SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 172035. July 4, 2012.]

FERNANDO Q. MIGUEL , petitioner, vs . THE HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN , respondent.
DECISION
BRION , J :
p

Before the Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 1 led by Fernando Q. Miguel
(petitioner), assailing the January 25, 2006 and March 27, 2006 resolutions 2 of the
Sandiganbayan. These resolutions (i) ordered the petitioner's suspension from public
of ce and (ii) denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the suspension order.
HDTISa

THE ANTECEDENT FACTS

On May 29, 1996, then Vice Mayor Mercelita M. Lucido and other local of cials 3 of
Koronadal City, South Cotabato led a letter-complaint with the Of ce of the OmbudsmanMindanao (Ombudsman) 4 charging the petitioner, among others, 5 with violation of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, in connection with the consultancy services for the
architectural aspect, the engineering design, and the construction supervision and
management of the proposed Koronadal City public market (project). 6
In a June 27, 1996 order, the Ombudsman directed the petitioner, among others, to submit
his counter-af davit. On October 23, 1996, after moving for an extension, the petitioner
filed his counter-affidavit. 7 In its July 29, 1999 resolution, the Ombudsman found probable
cause against the petitioner and some private individuals for violation of R.A. No. 3019 and
against the petitioner alone for Falsi cation of Public Document under Article 171, par. 4
of the Revised Penal Code. 8
On March 1, 2000, the Ombudsman led the corresponding informations with the
Sandiganbayan. 9 The information for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 reads:
That on 10 January 1995 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the
Municipality of Koronadal, South Cotabato, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the [petitioner], a high ranking public of cer in his
capacity as former Municipal Mayor of Koronadal, South Cotabato, and as such
while in the performance of his of cial functions, committing the offense in
relation to his of ce, taking advantage of his of cial position, conspiring and
confederating with the private [individuals] . . . acting with evident bad faith
and manifest partiality , did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally
give unwarranted bene ts and advantages to said [accused], by inviting them to
participate in the prequali cation of consultants to provide the Detailed
Architectural & Engineering Design and Construction Supervision and
Management of the proposed Koronadal Public Market, without causing the
publication of said invitation in a newspaper of general circulation, thereby
excluding other consultants from participating in said prequali cation. 10
(Emphases and underscoring added)
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On motions separately led by two of the petitioner's co-accused, 11 the Sandiganbayan

ordered the Of ce of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) to conduct a reinvestigation. On
August 21, 2000, the petitioner, through counsel, followed suit and orally moved for a
reinvestigation, which the Sandiganbayan likewise granted. The Sandiganbayan gave the
petitioner ten (10) days within which to file his counter-affidavit with the OSP. 12
Instead of submitting his counter-af davit, the petitioner asked 13 the Sandiganbayan for a
thirty-day extension to submit his counter-af davit. Shortly before the expiry of the
extension requested, the petitioner asked 14 the OSP for an additional thirty-day period to
le his counter-af davit. Despite the two extensions asked and granted, the petitioner
asked the OSP anew for a twenty-day extension period. 15
Despite the extension period asked and given, the petitioner failed to le his counteraf davit, prompting Prosecutor Norberto B. Ruiz to declare that the petitioner had waived
his right to submit countervailing evidence (April 25, 2001 resolution). On July 31, 2001,
then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto approved the resolution. 16
On August 7, 2001, Prosecutor Ruiz asked the Sandiganbayan for the arraignment and trial
of the petitioner and of the other accused private individuals. 17
On August 6, 2002, after several extensions sought and granted, the petitioner led a
Motion to Quash and/or Reinvestigation for the criminal cases against him. On February
18, 2003, the Sandiganbayan denied the petitioner's motion because of the pending OSP
reinvestigation this, despite the OSP's earlier termination of the reinvestigation for the
petitioner's continuous failure to submit his counter-af davit. 18 The petitioner did not
question the denial of his motion.
On November 3, 2004, the petitioner was arraigned; he pleaded not guilty in both criminal
cases. 19
On April 28, 2005, the OSP led a Motion to Suspend [the petitioner] Pendente Lite. On
June 27, 2005, the petitioner led his "Vigorous Opposition" based on the "obvious and
fatal defect of the [i]nformation" in failing to allege that the giving of unwarranted bene ts
and advantages was done through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. 20
HEIcDT

On January 25, 2006, the Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed resolution 21

suspending the petitioner pendente lite
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Prosecution's Motion is GRANTED. As
prayed for, the Court hereby orders the suspension of [the petitioner] from his
position as City Mayor, Koronadal City, South Cotabato, and from any other public
position he now holds. His suspension shall be for a period of ninety (90) days
only. 22

On February 2, 2006, the petitioner moved for reconsideration of his suspension order and
demanded for a pre-suspension hearing. 23 The Sandiganbayan denied his motion, 24
prompting him to le this certiorari petition to challenge the validity of his suspension
order.
THE PETITION
The petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in ordering his
suspension despite the failure of the information to allege that the giving of unwarranted
bene ts and advantages by the petitioner was made through "manifest partiality, evident
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bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence." He alleges that the phrases "evident bad faith"
and "manifest partiality" actually refers not to him, but to his co-accused, 25 rendering the
information fatally defective.
The petitioner bewails the lack of hearing before the issuance of his suspension order.
Citing Luciano, et al. v. Hon. Mariano, etc., et al. , 26 he claims that "[n]owhere in the records
of the [case] can [one] see any order or resolution requiring the [p]etitioner to show cause
at a speci c date of hearing why he should not be ordered suspended." 27 For the
petitioner, the requirement of a pre-suspension hearing can only be satis ed if the
Sandiganbayan ordered an actual hearing to settle the "defect" in the information.
CIaHDc

THE OSP'S COMMENT

The OSP argues for the suf ciency of the information since all the elements of the offense
under Section 3 (b) of R.A. No. 3019 are speci cally pleaded by way of ultimate facts.
These elements are:
1.

The petitioner was the Municipal Mayor of Koronadal, South Cotabato

at the time material to the acts complained of;

2.

The petitioner acted with manifest partiality and evident bad faith
when he invited only his co-accused private individuals to participate
in the prequali cation of consultants for the project instead of
publishing it in a newspaper of general circulation; and

3.

The petitioner's actions, performed in relation to his of ce, gave

unwarranted benefits and advantages to his co-accused. 28

The OSP faults the petitioner for his attempt to mislead the Court on the suf ciency of
the allegations in the information, by conveniently failing to cite the phrase "acting with
evident bad faith and manifest partiality" when the petitioner quoted the "relevant"
portions of the information in his petition.
Citing Juan v. People, 29 the OSP argues that while no actual pre-suspension hearing was
conducted, the events preceding the issuance of the suspension order already satis ed
the purpose of conducting a pre-suspension hearing i.e., basically, to determine the
validity of the information. Here, the petitioner was afforded his right to preliminary
investigation both by the Ombudsman and by the OSP (when the petitioner moved for a
reinvestigation with the Sandiganbayan); the acts for which the petitioner was charged
constitute a violation of R.A. No. 3019 and Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code; and
the petitioner already moved to quash the information, although unsuccessfully, after he
had been declared to have waived his right to submit countervailing evidence in the
reinvestigation by the OSP. 30
ISSUES
There are only two issues presented for our resolution:

DaAIHC

1.

Whether the information, charging the petitioner with violation of

Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019, is valid; and

2.

If it is valid, whether the absence of an actual pre-suspension hearing

renders invalid the suspension order against the petitioner.
THE COURT'S RULING

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We dismiss the petition for failure to establish any grave abuse of discretion in the
issuance of the assailed resolutions.

The information for violation of R.A. No. 3019 is valid

In deference to the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and the
cause of the accusation against him, 31 Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure (Rules) 3 2 requires, inter alia, that the information shall state the
designation of the offense given by the statute and the acts or omissions imputed which
constitute the offense charged. Additionally, the Rules requires that these acts or
omissions and its attendant circumstances "must be stated in ordinary and concise
language" and "in terms suf cient to enable a person of common understanding to know
what offense is being charged . . . and for the court to pronounce judgment." 33
The test of the information's suf ciency is whether the crime is described in intelligible
terms and with such particularity with reasonable certainty so that the accused is duly
informed of the offense charged. In particular, whether an information validly charges an
offense depends on whether the material facts alleged in the complaint or information
shall establish the essential elements of the offense charged as de ned in the law. The
raison d'etre of the requirement in the Rules is to enable the accused to suitably prepare
his defense. 34
In arguing against the validity of the information, the petitioner appears to go beyond the
standard of a "person of common understanding" in appreciating the import of the phrase
"acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality." A reading of the information clearly
reveals that the phrase "acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality" was merely a
continuation of the prior allegation of the acts of the petitioner, and that he ultimately
acted with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in giving unwarranted bene ts and
advantages to his co-accused private individuals. This is what a plain and non-legalistic
reading of the information would yield.
Notably, in his petition, the petitioner would have us believe that this elemental phrase was
actually omitted in the information 35 when, in his reaction to the OSP's comment, what the
petitioner actually disputes is simply the clarity of the phrase's position, in relation with the
other averments in the information. Given the supposed ambiguity of the subject being
quali ed by the phrase "acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality," the remedy of
the petitioner, if at all, is merely to move for a bill of particulars and not for the quashal of
an information which sufficiently alleges the elements of the offense charged. 36

The pre-suspension order is valid

Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 reads:
Section 13.
Suspension and loss of bene ts. Any public of cer against
whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under
the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending in court, shall be
suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all
retirement or gratuity bene ts under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be
entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and bene ts which he failed to
receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings
have been filed against him.

While the suspension of a public of cer under this provision is mandatory, 37 the
suspension requires a prior hearing to determine "the validity of the information" 3 8 led
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against him, "taking into account the serious and far reaching consequences of a
suspension of an elective public of cial even before his conviction." 39 The accused public
of cial's right to challenge the validity of the information before a suspension order may
be issued includes the right to challenge the (i) validity of the criminal proceeding leading
to the ling of an information against him, and (ii) propriety of his prosecution on the
ground that the acts charged do not constitute a violation of R.A. No. 3019 or of the
provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal Code. 40
AEcTaS

In Luciano v. Mariano 41 that the petitioner relied upon, the Court required, "by way of broad
guidelines for the lower courts in the exercise of the power of suspension," that
(c)
. . . upon the ling of such information, the trial court should issue an
order with proper notice requiring the accused officer to show cause at a
speci c date of hearing why he should not be ordered suspended from of ce
pursuant to the cited mandatory provisions of the Act. Where either the
prosecution seasonably les a motion for an order of suspension or the
accused in turn les a motion to quash the information or challenges
the validity thereof, such show-cause order of the trial court would no
longer be necessary. What is indispensable is that the trial court duly hear the
parties at a hearing held for determining the validity of the information, and
thereafter hand down its ruling, issuing the corresponding order of suspension
should it uphold the validity of the information or withholding such suspension in
the contrary case.
(d)
No speci c rules need be laid down for such pre-suspension
hearing. Suf ce it to state that the accused should be given a fair and
adequate opportunity to challenge the validity of the criminal proceedings
against him, e.g., that he has not been afforded the right of due preliminary
investigation; that the acts for which he stands charged do not constitute a
violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 or of the bribery provisions of
the Revised Penal Code which would warrant his mandatory suspension from
of ce under section 13 of the Act; or he may present a motion to quash the
information on any of the grounds provided in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.
(Emphasis supplied)

The petitioner questions the absence of any show cause order issued by the
Sandiganbayan before his suspension in of ce was ordered. As clear as the day, however,
Luciano considered it unnecessary for the trial court to issue a show cause order when the
motion, seeking the suspension of the accused pendente lite, has been submitted by the
prosecution, as in the present case.
The purpose of the law in requiring a pre-suspension hearing is to determine the validity of
the information so that the trial court can have a basis to either suspend the accused and
proceed with the trial on the merits of the case, withhold the suspension and dismiss the
case, or correct any part of the proceedings that impairs its validity. That hearing is similar
to a challenge to the validity of the information by way of a motion to quash. 42
While a pre-suspension hearing is aimed at securing for the accused fair and adequate
opportunity to challenge the validity of the information or the regularity of the
proceedings against him, 43 Luciano likewise emphasizes that no hard and fast rule exists
in regulating its conduct. 4 4 With the purpose of a pre-suspension hearing in mind, the
absence of an actual hearing alone cannot be determinative of the validity of a suspension
order.
TSEAaD

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In Bedruz v. Sandiganbayan , 45 the Court considered the opposition of the accused (to the
prosecution's motion to suspend pendente lite) as suf cient to dispense with the need to
actually set the prosecution's motion for hearing. The same conclusion was reached in
Juan v. People, 46 where the Court ruled:
In the case at bar, while there was no pre-suspension hearing held to determine
the validity of the Informations that had been led against petitioners, we believe
that the numerous pleadings led for and against them have achieved the goal of
this procedure. The right to due process is satis ed nor just by an oral hearing but
by the ling and the consideration by the court of the parties' pleadings,
memoranda and other position papers.

Since a pre-suspension hearing is basically a due process requirement, when an accused

public of cial is given an adequate opportunity to be heard on his possible defenses
against the mandatory suspension under R.A. No. 3019, then an accused would have no
reason to complain that no actual hearing was conducted. 47 It is well settled that "to be
heard" does not only mean oral arguments in court; one may be heard also through
pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, has
been accorded, no denial of procedural due process exists. 48
In the present case, the petitioner (i) led his Vigorous Opposition (to the OSP's Motion to
Suspend Accused Pendente Lite), and after receiving an adverse ruling from the
Sandiganbayan, (ii) moved for reconsideration of the suspension order issued against him,
and (iii) led a Reply to the OSP's Opposition to his plea for reconsideration. 49 Given this
opportunity, we nd that the petitioner's continued demand for the conduct of an actual
pre-suspension hearing based on the same alleged "defect in the information," 50 which
we have found wanting has legally nothing to anchor itself on.
Another reason that militates against the petitioner's position relates to the nature of
Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019; it is no t a penal provision that would call for a liberal
interpretation in favor of the accused public of cial and a strict construction against the
State. 51 The suspension required under this provision is n o t a penalty , as it is not
imposed as a result of judicial proceedings; in fact, if acquitted, the accused of cial shall
be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and bene ts which he failed to receive
during his suspension. 52
ESTDcC

Rather, the suspension under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 is a mere preventive measure
5 3 that arises from the legal presumption that unless the accused is suspended, he may
frustrate his prosecution or commit further acts of malfeasance or do both, in the same
way that upon a nding that there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof, the law requires the judge to
issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused. 54
Suspension under R.A. No. 3019 being a mere preventive measure whose duration shall in
no case exceed ninety (90) days, 55 the adequacy of the opportunity to contest the validity
of the information and of the proceedings that preceded its filing vis--vis the merits of the
defenses of the accused cannot be measured alone by the absence or presence of an
actual hearing. An opportunity to be heard on one's defenses, however unmeritorious it
may be, against the suspension mandated by law equally and suf ciently serves both the
due process right of the accused and the mandatory nature of the suspension required by
law.
Lest it be forgotten, Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 reinforces the principle enshrined in the
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Constitution that a public of ce is a public trust. 5 6 In light of the constitutional principle

underlying the imposition of preventive suspension of a public of cer charged under a
valid information and the nature of this suspension, the petitioner's demand for a trial-type
hearing in the present case would only overwhelmingly frustrate, rather than promote, the
orderly and speedy dispensation of justice.
WHEREFORE , we hereby DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Perez, Sereno and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1.

RULES OF COURT.

2.

Penned by Associate Justice Godofredo L. Legaspi, and concurred in by Associate

Justices Efren N. dela Cruz and Norberto Y. Geraldez, Sr.

3.

The Sangguniang Bayan members-complainants are as follows: Rose Dideles, Rene

Jumilla, Pablito Subere and Edwin Abris; rollo, p. 5.

4.

Id. at 83.

5.

Gaspar E. Nepomuceno, Jesus G. Casus, Ernesto R. Lagdameo, Jr., Bonifacio M.

Madarcos, and Vinci Nicholas R. Villaseor; id. at 103.

6.

Id. at 110-113.

7.

Id. at 124-125.

8.

Id. at 5 and 83.

9.

The case for violation of R.A. No. 3019 was docketed as Criminal Case No. 25819 (id. at
103). The Office of the Special Prosecutor filed a Motion to drop Ernesto R. Lagdameo,
Jr., Bonifacio M. Madarcos, Jesus G. Casus and Vinci Nicholas R. Villaseor from the
Information (id. at 106 and 108). The falsification case was docketed as Criminal Case
No. 25820 (id. at 103).

10.
11.

Id. at 117.
On March 3, 2000 and June 5, 2000, Bonifacio M. Madarcos and Ernesto R. Lagdameo,
Jr., respectively, filed a Motion for Reinvestigation; id. at 103-104.

12.

Id. at 104.

13.

Dated August 30, 2000; ibid.

14.

Dated September 28, 2000; id. at 105.

15.

Dated October 29, 2000; ibid.

16.

Id. at 106.

17.

Ibid.

18.

Id. at 27.

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19.

Id. at 6.

20.

Id. at 6-7.

21.

Id. at 21-24.

22.

Id. at 24.

23.

Id. at 13.

24.

Id. at 26-28.

25.

Id. at 67.

26.

148-B Phil. 178 (1971).

27.

Rollo, pp. 13-14.

28.

Rollo, p. 45.

29.

379 Phil. 125 (2000).

30.

Citing Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, 324 Phil. 151 (1996).

31.

CONSTITUTION, Article III, Section 14 (2).

32.

Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:

SEC. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. A complaint or information is sufficient
if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute;
the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place
where the offense was committed.
When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in
the complaint or information.

33.

Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:

SEC. 9. Cause of the accusation. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting
the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in
ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute
but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what
offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstance and for
the court to pronounce judgment.

34.

Lazarte, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 180122, March 13, 2009, 581 SCRA 431.

35.

See Dela Chica v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 144823, December 8, 2003, 417 SCRA 242.

36.
37.
38.

REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Rule 116, Section 9; and Romualdez v.

Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152259, July 29, 2004, 435 SCRA 371, 388-389.

Flores v. Layosa, G.R. No. 154714, August 12, 2004, 436 SCRA 337, 345.
Luciano, et al. v. Hon. Mariano, etc, et al., supra note 26, at 183-184; and People v.
Albano, Nos. L-45376-77, July 26, 1988, 163 SCRA 511, 517.

39.

Ibid.

40.

People v. Albano, supra note 38, at 518-519; and Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, supra

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note 30, at 179.

41.

Supra note 26, at 192-193.

42.

Talaga, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 169888, November 11, 2008, 570 SCRA 622,
632.

43.

Segovia v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 124067, March 27, 1998, 288 SCRA 328, 339.

44.

Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 128055, April 18, 2001, 356 SCRA 636, 645; and
Flores v. Layosa, G.R. No. 154714, August 12, 2004, supra note 37, at 345-346.

45.

G.R. No. 161640, December 9, 2005, 513 Phil. 400 (2005).

46.

Supra note 29, at 140.

47.

Flores v. Layosa, supra note 37, at 345-346.

48.

Tan v. Atty. Balon, Jr., A.C. No. 6483, August 31, 2007, 531 SCRA 645, 655-656.

49.

Rollo, p. 109.

50.

Id. at 95.

51.

Villaseor v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 180700, March 4, 2008, 547 SCRA 658, 666-668.

52.

Bayot v. Sandiganbayan, No. L-61776 to No. L-61861, March 23, 1984, 128 SCRA 383.

53.

Villaseor v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 50, at 666-667; and Segovia v.

Sandiganbayan, supra note 43, at 336.

54.

Bolastig v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 110503, August 4, 1994, 235 SCRA 103, 108.

55.

Deloso v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 86899-903, May 15, 1989, 173 SCRA 409, 419.

56.

CONSTITUTION, Article XI, Section 1; Berona v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 142456, July
27, 2004, 435 SCRA 303.

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