented from discharging a
duty which it alone has the power to perform, the performance of which is in the highest public interest
as evidenced by its being expressly imposed by no less than the fundamental law.
It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the framers of the Constitution could not
have been unaware of the possibility of an election contest that would involve all Senatorselect, six of
whom would inevitably have to sit in judgment thereon. Indeed, such possibility might surface again in
the wake of the 1992 elections when once more, but for the last time, all 24 seats in the Senate will be at
stake. Yet the Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling such unusual situations or for the
substitution of Senators designated to the Tribunal whose disqualification may be sought. Litigants in
such situations must simply place their trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice
of the Members of the Tribunal. Justices and Senators, singly and collectively.
Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal may
inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of
the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where
he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and
impartial judgment. What we are merely saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the Senate
Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its entire membership of Senators and that no
amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication
of a senatorial election contest.
More recently in the case of Estrada v. Desierto,132 it was held that:
Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court, particularly a majority of them, is nothing short
ofpro tanto depriving the Court itself of its jurisdiction as established by the fundamental law.
Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his judicial power. And if that judge is the one designated by
the Constitution to exercise the jurisdiction of his court, as is the case with the Justices of this Court, the
deprivation of his or their judicial power is equivalent to the deprivation of the judicial power of the court
itself. It affects the very heart of judicial independence. The proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned
and ordered, would leave the Court no alternative but to abandon a duty which it cannot lawfully
discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Justices. 133 (Italics in the original)
Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down by the Court when it exercises its power of judicial
review.
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In Demetria v. Alba,134 this Court, through Justice Marcelo Fernan cited the "seven pillars" of limitations of the
power of judicial review, enunciated by US Supreme Court Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. TVA135 as follows:
1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, non-adversary proceeding,
declining because to decide such questions 'is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the
determination of real, earnest and vital controversy between individuals. It never was the thought that, by
means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the
constitutionality of the legislative act.'
2. The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.'
. . . 'It is not the habit of the Court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely
necessary to a decision of the case.'
3. The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to
which it is to be applied.'
4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if
there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of. This rule has found
most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a
constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide
only the latter. Appeals from the highest court of a state challenging its decision of a question under the
Federal Constitution are frequently dismissed because the judgment can be sustained on an
independent state ground.
5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails to show that he is
injured by its operation. Among the many applications of this rule, none is more striking than the denial of
the right of challenge to one who lacks a personal or property right. Thus, the challenge by a public
official interested only in the performance of his official duty will not be entertained . . . In Fairchild v.
Hughes, the Court affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by a citizen who sought to have the
Nineteenth Amendment declared unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the challenge of the
federal Maternity Act was not entertained although made by the Commonwealth on behalf of all its
citizens.
6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one who has availed
himself of its benefits.
7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of
constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction
of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided (citations omitted).
The foregoing "pillars" of limitation of judicial review, summarized in Ashwander v. TVA from different decisions
of the United States Supreme Court, can be encapsulated into the following categories:
1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case
2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as required by the facts of the case
3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground
4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of the operation of the statute
5. that the parties are not in estoppel
6. that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality.
As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted by this Court in the exercise of judicial review:
1. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power

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2. the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement
3. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity
4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.136
Respondents Speaker de Venecia, et. al. raise another argument for judicial restraint the possibility that "judicial
review of impeachments might also lead to embarrassing conflicts between the Congress and the [J]udiciary."
They stress the need to avoid the appearance of impropriety or conflicts of interest in judicial hearings, and the
scenario that it would be confusing and humiliating and risk serious political instability at home and abroad if the
judiciary countermanded the vote of Congress to remove an impeachable official. 137 Intervenor Soriano echoes
this argument by alleging that failure of this Court to enforce its Resolution against Congress would result in the
diminution of its judicial authority and erode public confidence and faith in the judiciary.
Such an argument, however, is specious, to say the least. As correctly stated by the Solicitor General, the
possibility of the occurrence of a constitutional crisis is not a reason for this Court to refrain from upholding the
Constitution in all impeachment cases. Justices cannot abandon their constitutional duties just because their
action may start, if not precipitate, a crisis.
Justice Feliciano warned against the dangers when this Court refuses to act.
x x x Frequently, the fight over a controversial legislative or executive act is not regarded as settled until
the Supreme Court has passed upon the constitutionality of the act involved, the judgment has not only
juridical effects but also political consequences. Those political consequences may follow even where
the Court fails to grant the petitioner's prayer to nullify an act for lack of the necessary number of votes.
Frequently, failure to act explicitly, one way or the other, itself constitutes a decision for the respondent
and validation, or at least quasi-validation, follows." 138
Thus, in Javellana v. Executive Secretary139 where this Court was split and "in the end there were not enough
votes either to grant the petitions, or to sustain respondent's claims,"140 the pre-existing constitutional order was
disrupted which paved the way for the establishment of the martial law regime.
Such an argument by respondents and intervenor also presumes that the coordinate branches of the
government would behave in a lawless manner and not do their duty under the law to uphold the Constitution
and obey the laws of the land. Yet there is no reason to believe that any of the branches of government will
behave in a precipitate manner and risk social upheaval, violence, chaos and anarchy by encouraging
disrespect for the fundamental law of the land.
Substituting the word public officers for judges, this Court is well guided by the doctrine in People v. Veneracion,
towit:141
Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If [public officers], under the
guise of religious or political beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within which
they are required by law to exercise the duties of their office, then law becomes meaningless. A
government of laws, not of men excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting
under its authority. Under this system, [public officers] are guided by the Rule of Law, and ought "to
protect and enforce it without fear or favor," resist encroachments by governments, political parties, or
even the interference of their own personal beliefs.142
Constitutionality of the Rules of Procedure
for Impeachment Proceedings
adopted by the 12th Congress
Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia, argues that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V
of the House Impeachment Rules do not violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of our present Constitution, contending
that the term "initiate" does not mean "to file;" that Section 3 (1) is clear in that it is the House of
Representatives, as a collective body, which has the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment; that

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initiate could not possibly mean "to file" because filing can, as Section 3 (2), Article XI of the Constitution
provides, only be accomplished in 3 ways, to wit: (1) by a verified complaint for impeachment by any member of
the House of Representatives; or (2) by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any member; or (3) by
at least 1/3 of all the members of the House. Respondent House of Representatives concludes that the one year
bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same officials could not have been violated
as the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide and seven Associate Justices had not been initiated
as the House of Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet to act on it.
The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the term "initiate." Resort to statutory construction
is, therefore, in order.
That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the Constitution, Commissioner Florenz Regalado, who
eventually became an Associate Justice of this Court, agreed on the meaning of "initiate" as "to file," as proffered
and explained by Constitutional Commissioner Maambong during the Constitutional Commission proceedings,
which he (Commissioner Regalado) as amicus curiae affirmed during the oral arguments on the instant petitions
held on November 5, 2003 at which he added that the act of "initiating" included the act of taking initial action on
the complaint, dissipates any doubt that indeed the word "initiate" as it twice appears in Article XI (3) and (5) of
the Constitution means to file the complaint and take initial action on it.
"Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to begin, to commence, or set
going. As Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language concisely puts it, it means "to
perform orfacilitate the first action," which jibes with Justice Regalado's position, and that of Father Bernas, who
elucidated during the oral arguments of the instant petitions on November 5, 2003 in this wise:
Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single act. It is a comlexus of acts consisting of a
beginning, a middle and an end. The end is the transmittal of the articles of impeachment to the Senate.
The middle consists of those deliberative moments leading to the formulation of the articles of
impeachment. The beginning or the initiation is the filing of the complaint and its referral to the
Committee on Justice.
Finally, it should be noted that the House Rule relied upon by Representatives Cojuangco and
Fuentebella says that impeachment is "deemed initiated" when the Justice Committee votes in favor of
impeachment or when the House reverses a contrary vote of the Committee. Note that the Rule does not
say "impeachment proceedings" are initiated but rather are "deemed initiated." The language is
recognition that initiation happened earlier, but by legal fiction there is an attempt to postpone it to a time
after actual initiation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting the Constitution is looking into the intent of the law.
Fortunately, the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution can be pried from its records:
MR. MAAMBONG. With reference to Section 3, regarding the procedure and the substantive provisions
on impeachment, I understand there have been many proposals and, I think, these would need some
time for Committee action.
However, I would just like to indicate that I submitted to the Committee a resolution on impeachment
proceedings, copies of which have been furnished the Members of this body. This is borne out of my
experience as a member of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government which took
charge of the last impeachment resolution filed before the First Batasang Pambansa. For the
information of the Committee, the resolution covers several steps in the impeachment
proceedings starting with initiation, action of the Speaker committee action, calendaring of
report, voting on the report, transmittal referral to the Senate, trial and judgment by the Senate.
xxx
MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a reconsideration of the approval of the
amendment submitted by Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of record my thinking that we do
not really initiate the filing of the Articles of Impeachment on the floor. The procedure, as I have pointed
out earlier, was that the initiation starts with the filing of the complaint. And what is actually done

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on the floor is that the committee resolution containing the Articles of Impeachment is the one
approved by the body.
As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the Committee on Style, it appears that the
initiation starts on the floor. If we only have time, I could cite examples in the case of the impeachment
proceedings of President Richard Nixon wherein the Committee on the Judiciary submitted the
recommendation, the resolution, and the Articles of Impeachment to the body, and it was the body who
approved the resolution. It is not the body which initiates it. It only approves or disapproves the
resolution. So, on that score, probably the Committee on Style could help in rearranging these words
because we have to be very technical about this. I have been bringing with me The Rules of the House
of Representatives of the U.S. Congress. The Senate Rules are with me. The proceedings on the case
of Richard Nixon are with me. I have submitted my proposal, but the Committee has already decided.
Nevertheless, I just want to indicate this on record.
xxx
MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of the approval of Section 3 (3). My
reconsideration will not at all affect the substance, but it is only in keeping with the exact formulation of
the Rules of the House of Representatives of the United States regarding impeachment.
I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of this provision, that on page 2,
Section 3 (3), from lines 17 to 18, we delete the words which read: "to initiate impeachment
proceedings" and the comma (,) and insert on line 19 after the word "resolution" the phrase WITH THE
ARTICLES, and then capitalize the letter "i" in "impeachment" and replace the word "by" with OF, so that
the whole section will now read: "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be
necessary either to affirm a resolution WITH THE ARTICLES of Impeachment OF the Committee or to
override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded."
I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as the House of Representatives of
the United States is concerned, really starts from the filing of the verified complaint and every
resolution to impeach always carries with it the Articles of Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the words
"Articles of Impeachment" are mentioned on line 25 in the case of the direct filing of a verified compliant
of one-third of all the Members of the House. I will mention again, Madam President, that my amendment
will not vary the substance in any way. It is only in keeping with the uniform procedure of the House of
Representatives of the United States Congress. Thank you, Madam President. 143 (Italics in the original;
emphasis and udnerscoring supplied)
This amendment proposed by Commissioner Maambong was clarified and accepted by the Committee on the
Accountability of Public Officers.144
It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to start with the filing of the complaint. In his amicus
curiae brief, Commissioner Maambong explained that "the obvious reason in deleting the phrase "to initiate
impeachment proceedings" as contained in the text of the provision of Section 3 (3) was to settle and make it
understood once and for all that the initiation of impeachment proceedings starts with the filing of the
complaint, and the vote of one-third of the House in a resolution of impeachment does not initiate the
impeachment proceedings which was already initiated by the filing of a verified complaint under Section 3,
paragraph (2), Article XI of the Constitution."145
Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the same view as is Father Bernas, who was also a
member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, that the word "initiate" as used in Article XI, Section 3(5) means
to file, both adding, however, that the filing must be accompanied by an action to set the complaint moving.
During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas clarified that the word "initiate," appearing in the
constitutional provision on impeachment, viz:
Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment.
xxx

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(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a
period of one year, (Emphasis supplied)
refers to two objects, "impeachment case" and "impeachment proceeding."
Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common verb is "to initiate." The object in the first
sentence is "impeachment case." The object in the second sentence is "impeachment proceeding." Following
the principle of reddendo singuala sinuilis, the term "cases" must be distinguished from the term "proceedings."
An impeachment case is the legal controversy that must be decided by the Senate. Above-quoted first provision
provides that the House, by a vote of one-third of all its members, can bring a case to the Senate. It is in that
sense that the House has "exclusive power" to initiate all cases of impeachment. No other body can do it.
However, before a decision is made to initiate a case in the Senate, a "proceeding" must be followed to arrive at
a conclusion. A proceeding must be "initiated." To initiate, which comes from the Latin word initium, means to
begin. On the other hand, proceeding is a progressive noun. It has a beginning, a middle, and an end. It takes
place not in the Senate but in the House and consists of several steps: (1) there is the filing of a verified
complaint either by a Member of the House of Representatives or by a private citizen endorsed by a Member of
the House of the Representatives; (2) there is the processing of this complaint by the proper Committee which
may either reject the complaint or uphold it; (3) whether the resolution of the Committee rejects or upholds the
complaint, the resolution must be forwarded to the House for further processing; and (4) there is the processing
of the same complaint by the House of Representatives which either affirms a favorable resolution of the
Committee or overrides a contrary resolution by a vote of one-third of all the members. If at least one third of all
the Members upholds the complaint, Articles of Impeachment are prepared and transmitted to the Senate. It is at
this point that the House "initiates an impeachment case." It is at this point that an impeachable public official is
successfully impeached. That is, he or she is successfully charged with an impeachment "case" before the
Senate as impeachment court.
Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment proceeding" is not initiated when the complaint is transmitted
to the Senate for trial because that is the end of the House proceeding and the beginning of another proceeding,
namely the trial. Neither is the "impeachment proceeding" initiated when the House deliberates on the resolution
passed on to it by the Committee, because something prior to that has already been done. The action of the
House is already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is
initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is
the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow.
The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal reached
the floor proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary
to initiate impeachment proceedings," this was met by a proposal to delete the line on the ground that the vote of
the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does. 146 Thus the line
was deleted and is not found in the present Constitution.
Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No impeachment proceeding shall be initiated against
the same official more than once within a period of one year," it means that no second verified complaint may be
accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. By his explanation, this interpretation is founded
on the common understanding of the meaning of "to initiate" which means to begin. He reminds that the
Constitution is ratified by the people, both ordinary and sophisticated, as they understand it; and that ordinary
people read ordinary meaning into ordinary words and not abstruse meaning, they ratify words as they
understand it and not as sophisticated lawyers confuse it.
To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can initiate impeachment proceedings
because Section 3 (1) says "The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment," This is a misreading of said provision and is contrary to the principle of reddendo singula
singulisby equating "impeachment cases" with "impeachment proceeding."
From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two former Constitutional
Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term "to initiate" refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint
coupled with Congress' taking initial action of said complaint.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the
impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members
of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article
144

XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not
be filed against the same official within a one year period.
Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules, impeachment proceedings are deemed
initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is
sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice
that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement
before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of
impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House. These rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of
Article XI since the rules give the term "initiate" a meaning different meaning from filing and referral.
In his amicus curiae brief, Justice Hugo Gutierrez posits that this Court could not use contemporaneous
construction as an aid in the interpretation of Sec.3 (5) of Article XI, citing Vera v. Avelino147 wherein this Court
stated that "their personal opinions (referring to Justices who were delegates to the Constitution Convention) on
the matter at issue expressed during this Court's our deliberations stand on a different footing from the properly
recorded utterances of debates and proceedings." Further citing said case, he states that this Court likened the
former members of the Constitutional Convention to actors who are so absorbed in their emotional roles that
intelligent spectators may know more about the real meaning because of the latter's balanced perspectives and
disinterestedness.148
Justice Gutierrez's statements have no application in the present petitions. There are at present only two
members of this Court who participated in the 1986 Constitutional Commission Chief Justice Davide and
Justice Adolf Azcuna. Chief Justice Davide has not taken part in these proceedings for obvious reasons.
Moreover, this Court has not simply relied on the personal opinions now given by members of the Constitutional
Commission, but has examined the records of the deliberations and proceedings thereof.
Respondent House of Representatives counters that under Section 3 (8) of Article XI, it is clear and unequivocal
that it and only it has the power to make and interpret its rules governing impeachment. Its argument is premised
on the assumption that Congress has absolute power to promulgate its rules. This assumption, however, is
misplaced.
Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that "The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively
carry out the purpose of this section." Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the
phrase "to effectively carry out the purpose of this section." Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very
purpose of the Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article
XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on its power to make rules, viz:
Section 3. (1) x x x
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives
or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in
the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session
days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its
report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days
from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary to either affirm a
favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary
resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the
Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate
shall forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a
period of one year.

145

It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental law. If as alleged
Congress had absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary implication have the power to alter or
amend the meaning of the Constitution without need of referendum.
In Osmea v. Pendatun,149 this Court held that it is within the province of either House of Congress to interpret its
rules and that it was the best judge of what constituted "disorderly behavior" of its members. However, in Paceta
v. Secretary of the Commission on Appointments,150 Justice (later Chief Justice) Enrique Fernando, speaking for
this Court and quoting Justice Brandeis in United States v. Smith,151 declared that where the construction to be
given to a rule affects persons other than members of the Legislature, the question becomes judicial in nature.
In Arroyo v. De Venecia,152 quoting United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co.,153 Justice Vicente Mendoza, speaking
for this Court, held that while the Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings, it
may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and further that there should be
a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the result which is
sought to be attained. It is only within these limitations that all matters of method are open to the determination
of the Legislature. In the same case of Arroyo v. De Venecia, Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his Concurring and
Dissenting Opinion, was even more emphatic as he stressed that in the Philippine setting there is even more
reason for courts to inquire into the validity of the Rules of Congress, viz:
With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are non-justiciable. Nor
do I agree that we will trivialize the principle of separation of power if we assume jurisdiction
over he case at bar. Even in the United States, the principle of separation of power is no longer an
impregnable impediment against the interposition of judicial power on cases involving breach of rules of
procedure by legislators.
Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v Ballin (144 US 1) as a window to view the issues
before the Court. It is in Ballin where the US Supreme Court first defined the boundaries of the power of
the judiciary to review congressional rules. It held:
"x x x
"The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each house may determine the rules of its
proceedings." It appears that in pursuance of this authority the House had, prior to that day, passed this
as one of its rules:
Rule XV
3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the Speaker, the names of members sufficient
to make a quorum in the hall of the House who do not vote shall be noted by the clerk and recorded in
the journal, and reported to the Speaker with the names of the members voting, and be counted and
announced in determining the presence of a quorum to do business. (House Journal, 230, Feb. 14,
1890)
The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The question, therefore, is as to the validity
of this rule, and not what methods the Speaker may of his own motion resort to for determining the
presence of a quorum, nor what matters the Speaker or clerk may of their own volition place upon the
journal. Neither do the advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly, of such a rule present any
matters for judicial consideration. With the courts the question is only one of power. The Constitution
empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore
constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation
between the mode or method of proceedings established by the rule and the result which is
sought to be attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are open to the determination
of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better, more
accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the validity of a rule that a different one has been
prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to make rules is not one which once exercised is
exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be exercised by the House, and within the
limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal."
Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the validity of congressional
rules, i.e, whether they are constitutional. Rule XV was examined by the Court and it was found to
satisfy the test: (1) that it did not ignore any constitutional restraint; (2) it did not violate any fundamental
146

right; and (3) its method had a reasonable relationship with the result sought to be attained. By
examining Rule XV, the Court did not allow its jurisdiction to be defeated by the mere invocation of the
principle of separation of powers.154
xxx
In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for courts to categorically reject the
political question defense when its interposition will cover up abuse of power. For section 1,
Article VIII of our Constitution was intentionally cobbled to empower courts "x x x to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." This power is new and
was not granted to our courts in the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions. It was not also xeroxed from the US
Constitution or any foreign state constitution. The CONCOM granted this enormous power to our
courts in view of our experience under martial law where abusive exercises of state power were
shielded from judicial scrutiny by the misuse of the political question doctrine. Led by the eminent
former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded and sharpened the checking powers
of the judiciary vis--vis the Executive and the Legislative departments of government. 155
xxx
The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this Court is not a mere power which it
can decline to exercise. Precisely to deter this disinclination, the Constitution imposed it as a
duty of this Court to strike down any act of a branch or instrumentality of government or any of
its officials done with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly, the Constitution has elongated the checking powers of this Court
against the other branches of government despite their more democratic character, the President and
the legislators being elected by the people.156
xxx
The provision defining judicial power as including the 'duty of the courts of justice. . . to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government' constitutes the capstone of the efforts of the
Constitutional Commission to upgrade the powers of this court vis--vis the other branches of
government. This provision was dictated by our experience under martial law which taught us that a
stronger and more independent judiciary is needed to abort abuses in government. x x x
xxx
In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts of government committed with grave
abuse of discretion, the new Constitution transformed this Court from passivity to activism. This
transformation, dictated by our distinct experience as nation, is not merely evolutionary but
revolutionary.Under the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions, this Court approached constitutional violations
by initially determining what it cannot do; under the 1987 Constitution, there is a shift in stress this
Court is mandated to approach constitutional violations not by finding out what it should not do
but what it mustdo. The Court must discharge this solemn duty by not resuscitating a past that petrifies
the present.
I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration to this new constitutional provision
as the case at bar once more calls us to define the parameters of our power to review violations of the
rules of the House. We will not be true to our trust as the last bulwark against government abuses
if we refuse to exercise this new power or if we wield it with timidity. To be sure, it is this
exceeding timidity to unsheathe the judicial sword that has increasingly emboldened other
branches of government to denigrate, if not defy, orders of our courts. In Tolentino, I endorsed the
view of former Senator Salonga that this novel provision stretching the latitude of judicial power is
distinctly Filipino and its interpretation should not be depreciated by undue reliance on inapplicable
foreign jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar, the lessons of our own history should provide us the
light and not the experience of foreigners.157(Italics in the original emphasis and underscoring supplied)

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Thus, the ruling in Osmena v. Pendatun is not applicable to the instant petitions. Here, the third parties alleging
the violation of private rights and the Constitution are involved.
Neither may respondent House of Representatives' rely on Nixon v. US158 as basis for arguing that this Court
may not decide on the constitutionality of Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules. As already
observed, the U.S. Federal Constitution simply provides that "the House of Representatives shall have the sole
power of impeachment." It adds nothing more. It gives no clue whatsoever as to how this "sole power" is to be
exercised. No limitation whatsoever is given. Thus, the US Supreme Court concluded that there was a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of a constitutional power to the House of Representatives. This
reasoning does not hold with regard to impeachment power of the Philippine House of Representatives since our
Constitution, as earlier enumerated, furnishes several provisions articulating how that "exclusive power" is to be
exercised.
The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules which state that impeachment
proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified
complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding
of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by
the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint
or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House thus clearly contravene Section 3
(5) of Article XI as they give the term "initiate" a meaning different from "filing."
Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to
the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI
becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be
filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to
the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23,
2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same
impeachable officer within a one-year period.
Conclusion
If there is anything constant about this country, it is that there is always a phenomenon that takes the center
stage of our individual and collective consciousness as a people with our characteristic flair for human drama,
conflict or tragedy. Of course this is not to demean the seriousness of the controversy over the Davide
impeachment. For many of us, the past two weeks have proven to be an exasperating, mentally and emotionally
exhausting experience. Both sides have fought bitterly a dialectical struggle to articulate what they respectively
believe to be the correct position or view on the issues involved. Passions had ran high as demonstrators,
whether for or against the impeachment of the Chief Justice, took to the streets armed with their familiar slogans
and chants to air their voice on the matter. Various sectors of society - from the business, retired military, to the
academe and denominations of faith offered suggestions for a return to a state of normalcy in the official
relations of the governmental branches affected to obviate any perceived resulting instability upon areas of
national life.
Through all these and as early as the time when the Articles of Impeachment had been constituted, this Court
was specifically asked, told, urged and argued to take no action of any kind and form with respect to the
prosecution by the House of Representatives of the impeachment complaint against the subject respondent
public official. When the present petitions were knocking so to speak at the doorsteps of this Court, the same
clamor for non-interference was made through what are now the arguments of "lack of jurisdiction," "nonjusticiability," and "judicial self-restraint" aimed at halting the Court from any move that may have a bearing on
the impeachment proceedings.
This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as the question of the constitutionality of
initiating the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide is concerned. To reiterate what has been
already explained, the Court found the existence in full of all the requisite conditions for its exercise of its
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constitutionally vested power and duty of judicial review over an issue whose resolution precisely called for the
construction or interpretation of a provision of the fundamental law of the land. What lies in here is an issue of a
genuine constitutional material which only this Court can properly and competently address and adjudicate in
accordance with the clear-cut allocation of powers under our system of government. Face-to-face thus with a
matter or problem that squarely falls under the Court's jurisdiction, no other course of action can be had but for it
to pass upon that problem head on.
The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially entangling itself with the process of impeachment has effectively
set up a regime of judicial supremacy, is patently without basis in fact and in law.
This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the main issue of
whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally
imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor
indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions. Because it is not at all the business of
this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two great branches of the government. Rather, the raison
d'etre of the judiciary is to complement the discharge by the executive and legislative of their own powers to
bring about ultimately the beneficent effects of having founded and ordered our society upon the rule of law.
It is suggested that by our taking cognizance of the issue of constitutionality of the impeachment proceedings
against the Chief Justice, the members of this Court have actually closed ranks to protect a brethren. That the
members' interests in ruling on said issue is as much at stake as is that of the Chief Justice. Nothing could be
farther from the truth.
The institution that is the Supreme Court together with all other courts has long held and been entrusted with the
judicial power to resolve conflicting legal rights regardless of the personalities involved in the suits or actions.
This Court has dispensed justice over the course of time, unaffected by whomsoever stood to benefit or suffer
therefrom, unfraid by whatever imputations or speculations could be made to it, so long as it rendered judgment
according to the law and the facts. Why can it not now be trusted to wield judicial power in these petitions just
because it is the highest ranking magistrate who is involved when it is an incontrovertible fact that the
fundamental issue is not him but the validity of a government branch's official act as tested by the limits set by
the Constitution? Of course, there are rules on the inhibition of any member of the judiciary from taking part in a
case in specified instances. But to disqualify this entire institution now from the suit at bar is to regard the
Supreme Court as likely incapable of impartiality when one of its members is a party to a case, which is simply
a non sequitur.
No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any legal system which recognizes
equality of all men before the law as essential to the law's moral authority and that of its agents to secure
respect for and obedience to its commands. Perhaps, there is no other government branch or instrumentality
that is most zealous in protecting that principle of legal equality other than the Supreme Court which has
discerned its real meaning and ramifications through its application to numerous cases especially of the highprofile kind in the annals of jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not above the law and neither is any other
member of this Court. But just because he is the Chief Justice does not imply that he gets to have less in law
than anybody else. The law is solicitous of every individual's rights irrespective of his station in life.
The Filipino nation and its democratic institutions have no doubt been put to test once again by this
impeachment case against Chief Justice Hilario Davide. Accordingly, this Court has resorted to no other than the
Constitution in search for a solution to what many feared would ripen to a crisis in government. But though it is
indeed immensely a blessing for this Court to have found answers in our bedrock of legal principles, it is equally
important that it went through this crucible of a democratic process, if only to discover that it can resolve
differences without the use of force and aggression upon each other.
WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which
were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the
second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives
Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of
Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
SO ORDERED.

149

U.S. Supreme Court

United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)

United States v. Nixon

No. 73-1766
Argued July 8, 1974
Decided July 24, 1974*
418 U.S. 683
Syllabus
Following indictment alleging violation of federal statutes by certain staff members of the White
House and political supporters of the President, the Special Prosecutor filed a motion under
Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 17(c) for a subpoena duces tecum for the production before trial of certain
tapes and documents relating to precisely identified conversations and meetings between the
President and others. The President, claiming executive privilege, filed a motion to quash the
subpoena. The District Court, after treating the subpoenaed material as presumptively privileged,
concluded that the Special Prosecutor had made a sufficient showing to rebut the presumption
and that the requirements of Rule 17(c) had been satisfied. The court thereafter issued an order
for an in camera examination of the subpoenaed material, having rejected the President's
contentions (a) that the dispute between him and the Special Prosecutor was nonjusticiable as an
"intra-executive" conflict and (b) that the judiciary lacked authority to review the President's
assertion of executive privilege. The court stayed its order pending appellate review, which the
President then sought in the Court of Appeals. The Special Prosecutor then filed in this Court a
petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment (No. 73-1766), and the President filed a crosspetition for such a writ challenging the grand jury action (No. 73-1834). The Court granted both
petitions.
Held:
1. The District Court's order was appealable as a "final" order under 28 U.S.C. 1291, was
therefore properly "in" the Court of Appeals, 28 U.S.C. 1254, when the petition for certiorari
before judgment was filed in this Court, and is now properly before this Court for review. Although
such an order is normally not final and subject to appeal, an exception is made in a
"limited class of
Page 418 U. S. 684
cases where denial of immediate review would render impossible any review whatsoever of an
individual's claims,"
United States v. Ryan, 402 U. S. 530, 402 U. S. 533. Such an exception is proper in the unique
circumstances of this case, where it would be inappropriate to subject the President to the
150

procedure of securing review by resisting the order and inappropriate to require that the District
Court proceed by a traditional contempt citation in order to provide appellate review. Pp. 418 U. S.
690-692.
2. The dispute between the Special Prosecutor and the President presents a justiciable
controversy. Pp. 418 U. S. 692-697.
(a) The mere assertion of an "intra-branch dispute," without more, does not defeat federal
jurisdiction. United States v. ICC,337 U. S. 426. P. 418 U. S. 693.
(b) The Attorney General, by regulation, has conferred upon the Special Prosecutor unique tenure
and authority to represent the United States, and has given the Special Prosecutor explicit power
to contest the invocation of executive privilege in seeking evidence deemed relevant to the
performance of his specially delegated duties. While the regulation remains in effect, the Executive
Branch is bound by it. United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U. S. 260. Pp. 418 U. S.
694-696.
(c) The action of the Special Prosecutor within the scope of his express authority seeking specified
evidence preliminarily determined to be relevant and admissible in the pending criminal case, and
the President's assertion of privilege in opposition thereto, present issues "of a type which are
traditionally justiciable," United States v. ICC, supra, at 337 U. S. 430, and the fact that both
litigants are officers of the Executive Branch is not a bar to justiciability. Pp. 418 U. S. 696-697.
3. From this Court's examination of the material submitted by the Special Prosecutor in support of
his motion for the subpoena, much of which is under seal, it is clear that the District Court's denial
of the motion to quash comported with Rule 17(c), and that the Special Prosecutor has made a
sufficient showing to justify a subpoena for production before trial. Pp. 418 U. S. 697-702.
4. Neither the doctrine of separation of powers nor the generalized need for confidentiality of highlevel communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of
immunity from judicial process under all circumstances. See, e.g., 5 U. S. Madison, 1 Cranch
137, 5 U. S. 177; Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 369 U. S. 211. Absent a claim of need to protect
military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets, the confidentiality of
Page 418 U. S. 685
Presidential communications is not significantly diminished by producing material for a criminal
trial under the protected conditions of in camera inspection, and any absolute executive privilege
under Art. II of the Constitution would plainly conflict with the function of the courts under the
Constitution. Pp. 418 U. S. 703-707.
5. Although the courts will afford the utmost deference to Presidential acts in the performance of
an Art. II function,United States v. Burr, 25 F.Cas. 187, 190, 191-192 (No. 14,694), when a claim of
Presidential privilege as to materials subpoenaed for use in a criminal trial is based, as it is here,
not on the ground that military or diplomatic secrets are implicated, but merely on the ground of a
generalized interest in confidentiality, the President's generalized assertion of privilege must yield
to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial and the fundamental
demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice. Pp. 418 U. S. 707-713.
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6. On the basis of this Court's examination of the record, it cannot be concluded that the District
Court erred in orderingin camera examination of the subpoenaed material, which shall now
forthwith be transmitted to the District Court. Pp.418 U. S. 713-714.
7. Since a president's communications encompass a vastly wider range of sensitive material than
would be true of an ordinary individual, the public interest requires that Presidential confidentiality
be afforded the greatest protection consistent with the fair administration of justice, and the District
Court has a heavy responsibility to ensure that material involving Presidential conversations
irrelevant to or inadmissible in the criminal prosecution be accorded the high degree of respect
due a President, and that such material be returned under seal to its lawful custodian. Until
released to the Special Prosecutor, no in camera material is to be released to anyone. Pp. 418 U.
S. 714-716.
No. 73-1766, 377 F.Supp. 1326, affirmed; No. 73-1834, certiorari dismissed as improvidently
granted.
BURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all Members joined except
REHNQUIST, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases.
Page 418 U. S. 686

152