Retorika Görög 2 PDF

Cambridge Library CoLLeCtion
Books of enduring scholarly value
Classics
From the Renaissance to the nineteenth century, Latin and Greek were
compulsory subjects in almost all European universities, and most early
modern scholars published their research and conducted international
correspondence in Latin. Latin had continued in use in Western Europe long
after the fall of the Roman empire as the lingua franca of the educated classes
and of law, diplomacy, religion and university teaching. The flight of Greek
scholars to the West after the fall of Constantinople in 1453 gave impetus
to the study of ancient Greek literature and the Greek New Testament.
Eventually, just as nineteenth-century reforms of university curricula were
beginning to erode this ascendancy, developments in textual criticism and
linguistic analysis, and new ways of studying ancient societies, especially
archaeology, led to renewed enthusiasm for the Classics. This collection
offers works of criticism, interpretation and synthesis by the outstanding
scholars of the nineteenth century.
Aristotle: Rhetoric
Edward Meredith Cope (1818-1873) was an English scholar of classics
who served as Fellow and Tutor at Trinity College, Cambridge. One of the
leading Greek specialists of his time, Cope published An Introduction to
Aristotles Rhetoric in 1867. Though now considered a standard work, that
Introduction was intended as merely the first part of a full critical edition
of the Rhetoric, which was left incomplete on Copes death in 1873. Copes
manuscripts were collected and edited by John Edwin Sandys, and published
in this three-volume set in 1877. Copes analysis represented an important
advance in the modern interpretation of this foundational text on the art
of persuasion. Volume 2 contains the Greek text of Book 2 together with a
commentary on Aristotles views concerning the place of emotion and logic
within the discipline.
Cambridge University Press has long been a pioneer in the reissuing of

out-of-print titles from its own backlist, producing digital reprints of
books that are still sought after by scholars and students but could not be
reprinted economically using traditional technology. The Cambridge Library
Collection extends this activity to a wider range of books which are still of
importance to researchers and professionals, either for the source material
they contain, or as landmarks in the history of their academic discipline.
Drawing from the world-renowned collections in the Cambridge
University Library, and guided by the advice of experts in each subject area,
Cambridge University Press is using state-of-the-art scanning machines
in its own Printing House to capture the content of each book selected for
inclusion. The files are processed to give a consistently clear, crisp image,
and the books finished to the high quality standard for which the Press
is recognised around the world. The latest print-on-demand technology
ensures that the books will remain available indefinitely, and that orders for
single or multiple copies can quickly be supplied.
The Cambridge Library Collection will bring back to life books of enduring
scholarly value (including out-of-copyright works originally issued by other
publishers) across a wide range of disciplines in the humanities and social
sciences and in science and technology.
Aristotle: Rhetoric
Volume 2
E di t e d by E dward Meredith C ope
and John E dwin Sandys
C A M B R I D G E U N I V E R SI T y P R E S S
Cambridge, New york, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore,
So Paolo, Delhi, Dubai, Tokyo
Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New york
www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781108009669
in this compilation Cambridge University Press 2009
This edition first published 1877
This digitally printed version 2009
ISBN 978-1-108-00966-9 Paperback
This book reproduces the text of the original edition. The content and language reflect
the beliefs, practices and terminology of their time, and have not been updated.
Cambridge University Press wishes to make clear that the book, unless originally published
by Cambridge, is not being republished by, in association or collaboration with, or
with the endorsement or approval of, the original publisher or its successors in title.
THE
RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE.
CONTENTS OF VOLUME II.
l'AGES
i335
T E X T AND COMMENTARY, BOOK II
APPENDIX
(D).
On av with the optative after certain particles
. 336340
APISTOTEAOYS
TEXNHS PHTOPIKHE
B.
ZftKPATHS.
ATJ\OV &pa 6TL 6 Opa.o-ip.axis re Kal Ss av fiXXos ffjrouSj) rix"7!"
Kty 818$, Trpurov wd<ry &Kpi.tlq. yp&tpei re Kal ?roti5<7ei ^ f x V ISety, irbrepov $v
Kal opioiov ir4$>\)Kev TJ Kara (Fu)fJ.aros [i,op<pT}v iroXvetdH.
SeiKvivai.
$AIAPOS.
Xlavrdiracn ptv odv.
rj Tradeif virb rov irt<pVKv.

\6ytav re Kal fvxns
yivv
Ka
ÂI.
T
Tt IXT)V ;
Toirav
TOVTO ydp (pap.ev tptitjiv ttvai.
S i ) . Aeirepov 5i ye, &roi -rl KOIUV

S f i . 'Hpirov d drj diaTa^dp.evos rd
wa6y]p.arat dleun Tas alrias, irpooapfitiTTUv
eKdffTy, Kal SiSdffKoiy oi'o od<ra i<f>' oiW \6yoiv Si' tfv alrlav ef dvdyKiis ij /th
r/ di airuBei.
$ A I . KaXXtora yovv Av, us i'oix\ f x ' OVTUS.
f/.v odv, w tpt\e, AXXws evdeiKvv/j.evov 17 \cyo/j.evov TXVV

crerai oSre TI &\\O oSre TOVTO.PLATO,
Phaedrus,
7r0T
p. 271.
2 0 . Ofroi
^ Xex^^fffrat ^ ypa<prj-
APISTOTEAOYS
TEXNH2
I
PHTOPIKH2 B.
EK TLVUtV {XeV OVV Oi Kai ITpOTpVKt.IV
Kai aTTOTpS-
7T6iv Kal eiraiveiv Kai yêyeiv Kai KaTtiyopeiv Kai

Troiai $o$~ai Kal TrpoTacrei^
BekL
OLTTO-
quart
P5<
CHAP. I.
octav
In the following chapter we have a very brief account of the second 1^

kind of rhetorical proof, viz. the ethical, the tfdos iv ra \eyoim. The
treatment of it is cursory ; and we are referred backwards to the analysis
of virtue moral and intellectual in Book I c. 91, for further details of the
topics from which are to be derived the enthymemes whereby the speech and
the speaker may be made to assume the required character of cppovrjcrts,
apery and evvoia; and forwards to the chapter on <pi\la and fxia-os (11 4),
in the treatise on the naBrj, where the indications of these affections are
enumerated, which will enable the speaker to convey (always by his.
speech) the good intentions and friendly feeling by which he is affected
towards his audience. As supplementary and auxiliary to the direct
logical arguments this indirect ethical mode of persuasion is indispensable to the success of the speech. People are hardly likely to be convinced by a speaker who sets them against him.
On the order of the subjects of the work in general, and the connexion
of the contents of this Chapter, I refer as before to the Introduction [p. 245].
1. IK Tivav...TavT c'oriV] This is a confusion of two constructions:
the grammar requires either rivav expryrai (or something similar), or
else c' av ravT iari. The nolai in the second clause shews that the first
f the two was the one predominant in the writer's mind, which is caressly varied at the end.
8o|ai Kai npoTda-fis] These two are in fact the same. The current
popular opinions are converted by the artist into premisses of rhetorical
enthymemes. They are united again, c. 18 2, comp. Topic. A 10,
104 a 12, fltrl di irporao-ets SiaXcxriKai Kai r a rois evSoôis o/ioia...K<u ocrai
8u<u Kara TEâs flirt ras evptjixevas. And C. 14, init. ras /uv nporaafis
CKkeKTeov...Kal oaat Sogat Kara Terras tla-iv.
' Now the sources from which we must derive our arguments in
The connexion of this chapter with the subject of the Rhetorical %6os is
marked at the opening of the chapter itself: avfj-firjo-eTai yap </ta wepl TOI/TWK
\eyovras (cdxeica Sr]\oSv i% c3e roiol Tivt.% {iir6\i]cj>SrialiiJ,e0a Kara rb rjOos, ijirep rjv
devrepa Trieris' CK T&V avrwv yap ûas re Kit d\\ov aftdmtTTov Sv?i](r&iie6a roittn
rrpbs apeT-qv.
AR. II.
PHT0PIKH2 B i i, 2.
irpos TCCS TOVTCOV Trttrrets, TavT (TTIV irepi yap TOVTIOV Kai 4K TOVTWV TCL evdvfxrfjxaTa, 109 wept eK
2 e'nreTv i$ia TO yevos TU>V \6ytov. iirei B' eveica Kpu
i(TTtv J priTopiKr) (/cat yap Ta<s o~Vfxfiov\a<i Kpivovo~i
Kai JJ S//oj Kpicis eo-Tiv), dvdyKt] fxrj /movov TTJOOS TOV
Xoyov opav, oVws aVoSet/crtfcos etTTai Kai TTKTTO'S,
aAAa Kai avTov TTOLOV Tiva Kai TOV KpiTt]V KaTao~Kevaexhorting and dissuading, in panegyric and censure, in accusation and
defence, and the sort of opinions and premisses that are serviceable for
(rhetorical) proof in them, are these: for these are the materials and
sources of our enthymemes, specially, so to say, in each kind of speeches';
i. e. using a special treatment according to the kind of speech on which
we are engaged. If the text is right here, ws nepi exaa-Tov dirdv Ibia TO
ycvos rStv \6ya>vBekker retains it unaltered, and Spengel 1 accepts it
in his last edition, though he formerly proposed cHro/xfv this must be the
translation of it. as eiireiv 'so to speak', (o5j oros elneiv, as T jrofil
TfKfflpaaBai, Plat. Phaedr, 230 B, et sim.).
2. The commencement of this section is repeated and dwelt upon
at the beginning of c. 18, where, after the parenthetical account of the
ira8t\ and the six special ijdrj, a break occurs, the subsequent contents of
the work are enumerated in their order, and the logical part of Rhetoric
resumed.
On the extension of the signification of Kplvav, kpla-is, Kpirr/s, to
include decisions or judgments of all kinds, moral, political, (as in
deciding upon a course of policy to be pursued), literary, (criticism, in
matters of taste, works of art, written compositions, and such like), as
well as the ordinary application of it to the judicial decisions of the
judges in a court of law, compare I 1. 7, p. 10, and Introd. p. 137, note I.
d7ro8KTiKos] 'demonstrative', improperly applied to rhetorical proof.
See note on I 1. n , p. 19.
TOV Kpirrjv Karao-Kevaêiv] (or the audience in general) Ouint. v 12. 9
frobationes quas Tradr)riK.as vacant, ductas ex affectibus. There is a sort
of cvyiia in the application of KaTa<TKevaetv to avrov TTOIOV riva, and aâin
to TOV KpiTriv. In both cases it means 'to establish' or 'constitute' but
is applied in two slightly different senses; in the first it is to make himself out to be, to establish a certain character in and by the speech and
in the other to establish a certain feeling or disposition in the minds of
the judges.
1
In his treatise on the Rhetoric in Trans. Bav. Acad. 1851, p. 39, note he
translates the passage thus: wie man jedes genus der reden fiir sich behandeln soil
understanding iis etireiv, if I do not mistake him, in the sense of lis Set tiTeiv (?)
'according as we have to speak', which seems to me to be hardly allowable
us eiirae can, I think, in conformity with ordinary Greek usage, have no other
sense than that which I have attributed to it. See, for illustrations of ws thus used
with an infinitive, Matth. Gr. Cr. 545.
PHTOPIKHS B i 3) 4.
3 ftetv 7ro\u yap SiaCpepei Trpos TT'KTTIV, fxaXia-ra /xev ev

r a t s <rv/JifiovXals, elra Kal ev Tats SiKais, TO TTOIOV
Tiva (paivecrdai TOP XeyovTa Kal TO 7TJOOS avTOvs VTTOXafxfidveiv eêtj/ TTWS CLVTOV, 7T|OOS Ze TOVTOL$ idv Kal
4 avTol ^laKe'ifxevol TTWS Tvy^dvtocriv.
TO /uev ovv TVOIOV
Tiva <j)alveo~6ai TOV XeyovTa j(pt](Tip.uiTepov ets Tas
<ru/ui(3ovXds ecTiv, TO Se SiaKeTo-dal 7rws TOV aKpoaTt\v
eis Tas St/cas- ov yap TOVTOL (paiveTai (piXovcri
3. 7roXu yap &ia<j)ep(i irpos i r i W K.T.X.J
Comp. I 2. 4, 5.
Quint.
IV 5. 6, interim refiigienda non modo distinctio quaestiouum est, sed

omnino tractatio: affectibus perturbandus et ab intentione auferendus
auditor. Non enim soliiin oratoris est docere, sed plus eloquentia circa
movendum valet. This goes beyond Aristotle: Quintilian however is
speaking rather of the naBos, of the TOV Kpirfjv TTOI&V riva KaTa<TKfva(iv,
than of the ij#or. He sets the irados above the ij)os in point of its importance and value to the orator as a means of persuasion; Aristotl;,
admitting this in forensic speaking, takes the opposite view in the deliberative kind; 41- But compare I 2. 4, where a decided preference for
the rjdos is expressed.
' For the assumption of a certain character by the speaker himself,
and the supposition (of the audience) that he is disposed in a particular
way (has certain feelings towards themselves), makes a great difference
in respect of the persuasive effect of the speech, first and foremost in
counselling or deliberation, and next in legal proceedings (r)#os); and
besides this, whether they (the audience) are themselves in some particular disposition (feeling, frame of mind) (towards him) (wa8os)'.
iv rais avjxôv\ais] 'consultations*. Plat. Gorg. 455 A, orav <TTparr)yaiv alpcccas irepi...(rvfifiovkt) y.
4. TO Se dianetcrBal was TOV aKpoarr/v els Tas S/xas] Comp. I 2. 4, dia
fie Tcdv ctKpoaT(av...ov yap ofiotcos a7rodidop.ev Tas Kpiceis Xv7rovfivoi Ka\ \alpovTs...npos o KU\ \iovov ireipacrBal (jiafitv npayiiaTcvecrdai TOVS VVV TC^VOKO-
yovvras, who wrote only for the use of pleaders in the courts of justice,
I 1. 9, 10.
ov yap ravra (palverai (j>i\ovo-i Kal jxicrovo-i, K.r.X. ] Cic. de Orat. II 42.
178, nihil est enim in dicendo mains quam ut faveat oratori is qui audiet,
utique ipse sic moveatur ut impetu quodam animi et perturbatione magis
quam iudicio aut consilio regatur. Plura enim multo homines indicant
odio aut amore aut cupiditate aut iracundia aut dolore aut laetitia aut spe
1
The reason of this is, that when a man has to recommend or dissuade a
certain course of action, his character and the opinion entertained of it must give
great weight to his advice: and it is not in the law-court, but in public life, in
quelling the seditious riot, that Virgil's vir pietate gravis ac mentis (in the famous
simile, Aen. I. 149) exhibits his 'authority': whereas in a court of justice, where
facts are in question, the speaker's assumed character has either no weight at all,
or in a far less degree.
I2
PHTOPIKHS B I 4.
>*>
,1
, , % ' >) p . 1378.
TO Trapdirav 'eTepa fj KaTa TO /xeyeflos eTepa' TU> ^V

"yap (piXouuTi, irepl ov woieiTai Trjv Kpiatv, r\ OVK aoiKelu 7) fxiKpd BOKCI dSiKeTv, TW Be {JLLCTOVVTL. TOvvavTiov v- 55Kai Tco fxev 7rivvju.ovi>Ti Kai eve\7riot OVTI, eav rj TO
aiit timore aut errore aut aliqua permotione mentis quam veritate aut
praescripto aut iuris norma aliqua aut iudicii formula aut legibus. And
on this importance of evvoia, that is, the conciliation of it in the audience
by making your own good will apparent in the speech, compare Demosth.
de Cor. 277, p. 318, nane'ivo 8' fv 010", on TTJV cfif/v StivoTqra%<rra> yap'
Kalrot eycoy" 6pm rijs rav \cyovra>v Swa/teas rovs aKovovras TO n\eio~Tov
fiepos Kvplovs ovras' us yap av v/iets aTrodf^rjO'df Kal npos eKaaTov fXVT>
cvvoias, OVTODS 6 \eya>v eBoê (ppovclv K.T.\.
TO wapawav eTepa.-.To peyedos rrfpa] (' either altogether different', different in kind; 'or in magnitude and amount', different in degree!) This
clause (to rovvavriov) is explanatory of the effect of the irdBt] upon the
audience, (not of the rjdos,) as appears from the example chosen, <fn\ia
and fuo-os being naflr), II 4: and it belongs especially, though not exclusivelyfor in such cases as the public speeches of Demosthenes and
Aeschines it might be usefully, and in fact was, employedto forensic
practice; the result being in this case either complete acquittal from a
charge (OVK aStetj/) or a lenient construction of it, and a mitigation of the
penalty (/) pticpa dScxetv). The next (after Tovvavrlov) refers principally to the
deliberative branch of Rhetoric, as is shewn by the future timethe time
of the deliberative speaker is the future, I 3.2TO eo-6/j.evov, xal ?o-eo-6ai ra
aya6ov eo-fo-dat; and accordingly for the use of speakers in this branch
the emotions appealed to must be different and adapted to a different
purpose. The two which will be most serviceable to the public speaker
are desire (iiridv^la) and hope (An-i's): those who are under the excitement
of such feelings will be more likely to assent to the course of policy proposed, and so ensure the success of the speaker who recommends. It is
singular however that neither of these is found in the list of ndBrj which
follows: i7n.6vp.ia occurs amongst them in Eth. Nic. 11 4 ; and hope may
possibly be included under 6apo-os, as the opposite of (pnj3os, in the analysis of TO dappdXeov and 8dpo-os, Rhet. II 5. 16, to the end. This is partially confirmed by II 5. 16; after telling us that confidence is the opposite of fear,
he adds coo-re p.eTa (pavrao-ias IJ eXsrir T&V o-iaTrjplasv coy iyyvs
ovrav, as if 'the hope of near approaching safety' were convertible with

or the ground of, confidence, and therefore a iraBos opposed to d>6Bos
In the same way tvvoia, in the three 'ethical' virtues to be exhibited in
the speech, is included in <pi\la.
'And to one who feels a desire for anything, or is in a sanguine
frame of mind, the future result (announced by the speaker), if it be
pleasant, appears to be both certain and good; whilst to any one who
has no (such) feeling, or is in a bad humour, the contrary (is true
is the case)'.
PHTOPIKHS B i s, 6.
evofxevov tj$v} KCLI etrea-Qai nal dyaQov eo-eadai (paiveTai, TW <$' (XTraQel ical v(T)(epaivovTi TOvvavTiov.
5
TOU fxev ovv avrovs eivai TTKTTOVS TOW
Xeyovras
Tpia icrTi TO. aiTia' TocravTa. yctp e<TTi ti a 7ri<TTevofxev e^co Ttov anoêlêcov.
IECTTI e TctvTa <ppovr]<Tis
ical dperri KCLI evvoict' $ia\js6v$ovTaL yap irepi u>v Xeyovaiv i] crvufiovXevovcriv rj did nvavra Tavra t] $L<X
6 TOVTWV rr i] yap 3t' d<ppo(rvvriv OVK 6p6w<s ô^dôvariv, rj Soâ^bi/res 6p6ws Sta /JLO^6r]pl.av ov TO. do~
5- etrri 8e TCLVTCL (j>povt)(ris KCU aperrj Kat evvota] On Whately's com-
parison {Rhetoric, c. 2) of these three qualities as constituting the ethical

character of the speech, with the character of Pericles, as drawn by himself, in Thuc. 11 60, see Introd. p. 246, note 1. The explanation of them,
and the reason of their selection, are there given. (pp6vr)o-is is the intellectual virtue of 'practical wisdom', essential above all to a statesman;
apc.Tri is moral virtue, of character and conduct; cvvoia is required in the
speaker himself (or rather in his speech) as part of the %8os, and in the
audience as a ira8os. In the Politics v m (v) 9, init. the correspondence
is exact, and the three same qualities or virtues are selected as the
special qualifications of the statesman: rpla hi nva xPV ^xelv TVS /IE'AXovras apciv ras Kvplas dpâs, npiorou /lev (piKiav irpbs TX]V KaBe&rai&av
TtoXtrelav (this is something rather different from the (vvoia of the Rhetoric : but the purpose of Rhetoric and of Politics is different), eireira
bvvap.iv p.eyi<TTt)v r&v epyav rijs dpxfjs (this is 'ability', corresponding to
<ppovr](Tis in Rhet. and the combination of knowledge and eloquence in

T h u c y d ) , rpirov 8' dperf/v Kai hiKaiocrvvrjV iv fKaaTrj irokiTfia TTJV irpos Tt]V
TTokiTflav. It seems not unlikely that Arist. may have borrowed this
from Thuc, altering however and perhaps improving the classification
and the expression, and adapting it to his immediate purpose in the
Politics and the Rhetoric.
SiayjtevSovTat] '(the speakers) make mistakes, or false statements',
whether intentionally or unintentionally; ij/ev8e<T6ai can bear either sense.
In the Nic. Eth. where it occurs several times, VI 3, 1139 b 18, ib. c. 6,
1140 b 4, c. 13, 1144 a 35, IX 3, 1165 b 8, and in the ordinary usage of
other authors, it appears to be always 'to be deceived', implying an
unintentional error, accordingly here also the mistakes and false statements must be represented as unintentional, so far as the word is concerned ; though the alternative Sia /j.o\6rjplavthe second case, when
dpiTTj is lackingshews that it is also possible to make them intentionally and with intent to deceive. The fact is that here again is a sort
of tvyna, and 8ia^rev8e<r0ai (as interpreted by the ordinary usage of it)
will only apply properly to the first of the three cases ; in the other two it
requires some modification. The concluding observation, dioirep evdcxeTai...yiyva(TKovTas, 'it is possible to do this with one's eyes open', looks
as if it was meant to supply this.
PHT0PIKH2 B i 68.
Kovvra Xejovaiu, r\ (ppovifioi fxev teal eVteiKeTs ei<riv

dXM OVK evvoi, io7rep ivdexerai fxr) TO. fieXricrTa
<rv[jifiov\eveiv yi<yvw(TKOVTa^. xal "wapd TavTa ovoev.
dvdyKr] dpa TOV cnravTa hoKOvvra TavT exeiv IVCCI
7 Tois aKpocofxevoi's TTKTTOV. odev fxlv TOLVVV (ppovifioi
Kal o-KOVâloi (paveiev dv, IK TWC irepl r a s dpeTas Strj\ri7rreov e'/c TWV avrwv <ydp KCCV erepov Tts
Kav eavrov
KaTacrKevdcreie
TOLOVTOV
irept
g Kal <hiAias ev Tots 7repi TO TrdQr\ XSKTCOV
o
WV.
Be Ta irddn $t ova {xeTafBdWovr^

,%ia<p6pov<ri 7TjOOS
6. 8ta poxOrjptau ov ra doKovvra Xiyovcriv] i. e. from corrupt motives
do not state their real opinions. Whately's parallel from Thucydides, above
referred to, though not precisely corresponding to the three virtues of the
speech here described, is yet sufficiently close to serve as a commentary
on this passage of Aristotle; and as pourtraying, in terse and vigorous
language, the character of an upright and independent statesman, such as
were rare at Athens, it is sufficiently striking in itself, to deserve quotation on its own account. Kairoi ipoi roiovra dv8p\ 6pylCt<r8e, says Pericles, os ovdevbs o'lo/im rj<T(TU>v elvai yvavai re ra fteovra Kal ipfirfvevo-ai ravra
cpiXoTTokts (Aristotle's evvoia) re nai xPW^Ta>v Kpua-a-tav. (This illustrates
the iioxdrfpla, the ma/us animus, of the other, which consists in suppressing your convictions or making false statements from corrupt or interested motives.) o re yap yvovs Kal fii) <ra(pa>s di8aas ev 'Imp Kal el /ii) eveBvjiriBr)' o T excov d/ifporepa, rrj 8e jroXei Svrrvovs, OVK av opoiats TI oiKeuos
(ppdoi' irpoa-ovTos he Kal TOVSG, ^pij/ia(rt 8e viKa/xenov, TO. ^v/xTravTa TOVTOV
evos av TrrnXoiro, T h u c . II 6o.
7. K TO>V nepl ras dperas biflprHievani] 'from the analysis of the

virtues', in I 9. 7rep\ evvoias Kal <pi\las, in II 4.
ix Ttiv avrwv yap K.T.X.J Karaa-Kevaîv here again has the same double
sense and application as before, 2. It is to make oneself out, make to
appear, in the speech; and to put others in such and such a frame of
mind. Both of these can be done, he says, by the use of the same topics,
namely those of I 9. The topics there applied to panegyric under the
epideictic branch, can be here transferred to the representation of the
speaker's own character in and by his speech.
8. TO. iradrj] Of the various senses and applications of na.8os, and
also of its special signification in Aristotle's ethical system, an account is
given in the Introduction, p. 133 seq.; together with a comparison of the
two lists here and in the Nic. Ethics. These two it will be seen differ
materially. I have further referred (p. 246, note 1, on the summary of
this chapter) to Mr Bain's work On the Emotions and the Will for a
complete and scientific explanation of the actual facts of those which are
also included in Aristotle's lists, either here or in the Nic. Eth., viz.
anger, resentment, righteous indignation, terror and confidence or courage, love and hatred.
PHTOPIKHS B i 9.
Tas Kpicreis, ots eirerai AUTTTJ Kai JJ'SOW7, olov opytj

eAeos <^)o/3os Kai 6<ra a'Wa TOiavray KCCI TO TOUTOIS
9 evavTia.
c5e? Se ^laipeiv r a TT6J(H eKa&TOv els Tpiw
\eyto <$' (HOP 7T6jO/ opyijs, TTWS r e ^latceifievoi. SpylXoi
ei<rl, Kai T'KTIV elwdacriv 6pyie<r6aiy Kai eirl 7ro/ots* et
'yp TO juei/ ev 17 Ta Zvo kôifxev TOVTWV, htravTa $e
fxr\, aZvvaTOv av e'lrj Trjv 6pyr]v e/unroieTv 6/J.O'IWS Se
What is here said of them, that they are characterised, as parts of our
moral nature, by being always attended by pleasure and painone or
both, as angeris found likewise in E t h . N . 11 4, sub init. Xe'y< 8e ira8r}
/lev ewidviiiav opyijv 0o/3oc 6pa<ros (so written h e r e ; more correctly Bapaos,
II 5- 16,) (jidovov x<jpav <pi\lav fiiaoi irodov (fikov e\eov, o\as uls eirerai
jSovfi 5 Xvirr]. In E t h . Eudem. 11 2, 1220 b 12, it is said of them, Xty 8e
naBt] pep Toiavra, BVJIOV (po/iaiv ai'Sco i7n.6vfi.iav, (this is of course not in-
fended for a complete list: aldds and eVi0v/u'a come from the Nic. Eth.,
the former from the end of Book IV., where it appears with vepe<ris as an
appendage to the list of virtues; it is found likewise in the Rhet. II 6, under the name alaxivrj. iizi8vfiia is absent in the Rhetoric), oXo>? ott tn-erai
o5r <iri ro TTOXU (this is a modification of Aristotle's statement) 1} aio-î/rtic^
(this also is an addition) tjSovf/ fj \vir>} Kaff aira. In Magn. Mor. A 7, 8,
there is a summary account, borrowed directly from Aristotle, of the three
elementary divisions of man's moral nature, Tradq Swaêis Zeis. Of the
first we find, irddij ph ovv eariv opyf/ (j)6fios fiio-os iroBos f^Xor ?Xeor, ra
roiaiiTa, ois eiaiOe napaKo\ov8eiv Xvjri; (cm 17801/1;, 1186 a 12, which is afterwards thus modified, c. 8, 1186 a 34, ra 8c ira&t] r^roi XCn-ai elaiv tj ytjoval,
rj OVK arm Xvirijs TJ rjSovfjs. These wa$rj proper are therefore distinguished
from other vadrj, feelings or affections of like nature, such as the appetites,
hunger and thirst (which are also attended by pleasure and pain), not
by pleasure and pain in general, as seems to be implied in the above
statements, but by the particular kinds of pleasures and pains that severally accompany them; bodily in the one case, mental and moral in the
other. So that the appetites belong to the body or material, the ' emotions',
as they are now called, to the mind and the moral, immaterial, part of
man; and feeling (the general term) and emotion (the special term) are
thus distinguished: all emotions are feelings, all feelings are not emotions.
IKTafiaXkovTes diafopovo-i] (differ by change) 'are brought over to a
different state of mind or feeling', npos r i s Kpia-ets 'in respect of their
decisions', of all kinds; but especially judicial decisions and those of
national assemblies on questions of policy or expediency.
9. For rhetorical purposes we must divide the examination of
each naBos into three parts; the nature of them, what the disposition is
in one who feels the emotion; the ordinary objects, against whom the
emotion is directed (as the ordinary objects of anger); and the ordinary
conditions, the occasions and circumstances which give rise to them.
Without the knowledge of all three in each case, it is impossible to excite
in the mind of anyone the feeling or emotion required.
PHT0FJKH2 B i 9 ; 2 i.
Kal eTTt TtJov a\\u)v.

uxnrep ovv Kal errl TWV irpoeiprf
fiivtov heypdyâfxev r a s Tr/ooTa'o-etSj OVTCO Kal eirt TOVTIOV 7roir\(rwfxev Kal dieXwjxev TOV elprifxevov Tpoirov.
1
e<rTco $ij opyrj opegis juera AuV^s Tifjuopias (paivo- CHAP, n
8taypd<peiv, de-scribere, de-lineare, to describe, lit. draw in detail, with
all the divisions (Sid) marked: comp. Siaypafifia, of a mathematical diagram : applied to a descriptive analysis of a subject.
On this part of Aristotle's Rhetoric, the treatise on the nadrj, Bacon
has the following remarks, de Augm. Scient. v n 3, Vol. 1. p. 736, ed.
Ellis et Spedding: ' Et hie rursus subiit nova admiratio, Aristotelem,
qui tot libros de Ethicis consCripsit, Affectus ut membrum Ethicae principale in illis non tractasse; in Rhetoricis autem ubi tractandi interveniunt secundario (quatenus scilicet oratione cieri aut commoveri possint) locum illis reperisse; (in quo tamen loco, de iis, quantum tarn
paucis fieri potuit, acute et bene disseruit)'. I quote this with the more
pleasure, as one of the few fair statements of Aristotle's merits to be
found in Bacon's writings.
CHAP. II.
1. ecmo 817] said of a provisional definition, suitable for rhetorical
purposes, but without scientific exactness. Comp. I 5. 3, and note, 6. 2,
7. 2, 10. 3. On rhetorical definitions^ see Introd. p. 13.
opeis pera Alinespr/ Trpoo-qnovros] This definition of anger occurs
likewise in the Topics, 9 156 a 30^ 17 opyi) Spelts elvai ri/xwpi'ar Sia
cpaivo/iei^v SXiyapiav, as an average specimen of a dialectical definition ; whence no doubt it was imported into the Rhetoric. Another
definition similar to this is- again spoken of as popular and dialectical, and opposed to a true 'physical' definition, de Anima I, 403^29,
&ia<pep6vra>s 8* av oplvawro (pvaiKts re Kai SiaXexîKos e/caorov OVT&V, olov
tjpyr] TI eortV o fiiv yap opeiv dvTi\vrr^<rt<os rj n TOIOZTOV, 6 8 ffViw TOV
ncpi KapSiav aijuaros xai 6epfi.su; the latter is the 'appropriate' form of
definition. And Plutarch, de Virt. Mor. p. 442 B, speaks of opegis avrikv7riio-f<os in terms which seem to imply that Aristotle had himself employed
as his own definition. This, says Seneca, de Ira, I 3. 3, very nearly corresponded with his own, (eupiditas ininriae ulciscendae 1 2. 4,) ait enim
(Arist.) iram esse cupiditatem doloris repontndi; which appears to be a
translation of ap*is anCKvurjCTeas. A passage of the Eth. Nic. v n 7,
1149 a 30, will illustrate some points of the definition of the Rhetoric.
6 8vp.os hA 6ipiioTr]Ta Kai TaxvTrJTa...6pp.a Trpbs <tt)v Tifnaptav. 6 fitv yap
\cryos r) i; (pavracrla on vfipis rj o\iyo>pia e'SijX&xrev, 0 8' ao-n-tp o-vWoyia-dpevos on del T<j> TOIOVTCO noXefiav xaXfjraiVet Sj evtivs' 7) 8" int.8vp.ia, iav
fiovov e"nzr\ o n ijSu o Aoyor rj ij aio-8r)<ris, opjxa jrpos TTJV diroXavcriv. H e r e
two elements of anger are distinguished. And the pain lies in the struggle which the 8vp.6s undergoes, whilst the pleasure is caused by the
satisfaction of the iTnBvixia, the appetite or desire of satisfaction or compensation for the injury inflicted, which is the object of the rifiapia. Victorius quotes the Stoic definition of anger, np-apias iirU)vp.[a TOV SOKOVVTOS
ij8iKr]Kevai ov Trpo(rrj<6vT(o9, which is derived probably from this of Aristotle.
PHTOPIKHS B 2 I.
Sid <paivo/j.ivrjv oAiytoplav TWU ets avrov $ TWV

opfgts as a general term denotes a class of opi&is, instinctive and
impulsive faculties of the soul or immaterial part, intellectual as well as
moral, the ultimate origin of all action in the human subject. Sir W.
Hamilton, Led. on Metaph. I p. 185, laments the want of any corresponding word in modern psychology, and proposes to supply it by the
term 'conative' faculties. The opeis, so far as it is described at all, is
noticed in de Anima ii 3, sub init, and afterwards more at length in III
9 and 10; compare also Eth. N. VI 2. The first of these passages enumerates the ascending stages or forms of life which characterise and
distinguish the ascending orders of plants and animals. The first, TO
Bpenriicov, the life or principle of growth and nutrition, is the lowest form,
and is characteristic of plants, which have no other. The second stage in
the development of life is TO alo-BqTiKov, with which TO OP^KTIKOV, the ultimate origin of motion in the living animal, is inseparably connected;
(sensation implies impulse) both of them being instinctive and both together constituting animal as distinguished from plant. But the lowest
animals have no power of motion; consequently the next stage in the
upward course is TO KIVTJTIKOV, local motion, or locomotion in space, Kara
To7rov. The last, which is peculiar to humanity, is TO SI<IVOT]TIK6V, the
intellectual element, divided into mvs and bmvoia. The 0peK.TLK.6v is here
divided, 414 b 2, into three classes of faculties, iintivpia (the appetites, or
sensual desires)1, 6vp.6s (the passions, anger, love, hatred, and all the
more violent and impetuous emotions, the angry passions especiallythe
word is as old as Homer, a relic of antiquity, and as a psychological
term very vague and indistinct), and lastlyfiov\r]<ns,which seems here to
include 'will' as well as 'wish'. The will is more directly implied,
though- never disengaged and distinctly expressed, in the irpoalpeo-is.
the moral faculty of deliberate purpose: this consists of an intellectual,
and also of an impulsive element, the spontaneous origin of moral action
which it is the office of the intellectual part to direct aright; the irpoaipfcis accordingly is opeîs POV\(VTIKJ, Eth. N. VI 2, 1139 a 24, or again,
opeKTiKos vovs fj '6pe%is hiavor)TiKrj, ib. b 4. These two elements in combination, (the jrpoaipetm), are the apxh npaêas, ib. a 32, of which the
opiis (and so de Anima ill 9. 2, 3, Iv 817 TO KLVOVP, TO dpeK.Tin.6v,) is the
1
This reference of im9v/xia to the class of o>?eis indicates, as Plutarch, de
Virt. Mor. c. 3 (ap. Heitz, Verlor. Schrift. Arist. p. 171), has pointed out, a
change in the Aristotelian psychology, from the Platonic tripartite division of the
human nature, intellectual and moral, which he originally heldus SipuJj' itjTW e
uv lypaipev, i. e. in the lost dialogue irzpl oiKawtxiv-qs, according to Heitz : the
SviioaSh and iwi.9vii.-qTi.Kbv are actually distinguished, Topic. B 7, 113 a 36b 3,
and A 5, 126 a 813, where we have the three, TO iriffv/j,7iTtK6v, rd 8vij.oaS4s, rb
XoyLimKov (in both passages rb 0i//ioeia<?s is assigned as the seat of opyri); and the
division is certainly implied in Polit. IV (VII) 7, 1327 b 36, seq., where the
author is criticising the Republic to the views expressed in the de Anima, in
which the Platonic division is criticised, condemned, and rejected. Plutarch, 1. c ,
p. 442 B, after the statement above quoted, continues, varepov Si rb /iiv dufioeiSis
T iTn.Bvjj.riTi.KQ irpoaivtipev,
us iTn6v/iiav
n x a TOV BVJS.W OVTO. KOI opc$a> avTiXu,
10
PHTOPIKHS B 2 I.
original moving agent: and this, though not expressly so called, is in

fact the will. In de Anima i n cc. 9, 10, are repeated the statements of
11 3, with the addition of further details. Of the three component elements of opegu, the second, Bvpos, is omitted: and the five stages cf life
.of the former passage still remaining five, the intellectual is now divided
into two, TO vorjTiKov, and TO PovXevriKov (the speculative and practical
reason), and the Kivyrticov Kara TOWOV has disappeared. How this division
of the ijrvxv> s o u l o r life, is to be reconciled with that of the Ethics 11 4>
into naBt] 8wapeis ey, Aristotle has not told us, and no one I believe
has yet discovered. Of the three sets of 6ptets above mentioned opyr)
must belong to the Ovfius.
fiera Xiimjs] all the itadr\ being attended by pleasure or pain; or sometimes both, as opyr). Note on c. 1.8.
(paivofitvr]s and (paivofievrjv] are both emphatic; not merely'apparent'
and unreal, but 'manifest, conspicuous, evident', (paivoficurj nfiapia, ' a
punishment of which the effect can be perceived', (comp. II 3.16, and note;
II4. 31, a[o-()eo~dai yap K.T.X.) and 81a cpaiuofievrjv okiyaplav, 'due to a
manifest slight'; a slight which is so manifest that it cannot escape observation ; and therefore because it has been noticed by everybody, requires
the more exemplary punishment in the way of compensation. It is
because anger is an impulse towards this punishment or vengeance that
can be seen, and accompanied with pain until this impulse is quieted by
satisfaction, that we are told in I 11. 9, 'that no one is angry with one
who appears to be beyond the reach of his vengeance, or with those who
are very far superior to him in power'.
With (paivop.evrjs,{or<f>avfpas, comp. I 7. 31 (note), 8. 6; 9. 32; II IO. I; 11. 1;
III 2. 9, 81a TO irapaWr/ka TO. ivavrla pakurra (palveaBcu, compared with II
23. 30, where the same phrase occurs with <pavepa tlvai for (paiveo-dat.
Topic. H 3 , 153 a 31, OTIOLOV av nakio-ra <pavfi 6 ivavrios opio-fios. Eth.
Nic. Ill 7> 1113 b 19, (I 8e ravra (palverai, icat firj <?xH-fv K.T.X. Parv. Nat.
de Long. Vit. c. 5, sub init. ipalverai yap ovras. Compare also, alike for
the sense and the expression, Eth. Nic. V 10, 1135 b 28, inl cpaivo/iivij yap
dStxia 7; opyrj ecrTiv: and Top. B 2, 109 b 36, the parallel case of envy, tl
yap 0 (pOovos earl XUTTIJ ewi 4>aivop.evrj tvnpayiq TWV inieiKcov TIVVS.
Plato
Phaedo 84 C, o 2a>Kparr)s,as iSeiv i<palvero, (as plainly appeared in his face

and gesture). Eth. Eudem. Ill 1, 1229 b 12 (quoted in note on H 5. 1), is
a good instance.
oXiyaplav] 'slight esteem or regard', 'slight'. The caUseof anger is stated
so nearly in the same terms in Rhet. ad Alex. 34 (35). 11, opyrjv S<? (ipTroujo-op-ev), iav im8ciKvia>p,ei> napa TO npoovJKOv <a\iya>prip.evovs rj rjbiKrjpAvovs,
$1 T<OV (plXav eicetvav, rj avrovs r) av Krj86p.cvoi Tvyxavovaiv avroi, t h a t one
might almost suppose that the two explanations are derived from some
common source, perhaps a definition of anger current in the earlier treatises on Rhetoric, Thrasymachus' eKeoi (Rhet. Ill I. 7, Plat. Phaedr. 267 c),
and the like.
A valuable commentary on this explanation of the cause of anger, the
coincidence between the two being manifestly accidental, is to be found
in Prof. Bain's work on The Emotions and the Will, p. 166, ch. ix. 3, on
the 'irascible emotion". " These two facts both pertain," he says, "to the
nature of true anger, the discomposure of mind from the circumstance of
PHTOPIKH2 B 2 i, 2.
2 auTOv,
TOU oXiyaopeiv
fxr] 7rpo(r/]KOVTOs.
II
el S>) T O U T '
another man's intention in working evil against us, and the cure of this
discomposure by the submission or suffering of the agent." I will only add
one remark upon this interesting subject; that when Aristotle assigns 6\iyapla, the contempt and indifference to our feelings and sense of personal
dignity implied in the notion of 'slight', as the main cause of the emotion
of anger, he is thinking only of the angry passion as excited against a fellow
man. Yet we are angry with a dog that bites, or a cat that scratches us 1 ,
and here there cannot in all cases be any sense of undeserved contempt
or indifference to provoke the angry feeling; though perhaps sometimes
it may be increased by such an act of aggression, if the animal happen to
be a pet or favourite, in which case we may extend (by analogy) human
feelings to the brute, comparing him unconsciously with a friend who has
injured us, and forgetting the intellectual and moral differences of the
two, which aggravate the offence in the human subject. Seneca denies
the capacity of anger to all but man: de Ira, I 3. 4, dicetidum est/eras
ira carere et omnia praeter hominem.
TWV eh avrbv ('him' i.e. avrov, 'himself') rj T&V airoii] This phrase,
which is unusually ellipticaleven for Aristotlemust it seems be thus
filled up and explained, rav eh airov means T&V d8t/ci)#eVra>i/ or simply
TvpaxBivrav ds avrov, 'offences or acts committed against oneself, and
okiyaplav tav is, ' slight or contemptuous indifference of, i. e. shewn in,
evidenced by, offences &c.': in supplying the ellipse in the other part of
the phrase, f) TWV avrov, we are guided by a similar expression, c. 8 7,
<Tt/u/3e/3i;KoYa r) avra (so the MSS here) rj rav avroii, rj e'XjriVai yeviu&ai r)
avrw i) rmv avrov; in both of them the indef. pronoun is omitted, r) riva
rav avrov in c. 2. 1, and TIVI in the two other places.
TOU oXiympfiv fir) TrpoarjKovTos2, the last term of the definition, adds to
1
On the manner in which anger vents itself upon all sorts of objects indiscriminately, see Plut. de cohibenda ira, p. 455 D, 8V/J.Q 5' OLOIKTOV ob5ei> oiS' dveirtXeLptjTov dW 6pyi6/j.tda Kal iro'Ke/J.iois Kal ij>l\us KOX TIKVOIS Kai yovevai, Kal 0eoU
vrj Ata, Kal 6ripiois; Kal d\fi6x^ CKtieaL, which is further illustrated by some
examples.
2
This appears likewise in the Stoic definition quoted above. I believe it has
not hitherto been noticed that the four terms usually employed in Greek to express
the notion of duty or obligation may be distinguished as implying four different
sources of obligation, and represent appeals to four different principles by which
our actions are guided. The four are irpoeTjKei, Set", %p?f, Trp^wei. Thefirst,TO
irpoaiJKov, expresses a natural connexion or relationship, and hence a law of nature,
the prescriptions of 0ii<ris; as ol irpoo-fiKoi'Tes are our natural relations. This,
therefore, is the form of obligation that nature imposes upon us, or natural propriety. The second, del, is of course connected with Self, ' t o bind', and Sec/ioi,
and denotes the 'binding nature of an ob-ligation', which is equally suggested by
the Lat. obligatio. TO Siov is therefore the moral bond, the binding engagement,
by which we are bound to do what is right. The third, XPV> T XPtci"> appeals to
the principle of utility or expediency, xPVvOo-h XPe'ia> by which human conduct
is directed as a principle of action, and accordingly expresses the obligation of
a man's duty to himself, and the necessary regard for his own interest which the
law of self-preservation requires. Besides these, we have irptirei, TO trpiirov;
decorum, quod deed, Cic. de Off. 1. 27, quod aptum est in ornni vita; the befitting,
12
PHT0PIKH2 B 2 2.
eoTiv t] 6p<yt], dvaytct] rov 6p<yi^6fxevov 6pyl^(T0ai aei

the offence at the slight which provokes anger the consciousness or feeling that the slight is something which is not our due: by a slight the
sense of personal dignity is offended : we know that we do not deserve it,
and are the more enraged. This is a necessary qualificationa <rvpl$epTjicos <aff avro, and therefore added to the definitionbecause there may
be cases in which an insult or injury arouses no angry feeling, when the
person insulted is very far inferior in rank and condition to the offender
or of a very abject and submissive temper, or if the power of the
aggressor is so great and imposing, that the injured person is terrified
and daunted instead of angry, II 3. i a So at least Aristotle: but I am
more inclined to agree with Seneca on this point, who to a supposed
objection to his definition, cupiditas ulciscendi, replies .thus, de Ira, I 3. 2,
Primum diximus cupiditatem esse poenae exigendae, non facultatem: concupiscunt autem homines et quae non possunt. Deinde nemo tarn humilis
est, qui poenam vel summi hominis sperare nen possit: ad nocendum
potentes sumus. And anger is apt to be blind and unreasonable. This
is an answer to I 11. 9, already referred to.
The definition therefore of anger in full, is as follows: ' an impulsive
desire, accompanied by pain (and also pleasure, as is afterwards added),
of vengeance (punishment of, and compensation for, an offence) visible or
evident (in its result), due to a manifest (and unmistakeable) slight (consisting, or shewn) in (insults, indignities, wrongs) directed against ourselves, or (any) of our friends, when (we feel that) the slight is undeserved'; or literally, 'is not naturally and properly belonging to us', not
our due, in consideration of our rank and importance or of our personal
merits and qualifications.
Bacon's Essay, Of Anger, has oae point at least in common with Aristotle's delineation of it. " The causes and motives of anger are chiefly
three. First to be too sensible of hurtj for no man is angry that feels
not himself hurt... The next is, the apprehension and construction of
the injury offered to be, in the circumstances thereof, full of contempt:
for contempt is that which putteth an edge upon anger, as much or more
than the hurt itself." " For raising and appeasing anger in another; it is
done chiefly by choosing of times, when men are forwardest and worst
disposed, to incense them. Again, by gathering all that you can find out
to aggravate the contempt."
2. Anger is directed against the individual, not the genus or species (comp. c. 3. 16): that is, it is excited by a definite, concrete, single
individual, and by a distinct provocation, not by a mere mental abstraction, or a whole class of objects. This is one of the characteristics which
distinguish it from /xla-os or tx6pa;
infra c. 4, KOI ij plv opyfj del irepl TO. Kaff
the becoming; which represents the general notion of fitness or propriety: that
principle of kpjiovla. or KOG/UOTTIS (and the K6<T/JLOS), of harmony and adaptation,
which Dr Clarke selected as the basis of all morality, and styled ' the fitness of
things'. Our English words ought and duty, expressive of moral ohligation in
general, are both of them borrowed from the notion of 'a debt,' which is ' owed '
in the one case, and ' due' from us in the other, to our neighbour; comp. 6<pfl\etv
utj>ikov. " Owe no man any thing, but to love one another."
PHTOPIKHS B 2 2.
13
icad' enaarTov TIVI, oiov KXecovi dW ovK'dvdpwira),

i OTL avrou rj TWV avrov Ttvd TI ireiroitjKev i] i\fxe\- P. 1378*.
3
TWU
\ev, teal iracrt] opyij TT(r6ai Ttva tjdovrjv Tt)v airo Tjs
TOV Tifxwpri(Ta<r6ar tjBu fxev yap TO oiecrdcu
wv i<pleTat, ovdeis $e TWV (paivo/nevwv d$uvartov i(pierai avTw, 6 S* opytôfievo'i ecpleTai Zvvarwv
10 KCCXWS e'ipy]Ta.i Trepi dvfxov
os r e 7ro\u yXvicitov /neXiTos
dv^pwv iv (TTY]Qe.(T<riv di
eKacrra, oiov KaXXi'a tj iwKparei, TO 8e (utros Kai TT/JOS ra yen/' TOV yap K\iirrr)U
purfi KQ\ TOV o-vKo<pdpTT)v anas- [For KXEOII/I, see III 5. 2.] Add to these,
national antipathies, family feuds, class prejudices, religious and political

enmities, the odium theologicum, &c. On the ordinary objects of anger,
Prof. Bain says, Emotions and Will, p. 163, "The objects of irascible
feeling are chiefly persons ; but inanimate things may occasionally cause
an imperfect form of it to arise." Aristotle omits this. Mr Bain, more
correctly than Aristotle, includes under the same head, 'the irascible emotion', hatred, revenge, antipathy and resentment, or righteous indignation
(vc/iftRs) with anger, as mere varieties of the same nados or emotion.
Again, it is provoked by any injury (or insult) committed or intended,
rj 7reno!r)Ke ns 7 êXXfv, either against ourselves, or any of our relations,
friends, dependants, anyone in whose welfare we are interested.
' Thirdly, (as we gather from the terms of the definition, opcir Tifiatplas,) every angry emotion is accompanied by a feeling of pleasure, that,
namely (rr/v Bekk. rrjs A5), which arises from the hope of vengeance upon,
or of punishing (both are included in njiapla), (the person who has offended
us)'. First of all revenge is in itself pleasant: KO\ TO Ti[iu>pelo-dai y8v' ov
yap TO /if) rvyxaveiv \virr)pov TO Tvyxavtw ij'Su' ol 8' opyiôjiivoi Xvwoiivrai
dwKfpfikr)Ta>s fir/ Tijiapovfievoi, ikniôvTfS Se \alpovo-iv. Comp. Eth. Nic. IV
II, 1 1 2 6 ^ 2, 77 yap Tifiapla travel Trjs opyiyf; "JSov^j/ avri rrjt \vrrrjs iixnoiovaa. TOVTOV 8e fif/ yevofievov TO fidpos c\ovtriv. ' For it is pleasant to
think that we shall attain to the object of our desire', (the pleasure
of hope or anticipation, I 11. 6, 7,) 'and no one ever aims at what is
evidently impossible for himself (to attain), and the angry man's desire
always aims at what he (believes to be) possible for himself. He always
supposes that he shall obtain the object of his desire, the punishment of
the offender, and therefore even in his anger he feels pleasure in the prospective satisfaction. The first of the two following lines of Homer, II. 2
109, has been already quoted in illustration of the same topic, the pleasure of anger in the prospect of revenge, I n . 9. In the passage quoted
above from Seneca, de Ira, I 3. 2, what is here said, ouSels TSSV (paivofitvav
abwaTatv ((plcrai avra, may seem at first sight to be contradicted. The
two statements are however different: Seneca says that a man may wish
for what is quite beyond his reach; Aristotle says that he never aims
at it, never uses any exertion to attain to that which he knows to be
14
PHTOPIKHS B 2 2, 3.
ctKo\ovdei yap KCCI ri%ovri Tts Sta r e TOVTO KCCL OIOTI

Siarplfiova-iu ev TO TifxujpeTadai TIJ Ziavola.' tj ovv
Tore yivo/uievn (pavTa<ria fihovtjv ifX7roiel, wairep t)
3 ivv7rviot)v. eirel 5' J) oXiyoopia ia-riv evepyeia
w#attainable: which is equally true. No one ever deliberates about things
which are not under his own control. (For a list of such things see Eth.
Nic. Hi s, sub init.)
But this anticipation of the future is not the only source of the pleasure which we feel in an angry mood : ' it as accompanied by yet another
pleasure, the present pleasure of dwelling in the mind on the prospective
vengeance : it is the fancy that then arises (presents itself) that produces
the pleasure in us, just like that of dreams'. On the pleasures of the <f>avraa-la, and the (pavTavla itself, see again I 11. 6, 7, and the notes there.
Schrader refers to an excellent illustration of this pleasure of dwelling
on the prospect of vengeance, in Terent. Adelph. ill 2. 12, seq. beginning,
me miserum, vix sum compos animi, ita ardeo iracundza}.
3. iirti 8'] has either no apodosis at allwhich is highly probable
in itself, and seems to be Bekker's view, who retains the full stop at viroXafiâvo/iev: or else we may suppose with Vater that the apodosis is rpla
8' iariv...; in which case be may be added to the examples of the apodotic 8e in note on I 1. I r, or omitted with MSS Q, Yh, Zb. According to
Vater's view the connexion will be, that whereas okiyapla is an expression
of contempt for somebody or something supposed to be worthless, whether it be so or not in reality, there are accordingly three kinds of 6\iya>pla each expressing contempt, but in three different forms, or modes of
manifestation. To the three kinds of oXiyapia here distinguished dvai1
See also ' on the pleasure of irascible emotion,' Bain, Emotions and Will,
c. ix. 4. Mr Bain acknowledges, though he regards it as anomalous, the painful
fact that pleasure at the sight of suffering inflicted, especially under circumstances
of violent excitement when the passions are already inflamed, as at the sack of
a captured town, is in reality a phenomenon of human nature. Other examples
of this are the notoriously cruel habits of children in their treatment of animals,
and in their ordinary sports; the pleasure found in gladiatorial combats, bull
fights, bear baiting, cock and quail fights, and all the other cruel exhibitions
which have amused the most civilized as well as barbarous spectators. He traces
this to three sources, of which the principal is the love of power. I will venture
to add three more possible elements of the emotion, which may contribute,
without superseding the others, to the production of it. First, the sense of contrast between the suffering which we are witnessing in another and our own
present immunity: this is the principle implied in Lucretius' Suave mari magno,
and is illustrated in I 11. 8, of this work. Secondly, it may be partly traced to
curiositythe pleasure of learning, as Aristotle calls itand the stimulus of surprise or wonder which we feel at any exciting spectacle; another source of
pleasure mentioned by Aristotle in the same chapter. And thirdly, perhaps,
a distorted and perverted sympathy (this is an ordinary source of pleasure), which
gives us an independent interest in the sufferings of any creature whose feelings,
and consequent liability to suffering, we sharethat is, of all animated beings;
with inanimate objects there can be no sympathy.
PHT0PIKH2 B 23, 4-
IS
trepi TO fxriêvos a'îov (paivo/mevov Kctl yap TCL Katca

KCCI Tctyada a'îa olofxeda (nrovoTis eivai, Kai r d avvTeivovTa 7Tj0os avTa' ocra oe fxrioev TI rj [AiKpov, ovoevos
aia VTroXaufSdvofAev. Tpia ' ecrTiv e'lhr) oXiywpias,
4 KaTa(ppovt]cris TC teat eirripeaarjJLO^ Kai vfSpw 6 Te yap
Karacppovwv oXiywpeT (ocra yap o'lovrai fAtidevos
aia, TOUTCOV KaTacppovovcriv, TOOV he KaTa(ppovovtrxvvria is added in c. 6 2. In Dem. de F. L. 228 it follows avaibeia
as its ordinary companion (compare Shilleto's note).
evepyeia SOÎJE] represents the opinion, hitherto dormant or latent, as
roused into active exercise as a realised capacity, a Svvafiis become an
fvpycia. The mere opinion of the worthlessness of so and so, has now
become developed into oKiyapla, and assumed the form of an active or
actual expression of the contempt by the outward token of' slight regard'.
oXtytupm therefore shews 'indifference', as to something that we do
not care for at all, or regard as something so contemptible, so devoid of
all positive character, that it is not worth forming an opinion about:
what is positively good or bad is always worthy of 'earnest attention', or
'serious anxiety.' On OTIOUSTJ 'earnest', as opposed to muSid 'sport' (Plat.
Phaedr. 276 D, compared with E, Rep. x 602 B, alibi), and on (movhaios
'serious', 'earnest', 'of solid worth or value', opposed to (j>av\os 'light',
'trifling', 'frivolous', 'unsubstantial', 'worthless', and hence morally
'good' and 'bad', see note on I 5. 8.
Kai r<z (rvvTfivovra] 'as well as everything that has that tendency';
viz. to good and bad. ' There are three kinds of slight, or contemptuous
indifference, contempt, spite and wanton outrage'. First, 'contempt
involves 6\iyapia; because people despise men and things that they
regard as worthless, and oktycopla, slight esteem, contemptuous indifference, is directed to the same objects', whence it appears that they have a
common element, and that KaTarppovrja-ic is 6\iya>pla n i , a kind of slight.
4. A second kind of oXiyapla is <:V?;pio7ios, spiteful opposition to,
wanton interference with, the plans and wishes (rais /3ouXijo-ecrt) of others,
in order to thwart them, where you gain no advantage to yourself by
doing so; where the motive is the mere malicious pleasure of disconcerting some one, and thereby shewing your power over them: which is the
root of the wanton love of mischief inherent in human nature: comp.
6. 'This is an inclination to thwart or interfere with the wishes of
another, not for any advantage that you expect to derive from it yourself,
but merely for the mischievous satisfaction of depriving him of it. The
slight regard therefore is shewn in the wantonness of the offence; for it
is plain that there is no intention {lit. supposition) of injury in a s l i g h t that would imply fear, not merely indifferencenor of doing him any
service, none at least worth speaking of {oXiyapla excludes the notion of
good as well as bad, it is mere indifference; 3, Kai yap TO KOKO KO.1
rdyaBa. aia oio/tetfa virovdqs dvai K.TX); 'for this (doing him service)
would imply care for him, solicitude for his welfare, and that again
16
PHTOPIKHS B 2 4.
fxevwv oXiytopouaiv)
<f>poveiv].
ecrri yap
Kai 6 e7nipectct)v \cpalverai
KctTct-
6 7n7|Oeao-juos ijUL7rodi(riJ.ds
friendship,' lit. 'for (in that case) he would have shewn that he cared for
him, and therefore (so that ware, it would follow) that he was his friend'.
The argument of orei ovv(plXos tivai is this. The wantonness of the
mischief which is the effect of hrqpeournos, (spiteful interference with your
neighbour's inclinations,) shews that oXiyapia enters into it in this, that it
must proceed from a contemptuous indifference as to the person and character of the victim; for the very wantonness of the act, that it is done
for mere amusement, and without any prospect of advantage, shews the
slight regard that the perpetrator has for the sufferer; that he neither
fears him as he must have done if he wished to hurt or injure him by
thwarting his schemes, nor esteems and respects him as a friend, as
would necessarily be the case if he intended to interfere with and oppose
his plans and inclinations for the other's benefit: and therefore the indifference that he does manifest must be indicative of contempt.
c'mjpeao-fior] appears to be almost a &ra| \ey6[ievov ; only two examples are given in Steph. Lex., one from Diodorus and the other from
Polluxno great authorities. [It is also found infra c. 4 30.J The
usual form of it in the ordinary language is iiri]pzia, which occurs in
much the same sense; as also <F7njpedeii> frequently in Demosthenes,
and less frequently elsewhere, as in Xenophon and the Comic Poets.
Thucyd. I 26 is a good instance as a commentary upon Aristotle's
text, and illustrative of his interpretation : of the Corcyreans, during
their war with the Corinthians, it is said that after the surrender of
their colony Epidamnus to the Corinthians, they took this to heart, and
despatched a force of 25 ships, to demand amongst other things the
restitution of the Epidamnian exiles; and this they did nar' inripetav,
'they bade them out of mere spite and wantonness'' without any prospect
of benefit to themselves, merely for the purpose of annoying the others.
Comp. iirrjpea&iv, Dem. c. Mid. p. 519, of Midias'vexatious annoyance,
fVijpeia ib. p. 522 ult. where it is distinguished from vjipis, the wanton outrage on the sacred person of the choragus. See also de Cor. p. 229, lines
8, 14 in both of which it is applied to spiteful, wantonly offensive language;
whereas in Aristotle it is ejun-oSioyios rais PovKrjcranv, and in Plut. Reip.
Ger. Praec. p. 816 c, it is applied to acts of this character, TJ n-paffo-tr/
exova-ais CpikoTifilau e7n/peafa)i>; as in Ar. Pol. Ill 16, I287 a 38, 7roXXa
wpbs fViJpfiav xai x^Plv f">&"" TrpdrTeiv; which also marks the
'wantonness' characteristic of it by the addition of irpos X"Ptv- ^n Plut.
Coriol. 334 D ; VK e'wi KcpSeirtc dXAa 84' vftpiv ai nepi<j>povr](Tiv rols Trevrja-w
f7rr)peaav, which marks the wanton character of the acts of oppression.

These passages from Plutarch with some others from the same author
are to be found in Wyttenbach's note on Plutarch, p. 135 D. He renders
it vexantes, infestantes, per invidiam et contumeliam. The only other
instance that I will refer to, occurs in Herod, vi 9, where the word seems
at first sight to bear a different meaning, 'threatening': raSe <r<f>i Ae^yere
imqpeaôvTcs TO. nep o-<f>eas naref-ei, (and
so Schweighauser's
Lexicon
' minitari'). But by comparing the word as here used with its use and
explanation in other authors, we see that the sense of the threat is only
PHT0PIKH2 B 2 4, 5-
17
iva TI avTw dXX' 'iva fxt] e/ce/j/w. eVet

ovv ov% 'iva avTvo TI, oXiywpec h~rjXov yap OTI oure
fiXd\jseiv VTToXa/JL^dvei, icpofieiTO yap av Kal OUK IOXIycopei, OVT w<peXfj(rai av ovpev aîov \6yov, e<ppovTiê
S yap av w e r e (piXos eivai. Kal 6 vfiplfav B' oXiycopei' ecTTi yap vfipis TO /3Xa7TTeiv Kal XvTreiv e(p' oh
ala"xyvt] earl irdtrxovri, /nrj 'Iva TI yevt]Tai
aXXo r\ OTI eyeveTO, dXX O7rws f\arQr\' ol yap dvTnroiimplied, and that the prominent and characteristic signification is, as elsewhere, ' insult or spite them by telling them the fate that will overtake
them'.
ffloTf $i\os (lvai\ is an instance of a not unfrequent attraction of a
substantive or adjective, ordinarily in the accusative, within a grammatical bracket, as it were, to the subject of the verb without ithere ecf>p6vrtfeand hence expressed in the nominative. Plat. Euthyd. 273 A, vfiptorrjs Sta TO VCOS clvai. Arist. de part. Anim. IV 8. 2, xpijeripu npbs TO
\a($ovo~ai 7rpoo-(j>ep((rdai TTJV rpo<prjv. Plat. Phaedo 83 D, <Sare...ai ao-nep
aireipopivri
e'ii<f>vecrdai, xai ex. TOVTCHV afxotpos eivai
K.T.\.
5. vjipis] which corresponds with the preceding in some points,

while it differs in others, is ' an injury or annoyance inflicted, involving
disgrace to the sufferer; for no benefit that is expected to accrue to the
aggressor except the mere fact of its having been done, in other words
the pleasure of doing it: for retaliation is not wanton outrage but vengeance or punishment'. This is the locus classicus for the explanation of
vfipis, so important in the Orators and the Athenian law. See note on
I 12. 26, where it is examined from this point of view. The outraged personal dignity, the wounded honour, which gives its special sting to an
act of u/3/Ms, and distinguishes it from a mere assault, alula, is noted in
the text by the phrase i<j> oh alo-xvvr) e'erri TCU jraerôiTt, and the rest of the
definition describes the 'wantonness' of the aggression, which vfipis has
in common with em}peao-p.6s, and in which the oKvyapla is shewn. Compare I 13. 10, where the two same characteristics of vfipis reappear; ou
yap ei eiraraê Travras vftpurev, dX\' el evena TOV, OWV TOV drtfiao-ai ineivov fj
avToe qo-Srjvai. vfipis therefore is wanton outrage, an insult or injury

which disgraces and humiliates its victim, and is prompted by no motive
but the mere momentary gratification of humiliating another and therein
indulging the love and the sense of power. Some illustrations of acts of
vPpts are to be found in Polit. v i a (v), 10, 1311 a 33. Personal outrage,
ri TO o-apa, is one of the causes of conspiracy and revolution, rijr 8'
vfipeas outrijy ffoXv/ze/jour, fKacrrov avrav atriov yiverai TTJS opyrjs' rav S*
dpyio/jUi/av o-xfSov ol TTXCJOTOI Tijioipias X"Plv eTHXidevrai, aXV ovx virepoxfjs,
cuoj/ K.T.X. and then follows a number of examples. It is plain however

from a comparison of this with what immediately follows in the Rhet.
6, where vfipis is traced to the love of vnepoxi, that the vfipis here
spoken of is confined to insults or outrages of a particular kind, offered to
the person, r TO aa/ia.
AR. II.
13
PHT0PIKH2 B 2 6.
6 ovvres ov% vf3plôvcriv dWci TifxwpovvTai.
aiTiov
TJJS J(WjJS TOls vfipifyvO-lV,
OTl OLOVTai KCtKUIS
CIVTOVS V7repe")(eiv fxaWov.
cto ol veoi ical ol TT\OVO~IOI
6. ' The cause or source of the pleasure which men feel in wanton
outrages is that they think that by the illtreatment of (by doing mischief
to) others they are shewing in an unusual, degree their superiority over
them'. paXkov 'more than they otherwise would'. Superiority, or
excess in merit and good qualities, is a mark of virtue, I 9. 39, rj 8* varep0x7 rav KO\V. ...r) virepoxr) Soxe'i fir/vveiv aperjjv; a n d a source of pleasure, I I I . 14, TO viKav JjSu...<pavTa<rla yap VTTcpo%f)s ylyvtrai, ov navrfs
eX0V0~lv iwiBvpiav r) ijpepa r) /laKXov, a n d t h e corollaries of this, 15- T<>
apxeiv ij&io-Tov, ib. 27. On the 'emotion of power' and its ramifications,
the various modes in which it exhibits itself, see Mr Bain's excellent
chapter (vm), Emotions and Will, p. 145 seq. and the quotation from
Dugald Stewart in the note at the commencement [chap.x.p. I92jed. 1875].
bib ol veoi vfipitTTai]
Comp. II 12. 15, Ka\ TO. ddiKâra
aSucovcnv fls
vftpiv KCU ov KctKovpylav. This character and tendency of youth is also

expressed in one of the two opposite senses of the derivatives veavias,
veavicvfo-&ai, veavmos. The two last convey, in different contexts, the two
sides of the youthful character, and the good and bad qualities by which
it is specially distinguished. On the one hand, they represent the
gallant, spirited, vigorous, impetuous, nature of youth (eu KCU. yevvaltos,
are vios mv, Plat. Soph. 239 B), on the other the petulousness, wantonness,
insolence, which sometimes characterises itprotervus, ferox, sufierbus,
Ast, Lex. Plat. s. v. veauiKas. Both senses are abundantly illustrated in
Plato. I will only quote Soph. 239 D, T'I TIS TW veavia (this audacious, impertinent, youngster) irpbs TO ipcardfifvou ajroKpiveirai. See Heindorf ad loc.
who refers to Eur. Suppl. 580, Arist. Vesp. 1333, and interprets the word
'de homine feroci insolentique'; and veavieveaBcu, as exemplified in Lysias1
speech (Phaedr. 235 A), which 'ran riot', 'passed all bounds of moderation' in the endeavour to shew, &c.; and (according to Callicles, Gorg.
482 C) in that of Socrates, who had been talking like a mob-orator,
'running riot, luxuriating in language full of exaggeration, extravagance.1
So that 'to play the youth, act like a young man', sometimes means rash
and arrogant, wanton, insolent, overbearing, extravagant, licentious
conduct. The examples of both these words in Demosthenes display a
leaning towards the more favourable view of the youthful character.
Plat. Euthyd. 273 A, i5/3ptcrnjs 8e &i TO K'OS thai (Gaisford).
o! TrXovcrioi] II 16. I, T& de ITXOVTW a orerai 17^17 eVwroAjfy e<rrli> Ibtiv
oKauiv' v/3prTavoi, and the reason of this. And again
4, like t h e veoi, aSueij/iaTa dditcovo-iv ov xaKovpyiKa dXKa ra pev v/ipio-TiKa TO,
5e aKparevTiKa. In applying the doctrine of the 'mean' to the various

orders of population, with the view of determining the best form of
government, Aristotle makes the following remark, Polit. VI (iv) 11, 1295
b 6, all excess and defect is injurious ; ijjrepKaXov 8e jj virepio-xvpov rj virepevyevrj r) V7rep7rXovcrioc, rj ravavrla TOVTOIS, VTrepwraxov rj virfpao-8evr) (cat o-(podpa
arifiov, xaê'!rov Tffl Xoyco dicokovdelv. yiyvovrai yap ol fitv i!/3ptoTai Kal
p.eya\on6vrjpoi paKkov, ol St Katcovpyoi Kal fiiKpoirovrjpoi \iav' TS>V 8' aS
PHTOPIKHS B 2 6, 7.
19
vfipiarar virepe-xjeiv yap oiovrai vfipifyvTes. vfipecos

oe aTi/mla, 6 3' aTifxaîav oAtyoupeT' TO yap /ijjSevos
aîov ovhe/niav e'êt Tifxriv, OVT dyadov ovre Kaicov.
&o Aeyei dpyi^6/j.evo9 6
'A%iAAev$
' eAwv yap eêt yepas avro<s dirovpas
p. SIKai
ws ei TIV
7 cJs Bid TavTa opyiôfxevos.
Trpoariiceiv S' o'iovTai TTO-
ra>v TO. jikv yiyverai 8i' vfipiv ra 5e Sia KaKovpylav: where we have again the
same distinction of crimes as in the two passages of the Rhetoric already
quoted, II 12. 15, and 16.4; and a third time 13. 14, where the opposite
ds KaKovpylav, OVK els vj'iptvis said of old men. Crimes are hereby
divided into two classes, crimes on a great and on a petty scale; highminded crimes of violence and audacity, outrages which imply a sense
of power and superiority in those who commit them; and sneaking,
underhand crimes, of fraud and low villany, which are the crimes which
the poor and mean are especially inclined to.
virepex*1" yap oiovrai vftptovTfs] This, as we have already seen, is a
general tendency of human nature: but besides this general inclination,
there is in the case of the young a special desire and a special inclination
to assert their superiority to others, which is shewn in the love of victory,
or getting the better of an opponent in the mimic combats and contests
of their games; and also in their love of honour or spirit of ambition;
vwepo)(ijs yap imBv/id i; veoTrjs, 17 8e V'IKT) virfpoxq ris, II 12.6.
'Again, v^pis is a mark of disrespect, inflicts disgrace or indignity,

and this again is a mark of slight esteem; and this feeling of disrespect,
and the disgrace and dishonour to the sufferer that accompany it, shew
that the object of them is considered of no worth or value, because he has
no honour (but the contrary), which is as much as to say that he is of no
value {rip,ri having the double sense), worth nothing either for good
or for evil', and therefore is the object of the contemptuous indifference
which is the sting of oXiywpia.
This disgrace and indignity is then illustrated by two lines of Homer
II. A 356, repeated in I (ix) 367, and I (ix) 648 (644), in which the angry
Achilles expresses his indignation at the slight put upon him by Agamemnon, 'who had taken and kept for himself (avTos ?xe0 t n e present (gift of
honour, one of the pepy n/ji.rjs; see note on yipa, I 5. 9, p. 85) of which he
had deprived him'; and had treated him ' like some despised alien or
vagabond'. peTavdo-Tiis, comp, II. n (xvi) 59, where the line is repeated,
properly a ' settler in a foreign land', like the /ze'roiKot at Athens, a despised
class without civil rights, and therefore dW/iTji-ot; Ar. Pol ill 5, 1278 a 36,
Wfrjrfp Ka\"O\i.r)pos iiroirifTtv "airei TIV drifirfTov /ierai/aorî/"' wvwep iiiroiKos
yap eo-Tiv o rav Tipaiv pf] utTex"- And Herod, vil 161, where the Athenians boast that they are JXO'WOI ov jxeTavaarai 'EWyvaiv.
7. 'Now men think they have a natural claim' (7rpo<n;Keu/, note on 11
1 p. 11, /*i) n-pomiKQVTQs) 'to especial respect and consideration (woKvapeia-dat)
22
20
PHT0PIKH2 B 2 7, 8.
Xvtopeiardai VTTO TWU r\TTOvtav Kara yevos, Kara ovva~

fxiu, K<XT dperrjv, teal 6\ws ev w av ravrio vTrepe%r} P. 13797TO\v,
OlOV ev XprHJLCKTiV 6 7r\0VCTl0S
7TVriTOS KCtl V
Tea Xeyetv pwropiKOs dhvvdrov e'nreTv nal apx^v dpxfxivov teal apxeiv afyos ol6fAevos TOV apxecdai dgiov.
eip
eiprjrai
6v/Jids Se jueyas earrl
horpetyiwv
KCtl
dX\d ye Kal jxeToirio-dev %et KOTOV

8 dyavccKTOvcri ydp $ia TY]V virepoxîv.
eri v(p wv Tts
p
oieTcti ev Trdcrxzw ScTv OVTOI 3' e'urtu 01/s ev
(and therefore are all the more angry, the slight is felt more deeply, when
they fail to receive it) from their inferiors in birth, power, virtue (i.e.
merit), and generally in anything in which they far surpass (him who
slights them) when it is of the same kind (falls under the same yevos or
class) (as that in which they themselves excel); as in money the rich man
(claims respect) from the poor, the accomplished orator from one that has
no faculty for speaking, the governor from the governed, or one who
thinks he has the right to bear rule from one who only deserves to
obey'.
irokvmpe'iv, a rare word, found once in Aeschin. c.Timarch. 50, in a copy
of evidence, 'to pay attention to', but chiefly in later writers, {irokvapla a
Stoic term). It is opposed to, and formed upon the analogy of oKiyapeiv, and therefore appropriate here.
prjropiKos] ivocantur p'rjTopiKoi diserti et eloqwntes homines. Isocr.
Nicocl. 8, Ka\ prjTopucovs ftev /caXov/ifK rovs ev rw jrXijêt dwapevovs
\tyeiv.'
Victorius.
This is illustrated by two more lines of Homer, II. B 196, 'great is the
wrath of divine-bred kings' ('in Homeri II. B 196, singulare Aiorpcê'or
âa-CKrjos legitur. Sed cum haec sententia in proverbium abiisset, universe
pronuntiandum erat plurali numero.' Vater); and, II. A 82, 'Yet it may be
that even hereafter he keeps a grudge'here the endurance of the wrath
indicates its original violence and the magnitude of the slight that
provoked it (dXka ye Ka\, the vulg., is retained by Bekker. MSS
Ac, Yb, Zb have re, as also Mr Paley's text).ayavwcTovai yap K.T.\. ' For
the lasting vexation (this is in explanation of the iMToirHrOev KOTOV of the
last quotation) is owing to their superiority'.
8. 'Another aggravation of anger and the sense of slight arises,
when the insult or injury proceeds from those from whom, as he conceives, kind and courteous treatment is due; such are those who are
indebted to him for benefits past or present, bestowed either by himself
or on his account (such as are due to him) or by one of his friends, or
those to whom he wishes well (wishes to benefit) or ever did (wish well)'.
For the antecedent to ii<' >v, and the supplement of the context, we may
PHT0PIKH2 B 2 8, 9.
21
Trotei, r\ avTos t] Si' avrov Tts rj TWV avrov TI?, rj

rj efiovXrjdt].
<pavepov ovv e/c TOVTWV .t]^t] 7rm r eyovre<i opylavToi Kai Tiari Kal Sid iroia. avroi fiev yap,
oTav XvircovTai' i(pleTcti yap TWOS 6 \v7rov/uevos' edv
T ovv /car' evdvwpiav OTLOVV duTinpoucrr] Tts, oiov Tea
understand (as I have done) opyiôvrm paWou from what has preceded, or
possibly ayavaKTovcnv from the immediately preceding clause: otherwise
repeat o'iovrai no\va>pci<rdcu from the beginning of 7.
9. ' From what has been said it is by this time clear (we may now infer
from the preceding statements) what the angry disposition or state of
mind is, what sort of persons it is directed against or provoked by,
and (what sort of things it is due to) what sort of offences or acts
provoke it'.
'As to the first, we are angry when we are vexed or annoyed; because one who is vexed is always aiming at, eagerly bent on, something;
if then he be directly crossed or thwarted (lav avriKpovo-rj TIS) in anything
whatsoever,a thirsty man, for example, in his effort to drink,or not (i.e.
if he be crossed, not directly, but indirectly), the act in either case appears
to be just the same (the act in its effect or in the intention is the same;
the act itself is not the same); or again if any one offers any opposition,
or refuses to help, or troubles, bothers, throws obstacles in the way of,
a man in this state of mind (i. e. in a state of eager desire, and ' aiming
at something', tfydpevov TWOS), with all these he is angry'.
KOT evdveoplav] is 'in a straight line', -apelv, -copos (this must be a
mere termination in this word, as in Oeapos, rifxapos, o-ivaixapos, and the
Latin -orus and -osus, plagosus, generosus, animosus, bellicosus; &pa, as
in IIuXa>poy, can form no part of the derivation). The phrase, which is
equivalent to e evBelas or /car' cvdc'iav {ypajiftrjv), occurs elsewhere, in
Plat. Rep. IV 436 E, jfjv (vBvapiav (in a straight line, or straight) is
opposed to diroKKiveiv, and Kara TO nepKpepes KVK\<O. Ar. Metaph. A 2, init.
'in a straight line', (see Bonitz ad loc), de part. Anim. II 8.7, rf/v Se
<r\l<nv e^ft rrjs crapKos ov KCLT' ev8vu>plav dXka Kara KVKXovt 8iatpeT?ji> (Viet.).
Ib. C. IO. 16, aKovei yap ov fiovov KaT* cvBvwpiav aKKa 7ravTo6ev, rj S* oifns tis
TO fnrpoo-6ev, 6pa yap tear evdvaplav (directly forwards, in a straight line)

(Gaisford), Probl. XI 58, evdvape'iv, Eth. Eudem. VII 10, 1243 b 15, TO'IS
/if/ KOT evdvapiav ((piXots), of indirect friendships, where the two friends
are not of the same kind, but associated from different motives; Fritzsche,
note ad loc. (who refers also to Tim. Locr. p. 94 B, T> p.rpta tear evdvaplav
voeio-Bai dWa Kar' dvaXoycav, and to this passage of the Rhetoric). Add
Arist. de part. Anim. IV 9. 6, 1} cv'Svapla ran ivroaBiblav, and de Anima a 3,
4 0 6 ^ 3 1 , TT/V evdvaplau els KVK\OV KaTiKap.^rev. irepl 'TLvvnviav C. 2. 5, (car'
evdvcoplav rj <rvp.fialvei rfjv o\jnv opav.
dvriKpoveiv, 'to strike or knock against', 'to come into collision with',
hence metaphorically, to interfere with, interpose an obstacle, to hinder or
thwart a man's designs or efforts. The word is not common: it occurs in
Dem. de Cor. 198, and dvrUpovtns (a check, sudden stoppage), Rhet. i n
22
PHT0P1KHS B 2 9, io.
j
TTjOOS TO TTieiVy kaV T 6 fXrj, OpOlCOS TCtVTO ^>'~
verai jroietv Kai edv T dvTnrpdrrtj rts eav T6 /J

avfXTrpaTTij edv TB dWo TI ivox^fi OVTIOS exovra>
io Tot? Trao-tv d/J7iêrat. &o icdfxvovTes, 7rev6fievoi, <Vo\ejuouvTe<s), epa>vTe<s, Zi-^wvre^, 6'Aws iTriOvôvures Kai
/urj Karopdovvres opyiXoi eltri Kai ev7rap6pfxr]TOi, fxdfiev 77-jOOS TOI)S TOU 7rapoi/Tos
olov Kafxvwv fxev TO?S 7rpo$ TY\V voaov, 7rev6[xevo^ Ze.
Tr)v Treviav, 7ro\e/JLWp $e TO?S TTJOOS TOU
V, ipwv Se Tofc irpos TCV eptoTa' ofxolw^ tie Kai
ro?s aAAots* irpoooZoirolnTai. yap 'IEKCKTTOS irpos Trjv
g. 6. In the neuter sense in which it is here employed it follows the
analogy of ovyKpoveiv, npoo-Kpoveiv, and hundreds of other transitive verbs
which by the suppression of the reflexive pronoun pass from active to
neutera process common, I should suppose, to most languages, and
certainly found in our own.
ivoxkeiv, 'to mob' (O^XOF), only once in Plato: but frequent in Demosth.,
Xenoph., Aristoph.; applied to troublesome and vexatious annoyances and
to vexatious conduct in general; 'to trouble, annoy, bother'.
io. 'And therefore in sickness, in poverty (and distress), in love,
thirst, or any appetite and desire in general, which is unsatisfied' (in the
satisfaction of which they are unsuccessful firj Karopdovvres iv rjj imdvpla),
'men are irascible and easily excited to passion (provoked) especially
against those who shew a contemptuous indifference to their present condition (who wantonly obstruct them in the efforts they are making to
obtain the immediate object of their wishes, or in the gratification of this
particular appetite or desire of which they are under the influence at the
moment) as a sick man against those who slight and thwart him in his
efforts to cure his disease', oiov Ka/ivtov SpyiKos eori roij (oKiyapoinriv OVTOV)
irpos TTJV voa-ov(wpoy, 'in respect of', 'those who direct their obstruction
and annoyance to' his disease, i.e. to interference with the progress of his
cure : and the same explanation may be applied to the remaining cases):
'a poor man when his poverty (and efforts to relieve it) is at stake, and
a man in a battle against those who interfere with his fighting (or if
a general, with his manoeuvres and warlike operations), or if in love, with
the affairs of his love, and so on for all the rest: for in each case the way
is ready prepared beforehand for the anger of the individual by the existing affection (passion, or state of feeling)'.
opyiXos, 'irascible', eort 8e KBLI irepl Spyrjv vnepôXf/ Ka\ AXei^ts Ka j
fiea-oTrjs.-Taiv 8' aKpav 6 fiev V7rep[iaWa>v6pyl\os CCTTCO, i; Si Kaicla dpyiXonjy,
Eth. N. II 7, 1108 a 40, IV 11, 1125 b 29, and 1126 a 13, ot MV ovv opyiKoi
raxoj pAv opyifrvTai xai oh ov Sri Kai i<j> oh ov Set Kal p.a.Woj' ij del, navovTai
8e raxeojs' o Kai /3eXTtorov eôvow K.TX.
wpomdorroirjTai] See note on odonoulv, I 1. 2. npoKamfiv, Eur. Hippol.
PHTOPIKHS B 2 I I .
23
11 eKacTOu 6pyt]V viro TOV virdpôvTos .Trdfjows. en '

edv TavavTia r u ' ; ^ irpoa-êôixevo^' \v7rei 'yap fxdXXov TO TTOXV Trapd doâv, wcrirep Kal Tepvrei TO TTOXV
wapd So'âj/, idu yeutjTai o fiovXsTai. C)JO Kal copai
Kai yfiovoi Kal diadecreis Kal rjXiKiat 4K TOVTWV <pavepai, Troiai evKivrjTOi 7rpos opyt^v Kal irov Kal 7rore, p- 58.
23 (and elsewhere), 'to advance' by clearing away (KOITTCIV), before an
advancing army, wood and other obstacles to its progress, presents the
same metaphor in a somewhat different form.
n . Disappointed expectation is also provocative of anger: 'if a
man happen to have expected the contrary (to that which does actually
occur); for the pain of disappointment is increased in proportion to its
unexpectedness, just as the joy in the opposite case is increased by an
unexpected success. And so, by applying these principles to the different seasons, times, dispositions, and ages (in which anger chiefly
manifests itself), it will be easy to see what sorts of them (the two last
named) are easily moved to anger, and in what places and at what times,
and also that the more they are under these circumstances (in these
conditions) the more easily they are moved'. That is, the nearer they are
to the critical moment in the times and seasons and to the central point
or acme in the age of life, and the more they are under the influence
of the particular dispositions which prompt the angry feelingthe
higher the degree in each casethe greater will be the proneness to anger.
Schrader supplies a very apt illustration of the copeu from Theocr. Id. I
15: ' ut cibi et somni horae; caprarius ap. Theocr. Ou depis, a> noifidv, TO
fMcrajjifipivov, ov Befits afifiiv 2upurSei>' TOV Hava SeSoiKctyifs' rj yap an aypas
TaviKa KeK/iaKois afiiravfTai' %VTI S mKpos, Kai oJ del tpifiela x0^"? T O " P'"'
KadjjTai.' Of the three I}\IKICU, I I 12. 2, Seneca, on the contrary, de Ira 113,
ult., iracundissimi infantes senesque et aegri stint, et invalidum otnne

naturae querulum est (Schrader). j>eor>jr is the one which is most liable
to anger, Ib. 5, com. 9. As regards times and seasons, one man might
be more inclined to be angry in hot, and another in cold, weather
though perhaps this should rather be referred to the Siadeo-eis or bodily
temperaments ; constitution, or habit of body or mind, comes under the
denomination of Siadto-eisthe dcadeo-ts or 'passing temporary disposition'
being apparently not here distinguished (as it ought to be, Categ. 8, p. 8 b
27, comp. 11 a 22) from the confirmed,, settled, permanent, egis or 'state'.
On the 8ia&eo-eis Schrader notes, 'Affectiones animi corporisve: ut
morbus, maeror, pudor, metus. Sen. de Ira 11 19, vinum incendit iram,
quia auget calorem. Ill 10, vetus dictum est, a lasso rixam quaeri
(fatigue). Aeque autem et ab esuriente et a siticnte, et ab omni homine
quem aliqua res urit: nam uti ulcera ad levem tactum, deinde etiam ad
suspicionem tactus, condolescunt (this describes a state of irritation or
inflammation); ita animus affect us minimis offenditur. Adeo ut quosdam
salutatio, epistola, oratio, et interrogate in litem evocenf. Every
situation or condition of pain, discomfort, malaise, constraint, &c. makes
a man irritable.
24
Kai on
12
PHT0PIKH2 B 2 n , 12.
ore f4.a\\ov
iv TOVTOIS
ei<rt, /iaAAof Kat
avTol fxev ovv oura>? eôj/res evKivrjTOi irpos

opyltovTcti Se TOI<S TE KctTwyeXwcn Kai ^\evaôvo~i
(rKtOTTTOlKTlV vflpiÔVCTl yap.
Kai
TOiS Ta
TOiailTCC
12. So far of the subjects of anger ; next of its objects.

First, anger is provoked by ridicule (contempt expressed in laughter),
mockery, jeering; all of which imply vflpis, a wanton unprovoked attack
upon a man's feelings and personal dignity.
x\evaeiv, probably connected with êlXor or êXo? (êXwij) 'the lip' (so
Valck.), 'to shoot out the lips' in mockery and derision. Compare the analogous epeo-xeXeiv which may possibly be ipeo-o-etv xeXor expressing the same
action. x^ fu "f f "'i xêva(THjOS an< ^ X^vao"'a a P P e a r frequently in Demosth.
and occasionally in other authors: in Rhet. II 3. 9 we find ^Xewaon;r.
I n Top. Z 6, 144 a 5, we have KaScmep ol TOV TrpoTnjhaKuriiov vfipiv fiera
X\eva<rlas opiCojievoC q yap ^Xevatrla v/3pts rss, <oor' ov Suxpopa dXX' eidos i;
Xkevacria. x*-eva<7'a therefore is a ' kind' of vfipis, which exactly corresponds with the view of it taken here.
a-KcoiTTciv, is not easily distinguished from the preceding, except by the
greater frequency of its occurrence. It expresses an ill-natured joke,
sneering, taunting, gibing at, another, for the purpose of bringing him
into ridicule. This is the 'scornful jest', which, as Pope says, is 'most
bitter'. aK&piia or a-K&^ns is therefore opposed to eirpcnreXla., the easy
well-bred pleasantry which distinguishes the conversation and compoposition of the accomplished gentleman. The ill-natured intention implied, in a-Kairrftv appears incidentally in the phrase Xwreo' TOV vKamToficvov, which indicates that it is always attended with pain to the object of
it, Eth. N. IV 14, 1128 a 7: and again this its ordinary character appears
Ib. line 25, seq. norepov ovv TOV ev o-wiirTovTa oputTtov T& \yew a wpeirei
ekfvBepla, r) ra fir) \virelv TOV aKovovra rj Kai repweiv; (neither of which
evidently belonged to the ordinary character and operation of the o-x<5â),

and again, line 30, TO yap o-nafifia \oibopr)p,d TI iur'iv. I suppose that the
difference between this and xKivao-fios must be something of this kind :
xXfudfetv 'mockery' may be conveyed by the gesture or tone of voice
or the manner as well as by the actual words, and is therefore the more
general expression of contempt as conveyed by language or manner : in
o-Kafijxa the contempt is conveyed or embodied in a joke or taunting
phrase. It occurs, as might be expected, constantly in Aristophanes, who
dealt more largely in the commodity itself than most other writers. An
examination of the passages where it is used by this author will help to
confirm what I have said of the ill-natured use of it; for instance, Pac.
740, es r a paKta o-KttiTTovTas del Kal rois (f>8etpo\v iro\ep,o\tvras, N u b . 540,
ovS' eo-KaiTTe TOVS (pa\apovs, and so of the rest.
A second class of persons who are special objects of angry feeling,

are ' those who inflict such injuries as bear upon them the marks of wanton
outrage. These must be such as are neither in retaliation (for an injury
already inflicted on the aggressor) nor beneficial to those who inflict them;
PHT0PIKH2 B 2 1214.
25
p\a.Trrov(TLV ocra vfipecos (rnfxeia. dvdyicri he rotavra

etuat a /x^jVe dvri TWOS [XY\T w(pe\ifia roh iroiovcnv'
I3V$*I 7jO So/cei ZC vfipiv.
teal TCNS /cafews Xeyovcri Kai
KaTa(ppovou<ri wept a avTOi /maXicrTa cnrovBdtov(nv}
olov 01 em (piAocrcxpia (piAoTi/uLou/mevoi edv Tis els Tr\v
<piAo<ro(j)iav, oi h' e'wl Trj Idea edv Tts -rr\v lleav,
14 dfJLOicos ce Kai eirl Ttoi> aWwv.
Tavra 8e TTOAAW jxd\\ov, eav v7ro7TTevcrw<Ti /mr] virapyew avTois, rj oAws rj
for when this is the case' (by this time, now at length; note on rj8r), I 1. 7)
' then (and not till then) they are thought to be due to a wanton, malicious,
unprovoked, intention to offend'v(3pi?, the worst of the three kinds of
oXiywpia by which anger is provoked; 3, 5.
13. A third are 'those who revile and express contempt for things in
which the aggrieved parties are themselves most interested (or, to which they
are earnestly devoted, or in which they most desire to distinguish themselves,
or in which they most value themselves ; the Tast of the four referring to
such things as ISca, personal beauty, the second example); as those who
are eager and ambitious of distinction in the pursuit of philosophy are
especially indignant at any slight, any slur cast upon their favourite
study; or those who value themselves upon their personal appearance, if
that be called in question; and similarly in all other cases'. This topic
expresses the specially angry feeling that is called forth by any ridicule or
contempt directed against a man's profession, his studies, his order,
any class or society to which he belongs, and is carried even to the extent
of a national feeling: any reflexion, in short, upon what he is particularly
interested in and attached to or values himself upon, any association with
which he is bound up, and on whose credit his own credit and importance
in some measure depend. " Je me suis souvent despite", en mon enfance,"
says Montaigne (du Pedantisme, Livre I Ch. 24), " de veoir en comedies
italiennes tousiours un Pedante pour badin, et le surnom de Magister
tiavoir gueres plus honorable signification parmy nous: car leur estant
donne en gouvernement, que pouvois-je moins faire que d'estre jaloux de
leur reputation ?"
TTI ISca] 'the form', the primary sense of the word 1 , Plat. Protag.
315 E, rf/v Ibeav iravv KOKOS, Phaed. 73 A> e'w rovrtp ra dvOpanriva ct8ei, Ib. D,
TO (Idas TOV iraiSos, 76 C, iv av8pa>irov fi8ft, 109 B, ntpl TT\V yrjv TroXXa Koi\a
Kai TravroBana Kai ras iS/aj Kai ra peyeBr), Pind. Olymp. IO ( i l ) . 123, i'8ea
KaXos, et alibi. So elSos, Arist. Pol. I 2, 1252 b 26, awrrep he nai TO. etSij
cavrols acpopoiovo-iv oi avdpairoi, ovra> .<a\ TOVS filovs rav 8ea>v.
14. ' But this angry feeling is much aggravated, if he suspect that
this, whatever it may be, on which he prides himself, does not really
belong to him, either not at all or in no great force (i<rxup<Ss\ or that if it
does, at all events other people don't think so {lit, it does not appear so,
1
The following is Buhle's note on ISia, ' Cogitandum est de ideis Platonicis'!
and this is quoted by Gaisford without a remark.
26
PHT0PIKH2 B 2 1416.
prj io-Xvp<2s, rj nn tioKeiv iirefidv yap <r(p6pa oiwv- P.

rai vrrdpx^v [ev TOUTOIS] 1 iv oh a-Ktairrovrai, ov <ppov~
15 Ti%pv<nv. Kal rols (f)i\oi9 juaWov n TOIS pr] ty1^01*'
o'iovrai yap trpoirriKeiv /uaWov irdffx^v ev vir avrcov
16 tj pn. Kal Tots eWia-fiivoK Ti/ndv rj (ppovrigeiv, edv
1
ev Totirots sine uncinis.
M hoKtiv): for whenever people have a strong conviction that they really
possess the assumed advantage' (supply, virapxeiv avTois e'0 a> (piXoTi/xovvTai
from the last , or o o'lovrai exelv! o r vnapxctv avrois, from OUBVTCU vnapxeiv)
' in those particular things (studies, personal qualities, accomplishments,
rank and position, before enumerated) at which the taunt is levelled', (eV ols
'in which', represents the sphere, or circumstances, the 'locality' as it were
of the joke in which it resides), ' they care nothing about it'. A very acute
observation. F. A. Wolf has a note upon iv TOVTOIS, for which he proposes to substitute iavraiis or avrois. He insists upon connecting <T<f>6tSpa
vnapxtw, and pronounces that to be bad Greek or unintelligible. a-cj>68pa
olavrai, if it required any justification, would be sufficiently defended by
Phaedo 73 A, a(p68pa lUpvijiuu. I think that the translation above given
shews that the vulg. is correct, and there is no manuscript authority for
any alteration. o-(j>otSpa and Icrxvpas (above) are used here in the same
sense, 'in a high degree'. Wolf's conjecture is supported by Brandis'
Anonymus, in Schneidewin's Philologus IV i p. 46.
4o-xvp<5s] 'fortiter', 'strongly', 'vigorously', means here 'in a high
degree'. " foxypns, strongly, very much, exceedingly, Herod. IV 108,
cdvos fiiya Kal JTOXXOI/, ykavKov re irav l<r\vp&s K.T,\. Ib. 183, eSvos /'ya
l&xvpws, Xen. Anab. I 7. I7> 8iapv^ l&xvpcis fiaBtia; lir/p/pas rj&eadai,
avcaa-dai, (pofifTuiBai, Ib. Cyr. VIII 3. 44, &c." Liddell and Scott's Lexicon.
1 5 . ' Again anger is more readily excited against those who are dear
to us, than against those who are not; because we think we are naturally entitled to expect from them kind treatment rather than the reverse' (7 p.T\ ev).
Comp. Polit. IV (VII) 7, 1328 a I, oi)/xeiov 8e' npos yap TOVS avvrj8eis Ka\
(pl\ovs 6 6\ijios aiperai fiakXov rj npos TOVS ayv&rat, 6\iyapel<rdai vop.i<ras.
8to Kal 'Apî'Xoxor K.T.X. Aristotle adduces this as a proof that (in the
Platonic psychological division) the seat of (piXla, love, is the 6v/j.is or
TO 0vnoei.8es, the passionate element of the human composition, in which
all the noble, generous impulses, zeal, enthusiasm, righteous indignation,
resentment, courage, and with them anger, reside. Aristotle is here
criticising Plato's scheme, while he recognises its general validity, who
assigns (Tim.) <pi\la to the belly, with the other <rVt%u'at. A few lines
further on the author adds, TOVTO 8e fiSXXov ert npos robs a-wr/deis nio-xovo-iv, oirep dprjrai 7rporepov, av d8iKe1o-6ai vofiio-axriv Kal TOVTO o-vp,$aivei Kara
\6yov- nap' ols yap 6<pei\eo-6ai dtlv TTJV evepyevlav vnoXajxâvovai, npoi ra
PKafiei Kal TavTrjs awoo-TepelaBai voixiovaiv. 08ev e'tpr/Tai "xaXenol yap no-
Xeôi dtieXcp&v", (this line is more correctly given by Plutarch, de Frat.

Amor. 480 D, xaXenol noXeiioi yap d8e\(pv, as ~Evpuri8r}s eXprjKev, D i n d .
Eur. Fr. Inc. 57: it is in fact a paroefniac verse, the proper vehicle for
'proverbs'), Kal "OITOI nepa o-rkpâvTes, oi 8e Kal wepa /woOcriv."
16. 'And similarly against those that have been accustomed to pay
PHTOPIKHS B 2 1618.
27
TTaAtv fir] oi/rws SfXiXwcriv Kai yap viro TOVTtov o'tov17 TCCI KaTcKppoveta-dac tavTa yap av TroieTv. Kai rots
fxr] dvTnroiov<riv ev, /ijjSe TY\V l(rrjv avTairoZiZovcriv.
Kai TO?S TavavTia TTOIOXHTIV GEI/TOIS, eav qTTOVs dxriv*
KaTa(ppoveiv yap 7raWes 01 TOIOVTOI (paivovrai, Kai oil
18 f*ev ws r\TTOvcov o\ <T ok Trap' TJTTOVWU. Kai rots ev
fitlbevi \oyio oucriv, av TI oXiytopwcri, /maWov VTTOrespect and attention to them, if they afterwards cease (to associate or
live with them on the same terms) to treat them in the same way: for
from such, this seems to imply contempt, otherwise (if their feeling
towards them had not changed) they would have gone on doing as they
used to do'.
Kara^povfia-dai] passive, see Appendix B, on 1 12. 22 [at the end of
Vol. 1].
17. TTJV ta-rjv] sc. polpav, Bos, Ellips. pp. 3067, cites many instances
of the omission of this subst. with various words, as numerals, SeKaTrj,
rpianocrrq (Dem. c. Lept. 32), ^fila-eia. Analogous to rrjv 'ia-qv here, we
have in' I<TTJS, itn ccrg, i ttrjjr, CK rrjs i'cri;r, rrjv 6/j.oirjv (Herod. IX 78), itu rfi
o/iof'a, CK rrjs d(ioi'as. With 7ren-paixevt], it is a still more frequent ellipse.

With this word poipa is sometimes expressed; as it is likewise in Horn.
II. I (IX) 318, la-rj fioipa fievovn Kai el fiaka TIS TroXefxlôi. At the same time in
23, we have rots xapiv ixfj aitohihova-tv; and Bos himself in a subsequent
article on x^Pts (P- 523) re f ers t 0 this, Herod. VI 21, OVK direSoo-av TTJV
oixoirjv 2w/3a/>iTat; to which Schafer adds, IV 119, rf/v op.oir)v vp.lv crnoblbova-t. However potpav is just as natural a supplement as the other, and
the more numerous analogies, by shewing that the ellipse of it was more
usual than that of xP'") a r e m favour of the former explanation.
Kai Toir ravavrlanap' TJTTOVIOV] ' And against those that do things contrary to our interests, if they are our inferiors' (from inferiors opposition was
not to be expected, from equals or superiors it might be ; therefore in the
former case it is more provoking); 'for from all such, opposition seems
to imply contempt; either because (in opposing us) they seem to regard
us as inferiors' {qitis enim contra potentiores sponte contendit praeliaturque, Victorius; with as rjTrovav repeat Kareufrpoveiv cfraivovrai); 'or else
as if (these benefits had proceeded) from inferiors' (and therefore need
not be repaid; either not at all, or not in full). These belong to the
class described in the preceding topic, ' those who do not repay a benefit
at all, or inadequately'; from which the ellipse in as nap' f^trovav must
therefore be filled up ; by this non-repayment or inadequate repayment of
the benefits received they shew their contempt.
Those who fail to repay benefits received, altogether or in part, seem
to express contempt for their benefactors as inferiors; for they would not
neglect such a manifest duty, or do what they know must give offence,
unless they thought that it was not worth while to keep on good terms
with them. So Victorius. With nap TJTT6VU>V, cvepyerovuevoi, or tv nmoii, is to be understood.
18. 'The angry feeling is aggravated against those who are of no
23
PHTOPIKHS B 2 18, 19.
KeiTai yap rj opyrj TJJS oXiywpias 7Tj0os TOI/S fxr] trpo<Tig rJKOvras, 7rpo<rnKei le rots ^TTOCTI fxt] oXiytapeiv.
rots
e (plXois, lav Te fJLri eu Xeyaxriv n Trouacriv, tcai en
fxaXXov lav rdvavria,
Kal lav [in a'urddvwvTai Seofxevwv, uxrirep 6 'AvTUpcovros nXrjgnnros TW MeAeaaccount, no repute at all, if they are guilty of any slight, any contemptuous
indifference, to us and our pretensions'. This topic goes a step beyond
the preceding. In that the offenders were only relatively contemptible,
inferior to ourselves. Here they are absolutely contemptible and worthless, of no repute at all in any one's estimation' For anger is assumed to
be (referring to the definition, 1) provoked by the slight against those
who have no natural claim (to treat us in this way): the natural duty of
inferiors is not to slight (their betters)'.
On TTpoo-rjiceiD, and the several kinds of obligation from which the
terms expressive of 'duty' are derived, Bet, \PVJ wpJ'> 7rpocnJKet, see on
/xi) jrpooTjKdvTtoj, II 2 . 1 , note 2 on p . 11.
19. Tots (j>iKois] Comp. 15, and note. ' We are angry with friends
if they don't speak of us, and treat us, well, and still more if they do the
contrary ; and if, when we are in want of anything, they don't perceive it
(don't find it out before we tell them of it)'this manifests their indifference to us and our wants, which is a kind of contempt, and the sting of
oKiympla'as Antiphon's Plexippus was (angry with, dpyicTo) with his
(r<j>) Meleager: for this want of perception (or attention) is a token of
slight; because, when we do care for any one, (things of this kind) don't
escape us', av yap (ppovTigofiev {ravraj ov \av6dvci. This is expressed
in the abstract neuter of all thingsj meaning of course persons. There were
two poets named Antiphon: one a writer of the New Comedy, (Meineke,
Fragm.
Com. Gr. I 4^9; TTOITJT))! Kcuvrjs Ka/joiblat 'Avrt<f>G>v 'ASrjvalos,
Bockh, Corp. Inscr. I p. 767): and the other, a tragic writer, mentioned
by Athenaeus as a rpayafocmoios, together with his character, Plexippus,
XV 673 F. This second Antiphon is again referred to, Rhet. 11 6. 27,
'AvTicpav 6 WOITJTTIS, and his play Meleager, Ib. 23. 20, where two lines are
quoted from it. Besides Antiphon's play, there were several others with
the same title, and on the same subject, the Calydonian boar-hunt and its
tragic consequences, by poets comic as well as tragic, Sophocles, Euripides, Sosiphanes, (Wagner, Trag. Gr. Fragm. i n 179,) Antiphanes,
and Philetaerus, Mein., u. s., 1 315, 349. (The Meleager of Antiphanes is
doubtful, the names of Antiphon and Antiphanes being often interchanged, Mein.) See also Wagner, Trag. Gr. Fragm. m 113.
Victorius notes on this allusion: 'Plexippus was brother of Althea,
Meleager's mother, and with his brother Toxeus was put to death by Meleager, because they expressed indignation at his bestowing the prize, the
boarskin, which he had received for the destruction of the Calydonian
boar, upon his mistress Atalanta. Perhaps it was this very circumstance
that Antiphon indicated: he may have represented Plexippus as expressing his vexation at Meleager's insensibility to his want, to his great
anxiety, namely, to possess the boarskin, which his nephew (Meleager) had,
PHTOPIKHS B 2 2O, 21.

yp(p'
oXiywpia? yap
TO JUJJ aladdvecrdai
20 yap (ppouTtÔjuev, ov XavOdvei.
29
<rr]fxelov wu
Kal TO?S 7
Teas dTV%iais Kal oXws evdvfxovfxzvois eV r a l s

ari/îats* r\ yap eyQpov fj dXiycopovvTOs ari/ixelov. Kal
Tots fj.t) (ppouTtôvcrtv
idv Xv7rrj<rwcriv' $10 Kal
<
21 Ka/ca a yyeAAoi'<riv opyl^pvTai.

7rj0t ayVwi/ ; deuofxevoi's
euriv r\ oXiywpovcriv
Kal rots $
TO. UVTCOV
t] e'^^pors
(pavXw
TO?S
CLKOVOV<TI PO/ULOIOI
yap
Oi <yajo (piXoi (rvvaX-
regardless of the claims of consanguinity, bestowed nevertheless on Atalanta'. (I have altered the second sentence for the sake of clearness.)
The story of Meleager and the Caledonian boarhunt, is told by Ovid,
Metamorph. v m . The offence of the Thestiadae, Toxeus and Plexippus,
and their death by the hand of their nephew, are described in 428444:
from which Victorius apparently derived his account.
20. 'We are angry also with those that rejoice at our misfortunes or
in general maintain a cheerful demeanour in the midst of our distresses:
for this is a mark either of downright enmity or of contemptuous indifference'. oXtaf, without any special indications of joy, yet maintain a
most provoking air of serenity and indifference whilst they cheerfully
contemplate our vexations and annoyanceseveryone who has ever had
experience of this (and who has not?) knows well how provoking it is.
'And with those who don't care (who exhibit no solicitude, or sympathy ; comp. infra 21, oi yap <f>[Xoi o-wakyovtriv) when they give us pain ;
and .this is why we are angry with the messengers of evil tidings' (ingenious solution). Or the explanation might be, that the first surprise
and annoyance at the unwelcome intelligence associates the bearer with
his news. That messengers of unwelcome news are liable, to a rough
reception from those to whom they communicate them, is noticed also by
Aesch., Pers. 255, a>V0' KOKOV /itv nparov dyyeWtiv
trrlpyei yap ov&eis ayyeXov KaKwv iir&v.
Kaicd, Soph. Antig. 2JJ,
Shakespeare, Henry IV. Pt. II. Act I, sc. 1. 100, Yet the first bringer
of unwelcome news hath but a losing office. Antony and Cleop. II 5,
Though it be honest it is never good to bring bad news. Macbeth, v 5,
Liar and slave(to the messenger, who comes to announce the moving
of Birnam wood).
21. 'And with such as stand quietly, calmly, listening to an account
of (n-tpi), or looking on at (any painful exhibition of) our faults and weaknesses (TO <pav\a)', (without offering either help or sympathy); this looks
like either contemptuous indifference, or actual enmity: because friends
sympathise with us (feelpain as we do ourselves), (and these do not); and
every one feels pain at the spectacle, the contemplation, when he witnesses the exposure, of his own infirmities'the friend, being mpos
avros or aXXos avrot, ' a second self (Eth. Nic. IX several times repeated),
must regard the exposure of his friend's weaknesses just as he would of
his own.
59-
30
yovcriv, dewjuevoi Se TO oiKeia (pavXa wavres

dXyov22 criv en TOIS oXiyiopovcri TTJOOS irevTe, Trpo's 01/s (piXoTifxovvrm, 7TjOOS ovs dav/mdôvcriv, v(p' wv (SovXovTai
6avfxdê<rdai, t] ovs ala-x^vovTai, rj iv TO?S aicrxwopevois avTovs' iv TOVTOIS idv Tis SXiywprj, SpyiôvTcti
23 fxdXXov. leal TO?S ets ret ToiavTO. 6Xiytdpovo~iv virep
wv avToTs alcrxpov /Jirj fioridelv, olov yovefc, TCKVO,
?, dpxofxevovi.
K.a.1 TOIS X^PIV W d7ro$i$ov- P. 1380.
22. 'And further, with those who shew slight to us before (in
respect of) five different kinds of persons; (i) to those whom we are
ambitious of rivalling 1 (in the race for distinction; (piKoTifiuaBai expresses
the ambitious views, and irpas ovs the competition, comp. c. 4.24, 6.15,
10. 5, &c); (2) 7rpos (TOVTOVS) OVS, to those whom we respect and admire;
(3) those by whom we wish to be respected and admired; (4) those of
whom we stand in awe; (5) r) (rois d\iy<opov<rtv I?/^C3I/, or avrav as Ar.
writes it,) or, (we are angry with those who slight us) when in the company of (iv) those who hold us in awe. In the society of any of these, a
slight offered is provocative of a greater degree of anger (than it would
be elsewhere)'.
tutrx&vto-Oai, with the accus. of the person, means to ' be ashamed in a
man's presence, or before him; to be afraid to look one in the face, from
reverence; to stand in awe of him'. Soph. Phil. 1382, ov Karaitrxvvei
6eovs; TOP TrpooTpowaiov TOP MCETJJV ; The accusative is the local accus.,
an extension of the cognate accus., the person, whose presence causes the
shame or awe, being represented as the seat of it, as when we say aXyeiv
rrjv Kecpakqv. Matth., Gr. Gr. 441, has given a few examples of this use of
alo-xvveo-Bai and al8ci<rdaifour from Eur. Ion, 353, 379, 952, and 1093,
aloyyvoiicu TOV nokvviivov 8e6v, and one from Xen. de Rep. Lac. II 11.
Add Horn. II. A 23, aldela-dm 6' leprja, Z (vi) 442, alBeofiai Tpaias Kal TptoaSar
\Keo-iwen\ovs: so albfurBai iKeTi)v,as Horn. II. x(XXIl) 124. Aesch. Agam.362,

(Dind.), Ai'a TOI ivmv p-eyav aldovfuu. Aristoph. Thesm. 848, 903, Eccles.
381, Plut. 1077. Plat. Theaet. 183 E, M<='Wo-oe...^rToi> alo-xvvoixcu. Symp.
216 B, 218 D, Protag. 312 A, OVK av alvxyvoio a-avrov; Rep. VIII 562 E,
altrxvvecrdai TOVS yoveas, K.TX. Comp. Lat. pitdere, suppudere, aliquem
alicuius, Cic. Ep. ad Fam. IX 1 sed quod eorutn me suppudebat. Orator 155
'Pain's met, meum factum (i.e. meorutn factorum)pudet.'
23. 'And those whose slight is offered to such objects as it
would be a disgrace to us not to help and protect, such as parents,
children, wives, rulers and governors', such as have a natural claim upon
our help and protection. 'And those that have failed to make a due
return (for a benefit received); for in this case the slight (neglect, contemptuous indifference to moral obligation) is a violation of the natural
1
The phrase has been otherwise understood, ' those whom they are anxious
to stand well with'. But to say nothing of its not properly representing the Greek,
this interpretation leaves no difference between this first class and the third.
PHTOPIKHS B 2 2427.
24 civ
Trapd TO irpo(rr\KOV yap
r\ 6\iyu)pla.
eipwvevop.evoi's TTJOOS cnrovddôvTas25 yap

eav
r\ eipwveia.
26 T O HW dîovv
opyfjs
Kal i$ Arjdri, olov
(rrifxeiov eivar
rj S' dfxe\eia
ev
Kapp
TOVTO
tov 7rdvTa<z Kal avTOV.
ova a Trepl /zucpoV
27
Kal yap
oXiywplas
oXiycopla
yap
h'
OUTWS
SoKeT Kal r\ \r\6ri
/mev yap tf \r\dt]
yiyveTai,
io-Tiu.
Ois fxev ovv Spyi'ôvTai

Trola, d/ma eiprjTar
TTOIY]TIK6V
Kal f) TWV ovofxaTwv
di djxeXeiav
Kal TOIS
Kal TOIS TWV aWwv
jj.t] Kai avTwv
31
Kal ws e%ovTes Kal
SrjAov S' on
Seoi dv
claim, duty, or obligation. The nature ox fitness of things requires (under

this theory, which is that of justice, the lex talionis) such a compensation,
or the repayment of the favour.
24. 'And those (are provoking) who use irony to (7rpor, in reply to,
or conversation with) us when we are in serious earnest (whether merely
talking, or engaged in some serious pursuit: either of these is provoked
by untimely levity ; which is construed as a kind of contempt), for irony
is expressive of contempt'. This characteristic or construction of irony
is not noticed in the analysis of it in Eth. Nic. iv 13, 1127 b 22 seq. In
IV 8, 1124 b 30, it appears as a trait in the character of the niya\6\jrvxos,
and is part of the contemptuous bearing (1124$ 5 6 8e fieyaKo-^vôs Sixains
KaTcufxpovei) to the vulgar which is suitable to his dignity, e'lpava 8e n-poy
TOVS noWovs. On irony and its uses in Rhetoric, besides the passage
from the Ethics already quoted, see Rhet. ad Alexandrum 22. 1, Cic. de
Orat. II 67. 269 seq., Ill 53. 203, Quint, v n i 6. 54, IX 2. 44 seq. Socrates
was probably one of those whose constant use of elpatveia was construed
as contempt, and contributed to his unpopularity.
25. 'And (again we feel ourselves slighted) by those who are
naturally or habitually disposed to acts of kindness, if they don't extend
their kindness to ourselves : for this has the air of contempt, to consider
us (avrov is 'an individual' opposed to wa^rar) unworthy to be treated
in the same way as every one else'.
26. ' Forgetfulness too is provocative of anger, even, for instance,
forgetting your friend's name, though it be (shewn) in such a mere trifle:
for even forgetfulness (trifle though it be, Kai) is construed as a sign of
contempt: because this oblivion is due to neglect, and neglect is slight'.
Falconbridge, in King John, Act I, sc. 1. 187, And if his name be George,
fit call him Peter ; For new-made honour doth forget men's names.
27. 'So the objects, dispositions, and provocatives of anger have
been all treated together'. On the grammar of oh.. Apipai, see note, II 9.
11 (at the end).
The following sentence is a note upon the mode of applying the foregoing analysis to the conduct and management of the speech, for the
32
PHTOPIKHS B 2 27; 3 1.
exovcriV
w Aoyco TOIOVTOVS dloi 6vTes opyiXws
Kal TOI)S ivavTLOVs TOVTOIS ivoxov^
ovras e<p ois
opyiôvrai, Kal TOIOVTOVS O'IOIS opyiôvrai.
eirel U TO 6pylê<rdai ivavTiov TW irpavvzvBai CHAP, m .
l opyri TrpaoTtjn Xr\irreov 7rws côires 7TjOaot i
benefit of the student of Rhetoric: how, namely, to excite and direct this
passion in conformity with the interests of the speaker, and it is plain
that what is required is, to bring the audience by the speech into such a
state of mind as men are in, when they are irascible (so that their anger
may be brought to bear upon the opponent); and to represent the adversary as liable to the imputation of such feelings and acts as provoke men
to anger, and of such character or disposition as men are angry with.
Karaa-KevaCeiv has the same double meaning, or at least application, as we
noticed on n i. 2, q. v. In the one case, it is 'to establish', or produce
the feelings in the minds of the audience; in the other, to produce in
their minds by the speech an impression of the state of feeling of the
adverse party, to establish, i.e. to represent in the speech, airov after d/ot
' av, the reading of most MSS, is rightly omitted by Bekker with Ac.
CHAPTER III.
Analysis of rrpaoTrjs, patience; the opposite of opyj, as it is here
stated. In the Nic. Eth. IV 11, init. the statement is different. irpaoTrjs
is there the mean state, or virtue, lying between opycK6rT]s irascibility, the
excess of angry emotion, and aopyrjaia want of spirit, insensibility (to provocation or wrong), the defect; ro hi jrpojrrjXaKiôfifvov ave^cc-Bai Kai TOVS
OIKCLOVS nepiopav avftpcnrohahes. opyrj is the basis of t h e whole, t h e
ivados in general, the natural emotion in respect of provocation, capable

of modification so as to assume three different forms : its three eeis are
7repl TTJV opytfv, c. 12 init. jrpaoTijr then, here, as a nadosin the Ethics
it is a #s or virtueis this instinctive affection, feeling, emotion, in a
mild, calm, subdued state (opposed to dpyij an emotion in a state of excitement) ; placidity of temper. As a virtue (in the Ethics) it is as described
by Grant (Eth. Nic. Plan of book, IV p. 150, first ed.) 'the virtue of the
regulation (or control) of the temper'. In the de Anima, I 1, 403 a 16, it
is still only a TTCLQOS, together with Gvfion, <p6@os, eXeos, Bapvos, xapd, cpiKla,
and /ua-os. Again wpaoTTjs, the feeling, stands in the same relation to
irpawa-is, the quieting, calming, lowering process of the excited, angry
emotion, as opyij does to opyi&oOai, (and would to opyttrty if the word
were in existence). And lastly, as opyij is a Kivrja-cs (setting in motion in
the way of stirring up and exciting) de Anima, I 1, 403 a 26, ro 6py[{;rdai
Ktinja-is TIS TOV TOIOVSI a-cofiaros rj pepovs (c.r.X., SO vpavv<ris is a Karaoriuns, a
process of settling down, and rjpeprjms, a passing to a state of rest

nptiuiv the regular opposite of Kivela-Sat. The fifth book of the Physics
is on these two opposites, Kivrja-is and tjpcpia ; see especially ch. 6. 'And
whereas growing angry is opposite to growing calm, and anger to calmness, (and we rhetoricians are bound to be equally acquainted with both
sides of every question), we must now proceed to ascertain the several
PHTOPIKHS B 3 2 - 5 .
Kai 7rpos Tivas irpaws eôwi
2 rar
Kal $ia rivodv irpavvov-
kcrTto $rj 7rpdvvcris KardcrTaa-is
3 yfjs.
ei ovv opylôurai
33
Kal tjpe/mrjcris op-
TO?S oXiyiapovmv,
S' i(TTiv 6KOV(TIOV, (pavepov on
SXiywpia
Kai Tofc firjdeu T.OVTICV
KOIOXKTIV r\ dKOvcrioas TTOIOVCTLV rj (haivofxevois TOIOVTOIS
4 TTpaoi eiaiv.
Kai TOTS Tavavria
ujv liroi\](rav /3ouXo-
Kai bcroi Kai avTol els auToi)? TOIOVTOI' OV5 oe*s yap avros
avTOv ZoKei oXiyiapeiv.
Kai TO?S O/XO-
Xoyovcri Kai /xtra/jieAofteVois* cos yap eôp-res h'iKr\v ro

\v7re1cr6ai eiri TO?? 7re7roiiiiAevoi<s itavovTai
arrifxeiov Se 7ri T>JS TWI/ OIK6TWV
yap
dvTiKeyovras
Trjs opyrjg.
KoXacrews' TOI)S /uieu p. 60.
Kal dpvovp.evovs judWou KoXaô-
dispositions of calmness (in the subject), the states of mind (in the objects)
which are regarded with calmness {sang-froid), and the means of bringing
them into this state'.
2. eoTto] See note on I 5. 3, 6.2, &c. ' Let it be assumed then (as sufficient for our purpose) that the process or growth of this even and indifferent
state of mind is a subsiding or settling down, and a process tending to
rest (a quieting process) of the motion (i.e. excitement, ferment, ebullition)
of anger'. " In V. Nat. Ausc. [<f>v(riK.fjs dxpoao-tas, E p. 230 a 4,] (32,77 yap
els avro KIPTJCTIS iv 63 {TTT)Kev, ijpe/iô"iff ixaXKov icTiv) valet Aristoteli rjpefirj&iSj
viaprogressusque adquietem". Victorius.

3. 'If then anger is roused by slight, and slight is voluntary (i.e.
intentional), it plainly follows that to those who do none of these things
(the variotis kinds of oXiyapla enumerated in this last chapter) or do it
unintentionally, or have that appearance (though they may in reality
have intended a slight), men are calm (quiet, placable, take no offence)'.
4. 'And to those who offer a slight without intending it (with
the contrary intention). And to those whose feelings or dispositions and
conduct' (both included in TOIOVTOI) 'are alike to themselves and to the
others {lit. who behave in the same way themselves to themselves); for
no one is ever supposed to slight himself.
5. 'And to those who offer a slight, and then repent of it; for, accepting as a sort of satisfaction the pain felt at what has been done, their
anger ceases. A sign of this is what happens in the punishment of slaves;
for those that answer, or contradict us, and deny the fault, we punish
more severely, whilst we cease to be angry with those that admit the
justice of their punishment'.
aeraiteXo/ie'rou] aKoixriov be ro eirlXvirov Kal iv /XfTapeXela
TOV &r) fit*
ayvoiav 6 pep iv iLfTafxektiq S.KU>V doice't K.T.X. E t h . N i c . I l l 2 init. p . 11IO b 18.
So that repentance is a sign that the act was unintentional, and from
ignorance of the probable effect.
dvTt\eyovTas} Arist. Ran. 1072, \a\iav Kal ara>fiv\lav rj '(-eKevacrev rdc
T TTaKaiaTpas, Kai roi/c irapakovs dvineurev avrayopeveiv roir apxovtrtv-
AR. II.
34
PHT0PIKH2 B 3 5, 6.
fxev, irpos Se TOI)S dfAoXoyovvras ZiKaioa

Travoixeda 6vfxov}xevoi. a'inov 8* on dvaiarxwTia TO
rd (pavepd apveTadai, r) 3' dvaicrxwrlct SXiywpla KCCI
KctTctQpovrio-is' wv yovv TTOXV Karafpovovfxev,
OVK
6 alcrxwofxeda.
KCCI TOIS Tcnreivovfxevois TTjOOS avrovs
Kal /LIT) dvTiXeyovcriv' (paivovrai yap dfxoXoyeiv TJTTOVS
ehai, ol S' #TTOUS (pofiovvrai, (poôvfxevo<s t)e ovhek
oXiyiopei.
6'TI he 7Tjoos TOI)S Taireivovfxevov^ Traverai
irpos rovs opoKoyovvras] Schrader refers in illustration to Terent.
Andr. i n 5.15, Pamph. annon dixiessehocfuturum?
Dav. dixti. Pamph.
quin meritus's? Dav. crucem
Pamph. (whois mollified by the admission)
hei mihi, cum non habeo sfiatium ut de te sumam supplicium, ut volo.
Jul. Ccesar, IV 3,116, Brut. When I spoke that, I was ill-tempered too. Cass.
Do you confess so much ? Give me your hand. ' The cause of this (of the
heavier punishment of those that aggravate their offence by denying it),
is that to deny evident facts is effrontery' (dvaio-xwria is a want of respect
for the opinions and feelings of others), 'and effrontery implies slight
regard and contemptat all events we feel no respect for' (altrxvvea-dai
rtva, note on-n 2. 22) 'those whom we greatly despise'. This is an argument in support of the assertion that dvaurxvvria implies oXiyapla and
Kara(j)p6vrj(Tis. avaicrxovTia is 'disrespect'; now as experience shews that
we do treat with disrespect those whom we very much despise, it follows
from this that disrespect, effrontery, impudence, must carry with it, as its
outward expression, the feeling of contempt. Comp. c. 6 2, q fi'
dvai(r)(yvTia o\iya>pia rty.
dvcu<rxvvTia TO ra (pavepa apvelaBai] The sausage- (or black-pudding-)

monger in the Knights (296) is a perfect model of this kind of effrontery.
Cleon, who is represented as not overburdened with modesty, candidly
admits his thefts, o/ioXoyco KXenreiv' crv 8' oJ^'- The other lays his hands
upon something under the very eyes of the bystanders, and then swears
that he never touched it: vr\ TOV ''Epfirlv rbv dyopalov, KaiviopKai yt fiXeKovTav.
6. What follows, though put forward as an independent topic, may

also be regarded as the explanation of the second member of the alternative, the mitigation of the penalty consequent upon the admission of the
. offender.
'And to those who humble themselves before us, and do not answer
or contradict us; for in doing so they seem to admit their inferiority, and
(conscious) inferiority implies fear, (not contemptuous indifference), and
no one in that state of mind is ever guilty of a slight'. (Fear and anger
cannot coexist, 10.) 'That our anger does cease towards those who
humble themselves before us, is shewn also by the habit which dogs have
of not biting those that sit down (when they attack them)'. This fact in
X p s t also by the
experience of modern travellers in Albania [see esp. Mure's Tour in Greece
PHTOPIKHS B 3 710.
35
r\ opyrj, Koti ol Kvves t]\ov(Tiv- ov haKvovres TOJS KO.67 iôvTas.

Kal TOTS (Tirovhdrover1 irpos TOI)S o~7rovhdbvTas* ZoKel ydp cnrouddêadctL aAA' ov Karacppo8 ueltrdai.
Kal Tofc /nel^ca Keâpicr/JLeuoi^. Kal TO??
9 Seo/xej/ots /cat TrapaLTOvp.evoi^' TcnreivoTepoi ydp.
Kal
rots /x>) vjipicTTais /xjjSe ÂeyatrTar? yu^S' dAfyw'pots, ^
eh fxr]$eva rj /utrj els xpria-rovs /mrjh' eh TOIOVTOUS oloi
10 Trep avToi.
bAws S' eje TWJ/ evavTiwv del (TKO7reiv TO.
irpavvTiKa.
Kal ov<z (pofiovvTai rj
1 93100 or De Quincey's review XIII 3019]. I myself heard of it there.
In illustration of KaBiôvras, sitting as a suppliant posture, Victorius cites
Soph. Oed. R. init. rivas TTO6' eSpas rao-fie K.T.X. Arist. Plut. 382, 6pa> TIV
eiri row /3âro9 Ka6edovfievov, luiTTjpiav i'xovra.
Demosth. de Cor. 107 ova
iv Mowvxia cica6feTo (took sanctuary at the altar of Artemis in Munychia).

7. 'And to those who are serious with the serious' (earnest in anythingthe opposite of those who joke nalfavrts, or use irony, when you
are disposed to be serious, which makes you angry ; c. 2 24); ' because
then you consider yourself to be treated seriously' (which implies respect-,
that you are worthy of serious consideration), ' and not with contempt'
(as in the other case, in which people seem to 'make a joke' of you).
<nrovdaeo-dai and KaTa<fipove~icr6ai]
On this formation of the passive,
see Append. B on I 12. 22 (at the end of the notes to Book 1).
8. 'And to those who have done us more kindness and service (than
they have received from us)'. The explanation of this is not given
because it is too clear to require one. It is that this superiority in conferring favours constitutes a debt and an obligation on the part of the
inferior in this social commerce, whose account is on the debit side in the
books of the other; who is therefore obliged to him, and disinclined to
resent any real or supposed offence: the gratitude overpowers the sense
of slight.
'And those who beg for anything and deprecate our wrath or resentment 'both of these are confessions of inferiority, we acknowledge that
we are in want of something, a deficiency which they can supply, and
this shews superiority'for they are humbler' (than they would otherwise
be, if they didn't want anything).
9. 'And those who are not given to wanton outrage, or to mockery,
or slight'the opposite dispositions and conduct being of all the most
provocative of anger, C. 2 3, 5, 12' either such as never indulge them
against any one, or never against the good and worthy, or never against
those who are like ourselves'.
10. 'And as a general rule, the things (words or deeds) that are
productive (in our intercourse with others) of a calm temper' (a quiet,
indifferent, unexcited state of feeling; n-paemjs is purely negative; I believe,
strictly speaking, that it is no true nados at all, and is better represented
as a virtue or mean state in the Ethics) 'may be ascertained from their
32
36
P H T O P I K H S B 3 I I , 12.
yap av OUTCOS exô-iv, ova opyityvrar dlvvarov yap

11 a/na (pofieia-dai Kal 6pyie(rdai.
Kal T<HS SI opynv
ov
iroina-acriv rj OVK opyiôvrai in ?TTOI/ opyifyvTar
yap Bi oXiywpiav (paivovrai Trpaâr ovhek yap opyi^6/mevos oXiyooper r\ fxkv yap oXiywpla aXv-rrov, n $'
12 opyrj /Hera Xinrris. Kal rots ai<rxwo[A6POis avrov<s.
p.
tie ivavTicos TW opyiêcrdai drjXov on
opposites' (viz. the exciting topics of opy?' in c. 2). Buhle objects to this
clause, OXOJJ in rav ivavrlav as interrupting the analysis and out of place,
and pronounces it an interpolation. It is however a not unnatural
observation to make here. Up to this point Aristotle has been going
over very nearly the same ground as the topics of the last chapter; when
he has got thus far, the resemblance strikes him, and he says by way of
a note: "but in fact this is true as a general rule, all the topics of
jrpaoT>jr may be derived by merely reversing them from those of opyr'/".
I do not mean to say that he was previously unaware of this fact, but
only that it struck him more vividly at the moment, when he had the
preceding examples written down on his parchment or papyrus (probably
the latter) before his eyes.
After this little digression we return to the topics of irpaoTTjs.
'The presence of those that we are afraid of, or stand in awe of, makes
us calm: for as long as we are in this state of mind we cannot feel
anger; because fear and anger cannot coexist in the mind'.
11. 'At offences committed under the influence of passion we
either feel no anger at all, or in a less degree; because in this case the
offence appears not to be due to slight; for no one when angry with
another can feel indifferent about him and his proceedings; because a
contemptuous and indifferent state of mind, or slight, implies the absence
of pain, whereas anger is always accompanied by it', opyf) opegis pera
Xvirrjs, defin. II 2.1. "Eodem argumento Eth. Nic. Ill (4, m i b 17,)
distinxit 7rpoalpecriv a cupiditate: KQ! rj fxtv iin8vp.ia ij&tos Kal iniKvirov, tj
fie wpoalpea-is ovn Xvirrjpov ovff ijSeds". Victorius.
TOIS 81' opyfjv Troirjtracriii] As here the influence of passion mitigates

the offensiveness of an act, and the amount of provocation caused by it,
so in Eth. Nic. V. 10, 1135 b 19, orav d8as i*ev p.rj npofiovXevvas 8, dfiiKijâ,
0101/ ocra Te 81a Bvfibv Ka\ SXKa nadr], o<ra caiayxaia rj (pva-tKa, (rvfifiaLvei rots dv-
epwTrois, it diminishes its criminality. The supposition is, that a man who
kills another, for instance, in a fit of passion, is blinded by it, deprived
thereby of the knowledge of the particular circumstances of the case, which
is necessary to constitute guilt, Eth. N. i n 2, and the want of which
exempts in some degree from responsibility; there is no malice prepense
which makes the complete crime. The question of the degree in which
acts of this kind can be properly called involuntary is briefly discussed in
c. 3 of the same book.
12. 'Again, an offence from one who stands in awe of us', does not
provoke us to anger, because we know or guess that from one who
37
Trpaoi elcrlv, oiov iv 7rai$ia, ev yeXcori, iv iopTrj, ev

eurifxepi'a, iv Karopduxrei, ev 7r\ripc6(rei, 6'A.ws iv ctAvTr'ia Kctl rjlovn fJ-n vfipio-riKrj Kai iv ikmî emence?.
13 en Ke^poviKOTes Kal fxri viroyvioi Tf\ opyfj ovrev Travel
habitually regards us with awe or reverence the offence is unintentional,
being inconsistent with his ordinary feeling toward us. 'Also it is plain
that men are calm and placable when they are in any state (in any condition or circumstances, internal or external) which is antagonistic to
angry feeling, as when engaged in any sport or amusement, when they
are laughing, at a feast, in fine weather (or in a prosperous state), in
success, in a state of repletion or satisfaction; in short, in any condition
of freedom from pain (negative pleasure), or (positive) pleasureexcept
that of wanton outrage (v/3piy is always oiroit wdrj, II 2. 5)and of
virtuous, good hope'. Of tiricuajg it is said, Eth. N. v. 14, init. neracpepopev dvri TOV dya6ov. It can be substitzited, by metaphor, for dyadis. The
bad state of mind implied by a vicious hope does not exclude the feeling
of anger.
evrjiiepla] It is hard to say whether this is meant for a 'fine day',
'fine weather', like evSi'a, which certainly tends to placidity of temper,
and general eiBvpla and evxoXia(in which sense it is actually used in
Hist. Anim. VI 15. 6, OTOV fv/xepias yfvofiivrjs dvadepiialvr/Tai q yrj, and
again 7, orau evrj[iepla ?h and Xenoph. Hellen. II 4. 2, Kaos)or metaphorically,
for a
'state of prosperity, health and happiness', in which sense tvr\p.epos,

fvrmcpciv and evt)pepia are employed. See again Hist. Anim. vin 18.1,
evrjfiepovo-i Se (are in a flourishing condition) TO. feoa Kara ran mpav K.T.X.
V 1 1 . 5, irpbs Trjv aXkr/v TOV crafiaror cvrjfMptav. P o l . I l l 6 , 1 2 7 8 b 29, ms cvovarjs
Tivbs evrjfiptas ev aira> (T< QV) Kal ykvKVTrjTos (pvcrtKrjs. IV (VII) 2, 1324 a 3 8 ,
eju7T-o8iov 777 irfpl avTov fvrjuepiq (of the prosperity of a country). VII
(VI) 8, 1322 b 38, fvrjfiepovaais TroXetrii', VIII (v) 8, 1308 b 24, TO (vrjfiepovv
rijs TToXeeor. And in the same Sense everrjplas yivofiivr)s hi elprjvrjv K.r.X., of
a state, as before, vni (v) 6, 1306 b 11. De Gen. An. iv 6. 16, (irj/xepdv
TOU o-<opao-iv. Eth. Nic. I 9, sub fin. Trjs roiavTrjs cvijfitpias, including all
the elements of happiness or prosperity, according to the vulgar notion.

In Aristotle at all events the preponderance of usage is decidedly on the
side of the metaphorical application.
13. 'Further (men are brought to a calm or placid state of mind)
by lapse of time when they are no longer fresh in their anger (when their
anger is no longer fresh); for time brings anger to an end'.
XpovLfciv is 'to pass' or 'spend time', K^XPOVLKOTCS, men that have
'already passed some time', since the angry fit came on. For examples
of the use of the word see the Lexx. vTroytuoi, 'fresh, recent', of things
still under the hand of the workman. See note on I 1. 7.
Gaisford quotes in illustration of the topic, Thucyd. in 38, (Cleon) 6avliaa> \xiv TWV TtpoBivTUiv av&is fffpi MvTLkqvalayv Xtytiv, Kal xp"v &ia.TpifSr)v
cfmoirjo-cuiTav o E W I Trpbs rav I}SIKI]K6TWU p.aX\ov.
6 yap iraBav r<3 Spdo-avTi
dfiPXvTepq rjj opyfi eiret-epxeTai. And Eustath. ad II. Q, p. 1342. 46, o 81a
fieo-ov Kaipos ftaXarreJ Tr)V iv TOIS Bvpovpivois
o-<KrjpoTr)Ta, mare dXrjdevetv TOV
38
PHTOPIKH2 B 3 13.
yap 6pyr\v 6 wovcis. 7ravei Se Kal erepov 6pyr\v

r\ Trap aXKov \rj(pdel(ra n/uwpia 7rporepov 010 eu
<>I\OKpartis, eiTroVros rivm cpyityp.evov rov Stjfxov "n
OVK a.TroXo'yel;" "oinrco y e " e(pf]. " d\\a Trore ;
" orav aWov iBw ZiafiefiXnixevov." irpdoi yap yiyvovrai orav ets aWov rr\v 6pyr\v dvaXwawcriv, oiov
elitovra on (Soph. Electr. 179) xPms iiapr)s Seos. Virg. Aen. V 781,
Iunonis gravis ira, nee exsaturabile pectus, quam nee longa dies pietas
nee mitigat ttlla (Victorius), describes the implacability, the lasting
nature, of Juno's anger, which is the direct opposite of irpaorqs. This
is TTiKpoTrjs : 01 Se iviKfioi SvaSiaXvToi Kai TTOXVV xpovov 6pyiovrai, E t h . N . IV
11, 1126 a 20: likewise KOTOS, rancorous, vindictive wrath, said of one who
Trf'rTFi rfjv opyr/v, (nurses his wrath to keep it warm. Burns,) Ib. line 25.
And opposed to these are the apyikoi (irascible), deTr, d.<p6xo\oi, (ita Bekk.)
Ib. line 18 ; these raêwj 6pyi{ovTat and navovrai ra^ctor, lines 13, 15'And again a more violent animosity conceived against one person is
appeased by punishment previously exacted from another (who may not
have excited it so strongly): and therefore the saying of Philocrates was
to the point, when some one asked at a time of popular excitement
against him, 'why do not you defend yourself?' 'No, not yet', he replied.
'Well, but when?' 'As soon as I have seen some one else under accusation', (or 'under a similar suspicion': hiafiaXkciv, 'to set two people at
variance', being specially applied to ' calumny'). ' For men recover their
calmness and evenness of temper, as soon as they have expended their
anger upon another object'. So Eth. N., u. s., 1126 a 21, naiiXa fie ylverat
orav avTanohiha' 17 yap Tifiapia Travel rfjs opyfjs, TJSovfiu dvrl rijs Xvirr/e
ijxTtoiovira. " Tanta enim est primi impetus in ira vis, ut cupiditatem
fere omnem effundat." Schrader. He also cites from Plutarch's Life of
Alexander the case of Alexander the Great, who expended his anger
against the Greeks on the destruction of Thebes, and afterwards spared
Athens. Victorius supplies a very pertinent passage from Lysias, Or. x i x
imip TCOV 'Apio-ro(pdvovs xptjfidrav 5, 6, a<niu> yap eyaye...on irdvraiv
SeivoTaTov eart flta/3o\?J' p.aKiO'Ta he TOVTO fX01 **v Tls heivoraTov, orav TTOXXo! in\ TTJ avrfj atria dt ayoiva KaTao-raHTiV <s yap eVi TO TTOXV 01 reXeuTaToi
Kpivoiievoi (rcoôvrai' ireiravfiivoi yap opyfjs avrav axpoao-Be, nai TOVS iXeyxovs
ijSij edeXovTcs airodexccrde.
On Philocrates, of the Attic deme Hagnus ('Ayvovcnos), a contemporary and political rival of Demosthenes, see two columns of references
from the Orators, chiefly Demosthenes and Aeschines, in Baiter and
Sauppe's excellent Index no}ninum, appended to their edition of the
Greek Orators, ill 137 seq. [See also Arnold Schaefer's Demosthenes und
seine Zeit, II 345 and elsewhere. S.J
' As happened in the case of Ergophilus ; for though they (the Athenian assembly) were more indignant with him than with Callisthenes,
they let him off, because they had condemned Callisthenes to death the
day before'. Callisthenes and Ergophilus were both of them Athenian
generals commanding in the Chersonese, B. C. 362. See Grote, Hist, of
PHTOPIKH2 B 3 1316.
39
ti ewe 'Epyo(pi\ov.
fxaWov yap âAeTraij/oi/Tes p- 61.
t] KaWio-devei d<peT<rav Stct TO KaWiadevovs rfj TrpoH repala KctTccyvwvai ddvarov.
Kal idv eAeoHmv, Kal
eav fxelfyv Jtanov ireirovdoTes axriv JJ ol 6pyiV6fxevoi
ctv kSpatrav uxnrep el\r](pevai yap oiovrai Tifxwplav.
15 Kai eav dduceTv olwvTai avTol Kal hiKaiuys irdcryeiv ov
yiyverai yap r\ opyrj Trpos TO hitcaiov ov yap <ETI
irapa TO 7rp0(rfJK0v o'lovTai Tracrêti/, r\ S' opyrj TOVTO
r\v. tio $eT TW Xoyco 7rpOKo\d(êiv' dyavaKTOvcri yap
16 rjTTov KoAaôpevoi Kal ol SouAoi. nal eav fJ.rj aicrdtio-eadai o'lwvTai OTI ZL avTovs Kal dvd' cov e7ra6ov f\
Gr. x 508, 511, and the references in Baiter and Sauppe, u. s. pp. 45 and
73 [also A. Schaefer, Demosthenes, I 134]. The former is to be distinguished from Callisthenes the contemporary Orator. Of Ergophilus,
Demosthenes says, de Fals. Leg. 180, KCU 6'o-ot z TOVT (corruption
and treachery in the exercise of military command) dn-oXmXaa-i nap' v/uv,
ol Se -)(prjjiaTa najMTToW' a(j)\i]Ka<nv nv âAeiroj' Seiâi, 'EpyocpiXos, KrjCpKTO-
doros, T11j.6fi.axos, K.T.\. TO reconcile this passage with that of Aristotle,

we must suppose that Ergophilus was one of those that were fined, but
acquitted on the capital charge; which is not quite accurately expressed
by a(pei<rav: or possibly the two cases may be distinct.
14. ' Sympathy or compassion calms angry feeling; and if the
offence (which has aroused their indignation) has been visited by a heavier punishment than those who are thus angry would themselves have
inflicted (their anger is appeased); for they think they have received a
sort of ((Bo-n-fp) satisfaction (for the injury)', or 'exacted as it were a
penalty (for the offence)'.
15. 'Or again, if they think that they are themselves in fault, and
are suffering no more than they deserve; for justice, 'reciprocity', or
fair retaliation, excites no anger: and so they no longer think that the
treatment they receive is in violation of their natural rights, and this, as
we said, is essential to (or the notion of) anger'. r\v 'waswhen we said
it': that is, in the definition II 2.1. On Trpoo-ijuov, the appeal to nature
as the basis of obligation, see note on p.f/ npoa-^Kovros (on 11 2. 1 at the end).
'And therefore punishment should always be preceded by the (appropriate, ) explanation (of the nature of the offence and the justice of the
punishment); for even slaves are less vexed at being punished (when
treated in this way)'. This is Muretus' interpretation, against Victorius.
It is no doubt the natural and correct explanation. [' Decet verbis castigare, antequam puniamus.' Spengel.]
16. '(And men in anger are more easily pacified) if they think that
(those that they desire to punish) will never find out that the punishment
is due to them (that they are the authors of it) and that it is in compensation for their own injuries'; (this is the (paivofiiv^ oXiyapia of the defi-
40
PHTOPIKHS B 3 16.
yap Spyn rwu Ka& eicao-TOV eVrtjr SrjXov B' etc rov
opurfiov.
$16 opdws 7T67roiriTai

(bd<r6cu 'OSvo-o-ijct TrroKnropQiov,
a!? oy rerifxwpnfievos el fin fadero nal v(p' ov Kai
dvd' orov.
ware ovre TO7S aAAois oaoi fit) aiarBdvovrai opyityvrai,
ovre rote redvewcnv en, ws 7reTrovdoari re TO evyarov
K<XI OVK d\yno-ovo~iv ovo
aicdtitrofiivois, ov oi opyifyfievoi
icp'ievrai.
$LO ev
Trepl rov ''EKTOJOOS 6 7roit]Tn<s, Travarai fiovXofxevos rou
ea T^S Spy?]? Tedvecoros,
Kco(prjp yap drj <yaiav deiKiêi fj.eveai.vwv.
nition: see note on p. io,)' for anger is always directed against individuals,
(n 2. 2, infra 4. 31-, where this is made the characteristic of anger, as
opposed to hatred}) as appears from the definition'. This inference from
the definition is drawn from the (ftaivoitevrj rifiapla which is the object of
the angry man. If the punishment is to be such as can be actually seen,
the anger cannot be directed against abstractions like classes or kinds,
but must have a single, palpable, concrete, and also animated object;
something that can feel, and shew that it is hurt.
'And therefore (the trait of character, the representation, in) the verse'
(of Homer, Odys. IX 504) 'is right and true (to nature, rightly conceived
and expressed), " Tell him that it is Ulysses waster of cities (that blinded
him)"as though his revenge was not complete' (i. e. the revenge of
Ulysses, or of the character in Homer; which is the suppressed nomin.
to neireiTjTai, and with which Tert/iwpjjfjeVor agrees: lit. the character is
rightly represented in the verses as not fully avenged) 'unless the other
(the Cyclops) was aware by whom and for what' (the blindness was
inflicted).
T h e passage runs t h u s : KVK\O>\JA, a" mv TIS ere Kara8vr)Tav avBpocnrav
6<p6a\fiov e'lprjTai aeiKikirjU ahausTvv, (pdaffai 'O8vcr<rrja TiTo\nr6p6iov a\aa<rai, vioi/ Kaeprea, 'Waty %vi OIK" exovra. ' So that men are n o t
angry with all the rest (all besides those who are actually within reach),
who are out of sight (far away, for instance), nor any more with the dead'
(en, they do not retain their anger beyond the grave) 'as with those who
have endured the last extremity, and are no longer susceptible of pain,
nor indeed of any feeling, which (to give the other pain and to make him
feel) is what the angry man aims at. And therefore the poet (Homer,
Iliad, Q 54) has well said of Hector, wishing to represent Achilles as
ceasing from his anger against the dead (lit. wishing to put a stop to his
anger, i. e. represent it as ceasing): " For in truth it is but dumb (senseless) earth that he is outraging in his wrath."' Or rather, naiaai fiovUtievos means to suggest or assign a reason or motive for Achilles' ceasinofrom his anger: the words being those of Apollo, who is haranguing the
PHTOPIKHS B 3 17.
17
dfjAov ovv on
Tail's Karcnrpavveiv (3ovAo[j.evois en
TOVTWV TCOV TOTTWV \6KT0V,
ôvcri TOIOVTOVS,
4i
oh
CLVTOVS [A6V
' opylôvTat,
7Tapa(TKvd-
rj d)o/3epoi)s f\
Gods on the propriety of permitting Hector's body to be buried, and

concludes his speech very emphatically with this line.
iravo-ai |8oiAoftevos] These words, applied to the poet himself instead of
the character Apollo, represented in the poem, are an instance of a not
unfrequent confusion in expressions of this kind. It is the substitution
of the author himself for his personage or character; or the conversion of
the doctrine of a given philosopher or school into the philosopher or
school that holds it. Plat. Rep. II 363 D, rovs de dvoatovs.. .KaTopvTTovmv
iv "AiSou, ical KOGKIVCO vhu>p dvayKaov<rt <$>epeiv, of Musaeus and the Orphics,
who 'represent them as buried, and compelled to carry...' Theaet. 183 A,

Iva fxfi (rrrjo-aniev avrovs TW \6y<o, the Heracliteans to wit, 'that we may
not represent them as stopping'contrary to their doctrine of the universal flux. Similarly the Eleatics, Ib. 157 A, are called 01 ta-Tavres, 'the
stationers', meaning those who represent every thing as stationary or at
rest. So Soph. 252 A, the opposition school, of Heraclitus, receives the
name of ol peovres, 'the fluent philosophers', 'the flowing gentry', instead
of their theory: and compare Theaet. 181 A, TWV ra dKivrjTa KIVOVVTUV.
A good example is Thuc. I 5) oi 7raAcuoi TO>V iroirjT&v ras Trvtrreis TW Karan\f6vTav...iparavTes el Xr/aral elariv, making their characters put these
questions. Arist. Ran. 15, if the vulg. be retained (Meineke omits it),
Ib. 833, irepaTiveTO, 911 (Aeschylus), Trptoriara fj.tv yap epa TIV av Kaffitrev
(introduced in a sitting position) iyKaKv^ras. In Aristotle it is still more
common: de Gen. Anim. 722 b 19, Kadairep 'Efi7reSo(tX^s yevva. Metaph.
A 8, 989 b 34, 01 Hv6ay6peioi...yevva><ri TOV ovpavov, de Anima I 2, 405 a 25,
KCU 'Hpdickei.Tos...eg ijy raWa (rvvia-rrjcnv, 'of which he represents, holds
theoretically, everything else to be composed'. Ib. 404 16 and 24, (certain
philosophers) rr)v ^rvxrjv crvviaraaiv. De Gen. et Corr. I I, 3 ! 4 a 9> otroi
iravra e Ivbs yevvaxnv, and b I, Tois it; ivos TTavra KaTa<TKevaov(riv. De
part. Anim. I 1. 21, 640 b 11, oirais TOV KOO-^LOV ytvvainv, and 22, 640 b 17,
K T&V TQLOVTOiV O'tOJLtdro)!' tJVVKTTUai T^V <pV<TlV TTCLVTeS. S e e D r L i g h t f o O t ' s
notes on Ep. ad Gal. vi 13, 01 T!fpiTe\x,v6^voi, 'the Circumcisionists', the

advocates of Circumcision. Similarly in Latin, Juven. VII 151, quum
perimit saevos classis numerosa tyrannos. Hor. Sat. 11 5. 41, Furius
hibernas cana nive conspuet Alpes.
17. ' I t is plain therefore that those who want to soothe a man
down (bring him down to a placid state from the exaltation of his passion) must derive their propositions (or the traits of character) from these
topics, presenting themselves in such a lightassuming such a character
themselves(as is represented in the foregoing analysis), and the objects
of their anger as either formidable, or worthy of high respect, or benefactors, or involuntary agents, or as excessively afflicted at what they
have done', ala-xvvi) here is the feeling of reverence or awe which is
felt in the presence of any one who is entitled to unusual respect or admiration (see note on c. 2. 22); and ala-x""^ a&ovs is equivalent to TOIOVTOVS
Trpos ovs ala-xvvetrdat Sei: and virepaXyovvras is the representative of
the iierapeXoixevot of 5.
42
PHT0PIKH2 B 3 17; 4 h 2.
atovs rj tcexapio-fxevovz n aKOvras n (nrepaX-
rivets $e (piXoucri KCII purovtri, icai $ia ri, TIJJ/CHAP. IV.

2 (piXlav teal TO (piXeiv 6pi<rdfxevoi Xeywfxev. 'io~T(a &}
TO (piXeiv TO fiovXeo-dal TCVL a oierai dyadd, eiceivov
x
I have already hinted a doubt in the notes on the preceding chapter

whether irpaorrfs is properly ranked amongst the jraftj. I think that it can
be made plainly to appear that it is not. It is introduced no doubt for
the purpose of giving the opposite side to the topics of anger, because
the student of Rhetoric is in every case required to be acquainted with
both sides of a question. And this purpose it may answer very well
without being a real opposite of opyij or indeed a TTCLBOS at all. If we
compare irpamrfs with the other naOrj analysed in this second book, we
find that it differs from all of them in this respectthat the rest are
emotions, instinctive and active, and tend to some positive result;
whereas Trpaorrjs is inactive and leads to nothing but the allaying, subduing, lowering, of the angry passion, which it reduces to a particular state,
the right or mean state of temper. It seems plain therefore that it is
in reality, what it is stated to be in the Ethics, a egis, not a wados, of the
temper; an acquired and settled state of one of the iradrj, viz. opyy, in the
mean state (or due measure) of which (the iradrj) all virtue resides. It is
accordingly represented in the Ethics as a virtue, the mean between
irascibility and insensibility, the due measure of the passionate element or
emotion of our nature; and as a virtue it is the control or regulation of
our temper. The true irados is the opyy, the instinctive capacity of angry
feeling, which may be cultivated by habit and education and developed in
either direction, for good or evil; till it becomes SpyiXorris irascibility, or
dopyr/a-ia insensibilityif it take a wrong directionor else settles into
the mean state of a calm and placid temper. And this is the view that
is taken of it in Nic. Eth. IV 11, init. Trpaarrjs is pe<rarr)s irepl opyds; Ib.
1125 630, TO nev yap Trados iariv opyij; line 34, fiovXerai yap 6 npaos
arapaxos elvai Kd\ /Mr/ ayecrdai viro roil iraBovs, oilOC as av 6 Xoyoj Tag ouroo
K01 eVi TOVTOIS /cm erri TOGOVTOV xpovov xaXe7r<u'j/en>. This is doubtless the
correct view; arid the other, though no doubt subsequent to that of the
Ethics, is adopted in the Rhetoric merely for convenience, philosophical
accuracy not being required. Compare the introductory note to this
Chapter.
CHAPTER IV.
1. 'Let us now proceed, after having first defined love and loving, to
analyse its objects, motives or occasions1.
2. eara>] as usual, in the popular Rhetoric. See note on 1 5. 8, &c.
' Let love then be assumed to be, the wishing to another whatever we
think good, for his sake, not for our own, and the inclination to do such
things (to do him good) to the utmost of our power'. Eth. Nic. v i n 3,
sub init. 01 8e (ptXoivres dAXrJXous fiovXovrai. rdyada dXXifXots TCLVTB j; fpikov-
aiv. This makes the nearest approach to a regular definition of cf>i\la in

the Ethics, and is constantly recognised as the principle of love through-
PHT0PIKH2 B 4 2, 3-
43
eveica. dXXa fj.i] avTOu, KCCI TO KctTa. huva/div TrpaKTiKov

eivai TOVTWV.
(piXos cT io~Tiv 6 (piXwv Kal dvTKpiXov- P. 1381.
oiovTai he (piXoi eivai 01 OVTWS eêiv oiofjievoi
dXXr{Xov<s. TOVTCOV Be vTTOKeifxevwv dvdyKr] (piXov
eivai TOV (rvvtihofxevov TOIS dyadois Kal (rvvaXyovvTa
Ai/7r^pois fxri did TI eTepov dXXa hi eKelvov. ryiry<ydp vov flovXovTai âipovai 7rctWes, TWV
evavTiwv he XvirovvTai, wcrre TJ/S /3oi/\jVews (rri/uelov p. 62.
out the treatise on <pi\la, in Books vni and IX. It represents the desire
or the inclination of doing good to the object of your affection, which
is naturally, or has become by habit, instinctive, and therefore a naOosIn both definitions f$ov\eo-8ai is prominent and characteristic. Love is a
feeling, a sort of appetite, the wish to do good ; the power and the means
of doing good being alike accidental and non-essential, though it is true
(which is here added to the definition) that the inclination is always
present, and will be gratified when the means are forthcoming. The
words inelvov eveKadXka fifj avrov express the unselfishness, the disinterested
character, of the emotion, o Si fHovkofievos TIV evirpaytiv eXjri'Sa eêov
eviropias 81 iiteivov, OVK. toiK tvvovs tKciVa) (wai, aXKa fiaWov iavra, KaBawep
ov'Se tpiKos, el Bcpanevd avrov Sid riva XP*1&IV (Eth. Nic. XX 5 sub fin.).
Cicero, de Nat. Deor. 1 ult. (quoted by Schrader), has the same remark.
He adds, 'Prata et arva et pecudum greges diliguntur isto modo quod
fructus ex iis capiuntur. Hominum caritas et amicitia gratuita est.'
'And a friend is one that loves, and is beloved in return. And those
that have this disposition, or entertain this feeling to one another'.
evvoiav yap iv dvTinerrovdotri (piXlav flvai.
E t h . N. VIII 2, 1155 ^ 34-
3. 'From this assumption the necessary consequence is that a

friend is one who sympathizes with us in our joys and sorrows, rejoicing
at the good that befals us, and grieved at that which gives us pain, not
with any ulterior motive; but solely on our friend's account. For all
feel joy in obtaining the object of their wishes, and pain at the reverse, so
that the pleasures and pains that they feel are an indication of the nature
of their wish'. The pleasure or pain felt on the occasion of a friend's
good or bad fortune is the test of the nature of their wishes, and therefore
of their friendship or hatred. And also, as every one feels pleasure at
his own success and pain at disappointment, so by the rule <pi\os
aXkos avros, erepos avros, 'a friend is a second self, (Eth. N. ix 4, 1166
a 31, 9, sub init. et 1170 b 6), the test of friendship is this community of
pleasure and pain between friend and friend. Idem velle atque idem
nolle ea demum firma amicitia est, says Sallust. This same principle of
'fellow-feeling' as the basis of friendship (which is here principally in
question) runs through the following sections to 7. Zeno, the
Stoic, epa>Tr)6eh, r'l t o r i (piXos; aXkos, t<pr], iy<o. Diog. Laert. VII I,
(Zeno) 23. 1
1
The reverse of the medal is presented by the cynical La Rochefoucauld,
Maxime 81, " A'ous ne pouvons run aimer que far rapport a nous, et nous m
44
PHT0PIKH2 B 4 4, 5.
4 c Xv7rai Kai al t)ovai. Kai ots &/71 Tavra

dyada
KaKa, Kai 01 TO?S avroh (piXoi, Kai ol TOI<S avroTs
ixdpol" TctvTa yap TOVTOLS fiovXecrdai dvayKY], wcrre
a -wep avTu> Kai aXXco fiovXoiuewz, TOVTCO (paiverai
c (plXos elvai. Kai TOI)S 7re7roir}i<6Tas ev <piXov<riv, r\
avrous fj wv Krjhovrar fj el jueydXa, fj el 7rpo6vfxu)s, tj
4. 'And those who have now (by this time, ij&ri) learnt to regard the
same things as good and bad (to each)', ' id est, qui eandem fortunam
subiere, et in eum statum ac conditipnem vitae venere, ut quod aliis
molestum sit ipsis quoque incommodet, et quod alios iuvet eodem pacto
ipsos sublevet' (Victorius); 'and those who have the same friends and
the same enemies ; for between such there must needs be a community
of wishes, (good to the common friend, harm to the common enemy,) and
therefore, by wishing for another the same things that he desires for
himself, a man plainly shews that he is that man's friend'. See the illustrations from the Eth. N. quoted in the preceding note. For Ka\ ols 817
(Ac and Bekker), Q, Yb and Zb have rjdri, which is the reading of Victorius,
and is supported by Vater. The latter notes (as I had myself observed)
that 817 'you know', 'to be sure', to attract attention, is not at all in
Aristotle's manner (it is Platonic, not Aristotelian) in a mere enumeration
like this. I doubt if there is another instance of it in the Rhetoric.
ijdr] on the contrary, which Victorius has represented in his explanation,
is quite in point, and in fact adds something to the sense.
5. 'And men love their benefactors in general, (those who have done
good) either to themselves or to those whom they care for; or those who
have done them great and important services, or have shewn forwardness ;
readiness, in doing them; or if they were done on similar, i.e. great,
occasions (when the need was urgent, or the benefit signal), and for their
sakes alone; or those whom they suppose to wish to do them good':
the manifest inclination, TO Kara dvva/juv npaKTiKov elvai rovrav, 2, being,
as a test of friendship, equivalent to the actual performance. For f) ovs

av, Muretus, Wolf, and Brandis' Anonymus (in Schneidewin's Philologus IV. i. p. 46) read Kai ovs, as the commencement of a new topic.
faisons que suivre notre gout et notre plaisir quand nous prefirons nos amis nousmimes; c'esl neanmoins par cette preference seule que Vamitie peut etre vraie et
parfaite," and 83, " Ce que les homtnes ont nomme amitil n'est qu'une societe, qu'un
management reciproque d'interits, et qu'un echange de ions offices; ce n'est enfin
qu'un commerce oil Vamour propre se pi'opose toujours quelque chose a gagner."
The author of the Leviathan takes an equally low view of human nature, and
derives from self-love, in some form or other, all our emotions and desires. They
are all reducible to ' appetite' or 'desire'. " T h a t which men desire they are also
said to love: and to hate those things for which they have aversion. So that
desire and love are the same thing; save that by desire we always signify the
absence of the object; by love most commonly the presence of the same." Hobbes,
Leviathan, Pt. I. ch. 6. For a philosophical analysis of the ' Tender Emotion,'
its origin and varieties, see Bain, Emotions and Will, Ch. VI [Ch. vil, ed. 1875].
PHT0PIKH2 B 4 68,
45
ei ev TOIOVTOIS Kaipols, Kai avrcov eVe/ca* rj oi/s av

6 oicovTai fiovXecrdai iroie'iv ev. Kai TOI)S TWV (biXtov
(piAovs Kat (f)i\ovvTas ovs avroi (piAovcriv. Kai TOV<S
7 (piAov/xevovs V7ro TWV (piAovfjLevwv eavTofc.
Kai TOVS
TOZS avToTs i^dpous Kai /nia-ovvTas oi/s avToi fxicrov(nv,
Kai TOVS fMo-ovfiAevovs vwo TWV avTois
iracri yap TOVTOIS TavTa dyadd (paiveTai elvai Kai
eavToTs, WCTTS fiovXecrdai Ta ai/rots dyadd, 6 7rep r\v
8 TOV <pi\ou. eTi TOI)S evTTOir]TiKOV<s els y^pr\\xaTa Kai
roiotirots] 'such as, similar t o ' the before-mentioned, i.e. peyaKois.
With this use of TOWVTOS comp. PI. Phaedo 59 A, 67 A, 79 c, 80 c, iav ns
XapUvras txav TO a-aipa KOX iv Toiavrj] mpa, 'at a similar period of life', like
the preceding, i.e. xapie'crcn;. (See Stallbaum's note.) Thuc. Ill 58, liava-avlas
tBoTtTev avrovs von'âv iv yjj re (piklq Tidivcu Kai rrap' dvhpacn TOIOVTOIS ' a n d
amongst men of the same sort', i.e. (piXlois. Demosth. de F. Leg. 103,
Kai Tovvavriov opyr)v, av roiavra (palvrjrai ire77Oir;Kcos, SC. opyfjs tiia. Arist.
Pol. I 8, 1256 a 36, ot S' d<p' ahietas, ocrot \lfivas Kai e\r] Kai nora/iovs rj
BakdTTav Toiavrrjv TvpoaotKova-iv, 'who live by a sea of the same kind', i.e.
of the same kind as the before-mentioned lakes, marshes, rivers, in
which fish are to be found. Ib. II 4, 1262 b I, rJTrov yap'darrai<pi\ia
del de TOIOVTOVS elvai rois dpxonevovs, sc. TJTTOV (piXovs. Ib. VIII (v) 10,
1310 b 12, rj Kaff vwepo)(r)v TOIOV'TOV yerous 'a similar family', to the
preceding.
6. 'And friends' friends, that is (Kai) the friends of those whom we
love ourselves. And those who are beloved by those that are beloved
by ourselves'. If friendship is mutual, surely this is a 'vain repetition'.
7. 'And those who have the same enemies, or hate the same people
that we ourselves hate, and those that are hated by the same people as
we are hated by: for all such persons suppose the same things to be
good as we do ourselves, and therefore they wish the same things as
we do; which was the definition of a friend'. 2, fiovkecrOai rivi a. o'lerai
dyada. These common hatreds, founded on the principle of idem velle
atque idem nolle, and expressed in the proverb KOIVO. ra <pi\a>v, are one
of the strongest bonds of union by which religious and political parties,
for example, are held together. On KOIVO. TO (piXcov, see Plat. Legg. v
10, 739 C, a passage worth comparing on this subject of 'communism':
Rep. IV 424 A, v 449 C, Arist. Eth. Nic. VIII n sub init. and the entire
chapter, on this t o p i c ; Ka\ f/ Trapoi/Jiia "Koiva ra <pi\av" opBws, iv Koivavia
yap 7} (j>i\ia, 1159 b 32. And on the same, IX 8, 1168 b 6, Kai al napoi/iiai
de ixaaai ofioyvafiovovcnv,
"IO-6TT]S (piXoTrjs" Kai "yovv
olov TO "fJ-ia yjsvx'l" Kai "KOIVU TO. <pi\oiv" xai

Kvrjfirjs eyyiov" K.TX
TOV (pikov] Anglice, 'a friend'; on the generic use of the Greek
definite article see note on 31 of this Chapter.
8. 'Again, those who are capable of and inclined to' (both of which are
contained in the termination -IKOS) 'doservice to others in the way of assist-
46
PHTOPIKHS B 4 9. ">
eis o-wrtipiau- Bio TOI)S iAevdepiovs KCCI TOUS d

n/uLwari Kal TOUS diicalovs. TOIOVTOVS h' vTroXafipavovari TOVS /urj d(p' STepwv <wi/Tas' TOIOVTOI O 01 airo
TOV ipydê<rdai, Kal rovrwv 01 OLTTO yea) py las KUL TWV
aWwv 01 avTOUpyoi /uLaXurTa. Kal TOI)S arwcppovas,
OTL OVK aSiKOi. Kal TOI)S dwpdyfxovas
Zia TO avro.
ance, either pecuniary, or tending to their personal safety : and this is why
the liberal, and brave, and just are held in honour'. The liberal aid them
with money; the brave defend them from personal injury (tit o-arrjpiav);
and the just are always ready at least to pay their debts, and if they
don't do them any positive service, at any rate can be depended upon to
abstain from fraud and wrong. This is the utilitarian view of virtue,
which we have had already very prominently brought forward in I 9 ; see
for instance 4, 6. Comp. I 6.6.
9. The connexion between this topic and the preceding is thus
given by Victorius. 'The truly just are not easy to recognise, and we
are apt to be deceived by the outside show and to mistake unreal
for real justice. Consequently, in default of better evidence of justice in
men, they assume (inoXap-Pdvova-iv) those to be just who mind their own
business, and live upon their own resources or labour, and do not
prey upon others, /a) d<f>' irepnv C&vras. Such are those who work for
their bread, and amongst these especially, those who live upon (from the
produce of) agriculture; and of all the rest1 (or else), those most of all
who labour with their own hands'.
01 cnro yeapylas avTovpyol] See note on I 12.25- Hesych. avrovpyos,
6 St' iavrov ipyaôjievos. In the Oeconomics, attributed to Aristotle, I 2,
1343 a 25, agriculture is described as the first (in the natural order),
and the greatest and most virtuous of all employments, KTrjvews Se
npcorrj cVi/itXeta i) Kara (pvcrW Kara <pv<riv 8e J; yeapyucq Trporepa, Kal
bevrtpai o(rai dwo rijj yi)s, olov /ieraXKevTiK^ Kal ei Tit aXkt] Toiavrr). y 8e
yeapyiKTj /laKia-Ta on BiKala' ov yap air avBpamov ovff eKovrav, worirep
KanrjXeia Kal ai purdapviKai, OVT aKovrav aairep al 7roXejiiiicai. This ex-
plains the p.fj dcp' iTtpcov faivrar of the text. Agriculturalists do not
make their profit of men, but of the land which they cultivate.
10. 'And the temperate' (those who exercise self control), ' because
they are not inclined to wrong'. Being temperate, and their passions
under strict control, they are not tempted by any licentious and illregulated desires to gratify these by wrong doing. The import and
extent of the virtue of croxppoo-vvri are best set forth by Plato in the Gorgias.
It is the principle of order and moderation in the human composition,
and is hardly distinguishable from the conception of 8iKatoa~vvri, the
virtue that regulates the entire human machine, in the Republic.
1
This redundant oXXos with the superlativethe superfluous union of the comparative with the superlativemay be illustrated here by two parallel examples
from Shakespeare. Mids. Night's Dream, v. 1. 250, This is the greatest error oj
all the rest. Macbeth, v. 8. 4, Of all men else I have avoided thee.
PHTOPIKH2 B 4 i i , i 2 .
47
11 Kai oh (3ov\6[ieda <pi\oi elvai, edv (paivcovrai

fxevor elcri Be
TOIOVTOI
O'I T
dyadoi
(3ov\6-
tear dperrjv teal
ol evdoKipoi rj iu aitaa-iu r\ iu TOTS /36A,TJVTOJS rj iv
Tots davfxafyfxevois v<p'

12 auTOi/s.
pevo-ai-
6Ti
TOVS
TOIOVTOI
CIVTWU r\
iu
TOTS
r\êi<s (rvuîayayeTu
& ol
6avfj.atyvcnu
teal <rvvîrifxe-
evi<oXoi /ecu /urj
Dr Whewell in his Transl. of the Gorgias thinks that the character

assigned to it by Plato is best expressed by the term 'self-control'.
'And those who abstain from business', lead an easy quiet life, and
don't meddle with other people's business, 'for the same reason'.
dnpayjiav is opposed to Tro\vTvpayji.a>v, a meddler, or busy-body.
11. 'And those we should (otherwise, on general considerations) like to
be friends, provided they manifest the same inclinationmake it clear'
(<f>alvaivTai emphatic,) ' that they wish it (on their side); and such are the
good in respect of moral virtue', (men may he good or excel in other things,
as thefiorivayadbs MeveXaos excellent in shouting, and wig ayaBos IIoXu~hevKr)s in boxing); ' and men who are held in repute, either by every one,
or by the best, or by those whom we ourselves admire and respect, or
by those who respect and admire us'. If we read iv oh dav/uiôvenv OVTOVS
(Bekker retains TO'IS) with Ac, Q, Yb, Z , which Spengel adopts, these
four last particulars will be all neuters. 'And those who are distinguished,
either in every thing ('admirable Crichtons'), or in the best things
(qualities, pursuits, studies, accomplishments, or rank, wealth, power,
according to taste), or in things which we ourselves respect and admire,
or in those things which they admire in us {lit. in those things in which
they admire us)'.
12. 'And further, those who are pleasant to pass our life, or spend
the day, with; such are men who are good-tempered and cheerful', (ei?KoXor
contrasted with 8V<TKO\OS, transferred from good and bad digestion KOKOV,
to the temper and character; Arist. Ran. 82, of the good-tempered, genial
Sophocles),' and not inclined to find fault with any accidental error or mistake (not critical and censorious), and not quarrelsome, or contentious : for
all such are combative, pugnacious ; and people that contend with one (in
word or act, by contradiction, or interference with and opposition to our
tastes and wishes) appear to have wishes contrary to ours'and as to have
the same wishes is characteristic of friendship, 4, it is plain that people of
this sort cannot be our friends. Comp. Eth. Nic. v i a 6, 1157 b 15, ou'8els
hi hvvarai irvPTjuepevdv T> \virrjpa ovSe r<S pfj iJSfl.
T h e s e two words a r e
joined together again in Eth. Nic. VIII 6, 1157 b 21, Ib. c. 15, 1162
b id,, 16.
a-vvSiayayelv, trvvSirmepevo-ai] This form of verb, principally with the
prepositions iv and avvalso in two or three cases with emwhich
assumes for its explanation the dative of the indefinite pronoun, avra or
avrfi, avrols or avrdis, as the case may be, (the repetition of some substantive immediately preceding in which the person or thing resides,
or with which it is associated,) as understood after the preposition,
is expressed in our idiom by adding the preposition at the end
48
PHT0PIKH2 B 4 12, 13.
TWV afxapTavofJiivcov Kal fxn <pi\6veucoi fxnê $V(repioes'

7rdvTe<i yap 01 TOIOVTOI fxa^nTi-KOL, 01 $e fxaxofxepoi
13 rdvavria (palvovrai (3ov\e<rdai.
Kixi oi eiridegioi KCCI
of the phrase. Thus, the two verbs here in question are represented
in English by 'to pass one's life with', 'to spend the day with',
the phrase at full length being, TOVS i?8ei wore nva crvvbiayayelv avrois,
avTois being the persons previously mentioned. Porson, Advers. p. 265,
has referred to notes of various Commentators, who have illustrated this
idiom, and Elmsley has supplied four examples, on Eur. Bacch. 508,
cvbv<rrvxyo-ai. rovvop! eWijScior el Add the following, Soph. Oed. Col. 790,
X&ovos \axuv Toaovrov, evQave'iv fidvov, 'earth enough to die in'. Phoen.
727, ivbv<mixn<Tp6vrjs Kvi(pas (comp. Shaksp. Lear, III 4. 116,
a naughty night to swim in), Ib. Erecth. Fragm. x x v 22 (Dind.) Ijdrj,
Xafiwpa <rvyye\qv fiovov. Arist. Nub. 422, e7TLxa\êveiv Ttrapixoiji av, ' I
would lend myself to be forged on' (irapexlP "" supply e/iavTov, as Aj.
H46, irare'iv rrapelê T<5 Otkovn vavTiKtav, 'lent himself to be trodden on');
Id. Equit. 616, aiov ye TTCKTIV eVoXoXvât,' to shout at', Pac. 1127, ap. Elms.
Thuc. i n 23, ov fiefiaws mare eneXBeiv, 'ice, not firm, unsafe, to tread on'.
And the false antithesis in II 44, nal ols euevbaiiiovrjaai re o /3i'py cfiolas Kal
evreXevTrjcrai ^vvep.eTpr)8r). II 74j yrjv...evfievrj evayavltraaBai Tois"E\\rjcrLU ' a
land propitious for the Greeks to fight in'. I 2, Saov dirorjv, 'enough to
live off' or 'on'. Xenoph. Symp. II 18, o'Urjjia evLSpacrai, Ib. Ill 8, {yijv)
iKavas yevoiro iyKovitraa-dai.
Memor. Ill 8. 8 (OIKLO) ijbla-rr] ivbiairaaBai.
Plat. Polit. 302 B (woKtTeia) ^Kio-ra xaXeiri) vvQv, ' by no means hard to live
with'. I b . E, fiapvTa.Tr] i-vvoiKJitrat,. Phaedr. 228 E, epavrov croi efi/ieXerav
Trapex^v. Phaedo 84 A, wapaSibovai iavTr)v (TTJV \jfvxr)v) irakiv av ey/caTaSetv.
Herod. VII 59, 6 x^pos eVir^8eos ei/diaragai re Kal evapid/irjcrcu. Comp. VI
102, ix 7, quoted by Elmsley. Arist. Pol. IV (vn) 12, 1331 b 12, ayopa
ft/<rxo\aeiv 'a market-place to lounge in'. Lucian, Ver. Hist. 131, Uavbv
/j.vptav8pa> iroXei ivoineiv. Aelian, Hist. Anim. VI 42, ori/3aSa cyKadevSeiv.
Dem. de Cor. 198, ra Tav'EXKijvwv drvxr/liara ivevboKiixelu antKeiro. ey<aTakeiireiv,passim. Matth. Gr. Gr. 533, obs. 2.
13. Ka\ ol eViSeîot] Arist. has changed his construction trom tne
accus. to the nomin., from the objects to the subjects of liking{ox love is
here out of the question: these are men who are popular and agreeable in
society. We may supply (piKovvTai, or pa8ia>s (plXoi yiyvovrai. 'And those
who are dexterous at replying and submitting to raillerywho can take,
as well as give, a joke, gibe' (for here again there is community of
sentiment, another instance of fellow-feeling ravro <palveTcu dyaSov, the
foundation of friendship) 'for the mind of each party is set upon (their
efforts are directed to, anev8ov<n) the same thing (mutual amusement, a
friendly reciprocity in amusing each other) as (that of) his neighbour,
(the opposite in the 'wit-combat' or jesting-match), and each of them is
equally capable of taking a joke, and returning the taunt, but neatly,
gracefully, with propriety'.
iniSt^ws is one of those adjectives compounded with em, in which
the preposition expresses either the tendency or inclination (lit. direction),
or the liability to anything, which is defined in the second part of the
PHTOPIKHS B 4 13.
Twdaaai nai vTrofxeivav eW
TCWTO
49
yap d/uKporepoi
compound, imdeîos is a man that has a tendency to the use of his right
hand, the sign of skill and dexterity; the right and left hand being
severally the symbols of dexterity or cleverness and awkwardness; dexter,
laevusj 8eios, 8fftorj/s, a-naios, apurrepoi; gauche.
Another secondary notion, propitious and unpropitious, belonging to
these terms, is derived from the observations of augury, according as
the omens appear on the right or left hand: but in Latin, at all events,
the notion of 'awkwardness' conveyed by laevus, and the opposite by
dexter, cannot have been suggested by this, because in their practice
omens on the left, laeva, sinistra, were favoicrable.
imbil-uts is therefore one who has a tendency to OE ion;r, and follows
the analogy of imKivSwos, iniddvaros (liable to danger and death), inaiTios, inibiKOs, iit'iKaipos or iiriKaipios, iuCKrj<Tpa>v, emffifuos, irrifioprpos, iirl\vwos, inivotros, eniKkoiros, cVt/xeXt;;, eVi'/taôi, iiravayKrjs, imeiKijs, iniboôs
(' one who is expected to'... liable to that expectation, Isocr. Areop. 48).
i/Vo in comp. has very nearly the same signification, derived from the
'subjection' which it implies. So virtiBwos (subject or liable to a scrutiny),
vwohiKos, vwoKoyos (amenable to an account, accountable, responsible), by
metaphor from the analogy of VTTOO-IUOS 'under the shade of, viroa-pos,
Arist. de Anima, II 9, 421 b 11.
inroerreyos, viraidpms, vrrofiftpos, vrro<fiopos,
Ta>6aeiv is a variety of uKwirTtiv, to gird at, mock, jeer at, some one in
particular; both of them (as well as others of the same class) being distinguished from other forms of wit or pleasantry by their personal direction, or personality. The word occurs in Plato and Aristophanes, Vesp.
1362 and 136S, and once in Herodotus [il 60]. It is plain from the application of it, for instance in the passages of Aristophanes, that its special
meaning is what we now call ' chaffing' or 'poking fun at', the repartees, or
witticisms, mostly of a highly personal character, which pass between the
combatants in what is also nowadays called 'a slanging match'. This is
confirmed by the use of the word in Arist. Pol. iv (vu) 17, 1336^ 17. The
author is there condemning the practice of al<rxpo\oyia, ' indecent language', which should not be tolerated in a model state. An exception
however is made in favour of certain seasons of especial licence, as at
the Eleusinian mysteries, and the orgies of particular deities to whose
worship this raBaa-p-os 'licentious raillery' was appropriate, and permitted
by law, 011 KCU TOV Ta>6a<rfi.bv cnro8lda>a-iv 6 vd/j.os' such were Dionysus
during the celebration of the Bacchanalia, Aphrodite, Priapus, Hermaphroditus, llythia, and others ; see Schneider ad !oc. Comp. Addenda
p. 509, and Eaton.
All this is abundantly illustrated in the Chorus of the Ranae, 316
430. It is descriptive of the wild license that prevailed, and of the
indecent language of the raiBaa-jios that was then allowedsee particularly the application of the radao-fios, in the shape of indecent personalities, 416430; and the TaOcurpos is there represented by various phrases
indicative of its character, rau aKok-aurov (j)i\aTrmyp.ova ripav, 334; ^cop.o\6ôir 7recri, ' s c u r r i l o u s ' phrases, 358; KarTia-KanrTav xai iralfav KCU xXeuafox',
375 ; ira'uravTa Kai o-Ka-âvra; and finally (as already mentioned) by the
AR. II.
50
PHT0PIKH2 B 4 14, 15-
(nrevdov(n TCO rr\ri<riov, Suvd/nevol Te <TKtoirTe(rQai Kai

14 efxfiekws (TKtoTrTOVTes. Kai rovs eTraivovvTas rd virdp%ovTa dyaOd, Kai TOUTIOU juaAto"ra a (pofiovvrai fxrj
15 virdpêiv ai/Tots. Kai TOI)S Kadapiovs irepl byjsiv, irepl
specimen given at the end. Comp. Vesp. 1362, Iv avrbv Tadaa-a veaviK&s
otois noff OVTOS tpc npo rav nvcrTijpiav. This license of language, allowed
during the celebration of the Eleusinian mysteries, reached its height at
the bridge over the Cephissus, which was crossed and recrossed by the
initiated on their way to and from Eleusis; where they were doubtless
also awaited by a very numerous mob quite ready to take part in the fun.
Hence yt(pvp[eiv and yeûptcr/ior, e aixafyfs Xe'yeii/. Bentl. Phal. I p. 335,
Monk's Ed. [p. 307, ed. Wagner]. See on this also Mttller, Hist, of Gk.
Lit. c. XI 5, p. 132, Engl. Tr.
A similar license of language and conduct was permitted at the
Roman Saturnalia, 'the slaves' holiday': and was also illustrated by the
Fescennina, or Fescennine verses (Liv. VII 2), in which the countryfolk
(and afterwards the townsfolk) assailed and ridiculed one another in
extemporaneous verses. Fescennina per hunc inventa licentia inoreni,
versibus alternis opprobria rustica/WzY, Hor. Ep. II 1. 145 ; procax Fescennina locutio, Catull. 61. 124 ; Victorius ad Arist. Pol. IV (vil) 17, u. s.
quotes Athenaeus, XIV 622 E, of the <pa\\o(f>6poi., elra TrpocrTpixovTes '"
8aov oils npoeXowTO.
14. ' We like also those that praise our virtues and accomplishments (the goods we have, and those in particular of which the possession is doubtful (which we are afraid we do not possess)'. Praise is the
test of virtue, (1 9, and Introd. Appendix B, p. 212,) and the acknowledgment of others that we do actually possess the excellences of which we
are ourselves in doubt. This confirmation of our hesitating opinion as
to our own merits must of course be gratifying, and we accordingly like
those that praise us.
15. 'Cleanliness and neatness in the face and general appearance,
and in the dress, and in fact (as it is exhibited) in the whole life'; in a
man's habits, and all that he does in his daily life. "Cleanliness" is
said to be "next to Godliness"; and there is no doubt that neat and
cleanly habits and appearance in person and dress, some of which also
heighten personal attractions, are prepossessing, and apt to inspire a
liking for a man. We (English) also apply the same terms to the build
or frame of the body of men and animalsto denote the absence of all
impurity and imperfection, the superfluities, excrescences, deformities,
which, like the dirt that overlies and disguises and deforms the true surface underneath, mar the symmetry and harmonious proportions of the
body'clean built', 'clean made', 'neatly built and made'. This form
of' cleanness' is also prepossessing, and an element of comeliness, which
tends to liking. It is the apta compositio membrorum quae movet oculos,
et delectat hoc ipso, &c. Cic. de Off. 1 28. And besides this, cleanliness
of person and neatness in dress, implying a regard for personal appearance, imply also thereby attention to and regard for the opinion o
PHTOPIKHS B 4 16,17.
16 dîTrexovrjv, Trepi o\ov
TOP
fi'iov.
Kctl
51
fxrj ovei-
TOI)S
P.
1381
terras fxr\re TWV d/uapTri/JidTCtiv /uriTe TWV evepyerrj- p. 5j.

17 /xaTdJi/1 dfx(poTpoi <ydp ekeyKTiKoi.
nat
TOI)S
/mr) fjivti-
criKctKous, fxrihe (pvXctKTHcovs TWV eyKXrifxdTwv,

s' o'/ofs yap
dW
dp vTroXafjifidvcocriv eivai
otherswhereas a solitary or savage would never think it worth while

and thus establish a sort of claim upon our regard. The excess of this
attention to the person, shewn in the coxcomb and the jietit maitre, is a
sign of egotism and vanity, and consequently displeasing.
Kadapios is Lat. mundus. Of personal appearance, nadaptos OKOXOVQia-Kot, ' a neat little footboy', Posidon. ap. Ath. XII 550 A; r\ o-Kevama
KaSapios, Menand. Fr. Phasm. ap. Meineke, Fr. Comm. Cr. IV 218, ' d e
coquorum artibus dicens', Meineke ad loc, 'neatness and cleanliness in
dressing and serying a dinner'. In two Fragments of Eubulus,Tirdm,
Fr. 1, (Meineke, u. s. 111 258,) and Ephippus, Obeliaph. Fr. I (Meineke
u. s., i n 334), in both of which the same verse is found, ^7 Ti-oXuTcXcor,
d\Xa
Kadapeias on av T-J, otrlas evtKa,Kadapdas (another form of KaSaplas)
is applied to cleanliness in a religious sense. The subject is the purchase of fish. The same opposition of Ka8apicos and no\vre\ms occurs
again in Nicostr. Antyll. Fragm. 3 (Meineke, i n 280) where Meineke
notes, " His locis KaOapelas fere munditiae cum frugalitate coniunctae
notionem habet, ut apud Strabonem ill p. 154 a, icadapiats Kal Xtras." In
Athen. i n 74 D (ap. Liddell and Scott), KaOapeios plos has the sense of ' a
frugal life', opposed to TroXtrreAi;?, as in the Comic Fragments, and in
Diod. v 33 (ap. eosdem), Kadapws rfj Sialra. Xenoph. Memor. II 1. 22, of
virtue, in Prodicus' apologue, KtKOtrjirffieviqv TO pkv tr<5/ia KaBnptorrjTi (to
make her attractive) ra 8' omiara alhoi. Herod, n 37 of the Egyptian
practice of circumcision 'for cleanliness' sake', KaOapioTrjros ciV/cc Such
are the examples of this attractive KaOapiorrfs, in habits of life, manners,
dress and personal appearance, as they appear in the ordinary language
,and in common life.
16. 'And we like those who are not inclined to reproach us either
for trifling faults and errors, or for the benefits (they have conferred on
us); for both of these are censorious, (faultfinders).'
17. 'And those who don't bear malice' (this is one of the characteristics of the fieyaXoiffVxos, E t h . N i c . IV 9, 1125 a 2, ovde fivrjo-iKaKOS' ov yap
fieyaXoilfvxov T îxvlr}}i'ov^veiv-t aAXco? re Kal KaKci, aWa juaXXov napopav),
'and are not retentive' (if (pvkarTeiv be ' t o guard, keep in possession', as
Xen. Mem. Ill 4. 9, ad servandum idoneus, Sturz, Lex.: or 'observant',
'on the watch for', if 'to be on the look out for'; so Xen. Mem. ill 1.6,
(pvXaKTiKov Kai Kkinr-qv: opposed to acpiiXanros, a n d dcpvXagla, Hier. VI 4)
'of complaints and accusations, but easily reconciled'. Instead of keeping

in mind the complaints and accusations to which our errors and faults,
though perhaps trifling, will give rise, and so prolonging the estrangement and the quarrel between the two friends, these are ready at any
moment for a reconciliation. And this is, 'because they think themselves
equally liable (to these faults and errors, and equally requiring forgive-
42
52
PHTOPIKHS B 4 i821.
KCCITOVS
TOVS
I8TTJ0OS TOWS aWows, Kai 7r,oos ai5roi)s o'lovrai.
fxrj KctKoXoyovs fxrjdi eiSoTas
JUJJT r a
KCtKci \x.r\T TO ai/Twi', a'AAa Tayadd'

19 TOVTO $pa.
/maxrjTiKol yap
TOI)S 7TjOos avTOvs (nrovBaiws
vra's avrovs
0oras
21 ecr6ai
6 yap
Kal TOI)S /i7 dvTLTeivovTas Tote
n (nrovBdôva-iv
20 Kal xaipovTas
Twy 7r\t]<riov
01
ayavos
opyiô-
TOIOVTOI.
7rws eôfTas,
oiov
Kal <nrov%a'iov<z vTroXajj-fi
CCI/TCHS,
Kai nravTa
Trepl a. fxaXiara
fiovAovTai
r) cnrou'bal.OL ooKeiv
elvai
fxaXuTTa.
avrol
r\ 6avfAa-
i) ^ e i s .
Kal TOUS
ness) with the others',/*'*- because such as they suppose themselves to be

to the rest of mankind, (i. e. such as is their liability to give unintentional
offence to others,) such they think others are to them : that others are no
more liable to them than themselves.
18. 'And those who are not inclined to evil-speaking', (those who
are constitute a topic of opyrj, c. 2. 13,)' and don't know (don't notice) what
is bad in their neighbours, nor in themselves, but only what is good (all
their good points); for this is the conduct of the good man'. Comp.
Plat. Theaet. 173 D, of the wise man, ev dc fj KaKas TI yiyovev iv 7rdXfi, %
TI Tto KaKov iaTiv CK TTpoyovav yeyovbs fj Trpbs avbpmv rj yvvaiKiov, fiaKKov
avrov XeX?j#ej/ f) hi 6dkaTTrjs Xeyopevoi \es- An indisposition to evil-speaking is also a characteristic of the p<-ya\6\jrvxos, Eth. N. IV 9, 1125 a 8,
Sionep ov8( KaKoKoyos, ovde rasv c^flptoi'. (This is from no wish to avoid
offence, but because he is so supremely indifferent to all others, that he
abstains from blaming, as from praising, them.)
19. And people are liked 'who do not strive against, try to thwart,
offer opposition to, those who are angry, or in earnest' (earnestly, seriously, occupied with anything); 'for all such are pugnacious'. Comp.
12, iravrcs yap ol roioiroi /ia)(rjTtKol, 01 8e fxaxopzvoi ravavria
(jjalvovrai
[ZovXeadcu, which is the opposite to friendly feeling. 'And we have a

liking for any one that has a good feeling of any kind towards us, such as
admiration, and respects u s ; and thinks well of us, and delights in our
society; and this most especially when it happens in the case of any
thing for which we wish to be admired ourselves, or thought well of, or to
be agreeable'. The first of the two is also a topic of opyrj, 2.17.
21. 'And those who resemble one another (have a mutual liking), and
those who are engaged in the same pursuits'; (the pleasures of similarity are noticed and illustrated in I 11. 25, see the notes there); 'provided
their interests don't clash', (they don't trouble or annoy one another, ivoxXfiv, see note on 11 2. 9 ; "napa in the compound here, expresses an aggravation of the annoyance, the going still further astray from the right path,)
' and they are not competitors for their livelihood, (as all tradesmen are ;)
whence the proverb (of rival artists or tradesmen) Kepanevs icepafieV, 'two
of a trade', Hesiod, Op. et D. 25. On this and the opposite proverbs,
see note on I 11. 25.
PIITOPIKHS B 4 21-24.
ofxoiovs Kai TavTa
Xwcri priB' diro
eiriTntevovTas,
TCCVTOV
22 TO Kfjoayueus Kepa/mei.
Ta<s, wu
23 TavTO
exovcriv
iudexerai
Kai
OVTIO
(bare
edv /xt) Ttapevo-fc-
y 6 ft'ios' yiyverai yap
a/ma /merexeiv avTovs'

trv/J.(3aivei.
Kai
OVTCO
Kai rovs TWV avroov eTrtQvfxovvKai
fxri alo"xyve<r6ai ra
24 KaTa(ppovovvTe<s.
53
TTJOOS
7Tj0os
el $e /urj,
OVS
OI/TWS
irpos loâv,
om alo"xyvovTai
TO.
fxrj
7rpos
22. 'And those who desire the same things, so long as there is
enough for them to share them together: otherwise, the case is the same
here again'. Here again, as in the preceding topic, the competition is
fatal to friendship.
23. 'And those (we like) with whom we are on such terms as to
feel no shame in betraying our (apparent) conventional faults before them,
provided, however, that this does not arise from contempt'; provided
that they are not so far our inferiors that we totally disregard their
presence. That is, those who are so intimate that we can afford to take
liberties with them. Such are the members of a domestic circle, or any
very intimate friend, who knows our ways, and from habit has learned to
overlook any slight mark of disrespect. Schrader has illustrated this
by an epigram of Martial, x 14, which though rather coarse is too apposite to be passed over: Nil aliud video qua te credamus amicum Quam
quod me coram pedere, Crispe, soles.
ala^vvea-dai] See note on II 2. 22.
ra Trpbs hoav] opposed to TO. wpbs d\rjOfiav ( = r<z KCL8' aura) in the next
topic, 'the apparent or conventional' faults which violate the rules of

society and good-breedingand 'the real', moral and legal offences,
Rhet. II 6. 23, 12. 10. TO 7rpoy boâv in this opposition is defined, Topic. V
3, I l 8 a 2 1 , 6'poj 8e TOV Trpbs doi-au TO firjSevbs o-vveiftoTot firj av o-irovb'acra.
vnapx^-v, which is an exact description of the conventional and unreal, TO

81a TTJV S6av a'tperov. The same distinction of the conventionally and really
disgraceful occurs in Eth. Nic. IV 15, 1128 b 23, 1! 5' io-ri ra fiiv nar
akqdfiav aiV^pa TO. be Kara 86av, ovdev 8ia(pepei, ouSfVfpa yap TrpaKTea. T h e
conventionally disgraceful is illustrated by Aspasius ad locum, cos TO iv

dyopa icrBUiv (and this by Theophr. Char. XI d fihikvpos, who goes in full
market, iiKr]8ovo-r]s rijs ayopas, to the fruit-stalls, and stands chattering
with the vendor, and eating the fruit). Dancing was another of these
conventional solecisms. See the story of Cleisthenes and Hippocleides in
Herod. VI 129, which gave rise to the proverb ov (j>povr\s 'ITTTTOKAWST; (S101
TTJV opxqcnv Kai Trjv avaibeirjv): and of Socrates in Xenoph. Symp. II 17,
see note 6 p. 152 of Cambridge Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology,
Vol. 1 No. 2 on ' The Sophists'.
Compare also I 7. 36, where TO irpbs S6av is defined much as in the
Topics, o \av8aviiv jiiXKa>v OVK av Z\OITO. See note ad loc.
24. 'And the reverse, those before whom we are ashamed to exhibit
our real faults'. Those whom we respect and stand in awe of, and whose
good opinion we value.
54
PHTOPIKHS B 4 2427.
Kal 7rpos ovs (piXoTi/movvTai, r\ v(p wv

fy
fiouAovrai
Kal fxrj (pdoveTo-dat, TOVTOVS h
25 <pi\ovffLV r\ fiovAovrat. (piXoi efoai. Kal oh av Tayaua
<TVfXTrpdrTU)(Tiv, edv fxrj jueAAri avToTs ecreaQai fieiôi
26 KaKa. Kal Tots o/uolcoi Kal TOV$ dwovras Kai TOI/S
TrapovTas (biAovcriv Z16 Kal TOfs ire.pi TOI/S TeuvecoTas
TOIOVTOVS TrdvTes <pi\ov<riv. Kal oAws TOUS ar<poopa
<pi.Ao(blAovs Kal firi tyKaTaAeiTrovTas' /uaAicrTa <yap
27 (piAovcri TCOV dyadcov TOI) (piAelv dyadowz.
Kai TOWS
[xri TrAaTTO/xeVous Trpos iavrovv
TOLOVTOI %e Kal 01 ra
(pavAa rd iavToov Xeyovres.
e'lpr\Tai yap OTI TTJOOS
'And those with whom we vie (in friendly rivalry, for distinction;
see note on I 2. 22.), or by whom we wish to be emulatednot
envied (which is destructive of friendly feeling)we either love (already
from the very first sight of them) or conceive the wish to become friends
with them'.
25. 'And those whom we help to secure any good for themselves
(so Victorius)provided in so doing we do not ourselves incur greater evil'.
The joint efforts are a bond of sympathy, and fellow-feeling {avptraBeia)
makes men friends: but this community of feeling would be destroyed if
we were to be losers by our help; for then the other's feeling would be
pleasurable but our own painful.
26. 'Another amiable quality which secures regard, is the remembrance of and continued affection to friends absent as well as present;
and this is why everybody likes those who extend this feeling to the
dead. And in general, all (are liked by others) that shew a strong
affection for their friends, and never leave them in the lurch, never desert
them in distress and difficulty; for of all kinds of good men those are
most liked who shew their goodness in the strength of their affections'.
Eth. Nic. VIII 1, sub fin. roiis yap <f>t\o(j)L\ovs imuvovpev; and c. 10, init.
fxaKKov 8e rrjs (j>i\las OIMTTJS iv r&> tjfxAeti', Kal ra>p <f)tko<j)i\a)V iTraivovp.evwvt
(f)iXcov aperrj TO (ptXelu eoiKf, w a r ' iv ois TOVTO ylverai KOT' dt-iav, ovroi
fiovi-
jioL (f>ikoi Kal 7; TOVT(OU (piXia.
Victorius refers to T e r e n t . P h o r m . Ill 3. 30,
solus est homo amico amicus, and Apollodorus, from whom Terence
translated it, fiovos (friKc'iv yap rovs $/Xovs eViVrarat ; (this is Apollodorus
of Carystus in Euboea, a poet of the New Comedy, to be distinguished
from another of the same name, of Gela; his play 'En-iSucafofieyoj is
represented in Terence's Phormio, Prolog. 25). Meineke, Fragm. Com.
Cr. Hist. Crit. Vol. I 4646, Vol. iv 447.
27. 'And those who don't assume an artificial character in
their intercourse with us'; (who are open, sincere, frank, straightforward : this is the social or conversational virtue of dXrjdeia,
Eth. Nic. IV 13, the mean between dKafavela and elpaveia. 6fi<=/leVor
O
ns an aXrjdevTiKOi- Kal r<3 /3i's> Kal Xoyu, ra xmapxovTa o/ioXoyav
PHT0PIKH2 B 4 27-29.
55
iplAovs rd 777)0? hoâv OVK al(rxvv6fxe$a- el ovv 6

ctio-xwofievos fxr] cf)i\eT, 6 fxt] aiarxwo/uievos <j)i\ovvri
eoiKev. Kal TOI)S /mrj <po(3epovs, Kal oh dappodfxev
28 ovBek yap ov <po(3e?Tcti <pi\eT. e'ldrj de (pi\las iraipeia
29 oiKeiortis crvyyeveia Kal ocra roiadra.
TroirjTiKa Se p- 64.
(j)i\'t.as %aps, Kal TO fxr\ ZendevTos iroiricrai, Kal TO
f
Koir\(rovTa \XY\ ZrjXwarar avTOv <ydp OI/TCOS eveKa (balveTai Kal ov did TI eTepov.
TOWS
dual ivepl avTov, Kal ovre fi([a> oiVe eXarra. 1127 O. 24.
T h e f'Lpav of the
Ethics, the self-depreciatorlike Socrateswho affects humility, is here

o TrXarrofievos of the example);' and such are those who are always talking
about their own weaknesses and failings'.
7rXaTTEii/, properly said of a sculptor, who moulds a clay model, is
extended to moulding or fashioning in general, and hence to any artificial production; artificiosefingere: and so here. It is hence applied to
the training of the body, aaâra irkarrovTes, Plat. Phaedo 82 D (Heindorf
ad loc), Tim. 88 C, and of the mind, Rep. 11 377 C, nal nXarrew ras
i]fV)(as avrav Ttokv JXOKKOV rj TO. trdixara rats xcptrlv. Ib. V 466 A, of a society;
VI 509 D, of general education; Gorg. 483 A, of moral training.

' For it has been already said that in the company of friends we are not
ashamed of any little violation of conventional propriety ( 23) : consequently, if one who is ashamed is no friend, one who is not ashamed
in such cases is likely to be a friend'.
'And those who are not formidable to us, and in whose society we feel
confidence; for no one loves one of whom he is afraid'. I Ep. St John iv
18, "There is no fear in love; but perfect love casteth out fearj
because fear hath torment. He that feareth is not made perfect in
love" gives the reverse ; no one can fear one whom he perfectly loves1.
28. 'The kinds of friendship are, (1) companionship (the mere fact
of being often together, implying no high degree of friendshipsodalitas
eorum qui saepe ttna versantur, Schrader), (2) intimacy, familiarity, (constant and intimate, 'domestic', association, like that of members of the
same family, oiKeionjs from OIKOS ; a higher degree of friendship, confirmed
by habit and long association), (3) actual relationship, and all other
connexions, relations, of the like nature'. These are three degrees of
association ; and, iv Koivavla Traara (jj/Xia iari, Eth. N. VIII 14, init. The
whole chapter is upon the various degrees and relations of friendship or
love, of marriage, of parent and offspring, the several bonds of connexion, and the foundations of them. The same principle lies at the
root of all, <rvvexel KOIVOV.
29. 'Affection and love are produced by a favour or benefit conferred, and conferred without solicitation, and never disclosed, by
the benefactor: under these conditions the recipient construes it as
1
A striking contrast in the point of view between the Philosopher illustrating

a rhetorical topic, and the Christian Apostle illustrating the love of God.
56
PHT0PIKH2 B 4 30, 31.
30
irepi B' k'xdpas KCCI TOV ixiae'iv (pavepov ws e'/c r<v P. 138*.
evavTiwv Sel dewpeiv. 7roir]TiKa <$' eÔpa? opyn, e7rr\31 peao-fios, hafioXtj.
opyrj fxev ovv ecrrlv K TWV irpos
eavTOV, e'xdpa de Kat avev TOV 7rpos eavTOW eav yap
conferred for his sake alone, and from no other motive'; which is the
definition of <t>i\la, 2. The plural mwp-Ma includes the x"Pls a n d i t
two qualifications.
30.
' T h e affections of enmity and hatred may plainly be studied
from the opposites (of the preceding topics of (j>i\ia)'. On irepi e"x6pas
6eu>pe'iv, see note on I 9. 14. 'Productive of enmity are anger, spite,
calumny'. [On inrjpfacrpios, see note on II 2. 3.]
31. ' Now anger is excited by personal offences, but enmity without
personal offence as well; for if we suppose a man to be of such and such a
character we hate him. And anger always deals with individuals, as
Callias or Socrates' {opyrj is here made to govern the same case as its
verb opyifeo-dai1. With the statement comp. 11 2. 2); ' b u t hatred is
directed also against classes; for every one hates a thief or an informer'.
On TOV KXfirrtjv, the def art. denoting a member of a class, which we
render by the indefinite, see note on I 7.13. 'And the one is curable
by time, the other incurable. And the one is desire (ecpea-is subst. of
icpUadat 'to aim at' 2 ) of (inflicting temporary) pain, the other of (permanent) mischief; for the angry man wishes to see (the effect of his vengeance), to the other this makes no difference (whether he see it or not)'.
1
Compare PI. Phaedo 88 c, dirujTlav TOIS wpoeipriij.e'vois \6yois; Euthyphr. 13 D,
i] larpoLS VTrjperiKrj; 15 A, TO Trap' TJHSIV SUpa rots 0eois; Tlieaet. 177 A, Tijc avTots
6fioi.6r7]Ta; 176 B, OfiotuffLS 0; S o p h . 252 D, ctAA^Xois emKoivtovlas; G o r g .
6-2 2 D, fioriBeia eavrî; P a r m e n i d . 128c, PoyBeia. rq> HapfieviSov Xoyifi (Arist. Polit. VII
( v l ) 5> 1320 a 32, T) (SoTjffeta rots diropois); S y m p . 182 D, rj irapa.K\ev<ris T$> ipavn
iraph ir&VT&v ; R e p . VI 493 D, irdXet SiaKOvlav, I b . 4 9 8 E, iinjpcaiav tpCho<To<pl(;
Aesch. A g a m . 415, irrepols 6?ra5o?s V'TTVOV KeXeiSois; Soph. Oed. Col. 1026, rot SO'XM
T /ij SiKaiqi KT-qnara; Tracli. 668, rwv true 'HpcucXei 8ojp7i/j.dTU)i>; A j . 717, Bu/xiv
'Arpeilkus pieydXav TC vuiciuiv; Etir. I o n J 0 8 , rd OeoOiv riicva Bvarois; I p h . T .
1384, ovpavov Tttortna (i.e. TO air' otipavad TreirTUKos). On a similar constr. of
iiro and other prepositions with the genitive after a passive substantive (instead of
verb) see Stallbaum on PI. Phaedo 99 C, Slvrjv i-rro TOV ovpavov. Add to the examples
there gi en the following: Eur. Here. Fur. 1334, <TTi<pai/os''EX\7Jvuv u'jro; Thuc.
VI 87, iwi-Kovplas dip' r]/j.w; P I . Protag. 354 A, Ths inrd TUV laTpiSp Oeparelas;
Gorg. 472 E, Tvyxdveiv bltcys. biro 8eav r e Kal avQpwiruv; R e p . II 378 D, "Upas Si
fie<Tfj.ovs vwo i/te'os Kal 'Htfiaiarov pii^fis VTTO warpos; Arist. E t h . N i c . X 9, 1179 a
25, eiri/J.t\ei.a TI2V di-Spairlvav bird 6et2i>; Categ. 8, 8 b 32, /ieTa/3<A?j ivo cdtrou; d e
A n i m a II 8. IT, 420 b 27, T\ 7rX7/yij TOV dvawveon&ov depos biro rrjt iv TOVTOIS
/lopiois ipvxvS'
2
^0ecris, a rare word. I t occurs twice in Plat. Legg. IV 717 A, w h e r e t h e
metaphor is thus illustrated; GKOTOS p,kv o5c r)ixiv OVTOS, OV Set crToxde<r8ai- Bi\tj
I b . IX. 864 B, iXiriSai- Si Kal do^tjs
S avTod Kal olov i) TO?! fiiXeaiv 2<peois K.T.\.
T?IS aKrjdovs irepl TO dpiarov tyeais. Defin. 413 C, fio6\i)fjt.s Zipecris / i e r i \6yov
ip$ou. [So also in Eth. Nic. 111 7, 1114 3 6, tyeo-is TOV TtXovs. For its legai
sense, 'appeal', see Dem. Or. 57, treats wpos Eupov\l5r)v, 6, T'I\V els bfias Ifyeaiv,
and Pollux 8. 62 and 126. s.]
PHTOPIKH2 B 4 31.
v7roAanftavto/uiev
opyrj
del
xparei,
eivai TOiovhe,
57
fxiarovfxev.
Trepi TO tcad' exctcrTa,
olov KaXXia
T O he ixicros Kal TTJOOS TCL yevt]'
T O h' dv'iaTOv.
he KaKOV' aiadecrOai
h' ovhev
hiaipepei.
iravTa,
Ta
yap
\u7rr1s'
fiovXeTai
ov.
Kal
o fxev
\arov
6 6pyi<^6fxevo<s, TOO
opyifyfxevos
woWwu
aicrdriTct
KaKa i]Kt(TTa aicrOTjTa,
TO /meu fxeTo.
6 fJ-eu yap
Kal TO fxev
ecrTi he Ta fxev \v7rr1pd
Oe \xa\KTTa
Kal
/cAeV-
Kal TO fxev Xinrt}<s e<pe(ri<z, TO
Kia Kai dcppocrvvr]' ovhev yap

KaKias.
r\ I w -
TOV yap
Tr\v p.i&e'i Kal TOV <rvKO<pdvTr]v dnra^

Xpovw,
Kal r\ fxev
dv
\v7rei
\inrr\s,
r\
abi-
irapovcria
TO 8'
ov
A,U7rerrcu, o' he [MCTOOV

yevofxevojv
iXeriaeiev,
Comp. def. of opyq II 2. I, Speis rt/Jtopms <j>awo)i.evr)s, and the note.
o
'Now
all painful things (all things that give pain) are things of sense, (pain
is conveyed to us only by the senses,) but the most evil things are least
perceptible, wickedness and folly; for the presence of evil (of this kind)
causes no (sensible) pain. And the one is accompanied by pain (in the
subject of the affection, by definition), but the other is not: for one who
is angry feels pain himself, but one who hates does not. And the one
might under many circumstances feel compassion (for the offender, and
remit the punishment), the other never; for the angry man only requires
compensation (for his own suffering) in the suffering of the object of his
anger, but the other his utter destruction (annihilation)'.
With 1-0 iih fiera \inrrjs K.T.X., compare Pol. v m (v) 10, 1312 b 32,
aXka fiaWov TO /JLICTOS' >/ /V yap opyf/ fiera \virr]s napeunv,
astrre ov pahiov
Victorius refers in illustration to Soph. Aj. 121, where

Ulysses says of Ajax, iiroLKTelpm Se vw bvarrjvov i?fL7rqs Kaiirep ovra bva-jxe'vrj.
This shews that the feeling by which he was affected towards his rival
was not a long-standing grudge or hatred, but a temporary animosity
arising out of the contest for Achilles' arms.
Plutarch in his little treatise, ncp\ (pdovov Kal fi.ia-ovs,p. 536 D, Wyttenbach, Vol. Ill p. 165, gives an account of jxio-os from which something
may be added to Aristotle's description. In c. 2, it is said that hatred is
due to a sense of injury either to oneself, or to society at large, and sense
of wronc to oneself: fuo-os in (pavracrlas TOV o n novrjpbs r\ Koivas rj Ttpos
avrov IO-T\V 6 ni<TOvp,Vos' Kal yap adiKe'iaBai boâvns avrol irtfyvKao-t p.i<relv
K.T.X. In c. 3, the author remarks that hatred may be directed against

irrational animals; some people hate cats, or beetles, or toads, or snakes ;
Germanicus could not abide either the sight or the crowing of a cock,
and so on; envy however arises only between man and man. This is
not the case with anger; which is sometimes excited even by inanimate
objectsBain [quoted on p. 13]. c. 5; Hatred may be praiseworthy, as
58
PHTOPIKHS B 4 3 2 ; 5 1.
' ouBei/6$' o fxev yap dvrnradeiv fiovAerai u> opy'i8 $e fxrj eivai.
32
(pavepov odv eK TOVTCOV OTI eVSe%eTa exdpovs Kai
cj)i\ovs Kal oWas diroheiKvvvai Kal \IY\ oVras iroieiv Kai
(pd&KOUTas $ia\veiv, Kai Zi opyrjv r\ 1 e^dpav dfx(picrfit]TodvTa<2 i(p' oTroVep' av 7rpoaipfJTai Tts ctyeiv.
1
Troia Se (pofiovvTai Kal Tivas Kal 7ra>s eôj/Tes, coo' CHAP. V.
ecrTai (pavepou. effrco Zrj (pofios \v7rr] TIS r\ Tapayt]
K (pdvTacrlas jmeAAovTOs KOKOV (pdapTiKOv rj \v7rr1pov'
. ou yap irdvTa TO KaKa (pofiovvTai, oiov el earrai
liio-cmovrjpiaas also anger, in the shape of Vf/xea-is, righteous indignation, or of moral disapprobationenvy never can. In the last chapter,
538 D, he thus defines i t ; eV 8e JIKTOVVTOS lêv irpoaipeiris KOKSS noirjcrai
(Arist. <!(j>t(ns KaKov)' K.a\ TTjv dvvafi.iv ovTas 6piovTai, Stadfcrlv Tiva Kal npoaiptuw enLTrjprjTiKTJv TOV Kaicdis Troifjcrai (on the watch to do h i m mischief)
TCZ (pdova 8e TOVTO youj/ anecrTi. The distinction between envy and
hatred, in respect of the amount of mischief which they would do to their
respective objects, is then described, and the treatise ends.
32. This section points out the application of the contents of the
preceding chapter to the purposes of Rhetoric. ' I t is plain from all this
that it is possible, in respect of enmity and friendship, either, when men
are enemies or friends, to prove it; or if not, to represent them as such ;
or if they assert or maintain it, to refute their assertion; or, if there be
a dispute (about a feeling or an offence), whether it be due to anger or
enmity, to refer it, trace it, to either of the two which you may prefer'.
SiaXveiv] sc. TTJV (pa<nv, diluere, dissolvere, argumentum, obiecta,
argnmentatio7iem, Ho break up, dissolve', and so metaph. 'answer, refute' an opposing argument. See Introd. on \vuv, p. 267, note. This
seems the most natural interpretation of <paaKovras SiaXveiv. However,
in 11 11.7, it is applied to the breaking up, dissolution, or extinction of
the emotions themselves : so that it is possibleI think, not probable
that here also it may be meant 'in case of their asserting that they are
friends or enemies to proceed to destroy those relations in them'only,
I don't quite see the use of this for rhetorical purposes; and the other is
certainly not only easier to effect in itself, but also more to the point
here. If they assert that they are friends or enemies, and you wish to
shew the opposite, you must refute their arguments, or destroy their case,
which the preceding analysis will enable you to do.
On Fear.
CHAP. V.
Compare Bain, on the 'Emotion of Terror'; Emotions and
Will, c S [c. VIII, ed. 1875].
1. 'What sort of things, and what persons, are the objects

of fear, and how it is manifested, will be plain from what follows'.
to-] as before; see note on 1 5. 3.
PHTOPIKHS B 5 i.
59
tj (Spahv<s, a'AA.' oaa AwVas /ueyaXas r\ (pdopds

Kal Tavr eav jmri iroppvu d\\d (rvveyyvs <paivr]Tai wWe fxeWeiv.
r a yap 7roppw a-cpoBpa ov (po~
'Let fear be defined, a pain or disturbance arising from a mental
(presentation or) impression ((pavraa-ia, note on i n . 6 ) (a vivid presentiment) of coming evil, destructive or painful: for it is not all evils that
men are afraid of, as for instance of the prospect of being wicked or dull
_ (slow, stupid), but only those that amount to great pain or ruin : and this
too only if they appear to be not far off, but close at hand, so as to be
imminent or threatening. For things very remote are not subjects of
alarm : for every one knows that he must die, but by reason of death not
being actually impending, people care nothing at all for it'.
It is the proximity of danger that causes fear. Gaisford quotes a
poetical illustration from Pind. Nem. VI 94, TO Se nap TTOSI vaos ekio-aofievov
del KVfxar<ov Xeyerat 7ravr\ juaXiora doveiv dvp.6v.
On fear, and its proper objects, see Eth. Nic. ill 9. At the commencement of the chapter it is said, cpoôv/ieBa Se Si/Xov on ra (pofiepa, ravra S'
tariv as a7rXtSs elirelv <a<a' 816 Kal TOV (pofiov 6piovrai TrpooSoKiav KOKOV. But
of evil in general, all moral evil is to be shunned, and the fear of it is right,
and to be encouraged: in the control of this kind of fear, courage is not
shewn. It is in overmastering the sense of danger, in controlling the
fears that interfere with the exercise of our duties, and especially the
dread of death (the most fearful of all things) in battle, that true courage
residesoX<os /-lev ovv (poftepa Xeyerai Ta TVOIT^TIKO. (j)6(3ov. rotavTa d* (TTIV
otxa cj)aiveTai TroirjTina Xvwrjs (pOa'pTLicfjs' it is not the anticipation of pain
of all kinds, as the pain of envy, of rivalry, of shame, that is entitled to the
n a m e of 'fear', dXX' eVi jiovais Tals TOiavrais (faaivofievais %<J(tj6ai Xwcus (poftot
0 yap KLV$VVOS cVl roT? TOLOVTOLS
yiverai, oacov rj cf>v(Tis avaiptTiKr) TOV fjv
Ae'yercu /idvois TWV (fiofiepaiv, orav ifk-qcriov 17 ro TTJS ToiavTrjs <j>6opas TTOITJTIKOV.
(baiveTai fie KLVSVVOS orav likrjcnov (palvrjTat.. E t h . Eudem. Ill I, 1229 a 33j
which is in exact conformity with Aristotle's definition.
Comp. infra 2,
TOSTO yap eort nivhwos, (jtofiepov 7rXi;o"iao-/j,oj.
hvvaadai, to have the capacity, power, the force, and hence value, of;
to amount toj becomes thus equivalent to lo-xvew or o-dkvuv, Elmsley
a d Med. 127, ovSha Kaipov SVPUTUI Bvrjrols. Time. I 141, TTJV avTrji/ Swarot
SovKaxnv. VI 40, X07.01 epya Svpap-evoi. Similarly it denotes the value of
money, Xen. Anab. I 5. 6, o o-tyXos Swarm eTrra o/3oXou Kal TJfiioftokiov
'ATTIKOVS : or the general force or effect or amount of anything.

Ill 14. 5 TO TOV SiKaviKov irpootfua TOVTO Sivarai
Rhet.
oirep TCOV 8pap.a.Tav ol
irpokoyoi, 'amount to much the same', 'have much the same effect'. It
also expresses in particular the value or meaning, signification, of a
word or anything else (like the Latin valere), Herod. 11 30, Sivarai, TOVTO
TO enos ol <f dpio-Tepas x"Ps vapurraiievot /3ao-iAei. Ib. IV 192, r6 ovi/opa
diivarai Kara 'EXXaSa ykaaaav, &ovvoi. Ib. VI 98. T h u c . VII 58, hivarw. Se
TO vcoSapSb-ts fXevOtpov iffy eivai. Aristoph. Plut. 842, TO TPI^VU,V T[
dvvarat; (What's the meaning of this thread-bare cloak?). Plat. Protag.

324 A Crat. 429 T>, apa TOVTO croi dvvarai 6 Xoyof; Euthyd. 286 C, Su'parai
o Xoyoj. Xenoph. Anab. 11 2. 13. Demosth. de Cor. 26, W Se roCr"
60
PHT0P1KH2 B S 26.
povvrar
'tcrcuri ydp TraVres OTL drrodavovvTai, dXX'
2 OTL OVK eyyvs, ovBev <ppovTiov(riv. el Brj 6 (pofios
TOVT ecTTiv, dvdyKf] TCC TOiavTa (pofiepa eivai bcra
tyaiverai hvvafj.iv 'e'êiv peydXrjv TOV (pdelpeiv t] fiXairreiv /3Aa/3as els Xinrnv fxeyaXt}V crvvTeivov(ras.
Bio p. 65.
Kal r a <rt]fxe?a TU>V TOLOVTWV (pofiepd' eyyvs yap' (paiveTai TO (bofiepov TOVTO yap io~Ti KLVBVVOS, (pofiepou
3 7rXricriacriJ.6is. TOiavra Be e-)(Qpa "?"e KaL opyr\ Bvva/Jtevcov Troielv TL' BrjXov ydp OTL fiovXovrai, wcrTe ey4yvs eicri TOV iroieiv. Kal ddiKia Bvvafj.iv eôvtrw TOO
5 Trpoaipeicrdai ydp 6 a'SiKOs a'SiKOS. Kal dpeTrj vfipi-?- '38
ôfievt] Bvvafxiv eôvcra' BrjXov yap OTL irpoaipeiTai
6 fxev, OTav vfipity\Tai, del, BvvaTai Be vvv. Kal 0o/3os
rjdvvaro; 'What did this mean?'
Arist. Metaph. P 6, i o n a 7, bvvavrai
b' ai drropiai ai Toiavrai naval TO avro.
2. This being the definition of fear, fearful things, the objects of

fear, must needs be such as appear' (fear being IK (jiavraa-lai) ' t o have a
great power of destroying, or doing mischief, all kinds of mischief, that is,
which tend to, take the direction of, great pain', a-vurelveiv is 'to send
together', said properly, of several things which conspire or converge to
one focus or centre of attraction ; or metaph., which have a common aim
or tendency. 'And therefore the signs or indications of such things
(the symptom of the approaching fever or death, the clouds gathering
before the storm, the first threatenings or indications of any great calamity,
as impending ruin, the death of a dear friend, and so forth) are themselves
fearful: because they announce the proximity of the object of dread, that
it is near at hand; for this is the meaning of dangerthe near approach
of anything that is dreaded'.
3. 'Examples of such things are the enmity or anger of those that
have this power of doing mischief: for as it is quite clear that they desire
it, it follows that it must be close at hand'. That they desire it, we know
from the definitions of Spyy and ex&pa: the former being an opeû Tip.a>plas,
the other an <f<peo-is KOKOC, II 4. 31.
4. ' A second is wickedness or vice armed with power; for it is the
inclination, the deliberate purpose, the evil will, which is characteristic,
is involved in the very notion, of vice or wickedness (as of virtue)'. And
therefore injustice, the desire of unfair advantage, or any other vice, when
it has the power will be certain to exercise it, in order to gratify this
constant inclination.
5. 'Again, outraged virtue, if it have the power' (of avenging the
wrong: revenge is a virtue, I 6. 26, I 9. 24), 'is formidable; for it is plain
that she has always the inclination when outraged (to right herself by
retaliation, TO avmrarovdos hUaiov), and now she has the power'.
PHT0P1KHS B s 7, 8.
61
^vvaixevoiv TI Troirjcrar ev TrapacrKevrj yap dvdyKtj

7 elvai Kcti TOV TOIOVTOV.
eirei S' ol 7ro\Xoi xeipows Kctl
ijTTOus TOV Kephalveiv teal SeiXol ev TO?S Kivduvoist
(poflepov cos eVt TO 7TOAI) TO eV ctWw aiiTov elvai,
wcrre ol crvveidoTes ireiroinKOTi TI deivov <po/3epol fj
8 KaTenreiv ; iyKaTaXnreTv.
Kal ol dvvd/mevoi dfiiKe'iv
TO?S ZvvajjLevoK dîKeTcrdar w's 7ap eVi TO 7roAi) aSt 6. 'And fear in those that have the power of doing mischief (<ô/3epo?
ia-Ti, is to be dreaded); ' because any such also (as in the two preceding
cases) must always be on the watch, ready to act in a state of preparation'. He is always prepared to anticipate the attack of others, which
he dreads, by attacking them as a precautionary measure; but he also has
the power of executing his designs against them; his fear therefore is
formidable.
7. 'And as the majority of mankind are no better than they should
be (inclined to the worse; êlpovs TOV Seovros, ' worse than they ought to
be', or TOVrfa>6aros,' below the mean standing of morality', 'rather bad'),
and slaves to their own interest, and cowardly in all dangers, it is for the
most part a formidable thing to be dependent upon any one else (at the
mercy of, in the power of; ini penes, see note on I I. 7, 4n\ rots icpipovo-i) ;
and therefore the accomplices in any deed of horror are to be feared as
likely either to turn informers' (if they are T/TTOVS rod Kephalveiv, especially ;
though cowardice might have the same effect), ' or to leave their comrades in the lurch' (iv rots Kivhvvois namely, in which their cowardice is
shewn); run away and leave them to bear the brunt of the danger.
That the 'majority are worse' is proverbial; ol TrXelovs Kaxoi.
tyKaTahureiv] See note on o-vvStayayelv KCU o-vvSirjjjiepevo-at, II 4.12, ib. 26.
8. 'So are those that have the power of doing wrong, to those who
have the capacity of (are particularly liable, or exposed to) being wronged;
for, for the most part, men do wrong whenever they can'. With the doctrine of man's fallen nature we have here of course nothing to do. But
the imperfection and frailty of man, his weaknesses and liability to error,
are recognised by the popular philosophy of the multitude and confirmed
by the proverbs that convey it, 01 nkelovs KOKO'I, errare humanum est, and
the like. Compare the observations on equity, the merciful or indulgent
consideration of these human infirmities, in I 13. 1517, and the ordinary language on the subject illustrated in the note on the alrlai. dvdpioiriKai, I 2. 7all of which belongs properly to Rhetoric. Victorius quotes
Arist. Plut. 362, cos ovtef aTex1"^1 >h"e's io*riv oihevos, dAV tlo\ TOV Kep&ovs
awavres proves.
Plato seems to be nearer the truth on this point, OVTMS
av rjyjo-aTO, TOVS fiiv XPWTO^S

roils 8e jiera^v 7rXeio-TOVs.
Ka
' novr/povs o~(p68pa 6\lyovs elvai eKaTcpovs,
'And those who have already been wronged, or think they are
wronged at the time; for these are always on the watch for an opportunity'"(of avenging the wrong received). 'And those that have already
done a wrong, if they have the power (of doing an injury), are to be
62
PHTOPIKHS B 5 8II.
ol av6ptt)7roi oTav %vv(tiVTai. teal OL rj

tj VO/J.'IFOVTG'S dBuce'io'dar del yap Tripovcri Kaipov
ol vSiKtiKOTes, edv ZvvafjLiv e%wo-i, (pofiepoi S
TO dvTnraBeiv
vireiceiTO yap TO TOLOVTO <popepov.
9 Kai ol TCOV avT<Sv dvTayicvicrTai, ocra fxrj eVSe%erat
dfxa virdp-êiv dfxcpoiv del yap 7ro\e/j.ov<7i TTjOOS TOUS
10 TOIOVTOVS. Kai ol TCHS KpeiTTOcTiv avTwv (pofiepo'f
/mdXXov ydp av hvvaivTO /3\a7TTeiv avTOvs, el Kai TOI)S
KjOetTTOi/s. Kai oi/s (pofiovvTai ol KpeiTTOVs avTwv,
11 $td TavTO.
Kai ol TOI)S KpeiTTOVs avToov dvyprjKOTes.
Kai ol TOIS r\TT0(nv avTwu eTTiTiQefxevor rj ydp JJSTJ
(poftepol rj avpt]6evTe<i. Kai TWV riîKt]fxevcav Kai e%6pwv
KOVCTIV
dreaded, because they are afraid of retaliation (TO avrnreirovSos, Eth. N.

v 8, init.); for it was previously laid down that anything of that kind is
to be feared'. 6, Kai tfaofios TG>V.Swaiiivav ri jroirja-ai. Proprium humani
ingenii est odisse que7)i laeseris, Tacit. Agric. c. 42. Seneca, de Ira, II 23,
Hoc habent -pessimum animi magna fortuna insolentes: quos laeserunt et
oderunt (Lipsius ad locum). Ennius ap. Cic. de Off. II 7, Quern, mettmnt
oderuntj quern quisque odit fieriisse expetit.
9. 'And rivals in the same pursuits, for the same objects, (are
afraid of one another)rivals, I mean, for those things which they cannot
both enjoy together; for with such, men are always at war'.
io. 'And those who are evidently formidable to our superiors
(must necessarily be so to us; the a fortiori argument, or oinne mains
co?itmet in se minus), because they must have more power to hurt us, if
they have it also to hurt our superiors. And also those who are feared
by our superiors (must also be formidable to us) for the same reason'.
The difference between these two cases lies in the 4>o$epoi and (ftoôvvrai.
The first are those who are evidently and notoriously objects of dread by
reason of their rank, power, station on the one hand, and their manifest
hostility on the other: the second are secret enemies, men of no apparent
resources for mischief, whose real character and designs are known to
our superiors, though not to the world at large. This is the substance
of Victorius' explanation.
11. 'And those who have ruined or destroyed our superiors'; again
the a fortiori argument; ' and those who assail our inferiors ; for they are
either already formidable to us, or (will be so) when their power has
increased. And of those that have been injured (by us), and our
acknowledged enemies, or rivals, not the quick-tempered and out-spoken',
(the iifyaKo-^vxos is irappr)<Tia<nr)s, one who freely and frankly speaks his
mind to and about his neighbours, without mincing his language, Eth. N.
IV 9, 1124 b 29; napprjala 'frankness', between friends and brothers, Ib. IX
2,1165 a 29),' but the calm and composed, and dissemblers, and cunning;
PHTOPIKHS B 5n, 12.
63
n dvTnra\o3v 01)% ol o^vdvyLOi Kai 7rappricria(TTiK0i, dW

OL Trpdot KCCI eipwve<5 teal 7ravovp<yor aSrjXoL yap el
12 77119, UHTT ouSeVoTe (pavepoi OTI Troppw. irdvTa
be TO, (poftepd (pofiepcoTepa ocra, av dfxdpTwcriv, eiravdW fj oAws ddvvaTa,
opBuxraaQai fxr) ivêêrai,
Kai wu
i] [XY] e<p' eai/ToFs dW iwl TOIS ivavTiois.
@ot)6eiai p.r] el<riv r] /j.ri padiai.
ws S
for these leave us in doubt whether their attack is imminent, and consequently never make it evident that it is remote'. Cf. definition, in i.
irpaoi, such as hide under a calm exterior resolution and a deliberate,
vindictive purpose: ' still waters' that ' run deep'.
(Ipaves] is here employed in its primary and proper sense, of dissimulation or cunning, Philemon. Fab. Inc. Fragm. i n 6, ov< eW aXdnr]^ rj ph
c'lpav rfi <pvaei 77 8' avdeKatTTos, Meineke, Fr. Comm. Gr. IV 3 2 ; not in the
special meaning which Aristotle has given it in Eth. N. 11 7, and IV 13,

sub fin., where dpaveia stands for the social vice or defect in Trpocmoirio-is,
(pretension) 'self-depreciation', undue remissness in asserting one's
claims ; and is opposed to akafaveia, excessive self-assertion, braggadocio
and swagger.
a8rj\oi, (pavepol] attracted to the subject of the sentence, instead of
aSr/Xov io-rt p.fj elyai. The participle is used instead of the infinitive in
most of these cases, SijAds- el/u notav. Other adjectives follow the same
rule ; Aristoph. Nub. 1241, Zevs yfXoZoj ofivifievos, PI. Phaedr. 236 D, yeXoioy
ecroiiai auroo'YeSid^Gji', Arist. Eth. N. X 8, 1178 b IT, ol 6eo\ ytKoioi <pavovvTai
(TvvaWaTTovres K.T.X. Comp. IV 7, 1123 b 34. Thucyd. I 70, aîot vop.1fojuei' fivai rots 7re'Xas \jsoyov 7reveyKelu. Other examples are given in
Matth. Gr. Gr. 279, comp. 549. 5. Stallbaum, ed. Gorg. 448 D.
12. 'And all fearful things are more fearful, in dealing with which
(Victorius) any mistake we happen to make cannot be rectified, i. e.
remediedwhen the consequences of an error of judgment in providing
against them are fatal, and can never be repairedwhere the remedy (of
the error and its consequences) is either absolutely impossible, or is not
in our own power but in that of our adversaries'. When we are threatened with any formidable danger, from the machinations (suppose) of an
enemy, if we make any fatal or irreparable mistake in the precautions we
take to guard against it, the danger is greatly aggravated: our precautions and defences have failed, and we lie unprotected and exposed to the
full weight of the enemy's blow. 'And those dangers which admit of no
help or'means of rescue, either none at all, or not easy to come by. And,
speaking generally, all things are to be feared which when they happen in
the case of others, or threaten them, excite our pity'. Comp. c. 8. 13, ova
i<ti avrwv (poPowrai, radra in a\\<oi> yiyvo^va
iXeoixriv.
' Such then are pretty nearly, as one may say, the principal objects of
fear and things that people dread: let us now pass on to describe the
state of mind or feelings of the subjects of the emotions themselves'.
64
PHT0PIKH2 B 5 12, 13.
(pofiepd i<TTLV ova e(p' erepwv yiyvoimeva i) fieWovra

iAeeivd ecrnv.
TO. fjiev ovv (pofiepd, KCLI a (pofiovvTai, t r ^ o i / 5s P- 66.
elireiv ra fjieyicrra TCLVT ia-riv
ws de dictKeifievoi
13 avTol <po(3ovvTcu, vvv Xeycofxev. el <^' icrnv 6 (j>6fios
fxeTa 7rpoa-hoKLa<i TOV 7relcre(r8ai TI (pdapriKov 7rd6o<s,
(pctvepov OTi ovdek (pofSeiTai TWV olofxevcop pridev av
iradeiv, ovde ravra a [xrj O'IOVTCU. iradeiv, ovSe TOVTOVS
v<p' cou fjLt] o'lovrai, ovde TOTS ore \ir\ diovrai.
IXeetvos, as Aristotle, according to the MSS, is accustomed to write it,
violates Porson's rule, Praef. ad Med. p. viii, that eAeipos and not eXeeivos
is the Attic form of the word.
13. ' If then fear is always accompanied with the expectation of
some destructive suffering':the necessaiy alternative r) Xvirrjpov of the
defin. 1 is here omitted and left to be understood: as it stands, the
assertion is untrue; fear can be excited by something short of absolute
ruin or destruction. A general who had seen hard service replied to one
who was boasting that he had never known the sensation of fear, Then
sir you have never snuffed a candle with your fingers (this was in the days
of tallow):'it is plain that no one is afraid who thinks that he is not
likely (av) to suffer anything at all, (that he is altogether exempt from the
possibility of suffering,) or of those (particular) things that they think
themselves unlikely to suffer; nor are they afraid of those (persons)
whom they think incapable of doing them harm', Qj.fi oiovrai, sc. iraQiiv av:
and v<fr' <iv is allowed to follow vadelv, because a passive sense is implied
in it, 'to be hurt or injured by' 1 ,) 'nor at a time when they don't think
them likely to do so'.
As an illustration of i50' av ^7 olovrai, Victorius quotes Homer Od.
1 (ix) 513, where the Cyclops expresses his disgust at having been blinded
by a contemptible little fellow, ' weak and worthless' like Ulysses : vvv
be fi ea>v 6\lyos re Kal ovrtdavos xai aniKvs offaBakfiov aXiiacrev iirei /i' e'SaftacnxaTO oXvto.
1
This is one of the very numerous varieties of the i r x # irpbs TO <njij.ai.vbf/cnov, and is especially common after neuter verbs, but also occurs with transitives, or indeed any verb which is capable of being interpreted in a passive sense.
Such are Baveiv, Eur. Ion 1225, cpvytiv 'to be banished', avadTyvai., -yeyovivai.,
Gorg. 515 E, Trdcrxe^tvery common), iKiriwreiv, eKir\eh, Dem. c. Aristocr. 678, ear&vai
(to be stopped) VIT6; Arist. Top. E 4, 133 b 4, KeiaOai; Herod. I. 39, v n . 176,
TeKtVTqv, vapeivai; Plat. Rep. VI 509 B, TT)V ipxv" a,vii\tatv virb MiJSw; Ib.
Legg. 695 B, virb (pbfiov re Seiffavres; Rep. Ill 413 c, oioodaav itro Ko/xirairfj.dTui';
Arist. Ran. 940, &c. &c. And so with K, dirb, irpos, especially in the Tragic
poets: Soph. Oed. Rex 37, 429, irpos TOVTOV K\VUV 6veidieff$cu; 516, TT/JOS 7' eôO
irewovOevai; 854, mudds it; ifiov Savup; 970, 1454, IV e iKelvwv...$6.va, 1488.
Aj. 1253, /3oCs VTTO ajUKpas /j.d<TTiyos...fte 656v wepevtrcu, and 1320, oi5 K\VOI>TS
ecrfiev...Tov5' vir' avSpoi ipTluis.
PHT0PIKH2 B S 14.
6$
Toivvv (pofieicrdai TOI/S oio/uievous TJ 7ra6elv d'v, Kal

14 TOWS V7TO TOVT00V Kal TaVTCt
Kal TOT.
OVK OlOVTai P. 138, 3-
Se Tradeiv av oure 01 iv e\JTV)(iais /meyaAais oWes Kal

OOKOVVTCS, $10 vfipicTTal Kal oXcycopoi Kal dpaaeh
(TTOICT Se TOIOVTOVS 7T\OUTOS ir^t)s 7ro\v(pi\la
ZvvaV-is), OVTB 01 i'lSrj 7TeTrov6evai Trdvra vofxlfyvTes rd
Seivd Kal d7re\jsvy/j.evoi 7rpos TO . fieWov, wcrirep 01
dWci BeT Tivd e\7rida v-Keivai
'Fear therefore necessarily implies, or is a necessary consequence of,
the expectation of probable suffering in general (the opinion that they
might suffer, of the likelihood of suffering), and (suffering) from particular
persons (TOVTW), and of particular things, and at particular times'.
14. Consequently also, the following classes of persons are not
liable to fear.
'Exempt from (not liable to) the expectation of probable suffering are
those who are, or think they are, in a condition of great prosperity', (the
plural of the abstract noun indicates the various items or kinds of success,
prosperity, or good luck, represented by evrvxia,) 'and therefore they are
insolent (inclined to wanton outrage) and contemptuous (prone to slight
contemptuously indifferent tothe opinions and feelings of others) and
audacious or rashmen are made such by, (such characters are due to),
wealth, bodily strength, abundance of friends, powerand (on the other
hand) those who think that they have already endured all the worst
extremities (all that is to be dreaded, ndvra ra fieira) and have been thus
cooled down (frozen, their sensibilities blunted, all the animal heat, and
its accompanying sensibility, has been evaporated) (to apathy and indifference) as respects the future (possibility of suffering) like those who are
already under the hands of the executioner {tfSrj, in the very act of undergoing the sentence of death); but (that fear may be felt) there must be
at the bottom' (of Pandora's box, as a residuum; or underlying, as a
basis or ground of confidence, vnelvai,) 'a lurking hope of salvation remaining, (nepl ov about which is concerned) to prompt the anguish' (of
the mental struggle, aydv, implied in fear). Romeo and Juliet, v I. 68,
Art thou so base and full of wretchedness, and fear'st to die? and foil.
King Lear, iv I. 3, To be worst, The lowest and most dejected thing
of fortune
lives not in fear.
dnoTviiiraviio^tvoi] Tvjxnaviîv denotes a punishmentoften capital, as
it is hereof somewhat uncertain signification. It is generally understood to mean flogging or beating, sometimes to death, with cudgels ;
so much is certain; and the Tvpiravov, the drum, or instrument made to
resemble it, probably served as the block. So Alford explains it, note
on Ep. to Hebr. xi. 35, q. v. "an instrument like a wheel or drumhead
on which the victim was stretched and scourged to death." (It was not
scourging, but beating to death with sticks). It is sometimes called rpoxos,
Schol. ad Arist. Plut. 476, eo rvfiirava Ka\ Knaves' rvfinava v\a e'$' oh
AR. II.
66
PHTOPIKHS B 5 14.
(rcorripia?, wepi ov dywviw(nv.

(rri/JieTou Be' 6 yap
(polios (3ouAevTiKOvs 7roieT, KCCITOI ovdek fiovXeveTat
i^pavro yap ravrr] rfj rLfiapia. "Non infrequens verbum
fav: it is common only in Plutarch; Wyttenbach supplies several instances ; and it appears in the Septuagint, Maccab. ill 3.27, IV 5. 32,
9.20, where the instrument is calledrpoxos, in the Epist. to the Hebrews, I.e.,
and in Josephus) "nee tamen eadem ac diserta significatione; nam universe est verbcrare, ut rvprnavlûv, sed addita praepositio adfert notionem
ad fine7n verberare j quod est vel eiusmodi ut verberatus inter verbera
moriatur, fustuarium: vel ut vivus dimittatur, quae fustigatio quibusdam dicitur:" and then follow some examples. Wyttenbach, ad Plut. Mor.
170 A de Superst., item ad 60 A. Hesych. Tujumu'iferai, la-xvpas TiWerat.
TVfnravov, et'Soj rt/Jo>piar.
Phot. Lex. TVfi7ravov, TO TOV Srjfilov v\ov, a TOVS
irapaSiSo/xevovs Stexeipi^TO. Comp. Bretschneider, Lex. Nov. Tests.v.

airo-Tvfi7ravleiv, as Wyttenbach observes, denotes the fatal character
of the beating, a-rro 'off'; that the punishment was 'finished off', 'brought
to an end'. So direpyafco-6ai 'to complete a work', an-oreAete, diroKajivuv,
dwo)ia)(e(Td(u ('to fight it out', Lysias, npbs Si'/Mcoca 25), d7ro7Tcipao-0ai, ajroToXfiqv, diro8vri<TKeiv (to die off, die away), cmoKvaUiv (grate away), omoTpifieiv
(rub away, to an end), cmoKKvaOai and diroWivai. The same notion of carrying out, or completion, is conveyed by in in composition, as inxiKeiv,
eiKe(r()ai, infiaiveiv, and. others; the difference between the two prepositions being, that divo is 'from a surface', 'off', in is 'from the inside',
'out of, 'out'. The verb di:oTv\nra.vi&iv in this form denotes the aggravation of an ordinary beating; and corresponds to the Roman fustuarium, which is confined to capital punishment by beating with sticks
for desertion in the Roman army ; Cic. Phil. Ill 6, Liv. V 6 ult. Fusluarium meretur qui signa deserit aut praesidio recedit; and is opposed,
in its severity and fatal termination, to the ordinary flagellatio or verbera.
T h e verb is found in Lysias, Kar 'Ayopdrov, 56, ('Ayoparov) T<5 8rjfilm
irapeSore, ical dTrervfiTravla-dr], 57 a n d 58. Demosth. Phil. T 126. 19, dvr\
TOV T<5 /J.V florjBeiv rovs Se dnoTvinvavlo-ai. Rhet. II 6. 27.
a-rjiielov 8eovSeis povXeverat Trep\ rav dveXnio-Tcov] ' a n indication' (a
sign, not an absolute proof, or conclusive sign, dirobett-is or reK^piov) ' of

this is, that fear inclines men to deliberation, and yet no one deliberates
about things that are hopeless', or beyond the sphere of expectation. On
the objects of /3OIJ\Cvens, see Eth. Nic. i n 5. We do not deliberate about
things eternal and unchangeable; or about the constant motions of the
heavens, or of the processes of nature; or about things that are constantly varying; or about things accidental and due to chance. We
deliberate only about things which concern ourselves and human affairs
in general, and of these only such as are in our own power, in which the
event can be controlled by our own agency: and this is repeated throughout the chapter. Comp. VI 2, 1130 a 13, oiêir 8e fiovXevcrai irepl raiv fir}
ivhexojievav aXAtor *xflv> things necessary and invariable ; over which
therefore we have no control. It is plain therefore that these things
which we do not deliberate about are avtKmaTa ; they are beyond our
PHT0PIKH2 B s 1517.
67
15 7repi TWV aVeA.7r/crTcoj/. ware Set TOIOVTOVS Trapa(TKevdêtv, orav rj (ieXnov TO cj)o(3el(r6ai avrovs, on
ToiovToi eiariv oloi iraOeiv' Kal yap aXXoL /uelfyvs
e7ra6ov Kal TOI)S opo'iovs ZeiKvvvai Trdaôvra^ rj ireTTOVUOTa<S, Kal
V7TO TOIOVTWV V(p' WV OVK WOPTO,
Kal
TavTa Kal Tore 6Ve OVK WOVTO.

1
16
eirel Ze irepl .(pofiov (pavepov T'L i(rri, Kal rwv

(pofiepwv, Kal cos e/cao-rof e%oj/Tes SeSlacri, (pavepov
eK TOVTWV Kat TO dappelv T'L i(TTi, Kal 7r6jOi 7ro7a QappaXeoi Kal 7rws haKel/nevoi OappaXioi elaiv TO re
yap ddpo-os evavTiov TW <poj3w Kal TO dappaXeov TW
(popepcu' to'crre fxerd (pavrao-ias r\ eXirh TU>V O~(JHTY\piwv &)'? e'771/s OVTCJOV, TWV %e (poflepdov rj jut] OVTWV rj
17 7roppw ovTOiv. e<TTi o uappaXea Ta T ceiva iroppca
knowledge and control, and cannot therefore be the objects of future
expectation.
15. This is now applied to the practice of the rhetorician. 'And
therefore they (the audience) must be made to think, or feel, whenever
it is better (for you, the speaker) that they should be afraid, (when the
occasion requires you to excite this emotion in your hearers,) that they
are themselves liable to suffering ; for in fact (as you suggest) others
greater than they have suffered (and therefore a fortiori they are liable to
it); and you must shew that their equals and those like them (in position,
character, and circumstances) are suffering or have suffered, and that
from such as they never expected it from, and in the particular form, and
at the particular time, when it was unexpected'.
wapaa-Kfvafciv] 'to bring into a frame of mind, or excite a feeling
is used here as above, II I. 2 and 7. See the notes there.
16. 'From this explanation of the nature of fear and things fearful,
and of the several dispositions that incline us to fear individually, we may
plainly gather what confidence is, and the sort of things that inspire
confidence, and the dispositions or habits of mind that incline us to confidence : because confidence is the opposite of fear, and that which
inspires the one, the object of the one, is opposite to that which inspires,
the object of, the other: and therefore, the hope (which dapa-os implies, its
hope) of what is conducive to security, is attended by a fancy' (or mental
representation, or impression, derived from and connected with sense, see
on 111. 6) 'of their being close at hand, and the expectation' ({Knls in its
alternative, general, sense) 'of things to be dreaded by a fancy of either
their non-existence or remoteness'. This latter fancy being characteristic
of fear, defin. 1, we may infer that the opposite fancy is characteristic
of confidence.
68
PHT0PIKH2 B 5 17, 18.
Kai T O dappaXea iyyvs.

Kai eTravopdwcreis eav
wcri Kai fioqdeiai, ri 7roXXal rj fxeyaXai h afMpa, Kai
ixr\*re r\&iKt\ixevoi fxi'jre ^'StfajKoVes axriv,
dvTaywvicrrai
-re rj fxn wcriv oAwsj rj jJLtj e'xwcri Ivvafxiv, rj
eôi/res wcri (biXoi rj ireiroir]/cores ev rj Tr
rj eav irXeiovs wcriv oh Tavra (rvfMpepei, rj
18 rj a/m(bw. avrol he. OVTOOS eôvTes dappaXeoi euriv, p- 67.
edv iroXXci KaTwpdwKevai o'itovrai Kai /j.r] 7re7rov6evai,
ij edv 7roAAaKts iXnXvdoTes uxriv ek Ta Beivd Kai
OVTO.
17. 'Things that inspire confidence are (therefore) things dreadful

or dangerous when at a distance'it is the remoteness of them, not the
things themselves as the text seems to say, that inspires the confidence
' and things that embolden us (cheering, inspiriting) when close at hand.
And if there be means of rectifying, setting right again, repairing, remedying, the mischief we dread {after it is done), or of helping, defending
ourselves against it, rescuing ourselves from it, {before it is done; comp.
12, where Schrader thus distinguishes the two, correctio ntali ftraeteriti, auxilium malt imminentis]) numerous or effective, or both, and
we have neither been already injured ourselves nor injured others'the first
on the principle on which the proverb is founded, "the burnt child dreads
the fire," what we have already suffered we fear to suffer again; and the
second, because when we have done no injury we fear no retaliation
'or again if we have either no rivals and competitors at all, or such as we
have are powerless ; or, if they have power, are our friends or benefactors
or indebted to us for services'. All these are topics opposite to those of
fear, comp. 8, 9, 10, 12 ; from which it appears that the rivalry of the
ai/TayavHTTai consists in the competition for the same things, where there
is not enough of them for both the competitors; the rivalry, which naturally
engenders ill-feeling, makes you afraid of some injury from your competitor, a fear which is exchanged for confidence, as far as the other is concerned, when there is no rivalry between you. ' Or if those who have the
same interests are more numerous or more powerful, or both, (than
' those whose interests are different, our rivals or competitors)'.
18. This is an answer to the question was SiaKel^foi BappdKeoi eicriV
16. 'The feelings and dispositions in ourselves indicative of confidence,
are, the opinion which we entertain of great success in our previous
undertakings, and of having hitherto been exempt from injury, or if we
have often run into danger and escaped': all of these are apt to make
men sanguine as regards the future. Comp. Virg. Aen. I 198,-0 socii,
neque enim ignari sumus ante malorum, O fiassi graviora, dabit dens
his quoquefinem.
Vos et Scyllaeam rabiem...revocate animos maestumque timorem mittite, forsan et haec olim meminisse iuvabit...illic fas
rcgna resurgei-e Troiae. Durate et vosmet rehis servate secundis. Hor.
Od. I 7. 30, O fortes, peioraque passi mecum saepe viri, nunc vino
PHT0PIKH2 B 5 18, 19.
69
7re(pev<yoTes' St^ws yap aTradeh y[y vovrai ol avdpcoTTOI, % TW firj ireireipaa-dai tj TO /3o*j0ems eêtj/, warirep
ev Tois Kara daXctTTav KIVSVVOIS O'I Te aireipoi %6i[A(vos dappouari TO jxeXKovra teal ol /3or)6eias eôj/res
19 01a TY\V ifXTreiplav. Kal OTav TO?S dfioiois r\ [xr\ (po~
pepov, fj.t]he TOTS r\Trocn K<U COV Kpelrrovs o'lovrai
p
eivar
o'lovrat
Be, tov KeKpaTt]Kao~ip $ axiTOdV r\ TWV
pellite curas, eras ingens iterabimus aequor. ' For there are two things
which make men insensible (to danger), either never to have experienced it (from ignorance, which inspires confidence) or to have
plenty of helps, resources, means of defence, to resist and overcome it;
as in dangers at sea, those who have never had experience of a storm are
confident as to the future, and those who have derived from their experience plenty of resources'. What is said here of the inexperience of
men at sea tending to confidence seems to be contradicted by the
observation in Eth. Nic. Ill 9, 1115 b 1, ov% ovra Be as ol BaXdrrtoi' ol /itV
yap direyvwicacri TTJV crarripiav Kal TOV Bavarov TOV TOIOVTOV SutrêpaiVovcri!/, oi
8' fueXn-iSe's <rt napa TTJV efnrapiav. Victorius thus reconciles the apparently conflicting statements : in the passage of the Ethics the brave
men, who have had no experience, do keep up their courage though they
despair of safety, and are indignant at such a death as that of drowning;
the death which they covet being death on the field of battle: the sailors
on the contrary are sanguine by reason of the resources which their
experience has taught them. Still the contradiction is not removed by
this explanation; for in the Rhetoric the inexperienced are confident, in
the Ethics they are in despair, though their courage may not fail. In
fact the two cases are not identical, nor intended to be so. In the Ethics
the virtue of courage is displayed in the extremest danger, in the
other there is no virtue at all; the ignorance of the danger inspires
confidencenot courageand that is all. The passage of the Rhetoric is
explained by another in Magn. Mor. 1 2 1 , quoted by Schrader, eo-n yap
Ka\ Kar' iîTrapiau ns a^Speioy, olov ol o~TpaTtarat.' ovrot yap oidaa'i dt' efJLffeipiaV,
OTl iv
TOIOVTCO TO7TO) fj iv
T010VTC0 KOip&
T\ OVTOS eXOVTl ahllVOTOV Tl
iraQeiv.. ,na\tv ovv elmv dvdpeioi K TOV iuavrlov rfjs iftneiplas' ol yap airetpoi
T(ov airofir)o~oixva>v ov <po@ovvTai dta Trjp a7Ttpiav.
8iX<or yip drradils] 'Tritum apud Graecos proverbium a priore horum

modorum pendet, quo affirmatur, suave esse bellum inexperto: ykvxvs
aireipat 7roAe/nos.'
Victorius.
19. Comp. 10. 'And whenever (the danger apprehended) is not

an object of apprehension to our peers (those resembling us in rank,
station, wealth and resources), or to our inferiors, or to those whose superiors we suppose ourselves to be; this opinion (of superiority) is entertained toward those whom we have overcome (in some previous competition, or contest for the mastery), either themselves, or their superiors or
equals'.
70
PHT0PIKH2 B s 20, 21.
20 KpetTTOvwv fj TWI> o/noicov.
oitovTai 7r\eiw Kai /nei^w,

eiaiv
ravra
Kai eav virapêiv CLVTOLS
oh vTrepexovres
3' eVri 7rXfj6os -^pt][xaT(av Kai t
(TWfjLaTOJv Kai (piXiov Kai %wpas Kai
TWV TTJOOS
21 7rapa<TKevci}v t] 7ra<roov rj TWV fieylo-Twv.

fjStK^KoVes
(poftepoi?-
WCTIV
77 fit]êva
1
(21) TOWS irepi u>v (boflovvTai .
iro
Kai eav fj.rj
r\ \xr) iroXXowz r\ [x.r\
TOIOV-
Kai bXios ctv r a 7rpos
veovs
KotAtCs e'x^j Ta Te aAAa /ca< r a a7ro crr]fieiiov

20.. Another ground of confidence is, 'the supposition that we possess
in greater quantity or in a higher degree those points of superiority which
make (our enemies) formidable : such are wealth, bodily strength', (carry
on irkriBos and laxvs to the three following genitives,) 'number and power
(force) of friends, of territory, of military provision, (the last) either of
every kind, or the most important and valuable.
21. 'And if we have done no injury, either to no one at all, or to
few, or if those few are not the sort of persons that are feared'. Compare
8, which supplies the reason: it is, because they don't fear retaliation.
On 7T(p\ a>v ( = ovs) (pofiavvTai, see note on I 9.14.
'And, in general, if our religious relations are in a favourable state

(our account with Heaven stands well), and especially' (i-a re 3XXa rat,
'not only in everything else, but especially in this' : comp. aXXas re
Kai, Kai 817 Kai) 'in the communications of ( drro, 'what proceeds from'
the intimations as to our future conduct derived from them)' omens' (signs
from heaven, to direct us) 'and oracles'. Victorius quotes Cicero (who
calls (rqiiiia sometimes notae, indications, sometimes signd), and Plutarch
to shew that Xoyia means 'oracles', \oyiov and xPrl<rlJLs a r e used indifferently by Herodotus for 'oracle', and the word is also found, though rarely,
in other writers; Thucydides, Aristoph. Eq. 120, Eurip. Heracl. 405.
' For the angry feeling is accompanied with confidence, and to abstain
from wrong oneself and yet to be wronged by others is provocative of
anger, and the divine power is supposed to aid (side with) the injured'.
The argument is this, Innocence of wrong is a ground of confidence : but
this may be extended to the general (oXcos) case of the divine favour, and
the feeling of confidence is heightened if we believe that we have heaven
on our side, which we argue from favourable omens and oracles. This
divine authority strengthens our conviction of our innocence, of our
having right on our side (so Victorius), and therefore our confidence.
Another reason for this increase of confidence is the angry feeling which
is excited in us by the sense of unjust treatment from others to whom we
have done no wrong, for anger always implies confidence ; and at the
same time we feel ourselves under the protection of heaven, which is
always supposed to take the part of the innocent and injured, dappa\iov rf opyij. Comp. Cic. Acad. Pr. 11 44. 135, ipsam iracundiam fortitudinis quasi cotem csse dicebant (veteres Academici), referred to by Victorius and Majoragius.
P H T O P I K H S B 5 2 2 ; 6 1.
71
i Xoyicaw dappaXeov <yup f\ opyn, TO e \xr] ddiKeTv

dXX' dîKelcrdai opyfjs TTOI^TLKOV, TO Se Oeiov inroXajx22 fidverai fiorjdelv TOTS ddiKov/j.evois. Kai orav eiritj /x^Sey av iradelv fxtihe Treicrecrdai rj Karopo'iu)VTai.
i irepl fxev TWV (pofiepwv Kai dappaXecov

1 irola h' ala-^vvoprai Kai dvaio"xyvTOva-iv, Kai 7roos CHAP. VI.
22. The last ground of confidence is 'the thought or opinion, in
undertaking any enterprise, that we are not likely to, or (certainly) shall
not, meet with any disaster, or that we shall succeed. And so much for
objects of fear and confidence'.
CHAP. VI.
On shame or modesty, and shamelessness or impudence and
effrontery.
Prof. Bain's remarks on shameEmotions and Will, p. 142are so
brief that they may here be quoted entire. It falls under the general
head of Emotions of Self, and in the subordinate division under that of
self-love. " The feeling of shame is resolved by a reference to the dread
of being condemned, or ill-thought of, by others. Declared censure and
public infliction, by inviting the concurrent hostile regards of a wide
circle of spectators, constitute an open shame. One is also put to shame
by falling into any act that people are accustomed to disapprove, and
will certainly censure in their own minds, although they may refrain from
actually pronouncing condemnation. This is the most frequent case in
common society. Knowing the hard judgments passed upon all breaches
of conventional decorum, it is a source of mortification to any one to be
caught in a slip ; they can too easily imagine the sentence that they do
not actually hear. The character of the pain of all such situations exactly
accords with the pains of expressed disapprobation." [Chap. XI 16,
ed. 1875.]
1. ' The exciting causes of shame and shamelessness, the objects of
them, i. e. the persons to whom they are directed, and the dispositions or
states of mind that they represent, will be clear from the following analysis', ivo'ia here is generally expressed by iirl TTOLOIS, of the exciting
causes, which occurs in 3.
On albas, as a vados, the sense of shame, see Arist. Eth. Nic. II 7, and
more at large, IV 15. There, as here, no distinction is made between al&us
and atrrxvvrj. On the distinctions which may and may not be made between them, see Trench, N. T. Syn. [ xix] p. 73; and on alSds contrasted
with o-axppocrvin), ib. .xx. p. 76. They differ as the Latin verecundia (aldds),
znAftudor (ala-xvvrj): the first is a subjective feeling or principle of honour,
Germ.se/im; the second presents this in its objective aspect, as the fear of
disgrace (from others, external) consequent on something already done,
Germ, schaani and schande. Doderl. Lat. Syn. Vol. III. p. 201. al&as
precedes and prevents the shameful act, aio-xvvr) reflects upon its conse-
72
PHTOPIKHS B 6 2.
KCLI
quences in the shame it brings with it. This latter conception of w.<rxyvt\
corresponds to Aristotle's definition here, and in Eth. N. IV 15 init. (pofios
TIS dbogtas. On albas, as a principle of action, and vepeo-is, the two primary notions of duty, duty to oneself, and duty to others or justice, see
an interesting note of Sir A. Grant, on Eth. N. 11 7. 14. In Soph. Aj.
10731086, the two fundamental principles, by which human conduct
should be regulated, the foundations of law, justice, and military discipline, are albas or ala-xvvrj, and bfos or $d/3or. beos yap <p irpocreaTiv
aitrûcij ff d/ioC crasTrjpiav ?x0VTa TOVS" iniaTcxro. See Schneidewin's note
on line 1079.
Aristotle both here and in the Ethics represents albas or alcrxvinj, and
consequently the opposite, as irdBrj, instinctive emotions; and Bain by
classing shame amongst the emotions takes the same view. Eth. N. IV
15, init. nepl be albovs <Zs TWOS dperfjs ov TrpoarjKeL \iyeaf iraBei yap fiaXkov
HoiKev rj eet. 6plerai yoOi/ (pofios (which is a wdBos) TTJS dboljias, drrOTeXelrai bi ra nepl ra betva (pofia irapairkrjtnov' ipvBpaivovrai yap oi al<T)(yv6fitvoi, oi be TOV Bavarov (poftov/jievoi axpiao-iv.
trafiaTiKa br] (palverai TTCOS
elvai dfiCpoTepa, oirep boKei irddovs /^SXAov rj eea>_s tivai. T h i s view of
'shame' or 'modesty' as a nddos and not a ei?, an emotion and not a

moral state or virtue, is commented on and criticized by Alexander
Aphrodisiensis in his dvopiai nai Xvo-eis, Bk. A c.Ka' (21), nepl albovs. The
chapter opens with a reference to the two passages of the Nic. Ethics in
which the subject is treated, and after an examination and criticism of
the definition, he proceeds thus; ij yap, albas OVK eooeev djrXas elvai <p6/3os
dboîas, dXka iro\i> Trporepov aKkoTpWTrjs wpbs ra aKr^pd, bt fjv oi ovras
expvTcs (pofiovvrai TTJV e7T avrois dboîav. d bi i(TTi TOIOVTOV 7 alSds, OVK er'
av ovbe nados OTTXWS ei'7, aXX' eis TIS Kai bia6e<ris, y: TO npoeipijfjiivov orerai
waBos-
The character of the dualo-xwTos, as depicted by Theophrastus, Charact. c. ff. nepl dvaio-xvvrias, has not much in common with the analysis of
Aristotle. One common feature appears in 6 of this chapter, 7-0 Kcpdalv(iv diro jiixpav rj air' alo-xpav', Theophrastus' definition of dvaio-xwrla
being Kara<ppovr]o-i.s Soîjf alaxpov eveica Kepbavs- But the COmpletest por-
trait of the dvatcrxvvTos that Greek antiquity has bequeathed to us, is

doubtless the dXXavrcnrwX?;s of Aristophanes' Knights. In this character
the ideal of 'shameless impudence' seems to be reached, and human
nature can go no further.
2. ecrra] marking the popular nature of the definition, which may
be assumed for the occasion, though perhaps not strictly exact and scientific, has been already noticed several times, and will occur again in
the definitions of the next two chapters.
' Let it be assumed then that shame is a kind of pain or disturbance
(of one's equanimity, or the even balance of the mind, which is upset for
the nonce by the emotion) belonging to' (wept, arising or manifested in)
'that class of evils which seem to tend to discredit' (loss of reputation
(poftos rfjs dbogias, the popular definition, in Eth. N. IV 15, init.)'present
past or future' (this marks the confusion or identification of albas and
rj, see above), 'and shamelessness a kind of slight regard of, con-
PHTOPIKHS B 6 2s.
73
uvn \VTTYI TK r\ rapa^n irepl TO ets dloQav (pai(f>epeiv TWU tcatciov, r\ irapovTwv n yeyovoTwv
h fJ-eWovTcav, r\ cT dvaicrxwrla
oXiywpia TJS KO.1
a7raueia irepl TO. avra Tavra.
el Br] e&Tiv ala^vvri
3 n dpio-delcra, dvdyKtj alcr^vveadai eirl TOTS TOIOVTOIS
TWV KaKwv ocra ala-^pd Bonel eluai rj avTto n wu (ppovTier TOiavra 5' icrrlv ocra diro Ka/ctas epya ecrTiv,
oiov TO dwofiaXeLV d(riri$a r} (bvyeiv aTro ZeiXias
yap.
Kai TO diro(TTepy)crai TrapaKaTadtiKriw dtr dBi4 / a a s yap.
Kai TO crvyyeveadai oh ov del rj oirov ov
5 oei rj OTC /urj oer air axoAao-ias yap'
Kai TO Keptemptuous indifference to' (on oXiy<up/a, note on 11 2.1, comp. 11 2.3), 'and
an insensibility to these same things'. On the connexion of dvaicrxwria
and oXiywpia, Comp. Demosth. de F. L. 228, rlva Tav iv rfj nukei (pâ-aiT
av fiSeXvpararov eivai Kai n\ei(TTrj,s dvaibelas Kai okiyapias /J-CCTTOV (see
Shilleto's note); adv. Conon. 1268 and 9, 38, 39, o roivvv iravrav avai8e(TTaTov...Tfjv de TOVTOV npos TO roiair okiyaplav K.T.X.
3. ' From this definition of shame it follows of necessity that we

are ashamed of all evils which are of such a kind as are thought to bring
disgrace either on ourselves, or those we care for: and of this kind are
all deeds or acts that proceed from any form of vice, throwing away one's
shield for instance, or running away; for these proceed from cowardice.
Or to defraud (a friend) of a deposit, for this proceeds from injustice'.
airoo-repuv, as. distinguished from other varieties of the confusion of
meum and tuum, is applied to the meaner vices of cheating and defrauding, as opposed to robbery and theft accompanied with violence. It is
particularly appropriate to withholding a deposit, from the preposition
with which the verb is compounded: you not only deprive your friend of
his loan, but you keep back from him something which is his due: as diro
in cmaiTiiv, ano&ihovai, diroveixeiv, et sim. Comp. I J.$ and note (i). Cic.
Tusc. Q. m &,Sed quia nee qui propter metum firaesidium reliquit, quod
est ignaviaej nee qui propter avaritiam clam deposition non reddidit,
quod est ininstitiae...Victorius.
4. 'And sexual intercourse with forbidden (improper) persons, or
in forbidden places (as a consecrated building), or at forbidden times;
for this proceeds from licentiousness', onov ov Sei, ore fir) SeZ. This
variation of the negative, where no difference is intended, is by no means
unusual. If translated strictly, ov denotes particular places, and firj
times in general, any indefinite or hypothetical times; lit. ' at times, if
any, when it is forbidden'.
5. 'And to make a profit of mean and trifling things, or of things
base and vile, or from the helpless and impotent, as the poor or the
dead; whence the proverb to rob (even) a corpse of its winding-sheetj
74
PHTOPIKHS B 6 5.
daiveiv aVo fxiKpwv $ a V aurxptov i) air

oiov irevriTbov rj TedvecoTtov 68ev KCCI r\ 7rapoifxia, TO
KCLV dwo veKpov (pepeiv diro ala^poKepêia^
<yap KCCI
for this arises from sordid greediness and meanness'. Hor. Ep. I 1.65,
Rem facias; re?n Sipossis rectej si non, qiwcunque modo rem.
Kepdaweiv aV alo-xp&v} is illustrated by the well-known story of Vespasian, Sueton. Vesp. c. 23, Reprehendenti filio Tito, quod etiam urinae
vectigal commentus esset, pecuniam ex prima pensione admovit ad nares,
sciscitans, num odore offend eretur? et illo negante,- dA qui, inquit, e lotio
est'. Erasm. Adag. p. 199, 'e turpibus, velut ex lenocinio quaestttque corporis! Another illustration of profit derived from a disgraceful source
was (in the opinion of the Athenians of the 4th cent. B.C.) the practice of
the \oyoypdcpos, or SiKoypatpos, (SiKoypafpia, Isocr. avridcxris 2,) the rhetorician who wrote speeches for the use of parties in the law-courts. The
amount of discredit which this employment brought upon those who
practised it may be estimated from the following passages. Antiphon
commenced this practice (Miiller, Hist. Gr. Lit. c. xxxiii. 1. Westermann, Geschichte der Beredtsamkeit, 40. 10), and thereby brought upon
himself the assaults of the Comic poets; KaBairTerai 8' rj KtofnafSla. TOV 'AVTKpcovTos cos..'.\6yovs Kara TOV diKalov crvyneijxivovs an"oStSo/iej/ou TTOWCOU XPV~
/iirav.
Plat. Phaedr. 257 C, dia Tratrris rrjs \0180pias fna\et \oyoypd(pov.
Stallbaum ad loc. In Legg. XI 937 D ad fin., it is solemnly censured and

denounced: a prohibitory law is enacted, and the penalty is death to the
citizen, and perpetual banishment to the alien, who shall presume thus to
pervert the minds of the administrators of justice. See also Stallbaum,
Praef. ad Euthydem. p. 46. Dem. de F. L. 274, Xoyoypacpovs roivvv KCL\
trofpicrras anoKaKav; where Shilleto cites other examples from the Orators.
Isocrates, ircpl dcri8oo-0)9, is obliged to defend himself from the imputations of his enemies and detractors, who charged him with making
money by this employment, 2,fi\a<T<frrni.ovvTasivep\ rrjs i/J.rjs Siarpi^rjs KCU
Xzyovras <os 'ian Trepi diKoypa<piavwhich is much the same, he continues,

as if they were to call Phidias a dollmaker, or Zeuxis and Parrhasius
signpainters. And again 31, K Se rfjs TTfpl duccurnjpia. npaypareias els
opyfjv Kai fuaos vfias Karao-Tr/a-civ. Lastly, the author of the Rhet. ad Alex.
'36 (37), 33, has this topic, for meeting a calumnious charge, lav 8e hia$aXka><iw rjjias (os yeypafifievovs Xoyovs Xiyopsv rj Xeyav jUeXer<3/xei/ rj as orl
IM(r8<a TLV\ (Tvvrjyopovjiiv KTX. I will only add that this sense of the word
is not to be confounded with the other and earlier one of prose writers
and especially of the early 'chroniclers', antecedent to and contemporaries of Herodotus; in which it is employed by Thucyd. I 21 and Rhet. II
11.7,1117.7, 12.2.
KUV dnb pcKpov (fiepeiv] Prov. "contra avaros ac sordidas artes exercentes dicebatur." Victorius.
Other proverbs of the same tendency are quoted by Erasmus,
Adagia, p. 199. Avaritia et rapacitas. OTTO veKpov <popo\oytw 'to take
tribute of the dead', ahelv TOVS dvSplamas a\<j>iTa, 'to beg of the very
statues', KvajioTpa^, Aristoph. Equit. 41, 'a skinflint'. And Appendix to
Adagia, s. v. avaritia, p. 1891.
P H T O P I K H S B 6 68.
75
6 dve\ev6epias.
Kal TO fit] (ior)deiv ovvafxevov ets XP*l~
[AaTa, r] Y]TTOV Qotideiv.
Kal TO (5ot]6e1cr6ai 7rapa
7 TWI/ rjTTOv einroptov. Kal Zaveiêcrdai ore doêi aireTv,
K<xi alreiv ore diraiTeiv, Kal dirairelv ore aiTeiv,
l
e7raiveiv 'iva So^rj aireiv, Kal TO diroTeTV^KOTa
8 t)TTov wavra yap dveXevdepias TavTa cr^^xeia. TO
ai(rxpoKp8eiar...a!'cXcu^fpiar] Eth. N. IV 3, 1122 a 2, 8, 12; aveKevdepla,
Ib. c. 3, is the extreme, in defect, of the mean or virtue in the expenditure of the money, the excess being aa-wria, reckless prodigality: it is
therefore undue parsimony, meanness, stinginess in expense. aio-^poxfpSei'a
is one of Theophrastus' Characters, Y.
6. 'And either to lend no assistance at all when you have the
power or too little'. (JJTTOV SC. TOV beovros). 'Or to receive assistance
from those who can less afford it'.
7. 'And borrowing when it will look like begging, to ask a favour
under the guise of a loan (begging is a sign of impudence); or begging
when it will bear the appearance of asking for a return' (of a favour: the
shamelessness of this consists in the pretence that you have a claim
upon the person from whom you are in reality begging : a favour, even
supposing that your claim is well founded, ought never to be conferred
from any expectation of a return: comp. I 9.16, and 19, also II 4. 2, on the
unselfishness of friendship), 'and asking for a return (repayment or compensation) when it will have the appearance of begging'. (If you have
really done the other a favour, and so have a claim to compensation, still
you must not put it in such a way as to seem to beg for i t ; begging is a
sign of impudence.) The 'borrowing' propensities of the dvaia-xvvTos
appear in Theophr. Char, ff, ov diroo-repel, irpos TOVTOV dirt\da>v haveieo-8ai:
and also near the end. Victorius interprets the three cases differently.
He understands the Sdei of the other party in the transaction; the first case
is ' to anticipate the other by asking for a loan, when you fancy he is
going to beg of you 'y the second is that of the poorer party who begs when
the other is going to demand repayment, and so stops his mouth; the
third is that of the richer of the two, who has often assisted the other on
former occasions, and being tired of lending him money, when the other
comes to renew his solicitations stops his mouth by asking for repayment.
This I allow to be just as good, perhaps better, in point of sense, certainly more amusing, than my own interpretation: but as far as I am
able to judge, the latter is more naturally suggested by the Greek, and
more in accordance with precedent, as collected from the language of the
previous topics of these chapters on the rrcSri. The first of these three,
according to Victorius's interpretation, is well illustrated by Timon of
Athens i n 2. 49, What a wicked beast was I to disfurnish myself against
such a good time. ..I was sending to use Lord Timon myself, &c.
'And to praise (your friend, from whom you want to get money) in
order to induce him to suppose that you are begging, and after a failure,
repulse, rebuff, to go on all the same'this is the shamelessness of
importunity for all these are signs of illiberally or meanness'.
76
PHT0PIKH2 B 6 810.
<T eiraiveiv ivapovTa [icoXaKelas]1, Kal TO Tayada fiev

virepeiraiveiv TCL oe (pauXa o-vvaAei<peiv, icai TO virepaXyeTv dXyovvTi trapovTa, teal TaXXa TTCLVTO. bara
gToiavTcf
KoXctKeias yap ovj/zela. teal TO p.rj VTTOfxeveiv TTOVOVS ovs ol wpecrfivTepoi fi ol TpvcpwvTes ri ? i384ol ev eovo~la /ixaXXov oWes rj oAcos ol ddvvaTtoTepor
lOiravTa yap fxaXaKias crnfxeia. teal TO v(f> eTepov eu
7rct(T)(eiv, Kal TO iroXXcaas, teal a ev eiroitjarev oVetyap iravTa Kal Ta7reivoTrjTOis o~r]1
Ko\aKeias sine uncinis, Bekk. ed. Berol. 1831,1?? ed. Oxon. 1837 > item
Spengel ed. 1S67.
8. 'To praise a man to his face is flattery' (subaudi <n;/mov)Terent.

Adelph. II 4. 6, Ah vereor coram in os te laudare amplius, tie id assentandi magis quam quod grattt?n habeam facere existimes (Victorius)' as
is also overpraising a man's good qualities, and disguising (by smearing
over and so obscuring, as a writing, or blotting out) all his bad points
(all his peccadilloes and weaknesses); and excessive sympathy with his
distress (exhibited) in his presence, and everything else of the same
kind ; for they are all signs of flattery', oi rcm-eiyo! KOXOKCS, Eth. N. IV
8, 1125 a 2, Ib. VIII 9, US9 a '4> vTvepexoptvos 7<V <i'Aor d <oka, fj jrpocrTroulTai TOIOVTOS tlvai Koi fiaXKov <f)i\elv rj <f>ikeio'6ai. A distinction is taken
between apeo-nos and KoXag in Eth. Nic. IV 12, sub fin., which is here
disregarded. The apeo-xor, the 'over-complaisant', is what we usually
understand by KoXag or flatterer; but Ko\a is here confined to interested
flattery; els xPVH-aTa (ca ' (Ta '" XPW*7"<*"'J an< ^ i s ' n âc^ equivalent to
the ordinary napacriTos. Theophrastus, Char. /3', e, maintains the distinction. One of the characteristics of KoXaneia is nu eVatpeVai Si
(XKOVOVTOS : this appears also in the apecneos, Ch. e'.
9. 'And the refusal to undergo labours which older men (than
ourselves are willing to endure); or men brought up in the lap of luxury,
in luxurious habits (which engender tenderness, and delicacy, and effeminacy, and in general tastes and habits averse to labour); or those
who are in higher authority' (if they condescend to undertake them, we
are a fortiori bound to do so : or rather perhaps, in consideration of
the iMaXaKia which seems intended to include all the preceding, for the
same reason as the last mentioned, that they have not been inured to
labour); 'or in general, those who are weaker, less capable of undertaking
them, than ourselves ; for all these are signs of softness, delicacy, or
effeminacy'. The oi eV iôvala p-aXKov may be illustrated by the case of
a commanding officer on a march dismounting from his horse, and walking
on foot by the side of his men. Such an example would certainly shame
any of the men who complained of fatigue. [Xen. Anab. Ill 4. 4649.J
10. 'And receiving favours from another, either once or frequently, and then reproaching him with the service he has done: all
signs of a mean spirit and a low, grovelling, mind and temper'. On
'littleness of mind', see Eth. N. IV 9.
PHTOPIKHS B 6 n , 12.
77
II fxeTw Kai TO Trepl avTov irdvTa Xiyeiv Kal eTrayyeXXea-vai, Kal TO TaXXoTpia CLVTOV (bdcKew
dXaôveias <yap. 6/motto's Se Kal diro TWV aXXwv e/cao-Tjjs
TOU ijdovs KCLKIWV TO. epya Kal TO. <Tt)\xeia Kal rd
0/xota* aicrxpd <ydp Kal aio-xwriKa.
Kal eirl TOVTOIS
TO TCUV KaXcov cov TrdvTes \xe.Teyjov(Tiv r\ ol ofioioi
rj ol TrXel(TTOi, /mtj juere'êtj/. ofxolovs Se Aeyw
, TroX'iTas, jjAt/cas, crwyyeveTs, oXws TOI)S e^
'ta-ov alcrxpov yap j * / ^ TO JJLYI ûeTe'êti/, olov iraidevt7Tl TOO~OVTOV Kac TWV ClXXdOV
oe TavTa fxaWov, av oi eavrou (paivtiTar OVTW yap

i i . 'And saying any thing about yourself, making any kind of
boast or profession about yourself,no expression, however exaggerated,
of self-laudation that you abstain from; no profession of any art or
science that you do not lay claim to' and taking the credit of, appropriating, other people's merits and advantages', symptomatic of quackery,
undue and unfounded pretension or assumption. The worthiness of
praise distains his worth, If that the prais'd himself bring the praise
forth. Troilus and Cressida, I 3. 241.
cVayycXXeo-âi] to announce or proclaimto the world in the way of
profession in general, or especially the profession of any art, science, or
practice; and almost technically (by Plato) applied to the magnificent
professionwithout corresponding performanceof the Sophists. Rhet.
11 24. 11, of Protagoras' profession, what he undertook to do, viz. TOK
JJWO) \6yov KpetVrco TTOICIV.On a\aovfia see note on I 2. 7'And in like manner the products or results of each of all the various vices of the character, and the outward signs of these (inward
vices) and every thing that resembles them; for they are disgraceful (base and therefore to be shunned, in themselves), and provocative of
shame (in us)'.
12. 'And besides all these, the want (absence) of any of these
estimable things of which all our peers, or most of them, have
a share. By 'peers' I mean clansmen (members of the same race or
tribe), fellow-citizens, equals in age, relatives, or, in general terms,
those who are on an equality (on a level) with us ; for now (that we have
reached this stage, not perhaps before), it is shameful not to participate in
advantages, such as education, or anything else in the same way, to so
high a degree as they do. And all these disadvantages are still more disgraceful if they appear to be due to ourselves, and our own fault; for by
this it does appear that they result rather from (internal) vice' (of character,
the bad irpompeats which stamps them with the vicious character), ' if we
ourselves be to blame for the introduction (pre-existence), the actual
(present) existence, or future growth of them'.
78
PHT0PIKH2 B 6 13, H-
rj^rj ctTro KctKias /maWov, av avTOS r) aiViOS TWU virap13 âvTcov \] vTrap'XpvTtov t] /ueWovTWV, iracrxovre^ oe r\
rj Treia-o/JLevoi rd
roiavra
ocra eU aVt/xtai/ cbepei Kal ovel^t]' TctvTa 0 e<TTi TO.
eh v7rrjpeTrj(reis rj crwûaros rj epyvov aia"xpcov, wv eaTi
TO v/3pi(êcrdai. Kal TO. p.ev eU ctKoXacriav Kal eKOvra
l aKOVTa, r a h' ets (3iav ctKOvra'1 dwo dvavdpias
'yap t] SetA/as r\ V7rofxovri Kal TO \xt]
14
a [xev ovv aio"xyvovTai, TavT CCTTI Kai Ta TOI- p. fg.
(14) avTa' ewel de 7re.pl dSojîas (pavracria eamv rj aicr^vvri,
1
&Kovra- (TO, 6' els ptav HKOVTO,-)
13. 'And the endurance, present, past, or future (in the anticipation) of any such things as tend to dishonour and reproach, men are
ashamed of; and these are all acts of service or subservience of person
or shameful deeds, under which head comes wanton outrage' (meaning
here that particular kind of i'/3pir which lies in an outrage on or violation
of the person; virtjpeTew is equivalent to xaP^Ce<xâl! su* copiamfacere, the
surrender of the person to the service or gratification of another).
ra els aaoXacrLav] sc. (jjepovra, vvvrdvovTa ; quae specta?it ad inconlinentiam. 'Turpe est ea pati quae ab intemperantia alterius proficiscuntur'.
Schrader. 'And of these, all that have a tendency or reference to (all
that subserve) licentiousness (the reckless and indiscriminate indulgence
of the appetites) are disgraceful, whether voluntary or involuntary; the
involuntary being such as are done under compulsion (forza maggiore);
(even these are disgraceful) because the submission to, tame endurance
of, them, and the non-resistance (not defending oneself against the
violence), proceed from unmanliness or cowardice'. Inordinary cases,
compulsion, any superior external force which cannot be controlled,
absolves a man from responsibility for his actionsEth. Nic. ill 1, on
the voluntary and involuntarybut in these cases if the force be not
absolutely overwhelming he is bound to offer all the resistance in his
power: to refrain from this shews cowardice or an unmanly spirit, and
therefore such acts are still disgraceful, though not for the same reason
as the voluntary, TO S' els fiiav anovra is added as an explanatory note
to aKovTa: it interrupts the reasoning, and should therefore be separated
from the context by some mark of a parenthesis.
14. This concludes the first branch of the analysis of shame and
its opposite, irola alvxyvovTai Kai dvaia-^yvTovaw, I, shameful things. We
now proceed to consider the second, wpos Twas, the persons, namely, before
whom, in whose presence, this feeling is especially excited (lit. to whom
the feeling is, as it were, addressed). These two divisions exhibit the two
nddrj in their objective aspect, things and persons. The third, commencing at 24, gives the subjective view of them, shewing how the persons
who feel shame and the reverse are themselves affected by them, and what
in them are the signs of its manifestation.
PHTOPIKHS B 6 1418.
avTtjs XaPlv
' ^ I^V T W ct7ro(3cuv6vTcov,
ovoeis Be TY]<S So'^s (ppovriêi

tyvras,
15 \oyov
dW
fj Bid TOI)S Bod-
dvd'yKt] TOVTOVS aia"xyve(rdai wv \6yov

B' 6%et TOV Oavfxaôvrwv,
Kai v(p' cov (3ov\erai

16 Ttfxeirai,
davfjidêadai,
Kai cov /mrj KaTafppovei
êcrdai fiev
ovv
(ôvo-i TOVTOVS
h
79
fiovAovrai
I/TTO
b'croi TL eyovcnv
ical oi/s dav/mdêi,

Kai 7rpo<s ovs (pi\oTr\<i B6t]<s. dav/mdTOVTWV
dyadov
Kai davjudTWV TI/JLICOV,
Trap' wv TV<y-)(dvov(Ti Seoiuevoi trcpoZpa
17 eKeivoi Kvpioi, olov oi epwvTe?'

TOWS 6/JLOIOVS, (ppovTiôvcri
eêi.
(piXoTifxovvTai
TIVOS
WP
Se irpos
S' ws d\r]6ev6vTU)v TCOV
(ppovifxwv, TOiovTOi h' o'l T 7rpeo-fivTepoi Kai oi Treirai18 BevfjLevoi.
Kai TO. iv
ScpdaX/noIs Kai TCC iu (pavepw
' Such and such like are the things that men are ashamed of. And
as shame is a fancy or mental impression about discredit or loss of reputation (def. 2), and this on its own account, with no reference to any
ulterior results or consequences (of the loss of it), and no one cares for the
opinion except on account of those who entertain it, it follows of necessity
that the persons to whom shame is addressed are those whom we hold
in account (take account of, regard and esteem)'.
15. 'We take account of those that admire and look up to us, and
those whom we admire and look up to (comp. I 6. 29), and by whom we
wish to be admired, and those whom we are ambitious of rivalling (11 2.
24, note, 4. 24), and those whose opinion we don't despise'.
16, 17. 'Now the persons whom we wish to be admired by, and
whom we ourselves look up to, are those who are in possession of any
good of that class which is highly valued (which confers distinction), or
those from whom we have an excessive desire to obtain something that
they are masters of, as lovers ; those that we vie with, or strive to rival,
are our equals; and those that we look up to as authorities on any
question (regard as likely to speak, or rather see, the truth in any disputed question on which their opinion is asked) are the men of practical
wisdom; and such are men advanced in life and the well educated'.
18. In the first clause of this section, as Schrader has noticed, there
is a momentary transition from the persons who feel shame to the things
which produce it; in the second, a return is made to the masculine.
Supply ala-xyvovrai. 'And of things that take place, of acts done, under
our very eyes, and openly (in broad daylight, or very prominent and
conspicuous in position) men are more ashamed: whence also the proverb, the seat of shame is in the eyes. And the shame is deeper in the
presence of those who will be always with us (constantly in our society,
as members of our family, intimate friends ; and the closer the intimacy
the deeper the shame), and those who pay attention to, take particular
80
PHT0PIKH2 B 6 i8, 19.
fxaXXow b'Qev KCLI ri 7ra.p01.fiia, TO tv 6<pdaXfxoT$ elvai

ald(3. Bid TOUTO TOVS del Trapecrofxevovs fxaXXov
a\a-)(yvovTai
Kal TOI/S irpoarkôvTa^
6<p6a\fjLoh dfjtfpoTepa.
%ovs'
BrjXov yap
avToIs,
Sia TO ev
Kai TOVS fJ.rj Trepl TavTct evo- P. 1384 b.
OTI TavavTia
So/ce? TOVTOIS.
Kai
notice of us (study our character and actions); because both these are
cases of special observation'.
dixfroTepa] the abstract neuter; 'both the preceding thitigs, or cases';
these two facts, or observations on the manifestation of shame, that it is
more felt in the presence (1) of intimate associates and (2) curious observers, are confirmed by the proverb that the seat of shame is in the eyesj
when we are very much ashamed of anything we turn away our eyes,
and dare not look our friend in the face. So Sappho to Alcaeus, supra
I 9. 20whatever the true reading may bedirectly expresses this in the
p h r a s e albas <?X(l ofifiara.
The principal organ by which the emotion is expressed or manifested
is naturally regarded as the seat of that emotion : and this is by no means
confined to shame, but is extended not only to other emotions, but even
to justice by Eurip. Med. 219, bU-q yap OVK IWOT' iv 6<p8a\no1s fipoT&v:
the eyes are in this case represented as the organs of injustice, not discern" right and wrong. So Eur. Hippol. 246, Kai in alo-xvvriv ofip.a Terpairrat.
Id. Ctesph. Fr. XVIII (Dind.), albas iv 6(p6a\fiotcn ylyvirai TCKVOV (apud Stobaeum). Arist. Vesp. 44-6, aXXa TOVTOIS y' OVK evi ovb' iv 6<p8a\iJ.oicnv alSas
T&V TraKaiav ipfiaSav. Athen. XIII 564 B (Gaisford), Kai 6 'Apco-Torekrjs fie
e(j>rj roils ipaaras els ovBev &\\o TOV crap-aTos rav ipa>p.eva>v a.Tro[$\eir*iv fj
rovs 6<pdaXp.ovs, iv ols TTJV al8a> KaroiKetv. Theogn. 85, oUriv eVi yKaxnrrj
T Kal o<p6a\p.oi<Tiv eTre&Tiv aiSmr. Theocr. XXVII 69, on)ia<Tiv aldop.cvr/.
(Paley ad Suppl. 195, Latin ed.) Apollon. Rhod. Ill 92 (Victorius). Suidas
s. v. albas. Kal irepa irapoifila "albas iv 6<p6a\p.ols," wap oaov of KiKaKa>p.ivoi
TOVS d<p8a\p,ovs OVK albovvrai, rj on TOVS irapovras opavres albovvrai p.a.Wov
of avBpamoi r\ TOVS anovras. Eustath. ad II. N 923. 18 (Gaisford), 'Apio-rortkovsyap <j)i\o(ro(pd>TaTa wapabop-evov oiKr\Tr)piov albovs elvai TOVS 6(pda\p,ovs.
Id. a d Odys. ' I754- 39; 'ApiirroreXous (pap.evov TI\V alba iv o^>6a\p.ois elvat,
oia rav albr)p.6va>v Kal i avrrjs oTêcoy xaPaKTVPlll*1'a>v> ' e>(^' ^ r albetoSai
Xpy xa^^(Tl Ta /3Xe<apa Kal fiXtTreiv arcves 6KVOVO-IV. I n Probl. XXXI 3, 957
6 11, this is directly stated as a matter of fact without any reference to
the proverb or to vulgar opinion, iv 6<p6a\pxTis yap albas, as an explanation
of something else.
So of love, the eye is the medium or channel by which it is conveyed; Eur. Hippol. 527, i'pas, epas, 6 Kar 6/J.p.aTav oraffis iroBov. Aesch.
Agam. 419, op.p.aTO>v 8' iv dxrjvtais eppti trao-' 'A<poSiVa, On which see
Donaldson, New Crat. 478. Ib. 742 (Dind.) fiaXBaKov 6p.p.aTa>v /3eXos
brj^lBvjiov 'ipaTos avBos. Plat. Phaedr. 251 B, TOV KOXKOVS TTJV a-rvopporjv bia
Tav op-ixaTcavthe Emanation theorywhich is afterwards explained, ib.
251 C, Cratyl.420 B, %pas 8e, on capel 'ia6ev.,.ii!tio-aKTos 81a Tav 6fip.a.Tav
...eKaXfTro. Arist. E t h . Nic. IX 12, init. ao-7rep TO'IS ipaai TO bpav ayanrjTorarov io~n Kal paKXov alpovvrai TavTrjV TTJV a\u6r]0-iv r\ ras Xonvas as Kara
PHT0PIKH2 B 6 19, 20.
81
fxrj a-wyyvtojAOViKOvs TO?S (paivofxevois dfxaprdveiv a yap Tts CLVTOS Troiei, TavTa. Xeyerai TOIS
TreAots ov vefxecrav, wa-Te a fxrj 7roieT, SrjXov on
20 vefxeaa.
KCU TOI)S iâyyeXTiKous
7roAAoIs# ovdev
yap $ia<pepei fxri hoiceiv r\ {xr\ epayyeXkeiv.
TOVS
TavTrjv fx.a\i<TTa TOV eptaros ovros <a\ yevo/ievov K.T.X.
Heliodorus III 8,
quoted by King, Gnostic Gems, p. 1134, on fiavmvia 'the envious' or

' evil eye'. In the same passage love is described as a kind of ophthalmia,
or infection by the eye. Similarly <p66vos, 'the evil eye', Aesch. Agam..
947 (Dind.), fuj ns 7rp6cra>dev ofipaTwi' j3a\oi (pdovoswhere Paley quotes
Eur. Inus Fragm. 11, iv xepviv, 77 cnrXayxvounv, rj Trap on/iara 'iaff tffuv
(o cpdovos).<j>uftos, Aesch. Pers. 168 (Dind.), dpcpl If dâXôis (pofios.
aXos> Soph. Aj. 76, eXvirev alvbv aôs air oiifiaTav"Apt]S. S. Petr. Ep. II ii.
14, 6(p6a\iJ.ovs exovrei jieorovs /J.oixa\iSos, S. Joh. E p . I ii. 16, 1; ejnBvfiia TWV
6<l>8dKjiay. xaP"> 'tears of joy', Soph. Electr. 894, 1304, 1231, yeyrjdbr
fpTTfi SaKpvov opixaTviv aito. Aesch. Agam. 261, xaP"- P v<pf>Tci SaKpvov
iKKakovfievij. Ib. 527. Prov. vi. 17, haughty eyes are an abomination to
the Lord. Isaiah v. 15, the eyes (i. e. pride) of the lofty shall be humbled.
Ezekiel v. 11, neither shall mine eyes (i.e. either mercy or justice) spare.
Habak. i. 13, thou art ofpurer eyes than to behold evil. All these various
examples shew, what'may also be inferred from our own ordinary language, in which we speak indifferently of the eye of mercy and of pity on
the one hand, and of the eye of anger, of envy, of scorn, of hatred, of jealousy on the other, that the eye may be taken to represent in laitguage
any emotion whatsoever, good or bad, of which it is in nature the most
prominent organ of expression.
19. 'Again, in the presence of those who are not liable to the same
imputations (as we lie under for some shameful act); for it is plain that
(in this matter) their feelings and opinions must be contrary to our own.
And of those who are not inclined to be indulgent, to make allowance for,
apparent faults; for things which a man does himself he is generally
supposed not to find fault with in others, and therefore (the converse,
must be true) what he does not do himself he is plainly likely to condemn
in others'. Such asaccording to HudibrasCompound for sins they
are inclined to, by damning those they have no mind to [1 i. 215].
vejieo-is is righteous indignation, moral disapprobation or reprobation;
the opposite of i'Xeos and <Tvyyvap.r), which take the indulgent and merciful view of human frailty. Infr. cc. 8, 9. Comp. 9. 1.
20. 'And of those who are inclined to gossiping (to telling tales,
betraying secrets, publishing, divulging them to their acquaintance in
general): because there is no difference (in regard of the effect upon the
other) between not thinking (a thing wrong) and not publishing it to the
world'. That is, as far as the effect upon the person who has done something wrong is concerned, and the amount of shame which it causes him,
it makes no difference whether the other really thinks it wrong, or merely
says so, to the world. In no other sense are 'not thinking' and 'not
telling' the same. ' Tell-tales are, such as have received an injury,for
AR. II.
82
PHTOPIKHS B 6 20.
yeXriKol Se oi r e îKrifxevoi did ro 7raparripe7v KCU

ol KaKokoyoi' e'lwep yap teal TOVS fxri
en fJiaXKov TOUS d[iapTdvovTa<i. KCU ots r\
67rt TaTs TWV 7reAas dfiapTiais, diov yXevaarrai<s KOL
K(t)[A(oSo7roLol'S' K-aKoXoyoi yap 7ra>s OUTOI tcai eayyeXriKoi.
nal iv oh firjdev a.7roTTV^Ka(ni/' wenrep
yap Bavfxa^pfxevoi dtaKeivTai.
tiio Kal TOVS 7rpwT0V
these are always on the watch, lying in wait (napd lurking in the neighbourhood) (for an opportunity of retaliation)and those who are censorious and inclined to evil-speaking in general: for the latter, (supply
KaKo\ayovcri, or KCIKO>S Xeyovo-t,) if they speak evil of the inoffensive or innocent, a fortiori are likely to do so of the offenders or guilty.
iraparripeiv} infr. i n 2.15. Xen. Mem. Ill 14.4, with an evil design, ' t o
lie in wait for', Polyb. xvn 3. 2, ap. Liddell and Scott. Add Arist. Top.
O i l , 161 a 23, orav 6 airoKpivoixevos Tavavrla T& iparavri
irapaTr)prj Trpoa-
eirrjpealjov, of one, who in a dialectical discussion 'wantonly' (jrpoy, in

addition to his proper functions, as a work of supererogation) 'and spitefully or vexatiously (iirrjpedfav) lies in wait to catch his opponent' in
some logical trap or other.
'And those whose occupation or amusement (jarp/3?;, passe-temps)
lies in finding fault with their neighbours, such as the habitually sarcastic
{busy mockers, Ps. xxxv. 16), and comic poets or satirists in general:
for these are in a sense (in some sort may be considered as) professional evil-speakers, and libellers of their neighbours'. To the readers
of Aristophanes, and indeed of Comedyespecially ancient Comedy
in general, this satirical and libellous character, which has become
identified with their art (KG>/*<B8II', Aristoph., Plato, &c), needs no illustration. Hor. A. P. 2814.
Xêvaorais] See II 2. 12, and note. II 3.9.
' And those with whom we have never before met with a failure (incurred reproach or damage, sustained a repulse, lost creditexplained by
iJ8o|ijKorer infra); for we are to them as it were objects of admiration and
respect' (SiaKeiurm, lit. we are to them in such a disposition, or position,
attitude, posture)they have never yet had occasion to find fault with us,
we have hitherto not lost caste in their estimation' and this is why we
feel ashamed in the presence of (are reluctant to refuse) those who ask a
favour for the first time, because (on the supposition that) we have never
yet lost credit in their eyes (and this respect which they have for us we
should be loth to impair)'.
to<nrep 6avpa6fievoi]
Objects of shame (ous altrxvvovreu) are those
before whom men feel ashamed of any offence against virtue or propriety:
comp. y airy t) d>v (ppovri^fi, 3 ; also 15, 24.
' And these are either such as have recently conceived the wish to be
friends with usfor they have hitherto seen only the best of usand
hence the merit of Euripides' answer to the Syracusansor, of acquaintances of long standing, such as know nothing against, know no ill of us',
PHTOPIKHS B 6 2O, 21.
83
TL alcrxvvovTai ws ov'êv iron tjSo^nKores eV

z' TOIOVTOI ' O'I T6 apTL (3ov\6fj.evoi (biXoi ehai
(ra ydp (Se\.Ti(TTa Tedeavrai, $10 ev eêt f\ TOV EVpnrioov d.7roKpi(ris 7TjOos TOI)S ^vpaKocrlovs) Kal TCOV
21 7ra\ai yvwpifJLWV ol /arjêv arvveihoTei. auryyvovTai 8'
ov fxovov avTa T<X prjOevra a\a"xyvTr)\d dWd Kal TO. p. 70.
crti/ueTa, oiov ov fxovov d<ppodi(ri.dôvTes dWa, Kal
T crtj/uteia avTov. Kai ov jxovov TroiovvTes r a alcr^pd,
(are privy to, conscious of, no vice or misconduct in us,) whose good
opinion of us is unimpaired.
The answer of Euripides to the Syracusans is giveninvented say
someby the Scholiast, in these words: Evpnri8r]s npos rois SvpaKoo-tovs
7rpor/3us aTrocrraXeis Kai jrcpi clpijvrjs Kal (piXias Seopcvos, (is (Keivoi avivevov,
L7TV' eSet, avftpes ^vpaKOfrioi, et Kal Sta firjbeu a\Xo7 dXAa ye dia TO aprt
V/J.WU bieadai, altrxvvetrQat rffias cos 6avfiaovTas. W e know nothing from
any other source of Euripides having ever been employed on any other
occasion in any public capacity; but as Aeschylus fought at Marathon,
and Sophocles was one of the ten generals who conducted the exhibition
against Samos under Pericles, there seems to be no a priori objection to
the employment of another tragic poet in a similar public service. That
Euripides could speak in public we learn from a reference of Aristotle to
another answer of his, Rhet. ill 15. 8. Nevertheless the objection has
been held fatal to the soundness of the reading, and Ruhnken, Hist.
Crit. (ap. Buhle), has proposed to substitute 'Y7repi8ov for EvpmlSov in our
text, the one name being constantly confounded by transcribers with the
other. Sauppe Orat. Att. Vol. ill. p. 216, Fragm. Oratt. xv argues the
question, and decides (rightly, I think) in favour of the vulgate. There
is in fact no reason whatsoever, except our ignorance, for denying that
Euripides could have been sent ambassador to Syracuse. Sauppe thinks
that the occasion probably was the negociations carried on between
Athens and Sicily from 427415, previous to the Sicilian expedition.
His note ends with an inquiry whether another Euripides, Xenophon's
father, Thuc. II 70, 79, may possibly be meant here. The extreme appositeness of the answer to Aristotle's topic, which seems to have suggested
the suspicion of manufacture for the special occasion, tells in reality at
least as much in favour of its genuineness; it is because it is so appropriate, that Aristotle remembers and quotes it.
21. 'And not only the things already mentioned cause shame, but
also the signs and outward tokens and indications of it' (a trrjixewv is, in
logic, the ordinary accompaniment of something the existence of which
it indicatesj the invariable accompaniment, a certain proof of the existence of it, is a Ttupripiov), 'as in the case of sexual intercourse, not merely
the act itself, but the signs of it. And similarly, people are ashamed not
merely of shameful acts, but also of shameful words, foul language'.
Qvodfactu foedum est, idem est et dictu turpe. Soph. Oed. R. 1409, a'AV
62
84
PHT0PIKH2 B 6 2224.
22 dWd
Kai XeyovTes.
fxovov a\a")(yvovTai,
o/noitos Se ov TOV? el
a'AAa Kat TOV?
23 r o l s , oiov depdirovTas
OVK auryyvovTai
ovd'
S o ' ^ s TOV d\r)6eveiv

alcryyveTai)
dyvwras,
ovre
teal (pl\ovs
wv
TTOAI)
(ovSek
Tavrd
yap
TOV?
6AWS 0
TOVTIOV.
Karaippovovari
iraiUa
yvcopifiovs
Tt\?
Kai Qnpict
Kai
TOV?
aAAa TOV? fxev yvtopi/ULOVZ Ta 7rpo? dXrjueiav
ZoKOvvra TOV? Ze aircoQev rd 7rpos TOV VO[XOV.

24
avTOi $e code SiaKei/uevoi aia"xvv6eZev a'v,

f
el virdp-fcoiev trpos ai/roi)s 'e'xovres OVTCO Tives oiovs
e(ba/j.ev elvat ovs alcrût/ovTai.
t]<rav $' OVTOL rj vav-
ov yap avtav e<rff a fiySe dpav nakov. Isocr. ad Demon. IS, a woielv
alaxpbv, ravra v6(ite /irjSe \tyeiv etvcu KaXov.
22. 'And in like manner we are ashamed (of any disgraceful
action) before those who will reveal or betray it to them' (viz. the beforementioned rots 6aviiaov<Tiv and the rest: avrois is due to Victorius for
varia lectio avrovs); ' as servants, and their friends'.
23. 'And in general, people are not ashamed in the presence of
those for whose opinion, in respect of perceiving the truth and forming a
sound judgment on it, they have a very great contemptfor no one feels
shame in the presence of children or brutesnor of the same things' (raira
cogn. accus. after alcrxvvoT<u understood) ' in the presence of persons well
known to them and of strangers; but in the presence of intimates they
are ashamed of things which are considered (SOKOVVTO) really and essentially, in that of the remote (from them in connexion), of what is only
conventionally, disgraceful'. On this distinction of upas d\rj6eiau and
irpos b6S-av = irpbs TOV vofiov, see note on II 4. 23 : and on awa8(v (the termination) note on 1 11.16.
24. This section is the commencement of the third division of the
analysis of shame and its opposite; the subjective view of them, shewing
how they appear in the persons themselves who are affected by them.
' The likely subjects of shame themselves are, first of all men of such
a disposition,- or in such a state of mind, as if they had certain others
standing to them in the same relation as those of whom we said they
stand in awe'. Such are persons whom they respect and admire, whom
they regard as mithorities, whose judgment and opinions they look up to.
A somewhat complicated assemblage of words to express this simple
meaning, that the disposition to shame is the same state of mind as that
which has been before described as felt in the presence of certain classes
of persons of whom we stand in awe; which are immediately specified.
' These were (i. e. are, as we described them, 3>v TIS rrjs Sd^r (ppovrifci,
TWV davjxafavTaip, Kai ols 6avjj.afci K.TX. ante 14, 15) either those that we
admire, or that admire us, or by whom we wish to be admired, or those
from whom we require any aid or service which we shall not obtain if we
PHTOPIKHX B 6 24, 25.
85
voi rj 6avfj.d(ôvTe<s rj v(p' wv fiouXovrai 6av/udrj wv htovTal Tiva xpelav wv firj Tevôvrai
oWes, KUI OVTOL rj opwvTes, uxnrep KvSms Trepl
Atipov%la<s i$r]iuir]y6pr]<rev (rjiov yap VTTOXafleTv TOI)S 'Adtivaiovs irepiearTavai KVKXW TOI)S ''EA.Xrjvas, ws opwvTws K<xi fxr] fxovov aKOvcrofxevovi a av
\[si](pio-wvTai), rj av 7r\t](ri.ov UXTLV ol TOLOVTOI, rj fxe\Xwaiv ai(rdr\(re(r6ai. Zio nal opaadai dTV%ovvT<s viro
tyXovvTwv 7T0T6 ov ftovXovTar 6av[J.a(Tral yap
25 ol
fyiXwTat.
teal orav
e^wcriv d KaTai<T)(yvov(riv P. 1385.
lose our credit with them; and these either as actually looking on, actual
spectators (of what we say or do), of which Cydias1 harangue on the
allotment of Samos furnishes an examplefor he required them to imagine the entire Greek people to be standing round the Athenians in a
circle, as actual spectators, and not mere (future or expectant) listeners,
of the decree they are about to makeor if such be near at hand, or
likely to be listeners' (to what we have to say: this especially for the
deliberative speaker).
The Sdjiou Kkrjpovx<-a here referred to is not the allotment of the
Samian lands amongst Athenian citizens after the revolt of the island
and its subsequent reduction by Pericles in 440 B.C. Thucydides, who
gives an account of the treatment of the Samians after their defeat, I 117,
makes no mention of any such allotment. It is referred by Ruhnken,
Hist. Crit., and by Grote, Hist, of Gr. x 407 and note, 408, to Timotheus'
conquest of Samos in 366, and the subsequent Athenian settlement there
in 352 ; of the former of which Cornelius Nepos speaks, Vit. Timoth. c. 1,
ap. Clinton F. H. sub anno 440. It was against this allotment of Samos that
Cydias (of whom nothing seems to be known beyond this notice, his
name does not even occur in Baiter and Sauppe's list of Orators,) made
his appeal to the Athenian assembly, and invited them to decide the
question of spoliation, as though all Greece were standing round them
looking on. Isocrates, Paneg. 107, is obliged to defend his countrymen from the reproach (6vei8igeiv) of this and similar practices, not specially named, by the plea that the appropriation of the territory was not
due to rapacity, but solely to the desire of securing the safety of the
desolated properties by planting a colony to defend them.
' And therefore also men in misfortune don't like (are ashamed) to be
seen by their quondam rivals or emulators, because these are admirers';
and therefore, by the rule previously laid down, they are ashamed to
appear before them in this undignified and melancholy condition.
25. And men are disposed to feel shame, 'whenever they have
attached to them any disgraceful deeds or belongings, derived either
from themselves or their ancestors, or any others with whom they are in
near relation', dyyivrda, 'nearness of kin', gives the right of succession
86
PHTOPIKHS B 6 2527.
epya Kal Trpdyjj.a.Ta t\ avrcov i] 7rpo<yovwv r] aXXtov

Tivwv 7Tjt)ds ovs V7rdp-)(ei avTOis dyîcrTeia Tts. Kai
oXws virep cop a\(r~)(yvovTai avToi' e'url & OVTOL OL
elprifievoi Kal ol els CCVTOVS dvacpepo/nevoi, cou cioacrKaXoi fj aviuiftovXoi yeyovacriv, n edv axriv trepoi 0^10101,
26 7rpos ovs (piXoTifxovvTav 7roXXa yap ai
td
2 7 TOVS
T010VT0WS
KCCl TTOlOVfTl
K(Xl
OV
7TOIOV(TIV.
KCtl
opdcrdai Kal ev cpavepw dva<TTpe(pe<r6ai

TO?S (rvveiBocriu aiar^vvTtjXoi /maXXov eicrtv. bdev Kai
'AvrKpwv 6 7roiriTt]^ /meXXcov d7roTV[XTraviê<r6ai viro
Aiovva'iov elirev, idoov TOI)S <rvvaTro6vr}(rKeiv
under the Attic law.

avdpa,
Victorius quotes Eur. Hippol. 424, SouAoT yap
Kav 8pacrv<T7r\ayxv6s TIS , orav (rvveiSrj /ui/Tpos ij Trarpbs Kand.
a Karaia-xwova-iv i'pya] The subject of the neut. plur. with verb singular, and the exceptions, is well treated in Jelf's Gr. Gr. 384, 385.
Porson, Addenda ad Eur. Hec. 1149, had restricted the exceptions to persons or animate objects : Hermann, ad Soph. Electr. 430, corrects this too
limited statement. Lobeck, Phrynichus, p. 425. On Aristotle's use of this
licence, see Zell ad Eth. Nic. vol. 11. p. 4, Waitz ad Organ, vol. 1. p. 535.
'And, as a general rule, those on whose behalf (account) we ourselves feel ashamed (when they are guilty of any shameful act). These
are such as have been just named (sc. -npoyovoi 3) aXXoi nvis K.T.X.) as well
as all such as fall back upon us (acaêpo/ievoi, re-lati, who refer to us, as
patrons or authorities), those, that is, to whom we have stood in the
relation of instructors or admirers; or indeed if there be any others, like
ourselves, to whom we look up as competitors for distinction: for there
are many things which out of consideration for such we either do or
avoid doing from a feeling of shame'.
27. 'And when we are likely to be seen, and thrown together' (dvaorpetpeo-dai, versari, conversari; of converse, conversation, in its earlier
application) ' in public with those who are privy to (our disgrace), we are
more inclined to feel ashamed'. Comp. Thucyd. I 37. 4, Kav TOVTW TO
fV7rp67ret aenrovbov ovx "iva p j ^vvaSiKâ-axriv irepois 7rpoj3e/3X;j/Tm, aXk' on-coy
Kara, jxovas dSuccoo-4, Kal oirais iv w p.kv av Kparaxri fiiafavrai, ov S' av "Kddaxn
7r\cou camera', rjv 8e TTOV TI wpotrkafittXTW avai(ry(yvTacn.
" May be spared
their blushes, as there are none to witness them." According to the proverb, Pudor in oculis habitat. Arnold ad loc.
To which also Antiphon the poet referred (odev, from which principle he derived his remark) when, on the point of being flogged to death
by Dionysius, he said, as he saw those who were to die with him (his
fellow-sufferers) covering their faces as they passed through the gates (at
the city gates, where a crowd was gathered to look at them), " Why hide
your faces? Is it not for fear that any one of these should see you
to-morrow?"'
PHTOPIKHS B 6 27 ; 7 I.
87
a? yecrav Sid rwv irvXwv, (CTI i

\v7TT(r6e" e(prr f(rj fxri avpiov Tts i//xas t^tj TO
irepl fxev oiiv cucr^wj/s TavTa- 7repi Se avauryyv- p. 71.
SrjXov ws e/c TWV ivavTiwv e\nropr\(TO]xev. T'KTI CHAP. VII.
On Antiphon the tragic poet, see II 2. 195 and on dirorvfitraviêo-dai,
c. 5 14. ^
iyKdXvTnea-Oai, ' to hide the face' especially for shame. Plat. Phaedr.
2
43 B, yviivjj TTJ tccfpaXy, Kai ovx. a<nrep Tore vn al(TX'"vrls ^yêKaXvîxevog. I n
Phaedo 117 c, Phaedo covers his face to hide his tears, aora/crl câSpa ra
dcucpva, wore eyKakvyfraiievos diretcKaov e/iavTov. Stallbaum refers to Dorville
ad Charit. p. 274. Aesch. c. Tim. 26, (Timarchus) yv/j,v6s iirayKparla^v

...ouro) KaKms (cm alaxpas diaKelfifVos TO <r<5/ia viro /ieîjs KCU |38cXupias, <Sare
TOVS ye ev (ppovovuras iyKakvyfrcHrdaL, alcrxvvBevras virep Ttjs nokeas K.T.\.
In the 3rd of the letters attributed to Demosthenes, 1485.9, rfjs 'Aprroyeirovos Kpl<rea>s dvafivrjirBevTes eyKaKvâcrde (hide your faces for shame).
Also for fear, Arist. Plut. 77> /ro TQVT' iya> /xeV evdvs eVe/caAu^djuijv
SeiVar, Ib. 7'4Plutarch, x Orat. Vit., 'Avncpav, relates this story of Antiphon the
orator. He was sent on an embassy to Dionysius tyrant of Syracuse;
and, at a drinking party, the question arising, which was the ' best
bronze' in the world, rls apto-ros i<rri xaXxoy; Antiphon said that was the
best of which the statues of Harmodius and Aristogiton were made.
Dionysius interpreting this as implying a similar design upon himself
ordered him to be executed. Others say that the order was given in a fit
of passion brought on by Antiphon's criticism of his tragedies.
TJ /UIJ m Xbrj] The alternative rj prefixed to the interrogative sentence,
expresses the opinion of the writer or speaker,' It is soisn't it ?' ' You do
think so, don't you?' and is most familiar in the Platonic dialogues ; also
very frequent in our author. The alternative, which conveys this, refers
to a suppressed clause or clauses, " Is it so and so, or so and so,or
rather, as I myself think and suppose that you do also, is it not thus ?"
In order to express this, in translating we supply the negative. Socrates'
rj ov ; 'You think so, don't you?', which occurs so constantly (in Plato) at
the end of his arguments, may seem to contradict this. But it really
amounts to the same thing. Socrates, meaning to imply that he expects
the other's assent, says (literally)' or not?'; which is, being interpreted,
' You surely don't think otherwise ?' Dionysius' rj ûj consequently mean
when expressed at full length ' Is it anything else, or is it not rather as I
suppose, lest'...
' So much for shame: of shamelessness, the topics may plainly be
derived from the opposites of these'.
CHAP. VII.
xapis, the nados, or instinctive emotion, of which this Chapter treats,
represents the tendency or inclination to benevolence, to do a grace,
favour, or service, spontaneous and disinterested ( 2, 5) to another, or
to our fellow-man. It also includes the feeling of gratitude, the instinctive inclination to return favours received.
88
PHT0PIKH2 B ; 2 .
^
Trjv X^PLV $fav
2 opia-a/uLevois
p
avrol e
etTTcu. e<rT&>
Kad' rjv 6 exoov XeyeTcu X"-PIV virovpyeiv
Zeofxevca fxrj
TWOS, /ULt}^' 'iVOL Tl aVTGO TO VTTOVpyOVVTl dW
'lV
i. 'The objects of benevolence, the circumstances and occasions

(on which it is exercised), and the dispositions, characters, and moods
of mind (of those who exercise it), will be evident when we have
defined benevolence'.
2, ' Let us then assume benevolence to be that, in accordance with
(under the influence of) which he who has the feeling is said to do a service
tp one who is in want of it, not in return for anything (as a compensation
or payment)'it must be spontaneous as an instinct'nor for his own
benefit, but for the advantage of the other party (to the transaction,
sKt'iva): the favour is great if it be (conferred on) one who is in extreme
need of it, or if (the benefit it confers) be of great value or difficult (of
attainment), on occasions of the like kind (fieyaKois Kal â\e7roir), or if
it be unique' (a solitary instance of such a service, the only time it ever
was conferfed : supply rj av fiovos 6 vwovpyau vTrovpyijarj or simply âp/cnjrai), ' or the first of its kind pi the most important of its kind {lit. more
than any one else has ever done)'.
A passage of Cicero, de Invent. XXXVlll. 112, will serve as a commentary on this. Beneficia ex sua vi, ex tempore, ex animo eius qui
facit,ex casu, considerantur. (The character of acts of benevolence is
gathered or determined from these four considerations.) Ex sua vi
quaerentur hoc modo: magna an fiarva, facilia an difficilia, singularia
sint an vulgaria, vera an falsa, quanam exornatione honestentur: ex
tempore autem, si tutn quum indigeremus, quum ceteri non possent,
aut nollent, opitulari, si turn quum spes deseruisset: ex animo si
non sui commodi causa, si eo consilio fecit omnia ut hoc conficere
posset: ex casu, si non for tuna sed industria factum videbitur aut si
industria fortuna obstitisse. From this close resemblance I should
infer, not that Cicero had Aristotle's work before him when he wrote
the de Inventione, but rather that it had been handed down, perhaps
from him in the first instance, as a common-place in the ordinary books
of Rhetoric.
It was a disputed question, says Ar. again, Eth. Nic. vin 15, 1163
a 9, seq., whether the magnitude of a favour or benefit is to be measured
by the amount of service to the recipient, or by the beneficence1 of the
doer, of it:. the former being always inclined in the estimate of its
value to underrate, the latter to overrate it. ot îv yap iradovres Toiavra
ff>a(Tt \a/3elv napa TU>V evepyerav a ixiKpa rjv indvots Kal iqv nap' irepav
XafSeiv, KaTao-piKpifrvTes' oi S' avcmaXiv ra fityicrra rav Trap' aiirolf Kal a nap'
aW(ou OVK rjv, Kal iv KIVVVOLS T) rotavrais vpetats.
1
rg TOO bpi.aa.VTos eiepyevi,}. The amount of pains, labour, risk, or sacrifice
incurred by the conferrer of the benefit here seems to be regarded as the measure
of his ' beneficence '.
PHTOPIKHS B 7 2, 3.
89
e/ceiVa> TV \xeyd.Xr\ S' aV ^ (T(pohpa êofievw, rj fxeyaXtou

Kai âXerrwu, r\ iv KaipoTs TOIOVTOLS, TJ /J.6VOS r\ irpw3 TOS t] ixd\i(TTa.
Se^Vet? ' ettnV at operas, Kai TOVTCOV fxd\i(TTa ai fxerd Xv7rt]$ TOV fxrj yiyvofxevov'
TOiavrai oe 01 GTTivvfxiai, oiov o epws. Kai ai ev TCILS
TOV au)fxaTO but this I believe cannot be intended ; though
gratitude and ingratitude are not distinctly noticed in the chapter.
The case is this. x<*P's m this chapter is employed exclusively in its
sicbjective sense (see the Lexx.), to denote one of the instinctive feelings :
when therefore it is applied to express gratitude, it is the feeling only,
and not the actual return of the favour, which is taken into account.
Thisis expressed by the words fit) avrl TWOS, which signify that it is ' independent of the actual requital of the benefit conferred': and, indeed,
gratitude may be equally felt when the receiver of the favour has no
means of repaying it in kind. This independent or subjective feeling
of gratitude is therefore opposed in the words fifi dvrl TWOS to the notion of a
pio-86s, the 'payment' or wages which a workman receives in fulfilment
of an implied contract; where there is no feeling of gratitude or obligation remaining on either side after the work is done and paid for. Whereas
gratitude is a permanent feeling, and the sense of obligation still remains
after the requital or repayment of the service. The opposite to this is
OH dnedaxav dXX' OVK eSa>Kav, 5. It may be argued in certain cases
that what appears to proceed from gratitude or spontaneous benevolence,
is in reality nothing but the repayment of an obligation, with which xp
is not concerned.
3. 'All our natural impulses are wants, and of these those especially
which are accompanied by pain at the non-attainment (^?) yiyvofievov) of
their object: such are the appetites and desires, as love'. On'6ptissee p. 9,
note on II 2. 1. The connexion of this remark is with the deofievca of the
preceding definition. The feeling (and the consequent act) of benevolence
always implies the satisfaction of some want in the recipient of the
favour; if he did not want it, it would be no favour. And besides this,
the magnitude of the want is a measure of the magnitude of the favour
and of the benevolence that prompts it. Aristotle therefore proceeds to
notice some of the principal wants, in the satisfaction of which \apcs
is manifested in the highest degree. All our natural impulses imply
the 6peeis, the 'conative' or striving faculties, all aim at some
wants
object which they desire to attain. To the 'impulsive' element of our
nature, TO opmcTiKov, belong the appetites and desires such as love (the
animal passion). (Besides these the opeis includes 6vp.6s, and povXrjcns
'the will'.) These appetites and desires, being always accompanied with
pain when thwarted or failing to attain their object, are for this
reason 'wants in the highest degree', HOXIO-TO deijo-eis.
Kai al (iiridvixiai) iv rais TOC crw/xaroy KaKwo-eai Kai iv Kivhvvois (fiakio-ra
m s tlalvj]
'Also those (desires) that occur in (belong to) bodily
go
PHT0PIKH2 B 7 3, 4.
Kivduvevwv ewiGvixei Kai 6 \ir7rov/j.evos. Bio 01 ev irevia.

Trapicrraixevoi Kai (pvyals, KCLV fxiKpa v
Bid TO peyedos TJS herio-ews Kai TOV Kaipov
4 voi, oiov 6 iv AvKeita TOV (pop/mov Sous. dvayKr] ovv
fj.aXiorTa [xev ets Tavra e%etv Trjv vrrovpyiav, ei oe fi.t],
ets tcra rj fxei^co. WO~T' iirel (pavepov Kai OT Kai i<p'
oh yiyveTai %jOis Kai 7rcos %OVO~I, ZfiXov on e/c
TOVTCOV TrapacTKevacTTiov, TOI)S /j.ev BeiKwras rj ovras
sufferings or injuries (are wants of a high degree): for in fact (this a note
on the preceding) every one that is in danger or in pain feels desire',
for emdv/jiel 6 Xvnovfievos compare supra c. 4 3, yiyvofievav a>v fiovkovrai
%atpov(TL Traires, Ttitv ivavr'uav
al \vircu Kai ai TJSoval.
di Xviroiivrai,
a>ffre TTJS fioxjXijO'eas <njfiiov
KaKttKTis, in its ordinary use, and especially in its legal application,

denotes a particular kind of injury or suffeung, viz. ill-treatment. It
also however bears the more general sense, at least three times in
Thucydides, II 43, where KaKaxris is a repetition of Kanoirpayovvrec, and
implies ill-fortune, disaster, suffering : VII 4, and 82, rois re rpavfiaa-i KO\
r!j aXKy KaKwo-ei, where the sense is unmistakable, and coincides exactly
with the use of it here.
'And therefore it is, that those who stand by (assist or succour,
irapuTTafievoi) a man in poverty or exile, however slight the service they
render, by reason of the magnitude of the want and the occasion, confer
a great favour' (or, 'are very agreeable, acceptable'. The word seems to
include both senses); 'like the man who lent the mat iv AvKeico'. A
friend in need is a friend indeed.
I have not attempted to translate the word Avxela. We do not even
know whether it is the name of a man or a place: it might also be the
title of a play or a speech, from which the instance was borrowed.
Victorius says, 'historia ignota mihi est;' Schrader, 'quis, cui, quando
dederit, incertum (rather ignotum) est.' The meaning is plain enough:
it is a case like that of Sir Philip Sidney's cup of cold water, in which circumstances of time and place enormously enhance the value and importance of something which in ordinary circumstances is trifling and
worthless [cf. Vol. I. pp. 84, 144].
4. ' Accordingly, the service that is received' (by the recipients,
which seems to be the subject of exelv) ' must be especially directed
to these same things' (viz. the satisfaction of the more urgent wants and
desires. I have followed Bekker in retaining ravra. MS A c has ravra,
and Q,Y b ,Z b romira, which is adopted by Victorius), 'or if not, to
things equal or greater. And therefore, now that the times, circumstances, and dispositions of mind, which give rise to benevolent feeling
have been pointed out, it is plain that it is from these sources that we
must provide our materials (for producing it in our audience), by
shewing that the one party (the recipient in the transaction) either is
PHT0PIKH2 B 7 4. 5TJ yeyevtifxevows
v7rripeTr}KOTa$ ev
5
TOVVTCLS.
ev ToiavTt]
TOICLVTY\
91
Serjcrei KCCI Xvirrj, TOWS Se
xpei'a
TOLOVTOU
TL
t] V7rr]pe-
<pavepdv he leal 66ev d(paipeT<r6ca
Tt\v XaPLV K C " Troielv aâjOi'o'TOi's* rj <ydp OTI P. 1385 b.

avTcov eviKa inrripeTovcnv rj V7rr]peTr]crav (TOVTO 8' OVK
or has been 1 in want or pain such (as has been described), and the
other either has done or is doing a service in a case of need, the service
and the need being each of the kind mentioned'.
5. 'It is plain too from what sources (or topics) may be derived
the materials for depriving (those who have conferred a favour) of (the
credit of) this kindly and benevolent feeling, and making them (and
their act appear, representing them as) devoid of all such feeling and
intention'. This is Victorius' interpretation, and I think more consistent
with what follows than that of Schrader, who understands it of the
audience, and not of the benefactor; and explains it, "facere ut affectu
illo, qui ad gratiam habendam referendamve fertur, vacui nant auditores." dx&pLo-Tos and dxapiros, 'without grace', stand in the first instance
for 'unpleasing, disagreeable',so in Homer, Theognis, Herodotus
and express the opposite of Kexapta-fi-ivos, supra 3 : and this, with the
substitution of the special sense of x-Pli a s a irddos for the general sense
of grace, beauty, favour, is the meaning given to the words by Aristotle
here: 'without grace' is here to be understood 'without this kindly
feeling'. The ordinary use of the word for 'ungrateful' is founded upon
a third sense of x-p^, viz. gratitude.
' For (we may argue) either that the (boasted) service is, or was, done
from motives of self-interest, and this, as we said, (^v, by definition,
2,) is not benevolent feeling, or that the service was an accident of
coincidence, or done under constraint, or that it was a payment and
not a free gift, whether the party was aware (of his obligation to the
other, so Victorius) or not 2 : for in both cases (whether conscious or
unconscious) it was a mere barter or exchange, and therefore again in this
respect no benevolence1.
1
yeyev-qjiivovs. There seems to be no intelligible distinction here made
between e'vai and yiyveaBai; at least, none that is worth expressing in the translation. "What again is the difference intended between the two verbs in this
passage, yev6/j,eva rj eV6/jej/a, II. 8. 13? It may be supposed that Aristotle has
only used the latter verb in default of a perfect of the former. And it is certain
that the Greek writers do occasionally employ forms of ylyveadm where our idiom
requires the substitution of the simple ' to be'. If the word here be translated
literally, the notion of ' becoming' must be rendered by ' having come to be in,
or fallen into, such want'.
2
If I understand Aristotle aright, I cannot see how the alternative eiVe /dy
el Sires can be fairly and properly included in this topic; though it might of course
be employed by an unscrupulous speaker to delude an unintelligent audience.
It seems to me that the forgetfulness or ignorance that anything is due to the
person who receives the favour does alter the character of the transaction; that
the gift in such a case may be a free gift, and the feeling that prompts it x^'s,
disinterested benevolence, and that the rl dm' Tiros does not here fairly apply.
92
PHTOPIKHS B 7 5, 6.
r\v X^9l%)->
% Tl
)> %
a 7r
' TVXVS
XV o-vvewea-ev n
v v , JJ o n aTrelooKav d\X OVK elwKav, eir eidores
eiVe [xr\- dfx(j)OTepa)s ydp TI dvrl TWOS, WVT' OI/'S'
6 OUTWS av eiri x<*PL<s- Kal Trepl ctTraVcts rds KocTtvyoplas
(TKe7rT6OW n yap xa'/ots CVTJI/ fj OTL Todc r\ TO<TOVCL h
n 7TOT6 t) 7TOV. (Tr]ÔV
]
6, 1 eXaTTOV fir]
<riv, as in (re'/OTToi/m and irvfKpopa, m a r k s t h e 'coincidence.'
a-vvrivaynda-drjo-av]
T h e <rvv in this compoundcompare Lat. cogere,
comfiellere conveys the notion of bringing close together, squeezing,

crowding, and hence of wnpression, constraint; and thus enforces the
avayKrj of the verb with which it is combined. Compare uvyaniâi
and <jv]miXeiv (Plat. Tim.).
In illustration of the topic cnribaxav aXX' OVK ehaxav, Victorius very
appositely cites the case of Demosthenes and Halonnesus referred to by
Aeschines Kara KTt]<rt>&vTos 83. 'A\6wr)<rov eSifiou (Philip offered to give,
make us a present of Halonnesus), o 8' (Demosthenes) cmr)y6peve fifj Xa/i./Sai/etv, el Stiaxnv dXXa pr) airobidaxriv (if the offer is to be regarded as a free
gift instead of a repayment), Trepl crvWafiaiv Siacpepofievos: and (in Athenaeus vi 223 D224 B) by the orator Cothocides ; and the Comic Poets,
Antiphanes (iv NEOTTISI), Alexis (eu irpaTiaTrj and eV 'A8eX(o7s), Anaxilas
(eV EiWSpi'a), and Timocles (iv ""Upaxriv), who ridicule the objection
as a mere verbal quibble. The phrase seems to have passed almost into
a proverb. Victorius truly observes, "maioris tamen ponderis res erat
quam videbatur, ut ex hoc quoque loco intelligitur." Demosthenes seems
to have advised his Athenians to refuse the offer as a gift, and only to
accept it as a repayment of an outstanding obligation. The argument
derived from Aristotle's topic when applied to the case would be different.
This offer is prompted by no x<*Pls o r kindly feeling, as Philip represents
i t ; for it is no free gift but the mere payment of a debt. Consequently
he is dx&pioros, and we owe him no x^Pls> o r gratitude, in return.
OD'S' OVTOIS] 'neither in this way'. 'Neither in this way1 (i.e. in the
two last cases of intentional or even unintentional repayment, included
as one under the head of repayment), is it true x"Pts> any more than in
the two preceding, where the act is (1) not disinterested, or (2) accidental
or compulsory.
6. ' And (in estimating the value of the feeling or act of benevolence) we must examine it under all the Categories; for x<W may be
referred to that of substance (the fact) or quantity, or quality, or time,
or place'. Schrader has illustrated the first three of these, but examples
are hardly necessary where they so readily suggest themselves. Brandis,
in the tract so often cited [Philo/ogus IV i], p. 26, observes on this
passage, that though there can be no doubt that when Aristotle wrote
this he had the list of categories lying before him, whether or no the
book was then written cannot be decided.
' And it is a sign (of the axapiaria, the absence of benevolent feeling,
that there was no intention of obliging us, and that we therefore owe
PHTOPIKHS B 7 6; 8 I, 2.
93
v7rripeTti(rav, Kal el TOIS e ^ p o l s rj ravrd rj 'icra tj

o)' SfiXov yap on ov$e r a u r a IJ/XWJ/ eveKa. JJ el
<pavXa elhw'S' ovdek ydp 6/j.oXoyeT $eT<r6ai (havXcov.
a l e(T aL
Kc
KCCI Trepl fxeu TOV x P ^, ^
" djâpia-Teiv e'lpn1 Tar Troia 3' eXeeivd Kal Tivas eXeovcri, Kal 7rws avTOi CHAp vm>
2 eX0VTe^y heyw/jLev. ecrTU) Srj eXeos Xxnrr] r t s eVt <pai- p . ?2<
vo/mevco KaKto (pdapTucui $ Xv7rr]pw TOV dva^lov Tuyâthem no thanks), if people have previously refused a smaller service1',
because it is clear that they must have had some interested motive in
conferring the greater, which destroys the favour: ' or if they have done the
same or equal or greater to our enemies; for it is plain that here again
the service was not disinterested', was not done for our sake. ' Or if the
service was worthless, and the doer of it knew it to be so';(like the
' Calabrian host' and his pears, fiords comedenda, which he tries to force
upon his unwilling guest; Hor. Epist. I 7. 14 seq. Prodigus et stultus don at
quae sfiernit et odit)' for no one will admit that he wants things worthless'.
' Having thus dispatched the subject of favours bestowed from feelings of benevolence and the reverse, let us now pass on to things pitiable^ the objects of pity, and the states of mind or dispositions in which
it resides'.
CHAP. VIII.
2. Pity, according to the popular definition, which is all that Rhetoric requires, is a feeling of pain that arises on the occasion of any evil,
or suffering, manifest, evident {apparent, to the eye or ear), deadly or
(short of that) painful, when unmerited; and also of such a kind as we
may expect to happen either to ourselves or to those near and dear to us,
and that when it seems to be near at hand: for it is plain that any one
who is capable of feeling {lit. is to feel) the emotion of pity must be such
as to suppose himself liable to surfer evil of some kind or other, himself
or his friends; and evil of that kind which has been stated in the definition, or like it, or nearly like it.
On (fmivoiievcp = (}>avepcp, evident, unmistakable, see note on p. 10(112.1).
Victorius understands it to mean " quod nobis malum videatur: possemus
enim in hoc falli, atque earn miseriam esse iudicare quae minime sit."
But this surely would be expressed by boxeiu, not (paluco-dai: and to say
nothing of the numerous examples by which the other interpretation is
supported, (some of which are given in the note above referred to,) this
seems to be more appropriate to what follows, and to the nature of the
TraBos itself: for the feeling of pity is strong in proportion to the vividness with which the suffering is brought home to us 2 . The actual sight
of it, when we see the effect of the injury (and perhaps also a graphic
description of it from an eye-witness), gives it a reality and a force which
1
Toup, quoted by Gaisford, very unnecessarily conjectures el (Xarrov ij.iv,
' si minus dederint quam par esset.'
2
A remark of Lessing, at the end of the first section of his Laokoon, will serve
as a commentary on Aristotle's (ptuvofiAvy. "Alles stoische ist untheatralisch;
94
PHTOPIKHS B 82.
veiv, o KCLV avTos trpecrôKria-eiev av irafieiv h TWV

intensify our sympathy. That this is Aristotle's meaning appears most
clearly from a subsequent passage, 8, where these painful things are
enumerated, and are found to be all of them bodily affections : and still
14 where the effect of irpb onfiarmv iroiziv is
more perhaps from 14,
described. Aristotle has omitted, designedly or not, all mention of
mental suffering: perhaps he thought that not being actually visible it
was incapable of exciting pity. See further on this in note on II 8.8.
Again, this view of the meaning of the word is in exact agreement
with a preceding observation upon pain, II 4. 31, that 'all painful things
are objects of sense, (that is, all feelings which can properly be called
painful are excited by sensible objects,)1 and the greatest evils, as wickedness and folly, are the least sensible; for the presence of vice causes no
pain'. Victorius, who however does not refer to this passage, has
pointed out that the kind of evil which excites pity is distinguished and
limited by the epithets (pdapTinw Kal XvTrtjpcp; which upon the principle
laid down in c. 4. 31 excludes the greatest evils, moral and intellectual,
as objects of pity.
With TOV dvaiov Tvyx-veiv comp. II 9. I, avTiKdrai TO e'Xeeie...o
nakovcri ve^craV T<}> yap \vneicr6ai in\ rats avaîais KaKoirpaylcus /c.r.A.
When a bad man suffers we look upon it as a deserved punishment, and
(eel no pity, unless we deem the punishment to be excessive. 'Alas',
says Carlyle, of the end of the Girondins, ' whatever quarrel we had with
them, has not cruel fate abolished it ? Pity only survives.' French Revolution, Pt. ill. Bk. IV. c. 8, ult.
The last clause of the definition, o K&V avros K.T.\., expresses the compassion, sympathy with the sufferer, the fellow-feeling, implied in pity.
Haud ignara malt miseris succurrere disco. It is only in this form, as
'compassion', that the emotion enters into Mr Bain's list; Eiiwtions
and Will, p. 112, [chap, vil 22, ed. 1875]. Compassion, according
to him, is one of the benevolent affections, a group subordinate to
the family of Tender Emotions. This appears to be a juster view
of the nature and connexion of the feeling than the account given
by Aristotle. The fact is, as I have elsewhere stated2, that the conception of general benevolence and love and duty to our fellow-creatures, is of modern and Christian origin, and finds no place in Aristotle's Ethical System: the xw* of the preceding chapter includes but
und unser mitleiden ist allezeit dem leiden gleichmdssig welches der interessirende
gegenstand dussert. Sieht man ihn sein elend mit grosser seele ertragen, so wird diese
grosse seele zwar unsere bewunderung erwecken, aber die brarunderung ist ein kalter
affekt, dessen imthdtiges staunen jede andere warmere leidenschaft, so wie jede andere
deutliche vorstellimg, ausschliesset."
1
This however seems to require some qualification: it is true of course of all
bodily pain; but are not certain mental states, as doubt, suspense, uncertainty,
disappointment, also painful? In the case of Xeos, Ar. probably means that at
least some sensible image, a mental representative, or tpavraaia, proceeding from
some object of sense, is required to excite the painful feeling. But surely we can
pity the mental as well as the bodily sufferings of a friend, provided he makes
them sufficiently distinct and intelligible to us.
2
Review of Aristotle's System of Ethics, 1867, p. 52.
PHT0PIKH2 B 8 2, 3.
95
avTOu Ttva, Kai TOUTO oTav 7r\r](riov (palvrjTar $fj\ov

yap OTi dvdyKt] TOV /diWovTa e\eri<reiv inrdp-yeiv TOIOVTOV oiov oieo'dai iradeiv av TL KaKov fj avTov r\ TWV
avTov Tivd, Kai TOIOVTO KaKov oiov e'lpr}Tai ev TW opw
3 h bfJiOLOv i) 7rapaTrXr](TL0V. $10 OUT ol 7ravTe\u>-i diroeXeovcriv (ovfiev yap av TI 7ra6eiv O'LOVTUL'
yap) OVTS ol v7repev<$ai[jiove?v olofxevoi, dXK
vfipi'Cpvcnv el yap airavTa olovTai vTrdp-êiv Tayadd,
a small part of it, being in fact confined to doing a service to a friend
in need. Again the limitation of pity to those sufferings to which
we ourselves or our friends are exposed, ascribes a selfishness to the
emotion which seems not necessarily to belong to it. In fact if this were
true, the God of the Christian, and the gods of the heathen would be
alike incapable of it. Hobbes, in accordance with his theory of universal selfishness, goes beyond Aristotle in attributing the feeling solely
to self-love. Leviathan, Pt. 1. c. 6, ' Grief for the calamity of another is
Pity; and ariseth from the imagination that the like calamity may befall
himself; and therefore is called also Compassion, and in the phrase of
this present time a Fellow-feeling. And therefore' (he continues, another
point of contact with Aristotle,) 'for calamity arising from great wickedness the best men have the least pity; and for the same calamity those
have pity that think themselves least obnoxious to the same.' [Hobbes,
as is well known, analysed Aristotle's treatise in his Brief of the Art
of Rhetorick, first printed with date in 1681. The Leviathan was published in 1651. S.J
The Stoic definition, quoted by Victorius from Diog. Laert, Zeno, VII
I, is in partial agreement with that of Aristotle, but omits the last clause;
?Xfor m Xujn/ <BS rl dvaîas KaKonaBovvri. Whence Cicero, Tusc. Disp.
IV 8. 18, misericordia est aegritudo ex miseria alterius iniuria laborantis.
But the Stoics, though they thus defined pity, nevertheless condemned
the exercise of it: Diog. Laert., u. s., 123, c'Xci?novas prj elvai avy/vay^v
T exelv Piftevi' pf/ y<*p irapievai Vets EK TOV vopov iinfiaXkovo-as KoXao-fis,
cVel TO y eliceiv Kai 6 eXcos avTt] ff rj ime'iKeia ovSeveid ian tyvxfjs Trpos
Ko\ao~eis 7rpoo'7roiovfivrj \pr\(jTOTr\Ta' fir/ft o'Uadai o~K\riporepas auras elvai.
" Pity, anger, loveall the most powerful social impulses of our nature
are ignored by the Stoics, or at least recognised only to be crushed."
Lightfoot, Dissert. II on Ep. to Philip, p. 320.
3. 'And therefore, neither are those who are utterly lost and
ruined inclined to pityfor they suppose themselves to be no more liable
to suffering, seeing that their sufferings are all over (their cup of suffering
has been drained to the dregs)nor those who deem themselves transcendantly happy; on the contrary, they wax wanton in insolence. For,
supposing themselves to be in possession of every kind of good, it is
plain that they must assume also their exemption from all liability to
evil; which in fact is included in the class total of goods'
See note on flprjo-da, i n . 29, and the examples of the
96
PHTOPIKHS B 8 3, 4.
SfjXov on Kal TO fxri evlex^dai

iradeiv fxtêv KCIKOV
4 Kal yap rovro TOOV dyadwv.
elcrl $e TOIOUTOI oloi
iradeiv av 01 r e ireirovdores tjBr] teal hiaire(pevs, Kal 61 7rpe<rfiuTepoi Kal $ia TO (ppovelv Kat CL
fxdWov,
ifjnreiplav, Kal 01 d(r6evei<s, Kal 01 dei\6rtpoi
indicative perfect there collected. Cf. Troia fuit. Fuit Ilium et ingens
gloria Teucrorum.
4. 'Persons inclined to think themselves (especially) liable to
suffering are such as the following; those who have already suffered
some disaster from which they have made their escape (i. e. were not iravTeA<3r cmokasKores, completely ruined by it), and men advanced in years,
by reason of the prudence (or wisdom) and experience 1 (which belong to
advanced age), and the weak (in body; who are powerless to protect
themselves against aggression and injury), and those who are of a rather
more timid disposition than ordinary (this is weakness of mind), and men
of study and cultivation, for these are men who can accurately calculate'
(the chances of human life; by the experience and knowledge which their
studies have taught them. So Victorius).
mi dumeipevyoTfs] This is a remarkable exemplification of that rule
of Rhetoric, that every question has two sides, of which either may be
maintained indifferently according to circumstances, and that all its
materials and reasonings are confined to the sphere of the probable.
Here we have a flat contradiction of the statement in the chapter on
<poj3os and Bapa-os, II 5. 18, where we are told that repeated escape from
danger is a ground of confidence. The fact is that it may give rise to
either, according to the temper and turn of mind of this or that individual : the sanguine will derive confidence from repeated escapes; the
anxious and timorous, and the student or philosopher, the Solon, who
has learnt by bitter experience that no one can be accounted happy
until the end has come,the second class, the ireTraihcvuivoi, [will be
affected in exactly the opposite manner], for the reason given by Aristotle
himself, euXoyioroi yap. There can be no doubt that he had two different
kinds of characters in his mind when he made the opposite statements.
oifieiXorepoi/iaXXov] It is quite possible to find a distinct meaning
for both these comparatives and not regard them as mere tautology.
The comparative in Greek, Latin, English, when it stands alone, with
the object of comparison suppressed, has two distinguishable significations ; fiaXkou, for example, is either (1) p.aXXoi< TOS htovros, 'too
much', (ne quid nimis), more than it ought to be ; or (2), what we express
by 'rather', (itself a comparative of rathe 'early'comp. Ital. fiiutosto,
1
By these they have been taught the instability of all human fortunes; T&Vepibira/a, their constant liability to accident and calamity and ' all the ills that
flesh is heir to.' ptpcua d' ovSeh dvrjTbs tirvxet yt-/(bs. Eur. Fragm. ap. Stob.
p. 562 (Fr. incert. 44 Dind. [fr. 1059, ed. 5]). 0j/)jrds yap coy Kal 01/ijrct wei<reo6cu
SI5K- 0eov lov tfjy dfiois avdpuiros w; Ibid. p. 568 (No. 45 Dind. [fr. 1060,
ed. ?]).
PHTOPIKH2 B 8 s, 6.
5 Kal ol TreTraieviJ.evoc ev\6yi<rT0L yap.
)(OV(TL
yovets
6 ravra,
tj
TCKVO.
r\ yvvcuKSS'
Kal ola TraBeTv ra elpt]fxeva.
97
Kal oh v-rrdp-
avrov
re
yap
Kal ol fx^Te ev
dvfipias 7rd6ei b'vres, oiou ev opyfj rj ddppei
(d\6yio~Ta
yap rod ecrofxevou r a u r a ) , JULI^T' ev vfipicrTiKfj Ziadecrei
( l
ydp
OVTOI
aXoyiaroi
TOVTCOV.
/JL/JT'
TOV
7rei(recr6ai TI),
a'AA' ol
av (poftov/uLevoi crcpofipa- ov ydp
ol eK7re7r\t]yiuLevoi did TO eivai upo? TW oiKeiw

piutosto grasso 'rather fat'), i.e. more than ordinary, \iSKkov TOV eladuros,
a little in excess, rather more than usual. Hence oi deikorcpoi fiaKXov maybe rendered 'rather too timid', more in a slight degree than men usually
are, and also 'unduly timid', more so than they ought to be. Examples of
this 'double comparative'it being assumed apparently that it is in all
cases a mere tautological reduplicationare given by Victorius ad I 7. 18,
and by Waitz (from Aristotle) on Top. r I, 116 4, Vol. n p. 465. I have
shewn on 1 7.18, that fiaXkov KOXXIOV there is not a case in point, both
of the words having each its own meaning. Of the reduplicated comparative and superlative, some examples are given in Matth. Gr. Gr.
458, 461, and of the latter, by Monk, Hippol. 487.
fvXoyicrTos, opposed to aXoyioroy 5> means one that ev Xo-yiferat,
is good or ready at calculating, or reasoning in general: and marks
the reflecting, thoughtful man, as opposed to the careless and unreflecting, who does not look forward or take forethought at all.
5' ' And those who have parents or children or wives (are inclined
to pity), because these are one's own (part and parcel of oneself) and
at the same time liable to the accidents before mentioned'.
6. 'And those who are neither in a state of feeling implying
courage, as anger or confidence,for these {ravra, ra iraQrj) take no
thought for' ('are devoid of calculation or reflexion', as before) 'the future
nor in a temper of insolence and wantonnessfor these also never
reflect upon the possibility of future disaster, but those who are in a
state of mind intermediate to these. Nor again those who are in excessive
terror, for people who are startled (frightened out of their wits) have no
pity for others because they are absorbed by their own emotion (or
suffering)'. oiKfi'a> 'that which is their own', or proper to them at the
moment, and so does not allow them to think of the suffering of others,
opposed to ra dXXorpla. Comp. infra II, ro yap Seivbv erepov TOU
Iketivov, Kai cKKpovo-rticbv TOV e'Xeov K.T.X., and King Lear, V 3. 230. Albany.
Prodtice their bodies, be they alive or dead. This judgment of the heavens,
that makes us tremble, touches us not with pity. Compare also, I 14. 5,
o 01 aKovovres (frofiovvTai paXKov r) iXeovaiv, and Cic. Tusc. Disp. Ill 27,
quoted by Victorius on that passage.
itpbs T& olnela) rradei.) From the primary, physical, sense of irpos with
the dative 'at, by, upon', (ftaXXeiv TTOT\ yair/, Horn. II. A 245,) and so
'resting upon', is immediately derived, by an obvious metaphor, that
AR. II.
98
PHT0PIKH2 B 8 7.
7 Trddei. KCLV o'itovTal Tivas eivai eVtet/cers* 6 yap

oiofxevos 7rdvTas olncreTai d^lovs eivai Kaicov. Kai 6A.s P. 1386.
hi\ OTav e-)(Tf\ OVTWS COUTT dva/nvr](r6fjvai TOiavra (rvfxof 'mentally resting upon, fixed upon, devoted to, busily engaged in (as a
pursuit)', or as here, 'absorbed in'; generally with ehai but also with other
verbs signifying a state of rest. The usage is very inadequately illustrated,
in fact, hardly noticed, in most of the grammars and lexicons that I
have consulted, with the exception of that of Rost and Palm : I will
therefore add a few examples that I have noted, though some of these
are to be found in the lexicon above named. Wyttenbach, on Plut.
de ser. num. vind. 549 D (Op. VII p. 328), and on Plat. Phaedo 84 c
(p. 223), has supplied instances chiefly from Plutarch and still later writers,
to which Heindorf refers in his note on a passage of the Phaedo. Plat.
Rep. VI 500 B, irpbs ro'ts ovo-i rfjv Siavotav ex0VTt (with the mind, i. e. the
attention fixed upon), Ib. v m 567 A, irpbs T<3 <ad' rjfitpav (/3i'o> i. e. Tpo<prj)
dvayKafavrai eivai, I b . IX 585 A, Trpbs ir\r]pa>o-ei re tca\ iJSovi; yiyvetrBai.
Critias, 109 E, Parmen. 126 C, irpbs iiririKrj ra TroXXa Siarplfia.. Phaedo 84C,
Phaedr. 249 C, 7rpos c'neivois ae\ to-ri IIVI}JJ,J], D, n-por rco Beta yiyvojirvos.
Demosth. de Cor. 176, r\v...TrpbsTOo-Koirdv...yevr]o-6e (seriously occupy

yourselves in the consideration...give your serious attention to it). Id.
de Fals. Leg. 139, oKos irpbs ra Xtjppan qv. Aesch. c. Timarch, 74,
Trpbs rfi avayufi ravrr) ylyveo-Bai. Ib. adv. Ctes. 192, irpbs irepa nvl
TTJV yva>/j.rjv exflvArist. Pol. VIII (v) 8, ter. 1308 b 36, jrpos ro'ts Idiots
<Tx<>\aeu> (to have leisure to attend to their private affairs), 1309 a 5, 7rpos
ro'ts Ibiats clvai, Ib. line 8, Siarpi'/3ftv rrpos TOIS epyois. I b . c. I I , 1313 b 20,
irpbs ra Kad' ij/j.epav ovres a(rxoXoi uo~iv cirifiovkeiuv.
I b . VII (Vl) 4>
1318 b 13, 7rpor rois epyots Siarptfietv. Similarly in Latin: Cic. de Or.
I 8.34, studium in quo estis. Hor. Sat. I 9. 2, totus in Mis. Epist. I
1. 11, omnis in hoc sum.
7. ' W e pity also any of those that we deem men of worth: for
if there be any one who thinks that there are none, such will believe that
every one deserves to suffer'.
o yap p.rjBeva olojxevos (eivai (irieiKrj) K.T.\^]
Such as T i m o n 'of
Athens', 0 ixio-avBpcoiros, Viet, and Schrad.; of Timon, see Arist. Av.

1549, Lysistr. 808 seq., Phryn. Com. Moj/6rpo;ror, Fr. I., Lucian, Tim.
Hemsterh. ad Luc. I p. 99. Plut. vit. Anton, c. 69 ult, 70. Meineke,
Hist. Com. Gr. I p. 327. Cic. Tusc. Disp. IV 11. 25, (odium) in hominum
universum genus, quod accepimus de Timone, qui fittravBpanros appellatur.
Id. de Amic. XXIII. 87. Schrader cites also Mamercus, in Martial.
Ep. v 28, which concludes thus ; Hominem malignum forsan esse tu
credas: ego esse miserum credo cut placet nemo.
'And indeed in general, (a man is inclined to pity) whensoever he
is in such a mood as to call to mind things similar that have happened
either to himself or to one of those he loves, or to anticipate the possibility' (yeuio-Bai without av) 'of their happening either to himself or
his friends'. On the ellipse in rav avroi see the note on the parallel
case, II 2. 1, tj rmv avrov.
dvafivrja-Brjvai] Victorius quotes Virgil's Dido, kaud ignara mali miseris

s-uccurrere discoj and Theseus, Soph. Oed. Col. 562.
PHTOPIKHS B 87; 8.
tj avrw r\ rcov
avTto i] TWV avTOv.
CIVTOV,
$ 4\Tri<rai
w's /xeV ovv eôvTes eXeovcriv, eiprirat, a 3' e'Aeouariv, K TOV opicrfxov rj\ov 6<ra r e yap rwv \vv Kal oBvvriptov (pBapTiKa, iravTa eXeeivd, teal
eXn-i'o-ai] ikiris
and eXirlfciu, like SvtiBos, o-vfupopd, TOO-OVTOS (which
is sometimes used for 'so little') and others, are voces mediae,
i. e. have in themselves a middle or indifferent sense, to be determined
either way by the context, e/ iris is 'expectation' or 'anticipation',
and becomes either hope or fear, according as the expectation is of good
or evil. Find. Nem. I 32 (48), KOival yap epxpvT iXiriiSes nokvirovav av8pa>ircov (Dissen ad loc ). Plat. Legg. I 644 C, 86gas ixeXXovrcov, olv KOIVOV jxtv
ovojxa fXirit, 'i8iov 8i (f>6fios jitv rj irpo \v7rrjs C\TTIS, dappos 8e r\ npo TOV
ivavriov (Stallbaum ad loc). It occurs in the sense of simple expectation,

and of anticipation of evil, two or three times in Sophocles. In the
former, Trach. 721, rr/v tKiriSaxijr TV^TJS KpLveiv ndpos, Aj. 600, Kanav
An-i'8' e y w
In
the latter, Oed. R. 771 (quoted by Victorius), KOV /)
<rTept}6rjs y', es TOCTOVTOV iXniScov ep,ov /3e/3(5ro9.
I b . I 4 3 2 , eXiriSos ft' dire-
tnraa-as (the expectation of evil). So spes and sperare. Virg. Aen.

IV 419, hunc ego si pottti tantum sperare doloretn (apud Victorium), Cic.
de Or. i n 13. 51, quoniam haecsatis spero vobis...molesta etputida iiideri.
Juv. Sat. iv 57, iam quartanam sperantibus aegris: with which Ruperti,
in his note on the passage, compares the German, Ich will nicht hqffeu
dass diesesgeschehe. Sallust, Cat. 20, mala res, spes multo asperior.
cXnitjai yevtadai] See note on I 4.9, Vol. 1. p. 65.
8. ' We have now stated the moods of mind in which men are
inclined to pity; what the objects of pity are, is plain to be seen from the
definition : that is, of things which cause pain and suffering all are pitiable that are also destructive, and (in fact) everything that is destructive
and ruinous; and all evils of which chance is the cause, provided they be
of sufficient magnitude'.
On \vin)pa Kal oSvvripa, Victorius and Schrader are agreed, that Xvnrjpcs
represents mental, and 6&vvqp6s bodily, pain or suffering. But it is certain that in ordinary usage either of them can be applied to both. That
\v7rr] and Xvjrrjpos include bodily pain appears from the regular opposition
of ijdovi) and XVTTT; expressing pleasure and pain in general: equally so
in Aristotle's psychology, where 77601/17 and XVTTTJ are the necessary accompaniments of sensation in all animalsj and in Plato's moral philosophy
(Gorgias, Phaedo, Philebus, &c), where they most unmistakably include
all kinds of pleasures and pains, ohivrj and odwrjpos, though most frequently perhaps applied to pain of body (as especially in Homer, also in
Plato and in Soph. Phil. 827, O'SWJJ bodily, opposed to aXyos mental, pain\
can also be used to express mental suffering, as may be seen by consulting Rost and Palm's Lexicon. 'OSUVIJ, proprie corporis
transfertur ad
animi dolorem (Ellendt, Lex. Soph. s. v.). The derivation of SSVVT] from
a root ed 'eat', ed<o, icr8ia> edo, and of Xirnri from a root hip 'to break',
(Curtius, Grundz. der Gr. Etym. I. pp.218, 240,) throws no light upon
72
ioo
oaa dvaiperiKa, Kal ocrwu tj ri>xn curia Kaxwv

6
9 yedos ixovrwv.
ecrri <)' oSvvripa fxev Kal <p6apriKa
ddvaroi Kal aiKiai <ru>ndroov Kal KaKaxreis Kai ryr\10 pa? Kal vocroi Kal rpofbtjs evdeia, wu ' r\ rvxn
atria
KUKWV, dchiX'ta, oXiyocJiiXia ($10 Kal rb hieGTracrdai
dwo rcov (piAwv Kal <rvvt\6oov eXeewov), aia-xo?, d<roe- p. 73the distinction between them: both, according to the natural growth of
language, have a physical origin, and are transferred by metaphor to the
expression of mental affections. But, read by the light of the explanatory
8, the difficulty is at once cleared up. Only obvvrfpa is repeated, which "
shews that the difference between this and \vTT-qpa ishere at all events
one of expression merely and not of conception. This is confirmed by
the details of things painful which are enumerated in 8, all of them
evils affecting the body alone. And this is in fact an explanation of the
meaning of (paivofxevip KaKa in the definition, that being most evident or
palpable which is presented immediately to the sense. Comp. note on
<$>nivojievco I .
Of dvatperiKa Victorius says that it is not in itself precisely distinguishable in sense from cpdapriKa, but (as I have expressed in the translation)
the latter term applies only to some particular cases of \virr]pd and oSuvrjpa, whilst avaiperiKa is extended to all things destructive.
9. ' Painful and destructive are, death' (in its various forms, plur.
sundry kinds of deatli) 'and personal injuries' (such as wounds or blows
inflicted in an assaultSIVJ/ alulas is an action of 'assault and battery'
under the Athenian law) 'and all bodily suffering or damage' (of any kind,
see ante 11 7. 3, and note), 'and old age, and disease, and want of food'.
10. ' The evils which are due to chance (accident or fortune) are the
entire lack, or scarcity, of friendsand therefore also to be severed'
(parted, divorced, torn away, divelli, distraki, ab aliquo, Cicero,) ' from
friends and familiars is pitiablepersonal ugliness or deformity, weakness of body, mutilation' (or any maimed crippled condition of body,
which prevents a man from taking an active part in the service of the
state, and discharging his duties as a citizen).
The three last of the evils mentioned, ala-xos, dcrGeveia, dvaTnjpta, occur
again, as Victorius notes (without the reference, which is also omitted by
Gaisford who quotes him), Eth. N. m 7,1114 a 22, seq., in a passage (which
will serve as a partial commentary on the text of the Rhetoric) in which
the distinction is drawn between defects and injuries bodily and mental
as misfortunes, due to nature or accident, and the same when we have
brought them on ourselves by carelessness or vice. Thus al<rxpoTrjs or al<rxps may be due to nature, Sia (jiva-iv, or to the neglect of athletic exercises, dyvjj.vaa-lav, or carelessness in general, dfiiXeiav: in the former case
it is the object not of censure but of pity; in the latter it is to be blamed.
The same may be said of a&deveta, and nripaxris, the equivalent of dvawipia in the Rhetoric; the instance of the mutilation or crippled condition there given is blindness; 'no one would reproach a man blinded
either by nature or disease or a blow, but would rather pity him; but if
PHTOPIKHS B 8 io, n.
101
veia, dvairr]pia. Kal TO odev "7rpo(rfJKev dyadov TI

Trpaâi, KCLKOV TI o-v/nfifivai. Kal TO 7roAAa/as TOII i OVTOU.
Kal TO ireTrovdoTOs <yeveadai TI dâdov, oTov
the blindness proceeded from drunkenness or any other form of licentiousness every one would condemn it'. We have here the-necessary
qualification supplied which limits and distinguishes the cases in which
ugliness, weakness and mutilation are really pitiable.
'And when an ill result follows from what might naturally have been
expected to lead to good', i. e. when in any enterprise or course of action,
we have done everything that seemed likely to ensure success, and yet
fail (or 'come to grief) in spite of all our endeavours, this again is a misfortune, or piece of ill-luck: 'and the frequent repetition of accidents of
this kind'.
W i t h dyadov n npaai comp. xpr)o~Tov TI irparToov, Arist. Plut. 341.
Victorius refers in illustration of this disappointed expectation to Ariadne's complaint in Catullus, Epith. Pel. et Thet. 139, certe ego te in
medio versantem turbine leti eripui, et seq.
11. 'And the occurrence or accession of some piece of good fortune after a calamity (or disaster which prevents one from enjoying it;
as when a man succeeds to an estate in his last illness), as the present
from the 'Great King' did not reach Diopeithes till after his death'.
This is illustrated by Schrader from Veil. Paterc. II 70, Deciderat Cassii
caput cum evocatus advenit nuiicians Brutum esse victorem.
nenovdorot yevtaOai] for nenovOoTi, the genitive absolute being substituted for the proper case after the verb. This irregularity occurs more
frequently in Aristotle than elsewhere. Comp. Rhet. II 23. 7 (this is a
doubtful instance), Ib. 24, vTroê^X-qfjtevrjs Tivos...f86i<ei. Ib. 30, a/ia
tlprjp.cva>v yvatpl&iv. Polit. II I I , 1273 b 7, /3eXriop 8e...dXK' dpyôvrav ye
imiickciuSai rrjs (rxokfjs. Ib. c. 2, 1261 b 5, dpxovrav crepoi irepas apôv<riv dpxas. D e Anima I 5, 410 b 29, <pi)<Ti yap TT/V \jrvxqv i< TOS O\OV
dcntvai dvairvfovrav (for the ordinary di>airvav<rii>). Ib. II 8, 420 b 26,
dvayKalop et'cro) dvairveojievov elaiivat TOP dtpa. PhyS. VI 9* 7i 240 (I 9> "v/^~
fiaivci ir\ TO B elval Kal TO T.... nap' aWrj\a Kivovfievav (for Kivovfieva). De
Gen. Anim. II 2. 8, 735 b 34, it-e\86vTos 8e orav dnoirvivar; TO 8epp.6v K.T.\.
In Rhet. I 3. 5, cos- xei/w, an absolute case, nomin. or accus., is probably

an example of the same irregularity. The same usage occurs not unfrequently in Plato, but generally with the addition of as. See Phaedo 77 E,
94 E, biavoovjitvov <as apjxovlas ovo-rjs. Rep. I 327 E, ws /ii? aKovo-ophav
OVTCH hiavoelo-6e. V 470 E, VII 523 C, <is AfyoKi-or pov Siavoov. Cratyl. 439
C. Theaet. 175 B, ycXS ov Swafiivav Xoyl(fo-8ai. This is further illustrated by Matth., Gr. Gr. 569.
Somewhat similar is the very common transition from dative to
accusative, and especially when the adjective or participle is joined with
an infinitive mood as the subject; in which case it may be considered as a kind of attraction: so Sympos. 176 D, oi!re avTos edeXtjo-ai.y.1 av itulv,
OZTC aXXa o-vôv\eio-aip.i,
al\a>s re /cat KpamaXSvra
i'Ti CK rrjs irporepaLas ; where the participle is attracted back to

TTifw. Ib. 188 D, where Swa^vovs is similarly attracted to SpiKeiv from
102
PHTOPIKHS B 8 I I .
Aioireidei ra irapa /3ao-tA.e'? Tedvewn

Kctt TO r\ nnêv <ye<yevr}(r6ai dyadov, f) yevopevtov prj
eivai d7ro\avcriv.
id) ols jJiev ovv eAeot/crt, TavTa KCII r a TOICCVTCX
the preceding ijfiiv, with which it ought strictly to agree. Instances of a
change (without such attraction expressed, but apparently derived from
it by analogy,) from dative (or genitive) to accusative may be found in
Elmsley's note on Eur. Heracl. 693. Two of these are, Aesch. Choeph.
408, fioi likvovo-av, and Soph. El. 479, vireo-Ti jxoi 8pa<Tos...Kkvovcrav. A d d
Plat. Rep. Ill 414 A, ri/ias boriov a>vTi...\ayxavovTa, V 453 D, j\piv vevariov
Kai neipareov.. .i\7rioi>Tas. The opposite change occurs in Rhet. I 5. 13,

where fiei&vi is substituted for fieiôva after vnepkxew.
Atoirci&t] This reference to the death of Diopeithes, commander of
the Athenian troops who defended the Thracian Chersonese against the
incursions of Philip, B.C. 342341, see Grote, Hist. o/Gr. [Chap. 90] Vol. XI
p. 622 seq., furnishes one additional item of evidence, hitherto I believe
unnoticed, as to the date of publication of the Rhetoric. Demosthenes
defended Diopeithes and his conduct against the Philippizing party at
Athens in the speeches irepl T&V iv Xeppovrjo-ai and the third Philippic,
both spoken in the last half of 341. Grote, u. s., p. 624. The earliest
date assignable to the death of Diopeithes is consequently 340 B.C. This
may be added to the passages, which go to fix the date of this work, cited
in the Introd. p. 37 seq. Little more is known of Diopeithes : the references to him in Demosthenes are collected by Baiter and Sauppe, Oratores
Attici III. Ind. Nom. p. 40. Most of them occur in the two speeches
above mentioned: he is referred to again in the letter attributed to Philip
(Orat. 12), and de Cor. 70, as the author of a certaintyi)itrp.a.together
with Eubulus and Aristophon. In the Schol. on Demosth. (Baiter and
Sauppe, u. s.; III p. 72 b 17) ire pi rS>v iv Xcppovytrai, we have the following
notice, OVTOS 6 AioTreidrjs (there are three others named in the Orators)
Karrjp rjv WlevdvSpov TOV KUIJIIKOV 6 de Mivavdpos <j>l\os rjv Arj/io(r6ei>ovs,
di' ov vntp Aioneidovs ftovXeverai. [See however A. Schaefer's Demosthenes
II 422, where the father of Menander is identified with Diopeithes of

Cephisia and not with Diopeithes of Sunium, the general referred to in
the text.] Compare also Clinton, Fasti Hellenici 11 144.
irapa /3a<7tXea>s] The 'Great King', the king of Persia, as unique
amongst sovereigns, and standing alone, far above all the rest who bore
the title, appears consequently as fiaanXeis, without the definite article.
Being thus distinguished from all other kings, his title, like proper names,
and some of the great objects of nature where there is only one of the
kind, requires no additional distinction, and consequently the article is
omitted.The reigning king of Persia was at this time Ochus, who took
the name of Artaxerxes (Artax. III.). Diodorus apud Clinton, Fasti
Hellenici, p. 315: on Ochus, ib. p. 316.
'And (it is pitiable) either never to have attained to any good at all
(i. e. desired good or success) or after having attained to lose the enjoyment of it'.
PHTOPIKHS B 8 12.
103
12 ecrTiv iXeoucri Se TOI/S T yvwpifxows, edv fxrj (r(p6$pa

iyyvs dxriv OLKei6rr\Ti' irepl he TOVTOVS wcnrep irepl
auTous fxeWovTas 'iôvcriv. did KCCI ''A/macris eV* ftej/
TW vieT dyo/uevto eirl TO dirodaveiv OVK eZdicpvcrev, ws
(paaiu, i7ri he r w <j)i\w irpoo-aiTOvvTr TOVTO fxev yap
eXeetvov, e'/cetVo Se Seivov TO yap deivov eTepov TOV
eXeewov teal eKKpovarrucdv TOV i\eou Kal 7roAAa'/as TO
12. 'These and the like are the things (the ills or sufferings) that
we pity: the objects of pity (persons) are our friends and acquaintanceprovided they are not very closely connected with u s ; for in
regard of the latter we are in the same state of mind' (have the same
feelings, i. e. in this case the feeling of anxiety and alarm) 'as we are
about ourselves when threatened with (the like disaster)', jueXXovrar
(ravra wc'urtaBai). 'And for this reason it was that Amasis, as is reported,
wept, not at the sight of his son led away to death, but of his friend begging : for this is a spectacle of pity; that of terror: for the terrible is distinct from the pitiable, nay, it is exclusive of pity, and often serviceable
for the excitement of the opposite feeling'.
The king of Egypt, here by an oversight called Amasis, was in
reality Psammenitus, his successor on the throne. The horrible story
of Cambyses' ferocious cruelty here alluded to is told by Herodotus
III 14, with his accustomed naivete", as if there was nothing in it at
all extraordinary or unusual. It will be sufficient to quote in the
way of illustration Psammenitus' answer to Cambyses' inquiry, why he
acted as Aristotle describes, which will likewise serve as a commentary
on olKdorr/Ti in our text. <S nat Kvpov, ra fiev oixijta rjv pefa) KOKO. rj more
avaKKaUiv, TO he TOV iralpov TrivBos aîov r\v daKpvcvv' bs in TTOXXCOV Kal
evhaitiovav eKireaaiv el nTa>f(VtLT)v aniKTai ini yijpaos ovda. Ta oiKrj'ia are,
his son's death, and his daughters humiliation. As to the substitution of

Amasis for Psammenitus, Victorius and Buhle think it may be explained
either by a slip of memory on Aristotle's part, or by a variation in the
story in the account given by other authorities. I have no doubt myself
that the true explanation is the former. We have already seen that
our author is very liable to misquotation, as I believe to be the case
with all or most of those who, having a wide range of reading and an
unusually retentive memory, are accustomed to rely too confidently
upon the latter faculty. The vague ws (pao-lv confirms this view. If
Aristotle had remembered as he set down his example that he had
it from Herodotus, it seems to me quite certain that he would have
mentioned his name.
eKKpova-TiKov] prop, 'expulsive', inclined to strike or drive out (having that nature or tendency), the metaphor being taken, according to
Victorius, from two nails, one of which being driven in after the other
forces it out, or expels it. He quotes Eth. Nic. Ill 15, sub fin., (at
imdvu'iai)
av peyaXat Kal <r<po8pa\rocriv,KCU TOV "koyio-pov eKKpovovo-iv.
Plut. p. 1088 A, non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum c. 3, (TTO'TOS)

vir aXKasv nowov, So-irep rj\cov o-(po$poTepav, eKKpovup.evos nVaAXarrerni, and
io 4
PHT0PIKH2 B 8 13.
13 tvavTLia xpri<niJLOv. en \eov<riv iyyvs

avroh TOV
deivov OVTOS. icai TOV? ofAoiowz iXeovcri Kara rjAt/aas,
Kara t]6ri, KCLTCC eets, KCITO. dîwfxaTa, Kara <yevt]'
ev Tracri yap TOVTOIS JULCIWOV (paiverai xal avrw av
c 0X00$ yap nal ivTavOa del Xafieiv OTI, oara
Cic. Tusc. Disp. IV 35. 75, etiam novo quidem amore veterem. amorem,
tanquam clavo clavuin, eiciendum putant.
r\Kov rj\(o eKicpovfiv is a
proverb, occurring three times in Lucian, de mere. cond. c. 9, Vol. I.
p. 716, ed. Hemst., pro lapsu inter salut. c. 7, I 733, Philopseudes, c. 24,
III 39, ijXcp, (pauiv, eKKpoveis TOV q\ov.evavria]
SC. Tradei.
xp-qan-iiov] seems to refer to the rhetorical use of the topic, rather than
to the promotion of the feeling itself, to which the word is less appropriate.
On the mutual exclusiveness of terror and pity compare I 14. 5 (note),
and 5 of this chapter. The pity and terror therefore, which it is the
object of tragedy to excite and purify, Poet. VI 2, can never be simultaneous.
I will just observe here in passing that these two emotions are
appealed to in that branch of Rhetoric which was collectively called
affectus and divided into indignatio and miseratio, technically deiva<ns and f'Xeoy; dfivacris is otherwise called crxcrKiao-fios (Rhet. II 21. 10).
Though they might be scattered over the whole speech, the proper place
for them is the conclusion, the in'iKoyos or peroratio, because the impression is then most vivid and intense, and is 'left behind', like the bee's
sting, in the minds of the audience, TO Ktvrpov iyKareKfme TOIS dKpoaftevon (Eupolis, of Pericles).
The importance of these to the rhetorician may be estimated by
the fact that Thrasymachus, one of the most celebrated of the early
writers on Rhetoric, gave his work the title of e'Xeot (Cicero, miserationes)
referred to by Aristotle, Rhet. ill 1. 7, and ridiculed by Plato, Phaedr.
267 c. The i'Xeoi certainly 'had a wider scope than their name would
indicate' (Thompson's note ad loc), for Aristotle expressly mentions in the
passage quoted that they included remarks upon language and style.
See further on this subject, Introd. p. 367, and 368 note 3.
13. 'Further' (returning to the last term of the definition, KO.1
TOVTO oTav nXrjcnov (palvrjTai) 'men are pitied when danger or suffering
is impending and close at hand', (dtwov is any object of S/oy or dread ;
derived from Seos as ekeeivos from e'Xeoj, KXIIVOS from icXeos.) 'We pity
also those who are like us, in age, or character, or habits of mind (moods,
states of mind, moral and intellectual, virtuous and vicious), in reputation (of various kinds, expressed by the plural), or in blood (race and
family) : for in all these cases there seems to be a greater likelihood of
the same misfortune occurring to oneself as well as the others (K.O.1
avTta): for here again' (ivravda, mal as well as in the case of fear, referring
to 11 5. 12, "the same things that we dread for ourselves, we pity in
others") 'in a general way we must suppose' (Xa/3eti/ 'to take up, receive',
an opinion; to assume or believe ; or perhaps 'to gather' as the result
of observation, and so form an opinion of conclusion) 'that all things
PHTOPIKHS B 8 14.
105
e(j> avrwv <po(3ovvTat, ravra eV clWwv yiyvo/uieva

4e\eov(rii'.
eVe* 0" 6771)5 (paivo/meva ret iraQr] eXeeivd
ecrTi, TO. 06 fxvpioa-TOv 6TOS yevofxeva rj icrofxeva OVT
T6s owVe \xe[x.vr]\xkvoi rj oAws OVK eXeovcriv rj
ofxotws, dvayKt] TOI/S crvvcnrepyaôiuLevous (Tîxacri
i (pwvaTs Kai eadiqcrei Kai oAcos rf\ V7roKpi<rei eAeeivoTepows elvar 6*771)5 yap iroiova-i (palvecrdai TO KaKov
irpo ofiXfiaTtov 7roiovvTes, r) cos /ueWov r) a>? 7670^0?.
that we dread in our own case, the same we pity when they happen
to others'.
14. 'And seeing that all calamities and sufferings are (especially)
objects of pity when they appear close at hand, and yet things that
either have happened ten thousand years ago, or will happen ten
thousand years hence, neither in expectation or recollection do we ever
pity equally, if at all, (ofioims, as we do things close at hand, whether
past or to come,) it necessarily follows from this (that pity is heightened
when the object is brought near us) that those (orators) who aid the
effect of their descriptions {lit. join with the other arts of Rhetoric in
producing 'i\eos) by attitude (gestures, action in general), by the voice,
and dress, and the art of acting in general, are more pitiable (i. e. more
successful in exciting pity) : because, by setting the mischief before
our very eyes (by their graphic representation of it) they make it appear
close to us whether as future or past'.
irpo o/tpaTav] which is almost technical in Rhetoric, is again used
to denote a vivid, graphic, striking representation, in 2. 13, Ib. 10. 6,
and in III 11. 1, seq. is explained and illustrated. Comp. Poet. c. XVII
I, del 8 Toils [ivdovs (TvvurTavai Ka\ TTJ \e*L avvaTrepyaêaSat (aid the
effect by the language) on /jaXicrra irpo ojiiiarav Ti8tfievov' ovr<o yap av
evapyeo~TaTd op&Vy wemep nap avrols yiyvofitvots TOLS TrpaTTOixevois, tvpicncei.
TO wpiirov Kai rjato-T av *kav8avoiTo TO. vnevavTia. Ib. 3 we have the
same phrase that occurs here, TOIS crxviMa'i o-vvanepya6p.evov. Compare also Poet. XIV I, TO (fcofiephv Kai eXeeivbv e'/c rfjs oiêtor yiveo-Bai
K.T.X., de Anima III 3, 427 b 18, npb dfipiaT(i>v yap ZO~TI nocrjo-acrBai, tZo-rrep
01 iv TOIS /j.vrj/j.oviKois TtBtpevoi Kai elUakoiroiovi/Tes1- Cicero expresses this
1
Referring to mental pictures, in aid of the memory as a kind of memoria
technica, such as that of a large house-front with various windows, or the plan of
a building, or any other divisions, occurring in a regular order, in which the topics
of a speech or argument may be lodged as it were; the plan of this is retained in
the mind, and will suggest the topics in their proper order. These ' mnemonic '
artificesrd fj.vrnj.oviKa, "mnemonics"are described in Auct. ad Heren. i n .
xvi. 29, seq. Such aids to the memory are of two kinds, loci and imagines; the
former are ' the places', or compartments, the sequence of which suggests the
order or arrangement of the imagines, which are the "forms, marks, images, of
the particular things which we wish to remember, such as horse, lion, eagle, &c."
The same subject is treated by Cicero, de Orat. II 86. 351360, from whom the
author of the other treatise has manifestly borrowed. The invention of this
io6
PHT0PIKH2 B 8 15, 16.
15 Kal rd yeyovora
apri rj /meXXovra dtd raj(eaiv eXeei- P. 1386 b.
16 vorepa Bid TO avro.
Kal rd a-rj/neTa Kal r a s 7rpdeis,
olov i(r6fJTa$ T6 TWV TrewovdoTciiv Kal b<ra TOiavTa,

Kal Xoyovs Kal oara d'XXa
olov r\r] TeXevTcovTcov.
elvai iv rots
TOLOVTOIS
TWV
ev
TW
7rddei
OVTWV,
Kal /uaXia-Ta TO <nrov%aiovs
KaipoTs bvra<i eXeeivov
airavTa
by the equivalent phrase, subicere ociclis, Orat. XL 139. Auct. ad Heren.

IV 47'.60, ante oculos ponere (de similitudine); hoc simile...sub asfiectum
omnium rent subiecit. Quint. VIII 6. 19, translatio...signandis rebus ac
sub oculos subiciendis reperta est. Ern. Lex. Techn. Cr. s. v. oppa.
15. 'And things that have happened recently, or are about to
happen speedily, excite more pity for the same reason'; i.e. because the
recent occurrence or immediate anticipation makes almost the same
impression upon us as if the suffering or disaster were actually present,
and enacted as it were before our eyes.
16. 'And all signs (of any tragic event), and acts (of the sufferer,
represented in narrative or description), (the exhibition) for example
(of) the dress of the sufferer and everything else of the same kind, or
his (last) words, or anything else connected with those who are in
the very act of suffering, for instance such as are actually dying' {in
articulo mortis). It is hardly necessary to mention the use that is made
by Mark Antony of this 'sign' in exciting the people after the murder
of Caesar by the exhibition of his 'mantle',"you all do know this
mantle"pierced by the dagger of his assassins, in Shakespeare's
Julius Caesar, ill 2. 174, since it must be fresh in everyone's recollection.
The incident and accompanying circumstances and the effect of Antonius'
speech are related by Plut., Vit. Anton, c. 14, from whom Shakespeare
may have derived i t ; and referred to by Quint., VI 1. 31. Suetonius,
Jul. Caes. c. 84, gives a very different account of what passed on this
occasion. See also Appian, Bell. Civ. 11 146 (Schrader). Another
example occurs in Aesch. Choeph. 980, where Orestes after the death
of Clytemnestra holds up to the spectators the bathing robe in which
his father was murdered, 'ibecrde...TO /jtrjxavijfia, Sea/xov d8\lqs narpl K.TX.
982, eKrelvaT avrov, which is also referred by Hermann to the display

of the robe.
'And most pitiable of all is the case when men have borne themselves
bravely (worthily), at such critical moments, because all these things
intensify our commiseration (in three ways), by the appearance they
have of being close upon us, and by the suggestion (or impression, as)
of unmerited suffering and by the vivid representation of it (as though
it took place before our eyes)'. The gender and construction of avaglov
ars memoriae is there attributed to Simonides, 351 3-3. The theory of the
art and practice is, that as of all mental impressions those derived from the senses
of which the sight is the keenest and most powerful, are the most distinct, vivid
and intense; quare facillime animo teneri posse ea quae perciperentur auribus aut
cogitatione, si etiam oculorum commendatione animis traderentur.
PHTOPIKHS B 8 16; 9 i.
107
yap TavTa Sid TO 771)9 (paivecrdai juidXXov Troiel TOV

eXeov, K<xl OJS dvaîou OVTOS Kai ev 6<p6aXiJ,oTs (paivojnevov TOV iraQows.
avTiKeiTai oe TO eXeeiv fiaXurTa
fxev o KaXovcri CHAP, IX
are both uncertain ; it may be either masc. or neut.; and may be made
to agree either with nidovs if neut., or, as I rather think, used as masc.
and construed thus ; KCU cot TOV iradovs OVTOS dva^lov ('being that of one
who did not deserve i t ' ; whose sufferings were unmerited because he
was cnrouSatof) Kai iv dcpdak/io'is (paivofievov : and so I have rendered it. Or
again, if dva^lov be considered as neut., it may be interpreted with TOV
ivdBovs OVTOS, ' unworthy' of the sufferer, in the sense of undeserved by
himthough this is rather a non-natural explanation of the word. Or
thirdly, a comma may be placed after OVTOS, and dvaglov will then be masculine with TOV waBovTos understood.
CHAP. IX.
The subject of the following chapter, vtpecns, is briefly noticed by Aristotle, Eth. Nic. II 7 sub fin., together with cuSeor, as a nados, an instinctive emotion, which approaches nearly to a virtue, and may therefore be
included in a list of virtues. The detailed description of it, which ought
to have followed that of alias in IV 15, is lost, together probably with
some concluding observations leading up to the separate discussion of
justice in Bk. V., and justifying its connexion with the other virtues and
conformity to the law of the 'mean', which is barely mentioned in the fifth
book as it stands at present, ve/xecris is defined in Eth. N. II 7, as here,
o vip.(o~rjTiKos \vTTeiTai eVi TOIS dva^las ev irpaTTovo~iv, and is placed in the
scheme as a mean, or virtuous state of feeling, between qbdovos the excess,

and iinxaipeKaKia. the defect, of indignation. Of this we shall have to
speak further in the explanation of 25, which reads like a criticism
and retraction of the misstatement of the Ethics, and very much
strengthens the evidence of the later composition, as well as publication,
of the Rhetoric. See Introd. p. 48. A definition of ve/xeo-is and cpdovos
is found likewise in Top. B 2, 109 b 36, cpBovos ccrri Xvirr; eVi <paii>op,evr)
evnpayia TU>V im-eikav TWOS, and again, p . IIO a I, (pdovepbs 6 \mrovjxevos
iiri Tats TU>V dyaBav evnpayiais, veiMO-rjTtKos 8' 6 Xviroifievos iiil roil TOIV
KaKav evirpaylais. Fuller and better than all these is that of Eudemus,
Eth. E u d . Ill 7' 2 , 6 Cf/ifcnjriKos, Kai o exaXovv oi dpxa'toi rf/v Vip.ecnv, TO
\vTTe1o-8ai jiev ilii rats irapa. TTJV dLav KaKoirpayiais Kcii evwpayiais,
xa'lP(lv
S' enl Tals d$-iais' Sio KCU Bebv olovTai eivai TTJV veu-eo-iv. Comp. 2 of this
chapter, 8ib Kai rots Beats dnohlbofiev TO vefieo-av.
Of the earlier notion of vixens, alluded to in the foregoing passage,

viz. that of divine vengeance or retribution, or the power that exercises it,
a good description is found in a fragment of Euripides, Fr. Inc. 181
(Dind.), orav o 'iSr/s npbs vôs ^pp.evov Tiva, \ap.ivp& Te jrXoura Kai yevec yavpoijievov, ocppiiv Te ^fifco Ttjs Tvxys fVijpftora' TOVTOV raxelav vepecnv evdii
TTpooSoKa' eTraipercu yap fieiôv "iva fielov weo-fl [tolluntur
m altum, lit
lapsu graviore ruant. Claudian, in Rufinum, I 22.].

This doctrine of the dpxa'101 is well illustrated by two stories in Herodotus, that of the interview between Solon and Croesus; 1 2933, and
108
PHTOPIKHS B 9 i.
vefxea-av TW yap XvTreTadai eirl rah
dva^lais
Katco-
what followed it c. 34, pera Be SoXawa olxofievov, ?Xa/3e e'/e 6COV

fieyaXr) Kpoiaov' <6s eiVatrm, o n ivofiiê eavrbv eivai avBpamav diravjav oX/3iw-
Tarov. and the story of Polycrates, 111 3943. On these two stories see
the remarks in Grote's Hist, of Gr. IV 263, and 325 [Chap. XI and XXXIIl].
Compare also Horn. Od. XIV 283, Aibs 8' diriero firjviv geiviov, oore
/iaXto-7-a j/ffiea-o-arai Ka<a i'pya. Herodotus says in another place, VII 10,
ov yap ia (ppoveeiv aWov /xf'ya 6 Sebs ^ iavrov. Aeschylus (Fr. Inc. 281,
Dind.) has presented vepeais in its human aspect as the natural indignation which is felt at undeserved good fortune, KUKOI yap ev Trpaa-a-opres
OVK avacr\eroL Fr. Inc. 243, line 3, fjfiaiv ye pivroi Ne/ie(ris t<r6' vireprepa, Kal
TOV BavovTos )J biKrj npd(T(rei KOTOV.
According to Aristotle's definition of vip-ecris ' a feeling of pain at

undeserved good fortune', it represents the 'righteous indignation',
arising from a sense of the claims of justice and desert, which is aroused
in us by the contemplation of success without merit, and a consequent
pleasure in the punishment of one who is thus undeservedly prosperous.
It is no selfish feeling, 3; if it had any reference to oneself and one's
own interests it would be fear of evil consequences arising to us from the
other's prosperity, and not indignation. It implies also its opposite, the
feeling of pleasure at deserved success or prosperity. In this narrow
sense it is treated in the present chapter. It is in fact one form in which
'moral disapprobation', founded upon the distinction of right and wrong,
shews itself in our nature. Aristotle, in classing it with the nadrj, makes
it instinctivej not therefore a virtue, nor necessarily requiring moral
cultivation. Of moral approbation and disapprobation see the account
given by Butler, at the commencement of his Dissertation on the Nature
of Virtue. He also seems to regard these two as natural instincts, when
he says of them, " we naturally and unavoidably approve of some actions
under the peculiar view of their being virtuous and of good desert; and
disapprove others as vicious and of ill desert." See also Serm. VIII. ' On
deliberate anger or resentment.' Prof. Bain, Emotions and Will, p. 321,
[Chap. XV 22, ed. 1875], in treating of'moral disapprobation', expresses
himself thus; "the feeling that rises up towards that person (a guilty
agent) is a stfong feeling of displeasure or dislike, proportioned to the
strength of our regard to the violated duty. There arises a moral resentment, or a disposition to inflict punishment upon the offender," &c.
But such an instinctive sense of right and wrong has a much wider
scope and sphere of action than Aristotle's vejxfa-is, which is confined to
one particular class of cases upon which this moral instinct or faculty
operates.
1. ' The nearest opposite to pity is what is called righteous indignation ; for to the feeling of pain at undeserved misfortunes is opposed in
some sort (or sense), and proceeding from the same temperament, the
feeling of pain at undeserved good fortune'.
liokia-ra /ueV] seems to have for its correlative Soeie 8f', 3, and the
sense is this:Pity is most opposite to righteous indignation1, though
1
I find, on looking through a very long note of Victorius, after writing the
above, that he has so far anticipated me in this observation.
PHTOPIKH2 B 9 i 3.
109
ai/TiKeifievov icrTi Tpoirov Tiva Kal CLTTO TOV

avTOu t]dovi TO XvTreicrdai eVi TCS ava^'ictts evrrpa2yiai<s. Kal d/m(pw TO. irddr] rjdovs )(pr](rTOV' Set yap
67Ti fxev TOL<S dva^tcos 7rpa.TTOV<TL /ca/cws (ruvd^6ecr6at
KCCI i\ee?u, -rots $e ei> vefxetrdv ahucov yap TO irapd
Tt\v ci^tav yi.yv6fjievov, Zio Kal TOL<S $eo?5 aTroBidofxev
3 TO ve/utecrav. Soêie S' au Kal 6 (pdovos TU> eXeeiv TOV
avTov dvTiKeicrdai Tpoirov w's crvveyyv^ u>v Kal ravTOU
envy seems to be as much so, but is not. I have therefore substituted a
period after TO vepevav for the comma of [Bekker's Oxford edition of 1837.
The punctuation given in the text is also found in Bekker's Berlin
editions and in Spengel's].
2. 'And both of these feelings are indicative of good character
(i. e. of a good disposition of mind shewing itself outwardly in the character) : for it is our duty to sympathise with unmerited misfortune and
pity it, and to feel indignant at unmerited prosperity: because all that
happens to a man' (7-6 yiyvo\x.ivov, Victorius, 'quodfit1, 'all that is done';
meaning I suppose 'whenever the rule of justice is violated', in any case,
generally. But I think 'happens', which includes the injustices of nature
and fortune, as well as those of man, is more to the purpose here) 'not in
conformity with his deserts is unjust, and this is why we ascribe (or
assign, render as a due; see note on I 1.7) righteous indignation to the
gods as well as to men (<a\ rois deoh)'.
irapa TTJV dlav] i. e. in violation of the principles of distributive justice.
dijla is the 'value' of anything, by which its worth or merits or deserts
are measured. It is the principle and basis of distributive justice, and
should determine the assignment of power and property in the state. It
does in fact regulate the distribution of them; only the standard of a
citizen's value, his d^la, varies with the constitution under which he lives ;
for in a democracy the principle of distribution is founded upon liberty,
in an oligarchy upon wealth or birth, in an aristocracy upon virtue. See
the passage of Eth. N. v 6, 1131 a 24 seq. from which I have been quoting. Quarrels and factions and complaints always arise out of the undue
apportionment of civil rights and power in the state, arav rj "troi pr) "era fj
fifi "a-oi ia-a zxaoi <al vefiavrai. But the true standard by which the share
of the individual citizen should be measured is virtue or merit and the
power of doing the state service, Pol. ill 9 ult. Justice in this sense is a
pTOftovtion, TL eK TOV KctT* diav rovro drj\oi>' TO yap SiKaiov iv Tats diavoaals 6fiohoyov<ri irdvres KOT' dîav TWO. 8eii> dual, TYJV fiivToi ov TTJV avrr)v
Xeyovo-i iravTts vrrapxetv. Compare Ib. VIII 12 on the three forms of constitution, 1160 b 13, the change from aristocracy to oligarchy is due xa/aa
rav dpxovTav, 0% vefiovo-i Ta TTJS jroXews1 irapa TTJV dîav; and in family life
/car diav 6 dvfjp apx e ' Kc " 7 r e P' Tavra a Set TOV avdpa. If he encroaches on
his wife's rights his government becomes an oligarchy, 7rapa rf/v dt-iav yap
avrd Troiet, Ka\ ovx fl djxeivav. On the same subject of political justice see
Pol. ill 9, from the beginning.
3. 'But it may be thought that envy as well (as vipfau, xai) is
no
PHTOPIKHS B 9 3, 4.
vefJLeaav, '1<TTI V erepov* Xinrn fxev yap

teal 6 (bdovos earTL K<XL eU einrpaylav, et'AA' ov TOV dvaiov dWd TOV icrov leal 6/u.oiov. TO he fJ.n OTL avTw TI
GVfxfir\GTa.i eTepov, d\\d
$1 avTOV TOV K\r\ar'iov',
airacriv O/JLOIWS cei virapyeiv ov yap eTt ecTTai TO fxeu
vefieais TO he (pdovos, dWd (pofio<s, eav $ia TOVTO f[
\virr\ xnrdp^r] KCLI r\ Tapayri, OTI avrw TI 'ecrTcti (pav4 \ov diro Tr\<i kme'ivov evTrpaîas. (pavepov o OTL aKoXovdricrei ical TO ivayTia irddr] TOVTOLS' 6 fxeu yap \v7r0v/Jievos 7ri TO?S dvaplws KaKO7rpayovo~iv tjardrjcreTai rj
TW
opposed in the same way to pity, on the ground that it is very closely
connected, or indeed identical, with righteous indignation, though it is in
fact different; for though it be true that envy is also {K.O.1 as before) a
pain causing perturbation of mind and directed against good fortune, yet
the good fortune is not that of the undeserving, but that of an equal
and one like himself. Compare with this Poet, x i n 145304, of pity and
fear, 6 fiev yap irepi TOV avaîov e<7Tt bv(TTV)(ovvTa: o 5e irzp\ TOV oîoiov^ e\eos
fiev irep\ TOV dvaiov, (pofios Se JTC/H TOV OJIOIOV. W i t h aXka TOV Xaov teal
o/xoiov comp. c. IO I, <p66vos, XuTnj nep\ rouy 6/ioiovs.
' The absence of all selfish, interested motive, distinct from (independent of) the feelings themselves, (and their direct objects, supply T&V
rradaiv,) these emotions, on the contrary (dWa), being entirely on our
neighbour's account, must be common to them all (common to all men
who have the feeling); for they are now no longer the one righteous
indignation and the other envy, but (both of them) fearon the supposition namely that the pain and perturbation are due to the expectation
that some evil consequence to ourselves will follow from the other's good
fortune.'
TO f"7 OTJ K.T.A.] The grammar of this sentence is to be explained
by regarding all the words OTI avrwTOV n\rjo-iov as one collective abstract
notion, which would be commonly expressed by a verb in the infinitive
mood, and therefore neut., TO ; this notion being negatived by prf 'the
non-existence, want, absence of it'. The usage is by no means uncommon, but occurs generally in much shorter phrases, from which
this differs only in the number of words included. Matth., Gr. Gr.
272 c, and Jelf, Gr. Gr. 457. 1, 2, 3, will supply sufficient examples.
Aristotle's formula descriptive of the Xoyos or eldos 'the formal cause',
TO T'L r\v eivai, 'thewhat it was (designed) to be', is a good illustration.
ov yap eVi] On en in a negative = rjSrj in an affirmative sentence, see
note on rj8r], 1 1. 7.
4. ' Plainly too these will be accompanied by the opposite feelings
also (in addition, *ai); for one who feels pain at unmerited ill fortune,
will feel either pleasure or no pain at the misfortunes of those who do
deserve them (ivavriasâgias); for example, no man of worth would
feel pain at the punishment of parricides or murderers, when it befalls
them, for at the sufferings of such we should rejoice, as in like manner
PHTOPIKH2 B 9 4, 5.
aAv7ros 6(TTca eTrc TOIS evavTitos KaK07rpa<youo'iv' oiov

TOI/S iraTpaXoias KCCI (xiaifpovovs, orav TV^WCTL TI/ULCOptas, ovêis av \v7rr]6eiri xptjcrTos' e? ^ a p yalpe.iv eirl
TOIOVTOIS, a5s 2' ai/Tw? fcai eVi TO?S ei) irpaTTOvai
dj~iav a/uL<pa> <yap ZLKCHCL, KO.1 Troiei ya'ipeiv TOV
' aVcey/aj yap eXiriêtv V7rdpai av, airep TW
5 6p.oiu>, Kal avTW. KCLI (TTL TOV avTOv tjdovs airavTa
TO. 0 ivavTta TOV evavTiov 6 yap ai/ros
at the prosperity of such as deserve it: for both (the sufferings of the
one and the prosperity of the other) are agreeable to justice and give
joy to the good m a n ' ( o r e fiiv TO iineiKes (7rcuvoviJ.(V...Kai...fieTa(f>epofiev
avrl TOV ayadov, Eth. Nic. v. 14, 1137 b i), 'because (being a good man
himself) he must needs hope that what has fallen to the lot of his like,
may fall also to his own'.
Tovs miTpaXoias na\ jxiai<^>6vovs \virr]8eiri] Vater explains the accus. after
the passive verb by supposing a change of construction, Ar. having intended

to write, ouSeis av f'Aeijcrei (sic) xpijtrroy. This is quite unnecessary. The accus. after passive and neuter verbs, indicative of the local seat of any affection, an extension of the cognate accus., is common enough fully to justify
the construction of the text. At the same time there is a difference between such an expression as this, and the ordinary case of the local accus.,
such as akyeiv TTJV Kfc^dkrjv. The accus. KefpaXrjv directly and properly
expresses the seat of the affection as in the subject who himself feels
the pain : and this is the ordinary case. But in our text the seat of the
pain 1 is transferred from subject to object, the feeling migrating, as it
were, and taking up its temporary residence in the parricides and
murderers who are the objects of it. But whatever the true explanation
may be, there are at all events several precisely parallel instances
some of which may be found in Matth. Gr. Gr. 414, and Jelf, Gr. Gr.
549 cquite sufficient to defend this particular use of the accus.
Comp. for instance Soph. Aj. 136, o-e \ih> ev npaaaovr' iirixalpta. Eur.
Hippol. 1355, roii? yap eiVe/3e7j 8eo\ 6vr]UK0vrat ov âipovinv, where the
dying are just as much the objects of the joy (or the absence of it)
as the murderers are of the pain in the passage before us. Similarly
alo-xvveo-dai, (frequent in the Rhet. and elsewhere,) as in Eur. Ion 1074,
where alo-xvvoiiai TOV ivo\vvfivov 8eov, is to feel awe in the presence of the
god ; who is the object of this feeling of shame, just as the murderers are
of the painful feeling. Victorius thinks that the prepos. Sia is understood,
'as it often is in the Attic writers, such as Thucydides, Lysias, Aristophanes'! He contents himself however with the general assertion, and
quotes no example.
5. 'And all these (javra is explained by o yap, 'namlich', K.T.\.) belong to the same kind of character (or disposition), and their opposites
1
It is in fact not the pain, but the absence of it, that is here in question: but
as this would make nonsense of the illustration, nonentities having no local habitation, I must be allowed to substitute the positive for the negative conception.
H2
PHT0PIKH2 B 9 5ai
KaK0
Kal
ecrriv eTnx p^
^
(pOovepos' e(j>' u>
\vTreTrai yiyvojutvcp teal virapôvn,
avayvidiov
iiri Ty a-Tepâ-ei Kal TY} (pdopa Trj TOVTOV
Bto KtoXvTuca fJLev iXiov ira'vTa TavTa ecTTi,
yap
-ns P. i38r.
TOVTOV
xa'lPeiv(Siacpepei
to the opposite temper; that is to say, it is the same sort of man

that takes a malicious pleasure in mischief and that is given to envy ;
for whenever the acquisition or possession of anything (by another)
is painful to a man (envy), he must needs feel pleasure at the privation
or destruction of the same (cmxcupeKaida)'.
orepqo-ts, Categ. 10, is one of the four kinds of opposites, relative
opposites, contraries (as black and white), state and privation (eir,
a-rip-qiTis), affirmation and negation, o-reprja-is is denned ib. 12 a 26 seq.
It is the absence or want of a state which is natural and usual to that
in which the state resides, as sight to the eye : TvrpXbv ov TO fir/ i'xov
oifnv, dWa TO firj exeLV TC necpvKev i'xetv-
A man's blindness is a
o-Ttprja-is, because with him sight is natural: the term is not applicable
to animals born without eyes, i< yeverrjs OVK o\j/iv (xovra ' these cannot
properly be said to be deprived of sight, which they never had. o-reprjo-is
therefore in the present passage implies a loss of some good which
had been previously gained or possessed, and is distinguished from
<t>8opa, as privation or loss from ruin or destruction. Victorius understands (pdopa of destruction, decay, as opposed to ytvtoei which is
implied in yiyvojitva ; a man may be deprived of or lose a possession,
that which grows may decay and come to nothing, 'Interitus manifesto
generationi alicuius rei contrarius est.' I cannot think this interpretation as appropriate as the other: yiyvso-dai, to come to the possession of
something, to gain or acquire it, is properly opposed to xmapxzw, to have
it already in possession, long-standing and settled.
' A n d therefore all these feelings (venco-is, <f>66vos, eirixalP*KaK'a)
are
obstructive of pity, but different (in other respects) for the reasons
already stated ; so that they are all alike serviceable for making things
appear not pitiable'.
The introduction of these episodical remarks, 35, upon the
connexion and distinctions of the three irddr).above mentioned, otherwise
not easy to explain, may possibly be accounted for, as I have already
suggested, by referring them to the statements of Eth. Nic. 11 7, 1108
b 4, which Ar. now sees must be retracted. There they are reduced to
the law of the mean by making pep-ctris the mean state of the pleasure
and pain felt at our neighbour's good or ill fortune ; of which fydovas
is the excess, the pain being felt at all good fortune deserved or undeserved, and iirixaipeKania the defect 'because the feeling falls so short
of pain that it is actually pleasure'. The words of 5, Ka\ eo-n TOV
rj6ovs...6 yap avros iaTiv emxaipeKaKos KO.1 (pdoi/cpos, K.T.X. are, whether they
are intended for it or not, a correction of the blunder made in the Ethics.
It is plain enough, as we are here told in the Rhetoric, that the two
7r<i6r) in question are but two different phases of the same ^8os or mental
disposition: the same man who feels pain at his neighbour's good fortune
PHTOPIKHS B 9 68.
113
oe ota Tas eipt][j.eva$ a'niav usarre TTJOOS TO fxr\ eXeeivd

Troieiv cnravTa dfxolws ^priaiixa.
6
Trpwrov }xev ovv Trepl rov vefxecrav Xeyuipev, T'KTL
re vefxecrwcri nal eirl T'KTI teal 7ra>s 'iyovTes avrol, elra
7 /xera Tavra irepl TWV aXXcov. <bavepov h' K TOOV p. 75eipr}fj.ev(nv ei yap ecrri TO ve/meaav Xv7re7(rdai im TOJ
(pa.ivop.evw dvaîws evirpayeiv, 7rpcoTov jxev drj\ov OTI
8 ovx oiov T eirl iracri TO?S d<ya6oh ve[JL<rav ov yap
will feel pleasure at his misfortunes, and the two cannot be opposed as
extremes. Again, the description of fVixaipeKaia'a as a defect of ve/xia-is and
opposite of <t>86vos cannot be sustained : the objects of the two feelings
are different: envy is directed against the good fortune of another, the
malicious pleasure of the other is excited by his ill fortune. See also
Grant's note on the above passage of the Ethics.
After this digression we return to the analysis of veô-ir.
6. 'Let us begin then with an account of righteous indignation,
who, that is, are the objects of it, the occasions that give rise to it, and
the states of mind of the subjects of it, and then pass on to the rest (of
the ira&T), to what remains to be said of them)'.
7. 'The first of these is plain from what has been already said,
for if righteous indignation is (as it has been defined) a feeling of pain
which is roused, against any one who appears to enjoy unmerited prosperity, it is clear first of all that this indignation cannot possibly be
applied (directed) to every kind of good'; (virtue for example and the
virtues are exceptions.)
8. ' For no one is likely to feel indignant with one who becomes
just, or brave, or acquires any virtue in general', (that is, one who by
exercise and cultivation attains to any special virtue, or to a virtuous
character in general)' nor indeed is compassion' (the plur. eXeoi indicates the various acts, states, moments of the feeling) 'bestowed
upon (applied to) the opposites of these' (vices, namely, which ought to
be the case, if the others were true)'but to wealth and power and such
like, all such things, namely, to speak in general terms (without mentioning possible exceptions, dvrXay opposed to Kaff eKaarov), as the good
(alone) deserve'.
So far the meaning is clear ; the good as a general rule are entitled
to the enjoyment of wealth and power and the like, and when they
do acquire them we feel no indignation because we know they deserve
them ; it is upon the undeserving that our indignation is bestowed.
But as the text stands, and as far as I can see there is no other
way of understanding it, there is another class of persons, viz. those
who are endowed with natural or personal advantages, such as birth
or beauty, which, being independent of themselves and mere gifts
of nature, cannot be objects of moral indignation, though they may
be of envy, who are coupled with the morally good as deserving
AR.
n.
H4
PHTOPIKHS B 9 8, 9.
el BJ'KCUOS rj dvSpelos, fj el dperr\v Xy^êrcd, vepe(rti(rei

rovrip (ovU <ydp 01 eXeoi eirl rots ivavTiots TOVTWV
eio-iv), dXX' eirl TTXOVTW Kai Zwdfiei Kai TOIS TOIOVTOIS, oartov a!s aTrAafs e'lTreiv a'îol elcriv 01 ayavoi
Kai ol TO. (pvarei e'xovres dyadd, 61 ov evyeveiav Kai
9 KaAAos Kai ocra roiavra.
errei Be ro dpxaTov eyyvs
ri (paiveTai TOV (pixrei, dvd<yKr] TOTS ravro exovcriv
KaL
dyadov, ectv vewcrrl eôj/res Tvyxavco(rt
La TOVTO
evTrpwywcri, JULCCWOV vefxeadv JJLOXXOV yap Xv7rovaiv
ol vetoarri TrXovrovvre^ TWV 7raXcti Kai did yevos'
dfto/ws he Kai apxPVTes Kai duvdfJLevoi Kai 7roXv<piXot
Kai eurcKVOi Kai onovv TWV TOIOVTWV.
Kav cia ravT
of wealth and power. This however cannot possibly be Aristotle's
meaning : birth and beauty certainly have no claim per se to any other
advantages. When a bad man makes his way to wealth or power,
we infer that they have been acquired by fraud or injustice, and thence
that he is undeserving of them, which excites our indignation ; but no
such inference can be drawn from the possession of birth or beauty, there
is no such thing as illicit, or undeserved possession of them. Aristotle
seems to have meant, what Victorius attributes to him, that, besides
moral excellence, natural gifts and excellences are also exempt from
righteous indignation, for the reason above giventhat they are gifts
of nature, and the possessors are in no way responsible for them : and
this is fully confirmed by the connexion of what immediately follows.
Bekker, Spengel, Buhle and the rest are alike silent upon the difficulty,
and Victorius, though he puts what is probably the right interpretation
upon the passage, has not one word to shew how such interpretation
can be extracted from the received text.
9. 'And seeing that antiquity (possession of long standing) appears
to be a near approach to a natural gift or endowment' (i. e. to carry with
it a claim or right, nearly approaching to that conferred by nature), ' of
two parties, that have possession of the same good, the one that has
come by it recently, and thereby attained his prosperity, provokes the
higher degree of indignation: for the nouveaux riches give more offence
than those whose wealth is transmitted from olden time and by right of
family (or inheritance): and the like may be said of magistracies (offices
of state), of power (in general), of abundance of friends^ of happiness in
children (a fair and virtuous family), and anything else of the same sort.
Or again, any other good that accrues to them, due to the same
causes ; for in fact in this case again the newly enriched who have
obtained office by tlieir wealth (been promoted in consequence of their
wealth) give more pain (or offence) than those whose wealth is hereditary. And the like in all similar cases'. Comp. II 16. 4. dpXm6Tr\ovTos,
PHT0PIKH2 B 9 9 n .
115
aAAo TI dyadov yiyvrjTai avToTs, w<ravTws- teal yap

evTavva fxdWov Xvirovcnv oi veo7rXov7Oi ap-ôvTes Bid
TOV TTXOVTOV r\ oi dpâioTrXovTOi.
d/io/eos <5e Kal iirl
IOTWV dXXtov.
aiTiov 3' OTL ot /zei>
doKOV(n rd
/
e
Xeiv OL & v' T o yap del OUTCO (paivo/mevov e%eiu

11 aAfjnes Sofcet, taarre oi eTepoi ov TO UVTWV e%etv. Kal
67rei enacTTov TU>V dyadtcv ov TOV TV%6VTO$ dpiov,
s, veiiiKovros, all occur in other authors. The first in Aesch.
Agam. 1043, Blotnf. Gloss. 1010, Soph. El. 1393, and Lysias [Or. 19 49]
ap. Blf. Gl. apriirkovTos as a synonym of the third is found in Eur. Suppl.
742, and veo-rrXovTos twice in Rhet. II 16. 4 ; as a term of contempt,
Demosth. jrepl rav wpos 'A\ai>8pov <TVV6T]K5>V 23, p. 2181; Arist. Vesp.
I309, veotrKovrm rpvyl.
10. ' The reason of this is, that the one seems to have what is his
own (that which naturally and properly belongs to him), the other not;
for that which constantly presents the same appearance (shews itself in
the same light) is thought to be a truth (or substantial reality), and therefore it is supposed that the others (01 Zrcpoi 8OKOVO-IU) have what does not
really belong to them. Here we have a good example of the distinction
between (palvea-dai and BOKCW. The former expresses a sensible presentation, a tfiavrao-la, an appeal to the eye or other senses: SOKIIV is an act of
the understanding, an operation and result of the judgment, a Soa an
opinion or judgment, appealing to the reasoning faculty or intellect, consequently TO (fyaivio-dai represents a lower degree of certainty and authority than SoKelv. Eth. Eud. VII 2, 1235 b 27, rots /teV yap Soxei, rots 8e
(j>aivcrai Kav /zi) hoxrj' ov yap iv ravra rrjs \jrvxijs i? (pavTacria Kal 7 Soa.
The distinction appears again in irep\ iwirvltav c. 3, 461 b 5, (paivirai ixiv

ovv Travras, SOKCI fit ov navTas TO (pa.ivoii.evoi>, a\\' iav TO iniKpivov KaTexiT<u
T] firj KtvfJTai rf/v olnelav Kivrjo-iv. Ib. 462 a I, ov fiovov (pai/flrat, dWa Kal
86ei elvai dvo TO ev, av he fxrj \av8avj], <paveiTai p,ev ov doei Be, K.T.\*
See
also Waitz ad Anal. Post. 76 b 17, II p. 327.

11. 'And whereas every kind of good is not to be indiscriminately
assigned to any one at random, but a certain proportion and fitness
(appropriateness) is (to be observed in the distribution or assignment of
the one to the other)as for instance arms of peculiar beauty (high
finish) are not appropriate to the just man but to the brave, and distinguished marriages' (i. e. the hand of a lady distinguished for beauty,
virtue, accomplishments, high birth and so forth, njv diav hel yap.uv TOV
aîov, III 11.12) 'should not be contracted with men recently enriched,
but with members of noble housesthen as I say (ovv) if a man being
worthy fails to obtain what suits him' (is appropriate to his particular
sort of excellence) ' it is a case for indignation'.
TOV TVXOVTOS agiop] The good that is ' worthy of a man, here seems to
1
The use of the word veSirXovros is assigned to the author of the argument as,
one of the reasons for ascribing the speech rather to Hyperides than Demosthenes.
82
n6
PHTOPIKHS B 9 I I .
dXXd
TIS 'Lcrnv dvaXoyla
OTTXWV KCCWOS
ov
TCO
Kai TO dppoTTOV,* oiov
Succt'io) dp/norTei. dXXa no
hpe'iw, Kat ydfxoi $ia<pipovT<s ov

Toxxxiv dWa
TOIS
evyeveaiv .
TOV dpjuoTTOVTOs Tvy-yaw),

TO
TO??
veuxm
av-
TTXOV-
edv ovv dyados wi> fxri

ve/meo-riTov.
KCCI rou r/TTW
Kpe'iTTOvi diMpicrfinTeiv, fxaXicrra fxev ovv
TOVS
ev
mean that which suits, befits, is appropriate to him: non omne bonum
cuivis homini congmit, Victorius. Similarly agtov with a dat. of the
person is used to signify 'worth his while', 'meet', 'fit', as Arist. Ach. 8,
aîov yap 'EXXaSi, ib. 205, rfj irokn yap atov u\Xa|3cu' TOV aVSpa, and
Equit. 616, atov ye nacLV eVoXoXuât.
iav ovv K.TX after Kai eWt eKao-rov is an Aristotelian irregularity of construction. The apodosis of e W is vffuirqTov at the end of the second
paragraph. The unnecessary ovv has crept in like the apodotic hi, in the
resumption of a previous statement, (on which see I 1. 11, note on SijXov
hi, Vol. I. p. 20)after the parenthetical illustrations; the protasis is
forgotten, or overlooked in the writer's haste, and a new sentence introduced by ovv terminates with the apodosis. I have collected a number of
examples of similar irregularities from our author's writings. I will here
only quote those that illustrate this particular form of oversight. eVtl Se...
ra fiev ovv, Top. 6 8, 160 a 35. ore* dvayxalov ... and after five lines, rfjs /xei/
ovv dvpaBev, de Somn. et Vig. c. 3, sub init. eVei hi...avayKjj ovv... Rhet. II
I I . I. el yap, ...dvaynrj hrj, Phys. VI 4 init., 234 b IO, 15. eWi de-.-onov /j.tv
ovv, Pol. VII (vi), S, 1320 a 17, 22. The remainder are cases of d 81J
afore, rciwore, ei ovvmo-re, iwel 8eS10 (!), iireibrfkov he, which may
be reserved for a future occasion. Meanwhile see Zell on Eth. Nic. VII
14,11 p. 324. Spengel in Trans. Bav. Acad. 1851, p. 34. Bonitz, Arist.
Stud. Pt. 11. p. 129 seq. One example cited by Bonitz, p. 131, from de
Anima ill 3, has a parenthesis of nearly 20 lines between its eVei 8e and
on fiei> ovv. On ovv in resumption, after a parenthesis, 'well then, as I was
saying', see Klotz on Devar. de Partic. p. 718. Hartung, Partikellehre, II
22 seq.
' It is matter of indignation also {subaudi vefieo-r/Tov from the foregoing
clause) for the inferior to compete with the superior, nay and especially
where the inferiority and superiority lie (or manifest themselves) in the
same department, province, study or pursuit'. With rois ev T<S av'roi must
be understood rjrrovas /cat Kpdrrovas from the preceding. The case here
described is that of an indifferent artist, painter or sculptor, setting himself up as the rival of Apelles or Phidias; of Marsyas and Apollo; of the
frog and the ox in the fable.
liokio-Ta piv ovv] The /xev in this phrase is the ordinary correlative of
8* in the next sentence, d Si p.^\ The other particle, ovv, though its
1
I will venture here to express my conviction that Dr Donaldson is right in
the account he gives of these two particles, New Crat. 154, 155; that ixtv viz.
PHT0PIKH2 B 9 I I .
117
precise meaning in this context may not be quite certain, and it is somewhat unusual in this collocation, is nevertheless fully justified by similar
examples to be quoted immediately. The origin of the particle is, as it
seems to me, as yet unexplained. It has been traced to various roots, as
may be seen by consulting Donaldson, New Cratylus 189, Klotzon Devar.
de Partic. p. 717 seq., Hartung, Partikell. 11 8, Doderlein, and Rost, in Rost
and Palm's Lex., but in none of these derivations have I been able to find
any intelligible connexion with the actual senses of the word. Yet until
we know the root of the word and its affinities, we shall hardly be able to
trace historically the various senses which diverge from its primary
meaning. It is a connective particle, which draws an inference or conclusion from something preceding, 'then, accordingly', (1) logically in an
argument, and (2) in the continuation of a narrative, the consequence primarily implied having passed into the mere notion of what is subsequent,
'that which follows', in both its senses. Hence in all Greek authors piv
ovv is habitually employed in this second sense, like the French ' or', and
our ' now' or ' then', to impart a slight degree of liveliness and animation
to a continuous narrative or discussion. From the first or inferential
signification, it acquires this intermediate sense of, ' so then', 'well then',
'accordingly', which lies halfway between the logical and the temporal
application; just like our 'then', which has both these senses, only
derived in the reverse order, the particle of time in the English 'then',
passing from the temporal to the logical use. For this pev ovv at the
commencement of a new paragraph the oratorsDemosthenes in particular, with whom fiev ovv is comparatively rare, Aeschines in a less
degreeoften substitute rolvvv or ftev rolvw, which is used precisely in the
same way. "u.kv ovv, in continuando sermone cum quadam conclusionis
significatione usurpatur." Hermann ad Viger. note 342.
The other prevailing signification of \iiv ovv when used in combination,
which, though by no means confined to them, is found chiefly in dialogues
as those of Plato and Aristophanesin the former most frequently in the
familiar naiv plv ovvhas a negative corrective sense conveying an emphatic assertion, sometimes to be rendered by a negative; being employed
to correct, in the way of strengthening or heightening, a previous statement
or assertion; and while it assents to a proposition indicates an advance
beyond it. Dem. de Cor. 316, &a ras (vepyeo-tas, ovo-as vnfpixtyideis,
ov fiev ovv e'Uoi TIS av IJXI'KQS\ Ib. 130, o\|^= yap Troreoê Ae'-ya) ; x#ey
/iiv ovv Kal npcirjv KTX. Aesch. E u m . 38, Seio-ncra yap ypais ovdtv, avTiwais
fxiv ovv. Eur. Hippol. IOI2, fiaraios up rjv, ovSa/iov fiiv ovv (ppevav. In all
these cases it may be translated 'nay more', or 'nay rather'.
Similarly in
answers it expresses a strong assent, iraw fj-iv ovv, /xaXio-Ta fiiv ovv, nop-i^fj
fj.tv ovv, 'just so', ' q u i t e so', 'exactly so'. In all these cases it may be
rendered iiimo',
' n a y rather'. Herm. ad-Vig. n. 343. In the same
is the neut. of an older form fieis, /ita, /J-tv, of which p.ia alone remains in the
language, the numeral ' o n e ' ; and Si connected with ovo 'two'; though as far as
I know he stands alone in the opinion; the origin usually assigned to it being
that it is a weaker form of Si]. Donaldson's view of the primary meaning and
derivation of these particles is so completely in accordance with all their actual
usages, and is so simple and natural, that it seems to me to carry with it its own
evidence, and to need no further proof of its truth.
u8
PHT0P1KH2 B 9 i i .
avTco' 66ev Kal TOVT eiptjTai,
TW
- '38?
A'lavros V dXeeive fxayriv TeXa/ntoviaSao'

Zevs yap ol ve/me<ra(rx', OT d/meivon (pwrl jJ.a%oiTO.
el he firi, KCCV OTTUKTOVV 6 ^TTCCV TW KpeiTTOvi, oiov ei
6 [AOVCIKOS TW ZiKalcp' j3eXTiov yap r\ îKaiocrvvr] TJJS
ols fiev ovv vejjieaoocn Kal di a, e'/c TOUTWV SrjXow
sense it appears in the Aristophanic e'/toS jxiv ovv, epov fih ovv, ' no, mine ;
no mine', in answer to Cleon's nauseous offer to the Demus, Equit. 911;
and elsewhere, rim jxkv ovv is to be explained thus; I not only assent to
what you say, but I go farther, I am absolutely convinced of it; 'nay
more (or nay rather), absolutely so'. The ovv in all these instances, and
others like them, conveying thus a strong emphasis, at the same time
maybe considered to retain its consequential sense, 'conclusions significationem', indicative of what follows, something else, 'accordingly',
which is contained in the assent to the preceding statement, and thus the
two usages of it are connected. The \iiv in the combination of the two
particles is explained by Dr Donaldson, NewCratylus\ 154rightlyl think
by a tacit reference to some suppressed sentence with the correlative
fie, fikv being always opposed to 8e expressed or understood, iraw juec ovv
would imply aWas 8e ov. (Donaldson supplies TC 8' eneiTa; 'but what
then?') Following this explanation we may render âXiora [iev ovv in our
text 'nay more, most of all, in the highest degree'.
I will now conclude this long note on a phrase which I have never
seen fully explained, with a few examples parallel to that of our text. Soph.
Ant. 925> ^ ' c ' M" ovv Tab' eanv iv Oeols Kaka
el 8' o?8' a/iapravovo-i
K.T.X. Plato, Phaedo 9 E J avbpurriov Kal trpo8vixr]Tiov vyims *xelv> ~01
/xiv ovv HU TO7S aXkois K.T.X., on which Stallbaum, not. crit., observes,
oZv utpote de vitio stispectum seclusimus. With what reason, we have
seen. Eth. Nic. VI 7, init. ivravBa pev ovv, where ovv, as here, seems
to be superfluous, and is certainly unusual. Ib. VII 9, 1151 a 14, eVelj/of
fiev ovv fvufTaTveio-Tos, 6 8 ou. Polit. I 2, 1252 b 29, yivo/iivrj jxiv ovv rou
rjv ZvtKfV, ovva 8s rav ev rjv. I b . IV (VIl) 10, sub i n i t , ra /xev ovv ir(p\
AiyviTTOV Secrfflcrrpior, cos <pao-iv, OVT<O vofiodfTijcravTos, MiVta 8 TO Trcpt
Kpt]TTjV. D e Soph. El. 6, 169 a 19, ot fiiv ovv napa rfjv \egiv...ol 8' aXXoi
K.T.\.
Hist. Anim. v 16, 548 a 25, al fiiv ovv...at 8e K.T.X. De part. Anim.
IV I I . 10, 691 a 28, avdpanros /lev oZv...o[ S' 'Ixdves Kal SpviBes... Magn. Mor.
II 3, 1199 b I, ds 8' avros 6 aSiKor...oiSfi'- aXX' d avTw... Ib. c. 6, 1203 a 16,

rod p.ev ovv dxpaTovs- .TOV 8e a/coXacrrou KO:KO>S*
'Whence also this saying'. Here follow two hexameter lines as an

illustration of the foregoing topic; Cebriones, who knew that the divine
vengeance falls upon those who attack their superiors, 'avoided the
encounter of Ajax son of Telamon'. II. XI 542. This is followed by
a line which is rejected by the recent editors from the text of Homer,
but appears again in the Life of Homer, attributed to Plutarch. See
Paley's note ad lo'c. '(Chiefly in the same art, profession, or pursuit),
119
12 Tavra yap Kai rd roiavra ecrrlv.

avrol he vefxecrn- p. 76.
TLK01 eicriv, eav dîoi Tvyyjdvuxriv oVres TWV /mey'ia-Tiov
dyadwu Kai ravTa KeKTt]/devoi' TO yap TWV ofdolcov
13 tjîuicrdai TOI)S fit] d/Woi/s ov diiKaiov. devrepov ', dv
dyadol Kal cnrovhaToi Tvy^dvuxriv Kpivov<ri re
or if not in the same, any case whatsoever of competition of inferior with
superior (understand dficpto-firjTrf); of a musician, for instance, with a just
man (" ut si musicus cum iusto viro de dignitate contendat." Victorius);
because justice is better than music'. The claims of the two are
unequal, of which the inferior ought to be sensible. 'So now from all
this it is clear what are the objects and occasions of righteous indignation; such they are (as we have described them) and such-like'.
oh Kal Si' a,...8^Xov] There is an inaccuracy here in the language, SrjXov
should befiijAocor SrjXa in agreement with one or other of the antecedents
to the relatives ; or else oh should be rio-tv, and dt a, Sia rlva or noia.
Aristotle, when he wrote SÂoe, seems to have had in his mind his usual
formula for designating these two departments of inquiry, in the iraOr),
viz. rlo-i Kai iir\ nolois. The same oversight occurs again c. 2 27, where
oh &c. is followed by Aprjrai, which is impersonal, and cannot supply
an antecedent to oh. The mistake is again repea-ted, c. 10 5, and,
reading oh, in c. 10 11.
12. We now pass to the third division of the analysis of vt/j-eo-is ;
the subjects of it, the characters, tempers, states of mind which arc
especially liable to it. ' Those who are inclined to this kind of indignation in themselves are, first, such as happen to be deserving of the
greatest blessings and at the same time in possession of them ; because
it is unjust that those who are unlike us should have been deemed
worthy of (should have been enabled to attain to) the like advantages'.
This is against the principle of distributive justice above described,
which assigns honours and rewards, &c. KCLT' aiav. See on 2, above.
The actual possession, as well as the right or claim to these good things,
is necessary to the excitement of the indignation provoked by this
comparison. The mere claim without the satisfaction of it would be
rather provocative of envy or anger than of righteous (disinterested)
indignation : when a man is satisfied himself, he is then ready to take
a dispassionate view of the successes and advantages of his neighbour.
When under the influence of personal feeling he is not in a state of
mind fit to measure the comparative claims of himself and the other.
13. 'And secondly, such as chance (have the luck) to be good
and worthy men;'because they both decide aright, and hate all injustice'.
They have both the faculty and the feeling necessary for the occasion ;
the intellectual faculty of discernment, and the hatred of all that is
wrong, which are both essential to the excitement of righteous indignation. On o-rrovdcuos and its opposite $aOXor, see note on I 5. 8.
14. 'Or again, such as are of an ambitious temper, and eagerly
striving after certain actions' (irpageit, modes of activity, such as public
employments- in the service of the state; these are also objects of
120
PHT0PIKH2 B 9 1416.
14 yap ev, Kai TO, ahiKa /HKTOVCTIV. KCCI eav <f)i\oTifxoi,

Kai opeyojievoi TIVWV Trpdêiov, Kai juaXicrra irepi
Tavra (piXorifjioi wcriv wv erepoi dvdîoi ovres rvyJ
5 %dvov<riv. Kai oXws ol dîovvTes avroi avrovs dov
eTepovs fxr] dîovci, vefxecrtiTticoi TOVTOIS Kai TOVTOOV.
hio Kai ol dvBpa7roc>u)Seis Kai (pavXoi Kai d(pi\oTifJLOi
ov vefJie(rr]TiKoi' ovSev yap O~TIV ov eavTOvs 0'iovTai
d^'
eivai.
16
(pavepov S' K TOVTOOV iiri 7ro/ots aTV)(0vcn
KaKOirpayovariv r\ [ir\ Tvyâvovcri jâipeiv r\ aXuircos
ambition, as giving scope for the exercise of special excellences, for the
attainment of distinction, of honours, and the like) ; 'and especially when
their ambition is directed to such objects as the others happen to be
unworthy of. The greater a man's ambition, and the stronger his
desire of the honours and distinctions which he feels to be due to himself, the deeper his resentment at the unfairness of their attainment by
those whom he knows, by comparison with himself, to be undeserving
of them.
15. 'And in general, all such (besides the really meritorious) as
think themselves deserving of things (honours, rewards, emoluments),
of which they deem others undeserving, are inclined to feel indignant
with them and for (on account of) them {for the honours, &c. which they
have unworthily obtained). And this also is the reason why the servile,
and mean-spirited, and unambitious, are not inclined to feel indignation ;
because, that is, there is nothing which they think they do deserve'.
16. 'From all this it is plain what sort of men those are at whose
misfortunes, and calamities, and failures, we are bound to rejoice, or (at
any rate) to feel no pain : for from the statements already made, the opposites' (i.e. opposite cases and circumstances) 'are manifest : and therefore
if the speech put those that have to decide (xpivav applicable to all three
branches of Rhetoric) in such and such a frame of mind (namely, such as
have been described), and shew that those who claim, appeal to, our
compassionas well as the things (the occasions and circumstances) for
which they claim itare unworthy to meet with it (in the particular
case), or of such a character and reputation in general as to repel it
altogether, it is impossible (for the judges or other audience) to feel
it'. The persons here meant are, according to Victorius, rei etadversatii,
the prisoner under trial, in a criminal, the opponent in a civil case :
but besides these the other Kpiral, the audiences of public as well as
panegyrical orations, must be included, who are equally liable with the
judges in a court of law to be unduly influenced by an appeal to the
feelings on the part of an unscrupulous advocate or declaimer.
PHTOPIKHS B 9 16; i o i.
121
orjXa, COCTT edv TOVS Te Kpirds TOLOVTOVS 7rapa(TK6vd(rt]

6 A.070S, Kal TOIVS ctîovvTas eXeeTcrdai, Kal e<p' ols
eXeelcrdai, $ely dva^lovs juev ovTas Tvy-^dveiv dplows
de fj.rj rvy^dveiv, d'hvvaTov eXeelv.
[
ot]\ov ce Kai eirl TIO'I (pOovovcri Kal TLCTI Kal 7TO)SCHAP.X.
eiTrep ecrTiv 6 (pdovos Xvirri TJS LTTI einrpayia
CHAP. X.
Envy, the next of the iradrj that comes under consideration, is here
defined ' a painful feeling occasioned by any apparent' (i. e. palpable, conspicuous) ' good fortune, the possession, namely, (or acquisition) of any of
the good things before mentioned'most likely the 'good things' enumerated in I cc. 5, 6' which falls to the lot of {irtpi, lit. in respect of, in the
case of,) those who are like us', (in various ways, detailed in the next section) ' not for any personal consequences to oneself (understand yevrjrai or
(rvjijiaivr)), but solely on their account', because they are prosperous or
successful, and it pains us to see it; usually (not always) because some
comparison, some feeling of rivalry or competition, is involved in it, when
we contrast our own condition with theirs ("rival-hating envy",
Shakesp. Richard II. Act I. sc. 3. 131)and therefore it is wep\ rohs
ojxolovs; commonly has reference to, i. e. is directed against, 'those like
us', with whom, that is, we come into competition in anything, hi eVetvovs is f u r t h e r e x p l a i n e d i n c. I I . 1,6 he ((pSovfpos) wapatncevaêi rbv ifkria-iov
fj.fi %x*lv ( "7a$") Sta TOV (pdovov. Such seems to be the meaning of the
definition. [For a consecutive translation of . 1, see p. 123.]
Victorius, here as before, and again on c. n . 1, renders (pawo/icvy 'or
that which appears to be so' in the more ordinary sense of the word. But
here at all events it cannot have this meaning, for there is no alternative in
Aristotle's text; and without it he is made to say, that it is only 'seeming'
prosperity that gives rise to the feeling. See note on 11 2. 1. Again he
and Schrader both understand p.f\ Iva TL avra [sic],' not from any dread of loss
or danger, or prospect of advantage to oneself, from the other's good
fortune', the second of which only is contained in ha TI avra; the first
would require /XTJ instead of iva; and also is contradictory to what was
said in C. 9 3, TO Si pr/ OTL avra TL crvfil3ij<reTai trepov,01) yap ert corral TO
fiev veixeo-LS TO 8e (j>dovos, aK\a (pojios, lav Sia. TOVTO 1/ Xiinrj virapxu Kai rj
rapa-ftf, OTI avra Ti eo-Tai (pav\ov airo rrjs Izetvov tV7rpalas.
The definition limits the objects of the pain, and is thus a second
correction, in addition to the criticism of c. 9 35 (on which see
note), of the erroneous language applied to 6OVQ<; Eth. Nic. II 7, sub
fin., o 8e cp6ovepos---Trl irao-i \virc~iTai.
Envy seems to have been regarded by the ancients as the worst and
most distressing of all the painful emotions. Insidia Siculi non invenere
tyranni mains tormcntum, says Horace, Epist. I 2. 58. Su/cpa^s TOV
43hwf4?
i}fi>xvs thai irplova; and Menander, d hi TO KCLKUTTOV TS>V KUKSV
TravTav <p6ivos, Men. Fr. Inc. XII 6, ap. Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. IV 235
(quoted by Orelli ad loc. Hor.). " Of all other affections (envy) is the most
importune and continual......It is also the vilest affection and the most
122
PHTOPIKHS B 10 i.
<paivofxevr\ TWV eipri/uevcov dyadwv Trepi TOI)S Sfxoiou?,

Hrj 'iva TI ai/Tw, dWa Bi enelvovs' cf>6opr](rovcri fxev
depraved; for which cause it is the proper attribute of the devil," &c.
Bacon, Essays, Of Envy, sub fin.
<&96i>ov Se O-KOTTWV (o SmKparrjs) o n e'lr], XvnrjV fiev riva cevpitricev avrov
ovra, ovr jitvroi TTJV ort cpiKa>v aru^t'ais ovre rf)v eV i^dpaiv evruxi'ats yiyvop.evt]V
aX\a fwvovs <j)t] (pdovelv TOVS em rats r&v <pi\av evTrpa^lais duia/ievovs. Xen.
Mem. Ill 9. 8 (quoted by Gaisford). Socrates defends this view of envy in

the next sentence against the charge of paradox, by asserting that the
fact is true, however paradoxical it may appear: still none but simpletons, ijXidlovs, are liable to the feeling, no wise man, (ppovipos, is capable
of it. This is in accordance with the doctrine that virtue is nothing but
knowledge. However it is plain that it is a mistake to confine the feeling to the good fortune of friends or those we love; and Aristotle has
doubtless improved upon it by substituting his TOVS ofioiovs. The so-called
Platonic opos runs thus, following Socrates, "kiirq eVi <j)i\a>p ayadois rj
ovtriv 7) yeyevrifievats.
"Opoi, 416 D.
The Stoic definition, \inr)v in dWorplois ayadots, Diog. Laert., Zeno,

VII i n , which does not define the objects of the feeling, seems to have
been the prevailing form of it. It is repeated by Cicero as Zeno's with
additions, Tusc. Disp. IV 8. 17, Invidentiam esse dicunt (Stoici) aegritudinem susceptam propter alterius res secundas, quae nihil noceant invidenti. Nam si quis doleat eius rebus secundis a quo ipse laedatur, non
recte dicatur inviderej ut si Hectori Agamemno: qui autem cui alterius
commoda nihil noceant tamen eum doleat his frui, is invidet profecto.
This leaves the objects of the ndSos unlimited, which seems to be the
true account of it. So Horace, Ep. I 2. 57, Invidus alterius niacrescit
rebus opimis.
I will conclude this note with two or three more modern definitions.
" Grief for the success of a competitor in wealth, honour, or other good,
if it be joined with endeavour to enforce our own abilities to equal or
exceed him, is called Emulation: but joined with endeavour to supplant
or hinder a competitor, Envy." Hobbes, Leviathan, Of the Passions,
Pt. 1, ch. 6. Envy and Emulation, f^Xo?, aemulalio, usually go together
in a classification of the nddrj, being evidently closely connected. See the
passages in Diog. Laert. and Cic. above quoted; and so also Aristotle.
This definition very nearly approaches to that of Ar., only omitting the
fir] iva. Ti avra.
"Envy", says Locke, Essay, &c, Bk. 11. Ch. 20, Of modes of pleasure
and pain, " is an uneasiness of the mind, caused by the consideration of
a good we desire, obtained by one we think should not have had it before
us." Here again the notion of 'competition' enters into the definition.
Lastly, Bain, Emotions and Will, Ch. vn, classes this under the
general head of emotions of self, and connects it, like his predecessors,
with Emulation, 9 [p. 105, ed. 2, 1865]. Comparison and the desire of
Superiority, lie at the bottom of both Emotions. " The feeling of Envy
is much more general in its application. Referring to everything that is
desirable in the condition of some more fortunate personage, there is
PHTOPIKHS B 10 2.
123
yap ol roiovroi oh elcri Tives ofxoioi r) (palvovrai.

2 ofxoiov? Se \eyco KCITO. yevo<s, Kara avyyeveiav, KaO'
t]\iKtav, Ka& eîv, Kara, hoâv, Kara TO. virdpôvra.
combined a strong wish for the like good to self, with an element of
malevolence towards the favoured party." This differs from Aristotle in
the introduction of the selfish and the malevolent elements, and removes
the unnecessary restriction to cases of competition, by which he has
limited its objects and scope. It is I believe a much truer and more
philosophical account of the Emotion.
Bacon's Essay, Of Envy, has some points in common with Aristotle.
Bacon places the sting of envy in the want of something which another
possesses. "A man that hath no virtue in himself, ever envieth virtue in
others. For men's minds will either feed upon their own good or upon
others' evil; and who wantcth the one will prey upon the other; and
whoso is out of hope to attain to another's virtue will seek to come at
even hand by depressing another's fortune:" This introduces Aristotle's principle of rivalry and competition as the foundation of envy.
Again, with 2 and 5, may be compared, " Lastly, near kinsfolk and
fellows in office and those that have been bred together, are more apt to
envy their equals when they are raised. For it doth upbraid unto them
their own fortunes ; and pointeth at them, and cometh oftener into
their remembrance, and incurreth likewise more into the note of others:
and envy ever redoubleth from speech and fame." This arises from their
constant association, which gives frequent occasion to envy. "Again, envy
is ever joined with the comparing of a man's self; and where there is no
comparison, no envy; and therefore kings are not envied but by kings;"
compared with the end of 5.
1. 'The occasions, objects, and mental dispositions, that give rise
to envy may be clearly gathered from the definition of it; that it is, viz.
a feeling of pain .occasioned by manifest or conspicuous good fortune,
the accession, that is, of any one of the good things previously mentioned,
(chiefly) in the case of any one of those like us, for no personal advantage or gain to ourselves that is likely to accrue from it, but simply
on their account: for such as have, or think they have, any like them,
i. e. persons similar to themselves, in such things as are likely to bring
them into rivalry and competition, will be most subject to the feeling
of envy'.
2. 'By like or similar I mean, those who are of the same race (or
are alike in stock), of the same family (relatives), alike in age, in states',
mental and bodily (virtues of all kinds, accomplishments, acquirements,
and excellences of mind and body, when developed, confirmed and permanent are Zeis : qui artibus scientiis et hiciusmodi rebus pares sunt,
Victorius : this may be included in the other, more general, meaning),
'in reputation, in property or possessions' (of any kind, patrimonio ac re
familiari, Victorius). This is well illustrated by a passage of Cic. Brutus,
c. XLII 156, quoted by Victorius on 5. Simul illudgandea, quod et
aequalitas vestra, et pares honoritm gradus, et artium studiorumque
finitima vicinitas, tan turn abest ab obtrectatione invidiae, qttae solet
124
teal oh fxiKpou iWe'nrei TO /uirj TTOLVTU virapytiv.

$10
ol /ueydXa 7rpa.TT0VT<z Kai ol evTVôvuTe^ (pdovepol
3 euriv TravTcts yap o'ioi>Tai T<X avTwu (pepeiv. Kai 01
lacerare plerosque, uti ea non modo exulcerare vestram gratiam sed etiam
conciliare videatur.
In reality envy is not confined, as Aristotle seems to say, to these
classes of people as objects; nor even to those with whom we are likely
to come into competition; it seems rather that there is no limit, within
the circle of humanity, to the objects on which it may be exercised. A
man may envy a baby its innocence, its health, its rosy cheeks, or the
poorest and meanest his health and strength: the feeling of pain which
belongs to envy no doubt proceeds from an involuntary comparison of
oneself with another, who has some valuable possession which we happen
to wantj and the unsatisfied desire, contrasted with the gratification of
it in some one else, friend or foe, good or bad, high or low, in a malevolent dispositionnot in the wise man, as Socrates has itbreeds the
feeling of pain. Aristotle's definition may be thus summed up : envy is
a feeling of pain, excited, usually if not always, by the successful competition of a real or supposed rival. 'Those also' are disposed to it
' who (have nearly attained to) want but little of complete satisfaction (of
possessing every thing desirable)'. A long and uninterrupted course of
success and prosperity, and the attainment of nearly all that is desirable,
seems to give them a right to what still remains deficient; and the envy
which they would in any case feel of the possession of it by another,
gains strength by the contrast with their own deficiency. Here again it
is the competition and the comparison of our own condition with that of
another, the want and the inferiority, that add a sting to envy.
/xiKpov"] like oXlyov, adv. 'nearly', 'within a trifling distance of, is a
genitive with Se'ec understood.
TO (/117) if cXXeiVei is impersonal, as it usually is, is redundant as
far as the sense is concerned; if not, TO firj virapx^v is its subject. In
illustration of the former case, see Hermann ad Aj. 114, eVftSi) repyjns iarl
<rot TO bpav, who (unnecessarily, I think1) distinguishes two senses of the
phrase, and exemplifies it by several instances all taken from Sophocles
the great storehouse of Greek idiom. Add these two from prose authors,
Dem. de F. L. 180, p. 392, VVK &pvqo-ls eortv avTOis...To ^,17 rcparreiv, Plat.
Tim. 20 c, npi'i(pacns TO /IT) bpav (vid. Stallbaum ad loc), and the present passage. Examples from Thucydides are to be found in Shilleto's note, ad
Dem. de F. L. 92. See also Matth. Gr. Gr. 541, 542.
'And this is the reason why those who undertake great enterprises
engage in great actionsand the successful are envious : because they
think that all such are carrying off what properly belong to themselves',
i. e. the profits, honours, and distinctions to which they are entitled.
The difference between this feeling and that of vefifo-ts is confined to
this, that the latter distinguishes between the deserving and undeserving,
the former does not. Comp. II 9. 3.
1
Indeed he allows it himself, qni usus, specie map's quam re, a priori illo
diversus est.
PHTOPIKHS B io 3, 4.
125
Ti[j.w[xevoi eiri TLVL dicMpepovTcos, Kai juLaXiarTa en I

<ro<pia r\ evSaifjLovia. Kai oi (piXori/moi (pdovepwrepoi
TWV d(pi\oTi[j.tov.
Kai oi Zoôcrofpor (piXoTijioi yap
7ri crocpia- Kai oAws oi (piXoôôi irepi TL (pdovepol
irepL TOVTO.
Kai oi fxiKpo^vôf
irdvra yap fxeyaXa
4 oo/cet avTOis eivai.
e<p 01s oe (poovovo-ti', Ta p.ev
dyadd e'lpr]Taf 6<p' ocrois yap (piXoSoôvcri Kai <piXo- P. 1388.
P- 77 3. 'And those who have a pre-eminent reputation for anything-,
and especially for wisdom or happiness'. The latter, says Victorius, on
account of its extreme rarity. These three classes, desiring to engross
all the success, credit, good fortune, themselves, grudge the acquisition
or possession of them by their competitors, or any others. 'And the
ambitious are more prone to envy than the unambitious' : because they
set a higher value upon honours and distinctions. 'And the pretenders
to wisdom and learning' (like the Sophists, o croîo-Tijr ^py/iano-Tris duo
(paivoîvqs cro<j>ias dXX' OVK OV<TT]S, de Soph. El. I, 165 a 21), 'owing to their
ambition of this kind of reputation, because they are ambitious of the
credit of wisdom'.
Plat. Phaedr. 275 B, &o6<ro(j>ot ycyovores CLVT\ <ro(j)6>v
("the conceit of wisdom instead of the reality." Thompson). 'And

as a general rule, all those who are covetous of distinction in anything
(art, study, pursuit, accomplishment, acquirement), are in this envious
(of the distinction of others). Also the little-minded (mean-souled),
because to them everything appears great (by comparison)'; and therefore an object of desire, which when unsatisfied breeds envy. fiiKpo-^vxi",
opposed to ixfyaXoyjfvxia, is defined in Eth. Nic. II J, 1007 b 22, irepi rlfir]v
Kai arifxlav \\fi.\j/is : again IV 7, 1123 b 10, the fUKpo-^vxns is described
as o eXarrdi'iBi' ^ aios iavrov diai>, one who rates his claims to honour
and distinction too low': and further, 1b. c. 9, sub init. 6 /tiKpoûôr <iios &v
dyadav eavrbv a7ro(TT(pei dv aîos icTTi. Having this mean opinion of
himself and his own merits and deserts, and no power of appreciating
what is really great, he is of course likely to over-estimate in others the
gifts and advantages which he supposes himself to want, and so becomes
indiscriminate in his envy. In I 9. 11, 12, itiKpoifrvxia occurs in a somewhat different sense, that of meanness in general, and especially in the use
of money. Some Latin equivalents of ftiKpoiîiîa and fieya\o\j/vx!a arc
cited by Heindorf on Hor. Sat. I 2. 10, Sordidus atque animi quodparvi
nolit haberi. Schrader quotes from a little treatise, irep\ dper^s Kai Kaxias,
attributed (most improbably) to Aristotle, which gives a very different
account of fitKpoi^vxi-" from that which we find in his genuine works.
It occurs c. 7, 1251 b 16, but is not worth transcribing.
4. 'The kinds of good things which give occasion to envy have
been already mentioned' (that is, they may be inferred from the preceding enumeration of the classes of persons who are most liable to
envy).
TO fievdyada] according to Donaldson's rule, Nc7c. Crat. 154 (see note
126
PHTOPIKHS B io4, 5-
Ti/JioiivTai epyots n KTri/uLacn Kai opeyovrai S o ^ s , Kai

O(ra euTv^riixaTa. ecrTi, (TêZov irepl iravTa (puovos
t, Kat fjidXia-ra wv avTOi rj opeyovrai r) olovrai
ai/roi)s eêiv, i) u>v TJ? KTr\<rei juiKpw v7repeôvcriv
5 t] fJUKpw eWe'nrovcriv.
(pavepov he Kai oh <p8ovovviv
ajua yap
iT'
eiptiTai'
T
TOIS
yap
e''yfs
e'y'yfs Kai ^povw
^povw Kai
on fjtiv ovv, II 9. 11), tacitly refers to a correlative clause rafiea\\a K.T.A.,

on the other occasions of envy, which has been forgotten and omitted.
'For everything of which men covet the reputation, or of which
they are ambitiousbe they deeds done or possessions acquired
striving after fame (the credit of the achievements and acquirements),
and every kind of good fortune (successes and acquirements due to
fortune, and not, like the others, to a man's own exertions),with all
these, as one may say, envy is concerned; and most of all, the objects
of our own aspirations, or whatever we think we have a right to ourselves, or things of which the acquisition confers a slight superiority or
a slight inferiority'. A very great superiority or inferiority places a
man beyond the reach of envy. It is when the competition is close,
and the difference between the competitors small, that the apparent
value of the good competed for is greatly enhanced, and the envy excited
by the success of the opponent proportionately strong.
crxebov] (1) 'near at hand', (2) 'pretty nearly', is familiarly used, especially
by Plato and Aristotle, to modify too general an assertion: signifying,
that your words in the general expression that you have, inadvertently
as it were, let fall, are not to be construed strictly and literally, but
room must be left for possible exceptions ; that the statement is pretty
nearly exact, but not quite. Hence it becomes equivalent to cos elnclv,
ds ewos disflv, 'as one may say', 'so to speak', which-similarly qualifies
what may be an over-statement of the case, demanding a fair latitude
of construction. Plato sometimes writes o-^fSov n, Aristotle (I believe)
rarely or never. [' <rxe&bv 8e' rj, &vo-iKrj dxpoacris, O 3, 253 b 6, sed TI om.
codd. EFHK.' Index Aristoteliats.^
5. cpavcpov oh] See note on 11 9. 11, at the end.
' It is plain too who are the objects of envy, from the mention that has
been already made of them incidentally' (a/ia simultaneously ; with
something else, another subject, to which it did not properly belong :
in 2, namely, as an appendix to the definitions); 'those, namely, who
are near to us in time, and place, and age, and reputation, are the
ordinary objects of envy'.
Tois iyyvs...rjkiKla...<p8ovov<riv\ Victorius illustrates rlkitdq by the
instance of Fabius Maximus' defence of himself against the suspicion
of having opposed himself to Publius Scipio out of envy: docuit enim si
nullae aliae res ab ea culpa ifisum -vindicarent, aetatent saltern liberare
debere; qicod nulla aemulatio sent cum P. Scipione esse posset, qui nefilio
quidem ipsius aequalis foret [paraphrased from Livy xxvill. 40, where the
defence is given in oratio recta].
PHTOPIKHS B i o 5 , 6 .
KCtl n\lKia
KCtl g o ' ^ (pQoVOVCTlV. 66eV e'lptiTCll
ro d"i"yyej/es yap
Kai (pdovelv
l 7rpds ov<s (piAoTi/movvTar

7TJ0OS TOKS eiprjfAevovs,
ovras
7rp6s
eiricrTaTai.
(piXoTi/nouvTcti
he rovs
o'lovrai
Trap
'HpaKAeiais
avroTs
a-TrJAaii.
rj irapa
Kai
dvrepacTTas
yap
eVos
ouSeis, ov&e
01)$' wv TTOAV
TCHS aAAois
Ae'i7re(r6ai,
wv 7roAv V7repexeiv> coo-avToos KCCI TTJOOS
Kat 7repi TO. Toiavra.
/nev
/uvpioa-Tov
rj 7rpos TOI)S (ro[xevov<z rj TeOvewras
Trpos TOI)S i(p'

ovo
127
TOVTOVS
eVet Se Trpos TOIVS

Kai
oAws
r o v s TWV
'Whence the saying', (of doubtful authorship: attributed by the

Scholiast to Aeschylus, apud Spengel) '"Kinship is well acquainted
with envy too." And those whom we are ambitious of rivalling'
(on vpbs ovs (juXoTtiiovpTai, see note on 11 2. 22); 'which occurs
towards those just mentioned (rols iyyvs K.TX. opposed to the following, who are all woppa, anadev, 'far off' in place or time) ; but
towards those who were alive ten thousand years ago' {lit. to whom it
is now the io,oooth year since they were, from the time of their existence), ' or those who are yet to be (yet unborn), or already dead', (differs
from the first in the length of timethe dead may be recently dead),
' never: nor towards those who are at the world's end'.
TOVS e<p' "BpaKXelais cmjXais] The 'columns of Hercules', the
limits of the known world, stand in the place of our 'antipodes' to
express extreme remotenessall beyond them being a mystery. Arist.,
Meteor. 11 1. 10, assigns it as the extreme boundary of the Mediterranean
sea, 1? VTOS "HpaKAciW (rrrfkav (Sakaa-aa); the Mediterranean itself being
7] i'a-a, ij euros, Sakaa-aa, mare internum, intestinum. See the article in
Smith's Diet, of Geogr. Vol. 11. p. 57, Internum Mare: and Vol. 1. p. 1054,
Herculis Columnae. With Aristotle's metaphor in the Rhet. comp. Pind.
Ol. Ill 79? Qr}p<>>v anrerai 'HpakXeos araâ?. TO jropca 6 <?(TTI aotpois aj3aroif
afiarov icd(r6(j>ots, a n d again, N e m . Ill 35, OVKCTI npbaa aârav a\a Kiovaiv
vnep 'HpaxXeos nepav cv/iapes. Isthm. IV 20. In Nem. IV 112, TdSeipa

takes its place.
' Nor (do we attempt to rival) those to whom, either by our own
judgment, or that of everybody else, we are brought to the opinion that
we are far inferior', (this is the general case of superiority and inferiority,
dignitate atque opibus, Victorius,) 'or superior; and the same is true with
regard to similar things as to these persons', i. e. the same that has been
said of these persons, may be applied equally to the corresponding
things for which men compete (this is the special case of competition in
some particular art, pursuit, or excellence; the case for example of an
ordinary mathematician and Sir Isaac Newton, or in any other art or
profession the distinguished and the undistinguished practitioner).
6. 'And seeing that this ambition of rivalry is (especially) directed
128
PHT0PIKH2 B i o 6 - 9 .
ityie/uevovs (piXoTifiovvTcu,
(pdoveiv 66ev e'ipt]Tai
dvdyKt] /uaAicrTa
TOVTOIS
Kal Kepafxevi Kepa/xe?.

7 Kal TOIS r a ^ i ) ol fi /ioAts TV%6vTes rj /nrj TV%6vTes
8 (pQovovaiv. Kal obv r] KeKTtipjLevcov r\ KaTopdovvrcav
ai/ToIs* e'url 2e Kal OVTOI iyyvs Kal o/uoioi'
yap on Trap' avrovs ou Tvy^dvov(Ti TOU dya9 6ov, w<TTe TOVTO Xvirovv 7roiei TOV (pOovov. Kal TOIS
i)
raura r\ Ke.KTr\\xevoi% bcra avToTs 7rpo(rfJKev
against (pointed at) our competitors in some struggle or encounter (i. e.
any aycau, in which there are dyaviarrai or 'combatants': law-suits, battles,
games, and such like), or in love {rivalry proper), or generally against
those who are aiming at the same things, these must necessarily be the
chief objects of envy: whence the saying "two of a trade''. See supra II
4. 21, I I I . 25.
Hesiod. Op. et D . 25, Kai Kepa/ieus KfpafieU KOTtet ml
TtKTOVl TK.TO>V.
7. ' Such as have attained a rapid success are objects of envy to

those who have either succeeded with difficulty, or not at all'.
8. 'And those whose possession (of any coveted object), or success,
is a reproach to ourselves: and these too are near us and like us' (in the
senses defined in 5 and 2. The meaning is, the attainment of something which is the object of competition, or success, on the part of a rival
is a reproach to us, when the other is not greatly our superior, but
nearly on the same level, and in our own sphere, eyyvs KOI a/tows; we
argue that if he could attain to it, it ought to have been within our
reach); ' for it is plainly our own fault that we fail to obtain the good
thing, and so the pain of this produces the envy'.
nap avrovs] 'along of ourselves, see Arnold on Thuc. I 141. 9 and
Dem. Phil. I 11, p. 43 (quoted by Arnold) where it occurs twice,
Trapa TT)V OUTOV p'djxr)v, napa rf/v
i/'/xerfpaK afn,e\eiav, in both, ' b y '
the agency, or cause, of... so that the prepos. with the accus. is used in
two diametrically opposite senses. Arnold's parallel English vulgarism
seems to explain very well this meaning of the word; the notion of
travelling alongside of, readily suggests the notion of constant accompaniment, and that of consequence, as in the two logical usages of ewea-dai
and a<6Kov8e'iv, to 'accompany' as well as to 'follow'. Otherwise, the
sense of constant companionship may give rise to the notion of friendly
aid in producing some effect or consequence, and so it passes into the
signification of dia, or nearly so.
9. 'And we are apt to envy those who either have now in their
possession, or have once possessed', (so I distinguish i'xova-t and ncKTrjpevois, which however ordinarily express the same thing. Victorius
translates habent fiossidentquej which not only conveys no distinction
at all, but mistranslates the alternative rj, which clearly shews that
PHTOPIKHS B I O I O , H.
>\ KdKTY\VTO
10 Y\
01 7ro\\d
11 vouariv.
7TOT'
129
StO 7TpCrl3vTpOl VeWTCpOK. KCtl
t>cnravricra.vT<i eis
TCCVTO
SfjXov Se icai ots yalpovaiv
TO?S
ol
oAiya
TOLOVTOI KCCI
7Tl TMTl KUL 7TWS 6^01/TeS* ft)S <ydp OVK eÔJ/TS

1
<p6o\v~
<p' ots infra.
Aristotle did mean two different things,) 'anything to which we ourselves

had a natural claim or had once possessed (subaudi o<ra avroi KeKD/vrat) ;
and this is why seniors are prone to envy their juniors'. Victorius recurs
here to the case of Q. Fabius Maximus and Scipio, already cited on
5. Maximus in his old age was naturally suspected of envy in the
opposition he offered to Scipio's command in Africa: people thought he
was jealous (this is nearer to jealousy than envy) of the reputation that
the young general was rapidly acquiring, which interfered with his own
earlier claims to similar distinction. The case of a similar jealousy of
a younger rival, in any science, art, or profession, is too notorious to
need special illustration.
10. 'And those that have laid out large sums (for the attainment
of any object) envy those who have obtained the same success at a
small expense'. Here again the envy arises from having been beaten in
the competition,
TOIS oXiya (8<mavrj<Ta<n).
11. In this last section there are two or three points requiring
consideration which it will be as well to dispatch before proceeding to
the translation. The first is, whether we are to read e'<' oh or oh without the prepos.; and then, what do c<f> oh or ots and eVi TIVJ, severally
represent. Spengel, following MS A0 retains e'0' oh; Bekker in his
third ed., for once departs from that MS and reads oh, although, as it
seems, none of the MSS give any various reading. It seems therefore on
this ground preferable to retain (j> oh if we can; and we have next to
consider how it is to be interpreted, and how distinguished from iiri ria-t.
<(>' oh and oh are'equally irregular after dfjXov (see note on II 9. n , at the
end), and the grammar therefore throws no light upon the reading. As
far as the grammar and interpretation are concerned there seems to
be no objection to retaining ini.
We have then to decide whether oh or T'IO-I stands for persons
or things; either of which is possible. However if the choice is to be
made between them, nVt seems the more natural representative of persons,
and oh of things; and so in general, throughout these analyses of the
feelings, Aristotle is accustomed to designate the persons who are the
objects of them by the pronoun rives.
Thirdly, there is no objection to ewi T'IO-I xaipovo-w in the sense of 'at' or
' by whom they are pleased' (lit. upon whom their pleasure is bestowed or
directed), 'in whom they find pleasure', though the bare run is more
usual (possibly this may be Bekker's reason for his alteration [of i<j> oh});
and if there were any doubt about it, it would be sufficiently supported
by eVi nolois (what sort ol persons) xa<-P*lvt c- 9- ' ^ Consequently, as I
can see no sufficient reason for altering the text contrary to all manuscript
authority, I have retained i<f>' oh, understanding it of things, the occasions
of joy or delight; and Vi rlo-t of the persons who excite the feeling in us.
AR. II.
130
PHTOPIKHS B I O I I .
7rovvTai, OVTWS eôi/res eirl TOIS evavriois Y\<TQY\(TOVThe next clause, cos yap OVK CÔITFJ \VTTOVVTCU, K.T.X.
presents
some difficulty, and Muretus and the Vetus Translatio, followed

by Schrader and Wolf, reject the negative OVK (or firj as it stood
in the MSS employed in the older editions). This however would
make the two opposite feelings of pleasure and pain the same state
or disposition of mind, which I think could not possibly have been
Aristotle's meaning. Victorius takes what I believe to be the right view
on the point. The. meaning will then be, that the negative, the contradictory, of pain, i. e. pleasure (the two never co-existing), is excited by
the opposite circumstances to those which are productive of the pain
of envy; if pain under particular circumstances is excited by the sight of
the good fortune of another, substitute the opposite, ill fortune for good
fortune in each case, and you will have the appropriate topics for giving
rise to the feeling of pleasure in your audience. This, says Victorius, is
imxaipeKaida, wanton malice, malevolent pleasure in the misfortunes of
others. The above interpretation is at all events free from the objection
to which Schrader's is liable, namely that it makes Aristotle say that the
same mental state or disposition is painful and pleasurable. The choice
between the two depends mainly upon the interpretation of ot TOIOVTOI
and vas exovres. I understand by the former the tpdovtpol, the common
character of all the classes distinguished in the analysis; Schrader of the
members of the several classes, the ambitious, the prosperous and successful ; and in his view these classes must fall under the several' states
of mind' designated by TTCOJ, as, OVTCOS, exovres, such as ambition; though
how it can be applied to others, such as 'the prosperous and successful',
his second instance, he does not inform us. If by the ' state of mind'
the nddos or emotion is meant 1 (which seems to be Spengel's view), it is
quite impossible that two such states, one pleasurable and the other
painful, can be the same. Schrader, however, appears to take the was
exetv m a different sense, for the character or habit of mind, the mental
constitution, which tends to produce such and such feelings; and in this
point of view, though ambition (his first instance) may fairly enough be
called a disposition of mind, yet I cannot see how the second, the prosperous and successful men, or prosperity and success, can well be
included in the designation.
In conclusion I will transcribe part of his note, that the reader
may have the opportunity of deciding for himself; merely adding
that manuscript and editorial authority is against his omission of
the negative, and that though his interpretation is very plausible at
first sight, I doubt whether it can be right, for the reasons stated.
"Veritas autem huius lectionis e re ipsa quoque net manifesta, si per
n-porao-tis a 2 ad 9 transeas, et hue illas applices. Ambitiosi e. g.
dolent honore alterius, iidem, sive eodem modo affecti, gaudent alterius
opprobrio. Qui res magnas gerunt, et fortuna utuntur prosperrima, dolent
1
This is certainly so. Take, for instance, the first words of the following
chapter, TTWS 5' Ixês pjkafiai, the state of mind in which tf\os is shewn, or resides:
which identifies fj\os with the state in question.
PHTOPIKHS B
IOII;
u I.
131
tocTTe dv avTOi fiev 7rapa<TKevao'6a)O'iv oi/Vws

, ol ' i\e7<rdai rj rvy^dveiv TIVOS djadov diovp.evoi wcriv oioi ol elptifxevoi, dfjXov ws ov revôvrai
eXeov irapa TCOV tcvpiaov.
7rws S' côures tyXovcri teal TO iroia teal iwlcnA?-XITKTLV, evdevh' CCTTI SrjXov el yap e'er: tyXos XVTTT]
Tts eiri (paivofievri irapovcria dyaOwv ivTijxtov teal evsi alium ad eundem fortunae gradum cernant evectum: iisdem vero illi
gaudent cum alios longe infra se relinqui conspiciunt."
And now to proceed with the translation:
' It is plain too what are the occasions, the objects, and the states of
mind of such (the envious); that is to say, that the same state of mind
which is absent in the painful feeling, will be present in the joy that
is excited by the opposite occasions' (or thus, 'whatever may be the state
of mind the absence of which manifests itself in, or is accompanied by,
pain, the same by its presence on the opposite occasions will give rise to
pleasure'). 'Consequently, if we ourselves (i. e. any audience) are brought
into that state of mind (envy or jealousy), and those who lay claim to
(think themselves deserving of) compassion from us, or any good that
they want to obtain from us' (as Kpiral, judges of any kind, in a disputed claim; but it is equally true of men in general),' be such as the
above described (i. e. objects of envy), 'it is plain that they will never
meet with compassion' (which will apply to rvyx&veiv TWOS dyadov as
well as to eXtelo-dai) 'from the masters of the situation'(those who have the
power to bestow either of them, those with whom the matter rests).
Trapa<TK.evacw, 'to prepare the minds o f the judges or audience, said of
the speaker who puts them into such and such a state of mind or feeling,
is rendered by KaratrKivaêiv, supra 11 1. 2 (see note ad loc.) and 7, where
it is applied in two somewhat different senses.
CHAP. XI.
With envy, as we have seen, is closely connected Crfkos or emulation ;
both of them originating in the desire of superiority, which manifests
itself in rivalry and competition with those who so far, and in that
sense, resemble us (n-epi TOVS opoLovs), that we are necessarily brought
into comparison with them. Both of them are painful emotionsthe
pain arises from the unsatisfied want which they equally implyand
the difference between them is this, that envy is malevolent; what
the envious man -wants is to deprive his neighbour of some advantage
or superiority, and do him harm by reducing him to his own level ; the
pain of emulation springs from the sense of our own deficiencies and
the desire of rising to a higher level of virtue or honour: consequently the one is a virtuous, the other a vicious, feeling ; emulation
leads to self-improvement, and the practice of virtue ; the object of
envy is nothing but the degradation or injury of another: or, as Aristotle
expresses it, emulation aims at the acquisition of good things, envy at
92
132
PHTOPIKHS B ii i.
/j.evwv avrci XafSeiv irepl TOIVS opo'iovs TJ/ (pvaei,
OTI aWw dW OTL ov^t ical ai/rw icTTiv Bio nal
icrriv 6 ^rjAos Kal 7rieiKcov, TO $e (pdoveTv
the deprivation of them in another, the infliction of harm and loss on

one's neighbour.
Such is Aristotle's account of emulation ; according to him the feeling
is one, and that virtuous. The Stoics however, as interpreted by Cicero,
Tusc. Disp. IV 8.17, distinguished two kinds of
aemulatio:utetinlaude
et in vitio nomen hoc sit. Nam et imitatio virtutis aemulatio dicitur :
el est aemulatio aegritudo, si eo quod concupierit alius potiatur ipse careat.
And again, c. 26. 56, aemulantis, angi alieno bono quod ipse non habeat.
The two definitions differ also in this, that in Ar.'s all emulation is
painful and all virtuous ; in that of the Stoics, one form of it is virtuous
but not painful, the other painful but not virtuous; and in fact it
is difficult to distinguish the latter form of it from envy.
The Stoic definition of Zeno and (apparently) Chrysippus, Diog.
Laert., Zeno, VII i n , gives only the painful and vicious form of fÂor,
~kinrjv emTOaWa irapelvai av avrbs ini6vjx.fl. Cicero attributes his double
definition also to Zeno.
Hobbes' and Bain's definitions of the affection I have already quoted
in the introductory note to Ch. X. Locke, in the chapter there referred
to, does not include emulation in his list of 'Passions', or 'Modes of
pleasure and pain'.
Stewart, Outlines of Moral Philosophy, Pt. 11. Sect. ill. 5, has some
remarks upon emulation, which he classes with the desires, and not (as
Aristotle and others) with the affections. " It is the desire of superiority
which is the active principle; and the malevolent affection is only a
concomitant circumstance." Here he is in accordance with Aristotle.
"When emulation is accompanied with malevolent affection, it assumes
the name of envy."
"Emulation," says Butler, Sermon I., On Human Nature, note 4,
"is merely the desire and hope of equality with, or superiority over
others, with whom we compare ourselves. There does not appear to
be any other grief in the natural passion, but only that want which is
implied in desire. However, this may be so strong as to be the occasion
of great grief. To desire the attainment of this equality or superiority
by the particular means of others being brought down to our own level
or below it, is, I think, the distinct notion of envy. From whence it is
easy to see that the real end which the natural passion, emulation, and
which the unlawful one, envy, aims at, is exactly the same ; namely
that equality or superiority ; and consequently, that to do mischief is not
the object of envy, but merely the means it makes use of to attain
its end." At all events, the malevolent feeling is a constituent element
of the emotion of envy, without which it would not be what it is: though
the actual doing mischief may not be essential to it.
1. 'The dispositions of emulation (the states of mind which exhibit
it, in which it resides), its occasions and objects, will be clear from what
follows', ra Tro'ta here stands for 'the sort of things' which excite emu-
P H T O P I K H S B i i 1,2.
133
(pavXov Kctl (pavXcov o fAev yap avrov 7rapaarKevd(jei

ZLO. TOV ^fjXov Tvy%dveiv TWV dyadwv, o Se TOV TrXrj(Tiov firj exeiv did TOV (j)66vov dvdynti $rj fyXcoriKOus
[xev elvai TOUS dîovvrm CIVTOUS dyadwv wv fxri e'%01;-P. 1388^
2 <riv ovcek yap dîoT -rd cjiaivo/ixeva d^vvara.
Bio ol
veoi KCU 01 /j.eyaXo\lsv%oi TOIOVTOI.
Kal cu? in
lation, usually expressed in these analyses by em TTOIOIS : eVi r'un for the
'persons' or 'objects', upon whom it lights, i.e. against whom it is
directed, which again is more usually conveyed by the simple T'IO-I. See
however c. 10 11, fVi nVi, and the note there ; and iit\ TTOIW âipciv
c. 9 16. 'If, namely, emulation is a feeling of pain on the occasion of
the manifest (unmistakable) presence of good things, highly valued and
possible for ourselves to acquire, (irepi in respect of, in the case of, i.e.)
belonging to, or acquired by, those who have a natural resemblance
to ourselves (in temper, faculties, powers, gifts and accomplishments
natural or acquired, or anything which brings them into contrast with
us); not because another has them (which is envy) but because we
ourselves have them not (and so, feeling the want, are anxious to obtain
them, in order to raise ourselves to the level of our assumed rival)
and accordingly, (the latter,) emulation is virtuous and a property of
virtuous men, envy on the other hand vicious and of the vicious : for
whilst the one is led by his emulation to procure (contrive, manage) for
himself the attainment of these goods, the other is led by his envy to
manage merely that his neighbour shall not have them':(This is mere
malevolence, the desire of harm or loss to another, without any corresponding advantage to oneself. The sentence from 816 to (p66vov, is a
note on the distinction of f^Xo? and <fiB6vos : the argument is now resumed, and the apodosis commences with the irregular 7, introduced
unnecessarily, more Aristotelio, after the parenthesis as correlative to the
el of the TcpoTaais, see note on II 9. 11,1 1. 11)''then, I say (if emulation
be such as it has been described), those must be inclined to emulation
who think themselves deserving of good things which they do not possess';
(sc. dwarav avrols ovraiv, provided they are possible for them to attain.
This connecting link, omitted by Aristotle, is supplied by Muretus and
Victorius, and doubtless explains the connexion of the reasoning,) 'for no
one lays claim to things manifestly impossible'.
2. 'And this is why the young and the high-minded are of this character'. With ol vioi comp. c. 12.6 and 11. The latter of these two
passages gives the reason why the young are inclined to emulation, it is
hia TO aîovv avTois jxeyakav ; which also makes them /Aeyakoipvxoi. Emulation in the /j.eya\6\j/vxoi must be confined to rivalry in great things, if it
is to be consistent with the character assigned to them in Eth. Nic. IV 8,
1124 b 24, K(d eir TO evTLjxa firj livai, rj ov irparevovfTiv uXKoi' Kai apyov thai.
Kal peXX-qTr/v dXX' rj b'irov np-r] fieyaKr) rj i'pyov, Kai o\iyo>v fxtv irpaKTiKov,
Se Kai ovop.ama>v. In fact self-sufficiency is characteristic of the

y x a s , 6 fieyaXau avrov aîav aîos &v, who therefore is devoid
of all vulgar ambition, dia TO oX/ya Tip.av.
134
PHT0PIKH2 B u 2.
TOiavTa dyadd a TWV ivTipj.ct)v a'Pia ecTTiv dvopwv'

'earn yap Tavra 7T\OVTOS teal 7ro\v<pi\ia Kal dp%ai
Kal oca TOiavra' o5s yap irpo<rr\KOV avTois dyadoTs
'Also, those who are in possession {themselves, opposed to ovs oj
&Xkoi d|ioC<nv, in the following sentence) of such good things as are
worthy of men that are held in honour; such are, namely (yap)1, wealth,
abundance of friends (an extensive and powerful connexion), state offices,
and all the like. For, on the supposition that they have a natural claim
to goodness, because the good have a natural right to these things
[on 7rpo(TfJKe Tols ayadiis i'xovcn], good things of this kind they emulously
strive after'. That is to say, they start with the assumption that their
natural character is virtuous, and then, because wealth and power and
such like have a natural connexion with, i. e. are the proper rewards of,
virtue, they are eager to obtain them, and vie with their competitors in
the pursuit of them2. The meaning of this sentence is further elucidated
by comparison with what is said in 7. We are there informed that
some kinds of good things, such as those that are due to fortune, or mere
good luck, without merit, may be the objects not of emulation but of contempt, ayada a TWV evrifiwv agio ianv avbp&v are consequently confined
to those good things the acquisition of which implies merit.
npoafJKe] imperf. is properly 'had a natural claim'. The past tense,
precisely as in the familiar use of the imperf., 'so and so is as I said',
referring back to a past statement, here signifies, 'has a claim, as they
were in the habit of believing'. I have not thought it worth while to
express this in the transl., as the phraseology is Greek and not English.
Muretus, approved by Vater, writes npoo-i]Kfi, overlooking the force of
the imperfect.
In ayaQas *xovo-i, dya6ms for ev is as abnormal as 'goodly' would be,
used as an adverb for 'well'. It occurs once again, Top. E 7, 136 b 28,
OVK ecrn TOO tSiKaias iSiov TO dyadms. Amongst the Classical Greek writers,
Aristotle appears to enjoy the monopoly of it [but the present passage
and the parallel just quoted from the Topics are the only instances given
in the Index Aristotelicus~\: it is found also in the Septuagint (Stephens'
Thesaurus s. v.), and apparently nowhere else.
'And also (opposed to the preceding), those whom everybody else
1
Here and elsewhere I.have followed Schleiermacher, who in his Translation
of Plato, invariably renders 711/3 ' namlich.' The same word in English, though
not so usual as in the other language, is perhaps the nearest equivalent to the
Greek ydp. It is used'thus in a specification of particulars, videlicet, that is to
say, in confirmation of, assigning a sort of reason for, a previous statement.
2
Brandis, in the tract on the Rhet. in Schneidewin's Philologus, IV i. p. 46,
following apparently the opinion of Muretus and Vater, calls the passage a vcrderble Stelle, for which I can see no foundation whatsoever. The sense and
connexion are perfectly intelligible, the imperf. irpoa-rJKe has been explained, and
ayaBws defended by the use of it in the Topics. Bekker, Ed. III., retains the
v. 1. The version of the Anonymus (apud Brandis) fijXouui yap rd Toiavra dyaBd
Sid TO oUadai avrods dyaOois elvai Kal 5td TOVTO lxeiv
dyadd a irptxr^Kei lxHV
TOI
'S
d-,aOois, seems to me to be sufficiently close to the received text to be intended for

a paraphrase of it, and not (as Brandis thinks) to suggest a different reading.
PHTOPIKHS B n 35ehai,
on
a 7rpo<rrJKe rofc dyadots
(2) TOiavTa
TOOV dyadwv.
3 Kai (ov 7rpoyovoi
KCCI OUS ol
r\ crvyyeveh
135
eôi/tri 1 , fyXovcri TO.

aXXoi
rj oiKeToi t] TO edvos t] r\
7ToA.S eVTl/JLOl, fyXtoTlKOl 7T6pl T<XVTa'

4 oXovrai
auToTs eivai,
fyXwra
diovo~iv.
Kai d'îoi
OlKCTa ydp
TOVTCOV.
el S' <TTI
TCJ evTifxa dyadd, dvdynt) Tas re dperds
eivai ToiauTas,
yeTiKa
Kai ocra TOI<S aXXois co(peXi/ixa Kai evep-
Tifxw(ri
dyaQovs.
yap
TOI)S evepyerovvras
Kai ocrcov dyadcou d7r6Xavais
Kai
TOTS 7rXr]o-'iov
5 ecrTiv, oiov TTXOVTOS Kai raAAos fxdXXov vyteias.

vepov Se Kai ol ZJJXUJTOI Tives'
1
ol yap
TOI)S
ravTa
<paKai Ta
Coniecit Vahlen. tin TpwrrJKe rots ayaSas lxov<Th MSS.
thinks worthy of them'. They are stimulated to exertion by the praises,

and exhortations, and encouragement of their friends.
3. 'Any distinction acquired or enjoyed by one's ancestors, or
kinsmen, or intimate friends, or race, or nation' (the city in Greece is
represented by the nation in modern language), 'has a tendency to excite
emulation in those same things (in which the distinction has previously
manifested itself) ; the reason being, that in these cases people think
that (these distinctions) are their own (properly belonging, appropriate,
to them), and that they deserve them'. Supply, /cai {o'Lovrai avrol eivai.)
aioi TOVTIOV. On irpoyovot, Victorius aptly quotes Cicero, de Off. 1 35,
quorum vero patres aut maiores aliqua gloria praestiterunt, ii student
plemmque eodem in genere laudis excellere; et seq.
4. 'And if all good things that are held in honour are objects of
emulation (i. e. of emulous exertion, what we vie with others in trying
to acquire), all the virtuous must needs be of this same kind {ivrljiovi),
and everything that is profitable and productive of benefit to the rest
of the worlds because all benefactors and good men in general are held
in honour. And especially those good things of which the enjoyment'
(particularly sensual enjoyment: see the account of the three kinds of
lives, the ajroXavcmKos, irpaKTiKos, a n d deaprjriKos, E t h . N i c . I .3: compare
III 13, 1118 a 31, TJj. drroXava-fi, 1} ylverai n w a Si' d(prjt KCU iv cnriois Kai
iv TTOTOLS Kai TO'LS a<j>poSi<TLOi.s Xeyo/ieVots1, VII 6, I I 4 8 a 5> (Ta>jxaTiKai
onrokava-fLs) ' can be shared by one's neighbours, wealth for instance, and
personal beauty, more than health'. The enjoyment of beauty may no
doubt be 'shared by one's neighbours', because the sight of it is always
agreeable; but how it, or health, can be called ' an object of emulation',
I own I am at a loss to see. No help is given by the Commentators. Did
Aristotle, absorbed in his distinction, forget for a moment that the
instances selected were inappropriate to the topic he was employed in
illustrating ?
5. 'It is plain too who the persons are, that are the objects of
emulation : they are, namely, those who possess these and similar
136
PHT0PIKH2 B 11 57-
TOiavTct KeKTri/nevoi fyXcoTol. ecrn ve TavTa TO.

elprjfxeva, oiov dvhpia <ro(j)ia. dpffi
ol yap apôvTe?
TroXXovs SvvavTcu eu Troieiv, CTpaTriyoi, priropes, irav6 res ol TH TOICCVTO. Buvd/mevoi. ical ots 7ro\\oi ofxoioi
fiovXovTai elvai, r\ iroXXol yvcopifxoi, r] (piXoi 7roXXol.
fj ous 7roXXoi davjudôva'iv, tj ovs avTOi 6avfxdôv(riv.
7 Kai (hv eiraivoi Kal eyKoo/una Xeyovrcci h viro ITOIYITWV //
Xoyoypa(piop.
KaTacppovoucri ce TWV evavncov
evavadvantages. These are those already mentioned, sucri as courage,
wisdom, power: the last class, men in power, are objects of emulation
in virtue of their frequent opportunities of doing service, conferring
benefits; examples are generals, orators, and all that have the like
power or influence'. The power that orators have of doing service is
exemplified in Crassus' eulogium on Rhetoric, Cic. de Orat. I 8. 32,
(referred to by Victorias): Quid tarn porro regium, tam Hberale, tarn
munificum, quam opem ferre supplicihis, excitafe afflictos, dare salutem,
liberare periculis, retinere homines in civitatef
6. 'And again, those whom many desire to resemble, or to be
acquainted with, or their friends'. These, according to Victorius, are
three classes of possessors of an dyadbv tvTijxov which makes them objects
of emulation. 'Or those who- are admired by many, or by ourselves'.
7. 'And those whose praises and panegyrics are pronounced either by
poets or speech-writers' (i.e. especially, writers of panegyrical speeches).
On the distinction of enaivos and eyicwfitov see Introd., Appendix B, to
Bk. 1. c. 9, p. 212 seq.
Xoyoypa<j>ot. This word is used in two distinct senses. In its
earlier signification it is applied to the Chroniclers, the earliest historians and prose writers, predecessors and contemporaries of Herodotus;
of whom an account may be found in Miiller, Hist. Gr. Lit. c. x v m , and
Mure, Hist, of Gk. Lit. Bk. IV. ch. 2, 3, Vol. IV, and Dahlmann, Life of
Herodotus, Ch. VI. sect. 2, and foil. In this sense it occurs in Thuc. I 21,
upon which Poppo has-this note: "Aut solutae orationis scriptores universi,aut historici veletiam jni0oypa</>oi" (this early history was often of a
mythical and legendary character), "denique orationum panegyricarum
auctores hoc ambiguo vocabulo significantur." (The later, and most
usual, meaning of the word is here omitted.) As this was for some time
the only prose literature in existence, the \oyoypa.(f>ot might well be contrasted with the poets, so as to signify ' prose writers' in general. And
this, according to Ernesti, Lex. Technologiae Graecae s. v., is the sense
that it bears here, Dichter undprosaische Schriftsteller. Isocrates also,
Phil. 109, has the same contrast, ovre TSV ivoujrav ovre TCOV XoyoThe later and commoner signification, which appears so frequently
in the Orators (see examples in Shilleto's note on Dem. de F. L. 274),
dates from the time of Antiphon, who commenced the practice, which
PHT0PIKH2 B I I 7.
137
became common, and was pursued for instance by Isocrates and Demosthenes, of writing speeches, for which he received remuneration, for the
use of parties in the law-courts. Public feeling at Athens was very
much against this supposed prostitution of a man's talents and special
knowledge (which may be compared with Plato's horror, expressed in
the Phaedrus, of making a trade of teaching), and Xoyoypacpos became
a term of reproach. Perhaps the earliest example of this application is
the passage of the Phaedrus, 257 c, where Lysias is said to have been
taunted with it by a political opponent, 81a 7rd<njs rfjs Xoi&oplas exaXei
Xoyoypacpoi*. Aeschines applied it very freely to his rival Demosthenes.
On this import of the word Gaisford (ad hunc locum) quotes Schol. Plat.
p. 63, Aoyoypaqbovs inaXovv 01 ira\aio\ TOVS eVl [M<r6a> \6yovs ypd<povTas, Kai
7rnrpa<TKovTas avrovs els biKacrrripia' pr/Topas Se TOVSfit*iavTav Xeyoirar.
But besides this special sense, Xoyoypa$/a and Xoyoypacpos are said of
speech-writing and speech-writers in general (so PI. Phaedr. 257 E, 258 B),
and especially of panegyrical speeches, like those of Isocrates, and of
speeches written to be read in the closet, and not orally delivered in the
law-court or public assembly: and as this is the most appropriate to the
present passage of Aristotle, who is speaking ofeulogies in poetry and prose;
and is likewise the sense in which it is used in two other passages of the
Rhetoric, in y.y, 12.2,1 have little doubt that it is to be so understood here.
Hermogenes irepl 'SecSi/, /3, chap. 10, nep\ TOV TVOXLTIKOV Xoyou, Rhetores
Graeci, Vol. II. p. 405, 6, and again chap. 12, irepi TOV COTXCOS iravr/yvptKov,
ib. p. 417, in treating of the navr/yvpiKos Xdyoy, the name by which he
designates Aristotle's imdeiKTiKov yevos, seems to divide all literature into
three branches, poetry, spoken and written speeches; distinguishing
prjTopes and Xoyoypacpoi, and both of them from iroirjrai; apio-Tos ovv Kavra
navTav \6yav e'tSrj Kal iroirjTGiu airavTO>v u i prjTopcov Kal Xoyoypafpav "Op-qpos
(p. 406, 9, and elsewhere). And (in the second passage above referred to)
he includes io-Topla under the general head of Xoyoypacfila, ou'Se jxfjv rj Xoyoypaqbla aXXa Kai. i; io-Topia, p. 417, and still more expressly io-Topias re Kal
rijs aWrjs \oyoypacplat, p. 418. Rhetoric, when treated as the art of composition* Xegts, may no doubt be considered to embrace all prose literature, which will so fall into two divisions (1) public and forensic
speeches, orally delivered, and (2) all written compositions. ["The relation between ancient oratory and ancient prose, philosophical, historical
or literary, is necessarily of the closest kind." Jebb's Attic Orators 1.
p. lxxi.J In Rhet. i n 12. 2, the written style, Xegcs ypacpiicrj, is opposed to
the ayavio-TLKrj, which has to be employed in actual encounter, spoken
and acted, not (necessarily) written; and the o-vfif5ovkevTiKri and SiKaviKij
to the fViSfiKTiK?;. The art of composition therefore, and prose composition in general, may properly be referred to this third branch of
Rheto'ric, the declamatory or panegyrical, as Hermogenes expressly, and
Aristotle tacitly, do refer it: and so Xoyoypa$or may mean either a speechwriter (as opposed to pâp), or a writer of prose (as opposed to poetry).
'The opposites of all these (the foregoing classes of persons) are
objects of contempt: for contempt is the opposite of emulation, and the
notion of the one to the notion of the other' (the substantive in -is denotes
the process, or operation of the feeling; the infin. with TO the abstract
conception of it). 'And those who are so constituted as to emulate others,
138
PHT0PIKH2 B n 7; 12 1.
T'LOV yap
fy\w KaTa(j)p6vri(ris ecTTi, Kal TW fy\ovv TO

KaTcKppoveiv. dvayKf] Be TOI/S OVTWS e%ovTas W(TT6
l nvas tj fyXovcrdcu, KaTa(j)povriTiKOiis eivai v- 79TOVTWV T6 Kal eVi TOVTOIS ocroi T(i
ivavria
exov&i TCOV dyadvov TWV ^TIXWTWV.
Bid 7roAAa/as
Kara<ppovovcn TWV evTV%ovvTwv, oTav ctvev TWV evTifxwv dyadwv VTrdpyr] avToTs ri TV)(t].
Bi wv fxev ovv TOL wddri eyyiyveTai Kal BiaXveTai,
1 IP wv al 7r/o"Tets yiyvovTai irepl avTtuV, eiprjTar TCCCHAP. XII.
or themselves to be the objects of emulation, must necessarily be inclined
to feel contempt for all such personsand on such occasions (an unnecessary parenthetical note, which interrupts the construction)as lie
under the defects and disadvantages opposite to the good things which
are the objects of emulation. Hence contempt is often felt for the
fortunate, when their luck comes to them without those good things
which are really valuable (i. e. which depend in some degree upon merit
for their acquisition)'.
' Here ends the account of the means (Jit. channels, media) by which
the several emotions are engendered and dissolved, (furnishing topics or
premisses) from which the arguments (modes o"f persuasion) that belong
to them may be derived'.
SiaXu'erm] is here applied to the dissolution, breaking up, and so
bringing to an end, of the isaBr) themselves. In a former passage on a
similar subject, c. 4 32, it seems rather to have its logical sense of
breaking up, or refuting an argument.
e'prjTai] it has been stated, and is now over [Vol. 1. p. 225, note].
CHAP. XII.
We now enter upon the consideration of the second kind of fjdt],
which may be employed as a subsidiary proof or instrument of persuasion, to assist the cogency of the logical arguments. This occupies the
six following chapters from 12 to 17 ; in which the salient features or
characteristics of the three ages, youth, old age, and manhood or the
prime of life; and of the three social conditions of noble birth or family,
wealth, and power, are set forth in detail. The import of these chapters,
and their connexion with the main subject of the entire work, which
explains and justifies their position here, has been already treated in the
Introduction, pp. no112, to which the reader is referred. The study
of these 'characters' will enable the speaker to accommodate his language and arguments to their several tastes and dispositions.
The four stages of human life, as described by Horace, Epist. ad Pis.
156 seq., have much more in common with Shakespeare's 'seven ages',
(As you like it, Act 11. sc. 7 [lines 143166],) than with Aristotle's
analysis. Horace writes with a view to the use of ihepoet, and describes
them as they should appear in the drama or the Epic poem: his cha-
PHTOPIKHS B 12 i.
139
racters are the dramatic characters: Aristotle writing for the rhetorician
applies his analysis to the purposes of argument; reserving the dramatic
expression of character for the third book, where it naturally falls under
the treatment of style and expression. Horace's object appears in the
lines, Ne forte seniles viandentur iuveni partes pueroque viriles, semper
tn adiunctis aevoque morabimur aptis [176].
Bacon's Essay, Of Youth and Age [XLIIJ, is too well known to need
more than a mere reference. Two such observers as Aristotle and Bacon
must of course agree in the general outline of the two contrasted
characters; but Bacon's is a brief sketch, presenting the leading features of both more particularly as they exhibit themselves in the conduct and management of business, and in public life: Aristotle fills in
the details of the picture in a much more complete and comprehensive
analysis.
Plutarch, in the treatise de virtute morali, c. XI, discussing the moral
constitution of the human subject, illustrates his material theory of the
origin of the Txd6r\ by reference to the characters of the young and old,
which he thus describes ; 810 vioi pAv Ka\ dels <al lrap.o\ (headlong, hasty,
precipitate,) nepl re ras operas Siairvpoi Kai oiVrpoJSfis alparos irkr)8ei Kai
6epiA0TT]Ti' TOIV 8e wpeo-fivTav rj irpos TO r)irap dpx'j TOV ewi8vp.r]TiKov tcaraufilvvvrai, Kai ylverai piKpa. Kai do~8svrjs' lo~^(vt de fiaWov 6 Xoyos TOV
7ra3rjTiKov TIB o-cop-ari <Tvvairop.apaivoij.ivov. Compare with this Rhet. II 12. 8,
wcrwfp yap ot olvdp-evoi, ovra> btdSfpfiol elo-iv 01 veot vivo rf/s (pucrecos: a n d
*3- 7? ' 7rpeo~/3iJTepoe evavrtws hiaKeivrai rots vcois' Karc^vyp-ivoi ydp elo~iv,
ol 5e OepfWL. mare jrpo(o8oiro[t]Ke TO yrjpas TTJ dsiXiq' Ka\ yap o <fio[3os Kara-
ijrvgis TU io-ri. The curious correspondence of the metaphors in the two

authors' description of the hot impetuosity of the one and the cold
phlegmatic temper of the other, is accounted for by similarity of theory
as to the origin of the nd8r). With both the explanation is physiological,
and in the spirit of modern inquiries in the same department. Aristotle's views may be gathered from the de Anima I 1, 403 a 3, seq.
He there describes them as inseparable from the body and its matter
and functions; with the possible exception of TO votiv ' thought and
intelligence', which is there included with the irddr/ as a property of 'life';
and they are ranked with sensation in general: 0aiVeTai 8e TS>V fih ir\elo-ravthe independent existence of the intellect, or part of it, being left
an open questionovStv avev TOV O"G>/JCITO? udo'Xîv ovhk iroieivy olov 6pyl~
eo-dat, Bappelv, iwi.dvp.elv, SXas alo-ddvtcrQai. See further, ib. line 16: a n d
ib. line 31, a ' physical' definition of anger (which he seems to accept as correct as far as it goes) is given, feVts TOV irtp\ Kapbiav a'ip.aTos Kai 8epp.ov:
this is the definition of ttte V\TJ of the nddos. Eth. N. IV 15, 1128 b 14,
o-<op.aTiKa 8r/ (paiveTaL
ircos civai
a/x0o'rcpa
(aiSto Kai vep.e(Tiv) oirep
SOKCI
iraBovs ixSXkov rj e&ws dvai.

Near the end of the 12th chapter Plutarch
further assigns as t h e TrdBr) TV>V vea>v, alaxyvr) (comp. E t h . N . IV 15, 1128 b
16 seq.), imBvp-'ia (Aristotle, ini8vp.rjTiKoi, c. 12. 3), p.erdvoia (Ar. evp.eTd(io~Kai, c. 12. 4), r/Sovrj, Xinrr] (meaning of course that they are excessively
susceptible of these two feelings), cpiKonp-ia. (Ar. ib. 6.)
Against Spengel's view of these ?&/viz. that they are the analysis
of the r)8os proper, lv Xe'yovn, taken by Aristotle out of the order of
treatment, which he had originally laid down for the three great divi-
140
PHT0PIKH2 B 12 i.
Be rfin iToioi Tives Kara TO. Trddri Kal ras eets teal
ras jjAi/a'as Kal ras T i ^ a s , SieAdcofxev fxera
ravra.
sions of rhetorical proof, irloreK, rj8os, irddos; and placed after, instead of
before, the n-aÎ will here add to what I have already said in the
Introd. p. 112 (and p. n o on the real difference between the two kinds of
ijdos described in II I and here), that, whereas in II I reference is made
for details to the analysis of the virtues in I 9, the political characters of
I 8, and the characters of the three ages and conditions of life, are not
noticed at all; and for the best of reasons ; because they in fact belong
to a different class of rjdos; the object of the first, rjdos proper, being to
impress the audience favourably as to your own character and good
intentions; that of the second to adapt your tone, sentiments and language, to the tastes and feelings of certain special classes whom you
may have to address; you study their 'characters' for the purpose of
introducing into your speech what you know will be acceptable to each
of them. And precisely the same thing may be said of the political
characters.
1. ' T h e varieties of men's characters in respect of their instinctive
feelings and developed states and of their several ages and fortunes
(conditions of life), let us next proceed to describe'. 2. 'By feelings or
emotions I mean anger, desire, and such like of which we have spoken
before (II 211), and by settled states, virtues and vices : these too have
been discussed before, as well as the objects of individual choice, and of
individual action (what sort of things they are inclined to do, or capable
of doing, TrpaKTiKol)'. The second reference is to I 9, and probably also
to I 5 and 6, on good absolute and comparative, as the object of human
aspiration.
On nadr], Sueajueir, eeis, see Eth. Nic. II 4 ; and on the import of
tjdos and its relation to Z6os, Introd. p. 228, Appendix C, to Bk. 1. c. 10.
Vater raises a difficulty about the connexion of the above passage
with the concluding sentence of the last chapter, which he says he cannot understand. " How could Aristotle after stating that he had concluded the description of the na0rj immediately add, as though nothing
had been said about them, nunc autem qui mores ant animorum motus
explicemus"? My answer is that he does not say so : the two sentences
have reference to two totally different things: at the end of c. 11, he tells
us that he has now finished the analysis of the nddr], and shews by the
analysis how they can be applied to the purposes of the rhetorician, how
to excite and allay them. What he says at the opening of c. 12, is that
he is now going to treat of the application of these nadr) and the e|eiy
which grow out of them to the characters of certain ages and conditions
of life. The Latin words quoted are a mere mistranslation : the KOTO is
overlooked, and the sentence rendered as if it were ra S<j ij6rj KOI TO iraBrj
...8U\8a>fiev. Vater accordingly on this ground, and also on that of the
passage of Quintilian (immediately to be noticed), supposes that something is lost here.
The passage of Quintilian, V 10. 17, presents a real difficulty. In
referring to Aristotle in secundo de Arte Rhetorica librowhich can only
PHTOPIKHX B 12 2 - 4 .
2 Xeyco Se iradt] /mev opyriv
Trepi dbv elp^Kafxev
KaKiav
eiridvfxiav Kal rd
Trporepov,
eiprjTai ce Trepi TOVTWV
Trpoaipovvrai
eet?
de dperds
Trporepov,
Kal
Kai iroia
Tv^rjv
Se Xeya) p. 1389.
Kai TTXOVTOV Kal Zvvdfxeis Kal TavavTia
TOJS Kal oAcos evrv)(iav

3
roiavra,
eKacTTOi, Kal TTO'ICOV TrpaKTiKol. iqXiKiai
' elcrl veorr\<i Kal d.K/j.rj Kal yfjpas.

evyeveiav
141
TOU-
Kal Bva'TVîav.
01 /ULP ofiv veoi TO r\%Y] elarlv 6Tridvfxr)TiKOi, Kal 0101

7roi6iv cov dv 67riQviJ.t]<r(ti(riv. Kal TWV irepl
eiridviJLiwv fxd\i(TTa
aKo\ov6r]TtKoi
4 d(ppoh'i(Tia, Kal aKparels ravrris.
elcri Tafc
TO crcofxa
nepl
evjieTafioXoi
Ta
c)e Ka\
mean this placehe adds to what we actually find in Aristotle several

other 'characters' of which no trace is now to be found in his text, " u t
divitias quid sequatur, ant ambitum, aut superstitionem; quid boni probent, quid mali petant, quid milites, quid rusticij quo quaeque modo res
vitari vel appeti soleat." Both Victorius (Comm. ad II 17. 6, p. 358,
ed. 1548), and Spalding (ad loc. Quint.), attribute the discrepancy to a
lapse of memory on Quintilian's part, who was here quoting without
book. The former, in a sarcastic note, thinks that it is much more probable to suppose that Quintilian, without referring to the text of his
author, added de suo what he thought ought to be there, than that anything has been lost in a book which presents no trace of any hiatus. To
which Spalding adds, "non uno quidem loco vidimus videbimusque Quintilianum memoriae vitio e libris afferentem, quae in iis non plane eadem
legerentur. Cf. IV 2. 132." In this explanation I think we must acquiesce. Spengel also, in his tract iiber die Rhet. des Ar. (Trans. Bav. Acad.
1851) p. 43, attributes this want of coincidence to a 'mistake' of Quintilian.
2. ip'Xucuu, K.T.X.J ' The ages are youth, prime of life (manhood), and
old age. By " fortune" I mean, birth, and wealth, and power of various
kinds {plural), and their opposites, and in general good and bad fortune'.
3. 'Now the youthful in character are prone to desire, and inclined
to do (to carry out, put in practice or execution) anything they may
have set their hearts upon. And of the bodily appetites lust is that
which they are most disposed to follow (to give way to, or obey), and in
this (sc. T?)S imdviiias, this particular appetite) they are incontinent'. If
rais is right (some MSS have rfjs), Tavrijs is a piece of careless grammar,
denoting lust as a single appetite, of which the plural preceding represents the varieties, or moments. Comp. Eth. Nic. I 1, 1095 a 5, seq. E
fie (o vkos) TOIS iradf(TLV OKOXOUÎJTIKOS &Vit will be in vain and unprofitable for him to study moral philosophy, which is a practical science,
whereas he has as yet no sufficient control over his own actionsou yap
irapa TOV XPVOV V fXXfii^-if, aXka Sia TO KOTO nados Q(v Km. diionciv fx
142
PHTOPIKHS B 12 4.
d^piKopoi TTJOOS Tas emOu/ulas, KCCI cr(f)6Bpa [xev mdv/uLOvai Taê'ft)? Se iravovTar
oêiai <ydp al pov\rjcras Kal ov /meydXai, wcnrep al TWV Ka/mvovTtov
4. ' Changeable too and fickle are .they in respect of their desires
and appetites, and these are violent but soon subside: for their wishes
and volitions {ov\r)o-is includes both) are sharp (keen, eager) and not
strong or enduring (non firma, non perdnrantia, Victorius), like the
hunger and thirst of the sick' (the plural of the abstract nouns, here, as
usual, the various or successive moments, accesses of the two appetites).
Comp. Eth. N. IV 15, 1128 b 16, ov ndo-rj 8' 7pUKia TO nados apy.6^1, dXka
TTJ vitf oloîcda yap Betv TOVS T7]\IKOVTOVS aldrjfiovas eivai hia. TO iradti
fcovras jroXXa afiapTaveiv, virb Trjs alhovs 8e KcoXveaOai. Horace, A. P. 160,
(puer) mutatur in horas (fi!îera/3oXos); 165, et amata relinquere fiernix
; 163, cereus i7i vitium flecti.
s. As this word is not explained nor sufficiently illustrated
in the Lexicons, it will be well to supply the deficiency by a few examples. This appears to be its earliest appearance in the extant Greek
literature. It does not become at all common till Plutarch's time.
Hesychius and Suidas supply the derivation. aîKopov- air\rjo-(U)v. r) apa
r<3 aijrao-&ai Kopzwiptvov Tayâs. d^rlKOpot' Kavftarivos (KafiaTrjpos, Salmasius), Taêws o\iya>pav, Ka\ Kupov \afij3avav. aîKopas' euî6Ta/3Xi)T(os
(Hesychius S. V.). a\jflKopo$' ev/iTa/3Xi)TOS" rj 6 ravens (cat ajxa Ta a\j/ao-6ai.
Kopevvvp.evos. " Sta re Tr/v (ÛCTIKIJV Tav No/iaSa)** a^nnopiav" (fickleness)
K.r.X. (Polyb. xiv I. 4 ; the quotation in Suidas is inexact), ical avdis
(M. Anton. I 16, Bekker ad loc.) " o-vvTrjpr]Ti.K6v dei elvai irpos TOVS (pfKovs
Kai iirj8ap.ov ayjriKopov " (Suidas, s. v.). Thus the primary meaning of the
word is, one that is satiated by a mere touch, aêt KeKopea-p.ivos, Kopecrdeis, easily satisfied with anything, soon tired of it; fickle, changeable,
fastidious; fastidiosus, ad mutationem pradivis (Ast's Lex. Plat, s.v.);
"quem cito omnis rei fastidium capit, ac simul atque attigit satiatus ilia
expletusque est" (Victorius ad hunc locum). It is found in the PseudoPlat. Axiochus, 369 A, as an epithet of the Sfjp.os. Once in Lucian,
Calumniae non temere credendum, c. 21, TTP&TOV p.eu TO <jn\6<aivov, o (pvarei
Trcuriv av6pamois virap^fi, Kai TO a<\ri<opov. Once in Polybius, the passage
quoted by Suidas. More frequently in Plutarch, n-fpi iralhav dyaiyrjs,
C. 9, p. 7 B, TOV jiovoKokov \6yov...7rpbs T17X ao-Krjo-iv d^tKopov (tiresome,
speedily producing weariness or disgust) KCU navrri aveirifiovov. Id. jreSs del
TOV viov TToir)fxaT<ov aKoveiv c. 4, p. 20 B, it is coupled in the same sense
with icpi]iiepov and dpeâiov, with which it is almost synonymous. Id. irepl
no\v(pi\ias, c. 2, p. 93 D, 81a TO (pikonaivov Kai difriKopov {praesentium fastidio, Lat. Transl. ap. Wyttenbach). irepl aSoXeo-x'ar, c. 5, p. 504 D, y.6vos
"Ojir^pos TTJS T&V 'dvdpamtnv a\jnKopias Trepiyeyovzv. 'EpaTiKos, C. 5, 752 B,
"Epco? x<opir 'A(ppo$iTrjS...Ka\ Trkr)O-p.iov Ka\ aiîKopov. Ib. C. 16, 759 F, "Ort
ovdt tfjveoTip rjbiais Kar "EnUovpov, c. 3, p. 1088 B, TO <rajia...iv TavTais (rais
iJSovaif) da-devfs n Kal d\jrUopov {satietati, fastidio obnoximri).
o-(pohpa iiri8vp.ovviv\ Victorius refers in illustration to Caesar's
saying of Brutus, quidquid vult valde vult [Cicero, ad Att. Xiv 1. 2];
which Plutarch renders, irav ' o j3ou\rai o-(p68pa /3oAerai [Brutus, c. 6].
PHTOPIKHS B 12 57.
5 Kai ireivai.
Xovdeiv
yap
Kal 6V/J.IKOI teal 6v6v[Jioi Kal 0101 O.KO-
Ttj opfin-
(piXoTifxlav
6 dyavaKTOvcriv
Kal /TTOI el<rl TOV 6V/IOU.

OVK avkôvTai
oXiywpovfxevoi,
av o'lcovrai ddiKtTo-Oai.
p.tv elcri, fjLaWqv Se (piXovtKor
fxdXXov
rj cpiXoxptiV-ctTor
did
ixr\TT(a evdeias
ha
a'AA'
Kal
virepoxm
n PeoTtj<s, jy de V'IKY] virepoyr] T J S .
TO
143
yap
Kal ajuMpu)
cpiXoxprj/maTOi. Se r\K.i<na
ircireipatrQai,
wenrep
7 TaKoO e ^ a dTro<pde<yiJ.a els 'A/Mpidpaov.
TO
YIIT-
Kal ov KaKO-
rjdei's dXX' evtideis did TO j u p w TeQewprjKevai 7roXX<xs

5. 'And passionate and quick-tempered (hasty), and apt to give
way to their impulses. And under the dominion of (slaves to) their
passion' (dvfios, here the angry passions: on the more technical sense of
Bvjxos, as one of the three divisions of the opegus in a psychological
classification, see in note on 11 2. 1); 'for by reason of their love of
honour they cannot brook (put up with) a slight, but always resent any
thing which they suppose to be a wrong'. Hor. A. P. 159, puer...iram
colligit ac ftonit temere et mutaticr in horas.
6. 'And fond as they are of honour, they are still fonder of victory : for youth is desirous of superiority, and victory is a kind of superiority'. The <f>iKoTifiia of youth seems to be represented in Horace's
cupidus, A. P. 165, 'desirous', that is, of honour and glory; not, of course
of money, covetous or avaricious. Comp. 11 2.6; and I 11. 14,15, on the
pleasures of victory in competitions of all kinds, founded on the natural
desire of superiority which is an instinct of humanity. Victorius quotes
Cic. de Fin. V 22. 61, (de pueris) Quanta studia decertantium sunt:
quanta ipsa certamina: ut illi efferuntur laetitia cum uicerint, ut ftudet
victos:...quos illi labores non perferunt ut aequalium principes sint.
'And both of these they are fonder of than of money : in fact for money
they have no fondness at all {lit. in the very least degree), owing to their
never yet having had experience of want; to which Pittacus' pithy saying
(or a7ro<fideyij.a II 21. 8) of Amphiaraus is in point'. Until we know what
the saying wasdictum hoc Pittaci intercidit, says Buhlewe canndt
decide whether ds is to be interpreted ' against' Amphiaraus or merely
applied or addressed ' t o ' him; [perhaps simply 'on'; with airofydeyna els
'Afjufiiapaov, compare in this sense Pindar, 01. VI. 13, ahus, ov "ASpaaros ?
'Afi<f>iapr]OV <f>6zyaT0.]
7. 'And not ill-natured but good-natured, because they have as yet

had but few opportunities of observing the (prevalent) wickedness (of
society)', irovrjpias, plural, the acts or cases of villainy which meet us so
frequently in the experience of life.
The meaning of evr/Beis here may be determined by its opposite KCIKOi]dei.s, which is thus denned in c. 13. 3 ; KaKoydeia. TO <FV! TO xeipv vTvoXap.-
fiaveiv wavra. It therefore denotes the simple, innocent, artless, candid

turn of mind which 'thinketh no'evil', and puts a favourable interpretation upon any doubtful act or expression. This is of course the primary
144
PHTOPIKHS B 12 8.
7rovtipia<i. teal evTricrTOi %ia TO /xfjTrw iroXKa ktv\ira8 rfjcrdai. Kal eve\7rides' axnrep <ydp oi oivcopevoi, obra)
ZiadepfJiOi euriv oi veoi VTTO rrjs (î/crews* a^xa $e Kal
and proper sense of the word, and so it is employed by Thucyd. m 83,
Kal TO eSrjdes, ov TO yevvaiov jrAeioTov fiere'xe', KarayeXaoSev i}<pavio-8ri, ' sim-
plicity, the chiefest ingredient of a noble temper, was laughed to scorn

and disappeared'; namely, in that degeneration of character, and consequent perversion of language, which are ascribed by the author to the
factious quarrels then prevailing in Greece.
In Herod, i n 140, there is a doubtful instance, 81' evrjBlrjv, which
Scliweighauser explains by animi bonitas, though the more unfavourable
signification is equally probable. And in Demosth. c. Timocr. 717. 2, Trjs
vfLCTepas fvrjdflas certainly bears the same sense as Aristotle gives to the
word here. But in its ordinary applicationeven in Herodotus and the
tragedians; in Plato, with whom it is very frequent, almost invariably
'simplicity' has degenerated into silliness or absurdity, by that process
of deterioration, common in language, which Trench, Study of Words,
Lect. II. 'On the morality in words', has abundantly illustrated. He
refers to tvijBrjs without naming it, p. 46. Bonhomie and Einfalt have
precisely the same double sense. [Cf. Vol. 1. p. 175.]
I must however add that it is equally possible that Ar. may have
meant here that youth are 'simple-minded', i.e. prone to a simple and
literal interpretation of everything as they see it, without penetrating
beneath the surface, 'inclined to think well of everything'and so
Victorius, ingenii simplicis et fatui, bene de omnibus existimantes
especially as Ar. himself has twice used the word in the disparaging
sense, HI 1.9; 12. 2. Comp. Plat. Rep. ill 409 A (quoted by Victorius),
hio 8rj Ka\ evrjdets vioi oPTes oi 7rtiKe7s <j)alvovTai, Kal vea7raTr}T0t V7TO TCOV
dfiiKcoi', are OVK côvres iv iavTois TrapaSe/y/jara 6/ioioTradfj TOIS Trovripois-
[Martial, XII. 51, Tarn saepe nostrum decipi Fabullinum Miraris, Aule?
Semper homo bonus tiro est.]
Ka\ evnia-Toi, K.T.X.] 'And credulous (easy of persuasion), owing to their
having been hitherto seldom exposed to deceit'.
8. 'And sanguine ; for youths, like men when in a state of drunkenness, are pervaded by a heat due to their nature (i. e. their physical
structure); and also at the same time because they have not as yet had
much experience of failure'. The first is the physical, the second the
intellectual or logical, explanation of the phenomenon.
oha)i4voi\ This is one of the verbs beginning with 01 which " seldom
or never receive the augment", as olo-Tpav p. p. olo-Tprjêvos, "compounds
of oia| and olavos, ol'x&>Ka Aesch. Pers. 13, Soph. Aj. 896." Matth. Gr. Gr.
168 obs. "This seems," he adds, " t o have originated from the old
orthography, in which a> was as yet unknown." olfiaynevov, Eur. Bacch.
1284.
Similarly, cv for TJV, in evpelv, evprjKevai, KaSevde, ev\6yrjo-a.
See
Ellendt's Lex. Soph. s. v. olvoco, Elmsley ad Bacch. 686, who (following

Porson) writes civa>iivos, though the manuscript authority is against him.
See his note ad loc, and on evpeiv see Lobeck ad Phrynichum, p. 140.
olvripevos occurs no less than five times in Eth. N. vn, from c. 5 to 15.
With Sid-dtpfios, as a compound, 'hot or heated all through', pervaded,
PHTOPIKHS B 12 8.
14s
cia TO /JL^TTCO 7ro\\d diroTeTV)(t]Kevai. KCII (^wcri TO.

TrXeicTTa i\7rlî'
tj fxev <ydp iXTrh TOV /ueXXouTos Ve<TTLv r\ he fxv^fxr] TOV Trapoi^piJievov, TCHS he veoi$ TO
fxev fxeXXov iroXv TO he 7rapeXt)Xv66$ (ipayy' Trj yap
Trpu>Ttj n/xepa fxe/uLvrjardai p.ev ovhev oiov r e ,
saturated, with heat, compare 8id\evKos Ar. Probl. x x n i 6. 2,
Arist. Nub. 160, Hermann (81a XenroO, Dindorf and Meineke),
vav Plut., Sia/j.v&a\(os Aesch. Pers. 538, Porson, 8ia|>?pos, diairpvo-tos, 81afrvpos Plutarch, de virhite morali, XI (p. 403) [quoted supra on p. 139],
Xenoph., Eurip., &c.
With the statement comp. Plutarch (already referred to), and the
rest of the preliminary note on c. XII. The heat in youth is supposed'
to be caused by the boiling of the blood, this being the physical
origin of the na6r), (as anger, de Anima I 1, 403 a 31, already cited,)
which are specially characteristic of the young, see note supra 3.
The young are again compared to drunken men, Eth. Nic. VII 15,
1154 ^ IO, ofioicos d* iv fiev rfj vzoTiyri 8ia TTJV av^rjaiv cocnrtp 01 olvcofievoi 8iaKwrai, <al iJSu 17 veoTrjs. T h e physical explanation of both
these comparisons is given in Probl. XXX 1. 27, TO SE Bepfibv TO nepl
T6V TOTTOV a <ppovovp.ev Kai e\7rlôp,cu jroiel fv^v/xovs' /cat Sta TOVTO npos
TO irivew eh [ie6r]V ndvTes eôucrt 7rpodvp.as, OTI TvavTas o olvos 6 iro\vs
fviKmSas noiei, KaBairep 7; veorrjs TOVS naiSas (cited by Zell): which not
only serves as a commentary on the present passage, but also proves

that Zell's, and not Fritzsche's (ad Eth. Eudem. Z 15,1154$ 9n),interpretation of the second is the true one. " Inde igitur iuventutis et ebrietatis affinitas, quia utraque corpori calorem impertit." (Fritzsche in alia
omnia abit: q. v. si tanti est.) That 8t,d8epiioi here and Bepjiol c. 13. 7,
are to be interpreted literally as well as metaphorically will further
appear by a comparison of the passage referred to in the note on 11
13- 7 [p- I54]'And their lives are passed chiefly in hope ("earn sibi propositam
habent in vita ac sequuntur ut omnium suarum actionum ducem." Victoria) ; for hope is of the future, but memory of the past, whilst
to youth the future is long but the past short; for in their earliest
years' (so Victorius; comp. rfj rfXevralq rjpe'pq, c. 13.8) 'it is impossible for them to remember anything (i. e. they have nothing or
hardly anything to remember), whilst everything is to be hoped for'.
I have adopted (as also Spengel) Bekker's conjecture olou re for
o'lovrai, which has little or no meaning, rfj irpwrr; rjfie'pq may also very
well be interpreted literally 'on the first day of their existence', the
extreme case being taken for the purpose of illustration. With this
interpretation O'IOVTCU may be retained; for it now will have the meaning,
that on the very first day of their existence, even then, they suppose
they can't be surethat they remember nothing, &c.
The phrase ao-iv ikwidi, which recurs in 12, ra rfdti w<ri fiaXXov rj
T<i Xoyi(T/im, and c. 13. 12, expresses the same thing, viz. 'living in the
exercise or practice of, as Qv Kara nados and rots iradeo-tv a<o\ov8r)TiKoi,
AR. II.
IO
146
PHT0PIKH2 B 12 911.
Se 7rdvTct. Kai evepcnrdrriTol elai did TO eipt]p.evov

9 e\7ri<ov<n yap p'adicos. Kai avSpeiorepor 8vf*a}$ei<s
yap Kai ei/e'A7ne?, <av TO fJiev fj.rj (pofieiaQai TO ce
dappeiv 7roter OVTC yap 6pyi<^6fievos ovheh (popeiTai,
10 TO T6 eXiriêiv dyaOov TL QappaXeov e&Tiv.
ai<r)(yvTn\oim ou yap TTIO KaXd eTepa vTroXajxfi
11 civ, dWd 7re7raiBevvTai viro TOV VO/JLOV fxovov.
OVT yap inro TOV (3iov 7rio TeTa7reiEth. Nic. I 1, 1095 a 5 and 9, comp. infra 13. 14, and iinOvynav aKoXovdi]Tixoi, supra 3. It is otherwise rendered by QJV irpos n, c. 13. 9; 14. 2,
3, npbs TO KaXbv Cavres K.T.X. Victorius quotes Probl. XXX (11), d pkv
ovv avBpamos TW va ret TrXeiora rj, Ta S Brjpla Ojjeêi Kai Bvfxm Kai imBvixla.
'And easy to deceive for the reason already mentioned, that is, the
readiness with which their hopes are excited'.
9. 'And rather inclined to courage (av&petorepoi TOV daBoros, or TCOV
SXXwv); for they are passionate and sanguine, of which the one produces
the absence of (or freedom from) fear, the other positive confidence: because on the one hand fear and anger are incompatible (11 3. 10, ahvvarov
n/xa (ftofie'iadat Kai 6pyleo-8ai, 5. 21, BappaXeov yap ?/ opyrj), and on the Other
hope is a sort of good thing that inspires confidence'.

10. 'And bashful, sensitive to shame; because they have not yet
acquired the notion of (viroXanPivfiv) any other standard of honour and
right, but have been trained (schooled) by the conventional law alone'.
0 vofnos is here the law established by society, the conventional usages in
respect of honour and conduct, the traditions and customary observances
of good breeding, any violation of these calls a blush to the cheek of
youth. Old age, the opposite, has lost this quick sense of shame; fiia
yap TO fir/ <ppovTieiv ofiolois TOO KaXoO Kai TOV (ruyu<epoiTor dXiyo>pov<r TOV
SOKCIV, c. 13. 10. 7rpeo-fivTfpov 8' ov8c\s av fVaivecrfify OTI alo-\vvTr)\6s, E t h .
N. IV 15, 1128 b 20. Nd/ios- in this sense is opposed to (pvo-is, as in the

famous antithesis, the abuse of which is one of the principal sources of
paradox and sophistry (7rXeiaroy TOWOS TOV iroieiv irapa8oa \eyav), TO KOTO
(pvaiv Kai Kara TOV vo/iov. rjv fi TO fiev Kara <pv<rw avrols TO aXr]6es, TO 8e Kara
vofiov TO TOIS 7roXXois SoKoiiu. Topic. IX (de Soph. El.) 12, 173 a y seq.
In this more comprehensive application of the term, however, the positive laws, of human origin, enacted in the various states and cities, are
included amongst the ' social conventions'. On the similar antithesis of
71-por h6av and n-pos d\ij6fiav, see note on ii 4. 23, comp. c. 6. 23. In the
former case truth or reality is opposed to popular opinion and its results ;
in the latter reality and right are represented as the 'natural' law or
order of things. In this passage the d\rj8eia has a moral character; TO
KOXOV, the 'true' is here the 'right' or 'noble', the ultimate end of the
moral action. On this sense of KOXOV, see my Review of Aristotle's System
of Ethics, 1867, p. 14.
11. 'And high-minded (having lofty thoughts and aspirations) for
PHTOPIKHS B 12 I I , 12.
147
vwvrai, aXXa TCCV dvayKaliov aireipo'i e'uriv, icai TO

aîovv avTou jjeyctXtov fieyaXoyj^vîa' TOVTO S' eveX12 7rtoos. KCLL fxaXXov alpovuTai irpctTTeiv rd KaXa TCOU
TW yap edei Z^wcri /JiaXXov rj T<5 XOtwo reasons: first, because they have not yet been humiliated by (the
experience of) life'their thoughts and aspirations have not yet been
checked and lowered by the experience which life gives of the impossibility of realising them'but are as yet without experience of the force
of circumstances' (TO. dvayKaôvra, things that constrain and compel us
against our will, control our actions, and thereby check and prevent the
carrying out of lofty designs, of high and generous purposes : ' enforced
actions', says the Rhet. ad Alex. c. I 10, ra dvayKaia, TO. fir) <?</>' TJÛJ/
ovra irpaTTUv, dW
as e dvayKrjs Betas fj dfdpcoTrivrjs OVTCOS OVTO); ' and
secondly, because highmindedness is characterised by the consciousness

of high desert (thinking oneself deserving of great rewards and successes),
and this belongs to the sanguine temper': and therefore may be inferred
from 8. The definition of p.tyak!r\rvxos, Eth. N. IV 7, sub init., is 6
peytiXav avrov di<ov uios 3>v. The two last words, essential to the definition (as may be seen from what immediately follows), are omitted in
the Rhetoric as not required for the occasion. The consciousness of
exalted merit, which does form a part of the definition, is sufficient here
for the purpose aimed at, namely to connect highmindedness with the
sanguine temperament, Hor. A. P. 165, sublimis, full of high thoughts
and aspirations.
12. 'And in action they prefer honour to profit'utilium tardus
proviso?; Hor. A. P. 164'for their conduct in life is rather due to the
impulses of their character, than guided by reasoning and calculation;
the latter being directed to profit, whereas honour and the right are the
aim of virtue'. The intellect and its calculations are here distinctly
excluded from any participation in virtue, which is assigned solely to the
moral character; the impulses, opiêis and iradrj, duly cultivated and
regulated, pass into virtues. This is in direct contradiction to the
doctrines of the Ethics, which give to the two virtues of the intellect,
<ro<j>[a and (ppovrjcris, 'wisdom, speculative and practical', even the preeminence over the moral virtues; identifying true happiness with the
exercise of the former. But our author is here departing from his
Eudaemonistic ethical system, which makes happiness (in a transcendental sense no doubt) the end of all human action ; and substituting for
it the more popular and higher view of the rekos, which represents it as
the abstract good and noble, or the right, TO KOKOV ; a standard and an
end of action independent of all sordid and selfish motives or calculation,
with which it is here brought into contrast. This view of the TCXOS
appears incidentally, as an excrescence upon the systems (to which it is
opposed), in the Nic. Ethics, as ill 7, sub init. Ib. c. 10, 1115* 24, and
especially IX 8, p. 1169*4, et seq. With what is said in our text, comp.
E t h . N . 1X8, 1 1 6 8 0 3 4 , o 8' e7nciKrjs (wparTet) 81a TO KOXO'V, K av
ficXriav rj fiaWov 81a TO KiiXov.
102
148
yicrfjiw, e<rTi ' 6 fiev XoyHr/iids TOV crv/utfpepovTOs r\ oe

13 dperri
rod
(piXeraipoi
KaXov.
fxdXXov
Kal <piX6(piXoi Kal (piXotKeioi K<XI
TWV aXXtav nXiKiwv Sia TO âLpeivV. 1389^
TW <rvt?iv Kal {jLtjirw 7Tj0os T O avp.(pepov

14
WCTT
/ixrjde
TOV?
(piXovs.
Kal airavra
Kpiveiv /*>7oeV,
kiri
TO
fidXXov
Kal (r&odoTepov d/xapTccvovcri irapa TO

On AoyioTior, the discursive, r e a s o n / ^ or calculating faculty or process, opposed to the vovs, and identical with hiavoia in its lower and
limited sense, see Eth. Nic. VI 2, 1139 a 6 s e q . ; where the entire intellect
is divided into two faculties, (1) the vovs, or pure reason, atiewpovfiev,the
organ of speculation, and of a priori truth, TO lirio-Ti\\u>viK.ov, and (2) the
diavoia (in its special sense) the understanding, the organ of reasoning,
and of deliberation or calculation in practical matters, TO Xoyio-TiKov.
The exact opposite of all this [ 812] appears in the character
of old age, c. 13 5, 9, 10, 11, 14. Old men are $vo-e\iri8es, dvaio-xwroi,
fiLKpo^vôi,
a>cn Trpos TO o-v/i,<t>epov a n d Kara
\oyio-fiov.
13. 'And they are more fond of their friends and companions than
the other ages (prime of life, and old age), owing to the pleasure they take
in social intercourse ('their liking for company'), and to their not yet
having learnt to measure everything by the standard of profit or selfinterest, and therefore not their friends (either)'. Of the three kinds of
friendship, Eth. N. VIII 2, 3, 4, founded severally upon (1) good (i.e. real,
moral, good, the only basis of perfect friendship or love), (2) pleasure,
and (3) profit or utility, that of young men belongs to the second. Of
these it is said, c. 3, 1156 a: 13, ojioias Se xal ol Si' jjSoinJi/' ov yap TG>
TTOIOVS Tivas tlvai (by reason of their, moral character) dymrwo-i. TOVS evrpa7reXouff, d)OC OTL T^d^ls CLVTOIS.
14. 'And all their errors are in the way of excess and undue
vehemence, contrary to Chilon's maxim (^.i/Sc ayav, ne quid nimis); for
everything that they do is in excess; for their love is in excess, and their
hatred in excess, and everything else in the same way. And they think
they know everything, and therefore are given to positive assertion,
which (this confidence in their own knowledge and judgment) in fact
accounts for their tendency to excess in everything'. /j.r]Sev ayav o-nevb'a.v'
Kcupos 8' eVi naa-iv aptaros epyp.ao-tv av8pa>Tra>v (Theognis, 401, Bergk).
" Cum enim omnia sibi nota esse putent, nee se labi posse credant, nihil
timide tractant," Victorius, who also quotes, in illustration of a ' positive
assertion', Hist. Anim. VI (21. 3), i'vioi 8e uo-xvpiovTai
8cna fifjvas
Kveiv yfitpoXeyo'ov (to the very daycounting the days throughout the
month till you come to the very end). The word occurs again in the
same sense Ib. c. 37. 5, and indeed is common enough in other authors.
Of .Chilon, to whom is ascribed the famous proverb which inculcates
moderation in all thingsthe earliest hint of the doctrine of 'the mean'
an account may be found in Diog. Laert. I 3. 6S, seq., and in Mure's Hist,
of Gk. Lit., Bk. ill, c. 6 16, Vol. ill, p. 392. He was a native of Lacedaemon, and his floruit is placed in 596 B.C. " Dubitatur quis sapientium
PHTOPIKHS B 12 1416.
7ravra yap ayav
Kai /uii(rov(Tiu
149
irpaTTOViriv' (piAovcri r e yap

ayav
Kal rd\\a
irdvra
eiMvai Travra o'lovTai Kal ZiKT^vpiôvrar

15 a'lTiov e'crrt Kai TOV TravTa ayav.
ayav
6/xoiws.
Kal
TOVTO yap
KCU TOC dîKY]jiaTa
a'oiKovcriv ets vfipiv Kal ov KaKOvpylav.
Kal e\et]TtKol
via TO TravTws ^pt](TTOVi Kal /3eA.Ttof?
viroXa/Jifldveiv
Trj yap
16 dvdîa
avTcov aKaKia TOI)S TTCACK /JLerpouaiv, oicrr'

7rda-^6iv \J7roXafxj3dpov(rtv avTOvs.
Kal (pi\o-
auctor esset sententiae, p/SeV ayav. Palladas in Antbol. 11 48. 1, /MjSei/

ayav TWV enra crofpcov 6 troâTaros eiwfv. Alii tribuunt Chiloni, alii Sodamo,
teste Scholiasta nostro, qui epigramma laudat quod in Tegea exstabat,
TOUT' eXeyfi' 2i68afios ' E ^ p a r o u , os p.' dveSrjKev, /xrjhev ayav, xaipa iravra
npoo-ea-Ti KaXa." Monk, ad Eur. Hippol. 265. See also Valckenaer on

the same passage. Diog. Laert., I 41, quotes the following epigram :
qv A-aKihaijxovios
XfCkav
(TO(j]6s, bs r d S ' e'Xfê'
fj.rjd(V ayav'
Kaipw
Travra
Trpdcreo-rt KaXa. Chilon and Sodamus are alike omitted in Smith's Dictionary of Biography.
15. 'The offences they commit incline to insolence or wanton
outrage, not to mean or petty crimes and mischief. Their crimes, when
they commit them, are rather those of open violence, outrage of personal
dignity, wanton aggression and the like, than of that mean and low form
of wrong-doing manifesting itself in all underhand dealings, as fraud,
cheating, calumny, and other similar offences, which work their mischief
secretly and insidiously, as it were underground, or in the dark: the
former being directed more especially against the person, vfiptns drifila,
11 2. 6 : the latter against a man's property, fortune, character. Compare
II 2. 6, which gives the reason for this distinction, 810 oi vim Kal 01 TTKOVO-LOI
ifipitTTai virepe'xeiv yap o'lovrai (they think to shew their superiority)
tjjpi(ovTs. Of vfipis, al<la is given as an instance 1116.4, where this kind
of offence is again attributed to the likovaioi: as it is also in Polit. vi (iv)
11, 1295 b 9. Excess in personal beauty, or strength, or birth, or wealth,
and their opposites, weakness and poverty and meanness of condition,
give rise severally to two different orders of offences : ylvovrai yap ol [iei>
v/3picrTa\ Kal p.eydKoTrovr)poi p.ak\ov, oi 8c KaKovpyoi Kal fiiKpoTvbvr^poi. Xiav'
TCOV S' dbi.Krip.aTav TO. p,iv yiverai bi vfipiv ra 8e Sia KaKovpyiav. Compare
Plat. Legg. V 728 E, as 8' avras ^ TCOV xprjp.aroiv Kal KTrjpaTaiv KTrjais Kara
TOV avTov pv6[i6v eêt' r a p.ev vnepoyKa yap eKaaTcav TOVTOV e^dpas Kal crrdo"ft?
aTCepydêTai Tals TrdAetrt Kai ita, r a 8' tWeinovra dovXeias cos TO TVOXV.
'And disposed to compassion, because they suppose every one to be

good {absolutely) or better [comparatively, than they really are; so
Victorius); for they measure their neighbours by their own harmlessness
(or freedom from malice and the love of mischief), and therefore assume
that their sufferings are unmerited': which is the occasion of e'Xeoy, 11 8. 1.
16. 'They are also fond of laughing (mirth, fun), and therefore
disposed to pleasantry or facetiousness; for pleasantry is wantonness
ISO
PHT0PIKH2 B 13 i.
ye\coTe<sf $10 Kal evrpctTreXor t) yap evTpaTrekia TTirailevixevn v(3pis ecrriv.

TO
fJieV OVV TWV
V6COV TOIOVTOU
i&TlV
7]6o'S)
01
($6 CHAP.XIII,
7rp6(r(3vTepoi Kal irap^KixaKore^ o-%6hov e'/c TWV evavschooled by good breeding'. From the description of evrpaneKla given
in Eth. Nic. II 7, 1108^23, and IV 14, ab init., it results that it is 'easy,
well-bred (rov Treiraiheviilvov, roiavra \lyeiv
KQI aKovttv oia 7(5 inieiKcl Kal
e\(v6tpia> dp/iorret) pleasantry in conversation, of which it is the ' agreeable mean', lying between flafuAoxia, 'buffoonery' the excess, and
aypoiKia, 'rusticity, boorishness', the inability to see or give or take a
joke. It is a social virtue (one of three), and one of the accomplishments
of a gentleman. It forms part of the relaxation of life, avcntaioeass iv r<5
/3i'o), which includes Stayioyfjs fiera naiSias, all the lighter occupations of
which amusement or relaxation is the object and accompaniment, opposed to the serious business of life, and corresponds exactly to the French
passe-temps; (on hiayay-q, which may include even literary pursuits, or
studies, anything in fact that is not business, compare trôXi;, and is so in
some sense opposed to wcuSid, which is therefore inserted here to qualify
it, see Bonitz ad Metaph. A 1, 981 5 18). 1128 a 10, 01 8' f^jucXms Traiôvres
cvTpdireXoi irpo<rayoptvovrai, olov eurponoi (from their versatility).
The
two terms are exactly represented by Cicero's facetus and facetiae. Wit,
sales, takes two forms, dicacitas and facetiae; the first, raillery, pungent
and personal, a/cappa, aKwrrTeiu; the second, easy and agreeable, giving
grace and liveliness to conversation or writing. Utetur utroque; sed
altero in narrando aliquid venuste, altero in iaciendo mittendoque ridiculo, et seq., Orat. XXVI 87. Compare de Orat. 11 54. 219, where the distinction is somewhat different, or at all events expressed by different
terms, de Off. I 30. 104, genus iocandi elegans, urbanum, ingeniosum,
facetum, et passim. Cowper's John Gilfiin furnishes a good specimen of
evTpawe\la : Now Gilpin had a pleasant wit, and loved a timely joke.
'Such then is the character of the young'.
CHAP. XIII.
The character of age we have already seen, and shall further find, to
be in almost all points the exact opposite of that of youth. Victorius
thinks that the desire of bringing out this contrast was Aristotle's reason
for departing from the natural order in his treatment of the three ages.
The authors quoted at the commencement of the last chapter will again
serve for illustrations of the topics of the present. Aristotle, as well as
Horace, confines himself almost exclusively to the delineation of the unfavourable side of the character of old age, suppressing its redeeming
features. Horace represents his opinion at the opening of his sketch
(A. P. line 169), Multa senem circumveniunt incomtnoda which he proceeds to describe.
1. 'Elderly men, and those who have passed their prime, have
most of their characters (formed) of the elements opposite to these ;
for from their long experience of life; its frequent errors and failures
PHTOPIKHS B 13 r 4.
151
Tr\ei(TTa exovcriv r\Qr\- Sia yap TO

7ro\\a ert] (SefSicoKevai Kal 7r\eiw e^r]7rart](T6ai Kal
evai, Kal TO. TrAe/w (pavXa elvcu TWV irpayv, OVT6 ZiafiefiaiovvTai
oudev, WTTOV TE ayav
2 cnravTa tj oeT. Kal o'wvTai, icracn S' ovBev, Kal d/m-p. 8i[.
(pivfiriTOuvTes wpocmdeaa-iv del TO i'crws Kal Terror,
3 Kai iravra Xeyovcriv OUTCO, 7ray'i(0s 3' ovfiev. Kal KaKorjdeis elcrlw ecni yap KaKotjdeia TO eirl TO ê
v7roAajufidveiv iravTa.
'LTI $e Ka^yiroTrTOi elcri
4 TY\V diTKTTiav, diTKTTOi 2e di i/j.7Teipiav. Kal OVT
TOUTOIS TO.
(from having lived many years and often been deceived or imposed
upon by others, and fallen into error by their own fault), and from their
observation of the inherent vice of all human things (everything turns
out ill, nothing can be depended upon, and so they lose all confidence,
and), they refrain from all positive assertion and are in excess in the
undue remissness shewn in whatever they do'. Muretus, et stint in
omnibus rebus remissiores. As the young carry everything they do to
excess, ayav, so on the contrary the old are in excess too (ayav...rj fiti)
but this is manifested in want of spirit and energy and activity in all
that they do undertake ; supply wparTova-iv. It is doubtful whether ayav
should be taken before or after TJTTOV. Itrjrrov ayav, as the order is
in the text, it will be 'everything they do is "less in excess" (referring to
the proverb, and the application of it to the young in the preceding
chapter) than it ought to be'. If the order is ayav TJTTOV, the meaning
is, 'everything they do is excessively too little (inferior in vigour and
energy) to what it ought to be'.
2. 'And they only say they think, never " I know". And when
in doubt (or, when they are arguing or disputing a point), they always
add "perhaps" and "possibly", constantly expressing themselves in this
way (doubtfully), never with certainty' (or decidedly, nayws, fixed, firm,
solid, and hence certain, iraylws \eyeiv, certo affirinare, Plat. Rep. IV
434 D, wayicos voijirai, Ib. V 479 C, Theaet. 157 A).
3. 'And they are ill-natured, for ill-nature is the tendency to put
an unfavourable construction upon everything' (to attribute, for example,
every indifferent act to a bad motive, in determs, in fieius, interpretari,
Comp. c. 12. 7, of youth). 'And prone to suspicion by reason of their
incredulity, and incredulous from their experience', KCXÔTTTOS is otherwise written naxvivoToiros in Plat. Phaedr. 240 E (Zurich Editors, and
Thompson ad loc), though in Rep. ill 409 c, it appears as Aristotle
writes it, and according to the Zurich Editors without varia lectio,
virorme'iv and -e'lvdat occur in Herod., Thucyd., Aristoph. and Lysias.
4. 'And for the same reason neither their love nor their hatred is
ever deep, but according to the precept of Bias, their love is such as may
hereafter become hatred, and their hatred love'. This famous and often
152
(pl\0V(Tl
PHTOPIKHS B I34, 5(T<b6hpa 0VT6 fXKTOVCTl ZlCL TCCVTCl, ClWa KO.TCI
Trjv Biavros
\nroQr\Kr\v Kai <pi\oucriv eJs fxicrri(rovre<s Kai
5 fJLicrova-iv w's (piXria-ovTes.
Kai
fxiKpo^rvôi
Sid
TO
quoted saying of Bias of Priene, the last of the seven sages (585540 B. c.)
on whom see Diog. Laert. I 5, 82 seq. and Mure, Gk. Lit. ill 393,is
again referred to, without the author's name, II 21. 13. I will give two
or three of the most important references. Soph. Aj. 678 (Lobeck's Ed.),
a well-known passage of six lines, concluding with the reason or explanation of the precept, rots TTOXXOUTI yap fiporav anicrTos ec6' iraipeias Xi/j.tjv.
Comp. Lobeck ad loc, and to the same effect Oed. Col. 614, rais p.kv yap
iffy, rols 8' hi vtrrepq xpovca, ra repirva iriKpa yiyverai KavBis (piKa. Diogenes,
u. s., 87 (in the same chapter several more of his apophthegms are quoted),
eAfye re TOV filov ovrco perpetv as Kai 7roXij' Ka\ SXiyov xpovov ^lOKTOfiivovs,
Ka\ cpiXetv as p.iarjtTovTas' roiis yap jrXeiorour elvai KOKOVS, and again 88,
&ire(f>diyS;aTo' ol nXfiaroi KOKOI, which gives his reason for the rule. A
similar sentiment is found in Eurip. Hippol. 253, xpnv !"!> perpias els
dXXjjXous (j)i\las 6vr)rovs avaKipvaaBai K.T.X. Cic. de Amic. XVI. 59, Negabat (Scipio) ullam vocein inimiciorem amicitiae potnisse reperiri, quain
eius, qui dixisset ita amare oportere ut si aliquando esset osurus: nee vero
se adduci posse ut hoc, quemadmodum putarettir, a Biante esse dictum
crederet, qui sapiens habitus est unus e septem, sed impuri cuiusdam aut
ambitiosi, aut omnia ad suam potentiam revocantis, esse sententiam. Publius Syrus apud Gell. Noct. Att. XVII 14 (ap. Schneidewin ad loc. Aj.), Ita
amicum habeas,posse utfierihunc inimicumputes. -Bacon de A ugm. Scient.
VIII c. 2, Works, Ellis and Sped, ed., Vol. 1. p. 788, "Septimum praeceptum
est antiquum illud Biantis ; modo non ad perfidiam, sed ad cautionem et
moderationem, adhibeatur: et ames tanquam inimicus futurus, et oderis
tanquam amaturus. Nam utilitates quasque mirum in modum prodit et
corrumpit si quis nimium se immerserit amicitiis infelicibus, molestis et
turbidis odiis, aut puerilibus et futilibus aemulationibus." Comp. Adv.
of Learning, 11 xxiii. 42. La Bruyere, Caract. c. 4 (in Ellis' note).
" Vivre avec nos ennemis comme s'i/s devoient un jour etre nos amis,
et vivre avec nos amis comme s'ils pouvoient devenir nos ennemis, ti'est
ni selon la nature de la haine, ni selon les regies de I'amitie: ce n'est
point line maxime morale mats politique. On ne doit pas se faire des
ennemis de ceux qui mieux connuspourroient avoir rang e7itre nos amis.
On doit faire choix d'amis si surs et dûne si exacte probite que venant
a cesser de Vetre Us ne veuillentpas abuser de notre confiance, ni se faire
craindre comme nos ennemis? (on which Mr Spedding has another
commentary, too long to quote). Finally, Demosthenes, c. Aristocr.
122, p. 660 (quoted by Gaisford), expresses his approbation of the
maxim as a rule of action. He refers to it as a current precept, without
naming the author, and sums up in conclusion, dXX' dxpl TOVTOV KOI
KpiXflu, olpai, xpn Kai picreiv, p.r]8eTpov TOV Kaipov virepftdWovras,
that is,
neither friendship nor enmity should be carried too far, and so interpreted,
as to exclude the possibility of a subsequent change of feeling.
5. 'And they are little-minded, because their spirit has been
humbled by life (the experience which they have had of life and its
PHTOPIKHS B 13 57-
i53
TeTcnreivcti(rdai VTTO TOV (Slow ovhevos yap jxeyaXov

ovoe 7repLTTOv, dXXd TCOV TTJOOS TOV fiiov eTriOvfiovcriv.
6 Kai dveXevdepor ev yap TI TWV dvayKaicov t) ovcria,
afxa (5e Kai Sid TY\V efXTreiptav itracriv 5s %a\67rou TO
7 .KTrjcracrdai Kai pahiov TO aTrofiaXeiv.
Kai detXoi Kai
irdvTa 7rpo(po(3r]riKoi' evavTitos yap ^laKeivTai TOIS
delusions and disappointments has taught them how little they can
do, and thereby lowered their aims and aspirations, and deprived them
of all spirit of enterprise and high endeavour) ; for they (now) desire
nothing great or extraordinary (standing out from and above all others
of the same class, nepirTov, singular, striking, extra-ordinary, above the
common herd, and the ordinary level; note on I 6. 8), but only what
tends to (the uses, or the ease and comfort of) their life'. This again
is in direct opposition to the character of youth, c. 12. 11.
6. 'And (for similar reasons) illiberal' (in money matters ; mean,
parsimonious : this is because they have known want; whereas their
opposites, the young, who have never known it, are inclined to liberality,
f)Ki<rra (piXoxprnâroi., c. 12 6); 'for property is one of the necessaries
of life ; and at the same time they know by (their) experience how hard
it is to get, and how easy to lose', as, of course, may also be 'that';
and the literal translation is 'that gain or acquisition is hard, and loss
easy'. Hor. A. P. 170, Quaerit et inventis miser abstinet et timet uti.
Comp. Eth. Nic. IV 3, II2I b 13, 80/cet yap TO yijpas Kai Ttatra abwa/ila
dveXevdepovs Troielv. Pericles (in the funeral oration, Thuc. n 44, ult.)
disputes this, though he allows that it is a prevailing opinion ; oo-ot
8' av ivaprj^r]KaTe...Kai ov< ev Ta d^pelai rf/s ijXwias TO (cfphalveiv, wtrirep
Tivis cpaa-i, fiaXkov Tcpwei, dWa TO TijJ-aaOm. Byron, on the other hand
accepts the Aristotelian view. So for a good old-gentlemanly vice
I think I'll e'en take ^t.p -with avarice (Don Juan).
7. 'And cowardly, and in everything (always) inclined to dread,
in anticipation of coming danger (or, always inclined to anticipate
danger and evil), their disposition being the reverse of that of the young:
for they are cooled down (chilled by age), the others hot'. Hor. A. P.
171, res omnes timide gelideyne miuistrat, the gelide being manifestly
taken from Aristotle. On dve\evdepoi, Gaisford cites Bacon on this topic.
The passage which he refers to in the Engl. Vers. occurs in de Augm.
Scient. Lib. VII c. 3, Vol. I p. 734, Ellis and Spedding's ed., " Videmus enim
Plautum miraculi loco habere, quod senex quis sit beneficus; Benignilas
hiiius tit adolescentuliest" (Mil. Glor. ill 1. 40). Bacon has misquoted:
the line runs, Nam benignitas quidem hitius opfiido adulescentulist
(Ritschl). Bentley on Hor. A. P. 172 has made use of this characteristic,
irpo(j)oPr)TLKoi, in support of his emendation pavidus for avidus. Orelli
observes on this that it contradicts spe longus which occurs just before.
But the two are not absolutely contradictory ; a man may look far forward
in his hope of a long life, and yet be fearful and anxious about what that
future may bring. This physical theory of heating and cooling as
154
veois' Karey^vyfxevoi yap elcriv, 61 $e 6epfxoi, WCTTB

7rpowdo7roir]K TO yfjpas TT} BeiXia' Kal yap 6 (popos
! Kard\jyv^k Tts eerriV. Kal (piXo^cooi, Kal fidXicrra
eirl TY\ TeXewraia r\ixepa Bid TO TOV aTrovTOS eivai TY\V
iirSvfxiav, Kal ov Be ivBeeTs, TOUTOV /j.dXt(TTa eTTtdvKal (piXavTOi fxdXXov rj del1 /JLiKpoy^vîa yap
applied to human character and passions is illustrated by ProbL XXX
I. 22, acre <f>ofiep6v TI orav elcrayye\6fo -iav piv iû^fjortpas ovcrrjs rrjs
Kpaatas Tv-fty, Stikov iroitl' Trpoa8o7rcno[r]Ke yap T<3 (pofico, Kai 6 <po/3os xara\jri)(ei. SrjXovm fie oi 7Tfpi'0o/3oi' rpipovcn yap. See the same, 29, 30.
Ato Kai oi /lev TraiSts cvdv/xoTipoi, ol de yepovres dvo-dvfioTepoi. Ol pev yap
6epfioL7 oi de i^vxpoL' TO yap yrjpas KaTa^rvîs TCS. 3^) rjQoiroiov TO oepfiov
Ka\ fyvxpov jxakiuTa Tcoy cV IJ/XIK iariv. Victorius refers to de Part. Anim.
II 4, 650 b 27, 6 yap <p6j3os KaTaifrvxei.' vpoaboiro'ir^Tai ovv Ta naSei ra
Toiavrqv <?%ovTa TT/V iv rrj KapSLq Kpacriv (of the blood). On this physical
or physiological account of the nadtj, and their connexion with the condition of the blood and muscles, and their different degrees of heat and
cold, see further in the remainder of the same chapter, êp/iorijros yap
rroiriTiKov 0 Bvfios (passion produces heat as well as heat passion), TO. hi
(TTfpea 8epjiav8tvTa y.aK\ov @epfialvi T&V vypav' ai S1 Ives (the muscles)
OTepebv Kal yeaiSfr, wore ylvovrai 010c irvpiai (vapour-baths) iv ro> aljxari
Kal fe'ow noiovo-Lv iv Tots dvp-ols. Ib. 650 b 35, TTOXKSV 8' icrrlv alria
rj TOV eu/iaToj (pvo-is Kal Kara TO rjdos TOIS faiois Kal Kara TTJV dio-Qr\<nv, K.T.X.
651 a 12.
'And therefore old age prepares the way for cowardice (on irpoohoTTOUIV, see note on I 1. 2); in fact fear is a kind of cooling down'. Comp.
Horace's gelide, A. P. 171, already quoted. " Virg. Aen. I 69, extemplo
Aeneae solvuntur frigore membra, Servius, frigore, i.e. timore, et est
reciproca translatio, nam et timor pro frigore, et frigus pro timore
ponitur." Schrader.
8. 'And fond of life, and more than ever in their last days' (not,
'their very latest day\ Victorius ad c. 12. 8, TJ} irpwry r,p.ipa. So also
Bentley, in note on A. P. 172, translates, 'sub supremo vitae die'), 'because
all desire is of the absent, and therefore what they (most) want (are
deficient in), that they most desire'. Orelli, on Hor. A. P. 170178, compares (pi\6i;<ooi with avidus futuri, which he retains; (also Bentley, on
verse 172). He also quotes Soph. Fragm. 64 (Dind.), TOV QV yap ovdels
as o yrjpao-Kav ipa.
9. ' And they exceed the due measure in self-love, this again (as
well as illiberality and cowardice) being a kind of little-mindedness'
(which is characteristic of them, supra 5). The connexion of fxiKpoyjrvxâ a n d 0'Xauri'a [a word used in late Greek only] seems to be this:
Little-mindedness (Eth. N. iv 9, init.) is the undervaluing of oneself,
and one's own advantages. This narrows and cramps the mind, which
is consequently incapable of lofty aims and aspirations. A form of
this is selfishness, or self-love, which is thus described, Eth. N ix 8,
PHT0PIKH2 B 13 9ii.
155
avrt].
KCLL ?rpos TO avfjKpepov (^tocriv, dXX' 01)
7T|0os TO KaXov, jmaXXov r\ Set, "hid TO (piXavTOi etvai'
TO fxev yap (ru/dcpepov avTw dyado'v icrTi, TO Se KaXov
!" a7rAws. KCCL avauryyvTOi }j.aXXov r\ aia")(VVTY\Xoi' cia P. 1390.
yap TO jj.ii (ppovTiêiv 6/Jtolws TOV KaXov nal TOV O-V/JL11 (pepovTOs oXtyiopovai TOV SoKeTv. Kal dv<re\7ri?>es Sid
Tt]v e/uL7reipiav TU yap 7rXeiw TOOV yiyvo\xevu>v (pavXa
TJS KCCI
Sub lmt. as iv al<T)(p<a tfoiXavrovs anoKakovfriv, SOKEI Te 6 ftiv <^>auXoj iavrov x"Ptv iroivra wpaTTfiv, Kai o<rfi) av fioxdnporepos j[, TOtroira
fiaXKoW iyxaKoicri Si) avra on ov6iv dip' iavrov (" away from himself",
without reference to himself, and his own interests) nparTei. But when
all a man's aims and desires are centred in himself, they must of
course be very mean and confined as compared with the lofty aspirations of the fieya\6ij/vxos, or even of the average man, and the wide
sphere in which they range; and therefore self-love when excessive is one
form in which narrow-mindedness shews itself.
' Their rule in life is profit, not honour, more than it ought to be,
which arises from their selfishness : for profit, self-interest, is a man's own
good, whereas honour (or the right) is good absolutely'. Orelli quotes this,
and a\\a Kara TO /cepSof, in illustration of Horace's guaerit el inventis
miser abstinet et timet iiti, A. P. 170. On the distinction of avra the
individual, and aw\as the general notion or the absolute, see note on TO
avTG> rj airkas, I 7- 35On ro KOXOV in its two aspects, see I 7.24, and I 9. 3, and notes.
We
are here presented with the two opposing views of good, the ideal and practical. The ideal form represents good as the fair and right, the aim and
end of our hopes and aspirations, and the rule of life, in the shape (it may
be) of honour or glory {la Gloire), or some immaterial, high and noble
object, apart from all considerations of self, and one's own interest. The
practical view of good regards it as something useful and serviceable for
the uses and purposes of life, and for one's own interest and advancement; it is TO xPV<TllL0V a n d ro vp.(j>epov, the useful and profitable.
Socrates in Xenophon's Memorabilia argues in favour of this view of
'good'.
10. 'And they are rather inclined to insensibility than to sensibility
to shame (comp. 12. 10); for in consequence of their caring little for
honour as compared with profit, they pay slight regard to (treat with
contempt) other people's opinions of them (how they seem to others)'.
They only care for solid and substantial advantages, and disregard all
mere empty 'seeming' and 'opinion', npeo-^vrepov 8' ov8e\s av inaivto-eiev oTi alo-xvvrrjXos (Eth. N. IV 15, 1128 b 20). If he were keenly sensitive to shame, he would get no credit for it; ovBev yap nlofie&a Setv avrbv
TrpaTTeiv oh i<rr\v alcrxvvri.
11. 'Also they are given to despondency, in consequence of their

(unfavourable) experience (of life and its fortunes);for most things that
156
PHT0PIKH2 B 13 12, 13.
ea-rtv
cLTrofiaivei yovv rd
12 T Zid rrjv SeiXlav

e\7ridi'
TOV yap
7ro\\d
em TO %eTpov KCII
Kai (fw<n rrj fj.vrifxn pdXXov
fliov
TO jxev Xonrov
oXiyov
7rapeXr]Xvdds TTOXV, e<TTi Ze r\ jxev eXirh

n Se [xvnikt] TCOU TrajOOiô/xeVwj/.
TOS
Trjs ddoXecr^las
13 XeyovTes'
avTofe"
diaTeXov&i
dua/Mjuvrja-KOfJievoi
yap
TOV
rj rj
TO ce
^.eXXov-
o 7rep aiTiov Kai

yap
TU yevop.eva
ijdovTai.
Kai 01
dvfjiol o'êls fxev eio-iv dadeveT's c)e, Kai al Tri6vfxi.ai a'l

fxev eKXeXoLiracnv at 2e dcrdeveh elo-iv, UXTTB OVT e7rii ovTe 7rpaKTLKol KaTa r a s eTridufilas,
dXXd
happen are bad (full of defects)at all events the results are mostly disappointing (things mostly turn out for the worse);and besides this,
owing to their cowardice.' Aesch. c. Timarch. 24, OJK 77'yj/dei 0 voju>8irqs
on oi TTpfa-fivTepoi r a fiev ev (ppove'iv dK/xaôvcriv, rj Se rokîa fjhrj avrovs
apteral iirCkenTeiv 81a rrjv p.nipiav TG>V TrpayfxaTayv.
12. 'And they live by (their) memory rather than by hope' (comp.
c. 12. 8, and the note there, on m<riv eXm'Si), 'for what remains to them of
their life is short, but that which is past long ; and hope is of the future,
but memory of the past. Which is also the reason of their garrulity
(habit of chattering or prattling 1 ); for they are continually talking about
what has happened, their delight being in recollection'. The aged
Cephalus says of himself, Plat. Rep. I 328 D, cu "<rOi on i'/j.oiye ouov al
aXXai al Kara TO ywjua rjdoval dTrofiapaivovrai, TOGOVTOV avôvrat al irspl TOVS
\6yovs imBvfilai re Kal rjftovai (Gaisford). " With seats beneath the shade
For talking age and whispering lovers made" Goldsmith, Deserted
Village.
13. 'And their fits of passion (dvfios, as before, the passionate,
angry impulses; one of the three opegeis, with hridvpia andftoii\r)(ris)are
sharp, but feeble, (neither strong nor lasting,) and of their appetites, some
have failed altogether, others become enfeebled, so that they are not
prone either to the feeling of desire or to act under its impulses, but only
according to the dictates of self-interest. Accordingly men at this time
of life are thought to have the disposition to temperance, or self-control,
besides (sc. the preceding); not only because their appetites are relaxed
(slackened, dvito-Otu contrasted with eirireivecr6ai, met. from stringing the
lyre, note on I 4.12),' but also because they are slaves to their own interest'.
aaxppoa-ivr) being the acquired and fixed habit, or virtue, of self-control,
a-cofppav the possessor of the virtue, and tra<j>poviKoi those who are inclined
or have a tendency to it; those men, whose desires and passions are so
feeble as to require no control, gain credit in the eyes of the world for the
disposition to (termination -iKoi) the virtue itself.
1
adoXeirxla. Eth. N. Ill 13, 1117 b 35, Toils Trepl TWV TUX<WC
Tcks yfiipas &<)o\{<rxas...Ku\ovfi.ev.
157
Kara TO nepdos. $10 Kal crcocjipoviKol (paivovrai 01 p. 82.

Tt]\iKOVTOL- at re yap eTridvfxiai dveLKaai, Kal dovXev14 ovai TW Ke'joSet. Kal /j.dXXov fyocn Kara A.07Z07Z0V r}
Kara TO t)6o^ 6 fxev yap Xoyio-jjids TOU (rv/uKpepovros
TO o rjdos T>79 dpeTrjs eo-Tiv. Kal TaSiKfj/xara dZiKOu1
5 <TIV ets KaKovpylav, OVK eis vflpiv. iXerjTLKol Se Kal 01
yepovTes elaiv, AA' ov Sia TavTO Tofe viois' dl /aev
yap Sid (pi\av6pco7riav3 oi he SL dcrdeveiav irdvTa
yap o'tovTai e<yyi)s eivai avTois 7ra6elv, TOVTO <T r\v
bdev dSvpriKol eicri, Kal OVK evTpdireXoi
ovZe (piXoyeXoLOL' evavTiov yap TO odupriKou TO
(pi XoyeXcoTi.
16
TWU fjiev ovv veuiv Kal TWV 7rpeo-ftvTepa)v r a tj
UXTT eVei aTroêôvTai TravTes TOI)S ra
<ra(f>pomKoi recurs in Eth. N. VI 13, 1144 b 5, and is found in Xenophon and Plato, and the adverb in Aristophanes.
14. 'And their course of life is directed rather by calculation than
character: for calculation is directed to one's own interest, whereas
character is indicative of virtue'. The opposite of this, c. 12. 12.
fjBos] is 'the impulse of character', as before. Virtuous 'dispositions'
or.'characters' are natural to us, Eth. N. VI 13, u. s. naai yap So/cfT eKaara
T&V T]dcOV VTTCLp^lV <pV(TGt 7T(OS' KCU yO-P blKCtlOl KOI fTCOCppoVLKol KOI
ie(
dfdpeloi
Kal raXXa ex/ ' evdvs EK yeverrjs. These however are not virtuesEth.
N. II I, sub init., ovdefila rav rjdiKav dperav (pvtreL rjjxiv lyyivtrai'but
dispositions or tendencies to virtue, fiwa/xeir, which may be developed
into e!-eis, of which traxppoviKos (having a tendency to o-wrppoo-vvri) is an
individual instance.
'And the offences which they commit incline rather to petty knavery
and mischief than to insolence and wanton outrage'. See c. 12. 15, and
the passages there referred to.
15. 'Old men also (as well as young, c. 12. 15) are inclined to compassion, but not for the same reason as the young; in the one it is from
humanity, in the other from weakness; for all calamities that happen to
others seem to be near at hand, impending over, themselves (near at
hand to themselves to suffer, wVre avrovs naddv avra), and this is what
was said (rjv, viz. c. 8 1) to incline men to pity. And hence it is that
they are querulous (difficilis, querulus, Hor. A. P. 173) and not given
to pleasantry nor fond of mirth; for a querulous disposition (habit of
complaining, bemoaning oneself) is opposite to love of mirth'.
16. 'Such are the characters of the youthful and elderly; accordingly, since language conformable to their own character, as well as
persons similar to themselves, are acceptable to every one, it is plain
158
PHT0PIKH2 B 13 16; 14 1.
tidei Xeyo/mevous Xcyovs Kai TOI)S ofxotovs, OVK

7T0JS xptofxevoi TO?5 Xoyois TOIOVTOI (pavovvrai
1 Kai avTol Kai ol Xoyoi. 01 Se aK/xaô^Tes (pavepov OTI CHAP.XIV.
-1) TOJTWJ/ TO >j0os ecrovTai, eKaTepcov dtpaipovvenough how we are to use our words in order that we and our speeches
may assume such and such a character'. The study of the tempers, and
manners and habits and modes of thought of these two ages and the rest,
will enable us without difficulty to assume the tone and language which
are in conformity with the taste of any particular kind of audience which
we have to persuade: everybody likes to be addressed in his own style,
to hear the sentiments and language which are habitual to himself.
TOVS T& <r<j>T(pcp rjdfi Xeyophovs Xoyovs] Orationes quae dicuntur ad
proprios mores, Vetus Translatio ;Quae inge7iio moribusque ipsorum
convenientes habentur, Victorius;Quae suis ipsorum moribus convenientes habentur orationes, Riccobon. No notice has been taken of the
difficulty of explaining the force of the dative TjSfi after Xeyopevovs. In
the above translations the first evidently understands it in the sense of
spoken to, addressed to, the direct dative. But although Xtyeiv nvi, to
say unto, tell, or bid anyone is allowable Greek, I doubt if that use of it
is applicable here. Surely to address to must be rendered by Trpbs TO
<r(j>eTepov ?i&os, and not by the dative. The other two translations are
mere evasions of the difficulty, giving the sense, but not explaining the
construction. The only other possible sense of the dative which suggests
itself to me, is the instrumental'hy':
but 'by the aid of their character'
is I think not a probable, though a possible, mode of expressing the
conformity which is here required. The meaning is plain; speeches
which express, or are in conformity with, the characters and manners of
certain classes, whom we may have to address. As a last resource I
venture to propose b\ioKoyovp.hov^ as a substitute for Xeyopevovs; there is
no variation of MSS; but it certainly seems possible that the three first
letters in the long word in question may have been accidentally decapitated in the course of transcription, and then the remainder Xoyoufihovs would naturally have been converted into \tyojiivovs.
CHAP. XIV.
1. 'The character of men in the prime of life will plainly lie
between the other two, by subtraction of the excess of each, (so that)
they are neither excessively confidentfor that kind of disposition is
rashnessnor overmuch given to fear, but in a right state of mind as to
both, neither implicitly trusting nor altogether distrusting everyone indiscriminately, but rather with a due distinction according to the real
facts of the case'.
arftaipau, properly opposed to TrpoaTidivai, as in a numerical calculation to add and subtract. Hence withdraw, remove, et sim. For example, Plat. Cratyl. 431 C, TTpouTiBits fj- dcpaipwu ypafipaTa. Ib. 432 A.
Phaedo 95 E, bis, et alibi. Xen. de Rep. Ath. ill 8 and 9, KOTO p.i<p6v TI
ttpoaOivra r) dcpeXoura, 'by slight and gradual addition or subtraction'
(said of the changes of political constitutions).
pp
159
pp
(6pa(p
Kal ovre (r<p6dpa QappovvTes

2 a-VTt]<s yap
ovre
TO TOLOVTOV)
ce 7T|Oos afj.(p(jo exovres,

1
7ra(riv ainarTovvTe ;,
Xlav (pofiovfxevoi,
KCCAWS
OUTC 7ra<ri 7ricrTevovTe$
dXXd
T O dXrjdes
KUTO.
oure
Kpivovres
i5
v, Kai OVTC 7rp6<z TO KaXov
^W^TCS JJLOVOV ovTe P. 139 -
os T O crv/uKpepov dWct 7rpos a/ji(pa), KCCI OUTC 7rpo$

(peiCCO 0VT6 TTjOOS dffWTiaV dWd
TTJOOS TO dpfXOTTOV
3 o/xoiws oe Kat 7rpoi dvfxov
crcocppoves fieT
iv
yap
euri
dvZpia<s Kal dv^peioi
01 fxev veoi dvBpeioi
TrpecrfiuTepoL
awcppoves
Kal
eTnOujJiiav.
Kal
/ueTa crw(ppo(rvvri<5.
TO?S iêois Kal TO?S yepovari
yap
enreiv,
Kai irpos
^L^prjTai
TavTa-
ical aKoKacTTOi, ol 3e
$ei\oi.
o)s Be
Ka66\ov
bora juev Zirfpt]Tai t] veoTrjs Kal TO yvjpas TWV

TavTa
afxfpco 'iyovcTLV, oaa
'
virepfiaX-
and Qpao-vr-qs here preserve their proper distinction, Bapo-os,

true courage, Gpaa-os, reckless audacity or impudence, though these senses
are often interchanged. The verb Bapo-elv or 8appdv, as Plato, Aristotle,
and the later Greeks write it, has never the unfavourable sense.
2. ' And the conduct of their life will be directed neither to honour
alone, nor to self interest, but to both'. Compare 12.12; 13.9. 'And
neither to parsimony nor to profligate extravagance, but to what is fit
and proper', i.e. the mean, e\ev8epioT7]s; Eth. N. 11 7, 1107 b 10, jv I,
ii2o<i: 1, seq.
3. 'And similarly in respect of passion and appetite. And they
will be temperate (sober-minded, under self-control) with courage, and
courageous with self-control: for in the young and old these two are
separated (or distinguished), the young being brave and licentious (devoid
of self-control), and the elders sober and temperate but cowardly'. 'Selfcontrol' is the form in which the virtue appears especially in Plato's
Gorgias and Republic, where it is described as a regulating principle
which guides the whole man, ordering and harmonising his entire moral
constitution.
' And, speaking in general terms, all the advantages (good qualities,
elements of good character) that youth and old age have divided between
them ( = ?xel 8'!7/"?/i('a)i both of these the others enjoy; and whereinsoever
(the two first) are excessive or defective, in these (they observe, subaudi
01 aKfiafrvres exovcnv) a due moderation (or mean) and a fitness or propriety of conduct'.
otra hifipr)Tai rj vcorrjs Kai TO yrjpas]
I think Siaipuadai must b e here
middle, said of those who divide amongst themselves, have shares in any
joint work or possession. Thuc. vil 19, 8i~K6fifvoi. TO tpyov. An objection might be taken to this, that hii^Tai is singular and not plural, and
160
PHTOPIKHS B 14 4.
rj iWe'nrovcri, rovriav TO fxerpiov nal TO dp4 fiOTTOV. aK/JLaêi he TO /meu aoofxa airo TWV TpianovTct
ircov nexPL T^v TrevTeKanpidicovTa., r\ de ^v%r] irepi
TOL eVos heiv 7revTr\KOVTtx.
XOVCTLV
that no one can share a thing with himself. But although the verb is
singular in form, being connected grammatically with veorrjs alone, which
stands next to it, yet it is evident that yrjpas is meant to be included in
the distribution as well as the other. It is accordingly equivalent to 8(17prjiLtva ex0V<7lv- I think it cannot be passive; the analogy of n-urrcvco-dai
n ' to be trusted with something', imTerpdcpdai TI, and the like, cannot be
applied to this case.
TO fitTpiov] is Plato's summum bonum, the highest in the scale of
goods, in the Philebus; also the Horatian aurea mediocritas: it may also
stand for the Aristotelian peo-ov, which at all events is the sense in which
it is employed here.
TO apuoTTov] that which fits, the fitting; derived by metaphor from
the carpenter's, joiner's and builder's trades; is nearly equivalent to TO
irpinov, and like it refers us to the fitness of things, as a standard of good,
to a harmonious organisation or order of the universe, a system physical
or moral which has all its parts dove-tailed, as it were, together, arranged
in due order and subordination, carefully and exactly fitted together;
Cicero's apta comfiositio (membroruiu, of the human figure [de omciis
128.98]).
4. ' The body is in its prime from 30 to 35 (years of age), the soul
(i. e. the intellectual and moral faculties) about nine and forty' (50 minus
one : 8e Iv is hkov, wanting so much).
Two of the numbers here mentioned are multiples of seven. The
stages of life are determined by a septenary theory, the earliest record
of which is an elegiac fragment of doubtful genuineness (Porson), attributed to Solon (ap. Clemen. Alexandr. Strom., Bergk, Lyr. Gr. p. 332
[346, ed. 2], Sol. Fragm. 25), in which the seventy years allotted to human
life, and its successive stages of growth, development and decay, are divided
into ten periods of seven years each. The dates here given by Aristotle
for the prime of body and mind, agree tolerably well with the verses of
the fragment,
TJJ Sc rerapri; was ris iv c/38oâSi fiiy apto-ros lirxvv rjv T
avdpes (frf/iar' exovcr' dpeTrjs. The fifth septenary is the marriageable age.
In the seventh the intellect and powers of speech have reached their
prime,
furo de (49) </oCv KOL yhwo-o-av iv /38o/*ao-(i/ /xey' apio-Tos K.TX.
The same theory, whether derived from Solon or not, which seems to
have been generally current, reappears in Polit. iv (vn) 16, 1335 b 32, Kara
TTJV rfjs dLavolas aKjirjv' avTrj 8' itrriv iv TO'LS 7rXetVro(s rjvwep rav iroirjTWV Ttves
elprjKao-w ol jj.Tpovvres rats c/38o/iao"( Tr\v fjkiKiav, nipl TOV xpovov TOV TSV
neprrjicovra irav (i.e. 7 x 7 =49): and again Polit. ib. c. 17,1336^37, bvo
fi' clcrlv r/XiKiai Trpoi as dvayxalov SiypijoSai rf/v irmbdav, /xera TT\V awh rav
ejrTa /ifxpii tfPqs nal nakiv p.tTa rr)V dcp' rj^rji fiexpl Tav ivbs Kai e'Uoo-iv irav.
ol yap rais efihojiao-iv upoCj/rej ray ijXuei'a? a>s iir\ TO TTOKV \iyovo-iv ov
PHT0PIKH2 B is i.
Trepi /j.eu ouv veoTtjTos
1
Kai yypcos Kai
t]6oov eKcuTTov i<TTLV, eiprj<rdco ToaravTW
awo
TIT^JJS
161
lyiyvo/Jievtov ayaocov,
7repi he TWI/ CHAP. XV.
01 ocra aurcov Kai
TO.
Kakas (leg. Kaicas, Spengel), Set Sf rrj btcupicrei rrjs <f>v<T(ais iraKo\ov8etv.
Nevertheless the theory is departed from in assigning the proper age of

marriage in the two sexes; ib. c. 16, 1335 a 28, the woman is to marry at
18, the man at 37 'or thereabouts'; neither of them divisible by seven; iv
TooovTto yap dicfiaôwn re TOIS o-c&fiaai <n)fev|ir ecrrai K.T.A.
And in line 35,
the term of human life is again fixed at 70 years. So the Psalmist [xc. 10],
" The days of our years are threescore years and ten."
And to the same theory (the number seven, marking a crisis, or stage
of growth, in the life of an animal,) reference is frequently made, in the
Hist. Anim., as VII 1.2, 16, 18, c. 12.2, and elsewhere: from all which it
may be concluded that Aristotle was a believer in it. Plato, Rep. v 460 E,
fixes the prime of life in a woman at the age of 20, in a man at 30: in
Legg. IV 721 A, and in three other places, the age of marriage is fixed
from 30 to 35, though in one of them (vi 772 E) 25 is also named.
Compare on this subject Hes. Opp. et D. 695 seq. Xenoph. de Rep.
Lac. 1 6, (Stallbaum's note on Plato 1. a ) .
But the theory of the virtues of the number seven was carried to a far
greater extent, as may be seen in T 6 of Macrobius' Commentary on
Cicero's Somnium Scipiouis, of which the sum is given in a quotation
from the Somnium Scipionis:Cicero de septenario dicit, Qui numerus
rerum omnium fere nodus est. Everything in nature is determined by
the number seven. Near the end of the chapter, we are told, in conformity with Aristotle's statement, Notandum vero quod, cum numerus
se multiplicat (at the age of 49, 7 x 7), facit aetatem quae proprie perfecta
et habetur et dicitur: adeo ut illius aetatis homo, utpote qui perfectionem
et attigerit iam, et necdu)npraeterierit, et consilio aptus sit, nee ab exercitio virium alienus habeatur. This is the prime of mind and body
together. Quinta (hebdomas) oinne virium (strength and powers of body
alone), qitanta esse unicuigue, possunt, complet augmentum. All this
came no doubt originally from the Pythagoreans; as may be inferred
from Arist. Met. N 6, 1093 a 13, where this number seven, is said to be
assigned by them as the cause of everything that happened to have this
number of members ; seven vowels, seven chords or harmonies, seven
Pleiads; animals shed their teeth in seven years yes, says Ar., some do,
but some don'tand seven champions against Thebes. And from this
and similar considerations they inferred some mysterious virtue in the
number; and identified it with vovs and icaipos. (Ritter and Preller,
Hist. Phil. c. 2, Pythag. 102, note a.)
' So for youth and age and prime of life, the kind of characters, that
is to say, that belong to each, let thus much suffice' (to have been said).
CHAP. XV.
A yvafui of Phocylides may serve as a motto of this chapter. Kai
roSe &<0Kv\idea>' ri ifkeov yivoi evyeves tlvai oh oiiT iv /11801s ejrerai
AR. II.
l l
\Pls,
162
PHTOPIKHS B is 2.
t]6ti TTO'I arra o-Vfjifialvei TOIS dp6pa)7roi$, \eycofxev

2 e(perjs. evyeveias JJLIV OVV %66S ecm TO cpiXorifxoTepov eivai TOP KeKTrj/uevov avTr\v airavTes yap, brav
virdp-^r] Tt, TTjods TOVTO crwpeveiv eiwdacriv, t) c)' evyeveia ivTLfAOTtjs Tts 7rpoy6vwv icrTiv.
Kal KaraCppoVY\TIKOV KCtl TWV
, oiori
6/ULOIWV i(TTl
7roppa) TavTa
fxctAAOV r\ 771;?
yiyvofieva
OVT iv\ fiovXjj; Brunck, Poet. Gnom. p. 91. Bergk, Poet. Lyr. Gr.
P- 339 [P- 358, ed. 2].
1. 'Of the goods arising from fortune, as many of them, that is, as
have an influence upon men's characters, let us proceed to speak next in
order'.
2. ' One characteristic of noble birth is that the ambition of the
possessor of it is thereby increased. For everyone that has anything to
start with, or to build upon', (as a nucleus, focus, or centre of attraction :
vivapxeiv, to underlie, to be there already, prop, as a basis or foundation
for a superstructure,) 'is accustomed to make this the nucleus of his
acquisitions or accumulations, and high or noble birth implies or denotes
ancestral distinction', trapeveip irpos rt, lit. to bring to this, in order to
heap round it, any subsequent accumulations. The meaning is, that any
new acquisitions of honour or property that a man makes, will generally
take the form of an addition to some stock which he already has, whenever he has one ready for the purpose, Srav TL vivapxa' This condition of life is inclined to look down upon even those who
resemble, are on a level with, (in condition, wealth, rank, distinction, and
so forth,) their own ancestors, because their distinctions, in proportion to
the degree of their remoteness, are more distinguished (than those of contemporaries) and are easier to brag o f (more readily admit of boastful
exaggeration). Distance lends enchantment to the view. Honours and
distinctions shine with a brighter lustre in the remote ages of antiquity,
and confer more dignity upon those who by right of inheritance can claim
a share in them, than those of the same kind, and equal in all other
respects, when acquired by contemporariesfamiliarity breeds in some
degree contempt for themjust as apxaioTrkovTeiv is a higher claim to
consideration than vcoirXovrtiv, 11 9. 9, q. v. Antiquity of possession
carries with it a prescriptive right.
KaTcKppovrjTiKov] agrees with ro euyevis, the abstract for the concrete,
und. from the preceding evycveia. An abstract term is often particularised, or expressed by the component members in detail, as in construction
of antecedent and relative, such as Polit. 1 2, 1252 b 13, Koiva>via...avs
XapmvSas KOXC'L... This construction is an instance of that wide-spread
and multiform grammatical 'figure', the o-xâ npos TO <rqix.aiv6fi.fvov,
which, in a great variety of different ways, departs from the usual construction of words and adapts it 'to the thing signified'; as, in the case
above given, the abstract virtually includes all the component members
of the society who are expressed in the plural relative.
PHTOPIKHS B 15 3.
163
3 ivri/jLOTepa Kctt evaXa^pvevTa.

ecrri <$e evyeves fxev
Kara Ttjv TOV <yevovs apeTt\v, <yevvaiov oe Kara TO fir]
e^'uTTaadai T^S (pvcrews' 6 irep ws enl TO 7ro\u
eva\a6vevTa]
On a\aovela and d\a<&v, see note on I 2. 7.
Of the
two significations of the word, that of 'bragging' is here uppermost.

3. ' The term evyeves (well-born, come of a good stock, of noble
race, or descent) is applied to mark distinction (excellence) of race ;
yevvaios (of noble character) to the maintenance of the normal type of
character' (keeping up to, not degenerating from, the true family
standard). The difference between evyevrjs and yevvaios lies in this ;
that in the former the race or descent, yevos, is directly expressed as the
prominent and leading idea ; it indicates that the cvyevqs comes of a
good breed, but says nothing of the individual character : in the latter
it is the character, conformable to the excellence of the breed or race,
that is put prominently forward. The account here given of evyeveia
is illustrated by the definition of it in I 5.5; it denotes in fact the excellences and distinctions of one's ancestors, as distingicishedfro7n one's
own. See the passages there collected. In Hist. Anim. I 1, 488 b 18,
these two words are defined and distinguished almost in the same terms ;
evyeves p.ev yap i<m TO e dyaBov yevous, yevvaiov he TO fifi lîo-rd\ievov
e< rijr auroD (pvo-eas. Ar. is here characterising the dispositions of

animals. Some are eXexidcpia <a\ avhpt'ia KCU evyevfi olov Ae'a>p, ra de yevvala
Ka\ aypia <al ni(3ov\a, olov \VKOS' from which it appears that yewcuoTrjs
is strictly and properly only the maintenance of a certain type of character, which need not necessarily be a good one : though in ordinary
usage it is invariably applied to denote good qualities. On evyeveia,
see Herm. Pol. Ant. 57.
iio-Tao-8ai]' to quit a previous state'; of a change in general, especially
a change for the ivorse, degeneration. Plat. Rep. 11 480 A, rr/s iavrov
ISeas i<âiveiv...(1nep TI i^loTairo rfjs avTov Ideas' of God, changing his
own proper form, and descending to a lower. Eth. Nic. VII 7, 1150 a 1,
dXX' iêcrrrjKe rrjs (pvcreus, ao-irep 01 fxaivofnevoi TOSV avdpumav. Pol. VIII (v)
6, sub fin,, al SrjfioKpaTiai KCU SXiyapxlcu et-Lo-ravTai iviore OVK els ras evavrias
TToXiTeias K.T.\.
I b . C. 9> !39 ^ 32> dXtyapxiav Kal br)jxoKpaTlav...eêaTT]Kvlas TTJS jSfXriorijs raêcos.
On tpitris as- the re'Xor, the true nature, the normal or perfect state
of anything, see Pol. I 2, 1252 b 32,77 8e <f>vo-is reXos ecrLv olov yap ettao-rov
earl rrjs ytvecreios TeKeo-QeiarjS, ravTtjv qbafiev TIJC <pvo-iv eivai efcaoroO, acmep
aidpanrov, ITTJTOV, oiKias. Grant, on Eth, Nic. II 1. 3, distinguishes five

different senses of <f>io-is in Aristotle, of which this is the last.
'Which (the maintenance of the ancestral character) for the most part is
not the lot of the well-born, but most of them (the members or descendants
of an illustrious family) are good-for-nothing n (evreXr/s vilis, cheap. Fortes
non semper creanturfortibus) ; 'for there is a kind of crop in the families
of men (<popd here implies an alternation of <j>opa and d<popla, of good
and bad crops) just as there is in the produce of the soil (lit. the things
1
iravpoi yap roi iraiSes op.0101 irarpl WXCHTCU' oi irXeoxes /COK/OVS, iravpoi Si TS
apdovs.
Horn. Od. jS' 276.

II2
164
PHT0PIKH2 B 15 3.
ov (rvufiaivei TOIS evyevecriv, a'AA' elarLV 01 TTOWOL

cpopd yap T/S ecTTiv ev TO?S yevecriv dv^pwv
locnrep ev TO?S KCLTO. T S ^lopcis yiyvofxevois, K<XI iviore
av rj dyadov TO yevos, eyyivovrai
did Tiros xpovov
that grow in the country places); for a certain time (Sia with gen., along
the course or channel of, during,) remarkable men (distinguished above
their fellows, standing out from among them, mepi,) grow up in them, and
then (after an interval of unproductiveness) they begin again to produce
them'. There are two ways of understanding avaftlftoxnv; either it is
active, 'to send up, produce', as the earth yields her fruits, and this is
the natural interpretation, and supported by the use of the word in
other writers: or, as Rost and Palm in their Lex., zuriickgehen, 'to go
back', relapse into a state of barrenness, on the analogy of dvaxapelv
et sim. ['deficit'. Index Aristotelicus\
In this case h&bvai is neut. (by
the suppression of the reflexive pronoun) as indeed both itself and its
compounds frequently areand may be either 'to give (itself) back, to
give way', or perhaps rather, like dvievai, dviivGai, to relax or slacken in
production (dvjj, Soph. Phil. 764). Victorius gives both renderings ; I have
adopted his second version ["posteaque rursus, intervallo aliquo temporis
edit ac gignit industrios item atque insignes viros"], which seems to me
the more natural interpretation of dvaBidwmv.
tpopa] proventus, the produce which the earth bears, cpepei, is either
'acrop' simply,or 'a good crop', opposed to atpoplafertility, abundance,
to barrenness, either absolute or comparative. Plat. Rep. VIII 546 A,
ov (lovov (pvrois iyyeiois, dWa KO\ iv iwiyeiois fraotj <popa nal dcpopla i^vx'is
re KCU tTcdfLaToov yiyvovTat. Ar. Hist. Anim. V 21. I, i\aio>v ffaopa, ' a crop
of olives'. I b . 22. 3, iXaiSv <f>., de Gen. Anim. Ill 1. 15, rav 8ev8pav ra
TroWa...iavalveTai peTo. rrjv ifropdv (after the crop). A n d
metaphorically
in Dem. de Cor. 61, <popau irpoborav KCU $apo&6ica>v. Aesch. c. Ctes.
234, <j>. p'r/ropav TTovr/piSv a/j,a KO.1 To\p.rjpav. Dissen ad loc. Dem. cit. Plut.
Platon. Quaest. I 1, 999 E, <f>. <ro<picrrav. Diodor. XVI. 54, tp. trpoborav.
" Sic Latine novorum proventum scelerum dixit Lucan. Phars. 11 61, et
similiter messem usurpat Plaut. Trinum. 1 1. 11." Dissen, 1. c.
With the whole passage compare Pind. Nem. XI 48, dpxaiai 8' dpcTal
d[i<fipovT* aWafro'Ofieva.i yeveais avftpav (rdevos. iv o~xepa> 6' ovt* tov fxeKaivai
KapTrbv eSoiKav Spovpai' dtvSpea r' OVT i6i\ei Tracrats iriwv wep 68ois \al.
7TfpoSoir] avdos evades (pepeiv, TT\OVTG> I&OU, aXV iv diielftovn. xai dvaruv
ovra tr8evos ayei Mdipa. Ib. VI 14 (Gaisford).
'When clever families degenerate, their characters acquire a tendency

to madness, as for instance the descendants of Alcibiades and Dionysius
the elder (tyrant of Syracuse), whereas those of a steady- (staid, stable)
character degenerate into sluggishness or dulness' (of which the stubborn
ass is the type; as &' OT' oj>oy...e/3JcraTo 7ra!8a? vcoBrjs, a> df) froXAa ncpl
poirak' dptph idyrj [II. XI S59]), as in the case of those of Conon and Pericles
and Socrates'. We learn from Plato, Men. 93 B94 E, that the son of
Themistocles, Cleophantus; of Aristides, Lysimachus ; the sons of Pericles,
Paralus and Xanthippus : of Thucydides (the statesman and general, the
opponent of Pericles and his policy), Melesias and Stephanus; all de-
PHTOPIKHS B 15 3 ; 16 1.
165
uvfipes irepiTToi, KaireiTa 7rd\iv dvaZihuxriv.

epLcrraTai oe Tct fxev ev(pvd yevrj eU fJ.aviKu>T6pa qdrj, olov
ol air 'AKicifiiddov KCLI ol airo Aiowc'iov TOV irpoTepov, Ta oe crTacri/JLa eis ape\repiav KCCI vwvpoTt]Ta,
olov ol drrd Kt^wyos KCLI TlepinXeovs nai ~E.ojKpd.TOV9.
TW ce 7T\OVTW a 'eweTai r\Qv\, e7ri7roXtj's etTTiv'iZeivCHAP. XVI.
airacriv v(3pio~Tai yap Kai V7reprj(pavoi, 7rda")ôvT<s TI
VTTO T>7? KTY](reco<s TOV TTXOVTOV axnrep yap eôj^Tes
diravTa TciyaOd OVTCO SiaKeivTctr 6 ydp TTAOUTOS olov p. 1391.
generated from their fathers; and in spite of the advantages of their education turned out nevertheless either quite ordinary men, or altogether bad.
The alliance of quickness of wit or cleverness and madness is marked
again in Poet. XVII 4, 1455 1 32, evtpvovs 17 iroirjTiKri tarw r/ paviKov (the
poet's 'fine frenzy'). Probl. XXX 1. 18, oa-ois pev woXXi) KOI tyvxpa ivvirdpêi (?) Kpaais rr]s fiikaivrjs xoXiys) va>6po\ Kai p,o>poi, otrois 8e Xiav noKkfi
Ka\ Sepfir) fiaviKol Kai ev<f>ve1s K.TX. Great wits aire sure to madness near
allied, and thin partitions do their bounds divide.
Dryden [Absalom and
Achitophel, I 163].
ordcn/xa] settled, steady characters, is illustrated by Thuc. II 36, iv Trj

Kadfo-rrjKvLa rjXiKia. ('mature and vigorous age'), Soph. Aj. 306, ij.<ppoiv
fioXtr was gvv XP"V KaOia-Tarai ('settles down again into his senses').
Aesch. Pers. 300, Xe'ôv xaraa-rds (' first compose thyself, and then speak').
Blomfield, Gloss, ad loc, refers to Ar. Ran. 1044, nvivjia Ka9earr]ii6s, and
Eurip. Orest. 1310, ndXtv KardarrjO' JJO-D'X^) jiev ojipn. Theophr. ap. Plut.
Symp. I 5, p. 623 B, /ia'Xiora 8e 6 iv8ov<natrpos e^la-rtjai Kai wapaTpinti TO
re traifia KOL rfjv (f>a>vfju TOV Kadeo-TrjKOTos. Victorius points out a similar
opposition of the two characters here contrasted, in Probl. in (16. 1).

What is here called a/3fXrepi'a and vadporr/s is there designated by TCTV(pa/iivovs, a term of similar import. 8m TI 6 oivos Kai Terv(pa>p.evovs TTOUI
Kai fiaviKovs; ivavna yap rj &ia6eo~is. (rTv(paio-dai is explained by Harpo-
cration and Suidas of one who has lost his wits in the shock of a violent
storm ; whether by the storm itself which has confounded him, or by the
accompanying thunderbolt: Hesych. s. v. p.ep.rjvevat; and TervfpaTai, anoXeoXei/. iaTrinprjo-Tai. t/i/3e/3poi/rj)Tai. (Trypdr). Hence, of one stufi'jied,
cfj.fip6vTr)Tos, Trapairkr]^, out of his wits ; or of fatuity, dulness in general).
CHAP. XVI.
1. The characters that accompany wealth (the characteristics of
wealth) lie on the surface within the view of all {lit. for all to see; in-nro\r;s
airao-iv COOT* avrois Idelv avrd' comp. I 15.22, and note there); for they
are insolent, inclined to violence and outrage, and arrogant (in their conduct and bearing), being affected in some degree (their nature altered, the
alteration for the worse regarded as a kind of suffering or affection) by
the acquisition of wealth. These dispositions originate in the supposition that (in having wealth) they have every kind of good, all goods in
166
PHTOPIKHS B 16 2.
Ti/jiti r t s Ttjs a m s TWIS aWwv, Sid <j>aiveTai wvia

2 cnravTa eivai avrov.
Kal Tpv(pepol Kal
Tpv(pepol fiev $ia TJJV Tpv(pr]v Kal TY\V
evdai/movlas, caXctKtoves c$e Kal (TOAOIKOI Sta TO
one; for wealth is as it were a sort of standard of the value of everything
else, and consequently it seems as if everything else were purchasable
by it'.
2. 'They are also voluptuous (dainty and effeminate, molles et
delicati, Victorius), and prone to vulgar ostentation, the former by reason
of their self-indulgence (the luxury in which they live) and the (constant)
display of their wealth and prosperity (evbaipav, as well as oX/3<or, = 7rXoi;o-ios); ostentatious and ill-bred, because they (like others) are all accustomed to spend their time and thoughts upon what they themselves love
and admire (and therefore, as they think about nothing but their wealth,
so they are never weary of vaunting and displaying, which makes them
rude and ostentatious), and also because they suppose that everybody
else admires and emulates what they do themselves'. Foolishly supposing that every one else feels the same interest in the display of wealth
that they do themselves, they flaunt in their neighbours' eyes till they
excite repugnance and contempt instead of admiration.
rpvfepoi] denotes luxury rpvcpri, and its effects, luxurious, effeminate,
voluptuous habits: Eth. N. VII 8, 1150 b I, 6 8" iXXftnav irpps a oi woXXol
KC\ avTirelvowil Kai bivavrai, ovros paXaKos Kal Tpvcpav' Kal yap J; rpvcpr/
fiaXaKia its t'oTtv. E t h . E u d e m . II 3. 8, d fiiv ixrjSefiiav VTropivav Xvirrji/,
ixijb' d fifk-rtov, Tpvqyepos.
aa\a<avfs] denotes vulgar ostentation, and is very near akin to, if

not absolutely identical with, fiavavala and dnfiponaXla; the former is the
excess of fuyaXmrpeiTUa, proper magnificence in expenditure: the fidvavcro goes beyond this, spending extravagantly where it is not required:
E t h . Nic. IV 6, 1123 a 21, seq. f iv yap rots /juicpois rav SaTravrjuarcov 7roXXa
dvaXi'o-Ket Kai \ap.npiiverai napa fieXosof which some instances are given
Kal navra ra rotavTa Trotrjo'et ov TOV Kakov eveKa, dWa ?ov TT\OVTO V
eTrideiKVVixevof, Kal 8ta ravra ol6fiei/os &avfidccr8ai. I b . c. 4, 1122 a 31
r) S" vn-fp/SoXij (i\ev8tptoTT]Tos) fiavavcrla Kal aVftporaXi'a (bad taste) Kal ocrai
roiavrai,...iv ois ov Set Kal as ov 8ei \a/j.Trpw6fievat. Comp. E t h . E u d e m .
II 3. 9, aiTwros (spendthrift) juev o wpbs awao-av bandvrjv imepfiaWwv, dveXevBepos 8' 6 Trpos airao-av iXKeljrau. 6p-ota>s 8e Kai 6 tuKpowparris Kal 6 o-aXdKCOV' 6 u.ev yap vrrepfidWei TO irptirov (0 craXaK), o 8' eXXeiVei roO irpiirovroj. Hesych. S. V. o-akaKavia' 7) iv irevlq dXafovela. craXaKa>vlo-aC (after a
different and wrong explanation, he adds) o 8e eeotppaaroc o-aXaKavd (prjcrip

eivai, TOV 8airavvTa oirov jifj bet', which agrees with Aristotle. Suidas, s.v.
craXaKwv' npoo-iroiovfi.evos n\avffios eifai, Trevr)S ^ ( a s Hesych.), Kal o-akaKiavia
d\aoveta vncp TO beov, Kal aaXKavlcrai d\aovevto-8ai.
Ib. biao-akaKcovio-ai
bia8pv\lrao-dai' " cira ir\ovo-i<*>s cobi Trpvjias Tpvfapov TI biacra\aK(ovio-ov"
('swagger', Arist. Vesp. 1169).

O-OXOIKOI] 'rude, ill-mannered, ill-bred'; liable to make mistakes, or commit solecisms; first,in languageO-OXQIK'I&IV, rrj Xeu Pappapifav, Top. I (de
PHTOPIKHS B I 6 2 .
167
eiooOevai SictTplfteiv Trepi TO epoojJievov Kai 6avp.a^6[xevov VTT avTwv, Kai TW oie<rdat fy\ouv TOI)S aWovs
a Kai avToi. a/na he Kai ei/coTws TOVTO iraa-ôvcriv
7ro\\ot yap el(Tiv ol Zeofjievoi TCOI/ eôvrav.
66ev Kai
TO îfxcovidov eiprjTai irepi TWV cro(pu>v Kai TTXOVCTLCOV
Soph. El.) 3, ult. [p. 165 b 21]and secondly, transferred thence to manners, conduct, breeding. Victorius cites, Xen. Cyr. vni 3. 21, Aa'icpapurjs Se
Tts r\v (ToXoiKorepos av&p<07Tos TW rpo7r&), ov ajero el nrj Ta%y viraKovoi e\v0fp<6Tepos av (paivetrdai. Plut. Pol. Praec. p. 817 A, ovx (Scnrep evtoi rav aweipoKaKatv Kai (ro\ol<G>v. Ib. Vit. Dion. p. 965 A, ovbev iv ry ^lairrj (TOKOKOV
ewiheiKviijievos. The word is derived from SoXoi, a town of Cilicia (there

was another place of the same name in Cyprus), iroXtj dgioXoyos (Strabo).
' Qui cum barbare loquerentur, inde vocabulum hoc ad omnes vitioso
sermone utentes, et tandem ad illos quoque qui in actionibus suis ineptiunt, est translatum' (Schrader). Strabo XIV c. 5, Cilicia. Diog. Laert.j
Solon I 51, eKeldev TE a7raXXayeif (o Kpolcros) iyevero iv KtXtKi'a, Kai iroXiv
o-vvaiKHTfv rjv an avrov (Solon) SoXouj eKaXfcreu (others represent Soli as
founded by the Argives and Lindians from Rhodes. Smith's Diet. Geogr.
Vol. Ill IOI2^); 6\lyovs. T rivas T<>V 'ABTjvalajy eyKar&)Ki<7^, 01 ra \pova TT)V
(j)covr)v dnoêvadfVTfS eke)(6t]<Tav. Kai slaw ol /lev ivBtv SoXeir, 01 8' cmb
KvTrpov SoXiot. Schrader therefore is incorrect in saying, ' Solis oppidum

cuius incolae Soloeci'; O-OKOLKOS is derived from S0X01, but is not the
name of one of its inhabitants.
'And at the same time, these affections are natural to them, for many
are they who require (the aid, the services) of the wealthy'. They have
an excuse for being thus affected by their wealth; the numerous claimants
upon their bounty elate them with a sense of superiority, and at the same
time by their servility give them frequent opportunities of exercising at
their expense their ostentation and ill manners. On ol i'xovres, the
possessors of property, sub. xpj para, see Monk on Eur. Ale. 57.'Whence
alsothis also gave occasion to the saying of Simonides about the
philosophers and men of wealth to Hiero's wife, when she asked him
whether it was better to get rich or wise (to acquire riches or wisdom):
Rich, he replied: for, said he, I see the philosophers waiting (passing
their time) at the doors of the rich'. This same story is alluded to by
Plato, Rep. VI 489 C, without naming the author of the saying, who indignantly denies its truth. The Scholiast, in supplying the omission,
combines the two different versions of Aristotle and Diog. Laert, and
describes it as a dialogue between Socrates and Eubulus. Diog. Laert.
(11 8.4, Aristip. 69) tells the story thus: ipmTrjOeh (Aristippus) vnu
Aiowo-lov 81a Ti ol /lev <pi\6o~o<j>oi irn ras TWV ir\ov<ria>v dvpas epxovrai, ol Se
7r\ovo-ioi
iiri ras TG>V <pi\oo-6<f>a>v ovKeri, edjT], on ol fitv "10-acnv a>v Sfovrai, 01
d' OVK
1
The merit of another mat attributed to Aristippus, as it is also connected

with our present subject, may excuse its insertion here. Aiovvviov TTOT' ipofxlvov
(TOP 'kpiamrirov)
inl ri f)Koi, lip-q...STTOTC /xlv <ro<pias tSeofiriv, TJKOV Tapk TOV
XuKpdrijV vvv Se xpW*-Tav Seo/ievos irapa cri rjnu. Diog. Laert. u. s. ; 8 .
168
PHT0PIKH2 B 16 24.
7T|0os Tt]V yvvaiKa rrjv 'lepcovos epofxevtjv irorepov yeve<rdai npeiTTOv irXovariov t] cocpov 7rXov(Tiov enreiv
TOI)S cod)oi)s yap e(pt] opav iwi TCCIS TCOV TTXOVGIWV P- 84.
3 dvpais liaTpifiovTas.
Kal TO o'leadai dîovs eivai
ap%eu/' eêti/ yap O'LOVTOLI WV eveicev ap)(eiv aîou.
Kal ftJs ev KecbaXalu), dvor\TOV evdal/movos tjdovi 6
4 TTXOVTOS iariv.
ia(pepei Se TOIS vecocrTi KeKTri/mevois
Kal TO?S irotXai TO. t)6t] T B aitavTa /uaWov Kal <pav\6repa TO. KaKa e)(eiv TOI)S j/eo7rAoi/TOi/s" cocnrep yap
On ejii rats r&v TT\OV<TIO>V dvpacs, see Ast ad PI. Phaedr. 245 A, p. 376.
Add to the examples there given, Plat. Symp. 183 A, 203 D, de amantibus.
Svpavkc'iv, Ruhnken ad Tim. p. 144, Stallbaum ad Symp. 203 D, Arist.
Eccl. 963.
3.
(cat TO oiecrOai (errerac Ta TTKOVTO). ' Cum Kal 04 ol6jj.evoi pergere
oporteret, TO oletrdai posuit.' Vater. 'Wealth too is accompanied (in the

minds of its possessors) by the opinion of a just claim to power (office,
authority); and this is due to the supposition that they have what makes
power worth having (aljiov). This I think is the only way of translating the
text, with Sgiov: and so the Vetus Translatiaj habere enim put ant quorum
gratia principari dignum.
The version of Victorius is quod tenere
se putant ea, quae qui possident regno digni sunt. But this seems to
require aioi, though the sense and connexion are certainly better; awi
had suggested itself to- me as a probable emendation. Bekker and
Spengel retain aîov. 'And in sum, the character that belongs to wealth
is that of a thriving blockhead (a prosperous fool, good luck without
sense).' Victorius very properly observes that evbaijiovia is not to be
understood in its strict ethical sense of real happiness, which must
exclude folly, but it is used here loosely as a synonym of evrvxia. He
also quotes a parallel phrase in Cic. de Amic. (54), nihil insipiente fortunato intolerabilhts fieripotest.
4. 'However there is a difference in the characters of the recent
and the hereditary possessors of wealth, in that the newly-enriched have
all the bad qualities of their condition (to) in a higher degree and worse
(than the others); for recently acquired wealth is a sort of want of
training in wealth (in the conduct, the use and enjoyment of it)'. On
the habit of the parvenu, Victorias quotes Plut. Symp. vil, p. 708 C, Kal
ircpi olvusv Siaifiopas Kai fivpa>v ipcorav Kal dumvvOdveo-dcu <popriKup KO/xiBrj Kal
veonKovrov, and Gaisford, Aesch. Agam. 1009, el 8' ovv avayKrj TJJO-8'
firippeiroi Ti/^Tjy, apxaioirXovrcov deo-iroTav jroXXij x<*P'y' ' oviror
<ravTs TJixrjirav KaXas u>p-oi re SovXois navra Kai napa <TTa6p.rjv.
i\iriBlomfield's
Glossary. Donaldson's New Crat. 323. Supra II 9. 9.

'And the crimes that the wealthy commit are not of a mean character
petty offences of fraud and mischiefbut are either crimes of insolence
and violence or of licentiousness, such as assault (outrage on the person)
in the one case, and adultery in the other'.
P H T O P I K H S B i 6 4 ; 17 13.
169
a.7raihevcria TTXOVTOV earrl TO veoirXovTov ehai.

Kai
dSiKrifActTa ddiKovaiu ov KctKovpyiKci, dXXa rd fxev
u(3pi<rTiKci TO he aKpctTeuTiKa, oiov eU aiKiav Kai
1
ofxolws he Kai Trepl cWa/xews a-%ehdv TO. irXeicrTa CHAP.

1
>//)
>
tl
< t I
XVII.
(pavepa e&Tiv rjorj' Ta fxev yap TO, avTa eêi r\ cvva2//is ToJ TTXOVTLO rd he /3eA.Tr (piXoTi/uoTepoi <ydp
teal dvBpcodeo-Tepoi elcri TO t]6i] ol hwajxevoL TWV
7rXov(ricov $ia TO e(p'ie(rdai epycov oaa eôvala
3 irpaTTeiv Sid Trjv huva/jLLV. Kai
Bia TO ev eTTifxeXela elvai, dvajKaô/JLevoi (TKOTreTv TO
4 irepl TY\V Bvvafxiv. Kai trefxvoTepoi r\ j3apvTepor 7roiel
ds aiKiav K.T.X.J signifies the direction or tendency, or the issue or
result, of the particular ddiKr]fia. This distinction of crimes has already
occurred twice in the delineation of the characters of Youth and Age,
11 12. 15 (see note), and 13. 14. alida, the legal crime of assault and
battery, is here adduced as an illustration of vjipis, though under the
Attic law it is expressly distinguished from it; vj3pit denoting a higher
class of crimes, subject to a ypa(fj or public prosecution, alda only to
a SUri, private suit or action. [Isocr. Or. 20 2, 5 ; Dem. Or. 54 (Conon)
J, 17. Comp. Jebb's Attic Orators II 2156.]
CHAP. XVII.
1. 'And in like manner also of power, fhost of the characters are
pretty clear, the characteristics of power being in some points (or particulars) the same as those of wealth'.
2. 'In others better (but still of the same kind); for the powerful
are more ambitious and more manly (or masculine) in their characters
than the wealthy, which is due to their aspiring to such deeds (achievements) as their power gives them the liberty of effecting', tarw 8' ore
TOP (piKorifiov inaivovixev oS? dv8p<o8rj (shewing how nearly the two charac-
ters coincide), Eth. Nic. IV 10, 1125^11, ai/8p<i8as <os hvvaficvovs apx-v,
I b . c n , 1126^2. The power supplies the occasion of doing great deeds,
and the habit of doing them forms the ambitious and masculine character:
wealth does not confer such opportunities.
3. 'And more active and energetic, by reason of the constant attention they are obliged to pay in looking to the means of maintaining their
power'; which without such close attention might probably slip from
their hands.
4. 'And they are rather proud and dignified than offensive, because
their distinguished rank (or position) by making them more conspicuous
(than all the rest) obliges them to moderation (in their demeanour). This
pride and dignity is a softened (subdued) and graceful arrogance (or assumption)'.
170
PHTOPIKH2 B 17 46.
yap
i/uLCpaveo-Tepovs TO dgiwpcc, $10

he n a-eixvorm juaAa/a/ teal ev<rxnpw
dh
ov [AiKpaSiKrjTat eicriv dXXa
Kav dhiKwcriv,
fieyaXa-
ClKOl.
>) S' evTVx'ia Ka-rd -re1 fxopia TWV elpTj/iievcov e

TO. t]6r]' ets yap TOUT a crvvTeivovariv al
honovaai elvai evTV)(iai' Kal en ets eureKviav teal Ta
Kara TO (TWjxa dyadd 7rapa<rKva(êi jf evTvyia irXeov6eKTeiv.
v7repr](pavwTepoi fxev oiiv
hid Trjv evrvxiav eicri.v, eV h' dicoXovdei
'leg. TO.' [margin of Mr Cope's copy of Bekker's Oxford ed. 1837].
f3apvs, heavy, burdensome, and hence offensive, the German lastig.

fiapvTrjs, 'offensiveness' in general; Dem., de Cor. 35, speaks of the
dvakyrjaia and Papvrrjs of the Thebans, where it evidently means imfiortunitas. Similarly in Isocr. Panath. 31, it belongs to the character of
the 7rc7rai8euffVot, to assume themselves a becoming and fair behaviour to
their associates, Kai ras piv TG>V liXXcov dr/dias Kai papvTrjras evuoXas Kal
pabiws (pepovras; where it seems to denote offensiveness in the form of ill

manners. Here it is applied to a particular kind of offensiveness or bad
manners, which shews itself in that excess or exaggeration of crejui/c'i-i/r or
pride called arrogance and assumption. ' Whenever they do commit a
crime, the criminality shews itself, not in a trifling and mean offence, but
on a grand scale, in high crimes and misdemeanours'.
5. 'Now the characters of good fortune are indeed found (or exhibited, principally) in the parts (the three divisions) of those already
mentioned-^/brall those which are considered the most important kinds of
good fortune do in fact converge to thesebut also besides these, good
fortune (prosperity) provides an advantage (over a man's neighbours) in
respect of happiness of family, and all personal gifts and accomplishments'.
7r\eovcKTclv] must here, I think, be used, not in its ordinary and
popular acquired signification, of seeking an undue share, covetousness,
greed, rapacity, but in the simple and literal meaning, which it sometimes
bears, of having an advantage (of any kind) over others. The ordinary
sensethough Victorius appears to understand it soseems to me quite
inappropriate to the passage. These other kinds of good fortune are
supplied in the list given I 5.4, where cvVexvia and TO. Kara TO anpa dya6a,
are both introduced, and the particulars of the latter enumerated.
6. 'Now though good fortune makes men more arrogant, overweening and inconsiderate, thoughtless, yet good fortune is attended by
one excellent characteristic, viz. that (the fortunate) are pious or lovers of
the gods' (God-fearing, we say), ' and have a certain religious character,
their trust in them being due to the good things they have derived from
fortune1"; they are in reality due to fortune, but are ascribed by them to the
PHT0PIKH2 B 17 6 ; 18 1.
171
t)6os T?I evTvx'ia, OTI (pi\66eoi eicri Kai eôi/o-t irpos

TO Belov TTtos, Tzia-revovTes Bid TO. yiyvo/neva dyadd
dwo T^S Tii)(r}<z.
l fxev ovv TWV Kad' rjXiKtav Kai Tv%t}v f\Qdav
TO. yap ivavTia TWV eiprj/aevwv IK TWV evavTIWV (pauepd io-Tiv, olov 7revr]Tos Kai drvôv^
fidos
CHAP.
dhvvaTOV. eirel & r\ TWV 7ri6avwv \6ywv
XVIII.
divine grace and favour. Lactantius, Div. Inst. 111.8 (quoted by Gaisford),
gives a truer account of this matter: Turn (in prosperis rebus) maxime
Deus ex memoria hominum elabitur, cum beneficiis eius fruentes honorem
dare divitiae indulgentiae deberent. At vero si qua tiecessitas gravis
presserit, tune Deum recordantur.
And Lucret. i n 53, multoque in
rebus acerbis acruis advertunt animos ad religionem.
'So of the characters which follow the various ages and conditions
of life enough has been said ; for the opposites of those that have been
described, as the character of the poor man, the unsuccessful (unfortunate), and the powerless, may be easily ascertained from their
opposites', i. e. by substituting the opposites of their opposites, the
characteristics, viz. of poverty, misfortune, powerlessness, for those of
wealth, prosperity, and power.
CHAP. XVIII.
The following chapter marks a division of the general subject of the
work, and a stage or landing-place, from which we look back to what
has been already done, and forwards to what still remains to do. The
evident intention of the writer is to give a summary statement of the
entire plan, and the main division of his system of Rhetoric, contained
in the first two books, which comprise all the intellectual part, ra 7rept
rqv biavoiav, II 26.5, all that depends on argument; as opposed to the
non-essential and ornamental part, style, action, and arrangement, treated
in Bk. in. And it may fairly be supposed that it was also his intention
to arrange these divisions in the same order as that which he proposed
to follow in the actual treatment of the subject.
But in the text, at any rate of the first half of the chapter, to TTOU)T{OV,
this order is not observed; and there is altogether so much irregularity
and confusion in the structure of the sentences, and such a mixture of
heterogeneous subjects, that it seems tolerably certain that we have not
this portion of the chapter in the form in which Aristotle wrote it. First,
the long parenthesis about the applicability of the terms icpio-is or decision,
and Kpir-qs, judge or critic, to all the three branches of Rhetoric, has no
natural connexion with the contextthough at the same time it is quite
true that the use of the parenthesis, a note inserted in the text, is a marked
feature of Aristotle's ordinary style : still this would be an exaggeration, or
abuse of the peculiarity. Spengel has pointed out (Trans. Bav. Acad. 1851,
p. 35), that the whole of this parenthesis, i'a-n dePovXevovru [p. 175, line 2,
to p. 176, last line], is nothing but an expansion of a preceding passage,
172
PHTOPIKHS B i 8 i.
I i. 2, the same notion being here carried out into detail. But although
it is so much out of place that it is hardly conceivable that even Aristotle
(whose style is not remarkable for its close connexionis in fact often
rather rambling and incoherent) should have introduced it here, as
part of an enormous protasis of which the apodosis or conclusion
relates to something entirely different; yet as it bears all the characteristic marks of the author's style, including the irregularity and the
heaping of parenthesis upon parenthesis, though it was most probably
not written for this place, there is no reason to doubt that it proceeds
from the pen of Aristotle.
The parenthesis ends at fiovkcvovrai, and we ought now to resume
the interrupted nporavis. This appears, according to the ordinary punctuation, (with the full stop at nporcpov,) to be carried on as far as irpoTepovt
the conclusion or apodosis being introduced by more, as usual. The
grammar tVW...more is no objection to this, since we have already seen
(note on II 9. 11) that Aristotle is often guilty of this, and even greater
grammatical irregularities. But the sense shews that the passage when
thus read cannot be sound. There is no real conclusion; for it by no
means follows that, because 'the employment of all persuasive speeches
is directed to a decision of some kind', and because (second member of
protasis) 'the political characters' have been described (in I 8), ' therefore
it has been determined how and by what means or materials speeches
may be invested with an ethical character'. In fact it is a complete
iwn-sequitur.
Bekker [ed. 3] and Spengel, in order to establish a connexion between
protasis and apodosis, put a comma at irpoTfpov; suppose that the
preceding sentence from the beginning of the chapter is left incomplete,
without apodosis, at fiovXevovrm ; and that wore marks the conclusion
only from the clause immediately preceding ; the meaning then being)
that the description of the 'political characters' in I 8 is a sufficient
determination of the modes of imparting an ethical character to the
speech. But this cannot be right: for not only is the fact alleged quite
insufficient in itself to support the conclusion supposed to be deduced
from it, but also the two kinds of characters designated are in fact
different; and it could not be argued from the mere description of the
characters of I 8, that the r^dos iv r<$ Xeyocrt had been sufficiently discussed and determined; which is in fact doneso far as it is done
at allin 11 1, and not in I 8.
Other proposed alterations and suggested difficulties in the rest of
the chapter may be left for discussion to their place in the Commentary:
the meaning and connexion of this part are in general perfectly intelligible, though omission, interpolation, and obscurity or error are alleged
against this and that phrase; and the order of the actual contents of
the work coincides essentially and in the main with that which is here
followed.
I have now to state the views of two recent critics and commentators
upon the whole passage, in its connexion with the order of the several
divisions of the entire work.
Spengel's views upon this subject are to be found in his tract iiber
die Rhetorik des Arist., in the Transactions of the Bav. Acad. 1851,
PHT0PIKH2 B i 8 i.
173
pp. 3237 ; a work which I have already had frequent occasion to refer
to. He had previously spoken of the order contemplated and adopted
by Aristotle, in the arrangement of the three main divisions of his
subject ; the analysis of the direct proofs, nia-reis, by logical argument,
and the two modes of indirect confirmation of the others, the iffy, and
the iradrj. The passages which he himself quotes in illustration of the
first order in which Aristotle proposes to take them, pp. 2527, shew
that the order is Trio-rets, fjdrj, rtadrj : nevertheless Spengel inverts the
two last, p. 30 et seq., omitting the actual treatment of the %9os, as a
subsidiary argument or mode of persuasion in 11 i, the true rjdos iv ra
\eyovTi ; and, as it seems to me, confounding that with a totally different set of characters, which are delineated as an appendix to the
naOr), and consequently after them in 11 1217. This I have already
pointed out, and explained the real application of the six characters of 11 1217 to the purposes of Rhetoric, in the Introduction
p. n o , foil, and at the commencement of c. 12 in the Commentary.
Spengel notices the inconclusive wa-re in the apodosis, c. 18. 1 (p. 34),
apparently assuming that the passage is corrupt, but throws no further
light upon the interpretation or means of correcting the section. Next
we have, p. 36 foil., an attempt to prove that TO Aora-d, in 5, is to be
understood of the treatment of the nd6os and jjtfoy contained severally
in c. 2II and 1217 of Bk. II, and that consequently from the words
OTTGK ra \017ra TrpoaBivres airohajuv rfjv e dpx^js npoBtmv we are to con-
clude that the order of treatment of the contents of the first two books
was as follows ; the ftSij, or iriorcts it; avroii TOV \6yov (as if the f/dos and
7va6os were not equally conveyed by the speech itself), occupying the first
book ; next, the four KOHOX TOTVOI, and the second part of the logical
irltrreis, II 1826; and thirdly, the ir&Oos and tfQos in the first seventeen
chapters of Bk. 11, which originally formed the conclusion of that book,
though now the order of the two parts is inverted.
Vahlen, in a paper in the Tra?isactions of the Vienna Acad. of
Sciences, Oct. 1861, pp. 59148, has gone at some length into the questions that arise out of this eighteenth chapter, where it is compared with
other passages in which Aristotle has indicated the order in which he
meant to treat the several divisions of his subject. Op. cit. 121132.
His principal object in writing, he says, p. 122, is to defend against
Brandis' criticisms Spengel's view that the original arrangement of
Aristotle in treating the subjects of the second book has been subsequently inverted in the order in which they now stand; Aristotle having
intended to complete the survey of the logical department of Rhetoric
before he entered upon the jjOr) and iraBtj. He is of opinion (p. 126) that
the analysis of the KOLVOI TOTTOI came next (in accordance with the original
plan) to the e'idrj of the first book; and consequently that there is a gap
at the opening of the second between the conclusion of the ei'8?; and the
commencement of the Ijdjj and naBt); and that as a further consequence,
the words in 2, en 8' e av jdiKovshiapiarm, are an interpolation of
some editor of Aristotle's work, who introduced them, after the KOIVOI
TUOI had been transferred to their present place, as a necessary recognition
of what had actually been done. His principal object is in fact to
establish what he conceives to be the true order of the several parts of
174
PHT0PIKH2 B 18 i.
the work; and in doing so he deals, as it seems to me, in the most

arbitrary manner with Aristotle's text. He assumes a Redactor, or
Editor, who has taken various liberties with the text of his author, and
has interpolated various passages, chiefly relating to the ijffr), to supply
what he conceived to be deficient after the order had been changed.
How or why the order was changed, neither he nor Spengel gives us any
indication; and the supposition of these repeated interpolations has little
or no foundation except his own hypothesis of the inseparable connexion
of the eZ8ri and KOIVOL TOTTOI : for my own part I cannot find in the passages
which he quotes in support of this opinion, or elsewhere in Aristotle's
Rhetoric, any statement of a necessary connexion between the two, such
as to make it imperative that the KOIVO\ TOTTOI should be treated immediately after the el'S^. The order of treatment which we find in the
received text appears to be sufficiently natural and regular to defend it
in default of the strongest evidence to the contraryagainst the suspicion
of dislocation and interpolation, though no doubt the order suggested by
Vahlen may be, considered in itself, more strictly logical and consecutive.
On the connexion of the clauses of the passage now under consideration
(c. 18 i), and how and why the long inappropriate parenthesis was
introduced herewhich are, after all, the things that most require explanationhe leaves us as much in the dark as his predecessor Spengel.
His interpretation of ra Xuiird (which Spengel seems to have misunderstood), and anything else that requires notice, may be left for the notes on
the passages to which they belong.
I have suggested in the Introduction, p. 250, the possibility of the
accidental omission of some words or sentences between c'lprjTm irporepov
and ware biatpio-nlvov, in order to supply some connexion between protasis
and apodosis, and give some significance to the conclusion; but without
any great confidence in the success of the attempt to solve the difficulty:
to which I am bound to add that it leaves unexplained the introduction
of the parenthesis, eortfitpovXevovrcu,which, however and whencesoever
it may have been introduced, is here most certainly out of place. And
I will now proceed to give a summary of the contents of the chapter, as
I understand them.
All speeches which have persuasion for their object are addressed to,
or look to, a decision of some kind. In the two more important branches
of Rhetoric, the deliberative and forensic, iv rots TTOKITIKOIS ay&o-iv, the
decision and the judge may be understood literally: in the third or
epideictic branch, the audience is in some sense also a judge, in his
capacity of critic, being called upon to decide or pass sentence on the
merits of the composition. Still it is only in the first two that the term
'judge' can be applied to the hearer in its absolute, or strict and proper
sense (anXas /c/nrijr). Then, as a second member of the protasis, comes
a clause which has the appearance of being a continuation or supplement
of something which has been losta reference, namely, to the treatment of
the Jjdos in 11 1, which might justify the conclusion that follows, that 'it
has now been determined in what way and by what means speeches may
be made to assume an ethical character'. Still the sentence and its
statements remain incomplete: for if, as it appears, Aristotle's intention
was to give an enumeration in detail of the main divisions of his Rhetoric
PHTOPIKHS B 18 i.
175
i(TTi (jrepl wv yap 'i(TfX6V Kal KeKpiKajaeu,

en 3e? \6yov), eari M, av re irpos era rts rw
in the order in which he had placed them, the omission of the important
department of the nadrj would be quite unaccountable, unless indeed
which I am myself inclined to believehe meant to include the wadr)
under the general head of IJ&KOI Xoyoi; which, as the treatment of the
ivaBrj belongs to Ethics, and the effects of the use of them by the speaker
are purely ethical, he was fairly entitled to do. At the same time, if this
be admitted, the first part of the protasis with the parenthesis appended
has no sufficient connexion with the conclusive wore : nor is it clear why
the 'political characters', which do not come under the rjdos proper,
should be especially singled out as one at least of its representatives :
though, if I am right in supposing something to be lost which stood
before this clause, it might very likely have contained something which
led to the mention of these characters, as one of the varieties of %8os
which impart an ethical colour to the speech.
However, let us suppose at least, as we fairly may, that Aristotle's
intention, however frustrated by corruption of his manuscript, was to tell
us what he had already done from the commencement of the second
book, and what he next proposed to do in the remainder of it. He has
hitherto been employed (in this book) upon the Ethical branches of the
art, by which the character of the speaker himself may be displayed in
a favourable light, and the emotions of the audience directed into a
channel favourable to the designs of the orator, 1.
"We now take a fresh start, and from a new protasis, which states that
the 41817, from which the statesman and public speaker, the pleader, and
the declaimer, may derive their premisses and proofs, have been analysed
under these three branches of Rhetoric, and also the materials, which may
serve for imparting an ethical colour (in two senses, as before) to the
speech, have been already despatched and determined, we arrive at the
conclusion that it is now time to enter upon the subject of the KOIVOL or
universal topicsthree in number as they are here classified, the possible
and impossible, the past and the future, and amplification or exaggeration
and depreciationwhich comes next in order; and is accordingly treated
in the following chapter. When this has been settled, we must endeavour to find something to say about enthymetnes in general, arguments
which may be applied to all the branches of Rhetoric alike, and examples,
the two great departments of rhetorical reasoning or proof, ' that by the
addition of what still remained to be done' (that is, by the completion of
the logical division of the subject, by the discussion of enthymemes and
examples, c. 20, the enthymeme including the yvd/irj, c. 21, the varieties
of enthymeme, demonstrative and refutative, c. 22, and specimens of
these, c. 23, fallacious enthymemes, c. 24, and the solution of them, c. 25,
with an appendix, c. 26), 'we may fulfil the engagement, the task, which
we proposed to ourselves at the outset of this work'.
I. i'a-ri. de, au re irpbs eva K.T.X.] Comp. I 3. 2. 3, of which most of the
statements of this parenthesis are a repetition, though in other words.
This may help to account for the introduction of it here, where the
176
PHT0PIKH2 B 18 I.
\6<ya) xpto/Jievo? irpoTpeirr] rj aTTOTpeTTy, oiou 01 vovoeTovvres 7roiouariv rj 7reidovTes (ovSev yap r)rrov KpiTtjs
6 els* ov yap del ireicrai, OI/TOS kcrnv ws a?rAws enreiu
ii), edv Te Trpos diuKpurfiriTOVVTa edv r e irpo<s
-LV \eyrj Tts, dfjioiws' TM yap Xoyco dvayKt]
Xpfjcrdai Kal dvaipeTv TavavTiay 7rpos d oocnrep d/u<pi<rpr\TOWTa TOU Aoyov iroieiTai.
cocravTMs oe Kai ev
TOTS eTnheiKTiKoi<i' wcnrep yap 7rpo$ KpiTrjv TOV decopov
6 \6yOS (TVvk<TTt\KtV'. oXlCS Be fAOVOS tCTTlU a7rAft)S Kplr>)s ev rote TTOAITIKOTS dydHcriv 6 Ta tyrovfxeva Kpivtav
r a Te ydp dn<pi<rfiriTOV}ieva tyreiTai 7rws e%ei, Kal
nrepl cov fiovAevovrai. irepl $e rwv Kara Tas TTOXIauthor is reviewing the progress of his work; the same train of reasoning
recurs to his mind, and he starts again with the same topic.
K/HTJJS o f] Comp. i n 12. 5.
lav re 71710s d/i^Kr^jjToCvra K.TX] ' Whether you are arguing against a
real antagonist (in a court of law, or the public assembly), or merely
against some thesis or theory (where there is no antagonist of flesh
and blood to oppose you); for the speech must be used as an instrument, and the opposite (theory or arguments) refuted, against which
as though it were an imaginary antagonistyou are directing your
words'. In.either case, if you want to persuade or convince any one, as
an antagonist real or imaginary, you are looking for a decision or judgment in some sense or other: in the case of the defence of the thesis,
the opposing argument or theory, which has to be overcome, seems to
stand in the place of the antagonist in a contest of real life, who must be
convinced if you are to succeed. When you want to convince anyone,
you make him your judge.
acrnep yap irpbs Kpirijv K.TX.] ' the composition of the speech is
directed (submitted) to the spectator (for his judgment or decision) as
though he were a judge'. The spectator, the person who comes to listen
to a declamation, like a spectator at a show, for amusement or criticism,
stands to the panegyric, or declamatory show-speech, as a critic, in the
same position as the judge to the parties whose case he has to decide.
I 3. 2, dvdyKij TOV aKpoarfiv rj dcapbv dvai fj KpvrrjV...o 8e nfpl rrjs Svi/a/iewr
(jcpivctv) 6 deapos.
' But as a general rule it is only the person who decides the points in
question in political (public, including judicial) contests that is absolutely (strictly and properly) to be called a judge; for the inquiry is
directed in the one to the points in dispute (between the two parties in
the case) to see how the truth really stands, in the other to the subject of
deliberation'.
PHTOPIKHS B 18 24.
177
y]6wv iv roh o-v/j.fiovXevTiKo'LS eiprjTai Trporepov,1

CMopKr/mevov av eirj 7rws r e Kal $ia T'LVIAV TOI)?
2 Xoyovs ridiicovs TroiriTeov. eirel $e Trepl 'IKCMTTOV p.ev
yevos TCOV Xoytov eTepov r\v TO TCAOS, irepl dirdvToov
o avTwv elXrjjj.fj.evai Zoâi Kal 7rpoTa(reis elcrlv e tov
7ri'crTets (pepovfri Kal <rvn0ov\evovT6<s Kal ewiKai dp.<pi(r(3tiTOiivT6s, en S' e'^ wv tfducovs
vheêTai 7roieiv, nal 7repi TOVTWV $IW3 piuTai, Xonrov r\}xiv dieXdeTv Trepl TCOV KOIVCOV iracn
yap dvaytcaTov TO Trepl TOV hvvarov Kal
Trpoa-xpfjadai iv TO?S \6yois, Kal TOIVS fxev ws
4 TOI/S he <Js yeyove 7reipd(r6ai heiKvvvai. en $e 7repl
jj-eyedovs KOLVOV dirdvToiv CCTTI TCOV \6ycow
xpwvrai
yap TrdvTes TW fxeiovv Kal avêiv Kal (TVfxfiovXevov1
irporepov.
cjtxre Bekker
(ed. 1831).
iv rots <rvnl3ov\evTLKois] The division of the work, from I 4. 7 to I 8

inclusive, in which is contained the analysis of the various etdr), or special topics, which belong to the deliberative branch of Rhetoric. The
punctuation irpoTepov, MOTC, in Bekker's [later] editions and in Spengel's,
making aJorcnoirjTcov the apodosis to the preceding clause only, has
been already mentioned in the introductory note to this chapter [p. 172,
middle], and the arguments against it stated.
f'ipr)Tai irpoTepov] I c. 8, see especially 7: the notes on 6, and Introd.
p. 182, and p. n o .
2. crepov yv ro TXOS] ijv, 'is as was said', sc. I 3. I, seq.
Sagai Kal irpoTa<rus] Sogat are the popular prevailing opinions which
form the only materials of Rhetoric, TrpoTatrets the premisses of his enthymemes, which the professor of the art constructs out of them. Vahlen,
Trans. Vienna Acad. u. s., p. 128, remarks that this combination of Soa
and TrpoTcuris occurs nowhere else except here and in II 1.1, and is an
additional mark of the connexion between that passage and this chapter.
o-vfiflov'Xevovrf j] in I 4. 7, to I 8; cVtSeixcu/xei'oi in I 9; and a/j(i<r/3ijTovvTts, I 1015.
en Sc
Stapio-Tai] Vahlen (u. s., p. 126), in conformity with his
somewhat arbitrary hypothesis, has, as already mentioned, condemned
this clause as an interpolation, partly on account of the absence of the
nadr] where they required special mention. I have already observed
that in default of any other evidence of the spuriousness of the passage
we may very well suppose that Ar. intended to include them in the JJ&KOI \6yoi [see p. 175 initi\.
3, 4. The four KOIVOX TOTTOI, common to all three branches of Rhetoric. These are illustrated in c. 19.
jrpo<rxpri<rQai\ to employ them in addition
AR. II.
to the T8IJ.
12
178
PHT0PIKH2 B i 8 j .
Tes 1 Kal e7raipovvT<s tj \fseyovTes Kal Karriyopovvres T\

5 a.Tro\oyov}xevoi. TOVTWV $e hiopLcrQevruiv Trepl r e evdv- p. 1393.
fxrjfxaTcov KOivt} Treipadco/meu enreiv, e'l TI eÔfxev, Kal
Trepl irapaêiyp.d.Twv, OTTCOS TO. Xonrd Trpo&OevTes airoTrju e dpxfj<s TTpoQecriv ecrri de TWV KOIVWV TO
vêiv oiiceioTcnov TO?S eTridetKTiKoh, wcrTrep
'
TO c"e yeyovos TO?S BiKaviKoTs (Trepl TOVTCOV yap r\
, TO Se BvvaTov Kal ecroixevov TO?S arv
7rpwTOV pep ovv Trepl hvvarov Kal dhvvaTOv Xiyw- CJIAP.XIX.
J
+ IJ a-jrorpiwovTesBeA&er(ed.i8$i)A.
Kal TpoTpiirovres Kal dirorpiroi'Tes Q, Y b , Z b .
fj d7roTptirovres is rejected by Bekker and Spengel [ed. 1867], and is certainly suspicious. The latter had already remarked, Trans. Bav. Acad.
[1851], p. 33, note 2, that Ar. never uses avfipovXevav for irporpiiveiv, as he
has done in this case if the text be genuine. Therefore, either trvpfiovXevovTes
must be changed into TrporpeirovTes (printed by an oversight a7rorpeVoiTes)
or better, rj dirorpijrovres erased: the course which he has adopted in his
recent edition. Of course Arist. employs <rvfi.fiov\eveiv as a general term
includingt>oth persuasion and dissuasion; as in II 22.5 and 8 (referred
to by Spengel).
5.
Next to the KOIVOI TOTTOI will follow the illustration of the KOIVOX
iria-reis, c. 20. I, the universal instruments of all persuasion, Example

(c. 20), Enthymeme (and its varieties) cc. 21 24, with an appendix on
Refutation, c. 25 (and a shorter one of a miscellaneous character, c. 26).
TO XOITTO] interpreted by Spengel, u. s., of the %8r) and rrddrj, which he
supposes to have been treated last in this book; and by Vahlen (rightly,
as I think) of the logical part of the treatise, the enthymemes and examples, 'which still remain' (after the analysis of the KOIVOI TOTTOL) to be
handled, u. s., p. 129). Brandis, ap. Schneidewin's Philologus iv 1, p. 7,
note 7, unnecessarily limits TO Xowra to the contents of cc. 2326.
Schrader, "doctrinam de elocutione et dispositione hoc verbo innuit,
quam tertio libro tradit." Vahlen, u. s., pp. 128 and 132, contemptuously
rejects this interpretation.
aiTobaijiiv rrjv Trpodeaiv] O n airohibovai, see note on I i. 7. Here, to
fulfil a purpose or intention, lit. to render it back, or pay it as a due,
to the original undertaking.
aa-jrep c'lprjTat] I 9. 40. Comp. Rhet. ad Alex. 6 (7). 2. TO 8<r
yeyovbs
TO'IS diKaviKols,
I 9. 4 0 ; I 3 . 4 a n d 8.
trv/i|3otiXfVTIKOXS, I 3. 2, and 8.
r o 8e
dvvaTov...rots
TO ycyovos
Trep\ TOVTOIV] 'Fact', as an abstract conception, and
therefore neut. sing., is represented in its particulars or detailsthe particular, individual, instances, from which the notion is generalisedin
the plural TOVTCOV.
CHAP. XIX.
In the following chapter the KOWO\ TOTTOI are treated under the three
heads, (1) of the possible and impossible, (2) fact, past and future, and (3)
179
p.ev. av (it) TovvavTiov n hvvarov i) elvai t) yevetrdai,

Kctl TO evavriov Boêiev av eivai dwarov, oTov el ciuVOLTOV avdpwirov vyiacrdfivai, KCXI vocrr\(Tai' r\ yap avrrj
2 SvvajuusTwu evavTLWv, fj evavria.
Kal el TO 6/moiov
amplification and depreciation ; for the topic of degree, of greater and less,
or the comparative estimate of goods, which might be distinguished from
the third, seems here, and c. 18. 3, 4, to be included in it. In the latter
of the two passages, this third TOTTOS1 is called simply mp\ peyeBovs, and
here the two parts are included under the one phrase irepX /j.eyd'Kiov Kal
fiiKpav, which is equivalent to avt-eiv <a\ IKIOUV, and denotes one general
topic. I wish so far to correct what I have said in the Introd. p. 129.
They may also be divided into four, or six heads.
Of the importance of the first in deliberative oratory Cicero says, de
Orat. II 82. 336, Sed quid fieri possit aut non possit quidque etiam sit
necesse aut non sit, in titraqtie re maxime quaerendum. Inciditur enim
omnis iam deliberatio, si intelligitur non posse fieri ant si necessitas
affertiir; et qui id docnit non videntibtts aliis, is plurimum vidit.
Quintilian has some observations on the possible, and necessary, as
partes snade?idi, Inst. Or. Ill 8. 2226.
On Svvafiis, dwarov and the opposite, and their various senses, there is
a chapter in Metaph. A 12.
1. 'The possibility of anything, in respect of being or coming to be,
implies the possibility of the contrary: as, for example, if it be possible
for a man to be cured, it is possible for him also to fall ill: for there is
the same power, faculty, potentiality, i.e. possibility of affecting a subject,
in the two contraries, in so far as they are contrary one to another'.
rj ivavria] i. e. solely in respect of their being contraries, and excluding
all other considerations. As in the instance given, a man is equally
liable to be affected by health and sickness in so far as they are contraries, without regard to any properties or qualities in himself, which
may render him more or less liable to one or the other. This is
Schrader's explanation.
Tavavrla] 'contraries' is one of the four varieties of dvriKeifieva, 'opposites'. These are (1) avricpao-is, 'contradiction' (or contradictories), Kara(paais and dwofpaa-is, affirmation and negation, affirmative and negative,
to be and not to be, yes and no. (2) ra cvavrla, 'contraries' which are
defined as the extreme opposites under the same genusgood and bad,
black and white, long and short, quick and slow, &c.which cannot
reside in the same subject together. (3) Relative opposites, ra jvpos TI, as
double and half, master and servant, father and son, &c. And (4)
opposites of state and privation, eis and crreprja-is, the possession of
something and the privation, absence, want, of it; as sight and blindness.
(This last term, however, privation, is properly applied only to cases in
which the opposite, possession or state, is natural to the possessor; in
which consequently that which wants it, is deprived defrauded, as it
wereof something to which it has a natural claim: blindness can only
be called a o-Tep-qTis when the individual affected by it belongs to a class
122
180
PHT0PIKH2 B 19 2.
of animals which have the faculty of vision : rvjAbv \iyoptv ov TO /117

otyw, aXKa TO fir) %xov re ^4>VKev
*x.iiv-
Categ. c. io, 1 2 ^ 2 6 seq.)
On
'opposites', see Categ. cc. 10, 11. Top. B 2, 109 b 1723. Ib. c. 8, 113 b
15 seq. Ib. E 6. Metaph. A io, 1018 a 20 seq. (where two more kinds
are added, unnecessarily, see Bonitz ad loc.) and I 4, 1055 a 38, where
the usual four are alone mentioned. Cicero, Topic. XI4749, enumerates
and illustrates the same four. Of ivavrla he says, Haec, quae ex eodem
genere contraria sitnt appellantur adversa. Contrariwn with him is
Aristotle's avriKeifievov, the genus, or general notion of opposite.
The argument from contraries, as employed here, is this : the possibility of anything being or becoming the one, implies that of being or
becoming the other; only not both at once: a virtuous man may always
become (has the capacity, bvvajxis, of becoming) vicious, and the converse;
but ivepyelq, when the one state is actually present, and realised in the
subject, it excludes the other. This reciprocal possibility in contraries
arises from the fact that the two contraries belong to the same genus or
class. Black and white both fall under the genus colour, of which they
are the extremes; they pass from one into the other by insensible gradations of infinite variety, from which we may infer that any surface that
admits of colour at all, will admit either of them indifferently apart, but
not together; two different colours cannot be shewn on the same surface
and at the same time.
2. Again, likeness or resemblance, TO OJUHOV, between two things
suggests or implies a common possibility; if one thing can be done, the
probability is that anything else like it can be done equally.
This is a variety of the argument from analogy. We have a tendency,
which appears to be natural and instinctive, to infer from any manifest or
apparent resemblance between two objects, that is, from certain properties
or attributes which they are seen or known to possess in common, the
-common possession of other properties and attributes, which are not
otherwise known to belong to them, whereby we are induced to refer
them to the same class. So here, the likeness of two things in certain
respects, is thought to imply something different, which is also common
to both; a common capacity or possibility. The argument being here
applied solely to the use of Rhetoric, the things in question are rather
actions and their consequences than facts and objects: if it has been
found possible to effect something, to gain some political advantage for
instance, in several previous cases, we argue that in the similar, parallel
case which is under consideration, the like possibility may be expected.
This however, though the popular view of the argument from analogy,
and the ordinary mode of applying it, is not, strictly speaking, the right
application of the term. Analogy, TO avakoyov, is arithmetical or geometrical proportion, and represents a similarity, not between objects
themselves, but between the relations of them. See Sir W. Hamilton,.
Led. on Logic, Vol. II. p. 165174, Lect. x x x n , and on this point, p. 170.
Whately {Rhet. p. 74, c. 1), "Analogy, being a resemblance of ratios, that
should strictly be called an argument from analogy, in which the two
cases (viz. the one from which, and the one to which we argue) are not
themselves alike, but stand in a similar relation to something else; or, in
other words, that the common genus that they both fall under, consists
PHT0PIKH2 B 19 35.
3 ZvVClTOV,
Kal
TO
O/J.OLOV. KCtl el
TO
181
Xaê7r>Tf}0V
4 ovvaTov, Kal TO paov. teal el TO cr7rovda'iov Kal naXov

'yevecrQai ZwaTov, ical OA&JS hvvctTOV yevecdar
%a\e5 ircoTepov >ydp KaXijv oWiav r\ o'lKiav elvai. Kal ov
in a relation." This he illustrates by two examples of analogical reasoning. One of them is, the inferences that may be drawn as to mental
qualities and the changes they undergo, from similar changes (i.e. relations) in the physical constitutionthough of course there can be no
direct resemblance between them. Hamilton's illustration of analogy
proper is derived directly from a numerical proportion: that of analogy
in its popular usage is, "This disease corresponds in many symptoms
with those we have observed in typhus fevers; it will therefore correspond
in all, that is, it is a typhus fever," p. 171.
Butler's Analogy of Natural and-Revealed Religion to the constitution
and co2irse of Nature may be regarded as an analogy of relations between
them and God the author of both, in the proper sense of the word, though
in his Introduction he twice appears to identify analogy with mere likeness or similarity.
Lastly, the logical description of Analogy is to be found in Thomson's
Laws of Thought, 121,' Syllogism of Analogy', p. 250, seq. The author's
definition is, p. 252, "the same attributes may be assigned to distinct but
similar things, provided they can be shewn to accompany the points ot
resemblance in the things, and not the points of difference.'' Or 'when
the resemblance is undoubted, and does not depend on one or two
external features'), "when one thing resembles another in known particulars, it will resemble it also in the unknown."
On the different kinds of d/xot'onj? and o/xoia, consult Metaph. A 11,
1018 a 15, with Bonitz' note, and Ib. I 3, 1054 b 3, seq., also Top. A 17, on
its use as a dialectical topic.
3. ' Thirdly, if the harder of two things (as any undertaking, effort,
enterprise, such as the carrying out of any political measure) is possible,
then also the easier'. This is by the rule, 07tme mains continet in se
minusj or the argumentum a fortiori.
4. 'And (again a fortiori) the possibility of making or doing any
thing well, necessarily carries with it the possibility of the making or
doing of it in general' (8\a>s, the general or abstract conception of making
or doing; in any way, well or ill): 'for to be a.good house is a harder thing
than to be a mere house', of any kind. The same may be said of a. fine
picture, statue, literary composition, or any work of art; anything in
short in which apery, merit, or excellence, TO o-irovdaiov, can be shewn.
paov yap OTIOVV Tvoirjo-ai rj KaXSs iroirjo-cu, Top. Z I, 139 b 8 (cited by
Schrader).
Compare with this Metaph. A 12, 1019 a 23 (on the various
acceptations of bvvarov), ert r] TOV icaXas TOVT i-rriTeXeiu (SiW/ni?) ^ Kara

TrpoaipfCTlW iviore yap TOVS \IOVOV av nopevdevras rj eiirovras, p-r) KaXas f) fir/
cos irpoz'CkovTo, ov cpafitv bvvaudai \iyuv r) |3a8iXy; which may possibly
have suggested the introduction of the topic here.

5. ' The possibility of the beginning of anything implies also that
of the end: for nothing impossible comes into being or begins to do so,
i82
PHT0PIKH2 B 19 5, 6.
jj dp%rj hvvaTai yevecrdai, KCCI TO TCAOS* ov$ev yap

ylyvtTai oi)3' a'p%eTai ylyveo~dai TU,V ctdvvctTwv, oiov
TO arvfXfxeTpov Tt\v SidjueTpov elvcu OVT av apâtTO
yiyvecrdai oi/re ylyveTai.
Kal ov TO TeAo?, Kal t]
airavTa yap e dp%fjs yiyveTai.
l
as for example the commensurability of the diameter (with the side of the
square) never either begins to, nor actually does, come into being. To
begin implies to end, says Tennyson, Two Voices [line 339]. In interpreting a rhetorical topic which is to guide men's practice, it is plain that we
must keep clear of metaphysics. The beginning and end here have
nothing to do with the finite and infinite. Nor is it meant that things
that can be begun necessarily admit of being finished: the Tower of
Babel, as well as other recorded instances of opera intermpta, shew that
this is not true. And though it may be true of the design or intention,
of any attempt, that it always looks forward to an end, immediate or
remote, still to the public speaker it is facility and expediency, rather
than the mere possibility, of the measure he is recommending, that is
likely to be of service in carrying his point. All that is really meant is,
that if you want to know whether the end of any course of action, plan,
scheme, or indeed of anythingîs possible, you must look to the begining: beginning implies end : if it can be begun, it can also be brought to
an end: nothing that is known to be impossible, like squaring the circle,
can ever have a beginning, or be brought into being. Schrader exemplifies it by, Miihridates coepit vinci, ergo et debellari potent. Proverbs
and passages on the importance of apxq are cited in the note on I 7. 11.
The incommensurability of the diameter with the side of the square,
or, which is the same thing, the impossibility of squaring the circle, is
Aristotle's stock illustration of the i?npossible: see examples in Bonitz ad
Metaph. A 2, 983 a 16, Euclid, Bk. x. Probl. ult. Trendelenburg, on
de Anima in 6. 1, p. 500, explains this: the diameter of a square is represented by the root of 2, which is irrational, and therefore incommensurable with the side. He also observes that Aristotle cannot refer to the
squaring of the circle; a question which was still in doubt in the time of
Archimedes could not be assumed by Aristotle as an example of impossibility. The illustration, which passed into a proverb, IK Sia/xeVpou avriKeicrBai, is confined to the side and diameter of the parallelogram. See
also Waitz on Anal. Pr. 41 a 26.
'And when the end is possible, so also is the beginning, because
everything takes its origin, is generated, from a beginning'. The end
implies the beginning : everything that comes into being or is produced
everything therefore with which the orator has to deal in his sphere of
practical lifehas a beginning. Since the beginning is implied in the
end, it is clear that if the end be attainable or possible, so likewise must
the beginning be.
6. 'And if it is possible for the latter, the posterior, the subsequent,
of two things, either in substance and essence, or generation, to be brought
into being, then also the prior, the antecedent; for instance, if a man
PHTOPIKHS B 19 6.
183
et TO bcTTepov Ttj ovcia r\ Trj yevecrei hvvaTov yevecrdai, KCCI TO 7rpoTepov, oiov el avZpa yevecrdai hvcan be generated, then a child ; for that (the child) is prior in generation
(every man must have been first a boy ; this is iv ycvia-u, in the order
of growth, in the succession of the natural series of generation or
propagation): and if a child, then a man ; because this (the child, ixdvr)
being made to agree with dpx1) instead of nals,) is a beginning or origin'.
This latter example is by the rule that every end necessarily implies
a beginning ; a child stands in the relation to mature man of beginning
to end: and therefore every grown man must have passed through the
period of childhood ; which is also reducible to the other rule, that the
possibility of subsequent implies that of antecedent, of which the preceding example is an illustration.
TO vortpov, TO 7rp6rtpov] The two principal passages on the various
senses in which nporepov and vo-rcpov, before and after, earlier and
later, antecedent and subsequent, prior and posterior, can be applied,
are Categ. c. 12, in which five varieties are distinguished, and Met. A 11,
in which there are four. On the former passage Waitz says in his Comm.
p. 316, "non premendam esse divisionem quam nostro loco tradidit:
apparet enim non id agi in his ut ipsa rerutn natura exploretur et pervestigetur, sed ut quae usus ferat sermonis quotidiani distinguantur
alterum ab altero et explicentur.'
In the Metaphysics, the divisions are four. In the first, prior and
posterior refer us to a series and an order, established either by nature
or by the human will,.under which the rg yevecrei of the Rhetoric will
naturally fall. Of this there are five varieties, (1) Kara TOWOV, local (comp.
Phys. IV 11, 219 a 14, seq.); (2) Kara xPV0V> chronological, the order of
time (Phys. IV 14, 223 a 4, seq.); (3) KOTO. KIVYJO-IV ; (4) Kara bivap.iv, capacity
or power; capacity a natural order, power either of nature or human
choice ; (5) Kara raîu.
In the second the order of knowledge is referred to: only in two different applications the meaning of the two terms is inverted: in the order
of growth the particular is prior to the universal, sense and observation
to generalisation or induction: in the order of dignity, the universal is
prior to the particular, as the whole to the individual parts. The one is
irpoTepov npos *J/ASy, the other, nporcpov CLTTX&S.
T h e third, nporepa Xeyerai ra TS>V npoTtpav iradrj, the priority of the at-
tributes of the prior (in some series), as straightness is prior to smoothness, because the line is prior to the plane or surfacethe notion is
that the plane is generatedfrom, and so, in growth and origin, posterior to
the line; and therefore the attribute of the latter is prior to that of the
formeris not, as Bonitz remarks, coordinate with the three others,
"pendet enim a reliquis, quae suapte natura sunt priora, tamquam
accidens a subiecto suo qui inhaeret."
The fourth, the ovtria of the Rhetoric, priority and posteriority in
essence or substance, ra Kara (pvo-iv <ai ovo-iav; priority in this sense
belongs to things 6'cra hdtx( f """ "' aXXav: that is, things which are
independent of others, whereas the others (the posterior) are dependent
on them: the latter imply the former, the former do not necessarily imply
the latter. Such is the relation of one and two; two always imply one,
i $4
varov, Kal -ira'tda (7rpoTepov yap itceivo yiyverai),

7 el ircuba, Kal av^pa (dpxrj yap eKe'iut]). Kall cop epcos fj
e7ri6vfxia (pvarei icrriw ov$eh yap TWI/ ahvvaTwv e'pa
8 ovd' eVi^y/xe? a>s eirl TO 7ro\v.
Kal cov e7ri(rTfJiuai elcri
one does not necessarily imply two. Similarly the first category, ovaia
substance, is prior to all the others, which express only properties and
attributes of the first. This priority is ova-la, which is evidently inserted
merely because it was suggested by the opposite ylvea-is, and being utterly
useless in Rhetoric, from which all nice distinctions and subtleties of all
kinds are alien, is accordingly passed over in the illustration. This division of ovcria also includes priority of dvvafiis and ivepyeia, where again
the order of growth and of dignity inverts the relation of the two: hvvajus,
the capacity, being of course prior in growth or time, the ivipyeia, actus,
the realization, or active and perfect condition, being superior in the
order of dignity and importance, or in conception, \6ya.
Another division is that of ova-ia substance, \6y<p conception, and
Xpovco. Metaph. e 8, 1049 b 11, seq.
See further on this subject, Bonitz ad Met. A n , Comm. p. 249252;
Waitz ad Organ, p. 14 a 26 (Categ. c. 12). Trendelenburg, Categorienlehre
p. 38, seq., 72, seq.
7. 'And things (in general) are possible which are the objects of
love or desire'these irddr), being instinctive and natural, show that the
objects of them are attainable, because "nature does nothing in vain",
a constantly recurring principle in our author: ov6ev yip, oSs cpa/icv,
fiaTJ]V 1) <pva-is Troiet, P o l . I 2, 1 2 5 3 a 9, fi ovv fj (pvais
firjdev ]O\Tt areXej-.
7roiei pjre fiirrju, Ib. c. 8, 1256 b 20, et passim : if the desires could not
be satisfied, nature would not have implanted them in us'for no one
either loves or desires anything impossible for the most part' : the
qualification as in\ TO no\v, is added to allow for the exceptional cases
of insane or infatuated passion as that of Pasiphae (referred to by
Victorius) or of Pygmalion ; or a child's desire to have a star to play
with.
8. 'And all sciences and arts imply the possibility of the existence
or generation of their objects'. The sciences, as natural history, moral
and political philosophy, chemistry, geology, &c, have facts or phenomena, actually existing, which are to be observed and generalized,
for their objects ; the practical arts produce, or bring into being, their
objects, as painting, sculpture, and the fine arts in general, also the
useful and mechanical arts. This I think is the distinction here intended.
Moral and political philosophy come under the head of sciences which
have facts, moral and social, for the objects of their study ; though they
belong to the practical department of knowledge, and have action for
their end and object. eVicrrTJ/it; and its object TO imaT-qTov, are relative
terms, the one necessarily implying the other, Categ. c. 10, 11 b 27, Kal r\
iiriaTtjiij) 8e raj imarriTw cos ra irpos n avriKeiTat, ; a n d often elsewhere.
This may help to establish the necessary connexion which is assumed

between knowledge, science, art, and their objects. But I do not suppose
that Ar. here means to assert the existence of a natural law which connects them; but only that, as a matter of fact, men never do choose as an
PHTOPIKHS B 19 9,10.
KCII
re%vai,
Svvarov
ravra
185
Kal elvcu Kal yevecrdai.
9 Kat bcrtav rj dp-)(fl TV* yevecrews ev TOVTOLS icrrlu a

r]p.et<s avwytcdcraiiAev av r) Trelcraiimev ravra 3' ecrrlv
10 wv Kpelrrovs i) Kvpioi rj <pi\oi. Kal <Lv ra \xepn
cvvara, Kal ro 6\ov, Kal wv ro o\ov dvvarov, Kal ra
p.epri cos 7rl ro 7ro\v- el yap Trpoa-^LO-fxa Kal Ke(pa\k
Kal xirciov hvvarai yevecrdai, Kal viroSruxara Zvvarov
object of study in science, or try their hand at producing by art, anything
which they know in the one case to have no real existence, and in the
other to be incapable of being produced.
9. 'And again, anything (that we wish to do, or to effect, in the
ordinary course of life, as in our business or profession) of which the
origin of generation lies in things which we would (if we wished it,
opt. with av,) influence or control either by force or persuasion (meaning
by iv TOVTOIS men in particular, as appears from what follows; but not
excluding things, as circumstances, conditions and such like, the command
of which might enable us to effect our purpose); such are (persons whom
we can influence or control) those whose superiors we are in strength
and power, or those who are under our authority, or our friends'. The
two first classes illustrate the avayKaîv the force of superior strength, and
of authority natural (as that of a parent or master) or legal (the authority
of the magistrate) ; the third, friends, who are amenable to persuasion,
exemplify the irel-deiv.
10. 'If the parts are possible, so also is the whole: and if the
whole of anything, so are the parts, as a general rule : for if slit in front,
toe-piece, and upper-leather, are capable of being made, then also shoes
can be made; and if shoes, then front-slit, toe-piece, and upper-leather'.
A whole implies its parts, and the parts a whole. Whole and part
are relative terms : neither of them can stand alone, nor has any
meaning except in reference to its correlative : hence of course the
possibility of the one necessarily implies the possibility of the other.
SXov Xe'yerai ov jirjBiv mrztrri jiepos i% a>v \eyerai
o\ov
(frvaei, Metaph.
A 26, 1023 b 26. Ib. c. 2, 1013 b 22, the whole is said to be TO ri fy elvai,
the Xoyos or formal cause of a thing, that which makes the combination
of parts what it was to be, viz. a whole, and therefore of course inseparable from it.
The qualification, as iiii TO TTOKV, of the universal possibility of the
divisibility of a whole into its parts, seems to be introduced to meet the
objection which might arise from the existence or conception of aSim'pera,
such as a geometrical point, or an atom, or the human soul, or Parmenides' 'one', ovXov, jiovvoyeves,...*!/ wex [Ritter and Preller, Hist.
Phil. % 145]Of the parts of a shoe here mentioned we have absolutely no information either in ancient or modern authorities. The explanation of the
word irpoo-xLcriJia, given by Photius, who refers to Aristophanes for an example of it, (I8os viroSijixaTos ; and by Hesychius, the same words with the
186
yevecrdcu, Kai el virolnjJiaTa, Kal wpoayiaixa

11 <pa\k
KCCI yirwv.
yevecrdai,
oiov
KCCI el TO yevos
KUI Ke~
b'Aov TWV hvvaTwv P. 1392 6.
Kai TO eldos, Kal el TO e/Sos, Kai TO <yevo<s,
el irXolov yevecrdai
12 Tpiript], Kal 7r\oTov.
^vvaTov,
Kal Tpit]pr], Kal el
Kal el OaTepov TCOV 7rpos a
addition of iax^^vov i< rod tuirpooBiv, and Polluxwill not apply here
at all events, nor to Ar. Probl. XXX 8, vwodijiia in Trpoo-^'V/iaroy, where
it is plainly, as here, a part of the shoe, and not the wholethough it
is probable enough that Aristophanes in the passage referred to by Photius may have meant it by virobrjiiaros efSos: and Keq>a\is and ^tTw are
passed over in total silence: they appear in none of the dictionaries of
antiquity that I am acquainted with, nor are the ordinary Lexicons more
instructive. We are left therefore to conjecture as to the precise meaning
of them, but I think the consideration of the words themselves will help
us at least to understand what they represent.
7rp6crxuT[ia is 'a slit in front' of the shoe, with which Aristotle's use
of the word in the Problem above quoted exactly agrees. This I think
is fully confirmed by a drawing of a vwodrjfia in Becker's Charicles, p.
448 (Transl. ed. 2), which is a facsimile of a modern half-boot laced up
in front. The irpovxivpa. is the slit down the front, which when the shoe
is worn has to be laced up. This seems pretty certain ; but of Ke<pa\ls
I can only conjecture from the name, that it is a head-piece, or cap,
covering the toes, and distinguishing this kind of shoe from those in
which the toes were left uncovered, which seems to have been the usual
fashion, xyravguided- by a very common use of the word, which
extends it from a covering of the body to any covering whatsoever (in
Kost and Palm's Lexicon, s. v. No. 2, Vol. II. p. 2466)I have supposed
to mean the upper leather, the object of which, just like that of the
tunic or coat, is to protect or cover the upper part of the foot, and
keep out the cold. Stephens' Lexicon referring to this passage translates
Ke<fiaXis tegumentum
capitis!
Xen. Cyrop. Vlll 2. 5, (where crxiCa>v a n vas are used in connexion with shoes,) and Schneider's note, throw
no additional light upon the exact meaning of these three words.
11. 'The possibility of a genus or class implies that of any subordinate species, and conversely; if a vessel can be built, then triremes;
and if triremes, then a vessel'.
12. 'And if the one of two things that stand in a natural relation to
one another (i.e. two relative terms ; see above, 8 and 10) be possible,
then also the other; as double implies the possibility of half, and half of
double'. Categ. c. 10, 11 b 26, tnrkaa-iov Kai tffitcrv is one of the stock
examples of one kind of TO. wpos TI, the category of relation. Of these
relative opposites Cicero says, Top. XI 49, nam alia quoque stint contrariommgetiera, velut ea quae cum aliquo conferuntur: ut duplum, simphtm;
multa, paucaj longum, brevi; maius, minus. In de Invent. I 30.47, the
argument from these opposites is thus illustrated; In us rebus quae sub
eandem rationem cadunt hoc modo probabile consideratur: Nam si
Rhodiis turpe non est portorium locare, ne Hermacreonti quidem turpe
PHTOPIKHt B 19 13, 14.
187
v, Kal daTepov, oioi> el diirXdcriov, Kal rj/nia-u,

13 Kai el rj/jLicrv, Kal SnrXdcriov.
Kal el dvev Te~xyt)<z Kal
Trapa<TKevY\% dvvaTOv yevecrdai, fidWov did Te^vris Kal
7ri/j.e\eia^ Svvarov '66ev Kal 'Ayddcovi etp^rai
Kai fxt]v Ta fxeu <ye xpt] Te^vt] irpdcrcreiv, Ta Be
r\\xiv dvayKt] Kai
14 Kall el
TOIS
%eipo<ri Kal
TJTTOO-I
p. 87.
Kal
est conducere. To which Quintilian (referring to this place of Cicero, and

quoting the example) addsde suo apparently, for it is not in the original
Quoddiscerekonestum,etdocere[com-p- Cicero, Orator, 145]. Victorius.
Ar. Rhet. II 23. 3, Tvoielu and jrdoêu' TI KeXtvirai and ireTroirjKivai. el yap
fir]8' vjxiu alcrxpov TO TrcoXetv, ovb' ijfj.iv TO tiveioSai.
13. 'And if a thing can be done without art or preparation (or

perhaps rather, apparatus) it is a fortiori possible to do by aid of art' (81a
with gen. ' through a channel', medium, and hence, ' by means of'), and
pains (study, attention)'. This is not the exact converse of the topic of 3,
which implied the possibility of a thing being done at all from that of its
being well done; here the use of art, study and attention, and any other
artificial means by which we assist nature, is alleged as facilitating the
construction of anything, or of carrying out any purpose or design that
we may have in view: the possibility of doing anything without art
implies a fortiori the possibility of doing it with additional help and
contrivance.
In the two verses of Agathon (from an uncertain play) which follow,
the old reading was Kai fifjv Ta piv ye rrj TVXJl wpdo-creiv, Ta Se rjjuv avdyKT]
Ka\ TexvV vpotrytyveTCit, but Porson's transposition of TVXT) and riyyr) (ad
Med. 1090), which is undoubtedly right, has been adopted by Bekker,

ed. 3, and Spengel, as it was by Elmsley, ad Med. 1062. This alteration brings them into the required correspondence with Aristotle's text.
" If", says Aristotle, "anything can be effected without art",which is
interpreted as it were by Agathon's "accident, and necessity or overpowering force". But ri} TCXVTI may be very well retained; and the
translation will be: "And moreover it falls to our lot to do (effect) some
things by art, others by force and mere accident". npoa-ylyveaBai occurs
three times in this sense, efficior, accido, in Sophocles, Oed. Col. 1200,
Electr. 761, Trach. 1163 (Ellendt's lex.).
14. 'And anything that is possible for inferiors in capacity (and
personal qualities in general), and power or position, and intelligence, is
a fortiori possible to the opposites (those who are superior) in all these'.
Schrader quotes in illustration: Ergo haec (ferre laborem, contemnere
vulnus,) veteranus miles facere poterit, dodus vir sapiensque non poterit t
Me vero melius ac non fiaullo quidem (Cic. Tusc. 11 17). Galgacus, ap.
Tacit. Agric. 31, Brigantes femina du-ce exurere coloniam, expugnare
castra, ac nisi felicitas in socordiam vertisset, exit ere iugum potuere: nos
integri et indomiti primo statim congressu non ostendemus quos sibi
Caledonia viros seposuerit?
188
Kal TO?S ivavTiois fxaWov, wcnrep KCCI 'ItroKpa.Tri's e(br] heivov elvai el 6 fxev Evdvvos efxadev, auVos
15 e fj SvvrjcreTai evpeiv. 7repl de ctdwctTou $f]\ov on
ex TWV ivavTLwu TOI<S e\pr}}xevois VTrap-êi.
16
el Be yeyovev rj fir) yeyovev, e'/c Twvde (TKeirreov.
ZVVCLTOV,
'As indeed Isocrates said, that it was monstrous to suppose that what
an Euthynus could learn he himself should be unable to discover'. Of
Euthynus Buhle says, "de Euth. nihil constat, praeterquam quod ex
hoc loco colligi potest, fuisse eum stupidi et sterilis ingenii hominem."
After all it is only Isocrates1 estimate of him that we have to judge by:
in comparison with himself most of Isocrates' contemporaries were to him
contemptible. The name of Euthynus does not occur in Isocrates' extant
orations. A doubtful speech, irpbs Eudwouv (Ready wit), is printed with
his works. This Euthynous was dve^nbs NIK/OU, 9. Of course he cannot
be the person here meant. Euthynus, a wrestler, is mentioned by Demosthenes, c. Mid. 71, who might possibly be the man for whom Isocrates
expressed his contempt.
[The latter part of the speech irpbs 'Evdivow, Isocr. Or. 21, has not
been preserved, and Aristotle may possibly be here referring to something
in the part that is now missing. Perhaps the only difficulty about this supposition is the loose sense in which 'la-oKparrjs Zcpt) must then be interpreted,
as the speech in question (whether written, as I believe, by Isocrates, or
not) was not delivered by him. In another speech, Isocr. npos KoXXt/iaX<>v, Or. 18 15, we have the words : davjiaât 8' el avrbv fxh Uavbv yvwvai
vopifei, OTi...e/xe S' OVK av oieTCU TOVT' il-tvpeiv, ('iirep ij3ovho)ir]V ^/tvSrj \eyeiv,
on K.T.\., and Aristotle may, after all, be quoting niemoriter, as is his

wont, from the latter passage; in this case we should have to suppose
that Ei'tfwos is a slip of memory for KaWipaxos. See Blass, die Attische
Beredsamkeit, II 203 ; and comp. Jebb's Attic Orators, 11 259. S.]
15. 'On the impossible, it is plain that the orator may be supplied
with topics from the opposites of those which have been already mentioned (on the possible)'.
ra-dpxei] 'are already there', ready at hand, for use; as a stock, on
which he may draw for his materials.
16. The second of the KOWO\ iwot is the topic of fact, 'whether such
and such a thing has been done or not': this is most useful in the forensic
branch, in courts of law. It is the o-i-acri? o-ToâortK^, status coniecturalis
the first of the legal issues, and the first question that arises in a case.
To this is appended, 2325, fact future; or rather, future probability,
whether so and so is likely to happen or not. This of course belongs
almost to the deliberative orator, who has to advise upon a future course
of policy. The following topics suggest arguments to prove the probability
f some act having been committed which the pleader wishes to establish
against his antagonist.
' First of all we may infer that if anything that is naturally less likely
to have occurred has happened (been done), then {a fortiori) anything (of
the same kind) that is more usual may probably have happened also'.
189
Trpwrov jnev yap, el TO Y]TTOV ylyvecrOai 7T6^)I/KOS

17 yeyovev, yey ovds av e'lt] KCU TO fiaWov*
KCLI el TO
vcrTepov e'ltodos yiyveardai yeyovev, K.a.1 TO irpoTepov
yeyovev, oiov el eVtAeAjjcrrat, KCCI ejuiade iroTe TOVTO.
18 Kai el ehvvctTO KCLI i/3ou\eTO, Treirpayêv TraVres yap,
brav dwd/uLevoi (iov\t]6wcri, TrpaTTOvcriv' e/Jnrodwv yap
19 ovcev. eTt el e'/3ouAero Kal jutiêv TCOV t^c
The probability the degree of which is estimated by the frequency of
recurrence, being in the latter case greater. Introd. p. 160.
17. 'And if (in a relation of prior and posterior, antecedent and
consequent) the usual consequent (of the antecedent) has happened, then
(we may argue that) the antecedent also has happened; as, for instance,
the having forgotten something implies a previous learning, some time or
other, of the same'. Learning is the necessary antecedent of forgetting;
without the first the second is impossible. As this is a necessary connexion, the argument from it is a TfKixrjpiov, a certain indication: it is not
however convertible, as a necessary sequence; for it does not follow that,
because a man can't forget without having first learnt, he also can't learn
without afterwards forgetting: the converse is only probable, not necessary.
18. When power is combined with the will to do a thing, we may
argue that the thing has been done: this is human nature: every one,
having the power to do what he wishes, does it; because there is no impediment, nothing to hinder him from the gratification of his desire.
Polit. VIII (v) 10, 1312 <5 3, a Be (3OV\OVTCU bwajinvoi 7rpa.Trov(Ti navres,
19. ' Further, it may be argued that an act has been done, if the
supposed perpetrator had the wish or desire to do it, and no external
circumstances stood in his way; or if he had the power of doing it (some
injury to another), and at the same time was angry; or if he had at the
same time a desire and the power of satisfying it', (the desire here is
especially lust, and the act done, adultery); ' for men for the most part are
wont to gratify their impulses when they have the power of doing so; the
bad from want of self-control, and the good because their desires are
good or well-directed (because they desire what is good, and nothing
else).
ifiovXero, eiredv/xei] " Voluit praevia deliberatione, concupivit ex
affectu." Schrader. If Schrader meant by voluit that fiovhricns is willing and not wishing, and that it implies deliberation and purpose, as he
certainly seems to say, this is a mistake. I will endeavour to determine
the proper signification of PovXtjcris and its distinction from imdvfiia.
First, however, it must be admitted that neither of the two terms, /3oi5\ea6cu and iwidvfielv, is confined exclusively to its own proper and primary sense: these like other terms of psychology are used with a latitude and indefiniteness which belong to a very early stage of inquiry
into the constitution of our inner man. For instance, iwiSvpla, which
properly denotes the three bodily appetites, is often extended to the
190
Kcti el ihvvaro Kal wpyiêro, KCCI el idvvaro Kal eVeQvfxei' ws yap eirl TO 7TO\V, WU opeyovTai, av G~VVU>VTOLI, Kal 7roiov(Tiv, ol fxev (pavXoi di a.Kpao'iav, ol c)'
20 eTneiKeh OTI TWV eirieiKcov eiridvuovo-iv.
Kal el
whole class of desires, mental as well as bodily; and thus becomes identified or confounded with fioiiXrjcns.
From a comparison of three passages of our author in which we
find notices of PoiiXrja-is, we draw the inference that it means wish
and not will. Will implies purpose; and we are distinctly told in
Eth. Nic. Ill 4, m i b 20 seq. that /3oiiXij<ns is distinguished from
7rpoai'peo-ir, deliberate moral purpose, by the absence of this. Further
the exercise of irpoalpeais is confined to things which are in our
power to do or avoid; the wish sometimes is directed to what is
impossible or unattainable, to immortality for instance or happiness.
It is also directed to the end, whereas 7rpoalpecns looks rather to the means
of attaining the end.
rfXos earl TG>V irpaKT&v o hi avro fiovXofieda, Eth.
Nic. I i, 1094 a 19. Further it is always directed to what is good, real or

supposed, Rhet. I 10. 8. Psychologically considered, it belongs to the
family of the operas, the instinctive impulses which prompt to action,
acting unconsciously and without deliberation. These are three, de
Anima II. 3, 414 b 2, ope|is fiiv yap enidvfiia (appetite) cai dvjios (passion,
especially anger), KCU PovXrjcris (wish, the mental desire of good). (POVXTJO-L:,
Rhet. u. s., is distinguished from emBvîa, by this intellectual character
of discrimination between good and bad; irnBvjxla being a mere animal appetite, aXoyor ope|is). Comp. de Anima I. 5,411 28, en 82 TO iividvixeiv nal
fiovXtcrdat Kal SXas al ope'gus, where the two are again distinguished. And
in Rhet. u. s. the three opegcis are divided into Xoyia-Tioj and aXoyoi, the
former character belonging to {iovXrjcns, the latter (irrational) to 6V/J.6S
and inidviiia. imdv/ila therefore is bodily appetite, and iiredufiei here, as
a cause of crime, though not excluding hunger and thirst, refers more
particularly to lust. In the second case, iKiOvjioua-iv rav iirieiKav, 'desire' is extended to intellectual impulses, which can distinguish good
from bad; and is thus confounded with fiovXr)<ns, which denotes wishing,
but not willing. It is to be observed that the discrimination which is
exercised by /3OVXT]<TIS in the choice of good, is purely impulsive or
instinctive, otherwise it would not be one of the opeêis: it employs no
calculation or deliberation like the Trpoalpeo-is preparatory to decision,
and does not always stimulate to action; as when it is directed to impossibilities.
(I ehvvaro KCU apyifcro] Because anger, as long as it lasts, is always
accompanied by the desire of vengeance, which, if a man have the power,
he will be sure to wreak on the object of his anger, 11 2. 2. After each of
these three clauses supply wlnpayfv, from 18, as the apodosis.
20. Kal fi e/xcXXc y'tyveaBai, KU\ noieiv] What seems to be meant is
this; anything which was on the point of being done, we may assume to
have actually happened ; or whatever a man was on the point of doing,
that he actually did. Expressed at full length this would run, KO\ e'l TI
yiyverrdai, (eyevero)' Kal (ft Tis (jxiXXe) noiclv, (wolrjo-fv, or
PHT0PIKH2 B 19 21.
191
[yiyvecrdai, Kal~\ iroieiv eixos yap rov neWovra KCII

21 7roii]crcu. Kai el yeyovev ocra 7re(pvKei 7rpo ine'ivov r\
eveica tKelvov, olov el tja-Tpayjye, Kai efipovrncrev, Kai
ei eireipaa-e, Kai eirpaêv.
Kai el ova vcrrepov 7rep
yiyvevOai rj ov evexa yiyverai yeyovev, Kai TO
(again from 18). In any other Greek author one would hardly perhaps
venture upon thus supplying an ellipse; but I see no other way of extracting at once sense and Greek from the text. There appears to be no
variation in the MSS. Bekker, ed. 3, and Spengel, read Ka\ el >eAA<r
[yiyvta-dat, nal] iroieiv. In 19, the latter also puts ifiovkero KO\, and (after
(KoiXvev) Kai d Swarbv (so Ac for iBvvaro), in brackets, as interpolations.
The last three words are also omitted by MS Zb. It seems to me that,
in the two latter cases at least, the text is perfectly intelligible and
defensible. The only reason alleged for omitting the five words in
brackets in 19 is that, if we retain them, el cfiovXero...iicaXvev is a mere
repetition of the preceding ft iBvvaro <al eftovXero. That this is not the
case, Victorius has pointed out in his. explanation. The former of the
two topics, 18, combines power and wish: both together are certain to
produce the act. The latter statement is different; the wish alone is
sufficient to produce the actprovided there are no external impediments in the way: in that case the mere wish, the internal impulse, is
not sufficient.
' For it is natural or likelythis is all we want for our argument
that one who is waiting to do something, or on the point of doing it,
would also actually carry out his intention, and do it: the probability
is that it has been done '.
21. In this connexion of antecedent and consequent, if it is usual,
but not necessary, it is a sign, o-rjfiriov, and uncertain ; when necessary,
it is a TeK/ir/piov. Anal. Pr. II 27, sub init. aTj/ulov (here including both
kinds) Se /SouXerat (would be, if it could: aspires to be) elvai irpoTatns
dwoSetKTiK^ avayKaia rj ev&oos' ov yap OVTOS'4<TTIVrj ov yevofievov npoTepov,
rj varepov yeyove TO wpayjxa, TOVTO (rripuov tern TOV yeyovival r) eivai.
'And again, if what had been previously (vre^HJKei, 'had always been',
the regular accompaniment) the natural antecedent of so and so, (of the
assumed event, or imputed act,) or means to a certain end, has happened,
(then the ordinary consequent has happened, or the end aimed at been
attained) ; for instance, we infer from the occurrence of thunder that
there has been lightning ; and from the attempt, the execution of a
crime'. By irtipaa-e, says Victorius, is meantprincipally, not exclusively
stuprum, 'seduction', the attempt on a woman's chastity : on this use
of the verb veipav see Ruhnken ad Tim. s.v. p. 210. Timaeus explains
it, iretpafav 81a X6ya>v iraiSa fj yvvaina.
Plat. Phaedr. 227 C, Arist. Plut.
150, and Lat. tentare.

'And (the converse) if what had been the ordinary natural consequent of something else, or the end of certain means (the aim and
object of certain actions) has happened, then we infer that the ante-
192
irporepov Kal TO TOUTOV eveKct yeyovev, oiov el efipovTrjcre, Kal ijo-Tpa\fsev, Kal el ewpaê, Kal eweipaa-ev.
ecrn be TOVTLOV airavrwv ra fxev e avayKris ra 0 o>s
22 eirl TO TTO\V OVTWS e%ovTa. irepl Ze TOV /j.rj yey ovevai
(hctvepov OTi e'fc TWV evavTicov TOIS eiprifxevoi^.
23
Kal 7repl TOV e<ro\ievov e/c TUJV avTwu $tj\ow TO P. 1393.
cedent in the one case has occurred, the means to the end in the
other have been employed, as We infer lightning from thunder, and the
attempt from the execution of an act or crime. And of all these cases,
in some the connexion is of necessity, in the rest only for the most part'.
The natural antecedent and consequent, as the uniform order of nature,
is the necessary connexion : of the uncertain issues of human agency, TO.
<?<' fjiuv, actions which depend upon ourselves and our own will, nothing
more than probability can be predicated : dyawtfTov ovv urepl TOIOVTCOV KOI
eK Toiovrcav \4yovras Tra)(v\as Kal rvira TaKr/Ses ivSeiicvvotfai, Kal irpl rav
as inl TO woXii Kal K TOIOVTCOV Xeyovras roiaOra Kal o-vfiirepalveardai : the
conclusions of moral and spcial sciences can but amount to probability

(Eth. Nic. 1 1, 1094 b 19, et passint). Consequently, the connexion of
motives and actions, and of actions with one another, follows only a
general rule, and this rule can never be applied with absolute certainty.
22. Materials for arguments on the topic of 'not happening-1, the
disproof of a statement of fact, may plainly be derived from the opposites
of the preceding, which shew how it may be established. The verb is
omitted: supply, as in 15, vn-apxei. This omission of the verb probably
accounts for the omission of on in MSS Q, Y", Z \
23. Arguments for the establishment of the probability of future
events and consequences clearly may be derived from the same source:
for where the power and the wish to do anything are united, the thing
will be done; as likewise when desire, anger, and calculation, are
accompanied by the power of gratifying the two first, and carrying out the
third. Spengel has again, without manuscript authority, bracketed Kal Xoyio-iia as an interpolation; doubtless because it is not mentioned in 18,19,
of which this is a summary. The objection has been already anticipated
and answered by Victorius. Calculation or reasoning is implied, he
thinks, in the desires of good men, which are always directed to what
is good. I cannot think however that this is what Ar. means here by
Ao-yioyto'r. And if we insist upon the strict interpretation of e7riviiovcni>,
as excluding any operation of the intellect, still it is hard to deny the
author the opportunity of supplying in 23 what he has omitted to
notice in 19. The statement is perfectly true: 'calculation plus the
power' of carrying it out will produce future consequences : neither
does it contradict anything that has been said before, but merely
supplements it. After all even Aristotle is a man, and liable to human
infirmities ; and certainly his ordinary style of writing is not of that
character which would lead us to expect rigorous exactness: on the
contrary it is hasty and careless in a degree far beyond the measure of
.ordinary writing. Upon the whole, I see no reason whatsoever for
PHT0PIKH2 B 19 2325.
193
r e yap ev Zwdfiei Kal (3ov\}](rei ov earrai, Kal TO. ev

e7n6vfjLia Kal opyfj Kal XoyLcr/nw jj.6Ta Buvdfxews
cia TavTa
OVTO..
Kal el ev op/my TOV iroielv fj
r ok yap eirl TO WOXV yiyveTat judWov TO.

24 XovTa if T<X fxr] fxeWovra.
Kal el -rrpoyeyovev ocra
irporepov ire<p\jKei yiyvecrdai, oiov el (rvvvefpel, eiKOS
25 vcrai.
Kal el TO eveKa TOVTOV yeyovev,
eiKos yevea6a,i oiov el dejueAios, Kal oiKia.
Kal
TOVTO
p.
excluding xai Xoyt<r/iw from the text : the MSS warrant it, and Bekker
retains it.
dia ravra K.T.X.J The meaning of this obscure sentence seems to be
this:It follows from what has just been stated, Sta ravrathe statement,
that is, that the co-existence of impulse (desire and passion) with power,
is a sure source or spring of actionthat the intention which these
impulses suggest,whether it be immediately, in the very impulse (or,
starting-point, first start) to action, or (future) when a man is anxiously
waiting for his opportunity (iv /j,e\X>jo-ei),is most likely to be carried out;
and then an additional reason is assigned for the probability of the
future event when it is on the point of taking place, either immediately,
or not long hence, that things that are impending (acts or events) are
for the most part much more likely to happen than those that are not
impending. With iv dp/ij comp. Soph. Phil. 566, ovra xaff opjirjv bpaxnv.
I subjoin Victorius' explanation. " Vi etiam horum locorum, si operam
dabat ut gereret, ac iam iamque earn rem aggrediebatur (hoc enim
valere hie arbitror iv opjiri), aut denique si post facere aliquando statuerat
(quod significari arbitror hoc verbo /ieXX^Vf t) dici potest id futurum :
duos autem, si ita legatur, manifesto locos complectitur: quorum prior
rei tentandae peragendaeque propinquior erat: alter tantum facere in
animo habebat."
24. 'And if the things that had previously been in the habit of
preceding, in a natural order of succession, have already happened, (then
we may expect the usual consequent); if the clouds gather, we may
expect rain'.
arvwifaiv, transitive, Arist. Av. 1502. Here impersonal, according
to the analogy of verbs which express states of weather or atmospheric
phenomena, vet., vlcpei, ifipovTr/cre, TJ<rrpa\l/tv, supra 21, eVctcrf, Thuc. V. 52.
The impersonal use of these verbs is explained by the original expression, and subsequent omission of a subject, 6 6eos or Zevs (the God
of the sky). In their ignorance of the natural causes of these and similar
phenomena, they attributed them to divine interposition [Shilleto on
Thuc. I 51. 2, Iwfo-KOT-aff].
25. 'And if anything which would serve as means to a particular
end (act or event) has happened, then we may infer that the end or
object which these imply is likely to be brought about; as a foundation
implies a future house'.
AR. II.
13
194
26
PHTOPIKHS B 19 2 6 , 27.
irepl he /ueyedovs
Kal fxiKpoTtjTO'S TWV 7rpa<yfxarwv
Kai fxei<ovos TS Kal IXCLTTOVO'S Kal CAOJS p.eya\(x>v KCCI

jJUKpvov e'/c TCOV Trpoeipr]fxevwv rijjuv ecTTi (pavepov
Tai
yap
dyadwv
ev TOIS (rv/dfiouXevTiKoh
eiptj-
irep'i TC /ueyedovs
Kal Trtpl rod fj.ei.ôvo's aVAws Kal eAaTTOVOs.
WCTT eirel Kad' etcaarTdv TU>V Xoyoov T O TrpoKeifievov

TeAos dyaOov
i(TTiv,
blov TO crvfMpepov Km TO KaXov
Kal TO diKaiov, (pavepov [OTI hi eKelvcov Xt]7TTeov

27 avpiicreis Tracriv.
TO he 7rapa TauTct TI
26. The last of the three KOIVOI TOTTOI is that of amplification and
depreciation, of exalting and magnifying or disparaging and vilifying anything, according as we desire to set it in a favourable or unfavourable
light. Its usual name is avîv K<U fietovv, II 18. 4 ; 26. I; III 19. 3. Comp.
Introd. p. 276, on 11 26, and the note.
Though this is a K<HV6S TOWOS, and
therefore can be used in the three branches of Rhetoric, it is most

especially applicable to the em&eiKTiKov yevos, and finds there its most
natural and appropriate sphere; I 9. 40.
'The subject of {itepi) the arguments or inferences that may be drawn
as to the value of things, absolute or comparative; of greatness and
littleness of things in themselves, or relatively to one another; or in
general of things great and small; is clear from what has been already
said'. They have been treated of under the head of the deliberative
branch of Rhetoric, in I 6, on things good in themselves, and I 7, on the
degrees, or comparative value of them.
an-Xfflf] simpliciter (Victorius), seems to be more applicable to fieyedot
than to the relative fidôv and eXcm-ov. As it is applied here to the latter,
it must mean that the degree, or relative value, is the only thing which is
taken into the account of them in that chapter.
' And therefore, since in each of the three kinds of speeches (I 3. 5)
the end or object proposed is some form of good, that is to say, either the
expedient, or the fair and right, or the just, it is plain that these must be
the channels by which they are all (all three kinds of speakers) supplied
with the materials of their amplifications'.
oiw] 'that is to say', nenipe, scilicet, not 'for instance'; defining or
explaining, not exemplifying; occurs perpetually in Aristotle's writings.
Waitz has some examples on Categ. c. 4, 1 b 18; comp. note on 4 b 23;
and Bonitz on Metaph. A 4, 985 b 6. [For some instances, see infra, note
on III 1. 4.]
27. ' But to carry our inquiries beyond this into the subject of
magnitude and excess or superiority absolutely and in themselves is mere
idle talk (trifling with words): for for use, or practical purposes (the
needs or business of life), particular things are far more important (authoritative, carry greater weight with them, are more convincing) than
universals'. What is said here of particulars being more useful than
universals for practice, or for the practitioner in any art, and therefore
PHTOPIKHX B 19 27 ; 20 I.
195
a7rAws Kal uTrejOo^jjs icevokoyeiv iarrlw KV~

yap e'cTTt 7rpos rr\v xpeiav TWV KadoXov ra
Kad' eKacrra TWV 7rpay/ndTwv.
Trepi jjL6v ovv ZWCLTOV Kal dZvvdrov, Kal irorepov
yeyovev i] ov yeyovev Kal earTai rj OVK eo~Tcti, en de
i fxeyedovi Kal /JUKpoTriTos TWV 7rpayfxd.TCDV elTCCVTO.' \oi7TOV
$6 7Tpi
TWV KOIVWV 7TL(TTeWV CHAP. XX.
airaaiv enreiv, eirei Trep eipr)Tai irepi TWV wiwv.

for the rhetorician, is illustrated by Metaph. A I, 981 a 12, wpos fxh ovv TO
irpaTTeiv e/nreipia T<=X"/ ovfiew SoKfl diatpepciv, aXka Kal paWov imTvyyJivovras opmfiev TOVS ifnrelpovs rav avev rfjs ffiircipias \6yov côvrav. a'inov
o OTL rj p.ev fX7Ttpta TWV Ka& ettatTTOv (TTL yvco(Tist tf de T4^VTJ TOIV Ka36\ov3 at
8 npa^fis Ka\ at yeveaus Tratrai irep\ TO Kad' tKaaTov d<Ttv' ov yap avdpamuv
vyiaei 6 laTpeva>v...a\\a KaXklav rj 'S.aKparqv. I n Rhet. I 2. I I , where at
first sight this might seem to be contradicted, the author is speaking of

Rhetoric as an art, which deals with universals, if it be a true art and not
a mere empirical practice: here as a practice, and as employed by a
practitioner.
KcvoXoye'iv] is found in the same sense applied to the mere variety or
idle talk, without meaning, of the Platonic ideas, in Metaph. A 9,991 b 20,
and the repetition of the same passage, M 5, 1079 b 26.
CHAP. XX.
Having now finished the treatment of the special modes of rhetorical
proof, the Ahr\, %8os, iraQos and KOIVOI roiroi, we have next to speak of the
universal.
Hitherto the objects of our investigation and analysis have been of
a special character, included under particular sciences, chiefly moral and
political, and also, under the three branches of Rhetoric, the topics severally
appropriate to each : the ?j#oy and irados, the secondary arguments, by
which a favourable impression of the speaker's character is conveyed to
the audience, and they themselves brought into the state of feeling which
his purpose requires, are likewise confined to Rhetoric : as are also the
KOIVO\ TOTZOIcommon to all the three branches, though even these are not
equally applicable to all, and may therefore in a sense be included under
the term "81a (so Schrader).We now proceed to what remains to be
done before we bring the logical and intellectual division of Rhetoric to
its conclusionto give an account of the two universal methods common
to all reasoning of every kind, compared with which all the rest may be
called ffiia, viz. deduction, demonstration, syllogism, and induction; or,
as they appear in Rhetoric, in the imperfect forms of enthymeme (inference) and example; which are in fact the only two methods by which
we can arrive at truth and knowledge, on 8' ov fiovov o 8ia\eKTiico\ Kal
airoheiKTiKol o-vXkoyio-jiol bia TO>V wponprijiivav yivovjai ( T ^ a r a i ' (the figures
of syllogism), dXKa Kal 01 prjropiKoi, Kal dn'kas r/rtcrovc maris Kal naff
132
196
PHTOPIKHS B 20 13.
<5' at KOival TTicrTeis huo TW yevei, TrapaZeiyixa Kai

ev6vnr)jxa' t] yap yvwfxri /nepos evuv/JLtj/nciTO^ CCTTIV.
2 TrpwTov jxev ovv irepi 7rapaheiyfxaTO<s Xeycopiev bfxoiov
yap eiraywyri TO Trapaheiyfxa, r\ 2' eiraywyr] dp~)(Y\.
7rapaSeiyjuaTwv o eior] Ovo' ev jxev yap e<TTi
7rapaZeiyfj.aTO's e*$os TO Xeyeiv irpayixaTa irpoyeyevt}fxeva, ev 8e TO avrov iroielv.
TOVTOV h' ev fxev irapa3 fioXrj ev de Xoyoi, olov 01 K'urunreioi Kai AI(3VKOI. etrrt
oTTOiavovv p.i6o8ov, vvv av elrj \eKreov.
airavra yap iriarevofiev 1/ 8ia <riA-
Xoyicr/ioO rj eg eTraynyrjs. Aristotle supposed that inductive reasoning

could be reduced to a syllogistic form [Grote's Aristotle I 268]. Anal.
Pr. II 23, 68 b 9.
iirrep fiavdavopev fj iirayayjj rj dnoSclgei.
Anal. Post. I
18, 81 a 40. This explanation will reconcile the apparent contradiction

of including the KOIVOI TOTTOI under ibia ; it is only as contrasted with the
still more universal induction and demonstration that they can be so called.
' These common (universal) modes of persuasion, or rhetorical proof,
are generically two (two in kind as we say; two species in one genus),
example and enthymeme; for yvdjirj is a part of enthymeme'. This last
remark is meant to correct the ordinary treatment of the yvmfir) as a
distinct species of argument, apart from the enthymeme, of which in
reality it is a mere variety. This is actually done in the Rhet. ad Al.
c. 7 (8). 2 and c. 11 (12). The yvdfirj and its logical character are described in the next chapter, 2.
2. ' First of all then let us speak of example; for example is like
induction, and induction is a beginning or origin'. 8ij\ov 8r) on r)pXv TO,
Tzpa>Tu inayayyrj yvu>pieiv avaynalov'
Ka\ yap a'laSrjcris ovra TO KaSuXov ifxT70iei*
Anal. Post. 11 19, 100 b 3, and the whole chapter. Induction is a beginning, because from and by it, originally from objects of sense, we
collect all our primary {vpara) and universal first principles, the highest
dpxal, from which all our syllogisms must ultimately be deduced. It
seems that this is assigned as a reason for beginning with napdSeiyfia,
which is a variety of induction, rather than with ivdv/irnjia, the rhetorical
offshoot of dn-o8ei|is, demonstration or deduction. On KapaSuyna, or
example in general, see Introd. p. 105, seq.
' Of examples there are two kinds : one of them is to relate past facts,
the other to invent them for oneself. Of the latter again, one kind is
comparison or illustration ; the other Aoyot, fables, like Aesop's and the
Libyan'; (and the fables of Phaedrus, La Fontaine, and Gay). The illustration, 'those of Aesop and the Libyan', is confined to only one of the
two kinds of Xdyoi, fables proper, in which animals, plants, or even
inanimate objects are endowed with speech and reason: the other includes fictions, tales, stories: analogous cases, fictitious, and made for
the occasion, or more usually derived from the writings of poets, especially epic and tragic, philosophers, historians, or any authors of credit.
See further on these terms and divisions, Introd. pp. 2546, and the
197
oe TO juei/ Trpd.yp.aTa Xeyew TOiovZe n, wcrwep e'l Tt? Aeyoi 'on Sel TTJOOS (BcHTiXia 7rapacrKevdê(r6ai Kal fxrj eav
Alyv7rT0V êipwaraa'Qar Kal yap Aapeios ov irporepovp. 1393*.
r] Trplv A'iyv7TT0v eAa/3ev,\a(3u)v he hief3rj, Kal wdXtv
^ s ov 7rpoTepov eireyeipno-e irplv e\a(5ev, Aafiuiv
wore Koti OI)TOS e'ai/
A OVK eTTLrpeTrriov irapaôXr) Be r a TLwKpaTiKci, olov
references there given: and on Xoyoi, 'fables', p. 255, note. On the
Fable, see some excellent remarks in Miiller, H. G. L. c. XI 14, 15 ; and
G. C. Lewis, in Phil. Mus. I 280, " On the fables of Babrius." He begins
with this definition:"A fable may be defined to be an analogical
narrative, intended to convey some moral lesson, in which irrational
animals or objects are introduced as speaking."
3- tan hi TO fitv Ttpiyjiara \eyeiv] For 7rapaSeiy/ia of the older
editions, I accept with Bekker, ed. 3, Spengel's alteration wpdyiiara \iyeiv.
It is suggested by MS Ac 7rapa8eiyfiara \eyeiv, and supported by 8, TO Sia
rav npayjiaTcov; see in Trans. Bav. Acad, Munich 1851, p. 49.
' The historical example (TO Xeyeiv vpay/xaTa Trpoyeyevrj/ieva) is of this
kind: as if, for instance (a deliberative speaker) were to say, We must arm
against the King' (the Great King, the King of Persia, as usual without
the article), 'and not allow him to subdue Egypt: for in fact Darius did
not cross (the Aegean to attack us) until he had secured (got possession
of) Egypt, but as soon as he had done that, he did cross; and Xerxes
again did not make his attempt upon us until he had seized it, but crossed
as soon as he was master of it: and therefore (the inference from the two
examples or historical parallels) this King also is likely to cross if he is
allowed to seize it, so that we must not permit it'. The case here given
in illustration is probably an imaginary one, TIS X/yoi; and this seems
to be Victorius's opinion. But it is barely possible that the recovery of
Egypt by Ochus, 6 [lerovofiaa-dels 'Apraêpgqs (Diod.), about 350 B.C.,
Clint. Fast. Hell. II, p. 316 and note W, may have attracted the attention of
the Athenian assembly, and this argument have been used by one of the
speakers on the question. Max Schmidt, in his tract On the date of the
Rhetoric, makes use of this passage as helping to fix it, pp. 1921.
Artaxerxes'expedition to Egypt was undertaken in 351 B.C., and continued
through the next year. Both the rival sovereigns, Nectanebus, the reigning king, and Artaxerxes, sent ambassadors to the Greek states for aid,
and the subject excited general interest at Athens, as well as in the rest
of Greece. It was at this time that Aristotle, who was then employed on
his Rhetoric, introduced this illustration, which was suggested by what
was actually going on at the time.
4. jrapaôXiy is juxtaposition, setting one thing by the side of another
for the purpose of comparison and illustration; taking analogous or
parallel cases ; it is the argument from analogy, av TIS 8vvr)T<u o/xotov opSc,
7. A good instance of Tvapaôkq in this sense occurs, Pol. 115,1264 b 4,
where Plato is said to derive a napaôKij, or analogy, e TWV 6rip[a,v
198
PHT0PIKH2 B 20 4.
ei TIS Xeyoi on ov Set k\r]p(t}Tov<z apxeiv O/JLOIOV yap p. 89

w(nrep av ei TI<S Toil's ddXtirds icXripoiri fxri o\ av hvvoovd<ywvlêo~6ai dW 01 av Xa^wanv, f) TWV 7rAa>ov Tiva del Kvfiepvdv KArjpwcreiev, o>5 Seov TOV
(i.e. dogs), to prove that the pursuits and occupations of men and women
should be the same.
' Of Trapafiokri1 the Socratic practice or method is an example; as for
instance if one were to say, that the magistrates ought not to be chosen by
lot: for this is analogous to the case of choosing for the athletes (who were
to enter the lists) not those who are fitted for the combat, but those upon
whom the lot falls ; or to choosing the steersman out of a crew of sailors
on the principle that it was the man who won the toss, and not the man
of knowledge and skill (the man who knows his business), that ought to
be chosen'.
This very same analogy is ascribed to Socrates by the accuser
at his trial, as one of those which he was in the habit of using,
1
Xen. Memor. I 2.9. And the same mode of inference, from the analogy
of the mechanical and other arts, was transmitted by Socrates to Plato,
and through him to his pupil Aristotle, in whose writings it constantly
appears in illustration of many of his moral and social and political
theories. It is to this practice of Socrates that Critias refers, when he
and Charicles, during the tyranny of the Thirty, summoned him before
them, and forbade him to continue his dialectical practice and intercourse with the young Athenians. Socrates inquires what sort of questions he is ordered to abstain from. Ib. I 2. 37, d fie KpiTias, aXKa. r&vhe
rot ae dnexeo~6ai, erf>rj, 8erjo~ei, <3 SuKpares, T&V (TKvreav ical TWV TCKTOVCOV KO\
TWV xakKeov' Kai yap OLfiai avrovs rjbrj KaraTerplcpOai SiaBpvWovnevovs viro
a-ov. Similarly Callicles, Plat. Gorg. 491 A, vrj rovs deovs, arexvas ye at!
(TKVTeas re na\ KVa<fie'as Kai p.ayeipovs Xeyav Kai larpovs ovSev navel, K.T.X.
Alcibiades, Sympos. 221 E, ovovs yap K.av6rjklovs Xe'yet Ka\ xaAas TIVCLS
1
ILapaj3o\ii is thus described by Eustath. ad II. A p. 176 (ap. Gaisford, X^yertu Si
Tapafiokfy Sto'ri TO:S \eyof/.6'vois TrapafidWei, rovre'aTi ffvyKphei Kai TrapaTtOrjert, irpa.y
fid Ti yvd'ptfjLov elu$b$ del ylveadai1 oirep otpetXn Tdvrojs yvojpifiiorepov eTva.i TOV di 0
irapel\riirrai. xaxta yttp TrapaôXijs TO ayvuitjTOv Kai d<rvvT)8es... SIOTI oi5e StSatr/caXi/ci;
q ToiaiTij earl TrapafjoXr/. On the definition, and various definitions of the 'parable,'
see Trench on the Parables, Ch. I Introd. The author in defining parable, and distinguishing it from fable, seems to confine himself too exclusively to the New Testament parables, when he says that the latter " is constructed to set forth a truth
spiritual and heavenly," whereas the fable "never lifts itself above the earth"; it
"inculcates maxims of prudential morality, industry, caution, foresight," all its
morality being of a worldly character, p. 1. And again, p. 9, "the parable differs
from the fable, moving as it does in a spiritual world, and never transgressing the
actual order of things natural." Aristotle, to whom Dr Trench does not refer, distinguishes parable in general from fable by this; that the former depicts human
relations (in which the N. T. parable coincides with it); it invents analogous cases,
which are not historical, but always such as might be so; always probable, and
corresponding with what actually occurs in real life. The fable is pure fiction, and
its essential characteristic is, that it invests beasts, birds, plants, and even things inanimate with the attributes of humanity.
PHT0PIKH2 B 20 5.
199
5 XaôvTa dXXa fxr] TOV kiruJTaixevov.

A.o'<yos Se, oios
6 ^.Tria-Lôpou Trepl fyaXdpihos Kai AICTCOTTOV Virep TOV
cr
2 T ^ O " / ^ O ^ O S jxev yap, eXo/neucou <TTpaavTOKpctTopa TWV 'Ifiepaiiov QaXapiv Kai
XOVTWV <pvXaKt]V Bihovai TOV ccofiaTOS, TaXXa
e'nrev avToTs Xoyov cos iinros KaTeiê Xeifxwva
?, eXdovTOs 8' iXdcpov Kai Sia(p6eipovTO$ Tt\v vofj.r]v fiovXo/uevos Tifjioopticrao-Oai TOV eXa(pov rjpaiTa TOU
Kai crKVTOTofiovs Kai ftvpcrobtij/as, Kai del 81a rav avrav ravra (âtVerat
Xeyeiv. And Hippias' sneer, Xen. Mem. iv 4, 5 and 6, (Socrates had

just compared more suo the teaching of justice to that of various trades,)
en yap av, d> ScaKpares, TCL avra itctiva \eyeis, a /y<a nâXat irore aov rjKovaa,
and Socrates' rejoinder repeated in Gorg. 490 E, 491 B. Compare Xen.

Mem. ill 1. 2 and 4, i n 7. 6. Plat. Rep. I 332 C, 333 C, 11 370 D, 374 c,
VIII 551 c (the pilot), Gorg. 447 D, and indeed throughout most of his
dialogues. His favourite trades for the purposes of this kind of illustration seem to have been that of the physician and cobbler (0 cr/curoro/uos).
anTTTsp av ei T(J] See note ad I 1.5, Vol. 1, p. 9.
5. The fable may be exemplified by that of Stesichorus about
Phalaris, and that of Aesop, in his defence of the demagogue.
For when the Himereans had elected Phalaris general with absolute
power, and were about to give him a body-guard, Stesichorus, after
having finished the rest of his argument (or discussion), told them a
fable, 'how a horse was the sole possessor of a meadow, when a stag
came, and desiring to take vengeance upon the stag for spoiling his pasture he asked the man (or a man TIJ/CJ, MS Ac, Spengel) if he could help
him to chastise the stag: the other assented, on the condition of his
accepting a bit and allowing himself to mount him with his javelins : so
when he had agreed and the other had mounted, instead of his revenge
he himself became a slave henceforth to the man : so likewise you, said
he, see to it that ye do not in your desire of vengeance upon your enemies share the fate of the horse: for the bit ye have alreadywhen ye
elected a general with absolute power, but if ye grant him a body-guard
and let him get on your backs, then henceforward ye will be Phalaris'
slaves.' The same fable is briefly told by Horace, Ep. 1. 10. 34, Cervus
equu)n pugna melior communibus herbis pellebat, &c.
This fable of Stesichorus, which Aristotle here assigns to the
age and case of Phalaris, is by Conon ' a writer in Julius Caesar's
time,' Bentley, Phalaris, Vol. 1. p. 106 (ed. Dyce [p. 101 ed. Wagner])
transferred to that of Gelon; and this latter version is regarded by
Bentley as the more probable; 'the circumstances of Gelon's history
seem to countenance Conon.' ' If we suppose then with the Arundel
marble that Stesichorus lived 01. LXXIII 3,' (this is highly improbable ; it places Stesichorus' floruit a full century too low, in the year
B.C. 486; which should indeed be 485, the year in which Gelon became master of Syracuse, Clinton, FastiHcllenici, sub anno,) 'it exactly
200
PHTOPIKHS B 20 5. &
ayOptoTrov el ^vvaiT av fxer CLVTOV Ko\ao~ai TOV e\a<pov, 6 I' ecprjarev, edv \dfin âXii/oV Kal avTOs dvafiij
eV avTOV e'x^v aKOVTia' irvvofxo\oyti<ravTO$ he Kai dvafiavTOS, dvTi TOV Ti/ui(optj(ra<rdaL avTOS e'ZovXevcrev 7/0*7
Tw dv8pw7rw. " OVTIO hi Kal v/mefc " e(pn " opaTe fxt)
(3ov\6fxevoi TOV? TToXe/iALOvs TifjL(apt]crao'6ai TCCUTO ira6rjTe TW 'ITTTTCO' TOV fj.ev yap âXivcv exeTe
^1
e\6fxevoi CTpaTriydv avTOKpaTopa' edv $e <pv\aKt\v
Kal dvafinvai idariTe, Zov\evat]Te tjh*ri <&a\d." AiO-&)7ros ê ev Sa'/xw (rvvriyopcov
agrees with the age of Gelon, and Conon's account of the story may
seem more credible than Aristotle's. And then all the argument that
would settle Phalaris' age from the time of Stesichorus, will vanish
into nQthing' (which is probably Bentley's principal reason for maintaining the paradox). Mure, Miiller and Clinton, F. H., sub anno 632,
place the date of Stesichorus' birth in B.C. 645, 643 or 632, and 632,
severally;' s,o that,' s.ays Miiller, H. G. L, ch. xiv 4, (as he lived over 80)
' h e might he a contemporary of the Agrigentine tyrant Phalaris,
against whos,e ambitious projects he is said by Aristotle to have warned
his fellow-citizens (he was a native of Himera) in an ingenious fable.'
Mure likewise, Yl- HI. p. 226, follows Aristotle. Clinton, F. H., places
Phalaris' accession to the throne of Agrigentum in B.C. 570. On Phalaris, see Mr Bunbury's article in Smith's Biographical Dictionary. Mr B.
says, it would appear from Aristotle, Rhet. 11 20, if there be no mistake
in the story there told, that he was at one time master of Himera as
well as Agrigentum.
On fl Svvair av, see Appendix at the end of this book, On av with the
optative after certain particles.
6. Ato-amos] On Aesop, see Miiller, Hist. Gr. Lit. c. xi 16.
'And Aesop in Samos as advocate for a demagogue on his trial for a
capital offence, said that a fox in crossing a river was driven into a cleft
or chasm (in the bank); being unable to get out, she suffered for a long
time, and many dog-ticks fastened upon her. And a hedgehog, in his
wanderings, when he saw her, took compassion upon her, and asked her,
if he should (was to., optative) remove the dog-ticks from her. But she would
not allow it. And upon his asking her why, she replied, because these
are already satiated with me and suck (draw) little blood ; but if you
remove these, others will come, hungry, and drain me of all the blood
that is left. But you too, men of Samos, he continued, this one will do
you no more harm, for he has got rich ; but if you put him to death,
others will come who are poor, and they will waste all your public property by their thefts.'
This fable is referred to also by Plutarch, An seni gerenda respublica
p. 790 C, i) y.iv yap Aioweioj akanyt; ibv iffwov OVK (la rots Kporavas
2or
Trepi Bavdrov k'(pr} dXtoireKa Ziafiaivovaav

7roTafxov diru>(rQr\va.i els (pctpayya, ov huvajmevriu S'
CKfifjvai woXuv ^povov KaKO7ra6eiv, Kal Kvvopa'io-Tas
7TO/\Aoi)s 'e'xecrdai avTfjs' eîvov he 7r\avwfjievov, w?
elBeu avTriv, Ka.TOiKTeipa.vTa iptuTav el d(pe\oi avTrjs
TOWS KvvopaicTTds' tr\v he OUK edv epo/neuov Be hid TL,
OTI OVTOI jJLev (pavai rjZt] /JLOV 7TAJJ'JO69 el<ri Kai oXiyov
e\K0vcriv alfxa' edv $e TOVTOVS d(peArjs, eTepoi e\66v~
Tes Treivtovres eK7riovvTa'i fxov TO KOITTOV cu/ma. " ctTap
Kai iifxas e<pri, " co dvfipes fEd/uLioi, OVTOI fiev ovZev
<ydp ecrTiv)' edv he TOVTOV
eTepoi YIÔVCTL irevrjTes, 0% v/uuv dva- P. 139+.
7 \wo-ovcri Ta Koivd icAeTTTOVTes." elcri $' ol Aoyoi hrjavTTjt a(pe\f1v fiovXoficvov, av yap TOVTOVS, ?<//, fietrrovs a7raXXd^gs erepoi
7rpo(rla(rL TreLvavres. Victorius.
ds (papayya] <papayg has two senses, 'a cliff', as Alcm. Fragm. 44

(Bergk), cvdov<riv opeav Kopvcpai re Kai (papayyts ', and 'a chasm' or 'cleft',
which it bears here. A fox in attempting to cross a rapid river has been
carried down by the torrent, and lodged in a rent or chasm of the
precipitous bank, and is there caught as it were in a trap, prevented
from getting out by the rapidity of the stream in front. This sense of
<f>dpay is illustrated by Thuc. II 76, its, where it is used of the pits or
clefts in the rocks into which the Athenians threw the bodies of the
Spartan ambassadors who had been betrayed into their hands and then
murdered, the Lacedaemonians having previously treated Athenian prisoners in the same manner, direicreivav 7rdvras Kal ft (papayyas ivej3a\ov.
Eur. Troad. 448, (papayyes v8an ^fi/âppo) pemxrai, whether they are narrow
clefts or ravines traversed by winter torrents. Arist. Equit. 248, of
Cleon, <jmpayya (met. vorago, a chasm or abyss, which swallows up all
the income of the state) Kal xdpv^&iv apnayrjs. Xen. de Ven. v 16, Hares
when pursued sometimes cross rivers, Kal Karahvovrai. els (papayyas "are
swallowed up in their chasms or abysses."
Another of these political 'fables', of Antisthenes (Socraticus), is
referred to by Ar., Pol. ill 13, 1284 a 15. Speaking of the folly of
attempting to control by legislation the born rulers, who, one or more,
excel all the rest of the citizens together in virtue, and are like Gods
amongst men, he adds, "they would very likely reply if the attempt
were made, atrep 'AvTio-8evr]s i'<pi TOVS \eovras drjp.rjyopovvT<ov TU>V da<TV7r68u>v
(hares) Kal TO icrov dîovvrau iravras l\tiv.'
Kvvopaioral, 'dog-ticks'. These canine-tormentors are as old as

Homer. Argus, Ulysses' dog, in his old age was covered with them;
iv8a Kvav KCIT "Apyos ivlir\eios Kvvopai<TTta>v- Od. p (XVII) 300.
7. 'Fables are adapted to public speaking, and the virtue they
202
PHTOPIKH2 B 20 7.
i, leal exovcriv dyadov TOVTO, OTI Trp

evpeiv o/noia yeyevtifieva âXeôu,
Xoyovs oe
paov 7roifj(rai yap Be? wcnrep teal 7rapaj3o\ds, av Tts p- 9TO Ofxoiov opdv, 6 7rep pahiov icrTiv e'/c (piXohave lies in this, that whereas (jtiev) similar facts that have really happened
are hard to find, fables are easier (to inventevpeiv being unconsciously
used in two different senses); for they must be invented, like the parallel,
analogous, cases ; (which, as we have seen, are invented for the occasion,
but must be conformable to the circumstances of real life,) that is to
say, if one has the faculty of seeing the analogy, which may be facilitated
by the study of philosophy'. Philosophy is used here in a vague and
popular sense, for intellectual study, and mental exercise in general.
So research and philosophising are identified, Pol. V (vill) 11, sub fin.
1331 a 16, {jjrelv Kal <pikoo-o(p(iv. Comp. Ill I I . 5, olov Kal iv <piXooo<plq To
ofiotov Kal iv TTOKV dieôvcriv Bcapeiv ev<TTO)(ov, and t h e note there. T h e
tracing of resemblances in nature is the foundation of analogous reasoning,

and consequently of the inductive method. ^rjTe'iu Se Sei imjSkewovTa M
TO. Sfioia Kal abiacpopa, wparov TI airavra TavTov exovaiv, K.T.\.
Anal. Post.
II 13, 96 b 7. I n Top. A 13, 105 a 25, jj rov ofioiov (TKI^TIS is said to be
one of four opyava 81 cou evTroprj(rop.ev rav (ruXXoyio-ftwc. Comp. C. 17,
108 a 7, seq. on analogies. See Trendelenburg, El. Log. Ar. 59, p. 137,
On the various senses of (piXoa-ocpla and irpayixaxeia (which are often
identified) see Waitz, ad Org. 96 b 15, 11. p. 415.
On Isocrates' comprehensive use of this word see note in Camb,
Journal of Cl. and Sacred Phil. Vol. 11, No. 5, p. 150, and especially the
passage of nepl avriboo-eas 180192, 'where he includes in it all
branches of mental education, in which Rhetoric of course occupies the
foremost place.' Other references are there given1. [Cornp. Isocr.
Paneg. 10 TTJV 7vepl TOVS Xuyovs (pikotrcxplav (with note) and especially
Jebb's Attic Orators, II, p. 37.J
Xoyot SijfiTjyopiKoi]
drjfirjyopiKov yivos,
or
hrffiriyopia, is one of
the
alternative names of the first branch of Rhetoric, the vvpftovhevTiKov.

I I. IO, rrept TO. 8r]iJ.rjyopiKa Kal SiKaviKa, TTJS hr)jirfyopiKrjs npayfiareias, iv rois
8rnj.rjyopi.Kols, ^ Srjinjyopta. i n 12. 5, r] 8rjp.riyopiicr) X<?(y. Historical
examples
(as indeed we are told in the next section) of similar cases that have
already occurred, must of course be more useful to one who is addressing
a public assembly on matters of state policy, than to the pleader in a
court of justice, or a declaimer in an epideictic speech. But these, says
our text, are not always easy to be found; either there are none at all,
or they are rare ; or at all events easily forgotten: whereas fables, and
other analogous cases, which may be invented for the occasion, may
be easily supplied if the faculty of tracing resemblances already exists ;
if not, it may be cultivated by exercise in philosophical study.
dyadov] some virtue, something good (about them), comp. 1 2. 10,
(faavepbv OTI. Kal eKarepov eêi ayaBbv TO eibos Tr)s p'r)TopiKr)s.
1
cj>i\o<io(j>ia. is inadequately rendered 'literature' in Introd. p. 256.
203
8 crocptas' paw /utev ovv iropiaaa-Qai TCL Sid TWV \6ytov,

a Se TTJOOS TO fiovXevcracrQai TO hid TWV
TOT<S
v bfxoia yap u!s eirl

yeyovocriv.
TO 7TOAI) TO.
heT (ie ^pTicrBai TOIS 7rapa$eiy[jiacri
evdvfj.riij.aTa
cos ctTrode'iêcnv {r\ yap
, e%ovTa oe cos /napTvpiois,

iv6vfJLt]fxa(nv
TrpoTiQeneva
fxeWovra
fxt] eôvTa
/uei/
7ri<TTts hid TOV-
eiriAoyto xpco/mevov
jj.ev yap eoixev e7ra-
ri, TO?S ê prjTOpiKOis OVK 0'iK.eiov eiraytoyri
irXnv ev
8. 'Now the arguments or inferences by way of fables {TO. 81a,

with genitive, which are conveyed 'through the channel of, are conveyed
'by',) are easier to supply (provide) oneself with, but those by way of
facts (historical parallels) are more serviceable for deliberation ; because
the future for the most part resembles the past'. We can therefore
argue with probability from the results of circumstances past, to the
results of similar circumstances, which are now under deliberation, in
the future. Men are much the same in all ages; human nature is
tolerably constant in its operations and effects ; the same motives prevail,
and lead to similar actions ; what has been in the past, will be in the
future.
9. 'Examples must be used, in the absence of enthymemes, as
direct logical proofsfor this is the road to persuasion (or conviction)
if we have them, as (confirmatory) evidence, and they are to be employed
as a supplement to our enthymemes : for when put first they resemble
an induction (the several examples are the particulars, or facts, from
which the general rule is collected^, but induction is not appropriate to
Rhetoric, except in rare cases ; but when they are appended to the others
they are like evidence, and evidence is always acceptable (the witness
always carries weight, is always listened to; people are inclined to believe
him)'.
T h e enthymeme is the u&\x.a rrjs jriorftor, I 1. 3> <rd8etir prjTopiKrj
v8vfir)iLa...Kvpi(iTaTov
TS>V nto-reav,
Ib. II.
O n t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e
term 07708^1^1? to rhetorical proof, see note on I 1.11.

eViXoyoj is here simply equivalent to TO (wiXeyofievov, something
added, appended, as a supplement, and not to be understood as the
technical iwiXoyos, the concluding member of the speech, the peroration.
eVtXdya xpcfl/iecov rots ivdv^r))ia<7Lv] This cannot mean 'using the
enthymemes as a supplement', which is directly contrary to what the
author intends to say. The construction is, ^profifvoi/ (avro'is as) eViAdya>
rois- ivdvpriiiaaiv, that is as Xdya> <rV< TOXS ivBvurijJ-aaiv as a Xdyos'argument' or 'sentence'after, following, supplementary to, the enthymemes*
And this is confirmed by imXcyofieva fnapTvplois in the next clause. This
construction, the substantive taking the case of its verb, is fully justified
by the examples given in the note on II 4.31, supra p. 56, note 1.
204
PHT0PIKH2 B 20 9 ; 21 1, 2.
6\iyoK}
ewiXeyofxeva
Ta~)(ov iridavo'i.
Xeyeiv,
he fxaprupiois,
6 he /mdpTi/s irav-
hid Kai irpoTiQevTi fxev dvayKt] TroXXa
einXeyovTi
he Kai ev itcavov
fidpTvs
yap
Kai
av-
TTKTTO'S
TTocra fxev ovv e'ihr] Trapadeiy/uaTcov,
TTWS
1 rots Kai iroTe xprjo'Teov, eiprjTai' wepi he yvwfxoXoy'ias,

pr)6evTOs TI ecTTi yvto/mri, fxaXiaT
7repi woiwv Te Kai wore Kai
TKTIV
2 TW yvwfJioXoyeiv ev TOIS Xoyois.
CHAP-,
dv yevoiTO (pavepov
dpfxoTTei
xpfjadai
ecrTi he yvw/Jit] diro-
'And therefore also, if you put your examples first you must necessarily employ a considerable number; if you introduce them afterwards
even one is enough; for even a single witness that can be relied on is of
service'. This is a second objection to putting the examples first. If you
do so, they will resemble an induction: but an induction derived from
only one or two particulars is of little or no force. Therefore the particular cases must be numerous; and so, not only the induction itself is
inappropriate in Rhetoric, but you will also be obliged to make it long.
'So the subject of the number of kinds of examples, and how and
when they are to be employed, has been dispatched (disposed of)'.
CHAP. XXI.
Of yvu/icu 'maxims', general sentiments of a moral character,
which serve as enthymemes, and are therefore included here as introductory to the treatment of them, an account has been given, with
reference to other writers on the same subject, in Introd. p. 257 seq., to
which the reader is referred. Compare on this subject Harris, Philolog.
Ing. Vol. IV. p. 182 seq. The author mainly follows Aristotle.
For examples of yv&fiai see Brunck's Poetae Gnomici, passim: and
Bergk, Poet. Lyr. Gr., Theognis, Phocylides, Solon, &c.
1. yvaifioKoyla, ' t h e subject, or art of maxim-making', occurs
again, PI. Phaedr. 267 C, as part of the contents of Polus' rhetorical
repertory1. As to (the art of) maxim-making, we shall best arrive at a
clear understanding of the objects, times, and persons, to which and at
which the employment of it is most appropriate in our speeches, when
it has been first stated what a maxim is.
2. ' A maxim is a declarationnot however of particulars or individuals, as, for instance, what sort of a person Iphicrates is, but universally (a general statement, an universal moral rule or principle)'. 0V01
This may help to throw light on the disputed explanation of this word in the
passage of Plato, see Dr Thompson's note ad loc. It is there translated " the style
sententious." yvuiu>\oyla is here, at any rate, the science or study, the theory
(X67os), and (in Rhetoric) the use or practical application, of yv&ixai., maxims or
general moral sentiments; after the analogy of darpoXoyta, /iereupo\oyla, SmoXoyla
(Rhet. I 1.10), <t>v<rio\oyla (Plut.) and a great number of modern sciences ; the use
of the maxim predominates in the application of yvuftokoyeiv throughout the
chapter.
xxi.
PHT0PIKH2 B 21 2 .
205
<pavcri<;, ov [xevTOi 7repi TWI/ KCXB' enaa'TOv,

T15 '\<piKpa.Tr)<s, d\\d
KauoXou,
KCL66\OV'
Kai ov
olov
7repl
7ro?os
TrdvTwv
olov OTL TO evdv ra KaiunrvXip evavTiov,
Tr'epi baroov al 7rpaei<s elcri, Kai alpeTa

Trpos TO 7rpaTTip.
TOVTOOV a-vWoyio-fxo^
dWd
rj (pevKTa ecrTi
UKTT eirel TO evOvfxrijJiaTa 6 irepl

e<TTi oêcSoV, Ta TC (TV\XTrepd<r-
f t a r a TWV ivdv/mri-fxaTiov Kai al dp%ai dcpaipedevTOS TOV

(rvWoyia-fxov
yvcSfxai elcriv,
olov
ov 7ro6', os Tis dpTi(ppcau 7T6(J)VK dvrjp,

o~o(pov?.
4>avcrts (diro(j>aMiv) a 'declaration' or 'utterance'. Here again we
have in two MSS the varia lectio dwocfxicns. See on this, note on I 8. 2.
Comp. 9, 01 dypoiKoi /mXiora yvafioTinroi eta-i Kai paSlms dnofpaivovrai,
and 16, tta TO dirocfiaii'eG'Bai TOV TTJV yvafirju XeyovTa..*
diro<t>aivo8ai seems to have some special connexion with yvdfij] in its

ordinary signification as well as this technical application. See Heindorf
on Gorg. 48, p. 466 c. In several passages which he quotes the same
verb is used for declaring a yvaSju?), in the sense of opinion. [" So Protag.
336 D, rfjv eavTOV yva>^r)V dwo<j>ali/e(rdai; ib. 340 B,"
D r Thompson On
Gorg. 1. c ]
' And not of all universals, as, for example, that straight is opposed to
crooked, but only of those which are concerned with (human) actions, and
are to be chosen or avoided in respect of action.' This concern with human
actionnpagis can only be predicated of human beingsgives the yvwfir/ its
moral character. See, for instance, the beginning of the second chapter
of Eth. Nic. II. Of actions it is said, 1104 a 31, avTai yap ela-i Kvpiai
Kai TOV rroias yfvecrdai ras e(is \ they determine the moral character.
And so frequently elsewhere. This moral character of the yvmjxrf however, though it undoubtedly predominates in the description and illustration of it through the remainder of the chapter, is not absolutely
exclusive: the yvdfir) may be applied likewise to all practical business of
life, and all objects of human interest, as health in 5; and Tvpat-eis must
be supposed virtually to include these. With this definition that of
Auct. ad Heren. IV 17. 24 deserves to be compared: it is not so complete
as Aristotle's, but may be regarded as supplementary to it: Sententia
(i. e. yvajij}, which is also the term by which Quintilian expresses k, Inst.
Orat. VIII 5) est oratio sttmpta de vita, quae aut quid sit aut quid esse
oporteat in vita breviter ostendit, hoc pacto; it is there illustrated to the
end of the chapter. One useful precept for the guidance of the rhetorician in the employment of the yvdfir) may be quoted here, especially as
Aristotle has omitted it. Sententias interponi raro convenit, tit ret
adores, 11011 vivendi praeceptores videamur esse. yva>p.ai often take the
form of 'precepts'. Harris, u. s, p. 182.
'And therefore since rhetorical enthymemes are as one may say'
206
PHT0P1KH2 B 21 2.
fxev ovv yviajiri'
TOVTO
-jrpocrTedei<rri<s 6"e T ^ S atria?
TOV &a TI, evdvfJLti/Jid i(TTi TO awav,

w
X pi$ 7i
"AAJJS
|s exovcriv
nai
oiov
dpylas,
Jovov Trap' CLCTTWV d\<pdvovcri
icai TO
OVK e<TTiv os Tt5 irdvT
dvrip evZaip.ovei.
p
Kal TO
OVK ecTTiv dvBpcuv os Tts (TT iXevOepos
- 1394*.
v- 91-
Se TO e'ÔjueVw ev6vfxt}fuf
yap SovAos ecTTiv r\
'pretty nearly', that is, not absolutely, but generally, making
allowance for some which are not concerned with the practical business
of lifeso Victorius).'the logical mode of reasoning or inference on these
subjects (the business of life and human actions), when this syllogistic
process is withdrawn (and the major premiss or conclusion is left alone),
the conclusions and major premisses of enthymemes are yvafiai'. These
premisses and conclusions taken- by themselves are mere enunciations of
some general principle: they do not become enthymemes, i. e. inferences or processes of reasoning, till the reason is addedsententia cum
ratione, Quint, and Auct. ad Heren., Introd. p. 257which is stated in the
next sentence. Hanc quidem ftartem enthymematis quidani initium aut
clausulam epichirematis esse dixerunt: et est aliquando, non tamen semper.
Quint. VIII 5.4 (de Sententiis, VIII 5. 18, q. v.).
' For instance, " No man that is of sound mind ought ever to have
his children over-educated to excess in learning," (Eur. Med. 294). Now
this is a maxim (moral precept, the conclusion of the enthymeme): but
the addition of the reason, and the why (the ahla or cause) makes the
whole an enthymeme, for example, "for besides the idle habits which
they thereby contract to boot" (into the bargainthe comparativea\\os,
other, in this common, but illogical use of the word, brings two heterogeneous things into illicit comparison : see [p. 46 supra and note on III 1.9])
" they reap (gain as their reward) hostile jealousy from the citizens." The
crpyi'a here is the literary indolence, or inactivity, the withdrawal from
active life and the consequent neglect of their duties as citizens, into
which they are led by their studious habits. This is what provokes the
jealousy and hostility of the citizens. Plato's unpopularity at Athens was
due to the same cause. Plato justifies himself against these charges of
his enemies in four well-known passages, in the Republic [vi 484497],
Theaetetus [172 c] and Gorgias [527]; and in the seventh Epistle, if that
be his [see Introd. to Dr Thompson's ed. of the Gorgias, pp. xiixiv].
These lines are put into the enthymematic form, as an argument, in
7. It is a specimen of a practical syllogism, or enthymeme, logic
applied to action or conduct. As a syllogism it would run thus: All
PHTOPIKHS B 21 35.
207
3 el S>7 ecrri yviofit] TO elprifxivov, dvdyKrj rerrapa e'/Sjj

eivai yvcofxrjs" n yap /JLBT eTriXoyov ecrrai % avev
4 e7rt\o<yov. diroheiêws [xev ovv Seofxeval elcriv cacti
irapaooôv TI Xeyovaiv rj djj.(j)io'(3r]TOviJLei'OV ocrcu $e
5 fxridev 7rapddoov, d'uev eiriXoyov.
TOVTOOV S' dvdyKtj
Tas [xev hid TO irpoeyvwo-dai /utrjêv êladai eiriXoyov,
oiov
dvhpl 3' vyia'iveiv dpicrTov ecrTiv, ws y' tj/juv So/cel
ought to avoid, or no man should be rendered liable to, idle habits and
the hatred of his fellow-citizens: children who are over-educated do
become idle and unpopular; therefore children ought not to be overeducated.
'And again, "There is no man who is altogether happy"'Eur.
Fragm. Sthenel. I (Dind., Wagn.). The reason, which converts it into an
enthymeme, is supplied by Aristoph. Ran. 1217, rj yap 7re<j>vKas ccrB'hbs
OVK t'êt filov, rj 8vcryevr)s <ov, (he is here interrupted by Aeschylus who
finishes the verse for him with Xrjicvdiov djrdXecrev: but the Schol. supplies
the conclusion,) ifKovalav apoi ifKaKa.
'And another, "there is none of mankind that is free"' is a yvdfirj,
but with the addition of the next verse (ra ixofievw m) it becomes an
enthymeme,' "for he is the slave either of money or fortune."' From Eur.
Hec. 864. Our texts have Oi/rjrav for avbpav: doubtless it is one of Ar.'s
ordinary slips of memory in quotation, and a very unimportant one.
But I think as a general rule, it is quite unsafe to rely upon our author's
quotations in correction of any reading in more ancient writers.
3. ' I f then a yvdjir) is what has been described, there must necessarily be four kinds of yvtifirj: either with, or without, an appendage or
supplement (containing the reason)'. It is first put forward independently as a yvd\n\, and then, if it is not generally acceptable, and a reason
is required, this is added, and it becomes an enthymeme.
4. 'Those that require proof (aTrofieitjis 'demonstration', as before,
used loosely for proof of any kind) are all such as state anything paradoxical (contrary to received opinion; or surprising, unexpected, contrary to expectation, and to anything that you ever heard before) or anything which is questioned (or open to question): those that have nothing
unexpected about them (may be stated, Xeyovrai.) without a supplement'.
These together make up the four kinds.
5. The first two kinds are those which require no supplement.
' Of these, some must require no supplement owing to their being
already well known, as, " best of all is wealth for a man, at least in my
opinion;" because most people think so'.
The line here quoted is of uncertain origin. There was a famous
a-Kokiov, drinking-song or catch, usually attributed to Simonides, which
Athen., XV 694 E, has preserved amongst several that he there quotes ;
and it is also to be found in Bergk's Collection, Fragm. Lyr. Gr. Scolia,
208
((paiverai yap roh 7roAAo?s OVTW), rca $ apa \eyo~

fxiuws hj\as eivai emfiXe^saGiv, oiov
ovheh epacrrri's os TIS OVK del (piXeT.
6 TCOV Se /JL6T 7ri\6yov cu fxev evdu/uruucLTOs fxepo^ turiv,
axnrep
Xpri h' ov TTO6' os TJS dprltppcov,
13. It runs thus : vyiaiveiv jj.ev apt(TTOv avSpl Bvara, bevTepov be Kakbv
<j>vau yeveo-6ai, TO rp'nov Se ifkovTtiv afioXtoj, xai rp TerapTov ijfiav pcra
TU>V cplhav. This is repeated by Anaxandrides in some iambics of his

Thesaurus, Fragm. I (Meineke, Fr. Comm. Gr. ill 169), and quoted
by Athen. immediately after the OKOKIOV as a parallel or illustration.
Anaxandrides does not know the author ; 6 TO O-KOKIOV evpaiv imeivos,
cans riv. Plato has likewise quoted it in Gorg. 451 E, and elsewhere (see
Stallbaum's note). The Scholiast oil this passage says, TO O-K6\IOV TOVTO
01 fitv Zifiavldov (pao-lv, ol Si 'En-iâp/iou. On which Me!neke, u. s., note,
says 'Nonne igitur pro ^fj.lv legendum ijx.lv, et ipse ille versus, dvbpl 8'
vyialveiv K.T.X., Epicharmo tribuendus ?' The trochaic metre is doubtless
in favour of this supposition, but that shews on the other hand that it
could not have formed part of the scolion above quoted, which is in
quite a different measure: and also, supposing it to be taken from that,
it would be a most improbable and unmeaning repetition of the first
line. If therefore Meineke is right in attributing it to Epicharmus, it
must have belonged to another and independent scolion. Another
scholium in Cramer, Anecd. Paris, on Ar. Rhet. has TO " dvSpl S' vyiaiveiv
apicrTov" Sijuavi'Sou eoriv curb TQIV O-KO\L5>V avrov enaiv.
<A 8'
''Enixapjiov.
Meineke, u. s. Simonides at all events has something like it, ovSe KaXas
<ro(ptas xapty, e* M7? 7is *Xt o~cfivav vyUiav. This places health at the
head of the list of goods : another distich, quoted in Ar. Eth. Nic. I 9,
Eth. Eudem. init., as 'the Delian inscription' inl TO irponi\aiov rou
ArjTaov (Eth. Eud.), Theogn. 255, and (in iambics) Soph. Fragm. Creus.
(Stob. c m 15, Dind. Fr. 326), places health second in the order, or rather,
perhaps, leaves the question open. Ariphron of Sicyon (Athen. xv 702
A) wrote a hymn to Health, beginning vyUia irpeo-filo-Ta paKapcov; he
also regards it as the greatest of all blessings, o-tdev 8t xwpis oiVis
eihalfiav e<pv, line 8. See in Bergk, Fr. Lyr. Gr. p. 841 [p. 984, ed. 2].
Comp. Philem. Fr. Inc. 62, alrm 8' iyUiav irparov, eh' einrpaîav R.TX.
'Whereas others (the second kind, of division 1) (though previously
unknown) are clear the very moment they are uttered, provided you
pay attention to them,' (or perhaps, 'the moment you cast your eye
upon them)'. Comp. Top. r 6, 120 a 32, 34 ; b 15 and 30, E 4, 132 a 27.
emfiXeilns Anal. Pr. I 29, 45 a 26, ini^Xiêav
Ib. V 17, irpoo-eirtPXe'Trct.v
Ib. V 21 (from Waitz).- Upon the whole I think the comparison of these
passages is in favour of the former of the two interpretations: and so
Victorius.
olov K.TX] 'as "no lover is inconstant in his affection.'" Eur. Troad.
1051, quoted again, Eth. Eud. vil 2, 1235 b 21.
6. 'Of those which have the supplement (these are the two kinds
PHTOPIKHS B 21 6.
209
at B' ivdufxrifxartKai fxev, OVK evdvfj.ruj.aro^ he. fxepo^ a'l

Kai fxa\i(rT evdoKifxovcriv. elcrl B' avrai ev o<rats
aiverai rov Xeyo/sevov TO CC'ITIOV, olov ev TW
dddvciTOv opyrjv jua) (puXacrae dvrjTOs u>v
TO fxev yap tydvai fxn ZeTv del (pvXaTTeiv TT\V 6pyr\v
of the second division), some are part of an enthymeme, as "no man of
sound mind ought," (the commencement of the verses of Euripides in
2), and the rest have an enthymematic character, but are not part of
an enthymeme: which (the latter) are in fact the most popular', at
fiiv ivBviirnMTos pepos may be thought to be a careless expression,
contradictory to the description of enthymeme in 1 2.13 : since it is
characteristic of the enthymeme that it omits at least one of the premisses
(see on the enthymeme Introd. p. 104), and therefore a yvm^ with the
reason appended represents a conclusion with one premiss, which is an
enthymeme. The explanation seems to be that an enthymeme is an
assumed syllogism : the inference which it draws rests upon the possibility
of constructing a syllogism out of it: if that cannot be done, the inference
is not valid. So that in one sense the enthymeme is a true and complete
syllogism, in another, in so far as it expresses only one premiss, it may
be called a part of it, and incomplete. And this serves to explain the
statement of I 2.13, TO 8' iv6v\ii\\i.a <rvWoyi<rii6v (i. e. a mode of syllogistic
reasoning), Ka\ e oXlytov re Kat 7ro\\aiu.s AaTTowav rj e' av 6 irparos
cuXXoytcr/io?.
'And all those have this (latter) character in which the reason of the
(general) statement is made to appear, as in this, "mortal as thou art,
guard, keep (cherish), not immortal anger ;" for, to say "that a man
ought not to keep his anger for ever" is ayvoi/ii;; but the addition, "as
a mortal" (because he is a mortal), states the (reason) why. And like
it again is this, " Mortal thoughts" (or a mortal spiritthat is, one which
confines its aims and aspirations within the limits of its mortal condition), "not immortal,, become a mortal man."'
The first of these two quotations is used by Bentley in his Dissertation
on Phalaris, p. 247 [p. 229 ed. Wagner], and foil. He does not attempt to
fix the authorship of it, but contents himself with saying "this, though the
author of it be not named, was probably.. .borrowed from the stage," p. 247,
but afterwards, p. 249 [231], "and even that one (the verse in question) is
very likely to be taken from the same place" (viz. Euripides). Subsequently, p. 262 [243], he speaks of it as from " a poet cited by Aristotle," and
"Aristotle's poet." He quotes from Euripides' Philoctetes, Fragm. IX
(Dind.), XII (Wagner), a parallel passage as having been borrowed by the
author of Phalaris, alcmcp 8e dvryrov Kai TO cra/i' IJ^CBI* (pv, OVTW jrpooT/icei
inrjde TX]V opyr/v <?XeLV odauarov,
oaris <ra>(j)pove~iv eiricrTarai.
T h e same verse,
with exPpal> f r P~i*lvi occurs also in Menander, Tvafiai fiovoo-nxoi, line 4,
ap. Meineke Fragm. Comm. Cr. 340. Wagner, Incert. Trag. Fragm. p. 185,
" Auctor versus, quisquis fuit, imitatus est Eurip. Fragm. 790 (sc. Philoct.),"
and to this also he ascribes the yvd>\a] attributed to Menander, t^
being "sive calami errore, sive imitatione."
AR. II.
210
PHT0PIKH2 B 21 6,7.
yvwfxrj, TO he TrpoaKelfxevov " dvrjTov ovra" TO hta TL

Xeyei.
6/JLOIOV he Kai TO
1
dvtjTa xprj TOV OvrjTov1) OVK dddvaTa TOV QVY\TOVX
(ppoveiv.
7
(pavepov ovv en TWV e\pr\\xevwv irocra TC e'lhn yvcaiuti<s, noil 7repl TTOTOV enacrTOv dp/moTTei' irepi [xev yap
TWV d/ii(bi<r(3t]ToviJLe'i/wv t) irapado^wv fxrj avev eiriXoyov, d\X' r\ TrpodevTa TOV eTriXoyov
1
6vaTa,...BvarBv. ' Si Epicharmi est versus, male vulgares formas dvryrh. atque
Tov exhibet A...doricam formam ceteri omnespraeferunt.'
Spengel.
The second verse, Ovara xPV K.T.X., is ascribed by Bentley to Epicharmus ; a supposition with which the dialect and metre agree. Miillach,
Fragm. Philos. Gr. p. 144, Fr. Epicharm. line 260. This maxim is alluded
to, but condemned, in the exulting description of perfect happiness,
Eth. Nic. X 7, 1177 b 32, ov xPV Se Kara roiis irapaivovvTas avBpdnnva.
(ppovuv avSpawou ovra aibe 8vt)Ta TOV dvrjTov, dW e(j)y ocrov ipbexTaL 0^0""-
ri'fi' K.T.X. Buhle quotes Horace, Od. II 11. 11, quid aeternis minorem
consiliis animum faligas ?
For the use of the article in TOV 6VI\TOV, indicating a member of a
certain class, see notes on I 7.13, II 4. 31.
7. ' I t is plain then from what has been said, how many kinds of
yvafirj there are, and on what sort of subject (or occasion) each of them
is appropriate ; for (when it pronounces) on things questionable or paradoxical (or unexpected, surprising, as before) the supplement must not
be omitted {subaudi dpfioTTei. Xeyciv); but either the supplement should
come first, and then the conclusion (of the inference) be used as a
yvdjj.il as, for instance, if it were to be said (returning to the first
example, 2), " now for my own part, since we are bound neither to incur
jealousy nor to be idle, I deny that they (children) ought to be educated";
or else, say this first, and then add the supplement (the reason)'.
TWV afi<purfir)Tov)j.eva>v rj napadoâv
K.T.X.]
" N i enim ratio
addatur,
fidem non inveniet huiusmodi sententia. Melius esse iniuriam accipere

quam inferre (this is the apparent paradox maintained by Socrates in
Plato's Gorgias and Republic): supplicum misereri non oportere, et his
similia qui audit reicit; at si rationes annectantur, haud dubie assentietur; nempe qui facit iniuriam semper improbus est, at qui patitur
probus esse potest. Et misericordia intempestiva iustitiae solet esse
adversa." Schrader.
'(When they are) about things, not unexpected, but obscure' (not
immediately intelligible. Understand del, apuoTrei, \eyav OVTOS), 'you
must add the (reason) why, as tersely as possible'. A popular audience is
always impatient of long explanations, and long trains of reasoning; or
enthymemes, II 22. 3 ; comp. I 2.12, i n 17.6. In assigning therefore the
reason for the ambiguous or seemingly paradoxical yvd/xr), we must express
ourselves in the fewest possible words, as briefly and compactly as possible.
211
a6ai rw crufXTrepda-fxari, olov e'i Tts e'iiroi "eyto

ouv, ineihrj ovreXp6ovei(rdaieiOVT dpyov ehai, ov <pt]/un.
Xpijvai Trcudevecrdai," rj TOUTO irpoenrovra enTeiTreiv ra
efj.7rpocr6ev, rrepl de Ttov /xr] 7rapah6û>v a^Xcov de,
8 Trpoa-TidevTct TO dioTi CTTpoyyvAwTaTa.
dpfxoTTei
o ev TOIS TOIOVTOL<5 Kai To. ActKcoviKa a7ro(p6eyiuaTa
i TO. aiviy/uLaTwSti, olov e'i Tte Xeyei 6 7rep
<TTp6yyv\os, 'rounded', 'compact' (as a ball), is properly applied to
the periodic stylethe period, n-fpi-oSor, is in fact a kind of circle, " a
sentence returning into itself," Miiller, Hist. Gr. Lit. [11 155]. Comp.
Dionysius, de Lysia Jud. c. 6. rj a-vo-rptyovo-a (condenses, packs close) 7-a
voijfiara Kai (rrpoyyvXas fKcf>epov(ra \fis, " expresses them in a rounded,
compact, terse form." Arist. SxijKas KaraXaixâvovcrai, Fragm. IV (Meineke,
Fr. Comm. Gr. 11 1142), of Euripides' neat, terse, well-rounded style, XP%
yap avrov rod o-TOfiaros rm trrpoyyvka. So rotunde; Cic. de Fin. IV 3. 7,
Ista ifisa, quae tu breviter,a te quidem apte et rotunde : quipfie habes
enim a rhetoribus. Brut. Lxvni 272, rotunda constructio verborum. Orat.
XIII 40, Thucydides praefractior nee satis, ut ita dicam, rotundus. Nizolius ad verbum, concinne, explicate, a-rpoyyvXas. Ernesti, Clavis Cic. s. v.
8. ' I n such cases (or on such subjects) Laconic utterances and
enigmatical sayings are appropriate, as when one employs what Stesichorus said at Locri, that they had better not be so presumptuous, lest
their cicales should be brought to chirp on the ground.' AaKaviKa awo<f>diyfiara; pithy, sententious, utterances, which have become proverbial in
our word 'laconic'. Plutarch has made a collection of 'Laconic Apophthegms', from which it appears that they are usually of a character rather
wise than wittythough there are also some extremely smart repartees in
answer to impertinent questions or observationspithy, pungent, pregnant, expressed with pointed brevity, which indeed is characteristic of
them, and is also the 'soul of wit'.
I will quote only one (a short one) as a specimen. Antalcidas: irpbs
Se TOV dfiaSe'is KaXovvra TOVS AaKeSaifjioviovs 'Adqvaiov, fiovai yovv, einev,
y/xfls ovSev [ieixa@i]Ka{iv nap' vjxav KCIKOV. Quite true (says Ant.); we are
deplorably ignorant"At any rate we are the only people that have
learnt no mischief from you'' The word is applied to two sayings of
Theramenes, before his death, Xen. Hellen. 11 3 ult. Fo'r a description
of these Aatcwvucct aTro^tOeyjxara as pointed and pithy as the prjîara described, see PL Protag. 342 E [eW/3a\e prjp.a aj-iov \6yov ftpaxv Kai avvta-Tpap.ji.evov uenrep Seivbs
aKovria-Tijs].
alviyfiarcSSr]] hard, obscure, ambiguous sayings, which like riddles

require solution before they can be understood; like that pronounced by
Stesichorus to check the presumptuous insolence of the Locrians: the
solution of which is, that cicalas always sit in trees when they chirp. So
that, ov yivovrai TtVriyef owov fir) devSpa ioriv, Arist. Hist. An. V 30, 556 a
TI (the entire chapter is on TcVrtyer). When the trees are gone, when
they have been felled and the land ravaged, then it is that the cicalas will
142
212
PHT0PIKH2 B 21 9.
criôpo^ iv Aoi<po?s elirev, cm ov Set vfipio-Tas eivai,

9 07rws [xrj 01 TeTTiyes âfjiodev aZuxriv. dpÔTTei Be P. 1395.
/uev 7rpeo~fivTepoi<i, 7repl Be TOVTWV
have to sing their song on the ground. This is what the insolence of the
Locrians will bring them to. See Mure, Hist. Gr. Lit. (Stesichorus), III
248. He says, note 2, " Similar is our own popular proverb of 'making
the squirrels walk', denoting a great fall of wood." This is repeated nearly
verbatim,
III 11.6. Demetrius, 7repl epfirjvfias (n-epi <rvv6iai<as ovofiarav) 99
(Vol. III. p. 284, Spengel, Rhet. Gr.), attributes the saying to Dionysius,
without telling us to whom it was said: and calls it an dWtjyopia. And
again, 243, jrepi beivoT-qros (ill p. 315), OVTCO KOI TO xaH-o8ev oi
rem-yes
VfiXp aaovrat fttivorepov aXkrffOpiKWS p'rj&ev, fj c'lirep arrX&s ipp'qdr], ra 8(vSpa
v/iav K/co7ri)'<rerat. The felling of the trees, especially the fruit trees,
always accompanied the ravaging of a country in a hostile incursion.
Hence SevSporojueiv Thuc. I 108, of Megara, comp. II 75. 1, IV 79. 2. Dem.
de Cor. 90 (in a Byzantian decree), nai rav xPav SOI'OITOS ical SevSpoKojr/oiToi. [Dem. Or. 53 (Nicostr.) 15, <j)vTVTrjpia...KaTicKa<rei>, OVTO> beivas
Bf ovS1 av 01 irokifuoi SiaBelev].
9. 'The use of maxims, or sententious language, is appropriate in

respect of age (time of life) to elders, and as to subjects, should be
directed to those in which the speaker has experience; since for one who
is not so far advanced in life to employ maxims is as unbecoming as
story-telling (i. e. fables, legends, mythical stories), whilst to talk about
things that one knows nothing of is a mark of folly and ignorance (or
want of cultivation)'. On /ivdoXoyeiv Victorius says," Fabellarum sane auditione delectantur pueri; non tamen ipsis fabulas fingere aut narrare congruit." And this, because young people have as yet had little or no experience of life, and if they pronounce maxims and precepts at all, must do
it of things of which they are ignorant: and this shews folly, as well as
ignorance. So Quintilian, who supplies the reason for this precept: VIII
5. 8, nepassim (sententiae) et a quocunque dicantur. Magis enim decent eos
in quibus est auctoritas, ut rei pondus etiam persona confirmet. Quis
enim ferai puerum aut adolescehtulum aut etiam ignobilem, si iudicat
in dicendo et quodammodo praecipiat ? " It has been said too they come
most naturally from aged persons, because age may be supposed to have
taught them experience. It must however be an experience suitable to
their characters: an old general should not talk upon law, nor an old
lawyer on war." Harris, Philol. Inq. Works IV 186. The Justice in the
' Seven Ages' {Asyou like it [11 6. 156]), who is advanced in years, \sfull
of wise saws and modern instances. 'A sufficient indication (of the truth of
what has just been said, viz. that it is only the simpleton, or the ignorant
and uneducated, that pronounces maxims upon subjects of which he knows
nothing), is the fact that rustics (clowns, boors) are especially given to
maxim-coining, and ever ready to shew them off (exhibit them)'. This
propensity to sententiousness, and the affectation of superior wisdom
which it implies, characteristic of the 'rustic', has not escaped the observation of Shakespeare: whose numerous 'clowns' are all (I believe)
addicted to thi& practice. Dogberry in Much ado about nothi)igsee in
PHT0PIKH2 B 21 9, 10.
wv efX7reipos
yvw^.oXoye'ii/
o
TIS
TO
fxev fxr\ rrjXiKOVTOV OVTCL
dirpe7re<s wcnrep Kai TO /JLvdoXoyeTv, 7repi
wv aweipo^,
iKavov
e&Tiv, ws
213
01 yap
tjXtdiov
dypoinoi
10 Kai paoicos a7ro(paivovTai.
Kai dira'i&evTOv.
fxaXurTa
crrifxelov B'
<yvwfj.OTV7roi eld
KadoXou e /mt]
6'VTOS
KadoXou
enrelv fxaXicrTa dp/moTTei iv <r%TXiacr/JLto Kai

particular, Act III Sc. 5the 'fool' in Lear I 4'Touchstone' in As you
like it, i n 3 and 'Costard' in Love's labour's lost, throughout; are all
cases in point.
dypoiKos, country-bred, rustic, boor, clown, implying awkwardness
and the absence of all cultivation and refinement of language, manner,
mind, is opposed to aartlos which represents the opposite, city life,
and city breeding, the city being the seat of refinement, cultivation
personal and intellectual, civilisation and fashion ; as rusticiis to urbanus,
and Country with its associations, to Town and its belongings, in our
dramatists and light literature of the two last centuries, the echo of
which has not quite died away.
10. 'Generalising, where there is no generality (stating a proposition, or maxim universally which is only partially true), is most
appropriate in complaint and exaggeration, and in these either at the
commencement (of either of the two processes), or after the case has
been made out (proved, aTtohtiKvvvou. here again in a vague and general
sense)'.
<rx(T\ia<riJ.us, "conqucstio, h. e. ea pars orationis qua conquerimur et
commoti sumus ex iniuria vel adversa fortuna'. Ernesti, Lex. Technologies
Graecae, s. v. Conquestio est oratio auditorum misericordiam captans, Cic.
Inv. 155. 106, who gives a long account of it divided into 16 topics. This was
the subject of Thrasymachus' treatise, the eXeoi {iniserationes Cic. [Brutus
82]), referred to by Arist., Rhet. ill 1. 7 ; the contents are satirically
described by Plat., Phaedr. 267 C. It was "a treatise, accompanied with
examples, on the best modes of exciting compassion" (Thompson ad loc).
What follows, opyio-ai re av K.T.X. describes the art of htlvaxris, which no
doubt accompanied the o-x6T^'ao>">s ' n Thrasymachus' work. On Thrasymachus' e\eoi see Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil. Vol. in 274, No. 9.
(7X""Xiacr/ids therefore is the act of complaining, or the art of exciting the
compassion of the audience for the supposed sufferings of the speaker
himself or his client by age, penury, distress, or wrong or injury from
others : and its appropriate place is the iw'ikoyos, the peroration of the
speech. See Rhet. i n 19.3.
deivaxris is a second variety of the same KOIVOS TOTTOS, viz, avrjo-ts
and fieiaa-is, to which both of these are subordinate. There is in fact

a natural connexion between the two : pity for the person wronged is
usually accompanied by indignation against the wrong-doer. This is
indignatio, of which Cicero treats de Inv. 1 53. 10054. 105. Indignatioest
oralio per quain conficitur ut in aliqueni hominem magnum odium aut in
rent gravis offensio concitetur. The art of exciting indignation or odium
214
II
PHTOPIKHS B 21 ii.
Kal ev TOVTOVZ rj dpôfievov fj a.7roZeiâvTa.

Se Se? Kal TCS TedpvArj/nevais Kal KOivals 'yvcofxais, eav
cb<ri%pYi(Ti}xoi'Zia yap TO eivai KOivai, ws dfj.o\o<yovvagainst any person or thing, by exaggeration or intensification; vivid
description heightening the enormity or atrocity of that against which
you wish to rouse the indignation of the audience. "tSelvao-is invidiae
atque odii exaggeratio," Ernesti, Lex. Techn. Gr. s. v. Quint. VI 2. 24,
Haec est ilia quae deivaxns voeatur, rebus indignis asperis invidiosis
addens vim oratio; qua virtute praeter alios plurimum Demosthenes
valuit.
Ib. VIII 3. 88, bdvaxns in exaggeranda indignitate. IX 2. 104,
intendere crimen, quod est heivaxns- Comp. Rhet. Ill 19. 3, on the
ewlXoyos.
Macrobius Saturn. IV 6 (ap. Ernesti u. s.), Oportet enim, ut oratio
pathetica aut ad indignationem ant ad misericordiam dirigatur, quae a
Graecis OIKTOS <ai ddvaxris appellatur: horum alterum accusatori necessariuni est, alterum reoj et necesse est initium abruptum habeat, quoniam
satis indignanti leniter incipere non convenit.
The illicit generalisation above mentioned is one of the arts employed to heighten the two iradrj which are most serviceable to the
orator, eXeos and opyq or peêcis by o~xTXiao'p.6s and SeiVoxriy. The first
is well illustrated by Victorius from Catullus, Epith. Pel. et Thet. 143,
the deserted Ariadne exclaims, lam iam nnlla viro iuranti femina
credat, Nulla viri speret sermones esse fideles &c. (similarly Ovid, Fasti
ill 475, Nunc quoque ' nulla viro' clamabo 'femina credat') and Eur.
Hec. 254, axapitTTOv vfiav OTrep/j' ocroi fij/juijyopovj r)\ovTe Tifias.
T h i s is
a generalisation from the single case of Ulysses. Add Cymbeline, Act II

5. 1 ; Posthumus. Is there no way men to be, but women must be halfworkers ? We are bastards all &c. and (already quoted in Introd.) Virg.
Aen. IV 569, varimn et mutabile semperfeminaj and Hamlet, Act I Sc. 2,
[146], Frailty, thy name is woman. So ovSiv ytirovias ôXen-aSi-cpoc 15.
11. 'Maxims which are in everyone's mouth (notorious), and universally known, should be also employed if they are serviceable (when they
are to the point): for the fact that they are universal (universally known
and employed) being equivalent to an universal acknowledgment (of their
truth), they are generally supposed to be right (true and sound)'.
TcdpuX-rjfievais <ai noivals yvajuus] Such are the sayings of the seven sages,
and of the old gnomic poets in general, Theognis, Hesiod, Phocylides and
the rest, which everybody remembers and repeats, dpvkciv is to repeat
again and again, as ijiveiv, decantare. Zonaras, oweyas Xeyeiv. Suidas and
Photius, XaXfTi/, KVKQV. (Hesych. BpvXXet, rapao-o-ei, o^Xft. dpvXXoi, -fyiBvpurjioi, o/iiXi'ai.) Arist. Eq. 348, T17K vvxra SpvXav Ka\ XaXcov iv rats 6801s, of
the sausage-monger, who after having made, as he thinks, a good speech,
walks about the streets all night repeating it over and over again, and
chattering. Eurip. El. 99)
Ka
' A"7" $*' opBpcov y' OVTTOT iêkiixnavov dpvhoxxr,
a y clwelv tfdeXov. "She had long practised and considered her speech
in the early dawn of the mornings." Paley. For Te8pvkr)p.tvais cf. also i n
7.9 ; 14.4,'notorious'. Plat. Phaedo 65 B, 76 D. nokvBpvkrjTov, Ib. 100 B,
Rep. VIII 566 B. Isocr. Panath. 237, nep\ dvnfSoaeas 55, (\iyavs) TOVS
P H T O P I K H S B 21 I I .
diravTcov,
XOVVTI
e7ri
TO
opdws
eêti/
SOKOVCTIV,
215
olov Tra.pa.Ka.-
Kiv^vveveiv fxrj dvcraixevovs
eh olwvos api(TTO<s ct[xvv6(r6ai 7repi

TO r]TTOV<i 6'1/Tas
wos 'EvvaXios,
Kai iwi TO dvaipeiv TWI/ i^dpwv
TO. TeKva Kai /j.r]deu
naXai nap' vfiiv StaredpvKrjfiivovs. Ast, Lex. Plat, decantare. May not
dpvWeiv (so it is sometimes written) be an onomatopoeia from the sound
of the harp, like Bptrraviko, Arist. Plut. 290 ; the notion of constant
repetition, recurrences being derived from 'harping' perpetually on the
same string, chorda qui semper oberrat eadein? [Horace, A. P. 356].
TrapaKaKovvTt] lit. 'to a man exhorting'; when Ar. wrote this dative he
was most likely thinking of lav aim ^pi/cri/noi, rather than of anything else ;
though it is extremely uncertain. 'As for instance in an exhortation to
make the adventurerun the risk of battlewithout previous sacrifice'.
dva-afievovs] Schrader interprets litare, said of a sacrifice which propitiates the deity to whom it is offered. He may possibly mean that it is
the use of the middle voice that gives it this sense 'for themselves, for
their own benefit'.
(Is olasvos K.T.\.] Horn. II. xil 243 (Hector to Polydamas, who has
threatened him with an evil omen), OIMKOS in the yvmja] has reference
to the preceding Bvuaiievovs. Talk not to me of your omens (from
sacrifice) says the officer, cheering on his men, who are disheartened by
the absence of favourable omens; " One omen is best of all, to rally
for our country's defence." Pope, "And asks no omen but his country's
cause." Lord Derby, " The best of omens is our country's cause." Applied
by Cicero to his own public conduct and intentions, Ep. ad Attic. II 3. 3,
ult. Schrader quotes Cic. Cato Maior, 3. 4, Q. Fabius Maximus, augur
cum esset, dicere ausus est optimis auspiciis ea geri quae pro reipublicae
salute gererenhtr: quae contra rempublica7n fierent contra auspicia fieri.
'And again an exhortation to run the risk {subaudi napaKakovvn eVt
TO KivSvvtveiv1) with inferior forces'; wbs 'EvvdXios, II. XVIII 309. This
again is from a speech of Hector, expressing his readiness to encounter
Achilles. Ov ]iiv eycoye (pevo[iai...dWa fia)C avrj]V uTij<Top,ai} T] K (peprja'i
fiiya Kparos, rj K( (pepoifirjv. ^wot 'EvvaXios, Kai re Kravcovra Karenra. This
passed into a proverb for 'the equal chances of battle'.
Archilochus,
(Bergk, Fr. Lyr. Gr. No. 56, p. 479 [p. 550, ed. 2]), ITIJTV/J.OV yap gwbs av-
Bpainois "Aptjs. Aesch. S. C. T. 409, epyov 8' ev Kvfioie "Apr/s Kpivei. Liv.
XXVIII 19, In fiugna et in acie, ubi Mars communis et victum sdepe
erigeret et affligeret victorem. Ib. V 12, XXI 1 (quoted by Trollope on the
verse of Homer).
'And an exhortation (und. as before) to destroy enemies' children
1
Gaisford, echoing F. A. Wolf, says of this, "Recte statuit W.haec non sana
esse. Mihi videtur verbum aliquod excidisse." In a writer like Aristotle there is
notlrng at all extraordinary in such an ellipse as I have supposed : in any other it
mi<Tht no doubt lead one to suspect an omission.
216
PHT0P1KHS B 21 12, 13.
09 ircnepa KreiVas 7ratSas KaTaA.e(7rei.

12 e n iviai TCOV 7rapoi[x.i(iov Kai yvw/Jiai. elcriv, oiov irapoi1$ Ilia " 'ATTJKOS Tra'jOOj/cos." Set Se Tas <yvwfxas Xejetv
Kai trapa TOL Sed^/jLoaiev/Jiepa (Ae'ya) &e SeBt]/JiO(riev/j.va
oiov TO yvwdi (ravTOv Kai to fxrjZev ayav), hrav r\ TO
t)do<s (paivecdai /neWt] (SeXnov, fj 7radf]TiKw^ elprjfxevri
rj. ecTTi $e iraQr\TiKr\ fiev, oiov e'i r t s
even when innocent, " Childish is he, who first slays the father and then
leaves the children behind."' This is a verse of Stasinus's Kinpia, one
of the Cyclic poems. It is ascribed to him by Clemens Alex. Strom. VI
p. 747. Diintzer, Fragm. Epic. Gr. p. 16. See note on I 15.14.
12. ' Some proverbs also are ywS/xcu; for example, " an Attic neighbour" is a proverb (and also may be used as a yvwfitf)'. vyirios or K.T.X.
is quoted as a proverb in I 15.14; here it is a yum/tr). It may be added
to the list of Trench's 'immoral proverbs', On Proverbs, p. 82 seq.
On the napoi.fx.la, its definition and character, see Erasmus, Adag:
Introd.: and Trench, "on the lessons in Proverbs."
What sort of neighbour an Attic neighbour was, may be best gathered
from the description of the Athenian character drawn by the Corinthians,
and contrasted with that of their Lacedaemonian rivals, in their speech
at the Congress at Sparta. Thuc. I 70. The restless, excitable, intriguing spirit, the love of novelty and foreign adventure, the sanguine
temper, quick wit, and daring audacity, therein described, must necessarily have made them the most troublesome and dangerous of neighbours; ever ready to interfere in their neighbours' affairs, and form
schemes of aggrandisement at their neighbours' expense. Another proverb of the same kind is mentioned by Schrader as having been applied
to the Franks, Francum amicum habeas, vicinum non habeas: it is
found in Eginherd's Life of Charlemagne. Gibbon also refers to it, without naming his authority. In the 10th century at Constantinople, " a
proverb, that the Franks were good friends and bad neighbours, was in
every one's mouth." Decline and Fall, ch. XLIX. Vol. IV. p. 509 (Murray,
1846).
13. 'Maxims may also be cited in opposition to, or in contradiction of, those that have become public propertyby these I mean such
as 'know thyself, 'avoid excess' (the maxims or adages of Solon and
Chilon)whenever one's character is likely to be put in a more favourable light (thereby), or the yvw^jj has been pronounced in an excited
state of feeling (by the opponent who is to be answered); of this
'pathetic' yva^r\ an instance is, if for example a man in a fit of passion
were to say that it is false that a man is bound to know himself, " this
gentleman at any rate, if he knew himself, would never have claimed to
be elected general."'
Aristotle has said that there are two classes of cases in which a
PHT0PIKH2 B 21 13, 14.
217
(petit] \js6vdos eivcti ok Bel yiyvwariceiu avTOv' OUTOS

yovv el eylyvwcTKev iavrov, OVK av TTOTC (TTpaTtjye'iv
rjîcoa-ei/. TO Be r/dos fieATiov, ori ov BeT, wenrep (pacri,
(pi\eTv oJs fAMrtjo-ovras dWct /naWou /jutreiv &>? (pi\ri14 (rovTas.
Be? Be Tt\ Xe'êi TY\V Trpoalpecriv <rvvBr\\ouv,
generally accepted or 'universal' maximsuch as Solon's yva>8i <reavTOVmay be contradicted with effect. One of these is, when the yviinrj
itself, including the contradiction of itas appears from the example
is uttered in a state of excited feeling, real or assumed, such as indignation. The example of this is a man in a fit of passion, opytô/ievos,
loudly asserting that Solon's universally accepted maxim, or the precept
conveyed by it, is untrue, or at any rate liable to exception; for if so
and so (some imaginary person) had had a true knowledge of himself
(and his own incapacity) he never would have aspired to be a general:
but he has done so, and succeeded in the attempt: and this success
shews the falsity of the rule, as a prudential maxim, at any rate in this
case; and also being undeserved provokes the indignation of the speaker.
And it is to be observed that this success without merit is necessary to
inspire the feeling, the existence of which is distinctly stated. The case
is that of Cleon, Thuc. iv 27 seq. Victorius however understands it in
a different sense. According to him the case is that of an Iphicrates,
who raised himself from a low condition to the height of power and distinction ; Rhet. I 7. 32, 'l(f>iKpaTr]s avrbv ivfKa>fiiae Xiywv av virrjpê ravra ;
1
9-3 1 ! iolavtls ofu, (TO Toii'lcpiKparovs); if Iphicrates had ' known himself',
i. e. remembered his origin, he never could have entered upon such a
career. But it seems to me that this is not a proper interpretation of
' self-knowledge', and that the maxim could not be applied in this sense :
the mere recollection of his former low estate surely is not entitled to
the name of knowledge of self. Iphicrates, instead of disobeying the
precept, conformed to it in the strictest sense; he did know himself so
well, he was so fully aware of his capacity for fulfilling the duties of the
office, that he did not hesitate to apply for and exercise the command of
an army. Victorius' words are; "jradrjTiKais dicet, qui ira percitus ita
loquetur" (but what is the occasion of the anger, when it is thus interpreted? The mere contradiction of an universal maxim does not give
rise to a fit of passion), "falsum est omnino, quod aiunt, debere homines
seipsos nosse: hie enim profecto si se ipsum cognosset nunquam praetor
ducere exercitum voluisset." It may perhaps be meant that the speaker
assumes indignation in order to give force to his contradiction: or really
gets into a passion at the thought of the folly of mankind for believing it.
' Our character is bettered, men's opinion of our character is improved, by saying for instance (subaudi olov e" TLS \iyoi, aut tale illiquid)
that we ought not, as is said, to love as with the prospect of our love
being turned into hatred, but rather the reverse, to hate as if that was
likely to become love'. This is Bias' precept or suggestion, WTO0J}(OJ, see
note on 11 13.4.
14. 'The language (statement, expression) should be accompanied
218
PHT0PIKH2 B 21 14 IS-
61 Be /Hi], TY\V aiTiav eiriXeyeiv, oiov rj OI/'TWS e'nrovTa,

OTt " Bel Be (piXeTv ov~x wcnrep (f)a(rlv, dXX' ws del
(biXricrovTa' einfiovXov yap OaTepov," r\ woe " OVK
dpe<TKeL Be fxoi TO Xeyojxevov Bet yap TOV y dXr\6ivov
(piXov cos (piXt](rovTa del (piXeiv." icai " ovBe TO p. 93.
fxrjoev ayav cei yap TOV? ye /ca/coys ayav p.i<reiv.
15
exovcrt B' ek TOVS Xoyovs f3otj6eiav fxeyaXrjv /uilav P. 1395s.
uev Bn BLCC Tnv (bopTiKOTtiTa TCOV aKpoaTwv "vaipovtri
I
/V
by the manifestation of the deliberate moral purpose (by which the

moral character of every thought and action is estimated), or if not, the
reason (at any rate) should be added; as thus " a man's love should be,
not as people say, but as though it were to be lasting (as deep and fervent and assured, as though it were to endure for ever); for the other
(the reverse) has the character of treachery (belongs to, is characteristic
of, a designing, plotting, treacherous man; implying deceit together
with evil designs of future mischief)."' This is the construction that may
be put upon it: it also admits of a more favourable interpretation: see
the note on 11 13. 4, already referred to. ' O r thus, "but the statement,
the maxim, does not satisfy me : for the true, sincere, genuine friend
should love as if his love were to last for ever." And again, neither does
the (maxim) "nothing to excess (satisfy me); for the wicked surely
should be hated to excess."'
15. 'These yva/j.ai are of the greatest service (help) to our speeches
one of which' (the other follows in the next section) 'is due to, arises
out of, the want of cultivation and intelligence in the audience; for they
are delighted if ever any one chance to light upon, and express in
general terms, any opinion that they hold themselves, but partially'.
(jiopTiKorrje, as far as Classical Greek is concerned, appears to be a
awa.% Xeyoiievov. it is found also in Eustathius (Steph. Thes. sub v.). <jiopTiKor, from (popros a burden or load, burden-like, burden-ish, and hence
met. burdensome, oppressive, annoying : especially applied to vulgarity,
in person, manners, or intellect. The last of these senses, intellectual
vulgarity, the want of cultivation and refinement, and especially of philosophical cultivationa coarse and vulgar habit of mind, which looks
merely at the surface of things, with little or no faculty of observation or
power of distinction, and contents itself with a mere vulgar knowledge
shared with the mass of mankindis, if not peczdiar to Aristotle, at any
rate much more commonly found in his writings than in others. In
this sense the (popriKos does not differ much from the dnaiSeVTOS, and is
opposed to the xapieis, which, in Aristotle, often expresses the highest
degree of grace and refinement, arising from the study of philosophy.
It is in this signification that the "word is used here, meaning a want of
intelligence and of philosophical or (generally) intellectual training,
which disqualifies men for making distinctions and estimating the
value of an argument; consequently they measure the validity of a
PHTOPIKHS B 21 15.
219
yap eav Tts KadoXov \eywv eiriTV'Xfi TWV Zopwv a\

eKeivoi Kara fiepos exovcriv. o Se Xeyto, SrjXov ecrTai
woe, afxa he Kai TTWS del auVas Qripeveiv. r\ fxev yap
a-wep e'tprjTai, d7ro<pav(rits KadoXov e(TTiv,
he KadoXov Xeyo/nevov o Kwrd /mepos irpoV7roXafj.(3avovTes Tvy^dvovariv
oiov e'l TLS yeiToai
TV%OI Kexprunevos rj T6KVOI$ (pavXois, d.7rodeaiT' av
TOU e'nrovTOs OTI ovSev yeiTovias âXeirvoTepov t) OTI
ovhev nXidiOTepov TeKvo7roua<s. wcrTe SeT
reason not by its logical force or cogency, but by its coincidence with
their own previously conceived opinions; which they love to hear exaggerated by the orator, who humours them by these illicit generalisations.
The Scholiast explains it dypoiidav. Victorius has, I think, entirely mistaken the meaning of the word. The (popTiKOTrjs here ascribed to vulgar
audiences is much the same as the noxfypia rav dKpoarwv, in 1.5, the
vices or defects, which oblige the orator to have recourse to raXXa e<o
TOV airoSeifai in order to convince them, because they are unable to
appreciate logic alone. Comp. 1 2. 13, on this subject, 6 yap Kpirijs
inroKfirai dual anXovs.
See also on III I. 5-
' My meaning will be explained, and at the same time also how they
(the yvafj-ai) are to be caught' (hunted, pursued, like game, Anal. Pr. I 30,
46 a 11, Gqptvew dpxas), 'by what follows (ade)'. ' The yvaju), as has been
stated ( 2), is an utterance or declaration expressed universally; and an
audience is always delighted with the expression, as of an universal
truth, of any opinion which they previously, but partially, entertain: for
example, if a man chanced to have bad neighbours or children, he would
be glad to hear (approve) any one who said " nothing is more troublesome
(harder to bear) than neighbourhood" (abstract for concrete, yen-over
neighbours), or "nothing is more foolish than the procreation of
children."'Possibly also, though this is doubtful, a man with a frail
wife might like to hear Hamlet exclaim "Frailty, thy name is woman."
yeiTOvlas] Plat. Legg. VIII 843 C, xaKeTrr/v Kul a-(p68pa TTiKpav yenovLav dwepyaovTcu. yeirovav, apudeundem. For xaê7r<0T*P>/ yeirovias, comp. Thuc.
Ill 113, e$ei<rav fir) oi'Adrjvalot eôyref avrrjv âXfjro!repot trcpio-i napoiKOL atri.
W i t h the yvu>p.r) comp. Demosth. 7rpos KaAXixAea [Or. 55], init. OVK T)V dp', 3>
avdpes 'Adrjvaioi, âXeirtorepoy ovSev rj yelrovos wovr/pov Kai nXeovenTov Tvê'iv
(Victorius), evidently referring to this proverb, [cf. Hesiod, Op. et D. 345,

irfjua KaKos yeiruiv}.
(TToxa&adai K.TX] 'And therefore (the speaker) must guess what their
previous (already formed) opinions are and what sort of things they are
about.,(/^w they think aboutwhat),and then express this opinion inageneral
proposition on these matters'. Schrader quotes Cic. de Orat. 11 44. 186,
(M. Antonius) sicut medico.. .sic cum aggredior ancipitem causam etgravem,
ad animos iudiami pertractandos omni mente in ea cogitatione curaque
versor, ut odorer quant sagacissime possim quid sentiant quid existiment
quid exspectent quid velint, quo deduci oratione facillinie posse videantur.
220
PHT0PIKH2 B 21 16; 22 I.
iroTa
l 6 l& OUTGO 7Tpl TOVTWV KaBoXoV
XeyeiV.
TCWTt]V T $tj
\pr\cnv TO yviofxoXoyelv, Kai eTepav KpeiTTW

vs yap iTOiei TOI)S Xoyovs.
i]dos h' eôucriv ol
Xoyoi ev ocrois hriXtj r\ irpoaipecris. al oe yvwjxai
Tracrai TOVTO TTOiovari hia TO a7ro(f)alvecr6ai TUV TY\V
yvwfjLtiv Xtyovra KCIBOXOV irepl TWV TrpoaipeTwv, UXTT
av xprjcrTal uxrtv al yvw^xai, Kal ^prj(TT0t]6ri (palvecrdai
7roiov(n TOV XeyovTa.
nrepl fxev ovv yv(id\xv\<s, Kal T'L iffTi Kal irocra '
ainfi<z Kal 7rais ^prjarTeov
, eipri<rdu) TOcrauTa'
avTrj
Kal Tiva
to(peXeiav
7repl 3' evdv[xrifxaToiv KadoXov CHAP.XXII.
7rs nola] Two mterrogatives without copula: common in Greekbut

in verse rather than proseas Soph. Phil. 1090, TOV nore Tevgofiai...Tr68ev
eKiri&os.
16. 'This then is one use (or usefulness, advantage) of the employment of yvajxm, there is also another, and a better; that is, that it gives
an ethical character to our speeches. All speeches have this moral character in which the moral purpose is manifested'. Comp. i n 17.9. The
y8os referred to in i n 16. 9 is of a different kind, it is dramatic character, the third of the three distinguished in Introd. p. 112.
'AH yvapcu have this effect, because any one who uses 2.yva>iir) makes
a declaration in general terms about the objects of moral purpose (or
preference), and therefore if the yvijiai themselves are good (have a good
moral tendency) they give to the speaker also the appearance of good
character'. On dnocjiatvea-dai, see above on II 21.2.
' So, for the treatment of yvdjxrj, its nature, number of kinds, mode of
employment, and advantages, let so much suffice'.
CHAP. XXII.
On the treatment of enthymemes in general. A summary of the
contents of this chapter is given in the Introduction, p. 260 seq., and the
enthymeme in its logical aspect described in the same, p. 1018. The
principal part of it is occupied with the selection of topics of enthymemes, preparatory to, and exemplified by, c. 23, the TOWOI TV iv6viujfiaTav. [On the enthymeme, see Grote's Aristotle I 2913.]
On the selection of topics, comp. Top. A 14. "Derivatum est hoc caput
ex evnopta irporacreav, rahone conquirendi medios terminos"the middle
term which connects the two extremes and so gives rise to the conclusion, is therefore the thing to be looked for in constructing a syllogism
"quae docetur, Anal. Pr. I 2732 : ut seq. cap. (23) e libris Topicorum,
c. 24 et 25 ex Elenchis Soph, est traductum." Schrader. Of course the
mode of treatment is adapted to the purposes of Rhetoric. I will repeat
PHTOPIKHS B 22 13.
221
T e'nrwêu, Tiva Tpoirov Set fyreTv, Kai /meTci ravra

TOI/S TOTTOVS' aWo yap e/So? eKarepov TOVTWV ecrrlv.
2 on fxev ovv TO evdvfJLiina (rvWoytarfxos Tts CCTT'LV, elpnTai 7rpoTepov, Kai 7rws (rvWoyKT/xo^, Kai ri diacpepei
3 TWV oiaAeKTiKtov ovre yap iroppwQev 01/Ve iravra Bel
here, that the enthymeme differs from the strict dialectical syllogism
only inform.
The materials of the two are the same, probable matter,
and of unlimited extent: the dialectician may dispute, and the rhetorician draw his inferences, about anything whatsoever. The difference
between the two is simply this, that the dialectician rigorously maintains
the form of the syllogism, with its three propositions, major and minor
premiss and conclusion: the rhetorician never expresses all threeif he
did, his enthymeme would become a regular syllogismthough his argument or inference derives all the validity of its reasoning from the syllogism, of which it is a kind. [See esp. note on p. 103 of Introd.]
1. 'Let us now speak of enthymemes in general, that is, of the
mode of looking for them, and next their (principal) TOITOL' (general heads
of enthymemes, arguments or inferences; a classification of cases to
which orators may refer for appropriate arguments in any particular
case which they have to argue: in c. 23); 'for each of these is (of) a
different kind'. On which Schrader, "ratio seligendi enthymemata differt
a locis ipsis. Quomodo aliud est argenti fodina, aliud argentum investigandi et explorandi modus."
2. 'Now that the enthymeme is a kind of syllogism has been
already stated (I 2.8, and 13), and also how (in what respects) it is a
syllogism, and wherein it differs from those of dialectics (1 2.11) ; for'
these are two of the differences'we must neither go very far back,
nor introduce all the steps (of the regular syllogism), in drawing our
inferences ; the one is obscure by reason of its length, the other is mere
chattering (idle talk, or vain repetition, leading to nothing, ill 3. 3),
because it states what everybody sees already (what is already evident)'.
ovre yap 7r6ppa>6fv K.T.X.] This is a manifest reference to I 2.13,
where both of these two things which the rhetorician has to avoid are
expressly mentioned.
First, he must not deduce his inference, the conclusion which he
wishes to establish, by a long train of connected syllogisms from a
remote distance, <TtiXXoyiW#ai Kai o-vvayew IK avXKi\oî(jp.ivwv wporepov..,
avayia) jxr) elvai fvewaK.okov8r]Tov 8in TO iirjuns, 6 yap Kpirrjs inroKeirai eivai
arfkovs. Comp. I 2.12, %UTI TO tpyov avTr/s (rfjs p't]TopiKrjs)...ev TO'IS TOWVTOIS
aKpoarais 0% ov SvvaiTai 81a ivoKkav avvopav ovSe XoylêoSai noppaBtv.
(Comp. Topic. A 11, 105 a 8, where this is extended to dialectical argumentation. A similar precept is given in HI 17.6. noppaidtv of 'farfetched' metaphors, III 2. 12. Comp. ill 3.4.) This will only puzzle his
'simple' audience, whose powers of perception and memory will be alike
unable to keep pace with him. The reasoning of the rhetorician must be
as clear and as brief as possible.
Secondly, he must draw his conclusion without expressing all that
222
PHT0PIKH2 B 22 3.
\a/mf3dvovTa<; arvvdyeiv
TO /mev yap do~a<j)e$ hta TO
/nijicos, TO he dho\ea"xia hid TO (pavepd Xeyeiv. TOVTO
yap a'lTiov Kal TOU 7ridavwTepovs eivai TOUS aTraihevTOVS TWV 7re7raihevfxevwv ev TO7S 6)(\OIS,
wcnrep p l
belongs to the regular syllogism; this is also for the sake of brevity; the
formal syllogism is unsuitable to the orator who has a great deal to say,
and is hastening to his conclusion, fearing to weary his audience, because
it expresses a great deal that is self-evident, and may well be left for
the hearers themselves to supply. Besides this, the enthymeme which
he employs obliges him to omit either one of the two premisses or the
conclusion ; which of them it is to be, depends upon the degree in
which the reasoning will be intelligible without it : anything that is
absolutely <j)avep6v should (in reasoning) be omitted to save time. These
are the two points in which the use of the enthymeme differs from that
of the dialectical syllogism.
With respect to the first, the dialectician, whose object is merely to
gain the victory in the dispute, and who has an antagonist more or less a
match for him, can take his own time, and need not accommodate his
reasoning to the intelligence of his opponent : to the rhetorician, the time
allowed is generally limited, he has usually an uneducated and perhaps
unintelligent audience to address, which he must keep in good humour,
and therefore neither puzzle nor weary. The second point conveys the
essential difference between the enthymeme and dialectical syllogism,
that in the former ov ndvra del Xafifidvovras crvvayfiv. irdvra may also
include, what Schrader adds, "multas propositiones probabiles, communes, intempestivas/' which " plane omitti debere praecipit."
On doXeo-xi, see note on III 3.3. Eth. N. i n 13, III8<Z I. Comp.
de Soph. El. c. 3, 165 b 15.
TOVTO yap] yap here can hardly bear its usual signification, that of
'a reason assigned': the factthat the uneducated are more convincing
to a mob than your philosopheris not the reason of the preceding
statement, but rather the reverse; the previous statement explains
(supplies the reason or explanation of) the fact. It must therefore be a
case of that use of yap which Schleiermacher in his translation of Plato
represents by namlich, videlicetj z. use of the word which frequently
occurs in the Platonic dialogues. And so I have translated it: though
it is to be observed that if namlich always represents the Greek yap
(in these special cases), the English 'namely' will not always represent
the German namlich. [Comp. note 1 on p. 134, and Shilleto on Thuc.
1. 25. 4.]
'This, namely, is also the reason why the ignorant (or illiterate)
have a greater power of persuading when they are addressing a mob
than the highly educated or cultivated (in dialectics and philosophy),
as the poets say that the uncultivated are the more accomplished
speakers in a crowd'.
01 Troirjra'i] is generalised from one, viz. Euripides, who alone is
referred to. The plural sometimes expresses the single individual
plus those like him. So we speak of ' our Newtons and our Bacons',
PHTOPIKHS B 22 3.
223
01 7roit]Tal TOI)S aVouSevTOi/s Trap'

as if there were several of them, 'poets, Homers and Virgils'; or
else conveys contempt, 'don't talk to me of your Hegels and Schellmgs' (from some one who was no admirer of German philosophy) and
so on. Soph. Phil. 1306, yjrevSoKijpvKai, of Ulysses alone (Schneidewin).
Sim. Plat. Rep. Ill 387 C, KWKVTOVS re KO.1 2rvyas. Aesch. Agam. 1414,
Xpv(rrjtBa>v fiei'Xty/ia ray vir 'l\ia>. (Longin. jrfpi v^jrovs 23, c^rjX6ov"EKTopcs
re Kai SapTnjfioi/es, Eur. Rhes. 866, OIJK oiSa rois (roi/s ovs Xe'yets 'OSuoWar.
Hor. Ep. II 2. 117, Catonibus atque Cethegis, Lucan, Phars. I 313,
nomina vana, Catones, quoted in Blomfield's Gloss, ad loc.) Arist.
Ran. 1041, narpd/cXcov TevKpav OvtioXiovrav (characters of Aeschylus).
See Valckn. ad Theocr. Adon. line 141, subfin.AevicaXiavas.
The verses here referred to, not directly quoted, are from Eur.
Hippol. 9^9; ' 7P " ffotfiots (pavXot, nap' O^XM p-oixriKeBTepot Xeyeiv. The
same verses are referred to by Plutarch, de Educ. Lib. c. 9, p. 6 B.
IIOVO-IKOS, has here an unusual sense, which seems to be borrowed
from the notion of cultivation, literary and intellectual, which the term
expresses : hence 'skilled in', 'highly trained or cultivated' in the
practice of a particular art. So Rost and Palm Lex. wohlunterrichtet, geschickt. "Accomplished in" seems to unite the two meanings ; general
cultivation, with special skill in the particular art. Ast's Lex. Plat., on
nova-mas : "Et in universum decetiter. Plat. Rep. Ill 403 A, epas ncipvue
...fiova-iKas ipqv, Legg. VII 816 C."
'For the one (the TrfTrmSevfievoi) talk about generals and universals,
the others about {lit. 'from', the materials from which the speech is
derived) what they really know, and things that are near to us (near,
that is, to our observation, things sensible; and to our interests, those
which nearly concern us)'. The KOIVO. nal KadoXov are the general or
abstract, and universal notions, with which alone the philosopher and
man of science care to deal. These are of course remote from popular
knowledge and interests. The artist also is conversant with ' generals'
and not with 'particulars or individuals' : the rules of art are all general
rules. Experience or empiricism deals with the particular: i) ficv
epireipia rav KO.8' eKao-Tov Ian
yv&ais, 1) 8e rix^l
<*>v KadoXov. Metaph.
A 1, 981 a 15. Rhet. I 2. 11, II 19. 27. But although these abstract
universal truths and rules are in themselves better known, Kaff avra,
dn-Xffly, TTJ (f>vo-ci yvapiiMorepa, that is, convey a higher and more comprehensive kind of knowledge, yet to us, y/Mv, jrpos was, things of sense
and the concrete, the visible and palpable, are nearer or closer {iyyvs),
clearer and more interesting, and in this sense, better known; the
knowledge of these comes to us first, as the simpler nporcpov, appeals to
our senses, and is consequently more in accordance with our lower
nature 1 . The distinction of absolute or objective, and relative or subjective, knowledge is very familiar to Aristotle. See Phys. Auscult. at the
1
<t>v<ns is used in more than one sense : thus it may be applied to the normal or
abstract notion of nature, its true and highest form, perfect nature; or an imperfect
nature, as it shews itself in us and our imperfect faculties and condition.
224
PHTOPIKHS B 22 3.
\eyeiw o'l jxev yap ret Koivd Kai KadoXou Xeyovtrtv,

01 <$' e wv icracri, Kai TO. eyyvs.
UMTT OUK e diravTUiV TWV SoKOVVTCOV CtW
?
.\
.\
K TlSv
A
<\ r
wpi(TfiVWV
XCKTCOV, p.
p 9
,
P.
1396.
oiov i] Tots npivovcriv t] ovs a.7rooe)OVTai. Kai TOVTO

beginning [p. 184 a 16], ire<f>VKefiee'(e TWV yiiapifiayTepav rifiiv 7j ofioy icai
<ra<f>eoTepa>v eVi ra tracpeo-repa rfj (pvo-ei Kai yvapifuoTepa" ov yap ravra r\\u.v
re yvdpip.a Kai dnXas. Metaph. Z 4, 1029 b I, seq. Bonitz ad loc. Waitz

ad Organ. 71 a 1,11 299, 71 b 24, p. 307. Trendelenburg ad de Anima
p. 337 seq., Elem. Log. Ar. 19, p. 82.
' We therefore must not derive our arguments or inferences from all
possible opinions' (" ex omnibus quae probantur, et vera esse videntur."
Victorius); 'but select them out of those which are defined or determined
or settled for us (marked off, and separated from the rest, as especially
suitable to our purpose) (in some way or other) as, for instance, either
by the judges (i. e. their known opinions : this in a law case) or those
whose authority they accept'.
That, is, there are many truths, such as scientific generalities, which
may indeed be included amongst opinions (because they are believed as
well as known) but yet are alien to the purposes of Rhetoric, and also
many opinions, properly so called, which are unfit for its use, OVK C'
av trvxev, I 2. 11; and besides this, "every fool has some opinions",
I 2. 11; we must therefore make a selection if we wish to persuade
we had been already told that though the sphere of Rhetoric, like
that of Dialectics, is theoretically unlimited, I 2. 1, yet that in practice
it is usually confined to the business of life and human action, and there~
fore that its materials are in fact drawn from Politics, including Ethics,
from political and social philosophy, ib. 7.
Here however there is a still further restriction-we must select out
of the vast range of probable opinions those which happen to suit our
immediate purpose : for instance, if we are arguing a case in a law-court
we must draw our inferences from such opinions as they (the judges)
themselves are known to hold, or at any rate such as those whom they
regard as authorities are known to approve, xpiveiv and Kpirijs, as we
have seen, 11 1. 2; 18. 1, may be extended to the decision of audiences in
all three branches of Rhetoric, the assembly, the judges, and the Bearai or
decopoi of an epideixis, and Victorius takes this view. As however Kpivovcriv
is qualified by olov, which shews that there are other analogous cases, the
two audiences of indirect Kplvovres may perhaps be left to be understood.
TS>V SoKotWcai/] 'probable opinions', comp. II 1.6; 25.2, and (patverai
in I 2. 11, and in the succeeding clause.
Kai TOVTO fie] 'And this too should be clearthe speaker should be
quite certainthat it does so appear tothat this is really the opinion
ofall or most (of any audience)'.If fie be retained (so Bekker), compare
note on 1 6. 22. MS Ac Sij. Quaerefie?? Victorius seems to understand
it so, as he uses the word debet; perhaps supposing that the notion of
'ought' is carried on from the preceding Xexreov: and this is confirmed
by the following o-wdyeiv.
225
o\ OTI ovTia (paiveTCLiy ZrjKov elvat rj /7ru(Tiv~ tj TOZS P. 139s7r\i<TTOi<i. Kal fxrj fxovov trvvd'yeiv CK TWV dvayKaiwv,
d\\d Kal 4K TWV w's eirl TO TTOKV.
irpooTov ixkv ovv Zel XctfieTv on 7repl ov Se? Xe<yeiv
Kat avWoyiêa-dai
eire TTOXITIKW (rvWoyKT/Jiw eld'
' And his inferences should be drawn not only from necessary propositions, but also from those that are only true for the most part', probabilities. The .reKfiijpiou, the certain sign, the necessary concomitant, is
the only necessary argument admitted in Rhetoric: its ordinary materials are UKOTO and o-rjfieta, things by their very name and nature only
probable. On these materials of Rhetoric, see Introd. p. 160 seq. One
might suppose from the phraseology adopted here, ^ p.6vov ex T&V dvayKalav,
XXd Kal K rav air eVt TO TTOXU, that the necessary propositions and conclusions were the rule and the probable the exception; instead of the
reverse. The true statement is found in I 2. 14. Comp. Anal. Pr. I 27,
43 b 3236.
4. ' S o first of all it must be understood that anything we have to
speak or reason about' (on o-vWoyl&o-dai et sim. for reasoning in general,
see note on I 1. 11), 'whetherit be on a political subject or any other
whatever, it is necessary to (have in our possession) be acquainted with
everything that belongs to this also (KOI besides the o-vWoyLcrpos itself,
or the particular point which the argument has in view), either all or.
some (according to circumstances); for if you have nothing (no information, no facts) in your possession (as material) you will have nothing to
draw your inferences from'. The same thing is stated, and nearly in the
same words, Anal. Pr. I 3a, 46 a 3, ij fiiv ovv 686s KOTO, nivrav 7 avrq Kal
Trcpl <j>i\o(ro(plav Kal jrepi Teftvyv arrmavovv Kal fiadijfia' (all learning a n d all
philosophy and science begin with observation^} dct yapTOvirapxovra

Kal ols V7rdpxi Trepl iKarepov dBpeiv, Kal rovrav as TrXeiVraie tinopeiv.
And
again, a 22, <o<rre av \rj<pd!j ra virapx.vra irepl eKaorrov, rjixerepov rjSn Tas
airohciêis eTolfMos eftfpavi&iv. el yap /iijSev Kara rrjv lerropiav napa\r)<p8tlj)
TWV dXqSais VTrapxovTav TOIS Trpayfiaa-iv, eofiev Trepl airavros, ov juev eanv
aTroSeigis, TavTTjV evpeiv Kal dnoSciKViivai, ov 8e /*>) ire<pvKev dwohei&s, TOVTO
iroifiv (pavfpov. The virapxovra here spoken of are all that properly
belong to a thing, all its properties, qualities, attributes, all its antecedents and consequencesthese are especially important in human
actions, the rhetorician's subjecteverything closely connected with it,
whether similar or different, as opposites, relative terms and so on : in
shortr if you have to speak or reason upon any subject, if you wish to
succeed, you must first know all about it. This is illustrated at length
from the three branches of Rhetoric in the next five sections.
Xa(3eiy I take to be here \a/3eiv ra> KJ> or 777 diavola, to seize or grasp
with the mind, apprehend, conceive.
JTOXITJKM] Politics, including Ethic3, being almost exclusively the
source from which rhetorical enthymemes are to be drawn, though
theoretically the field of rhetorical practice is boundless : see note on p. 224.
Otherwise, 7TO\ITIK6S <rvM.oyio-p.6s may mean ' a rhetorical syllogism' or
AR. II.
IK
226
PHTOPIKHX B 22 46.
ctvayKaTov Kaii r a TOVTU)
i] iravTa
5 crvvdyeiv.
n evict'
Xiyco
Xeveiv 'Adrivalois
fitjBev yap
S' olov
XIV
e^wi' e ovdevos
7rajs av
el iroXeixriTeov f\ fit} 7ro\efir]Teov,
e'ÔJ/Tes Tts *J Zvvafxis avTcov, vroTepov

i/a) tj a'/JXpw, Kai avTt]
<j>l\ot Kai i^dpoi,
6 icavi
en
iv
nn
vavTiKrj r\ 7re-
Trocrri, Kai "irpoGoZoi Ttws tj

Se TiVas 7rQ\e/uovs
Kai TTWS, feat TaWa
fit] '&xpifiev rr\v
av
Swal/neda
TO. TOiavrw
"ZaXa/uuvi vavfxa^lav
7re7roAeju>j-
t] iiraiveiv,
e't
f) Ttjv
iv
enthymeme: 'political'that is 'on political subjects', to which Rhetorio

is almost exclusively confined, is so far convertible with 'rhetorical'.
This seems to be Victorius' view; on n 22. 10.
5. ' A s an instance of what I meanhow could we possibly advise
the Athenians' (the irviifiovXevTiKbv yivos) 'whether they should make war
or not, unless we know what is the nature of their power (or forces),
whether it is a naval or military force, or both, and its amount or magnitude, and what their revenues are, and their friends or enemies, and
besides all this what wars they have waged, and with what success (or
possibly, what are their modes of warfare)and everything else of the
same sort'. Compare with this I 4. 7, to the end, on political topics.
6. ' O r deliver a panegyric' (the imbfiKTiKov yc'voi) 'if we had not the
sea-fight at Salamis, and the battle at Marathon, or all that was done on
behalf of the Heraclidae, or anything else of the like sort. For all (panegyrists) derive their encomiums from the fair deedSj renown, distinctions
(of their hero), real or supposed'.
These are the stock subjects of the Athenian declaimers : t>v âXen-oK
'A6rp/aiovs ev'A.6r)vatois tTraivtiv, I 9. 30, i n 14. 11. Plato's Menexenus
has all these topics, the Heraclidae, 239 B; Marathon, c. 10; Salamis,
c. 11. Isocrates, Panegyricus, 5460; 64, 65; Marathon and Salamis,
85 seq. Comp. Philipp. 147. de Pace 37. Panath. 194, Eurystheus
and the Heraclidae; 195, Marathon. He can't even keep it out of the
wepi avrihoaeas (though that speech is of a purely personal nature);
where it appears again, 306. Lysias, emracjiios, 1116, 2026,
2743. And the same three topics recur in the same order, only more
briefly treated, in the imra4>ios attributed to Demosthenes, 8 seq.
Pseudo-Dem, mpl avvraêws 22. Aesch. c. Ctesiph. 259. Demosth,
c. AristQcr. 198. These topics are not introduced in the Speech for
the Crown.
The tragic poets wrote dramas upon the same stories of unfailing
interest, as Aeschylus' Persae, and Euripides' Heraclidae; and Aristophanes refers derisively to this habit of self-glorification, Acharn.
696^-7, Vesp. 711, Equit. 781785, and 1334. The MapaBavo/xaxai, the
warriors of Marathon, Ach. 181, Nub. 986, is not applied altogether in
jest.
[(V MapaSavi. is an instance of departure from the stereotyped ad-
227
MapaBtSvt \ia-)(t\v tj TO. VTrep 'HpaKXei^wu Trpaxêvra

t] aXXo TI TWV ToiovTcov e'/c yap Tbov virapxpvTuyv i)
7 SOKOVVTCOV vTrdpxeiv ttaXwv eiraivovcri TraVres. O/JLOIUK
oe Kal \jseyov(nv eV TWJ/ ivavriwu, o~KO7rovvTes TI
V7ra
PXei TOIOUTOV avrols i) So/ce? xnrdpxîv, olov on
Tovs ' EWj/ras KctTedovXwaavTO, Kal TOUS Tryjos TOV
fidpBapou o-yju/xaêca/xeVoys Kal dpi<rrev<TavTa's r\vBpa7TO()L<ravTO Aiyivyras
Kal FIoTtâtaTa?, Kal o<ra
aXXa TOiavTa, Kal ei TI aXXo TOIOVTOV dfxdpTtjfjLa
virapxei CLVTOIS. ws h' ai/Vws Kal ol KUTtjyopovvTes
Kai ol diroXoyovnevoi 4K TCOV virapxovTtov O~KO7TOV8 fJLevoi KaTtiyopovcri Kal dTroXoyovvrai.
ovêv de
verbial form Mapa&Sw, without the preposition. See Cobet, Variae Lectiones, p. 201, and Dr Thompson's ed. of the Gorgias, p. 152.]
7. 'And in like manner also topics of censure are derived from
the opposites of these, by considering what of the like (1. e. TO ivavriov,
the opposite) nature actually belongs, or seems to belong, to them' (the
objects of the censure; things as well as men: see note in Cambr.
Journal of Cl. and Sacred Phil, Vol. 11., No. 5, p. 158), 'as for instance,
that they (the Athenians) reduced the Greeks to servitude and made
slaves of the Aeginetans and Potidaeans, men that had shared in the
fight and distinguished themselves against the barbarian (in the Persian
invasion), and everything else of the like kind; and any other similar
offence that can be alleged against {lit. belongs to) them1. On the treatment
of the Aeginetans, see Thuc. 11 27 ; and of the Potidaeans, Ib. c. 70.
Against the charges brought against the Athenians of abusing their
maritime supremacy, and oppressing their subject states, and other
iniquities, Isocrates, Paneg. 100 seq, defends them as well as he
c a n : fura 8e ravra ^8?j rives rifuav KaTrjyopovaiv, (is infiSrj TTJV ap^rjv
Trjs 6aKaTTrj9 7rap\d@O[iV 7roWcoi> KaKcov aiTtoi TOT? "EXX^cri KaTearijfiev^
Kai TOV re MijXt'o)!/ avSpairohurixbv (cat TOV SKiavaiav oXeOpov iv TOVTOIS TO'IS
Xoyois 17/iIj' 7rpo(f>tpovo-iv' K. T. X.
'And in like manner also, plaintiff and defendant (in a court of

justice) derive their (arguments in) accusation and defence from the
circumstances of the case, which they have to consider (take into
account)'. Ta vnapxavra are here the acts and facts alleged, the characters
of the two parties, and such like.
Schmidt, On the date of Aristotlis Rhet.' p. 17, remarks on the three
last sections, that the examples therein given would have been used by
none but a resident at Athens, and go far to shew that the Rhetoric was
written in that city.
8. 'But in doing this (in acquiring the requisite information on
the facts of the case, and the character and history of the person) it
IS2
228
PHT0PIKH2 B 22 8 io.
(pepei wepi 'Afhivalwv t) AaKebaifxovitav t] dvdpunrov ij

deov Tavro TOVTO Zpdv Kai yap (rufx/3ov\evovTa TW
'A%i\\ei
Kai eiraivovvTa Kai \jseyovTa Kai KaTr\yopovvTa Kai a.7ro\oyov[xevov VTrep avTOv TO. virdpyovTa
1} ZoKovvTa V7rdp%eiv XrjTTTeov, iV e'/c TOVTIOV Xeywfxev
ewaivqvvTe^ f> -^seyovTes e'l TI KO\6V r\ ala"%pov inrdpXî, K.ajt]yopovvTe<s h". i) airoXoyovixevoi e'l TI %'iKaiov
t) OZIKOV, orvfj.@ov\evovTe<; Z' e'l TI o-vftfpepov ij 0\a9 fiepov. 6[Aolws $e TouVots Kai Trepl 7rpdyfiaT0(s OTOUovv, dlov irepi diKaid<rvvr]s, el dyadov tj fxrj dyadov, eV p- 95IOTCOV virap-ôvTcov Trj ZiKaiocrvvy Kai TW dyadw.
UKTT'
makes no difference whether our subject be Athenians or Lacedaemonians, man or god; for whether we advise Achilles' (for any individual), 'or praise or censure, or accuse or defend him, we must alike
make ourselves acquainted with all that belongs, or is thought to belong
to him, in order that from this we may have to state whatever belongs
to him and to his interests, whether fair or foul (noble or base, right or
wrong), in praise and censure; just or unjust, in accusation and defence ;
and in advising' (advice or counsel includes dnoTpeireiv as well as wpoTpeireiv) 'expedient or injurious'.
9. 'And in like manner any subject whatsoever is to be dealt
with ; as for example, the question of justice, whether it be good or
bad, (must be discussed from topics) derived from the belongings of
justice and good'. Victorius reminds us of Thrasymachus' thesis in the
first book of Plato's Republicand he might have added that of Callicles
in the Gorgiasthat injustice is in reality, and by nature, superior to
justice, which is the good of others, but injurious to the just man himself.
10. 'And therefore since everyone manifestly demonstrates (i.e.
argues, infers) in this way (i. e. from and by the knowledge of everything
that belongs to his subject) whether his reasoning takes the exact or
rigorous form of the syllogism (as in scientific demonstration, and
probably also in dialectical argument), or employs the laxer mode (of
the rhetorical enthymeme)'(yap in the parenthesis that follows, assigns
the reason for the 'selection', the irepi eWroi/ exflv cêiAeyjie'va ; and
as it comes before that for which it assigns the reason, must be translated
'since')'since they don't take (their propositions, premisses, materials)from everything'
(OVK il- diravrav rS>v SOKOVVTGV K.I-.X. supra 3see note
ad locOVK eg av ZTVX*V, I 2.u : although it is true that Rhetoric admits

of this, it may argue anything), 'but from what belongs to each particular
subject (that comes under their notice), and by means of the speech
(at any rate, to say nothing about the demonstrative and dialectical
syllogisms) it is plainly impossible to prove anything otherwise 1 : it
1
This I take to be the meaning of Sid rod \6yov. The other interpretation,
'it is plain by reason', or 'reason shews that', is supported by Muretus andVater.
PHTOPIKHS B 22 10.
229
Kal TraVres ovrto cbalvovTai aVoSei/ciwres, edv

r e dt<pil3i<rTpoi/ idv r e na\a.K.u>Tepov
is clearly necessary, as in the Topics (or Dialectics, in general), first to
have ready on each particular subject a selection already prepared of the
probabilities and of those circumstances of the case which are most suitable, appropriate (opportune, timely, seasonable, germane to the matter in
.hand); (these are to be kept in stock, and ready prepared for use on occasion:
from which are distinguished ra ' vTroyviov); and also about circumstances (evidence, or what not) that arise on the sudden, to pursue
your inquiries in the same way (make yourself acquainted with them
as far as possible in such an emergency) ; turning your attention not to
things indefinite (such as universals, intellectual and moral) but to
what actually belongs to the subject of your speech, and including
(drawing a line round, enclosing with a line) as many, and as close
(nearly connected) to the subject, as possible: for the more of these
circumstances there are in your possession, so much the easier is it
to prove your point; and the closer the connexion, so much the more
appropriate are they, and less general'.
Of the selection of irpoTdo-eu for syllogisms, Anal. Pr. I 27, 43 b 6,
it is said, Staipercov 8e Kal i w iiropevav (antecedents, consequents, and
concomitants) oa-a re iv raj ri can, Kal ova as 181a {propria: properties
which, though not of the essence of the subject, are yet inseparably
attached to it, and peculiar to, characteristic of it), Kal oa-a as a-vfiê^riKora
KaTrjyopeirai, Kal rovrav
iroia SoâtrrtKas Kal jroia Kar> aktjdttav'
O<TB> ptv
yap av 7r\ti6va>v TOIOVTWV evwopfj TIS BCLTTOV evrevêrai <TVfxi7epdtrp.aTij otr<n
S' av aKrjdfo-Tfpav /laXkov airoBelget,. Mutatis mutandis, and omitting the

woia Kar aXijtieiav 'the truths of science', this agrees with what we find in
the Rhetoric.
aKpi&iiiTepov] the more exact mode of reasoning by formal syllogism,
demonstrative or dialectical: the latter probably included, because, as
far as the form is concerned, the dialectical syllogism follows precisely
the same rules as the other, and the construction of the two is identical.
Ha\aKaTepov] softer, more yielding, less stiff and rigid and unbending, is
naturally transferred to a more relaxed or less rigorous mode of reasoning, in force and substance, i.e. to the lhetorical enthymeme. Though
the word is very often used metaphorically, I can find no other instance of
this particular application of the metaphor. [For the metaphor, compare
Metaph. E I, 1025 b 13, airoSeiKVVOvcnv rj avayKawTepov rj fiaKaKarepov, ib. K 7,
1064 a 6, SeiKiruvai ra XOOTO ixaKaKarepov rj aKpifilorepov, de generatione et
corruptione, B 6, 333 b 25, eSet ovv t) oplaaaOai fj viroBeaBai r) diroSelgat, r)
Victorius renders it, " as by general use, so also, ita etiam ratione quadam con'firmalur" meaning by ratio the process of reasoning. As to the first, it seems to
me that Sid TOU X070U would be a very affected and unnatural way of expressing
either ' by reason', or ' by reasoning': it would rather be T$ \6ytp if that weie the
meaning. Also Sid with the genit., which denotes the channel/medium, course,
or means, of anything, is much more appropriately joined with Sawivai, with
which my version connects it, than with SrjXov, which, to say the least, would be
very unusual Greek.
PHT0PIKH2 B 22 io3 11.

(ov yap i^ dtrdvTiav Xajxftdvovcrtv d\\' e/c TVL,V irepl P. 1396^
eicao'Tou vrnrapôvTtov), Kal id TOV \6yov oijAov OTI
dhvvaTov a\\ta<s ZeiKvvvou, tpavepov OTI dvayKalov,
w&irep iv rofe TOTTIKOIS, irpwrov m-epl IEKCUTTOV e%eiv
eêiKeyfxiva irepl rwv ivêôfxevwv Kal TWV emKaipo11 TaTtov, irepl Se TCOV i diroyviov yiyvo/ueviov tyTelv
TOV CCVTOV TpoTTOV, dTrofiXeirovTo. /nrj ets dapKTTa d\\'
p a s fj fiaKaKms, % ap&s ye ircos, i b . N 3 , 1 0 9 0 b 8, fifj Xai rj fiahanos (o Xoyor),
de Caelo, A 6, 313 b 4, ii/trrils Aii fiaKaxas:. Index Aristotelicus (Bonit?).]

a(T7Tfp iv Tois TcmtKois] Brandis, in the tract so often referred to [Philpl.
iv i] p. 18, notices on this "that it maiks the connexion between Rhetoric
and the Topics, i. e. dialectics", being a reference to 11 23. It seems not
to refer to any particular passage of the Topics, but merely to state in
general ternis that the mode of treating the Topics is the same in Rhetoric as in 'the Topics', i. e. the entire work, or the practice of dialectics
in general. Similarly Schmidt, in the tract On the date of the Rhetp. 2, "verisimile est etiam in tribus aliis locis (videlicet, 11 22.10, 11 23.9,
11 26.4)eum non suos de arte topica libros (we need not go so far as this)
sed hanc artem ipsam intellexisse." Is it possible that this may be one of
the, I might almost say, ordinary lapses, of the Aristotelian memory in
quotation, and that he has referred to the Topics instead of the Prior
Analytics ? In the latter, I 30, quoted above on 4, there is a passage
which contains a statement very closely resembling what has been said
here about the selection of topics, 46 a 10, OJTWS firj /Shtimafuv eIs airavra
ra Xfyo/iera...dXX' ft? cXaTro) Kal dpia-fiiva, naff eKacrrov 8c cjcXcyetv rav
ovrav, olov jrepi aya$ov xi fTrtarijfirjs. Whether this be so or not, the passage at all events deserves to be compared with this section of the
Rhetoric. Top. A 14 is upon the selection of -npoTaa-fis, chiefly in the
shape of Kai for dialectical purposes,; but cannot, I think, be directly
referred to here.
ii-tikeyiiiva, iAoyrjs, 12.} " T h e collection of premisses, whether
scientific theses, or dialectical organa, or rhetorical specific data, is expressed by the word exXryetv or eic\a,nPdi/eivt" Poste, Poster. Anal. p.
121, note 1, comp. p. 25, and note 1. The terms occur constantly in the
Anal. Prior. [Comp. supra I 2,1358 a 23, f$k\nov ovv ixXiyea-Bai rat jrpoYaa-eis.] The use of them is not confined to Aristotle, and seems to be
technical. Rhet- ad Alex. c. 10 (11), 2, i&tjnTiov.
iT!iKmpoT&.Ttov\
So Top. F 6, 109 a 36, fiakuTTa in'iKCupoi KOI KOivoi TWV
ronav. Ib. H 4 init.

11. i \moyvlwi\ See note on 1 1. 7, p. 11. The phrase is applied here
to circumstances that arise out of the occasion., which you must seize on as
well as you can; extemporaneous, sudden, unpremeditated, and therefore unprepared; temporary accidents of the subject in hand, quae
repente eveniunt (Victorius). These we must collect as well as we can> on
'hp.sonjrt-Qf thp.Jnott\euJU.hvt_th,p.&atTifi...r.ul<i%..a!;pJt<i be ob=eEes',^s in,
the other cases.
Poste, u. s., p. 24, " singular circumstances."
P H T O P I K H S B 22 i i , 12.
231
ets TO. vTrap-^pvTa irepi wv 6 Ao<yos, Kal 7T6piypd(f)ovTas OTI 7r\ei<TTa Kal eyyvTaTa TOV Trpay/maTOs' cxrw
fxev yap av ir\eiw ky^Tai TWV virapypvTwv, TO&OVTW
p'aov heiKpvvai, Saw $' iyyvTepov, TQCTOUTU) oiiceioTepa,
12 Kat r'jTTOv Koivd. Aeyw Se icoivd fxev TO eiraivetv TOV
'AîAAea OTI dv6pwTro<s Kal OTI TWV q/iAidewv Kal OTI
t TO 'l\iov e<TTpaTev<raTO' TavTa ydp Kal aAAote
7roAAor?, wcTT ovtiev fxdWov 6 TOIOVTOS
neptypatpovras] irepiypacpeiv and ir(piypa(f>j are Usually applied to the
outline of a drawing, so irepiyeypdfpdco rdyadov of a rough sketch or outline of good (opposed to avaypa^nu, to fill up, lit. draw over, this outline)
Eth. N. I 7, init. and nepiypa<prj Ib. 1098 a 23: but this is not applicable
here. Praefinientem seponentemque says Victorius. The meaning required
seems to be that of ' enclosing', for the purpose of keeping things separate from others, so that you may be able to lay your hand upon them
at once when you want them, and not have to sort them at the time: for
this purpose you draw a line of demarcation round them, which keeps
them from getting mixed up with other things that resemble them, or at
all events that you don't want just then. [Metaph. K 7, 1064 a 2, inaarr\
yap Tovrav Trepiypayjrafievj] TI yevos avrfj nep\ TOVTO irpaypaTeveTai.]
TJTTOV KOIV6L\ 'less general', and therefore more special, XSia. KOIVO. is
illustrated in the next section; from which it appears that it means here
the wider and higher generalisations which are attributes of very large
classes, and have therefore nothing special, distinctive, and characteristic,
"about them. Neither of them is used in a technical sense, a.s genus and
species. %bta axe peculiarities and peculiarities of individuals.
In contrast with what is here said of the selection of rhetorical topics
compare Anal. Pr. I 27, 43 b 1 seq., on the selection of topics for demonstrative syllogisms: in these the major premisses and conclusions must
be universal and necessary, and the rules laid down are in conformity
with that. Near the end of the chapter, \ryisriov hk K.TX. 43 b yz, seq. a
supplementary note is added, on probable (ra as enl TO troXv) questions
and their syllogisms, referring to dialectical and rhetorical proofs.
12. 'By "common" or "general" I mean, saying (for instance) in
praise of Achilles, that he is a man, or one of the demigods, or that he
joined the expedition against Troy; for these things belong (these distinctions are shared by, are common) to many others besides, so that one
who does this (such an one) praises Achilles no more than Diomede.
By " special" or " peculiar", what belongs' (properly as a separable accident,
but not technical here) 'to no one else but Achilles, as for instance to
have slain the famous (TOV) Hector, the best and bravest of the Trojans,
and the renowned Cycnus, who, being invulnerable, prevented the landing
of the whole (Greek) army; and that he was the youngest of those that
made the expedition, and joined it without taking the oath1 (unsworn,
i. e. voluntarily, whereas the rest were compelled to serve by their engagement to Tyndareus), 'and anything else of the same kind'.
232
'A^jAAea eiraivei fj Aio/a^tiv

iSict Se a /i>jSew aAAa>
o-Vfifieflr}Kv f\ TW AxiAAet, 0I01/ TO diroKreivai TOV
''Europe* TOV api<rrov TCOV Tpiowv KCCI TOV KVKVOV, OS
eKw\v<rev airavTas dirofiaiveiv aTpwTOs wv} KCU OTI
vewTctTos KCCI OVK CVOJOKOS u)v icFTpaTeva-ev, teat b<ra
a'AAa TOiavTct.
els fxev oyv TjOdVos TJJS e'/cAoyjs KCLI TrpwTOs OVTOS
6 TOTTLKOS, T Be arToiêia Twv evdvfxriixdTWV Xeyco/nev.
(rToi)(eiov Se Aeyw nal TOTTOV ivdvfJLrifxaTos TO auTO.
7rpcoTov B' e'L7rwfxev irepl cov dvayicaTov elvreTv TrpcoTOV.
KVKVOV] Cycnus does not appear in Homer. The earliest mention
of him seems to be that of Pindar, 01. 11 82 (146), who uses him for the
same purpose as Aristotle, viz. for the glorification of Achilles. (Ar.'s
notice may possibly be a reminiscence of Pindar.) 'AxiXXa...os "Exi-op*
e<rcf>dKe, Tpaas a/iaxov daTpafirj Kiova, KVKVOV re Bavaria iropev, 'Aovs Tt TraiS'
Ai&Wa (Memnon.) The story of Achilles' encounter with Cycnus at

the landing of the troops, the long conflict with his 'invulnerable' antagonist, and how Achilles finally destroyed him, are all related at length
by Ovid, Met. XII 64145. He was the son of Neptune, Ovid u. s. 72,
proles Neptunia; is again classed with Hector, line 75 ; and in lines 135
144 is described as finally crushed and strangled with the thong or fastening of his own helmet.
arparos] not utiwounded, but invulnerable (invulnerable by ordinary
weapons ; not absolutely, since he was killed). Pind. Nem. x 11, arpdrtp
Kpabla, Isthm. Ill 30 arparoi naiBes 6ewv. Plat. Symp. 219 E.
OVK. cvopKos] The oath sworn by Helen's suitors to her father Tyndareus at Sparta, that they would defend him whom she chose for her
husband against any aggression. This was Menelaus. Victorius quotes,
Pausan. Lac. c. 24, "O/uijpor fie tfypaijre jiiv TTJS Trorfo-fas apxpfitvos as
AîXXevs xapifo/ifvos rots 'Arpians iraia'i, Kai OVK iveXop.iV9S TOIS opKois Tins
Tvvbapea, napayevoiTo els Tpoiav. The passage referred to seems to be

II. A 158. Ulysses says the same of his son Neoptolemus, Soph. Phil.
72, o-ii p.ev irtTrXevKas, OVT evopKos ovdevi K.T.X.: a n d Philoctetes of himself,
Ib. 1026. The story of the oath is told in Eurip. Iph. Aul. 4965;
and frequently alluded to elsewhere in the Tragic writers. Comp. Soph.
Aj. n i l , Teucer of Aj,ax, ov yap rt rijs crijs oCvex ioTparfvcraTO,
oive\ opKav oicriv 7)V ivcifioTos-
dXX'
13. 'One method of the selection then, and the first (most important), is this, namely the topical (dialectical, following the dialectical
method, that by topics); and now let us pass on to the elements of enthymemes; by elements and topics of enthymemes I mean the same thing'.
This is repeated, c. 26.1. On O-TOIXÔV=T6TTOS, and why so called, see
Introd. pp. 127, 128. Add to the examples there given, Rhet. ad Alex. 36
(37)- 9? oToixt'ta Kowa Kara navruv, which seems to mean rojrot.
PHTOPIKH2 B 22 1416.
233
14 t(TTi yap Tbitv ivdvfxtjindTwv et'&j Si/o* TO. /nev yap $eiecrTiv OTi eaTiv rj OUK earTiv, TO. $ eXeyKTiKa,
w(nrep ev TOT<S SiaXeicTiKofe eXey%os Ka
*5 XoyKrjuos. e<TTi Se TO /nev SBIKTIKOV evQvixr\\xa TO ep
o/JLoXoyov/mevwv (rvvdyeiv, TO Be eXeyKTiKov TO TCL dvo16 fioXoyovjuieva (rvvdyeiv.
(r%ed6v fxev ovv rijjiiv irepl
'But (before we proceed to do so) let us first state the necessary
preliminaries'.
14. ' Of enthymemes namely there are two kinds: for some undertake to shew that something is, or is not, so and sodirect proof;
the establishment of a proposition, affirmative or negativeothers are
refutative ; and these differ just like refutation and syllogism in dialectics'. On this and the next section see Introd. pp. 262, 3, and the notes.
15. 'The demonstrative enthymeme (which proves directly) is,
to draw an inference' (to 'gather,' colligere; corresponding to the conclusion, (rvimepao-pa, of the regular syllogism)' from universally admitted
premisses (those general probabilities which everyone is ready to
admit); the refutative is to draw inferences or conclusions not agreeing
(with the opinions or inferences of the adversary)'. The fKcyxos is
avTt>a<rea>s o-vWoyto-fios, the negative of, or conclusion contradictory to,
the conclusion of the opponent : refutation always assumes an opponent,
real or imaginary, whose arguments, or opinions, or theories are to be
refuted by proving the negative.
This interpretation is in conformity with the received signification
of avoiLoKoyovuevos' disagreeing with, contradictory'. This negative sense
is rare: Plat. Gorg. 495 A, Ar. Anal. Pr. 1 34, 48 a 21 [TOVTO Se avopohoyovfievov Tots n-poetpij/icVois], Rhet. li 23. 23, bis, are the only instances cited;
c6mp. Buttm.-Auctar. ad Heind. Gorg. 108, p. 490. So Victonus, "quae
adversentur iis quae ab adversario ostensa prius et conclusa fuerint;"
and Augustinus Niphus (quoted by Schrader)' c quod ex datis concessisve
adversario repugnantia atque improbabilia colligit. Repugnantia autem
et improbabilia dico quae sunt contra adversariorum opimonem."
16. 'Now of the general heads or classes of the specific topics
that are useful or necessary we may be said to be pretty nearly in
possession; for the premisses on each particular subject have been
selected, so that the special topics from which enthymemes on the
subjects of good or bad, fair or foul (right or wrong), just or unjust,
must be derived' (these are the ei'89, analysed under the heads of the
three branches of Rhetoric in the first book, from c. 4. 7, to 14), 'and in
like manner the topics of the characters, and feelings, and states of
mind, have been previously taken and are before us' (virapxovo-iv are
ready for us, for our use).
The construction of the preceding clause <OT01 T<OTOI I understand to be this, though Vahlen {Transactions of the Vienna. Acad.
of Sciences, Oct. 1861, p. 131] declares (Sure and Tonatv to be indefensible.
Tonav is attracted, as usual, to the construction of the relative, for
oi TOTTOI i av bei (ptpuv ra ivOvfirjâTa: and oi TOTTOI is repeated at the
234
PHTOPIKHS B 22 16.
ixdcrTcoy TWU elBwv T<3V xprio-'ifjtiov Kal
dvityicaMv
end of the clauseunnecessarily perhaps, but not ungrammatically

in the Second part of it introduced by icm. As to the mart, readers of
Aristotle must have remarked that his ware's are not always to be very
strictly interpreted; sometimes they almost lose the force of a logical
consequence, and indicate little more than a sequence. I presume that
Vahleri's meaning (which is not explained) is, that atrre K.TX. is a
meie repetition, and no consequence-at all. But the two things spoken
pf are not precisely identical, and there is a -certain connexion of cause
and effect between them: it is first said in general terms that the
premisses upon each subject of Rhetoric have been already selected':
and from this it may in a sense- be said to fallow that we are supplied
in detail, with topics for our enthymemes, with SIJ or special topics
under the three branches of Rhetoric, and also for the ijdi], wady and
eeis in Bk. II.
Vahlen, u. s. pp. 130, 1, for the reasons before mentioned (some account
of his views on this subject has been given in the introductory observations on c. 18), condemns the whole of section 16, as the interpolation
of an editor, who has inserted (we are not told why) a sentence 'without
motive, and disturbing' the connexion, in which of course, following
the altered arrangement (which is assumed) he has placed the tj0r) and
uafft) immediately after the e'/Si; (as they now stand).
Besides this he objects to iraBtmarav and eea>v, with which we have
next to deal, jro&â in this sense for irados, is certainly very rare,
perhaps unique. But, per contra, there are at least four passages where
nadt]fia is found in other senses, t c express which iratios is always
elsewhere employed. Metaph. A 2, 982 16, rav rfjs o-ekqvrjs KaSrârav,
and C. 4, 985 b 12, rav iradrfiwxav (rqs vTroKfi/iev^s ova-las): Anal. Post.
I 10, 76 i 13, ran nad' aira. vad^jLarav, and AnaL Pr. II 27, 70 b 9
ocro (pva-iKa ion na0âra: which certainly seem to be sufficient to
justify nadmumav here 1 .
1
[Bonitz (Aristoteliscke Stitdien V 50, and Index Aristotelictcs) holds that in
Aristotle there is no clear distraction of meaning between iraffripa and va9ot, "sed
eadem fere vi et sensus varietate utrumque nomen, saepius alteram, alterum rarius
usurpan." In the Aristotelian writings, n-atfij/Mus never found in the sing, except in
the spurious Physiognotiiomca 806 a z; the gen. pi. va8r)/idTui> occurs 38 times, vaOwv
only 8. (Note Eth. Eudem. B, 1, liio b 6, \(KT4OP 5?j icard rl rijs >j/vxi)S wol'
aTTa flOr/. larai
Si Kara re rds
Supo/ieis TWC Tra6i]|idTwv, KCL$' a s (is Ta0ijn/co2
teyorrat, Kal Kara rds ?|f, KaS' as 717)01 ra irrf0<] ravra \iyovrai T$ iraffx""
7TUS rj airaBtls e&tu. /lerd ravra ?j Siatpens Iv TO?S dirriWay/iivois (?) TWII
ira,6r||idT(av Kal TUW Svpa/itup Kal TISV ?{ewv. X^yw Si TOUII] piy rd rornvra,
Svjiov ipofiov aiSii imdv/jUav.) Bemays, while admitting that the words are often
used loosely, draws the following distinction: irdBos ist der Zustand eines irdoxoiv
imd beteichnet den unerwartet ausbrechenden tmd vorulergehendenden Affect; rafhjfia
dagegen ist der Zustand eines iraSijracos und bezeich.net den Affect also inharirend
der afficirten Person tmd alsjederzeit zum Ausbruche reif. Kurzer gesagt, jra'flos
ist der Affect und Tr&Bujim. ist die Affection (Anstoteles uber Wirkung der Tragodie,
Abhhandl. der lust. phil. Gesellschaft in Breslau, I. pp. 149, ip 4 6). The
distinction is insisted on in a treatise by H. Baumgart, Pathos und Pathema
ttii Anstotehscheu Sprachgebrauch, Konigsberg, 1873, pp. 58.]
PHTOPIfKHS B 22 16, 17.
235
oi TOTTOV iêiXey/mevcti yap at TTjOOTaVets

7repl eKaarrov elcnv, UXTT' e w Zei (pepeiv rd ev- P- 966v[x^jiara TOTTOJV 7repi dyadov tj KUKOV, n KaXov r\
i].%iKaiov t] ddiKOV, Kai irepl TWV rjBwv teal
Kai eêwv toa-avTws el\r}/nfjivoi ftfiiv virdpov<ri 7r o Te ov
ot
17 X ' P ' P
foiroi.
eTi Z' aWov Tpoirov /ca0-P. 1397As to ZeuK, this, through a deviation from the author's usual phraseology, who generally confines himself to %8r) and iradrj, appears again
in this connexion, II 12 init, TO 8' i\6t) irotoi nves Kara ra -nadrj Kai Tas
?ieis K.T.X. The author there himself tells us his meaning, interpreting
*eir by dpcras Kai Kaxias; and I can see no reason for condemning the
word, as Vahlen does, except the very insufficient' one, that it is unusual 1 . The Zeis in this sense, do actually enter into, and in fact
constitute the if6os, and I do not see why they should not be specially
mentioned, if Aristotle chose to depart from his ordinary practice, and
do so.
So far then we have been occupied with the ei&tj, special subjects
derived from special sciences, and specially employed each in one of
the three departments of Rhetoricthis is generally, not absolutely true;
for though the three ends of Rhetoric, the good or useful, the just, and
the noble or right, are more, appropriate and more serviceable, each
in one of the three branches, yet any of them can be, and sometimes
is, introduced in them alland we must now turn to the topics, the
families, classes, of arguments into which enthymemes in general may
be made to fall, This is for convenience of practice, that we may
know where to look for them when we want them, and apply that
which happens to be appropriate to the particular case. This classification is made in the 23rd chapter, which therefore is the rhetorical
representative of the far more extensive and minute classification of
dialectical topics, and is the object also of Cicero's Topica. And as
the treatise on fallacies, the book we(A aocjuoriKav iXcyxav, is appended
to the. books of the Topics, so we have a similar chapter on rhetorical
fallacies (c. 24) added to the analysis of the genuine arguments.
I will here remark (against Vahlen) that the word KadoXov \y, which
contrasts these universal ro7roi with the special topics that have preceded, renders the actual mention of them in the .foregoing section
almost, if not quite, necessary.
17. 'Let us now proceed further in another way to take (or find)
1
I have noticed in many recent German commentators on Aristotle, Brandis
being an honourable exception, a disposition to pin down their author to a fixed
and particular mode of expression in certain cases from which he is never to be
allowed to deviate. Aristotle is the very last writer to whom any such rule should
be applied. He is always hasty, often careless; and, as we have seen in so many
instances in this work, is very apt to use words in senses either vague and indeterminate, or (properly) inapplicable, or unusual; and his style is loose and careless to
a fault, both in construction and expression. He is a writer who more than all
others requiies a most liberal allowance for in egulanties.
236
PHTOPIKHS B 22 17; 23 r.
oXov 7repi ccTrdvTwv Xdfiwjxev, Kal Xeytafxev irapa(frifAaivofJievoi TOI)S eXeyKTikovs Kal TOI/S awooeiKTiKovs
teal TOI/S TWV <paivofxevu)v evduiutj/jLCiTcov, OVK bvTtav oe
evdvfxrinciTuiv, eVet irep ovhe <rvXXoyio~fXwv. o~t]X(adevTtov Ze TouTiov, irepl TWV Xv&etov Kal ivcrTacewv 010pi(ruijjLev, Trodev Se? Trpos Ta, evQv\xr\ixaTa (pepeiv.
1
i(TTi B' eis jxev TOTTOS TWP ZBIKTIKWU e/c TU>V evav- CHAP
XXIII.
universal topics.about every thing (taken promiscuously, that is, from

any of the e?8t), and applied indifferently to any of the three branches of
Rhetoric), and add a supplementary note upon the refutative and demonstrative {subaudi rowovs ivOvfi^fwratv) topics of enthymemes (the contents
of c. 23), and those of apparent' (shams, impostors, not genuine), 'not real,
enthymemes; not real, because this is likewise the case with syllogisms
(of which enthymemes though mutilated are a copy, and therefore share
with the others the fallacious kind)'.
T h e literal translation of OVK OVTWV 8e ivBvfi^fiarcov, iircl irep ovbi <7iAXo-
yiafiaiv is, " enthymemes not real, because there are also unreal (not-real
syllogisms"; ov&e, neither, being broken up into two parts, of which the
8e contrasts trvWoyuriiav with ii/dvfirjfiarav, and the ov negatives the
genuineness (und. from the preceding) of the syllogism, not the syllogism
itself.
napao-rjfiaivoneiioi] is a very oddly chosen word to express the treatment of chapters 23 and 24, which are just as much connected with the
subject of the work, and treated with as much care and detail, as the rest.
It means according to Victorius (and Rost and Palm's Lex.) adscribere,
adnotare, applied to something of subordinate interest and importance, or
not immediately and closely connected with the subject in hand, as a
note on the margin of a manuscript; 'noting beside' the main subject, a
supplementary note. This is certainly the meaning of it in Top. A 14,
105 b 16, where it is applied to the 'noting down' of the opinions of individual philosophers, 'beside', as supplementary to, those which are generally accepted: and also, as Victorius thinks, of -irapacrr]fia in de Soph.
El. 20, 177 b 6this is not quite so certain: [' TOIS yeypamiivois rrapda-rifia
TToiovvrai. (signa ponunt ad vocabula distinguenda), Index Aristotelicus\
Alexander Aphrodisiensis in his commentary on the former passage adds
napaypdcpeiv, apparently as a synonym, or interpretation of the other.
' And after this has been made clear, let us pass on to the determination of solutions and objections, whence they must be brought, from
what sources derived, for the refutation of enthymemes'. Of \va-is and
its two modes, TKeyxos and i'va-Tacris, the contents of c. 25, see Introd.
268 seq.
CHAP. XXIII.
In an excellent Review of the study of ancient Rhetoric [by Spengel],
lead at the celebration of the eighty-third anniversary of the foundation
PHTOPIKHS B 23 i.
237
of the Munich Academy of Sciences, 1842, a clear account is giyen of

the relation of these TOTTCM ivOv/irnidTav'that follow to the f "817 of the first
book, of which I will give a translation with veiy slight alterations.
To the first of these he gives the name of 'formal', to the second of
' material' proofs. " Formal proofs, such as they appear in Dialectics
and Rhetoric, are of an universal nature, and therefore applicable alike to
all branches of science ; they form the collective Topics, which Aristotle
has elaborated for Dialectics with wonderful completeness in the most
comprehensive of all the works of his Organon; whilst in Rhetoric, not
without reference to the other, he has selected and put forward only what
is most essential. Material proofs are with him such as are derived
from the principles of the special sciences, the knowledge of which the
orator must bring with him, ready for any occasion on which it may be
properly applied. Aristotle is by no means of opinion that a mere
superficial description, without thorough knowledge of the object to be'
described, and alien to the true spirit of it, can be called 'rhetorical'
with propriety; on the contrary, the orator must be thoroughly imbued
with the knowledge of his subject, whatever department of knowledge it
may happen to belong to, and from this special science bring with him
his concrete proofs, for the purpose of convincing. Accordingly, for
forensic pleading the accurate study of law is indispensable, for the deliberative speaking or counselling that of Politics, the science of government, and similarly for each kind the special knowledge which belongs
to it. But this special knowledge cannot be obtained from Rhetoric
itself, otherwise it would carry in itself all knowledge, which ig not the
case: the office of Rhetoric is, to work up the proofs which the special
science offers, to combine them with the 'formal', and so to bring the
subject within the reach of universal comprehension."
On the contents of this chapter, and its connexion with the Topics,
Brandis, ap. Schneidewin's Philologus [IV i.J p. 18, has the following
remarks. " We now turn (c. 23) to the universal points of view (topics)
most worthy of attention for the formation or refutation of enthymemes,
which are briefly discussed. Before passing to this, Aristotle has already
pointed out the connexion which exists between this division of the
Rhetoric and the Topics (c. 22 10). It is perfectly conceivable however
that here also (as before, leferring to Rhet. I 7,) what in the Topics has
met with a detailed discussion in regard of the various modes of applying
them, is here only briefly referred to, and with an exclusive view to the
application to be made of them in speaking " He then illustrates this at
some length from the two works; but it will be more convenient to leave
these details till we come to them in the course of the notes on the
topics themselves. [On the Topics, see in general Grote's Aristotle, ch. IX.]
Cicero, Topica, first gives a summary classification of the various
forms of. these arguments under their most general heads, m 11. These
are, conmgata, ex genere, ex forma, ex simihtudine, ex differentia, ex contrario, ex adiunctis, ex antecedentibus, ex consequentibus, ex repicgnantibus,
ex caussis, ex effectis, ex comparatione maiorum aut parium aut minorum, (the last, comp. maiorum et minorum, are the topics of Rhet. I 7,)
which are afterwards described in greater detail and illustrated, cc. IX
,8, XVIII 71, Haec ego argnmenta, quae frans/em hi mnltas causas
PHTOPIKHS B 23 i.
TIUJV
Set yap
enco7retV et
TW
ivavTiu)
TO
possunt, locos communes nominamus, de Inv. 11 15. 48.
evavTiov
Quintilian
treats them, Inst. Orat. v 10, 2094, and sums them up thus, 94; Ergo
lit breviter contraham summam, ducuntur arguments, a personis, causis,
locis, tempore (cuius tres paries diximus, praecedens, coniunctum, msequens), facultatibus {guibus instrumentum subiecimus), modo (id est ut
qttidque sit factum), finitione, genere, specie, differentibus, propriis, remotione, divisione, initio, incrementis, summa, similibus, dissimilibus, pugnantibus, consequentibus, efficientibus, effectis, eventis, iugatis, comparatione, quae in plures diducitur species. lugata are Cicero's coniugata,
Aristotle's owroixa and ofioim nroicmr.
These arguments can all if) be turned both ways, and applied to
prove either the affirmative ttKrixa, Karao-nevao-riKa, constructive, confirmatory ; or the negative, e'XeyKTUca, (23. 30); dvao-icfva&iv, avmpetv;
destructive of the proposition maintained by the theorist (in philosophy),
the opponent (in dialectics)
Rhetoric Tavavrla trvWoylfcTai [1 1. 12].
Of the first, i< T&V ivavriav, this is expressly stated.
1. One class of demonstrative (or affirmative) enthymemes is
derived from opposites: we have to consider, namely, whether the opposite (to the one) belongs to (i. e. can be said, or predicated of) the opposite (to the other). Two pairs of opposites are supposed, as in the
example, temperance and licentiousness, good, i. e. profitable, and injurious : the question is whether the two opposed terms or things stand in
the same relation to one another, i. e. that one can be predicated of the
other, as the two first, to which they are opposed: if they can, the original proposition may be maintained, or inferred by the enthymeme; if
not, it can. be confuted or destroyed. The inference in either case is
drawn CK TS>V havriav, from the correctness or incorrectness, the truth or
falsehood, of the assertion'of compatibility or coexistence in the opposites, or that one can be predicated of the other. Thus in the example,
if the opposites to the original propositiontemperance is profitablestand in the same relation to one another as the two members of the
first, so that the one can be truly predicated of the otherif the opposite, injurious, is truly predicable of licentiousnessthen, so far, we infer
the truth of the first: if not, the proposition may be Confuted. The
inference, like all other rhetorical inferences, is probable, not necessary:
it can always be contradicted.
Aristotle, as we have already seen (note on c. 19. 1), distinguishes
four kinds of avriKtlfieva, or opposites ; contradictory, contrary (extremes
under the same genus, as here aaxfrpoo-lvt) and a,Ko\a<ria are the two extremes, virtue and vice, under the genus ri$os, moral character), relative,
and eis and orepijo-ir, state and privation. In the Topics all the four
kinds in their relation to this form of argument are successively handled;
in the Rhetoric, the treatment is confined to the single kind of contraries,
as the most useful and plausible, and the rest passed over. See Brandis,
u. s., p. 18. The passage in the Topics corresponding to this is B 8,113 b 27,
seq. [Grote's^r. I, chap. IX pp. 422, 3]; but compare also B 2,109 b 17; on
the import and limitations of evavriov Ib. c. 7 ; T 6, init. on the great advantages and wide extent of these two first topics, viz. this, and the next,
PHT0PIKH2 B 23 i.
239
U7ra
PXei' o-vaipovvra fxkv el firj virdp-êi, KaTcurkevdfyvTa 06 el virdpyei, oiov OTI TS a'tocppoveTv dyadov
TO yap dicoXacrTaivew (3\a/3epov.
n ws iv TW Metr<rriviaKa>' ei yap 6 7roAe/xos airios TUV TrapovToov KaKWV, fxera T/JS elptjvtjs Set eTravopdw(ra(rdai.
ei Trep .yap ovBe TO?S Ka/cws de$paK.6(riv
duovarlws diicaiov els opyrjv 7rea"eIV,
ou& av dvayKaa-BeU TZS eu Spaay Tivd,
7rpo<ri]Kov e'crrt TWB' d($}ei\ecrdai
dW e'l 7rep e<TTiv ev fipoToTs
7ri6avd, vofxiêiv ^pri are ical TOuvavTiov,
d\r]6rj 7roA\a
T<OVovoToixov
Kai Tmv irTaxreav.
op.o'iu>s yap Hvdoov TO dîwatu,
cl Tracra 17801/17
aya&ov, Kai \v7rqv irao-av dvai KOKQV K.T.X. followed by a series of illus-
trations : also B 9, 114 6. The treatment of opposites in the Topics and

Rhetoric corresponds in this, that m both works it has reference solely
to the art of reasoning, to the inferences affirmative or negative that may
be drawn by constructive, or refutative, syllogisms and enthymemes.
Cicero (who borrows a good deal from Aristotle),- Topic. t Xl. 47,
Deinceps locus est, qui a contrario dicitur. Contrariormn autem genera
sunt plura: ttnum eorum quae in eodem genere filurimum differunt
(Arist), ut sapientia et stultilia....Haec quae ex eodem genere contraria
sunt appellantur adverse/.. His instance is, si stultitiam
fitgimus,
sapientiam sequamur (this in the Aristotelian form would be, If folly
is to be shunned, wisdom is to be sought or pursued). He then goes
through the three remaining kinds of contraria, following Aristotle.
Ex contrarits, Fnigahtas bonum, luxuria enim malum (enthym.).
Si malorum causa bellum est, erit emendatio pax: si veniam nteretur
qui intprttdens nocuit, non meretur praemium qui imprudens profuit.
Quint. V 10. 73. In the last example, the opposites are, excuse, indulgence (for a fault), and reward (for a service), injury and benefit:
the merit or desert is common to both : only in the one case it takes
the form of demerit, which deserves punishment : as is also the absence
of purpose, of good or ill intention.
avaipeiv, ' t o take up', passes on to the sense of removing, taking
away; thence to taking off, destroying; and so finally, when it comes
to logic, is applied to the argument which upsets, subverts, destroys,
or refutes the adversary's argument or position.
' Or (a second example) as it is in the Messeniac speech (of Alcidamas, on which see note on I 13 2), "for if it is the war which is the
cause of the present evils, it is by the peace (which I now propose) that
they must b e rectified." o-vuPovXtvei 6 'AXmdafias rots AoKeSatfiavioig
jxr) KaTabovkaxrai TOXIS iv Meao-i]vr], imxetpav K TOV ivavriov. El yap 6
240
PHTOPIKHS B 23 2.
2 aAAos ec TftJv ojuLoi'tov TTTuxreuw
SfiOioK yap
jroXf/109, îjo-i, irpovevr)(re rade TO. Kaicd, elpyvr) 770X11/ TaEra
Set
inrap-
enavopdcio-eTai
(Scholiast). ' Verba ipsa Alcidamantis scholiastes videtur conservasse."

Sauppe ad Alcid. Fragm. Messen. 2. Oratores Attici, ill 154. Quintilian
has borrowed this, see above [middle of p. 239].
"The four lines which follow as a third example are of unceitain
authorship : Gaisford attributes them either to Agathon or Theodectes :
the enthymeme ex contrario that it contains would suit either of them,
since they both cultivated Rhetoric as well as the dramatic art (Wagner
Trag. Gr. Fragm. i n 185). To avoid the conjunction of and ov, Elmsley,
ad Med. 87, proposes W. Reisig, Coniect. I p. 113 (ap. Pflugk), justly
replies that e'lnep is equivalent to eW, and therefore admits the same
construction. On ft with av and the optative, see Appendix (on 11 20 5)
at the end of this book; and on el followed by ou, see Appendix C,
Vol. 1 p. 301. For ovd' av, Wagner proposes either ijv or av.
Cicero, de Inv. I x x x 46, has adopted this : In contrariis hoc modoj
natn si its qui imprudentes laeserunt ignosci convenit, Us qui necessario
profuerunt haberi gratiam non oportet, and Quintilian, V 10. 73,
(above).
The second quotation (example 4), is from Euripides' Thyestes,
Fragm. VII (Wagner). This we learn from the Scholiast, quoted in
Wagner's note. Matthiae refers to the similar paradox in Agathon's
couplet, Rhet. 11 24. 10.
2. Top. II. e<raVOfioiav, itTao-ecov] On wraxreis and eruorotxa, see
note on \ 7. 27. m w i r "grammatische abbiegung," Brandis [Philol.
IV 1]. ' Another (inference may be drawn).from similar inflexions; for the
inflected words (or, the inflexions of the word) must be capable of similar
predication, (for instance from bUt) by inflexion, or variation of terminatjon, are formed the vtao-cis, liUaios, hucaiasas well as the grammatical
cases, inflexion and declension, and if biKaiov can be predicated of anything, then Swains must be predicable of the same). We may therefore
argue, says the example, 'that justice is not all good', taking the negative
side, pr) inrapxeiv, good is not universally predicable of justice ; otherwise
good would be predicable of the nratns, SiKalas, which is not true in
all cases; 'for all good is aiperov, an object of choice ; b u t a just punishment, or to be justly punished, everybody would allow not to be desirable'. This is an application of the topic to its negative, destructive,
or refutative use: the inference is that the rule laid down is not true.
Compare with this example, I 9. 15, where the same distinction is made:
although ru SiKaia and SiKaicos Zpya are similarly predicable, yet this is
not the case with the jrd0>;: iv pour; yap (this is therefore an exceptional case to which the ordinary rule of Zpoiai nrwatis does not apply)
ravTT) T<5I dperav OVK del TO SHCCH'COI KaXov, aX\'
TO diKatas fi&Wov r] TO dSUas.
tirl rov
^rjfiiovvdai
alcrxpov
Brandis u. s. notes on this topic another difference which shews itself

between the Topics and the Rhetoric, that whereas in the former the
o-varoiXa are usually (not always) added to the nrcSo-eis in the treatment
of it, they are here omitted, and the grammatical form of co-ordinates
alone taken into account.
241
t] fxrj virctpxeiv, olov OTL TO Zltcaiov ov TTOLV dyavov Kai yap av TO otKaicos, puv 0 ov% aipeTOV TO
3 SIKGCICOS dwodaveiv.
aAAos e'/c TWV irpos aX\t]\a' el
yap OaTepto V7rdp%ei TO KaAaJs n SiKcttws Troincrai,
vctTepui TO 7re7rovdevai, KCCI el KeXevcrai, nal TO ireThe use of the topic as a dialectical argument is abundantly illustrated in the Topics, in very many places, as may be seen by consulting
Waltz's Index ad Organon, s. v. The principal passage on the subject is
Top. B 9,where the irnio-tis, the grammatical co-ordinates, are properly
subordinated to the more extensive crvtrroixa, things which are logically
co-ordinate, 114 b 34. The latter are exemplified by Sutcuoovvr), MKCUOS,
fUieawv, SiKalios. Compare A 15, 106 b 29, on the application of them to
ambiguous terms, TrXeorax^s Xtyo'/iei/a, also r 3, 118 34, A 3, 124 a 10,
and the rest, which indicate their various applications1.
Cicero, Top. IV 12, comp. IX 38, illustrates coniugata, which is his
name for Ar.'s Trrda-eis, by sapiens, sapienter, sapientia; and the argument from it by, Si compascuus ager est, ius est compascere. Haec verborum coniugatio, he says, trvfuyia dicitur: on which Spengel {Specwt.
Comm. in Ar. Lib. 11 23, Heidelb. 1844) remarks, "Non Aristotelem qui
semper a-varoi^lav dicit, sed posteriores, in prirms Stoicos, intelligii." l a
de Or. 11 40. 167, they are called coniuncta.
Quintilian, who treats the topic with some contempt as hardly deserving of notice, has, Inst. Orat. v 10. 85, His illud aditcere nduuluni
putarem, nisi eo Cicero uteretur, quod coniugatum vocant: ut, Eos, qui
rem iustam fyc'iant iuste facere, quod certe non eget probationer Quod
compascuum est compascere licere (from Cicero).
3. Top. i n . tK TG>U ivpos aXkijka] The argument, from mutual
relation of terms or notions. This is treated, Top. B 8, 114 a 13, under
the head of oppositions or opposites, dvnBetrevs, or avTiKf'nuva, of which it
is one of the four varieties. For example, inferences may be drawn
from double to half, and vice versa, from triple to multiple and the converse; from knowing or knowledge eaurrf\\a\, to the thing known TO ini(rrryrov; from sight as a sensation, to the thing seen as an object of sense.
The logical objections, eVordo-eiy, that may be brought against it are
also given [Grote's Aristotle 1 pp. 423, 424].
"Latina schola vocat relata. Talia sunt ista: facere pati; emere vendere; dare accipere; locare conducere: et nomina ista; pater films;
dominus servus; discipulus magister." Schrader. He also cites as an
example, Cic. Orat. XLI 142, Sin ea non modo eos ornat penes quos est,
sed etiam universam rempublicam, cur aut discere turpe quod scire
1
If I am not mistaken o/xoiai jmiaas is a misnomer. If in-tjaeis are the various
inflexionsdeclensions in an extended senseof a root-word, the term must be
confined to the changes of the terminations; in these appears, not similarity., but
difference the similarity lies, not m the terminations, but in the idea or root common to all the varieties, 'similar'therefore, though it may very well be predicated
of the aviTTOt.x&i is not properly applied to Tmiiatis.
AR. II.
16
242
PHTOPIKHS B 23 3.
7roiriKevai} olov ws 6 TeXcovtrs Aio/JieSiov irepi TCOV

TeXtov " et yap /ULÔ" V/UUV alcrxpov TO irwXeTv, ovo
t}}xiv TO loveio-dai"
Kal el TO ireirovQoTi TO /caAws n
SiKaitos virdpxtiy Kal TW 7roit](ravTi, Kai et Tip TTOIr\<ravTi, Kal TO TteirovQoTi. eo~Ti Z' ev TOVTIO irapa-v. 97
Xoylaao-Qar el yap StKaioos eiraQev TI, SiKaiws Treirov-
6ev, dXX' ia-ws ovx ^7ro
(ro
^'
^lo ^
(rK07re v
^ XWP^
el a^tos 6 7ra6cov Tradeiv Kal 6 Troir\cra<i 7roifj(rai, e'na p.

honestum est, aut quod nosse pulcherrimum est id non gloriosum docere;
a good illustration of the argument from relatives.
This topic has occurred before, 11 19.12, as one of the topics of 'the
possible': where the parallel passages of Cic. Topic, xi 49, and de Inv.
I 30.47, will be found in the note. On the same, Quintilian, Inst. Or.
v 10. 78, Ilia quoque quae ex rebus mutuam confirmationem praestantibus ducuntur {quae proprii generis videri quidam volunt, et vocant e<
T&V irpbs ahXrjKa, Cicero ex rebus sub eandem rationem venientibus)/^rtiter consequentibus iunxerim (I should be bold to add to consequents):
si portorium Rhodiis locare honestum est et Hermocreonti conducerey et
quod discere honestum, et docere (from de Inventione, u. s.). The argument is, ' If it may be said of one (of the two terms of the relation) that
he has done rightly or justly, then the same terms may be applied to
what the other has suffered {iroulv and irao-x^v, agent and patient, are
relative opposites 1 ); and similarly {mekeveiv is relative to ircWeo-Oai) command implies obedience, and the converse (this may be inferred as the
ordinary, probable, not a necessary consequence): as Diomedon the taxcollector argued about the taxes (1. e. the farming of them) " If it is no
disgrace to you to sell, neither is it to us to buy"
olov <s] This pleonasm occurs again in 6, olov <as 'l(ptKpaTr)s.
Of Diomedon, nothing is known but what we learn from the passage.
'And if the terms fairly or justly can be applied to the sufferer, then
also to the doer (or perpetrator) of the act; and conversely, if to the
doer then also to the sufferer'. If there be any difference between this
and the preceding, el yap dareparreTrovdevac, it is that the first is the
general expression of the relation between agent and patient, the second
is a particular exemplification of it, in the justification of what would
otherwise be a crime.
' But this admits of a fallacy: for though it may be true (in general,
or in itself) that deserved suffering involves the justice of the punish1
The relation of rroie'v and uwxeip, agent and patient, action and passion, is
well illustrated in the argument between Polus and Socrates, Plat. Gorg. c. 32,
476 B, seq. It is there shewn by analogy-the usual Socratic and Platonic
methodthat the relation between the two prevails throughout its various applications, and therefore that crime and punishment follow the same law, and that justice
or desert in the punishment of the cnmmal or patient implies the like justice 111 the
infliction of it by the agent, and wee versa.
PHTOPIKHS B 23 3.
243
Xpn<rdai oTrorejows dp/uoTTer evioTe <ydp SiaipwveT TO

TOIOVTOV Kai ovdev KcoXvei, axnrep ev TW 'AAK/J.alwn
ToJ QeoêicTou
Se rr\v (rr\v ou Tis ia-rvyei
fiporwv;
ment, yet perhaps (it does not always follow that) you should be the
agent of it, that the punishment should be inflicted by you (any particular individual)'. This fallacy is actually illustrated from Theodectes'
Orestes, infra c. 24 3. The argument is used by Orestes in his trial for
the murder of his mother Clytemnestra. In the trial scene of the Eumenides this point is taken into consideration, and the act of Orestes justified by Apollo and Athena on the general ground of the superiority of
male to female; the father, the author of his existence, has a higher
claim upon the son's affection and duty than the mother, and Orestes
was right in avenging his father's death even upon her. Aesch. Eumen.
625 seq., 657 seq., 73840. Comp. Eur. Orest. 528, where Tyndareus,
Clytemnestra's father, says, 6vyarrjp 8* iprj davovo-' trrpatjeu i'vdiKa' a\X
tyv\i irpbs TOVS" eUbs %v avrrjv $aveiv: and Orestes, id. 546, defends himself on the same grounds as in Aeschylus, iya 8' diwids t/ nrfrepa
Kravdv, o<rios fie y trepov ovop.a, Tifiapau irarpl. 552, irarrjp pen e(f>vrev(rfv
/j.e K.T,\562, iirl 8' cSvrra fir^ripa, dvo<ria p.tv Spav dWa Tipapav imrpi.
Electr. 1244, (quoted by Victorius on Kprja-l 8' aTroicpivopevosKTaixiv,) the

Dioscuri to Orestes, SUaia /lev vvu ^8' fî" <rii 8' ouî SpSr. The case
of Orestes and Clytemnestra became one .of the stock examples in the
rhetorical books. Auct. ad Heren. I 10. 17, I 15.25, 16. 26. Cic. de Inv.
I 13. 18, 22.31. Quint. Inst. Or. Ill 11. 4, and n seq., VII 4.8.
' And therefore a separate investigation is required, not only whether
the sufferer deserved to suffer, but also whether the doer had a right to
do it (as, to inflict the punishment), and then make the appropriate use of
either: because sometimes there is a difference in cases of this kind (i e.
both kinds of right are not always found together: the punishment may
be just, but you may not be the proper person to inflict it), and there
is nothing to prevent (the case being) as it is put in Theodectes' Alcmaeon (where this 'division', 8ia\afH6vra, is actually made): "And did
no mortal abhor thy mother?" This is a question put to Alcmaeon, probably by Alphesiboea (Victorius), whose reply includes the words actually quoted, d\\a SuiKafiovTa XPV O-KOTTCIJ', with, of course, a good deal
more about the murder which is omitted. ' T o which (Alcmaeon) says
in reply " nay but we must first distinguish, and then consider the case."'
(The division or distinction here spoken of is well illustrated by the
parallel passage, the case of Orestes, II 24. 3) 'And when Alphesiboea
asks "How?", he replies, " T o her they adjudged death, (i.e. decided
that she was justly slain,) but (decided also) that / should not have been
the murderer.'" From this reply it may be gathered that the judges in
Theodoctes' play had made the requisite distinction: the death of Eriphyle they agreed was deserved, but it was not for her son to inflict the
penalty. "Alcmaeon Enphylen matrem suam mterfecerat, quod haec
Amphiarai manti salutem prodiderat" (Alcmaeon's act, like that of
162
244
PHT0PIKH2 B 23 3.
(J)t](ri B' diroKpivo
d\\d
TJJS
Tr\v fxev Qaveiv expivav, ijue $e /J.rj KTaveiv.

nal oTov f\ irepl Atnuio(rdevov<s ZiKt] Kal TWV a7roKTeivavTWV îKavopa' eirel <ydp diKaieos eKpidrjarav aT
Orestes, was justified by the implied murder of his fatherthe treachery
which caused his death). " Alphesiboea fuit Alcmaeonis uxor." Schrader.
This fragment is quoted by Wagner, Theodect. Fragm. Alcm. I, but without a word of commentary, ill 118.
On Theodectes of Phaselis, the rhetorician and dramatic poet, the
friend of Aristotle, who frequently refers to his compositions in both kinds,
and on the rhetorical character of his writings, which is well illustrated
here and in II 24. 3, see Muller, Hist. Gr. Lit. ch. x x v i 7, who refers
to these passages. Also, Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil. No. IX
Vol. i n p. 260 seq. 1 To the passages there quoted on this author, add
Theopomp. Hist. Phil. Lib. I, Fr. 26, ap. Fragm. Hist. Gr. (Didot) p.
282 ; and a ref. to his Philoctetes, Eth. Nic. VII 8, 1150 b 9.
Two other examples follow, but, as Spengel {Tract on the Rhet.
in Trans. Bav Acad., Munich 1851, p. 46) justly says, they have no
connexion with the preceding example from Theodectes, and the division
which it exemplifies, but are illustrations of the general topic. Retaining
the text (with Bekker) as it stands, we must accordingly understand
the words co-ri 8' iv TOVTW/tii) Kraveiv as parenthetical, and suppose
that the author, after the insertion of this as a note, proceeds with his
exemplification of the general topic. Spengel, u. s , p. 47, suggests that
they may have been a later addition by the author himself, a note
written on the margin, which has got out of its place My supposition,
of a note, not written on the margin, but embodied in the. text as a
parenthesiswhich is quite in Ar.'s mannerwill answer the purpose
equally well, and save the text in addition.
'And, another example, the trial of Demosthenes and those who
slew Nicanor; for as they were adjudged to have slain him justly (the
act), it was held that his death (the passion or suffering) was just'.
This is cited by Dion. Halicarn., Ep. I ad Amm. c. 12, as a proof that
Aristotle was acquainted with and quoted the speeches of Demosthenes,
referring it to the case (against Aeschines) for the Crown. In doing so
he omits irepl. Of course 17 mpi Arjuoadhovs dUrj cannot have this meaning . and it is most probable that it is not the Orator that is here
referred to, but Thucydides' general, or some other person of the name.
1
The unwarrantable identification, there supposed, p.. 261, of the Theodectea
with the "PyTopiKTi irpbs 'A\ân5pov, has been sufficiently corrected in Introd. to
Rhet. pp. 5567, on the Theodectea; where more information will be found about
the author and his works.
PHTOPIKHS B 23 3.
245
edoêv aTroBaveiv. xai 7repi TOV Qr\(it](nv airo6av6vTO<s, wept ov eKeXevcre Kplvai el Si/caioe r\v diro6a~
veTv, ftis OVK OZIKOV ov TO dvroKTeivai TOV BiKaicos diroNeither is anything known of Nicanor and his murderers. On the use
of Demosthenes' name in the Rhetoric, see Introd. p. 46, note 2.
'And again, the case of him that died at Thebes; concerning whom
he (the spokesman of the . defendants) bade them (the judges) decide
whether he (the murdered man) deserved death, since there was no
injustice in putting to death one that deserved it'. " In hanc quoque
historiam nunquam incidi." Victorius. Buhle rightly refers it to the case
of Euphron, introduced as an episode, and described at length by
Xenophon, Hellen. VII 3. There had been one of the usual quarrels
between the aristocratical (01 êXrtoroi) and the popular party at Sicyon,
of which Euphron took advantage, with the design of making himself
master of the city. But knowing that as long as the Thebans occupied
the acropolis he had no chance of success, he collected a large sum of
money and went to Thebes with the intention of bribing the Thebans
to assist him. Some Sicyonian exiles learning this, followed him to
Thebes and murdered him in the acropolis. Here the murderers were
brought to trial before the magistrates and council, who were already
there assembled. The accusation of the magistrates, and the speech
for the defence, are both recorded. All the accused with one exception
asserted their innocence: one alone admitted the fact, and in justification of it pleaded for himself and the rest the guilt of the man that had
been slain, just as Aristotle here describes it. Oi fiev ovv Bijflawi ravra
aKovo-avres cyvacrav 8Uaia TOV ~Ev<f>pova neirovQivai. But the
Sicyonians
(oi TToXtTai), interpreting the word 'good1 in the sense of good to them
(TOVS eitpyeras iavrav), said he was a good man, and buried him in
the market-place, and adore him as the (second) founder of their city
(cos apxrjyeTtjv), like Brasidas at Amphipolis (Thuc. V. 11).
The whole of this section, with the exception of the last example, Kai
7rcpi TOV Qqfirjinv cmoBavovros, is quoted by Dionysius 1. c. in support of his
view that Demosthenes' speeches had been delivered before the composition of the Rhetoric, and were accessible to its author. The difference between the text which he seems to have used and that now received is very
great, and apparently unaccountable. Besides minor discrepancies, the
entire quotation from Theodectes, cVtore yapKravriv is omitted ; and
the clauses preceding and following stand thus, to-Ti 8e TOVTO napakoyl(rao-dai. ov yap et 8ixaia>s eiraBev av, Kai Smaicot viro TOVTOV TriTtovBtv, <os 6
(bovov ata Troujcas iraTypj et V7To TOV vloii TOV iavrov TX\V iiri 6avaT(a dirdyeTai,
hei o-KOTTelu xa>p\s
oiroTepios av apfioTTrj. CVIOTE yap 8ia(pa>v(l TO TOIOVTOV.
ao~nep iv ra 'AXK/iaiavi TOV SfoStxrou, Kai olov ij irep\ Arjfioo-devovs 5/fci; K.r.A.
All the alterations seem to be for the worse, and in one of them, enadev av
for 'iwadiv TI, the grammatical blunder betrays corruption. The additional
example of the father and son introduced by Dionysius is, as Spengel
observes, not here in point. The very example for the sake of which
the extract was made is mutilated, and the explanation, eWi yap
drrodavelv, omitted: from which Spengel very justly argues that it could
246
PHT0P1KHS B 23 4.
0avovTa.
\ \ o s C'K TOV fjiaWov KCII TJTTOV, oiov " ei
fxt]& 01 deoi Trdvra icraa-i, <r;oAJ 7e Ol a-vdpwiroi."
not have been in the MS that he used : if he had read it there, he could
not have so absurdly misapplied the example to the case for the Crown.
Spengel has reviewed the two passages in connexion in the tract above
cited, pp. 4447. Our text, which is, when properly explained, perfectly
consistent and intelligible, is retained by Bekker and seems to require
no alteration : at all events none of Dionysius' variations could be
advantageously introduced.
4. Top. IV. The argument from greater to lessfrom that which
is more to be expected to that which is less (Brandis)and the converse;
Top. B 10, 114 b 37 seq. To which is subjoined, 5, c! /iijrf /xSXKov
fiijre IJTTOV, where two things are compared which are equally likely or
probable, and accordingly the one may be inferred from the other: of
this there are three cases, K TOV 0/101W virapxeiv y donelv vTrapx(tv rp^x*-
Top. Ib. 115 a 15. Of the first there are four varieties: according as (1)
the more or less is predicated of the same objectif pleasure is good,
then the greater the pleasure the greater the good; and if wrong-doing is
bad, the greater the wrong the worse; the fact is to be ascertained by
inductionor (2) when one of two things is predicated (in the way of
comparison), if that of which it is more likely to be predicated is without
it (any property or quality), the same may be inferred of the less likely;
or conversely, if the less likely has it, a fortiori the more likely: or (3)
(the reverse of the preceding) when two things are predicated of one, if
the more likely is not there, we may infer that the less likely will not, or
if the less likely be found there, that the more likely will also: (4) when
two things are predicated of two others, if that which is more likely is
wanting to the one, the less likely will surely be wanting to the other;
or, conversely, if that which is less likely to be present to the one is
there, the other will be sure to have that which is more likely [Grote's
Ar. 1. p. 425]. These nice distinctions, though appropriate to Dialectics,
are unnecessary in Rhetoric, and are therefore here omitted; but the
examples will suggest the proper use of the topic. The inference in all.
these cases is plain and will be acknowledged by the audience, and that
is all that is required.
The inference from greater to less, or from more to less likely or probable, is commonly called the argumentum afortiorij the rule omne mains
continet in se mitms may also be referred to the same principle, though
the two are not absolutely coextensive.
Cic.Topic, in 11, Alia (ducuntur argumenta) ex comparatione maiorum
aut parium aut minorum. This is well exemplified in iv 23. xvm 68,
Reliquus est comparationis locus cuius...nunc explicanda tractatio est.
Comparantur igitur ea quae aut maiora aut minora autparia dicuntur:
in quibus spectantur haec, numerus, species, vis, quaedam etiam ad res
aliquas affectio. These four modes of application are clearly explained
and illustrated in the following sections, 6971.
De Orat. 11 40. 172, Maiora autem et minora et paria comparabimus
sic: ex maiore; si bona existimatio divitiis praestat et pecunia tanto
opere expetitur, quanto gloria magis est expetenda: ex minorej Hie
247
yap eo~Tiv, el u> fiaWov civ vTrdpôi fxrj virdpovo" a> i\TTOv. TO O OTL TOI)S
6s ye KCCL TOV irctTepa, etc TOV, el TO TITTOV
i, KCCI TO fxaWov vwcipxei, KCIO' oirOTepov av
5 oey deiâi, eio OTL virap-xei eio OTI OU. e n ei
TOVTO
parvae consuetudinis causa huius mortem fert tamfamiliariter; Quid si

ipse amasset? quid Me mihi faciet patrif (Terent. Andr. I 1. 83)/ ex
pari sicj est eiusdem et eripere et contra rempublicatn largiri pecunias.
De Inv. I 28.41", 11 17. 55, de Orat. Part. 11 7, ult. Quint, v 10. 8693,
Apposita vel comparativa dicuntur quae 7naiora ex minoribus, minora
ex maioribus, paria ex paribus probant. These are applied, subdivided,
and illustrated through the remaining sections.
'Another from the more or less, as for instance, "if not even the gods
are omniscient, surely men can hardly be supposed to be so :" for that is
as much as to say, if that to which something is more likely to belong
wants it, plainly that which is less likely must want it too. Again (the
argument) that a man who was capable of striking his father would also
strike his neighbours, follows (is derived from) the (general rule or principle), that the less involves or implies the (possible existence, or capacity, tivvapis, of the) greater; in whichever way we are required to argue
(the inference is required to be drawn), whether the affirmative or the
negative'. This last example, as an exemplification of the inference from
less to greater, has been looked upon as an error, and various corrections
have been proposed, as by Vater, and Spengel in Specim. Comm. ad Ar.
Rhet- 11 c. 23, p. 12, 1844. The latter has subsequently altered his opinion, and in 1851 {Trans, of Bav. Acad. p. 58) he admits that the explanation suggested by Victorius, and adopted by Muretus, Majoragius, and
others, is sufficient to support the text; which, as usual, is retained by
Bekker. No doubt, according to the ordinary interpretation of fiaKKou
and T^TTOV in one of these comparisons, where the greater and less are
referred to the magnitude and importance of the crime, the argument is
i< TOV /iaWov, ex maiore ad minus: the man who would strike his father
(the greater) would a fortiori strike an ordinary acquaintance. But Ar.
has here departed from this usual application of the topic, and makes
the comparison in respect of the frequency of the crime: as it is less
usual to strike one's father than one's neighbour, a man that could be
guilty of the former, is much more likely to commit the latter and lesser
offence: and the inference is from the less to the greater in this sense.
"Aristoteles, cum boni viri officium sit nemini vim afferre, cumque
iniuria ab omni abesse debeat, si tamen ibi manet ubi minus esse debebat, illic etiam existet ubi frequentius esse consuevit: et haec causa est
cur el TO rfTTov -imapxci appellant, a minoreque earn significari voluerit."
Victorius.
On the double reading of MS A, see Spengel, Trans, of Bav. Acad.
1851 p. 57 [and to the same effect in Spengel's ed., 1867 ; "in A post
derj delai haec sententia alia ratione verbis Tvnrei oi-t...8ei 8ei|at explicatur...duplicem sententiae formam iuxta positam melius perspiciemus :
248
PHTOPIKHS B 23 5.
/xaXXov fxrJTe r\TTOv odev e'ipt]Tai

Kai c o s /JLEV otKTjflos 7raiSas ct7roXe<ras iraTr\p'
Olvevs 8' ap ov^l KXeivov diro\e<ra^ yovov;
i oTi, el /j.t]$e Gfjceus rjB'iKrio-ev, ov& 'AXeâvdpos,
el /uLrjS' 01 TvvdaplSai,
ovZ' 'AXeâvdpos, Kai el
T 8' on TOVS ifKijo-'iov TVTrrei os ye Kai TOV rrarepa
Tvrrrei eK TOV Kara TO ^TTOV vnapxet,
TVTTTCI OTI el TO TJTTOV wapiti,
kai fiaXXov vnap}(fi.
ixaKXov vwop^ft' TOVS yap Trarepas
av bey 8ei|at
Kaff onoTfpov
Kai TO
T\TTOV rviTTOVcriv 5 Toils TrXrj<riov. ij

OVTODS T i <p fiSXKov virapêi,
vTrapxei, ij ^ 17TTOJ/ ti virapêi
ojrorf-
pov Set 8eiai'

("iff ZTI virapxei e'ff OTI OS."]
On these Aristotelian StTroypacpiat, see Torstrik, Praef. ad de Anima,

p. xxi, seq.
5. The second branch of these inferences from comparison, is that
of parallel cases. This is the argument from analogy, the foundation of
induction, the observation of resemblances in things diverse, leading to
the establishment of a general rule: the Socratic and Platonic Method:
comp. c. 20.4, note. Ex part, Cic. de Inv. I 30. 47, ut locus in mari sine
portu navibus esse non potest tutus, sic animus sine fide stabilis amicis
non potest esse. On the argument from analogy in- general, see note on
C. 19. 2.
'Again if the comparison is not of greater and less, (but of things
equal or parallel) : whence the saying, " Thy father too is to be pitied
for the loss of his children. And is not Oeneus then, for the loss of his
illustrious offspring?" Spa marks the inference. " Par infortunium
parem misericordiam rneretur." Schrader. The verses are supposed (by
Victorius, Welcker, Trag. Gr. p. 1012, and Wagner, Fr. Trag. Cr. Ill 185)
to be taken from Antiphon's Meleager, which is quoted again 20, and
at 11 2. 19. (Antiphon, a Tragic Poet contemporary with the Elder Dionysius, Rhet. II 6.19, Clinton F. H. Vol. II. Praef. x x x n i , flourished at
the end of the fifth cent. B. c. Compare note on 11 2. 19.)
The first of the two versesif the story is that of Meleagerrefers
to the death of the two sons of Thestius, Toxeus and Plexippus, by the
hand of their nephew Meleager: Oeneus was the father of Meleager,
whom he too had now lost. The words are those of some one who is
consoling Althea, Oeneus' wife, and perhaps belong (says Victorius) to
Oeneus himself. The meaning then would be, (Oeneus to his wife,) You
speak of the losses of your father whose sons are slainare not mine
as great as his, in the loss of my famous son Meleager? and do we
not therefore equally deserve pity? The story is told in Diod. Sic. IV 34
(Schrader), and Ov. Met. Vlll. See 86, 87, Anjelix Oeneus nato victore
fruetur, Thestius orbus erit ? melius lugebitis ambo:
The conduct of Alexander or Paris in the abduction of Helen is next
justified by the parallel case of Theseus, who did the same ; Isocr.
PHTOPIKHS B 23 s , 4
249
YlaTponXov ''EKTWJO, Kai 'AîWea 'AAejâvdpos. Kai

el JUTJS' ol aWoi Teyyirai (pavXoi, ovh" ol (piXo(ro<poi.
el JUJJS' ol o-TpaTriyol (pauXoi on r\rrwvrai iroX, 01/S* ol o-ocpio-ral. Kai on " el (SeT rov llia>Tt}v
i/'/xerepas So'^s eTrifxeXe'ia'dai, Kai i)/xas Trjs TWV
aAAos e'jc TOV TOP ypovov (TKOTre'iv, oiov
Helen. 1820; and every oneand more especially an Athenian
audiencemust allow that he was a good man and could do no wrong
(OVK IJSI'KIJO-CC) ; and of the Tyndaridae, Castor and Pollux, who carried
off the two daughters of Leucippus, Phoebe and Eleaera (or Hilaira,
Propert. I 2. 15), Ov. Fast. V 699, Theocr. Id. XXII 137, and these
were demigods; and if Hector is not blamed for the death of Patroclus,
neither should Paris be censured for that of Achilles. This is from
some lyKtLpiov or anoKoyia 'A\eav&pov, of an unknown rhetorician,
similar to Isocrates' Helen. It is referred to again, 8, and 24 7, 9.
' And if no other artists (professors of any art or science) are mean
or contemptible, neither are philosophers : and if generals are not to
be held cheap because they are often defeated, neither are the sophists
(when their sophistical dialectics are at fault)\ From some speech in
defence of philosophy, and of the Sophists.
The following is an argument, urged by an Athenian orator upon the
general assembly, from the analogy of the relation of a private citizen
to the state of which he is a member, to that of the same state as an
individual member of the great community of the entire Greek race
to the whole of which it is a part: if it be the duty of an individual
Athenian to pay attention to, to study, the glory of his own country,
then it is the duty of you, the collective Athenians whose representatives
I am now addressing, to study in like manner the glory of the entire
Greek community. Or it might be used by the epideictic orator in a
Panegyric {iravr^yvpiKos \6yos, delivered in a nav^yvpLs), pleading, like
Isocrates, for the united action of the Greeks against the Barbarian.
6. Top. V. The consideration of time. This kind of argument,
though important in Rhetoric, is inappropriate in Dialectics, and therefore
receives only a passing notice in the Topics, B 4, III b 24, en eVi TOV
^pLvov Imfiheittiv,
ei TTOV bia^xovei, where the word
cirifiXeirew shews
that it is a mere passing glance, a cursory observation, that it requires :

and in Cicero's Topics it is altogether omitted [Grote's Ar. I p. 418].
The application of it in Top. B 11, 115 11, referred to by Brandis, is
different, and indeed unsuited to rhetorical purposes.
On this topic of time, and its importance in Rhetoric, Quintilian, Inst.
Orat. V 10. 42 seq., after a preliminary division of time into (1) general
(now, formerly, hereafter,) and (2) special or particular time, proceeds, Quorum utrorumque ratio et in consiliis (genus deliberativum) quidem, et in
Mo de?nonstrativo ( eVtSeutriKia yevti) genere versatur; sed in iudiciis
frequentissima est- Nam et iuris quaestiones facit, et qualitatem distinguit, et ad coniecturam plurimum confert (contributes very greatly
to the establishment of the factthe status coniecturalis or issue of fact
250
ftJS 'l(j>lKpaTt]$
PHT0PIKH2 B236.
iv
Ttj
7TpOS 'AjOjUo'StOI/,
OTt
"et
TTjO/Vp. 98.
7roifj<rai r\Qovv TJJS et/coVos TUê?v eay iroina-io, etiore

av Troino-avTL S' ap' ou &J<reTe; jU/7 TO'LVVV /xeAAoi/res
and especially to the refutation of the assertion of an alleged fact: this
is illustrated by the cases following); ut quum interim probationes
inexpugnabiles afferat, quales sunt, si dicatur {ut supra fiosui) signator,
qui ante diem tabularum decessit: aut commisisse aliqnid, vel quu?n
infans esset, vel quum emmino natus non esset. Further, 4548,
arguments may be readily drawn ex Us quae ante rem fada sunt, aut
ex coniundis rei, aut insequentibus, or from time past, present (instans),
and future : and these three are then illustrated. Inferences may be
drawn from what is past or present, to the future, from cause to effect;
and conversely from present to past, from effect to cause. It seems
that the two principal modes of applying the topic of time to Rhetoric
are (1) that described by Quintilian, in establishing, or, more frequently,
refuting the assertion of a fact, which is the chief use that is made of
it in the forensic branchthis is again referred to, II 24. 11, on which
see Introd. p. 274the consideration of probabilities of time in matters
of fact: and (2) the tempos, the right time, the appropriate occasion,
which may be employed by the deliberative orator or politician in
estimating the expediency, immediate or prospective, of an act or course
of policy ; and by the panegyrist to enhance the value and importance
of any action of his hero, or of anything else which may be the object
of his encomium. On this use of Kaipos comp. I 7. 32,1 9.38, and the
notes. For illustrations, see Top. T 2, 117 a 26 b 2.
'Another from the consideration of time, as Iphicrates said in the
case {subaudi Siicy) against Harmodius, " H a d I before the deed was done
laid claim to the statue, provided I did it, you would have granted it me :
will you then (the inference) refuse to grant' it me now that I have done
it? Do not, then, first make the promise in anticipation, and then,
when you have received the benefit, defraud me of it.'" The case, or
speech, as it is here called 'against Harmodius', is also known by the
name of ij n-epl rrjs CIKOVOS: this was the statue which was granted
him in commemoration of the famous defeat of the Lacedaemonian
liopa in B. C. 392. Aesch. c. Ctesiph. 243, Ask the judges why they
made the presents, and set up the statues, to Chabrias, Iphicrates,
and Timotheus. The answer is, 'lcpiKparei on p.6pav AaKeSaipovicov direKTiiVfV. [Dem. Lept. 482 84, np.a>VTs 7TOT6 'l<pucpaTr)v ov fiouov UVTOV eYt/iijr
vaT...ib. 86, ovdi yap v/uv apfiorrei boKeiv irapa fiev ras evepyeo-ias ouro)
rrpoxetpcos e%eiv, ware pi) fiovov airrovs robs evepycras rifmv, aKKa Ka\ TOVS
eKtlvaiv <pi\ovs, inetdav 8e xpovos Ste\0t) ^pa^vs, (cm o<ra avToh 8c8a>Kare
ravr dtpaipeio-dm]. The speech here referred to was attributed by some

as Pseudo-Plutarch vit. Lys. o-vveypaê fie \6yov mi 'KpiKpdreC rbv
fizv irpbs 'Apfi68iovto Lysias1, which is denied by Dionysius, de Lysia
1
See on this and two other speeches of Iphicrates attributed to Lysias, Sauppe,
ad Fragm. Lys. xvin and LXV. Oratores Attici ill 1J8 and 190; [also Blass,
die AUische Baredsamkeit, p. 335].
251
fiev vTria-ûelcrde, 7ra66vre<i 5' d(paipeT<r6e." Kal TTUXIV

7rpo^ TO Qrjfialovs Siewai <fri\nnrov ft? Triv 'ATTIKVV, P. 1398
OTL " el irplv fior)6ijcrcti ets ^w/ceis qîov, \nrea")(OVTO
aw aTOTrov odv el SIOTI irpoelTO Kal e7ri<rrev(re fxri
7 oitjcrovo'iv." aWos K TCOV eiptiiuevcov Kad' avTOv<* 7rpos
Iud. c. 12, on two grounds, first the inferiority of the style, which was
unworthy of Lysias ; and secondly, because Lysias died seven years
before the deed for which the statue was granted. Aristotle plainly
ascribes it to Iphicrates himself. The speech n-epl rfjs elxovot, is quoted
again, 8. See also Clinton Fasti Hellenici II 113, sub anno 371. It
was not till after Iphicrates had resigned his military command, and
retired into private life, aitobovs ra <rrpa.Teviia.Ta Ibidrrjs yivercu, that he
claimed his statue, /tera 'A\KHr6evr]v apxovra, i. e. in the archonship of
Pharsiclides, B. C. 371. The grant was opposed by Harmodius, a political
antagonist.
'And again to induce the Thebans to allow Philip to pass through
their territories into Attica, it is argued that, "had he made the claim (or
preferred the request) before he helped them against the Phocians
(when they wanted his aid), they would have promised to do so; and
therefore it would be monstrous for them now to refuse it, because he
threw away his chance {then)' ;behaved liberally or with reckless generosity (so Viet.) on that occasion, and neglected to avail himself of his
opportunity, (see the lexicons, s. v. wpoUcrBai.)'and trusted to their honour
and good faith'. The former event occurred in B. C. 346, when Philip
allied himself with the Thebans and overran Phocis, and so put an
end to the Phocian war. An embassy was sent to the Thebans after
the capture of Elataea B.C. 339, to request that Philip's troops might
be allowed to march through their territory to attack Attica; but
was met by a counter-embassy from Athens, proposed and accompanied
by Demosthenes, who prevailed upon the Thebans to refuse the request,
and conclude an alliance with Athens. Kara AvaifiaxiSriv apxovra, Dionys.
Ep. I ad Amm. c. 11. On this embassy and the proposals there made,
see Demosthenes himself, de Cor. 311, 313, from which it would seem
that the words here quoted are not Philip's, but an argument used by
his ambassadors. Comp. also 146, OVT' els rf/u 'ATTIKTJU ikdeiv SwaTos...
yLT)T Qrjfialav SIUVTKOV : and Aesch. C. Ctes. 151, tol ypd^tiv i<f>T) ijrTJ<fiio-iJ.a
(o Arjfioa8evr]s)---nif'.TTeiv vfias irpto-jSeis alrâ-ovras QtjfiaLovs 8i68ov iiri * i -
\vmtov, (referred to by Spengel, Specim. Comm. ad Ar. Rhet. Heidelb.

1844, p. 15). In the following year, 338 B. C. eV! Spxovros XcupdvSov, was
fought the battle of Chaeronea. M. Schmidt (On the date of the Rhet.
Halle, 1837, p. 16) uses this passage in fixing the date of Ar.'s work.
[See Introd. p. 38.]
Dionys., ad Amm. c. 11, cites the whole of this topic. The only
important variations are two manifest blunders ; the omission of ds before $a>KeIr, and &u<rirevcrev /xfj Sdaovaiv for cVioTcvcre fxr/ Siijo'outrii'.
7. Top. VI. This topic, "the retort which turns the point of what
has been said against ourselves upon him who said it," viz. the adverse
252
TOP
PHTOPIKHS B 23 7.
e'nrovTa' $La(pepei Se 6 TJ0O7TO?, olov eu TOO Tevtcptp'
party in the law-court or assembly, belongs, as Brandis also remarks,

u. s., p. 19, exclusively to Rhetoric. " Cum argumentum ducitur ex iis
quae ex moribus vitaque ipsorum dicta sunt, admodumque ipsis congruunt, adversus ilium ipsum qui dixit : eminet autem, inquit, hie inter
alios, ac vim maximam semper habere existimatus est." Victorius. That
Kara in the definition means 'against' and not 'of (in respect of) appears
from the example. Iphicrates asks Aristophon, who had accused him
of taking bribes to betray the fleet, "Would you have done it yourself?
No ; I am not like you. Well then, as you admit that you, Aristophon,
are incapable of it, must not I, Iphicrates, (your superior in virtue and
everything else,) be still more incapable of it ?" As Ar. adds, the
argument is worth nothing unless the person who uses it is conscious
of his own moral superiority, and knows that the audience whom he
addresses shares his conviction: employed against an ' Aristides the
Just', it would be simply ridiculous.
SuKpepet, 8e 6 rpemos KTX] This is interpreted by Spengel, Specim.
Cotnm. u. s.,p. 16 [and ed. 1867], "Mores sunt qui in hac re in discrimen
vocantur; mores enim et vita eminet et litigantes discernit." I doubt if
Tpcmos, standing thus alone, can mean mores: nor, I think, is the mention
of character and manners appropriate in this place : further on it would
be suitable. Gaisford's explanation and connexion seem to be upon the
whole most satisfactory. "Verba olov iv r<j> TevKpat'iirciiv puto esse Si
fieo-ou. His certe seclusis belle procedunt omnia. Sententiae nexus
hie est ; Excellit autem hie modus (vel locusreading TWOS), Sed ad
fidem accusatori detrahendam." And in that case, Quintilian's words,
V 12. 19, Aristoteles quidem potentissimum putat ex eo qui dicit, si sit
vir optimus &c, may be a translation of 8ia<j>epei 6 rponot. Siarptpeiv, if
thus understood, denotes 'pre-eminence, distinction above others'.
olov iv ra TfVKpco] This is no doubt Sophocles' tragedy of that name:
of which four fragments (and one doubtful one) still survive. See Wagner,
Fragm. Tr. Gr. I 388, 9. " Quum Ar. ubi poetarum nomina omisit tantummodo clarissimos quosque respexerit, facile inducimur ut eum Sophoclis Teucrum dixisse credamus." And Spengel, Spec. Comm. u. s., p. 16
[and ed.] "Sophoclis puto; si alius esset, nomen addidisset." The same
play is quoted again, III 15.9, whence it appears that Ulysses was one
of the characters. In an altercation with Teucer, the latter must be
supposed to have used a similar argument, or retort, founded upon his
own acknowledged superiority in moral character 1 . See Wagner 1. c.
1
Ulysses may be supposed to have accused Teucer of the murder of his brother
comp. Aj. 1012 seq. and 1021, where such a suspicion is hinted at: If you, Ulysses,
are shocked at such a crime, do you suppose that /, Teucer, could have been guilty
of it ? The same argument was employed by Euripides in his Telephus. Fragm.
XII, Dindorf, ap. Arist. Acharn. 554. Wagner, 11 p. 364. Fr. Tel. 24. raSr ott' on
ay I Spare (ita Meineke), rdr 5i irjKecjiov OVK ol6/j,eaSa; comp. Valck. Diatr. ad Fr.
Eurip.p. 211, "Telephi verba cum Ulysse loquentis." Ulysses had been making
some charge against Telephus, who makes this reply: You would have done so
and so: am / n o t as likely, or still more so, to have done the same? Plut. airo^d.
ii, Alex. II, p. 180 B, Aapdov SiSovroi avrf /j,vpia rdXavra nal TJJX 'Aalav
PHT0PIKH2 B 23 ;.
e
XPtl<TaT0
253
^(piKpa.Tf]<s 7Tjoos 'ApicTTOcpcopra,
el 7rpo$olr} av TOS vavs eirl ^pri/macriv

(TKOVTOS
iirepoou <pct-
de " e i r a " eiirev " cri) jxiv wv 'ApMrrcxptSv
av Trpoooiris, eyco 0 wv
icpiKpaTrjS ;
OVK
cei 0 v
who gives a long account of the subject of the play, and compares it
with Pacuvius' play of the same name, supposed to be borrowed from
Sophocles.
Aristophon was already celebrated as an orator in 403 B.C. (Clinton,
F. H., sub anno.) His fame may be inferred from the frequent and respectful mention of him by Demosthenes especially (see for instance, de Cor.
219, de Fals. Leg. 339), Aeschines and Dinarchus. See Baiter et
Sauppe, Orat. Att., Ind. Art>m. s. v., p. 21, Vol. m . He was an Azenian,
'Afyvievs, and thereby distinguished from his namesake of Collytus, de
Cor. 93. The speech to which Iphicrates here replies was delivered in
"the prosecution of Iphicrates by him and Chares for his failure in the
last campaign of the Social war, Diod. XVI 15. 21," (Clint. F. H.sub anno^)
in the year 355 B.C., at an already advanced age. See also Sauppe,
Fragm. Lys. 65, Or. Att. ill 190: and note on Rhet. i n 10. 6. He died
before 330, the date of the de Corona, Dem. de Cor. 162. On the
speech vnep 'icftiKparovs npoSoa-ias airdKoyta, attributed to Lysias (rejected by
Dionysius, de Lys. Iud. c. 12, comp. note on 6 supraj on that against
Harmodius), from which Iphicrates' saying against Harmodius is supposed to have been extracted, see Sauppe, Fragm. Lys. Lxv, {Orat. Att.
i n 190): and comp. ibid. p. 191, Aristid. Or. 49, who quotes the same
words somewhat differently, and, like Aristotle, attributes them directly
to Iphicrates, and not to Lysias. [A. Schaefer, Dem. und seine Zeit,
1 iSS-J
Ouintilian, V 12.10. borrows this example, referring it however to a
different class of arguments, probation-es quas ira6r)TtKas vacant ductas
ex affectibus, (he means the y8os,) 9. After quoting the nobilis
Scauri defensio, (on which see Introd. p. 151, note 1,) he adds, cui
simile quiddam fecisse Jphicrates dicitur, qui cum Aristophontem, quo
accusante similis criminis reus erat, ititerrogasset, an is accepta pecunia
rempublicam proditurus esset f isque id negasset; Quod igitur, inquit, tu
non/ecisses, ego fed f Comp. Spalding's note ad locum.
el irpodolrj av] cl = 7roTepov; see Appendix, On av with the optative
after certain particles [printed at the end of the notes to Book 11].
del 8' vnapxeiv K.T.\.] ' But (the person who employs the argument)
must have this advantage on his side, that the other (the opponent)
would be thought more likely to have done the wrong: otherwise, it
would seem absurd, for a man to apply this to an Aristides (the model of
justice and integrity) when he brings a charge;(not so), but only for the
discrediting (throwing a doubt upon, making the audience distrust, the
credibility) of the accuser: (if aXKa be connected with what immediately
precedes, to complete the sense, something must be supplied, such as ovx
vcl/J.a.ada.1 irpos airov Mays, Kal Hapiievlaivos elirSvros, Z\a8oi> av el '
ijwv, KdyCi, rij Ala, drev, el Hap^vlav w i " -
254
PHTOPIKHS B 23 7.
fxaXKov av ZOKOVVTCL a%iKi}<rai eiceivov el Se fxr/, yeXoTov av (paveiriy el TTJOOS 'Api<TTelBt]v Kamyopovvra
TOVTO Tis e'lireiev, dWd irpos dirurTiav TOU KaTr\yopov oAtos yap fiouAcTai 6 KaTrjyopwv /3e\Ticuv eivai
TOU (bevyovTOS' TOUT OVV te\ey%eiv
del. KCIVOXOV
ovrto, d\\a xpivreov1), and this, because as a general rule the accuser
pretends to be (would be if he could) a better man than the defendant:
this (assumption) then always requires confutation'. Should not del befiei?2
PovXerai] fiovXeo-dat like edeXeiv frequently implies a tendency, design,
intention, or aspiration, real or imaginarythe latter in things inanimatewants to be, would be, would like to be, if it could; and hence
here it denotes the assumption or pretension of superior goodness, ' he
would be better'. Zell, ad Eth. Nic. 111 r. 15 (in 2, n 10 b 30, Bk.),
Stallbaum ad Phaed. 74 D. Ast ad Phaedr. 230 D, p. 250. Thompson
ad euridem locum. Viger, pp. 263, 264, n. 77.
Eth. N . Ill 2, 1 1 1 0 ^ 3 0 , TO 8' duoicriov /3oiJXfrai \eyeo~6ai OVK et TIS
K-T.\. 'won't be called', 'don't choose to be called', as if it had the choice.

Hist. Anim. I 16. n [495 a 32], deXei yap elvai hifupfjs (wants to be, would
be if it could; of a general tendency, intention or plan, not completely
carried out)
6 Trkev/jLoyv iv aTratn. TOIS côutrti' avrov' aKka K-T.\.
[the
Index Aristotelicus does not quote this passage, either under Oektiv or
under Sipepys, though it is given under ir\evfiav]. Ib. vn 3. 4 [583 b 26],
at KaBipcreis fiovkovrai...ov firjv aKpij3ovfri ye K.TX* (the s a m e ) ; de Part.
Anim. IV 10, 29, dekei, I b . Ill 7. 2, d iyKe<f>a\os ftoiXerai Stfiepfjs etvai. de
Gen. An. II 4, 9, 10 (bis eodem sensu). Ib. V 7. 17, [787 b 19], -ra 8*
6<Tra fijret rr\v TOU vcvpov (pvtriv is used in the same sense. This I
believe to be a aira Xeyopevov, [no instance is given in the Index
Aristotelicus, s. v. i)Tii/, where even the passage just quoted is not
cited]), de part. An. IV 2. 10, fiovkirai, 'is designed to b e ' ; so Eth. N.
V 7, II32 a 21, d Sixaor^f /3oi5Aer<u twai olov biKaiov cfv\fvxpv, animated
justice, the embodiment of abstract justicethis is what he is intended
to be, though he often falls short of it. Ib. c. 8, 1133 b 14, (iovKerat
fiiviv paWov. de Anima A 3, 407 a 4, fiovkerai, Plato means or intends.
Topic. Z S, 142 b 27, TO Se ykvos ôuXerai TO TI <m o-ij/iaiVeiv. Ib. c. 13,
151 a 17. Pol. II 6, 1265 b 27, } o-vvTaîs Skr) 0. tlvai (n-oXireta)' is designed, or intended, to be'. Ib. 1266 a 7, tyicKLveiv /3. wpbs r^v okiyapyiav.
Ib. 1 5, 1254 b 27, a 6, 1255 b 3, c. 12, 1259 b 6, et saepe alibi. ["Saepe
per fiovkerai eivai significatur quo quid per naturam suam tendit, sive id
assequitur quo tendit, sive non plene et perfecte assequitur."

Aristotelicus, where more than forty references are given.]
Index
So Latin velle; Cic. Orat. XXXlll 117, quern volumus esse eloquentem.
Hor. A. P. 89, versibus exponi tragicis res comica non vult.
KaBoKov 8' aTonos i(TTiv X.T.X.] U n d . d rponos (or d TOTTOS) from above : not
1
This is the usual way of connecting the parts of the sentence; but I think
Gaisford's explanation, quoted above, is certainly to be preferred.
2
["In cod. abest Kal post TCV'K/V (p. 252), 'ego addidi; post ipapdr] extat el,
ego Kal scripsi: deinde TOVTO TIS, ego TOUT' 01ms; extremo autem loco del, Muretus
aliique Set." Ussing, in Opuscula Pkilologica ad Madvigium, 1876, p. 1.]
aTO7ros l(TTivi
OTCCV
255
Tts eVtTtjua a'AXots a
Troir\(reiev av, t] irpoTpeirtj
iroieiv
CIVTOS
CCUTOS
fxri
Troincreiev dv. aAAos e 6pi<rfxov, oiov

o r t TO oaifxovtov oucev ecrriu a\A r\ feos rj veov
as Victorius, who supposes it to mean an absurd man. ' And in general the
use of it is absurd whenever a man censures {taxes) others for something
which he does himself, or would do (if he had the opportunity), or exhorts them to do what he does not do now himself, and never would do
(under any circumstances)'. The first of these two cases is that of Satan"
rebuking sin; the second that of one who preaches what he does not
practise.
8. Top. vii. Definition. The definition of terms is the basis of
all sound argument, and the ambiguity of terms one of the most abundant sources of fallacy and misunderstanding. A clear definition is
therefore necessary for intelligible reasoning. To establish definitions,
and so come to a clear understanding of the thing in controversy, was,
as Aristotle tells us, the end and object of the Socratic method. The
use of the definition in dialectics is treated in the Topics, A 15, 107 a 36
b 5 [Grote's Ar. I p. 404], B 2, 109 13 seq. and 30 seq. Cic. Topic. V
26VII 32. De Inv. 11 17. 5356. Orat. Part, x n 41. De Orat. 11 39.
164. Quint. V 10. 36, and 54 seq.
The first example of the argument from definition, is the inference
drawn by Socrates at his trial from the definition of TO baijioviov, Plat.
Apol. Socr. c. 15. Meletus accuses him of teaching his young associates
not to believe in the gods recognized by the state, and introducing other
new divinities, ?Tepa Saiftowa Kau>d, in their place. Socrates argues that
upon Meletus' own admission he believes in Sat/iovia divine things (27 c);
but divine things or works imply a workman; and therefore a belief in
baifiovia necessarily implies a belief in the authors of those works, viz.
Salfioves. But Sai/ioi/ej are universally held to be either 8eol or 6ewv
irai8es (27 D), and therefore in either case a belief in Saifiovia still implies
a belief in the gods. The conclusion is TOV avrov eivai 8ai/i6via KCLI
6eia fjyeitrdai (E).
In Xenophon's apology this argument is entirely omitted; and Socrates is represented as interpreting the Kaiva haipovux (which he is
accused of introducing) of TO 8ai)i6i>iov, the divine sign which checked
him when he was about to do wrong; and this is referred to the class of
divine communicationsoracles, omens, divination and so forth.
As to the status of the Saljj.oves opinions varied: but the usual conception
of them was, as appears in Hesiod, Op. et D. 121, and many passages of
Plato, Timaeus, Laws (VIII 848 D, &eav re Kai TO>V kTtopkvuv deois Sat/iovav),
IV 713 B, OVK avdpamovt aXKa yivovs Oaorcpov re Kal ajxeivovos, talfiovas,
and elsewhere, that they were an order of beings, like angels, intermediate between men and gods, and having the office of tutelary deities or
guardian angels to the human race. So Hesiod, u. s., Theogn. 1348 (of
Ganymede), Plat. Phaedo 108 B, 107 D, 113 D. Aristotle seems to imply
the same distinction when he says, de Div. per Somn. I 2, init., that
dreams are not 8e 'nefinTa, because they are natural, fiatôeia /leVrot' tf yap
256
PHTOPIKHS B 23 8.
epyov
Kctiroi os TZS dierai 6eou epyov eivai, TOVTOV dvdyKtj oieo-dai Kai Oeovs eivai. Kai cJs 'l(f)iKpdrri<z, OTI yevvaioTaTos
6 /3eA.Tt<rTOs* Kai yap
'Ap/jioSiu) Kai 'Apia-Toye'iTOvi ovlev irporepov virnpxe
yevvalov rrplv yevvalov TI irpdâi.
Kai OTI cruyyele
ve&TCpos avTOs'
TO. yovv epya (rvyyevecrTepa ecrn
rd ifxd. TO?S 'Ap/modiov Kai 'ApicrToye'iTOvos r\ r a era.
Kai ws eV TW 'AXe^dvdpw, OTI TrdvTes dv o/noXoyrjcreiav
TOI)S fxr\ KOfffxiovs ov% ivos crw/xaTOS ayairav
diroXav<t>vo-is daifiovla, aXX' ov Beta. This argument of Socrates is repeated, ill
18. 2, more at length, and with some difference of detail.
The second example is taken from Iphicrates' speech upon the
prosecvition of Harmodius. the 8/(07 ""P"1 'Ap/ioSiov, supra 6, "cum Harmodius generis obscuritatem obiiceret, definitione generosi et propinqui
fastum adversarii repressit et decus suum defendit." Schrader. Harniodius had evidently been boasting of his descent from the famous
Harmodius, and contrasting his own noble birth with the low origin of
Iphicrates. The latter replies, by defining true nobility to be merit,
and not mere family distinction (comp. II 15, and the motto of Trinity
College, virtus vera nobilitas [Iuv. VIII. 20 nobilitas sola est atque
tfnica virtus']); ' for Harmodius (himself) and Aristogeiton had no
nobility anterior to their noble deed'. Next as to the relationship
which Harmodius claimed : he himself is in reality more nearly related
to Harmodius than his own descendant: true kinsmanship is shewn in
similarity of actions : 'at all events my deeds are more nearly akin to
those of Harmodius and Aristogeiton than thine'. This is still more
pointedly expressed in Plutarch's version, 'Kvo^Qtyiiara ficuriKewv KO.1 crrparrjyav Iphicr. e, p. 187 B, npos Se 'Apfi68iov, TOP TOV iraXaiov 'ApfioSiov dnoyovov,
fls 8vo"yeveiav avra \oihopoviuvov %<pr)' To fiev ifibv air (fiov yevos apxerai,
TO 8e (TOV iv o-o\ iravfTcu. This seems to be taken, with alterations, from
a speech of Lysias, ap. Stob. flor. 86. 15, quoted by Sauppe, Fragm.
Lys. XVIII. Or. Att. Ill 180. Another form of Iphicrates' saying, briefer
still, is found in Pseudo-Plut. nepl cvyeveias c. 21 (ap. Sauppe u. s.)|
'iqbiitpaTTjs ovei8i6ficvos els dvo~yci>iav' iya> apa>, elite, TOV
ytvovs.
The third is taken from the Alexander of some unknown apologist,

quoted before, 5, and 1 2 ; and c. 24.7 and 9. On this Schrader;
" sententia illius videtur haec esse : Paridem intemperantem habendum
non esse, una quippe Helena contentum. Argumentum e definitione
temperantis (temperantiae) petitum." Similarly Victorius, " p.r) KOO-JUOS est
qui una contentus non est...sed quot videt formosas mulieres tot amat.
Cum sola Helena ipse contentus vixerit, non debet intemperans vocari."
epos therefore is 'one only', and dytmav 'to be satisfied with'. aTrokavais,
of sensual enjoyment, Eth. N. I 3, sub init, 6 Smokavo-riKos /3i'oy, the life
of a Sardanapalus. Ib. Ill 13, 1118 a 30, inoXavo-ei, ?J yiWai nao-a fit'
a(j)rjs Kai iv (riTi'oir Kai iv TTOTO'LS Ka\ TOIS d<j)pobio-lois Xeyofievois.
1148 a 5) Tas crafiariKas a7roXav(reif.
VII 6 ,
257
civ.
Kai 1' 6 Sw/CjOaVtys OVK e(pt] (3a$lêiv ws 'Ap%tXaov vftpiv yap ecpri ehai TO fxri Buvacrdai dfxvvaa-dat
Ofxoiuis ev iraOovTa uxnrep Kac KflKws. 7raj/Ts yap
OVTOI 6pi<rdfxevoi nal Aa/3oVres TO TL icrTi,
(ruWoyl9 fyvTai Trepl tav Xeyovcriv.
aAAos e: TOV
The fourth is, the reason that Socrates gave for refusing to go to pay a
visit to Archelaus; that it would be ignominious to him, to receive favours
from a man, and then not to have the power of requiting the benefits
(good treatment) in the same way as one would injuries (ill treatment).
This was a new definition, or an extension of the ordinary one, of v/Zpis,
which is "wanton outrage," supra 11 2. 5, an act of aggression, vfipis
usually implies hostility on the part of him who inflicts it; in this case
the offer of a supposed benefit is construed as inflicting the ignominy.
The abstract vfipis, for the concrete vfipio-TiKov, occurs often elsewhere,
as in Soph. Oed. Col. 883, ap' ovx vfipis raS'; K.P. vfipis' d\\' dveKTca.
Arist. Ran. 21, efr' ovx vfipts ravr eari; Lysistr. 658, Nub. 1299. Similarly Ter. Andr. I 5. 2, quid est si hoc non contumelia est ? (Reisig ad loc.
Soph.) And in other words ; a pio-os (i. e. /tun/rov hated object) els
"EXXi/vas, Eur. Iph. T. 512 ; a fita-os, Med. 1323, and Soph. Philoct. 991.
oX-yos for aKyfivov, Aesch. Pr. Vinct. 261. Eur. Ion, 528 yeXajs for yfXotoi',
and D e m . de F . L. 82, e<rn fie ravra yekios, /xSXXov fi1 avaKT^vvrla beivrj.
Arist. Acharn. 125, ravra bf/r OVK dyxovrj.
T h e contempt of Archelaus implied in this refusal is noticed by
Diog. Laert., Vit. Socr. II 5. 25, virepe<f>poi>r)<re Si Kai 'ApêXdou TOV Mcuee86vos...p-i]Tf irap" avroiis direXOwv; and see Schneider's note on Xenophon,
Apol. Socr. 17, on Socrates' ordinary conduct in respect of the acceptance of fees and gratuities and favours in general. On Archelaus
and his usurpation of the throne of Macedonia, and his tyranny and
crimes, see Plato Gorg. c. xxvi p. 470 c471 C.
' For all these first define the term (they are about to use), and then,
having found its true essence and nature, they proceed to draw their
inference (conclude) from it on the point that they are arguing. The
opos or opio-fios, 'definition', is itself defined at length, Metaph. A 12,
1037 b 25, seq.: and more briefly Top. A 8, 103 b 15, 101 b 39, Z 6,
143 (5 20. The definition of a thing is its Xoyor, TO TL TJV tlvai o-tifialvav,
that which expresses the formal cause of a thing; the what it was to
be; the essence of it, or that which makes it what it is. Only ti'Sfj or
species can, strictly speaking, be defined: the definition of the e'Soy
gives the yivos, the essentials, together with the htatpopa, or specific
difference: and these two constitute the definition ; which is here
accordingly said to express TO TL icrrl, 'the, what the thing really is'.
On the definition see Waitz, Organ. 11 p. 398, and Trend. El. Log. Ar.
54, et seq. This topic of definition afterwards became the cnao-is
opiKT], nomen or finitioj one of the legal 'issues', on which see Introduction, Appendix E to Bk III pp. 397400 9. Top. VIII. IK TOV 7vocrax&s] Between the topics of definition
and division ( 10) is introduced this topic of ambiguous terms, or words
AR. II.
258
PHT0PIKH2 B 23 10.
10 Olou iv TOiS TOTTLKOLS 7Tpl TOV 6p6w<5.

jOeVews, olov
el Trai/res
Tpiwv
Tovde yap eveica rj TOvSe n Toude'
eveicev
OtAXoS K
ahiKov&tv
teal Zia fiev
TJ
TO. O*VO
p. 99.
that are susceptible of many and various senses, such as good (Top. A 15,
106 a 4 [Grote's Ar. I p. 402]); which must be carefully examined to see
whether or no they are all of them applicable to the argument. It is treated
at great length in Top. A 15, and again B 3 ; and is inserted here (between definition and division) because it is equally applicable to both
(Brandis). The exhaustive treatment bestowed upon it in the Topics
supersedes the necessity of dwelling on it here; and we are accordingly
referred to that treatise for illustration of it. Brandis, u.s., p. 19, objects
to irepi TOV opdas, "that there is nothing in the Topics which throws
any light upon the enigmatical ipBasf and proposes irepl TOV opdas
'upon the right use of the terms', i. e. whether it can be applied properly
in any one of its various senses or not. But surely the reading of the
.text may be interpreted as it stands in precisely the same meaning:
OLOV iv TOTTixois (XeXexrat, o r liuSpio-Tcu) irepl TOV op&as (xprjo-0ai avra),
'as
in the Topics (we have treated) of the right use of the terms'. Muretus
has omitted the words in his transl. as a gloss : and Victorius, followed
by Schrader and Buhle, understands it as a reference, not directly to the
Topics, but to the 'dialectical art', as elsewhere, 11 22. 10, for instance
see Schrader's note on 11 25. 3. "Disciplina Topica intelligenda est."
Buhle. It seems to me to be a direct and explicit reference to the
passages of the Topics above mentioned, in which the right way of
dealing with these ambiguous terms is described.
10. Top. IX. e< 8iaipeo-a>s] the topic of division. This is the
division of a genus into its etfiij or species ; as appears from the example,
the three motives to crime, from which the inference is drawn. Finitioni
subiecta maxime videntur genus, species, differens, proprium. Ex Ms
omnibus argumenta ducuntur. Quint. V 10. 55. Top. B 2,109 b 1329.r 6, 120 a 34 [Grote's Ar. I p. 435]. On biaipecris in demonstration, use
and abuse, see Anal. Pr. 131. Trendel. El. Log. Ar. 58, p. I34seq. Cic.
Topic, v 28, xxil 83, de Orat. II 39.165, Sin pars (rei quaeritur) partitione,
hoc modo: aut senatuiparendum de salute reipublicae fuit aut aliud consilium instituendum aut sua sponte faciendum ; aliud consilium, superbumj
suum, adrogans; utendum igitur fuit consilio senatus. Quint. V 10.
63, 65 seq. Ad probandum valet, et ad refellendum, 65. Periculosum ;
requires caution in the use, 67. The example, which illustrates the
topic by the three motives to crime or wrong-doing, pleasure, profit,
and honour, is taken from Isocrates' avriboais, 217220, as Spengel
points out, Trans. Bav. Acad. 1851, p. 20, note. All the three are successively applied to test the accusation (of corrupting youth) that his
enemies have brought against him, and all of them are found to be
unsuitable to explain the alleged fact. He therefore concludes by the
method of exhaustion, that having no conceivable motives, he is not
guilty. It must however be observed that Ar.'s ftia 8e TO rpWov ovb'
avroi (pao-iv, is not supported by anything in Isocrates' text. The causes
and motives of actions have been already divided in I 10, with a very
P H T O P I K H 2 B 23 I I .
259
1 dZvvctTOV, hia de TO rptrov ov& avrol (pacnv. ocAAos

e eTraycoytjs, oiov e/c TJJS YleTrapr}6ia<s, on wept rwu
different result. The same terms are there employed, SieXoyie&i 6,
a n dfiiatpE<7ts 11.
For an example of this topic, see n 23. 22 in the note.

On the inference from 'disjunctive judgments', see Thomson, Laws
of Thought, 90, p. 160.
I I . Top. X. e' ewayayfjs] The rudimentary kind of induction,
of which alone Rhetoric admits: two or three similar cases being adduced to prove a general rule, from which the inference is drawn as to
the present case. It is the argument from analogy, or cases in point.
This and the following, says Brandis, u. s., naturally find nothing corresponding to them in the Topics. Cic. de Or. 11 40. 168, ex similitudinej siferae partus suos diligunt, qua nos in liberos nostros indulgentia
esse debemus? &c. Quint, v 10. 73, est argumentorum locus ex similibus;
si continentia virtus, utique et abstinentia: Si fidem debet tutor, et procurator. Hoc est ex eo genere quod iwaya>yi]v Graeci vocant, Cicero inductionem.
K Ttjs TleiraprjBias] 8/KTJS ; comp. 6, iv r% trpbs 'ApfioSiov. An extract
' from the well-known Peparethian case', about the parentage of a child;
the speaker adduces two analogous cases, or cases in point, to prove the
rule which he wishes to establish, that it is the mother who is the best
judge of the parentage of the child. Gaisford quotes Homer, Od. A 215,
fiijTijp
pep T* cfjue <j}rj(ri TOV epfievat, avrap
eya>ye OVK otS*" ov yap 7ra> tis
iou
yovov avTos avkyva: on which Eustathius; donel de Ka\ TQ 'ApurroreXet Ta

1
] " Concionis (ut puto) sive alterius generis scriptionis

nomen est Peparethia," Victorius. But in that case it would be masc.
(with Xoyos understood), not feminine: and the analogy of 6 is also in
favour of the ellipse of BUrjs. Otherwise we might understand eirayaryfjs,
Or yvvaiKos.
The meaning is, ' Another topic of inference is induction; as, for
instance, it may be inferred as a general rule from the,Peparethian case,
that in the case of children (as to the true parentage of children) women
always distinguish the truth better (than the other sex)'. And the same
rule has been applied, from a similar induction, in two other recorded
cases; ' for, in the first, (on the one hand), at Athens, in a dispute in
which Mantias the orator was engaged with his son (about his legitimacy), the mother declared the fact (of the birth, and so gained the
cause for her child); and in the second, at Thebes, in a dispute between
Ismenias and Stilbo (for the paternity of a child), Dodonis (the mother)
1
Peparethus, one of a small group of islands (Sciathus, Icus, Halonnesus,
Scyrus; Strab. Thessal. IX 5) off the coast of Magnesia, trpiKuvrai. âyv-qTuv,

Strabo u. s. (vijaos pla ruiv KvK\dSui>, Steph. Byz. s.v., unaex Cycladibus, Buhle.
OVK aTroOev EiIô/oSj Suidas), N . E . of Euboea: famous for its wine, Soph. Phil. 548,
evfiorpw IiewdprjOov, Aristoph. Thesmoph. Sec. Fr. 1 (ap. Athen. 119, A [Aristoph.
fragm. 301. Dind. ed. 5]) Meineke, Fragm. Com. II 1076. Comp. Herm. Fragm.
Phorm. 2 u (ap. eund. II 410).
172
26o
PHT0PIKH2 B 23 11.
TKV(ov al yvvaitces iravTa-ôv Bioplôvo't Ta\t]6es'

TOVTO p.ev yap 'Adrjvt](rt MavTia TW pr\Topi dfMpicrfiti- P. 1398 b.
TOUVTI irpos TOU vlou j jjinrnp d7T(f>r]vev, TOVTO Be
Qtifiti<nv 'lo'fxriviov Kai 2T/A/3O>I/OS dfx(picr(3r)T0vuTh)u
ri Awowuts direZeiêu '\o~[xriviov TOU vlou, Kai Bid TOVTO
QeTTa\io~K.ov 'lo~f.it]vlov euofxi^pu. Kai 7rd\iv e/c TOV
VO/JLOV TOV QeoBeKTOV, el TOIS KaKcos e7rifie\r]6elo~i TCOV
made a declaration that it belonged to Ismenias; and in consequence
Thettaliscus was always regarded as Ismenias' son'.
' Mantias the orator', whose name does not appear in Smith's Biogr.
Diet., may be the same person who is mentioned as the father of Mantitheus and Boeotus, of the deme of Thoricus, Dem. Boeot. de nom. 7,
10; comp. 30 (bis), 37. ['Mantias proposed that Plangon should declare
on oath before an arbitrator, whether Boeotus and Pamphilus were her
sons by Mantias or not. She had assured him privately that if the oath
in the affirmative were tendered to her, she would decline to take it... She,
however, unexpectedly swore that they were her sons by Mantias.' From
Mr Paley's Introd. to Dem. Or. 39, Select Private Orations, I p. 131,
Comp. supplementary notes on pp. 134 and 182].
Ismenias, whose name likewise is wanting in Smith's Diet., was in
all probability the one somewhat celebrated in Theban history, as leader,
with Autoclides, of the anti-Lacedaemonian party at Thebes, mentioned
by Xenophon, Hellen. v 2. 25 seq. He was accused by his opponent
Leontiades, tried, and put to death by a court appointed for the purpose
by the Lacedaemonians, who were then (383 B. c.) in occupation of the
Cadmeia, Xen. Ib. 35,36, Grote, Hist. Gr. x pp. 80, 85,86 [chap Lxxvr].
His name is also associated by Mr Grote, H. G. x 380, 387, 391 [chap.
LXXIX], with that of Pelopidas, as one of the ambassadors to the court of
Artaxerxes at Susa in 367 B. c.; and again, as taken prisoner with him by
Alexander of Pherae in the following year. The authority for these statements appears to be Plutarch, Artax. xxn for the first; and Id. Pelopid.
xxix sub fin. for the second: Xenophon does not mention him in this
connexion. At all events, it was not the same Ismenias, that was put to
death in 383, and accompanied Pelopidas, as ambassador and captive, in
367 and 3661. Of Stilbon, and the other persons named, I can find no
further particulars.
'And another instance from Theodectes' "law"if to those who have
mismanaged other people's horses we don't entrust horses of our own, or
(our ships) to those who have upset the ships of others; then, if the rule
hold universally, those who have ill guarded or maintained the safety
and well-being of others, are not to be employed in (entrusted with) the
preservation of our own', Sauppe, Fragm. Theod. N<yios {Or. Att. Ill
1
The name Ismenias appears to have been traditional in Boeotiafromthe veryearliest times, '\ant\vii\s 6 Boiciirios is mentioned in the biography of Homer
ascribed to Herodotus, 2, 3, as one of the original settlers of the new colony
of Cuma in Aeolia, and carrying with him Homer's mother Critheis.
PHTOPIKHS B 23 11.
261
dXkorpitav ITTTTCOV OV 7rapa$i$6acri TOVS OIKC'IOVS, ov$e

Tots dvctTpe-^saai r a s d\\oTpia<s vavs' OVKOVV el
Ofxoiws i(p' dirdvTuiv, Kai TO?S /ca/cws <pv\dao~i
dWoTpiav ov ^jOJjo-reoi/ ea-rlv els Tt\v olneiav
piav. Kai ws 'A.\KiZdjj.a<s, OTI irdvTei TOI)S (rod>oi)s
Tifxcocriv Uapioi yovv AjOîAoôi' Kai irep ^X
bvTct TeTifxriKacri, Kai X101 ''Ofirjpov OVK SvTa
247), thinks with every appearance of probability that Theodectes1
'law' " (declamationem) ad rationes militum mercenariorum lege ab
Atheniensibus accurate ordinandas pertinuisse." Both the fragments
quoted by Aristotle, here, and again 17, agree perfectly with this view.
The extract here stigmatizes the folly shewn by the Athenians in entrusting their interests to mercenarieslike Charidemus~and his fellowswho
have already shewn their incapacity and untrustworthiness whilst in the
employment of othersforeign princes and stateswho have used their
services. The other extract, 17, is to shew that by their gross misconduct and the mischief they have already done, most of themwith the
exception perhaps of men like Strabax and Charidemushave entirely
disqualified themselves for employment. From the example in Theodectes' ' law', the general principle may be inferred, that it is folly to
entrust with the care of our own interests and the management of our
affairs such as have already shewn themselves incapable by previous
failures in like cases. The argument from the analogy of trades and
professions is quite in the manner of Socrates and Plato.
On Theodectes himself and his works, see note on II 23. 3, and the
references there.
'A\Kt8apas] Of Alcidamas and his writings, see note on I 13.2, and
the reff. This fragment is referred by Sauppe, Fragm. Alcid. 5, to Alcidamas' Mova-ftov; of which he says, on fragm. 6, that he supposes it
to have been: " promptuarium quoddam rhetoricum, quod declamationes
de variis rebus contineret" \îAlkida?nas...sein mannigfaltige rhetorische
Probestiicke umfassendes Buck /lovaciov nannte," Vahlen, der Rhetor Alkidamas, p. 495]. Alcidamas' Mecrmji'taKos' Xoyos is quoted, 1 13.2, and 11 23.1.
Uapioi yovvij jroXir] translated.in Camb. yourn. of Cl. and Sacred
Phil. No. 9, Vol. in. p. 267.
TOVS <ro(f>ovs] are here the great 'wits', men of genius; men distinguished (not here specially as artists, but) for literature, learning, or
wisdom in general.
Of Archilochus, his life, character, and writings, a good account is to
be found in Mure, Hist. Gr. Lit. Vol. in. p. 138 seq. (Bk. in. ch. iii), in
which the /3Xao-^7/iia noted by Alcidamas, as well as his great celebrity,
is abundantly illustrated. See also Muller, Hist. Gr. Lit. c. XI 610,
and 14. Archilochwn proprio rabies armavit iambo, Hor. A. P. 79 (with
Orelli's note). Parios iambos, Ib. Ep. I 19.23 seq.
OVK ovra ITO\ITT)V] This, the vulgata lectio, is retained by Bekker, and
even (for once) by Spengel, though A" has WO\ITIK6V. In favour of this,
262
PHTOPIKHS B23 11.
Kal MvTiXtivaToi 1.OTr(pw Kal irep yvvaiKa oixrav,

AaKeoaifxovioi XiAwva TWV yepovTcou eTroirjcrav r\
(piAoAoyoi oVres, Kai 'WaAiwTai Tlvdayopav, Kal
'Auaâyopav
êvov ovra e6a\jsav Kal
the reading of the best MS, it may be urged, that TTOX/TIJV would represent
the Chians as disclaiming Homer as their fellow-citizen, quite contrary
to the pertinacity with which they ordinarily urged their claim to the
honour of his birthplace. This was carried so far, that Simonides in
one of his fragments, Eleg. Fragm. 85 line 2 (Bergk), says of a quotation
from Homer, Xios eeiirev avrip. Comp. Thucyd. i n 104. On this ' Ionic'
claim, see further in Mure, Hist. Gk. Lit. Vol. 11 p. 202. On the other
hand ov iroK'iTqv may meanas Miiller supposes, Hist. Gk. Lit. ch. v
1that they claimed, not Homer's birth, but merely his residence
among them. The other reading TTOKITIKOV affords an equally good
sense ; that his Chian fellow-countrymen conferred honours upon Homer,
though not upon the ordinary ground of public services, or active
participation in the business of public life ; as the Athenianshad
they so pleasedmight have dealt with Plato.
Kai irep yvvaiica ovarav] "Sappho so far surpassed all other women in
intellectual and literary distinction that her fellow-countrymen, the
Mytileneans, assigned to her the like honours with the men, whom
she equalled in renown ; admitted by her countrymen of eveiy age to
be the only female entitled to rank on the same level with the more
illustrious poets of the male sex." Mure, H. G. L. Vol. 111 p. 273,
Sappho. He refers to this passage. Chilon, Mure, Ib. p. 392. Diog.
Laert, vit. Chil. 68, substitutes the ephory for the seat in the yepovcria
as the honour conferred on Chilon by the Lacedaemonians.
<piXoX6yot] ' of a literary turn'.
'IraAicSrai] (SuceXuSrcu) Greek settlers in Italy (and Sicily). Victories
remarks that these are properly distinguished from 'IraXoi, the original
inhabitants, who would not have understood Pythagoras' learning, or
institutions, or moral precepts.
Pythagoras, according to the received account, as reported by Diogenes
Laertius, vit. Pyth., was a native of Samos, to which after various travels
he was returning, when, finding it oppressed by the tyranny of Polycrates,
he started for Croton in Italy ; Kaxti vopovs 6e\s TOIS 'iraXitorais ihoâa-Brj
avv rots fiadr^rals, ot rrpos roils rpiaKotriovs oures (pKovofiovv apurra ra
TTokiriKa, wore frx&ov apurroKpariav ehcu rrjv iroXireiav, 3. I n what
way the honour of his new fellow-citizens was expressed rather by re*
spect and admiration, than by substantial rewards, may be gathered from
the famous avros e(pa of his pupils, and from a notice in Diogenes,
14, OVTCD 8' e8avfia<rdrj K.T.X.
Anaxagoras was a native of Clazomenae in Ionia, but, TeXos dnoxapwas tit Aa/x^raxov avTodt KaTearpexjreu. Diog. Laert., Anaxagoras, 14,
a custom held in his honour, Ib. nXevrija-avTa S17 avrbv tdaifrav evrifias
oi Aafiif'a/ciji/oi xai ineypafyav1 "EvBabe, n-Xeiorov dXrjdfirjs em Tep/ia 7repi)<ras
ovpaviov Kotr/Jiov, KEirat 'Avagayopas, 15.
263
en Kai vvv. . .OTI 'AStfvaToi TOIS

Xprio-a/uievoi evâifxovrjarav Kai
TO?S AvKovpyov, Kai Qrjfiriartv afxa 01 irpoarraTai <pi12 \ocro<poi iyeuovTO Kai evBaifiovticrev r\ TroAts. a'AAos
e/c Kpurews Trepi rov avrov fj 6/j.oiov t] evavTiov, fidKal 'A6nva7oi] ita vulg. et vet. transl. Lat. "on 'A8r)va1ot, A" apud
Viet, et Gaisf." Spengel. Accordingly Bekker, Ed. 3, Spengel and Vahlen
now read 8TI 'A6. preceded by the mark of something omitted. And
in fact, as Spengel observes, what follows is not a proper continuation
of the preceding quotation from Alcidamas, but a new example of the
general topic of induction. The general rule which is derived from the
two following instances has fallen out, or something suggesting it, to
which OTI refers, has been omitted either by a copyist, or possibly in his
haste by the author himself. Aristotle is capable of this ; continuing
perhaps to quote from Alcidamas, he may have neglected to supply
the proper connexion. The general principle that is to be inferred
from the induction may be the Platonic paradox that the true statesmen
are philosophers: this appears from the three examples, ' that the
Athenians flourished and were happy under the laws of Solon, and
the Lacedaemonians under those of Lycurgus; and at Thebes, the prosperity (or flourishing condition) of the city was coeval with the accession
of its leaders to philosophy'. I have rendered the last words thus to
express iyivovro. But the meaning of the whole is doubtless as Victorius
gives it, that the happiness of Thebes, that is, its virtue and glory, began
and ended with the philosophy of its leaders. This is inadequately
expressed by iyevovro, which only conveys the beginning of the coincidence : and, if the explanation of the suppressed rule be right,
would have been better represented by a/ia 01 cj>i\6o-o(f>oi irpoo-Tarai
iyivovTo. The last word is a correction of Victorius from MS A for the
vulgata lectio eXiyovro. (The leaders here referred to are Epaminondas
and Pelopidas.)
12. Top. XI. This is an inference i< Kplo-eas,' from an authoritative
judgment or decision already pronounced upon the same question, or
one like it, or the opposite' (opposites may always be inferred from
opposites); 'either universally and at all times' (supply ovra KeKpUao-iv)
'or, in default of that, by the majority, or the wiseeither all or most
or good'. This topic, like the last, is naturally wanting in the dialectical
Topics, to which it is inappropriate. Brandis, u. s.
Cicero, Top. XX 78, mixes up this topic with the authority of character, the tfdos iv Ta \iyovri, which ought not to be confounded though
they have much in common ; the authority being derived from the same
source, intellectual and moral pre-eminence, but employed in different
ways. The former of the two is made supplementary to the other,
sed et oratores etphilosophos et poetas et Mstoricos: ex quorum et dictis
et scriptis saepe auctoritas petitur ad faciendam fidem. Quintilian omits
it in his enumeration, v 10.
264
Xi<rra
dyadoi.
PHTOPIKHS B 23 12.
fxev el TravTes Kal del,
el Se fit], a'AA' 01 ye
(ro(j)oi
(ro(j)oi rj 7raVres rj 01 "irXeTcrroi
"irXeTcrroi, r)
n el avrol oi Kpivovres, rj 01/s
S'
We have here, and in the following sentence, a classification of

'authorities' from whose foregone decisions we may draw an inference
as to the truth of a statement, or the rectitude of a principle, act, or
course .of policy which we have to support; or the reverse. Such are
the universal consent of mankind1, quod semper, quod ubiquei quod
ab omnibus: short of that, the judgment of the majority: or of the
'wise', especially professional men, experts, pre-eminently skilled in
any art, science, practice, pursuit, or the majority of them : or, lastly,
the good, the right-minded, and therefore sound judging; whose minds
are unclouded by passion or partiality, unbiassed by prejudice, clear
to decide aright: men of c^poVijo-is who have acquired the habit of right
judgment in practical business and moral distinctions. The good, or
virtuous man, the (ppovi/ios or dya86s, or the opdhs \6yos, appears again
and again in Aristotle's Moral and Political writings as the true
standard of judgment.
Comp. Rhet. I 6. 25, ayadov, b TO>V (ppovl/iav ns
5 T&V ayadav avbpav r/ ywaixStv irpoexpivev, and see note and references there.
The wise, as authorities; particularly judges and legislators, as well
as poets, philosophers, statesmen, prophets and seers, and the like; are
one class of /laprvpes (as attesting the truth of a statement or principle)
of the aT(xml jr'oretr, I 15. 13, seq.: where Homer, Periander, Solon,
Themistocles (as an interpreter of oracles), and Plato, are selected as
examples.
17 ei avrol of Kpivovres] again Kfkpliuunv. ' Or again, (special classes of
authorities,) if the judges themselves, or those whose authority they
accept (have already pronounced upon the point); or those whose decision we have no power of opposing, such as our lords and masters (any
one that has power, controul, over us, with whom it is folly to contend);
or those whose decision it is not right to oppose, as gods, father, pastors
and masters' (whom we are bound in duty to obey).
' An instance of this is what Autocles said in his speech on the prosecution of Mixidemides' (this is lit. 'as Aut. said, what he did say against
M.')' 'that' (before el supply fia.vbi> ehai aut tale aliqujd, ' it was monstrous
that, to think that') 'the dread goddesses' (the" Eumenides or Erinnyes)
'should be satisfied to bring their case2 before the Areopagus, and Mixidemides not!' That is,that the authority of thecourthad been proved by the
submission of the Eumenides, Mixidemides was therefore bound to submit
in like manner: the jurisdiction and its claims had been already decided.
Of the circumstances of the case nothing further is known : but it seems
1
On the force of this argument from universal consent, see Cic. Tusc Disp. 1 cc.
XI, 13, 14, 15: especially 13, 30 (of the belief in God), and 15, 35, omnium consensus naturae vox est, seq. With which compare the maxim, Vox populi vox Dei.
2
SiKijv 8ovi>ai is here, as in Thuc. I 28, SUas rj$e\ov BOVPCU, 'to submit to trial or
adjudication': comp. Aesch. c. Ctes. 124, and the phrase 8Uip> Sowcu Kal \afle?i>,
denoting a general legal settlement of differences.
The usual meaning is 'to pay
the penalty or give satisfaction'.
PHT0PIKH2 B 23 12.
265
01 xpivovres, rj oh /mfj olov T6 evavTiov Kpiveiv, olov

rots Kvpiois, r\ oh fxt] naXov TCC evavTia Kpiveiv, oiov
6eols tj TraTpl fj StSacr/caAois, wcnrep TO ets
e'nrev AVTOKXIJS, el TOUS fxev (re/nvah deals i
iv 'Apeiia irayna Sovvcu S'uajv, MtîSfj/^'Sf/ S' oil.
r\ lucnrep ~Z,cnr<pw, OTI TO dirodvrio-Keiv KUKOV ol 6eol
yap O'VTCO KeKpiKacriv dweOvfjcrKOv yap av. r\ ws 'Aplfrom the allusion here, that Mixid. had first refused to submit to the
Court of Areopagus the trial of some charge against him, on which he
was subsequently, and consequently, prosecuted in one of the ordinary
courts of Autocles.
The appearance of the a-f/ival 6eai as prosecutors in the court of the
Areopagus is of course a reference to their prosecution of Orestes in
Aeschylus' Eumenides. Of Mixidemides we know but the name. Autocles was a much more important personage. He was an Athenian,
son of Strombichides, Xen. Hellen. VI 3. 2, one of the seven ambassadors
sent to the congress at Sparta in 371 B.C., in the spring before the battle
of Leuctra, Xen. 1. c , who reports his speech 7. Xenophon (u. s. 7)
calls him paka cVioTpEi^r pjrwp, ' a very careful orator' (so Sturz, Lex.
Xen. and Lexx. but I think rather,' dexterous', one who could readily turn
himself about to anything, 'versatile': and so apparently Suidas, who
renders it ayxivovs). Autocles was again employed in 362361 "in place
of Ergophilus (Rhet. II 3.13) to carry on war for Athens in the Hellespont and Bosporus." (Grote.) Xenophon's Hellenics do not reach this
date. His operations against Cotys in the Chersonese, and subsequent
trial, are mentioned by Demosth. c. Aristocr. 104 and c. Polycl. 12,
and his name occurs, pro Phorm. 53 [A. Schaefer's Dem. u. s. Zeit
1 pp.64, 134 and ill 2. p. 158]. See Grote, H. G. x 223 [c. LXXVII], and
511 seq. [c. LXXX]. Another Autocles, 6 ToXfiaiou, is mentioned by Thuc.
IV 53, and again c. 119: and another by Lysias, npbs 'S.lfj.ava 12: and a
fourth by Aeschines, de F. Leg. 155.
' O r (another example) Sappho's saying, that death must be an evil:
for the gods have so decided; else they would have died themselves':
using the gods as an authority for the truth of her dictum.
' O r again, as Aristippus to Plato, when he pronounced upon some
point inas he, Aristippus, thoughta somewhat too authoritative tone,
" N a y but," said he, "our friend"meaning Socrates"never used to
speak like that.'"
Aristippus draws an inference from the authority of their common
masterwho never dictated, but left every question open to free discussion, always assuming his own ignorance, and desire to be instructed
rather than to instructto the proper rule in conducting philosophical
discussion. On Aristippus see Grote's Plato, Vol. ill. p. 530, seq.
ch. XXXVIII.
On this passage, see Grote, Plato, III 471, and note. In qualification
of what is there said of Plato's ' arrogance', so far as it can be gathered
266
PHT0PIKH2 B 23 12.
(TTnnros Vjooy UXctTcova iirayyeATiKCvTepov TI et-pioo.

7rovTa, cos wero' " dAAa fxr\v 6 y' iraipos r\\xwv e(ptj
f* ovdev TOIOVTOV" \i<ywv TOV ILtoKpaTtiv. KCXI 'Aytjfrom our text, take Victorius' commentary on o>s aero, with which I
entirely agree: "quae sequuntur verba modestiam Platonis defendunt, et
paene declarant sine causa Aristippum arrogantiae eum insumulasse:
addit enim cos aero, ut opinio illius erat." I will not however deny that
Plato may even in conversation have been occasionally guilty of dogmatizing : in his latest writings, such as the Timaeus and Laws, and to a
less degree in the Republic, such a tendency undoubtedly shews itself:
but by far the larger portion of his dialogues, which represent probably
nearly three-fourths of his entire life, are pervaded by a directly opposite
spirit, and are the very impersonation of intellectual freedom. Following
the method and practice of his master, he submits every question as it
arises to the freest dialectical discussion, so that it is often impossible to
decide which way (at the period of writing any particular dialogue) his
own opinion inclines; and always presents in the strongest light any
objections and difficulties in the thesis which he is maintaining. I think
at all events with Victorius that Aristotle at any rate lends no countenance here to Aristippus' charge of dogmatic assumption. So far as his
outward bearing and demeanour were concerned, I can conceive that he
may have been haughty and reserved, possibly even morose; but a habit
of ' laying down the law', or of undue assumption and pretension in lecturing and discussionwhich is what Aristippus appears here to attribute to himseems to me to be inconsistent with what we know from
his dialogues to have been the ordinary habit of his mind, at least until
he was already advanced in life1.
iirayyeXTiKioTcpov] tirayyeWecrdcu is to 'announce', 'make public
profession of, as of an art, pursuit, business, practice. Xen. Memor.
1 2. 7, or' aperrjv, of the Sophists, who 'made a profession of teaching
virtue'. So Uparayopov ejrdyyeXfia, Rhet. II 24. II. This 'profession'
may or may not carry with it the notion of pretension without performance, imposture, sham, (pawo/ievr] a-o(j>ia, show without substance : and it
is by the context and the other associations that the particular meaning
must be determined. Thus when Protagoras says of himself, TOCTO
ia-nv, a? 2., TO eVayyeAfia o eVayyeXXo/icu, he certainly does not mean to
imply that he is an impostor: when Aristotle 1. c. applies the term to
him, this is by no means so certain; judging by his account of the
Sophists, de Soph. El. 1, 165 a 19 seq. Instances of both usages may be
found in Ast, Lex. Plat. There can be no doubt that undue assumption
or pretension is meant to be conveyed by Aristippus in applying the
word to Plato's tone and manner.
' And Agesipolis repeated the inquiry of the God at Delphi, which
he had previously made (of the God) at Olympia (Apollo at Delphi,
Zeus at Olympia), whether his opinion1 coincided with his father's;
1
I have expressed my opinion upon some points of Plato's character, in contrast with that of Aristotle, in Introd. to transl. of Gorgias p. xxvii, and note; to
which I venture here to refer.
PHT0PIKH2 B 23 12".
267
ev Ae\(po7s ewtipiora TOP deov, irpoTepov '/ce'OAv/n7ria(nv, el avTta ravra SoKei a Trep
ws alcrxpov OP TavavTia e'nreiv. Kal irepl TJS P. 1399.
'EA.ei'jj? ws 'ItrojCjOctTJjs eypayjsev OTI (nrovliaia, e'iirep
Qrjaevs etcpivev Kal irepl 'AXe^dvdpov,
bv at deal
irpoeicpivav, Kal irepl Tivayopov, OTI {nrovSa'ios, axnrep
(prjcriv Kovtov yovv hvcrTV)(ri(ra<2,
assuming or inferring' (as sc. from the obvious duty of respecting the
authority of a father) ' the disgracefulness of pronouncing the contrary'.
For v. 1. 'Hyijo-HrTror Victorius and Muretus had proposed to substitute
'AyTja-lTroXts, from Xen. Hellen. IV 7. 2, which has been adopted in the
recent editions of Bekker and Spengel; being also confirmed by a varia.
tion in the old Latin Transl., which has Hegesippus polis. See Spengel in
Trans. Bav. Acad. 1851, p. 53. Gaisford in Not. Var. and Victorius.
Xenophon in the passage cited tells the whole story. Agesipolis is the
first of the three kings of Sparta of that name, who came to the throne
in 394 B.C. (Clinton, F. H. 11 p. 205). His expedition into Argolis, to
which the consultation of the oracle was preparatory, was in 390 (Clinton,
F. H. sttd anno). This Agesipolis has been not unnaturally confounded
with his more distinguished fellow-citizen and contemporary Agesilaus,
to whom Plutarch, Reg. et Imper. Apophthegm., Agesilaus 7, p. 191 B,
erroneously ascribes this saying as an apophthegm (Gaisford). . And similarly Diodorus, xiv 97, has substituted the latter name for the former in
his account of (apparently) the same event that Xenophon is relating in
the passage above cited. See Schneider's note ad locum.
'And Isocrates' argument about Helen, to shew that she was virtuous and respectable, (as she must have been) since (e'Uep, ifas he
did) she was approved by Theseus (Theseus decided, or gave judgment
in her favour)'. Aristotle's eKpivev expresses Isocrates' dyaTnja-avras KO.1
davfiao-avras. See ante, I 6. 25. The passage of Isocrates referred to
occurs in his Helen 1822. Compare especially 21, 22. He concludes thus, irepXfier&v OVTG> nakaiav Trpocrijitei rois KOT' eKeivov TOV xpovov
ev (frpovrjaacriv ofiovoovvras rjjias <j>aipe<r6m, to give way to their authority.
'And the case of Alexander (Paris) whom the (three) goddesses (Juno,
Minerva, Venus) preferred' (selected, decided, by preference; wpo, before
all others ; to adjudge the prize of beauty). This instance is given
before, with the preceding, in I 6. 25.
'Andas Isocrates says, to prove that (on) Evagoras was a man of
worthConon, at all events after his misfortune, left all the rest and
came to Evagoras'. Evagoras, the subject of Isocrates' panegyric, Or.
IX, was king of Salamis in Cyprus. In the spring of 404 B.C., after the
defeat of Aegospotami (dvo-Tvxqo-as), he fled for refuge to Evagoras, Xen.
Hellen. II I. 29; the words &vaTvxi)<ra.s as TZvayopav q\6e are a direct quotation from the Oration, 52. This incident of Conon's forced visit is
absurdly embellished, exaggerated, and distorted from its true significance
by the voluble panegyrist, S1 seq.
268
PHTOPIKHS B 23 13.
13 TOI)S aWovs 7rapa\i7riov, &>s Evayopav %\0eu.

aAXos
eK Ttov fiepdov, io<rirep iv TOTS TOTTIKOTS, 7rota Kivr](ri<i
13. Top. XII. IK TWV iiepmv] the argument from the parts to the whole.
This topic, so briefly dispatched here, is much more clearly and fully set
forth in the Topics, B 4, 111 a 33 seq. [Grote's Ar. I p. 417], td which we
are referred; the same example being given in both. The parts and whole,
are the species and genus. Anything of which the genus or whole can be
predicated must likewise fall under one of its species, because the species
taken together make up the genus ; if knowledge for instance be predicable of something, then some one of its parts or branchesgrammar,
music or some other species of knowledgemust needs be predicable
of the same; otherwise it is no part of knowledge. And the same
applies to the declensionsirapcovvpas \ey6p-tva, the same root or notion
with altered terminationsof the words representing the genus; what
is true of imo'Trjp.r] &c. is equally true of emo-Tijfiiov, ypa/ipariKos, fiuvcriKos.
If then all the parts of the genus are or can be known (this is assumed
in the text), we have to consider when any thesis is proposed, such as, the
soul is in motion (TT/V ^fvx^v Kivturtiai; meaning, that the soul is motion),
what the kinds of motion are, and whether the soul is capable of being
moved in any of them ; if not, we infer, 'from part to whole', that the
genus motion is not predicable of soul, or that the soul is devoid of motion,
KtV?j<r is usually divided by Aristotle into four kinds, (1) 4>opa, motion
of translation, motion proper; (2) aXKoiacns, alteration; (3) avgr]<ns,[ growth;
and (4) QBlo-is, decay. De Anima I 3, 406 a 12. Again Metaph. A 2,1069
b 9 , Kara TO TI f/ Kara TO iroibv tj irocrov fj TTOV, w h e r e ytveait
anKij KOI <j)8opd
are added to the list, and distinguished from avfro-ts and <j)6io-it, but
still included in four divisions ; yeveo-is Kal <j>0opd, Kara ToSe or TO rt ;
avr]<Tis /cm <f>6opd, Kara TO noaov;
aXXoioxrtf, Karct TO iraBos, o r TTOIOV ; a n d
(jiopd, Kara TOITOV, or jrov. In Phys. VII 2 sub init. there are distinguished
(popa, ITOO-6V, iroiov. Categ. c. 14, 15 a 13, six, yivta-is, (pdopd, aSgrjo-is,
pciaxris, aXXoi'oxrtr, -q Kara TOKOV fieTaô\rj. Plato gives two, Parmen. 138
C, (1) motion proper or of translation and (2) change. To which, p. 162 E,
is added as a distinct kind the motion of revolution or rotation, (1) dXXocoiiaOai, alteration, change of character, Kara TO wddos, TO iroiov; (2) peTapalvtw,
change of place ; and (3) orperj>eo-6ai, revolution. And in Legg. x c. 6,
893 B seq., where the distinctions are derived from a priori considerations,
ten is the total number, 894 c. (Comp. Bonitz ad loc. Metaph., Waitz
ad 1. Categ.) Cicero treats this topic of argument, under the general
head of definitio, Top. v 26, seq., afterwards subdivided into partitio
and divisio; and under the latter speaks of the process of dividing the
genus into its species, which he calls formae; Formae sunt hoe, in
quas genus sine ullius praetermissione dividitur: ut si quis ius in legent,
morem, aequitatent dividat, 31 : but does not go further into the
argument to be derived from it.
Quintilian, v 10. 55, seq., follows Cicero in placing genus and species
under the head finitio, 55, comp. 62 ; in distinguishing partitio
and divisio, as subordinate modes of finitio 63 ; and points out the
mode of drawing inferences, affirmative or negative, from the division
of the genus into its parts or species, as to whether anything proposed
PHTOPIKHS B 23 13.
; ^v^tj'
TOI/S
jSe yap n %% irapaZeiyfia
-row QeoSeKTOV
(<
ei<z
TTOIOV
269
e/c rov
lepov
can or can not be included under it, 65. These are his examples.
Ut sit civis aut natus sit oportet, aut factus: utrumque tollendum est,
nee natus nee factus est. 1b. Hie serv.us quetn tibi vindicas, aut
verna tuns est, aut emptus, aut donatus, aut testamento relictus, aut ex
hoste captus, aut alienus: deinde remotis prioribus supererit alienus.
He adds, what Aristotle and Cicero have omitted; periculosum, et cum
cura intuendum gentis; quia si in proponendo unum quodlibet omiserimus, cum risu quoque tota res solvitur.
' Example from Theodectes' Socrates : " What temple has he profaned? To which of the gods that the city believes in (recognises,
accepts) has he failed to pay the honour due ?"' The phrase d<ref}elv els
TO Upav TO (v Ae\<t>ols occurs twice (as Victorius notes) in Aesch. c. Ctes.
106, 107. Theodectes' " Socrates," which is (most probably) quoted
again without the author's name 18, was one of the numerous djroXoytm
SuKparov? of which those of Plato and Xenophon alone are still in
existence. We read also (Isocr. Busiris 4) of a paradoxical Kartjyopia
SoKparovs by Polycrates (one of the early Sophistical Rhetoricians, Spengel
Art. Script, pp. 757. Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil. No. IX
vol. Ill 2812), which was answered by an diroXoyia SaKpirovs from
Lysias, Speng. op. cit. p. 141. On this see Sauppe, Lys. Fragm. c x m
Or. Att. Ill 204 : which is to be distinguished from another and earlier
one, also by Lysias, Sauppe, u. s. Fr. c x n p. 203. [Blass, Att, Bereds. I,
p. 342, 11, pp. 337,416.]
Theodectes is here answering the charge of Meletus, ovs iikv 77 nokis
VO/M'H deoiis ov vopifav, Xen. Mem. I 1. 1, Apol. Socr. 11, Plat. Ap.
Socr. 26 B. To this Xenophon, like Theodectes, replies by a direct
contradiction, and affirmation of the contrary, Mem. I 1.2, 6vav re yap
<pavepbs rjv, K.T.X. comp. 20; and sim. Apol. Socr. 11 seq. How the
charge is met by Plato in his Apology cc. XIV, XV, and dialectically
argued, has been already intimated, supra 8,see note, and comp.
ill 18. 2. The difference of the mode of treatment severally adopted
by the two disciples in the defence of their master is remarkable. The
inference implied in Theod.'s argument is this:You accuse Socrates
of impiety and disbelief in the gods. Has he ever profaned a temple ?
Has he neglected to worship them and do them honour, by sacrifice
and other outward observances? The indignant question, implying
that the speaker defies the other to contradict him and prove his charge,
assumes the negative. But such offences as these are the parts of
impiety which indicate disbelief in the godsthe orator in his excitement
takes for granted that the enumeration is complete, that there is nothing
else which could prove disbelief in the godsand if he is not guilty of any
of them, neither can he be guilty of the impiety which includes these, and
these alone, as its parts ; the whole or genus is not predicable of him1.
1 This argument may possibly be suitable to a sophist and declaimer, but the use
of it in a court of justice would certainly be exposed to the 'danger' against which
Quintilian warns those who employ the topic in general.
270
PHTOPIKH2 B 23 14.
TtVas
Betov
ov
TeTl/nriKev
wv
14 aAAos, eVetSr} 67TY TOV irXeicrTuiv

<T0at
TI
TW
ai/Tw dyadov
KCLI
r\
7roAts
(rvfjiâivei
tccticov, e/c
ioarff 67re-
TOS
CIKOXOU-
TrppTpeireiv rj airoTpeireiv Kcti KaTtiyopeiv t\

'icrdai ical eiraiveiv r\ yjseyeiv. oiov Trj 7rai$ev 14,15. Top. XIII. Argumentwn ex consequentibus; e/c TWV eirofievau
TUU dyadav r) Ka<av, which Viet, found as a title to the topic in one of
his MSS. On Hireadcu and aKokovBeiv, and their various senses, dialectical
and in the ordinary language, see note on I 6. 3 . The general meaning
of them seems to be 'concomitant'; that which constantly waits or
attends upon something, either as antecedent, simultaneous, or subsequent.
There are two topics of consequents, x m and xiv. The first is simple.
Most things have some good and some bad consequent usually or
inseparably attached to them, as wisdom and the envy of fellow-citizens
are the ordinary results of education. In exhortation, defence, and
encomium (the three branches of Rhetoric) we urge the favourable
consequencethe resulting wisdom in the case proposedif we have
to dissuade, to accuse, to censure, the unfavourable; each as the occasion
may require. The second is somewhat more complex. Here we have
two opposites (n-epi bvdiv KCU avTiKeifiivoiv) to deal within the example
public speaking falls into the two alternatives of true and fair speaking,
and false and unfair. These are to be treated 'in the way before
mentioned', TGS irporepov elprjitiva rpoira: that is, in exhorting or recommending we take the favourable consequent, in dissuading the
unfavourable. But the difference between the two topics lies in this
(Siatpepei 8e); that in the former the opposition (that must be the
opposition of the good and bad consequent, for there is no other) is
accidentalthat is, as appears in the example, there is no relation or
logical connexion between wisdom and envy; they may be compared
in respect of their value and importance as motives to action, but are
not logical oppositesbut in the latter, the good and the bad consequences are two contraries (ravavTia) love and hatred, divine and human.
In the example of the second topic, the dissuasive argument which
comes first assigns evil consequences {hatred) to both alternatives of
public speaking : that in recommendation, the contrary, love. The
topic of consequences, in the general sense, as above explained, has
been already applied in estimating the value of goods absolute, I 6.3;
and in the comparison of good things, I 7.5. In Dialectics it does not
appear in this simple shape, though it is virtually contained in the
application of it to the four modes of avridetris or opposition, Top. B 8;
and in the comparison of two good things, Top. r 2, 117 a 515.
Brandis u. s. \PMlologus iv 1] observes of the two Rhetorical topics,
that they could not find an independent place and treatment in the
Topics.
Cicero speaks of the general topic of consequence dialecticorum proprius ex consequentibus antecedentibus et repugnantibus, omitting the
PHTOPIKH2 B 23 14.
271
<rei TO <j)6oveT<rdai aKoAovdei KCIKOV, TO Be crocpov eivai

dyadov' ov TOIVVV Bel TraiBevecrvai, (pdoveicrBai yap
ov Bel' Bel fxev ovv iraiBeveardai, (ro(f)6v yap elvai BeT.
6
TO7TOS
OVTOS CCTTIV Y\ KaWlTnTOV
Xafiovcra Kai TO BvvaTOV teal TciWa,
Te%Vr]
TTjOOO"-
ois e'lprjTai.
simple form in which it appears in Rhetoric. His conseqitentia are

necessary concomitants, quae rem necessario consequuntur. Top. XII 53.
The mode of handling it is illustrated, XIII 53.
Quint, v 10. 74, Ex consequentibus sive adiunctis; Si est bonum iustitia, recte iudicandum: si malum perfidia, non est fallendum. Idem
retro. 75, sed haec consequentia dico, d/coXovOd; est enim consequens
(in Cicero's sense) sapientiae bonitas; ilia sequentia, irapiwofieva, quae
postea facta sunt aut futura.
And two other examples of the application of the argument, 76, 77. Quintilian naturally, like Aristotle,
gives only the rhetorical, and omits the dialectical use of the topic.
Note by the way the redundant aWe in o-v/x/Weei <S<T6' eneo-dai. See
Monk on Eur. Hippol. 1323, KvTrpis yap ijdeX coWe ylypeadai raSe. And
add to the examples there given, Thuc. I 119, berjQevrcs wore if/r](p., VIII 45,
f{ii&a<rKev ware, Ib. 79> boâv (Sore Siavaofiaxdv Ib. 86, iirayycXkontvoi mtrre
PorjSelv. Herod. I 74, III 14. Plat. Protag. 338 C, abivarov coo-re, Phaed.
93 B, 'imiv Sa-re, 103 E, (Stallbaum's note,) Phaedr. 269 D (Heindorf ad
loc. et ad Protag. 1. a). Dem. de F. L. 124 (Shilleto's note). Aesch.
de F. L. p. 49, -158, eao-eTe...<o<rre. Arist. Polit. II 2, 1261 a 34, avp./3mVt Sure iravTas apx^v (as here), Ib. VI (IV) 5, 1292 12, crvfifitfiriKfU
...coo-re. Ib. VIII (v) 9, 1309 b 32, 'itrnv COOT" eêti/. Pind. Nem. V 64,
Soph. Oed. Col. 1350 (D), SiKcuav <ao-re...Eur. Iph. T. 1017 (D), nws ovv
yivoiT av <aore... Ib. I380.
The example of Top. is taken from the passage of Eur. Med. 294,
already employed in illustration of a yvapr), 11 21. 2. Education of children has for its inseparable attendants wisdom or learning as a good,
and the envy of one's fellow-citizens as an evil: we may therefore take
our choice between them, and argue either for or against it, persuading
or dissuading. (Note a good instance of /j.ev ovv, as a negative (usually)
corrective, ' nay rather'; this of course comes from the opponent who is
arguing on the other side, that education is advantageous. Also in
15-)
' The illustration of this topic constitutes the entire art of Callippus
with the addition (no doubt) of the possible, (the noivbs TOKOS of that
name,) and all the rest (of the KOIVO\ rojroi, three in number), as has been
said', in c. 19, namely.
The two notices of Callippus and his art of Rhetoric in this passage
and 21, are all that is known to us of that rhetorician. He is not to be
confounded with the Callippus mentioned in I 12. 29. Spengel, Art.
Script. 1489, contents himself with quoting the two passages of this
chapter on the subject. He was one of the early writers on the art of
Rhetoric; and it is possible that a person of that name referred to by
272
PHT0PIKH2 B 23 15.
aAAos, brav Trepl ZvoTv Kai avrtKei/uevoiv r\ irpoTpeireiv

fj diroTpeireiv $er], Kai TO irpoTepov elpr)fxevw TJOOTTO)
6?r' d/uKpolv xpfia'Qai'
$ia(pepei Be, on e/ce? fxev TO.
TvôvTa dvTiTtdeTai,
ivTctvda $e Tavavna.
oiov
lepeia OVK e'la TOV vlov Brifxriyopelv' eav fxev yap, e(ptj,
TO. oiKcua Aeyjjs, 01 avvpwiroi o~e fxicrjcrovcriv, eav oe
TCC aSiKa, oi deoi.
Se? fxev ovv ZmJLrjyopetv eav fiev
yap rd Siicaia Ae'yjjs, ol deoi ae (piKqarovcriv, eav Se
ra aSiica, ol av6pco7roi. TOUTC S' icrri TOVTO TW Aeevh) TO eAos 7rpiacr6ai Kal TOUS aAas* Kai JJ ft\aiIsocrateswho was born in 436 B. C.as one of his first pupils, 7repl
avTiho&eas 93, may have been this same Rhetorician Callippus.
15. Tiresias, ap. Phoen. 968, S<TTIS 8" ipnvpw XPV T*XVV f^raios' fjv
fiev c\6pa <Tt)nrjvas TV\TI, mxpos Ka6i<m)x ' s " olmvoirKmrtj. \jrcv8fj 8" in
OIKTOV TO'UTL ^piB/ifVoif ~htya>v dSiKel TO TOOV de&v, is compared by Victorius 1
with the example in the second topic.

This second topic of consequences differs from the preceding in these
particulars. In the first, which is simple, the consequences of the thing
which is in question are twofoldbad and good, and these are unconnected by any reciprocal relation between them. The second is more
complicated, and offers contrary alternatives, which are set in opposition
dvriTiSeTcu Tavavria, as 8i<aia and adixa \iyeiv in the exampleand then>
'proceed as before', T<J> irporepov elpi)fievq> Tplmta; that is, state the consequence of each, (favourable in exhortation or recommendation, unfavourable in dissuasion,) and bring the two into comparison in order to
strike the balance of advantage or disadvantage between them. In
public speaking, for instance, the alternatives are, true and fair, and
false and unfair, words and arguments: if your object is to dissuade
from it, you adduce the ill consequences of both, and contrast them, so
as to shew which is the greater.
' But that is all one with the proverb, to buy the marsh with the salt':
i. e. to take the fat with the lean; the bad with the good; the unprofitable and unwholesome marsh (palus inamabilis, Virg. G. IV 479, Aen.
VI 438) with the profitable salt which is inseparably connected with it.
An argument pro and con, but only of the first kind, Top. x m , by comparing the good and the bad consequence, according as you are for or
against the purchase. An Italian proverb to the same effect is quoted
in Buhle's note, comprare il mel con le moschej and the opposite, the
good without the bad, appears in the Latin, sine sacris haereditas, Plaut.
Capt. iv 1.5 (Schrad.). [We may also contrast the proverb p-ifii p.i\i,
p.t\hi /ueXiVo-ar: em ra>v jtii) $Qvko\ikvti>v nadeiv TI ayaBbv juera djrevKroO
(Diogenianus, cent, vi, 58). Cf. Sappho, fragm. 113.]

1
Gaisford, Not, Var., cites this as from Victorius. It is not found in my copy,
Florence, 1548.
PHT0PIKH2 B 23 15.
TOUT' SCTTLV, OTav Zvdiv
ctyadov Kai KCIKOV eTrrjTai, ivavTia
273
ivavTioiv
eKctTepa e
There is an evident intention in the association of EXOS and okas: the

alliterative jingle, as in so many other proverbs (nadr'niaTa /tadij/mra, safe
bind safe find), sharpens the point, and helps its hold on the memory.
Some MSS have ZXaiov for e\os, which is expressed in the Vet. Tr.
Lat., 'olim (oleum) emi et sales,' and by other interpreters ; and also
adopted by Erasmus, Adag., oleum et salem oportet emere; 'to be in
want of oil and salt,' implying insanity, against which this mixture was
supposed to be a specific. Victorius, referring to the Schol. on Arist.
Nub. 1237, aXcrif Stac/ii/x^"5 '6vaiT av ovrocri, who notes TOVS Trapa<j)povovvras aXtri Kai tXala S(e'/3pfôj/, Kai (ofaXovvro, supposes that some
copyist having this in his mind altered eXor into TKaiov. At all events
the proverb in this interpretation has no meaning or applicability here.
In the following paragraph (KOI 17 /3Xai'o-(oo-ir...t(caTe'pois) the meaning of
/SXaiVoxri?, the application of the metaphor, and its connexion with what
follows, which appears to be intended as an exemplification or explanation
of the use of /3X<n'<r<<ns, are, and are likely to remain, alike unintelligible.
The Commentators and Lexicographers are equally at fault; Spengel in
his recent commentary passes the passage over in absolute silence:
Victorius, who reasonably supposes that pXaio-ao-is (metaphorically) represents some figure of rhetorical argument, candidly admits that nothing
whatsoever is known of its meaning and use, and affords no help either in
the explanation of the metaphor, or its connexion with what seems to be
the interpretation of it. Buhle, and W. Dindorf, ap. Steph. T/tes. s. v.
praevaricatio; Vet. Lat. Tr. claudicatio; Riccoboni inversio. Vater discreetly says nothing; and Schrader that which amounts to nothing.
After all these failures I cannot hope for any better success; and I will
merely offer a few remarks upon the passage, with a view to assist others
as far as I can in their search for a solution.
/3Xaio-os and patfios, valgus and varus, all of them express a deformity
or divergence from the right line, or standard shape, in the legs and feet.
The first (which is not always explained in the same way1) seems to correspond to our 'bow-legged', that is having the leg and foot bent outwards : for it was applied to the hind legs of frogs, /3Xaro7roSi)s fiarpaxos,
poet. ap. Suidam. And Etym. M. (conf. Poll. 2. 193,) interprets it, 6 rove
ir68ar els ra ea> Stecrrpaiifievos (with his feet distorted so as to turn outwards) Kai ra A oroide 10) c'oiKcot; so that it seems that it may represent
the act of straddling. The adj. itself and some derivatives not unfrequently occur in Ar.'s works on Nat. Hist.; likewise in Galen, once in
Xenophon, de re Eq. I 3, and, rarely in other authors; but fiXato-ao-is
appears to be a ana Xeyo/ievov. paiftos is the opposite defect to this,
'bandy-legged', where the legs turn inwards. And to these correspond
valgus and varus: the first, qui suras et crura habet extrorsum. intortas,
of which Petronius says, crura in orbern pandit; and Martial, crura...
simulant quae cornua lunae. Huic contrarius est varus, qui introrsus
1
/3\ai<rds...bandy-legged, opposed to pcupos. paijios, crooked, bent, csp. <j/"bandy
legs. Liddell and Scott's Lex. sub vv.
AR. II.
18
274
PHT0PIKH2 B 23 16.
i6aAAos, e7reihrj ov Tavra (pavepcSs eiraivova'i KCU d(pas, dWd (pavepcos fxev TO %'i.Kaia Kal Ta Ka\cc iiraipedes et crura obtorta habet. " Vari dicuntur incurva crura habentes."
Festus (ap. Face). Heindorf ad Hor. Sat. I. 3,47. G. Dindorf (in Steph.
Thes.) explains it by praevaricatio, quoting Cic. Orat. Partit. XXXVI 126,
(praevaricator definitur) ex nomine ipso, quodsignificat eum qui in contrariis caussis quasi vare (Edd. varie) esse positus videaturx. If we
revert to the derivation, and apparently the original meaning, of the
word, following Cicero, and understand it as ' a deviation from the right'
course or path, by a metaphor from bent or distorted legs, praevaricatio
might be taken as expressing by a similar metaphor the general meaning
of fZ\al<r<o<ns; but in its ordinary acceptation of 'the betrayal of his
client by an advocate, and collusion with his opponent'-in which Buhle
and the Translators must be supposed to understand it, since they offer
no other explanationit seems altogether inappropriate. So however
Rost and Palm, in their Lexicon.
The translation, as the passage stands, is 'and the p\al<ra<ris is, or
consists in, this, when each (either) of two contraries is followed (accompanied) by a good and an ill consequence, each contrary to each', (as in a
proposition of Euclid). This is a generalisation of the example in Top.
XIV: the two contraries are the fair and unfair speaking; each of which
has its favourable and unfavourable consequence; truth, the love of God
and hatred of men ; falsehood, the love of men and hatred of God. But
how this is connected withfiXaio-ucnsI confess myself unable to discover.
The nearest approach I have been able to make to itwhich I only
mention to condemnis to understand (i\al<ra><Tts of the straddling of the
legs, the A of the Etymol. M., which might possibly represent the divergence
of the two inferences pro and con deducible from the topic of consequences : but not only is this common to all rhetorical argumentation,
and certainly not characteristic of this particular topic, but it also loses
sight of the deviation from a true standard, which we have supposed this
metaphorical application of the term to imply.
16. Top. XV. This Topic is derived from the habit men have,
which may be assumed to be almost universal, of concealing their real
opinions and wishes in respect of things good and bad, which are always
directed to their own interests, under the outward show and profession
of noble and generous sentiments and of a high and pure morality.
Thus, to take two examples from de Soph. El. c. 12, they openly profess
that a noble death is preferable to a life of pleasure; that poverty and
rectitude, is better than ill-got gains, than wealth accompanied with disgrace : but secretly they think and wish the contrary. These contrary
views and inclinations can always be played off one against the other in
argument, and the opponent made to seem to be asserting a paradox:
you infer the one or the other as the occasion requires. This is in fact
the most effective (Kvpiararos) of all topics for bringing about this result.
The mode of dealing with the topic is thus described in de Soph. El. 1. c.
173 a 2, "If the thesis is in accordance with their real desires, the
1
Compare the whole passage ^4126, in illustration of praevaricatio.
275
vovcri fxaXi&Ta, ihla de TO. <ru/x(J)epovTa juaAXov (3ov- p- 101.

XovToti, eK TOVTWV ireipdcrQai (Tvvccyetv daTepov TWV
yap 7rapaS6u)v oi)ros 6 TOTTOS KvpiwTaTOS larr'iv.
17 aAAos e/c Toy dvaXoyov TCLVTO. <rv/j.ftaiveLV olov 6
respondent should be confronted with their public professions; if it is in
accordance with them [the latter], he should be confronted with their real
desires. In either case he must fall into paradox, and contradict either their
publicly expressed, or secret opinions." Poste, Transl. p. 43. This is for
dialectics : but it may be applied equally well to rhetorical practice, in
which there is nearly always a real or (as in the epideictic branch)
imaginary opponent. The author proceeds, Ib. 173 a 7, further to illustrate this by the familiar opposition of <j>v<ris and vo/xor, nature and convention or custom, which is to be handled in the same way as the preceding, and is irXeicrTos TOWOS TOV ra napaSoga Xeyeiu: referring to Callicles'
well-known exposition of the true doctrine of justice conventional and
natural, in Plato's Gorgias, c. 38, foil.
This topic does not occur in Cicero's tract, which is confined to dialectics ; nor is it found amongst the rhetorical topics of Quintilian's tenth
chapter of Book v, which has supplied us with so many illustrations of
Aristotle.
'Another; whereas in public and in secret men praise not the same
things, but openly most highly extol what is just and right, yet secretly
(privately, in their hearts,) prefer their own interest and advantage, from
these (i. e. from premisses derived from the one or the other of these two
modes of thought and expression, whichever it be that the opponent has
given utterance to,) we must endeavour to infer the other: for of all
paradoxical topics (topics that lead to paradox, which enable us to represent the opponent as guilty of it,) this is the most effective (most powerful, mightiest,- most authoritative)'. If the opponent has been indulging
in some high-flown moral commonplaces about virtue and honour, by an
appeal to the real but secret feelings of the audience on such matters, we
must shew that such sentiments are paradoxical, or contrary to common
opinion; or conversely, if we have occasion to assume the high moral
tone, make our appeal to those opinions which they openly profess, and
shew that it is a paradox to assume with the opponent that men are
incapable of any other motives than such as are suggested by sordid
self-interest.
17. Top. xvi. 'Another (inference may be drawn) from the proportion of so and so (ravra)'. This is the argument from analogy in
its strict and proper sense, the ' analogy of relations'. See Sir W.
Hamilton, quoted at 11 19. 2, and on the argument from analogy in
general. The analogy or proportion here is the literal, numerical or
geometrical, proportion, 2 : 4 :: 8 : 16. "Analogy or proportion is the
similitude of ratios." Eucl. El. Bk. y def. 8.
This topic also does not appear in the dialectical treatise, where
it is inappropriate; nor in Cicero and Quintilian, except so far as the
ordinary and popular analogy (see again the note above referred to)
l82
276
PHTOPIKHS B 23 17.
'\(piKpd.Tt\ rou vlov avrov vewrepov OVTO. T>JS t]\iKias,

on jueya? r\v, Xeirovpyelv dvayicaôvTcov, e'nrev on ei
TOI)S jmeyciXovs TWV 7raiSwv avdpas vo/ulfyvo-i, TOVS
fAinpovs 'twv dvZpvov 7raiBas eivctt y^r]<l>iovvTai. KG" P. 1399 &
0eoSeKT>js eV TO vofiw, OTI TTOXITCIS /nev iroiel<r6e TOVS
/uurdcxpopovs, oiov ULTpaflana KCII XajOt&jjuoj/, $ia Tt\v
is recognised under the names of similitude* (c) and similia (Q). Similitude is between two, proportion requires four terms. Eth. N. v 6,
1131 a 32,17 yap avaKoyia la-orrjs im\ \oynv (equality or parity of ratios),
Kai iv reTapcnv iXaxiTTois. And comp. the explanation of the 'proportional' metaphor in Poet, x x i 11, and the examples, 12, 13. Accordingly of the two examples each has four terms, and the inference is
drawn from the similitude of the two ratios.
'As Iphicrates, when they (the assembly, fyrifyiovvrai,) wanted to
force upon his son the discharge of one of the liturgies' (pecuniary
contributions to the service of the state, ordinary and extraordinary,
of a very onerous character), 'because he was tall, though he,was
younger than the age (required by law), said that if they suppose tall
boys to be men, they will have to vote short men to be boys': the
proportion being, Tall boys : men :: short men : boys. Two ratios of
equality. The argument is a reductio ad absurdum. The first ratio is
hypothetical. If tall boys are really to be regarded as men, then by the
same ratio, &c.
'And Theodectes, in the " l a w " ' (which he proposes, in his declamation, for the reform of the mercenary service, see above 11, note)
'you make citizens of your mercenaries, such as Strabax and Charidemus, for their respectability and virtue, and won't you (by the same
proportion) make exiles of those who have been guilty of such desperate
(avqK<rTa) atrocities?'
Of these 'mercenaries' who swarmed in Greece from the beginning
of the fourth century onwards, the causes of their growth, their character
and conduct, and the injury they brought upon Greece, see an account
in Grote, Hist. Gr. Vol. XI p. 392 seq. [chap. LXXXVll],
Charidemus, of Oreus in Euboea, in the middle of that century, was
perhaps the most celebrated of their leaders. He was a brave and successful soldier, but faithless, and profligate and reckless in personal
character. Theopomp. ap. Athen. X 436 B. c. Theopomp. Fr. 155, Fragm.
Hist. Gr., ed. C. and Th. Miiller, p. 384 b (Firmin Didot). 81a rrjv cmeUeiav,
therefore, is not to be taken as an exact description of Charidemus'
character, but is the assumption upon which the Athenians acted when
they conferred these rewards. His only real merit was the service he
had dpne them. He plays a leading part in Demosthenes' speech, c,
Aristocratem ; who mentions several times, 23, 65, 89, the citizenship conferred on him by the Athenians in acknowledgment of his
services, as well assomewhat latera golden crown, 145, np&rov
noKiTrjs, cfra TrdXiv xpva-ois are(puvoit oSt evepycTrjs tTTMpavarat, 157,
277
p
' ou iroiritreTe TOI)S iv TO?S fx18 <r6o<p6pois dvr\Kcna hiaireTrpayixevovs; aAAos e'/c TOW,
TO <rvfi(icuvov iav r\ TauTov, on Kal i wv trv/jifiaivei
TavTa' oiov !Z.6vo<pdvt\<i eXeyeu on dfxoiws d<re/3ov(riv
01 <yeve<r6ai (pdcrKOvres TOI)S 6eov<z TO?S diroQaveiv Xeyoucriv' dfx<poT6pa)$ yap (rvfxâlvei firj eivai TOI)S 6eovs
rrrore. /cat oAws Se TO crvnâlvov e enarepov Xa/xfidveiv <Js Tay'ro del" " fxeWere Se Kpcveiv ov irepl
presents, and the name of 'benefactor', 185, and 188. Besides the
Athenians, he was employed by Cotys and his son Cersobleptes, kings
of Thrace, and by Memnon and Mentor in Asia. A complete account
of him and his doings is to be found in Weber's Proleg. ad Dem. c.
Aristocr. pp. LXLXXXIII.
Of the other mercenary leader, Strabax, all that we know is derived
from Dem. c. Lept. 84, that through the intervention or by the recommendation (81a) of Iphicrates he received a certain 'honour' from the
Athenians, to which Theodectes' extract here adds that this was the
citizenship. We learn further from Harpocration and Suidas that Strabax
isan ovo/xa Kvptov. "De commendatione Iphicratis, ornatus Strabax videri
potest Iphicratis in eodem bello (sc. Corinthiaco) adiutor fuisse." F. A.
Wolff, ad loc. Dem.
18. Top. XVII. Inference from results or consequents to antecedents, parity of the one implies parity or identity of the other 1 : if,
for instance, the admission of the birth of the gods equally with that
of their death, leads to the result of denying the eternity of their
existencein the former case there was a time when they were not,
as in the other there is a time when they will not bethen the two
assertions (the antecedents) may be regarded as equivalent, or the same
in their effect, and for the purposes of the argument Sri ofwias do-ejiovtriv,
because they both lead to the same result or consequent; so that one
can be put for the other, whichever happens to suit your argument.
On Xenophanes, see note on I 15. 29, and the reff. On this passage
Miillach, Fr. Phil. Gr., Xenoph. Fragm. Inc. 7, " Hoc dicto veteres
poetae perstringuntur, qui quum diis aeternitatem (potius immortalitatein)
tribuerent, eos tamen hominum instar ortos esse amrmabant eorumque
parentes et originem copiose enarrabant." And to nearly the same
effect, Karsten, Xenoph. Fr. Rell. xxxiv. p. 85. The saying against
the assertors of the birth of the gods is not found amongst the extant
fragments, but the arguments by which he refuted this opinion is given
by Aristotle (?) de Xenoph. Zen. et Gorg. init. p. 974. 1, seq. and by
Simplicius, Comm. in Phys. f. 6 A, ap. Karsten p. 107, comp. p. 109.
For Kal8e, see note on I 6. 22.
'And in fact, as a general rule, we may always assume' (subaudibtl, xptj,
1
"Von der glekhheit der folgett auf gleichheit des ihneii zu grunde licgenden
schliessende" Brandis \Philologus iv i.].
278
PHT0PIKH2 B 23 18.
p
dWd 7repi eVi-rêJ/xaTOS, el XP P
aocbe'iv"
nal OTI TO Zihovai <yrjv /cat vdcop $ov\eveiv
Kal TO juereêiv Trjs KOivfjs elp^vtrs inroieiv TO
aut tale aliquid) the result of either of two things to be the same with
that of the other (eWt'pov), (or with Uaarov, as A, adopted by Spengel,
the result of anything, i. e. any things, two or more, that we have to
argue about) 'as in the example, "what you are about to decide upon
is not I socrates, but a study and practice, whether or not philosophy
deserves to be studied."' Whether you decide upon Isocrates or his
pursuit and study, the inference or result is the same (TOVTOV), and can be
deduced equally from both. I have here adopted Spengel's emendation
.of Isocrates for Socrates, "quam emendationem," as Spengel modestly
says, " Victorius si integram vidisset Ahtidosin nobis non reliquisset".
It is given in his Specim. Comm. in Ar. Rhet., Munich, 1839, p. 37.
A comparison of this passage with Isocr. irepl dcTtSoo-ewr, 173, ov yap
irepl ifiov fteXKcre p.uvov TTJV ijrTJcpov dwicreiv aXXa Kal nep'i ewiTrjdeviiaros, 10
TTOXXOI rav vearepav irpoafx0V<Tl Tv vvvi certifies the emendation. E v e n
Bekker has accepted it. At the same time the vulgata lectio SaKparovs;
as Victorius interprets it, yields a very sufficient sense, thus more briefly
expressed by Schrader, "Socrate damnato simul damnabitur studium
sapientiae : Socrate servato servabuntur sapientiae studia;" Socrates and
his study or pursuit stand or fall together ; to condemn Socrates, is to
condemn philosophy : and might even be thought to be confirmed by
KpLveiv, which more immediately suggests a judicial decision.
' And that (the result, effect, consequence of) giving earth and water
is the same as, equivalent to, slavery'. The demand of 'earth and water'
by the Persian monarchs from a conquered prince or state, in token of
submission, and as a symbol of absolute dominion or complete possession of the soiltherefore equivalent to slavery, 8ov\eveu>is referred
to frequently by Herodotus, IV 126, Darius to Idanthyrsus, the Scythian
king, 8f O-7TOT7? T&5 <r<3 Seopa (pfpwv yijv re Kai SSap.
V 17, the s a m e to
Amyntas king of Macedonia, Ib. 18, the same to the Athenians, Ib. 73,
vil 131, 133, 138, 163. Plut. Themist. c. 6. Plin. N. H. XXII 4 (ap.
Bahr), Sununum afiud antiqitos signum victoriae erat herbam porrigere
victos, hoc est terra et altrice ipsa httmo et humatione etiam cedere: quern
morem etiam nunc durare apud Germanos scio. It appears from Ducange, Gloss, s. v. Investitura, that this custom was still continued in
the transmission of land during the middle ages (Bahr).
'And participation in the general peace (would be equivalent to)
doing (Philip's) bidding'. The Schol. on this passage writes thus : *tAr7ro9 KarTjvayKcure TOVS 'Adrjvaiovs Iv elptjvdaxriu per avrov cocnrep Kal
ai aXkai xPah &* Ar.fioodfvrjs avTmiiTTav Xe'yet o n TO /ieTfÊtj/ rijs Kmvfjs
elprjvqs jiiTa TOV $iXi7T7rou r)f-as, (is Kal TOVS Xo(7roiis iravTas, itTTi TO noieiv o
irpocrTaTTCt 6 &i\nrnos. Spengel was the first to point out (Specim.

Comm. u. s. p. 39) that the KOWT) dpr\vr\ here referred to is the same of
which mention occurs several times in a speech ittpl rav npbs 'AXegavdpou
o-vvdrjKaivattributed to Demosthenes, but more probably by Hyperides ;
see the Greek argument, and Grote, H. Cr. [chap, xci] XII 21 and note
279
7rpoa-TaTT6/j.i/ou. XnrrTeov S' oirorepov av rj XP*1~

19 (Tifxov. aAAos e/c 7OV fxrj TCCVTO TOI)S avTOvs del alpeTcrdai vcnepov r] TrpoTepov, dW dydiraXiv, olov
TO ev6vnr]jj.a, " el (pevyovres fxeu ifxaôfjieda
IO >ii)i7> 1 9)3 o - The Koivij dpr/vy, and the ovvOrjicai npbs 'A\f. both denote the convention at Corinth of the deputies of all the Greek states, with
the exception of the Lacedaemonians who refused to appear, in 336 B. C,
"which recognised Hellas as a confederacy under the Macedonian
prince (Alexander, not Philip) as imperator, president, or executive head
and arm." Grote, u. s. p. 18. The speech rr. r. tr. 'AXe'. a-., according to
the same authority, p. 21, was delivered in 335. But neither Aristotle's
quotation, nor the Scholiast's comment, can refer to this speech, as
Spengel himself observes. If the Scholiast is right in describing the
opposition of Demosthenes as directed against Philip, it must be referred
to a different speech delivered by him against the former agreement of a
similar kind with Philip, after Chaeronea, which took place two years
earlier than that with Alexander, in 338. Grote, u. s., p. 17. Comp.
XI 700. [A. Schaefer, Detn. u. s. Zeit, ill 186193.]
This passage has been already referred to in the Introduction, on the
question of the date of publication of the Rhetoric, p. 28; and again, 46
note 2, on the references to Demosthenes in the same work.
' Of the two alternatives (the affirmative or negative side, whether the
result is or is not the same, either may be taken, whichever happens tobe serviceable'. Or, as Victorius, 'of the two alternatives, which though
in themselves different, yet in the result are the same, we may always
take that which best suits our argument'.
19. Top. XVlll. 'Another (is derived from the natural habit or
tendency of mankind) that the same men don't always choose the same
things' (Spengel omits TOVS avrovs with A c ; Bekker, as usual, retains it)
'after as before (something intermediate, act, occurrence, period), but
conversely ' (i. e. do the second time what they have avoided the first, or
vice versa) ; ' of which the following enthymeme is an example'.
!j quaere y ? which expresses ' a s ' (in the way in which), much more
naturally than ij. This seems to be the required sense: and so I think
Victorius understands it, " non eadem iidem homines diversis temporibus
sequuntur." The same meaning is very awkwardly expressed, if indeed
it is expressed, by rendering rj 'or'. In that case varepov and irporepov
must be 'at one time or another': Riccobon 'posterius vel prius1 'after or
before': 'sooner or later'. I will put the question, and leave it to the
judgment of others. Which is the more natural expression, the more
usual Greek, and more in accordance with the example ? ' The same
men don't always choose the same things after as before', i. e. the second
time, when they have to repeat some action or the like, as the first time,
when the circumstances are perhaps different: or, if 17 be or, ' men don't
always choose the same things after or before, sooner or later'. Surely
the alternative is here out of place; in this case it should be <al, not ij.
ivdvurjiia] Victorius interprets this "argumentum ex contrariis conclusum:" on which see Introd. pp. 104, 5, Cic. Top. x m 55. This is the
280
PHT0PIKH2 B 23 19.
KareXOuiixev, KctTeAdovres Se (peuô/neda O7r&>5 ^ fxaXco/ueda'" ore fiev yap TO /ueveiv dvTi TOV jxd-)(e(rdaL
sense in which it is found in the Rhet. ad Alex., Cicero and Quintilian,
and was in fact the common usage of it. But, as far as I can recollect, it
never occurs in this special sense, at all events, in Aristotle's Rhetoric ;
and is in fact one of the leading distinctions between it and the Rhet. ad
Alex. Neither was there any occasion to depart here from his ordinary
use of the term: for enthymemes, i. e. rhetorical inferences in general,
are exactly what he is employed in illustrating throughout this chapter.
The original sentence of Lysias begins with, htivhv yap av iirj, a
'Adrjvaiot, el K.r.X. ' For monstrous would it be, men of Athens, if
when we were in exile we fought for our return (to be restored to our)
home, and now that we have returned (been restored) we sh'all fly to
avoid fighting'. We were eager to fight before (this was, as will appear
afterwards, with the Lacedaemonians who aided the Thirty), shall we
now after our restoration shrink from it? The example is an instance
of what men are in the habit of doing, viz. changing their minds without
reason: the argument, that it is unreasonable, and monstrous at all
events to do it now.
KareXOeiv, to return from exile, prop, 'down', Kara, viz. to the shore
or harbour, at which almost all returned exiles would naturally arrive;
either from the interior of the country, dvapaiveiv Karafiaivew; or from
the open sea into port, dvayeaSai contrasted with Karayeadai, 7rpoo-o-xf'iv.
Aesch. Choeph. 3, and his own commentary, Arist. Ran. 11635.
This is followed by Aristotle's explanation, which is certainly more
obscure than what it professes to explain. ' That is to say (yap), at one
time (before) they preferred staying (where they were, 'maintaining
their ground') at the price of fighting; at another (after their restoration)
not fighting at the expense of not staying', i. e. the second time, they
preferred not staying, quitting the city, to avoid fighting. It is necessary
to interpret dvri in this way, n o t ' instead ofif the reading be sound, to
bring the explanation into conformity with the example; and thus no
alteration is required.
The words quoted by Ar. are taken from a speech of Lysias, of which
Dionysius, de Lys. Iud. c. 33, has preserved a long fragment; printed
amongst Lysias' speeches as Orat. 34. Baiter et Sauppe Or. Att. I 147.
[Blass, die AttischeBeredsamkeit 1 p.441 and Jebb's Attic Orators I p. 211.]
Dion, gives an account of the occasion of it in the preceding chapter.
He doubts if it was ever actually delivered. The title of it is, ntpl TOV pf/
KaraXvcrai rf/v iraxpiov iro\iT(iav 'Adqvyo-i; and its object was to prevent
the carrying into effect of a proposal of one Phormisius, one of the
restored exiles fiera TOV Srjpov,this was after the expulsion of the
Thirty in 403 B. C , when the demus had been restored and recovered
its authority, and the other party were now in exileto permit the
return of the present exiles, but to accompany this by a constitutional
change, which should exclude from political rights all but the possessors
of land ; a measure which would have disfranchised 5000 citizens. The
passage here quoted refers to a somewhat different subject. The Lace-
28 r
ypovvTO, ore 5e TO fxrj /j.dxe<rdai dvTi TOV fxri /aiveiv.

20 aAAos TO ov eye/c' av e'iri, ei /at) yevoiTO, TOVTOV 'evena
daemonians, who were at hand with their troops, were trying to impose
the measure upon them by force, dictating, and ordering, KtXevovo-iv,
npoo-TaTTovo-tv, 6, and apparently preparing to interfere with arms.
Lysias is accordingly exhorting the Athenians to resist manfully, and
not to give way and quit the city again, after their restoration, for fear
of having to fight: and Aristotleand this is a most striking instance
of the difficulty that so frequently arises from Aristotle's haste and
carelessness in writing, and also of his constant liability to lapses of
memoryquoting from memory, and quoting wrong, and neglecting
to mention the occasion of the speech and the name of the author,
which he had probably forgotten for the time,has both altered the
words and omitted precisely the two thingsBeivbv av eXrj, which shows
what the inference is intended to be, and Aa<e8aip.ovioiswhich would
have enabled his readers to understand his meaning. The passage of
Lysias runs thus : Seivbv yap av f'17, < 'Adrjvaloi, el ore fiev e(pevyouev,
(fiaxo/ieSa AaKeSaip.oviois Iva KaTe\6<op.ev, KareXdovres de <pev6fieda iva pr)
liaxtopeSa. And it is now pretty clear what the intention of the writer
of the fragment was, namely to stimulate the Athenian assembly not to submit to the dictation of the Lacedaemonians and to encounter them if it were
necessary in battle, by urging the inconsistency and absurdity of which
they would be guilty, if, whilst they were ready to fight before their
restoration to their city, now that they were in actual possession of it
they should quit it and return into exile, merely to avoid fighting.
20. Top. XIX. The wording of this is also very obscure from
the extreme brevity. The title of the topic in one of Victorius' MSS
is K TOV irapa TOV <TKO7TOV TOV Xafiovros, avufialveiv,
' inference, from the
issue being contrary to the aim or intention of the receiver,'i. e. a

mistake on the part of the receiver of a gift, who takes it as offered
with an intention different from the real motive. This however is only
a single instance of the application of the topic, and derived solely from
the illustration, olov el Soa; K.T.A. The true interpretation is, as Brandis
expresses it, u. s., p. 20, the general one, " An inference from the possible,
to the real, motive," as appears from the examples.
Two readings have to be considered : v. 1. followed and explained by
Victorius el /iij yevoiro, which Bekker (ed. 3) has retained ; and, Vater's
conjecture, r\ yevoiro, following the Schol., ovnvos eveKa elvai, %TOI, 810
8i'$a>/u a-oi. vop.lo-iw.Ta (this again refers exclusively to the first example).
rj yevoiro, rjroi edaxa : which at all events seems to shew that he read fj
yivoiro : this is also'expressed in Muretus'version, ' cuius rei causa aliquid est, aut fieri potest,' and adopted by Spengel in his recent edition.
To this in what follows elvai rj ycyevrjo-8ai properly corresponds. The
translation will then be, ' To say, that the possible reason for a fact (elvai)
or motive for an action (ylyveo-8ai), {lit. that for which anything might
be, or be done), that is the (true) reason or motive of the fact or action;
as in the case of one giving another something, in order to cause him
pain by afterwards taking it away (withdrawing it)'. Here is an ostensible motivea gift being usually intended to cause pleasurewhich
282
PHTOPIKHS B 23 20.
(pdvai eivai fj yeyevfj&dai, oiov el Soir] av Tis TIVI tv

7rri(ry. 66ev KCCI TOVT eiprirai,
ZS 6 dalfxcov ov KCIT evvoiav (pepaov
fj.e<yd\a SlSwo-iv evTvxwo-T, dW 'iva
as <rvfji(popds
conceals the real motive, which is to cause pain; and this is the inference, you infer from the apparent fact or possible motive to the real
one ; the object of the topic being to assign a motive which suits your
argument. Such then is the general meaning of the topic : the examples are all of the possible concealed motive or intentionwhich
may be bad or good as your argument requiresthat being the form
in which it is more likely to be of use in Rhetoric, ov evex av eit] rj
yevoiro 'that for which so and so would, could, or might be, or be
done', {would be naturally or generally, might be possibly,) expresses
the conditionality or possibility of the fact, motive, or intention, a
meaning which is confirmed by ivBexerai yap K.T.X., in the explanation
of the third example. (I call it the third, olov el 801?) av\viTJon being
an illustration.)
On Victorius' interpretation of d firj yevoiro, 'cuius rei caussa aliquid
esse potest, quamvis factum non sit,' Vater says, "sed hoc quamvis factum
non sit, ad rem non satis facit, neque in exemplis quae sequuntur eo respicitur an haec caussa vera sit necne:" but whether that be so or not,
I think that a still better reason may be given for rejecting it, that el
lirj ytvoiro cannot be rendered quamvis &c, which would require el xal,
or /ecu el (K6I) firj yevoiro. Victorius seems to mean, though the Greek
(even independently of el for quamvis) would hardly I think bear such an
interpretation, ' t o assert that what may be the cause of a thing (i.e. an
act) really is so, although it has not been (or, were not) done at a l l ' ;
in other words, 'though it is not': and this, though I cannot think it the
right rendering, can scarcely be said to be altogether ' beside the point.'
On elfioi'v&v, see Appendix on el bivatr av, c. 20.5,' On av with Optative after certain particles'1 [printed at the end of the notes to this Book],
In conformity with the explanation there given, Soi'ij av, the conditional, is joined with et, just as the future might be, of which in fact
the conditional (as the tense is in French and Italian) is a mere modification.
The first example, from an unknown Tragic poet (Wagner, Fragm.
Tragic. Gr. Ill 186), warns us t h a t ' Heaven bestows on many great successes or prosperity, which it offers not out of good will, with no kind or
benevolent intent, but that the disasters that they (afterwards) meet with
may be more marked and conspicuous'a contrast of the apparent with
the real intention, from which an inference may be drawn and applied to
a parallel case. Victorius compares Caes. de B. G. I 14 (ad Helvet.
legatum) Consuesse deos immortales, quo gravius homines ex commutatione rerum doleant, quos pro scelere eorum ulcisci velint, his secundiores interdum res et diuturniorem impunitatem concedere. [Cf. Claudian's tolluntur in altwn, tit lapsu graviore ruant (in Rufinum 1, 22, 23).]
PHT0PIKH2 B 23 20.
KCtl TO 6K TOV MeXedypOV
TOV
283
'AvTt<b(0VT0S,
V-I02-
ov% tva KTavwcri 6tjp', OVMS he /ndpTvpes
dpertjs yevwvTai MeXedypw 7rpos 'EAXa'Sa.

TO e/c TOV Ai'aj/Tos TOU QeodeKTOv, OTL 6 Aios 7rpoei\eTO 'OSvctrea
r\ o duoXovduiv
ov
ivBeêTai yap
1
TIJULWV,
TOVTOV
dXX' 'iva
Y)TTU>V
eveKa Trotfjcrai.
ovx tva KcLvutn.
'And another from Antiphon's Meleager'. Referred to above, II

2. 19, where some account is given of the author, and the story of his
play. The author of the Meleager is Antiphon the Tragic poet. See
also note on II 23. 5, where the lines quoted are probably from some play.
Wagner, Fr. Tr. Gr. i n 113. Antiph. Fr. 3. Conf. Meineke, Fragm.
Com. Gr. I 315. He suggests KCIVWCL for Kravaxri (caiVeu' is found several
times in Soph., twice in Aesch., and once in Xen. Cyrop.): Gaisford, Not.
Var. 327, with much less probability ovx >f uravaxn1. '(The intention is)
not to slay the beast, but that Meleager may have witnesses of his valour
in the eyes of all Greece'. " Qui locus," says Meineke, 1. c , "ex prologo
fabulae petitus videtur. Fortissimi quique Graecorum heroes (ita fere
apud poetam fuisse videtur) convenerunt, non quo ipsi aprum Calydonium interficiant, sed ut Meleagri virtutem Graecis testificentur.".
A third from Theodectes'Ajax (Aj. Frag. 1, Wagner, u. s., p. 118);
cited again 24, and ill 15. 10, where the same passage of the play is
referred to. It is there employed in illustration of the interpretation of
a fact or a motive, favourable or unfavourable according to the requirements of the argument; exactly as in the topic now under consideration.
Ar. there explains in much plainer terms its use and application: KOIVOV 8e
TCO tiaftdWovTL Kai r d7ro\vo[iVG)f eiret^r] ro avro eVfieêrat nXctovajv iveKa
jrfja^dtjvai, Ta /lew Sia/3aXXo!/Tt KaKorjdiarreov in\ TO êlpoi' eiiKafifilavoVTi (put-
ting an unfavourable construction upon the act and its motive), T< Se
ajroXvoiievcp cirl TO fieXnov (the reverse). The same explanation will
apply to both quotations alike. Theodectes' play contained no doubt
a rhetorical contestwhich would be quite in his manner, like Ovid's
between Ajax and Ulysses for the arms of Achilles, in which the argument from the construction of motives would be applied to the fact, by
the competitors, in the two opposite senses. Ulysses would refer to the
'preference' {npoeikeTo occurs in both the passages), shewing a sense
of his superior merit, implied by Diomede when he chose him out of all
the Greeks to be his companion in the hazardous exploring expedition to
Troy by night (Horn. II. K. 227 seq. Ovid. Met. x m 238 seq. Est
aliqttid de tot Graiorum millions umim A Diomede legi, line 241); Ajax
would retort that this was not the real motive of Diomede's choice, but it
was that ' the attendant might be inferior to himself (11 23. 20) or (as it
is expressed in III 15. 10,) 'because he alone was too mean to be his
rival', to compete with him in his achievements, and to share in the
renown to be thereby acquired.
Of eVSe'xerat, as illustrating d Soi'17 av, I have already spoken.
1
Bekker and Spengel both retain ovx tva KTivwai.!
284
PHT0PIKH2 B 23 2r.
21 aWos Kotvos KCLI TOTS dfx<pi<rfir}TOv<ri Kai TO?S (TVfxpovXevova-i, (TKOTreiv TO. irpoTpkirovTa Kai diroTpeTrovTa,
Kai wv eveKa Kai irpaTTOVGi Kai (pevyovav
ravra
yap etTTiv a lav fiev VTrdp^t] Set irpaTTeiv, iav oe fit}
d
fxr\ TrpotTTe.iv. oiov el dvvaTOU Kai pcfiiov Kai
$ UTW rj (piXois, fj fiXafiepou ex^pois Kai

v, fj eXdrrtav tj ty/ula TOV TrpdyfiaTOs. Kai p. i4oo.
h' e'/c TOUTWV Kai diroTpkirovfriv &K TWV
21. Top. xx. 'Another, common to counsellors (in deliberative rhet.)
as well as the two parties in forensic pleadings'. This seems to imply
that the preceding topic is confined to the forensic branch; and to this,
of the three, it is no doubt, most applicable; the suggestion and construction of motives and intentions being there most of all in request.
Still in an encounter of two opponents in the public assembly, as in that
of Dem. and Aesch., it is almost equally available; and in the remaining
branch even more so, as a topic of panegyric or censure. The present
topic, like the five preceding, with the partial exception of Top. xv,
which appears also amongst the 'fallacies' of the de Soph. El., is applicable to Rhetoric alone and does not appear in the dialectical treatise.
It embraces arguments, which may be used in the deliberative kind
in exhorting to some act or course of policy, or dissuading from it; and
in judicial practice in the way of accusation or defence; in which 'we
have to inquire, first what are the motives and incentives to action, and
what things on the contrary deter men from acting. The things which,
if they be on our side or are favourable to us, iav vnapxy, supply motives
for action, are such as possibility, facility, advantage, either to self or
friends, (of accomplishing or effecting anything); or anything injurious
(hurtful, damaging: that is, the power of injuring) and' (bringing loss
upon, on this form of adj. see note on I 4.9) 'involving loss to enemies,
or (if or when) the (legal) penalty (for doing something) is less than the
thing (that is, the thing done, the success of the deed and the profit of it',
('fructus voluptasque quae inde percipitur': 'quod cupiebant quod sequebantur et optabant.' Victorius). The construction of the last words, rj e'XarTCOI/ 17 {17/ita roG irpdyfiaros seems to be, if construction it can be called, that
>J {JIILIO. is continued as an apposition to the preceding nominatives; ' the
penalty being less than the profit' is another incentive to action. ' From
such cases as these, arguments of exhortation or encouragement are drawn,
dissuasive from their contraries (impossibility, difficulty, disadvantage,
injury, &c). From these same are derived arguments for accusation
and defence: from dissuasives or deterrents, of defence; from persuasives, of accusation'. That is to say, in defending a client from a charge
of wrong-doing, you collect all the difficulties, dangers, disadvantages
and so on, to which the accused would be exposed in doing what he is
charged with, and infer from them the improbability of his guilt: in
accusing, you urge all or any of the opposite incitements to commit a
crime, above enumerated. To these last, the inducements to the com-
PHT0PIKH2 B 23 21, 22.
285
tie TWU CCVTWV TOVTWV Kai Kaxtiyopovcri

Kai diroXoyovvTai' K fiev TWV diroTpeTrovTcov diroXoyovvTai, K e$e TWI/ irpoTpeTrovTiav Kartiyopovcriv.
ecrri S' d TOVOS oirros 6\t] Te)(yr} r\ r e Tla/uKplXov Kai
22 r\ KaWnnrov.
aAAos IK T W SOKOVVTWV /meu yiyIK
mission of crime, maybe added the topic cut bono, 'Cassianum illud'
[Cic. Phil. 11 35]. Compare with this the passage upon the various
motives and inducements to crime and wrong-doing, in I 10. 5 seq., which
is there mixed up with a general classification of all sources and causes
of action.
'And of this topic the entire "art" of Pamphilus and Callippus is
made up'. Of Callippus it has been already stated, supra 14, that
nothing is known but these two notices of Aristotle. It is likely, as I
have there pointed out [pp. 2712], that he was one of the earliest pupils
of Isocrates mentioned in his dirt'Sotrij, 93.
Pamphilus, the rhetorician, is mentioned by Cicero, de Orat. Ill
21. 82, together with Corax, in somewhat contemptuous terms, Pamphilum
nescio quern, and of his Rhetoric, it is said, (tantam rem) tamquam
pueriles delicias aliquas depingere. It is plain therefore that Pamphilus,
like Callippus, belonged to the early school of Rhetoricians of the age
of Gorgias and the Sophists, and treated his art like them in a ' puerile'
and unworthy manner. Another, and very brief notice of him occurs
in Quintilian, ill 6. 34, a chapter on the status or araa-fts; he rejected
finitio, the opixyj araens. Spalding in his note describes the contents of
Pamphilus' 'art' from the passage of the Rhet, and then discusses,
without coming to a conclusion, the question whether or no this Pamphilus can be identified with a painter of the same name, mentioned in
Quint. XII 10. 6, Pliny in several places, and Aristoph. Plut. 385, and
the Schol. Spalding has no doubt that Quint.'s Pamphilus, III 6. 34,
is the rhetorician. Spengel, Art. Script, p. 149, note 83, thinks that he
cannot be the same as Aristotle's, (erat itaque ille P. non ante Hermagorae tempora,) in consequence of his acquaintance with orao-cis, which
were of much later invention, and the name of them unknown even to
Ar. The same doubt occurred to myself: but I laid the evil spirit by the
consideration that though Aristotle was unacquainted with the technical
terms and classification of the orao-eir, he yet was familiar with the
thing, which he frequently refers to; and the technical expression may
belong to Quintilian and not to Pamphilus. Nine times the name of
Pamphilus occurs in the Orators, (Sauppe, Ind. Nom. p. 109, ad Orat.
AH. vol. Ill,) but the rhetorician is not among them.
22. Top. XXI. The object of this topic is (says Brandis, u. s.,
p. 20) to weaken the force of arguments from probability. " In incredibilibus provocatur ad effectum, qui si conspicuus sit, resisti non potest
quin, quod incredibile videbatur, iam probabile quoque esse fateamur."
Schrader.
'Another (class of arguments) is derived from things which are
believed to come to pass (ylyve&Oat, actually to take place or happen)
286
PHTOPIKHS B 23 22.
vecrdcu a.7ri'(rrwv Se, on OVK av eZoâv, el fxn i]V n

6771)5 t]V. Kai on fiaWov
n yap Ta b'vra h Ta
VTroXanfidvovcriv el ovv airia-TOv KCCI fxt] et/cos,
es av eiy ov yap 01a ye TO ewos Kai irivavov
ovruK. olov 'AvSpoKArjs eXeyev 6 Ylirdevs
but (still) are beyond (ordinary) belief, (you argue, namely) that they
would not have been believed at all, had they not actually been or
nearly so' : i. e. either been in existence, or come so near to it, made so
near an approach to it, as to enable us by a slight stretch of imagination
to realize it so as to be convinced of its existence. Any case of very
close analogy, for instance, to the thing in question might produce this
conviction, rj iyyis is a saving clause ; ' fact or nearly so'. Rhetorical
argument does not aim at absolute truth and certainty: it is content
with a near approach to it within the sphere of the probable, which is
enough for complete persuasion.
' Nay even more', (we may further argue that these at first sight
incredible things are even more likely to be true than those that are at
first sight probable. Sugply boKovvra ea-ri for the constr. and (/JLOKXOV)
a\r)8rj or ovra earl TU>V eiKoraiv Kai TriBavwv for the sense): 'because men
believe in (suppose, assume the existence of,) things either actual, real
or probable: if then it (the thing in question) be incredible and not
probable, it must be true ; because its probability and plausibility are
not the ground of our belief in it'. The argument of the last clause is
an exemplification of Topic IX, 10, supra, see note there. It is an
inference i< Simpeo-ecor, 'from division'; a disjunctive judgment.
All
belief is directed to the true or the probable : there is no other alternative.
All that is believedand this is believedmust therefore be either true
or probable : this is not probable ; therefore it must be true. d\t]6es
more antiquae philosophiae identifies truth and being : d\r]8es here = ov.
In other words, the antecedent improbability of anything may furnish
a still stronger argument for its reality than its probability. Anything
absolutely incredible is denied at once, unless there be some unusually
strong evidence of its being a fact, however paradoxical. That the
belief of it is actually entertained is the strongest proof that it is a fact :
for since no one would have supposed it to be true without the strongest
evidence, the evidence of it, of whatever Kind, must be unusually strong.
The instance given is an exemplification of the topic in its first and
simplest form.
' As Androcles of Pitthus' (or Pithus, whence 0 Ilidtvs; an Attic deme,
of the tribe Cecropis) 'replied in the charge he brought against the law,
to the clamour with which he was assailed by them' (the assembly, before
which he was arraigning the existing state of the law) 'for saying "the
laws require a law to correct them and set them right" which they
thought highly improbable"why so do fish require salt (to keep them
from corruption), though it is neither probable nor plausible that bred
as they are in brine (the salt sea) they should require salt: and so does
287
yopwv TOU vofxov, eirei e$opvftr](rav HUTO e'nrovri "deovrai 01 VOJXOI vofxou TOV SiopdcocrovTOs," " teal yap oi
i%6ues otAos, KaiToi OVK eihcos ovEe irSavov iv aX/mt]
Tpe(pO[xevovs SeTcrdai. aAo's, Kai TO. aTe/j.<j)vXa eXaiov
KaiToi aTTKTTOv, e wv eXaiov <y'ii>6Tai, TavTa heirrOai
23 iXaiov.
aAAos iXeyKTiKos, TOTOdvojj.oXo<yov[Jieva
<TKO7reTv, ei T I dvo{j.oXo<yoviJLevov e'/c TrdvTwv Kai
oil-cake' (o-Te/KpvKa, the cake or mass of olives remaining after the oil
has been pressed out) 'require oil (for the same reason), though it is
highly improbable that the very thing that produces oil should require
oil itself. Here we have an improbable statement which is shewn by
two close analogies to be after all very near (iyyvs) the truth.
Of Androcles, and the time and circumstances of his proposed alteration of the laws, nothing is known but what appears in our text. The
names of three Androcleses occur in the Orators, (Sauppe, Ind. Nom.
p. 13, Or. Att. in) of which the first, mentioned by Andocides 7rep\ JXVITnqpiav 27, may possibly be the speaker here referred to. The Androcles
of Thuc. VIII 65, (comp. Grote, H. G. vin 43 [c. LXII], Plut. Alcib. c. 19,)
the accuser and opponent of Alcibiades, assassinated in 411 B. c. by the
agents of Pisander and the oligarchical party, is most likely identical with
Andocides; the time of the events referred to in both authors being
nearly the same. I think upon the whole that it is not improbable that
Thucydides, Andocides and Aristotle may mean the same person1.
(TTefi<j)v\a] Ar. Nub. 45, Equit. 806, was a common article of food in
Attica. It denoted not only the cake of pressed olives, but also of grapes
from which the juice had been squeezed. Phrynichus, s. v., has 01 fiiv
iroKhoi TCL T<tv f3orpvG>v CKmefTîaTa dfiadas'
01 5' 'ArriKOt G~Te/JL<fiv\a tXaaiv.
Suidas, on the other hand, ro exSyfia rijs <rra(pvXfjs >) rav iXaav, oir dvrl
S\frav ixpa>vTo, and to the same effect, Hesychius. Also Galen, ap. Lobeck,
note. Lobeck settles the matter by quoting Geoponic. VI 12.435, flStvcu
Xpfj on (TTe/j.(pv\a ov\, as TLves vojxlôvtn, rav iXaimv fj.6vov eVrl 7rvprjves,
aXKa Kai ra raiv (rra.<j>vkv yiyapra.
(nvprjvfs must surely be a mistake ;
no amount of pressing could ever convert grape-stones or olive-kernels

into an o^rov, a dainty or relish, and moreover what is here said, that
the oil proceeds from the <TTtfL<pv\a, shews that the cake is made of the
olives themselves, and not of the mere stones.) The word occurs frequently, as might be expected, in the fragments of the Comic writers:
see the Index to Meineke's Collection.
23. Top. xxil. 'Another, to be employed in refutation', (i.e. of
an adversary; which, real or imaginary, is always implied in refutation.
T h e office of the iXeyKTiKov (vdvurjixa is ra a.vop.okoyovy.eva (rvvaysiv,
conclude contradictories', II 22.15,
an
'to
d note: see also Introd. ad h. 1-
1
The writer of the Article Androcles, in Smith's Biogr. Did., has no doubt
upon this point. He says on this passage, '' Ar. has preserved a sentence from one
of Androcles' speeches, in which he used an incorrect figure!".
288
Kal Trpdêcov teal Xoyoov, XWP^ iu*J/ >7r' T 0 ^ dfJL(pi<rolov (< Kal (pritrl fXev (piXeiv vfJLa<s, (rvvta-
Se Tots TpiaKOvra," xcopls 3 ' eV avTov, " Kal

<j)r]<rl fxev tiva'i /me <pi\6BiKOv} OVK e%et Be
BeBiKacfxevov ovBefxiav BIKTIV," %Wjo/s ' eV aurou Kal
f(
TOV d/j.(pio'fir]TOvvTOs,
Kal OVTOS fxev ov
TTOOTTOT' ovSev, eyoo Be Kal 7ro\Aoi)s \e\v/uiai
24 a'Wos TOIS 7rpoSi.al3e(3\riiuievois Kal dvdpvowois Kal p.
7rpd<yiu.a<Tiv, rj hoKOvari, TO Ae'yeti/ TY\V airiav TOV wap. 263 and note)' is to take into consideration (and argue from) all
contradictories, repugnances, disagreements (between your statements
or conduct, and the opponent's), whatever contradiction may be derived
from all times (conflicting dates), actions and words; separately (distinctly ; there are three distinct modes of employing it) in the case of
the adverse party, as for instance, " and he says he loves you, and yet he
conspired with the Thirty":' the thirty tyrants namely, after Aegospotami,
B.C. 404: this is from the deliberative branch: 'and separately in your
own case (as applied to your own conduct, 7rpde), " and he says that I
am litigious, and yet he can't prove that I have ever brought a single
case into court:" and again, distinguished from the preceding, the application of it to oneself and the opponent (in the way of a contrast of two
opposite characters and modes of conduct), " and he has never lent any
one a single penny, whilst I have even ransomed (got you liberated,
\t\viiai,) many of you (out of captivity).'" This last example reminds us
of the contrast drawn by Demosthenes, de F. Leg. pp. 412, 13, seq., of his
own character and conduct as compared with that of the rest of the
ambassadors to Philip, Aeschines, Philocrates and Phrynon: in which
the ransom of captives plays an important part.
This is Cicero's locus ex repugnantibus, Top. Ill 11, IV 21, where it
is illustrated by an example, which concludes, repugnat enint recte accipere et invitum reddere. And further, XII 53 seq. Quintilian, V 10. 74,
Ex pugnantibus, Qui est sapiens stultus non est. Ib. 8. 5, ex repugnantibus.
24. Top. X X I I I . T h e title of this topic ' i n scripto quodam libro'
apud Victorium, is airo TOV Xeyo/ievris rfji- alrlas \vftr6ai Staj3o\iji<.
Another, for' (the benefit of; the dative seems to follow Xe'yf iv;)
'those that have been previously brought into suspicion or odium, (whether by actual calumny) or suspected' (thought to be, having the appearance of being, SOKOVO-I, guilty of something wrong, for some other reason
so Vater, reading fj doKoi<ri),' both men and things, is to state the reason for the (otherwise) unaccountable circumstance: for there must be
some reason (fit" 5 is the curia,) for this appearance (of guilt)'. MS Ac
has fir) &OKOV(TI, which Victorius adopts and defends. All the recent edd.
have if. Victorius understands by j) SOKOVO-I a qualification of npoSias, to express the unexpected, apparently unreasonable, nature
PHT0PIKH2 B 23 24.
289
ôv 'i(TTL yap ri Si o (f)aiverat.

oiov V7ro(3efi\t]fj.evri$ TWOS TOV avrfjs vlov t>ia TO d<nraêo-dai
of the calumny or suspicion,, which seems to be quite unsuitable to the
character and circumstances of the object of it: "quae tamen nullo modo
haerere ipsis videatur, quod alienae ab ea sint." This agrees extremely
well with the wapaboôv following, and this reading and explanation is
deserving at all events of consideration. "It supposes only one case to
be contemplated, that of unjust suspicion and consequent calumny.
Vater on the contrary thinks that there are two cases intended, direct
calumny, and suspicion for any other reaso?i; and that this requires J;
SOKOCO-I. His transl. is, " Homines significantur, qui propter calumniam
vel alia de caussavideantur aliquo modo affecti esse." This is not very
clear; but I suppose his meaning to be what I have said. In this case
we must understand dSi<rjo-m, or something equivalent, after SOKOCO-I.
Spengel, in his recent edition, says that Victorius' reading and interpretation is refuted by the sense of the passagewhich I cannot agree
withand that 8ia^X!jardm must be understood after rj SOKOVO-IV. But
what is the meaning of 'apparent' calumny? and how is it distinguished
from the other ?
There is another point which has hitherto escaped observation, viz,
the interpretation of icai avBpdmois KCU Trpay/jiacn. Victorius interprets it as
in apposition to rois 8ia/3e/3Xi7/ieoir, ' qui valet ad purgandas aliquas et
personas et res,' which at first sight seems the most natural and obvious
explanation, and I have adopted it in my translation. But then, what are
the things that can be calumniated or brought under suspicion? One
might suppose that it means human actions: but Victorius renders it
res; and in fact actions are necessarily included in rois $ta|3e/3Xi)/x>/oit;
they are the things that are subject to misinterpretation; and therefore
there is no ground for a distinction between men and their actions, so
far at least as they are subjecf to calumny. I will venture to suggest,
though not with complete confidence, that we might give the words a
different construction, and understand them thus, "for the benefit of
those who have been unjustlywe must in this case read \ir\ Sonova-cv,
unlikely to be guiltysubjected to suspicion, by men (by human agency,
directly) or by circumstances" (indirectly; which would be equivalent to
Vater"s second case). At all events it makes very good sense.
We now come to a still greater difficulty, the interpretation of VTTOI3ej3\r]ptvris in the example.
A c reads fiiaficl3\r)iievris nvbs irpbs TOP vlov
' when a certain woman had been brought into suspicion with respect to
(i. e. as to her conduct or dealings with) her son', which gives a very
sufficient sense, but is rejected by Victorius as well as Bekker and Spengel and modern editors in general.
Victorius' renderingand no other Commentary that I have seen has
a word on the subjectis as follows; I must give it in his own words as
it will hardly bear translation. " Ceu cum mater quaedam filium subiisset, corporique ipsius corpus suum supposuisset, ut commode eum osculari posset, in eo habitu corporis spectata visa est stuprum cum adolescente exercere." vnofic[i\r]}iivr)s is translated literally.
AR. II.
19
290
iSoicei (rvveivai TW /meipaKiu), AeêVros $e TOV aiTiov

e\v6t] r\ SiafioArj' Kal olov ev TW A'lavTi TW GeoSe/CTOV
OSv(ro~evs \eyei irp6<s TOV A'tavTa, SIOTI dvSpeioTepos
25 wV TOV AiavTOs ov SoKel. aAAos aVo TOV aiTiou, av
T \nrap-)(Y], OTI e<TTi, Kav fxrj vwap-)(fj, OTI OVK eo~Tiv
ii/ma yap TO aiTiov Kal oil a'lTiov, Kal avev aiTiov ovdev
I see no other meaning that can be attached to the words as the
text at present stands, but it must be observed that \nro^f^\r]fievtts TOV
avTrjs vl6v is very strange Greek for supposuisse Jilium corpori suo, and I
do not see how it can be justified. The accus. after i5jroj3dAAi> represents not the thing under which you throw something, but the thing that
you throw under something else: and the passive viroêfi\jjfi(vt]s meaning 'throwing herself under', is possible perhaps, but by no means usual,
Greek. The ordinary construction of vwofidWeiv with two objects,
appears in these examples. The object thrown is in the accus.; the
object under which it is thrown is either in the dat. or has a prepos.
introduced before it. vwofiaXkeiv irkevpols irkevpa, Eur. Or. 223, wro/3.
a/upl patTTov o-rrohov, Suppl. Il6o. Xen. Oecon. 18. 5, iir. TO. arpnrra VJTO
TOVS 7roSay. Plut. Brut. 31, vir. rots l(pco-iv TCLS ar<payas, and similarly in
the metaph. applications of it (from Rost and Palm's Lex.). On the genit.
viroêfiXrjfievrjs see note on 11 8.10.
The general meaning of the whole is, that a mother had been seen in
this position which she had assumed for the purpose of embracing her
own sonwhich was not known to the witnesswas accordingly subjected to the suspicion of illicit intercourse with him: and we are to suppose further, that her character hitherto had been unimpeachable: when
the true reason was explained or stated, the calumny was at once
quashed (dissolved or unloosed as a knot). On this sense of \vtiv,
StaXveiv, &c. see note in Introd. on 11 25, p. 267, note 1.
A second example is taken from the argument between Ajax and
Ulysses in the contest for the arms of Achilles, in Theodectes' tragedy
'the Ajax',already referred to 20 supra: where Ulysses tells Ajax 'why
(the reason, which explains the paradox), though he is really braver than
Ajax, he is not thought to be so.' What the reason was we are not told;
nor does Ovid. Met. x m supply the deficiency.
On SIOTI and its three senses, see note on I 1.11.
25. Top. XXIV. airo TOV ain'ou] the inference 'from cause to
effect.' ' If the cause be there (its effect which necessarily follows, must
be there too, and) the fact (alleged) is so: if absent, then (its effect is
absent too, and) it is not so: for cause and effect always go together,
and without a cause (i. e. its proper cause) nothing is'. Brandis, u. s.,
p. 20, observes, that this like the preceding topics is confined to Rhetoric. Cicero, Top. 5867, treats of cause in general and its varieties : but has nothing exactly corresponding to this, though he speaks
of the great importance of the general topic to orators (6j7). Quintilian, observing that the " argumentatio, qua colligi solent ex us quae
Jaciunt ea quae ejficiuntur, aut contra, quod genus a causis vacant?
PHTOPIKHS B 23 25.
291
i(TTtv. oiou AewSctfjias a.Tro\oyovfxevo^ e\eye, Kart]Yopr}(ravTos QpaavfiovAov OTI flu (mjAt-njs yeyovcos
is nearly akin to that of antecedent and consequent, v 10. 80, exemplifies it in the four following sections.
' Leodamas, for instance, said in his defence, when charged by Thrasybulus with having had his name inscribed on the column (as a mark of
infamy) in the Acropolis, only'he had struck (or cut) it out in the time of
'the Thirty', replied that it was impossible; for the Thirty could have
trusted him more if the record of his hatred of the people had remained
engraved on the column'. The fact is denied on the ground of the
absence of a sufficient cause: an example of the second case, the negative application of the topic, av fir/ virapxt).
On Leodamas, see on I 7. 13, and the reff. Sauppe, ad Orat. Fragm.
XVI, Or. Att. ill 216, thinks it impossible that the two- Leodamases
mentioned by Ar., here and I 7-13, can be the same ['mit Rechf, A.
Schaefer, Dem. u. s. Zeit. I p. 129 n.\
He argues that the Leodamas
whose name was inscribed on the column as a ' traitor' (in proditorum
indice insert), according to Thrasybulus, before the domination of the
Thirty, that is, not later than 404 B. C. (he says 405), when he must have
been about thirty years old1, could not have been the Leodamas mentioned by Demosth. c. Lept. 146, as one of the Syndics under the
Leptinean law, in 355 B.C., and consequently, that the latter, the famous
orator of Acharnae, must have been a different person, because he
would then have been nearly 90. Clinton, F. H. II 111, sub anno
3723, merely says, quoting Rhet. II 23. 25, " From this incident it
appears that Leodamas was already grown up and capable of the duties
of a citizen in B.C. 404, which shews him far advanced in years at the
time of the cause of Leptines, in B.C. 355." And this appears to me to
be a sufficient account of the matter. Thrasybulus' accusation of Leodamas is mentioned likewise by Lysias, c. Evandr. 13, et seq.
The circumstances referred to in this accusation and defence, and the
meaning and intention of the inscription which Leodamas is said to have
effaced, are not quite clear. The use of the o-rij'Xi; or pillar here referred
to was twofold: the object of it in either case was the same, to perpetuate
the memory of some act or character to all future time. But the fact or
character commemorated might be either good or evil; and in the former
case it was the name of a public benefactor, in the latter of some signal
malefactor or public enemy, that was inscribed. It is usual to apply the.
latter explanation to the case here in question, which is probably what
is meant; and then it seems the story must be this:At some uncertain
time previous to the expulsion of the thirty tyrants and their Lacedaemonian supporters by Thrasybulus and his friends, the recover)' of the
city, and restoration of the demus in 403 B.C., the name of Leodamas
had been inscribed as a mark of infamyas a traitor to his country, as
Sauppe u. s. and Herm. Pol. Ant. 144. 11 interpret itaccording to
custom on a pillar erected in the Acropolis for that purpose. Now if it
was-'hatred to the demus' that was engraved on it (e'-yyeypcyi/LieVijs) as
Je n'en vois pas la necessite.
192
292
PHT0PIKH2 B 23 25.
eV T ^ axpoTToXei, dXK' eKKOâi e7ri TU>V

OVK evdexecrdai 'icpt]' fxaXKov yap av iricrTeveiv avrw
TOI)S TpiaKOVTa eyyeypafXfxevri'S Trjs eÔpa? 7rpos TOV
the sign and cause of his imputed infamy, it follows that it must have
been erected at some period when the popular party was in the ascendant ; Leodamas of course being a supporter of the oligarchs. When his
fri.ends were in power and he had the opportunity, Thrasybulus charges
him, inter alia of course, with having 'struck or cut it out' to efface the
record. He denies the possibility of their effect by arguing the absence
of all assignable cause, which could have produced it: for this permanent
record of his' hostility to the people' would have been an additional recommendation to the Thirty, who would have trusted him all the more for it.
Thrasybulus, says Victorius, was accusing Leodamas of being an enemy
and a traitor to his country; and one of the arguments he brought forward was the existence of this inscription, the subsequent disappearance,
of which he attempted to explain. He likewise cites in illustration of
the use of the topic Cic. pro Mil. 32, cum ostendere vellet insidiatorem
fuisse Clodium. Quonam igitur pacto probari potest insidias Miloni
fecisse Clodium f satis est quidem in ilia tarn audaci tarn nefaria bellua
docere magnam ei caussam, magnam spent in Milonis morte propositam,
magnas utilitates fuisse. And, as Cic. goes on to remark, this is Cassianum Mud, cut bono fuerit.
Of arfjkr) the pillar, and o-Tqklrqs, the person whose name is engraved
on it, in its unfavourable sense, where the inscription is a record of
infamywhich may be compared with our use of the pillory, the custom
of posting the name of a defaulter at the Stock Exchange, or a candidate who has disgraced himself in an examination; the object in each
case being the same, exposure of the culprit, and a warning to others 1 ;
the difference between the ancient and modern usages, that the latter are
temporary, the other permanentthe following are examples: Andoc.
nepl p.vo~r. 78, in a ijtrj<pio~iJ.a: Lycurg. c. Leocr. 117, sroMja-airer frTrjkqv,
dvaypa(peiv TOVS aXtTijpiovs KOL TOVS Trpoftoras: Demosth. Phil. F 42,
where an historical example is given, and the whole process described.

Isocr. jrf/H TOV evyovs, 9, <rrrjkiTr)V dvaypdcpeiv.
Of the favourable sense, Victorius quotes an instance from Lys. c.

Agorat. 72, irpotrypa<pTJvai els rrjv (rrrjXrjv <y evepyiras oiras. H e r m . Pol.
Ant. u. s. See also Sandys' note on Isocr. Paneg. 180.

KKoyfrai] Ar. seems here to have arbitrarily departed from his original constr. Having begun with Karijyopeiv and on rjv, he abruptly
changes to the infin. as if \eyeiv and not Kat-qyoptiv had preceded: so that
1
At Milan, says Manzoni, Introd. to the ' Storia delta colmna infamej in 1830,
the judges condemned to the most horrible tortures some persons who were accused
of having helped to spread the plague, and in addition to other severe penalties,
decretaron di piu, che in quello spazio (where the house of one of the condemned had
stood) s' innahasse una colonna, la quale dovesse chiamarsi infame, con un' iscrizione che tramandasse ai posteri la notizia deW attentato et delta pena, E in cid
non s' ingannarono: quel giudizio fit veramente memorabile.
PHT0PIKH2 B 23 26, 27.
293
26 dfjpov.
aAXos, el eVeSeêro fleXriov a'AAws ry eV

V (rv/jiftovAevei rj irpaTTei tj 7reVj0aê <ncotyavepov yap OTI, el fxrj oimos e'êt, ou
ovdek yap iicwv TCC <pav\a KCII yiyvwcncwv irpoaipeiTar P. 1400 b.
ecrTi oe TOUTO yseCSos' 7ro\ActKis yap vo~Tepov
cfjAov 7ra>s y\v 7rpaai /3e\Tiov, 7TpoTepov Ze
27 aAAos, OTav TL ivavTiov fxeWrj 7rpd.TTe<r6ai TOIS 7rewe must supply \iyeiv to explain the government of the infinitive. It
cannot be the optative.
26. Top. xxv. 'Another, to consider whether it ever was, or is
still, possible to improve (do better, more advantageously, under more
favourable conditions,) in any other way (by following any other course,
by any alteration of time, place, conditions, circumstances), any (bad)
advice (which the counsellor is charged with having given, Viet.), or anything which he is doing, or ever has done (anything wrong that he is
either meditating or has committed), (you infer) that, if this be not so (if
he has not taken advantage of these possible improvements, which
would have contributed to the success of his advice or design), he is not
guilty at all; because (no one would ever neglect such opportunities if he
had it in his power to avail himself of them) no one, intentionally and
with full knowledge, ever prefers the worse to the better.1 It seems
from the omission of o-vftjiovXfvei and 7rpdrr, and the prominence given
to mrrpaxev the past act in the explanation of the reason, that although
this topic may be applied to deliberative oratory, it is much more usual
and useful in defending yourself or a client in a court of law. You say,
My client cannot be guilty of the act with which you charge him, for he
could have done it much better, would be much more likely to have been
successful, in some other way ; at some other time, and place, or under
other circumstances : therefore, since he has not chosen to do the thing
in the best way that he could, and at the same time had full knowledge
of what was the best way of doing it, it is plain that he has not done it
now under less favourable circumstances. This is excellently illustrated
by Victorius from another passage of Cic. pro Mil. XVI 41. In retorting
upon Clodius the charge of lying in wait to assassinate, he first enumerates several favourable opportunities which Milo had previously neglected to avail himself of, and asks whether it was likely that, having
acted thus, he should now choose an occasion when time and circumstances were so much less favourable, to carry out such a design: Quern
igitur cum omnium gratia nohiit (occidere), hunc voluit cum aliquorum
querela ? quern iure, quern loco, quern tempore, quern impune non est
ausus, hunc iniuria, iniquo loco, alieno tempore, periculo capitis, non
dubitavit occidere ?
' But there is a fallacy in this : for it often does not become clear till
afterwards (after the commission of the act) how the thing might have
been better done, whereas before it was anything but clear'.
27. Top. XXVI. 'Another, when anything is about to be done
II.
294
PHT0PIKH2 B 23 27.
TrpayfxevoK, ajuia o-Koireiv olov "Eevcxpdvtis 'EAeaVats

epaiToocnv el dvtoai TY\ AevKodea /cat dprjvwaiv, rj fir],
crvvefiouXeuev, el /xev 6eov vTroXa/mfidvoucri, ;uj dprjve'ii/,
opposed to what has been done already (by the same person), to look at
them together 1 : i. e. to bring together things that had been hitherto
separate, and so to be able to compare them irapaXkriXa ipavepa iiSX\ov infra 30; irapafckrika ra ivavrla fiaKicrra (palve&dai, III 2. 9, 9. 8,
11.9, 17. 13, TrapdXhfKa fiaKXov ravavria yvapifcraia process which clearly
brings out the contradiction. Brandis u. s. [Philologies IV i] p. 20 thus
expresses the argument of the topic, "to detect a contradiction in the
action in question." It seems in itself, and also from the example
selected, to be most appropriate in giving advice.
' As Xenophanes, when the Eleates (his present fellow-citizens)
consulted him, asked his advice, whether they are to offer sacrifices and dirges to Leucothea, or not; advised them, if they supposed
her to be a goddess not to sing dirges (a funeral lament implying
death and mortality); if a mortal, not to offer sacrifices'. Xenophanes
here, by bringing the two practices into immediate comparisonif
the example is meant to represent literally the statement of the topic,
we must suppose that the Eleates had already done one of the two ;
deified her most likely; and now wanted to know whether they should
do the othermakes the contradiction between sacrificing to (which they
had done), and lamenting as dead (which they were about to do), the
same person.
Of Xenophanesof Colophon, but then living at Elea, or Velia,
where he founded the Eleatic schoolwe have already had notice in
1 15.29, and 11 23. 18.
el 0iWi] el being here equivalent to irorepov, admits equally with it
of construction with the deliberative conjunctive : compare the same
deliberative conjunctive in interrogation, as a modified doubtful future ;
r iroiuiitv; ' what are we to do ?' instead of the direct, 'what shall we
do?' Matth. Gr. Gr. 526.
This passage is cited by Lobeck, Aglaophamus, Eleus. 21, Vol. I.
p. 167.
Plutarch refers more than once to this dictum of Xenophanes, but
supposes it to have been addressed to the Egyptians, about the worship
of Osiris, and the propriety of dprjvoi in his honour. De Superst. c. 13,
p. 171 E, Amator. c. 18, 763 D, de Is. et Osir. c. 70, 379 B. Wyttenbach ad
loc. de Superst. Athen. XV 697 A, quoting Aristotle, iv rfj dnoXoyia, tl
firj Kareêvarat 6 \6yos' apud eundem.
Ino, daughter of Cadmus and Harmonia, and wife of Athamas, in a
fit of madness inspired by Hera, threw herself and her son Melicertes
two sons, Eur. Med. 1289; see the whole passage, 12791292into the
sea. Both of them became sea deities : she under the name of Leucothea, Melicertes of Palaemon. Virg. Georg. I 4367. The stories of
Athamas and Ino are told under those two names in Smith's Diet.
Biogr. Cic. Tusc. Disp. I 12. 28. de Nat. D. in 15. 39 in Graecia multos
PHTOPIKHS B 23 28.
295
28 el RavdpooTTOV, fit) dueiv.

aAAos TOTTOS TO eK TWV
dfxapTr]6ii/To)u Karivyopeiv fj diroXoyeio-dai, olov iv TV
dvou Mr/Sela 01 fiev KctTt]ryopov(nv OTL TOWS Trainees
Kapidv
ov (paive(r6ai yovv ai/roys* tffxapTe <ydp
n Mr/Seta irepl Trju a7ro(TTo\rju rwu 7raiou)W fj 8' dirohabent $x hominibus deosLeucotheam quaefuit Ino, et eius Palaemonem
jffiwn cuncta Graecia.
28. Top. xxvir. ' Another, from mistakes made; to be employed
in accusation or defence'. The example is an illustration of both; the
accusers convert the mistake that Medea made in sending away her
children into a charge of having murdered them; Medea retorts the
same argument from another mistake which she could have committed
had she done what they allege, of which however she is incapable.
Brandis, " in any mistake that has been made to find a ground of accusation or defence."
' For instance, in Carcinus' Medea, the one party (of the disputants in
the play) charge her with the death of her childrenat all events (say
they) they no where appear: because Medea made a mistake in (in
respect of) sending away her children (instead of merely sending them
away, they argued that she had made away with them, since they were
no where to be found): her defence is, that it was not her children, but
Jason, that she would have killed (if she had killed any one); for she
would have made a mistake in failing to do this, if she had done the
other too': and of such a mistake she never could have been guilty.
" Quasi dicat, quomodo tarn stulta fuissem' (how could I have made such a
mistake?) 'ut innocentes filios necassem; perfidum autem coniugem et
auctorem omnium meorum malorum relinquerem ?" Victorius.
Carcinus, a tragic poet contemporary with Aristophanes, and his
sons, Philocles, Xenotimus, and Xenocles, are often mentioned by Aristophanes, never without ridicule. See Vesp. 150112, Nub. 1261, Pac.
782, 864, and in Holden, Onom. Arist. Miiller, Hist. Gr. Lit. c. XXVI
2, passes him over with very slight notice, " known to us chiefly from
the jokes and mockeries of Aristophanes." Meineke, Hist. Crit. Com.
Gr. p. 505 seq., Fragm. Comic. Vol. I., has a long and learned discussion, principally with the object of distinguishing this Carcinus from
others of the same name. There was at all events one other tragic poet
of the name, whom Meineke supposes to have been the grandson of the
former, p. 506, being said by Suidas to be the son of Xenocles (or Theodectes). This Carcinus flourished according to Suidas ' before the reign
of Philip of Macedon', in the first half of the 4th cent. B.C. Some fragments of his Achilles, Semele, and Tereus, are given by Wagner in his
collection, Fragm. Trag. Gr. 111 96, seq. with some others of uncertain
plays: but he has omitted all those that are mentioned by Aristotle, the
Medea here, the Oedipus in ill 16. 11, the Thyestes, Poet. 16. 2. In
Poet. 17. 2, there is a reference to a character, Amphiaraus, in a play of
his not named, with which Ar. finds fault. Athen. I 22 A. See also
Clinton, F. H, 11. Introd. x x m .
296
PHT0PIKH2 B 23 28, 29.
XoyeiTai OTI OUK av rows TralBws dWct TOV 'lacrova av

d
TOUTO yap r^xapTev av firj 7roiri<ra(ra,
i BaTepov e7rolti<rev. earn $' 6 TO7ros OUTOS
TOV ivdv/ui^fxaTO's Kal TO eiôs o\t) r\ irpoTepov QeoaAAos a7ro TOU ovo/uaTOs, olov w's 6
<ra(pto$ 1.i$tipw Kal (popoua-a Tovvofxa,
' And this topic and the kind of enthymeme is the whole of the earlier
art of Theodoras'. Comp. supra 14 of Callippus, and 21, of Callippus
and Pamphilus.
JJ nporepov Q, rixyi]
' e - V Tporepov ovva, yeypaii/iivt], ireTroirjfiivrf'. as of
xpStTov, 'the earliest writers', III I. 9. Theodorus' work must have passed
through two editions, of which the second, from what is said here, seems
to have been larger and more complete. This one is the 'first' or ' earlier' edition; the one before the second. If this contained nothing but
the illustration of the topic of 'mistakes', it must have been extremely
insufficient as an 'art of rhetoric'. We must ascribe either to his second
and enlarged 'Art' or to speeches and rhetorical exercitations all that
Aristotle says of him, together with Tisias and Thrasymachus, de Soph.
El. c. 34, 183 b 32, as well as the naiva \iytiv, Rhet. i n 11. 6, and his
divisions of the speech, ill 13. 5; as also the notices of him in Plato's
Phaedrus, Quintilian, Cicero Brut. XII 48, &c, Dionysius, &c. (which
may be found in Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil. No. IX. Ill 284
foil.1). Of Theodorus of Byzantiumto be distinguished from another
Theodorus, a rhetorician of Gadara, Quint. 11 15. 21see further in
Speng. Art. Script, p. 98 seq.; Westermann, Gesch. der Beredtsamkeit,
30.16, p. 40, 68.7, p. 140. Sauppe, Fragm. Or. Att. VIII, Or. Att. ill
164, simply refers to Spengel's Artium Scriptores, and to his own tract
mZimmerm. diurn. lit. antiq. 1835, p. 406. [Blass, die Attische Beredsamkeit, 1 p. 253.]
29. Top. xxvni. The argument, 0770 roC ovo/iaTos, significant
names: "which draws an inference from the signification of a name."
Brandis. A dialectical topic akin to, but by no means identical with,
this, (the one is confined to surnames, the other extends to all words in
general,) occurs in Top. B 6, wzayi,
to consider the derivation and
signification of names with a view to applying them as suits the immediate purpose: which coincides more nearly with Cicero's topic, quum
ex vi nominis argumentum elicitur, quarn Graeci irvfioKoyiav vacant
Top. VIII. 35 seq., than with the rhetorical form of it as it appears here;
though both of the others may be regarded as including this special
rhetorical application. But in the rhetorical treatise, the de Inv. 11 9. 28,
we have the same use of names (i. e. surnames) suggested as by Ari1
In referring to this paper I take the opportunity of withdrawing all that I
have said in p. 286, r; irpdrcpov OeoSdpov Wxeij, and the illustration from Carcinus.
It is sufficiently corrected in the note on this section.
PHTOPIKHS B 23 29.
297
stotle: Nam et de nomine nonnuntquam aliquid suspicionis nascitur...

ut si dicamus idcirco aliquem Caldum vocari, quod temerario et repcntino
consilio sit.
Quintilian, V 10. 30, 31, thinks that an argument can seldom be
drawn from a surname, except in the case of such significant names as
are assigned for a reason, as Sapiens (Cato and Laelius), Magnus
(Pompey), and Plenus (?): or where the name is not significant, but suggests a crimeas the name Cornelius, in the case of Lentulus, was suggestive of conspiracy (for a reason there given). The use of the name
recommended by Aristotle's topic (which he does not mention) is pronounced, in the case of Euripideswho represents Eteocles as attacking
the name of his brother Polynices, noki VUKOS, ut argumentum morum
as insipid and tasteless, frigidum.
It is however ' a frequent material
for jokes; especially in the hands of Cicero, who freely employs it, as in
the case of Verres'. The passage of Euripides referred to, is Phoen.
6367; Eteocles terminates the altercation with his brother with the two
lines, %îff IK \aipas' d\r)8as 8' ovofia TloXvveiKrj iranjp eBero troi 8ciq irpo-
voia vetKeav indvvfiov. With this use of significant names all readers of
the Greek Tragic poets are familiar. It is not to be regarded in them as
a mere play on words, but they read in the significant name the character or destiny of its bearer: and thus employed they have a true
tragic interest. It is singular therefore that Elmsley, who had certainly
studied the Greek dramatists with care and attention, should, on
Bacch. 508, after citing a number of examples, end his note with this
almost incredible observation, " Haec non modo ijrvxpa sunt" (is the epithet borrowed from Quintilian?), "verum etiam tragicos malos fuisse
grammaticos. Quid enim commune habent 'AnoWcov et dwoWvi/ai
praeter soni similitudinem?" And this is all that is suggested by Ajax's
pathetic exclamation, al at rls av TTOT mer' K.T.X. Soph. Aj. 430, and the
rest! Elmsley has omitted Aesch. S. c. T. 658, iiravvfia 5e <apra IIoXuveUrj Ae'-ya, from his list; and Eur. Antiope, Fr. 1 (Dind., Wagner), and
Fragm. 2, Ibid. Agath. Fragm. Thyest. 1 ap. Wagn. Fr. Tr. Gr. ill 74.
Add from other sources, Dante Div. Com. Purg. XIII. 109, 'Savia non,
fui, avvegna che Sapiafossi chiamata. Shaksp. Rich. II, Act II. Sc. 1 73,
Gaunt. O how that name befits my composition ! Old Gaunt indeed;
and gaunt in being old, &c. The king asks, Can sick men play so nicely
with their names ? No, is the reply, misery makes sport to mock itself,
&c.: which is not a bad answer to Elmsley's objection. This tracing of
the character or destiny in the name is particularly common in the
Hebrew of the Old Test., as the well-known instance of Genesis xxvii.
36, ' I s not he rightly named Jacob? for he hath supplanted me these
two times.' The practice, which seems to be a suggestion of nature
itself, is thus shewn to have prevailed in various times, nations and
languages.
The line of Soph, is from his Tyro, Fragm. 1 (Fr. Soph. 563), Dind.
Sidero, Tyronis noverca: Fragm. IX, Wagn. Fragm. Trag. Gr. 11 413,
"Egregie Brunck. versum hue rettulit, quo haud dubie Sideronis crudelitas in Tyronem exagitatur." On the Tragedy and its contents, Wagner
u.s. p. 410. Victorius and Gaisford cite Eustath. ad II. A p. 158, etadll. r
379 = 287. 35, <a\ (la'tv aKrjdas (pfpiivv/ia TO IJIVTI.CS ol Trap' Ofiqpca...a>s...
298
PHTOPIKHS B 23 29.
Kai ft5s ev TOTS TCOV Bewv eTraivovz elwda(rt \eyeiu, Kai P-104.
tJs Kovcov QpacrvfiovXov dpao~ufiovAov eKctXei, Kai
'HjOoStKO? Qpacrv/ULaôw ft del dpaa-v/ULaô? el, Kai
HaiAov (t del (rv 7TftJAos el" Kai ApaKOVTa TOV vofxov, on OVK dvdpwrrov 01 vo/moi d\\d
BpaKovros'
Kara TT)V irapoifuafrfievrjv SitStjpu dpa<reiav eKelvrjv yvvauca, (popoiev TO olxtlov
ovofia. In the second passage the latter part of this is repeated. Kai at iv rois rav Beav inaivois] " Fortasse intelligit iis nominibus vocari
eos tune solitos quae vim et potestatem eorum declararent." Victorius.
It may perhaps refer to the 'significant names' derived from their attributes or occupations, by which deities are designated, and which, as
special distinctions would naturally occur in the hymns addressed to
them. These may sometimes be substituted for their proper names,
and may furnish arguments of praise.
The Conon and Thrasybulus here mentioned are doubtless, as may
be inferred from the absence of any special designation, the Conon, the
victor of Cnidus (394 B. a ) , and the Thrasybulus, the expeller of the
Thirty and restorer of the demus in 403 : though there are several others
bearing both of these names in Sauppe's Ind. Nom. ad Or. Att. H I .
pp. 63, 4, 81, 2. Thrasybulus is named by Demosth., de Cor. 219, as
one of the most distinguished orators among his predecessors, together
with Callistratus, Aristophon, and Cephalus; the two first of these we
have had mentioned in the Rhetoric. In de F. L. 320, he is called TOV
SrjtioTiKov (the popular Thrasybulus, the people's friend, KOL TOVOTTO*vAqr
Karayayovros TOV drjfiov. Conon and he were contemporaries. Conon
died soon after 392 B. C , Clinton, F. H. sub anno 388. 3, Thrasybulus,
"perhaps in the beginning of B.C. 389." Ib. sub anno 390. His name,
according to Conon, fitly represented the rashness of his counsels and
character. Grote, H. G. ix 509 [chap, LXXV.], in describing the character of Thrasybulus, omits to notice this.
In like manner the name of Thrasymachus, the rhetorician, is significant of the hardihood and pugnacity which were combined in his character. The sketch given of him in the first book of Plato's Republic is
in exact correspondence with this. "Always true to your name," rash
and combative, said Herodicus to him, doubtless provoked by some
rudeness of the Sophist in the course of a dialectical disputation. There
were two Herodicuses, both physicians; see note on 1 5.10. Doubtless
this again is the better known of the two, Herodicus of Selymbria in
Thrace; of whose medical practice Plato gives an account, Rep. i n
406 A seq. In a similar dispute with Polus, another Sophist and Rhetorician, (whose character, in perfect agreement with this, is likewise
sketched by Plato in his Gorgias, where he is said to be wos Kai ogis1,)
Herodicus again reminds him of the significance of his name, " Colt by
1
[P- 463 E-] A very brief summary of the leading points of Polus' character as
he appears in the Gorgias, is given amongst the 'dramatis personae' of the Introd.
to transl. of Gorg. p. lxxvii.

i yap.
KOCI
299
icai a5s )} Evpnrltiou 'E/ca/3^ eis TY\V
TOvvofA cp6ws ct
Kal cos
3
evZoKifxei Ze fxaXXov TWV ev6vfxr}fxdrwv TO.

a TcSf aTTodeiKTiKoov $ia TO (rvvctywyfiv fxev evavname and colt by nature 1 ." And lastly this inveterate punster applies
the same process to ' Dracon the legislator', declaring 'that his laws
were not those of a man, but of a dragonj so cruel were they'. Aristotle, Pol. 11 12 sud finem, says of Draco's laws, that they had nothing
peculiar, but >J xaAe7ror?;s, 8ia TO rrjs ft/fu'as fUyeBos. Nearly every offence
was made punishable with death. Hence Demades said of them that
they " were written not in ink, but in blood." Plut. Sol. 17. Tzetzes, Chil.
5, line 342 sqq. ap. Sauppe, Fragm. Demad. 17, Orat. Att. in 316; Grote,
H. G. in 202 [chap. x.J, whence our Draconian legislation.
The verse that follows is from Eur.'s Troades 990, where Hecuba is
answering Helen, who had been arguing the invincible power of Love.
"All follies are to mortals Aphrodite" (are attributed by men to this
passion, ' take the form of Aphrodite' in their fancy), ' and rightly does
the goddess' name begin the word a(j>pocrvi>ri.' 'Ac^poSiVij and 'Atfrpoo-vvr]
have the first half of the word in common.
Ilevdeiis, K.T.X.] ' Pentheus that bearest the name of thy future fortune'. Comp. Bacch. 367 and 508, and Theocr. Id. XXVI. 26, e opeos
TTv6rjp.a Kal ov HsvSfja <ppovo~ai.
Probably from Chaeremon's Dionysus, quoted three times in Athenaeus (Elms, ad Eur. Bacch. 508), and also probably, like the Bacchae,
on the story of Pentheus. Chaeremon's fondness for flowers and
the vegetable creation in general, noticed by Athen. XIII. 608 D, appears throughout the fragments preserved. See infra III 12. 2 where he
is spoken of as dKpifirjs, aimep Xoyoypacpos, on which see note in Introd.
ad loc. p. 325.
On Chaeremon see Miiller Hist. Gr. Lit. xxvi 6, and the Art. in
Smith's Diet. Biogr. s.v. He is a poet whose plays are more suited for
reading than acting, avayvao-riKos, Rhet. i n u. s. He is quoted again by
Ar. Probl. ill 16. In Poet. I 12, his Centaur is spoken of as a fiiKTq
pa\jfGi8La, on the import of which see the two writers above referred t o ;
and in Poet. 24. 11, this blending of heterogeneous elements is again
alluded to. See also Meineke, Hist. Crit. Com. Gr. p. 517 seq. Chaeremon is one of those who have been erroneously included amongst the
Comic poets. Wagner, Fr. Trag. Gr. ill 127147. Clint. F. H. Vol. 11.
Introd. p. xxxii.
1
This most ingenious rendering was given by Dr Thompson, then Greek
Professor, in a lecture delivered Feb. 6, 1854. [Introd. to ed. of Gorg. p. v.]
3OO
PHTOPIKHS B 23 30.
Titov elvm iv fxiicpw TO eXey/crncou evBvfxrjixa, Trap

aWt]\a Se (pctvepd elvai TW aKpoarr] fxaWou.
Se teal TWV eXejKTiKwv KCCI TWI' SeiKTiicuiv v
fxwv 6opv(3elTai fxdXicrTa TCC TOKXVTO. bcra dp
TTpoopw<ri [xrj eTrtTroAJjs etvai (a/xa. yap icai avrol
id)' avTois xa'LP0V(ri TrpoaKrOavofxevoi), ical o&wv TOaovTOv ixTTepiVovcriv uxrd' a/na elptj/uevcov
30. The chapter concludes with two observations on enthymemes
in general. First, ' Enthymemes of refutation are more popular and
applauded than those of demonstration, because the former is a conclusion ofopposites''(the def. of ?\pyx 09 ' see Introd. p. 262, note 1) 'in a small
space (or narrow compass), and things are always made clearer to the
listener by being placed side by side (close together, so as to admit of
immediate comparison)'. This is repeated in nearly the same words,
Hi 17. 13.
'But of all syllogisms destructive or constructive, such are most
applauded as those of which the results are at once (at the very begining, of the argument) foreseen: not because they are superficial (eiriiro\rjs, I 15. 22, note ad loc, II 16 1)for they (the hearers 'are pleased
themselves also with themselves at the same time') are pleased (not only
with the speaker and his enthymeme, but) with themselves also (apa)
for their sagacity in anticipating the conclusion : (and therefore they
don't think it superficial)and those which they are only just so far
behindwhich they can so nearly keep pace withas to understand
them (step by step) as they are delivered'.
aiia tlpripfvav] On this genitive, see note on 11 8 11. [For the sense,
compare III 10. 4.]
CHAP. XXIV.
In the preceding chapter a selection has been given of the topics or
special classes of enthymemes which are most appropriate and serviceable in the practice of Rhetoric: and these are ra ovra evdvfirj/uiTa, c. 24.
11, ult., sound, genuine, logical inferences. But besides these there are,
in Rhetoric as well as Dialectics, arguments apparent but not real, fallacious, illogical, which are often employed to mislead and deceive. Now,
although we are to abstain from the use of these ourselves, ov yap Set TO
<aCA<z uelBfiv, 1 1. 12, it is necessary for the rhetorician to be thoroughly
acquainted with them, in order to detect them in others and to refute
any unfair reasoning which may be employed against him, (ibidem): and
so vindicate the superiority of truth and right to falsehood and wrong.
And accordingly we have in the following chapter a selection of the most
prominent rhetorical fallacies, and in c. 25 the solution of them; corresponding respectively to the two parts of the de Soph. El. (cc. 1 15 ;
16, to the end), which in like manner is appended as a sequel to the
Topics in which is expounded and illustrated the genuine and artistic
method of the employment of the dialectical syllogism. On Fallacies in
PHTOPIKHS B 24 I.
301
general, see Grote's Plato, Euthydemus, Vol. I. c. xix [Grote's Aristotle

e x . ] and J. S. Mill, System of Logic, Vol. II. Bk. V. Whately, Logic, ch. V.
In the Topics, (de Soph. El.) c. 4, 165 b 23, fallacious arguments are
classified under two heads, irapa rf/v \iiv, fallacies of language, verbal,
and ?<a rfjs Xegeas, non-verbal, beyond the sphere of, not dependent upon
mere words; logicalfallacies. " Alterum vitium positum est in prava verborum interpretatione {wort-verdrehung), alterum in falsa argumentatione
(schluss-fekler)." Waitz ad loc. 165 b 23. ega> rfjs \ii-eas, die " ivelche in
den ausdruck ihren gnind nicht haben." Brandis, u. s. [Philologus, IV i]
p. 20. " Fallacies in the words, and fallacies in the matter," Whately, Logic,
ch. v. On Fallacies, 1. Verbal fallacies are six in number: (1) o/iavvfila,
equivocal, ambiguous, terms, TO nXfovaâs Xryo/K-vop; (2) dp<pi[2o\ia,general
ambiguity in language, ambiguous expressions, "ambiguouspropositions,"
Poste; (these two may be distinguished as here; or, as in Poet, xxv
21, identified, under the one general term dfUpiôKia, 'ambiguity in expression': in the explanation of them, Top. u. s. 166 a li, seq., we have
J) 6 \6yos the proposition, or combination of words, rj rovvofia, the single
word, the oiuowjiov) ; (3) o~6vt)eo-is and (4) dialpeo-ts, explained and illustrated
Top. ibid. 166 a 2238, illicit combination and separation of words;
(5) TTpocraSia, accent, pronunciationwhich is of more use in criticising
written composition, especially poetry; in Dialectics, where there is no
written text, avev ypcuprjs, it is of little or none. Ibid, b I ; and (6th and
last),7rapa TO <rxwa ^Vs A<r, 'in figura dictionis,'Waitz, fallacies or ambiguities, arising from the confusion of (assuming the apparent for the
real,) different categories"categories, that is, in their grammatical
acceptation, as predicates, or a classification of the parts of speech;
when, owing to similarity of (grammatical) form, a thing is referred
to the wrong category" (Waitz, note ad loc). And as this difference of
categorical predication is expressed in the termination of words, it may
be otherwise represented as " a similarity (or identity) of termination,"
which leads to fallacy (Poste, Transl. of de Soph. El.). Thus the termination -eiu (which marks the infinitive of a verb) in vyiaiveiv implies
'some quality or disposition of a thing', (as we say, it is a neuter verb),
i. e. belongs to the category of irowrqs fxeiv ' ' n T^vetv o r OIKOBO/UIV, it
implies action, irote'iv; i. e. it is an active verb; belongs to the category
of iroielv. Similarly from a masculine noun with a feminine termination,
or the reverse, and a neuter with either one or the other; Ibid, b 1019.
u
falschegrammatischeform"
Brandis, u. s. p. 22.
Of these, accent, division (probably including the opposite), and
ap4>i$o\\.a, including 6p.avvp.La, are illustrated from the poets in Poet.
XXV 1820. There is a fourth, 21, Kara TO C8OS TTJS X'|foj, which may
be brought under the more general topic of the dialectical treatise,
irapa TO o-x^fia rrjs \('ea>s-
Of these dialectical topics four are transferred to Rhetoric : ofj.wvvp.la,

including d/MpifloXia, 2; and a-vvdto-is and dialpeo-is, together, as one
topic, 3. o-xvpa TT\S Xeêffls, 2, stands for a fallacy of language quite
different to that which bears its name in the Topics. The difference is
explained in the note on 2.
Fallacies Zi-a> rrjs Xegeas, in the Topics are seven. (1) irapa TO o-vfifie(ir)Kos, from the confusion of subject and accident; (2) of absolute
302
iirel h' ivBexerai TOV fxev eivai avWoyta-fiov,

TOV CHAP.
Ze fxrj eivai fxev (paivecrdai Be, dvdyKt\ KOI evdvixrjfxa TO
fxev eivai evdvfxrifjia, TO Be ixri elvai <paive<rdai Be, eVet2 7rep TO evdvfxt]fxa auWoyMr/uios T K .
TOTTOI V ei<ri
ei<ri
TWV (paivofxevuiv evdvfxrjfxdTwv eh pev 6 Tcapa Trjv

ffls) and particular or qualified (KOTO TI, or irfi rj TTOV % irork fj irpos TI)
statements ; (3) iXtyxov ayvoia, ignoratio elenchi, " an inadequate notion
of confutation," Poste, "inscitiae eorum quae ad redarguendum pertinent,"
Waitz; (4) TO tv apxfi "Kapfiavciv, petitio principii, begging the question,
assuming the thing to be proved; (5) TO fir/ ainov us atnov riOivtu, " i n
ratione non recte reddita," Waitz, the assumption of not-cause for cause;
(6) irapa TO irroiievov, the assumption that antecedent and consequent
are always and reciprocally convertible: that if B follows A, A must
follow B. (The order of these two last is inverted in the explanation;
167 b I and 21.)
(7) TO ra dvo e'panj/xara iv TTOK'IV, to put two (or more)
questions as one, ' when it escapes observation that the question is not
one but several, and one answer is returned, as though it were one'. De
Soph. El. c. 5, 166 b 2027, where there is a summary enumeration of
them; and to the end of the chapter, 168 a 16, where they are explained at length and exemplified.
Of these (1) 6 (these two are the same only in namej see on 6 ) ;
(2) 9, 10; (5) 8; and (6) 7, occur also in the Rhetoric. c a-rjfielov, 5,
falls under the head of TO in-6/j.eva; de Soph. El. 167 b 8, ev re TOIS prjTopiKols al KOTO TO (njfifTov aitoftelêis in TSV iirofievav iWiv.
T h e remaining
three (3) (4) (7), are found only in the dialectical treatise. Brandis, u. s.
p. 22, expresses his surprise at the omission of these three, and thinks
that it argues the later date of the de Soph. EL; though of the priority
of the Topics there can be no doubt. Vahlen, Trans. Acad. Vien. Oct.
1861, p. 134, pronounces this to be very doubtful; and proceeds to argue
in favour of the earlier date of composition for both treatises. Besides
these we have the purely rhetorical topic of Sdvaa-is, aggravation, exaggeration, 4. The paradox or fallacy, HIKOS KCU TO jrapa TO (IKOS, or corm
TO ftfi eiKor tiVof, a n d also TO TOV TJTTCO ~koyov Kpelrra irouiv, both come
u n d e r t h e h e a d of iraph TO anhws Ka\ fit] anKSs, aXKa TI, N O . (2), 10.
1. eVel 8e Sexu] ' But seeing that besides the (real, genuine)
syllogism there may be another, which has only the semblance, not the
reality of it; so in the case of the enthymeme, there must necessarily be
two corresponding kinds, one real and the other not real, but only apparent, since the enthymeme is a kind of syllogism', conf. 1 i . u . The
enthymeme is a syllogism incomplete in form.See Introd. p. 103, note 1.
2. ' Topics of unreal enthymemes are, first, the fallacy that arises
from the language' (jrapa rrjv Aeii>, as Victorius also notes, is not
1
against', but' along of, Arnold's Thuc. I 141.9 ; likefim,' arising from',
' shewn in', as wapa Trjv 6/j.avvij.iav, 2, napa Trjv eWci^nv, 3, 9 ) ; ' a n d of
this one part (sort or kind),as in dialectics, to omit or evade the syllo
gistic process (that is, to assume without proof) and then in the terms of
a syllogistic conclusion to state the result, " therefore it is not so and so
PHTOPIKHS B 24 2.
303
\ej~ip, Kat TOVTOV eV fiev /nepo^,(w(nrep iv TOTS $iaXeKTitcoTs, TO firj (rvWoyKranevov (rvfX7repa(rfJLaTiKCd?
TO TeXevTaTov enreiv, OVK apa TO KO.1 TO, dvayKt] apa
T O Kal T o ' . l KGU T O TO?S evdvixrifxacri* T O
1
TO /tai TO, /col &> Tots ifBv/iriiiain
(Vahlen).
or
(the conclusion of an Fkeyxos syllogism of refutation of an opponent's

thesis) or, therefore necessarily so and so follows" (conclusion of a
demonstrative, constructive, syllogism);so in enthymemes (Rhetoric)
the enunciation of a concise, condensed, well-rounded or turned,
periodic' (owe oTpa/ijtevoor, Plat. Protag. 34 2 E : on 17 KaretrTpa/j/i/j'i; Xe(r,
Introd. p. 308 seq. on ill 9. 3) 'and antithetical sentence passes for an
enthymeme'. The completeness in the structure of the period, which
" like a circle returns into itself", its carefully balanced members, and its
antithetical epigrammatic character, have the effect of an argument and
supply to the deluded listener the lacking proof. The force of the
antithesis and epigram in conversation and discussion is too well known
to need further illustration. I have followed Vahlen, who has discussed
this sentence at lengt'.i in his paper, already referred to, zur kritik Arist.
Schrift. {Trans. Acad. Vien. Oct. 1861, pp. 1368), in removing the fullstop at TO Kai TO and reading KOI iv for KOI TO : or perhaps the simple
omission of TO would be sufficient. He apologises for the anacoluthon,
and the repetition of iv6vjir)fia at the end of the sentence, and proposes
two expedients for getting rid of them; unnecessarily as it seems to me :
accepting the two alterations, as I have done, the sense is perfect, and
the expression of it quite in character with the author's hasty and careless style. I pass over the attempted explanations of Vater and others.
Victorius has given the sense correctly, though his interpretation does not
adhere closely to his text. Bekker and Spengel leave the passage unaltered.
The words of de Soph. El. 15, 174 b 8 (comp. 18, 176 b 32), TO pA\iara ao(j)io~nKov (TVKo(f>avrrjfia T&V iptnTiovTav, TO firjhiv o-vWoyurafitvovs /xi)
(pwTijiia iroiciv TO TeXevrdiov, dXAa (TVfiirepavTiKas elireiv, cos cruXXeXoytu-^/-
vovs, OVK apa TO /cat TO, present an unusually close correspondence in

word as well as sense with this parallel passage of the Rhetoric: few I
think will agree with Brandis in supposing the dialectical treatise to be
the later of the two compositions.
' For such a style'this condensed and antithetical, periodic, style,
the style of Demosthenes and Isocrates,'is the proper seat of enthymeme'. x^Pa ^ e region or district, sedes, where enthymemes are to be
found; their haunt or habitat: precisely like TOJTOJ, locus, on which see
Introd. pp. 124, 5, and the quotations from Cic. and Quint. So Victorius,
"sedes et tanquam regio enth." It cannot possibly be 'form', as Vahlen
renders it, (if I do not misunderstand him,) u. s., p. 137, die dent Enth.
eigenthiimliche Form.
With the statement compare i n 9. 8, of antithesis, ifieia 8' ia-Av 17
TOiavri) Affif,...Km 6V1 eoiKe o-uXXoyioyiiS" o yap e\ey\os avvayayr) rav avTiiariv. Ill 18. 4> Ta ivdvu^/iara OTI fiaKio-ra o-vcrrpeffietv 8cT.
' A fallacy of this kind seems to arise from the fashion of (the style
304
PHTOPIKH2 B 24 2.
juevws Kai avTiKeifxevwi e'nrelv (paiverai iv6vfxr]fia' rj

yap TOiavTt] Xeîs X^Pa e o " r ' J / ev6vfxrnxaTO<5. Kai koine
TO TOIOVTOV eivai irapd TO <T")(r)ixa T?/S Xeêws.
eo~Ti
<ri ov
T0
Be els TO Trj Xeei <rvXXoyia-TiKcos Xeyeiv xp1 ^
<rvWoyiariuLwv 7roXXwv Ke(paXaia Xeyeiv, on TOVS
ecrwcre, TO7S B' erepois eTijULcopr](re, TOWS B'
tfXevdepcoo-ev' eKao~TOv fiev yap TOVTCOV e' aXXtov
direSe'i^St], (rvvTedevTwv Be (palverai Kai eK TOVTWV TI
ylyvea-dai.
ev Be TO Trapa TY\V ofuovv/uiiav, ftJs TO P- 105(pdvai o"7rovBaTov eivai fxvv, d(p' ou y' eo~riv r\ TI/JLICOof) 'language used', (,i. e. the periodical and antithetical construction of the
sentences). Such I think must be the interpretation of crxnô. T^S \ege<s,
though it differs in toto from the signification of the phrase in Top. (de
Soph. El.) 4, 166 b 10, the 6th of the verbal fallacies (see above). Vahlen,
u. s., points out this difference, which is sufficiently obvious. Nevertheless
Victorius identifies them. Both of them may no doubt be referred to the
head of fallacies of languagein its most general sense; but the dialectical topic is a mistake or misuse of the termination of single words, involving a confusion of categories; the rhetorical is an abuse of language
in a totally different application.
' For the purpose of conveying by the language the appearance of
syllogistic reasoning it is serviceable to recite (enumerate) the heads
(of the results) of many syllogisms (previous trains of reasoning); " some
he saved, and on the others he took vengeance, and the Greeks he set
at liberty'": (this is from Isocr. Evag. 659, as Spengel has pointed
out, Tract, on Rhel. in Trans. Bav. Acad. 1851, p. 22 note. Aristotle has
gathered into these three heads of the contents of Isocr.'s five sections.
The person of whom this is said is of course Evagoras, the hero of the
declamation. The same speech has been already referred to, 11 23. 12):
' for each of these points was already proved from something else, but
when they are put together, it seems as if some additional (<a[) conclusion might be drawn from them'.
K<pa\ma] heads of arguments, in a summary or recapitulation. Plat.
Tim. 26 C. Dem. Olynth. r 23 and the foil, de Symmor. 11, Ke(j>dXam TTJS Swafieas, followed by the enumeration of them. De falsa leg.
315, iirekdeiv eVi K(fta\aia>v.
cv fie TO wapa TIJI> ofiavv/iiav] The second topic of verbal fallacies:

probably including the dialectical afxôXla, 'ambiguous propositions'
fallacies of language which are not confined to single terms. 'One (fallacious argument) arising from verbal ambiguity; as to say that a mouse
is a thing of worth (a worthy and estimable creature)from it at least
the most valued (esteemed) of all religious rites is derived ; for the mysteries are of all religious rites most esteemed'. This is taken beyond all
doubt from Polycrates' panegyrical declamation, 'the Encomium of
PHTOPIKHS B 24 2.
305
Ta.Tt\ TTCKTWV TeAeTjj1 TO yap fxvcrTripia Tracrwv TI/J.IWTa.Tr] reAeTjj. tj e'i r t s Kvva eyKco/jiid^tov TOV ev
ovpavw (TVfXTrapaKanfidvei r\ TOV Yidva, OTI UivBapos
e(fir]crev
to [xdtcap, ov r e /JLeyaXas 6eov Kvva iravTOâirov
KaXeOVCTIV
'OXV/UL7TIOI.
r\ OTI TO /ULtjSeva eivai Kvva aTifxoTaTov "eo~Tiv, wave

mice', referred to in 6 : see the note there. The ambiguity from which
the fallacious inference is drawn is of course the assumed derivation
from fivs instead of fivetu. If mysteries are derivedfrom mice, how great
must be the honour due to the little animal. See Whately, ~~Logic, ch. v.
8, on ambiguous middle.
reXcn)] is a religious rite, and specially rites into which initiation
enters as a preparationmysteries; sometimes initiation alone. Athen.
B. 12, p. 40 D, TtXerar KaXoifiev rets ZTI peiôvs Kai pera. TWOS fiv(TTiK7)s
mtpa8oo-r iopras. Suidas, S. v., Ovaia fiv<rTJ]ptdSr]s TJ fieylo-TT] Kai Tipiaripa.
Hesychius, rektrai'
coprai, Bvtrlai, jxvarrjpia. Photius, Bvaia fivarrjpidSrjs.
Lobeck, Aglaophamus, Lib. II 8, Vol. I p. 304. Mystic rites, (Arist. Ran.

1032, Dem. c. Aristog. 11,) ascribed to Orpheus. Comp. Plat. Rep. 11.
635 A, ws apaXiitreis Ka\ Kadap/iol dSiKrjfiaTav 81a 6V<TIG>V K<X\ 7rat8tas jjfiovav ela\ /nei* ert ai<nv, tla\ 8e Kai Te\evrr)(ra(Tiv, as 81) TcXcras KaKovcriv, at
T&v eKt'i Kaxau airoXvoviTiv Tjfias' fir) Bvcravras 8e beiva mpifwvei.
This is
said of the Orphic and Musaean rites and mysteries and initiation into
them, but will apply equally to the Eleusinian, and all others which had
the same object and character. Comp. Protag. 316 D [and Isocr. Paneg.
28].
' Or if one in the encomium of a dog takes into the account the dog
in heaven (the dog-star)', KIKOV, as the star Sirius, the herald of the dogdays in summer, Horn. II. XXII 2729, d(TTep'...ov re KVV 'Qpiavos iirlK\T]<TIV KaXeovo-iv. Dem. c. Lacrit. 13, Arist. Hist. An. v m 15.9, eVl
KVVI, et alibi, as a mark of the season, like the Pleiads; also V7r6 Kvva,
liera Kvva, frepi Kvva, Arist. Theophr. al. Canis, canicula, Hor. Od. Ill
13. 9; Ep. I 10.16. Virg. Georg. I 218, Ovid, &c.
'Or Pan, because Pindar called him "the mighty mother (Cybele)'s
manifold dog"'. Pindar, Parthenia, Fragm. 6. " Pan optime in illo carmine audiebat, quo ante Magnae Matris, ubi eius statua, celebrabatur."
Bockh, ad Fragm. Pind., Op. II. 594. By ' Cybele's dog' Pindar meant
her faithful and constant attendant. This metaphor is converted by
some panegyrist of the animal into an argument in his favour, as if the
god Pan were really a distinguished member of that fraternity1.
fi OTI TO jirfhiua K.T.X.J The meaning of this is obscure. Victorius,
merely observing that this is another fallacious inference as to the value
of a dog, candidly admits that he cannot explain it. Schrader under1
Can the term 'dog' be applied to Pan, in reference to his character of ovium
cuslos, (Virg. Georg. I 17,) as a shepherd's dog? I suppose not.
AR. II.
2O
306
PHT0PIKH2 B 24 2.
Kvva $ij\ov on TI/JLIOV. Kal TO KOIVCOVIKOV (pavai

TOV 'Ep/Jifjp elvai fxdXicrTa TU>V 6edov /xows yap KCC\eiTai KOIVOS 'Ep/i^s. Kal TO TOV Xoyov elvai GTTOVV, OTt 01 dyaOol avdpes ov xprjpaTWV aWa
TO
stands it thus: " ne canem quidem in domo ali sordidum est. Ergo
canem esse honorificum est." He goes on to say that the equivocation
lies in the double meaning of KIXOV, dog and Cynic1. " Cynici enim philosophi Canes appellabantur, qui hac fallacia cognomen istud stium ornare
poterant." The argument is, ' T o have no dog at all is the highest
disgrace' (would this be accepted as probable?); 'therefore to be a dog
(in another sense, a Cynic,) is plainly a mark of distinction.'
'And to say that Hermes is the most liberal' (communicative of good
things to others (so Schrader); or 'sociable', communicative of himself,
superis dcorum grains et imis,) 'of all the gods; for he alone goes by
the name of Common Hermes'. The latter of the two interpretations
of Koivaviicov seems to be right, from the comparison of Polit. Ill 13,
1283 a 38, where justice is said to be a KOIVIOVIKTJ open;, y iracras avayKaiov duoKovOdv ray aWas. Eine der biirgerlicken gesellschaft we~
sentliche tugend, i. e. social, (Stahr). The fallacy lies in transferring the
special signification of KOIVOS in the proverb, and applying it in a general
sense to the character of the god.
KOIVOS 'Epfirjs] Hermes is the god of 'luck', to whom all cp/iaia, wind'
falls, lucky finds, pieces of good fortune, are due. When a man finds
anything, as a coin which has been dropt in the street, his companion
immediately puts in a claim to 'go halves', with the proverbial " Common Hermes", i. e. luck is common, I am entitled to share with you.
Theophr. Char. XXX, Kai evpicrKO/xevcav âXicaw iv rals odois V7r6 TOIV oiKelaiv
fifivor (o alaxpoKepdfjs) aTrairrjcrai TO pepos, KOIVOV dvai (pâas TOV 'Epixrjv.
Hesychius, KOO/OS '~Epp.rjs tVi TO>V KOIV?I Te eipL<TK.ovra>v. Plutarch, Phil, esse
cum princ. C. 2, dXX' d/iovcrict KOI aircipoicaklq. TOV Koiviv 'Ep/irjv (/jmoXmov
Kai ifijuaBov yeveadai (apud Erasm. Adag. Liberalitas, 'Communis Mercurius', p. 1144, ed. 1599), the god of gain, profit, luck, has ceased to be
as of old common and liberal, and has taken to commerce and mercenary habits. Lucian, Navig. 12 ; Adimantus had spoken of some golden
visions, to which Lycinus replies, OVKOVV TO Trpoxeiporarov TOVTO, Koivbs
'Ep/J-f/s, (pcuri, Kai is fie<rov Kararidei cpepnv TOV TrXovTnv (let me, as the proverb KOIVOS 'Epprjs h a s it, share your wealth), aiov yap airoXavo-ai TO pipos
tytKovs ovras. To be KOIVOS in this latter sense does not entitle a man or
god to the epithet KOIWVIKOS.
'And, to prove that words' (speech, rhetoric; this is probably taken

from an encomium on the art) ' are a most excellent, valuable thing; for
the reason that the proper reward of good men is, not money, but \6yos
(in the double sense of 'words', and 'consideration, estimation'; Xo-you
iroi(t<r6ai (?xf"') TWOS, iv oibevi \oya tlvai, et similia passim); 'for Xoyov
1
On this name as applied to Antisthenes, compare the epigram in Diog. Laert.
VI 1. 10, which interprets it thus, rbv piov rjada K6UV, 'Avrtadeves, de

ware Saneiv Kpa.Urjv ^fiaaiv ov arbjiiunv, and to Diogenes, VI 2. 60, 61.
307
Xoyov eicrtv apior TO yap Xoyov aîov ov% d7rXw$

3 Aeyerai.
a \ \ o s TO Siypri/uevov arui/Tidlvra Xeyeiv /;
TO crvyKei/jLevov StcupovvTct' eirel yap TCLVTOV Soxei
eivai OVK bv Tavrou TrpAAaVis, OTrorepou ^prjcriiucoTepov, TOVTO ZeT iroieTv. ecrn he TOUTO EvdvSqiuov Xo70s. oiov TO eihevai on Tpitiprj? ev Yleipaiel
aiov is an ambiguous, equivocal expression' (is used in more than one
sense).
3. <rvv6ris and 8ialpe<ns, ' wrong (fallacious) combination, composition, and disjunction, separation, in reading or speaking', which are
here taken together as one form of fallacy, are two in de Soph. El. c. 4,
165 b 26, Ib. 166 a 22, and 33. The solution of them is given in c. 20,
where "Euthydemus' argument" is also referred to, and thence no
doubt transferred hither.
'Another is, to pronounce in combination what is (properly, or is
intended to be) separated, or the reverse, the combined as separate : for
since it seems to be the same either way (when combined or separated,
'and it is in this appearance, and the advantage taken of it, that the fallacy lies), whichever of the two happens to be more serviceable, that
must be done'. 8ei does not here imply a moral obligation; it is not
intended to recommend the practice; the only obligation is that which is
imposed by the art; if you want to avail yourself of this unfair mode of
reasoning (which I don't say I approve, I am only stating what the art
requires), this is the way to proceed.
'This is Euthydemus' argument. For instance to know that a trireme is in the Piraeus, because he knows each (of two things which are
here omitted)'. This example, which is unintelligible as it stands here,
has some further light (or obscurity) thrown on it by the form in which it
occurs in de Soph. El. c. 20, 177 b 12, Kai 6 EvdvSijiiov 8e Xoyos, ap' ol&as a-v
vvv ov<ras iv Ueipaift rpir/peis ev Size'Klq &v; but in both much is left to be
supplied, the argument alluded to being supposed to be well known, and

in everyone's recollection. Schrader thus fills up the argument:What
you know, you know in the Piraeuswhere the two disputants were
standingthis is admitted: but you know also that there are triremes: this
also is conceded, because the respondent knows that the Athenians have
triremes somewhere; out at sea, or in Sicily, (referring to the expedition
of 415 B.C.): whence the conclusion, you know that there are triremes in
the Piraeus. The illicit combination {aivBea-is) in this interpretation
though Schrader does not explain it furthermust lie in the conjunction
of the Piraeus with the knowledge of triremes, to which it does not belong
in the respondent's interpretation of the question: and e/fatrrov will be
'each of these two pieces of knowledge, the knowledge of what is known
in the Piraeus, and of the triremes'. They are both known separately,
Euthydemus illicitly combines them.
This seems to be a reasonable explanation of the example so far as it
is given in the Rhetoric. But it seems quite certain that Aristotle is
202
308
PHTOPIKHS B 24 3.
eKaiTTOv yap
olfiev.
KCCI TOV TO. arTOiêla
fxevov OTi TO eVos olBev

Kai eirel
TO
Zh
vyieivov
eivai'
TO yap eTros TO avTO e<TTiv.
TOCTOVTOV
CLTOTTOV
vocrcoSes, ûjde
yap
ei
TO. BVO
TO
dyada
ev
ev
(pavai
nanov
quoting identically the same argument in de Soph. El. The triremes and
the Piraeus appear in both, and both are styled ~E.v6vbrni.ov \6yos, the
well-known argument of Euthydemus. Schrader, though he refers to the
passage, takes no account of the words ev "SiKekta <3v, which it seems must
have formed part of it. Victorius has endeavoured to combine both in
his explanation of the fallacyI am not at all sure that I understand it:
I will therefore transcribe it in his own words verbatim et litteratim.
" Tu scis te esse in Piraeo: quod concedebatur ipsi (the respondent), ac
verum erat. Scis triremes Atheniensium esse in Sicilia (miserant enim
eo classem ut earn insulam occuparent); id quoque non inficiabatur
qui interrogatus erat. Tu scis igitur (aiebat ille) in Piraeo triremes esse,
in Sicilia existens. Qua captione ipsum in Sicilia, scire triremes esse
in Piraeo cogebatur; cum eo namque, scire in Piraeo, coniungebatur
triremes esse: a quo remotum primo pronunciatum fuerat: ab illo vero,
in Sicilia, cum quo copulatum editum primo fuerat, disiungebatur: atque
ita efficiebatur ipsum, in Sicilia cum esset, scire in Piraeo triremes
esse. Quod vero hie adiungit %KO.<JTOV yap otdev : separatim scilicet utrunque nosse intelligit, se in portu Atheniensium' tune esse: triremesque
item in Sicilia. E quorum conglutinatione fallax ratio conflata, quae
inde vocata est irapa o-vvdeo-iv." By this must be meant, that the two
statements, existence or knowledge in the Piraeus, and knowledge of
triremes in Sicily, which ought to be kept separate, are combined in one
statement, and hence the fallacy: true separately, they are not true together. Whether this is a satisfactory version of Euthydemus' fallacy I
fear I must leave it to others to decide. My principal difficulty is as to
the mode of transition from the Piraeus to Sicily in the two first propositions, which as far as I can see is not satisfactorily accounted for.
What is there to connect the 'knowing that you are in the Piraeus', or
'knowing in the Piraeus', with knowing or being in Sicily? And yet
there must be some connexion, apparent at least if not real, to make the
fallacy plausible. This is nevertheless Alexander's solution of it. Comm.
ad Top. 177 b 12, TOV Se \6yov ljpdra 6 'EvduSrjij.os ev neipaiet rvyxavwv, ore
al T&V 'A6r)vaiov Tprfpeis els SmeXiav r/Xdov. earn Se ?; TOV croîV/iaror aycoyi)
ToiavTT]. " apa ye crv vvv ev TLeipaiel el; vat. ap' oiSar ev SiKeXi'a Tpirjpeis
ovo-as; vat. apa olSas eru vvv ovo-as ev Ueipaiet Tprfpets ev SixeXi'a &v,-" napa
rrjv o~iv8ecnv TO ao(plcrii.a.
However this may be, at any rate, if Plato's
dialogue is to be trusted, there is no kind of fallacy however silly, transparent, and contemptible, of which Euthydemus and his partner were
incapable; and the weight of authority, notwithstanding the utter want
of sense, must decide us to accept this explanation.
Of Euthydemus, and his brother and fellow-sophist Dionysodorus,
contemporaries of Socrates, nearly all that we know is derived from
Plato's Euthydemus. They had studied and taught the art military,
PHTOPIKHS B 24 3 .
309
/j.ev ovv e\e<yKTiKov, wSe Se deiKTiKow

01) yap icrTiv tv dyadou dvo natta.
6'A.os Se 6 TOTTOS
iraXiv TO Ylo\VKpd.TOVS ets Qpaarv-
6<TTIV.
OVTW
V,
OTl
TpMlKOVTOL
TVpOLVVOVS KCCTeXvCTeW
(TVV-
and the forensic branch of Rhetoric, Euthyd. 273, c. D, before entering at

an advanced age upon their present profession, viz. that of ipum/ci}, the
art of sophistical disputation, and of universal confutation, by which they
undertook to reduce any opponent whatsoever to silence. Many examples of their mode of arguing are given in the Platonic dialogue, but
Aristotle's instance does not appear among them. See also Grote's
Plato, on Euthydemus, Vol. 1., ch. xix. The fallacies are exemplified
from the dialogue, p. 545 seq. And on Euthydemus and his brother,
also Stallbaum's Disp. de Euth. Plat, prefixed to his edition of the dialogues, p. 10 seq. (Ed. i).
An example of illicit combination is given in the irepl 'Ep/jajveias, the
treatise on the proposition or elementary combination of words, c. 11,
p. 20 b 35, dXX' ovxh
' (TKVTeiis Kai dyaBos, KCU ITKVTCVS dyados.
cl yap, on
tKarepov aXr/des, eivai Set Kai TO trwa-pupat, iroKKa Kai arona ta~Tai.
' Another example is that one that knows the letters, knows the whole
verse; for the verse is the same thing (as the letters, or elements, of
which it is composed)'. The reason given, TO HTOJ TO avro io-riv, contains
the fallacy. It assumes that the things combined are the same as they
are separate; which is not true.
'And (thirdly) to argue, that since twice a certain amount (of food
or a drug) is unwholesome, so must also the single portion be : for it
is absurd to suppose that if two things separately are good, they can when
combined unite into one bad'. If the two parts together are unwholesome,
neither of them can be wholesome separately, because the combination
of two good things can never make one bad, This is a fallacious confutation ; of a physician, may be, who is recommending the use of a
drug. You say that your drug is wholesome : now you only administer
a certain quantity. Suppose you were to double it, you would not say
that it was wholesome then: but if the two parts together are unwholesome, how can either of them, the component elements being precisely
the same in each, be wholesome? two wholesomes could never make an
unwholesome. Here the undue combination of the double with the
single part produces the fallacy (so Victorius).
'Used thus, it serves for refutation, but in the following way for
proof (this is, by inverting the preceding): because one good thing cannot
be (made up of) two bad'. If the whole is good, then the two parts,
which is not always true. 'But the entire topic is fallacious': in whichever
way it is applied (Victorius).
'And again, what Polycrates said in his encomium of Thrasybulus,
that he put down thirty tyrants: for he puts them all together'. This
again, which without further elucidation would not be altogether intelligible, is explained by two notices in Quintilian, i n 6. 26, VII 4. 44.
As an illustration of the argument from number, he gives this, An
Thrasybulo triginta firaemia debeantur, qui tot tyrannos sustuleritf
3 id
PHT0PIKH2 B 24 3, 4-
rtdtja-i yap.
n TO eu 'Opea-rri rtp QeoSeKTOV e'/c
Statpeo-ewz ydp icrTiv.

Ziicaiov ecrriv, t) r t s av Kreivrj TTOCTIV,
diroQvY](TKeiv ravrriv, teal Trarpi ye Tip-wpeiv rou
vlov 0vK.0vvK.al nravra 7T7rpaKTar arvvredevra yap P. 1401 b.
i'crws ovKeri dUaiov. et'jj ' av Kai irapa. Tt\v eWeiyfsiV
4 d(baLpelTai yap TO VTTO T'IVOS. aAAos Se TO7ros TO oetvwcrei KaTao-Kevdêiv t] dvacKevdêiv.
TOVTO 0 i
OTav, [xri deltas OTI e7roit](rev, avr](rri TO
Whence it appears that Polycrates had argued that he deserved thirtyrewards for his services, one for each tyrant that he had expelled ; an
illicit combination. Spalding ad loc. III. 6, " H o c videtur postulasse
Polycrates, qui dixit:" quoting this passage. On Polycrates see 6, infra.
'Or that in Theodectes' Orestes, for it is a fallacy of division : " I t
is just for her that slays her husband" to die, and for the son to avenge
his father: and accordingly this is what has actually 1 been done: (but
this is a fallacy) for it may be that when the two are combined, (the
sum-total) is no longer just'. Orestes, being the son of her that had
slain her husband, was no longer the right person to take vengeance
on his murderer.
On the use of OVKCTI, the opposite of ^SJ;, 'not now
as before, in former cases', see note on I I. 7, ^617, ovirui, oiniri.

On Theodectes of Phaselis, see note on 11 23.3, and the reff. Also compare the topic of that section with this example from his Orestes, which
in all probability is there also referred to. This passage of Aristotle is
cited by Wagner, Fragm. Trag. Grace. Ill 122, without comment, as the
sole remaining specimen of Theodectes' Orestes.
'This may also be explained as the fallacy of omission; for the (person)
by whom (the deed was done) is withdrawn'. Had it been stated 'by
whom' the vengeance was inflicted, the injustice of it would have been
apparent. It is stated generally, the particular circumstances which
falsify the statement in this case being omitted, napa rf/v eXKeiyjnv is
explained in 9, TTJV'iXKei^nvTOV nore Kai nu>s, the omission of time and
circumstances, which falls under the more general head of TO mr\a>s
Kai firj airXSs, 10, an unqualified, instead of qualified statement. It
occurs also in 7.
4. 'Another topic (of fallacious reasoning) is exaggeration, 8eivatnsespecially the excitement of indignation contrasted with SXEOI, II
21. 10, ill 19. 3in construction or destruction (of a thesis or argument).
Haec est ilia quae SeiVaxru vocatur: rebus indignis asperis, invidiosis,
addens vim oratio. Quint. VI 2. 24. Ernesti, Lex. Technologies Graecae,
s. v. dvaoKevafciv and KaTao-Kevafciv, are technical terms distinguishing the
1
A c and three other MSS have OVKOW Kai ravra. KOX iriirpaKTai. Spengel,
ed. 1867, rightly puts the first in brackets and retains the second, which I have
followed in the translation.
PHTOPIKHS B 24 4 ) 5.
7roiel yap (paivecdai
wv
ex
yopwv
opyityiTctt.
yiêrai
r\ w's ov 7re7ro//Kej/, orav
aiTiav
v%*j> *l
ws
7re7roiriKei/,
OTCIV
OVKOVV <TTIV ivdvfXtJiAcf
6 Ttjv
6
TrapaXo- P- '<>-
yap 6 aKpoa.Tt]<s OTL 7roir](rev t] OVK eTro'iY](revi
5 ov (HecSeiyiuevov. aAAo? TO BK (rrjjue'tow

yap Kal
311
TOVTO.
oiov e'i TZS Xeyot
<pepovo~iv 01 epwvTes'
d<ruW6yia'T0v
" Tafe 7r6\e<n o~v[A-
6 yap 'ApfxoSiou
Kac 'ApicrTO-
two kinds of syllogisms and enthymemes, the destructive or refutative

iXeyKTLKol, and the constructive or demonstrative SeucriKoi, dwofciKTiicoi: as
Karao-Kevageiv is to establish something which you undertake to prove, and
leads to a positive conclusion, so dvacrKtvafciv or avmpdv (a term of the
same import) is to break down or destroy, upset, subvert, an adversary's
thesis or conclusion, by refuting it, and so leads to a negative conclusion.
Karaa-Kcvaa-riKa of enthymeme,
II 26. 3.
'This means to amplify, heighten, intensify, exaggerate (a species

of the general topic avêiv KM finovf, amplification and depreciation, the
fourth of the KOIVOI TOTVOI. Introd. p. 129, comp. 11 26. 1), the fact or act
alleged (usually a crime), without any proof of its having been committed : for it makes it appear, either that it has not been done' (read ov
for OVT, with Bekker and Spengel), 'when the party accused (or inculpated)
employs it ; or that the accused is guilty when the accuser grows angry
(works himself into a fit of virtuous indignation)'. This might seem
to confine the topic to accusation and defence in the forensic branch,
and no doubt it is in this that it is most useful and most usual; and
also this is its most appropriate sphere as a fallacious argument: still
as a species of one of the KOIVOI TOTTOI it must needs be applicable to the
other two branches, and in fact in all invectives, and in epideictic

oratory, it is essential. Its appropriate place in the speech is the cnlXoyoj or peroration, III 19. 1, 3.
' Accordingly it is no (true) enthymeme, for the listener falsely concludes (assumes) the guilt or innocence (alleged) though neither of them
has been proved'. This is of course a purely rhetorical topic.
5. 'Another fallacy is derived from the use of the ' s i g n ' : for
this also leads to no real conclusion {proves, demonstrates, nothing)'.
On the sign and its logical character and value, see Introd. pp. 1613^
and the paraphrases of Rhet. I 2.1518, Ibid. pp. 1635.
In the Topics, fallacies from the sign are noticed as the form which
fallacies of consequence assume in Rhetoric, ev TC TOIS pijTopiKois ai Kara
TO prjfie'iov a7ro5ctîs e/c TWV ZTTopevov flail*.
D e Soph. El. c. 5J *^7 b 8.
'As for instance if one were to say, "Lovers are of service to states;
for it was the love of Harmodius and Aristogeiton that put down (put
an end to) the tyranny of Hipparchus'". This is a mere apparent sign
or possible indication of a connexion between love and the putting down
of tyranny: there is no necessary consequence; it is not a reKfirjpiov,
a conclusive sign, or indication : no general rule of connexion can be
established between them, from which we might inferwithout fallacy
312
PHT0PIKH2 B 24 5,6.
yeirovos epws KareXvo-e TO/' Tvpavvov ''\inrap-)(ov.

irovripo's
r\ el TIS \eyoi oVt /CACTI-T^S Aiovvaw
yap'
davWoyiCTTOV yap Kal TOVTO' OV yap 7ras
7rovr]p6<s /cAe7TT7?, a'AA' 6
KA67TT7S
7ras
6 aAAos $ia TO GVjjLfiefir\Kos, olov b \eyei
Trovnpos.
Ho\vicpa~
that the one would always, or for the most part, follow the other. Herein
lies the difference between the dialectical consequence and the rhetorical
sign. The converse of thisfrom the governor's point of viewis
argued by Pausanias in Plato's Symp. 182 C. Ov yap, ol/mi, o-vp<pipei
TOLS apxoviri.(j)i\ias
Ifrxvpas Kal Koivavtas (iyyiveaBaC)' 6 Si} fiaKiara (piKei
ra re aWa rravra Kal o, i'pns ipiroielv. 'dpya fie TOVTO e/iadov Kal oi cv6a.de
Tvpavvoi' 6 yap 'ApioroyeiVoyos epais Kal 'Ap/iobiov <pi\ia /3f/3aior yevofievr]
KaTe\vo-(V avrwv TT\V dpx^v. VictoriuS.
' Or again, if one were to say, (it is a sign) that Dionysius (Dionysius,
like Socrates and Coriscus, usually, in Aristotle, here represents anybody, men in general) is a thief, because he is a bad man : for this again
is incapable of demonstration ; because every bad man is not a thief,
though every thief is a bad man'. The consequence is not convertible.
'O 8e irapa TO iiTOjxevov tXtyxps
8ia TO olfo-Bai dvTio-Tpe(peiv TTJV aKoXov-
6r)(rtv, (the fallacy in this topic arises from the assumed convertibility of
the consequence), de Soph. El. 5, 167 b 1. In the uncertain sign, antecedent
and consequent are never reciprocally convertible, the converse does not
follow reciprocally, and therefore the sign is always liable to be fallacious.
On the different kinds of consequences, see Anal. Pr. I c. 27, 43 b 6, seq.
6. ' Another, the fallacy of accident'. This is not the same fallacy
as that which has the same name in the Topics, the first of the fallacies
?ci> TTJS Xiêtos, de Soph. El. c. 5, 166 b 28 ; "Fallacies of accident are
those that arise from the assumption that the same things are predicable
alike of the thing itself (TO npayfia, i.e. the logical subject, TO inroKeiixevov).
For whereas the same subject has many accidents, it is by no means
necessary that all that is predicable of the former should also be
predicable of the latter." White is an accident, or predicable, of the
subject, man : it is by no means true that all that can be predicated of
man can also be predicated of white. The confusion of these, the sub.
stitution of one for the other, gives rise to the fallacy. The example
is the following:A Sophist argues that because Socrates is not Coriscus,
and Coriscus is a man, Socrates is not a man. Man is the subject, and
Socrates and Coriscus are both predicates, attributes, or accidents of
man. And if we substitute 'name' for ' man' in the proposition ' Coriscus
is a man', the argument vanishes. But both the examples here are instances of accident for cause, and not for subject, which is no doubt a
more suitable application of it for rhetorical purposes.
The first example is taken from Polycrates' encomium on mice, quoted
above without the name, 2. One of his topics in praise of them was
"the aid they lent by gnawing through the bow-strings." Something
similar to this is narrated by Herodotus, 11 141 (Schrader), but the
circumstances do not quite tally. Sennacherib king of the Arabians and
PHT0PIKH2 B 24 6.
313
ets TOI)S [Jivs, on ifior'idricrav StaTpayovres

vevpds. fj el Tt? (pair] TO eVt Zeiirvov K\ridfji/ai
TCLTOV Zia <ydp TO [XY\ K\r\Q?)vai 6 'A^tAAei)
ras
Assyria invaded Egypt with a great host, when Sethos the priest was
king. The god appeared to him in a dream with promises of succour
against the invaders. " A flood of field-mice poured over the enemy by
night, which devoured their quivers and bows, and besides, the handles
of their shields, so that on the following day, flying without arms,
many of them fell," &c. At all events, wherever the incident was taken
from, Polycrates meant to praise the mice for some service they had
rendered by gnawing the bow-strings : now this service was a mere
accident : their intention was, not to do service, but only to satisfy their
appetite (Victorius). Polycrates' fallacy therefore consists in assigning as
a vera causa what was only accidental. I do not see how this can be
construed as a confusion of subject and accident. And so Victorius in his
explanation; "quia quod casu evenit tamquam propter se fuisset sumitur V
Of the declamations of Polycrates, who has been already twice mentioned or referred to, the most celebrated were the dirdkoyla Bovo-lpidos, a
paradoxical defence of Busiris a mythical king of Egypt, proverbial for
inhumanity, illaudatus Busiris, Virg. Georg. ill 4 ; and an equally paradoxical <ari]yopia'2<oKpaTovs, Isocr. Busir. 4 (this speech is addressed to
Polycrates). He was also famous for his declamationsparadoxical again
on mean and contemptible subjects, as mice, pots (x^TPas)i counters,
(Menander ap. Spengel, Artium Scriptores, p. 75,) which he employed his
art in investing with credit and dignity. The paradoxical, napaboôv, is
one of the four kinds of cyKa/iLa, Menander jrepi inihei.KTitt.av II 1. He may
possibly have been the author of the similar declamations on ' salt' and
'humble bees'2, referred to, without the author's name, by Plat. Symp.
177 B, Isocr. Helen. 12, Menand. nepl iirtSetKTtKav {Rhet. Gr. ill 332.26,
ed. Spengel). Similar paradoxical declamations of Alcidamas, TO TOV
QavaTOV iyn.dp.iov, rj TO Trjs Hivias,
fj TOV Hpa>Tea>s TOV KVVOS.
M e n a n d . ircpl
fTriSeiKT-iKcoj' II I {Rhet. Gr. ill p. 346). Quint, ill 7. 28, somtii et mortis
scriptae laudes, et quorundam a medicis ciborum. It might have been
supposed that these ingenious exercises were intended for burlesques,
were it not that Aristotle by quoting arguments from them shews that
they had a serious purpose. Further on Polycrates, see Spengel, Artium
Scriptores,pp. 75,6; Westermann, Geschichte der Gr. u. R. Beredtsamkeit,
50,22; Cambr. Journ. o/Cl. and Sacred Phil. No. ix, Vol. ill. p. 281 seq.
1
This seems to be the true interpretation; Aristotle has here left it open by
not defining the topic. But if this absence of defin. be understood as a tacit
reference to the de Soph. El., and we desire to bring the examples here into conformity with the explanation of the topic there, we may understand TJ wpdyp.a in
that passage, not as the logical subject, but as 'thing' in general, and say that the
fallacy of the examples in the Rhetoric lies in the substitution of a mere accident
for the thing in question, i.e. the real thing, the reality; as in that of the mice, the
accidental service, for the real appetite: and in Achilles' case, the accidental neglect
to invite, for the real disrespect that it implied.
2
[Comp. Lucian's p.via.% iyKdfiiov. Blass, however, explains $op.j3i\uu, as Art
Trinkgefasse (see Bekker's Anecd., s. v. and comp. x"TPa!i supra)].
3H
PHTOPIKHX B 24 6, 7.
TO?S 'A^ceio?? eV Tei/e'SftT o S' ws ccTifJLaôfxevos e

7 crei/, (jvvk$r\ de TOVTO iiri TOV /nrj KXridfjvai. aAAos TO
TO 7r6fxevov, oiov iv TW 'A\edv$p(p, o n
Comp. Ib. No. v, Vol. 11. p. 158, note. Sauppe, Fragm. Orat.Gr., Polycrates,
Or. Att. ill 220. [Also Blass, die Attische Beredsamkeit, II pp. 341, 342-]
' Or if one were to say that an invitation to dinner is the highest
possible honour; because it was the want of an invitation which excited
Achilles' wrath against the Achaeans at Tenedos: his anger was really
excited by the disrespect, the non-invitation (the form or mode of its
manifestation) was a mere accident of it'. eVi TOV 'on the occasion, in
the case of. This is a fallacious inference (drawn either by Arist. himself,
or, more likely, by some declaimer) from an incident in a play-of Sophocles, the subject of which was this (Wagner, Fr. Trag. Gr., Soph., 'Kxaimv
SuXXoyor, Vol. 11. p. 230, from Welcker):The Greeks on their way to
Troy had put in at the island of Tenedos to hold a council as to the best
way of attacking the city. Achilles would not attend at the meeting,
having taken offence at the neglect, and presumed slight or contempt, of
Agamemnon in not inviting him, either not at all, or after the rest, to an
entertainment. There are two extant titles of plays by Sophocles, the
'AxaiSv ovXKoyos, and 'Axcuaiv (rvvSznrvov, or o-vvSeiwvot, Plutarch, de discr.
adul. et amici, 74 A, Vol. 1. p. 280, ed. Wytt. as 6 irapa SoôxXei TOV
'Ax'XXea 7rapovva>v 'Obv(ro-evs ov <tyr\<iiv cpyiar8ai 81a TO beinvov
K.T.X.,
citing three verses from the play (Ulysses had been sent with Ajax and
Phoenix to Achilles to make up the quarrel). Comp. Athen. I. p. 17 D,
2o$. iv 'Axaiav o-vv8elnva>, where four lines are quoted; and VIII 365 B,
TO 2o(j>. 8pafia...i7riypd(j>tv diovo-i 'S.vvbzmvav. Cic. ad Quint. F r . II 16,
"Svvhf'nrvovi 2o<. Dindorf, Fragm Soph. (Poet. Sc.) p. 35, following Toup,
Brunck, and Bockh, supposes these two titles to belong to the same play,
a satyric drama(Dind.). Wagner after Welcker {Trag. Gra.ec. pp. 112 and
233) shews that they were distinct, the 'A-xaiav o-vXKoyos founded on the
story above mentioned, the other 'Axm<3i o-vvftenvvav, or simply crvvSeiwvov
or o-ivbemvoi, derived from the Odyssey, and descriptive of the riot and
revelry of the suitors in Penelope's house. See Wagner, Fr. Trag. Gr.,
Soph., Vol. 11. pp. 230 and 380. The case of two distinct dramas is, I think,
made out.
7. 'Another from consequence', i.e. from the unduly assumed
reciprocal convertibility of antecedent and consequent: just as in the
'sign' (q. v.), between which and this there is no real difference. As we
saw in 5, in the de Soph. El. the sign is spoken of as the rhetorical
variety of the general topic of consequence: and they ought not to be
divided here.
'As in the Alexander', i.e. Paris; a declamation of some unknown
author, already referred to, c. 23 5, 8, 12; (it is argued) 'that he is
high-minded, because he scorned the society of many' {quaere T5>V TTO\Xwu'of the vulgar') 'and dwelt alone in Ida': (the inference being that)
'because such is the disposition of the high-minded, therefore he might
be supposed to be high-minded.' This is a fallacy, or logical flaw, as
Schrader puts it, " quia universalem affirmantem convertit sitnpliciter, et
PHT0PIKH2 B 24 7.
315
' uTrepidwu yap Trjv TTOWWV dfJuXiav ev Trj

KCC6' avTOV OTI yap ol
fieya\6\frvôi
TOIOVTOI, KCCI OI)TOS fieya\6^fW%o'z hopeiev av.
Kal
e7rei KaAAa>7rta"Tjs Kal vvKTcop irXavaTai, ûorôV TOIOVTOI yap.
bjJLOiov Ze Kal OTI iv -rots iepols ol WTWÔI
i acJovo-L Kal op-ôvvTai, Kal OTI TOIS (pvydcriv epoiKeiv OITOV av deXwcriv OTI yap TOTS ZOKOVGIV
virdpêi TavTa, Kal oh TavTa vTrdpêi,
av evdai/moveTv. SiaCpipei de TO 7rws# $10 Kal
quia in secunda figura concludit affirmative." Or rather, as this is an
illicit consequence, because here antecedent and consequent are not
reciprocally convertible : it does not follow, even supposing that all highminded men dwell apart from others, that all lonely-dwellers are highminded men: and to say that so and so, anybody whatsoever, is highminded for that reason and that alone, is as much as to say that the rule
is universal.
'And again (to argue) that so and so is a dandy and roams at night,
and therefore a rake, because such are the habits of rakes'. This, as
before, is to say that because (supposing it to be so) all adulterers are
smartly dressed and walk at night, therefore all smart dressers and
night-walkers are adulterers. This appears also as an example of the
sign, the rhetorical form of the topic TO inofievov, de Soph. El. c. 5,167 b 9,
(iov\6[ievoi yap delicti OTI ^toiôy, TO enofjLevov e\a[$0Vj OTI KaWaTTKXTrjs ^ oTt
vvKTcop oparai ifkavdfievos.
[See infra III 15- 5-J
KaWwrno-T^s] Plato Sympos. 174 A. Socrates (going out to dinner)

ravra
817 eVaXX<B?ri(ra/x?)j', tva KaXos Ttapa Kakbv 'La.
' And another (argument), similar to these (for exalting the condition
of poverty and exile), is that beggars sing and dance in the temples,
and that exiles are allowed to live where they please': because, these
things (enjoyments) being the ordinary accidents or concomitants of
apparent happiness, those who have them may also be supposed to be
happy'. Here again there is an illicit conversion of antecedent and
consequent: if singing and dancing, or living where one pleased, were
coextensive with happiness, the inference would be true and the two
convertible. As it is, it does not follow that, because these are indications of happiness, or often accompany (follow) it, all men that sing
and dance, or can live where they please, are necessarily happy. This
is taken from one of those paradoxical encomiums of poverty and exile
to which Isocrates refers, Helen. 8, tjBrj TIM'S...TOA/XCSCTI ypa<peiv, as
<TTIV 6 TG3V <7TTO>^v6vTaV
KOt (ficVyOVTtOl* /3iO? faXcOTOTtpOS Tf) TKtV ahXotV O.V
Bpamav ; such as Alcidamas' nevias iynwiuov cited above from Menander

on 6. [For an anoXoyia Ilevias see Arist. Plutus, 467597, in the course
of which a distinction is drawn between nevia and nr<B^cia, 5524.]
dia(pepi Se nws' 816 K.T.X.] 'But there is a difference in their manner
of doing these; and therefore this topic falls under the head of omission,
316
PHT0PIKH2 B 24 8.
eis TI\V e\Aet\[siv e/unr'nrTei. aXAos irapd TO dvaiTiov

TO
eJs aiTioVy oiov TU> a/mct rj /jLerd TOVTO yeyovevar
ydp fxeTa. TOVTO WS &a TOVTO Aafx(3dvovo~i, nal fxa01 ev TCUS iroXiTeiai^, oiov ftJs 6 A>;/xa<$js Trjv
as well as (u) that of TO eirifievov'. Beggars and exiles do what appear
to be the same things as the wealthy and prosperous, they dance and
sing in the temples and sacred precincts, and change their place of
residence at their pleasure : but there is a difference in the mode and
motive of doing these things, which is omitted; and the omission when
supplied explains the fallacy. The beggars dance and sing in the
temples to amuse the visitors and obtain an alms ; the wealthy and prosperous out of wantonness or exultation, to shew that they have the
liberty of doing what is forbidden to humbler people (so Victorius, and
Schrader who borrows his note : these may however be mere signs of
happiness in the evSaifioves). And again, the exiles are obliged to live
abroad, and would gladly be at home again ; the wealthy and prosperous
travel for change of scene, to satisfy their curiosity, or (like Herodotus
and Plato) their desire of knowledge. The eXKeiijfis is here of TO nas,
as in 3, ult. of iVo TWOS, and in 9, of wore and ir&s, which in each case
may be applied to explain the fallacy.
8. This section, aXKos irapa TO avainovo-vviî] 6 Trokcfios, is quoted
by Dionys. Ep. ad Amm. c. 12 with no other variation from our text than
the omission of oiov before as.
The fallacy here illustrated is the familiar post hoc ergo propter hoc;
the assumption of a mere chronological sequence as a true cause : to
mistake a mere accidental connexion of the order of time, for one of
cause and effect. It is the rhetorical application, and only one variety,
of the wider and more general topic of the dialectical treatise (de Soph.
El. c. 5, 167 b 21) non-causapro causa, in dialectical argumentation.
'Another from the substitution of what is no cause for (the true)
cause ; for instance (this substitution takes place) by reason of the
occurrence of something contemporaneously or subsequently (to that
which is presumed to account for it): for it is assumed that what merely
follows (in time) is the effect of a cause, and especially by politicians;
as Demades, for instance, pronounced Demosthenes' policy to be the
cause of all their calamities ; because it was after it that the war (with
Philip, and the defeat of Chaeronea) occurred'. Victorius refers to a
similar charge of Aeschines, c. Ctes. 134, Ka\ Taiff ^y.1v o-vix^r)Kev
( OTOV At]fioo-8evr)s 7rpbs Trjv iroXiTeiav Trpoa-eKri'Kvdev, compare 136, army
and navy and cities, apdtjv daiv dvr^pnao-jiivai e'/c rijs TOVTOV iroXirelas.
Dinarch. c. Dem. 12, 13.

This is the only place in which the name of Demosthenes appears
in Aristotle's Rhetoric. See on this subject Introd. pp. 45,6, and note 2.
In II 23. 18, a few words of his are quoted, but without the author's
name. The Demosthenes mentioned in m 4. 3 is probably not the
great Orator.
On Demades and his remains, see Sauppe, Fragm. Orat. LII Demades
Or.Att. in 312 seq.
'
PHT0PIKH2 B 24 9.
317
rrroXiTe'iav 7rdvTWV TWV KCIKWV aiTiav'

e.Kelvr\v yap <rvve(3rj 6 7roAe/xos. aAAos irapd TY\V
J
TOV Trore teal 7rws, olov OTI Sirca/cus '
avtipos e\af3e TY\V 'EAeyjjir a'ipecris yap avrrj

Kapa TOV TraTjOo's. ou yap del 'icrw<s, d\\d TO irpwTOV' Kal ydp 6 7raTrjp pexpi TOVTOV Kvpios.
n e'l r t s P. 1402.
<paln TO TVTTTeiv TOUS e\ev6epovs vfipiv ehar ov ydp
9. 'Another from the omission of when and how'1; a particular
case, like those of 3, and 7, of the following topic irapa TO arfkas KCU.
ixri an-XaJs ; a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter; the omission of
particulars in the way of exceptions to a general statement, as time,
place, manner, circumstances. 'For example, that Paris had a right
to take Helen ; for the choice was given her by her father (Tyndareus,
the choice viz. of one of the suitors, whichever she preferred)'. Eur.
Iph. Aul. 66, rel 8' emcrT<Sdr)trav, ev 84 Trios yipav virijXSev avrovs TvvSapeas TTVKVJI (ppevi, Sibcotr' ekcardai 8vyarp\ \s.vr\<TTr\pa>v era (Victorius). T h e
whole story of 'Helen's choice', and the sequel, is told by Agamemnon,

Iph. Aul. 49 seq., in his speech at the opening of the play, which serves
for the prologue.
But this is a fallacy ; 'for (the choice was granted) not it may be
supposed (lo-ar) for ever, but only for the first time : for in fact the
father's authority only extends so far'. Helen, acting upon her father's
permission, chose Menelaus ; 17 8' d\ed' ws ye firjiror toêXev \afieiv
MeveXaov, Iph. A. 70 ; and here, at this Jirst choice, her father's authority
and her own right to choose ended. The fallacy therefore consists in
the 'omission' of the particular time, TOV noTe ; she generalized the
time of choice from the particular time to all time; and therefore Paris
was not 'justified' in taking her.
'Or again, if one were to say, that to strike a free man is an act of
vfipis (wanton outrage, liable to a yparprj, a public prosecution): for it
is not so in every case (ndvrcos = dn-Xcos), but only (Kara n) when the
striker is the aggressor'. This of course makes all the difference in
the nature and legal construction of the offence. If the blow is returned,
it may be regarded as an act of self-defence ; the insulting wantonness,
the injury to the sufferer's honour and personal self-respect, is shewn
in the wanton aggression,
av TIS TVITTT] TWO. cprjo-iv (6 VOJXOS), apâtv xelP<nv
ddUav, <r, e'l ye yfiivaxo, ov< a8ei. Demosth. c. Aristocr. 50.

apxeiv xeiptov aSUav is to strike the first blow, to give the offence.
The phrase assumes various forms. Rhet. ad. Alex. 36 (37) 39, o-vviKoyj/ds fxov TOV vlov f eyo)ye ahiKOiV êtpwv apôvra. Isocr. KtiTa Aoîrov I,
erviTTC fie AOÎVIJS apxcov x*lPv aSiiaav. Xen. Cyrop. I 5- l3; Antiph.
TfTpaKoyla T. Or. 4, /3 I, and 6, ap|as TTJS nXrjyrjs. êipwj/ is sometimes

omitted, Bos, Ellips. p. 301, (527, ed. Schafer) ; sometimes abUav, Plat.
Legg. IX. 869D, apx- xelP^v irpoTepov. Herodotus has vnapxeiv dSiKav i'pyav,
I 5 ; and various similar phrases, IV 1. VII 8. 2, and 9 a, IX 78 ; also
ap\ei.v dfitKi'i/s et sim. Ill 130, &c. vnapxeiv alone, Plat. Gorg. 456 E,
318
PHTOPIKHS B 2 4 I O .
IO TrdvThi'z, d\\' orav dp^rj êipcop ddiKwu. CTI wcnrep p. 107.

ev TO?S ipitTTiKOis irapd TO a7rAws tcai fxrj aTrAaJS,
a'AAa TI, yiyverai
(paivo/uievos (rvX\oyi<Tfx6is, oiou ev
f n
ji.fi virapxovTas. Stallbaum et Ast, ad Legg. 1. c. Also ap
alone ; Arist. Hist. Anim. IX. 12. 3, KOL TOV derov, iav apt]rai, djj.vvoii.evoi
viicaariv (oi KVKVOI).
10. iu rois ipio-TiKois]. See note on I 11.15, where the meaning of

this as a technical term is illustrated from the de Soph. El. ra ipia-riKa
here designates a book or treatise; the fallacious, sophistical reasoning
exposed in the ninth book of the Topics; just as TO. diaXexriKa stands for
the dialectical treatise, including (as below), or not including, the appendage on Fallacies. The subject of the de Soph. El. is described as
nepl rav dyiovi<TTi<av Kal ipio-riKwv, 165 b IO.
ipioriKri there, c. 2, is first
distinguished from the three other kinds of 'discussion', SiSao-KoKiicj

(science), StaXeKrtKi/', and neipao-riKij, a branch of the latter; and the ipitrTiKoi are defined, oi K T&V (pmvofieva>v iv86a>v pr/ ovrav 8e cruXXoyiorjKol
J) (paivofievoi crvXKoyio-nicoi, which would include the O-OIÎO-TIKOI. Elsewhere the two are distinguished; both are ol navras vi<qv (victory at any
price) Trpoaipovfifvoi, 171 b 2 4 ; but 01 TJJS VIKT/S avri]s X^Plv TOLOVTOI ipi(TTIKOI Kai (pikeptdes 8OKOV<TIV flvai, oi Se So^rjs %dpiv rfjs (Is xPrllJLaTl'Tll<"'
<ro<j>MTTiKoi: the one dispute out of mere pugnacity and contentious habit,
the others add to this a desire of gaining a reputation which may be
turned to profitable account.
' Further, as in the eristic branch of dialectics, from the substitution
of something as universally or absolutely for that which is so not universally, but only partially, or in particular cases, an apparent (fallacious)
syllogism (i. e. enthymeme, see on I 1. 11) is elicited. As in dialectics for
instance, the argument " that the non-existent is (has existence), because
non-being is non-being"'. (Is, earl, has two different senses, absolute and
relative, or absolute and particular: the Sophist, in the second case,
intends it to be understood in its most general signification dn\s, of
actual existence: it is in fact a mere copula connecting the one fxfj 6V
with the other, and merely states the identity of those two expressions,
which is no doubt a very partial statement indeed: it is true, but
nothing to the purpose of the argument. Comp. de Soph. El. c. 25
180 a 33, 4.) 'Or again that the unknown is an object of knowledge,
because the unknown may be knownthat it is unknown'. (Here of
course the particular that is left out of the account is the on ayvcoo-rov;
whereby the absolute or universal, 'the unknown is knowable', is substituted for the partial or particular statement, that what is knowable
is only that it cannot be known.) ' So also in Rhetoric a seeming inference may be drawn from the absolute to merely partial probability'
This topic is illustrated in Plat. Euthyd. 293 c seq. See Grote's Plato
I 546, 7, and 549; [also Grote's Aristotle I 182, note].
The construction of this last sentence which had been obscured by
wrong punctuation in Bekker's 4to and first 8vo ed., has in the second
been made intelligible and consecutive by removing the full stops at ^
ov and 5rt ayvaarov, and changing all the colons into commas. The
PHTOPIKHS B 24io.
319
fxev TOIS 6ia\eKTiK0i<s OTI ecrTi TO fxri ov oV, e<TTi yap

TO fj.r\ ov fJLri ov, Kal OTI eiritTTnTov TO ayvwcrTOv,
ydp eTTKTT^TOV TO dyVOOG'TOV OTI dyVCOCTTOV, OUTW
iu
TOIS
prjTopiKo'i's CCTTI (paivo/Jievov ev6vp.t]fxa 7rapd
[At] a7T/\ws etfcos dWd TI eiKo's.

KadoAov, tocnrep Kal 'Ayddcov Aeyei
TO
ecrrt Be TOVTO OV
Ta^' av Tis eiKos avTO TOVT' eivai Aeyoi

j3poTo7(Ti 7roAAd Tvy^dveiv OVK eiKOTa.
yiyveTai ydp TO irapd TO et/co's, coaTe ei/cos Kal TO
irapd TO e'lKO's. el Be TOVTO, ecrTai TO /xr] ei/cos et/co'?.
correlative of Svirep cv rols ipicrTiKots is of course ovrco KOI ev rots prjTopiKois '.
and in the intervening sentence olov iv jxkv rois SiaXexTiKoir, the p&v has
also reference to an intended 8e, to be inserted when Rhetoric comes
to be contrasted with Dialectics, which however is never expressed and
the fxev left pendens.
The topic is first denned in general terms, as it appears in the dialectical treatise, and illustrated by two examples of its dialectical use:
and then exhibited in its special application to Rhetoric, the paralogism
of absolute and particular probability. The first, as in the dialectical
examples, is confounded with, or substituted for, the second.
'This (particular probability, r\ ei/tds,) is not universally (true or
applicable), as indeed Agathon says : Perchance just this may be called
likely, that many unlikely things befall mortals', Agathon, Fragm. Inc. 5.
Wagner, Fragm. Trag. Cr. ill 78. Of Agathon, see Miiller, Hist. Gr.
Lit. ch. xxvi. 3. Camb. Journ. ofCl. and Sacred Phil. No. IX, Vol. ill.
p. 257. Spengel, Artium Scriptores, p. 91, merely quotes four fragments
from Aristotle. The extant fragments are collected by Wagner, u. s., on
p. 73 seq. His style is criticized in Aristoph. Thesm. 55 seq. and imitated
or caricatured 101 seq. A specimen of his Rhetoric is given by Plato,
Symp. 194 E seq.
This 'probable improbable' is illustrated in Poet, x v n i 17, 18, from
tragedy, by the cunning man cheated, and by the defeat of the brave. i'o-Tt
Se TOVTO eluoSy (&o~7rep 'AydOatv
Xeyet' CIKOS yap yiveo~6ai TroWa
Kai napa TO
(LKOS. Comp. xxv 29. On this fallacy the ' solution' in Rhet ad Alex.
36(37) 29, is based. Dion. Ep. I ad Amm.'c. 8, TO KanovpyoraTov rav
imXeiprmaTav .OTI Kai TO jxrj UKOS yiverai wore el<6s.
' For what is contrary to the probable does come to pass, and therefore what is contrary to probability is also probable {Kai, besides what is
directly probable). And if so, the improbable will be probable. Yes,
but not absolutely (the answer); but as indeed in the case of Dialectics
(in the dialectical form of the fallacy), it is the omission of the circumstances (icara TI, in what respect,) and relation and mode that causes the
cheat, so here also (in Rhetoric) (the fallacy arises) from the probability
assumed not being absolute probability (or probability in general) but
320
d\X ovx a7r\ws, d\\' wcnrep Kai im

TO Kara TI Kai 7rpos T'I Kal Try ov 7rpo(rri6efj.eva -iroiei
TY\V avKotyavTiav, Kal evTctvda trapa TO etKos eiuai fir]
n ct7rXws d\\d TI etfcos. ea-ri B' e'/c TOVTOV TOV TOTTOV
ri KopaKos Texvn avyKeifxevrr av re yap fir] ecoôs j
TJ ama, olov dardevrjs tov at/cms (pevyrf ov yap duos'
Kav eVoôs wv, oiov av ttr^fjoo? cow ov yap CIKOS, on
some particular, special probability'. That which is only probable in
particular cases, as in particular times, places, relations, and circumstances in general, is fraudulently represented as probable absolutely,
without any such conditions or qualifications.
(rvKotfravTia, in this sense of a logical cheat or deception, transferred
from its ordinary meaning, of a false, calumnious information or charge,
is not to be found in any of the Lexicons.
11. 'Of (the application of) this topic the (whole) " art" of Corax is
composed.' 'This topic', as Ar. afterwards implies, is the topic of TO
eiKor in general, and not confined to the fallacious use of it. In the
former of the two alternatives of the example from Corax's Art the argument is fair enough; the feeble man may fairly plead that it was not
likely that he should be guilty of an assault upon one much stronger
than himself. Of course this does not prove the point, but it would have
a considerable effect in persuading^the judges of the accused's innocence,
' For whether he (the accused) be not liable to the charge, as for
instance if (repeat av from the preceding) a weak man were to be tried
for an assault, (he defends himself upon the ground that, ///. 'it is
because,') it is improbable: or if he be liable (under the same circumstances), as for instance if he be a strong man (he arguesthe omission
explained as before) that it is improbable because it was likely to seem
probable' (and therefore knowing that he would be exposed to the suspicion he was less likely to bring upon himself an almost certain punishment). And in like manner in all other cases: for the accused must be
either liable or not liable to the charge: now it is true that both seem
probable, but the one is really so, the other not probable in the abstract
(airXcos simpliciter), but in the way that has been already stated', i.e.
under the conditions and circumstances before mentioned.
Of Corax, with Tisias his pupil the founder of Rhetoric, see Cic. Brut,
c. 12, Spengel's Artium Scriptores p. 22 seq., Cambr. Journ. of Cl. and
Sacred Phil. No. v n , Vol. m . p. 40 seq., Westerm. Gesch. der Beredt. 27,
PP- 357, Miiller, Hist. Gr. Lit. x x x n 3 [and Blass, die Attische Beredsamkeit 1. pp. 19, 20].
The assault case and its alternatives was evidently one of the stock
instances of the rhetorical books. It has been already referred to in
1 12. 5, and re-appears in Plat. Phaedr. 223 B, as an extract from Tisias'
art. Again in Rhet. ad Alex. 36 (37) 6.
The topic TO ei'xot which formed the staple of the art of Corax, and
was treated in that of Tisias, Plato, 1. c , continued in fashion with the
PHTOPIKHS B 24 n .
32r
et/cos e/deWe 6eiv ofxoicos Se Kal eirl TWV aWwv' r\

yap evo-fcov dvdyKt] t] fxr) tvoôv eivcu TTJ aiTia' <palveTcti jjiev ovv a/ntporepa eiKora, e&Ti oe TO fj.ev et/cos,
TO Be ov% ct7rAws a'AA.' wcrirep ipr]Tai. Kal TO TOV
rjTTca Se \6yov KpeiTTW iroie'iv TOVT eaTiv.
Kal ivTevdev St/ca/eos e^vcrêpaivov 01 avQpcoiroi TO UpwTayopov eTrdyyeXfia.' êv^6<s r e yap CCTTI, Kal OVK
early rhetoricians of the Sophistical school, as we may see by the
constant notices of it in Plato. Somewhat later it was taken up by
Antiphon, a disciple of this school, and appears in his three surviving
school exercises, or juKerai, the Tetralogies. See also de caed. Herod.
63. On the TOTTOS of the first of these, see Miiller, Hist. Gr. L. XXXIII
2. It is to be found also in the Rhet. ad Alex. ; and of course in the
Orators : and it crept into the Tragedies of Agathon. An amusing instance of the alternative application of the argument is the story of the
encounter between Corax and his pupil Tisias in the attempt of the
former to recover the fees due for his instruction, which Tisias had
withheld. Related at length in Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil.
No. VII, Vol. in p. 34. It is likewise told of Protagoras and his wealthy
pupil Euathlus.
'And this is (the meaning of) "making the worse appear the better
argument:"' (that is, giving the superior to the inferior, the less probable)
argument, making it prevail over that which is really superior, and
more probable : which is identical with the second, the fallacious alternative of Corax's TWOS. Cic, Brut, vin 30, extends this profession to
all the Sophists. Turn Leontinus Gorgias... Protagoras Abderites ...
aliique multi temporibus eisdem docere se ~profitebantur, arrogantibus
sane verbis, quemadmodujn causa inferior (ita enim loquebantur) dicendo
fieri superior posset. See the dialogue betwee"n the SiVaior and. SSjxor
\6yos, Arist. Nub. 8891104.
ra> XoycoTOV Kpt'iTTOv, Sorts tori, Kal
TOV rjTTOva, 882. riy &v ; Xoyor. rfrrav y &v. dWd ere viKa, Tov e'ôu
KpfiTTa (ftdo-KovT that, 893 : and he keeps his word. The fair argument
is at last forced to own his defeat, and acknowledge the superiority of
his unfair competitor. This was one of the articles of charge of Meletus
and his coadjutors against Socrates, Plat. Apol. 19 B. Socrates is there
made to refer to Aristophanes as its original author.
' And hence it was that men were justified in taking offence (in the
displeasure, indignation, they felt) at Protagoras' profession : for it (the
mode of arguing that it implies) is false, and not real (true, sound,
genuine) but only apparent; and no true art (proceeding by, lit. 'included
in,' no rule of genuine art), but mere rhetoric and quibbling. And so
much for enlhymemes, real and apparent', avro flip ovv TOVTO IUTIV, %<$>r)
(o HpaTayopas), a ScoicpoTey, TO inayyeXfia b C7rayyc\Xo/xat. Plat. Protag.
319 A.
This distinction of dAi;#>js and (ptuvofievos, elvai and (palveo-dai, reality
and appearance, the true, genuine, substantial, and the sham, false
AR. II.
21
322
PHTOPIKHS B 24 i i ; 25 i.
ct\y6es ctXXa (paivopevov el/cos, Kai iv ovê^xia.

dW iv ptjTopiKrj Kai epiGTiKij.
1
Kai wept fiev ivdvixnjj.arwv Kai TWV OVTWV Kai rwv
e'iptjTar wept Se Xvaews exofxevov ic
CHAP.XXV.
semblance, is traced in its various applications at the opening of the

de Soph. El. The latter is the especial characteristic of the Sophists
and their professions and practice, 165 a 21, c. 11, 171 b 2734, and
elsewhere. It constantly re-appears in Aristotle's writings.
The imputation here cast on Protagoras' profession is rather that
of logical than of moral obliquity and error, though no doubt the latter
may also be implied.
I have already referred to the strong expression of Diogenes, Ep. ad
Amm. c. 8, on the use of this topic, above, note on 10.
CHAP. XXV.
The account of the genuine and spurious enthymemes or rhetorical
inferences in cc. XXIII, xxiv, is followed by a chapter upon Xva-is, the
various modes of refuting an adversary's argument; the same order being
observed as in the corresponding Dialectics (avriirrpo<pos 7 prjTopiicfj rjj
8i<ik<:KTiK7f), where we have first (in the eight books of the Topics) the art
of logical, systematic, argumentation, laid down and analysed; which is
supplemented in an Appendix, Top. ix, or de- Soph. EL, by an account,
(in the first fifteen chapters) of sophistical fallacies and paradoxes, and
(from c. 16 to 33) the various modes of 'solving' or refuting them [Grote's
Aristotle, chap. x]. The principal difference between them is that the
dialectical \iuis deals only with the refutation of fallacious arguments,
the rhetorical with that of rhetorical inferences or enthymemes in general.
The same subject is treated again, more briefly, in in 17, under the head
of nioTiK, the third 'division of the speech', including the establishment
of your own case and the refutation of your opponent's: and in the
Rhet. ad Alex. 36 (37), under that of accusation and defence.
On \vo-is, solution, or refutation in general, and its divisions, according to Aristotle, see Poste, Transl. of Posterior Analytics, Introd.pp.
2830. Thomson, Laws of Thought, 127. Trendelenburg, El. Log.
Arist. 41. Cic. de Inv. XLII 79, seq. On refutatio, Quint. V c. 13. On
tvo-rao-is, one of its two divisions, Anal. Pr. 11 c. 26, which is there treated
logically and syllogistically, see Poste, u. s., and Appendix C (note) p. 198,
Transl. of de Soph. EL, Introd. to Rhet. on c. 25, p. 267, seq. In the
Topics there is no direct and detailed explanation of Xva-is or exorao-js
AiW is exemplified in de Soph. El.though that book is twice referred
to, 11 25. 3, 26. 4, as containing an account of the latter of the twoThis apparent contradiction will be considered in the note on the
former of the two passages.
1. 'The next thing we have to treat of, after what has already
been said (c. XXIII. xxiv), is XiW, the modes of refuting an opponent's
arguments'. On the meaning and derivation of XiW, see Introd. p. 267
note.
PHTOPIKH2 B 25 1-3.
323
TWU elpnu&vwv enreiv. etrri Se Xuetv n dvTi<rvA\oyi2 crdfxevov r\ evcrTcuriv eveyicovTa. TO fxev ovv CLVTMTVX\oyle<r6cu SijAov OTL 6K TWV avTwv TOTTOOV ivde^CTai
Troieiv 01 fJLev yap (rvWoyKT/JLol CK T<SV evôptov, Bo3 Kovvrct e$e 7roX\d evavTia aWÂots i<TTiv. at S'
'This solution or refutation may be effected either by a countersyllogism (which concludes the negative of the opponent's thesis or
conclusion, the regular ckeyxos) or by advancing a (contradictory)
instance, or objection (to one of the premisses proving or indicating a
false statement)'. The conclusion must be refuted by a counter-syllogism.
Comp. on these two, c. 26.3, 4.
2. 'Now these counter-syllogisms may plainly be constructed out
of the same topics: for syllogisms' (i.e. not all syllogisms, not the
scientific and demonstrative, but dialectical syllogisms, and rhetorical
enthymemes: note on I 1. 11) 'are derived from probable materials,
and mere (variable) opinions' (what is generally thought, probabilities;
truth, the conclusions of science, is constant: and scientific demonstration, the object of which is dXq&uz, does not admit, like Dialectics
and Rhetoric, of opposite conclusions, of arguments on either side of a
question), 'are often contrary to one another, (and therefore can be
converted into opposite enthymemes)'.
3. ' Objections (contradictory instances) are brought (against
opposing enthymemes) in four ways, as also in the Topics'. Schrader
had long ago observed that the words in TOIS ronrxoir are not a reference
to the special treatise of that name, but express the art, or the practice
of it, in general; and this explanation he had already applied to other passages, as 11 23. 9, iv rois rowiKois and 24. 10, iv TOIS epiartKois', unnecessarily in those two, as we have seen.
Brandis will not allow that 'the Topics' can ever be applied to
Dialectics in general, but thinks that it must be confined to the particular book in which Dialectics are treated as Topics (wherein Vahlen
agrees with him). He admits that although the fourfold division of
eVorao-cir, as here given, is not found in the Topics, as we now have
them, (there is a different division into four,) yet the proper place for
them is indicated in Bk. e c. 10; also, that there are plenty of examples
of these four <Wra<rar in the Topics; and also that they are found (substantially, not by name and description,) in the Analytics. Nevertheless,
he hesitates to suppose that there can be a direct reference to the Topics
here and suggests the possibility of an alteration of Bk. subsequent to
the composition of the Rhetoric, or of an omission of something in our
present text. Tract in Schneidewin's Philologus IV. i, p. 23.
To this Vahlen very fairly replies, zur krit. der Ar. Schrift. 11 25,
1402 a 30, {Trans. Vien. Acad. Oct. 1861, p. 140), that Aristotle "has
so often exemplified the application of these four kinds of ivoraaus in
the eighth book of the Topicssee especially c. 2, 157 34, and b 1, ff.
and elsewhere throughout the treatiseas in the Topics of npos TI
(Z 8, 9), yhos (A), "ibiov (E),that he might very well refer to that work
212
324
PHT0P1KHS B 25 3, 4-
j/<rTao"6(s (pepovTai Kadcnrep KOLL eu TOIS TO7Wcoi9}

TCTjOaâJs* $ yap i iavTOv r\ e/c TOV OJJLOIOV fj e'/c p- 108.
4 TOV ivavTiov fj en TUOV KCKpi/meviov. Ae'^w $ d<p' iauTOV fxev, dlov el Trepl epaoTOs e'tr] TO evQv[ir\\xa ws airov- P-1402
SaTos, j\ e W r a t m St^ws* fj yap tcadoXov e'nrovTa OTI
Ka<ra evZeia 7rovr\p6v, fj Kara fxepo^ on OVK av eXeyero
here in the Rhetoric for the application of them to the use of that art."
" T h e words naBcurep KOI iv rots TOTTIKOU need not be referred to more
than the tfiepovrai eWracreir (the bringing or application of objections),
and the expression here is no less correct than in 1403 a 31." (26. 4):
and consequently (he says) Brandis' two suggestions are superfluous. The
reference to the Topics in Rhet. 1 2.9 is a case exactly parallel to this.
It is not made to any particular passage, but what is stated may be
gathered or inferred from the contents of that work. Compare note ad
loc, and see Introd. p. 154, note 1.
On eVorao-fis and its four kinds, Introd. pp. 269271; where the examples that follow, 47, are also explained. We learn from the chapter
of the Analytics that 'objections', directed against the premisses of a
syllogism (or enthymeme), may be either universal or particular: and
that the syllogisms into which they are thrown are either in the first
or third figure.
e'| iavrov] which in the next sentence becomes a$' lavrov, is, as
Schrader puts it, " Cum ex eo quod antecedenti enthymematis nobis oppositi, eiusdemque vel subiecto vel praedicato inest, contrarium argumentum exsculpitur, eoque id quod obiectum est confutatur." An argument
derived 'from itself must mean 'from the opponent's enthymeme itself,
and so retorted on him.
4. ' Supposing for instance your adversary's major premisses were,
"all love is good", the objection maybe opposed in two ways: either
(universally) by saying that all want or defect' (one of Plato's notions of
love, Philebus, comp. Rhet. I 11. 11, 12) 'is bad: or particularly, that, if
that were the case, the ' Caunian love' would never have passed into a
proverb (this is a particular instance; some love), if there had been no
form of love bad at all.'
Kavpioe epas]
T h e reading of all MSS but Ac is KOXXHTTOS 17 KOKIO-TOS
tpus. Who could have divined from this, without the aid of that MS, that
Kavvws was what the author had written? asks Spengel, Trans. Bav.
Acad. u. s. 1851, p. 50. What Ac really does read is KCIVVIKOS according
to Bekker, KavviKos according to Spengel.
The saying is proverbial for ' an illicit, or unfortunate (fatally ending)
passion'in either case irovripossuch as that of Byblis for her brother
Caunus; which was iromfpos in both its senses. Suidas, s. v. eVi rav p) Karop8ovjiivav imOviiMV' Kavvos yap Kai Bu/3Xis d8eX$ol idvaTvxrjo-av, Hesychius
iv Kavvn Tip-araC (under the next word we have Kavvos...KO.1 iroXts 'Pudov)
Kai 6 o-<po8P6:. Erasm. A dag. Amor. No. 1. " De foedo amore dicebatur;
aut si quis ea desideraret quae neque fas esset concupiscere neque liceret
PHTOPIKHS B 25 s, 6.
325
5 Kai/Vios epas, el fxrj r\<rav KCU 7rovrjpot epioTes. diro 5 =

TOV evavTiov evGTao'i'z (pepeTcu, olov el TO ev6vfxt]jxa
nv OTI 6 dyados dvr\p TrdvTas TOI)S (j)i\ovs ev TroieT,
6 dW oi/3' 6 [AO%6ripds /caKws. awo he TOV dfxolov, el
r\v TO eV%i?j/xa OTI ol /ca/cws 7re7rov6oTes del fxicrovo-iv,
assequi. Biblis Caunutn fratrem impotenter adamavit; a quo cum esset
repulsa, sibimet necem conscivit." Ovid, Met. IX 452664, who says
(662) that" she wept herself to death, and was changed into a fountain.
Byblis in exemplo est ut ament concessa puellae; Byblis Apollinei cerrefita cupidine fratris, N011 soror ut fratrem, nee qjta debebat a?navit.
5. ' The case of a contrary instance or objection is exemplified by
the following, suppose the opponent's enthymeme is this' (i. e. has for its
major premiss, is constructed upon the principle that, derives its conclusion from this), 'that all good men' (d SiyaOos, the definite article marks the
class: note on I 7.13, comp. 11 4.31), 'or good men invariably, do good
to all their friends, the objection may be taken, that the opposite is not
true; that bad men don't do harm to all theirs'. " The allegation of contraries," Poste, Transl. of de Soph. El. Appendix C, p. 197. If it be true
that all good men do good to all their friends, the contrary of this, that all
bad men do harm to all theirs, must be true likewise. But the latter is
known not to be universally true; to some of their friends bad men do
harm, to others not: it is not necessary therefore that good men should
always help all their friends; they may be good without that. So Victorius. Comp. Top. B 9, 114 b 6 seq. where two other examples are given:
he...Ka\ eirl TOV ivavriov TO ivavriov, olov OTI TO ayaBbv OVK e
8v' ovde yap TO KCIKOV Xvjrrjpov' rj d TOVTO, Kaneivo, KM el ij Siicaiotrivr) imaTrijir], Kal i; dStula ayvoia. Kal el TO SiKaiios emoTrmoviKas KCU
ijXTrelpas, TO dbiicas dyvoovvTcos Kai airdpas. A n d again B 7; H 3 " ' seq.
at fiev ovv ispanai dvo K.T.X... .line 8, ra de Xoirra navra rerrapa TroieX ivavrlacnv.
TO yap Toils (pIXovs ev noieiv ra roils (piXovs Kanas ivavriov' airo re yap ivavT'IOV rjdovc earl, /cat TO jiev aiperov TO 8e (pevKTov. " But the other four com-
binations, benefiting a friend, hurting a friend: benefiting an enemy,

hurting an enemy: benefiting a friend, benefiting an enemy: hurting a
friend, hurting an enemy: are all respectively contraries." Poste, u. s.
p. 201.
6. 'An example of an objection from similars (is the following),
suppose the enthymeme (i. e. the premiss, as before,) to be, that those
who have been injured always hate, (it may be met by the objection,) " nay
but, neither (no more than in the other case) do those who have been
well treated always love'". This, as Victorius observes, may plainly be
taken as an example of the preceding kind of evo-Taais dno roO ivavrlov.
It may also exemplify that of ' similars', to which Arist. has here applied
it. Ill treatment is no necessary proof of hatred, any more than
kindness and benefits are necessarily accompanied by love. The premiss, 'those who are injured always hate', we encounter with the objection, of a similar, parallel, case, t h a t ' those who are well treated don't
always love'.
326
7 on d\\'
PHTOPIKHS B 25 ;.
ovft 01 ev ireirovQores del <pi\ov<riv. at Se
K(OiO"ts at airo T(5v yvcopl/juou dvdptov, oiov et Tts

ivdu/JLtj/jia elirev on rots fxedvovari Set a-vyyv(ufit]v eêti/,
dyvoovvTes ydp d/mapTctvovartv, 'evffTatris on OVKOVV O
aiveTOS' ov yap av fieitjpvs ^jjjUtaS evofxoidu ns fxedviov d/xapTavt],
Parallel cases are also illustrated in Top. B 10, 114 b 25, but Hot as
objections, though objections might be derived from them.
7. A fourth kind is that of, 'judgments, or decisions proceeding
from distinguished men: as for instance, if the enthymeme be, that
drunkards should have allowance made for them (and be punished less
severely than if they had been in their sober senses), because they sin in
ignorance, an objection may be taken, that then Pittacus is no longer
commendable (i. e. loses his due credit; is no longer an authority, as he
is entitled to be); for (if he had beenon the supposition that the enthymeme objected to is true,) he would not have enacted (as he did) a
heavier penalty for an offence committed under the influence of intoxication'. The authority of Pittacus, which is of course maintained by
the objector, is urged in opposition to the general principle laid down by
the opponent, that indulgence should be granted to those who committed
a crime in a fit of intoxication, because they were then out of their senses
and had lost all self-control.
If this were true, replies the objector, Pittacus, one of the seven "wise
men," would be no authoritywhich cannot be supposedfor he ruled the
direct contrary, that drunkenness aggravated, not extenuated, the offence.
The text, with the supplements usually required in translating Aristotle,
seems to give a clear and consistent sense. Vahlen however, Trans.
Vien. Acad. Oct. 1861, p. 141, objects to alveros on two grounds; first,
the word itself, as belonging only to poetryj and secondly as inapplicable here ; the meaning required being, that Pittacus is no wise man,
for otherwise he would not have made such an enactment: that we must
therefore read crweros for alveros. On the second ground I can see
no necessity for alteration ; for the first objection, there is more to be
said, alveros is a very rare word: only two examples of it are given
in Steph. Thes. (this place of Aristotle is strangely overlooked) and
both from poets, Antimachus and Alcaeus. Whether this is a sufficient
reason for condemning the word in Aristotle I will not take upon me
to decide. It is retained by all editors ; and Aristotle's writings are not
altogether free from irregularities of grammar and expression not
sanctioned by the usage of the best Attic writers. For instance, KWTOTOTOV is quoted in Bekker's Anecdota, 1 101, as occurring in the jrfpl
noir)TiKr\sdoubtless in the lost part of that work.
On this example, see Poste, Trans, of de Soph. El. Appendix C. p. 199.
On Pittacus, Diogenes Laertius 14. In 76, VOJIOVS 8c %e- T<3 ptQiovri,
iav afiaprrj, hnrXrfV elvai rfjv (rjiilav' iva pr) ji(6{ia>ai, noXkov Kara TTJV vi\aov
dlvov ytvojiivov, Lesbos to wit, famous for its wine.
He was born at
PHT0PIKH2 B 25 8.
8
127
iiret Se TO, evOvfi^fxara XeyeTctt IK Terrapwu,

ra
he TeTTapa TOVT iarriu eticos 7rapdZeiyfia TCK/ntipiov
(Ttj/neiov, ecrTi oe TCC fxev e/c TCOV COS eTri TO WOAXJ r\
OVTCOV $ ZOKOVVTCOV o~vvt]y}xeva vdvp.rifxaTa CK TWV
TCL oe 01 eira.'ywyri'z dice TOD O/UOIOV, TJ evos r\
Mytilene in 651 B. C , and died in 569 B. c. Mure, Hist. Gr. Lit. i n 377.
Clinton, F. H. sub anno. Aristotle also refers to this law of Pittacus,
Pol. 11 12, 1274 19 seq., where the reason for enacting it is given.
vo/ios 8' tSios avrov, TO TOVS fiedvovras av TVJTTij(ra>m) TrXeiG) ^rffiiav Smorivtiv
TSIV vrf<$>6vTv' hia yap TO 7rKciovs vfipiêiv peBiovras rj vrj<f>ovTas ov Trpos
Trjv ovyyvdpriv a;rc/3Xei/rei>, o n Set iieBvovcnv exelv paWov, dXXo Trpos TO
ovficpepov. Comp. E t h . N . Ill 7, 1113 b 30 sq. cat eV avTm T<5 dyvoelv
Ko\aovo-iv, iav curios elvai 8OKJJ Ttjs ayvolas, olov Tois fiedvov&i dnr\a ra
fmTiiua'...Kvpios yap TOV fir) jx(6vcr6rjvai. Ill 2, 1110 b 26.
On the appeal to authorities, as paprvpes, comp. I 15. 13, 14, 15 ; and

note on n 23.12.
8, 9. The following two sections, 8 and 9, are a summary repetition
of what has been already stated more at length, I 2.1419, inclusive:
on the materials of enthymemes and their varieties.
' Enthymemes being derived from four sources, or kinds of materials,
probabilities, example, and signs certain and uncertain; in the first
enthymemes being gathered (conclusions collected) from things which
usually happen or seem to do so, that is, from probabilities; in the next
(examples) from induction (by an incomplete inductive process), by
means of similar (analogous, parallel) cases, one or more, when you
first obtain your universal (the universal major, premiss or proposition,
from which the conclusion is drawn) and then conclude (infer) the
particular by an example' (on this process and its logical validity, see
the account of 7rapadeiy)ia, Introd. pp. 105107); 'and (thirdly) by means
of1 (through the channel, medium, instrumentality, Bia with genit.) 'the
necessary and invariable' (reading xal del OVTOS, 'that which ever exists',
unchanging, permanent, enduring for ever), ' by TtK\n\piov that is ; and
(fourthly) by signs, universal or particular' (see on this, I 2. 16, the
two kinds of signs: and the paraphrase of 1518, Introd. pp.
1635), 'whether (the conclusion be) positive or negative (so Viet.);
and the probable, (of which all these materials of enthymemes consist
with the solitary exception of the Teierfpiov, which is very rarely used)
not being what is constant and invariable (always occurring in the same
way, uniform) but what is only true for the most part; it is plain that
(the conclusion is that) all such enthymemes as these can be always disproved by bringing an objection: the refutation however is (very often)
apparent and not always real; for the objector does not disprove the
probability, but only the necessity, (of the opponent's statement)'. As
none of a rhetorician's arguments is more than probable, this can
always be done, but in a great many cases it is not fair.
The words hC inayay^s are put in brackets by Spengel as an interpolation. With the limitation which I have expressed in the translation,
328
PHTOPIKHS B 25 810.
TrXeiovtav, orav Xafitov TO KCLQOXOV eiTct ovXXoytcrriTcti

Ta KaTa yuepos, did irapadeiyiuiaTos, r a de di duayKCtlOV KCCL OfTOS 1 did TK/Ht}ptOV, TO. de did TOV KCtdoXoV
tj TOV ev fxepei OVTOS, idv T OV edv T6 fin, did crnfieiwv,

TO de etKos ov TO dei dXXa TO a>s eiri TO TTOXV,
(pavepov OTI Ta TOiavTa jxev TWV evdv/nti/JLaTcov dei
g ecrTi Xveiv (pepovTa evcTacriv, n de Averts (paivofxevrj
dXX' OVK dXrjdrjs dei' ov yap OTI OVK etKos, Xvei
io 6 evicTTafxevos, dXX' OTI OVK dvaytcalov.
did Kai dei
eaTi irXeoveKTeiv d7roXo<yovfxevov /maXXov h KaTrjyopovvTa dia TOVTOV TOV TrapaXoyiarnov eirei yap o
(lev tcaTtiyopwv di e'iKOTcov dTrodeiKwaiv, 'eo~Ti de ov
TavTO Xvcrai t] OTI OVK eiKOS i) OTI OVK dvayKaTov, dei
1
KaX del
SVTOI
it seems to me that Inaycoyrjs is quite justifiable, and may be retained:

bia is at all events superfluous, and would be better away ; Victorius and
Buhle had already rejected it.
I have followed Vahlen (and Spengel in his recent Ed.) in supposing aei
to have been omitted between KCU and OVTOS in the explanation of reienypiov.
Vahlen truly observes, Op. cit. p. 141, "that the TeK/irjpiov rests not upon
the necessary and being, but upon the necessary and ever-being," (the
permanent and invariable) : referring to del Kai avayaaiov in 10 ; Phys. B
IO.6<5 13, ovre TOV it; avayicr)s Kai dei, ovre TOV as iiri TO 7TO\V : Metaph. E
1026 b 27, io-rlv iv rols OVO-I Ta fiev del wa-avTWS eôvra Kai ig dvayKTjS...
Ta 8' i dvdyKTjS u.ev OVK eariu ovd' del, ds 8' irri TO TTO\V : I b . 1064 b 32,
nav 817 dja/xev elvai TO jiev dei Kai i dvayKr/s : 1065 a 2 ff.which Seem
quite sufficient to warrant the alteration.

idv TE ov idv re /x^ (ov)] subaudi jj, a rare ellipse of the subjunctive mood
of iivai: Eur. Hippol. 659, es r av eK&rjfios xôvos '/ecu's. Aesch. Agam.
1318, Koiva>o-iie8a av was dtrcjiaKrj /3ovXi;'/xaTa (if). Paley, note ad loc, supplies other examples; and refers to Buttmann (on Mid. 14, n. 143, p. 529 ,
d$ rjsav ijypa^>j)),whogives two more, Antiphon de caed. Herod. 32, icjt ols
av TO nXelo-rov pepos Trjs [lacrdvov; Plat. Rep. II 370 E, av av avro'is XP E ' a -
Victorius offers an alternative translation of the above words, 'the

real or apparent' sign: but I think his first rendering, which I have followed, is the best.
The contents of 811 inclusive are paraphrased at length, with
an explanation, in Introd. on this chapter, pp. 2714; to which the reader
is referred. 10 (misprinted 8) is translated on p. 272.
10. eVel yap...6 8e KpiTtft] On this irregularity, iirei with the apodosis o de,a case of Aristotelian carelessness, his attention having been
diverted from inei to 0 fxev KaTtjyopavsee the parallel examples quoted
on 1 1. 11.
329
o' eêt 'ivcrTacnv TO OJS eirl TO 7roXv' 01) yap av r\v

eiKos dXX' del KCCI dvayKaTov 6 Se KpiTr\<s oieTcti, el p. I09OVTWS eXvdtj, tj OVK e'tKos eivai t) ov% avTto Kpireov,
irapaXoyif^pfxevos, uxnrep iXiyo/mev
ov yap e'/c TWV
dvayKaltov Zel CCVTOV [XOVOV Kpiveiv, dXXa Kal K TWV

eiKOTcop' TOVTO yap icrn TO yvwfxr) Ttj dpl<TTti xpiveiv.
oiiKOvv 'iKavov av Xvcry OTI OVK dvayKaXov dXka Zel
Xveiv OTI OVK et/cos. TOVTO Se <rviJi.(3t}o~eTai, edv n
iij 'evarTacns fxaWov OJS eVt TO iroXv. evdexeTcti Se
eivai TOiavTtjv St^ws, tj TW xpova) tj TO?S
Se, el djucpoTw el yap Ta 7rXeovaKi<; OVTW, P. 140312 TOVT ecTTiv eiKos fxdXXov. XveTai Ze Kal TO. o~tifxeTa
i Ta did (rtjfxetov ivOu/nti/maTa elprifxeua, /cdV J7 virdp, u>o~irep eXexdt] ev Tots 7rpwTOLs' OTI yap davXXoyurTov e'(TTi TTCLV (r^fxelov, SfjXov tjfuv e/c TWV dva13 XVTIKWV.
7T(OOs Se Ta TrapaheiyfxaTooZr] f\ avTr\ Avcts
av ovras eXvdt] of course cannot stand, though Spengel retains it in
his recent text. It must be either av OVTOXTL \v6rj, which seems the simplest and most natural alteration; or, as Bekker, ovras ikvBi].
On the dicast's oath, yvdug rfj dpurrji, or more usually rjj diKaiordTj;,
Kplveiv, see Introd. note 1, p. 273.
11. The enstasis may be made more probable in two ways, either
by the consideration of the time, (as an alibi for instance, shewing that at
the time alleged the accused was elsewhere, see 11 23.6, the topic of time:
this use of the topic may be added to that which is illustrated there,) or
the circumstances of the case ; or most conclusively (authoritatively,
cogently, weightily), by both: for in proportion to the multiplication of
events or circumstances similar to your own case as you represent it, is
the degree of its probability'. If I am right in the interpretation of ra
XPovasee Introd. p. 274ra nTveovaicis refers to rois Trpdy/jtaa-tv, 'facts
and circumstances', alone. If 'the time' meant 'the number of recurring times', it would surely be rots xPvols> n o t ; ri ? XPVV 12. ' Signs (except TeK/jnjpia), and enthymemes stated or expressed
by (i. e. derived from, founded on) signs, are always liable to refutation,
even though they be true and genuine, bona fide, (vTrdpxovra, really there,
in existence; not imaginary or fictitious,) as was stated at the commencement of this work (i 2.18, \vrov fie Kal TOVTO, this as well as the first, nav
akt)8ks 5) : ' f r ^ ^ n o s *S n c a n be thrown into the regular syllogistic
form is clear to us from the Analytics'. Anal. Pr. 11 27. Introd. pp. 162,3.
It wants the universal major premiss, except in the single case of the
330
PHTOPIKHS B 25 13.
Kai TO. eiKora' iav re yap 1e%(O[Jiev TI, ov% OVTIO AeAvrai1, on OVK dvayKaTov, el Kai TO.* TrAeico rj irAeov1 1
3
~ Hxa/dr TI ovx ovru, \i\vrat,
om. TO
13. In this section the clause, iav re yap i?x<>>pev...a\\a>s, should (it
seems) be read thus : iav re yap ?x<ofiev n OVX ovrca, \e\vrcu, on OVK
dvayKalov, tl Kal irXda fj Tvheavaias aXkas" and the succeeding, iav re Kai...
ovra, /jiaxfTcov rj on K.T.\. The first alteration of the punctuation, and

Kai ir\ei<o for rj Ka\TOjrXe/ca, appear first in Spengel's reprint of the Rhetoric, in his Rhetores Graecij the corresponding alteration of punctuation
in the second clause occurs in his recent edition. Bekker, who had adopted
the altered punctuation in his 2nd ed., has returned to the original one in
his 3rd, whether by mere oversight, or intentionally, who can determine ?
At all events with the punctuation found in all the editions prior to Bekker's 2nd, the sentences appear to be unintelligible. Vahlen, u. s., pp. 142,
3, has adopted the same alterations with the addition of the not improbable but unnecessary one of iav re yap ex<oi*ev tv TI. The connexion of
the passage thus altered is this: There are two ways of meeting and
refuting an opponent's example, the rhetorical substitute for a complete
induction: first, if we have an adverse or contradictory instance (ovx
ovra) to bring against his general rulea case exceptional to the example or examples that he has collected in support of itthis is refuted, at
all events so far as to shew that it is not necessary, even though the
majority of cases (irkelai Kai ifKcovaw, ' more of them and oftener') of the
same kind, or examples, are 'otherwise' (a\\as, are in another direction,
or go to prove the contrary): or, secondly, if the great majority of
instances are in conformity with his rule (ourtos), and (which must be
supplied) we have no instance to the contrary to adduce, we must then
contend that the present instance (any one of his examples) is not analogous, not a case in point, that there is some difference either of kind
and quality, or of mode, or some other, whatever it may be, between the
example and that with which he compares it, which prevents its applicability here. The objection to this connexion and interpretation is of
course the combination of ovx ovra with idv; which may perhaps have
been Bekker's reason for returning to the original punctuation. But as
the sense seems to require the alteration of this, we may perhaps apply
to this case Hermann's explanation1 of the conjunction of ov, the direct
negative with the hypothetical ej, which may occur in cases where the
negative is immediately connected, so as to form a single negative
notion with the thing denied, and does not belong to the hypothesis: so
that ovx ovras being equivalent to oiKKo or crepov may stand in its place
with the hypothetical particle: though no other example of this combination with iav has been produced. In the choice between the two difficulties, the grammar, I suppose, must give place to the requirements of
the sense. Neither Vahlen nor Spengel takes any notice of the grammatical irregularity.
With Kai ra chora in the first clause irpos is to be carried on from
jrpos TO TtapabuyiuiTah'r).
1
Review of Elmsley's Medea, vv. 87, 348. [Comp. supra Vol. I. Appendix C,
p. 301.]
PHTOPIKHS B 25 13, 14; 26 1.
331
a/as aAAws* eav re Kal TO. TrXelta Kal TO. I7r\eovccKi9)

OVTU) [xa%6Teov, r\ OTI1 TO irapov ov% ofxoiov t] ov%
14 opoiws i) diacpopdv ye Tiva eêt. TO. Be TeK\xr\pia Kal
TKfxrjptwBr] evdv/JL^/JiaTa Kara fxev TO davWoyicrTOV
OVK ecrTai Xvarai (&JA01/ Be Kal TOV6' n[uv e*c TWV dvaXe'nreTai B' a5s ov% virdpêi TO Xeyofxevov
el Be (pavepov ical OTI VTrdpêi KCLI OTI
CLXVTOV tjBt] yiyveTai
TOVTO'
TrdvTa yap
diroBelêi riBtj (pavepd.
TO S' avêiu ical fxeiovu OVK 6<TTIV ivdvfxrj/xaros CHAP.XXVI.
o~TOf)(eiov' TO yap aiiTo \eyco crTOiyeiov Kal TOTTOV'
yap crToi'xe'iov Kal TOVOS, ets o 7ro\\d ev6v[xri1-1
wKeovaKit ouru, ftaxeriov
rj on
ovx ofuoiov TI ovx ofioias] represent similarity of quality, TO irowv, the

third category; and similarity of mode, conveyed by the adverbial termination -as. " Non esse par, aut non eodem modo geri posse." Victorius.
14. TOc/tiJpm] ' Certain, necessary, signs, and enthymemes of that
sort (founded upon them), will not be found capable of refutation in
respect of their not being reducible to the syllogistic formwhich is
plain to us from the Analytics (An. Pr. 11 27), and it only remains to
shew that the fact alleged is false (or non-existent). But if it be clear
both that the fact stated is true, and that it is a necessary sign, then
indeed it does become absolutely insoluble. For by demonstration (the
TtK[Lr\piov converted into a syllogism) everything is made quite clear'; when
once a thing is demonstrated, the truth of it becomes clear and indisputable. On the TCKiujptov, I 2. l6,17, 18, fiovou yap av dXrjOes 3 S\VTOV i<mv.
CHAP. XXVI.
On the object and meaning of this short chapter, Victorius thus
writes: " Omnibus iam quae posuerat explicatis, nonnulla quae rudes
imperitosque fallere potuissent pertractat: ut bonus enim magister non
solum quomodo se res habeat ostendit, sed ne facile aliquis a vero
abduci possit, quae adversari videantur refellit." He not only states
what is true, but also guards his disciples against possible error.
1. 'Amplification and depreciation is not an element of enthymeme : by element I mean the same things as topic: for elements
or topics are so many heads under which many enthymemes fall.
But amplification and depreciation are enthymemes or inferences to
prove that anything is great or little (to exaggerate and exalt, or disparage, depreciate, lower it), just as there are enthymemes to prove
that anything is good or bad, or just or unjust, and anything else of
the same kind'. Comp. x x n 13. On O-TOI^CIOI/, and how it comes to
be convertible with TOWOS, see Introd. pp. 127, 8. avetv and nuovv are in
fact (one or two, under different divisions) of the KOIVOI TOKOI, the loci
332
PHTOPIKHS B 26 13.
efxir'nrrei. TO S1 avêiv Kai /neiouv etmV ev
TTjOos TO Zeiâi on /Jieya fj fxiKpov, uxnrep Kai on
dyaQov fj Siicaiov fj CLIIKOV Kai
TOOU dWcav
2 ravTa ' ecrri iravra irepl a ol <rv\\oyia-pol

OviJirifxaTa' WO~T el fxr\e
3 TOTTOSJ ouBe
TO
TOVTWV
eanv
KWV %i]\ov yap
\vei
on
aWo
Kai TO. ev-
Ka<TTOv evduf
avpeiv Kai fxeiouv-
evdufj-^fxara eiSo's n
onovv.
oude
TO.
rwv KaTao-Kevacrn-
fxev r\ Zeiâs r\ evaracriv
communissimi, which can be applied to all the three branches of Rhetoric :

and they furnish {are, Aristotle says,) enthymemes applicable to all the etSrj
in the three branches, as the good and bad treated in I 6, the greater
and lesser good in 1 7, fair and foul, right and wrong, in I 9, just and
unjust in I 13. Comp. II 18. 4, II 19, on the four KOIVOI TOJTOI ; 26)
nepl fieyidovs KOX (UKpoT-qTos, where h e refers to t h e 7rpoeiprnieva, t h e
chapters of Bk. I already quoted, for exemplifications of it: and II 22.16.

It therefore (it is here spoken of as one) differs from the TOTTOI evdvfir]liarav of 11 23. 24, which are special topics of particular classes of enthymemes.
2. 'And all these are the subjects (or materials) of our syllogisms
and enthymemes ; and therefore if none of these (good and bad, just
and unjust, &c.) is a toptc of enthymeme, neither is amplification and
depreciation'. This is the first of the two possible mistakes that require
correction.
3. The second is as follows. ' Neither are refutative enthymemes
a distinct kind other than the demonstrative (those that prove the
affirmative, construct, establish); for it is plain that refutation is effected
either by direct proof, or by advancing an objection; and the proof
is the demonstration of the opposite (the negative of the opponent's
conclusion)to prove, for instance, if the object was to shew that a
crime had been committed, that it has not; or the reverse. And therefore this cannot be the difference, because they both employ the same
kind of arguments (steps of proof) ; for both bring enthymemes to prove
one the fact, the other the negation of it ( 4). And the objection is
no enthymeme at all, but, as in the Topics, to state an opinion (a
probable proposition) from which it will clearly appear either that the
syllogism is defective (the reasoning, logic, is defective) or that something false has been assumed (in the premisses)'. See 11 22.: 14, 15.
JI 25. 1, 2, where avrurvWoyifcaOat. stands for dcrajroSeiKweiv here. It was
stated, c. 22. 14, that "there are two kinds of enthymemes," the fieiierticd
and iXeynriKa, founded on the distinction of constructive and destructive,
affirmative and negative: in this passage that statement is so far corrected as to deny that this is not a sufficient foundation for a distinction
of kinds; the mode of reasoning is the same in both, and therefore as
enthymemes they are the same.
4. On tv TOU rorriKoU, see nate on 11 22. 10, and 25.3.
PHTOPIKHS B 26 3 _ S .
333
iveyKoov, dvTairoheiKviiova'i he TO avTiKeifxevov, olov el p. no.

OTI yeyovev, OVTOS OTI OV yeyovev, el & OTL
ov yeyovev, OVTOS OTI yeyovev.
wo-Te avTti jueu
OVK av eft] r\ hia(popd- TO7S avToh yap y^pwvTai
dp.(pOTepor OTL yap OVK eo~Tiv r\ ecrTiv, ev6ufjt.11iJ.aTa
4 (pepovo-iv' n $' evo-Tacris OVK e&Tiv evdvfxtj/uia, dWd
Ka6a7rep ev TOIS TOWIKOIS TO elm-elv hoâv Tivd e js
'earTai hfjAov OTI OV o-vWe\6yio~Tai rj OTI yfsevhos Tt
e'i\rj(pev.
5
eVei he S>) Tp'ia etnlv a he? 7rpayfxaTev6fjvat 7repi
5. 'Now of the three departments of Rhetoric that require to be
treated, of examples, and maxims, and enthymemes, and the intellectual
(logical) part in general1, whence we are to obtain a supply of them, and
how refute them, let us be satisfied with what has been already said:
style and order (of the parts of the speech) remain for discussion'.
Dionys., de Comp. Verb. c. I, divides the art of composition into
two branches, SLTTTJS OV<TT]S acKytTccos jrepi navras roiis \6yovs, viz. (1)0 irpayliariKos TOTTOS, the facts, or matterAr.'s Trio-reis (in Rhetoric)and (2) \CKTI-
KVS, the style or manner. The latter is again subdivided into <rvv6eins,
'composition', combination, construction of words in sentences, and exXoyi)
TWV ovofiarav, selection of single words.
This (with the possible exception of ra \017ra in II 18. 5) is the first
notice we have in this work that there is anything to consider in
Rhetoric beyond the proofs or 7ri'oreiy that are to be employed in persuasion ; and the omission of any distinct mention of it up to this point
is certainly remarkable. Of course those who regard the third book
as not belonging to the system of Rhetoric embodied in the two first
(no one, except Rose, I think, goes so far as to deny the genuineness of
the book as a work of Aristotle)but as a separate treatise, founded on
a different conception of the art, improperly attached to the foregoing,
assume that the last words, Xombu 8c...ragea>s, are a subsequent interpolation added to connect the second book with the third. Vahlen,
Trans. Vien. Acad. Oct. 1861, PP- 131, 2, has again shewn that arbitrary
and somewhat dogmatical positiveness which characterises his criticism
of Aristotle's text. He pronounces, that of the last section, only the words
which h e alters into irepl /lev ovv Trapahfiyixaravelprjada qiiiv TQtravra
(omitting xa\ Zâs T&V Trep\ rr)v hiavoiav)that is to say, only those which
1
W i t h TWV irepl TT\V Sidvoiav, comp. Poet. XIX 2, r a ixh ofo Trepl rty Biavoiav
Iv TOIS irepi pi]Topu<rjs KdaBoi. TOVTO yap ISLOV fidWov tKetvys Trjs p.e06dov. ?UT( Si
Kara TT]V Sidvoiav ravra, Saa vivo TOV \6yov Set irapa<TKeva<rOijvat : which is followed
in 4 by a brief summary of the principal subjects of Rhetoric. Instead of inferring

from this correspondenceas seems most naturalthe indisputable genuineness of
the words in the Rhetoric, Vahlen (see below in text) uses this passageto which
I suppose he refersas an argument against i t ; that the (assumed) interpolator
borrowed his phrase from Rhet. in 1. 7, and 'the Poetics'.
334
PHT0PIKH2 B 26 5.
TOV Xoyov, V7rep fiev TrapaBety/ndTcov ncti yvtaixwv tcai

ev6vfxrjfJia.T(av Kal oAws TWV 7repl Ttjv Zidvoiav, bdev re
happen to agree with his theory, that the third book did not form part of the
original plan of the work, " are to be regarded as genuine Aristotelian."
The promised proof of this theory, is, I believe, not yet forthcoming.
Brandis is much more reasonable, Tract otiRhet. \Philologus IV i.]p. 7,8.
He thinks that the second and third parts (the contents of Bk. ill, Xt
and ragis) are already presupposed in the conception of the art expressed
in the preface to the work. (This is certainly nowhere distinctly stated,
and the lrpoo-BfJKai and ra ?<B rou irpdy/iaros of I I. 3 seem rather to
refer to the exaggerations and appeals to the feelings and such like
topics, of which the 'arts' of the earlier professors were mainly composed.
Still, the tricks of style, introduced by Gorgias and his followers into
their arts, may be included with the others, E. M. c). One of the
hypotheses suggested by Brandis on the relation of this third book to
the two others seems to me highly probable. It is that the third book
which is in fact complete in itself (E. M. C.)was written earlier than
the rest, and before the author had arrived at his final conception of
Rhetoric in its connexion with Logic; and was afterwards appended to
the two others, instead of a new treatise written specially with a view
to them; and this would account for the repetitions, such as that of
in 17, which certainly are difficult to explain, if the third book be
supposed to have been written after, and in connexion with, the first and
second. With regard to the references, as in cc. 1 and 10, to one of the
preceding books, Brandis thinks they might easily have been introduced
after the addition of the third to the two others. He altogether rejects
the notion that any one but Aristotle could have been the author of it.
(It has in fact all the characteristics of Aristotle's style, mode of thought
and expression, and nothing whatever which is out of character with
him: on the other hand let any two sentences in this book and the Rhet.
ad Alex, be compared, and it is seen at once that the style, manner, and
mode of treatment are all totally different. E. M. c.) Lastly he notes
that it is characteristic of Aristotle's writings (this, I think, deserves
attention) not to give a full account of the contents of the work at the
beginning of it; and such omission of style and arrangement was all the
more likely in the Rhetoric in so far as it was part of Aristotle's theory
of the art that everything but proof direct or indirect was non-essential
and completely subordinate. He concludes, " I think therefore that I
need not retract the expression I ventured on above (Sie ist ein werk
aus einetn gusse) that the Rhetoric is, more than most of Aristotle's
writings, a work made at one cast."
Spengel, in his tract on the Rhetoric, Mun. 1851, {Trans. Bav.
A cad. p. 40), though he thinks the phraseology of the passage requires
alteration in one or two points to bring it into conformity with
Aristotle's ordinary manner, yet as the MSS all agree in giving the words
as they stand in our text, says there is no ground for suspecting their
genuineness. On the connexion of the third book with the others he
gives no opinion. In the note to his recent edition, p. 354, he thinks
PIITOPIKHS B 26 5.
335
Kal ws avTct Xvaofxev, elp^crBto ^/MV TO- p. 1403 b.

aravTct, Xoiirov Ze Zie\6eiv mpl Aeêws Kal Ta
that it may have been added after the two first were composed. He
pronounces strongly in favour of its genuineness, and against Rose,
Pseudepigraphus, p. 3 and p. 137 note; adding, for the benefit of that
critic, haec est nostrae aetatis ars critica.
APPENDIX (D)
ON
B 20 5>
<s r
ei ovvaiT
>i
av.
On av with optative after certain particles.

The attempt to control the free expansion of the Greek language by rigorous rules which forbade the deviation from set
forms of speech, and allowed for no irregularities of expression by
which nice shades and varieties of thought and feeling might be
conveyed; rules derived mostly from a somewhat limited observation, often from the usages of the tragic and comic writers alone, the
least departure from which was to be summarily and peremptorily
emended; this attempt, which was involved in the practice of
scholars like Dawes, Porson, Elmsley and Monk and their followers,
has been happily frustrated, and we have learned, chiefly under the
guidance of Godfrey Hermann, to deal more liberally and logically
with Greek grammar. That Hermann was infallible; that he did
not sometimes overreach himself by his own ingenuity; that his
nice and subtle distinctions in the interpretation of grammatical
variations are always well founded; or that he is always consistent
in his explanations, I will not take upon me to assert: but it may at
least be said that in this branch of scholarship, the application of
logic to Greek grammar, he has done more than any other scholar,
past or present.
On this principle, that of leaving the Greeks to express themselves
as they please, let us not in the passage before us omit av, though
MSS Q, Yb, Zb do so, but rather endeavour to explain it.
The facts of the case are these. There are numerous instances
in the Greek poets and prose writers of av joined with the opt. mood
and various particles, in which ordinary usage would seem to require
either the subj. with av or the opt. without it. av and the opt. are
found (1) with relatives, as Thuc. vni 68, <J av yvoi-rj ciTretr, Plat.
Phaed. 89 D, OSS av yyâ-airo. Xen. Memor. iv 1. 2, iwôvivuv a $v
fi.d9oiev, (this is immediately preceded by the ordinary grammar,
337
oh irpoaexoiev, 'to learn whatever they gave their attention

to', which must imply a change of meaning corresponding to the
change of expression). Ib. de rep. Lac. 11 10, e W a n w on av
dyaOov SOKOP; eivai. (2) with <5S, 8s, Sir^, with which the subj. and
not the opt. is usually joined, Thuc. vm 54, 07177 av SoKoirj. Aesch.
Agam. 355, OTTWS av/3e'Aos rjMBiov a-Kûev. Arist. Av. 1337,
ytvol/xav aero's, cos av -rroraOti-qv. Plat. Pro tag. 318 E, OTTWS av, cum
optativo bis : and numerous examples in Herm. de Particula av, in 4,
p. 151: four in Jelf, Gr. Gr. 810. 4. (3) after Srav (Aesch. Pers.
450, orav eiccraoiaTo), oir&rav, liraSdv, Dem. adv. Onet. p. 865, 6,
omSaV SoKi/mcrêiijv, &>s, 2o-irep, A n d o c . irepl /Avo-Typtaiv 8 1 , os av
01 vofn.01 reOacv, Soph. T r a c h . 687, eu>s av dp/jLoo-aifii, D e m . c. A p h o b .
p. 814, eu)S av SoKifiao-Oetr/v, PI. P h a e d o 101 D, ecus av o-Ktij/aLo; f^xpi
vep, PI. T i m . 56 D , f**XPl ""V av...y7 yevoiro; irpfv, Soph. T r a c h . 2,
irplv av ddvoi ns, Antiph. de caede Herodis, 34, irplv av iym Z\0OI/JU.
(4) After Se'SoiKa |iij, Soph. T r a c h . 630, SeSoiKa yap fir] Trpm Xeyois av,
and Philoct. 4 9 3 , ov 87 TraXat" av e OTOD SE'SOIK' eyu fjLtj /J.OL /3e^??K0i.
ThuC. II 9 3 , TrpooSoKia...fiirj av irore.. iirnrXtvauav.
X e n . A n a b . VI
1. I, EKeico ivvoai fJLT] Xtav av ra^v aiocppovLO'OeLrjv. (5) After tl, tilircp,
Rhet. II 20. 5, II 23. 7, el irpoSoo; av, Ib. 20, et Sou; av. Plat.
Theaet. 170 C, o-KoVa ei i6e\oi av, M e n . 98 B, tlwep TI aXXo (pairjv dv
(IBevai, Phileb. 21 D, ci Tts Se'fair' df, P r o t a g . 3 2 9 B, cure/) aAXu TU>...
nu6otjxr)v av, Legg. VII 807 B, d Iryrolinv av. I b . X 905 C. R e p . VIII
553 E, 0-KOTraifi.ev el o/toios av urj. E u r . H e l . 8 2 5 , ei ^<os av dvaTraaai/xev.
All, I conceive, or most of these well-established usages would have

been condemned as solecisms by Dawes or Elmsley.
In the first class of cases, where av with the opt. follows a relative,
the simple explanation seems to be this. Take, for instance, the
passage of Xen. Mem. iv 1. 2, above quoted. pavOdvciv oTs Trpocrcxoiev is "to learn whatmr they gave their attention to", the opt.
indicating indefinite possibility, and the indefiniteness implying a liability to recurrence; an uncertainty as to when the thing will occur;
a possible frequency, which we express by the addition of ever to the
relative; whataw, whensoz>dr. The addition of the conditional av
suggests some condition attached to the act, and the " whatever they
attended to" becomes "whatever they would, could, or might, attend
to ", under certain circumstances which may be imagined but are not
expressed.
In class (2) ws civ, SITUS &V with the opt. are usually explained by
quomodo (Hermann), 'how', 'in what way', which is equivalent to
' that'. Thus in the passage of Aristophanes, quoted, under this
head " Oh that I were changed into an eagle that so I might fly",
o5s 'how', 'in what way', maybe resolved into oVcos OVTCOS (see Matth.
Gr. Gr. 48, obs. 3) ' that in that way', ' that so'; and the opt. with
av is exactly what it is in an independent sentence, a modified future
AR. II.
22
338
A P P E N D I X (D).
or imperative, as the grammars sometimes call it (Matth. Gr. Gr.

% 515, /3, y), or rather a potential mood or conditional tense like that of
the French and Italian verb. This is well illustrated by a passage of
the Pseudo-Plat. Eryxias, p. 392 c, v-rro Se TCCV o-[UKpmv TOVTWV av
/xoiWov opyotpivro, OVTCOS OJS av fi.d\urra
xaA.e7romn-oi eirjaav, where t h e
addition of OVTWS shews how ws is to be interpreted. Herm. de Part,

av, iv 11. 12, and in 4, p. 151 seq. divides these cases into two heads,
the first, in which oSs av, &c. signify quomodo; the second, in which
the conjunction retains its proper signification ' that', indicating the
end ox purpose, and the opt. with av is used only "ubi finis is est, ut
possit aliquid fieri"where it indicates possibility under certain conditions. In all the examples that he gives, ill 11, the other explanation is equally applicable.
(3) Conjunctions of time, with av and opt. Hermann in his
treatise does not separate these cases from the rest, and deal with
them as a separate class, as he does in the case of cos av, &c, and
the conditional sentence: the object of his first chapter on this
subject, in 4, is summed up (p. 151) "apparet ex his reprehensione
vacuum esse usum optativi pro coniunctivo, adiuncta particula av:"
from which it would appear that his object was rather the establishment of the fact than the explanation of it. But the ut quid possit
fieri may be intended to extend to all cases of opt. with av, though
it is confined in expression to that of the particulae finales, cos, OTTCDS,&c, p. 154. In his note on Trach. 2, he attributes the opt. 0avoi to
the obliqua oratio in which it occurs: which however leaves the av
unaccounted for. The time or tense of the preceding verb has at all
events nothing to do with the explanation; the preceding verb is not
always a past tense. Perhaps it may be sufficient to say, that it
appears from numerous examples, that the optative with or without
av may be used in the same constructions with conjunctions expressing time, as the subjunctive with or without av (av being often
omitted, especially in verse, with irp'w, eco?, &c.) with a slight
difference of sense; the subjunctive expressing as usual a future
expectation, the optative the bare possibility, or the indefinite issue of
an event, the av, as usual, adding the notion of certain conditions to
which it is subject.
These differences are so nice and subtle, that they are often
hardly capable of being expressed in translation: unless it happen,
as is not often the case, that there are words in the one language corresponding to those which we wish to render in the other, so far as to
suggest exactly similar associations. Perhaps the differences between
jrpiv Bav-Q or irptv av 6dvr\, and Trplv ddvoi may be partially represented
by 'ere he shall or may be dead', and 'ere he might be dead', implying uncertainty or mere possibility of the event; but when we
come to irpiv av Odvoi, where the condition, or circumstances under
339
which it may occur, is added, it seems impossible to convey the

whole by any tolerable English translation, since we have nothing
corresponding to av, a word of two letters, suggestive of associations
which would require in English certainly more than one word to
express.
(4) The same explanation may be applied to the rare cases in
which fvq preceded by Se'Soixa or something equivalent is followed by
the optative with av.
On these cases Jelf, Gr. Gr. 814 c, expresses a similar
opinion. " The opt. is also used in its secondary meaning to express
more decidedly a doubt as to the realization of the object, a
possibility only of its being so (this is Hermann's explanation of the
signification of the mood): av is added when the suspicion is supposed
to depend upon a condition: Xen. Anab. vi 1. 29" (quoted above).
The reason why the subjunctive after particles of purpose (ws,
OTTOS, &c), time, and fear (f*.ij) is most usual, and the opt. comparatively rare, so as to appear even irregular, is that the former of
the two moods, which conveys merely the future expectation, is the
expression of the direct and immediate tendency of the impulse or
emotion; of that which the subject would naturally and usually feel:
whereas the notion of possibility and condition would be, in comparison with the other, very rarely suggested.
(5) The fifth class of cases of opt. with av, with d or other
conditional particles, is treated by Hermann in a special chapter,
u.s., c. n , and abundantly illustrated. He distinguishes two varieties
of these, one peculiar to the Epic poets, "particulam (sc. av) sic
adiectam habens, ut magis ad voculam conditionalem, quam ad
optativum pertineat: quare cultior sermo ut non necessariam omittit,''
p. 171. In the second, "nihil nisi particula conditionalis vel finalis
ad optativum rectae orationis cum dv coniunctum accedit," p. 173.
That is to say, if the optative with av can be used in an independent
proposition, as the conditional tense (see above), it may equally well
be so used with a conditional particle attached, which is the mere
addition, and nothing more, to the independent proposition, and
does not affect the construction: and this is the view I had myself
taken. And this is especially true when d, as often happens, has
lost its conditional force, and become the mere equivalent of
' that.' It also is frequently used interrogatively, as iroVepov (some
of my instances exemplify this); and as irorepov can of course be
joined with av and opt. in their ordinary sense, so likewise can tl,
when it stands for the other. There is an actual example of this in
Pseudo-Plat. Eryx. 393 B, rjpofiriv irorcpov av ijiaii/, ' whether he would
or should say'.
Mr Paley, Appendix C to Aesch. Suppl. Ed. 2 with Latin Commentary, has a note on "ws av with opt", which is withdrawn
340
A P P E N D I X (D).
in the complete edition of Aeschylus, 1861. He there distinguishes

two usages of oSs, or on-ios, av with the opt., in one of which, the
more usual, (where the particle is to be interpreted quomodo,) he
says "av semper pertinet ad verbum". This means, as I understand it, that when cos or Sircos signifies ' how', ' in what way', av
is to be construed with the verb, and the two are to "be understood in precisely the same sense and construction as they have
in an independent proposition: as I have myself also explained
it. But in the other, in which cos, oirws, are 'in order that', av
adheres closely to, and is to be construed with, the conjunction,
cusav; so that the two combined may retain the ordinary sense
of purpose, as in the case of cos av with the subjunctive. It
seems to me better not to make a difference in the explanation of
idioms to all appearance identical, provided they can be explained in
the same way; as I have endeavoured to shew. And also, I see no
reason for supposing that the conditional particle can ever be
separated from the verb that it conditions, and associated with anything else, either in conception or grammatical construction: the
condition must accompany and modify the action, which is expressed
by the verb.
CAMBRIDGE: PRINTED BY C. J. CLAY, M.A. AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS.

Retorika Görög 2 PDF

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Retorika Görög 2 PDF

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Retorika Görög 2 PDF

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Cambridge Library CoLLeCtion

Books of enduring scholarly value

Cambridge University Press has long been a pioneer in the reissuing of

CONTENTS OF VOLUME II.

T E X T AND COMMENTARY, BOOK II

On av with the optative after certain particles

ATJ\OV &pa 6TL 6 Opa.o-ip.axis re Kal Ss av fiXXos ffjrouSj) rix"7!"

Xlavrdiracn ptv odv.

rj Tradeif virb rov irt<pVKv.

TOVTO ydp (pap.ev tptitjiv ttvai.

S i ) . Aeirepov 5i ye, &roi -rl KOIUV

wa6y]p.arat dleun Tas alrias, irpooapfitiTTUv

$ A I . KaXXtora yovv Av, us i'oix\ f x ' OVTUS.

f/.v odv, w tpt\e, AXXws evdeiKvv/j.evov 17 \cyo/j.evov TXVV

EK TLVUtV {XeV OVV Oi Kai ITpOTpVKt.IV

7T6iv Kal eiraiveiv Kai y^eyeiv Kai KaTtiyopeiv Kai

In the following chapter we have a very brief account of the second 1^

3 ftetv 7ro\u yap SiaCpepei Trpos TT'KTTIV, fxaXia-ra /xev ev

IV 5. 6, interim refiigienda non modo distinctio quaestiouum est, sed

, , % ' >) p . 1378.

TO Trapdirav 'eTepa fj KaTa TO /xeyeflos eTepa' TU> ^V

he adds coo-re p.eTa (pavrao-ias IJ eXsrir T&V o-iaTrjplasv coy iyyvs

ovrav, as if 'the hope of near approaching safety' were convertible with

parison {Rhetoric, c. 2) of these three qualities as constituting the ethical

<ppovr](Tis in Rhet. and the combination of knowledge and eloquence in

Kovvra Xejovaiu, r\ (ppovifioi fxev teal eVteiKeTs ei<riv

g Kal <hiAias ev Tots 7repi TO TrdQr\ XSKTCOV

Be Ta irddn $t ova {xeTafBdWovr^

7. K TO>V nepl ras dperas biflprHievani] 'from the analysis of the

Tas Kpicreis, ots eirerai AUTTTJ Kai JJ'SOW7, olov opytj

Kal eTTt TtJov a\\u)v.

Sid <paivo/j.ivrjv oAiytoplav TWU ets avrov $ TWV

n x a TOV BVJS.W OVTO. KOI opc$a> avTiXu,

original moving agent: and this, though not expressly so called, is in

Phaedo 84 C, o 2a>Kparr)s,as iSeiv i<palvero, (as plainly appeared in his face

eoTiv t] 6p<yt], dvaytct] rov 6p<yi^6fxevov 6pyl^(T0ai aei

infra c. 4, KOI ij plv opyfj del irepl TO. Kaff

icad' enaarTov TIVI, oiov KXecovi dW ovK'dvdpwira),

national antipathies, family feuds, class prejudices, religious and political

ctKo\ovdei yap KCCI ri%ovri Tts Sta r e TOVTO KCCL OIOTI

trepi TO fxri^evos a'^iov (paivo/mevov Kctl yap TCL Katca

Kai 6 e7nipectct)v \cpalverai

f7rr)peaav, which marks the wanton character of the acts of oppression.

iva TI avTw dXX' 'iva fxt] e/ce/j/w. eVet

e'ii<f>vecrdai, xai ex. TOVTCHV afxotpos eivai

5. vjipis] which corresponds with the preceding in some points,

avToe qo-Srjvai. vfipis therefore is wanton outrage, an insult or injury

cuoj/ K.T.X. and then follows a number of examples. It is plain however

6 ovvres ov% vf3pl^ovcriv dWci TifxwpovvTai.

TJJS J(WjJS TOls vfipifyvO-lV,

OTl OLOVTai KCtKUIS

CIVTOVS V7repe")(eiv fxaWov.

cto ol veoi ical ol TT\OVO~IOI

Comp. II 12. 15, Ka\ TO. ddiK^ara

vftpiv KCU ov KctKovpylav. This character and tendency of youth is also

5e aKparevTiKa. In applying the doctrine of the 'mean' to the various

vfipiarar virepe-xjeiv yap oiovrai vfipifyvTes. vfipecos

Trpoariiceiv S' o'iovTai TTO-

'Again, v^pis is a mark of disrespect, inflicts disgrace or indignity,