Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 132601 January 19, 1999

LEO ECHEGARAY, petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL., respondents.
RESOLUTION

PUNO, J.:
For resolution are public respondents' Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution of this Court dated January 4, 1990 temporarily restraining the execution of
petitioner and Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. It is the
submission of public respondents that:
1. The Decision in this case having become final and executory, its execution
enters the exclusive ambit of authority of the executive authority. The
issuance of the TRO may be construed as trenching on that sphere of
executive authority;
2. The issuance of the temporary restraining order . . . creates dangerous
precedent as there will never be an end to litigation because there is
always a possibility that Congress may repeal a law.
3. Congress had earlier deliberated extensively on the death penalty bill. To
be certain, whatever question may now be raised on the Death Penalty
Law before the present Congress within the 6-month period given by this
Honorable Court had in all probability been fully debated upon . . .
4. Under the time honored maxim lex futuro, judex praeterito, the law looks
forward while the judge looks at the past, . . . the Honorable Court in
issuing the TRO has transcended its power of judicial review.

5. At this moment, certain circumstances/supervening events transpired to

the effect that the repeal or modification of the law imposing death penalty
has become nil, to wit:
a. The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will veto
any law imposing the death penalty involving heinous crimes.
b. The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are against
the repeal of the law;
c. The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law only bears
his signature and that of Senator Pimentel.
In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, public respondents
attached a copy of House Resolution No. 629 introduced by Congressman Golez
entitled "Resolution expressing the sense of the House of Representative to reject any
move to review Republic Act No. 7659 which provided for the re-imposition of death
penalty, notifying the Senate, the Judiciary and the Executive Department of the position
of the House of Representative on this matter, and urging the President to exhaust all
means under the law to immediately implement the death penalty law." The Resolution
was concurred in by one hundred thirteen (113) congressman.
In their Consolidated Comment, petitioner contends: (1) the stay order. . . is within the
scope of judicial power and duty and does not trench on executive powers nor on
congressional prerogatives; (2) the exercise by this Court of its power to stay execution
was reasonable; (3) the Court did not lose jurisdiction to address incidental matters
involved or arising from the petition; (4) public respondents are estopped from
challenging the Court's jurisdiction; and (5) there is no certainty that the law on capital
punishment will not be repealed or modified until Congress convenes and considers all
the various resolutions and bills filed before it.
Prefatorily, the Court likes to emphasize that the instant motions concern matters that
are not incidents in G.R. No. 117472, where the death penalty was imposed on
petitioner on automatic review of his conviction by this Court. The instant motions were
filed in this case, G.R. No. 132601, where the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8177 (Lethal
Injection Law) and its implementing rules and regulations was assailed by petitioner. For
this reason, the Court in its Resolution of January 4, 1999 merely noted the Motion to
Set Aside of Rodessa "Baby" R. Echegaray dated January 7, 1999 and Entry of
Appearance of her counsel dated January 5, 1999. Clearly, she has no legal standing to
intervene in the case at bar, let alone the fact that the interest of the State is properly
represented by the Solicitor General.
We shall now resolve the basic issues raised by the public respondents.
I

First. We do not agree with the sweeping submission of the public respondents that this
Court lost its jurisdiction over the case at bar and hence can no longer restrain the
execution of the petitioner. Obviously, public respondents are invoking the rule that final
judgments can no longer be altered in accord with the principle that "it is just as
important that there should be a place to end as there should be a place to begin
litigation." 1 To start with, the Court is not changing even a comma of its final Decision. It
is appropriate to examine with precision the metes and bounds of the Decision of this
Court that became final. These metes and bounds are clearly spelled out in the Entry of
Judgment in this case, viz:
ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
This is to certify that on October 12, 1998 a decision rendered in the
above-entitled case was filed in this Office, the dispositive part of which
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED insofar as petitioner
seeks to declare the assailed statute (Republic Act No.
8177) as unconstitutional; but GRANTED insofar as Sections
17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement
Republic Act No. 8177 are concerned, which are hereby
declared INVALID because (a) Section 17 contravenes
Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659; and (b) Section 19 fails
to provide for review and approval of the Lethal Injection
Manual by the Secretary of Justice, and unjustifiably makes
the manual confidential, hence unavailable to interested
parties including the accused/convict and counsel.
Respondents are hereby enjoined from enforcing and
implementing Republic Act No. 8177 until the aforesaid
Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to
Implement Republic Act No. 8177 are appropriately
amended, revised and/or corrected in accordance with this
Decision.
SO ORDERED.
and that the same has, on November 6, 1988 become final and executory
and is hereby recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgment.
Manila, Philippine.
Clerk
of
Court

By:
(SGD)
TERE
SITA
G.
DIMAI
SIP
Acting
Chief
Judici
al
Recor
ds
Office
The records will show that before the Entry of Judgment, the Secretary of Justice, the
Honorable Serafin Cuevas, filed with this Court on October 21, 1998 a Compliance
where he submitted the Amended Rules and Regulations implementing R.A. No. 8177
in compliance with our Decision. On October 28, 1998, Secretary Cuevas submitted a
Manifestation informing the Court that he has caused the publication of the said
Amended Rules and Regulations as required by the Administrative Code. It is crystalline
that the Decision of this Court that became final and unalterable mandated: (1) that R.A.
No. 8177 is not unconstitutional; (2) that sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and
Regulations to Implement R.A. No. 8177 are invalid, and (3) R.A. No. 8177 cannot be
enforced and implemented until sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to
Implement R.A. No. 8177 are amended. It is also daylight clear that this Decision was
not altered a whit by this Court. Contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General, the
rule on finality of judgment cannot divest this Court of its jurisdiction to execute and
enforce the same judgment. Retired Justice Camilo Quiason synthesized the well
established jurisprudence on this issue as
follows: 2
xxx xxx xxx
the finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court has lost all its
powers nor the case. By the finality of the judgment, what the court loses
is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Even after the
judgment has become final the court retains its jurisdiction to execute and
enforce it. 3There is a difference between the jurisdiction of the court to
execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the
same. The former continues even after the judgment has become final for
the purpose of enforcement of judgment; the latter terminates when the
judgment becomes final. 4 . . . For after the judgment has become final

facts and circumstances may transpire which can render the execution
unjust or impossible.5
In truth, the arguments of the Solicitor General has long been rejected by this Court. As
aptly pointed out by the petitioner, as early as 1915, this Court has unequivocably ruled
in the case of Director of Prisons v. Judge of First Instance, 6 viz:
This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in various decisions, which
constitute jurisprudence on the subject, that in criminal cases, after the
sentence has been pronounced and the period for reopening the same
cannot change or alter its judgment, as its jurisdiction has terminated . . .
When in cases of appeal or review the cause has been returned thereto
for execution, in the event that the judgment has been affirmed, it
performs a ministerial duty in issuing the proper order. But it does not
follow from this cessation of functions on the part of the court with
reference to the ending of the cause that the judicial authority terminates
by having then passed completely to the Executive. The particulars of the
execution itself, which are certainly not always included in the judgment
and writ of execution, in any event are absolutely under the control of the
judicial authority, while the executive has no power over the person of the
convict except to provide for carrying out of the penalty and to pardon.
Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at bar, which is
that of execution of a capital sentence, it must be accepted as a
hypothesis that postponement of the date can be requested. There can be
no dispute on this point. It is a well-known principle that notwithstanding
the order of execution and the executory nature thereof on the date set or
at the proper time, the date therefor can be postponed, even in sentences
of death. Under the common law this postponement can be ordered in
three ways: (1) By command of the King; (2) by discretion (arbitrio) of the
court; and (3) by mandate of the law. It is sufficient to state this principle of
the common law to render impossible that assertion in absolute terms that
after the convict has once been placed in jail the trial court can not reopen
the case to investigate the facts that show the need for postponement. If
one of the ways is by direction of the court, it is acknowledged that even
after the date of the execution has been fixed, and notwithstanding the
general rule that after the (court) has performed its ministerial duty of
ordering the execution . . . and its part is ended, if however a circumstance
arises that ought to delay the execution, and there is an imperative duty to
investigate the emergency and to order a postponement. Then the
question arises as to whom the application for postponing the execution
ought to be addressed while the circumstances is under investigation and
so to who has jurisdiction to make the investigation.
The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction. It
cannot be the subject of substantial subtraction for our Constitution 7 vests the entirety

of judicial power in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established
by law. To be sure, the important part of a litigation, whether civil or criminal, is the
process of execution of decisions where supervening events may change the
circumstance of the parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the
litigants to prevent unfairness. It is because of these unforseen, supervening
contingencies that courts have been conceded the inherent and necessary power of
control of its processes and orders to make them conformable to law and justice. 8 For
this purpose, Section 6 of Rule 135 provides that "when by law jurisdiction is conferred
on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to
carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer and if the procedure to be
followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law or by
these rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which
appears conformable to the spirit of said law or rules." It bears repeating that what the
Court restrained temporarily is the execution of its own Decision to give it reasonable
time to check its fairness in light of supervening events in Congress as alleged by
petitioner. The Court, contrary to popular misimpression, did not restrain the effectivity of
a law enacted by Congress.1wphi1.nt
The more disquieting dimension of the submission of the public respondents that this
Court has no jurisdiction to restrain the execution of petitioner is that it can diminish the
independence of the judiciary. Since the implant of republicanism in our soil, our courts
have been conceded the jurisdiction to enforce their final decisions. In accord with this
unquestioned jurisdiction, this Court promulgated rules concerning pleading, practice
and procedure which, among others, spelled out the rules on execution of judgments.
These rules are all predicated on the assumption that courts have the inherent,
necessary and incidental power to control and supervise the process of execution of
their decisions. Rule 39 governs execution, satisfaction and effects of judgments in civil
cases. Rule 120 governs judgments in criminal cases. It should be stressed that the
power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure was granted by our
Constitutions to this Court to enhance its independence, for in the words of Justice
Isagani Cruz "without independence and integrity, courts will lose that popular trust so
essential to the maintenance of their vigor as champions of justice." 9 Hence, our
Constitutions continuously vested this power to this Court for it enhances its
independence. Under the 1935 Constitution, the power of this Court to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure was granted but it appeared to be coexistent with legislative power for it was subject to the power of Congress to repeal,
alter or supplement. Thus, its Section 13, Article VIII provides:
Sec.13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the
admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts
of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby
repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the
power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress
have the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning

pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law
in the Philippines.
The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear on its
surface. In In re Cunanan 10Congress in the exercise of its power to amend rules of the
Supreme Court regarding admission to the practice of law, enacted the Bar Flunkers Act
of 1953 11 which considered as a passing grade, the average of 70% in the bar
examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951 and 71% in the 1952 bar
examinations. This Court struck down the law as unconstitutional. In his ponencia, Mr.
Justice Diokno held that " . . . the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment a
judgment promulgated by this Court during the aforecited years affecting the bar
candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments
even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not the
legislative nor executive department, that may do so. Any attempt on the part of these
department would be a clear usurpation of its function, as is the case with the law in
question." 12 The venerable jurist further ruled: "It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate
power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the
law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities
say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license." By its ruling, this Court
qualified the absolutist tone of the power of Congress to "repeal, alter or supplement the
rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of
law in the Philippines.
The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973 Constitution. For
the 1973 Constitution reiterated the power of this Court "to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, . . . which, however, may be repealed,
altered or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa . . . ." More completely, Section
5(2)5 of its Article X provided:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec.5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, and the
integration of the Bar, which, however, may be
repealed, altered, or supplemented by the
Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall provide
a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the
speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform
for all courts of the same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights.

Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the independence of
the judiciary by giving to it the additional power to promulgate rules governing the
integration of the Bar. 13
The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among
others, it enhanced the rule making power of this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII
provides:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection
and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts,
the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the
speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform
for all courts of the same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and
quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective
unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was
given the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the first time the power to
disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most
importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or
supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court
with Congress, more so with the Executive. If the manifest intent of the 1987
Constitution is to strengthen the independence of the judiciary, it is inutile to urge, as
public respondents do, that this Court has no jurisdiction to control the process of
execution of its decisions, a power conceded to it and which it has exercised since time
immemorial.
To be sure, it is too late in the day for public respondents to assail the jurisdiction of this
Court to control and supervise the implementation of its decision in the case at bar. As
aforestated, our Decision became final and executory on November 6, 1998. The
records reveal that after November 6, 1998, or on December 8, 1998, no less than the
Secretary of Justice recognized the jurisdiction of this Court by filing a Manifestation and

Urgent Motion to compel the trial judge, the Honorable Thelma A. Ponferrada, RTC, Br.
104, Quezon City to provide him ". . . a certified true copy of the Warrant of Execution
dated November 17, 1998 bearing the designated execution day of death convict Leo
Echegaray and allow (him) to reveal or announce the contents thereof, particularly the
execution date fixed by such trial court to the public when requested." The relevant
portions of the Manifestation and Urgent Motion filed by the Secretary of Justice
beseeching this Court "to provide the appropriate relief" state:
xxx xxx xxx
5. Instead of filing a comment on Judge Ponferrada's
Manifestation however, herein respondent is submitting the
instant Manifestation and Motion (a) to stress, inter alia, that
the non-disclosure of the date of execution deprives herein
respondent of vital information necessary for the exercise of
his statutory powers, as well as renders nugatory the
constitutional guarantee that recognizes the people's right to
information of public concern, and (b) to ask this Honorable
Court to provide the appropriate relief.
6. The non-disclosure of the date of execution deprives
herein respondent of vital information necessary for the
exercise of his power of supervision and control over the
Bureau of Corrections pursuant to Section 39, Chapter 8,
Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, in relation to
Title III, Book IV of such Administrative Code, insofar as the
enforcement of Republic Act No. 8177 and the Amended
Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177
is concerned and for the discharge of the mandate of seeing
to it that laws and rules relative to the execution of sentence
are faithfully observed.
7. On the other hand, the willful omission to reveal the
information about the precise day of execution limits the
exercise by the President of executive clemency powers
pursuant to Section 19, Article VII (Executive Department) of
the 1987 Philippine Constitution and Article 81 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, which provides that the
death sentence shall be carried out "without prejudice to the
exercise by the President of his executive powers at all
times." (Emphasis supplied) For instance, the President
cannot grant reprieve, i.e., postpone the execution of a
sentence to a day certain (People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 110
[1937]) in the absence of a precise date to reckon with. The
exercise of such clemency power, at this time, might even
work to the prejudice of the convict and defeat the purpose

of the Constitution and the applicable statute as when the

date at execution set by the President would be earlier than
that designated by the court.
8. Moreover, the deliberate non-disclosure of information
about the date of execution to herein respondent and the
public violates Section 7, Article III (Bill of Rights) and
Section 28, Article II (Declaration of Principles and State
Policies) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which read:
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of
public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official
acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development shall, be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may
be provided by law.
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law,
the State adopts and implements a policy of full public
disclosure of all transactions involving public interest.
9. The "right to information" provision is self-executing. It
supplies "the rules by means of which the right to information
may be enjoyed (Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional
Limitations, 167 [1972]) by guaranteeing the right and
mandating the duty to afford access to sources of
information. Hence, the fundamental right therein recognized
may be asserted by the people upon the ratification of the
Constitution without need for any ancillary act of the
Legislature (Id., at p. 165) What may be provided for by the
Legislature are reasonable conditions and limitations upon
the access to be afforded which must, of necessity, be
consistent with the declared State policy of full public
disclosure of all transactions involving public interest
(Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 28). However, it cannot be
overemphasized that whatever limitation may be prescribed
by the Legislature, the right and the duty under Art. III, Sec. 7
have become operative and enforceable by virtue of the
adoption of the New Charter." (Decision of the Supreme
Court En Banc in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 150
SCRA 530, 534-535 [1987].
The same motion to compel Judge Ponferrada to reveal the date of execution of
petitioner Echegaray was filed by his counsel, Atty. Theodore Te, on December 7, 1998.
He invoked his client's right to due process and the public's right to information. The

Solicitor General, as counsel for public respondents, did not oppose petitioner's motion
on the ground that this Court has no more jurisdiction over the process of execution of
Echegaray. This Court granted the relief prayed for by the Secretary of Justice and by
the counsel of the petitioner in its Resolution of December 15, 1998. There was not a
whimper of protest from the public respondents and they are now estopped from
contending that this Court has lost its jurisdiction to grant said relief. The jurisdiction of
this Court does not depend on the convenience of litigants.
II
Second. We likewise reject the public respondents' contention that the "decision in this
case having become final and executory, its execution enters the exclusive ambit of
authority of the executive department . . .. By granting the TRO, the Honorable Court
has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive function." 14 Public respondents cite
as their authority for this proposition, Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution which
reads:
Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this
Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and
pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a
majority of all the members of the Congress.
The text and tone of this provision will not yield to the interpretation suggested by the
public respondents. The provision is simply the source of power of the President to
grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after
conviction by final judgment. It also provides the authority for the President to grant
amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress. The
provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the
enforcement of their decisions after their finality. In truth, an accused who has been
convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights and these rights can be
claimed in the appropriate courts. For instance, a death convict who become insane
after his final conviction cannot be executed while in a state of insanity. 15 As observed
by Antieau, "today, it is generally assumed that due process of law will prevent the
government from executing the death sentence upon a person who is insane at the time
of execution." 16 The suspension of such a death sentence is undisputably an exercise
of judicial power. It is not a usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though its
effects is the same the temporary suspension of the execution of the death convict.
In the same vein, it cannot be denied that Congress can at any time amend R.A. No.
7659 by reducing the penalty of death to life imprisonment. The effect of such an
amendment is like that of commutation of sentence. But by no stretch of the imagination
can the exercise by Congress of its plenary power to amend laws be considered as a
violation of the power of the President to commute final sentences of conviction. The
powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death
convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than
the right to life. Indeed, in various States in the United States, laws have even been

enacted expressly granting courts the power to suspend execution of convicts and their
constitutionality has been upheld over arguments that they infringe upon the power of
the President to grant reprieves. For the public respondents therefore to contend that
only the Executive can protect the right to life of an accused after his final conviction is
to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three branches of our
government.
III
Third. The Court's resolution temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner must be
put in its proper perspective as it has been grievously distorted especially by those who
make a living by vilifying courts. Petitioner filed his Very Urgent Motion for Issuance of
TRO on December 28, 1998 at about 11:30 p.m. He invoked several grounds, viz: (1)
that his execution has been set on January 4, the first working day of 1999; (b) that
members of Congress had either sought for his executive clemency and/or review or
repeal of the law authorizing capital punishment; (b.1) that Senator Aquilino Pimentel's
resolution asking that clemency be granted to the petitioner and that capital punishment
be reviewed has been concurred by thirteen (13) other senators; (b.2) Senate President
Marcelo Fernan and Senator Miriam S. Defensor have publicly declared they would
seek a review of the death penalty law; (b.3) Senator Paul Roco has also sought the
repeal of capital punishment, and (b.4) Congressman Salacrib Baterina, Jr., and thirty
five (35) other congressmen are demanding review of the same law.
When the Very Urgent Motion was filed, the Court was already in its traditional recess
and would only resume session on January 18, 1999. Even then, Chief Justice Hilario
Davide, Jr. called the Court to a Special Session on January 4, 1991 17 at 10. a.m. to
deliberate on petitioner's Very Urgent Motion. The Court hardly had five (5) hours to
resolve petitioner's motion as he was due to be executed at 3 p.m. Thus, the Court had
the difficult problem of resolving whether petitioner's allegations about the moves in
Congress to repeal or amend the Death Penalty Law are mere speculations or not. To
the Court's majority, there were good reasons why the Court should not immediately
dismiss petitioner's allegations as mere speculations and surmises. They noted that
petitioner's allegations were made in a pleading under oath and were widely publicized
in the print and broadcast media. It was also of judicial notice that the 11th Congress is
a new Congress and has no less than one hundred thirty (130) new members whose
views on capital punishment are still unexpressed. The present Congress is therefore
different from the Congress that enacted the Death Penalty Law (R.A. No. 7659) and
the Lethal Injection Law (R.A. No. 8177). In contrast, the Court's minority felt that
petitioner's allegations lacked clear factual bases. There was hardly a time to verify
petitioner's allegations as his execution was set at 3 p.m. And verification from
Congress was impossible as Congress was not in session. Given these constraints, the
Court's majority did not rush to judgment but took an extremely cautious stance by
temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner. The suspension was temporary
"until June 15, 1999, coeval with the constitutional duration of the present regular
session of Congress, unless it sooner becomes certain that no repeal or modification of
the law is going to be made." The extreme caution taken by the Court was compelled,

among others, by the fear that any error of the Court in not stopping the execution of the
petitioner will preclude any further relief for all rights stop at the graveyard. As life was
at, stake, the Court refused to constitutionalize haste and the hysteria of some
partisans. The Court's majority felt it needed the certainty that the legislature will not
petitioner as alleged by his counsel. It was believed that law and equitable
considerations demand no less before allowing the State to take the life of one its
citizens.
The temporary restraining order of this Court has produced its desired result, i.e., the
crystallization of the issue whether Congress is disposed to review capital punishment.
The public respondents, thru the Solicitor General, cite posterior events that negate
beyond doubt the possibility that Congress will repeal or amend the death penalty law.
He names these supervening events as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
a. The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will veto any law
imposing the death penalty involving heinous crimes.
b. The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are against the
repeal of the law;
c. The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law only bears his
signature and that of Senator Pimentel. 18
In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, the Solicitor General
cited House Resolution No. 629 introduced by Congressman Golez entitled "Resolution
expressing the sense of the House of Representatives to reject any move to review R.A.
No. 7659 which provided for the reimposition of death penalty, notifying the Senate, the
Judiciary and the Executive Department of the position of the House of Representative
on this matter and urging the President to exhaust all means under the law to
immediately implement the death penalty law." The Golez resolution was signed by 113
congressman as of January 11, 1999. In a marathon session yesterday that extended
up 3 o'clock in the morning, the House of Representative with minor, the House of
Representative with minor amendments formally adopted the Golez resolution by an
overwhelming vote. House Resolution No. 25 expressed the sentiment that the House ".
. . does not desire at this time to review Republic Act 7659." In addition, the President
has stated that he will not request Congress to ratify the Second Protocol in review of
the prevalence of heinous crimes in the country. In light of these developments, the
Court's TRO should now be lifted as it has served its legal and humanitarian purpose.
A last note. In 1922, the famous Clarence Darrow predicted that ". . . the question of
capital punishment had been the subject of endless discussion and will probably never
be settled so long as men believe in punishment." 19 In our clime and time when heinous
crimes continue to be unchecked, the debate on the legal and moral predicates of
capital punishment has been regrettably blurred by emotionalism because of the

unfaltering faith of the pro and anti-death partisans on the right and righteousness of
their postulates. To be sure, any debate, even if it is no more than an exchange of
epithets is healthy in a democracy. But when the debate deteriorates to discord due to
the overuse of words that wound, when anger threatens to turn the majority rule to
tyranny, it is the especial duty of this Court to assure that the guarantees of the Bill of
Rights to the minority fully hold. As Justice Brennan reminds us ". . . it is the very
purpose of the Constitution and particularly the Bill of Rights to declare certain
values transcendent, beyond the reach of temporary political majorities." 20 Man has yet
to invent a better hatchery of justice than the courts. It is a hatchery where justice will
bloom only when we can prevent the roots of reason to be blown away by the winds of
rage. The flame of the rule of law cannot be ignited by rage, especially the rage of the
mob which is the mother of unfairness. The business of courts in rendering justice is to
be fair and they can pass their litmus test only when they can be fair to him who is
momentarily the most hated by society. 21
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court grants the public respondents' Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and
lifts the Temporary Restraining Order issued in its Resolution of January 4, 1999.
The Court also orders respondent trial court judge (Hon. Thelma A. Ponferrada,
Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 104) to set anew the date for execution of the
convict/petitioner in accordance with applicable provisions of law and the Rules of
Court, without further delay.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Kapunan, Mendoza, Martinez, Quisumbing,
Purisima and Pardo, JJ., concur.
Vitug and Panganiban, JJ., Please see Separate Opinion.
Buena and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions

VITUG, J., separate opinion;

Let me state at the outset that I have humbly maintained that Republic Act No. 7659,
insofar as it prescribes the death penalty, falls short of the strict norm set forth by the
Constitution. I and some of my brethren on the Court, who hold similarly, have
consistently expressed this stand in the affirmance by the Court of death sentences
imposed by Regional Trial Courts.
In its resolution of 04 January 1999, the Court resolved to issue in the above-numbered
petition a temporary restraining order ("TRO") because, among other things, of what
had been stated to be indications that Congress would re-examine the death penalty
law. It was principally out of respect and comity to a co-equal branch of the
government, i.e., to reasonably allow it that opportunity if truly minded, that motivated
the Court to grant, after deliberation, a limited time for the purpose.
The Court, it must be stressed, did not, by issuing the TRO, thereby reconsider its
judgment convicting the accused or recall the imposition of the death penalty.
The doctrine has almost invariably been that after a decision becomes final and
executory, nothing else is further done except to see to its compliance since for the
Court to adopt otherwise would be to put no end to litigations The rule notwithstanding,
the Court retains control over the case until the full satisfaction of the final judgment
conformably with established legal processes. Hence, the Court has taken cognizance
of the petition assailing before it the use of lethal injection by the State to carry out the
death sentence. In any event, jurisprudence teaches that the rule of immutability of final
and executory judgments admits of settled exceptions. Concededly, the Court may, for
instance, suspend the execution of a final judgment when it becomes imperative in the
higher interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it. 1 Certainly, this
extraordinary relief cannot be denied any man, whatever might be his station, whose
right to life is the issue at stake. The pronouncement in Director of Prisons vs. Judge of
First Instance of Cavite, 2 should be instructive. Thus
This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in various decisions, which
constitute jurisprudence on the subject, that in criminal cases, after the
sentence has been pronounced and the period for reopening the same
has elapsed, the court can not change or after its judgment, as its
jurisdiction has terminated, functus est officio suo, according to the
classical phrase. When in cases of appeal or review the cause has been
returned thereto for execution, in the event that the judgment has been
affirmed, it performs a ministerial duty in issuing the proper order. But it
does not follow from this cessation of functions on the part of the court
with reference to the ending of the cause that the judicial authority
terminates by having then passed completely to the executive. The
particulars of the execution itself, which are certainly not always included
in the judgment and writ of execution, in any event are absolutely under
the control of the judicial authority, while the executive has no power over
the person of the convict except to provide for carrying out the penalty and
to pardon.

Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at bar, which is
that of execution of a capital sentence, it must be accepted as a
hypothesis that postponement of the date can be requested. There can be
no dispute on this point. It is a well-known principle that, notwithstanding
the order of execution and the executory nature thereof on the date set or
at the proper time, the date therefor can be postponed, even in sentences
of death. Under the common law this postponement can be ordered in
three ways: (1) By command of the King; (2) by discretion (arbitrio) of the
court; and (3) by mandate of the law. It is sufficient to state this principle of
the common law to render impossible the assertion in absolute terms that
after the convict has once been placed in jail the trial court can not reopen
the case to investigate the facts that show the need for postponement. If
one of the ways is by direction of the court, it is acknowledged that even
after the date of the execution has been fixed, and notwithstanding the
general rule that after the Court of First Instance has performed its
ministerial duty of ordering the execution, functus est officio suo, and its
part is ended, if however a circumstance arises that ought to delay the
execution, there is an imperative duty to investigate the emergency and to
order a postponement . . ..
In fine, the authority of the Court to see to the proper execution of its final judgment, the
power of the President to grant pardon, commutation or reprieve, and the prerogative of
Congress to repeal or modify the law that could benefit the convicted accused are not
essentially preclusive of one another nor constitutionally incompatible and may each be
exercised within their respective spheres and confines. Thus, the stay of execution
issued by the Court would not prevent either the President from exercising his
pardoning power or Congress from enacting a measure that may be advantageous to
the adjudged offender.
The TRO of this Court has provided that it shall be lifted even before its expiry date of
15 June 1999, "coeval with the duration of the present regular session of Congress," if it
"sooner becomes certain that no repeal or modification of the law is going to be made."
The "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration" filed by the Office of the Solicitor General
states that as of the moment, "certain circumstances/supervening events (have)
transpired to the effect that the repeal or modification of the law imposing death penalty
has become nil . . .." If, indeed, it would be futile to yet expect any chance for a
timely 3 re-examination by Congress of the death penalty law, then I can appreciate why
the majority of the Justices on the Court feel rightly bound even now to lift the TRO.
I am hopeful, nevertheless, that Congress will in time find its way clear to undertaking a
most thorough and dispassionate re-examination of the law not so much for its
questioned wisdom as for the need to have a second look at the conditions sine qua
non prescribed by the Constitution in the imposition of the death penalty. In People vs.
Masalihit, 4 in urging, with all due respect, Congress to consider a prompt reexamination of the death penalty law, I have said:

The determination of when to prescribe the death penalty lies, in the initial
instance, with the law-making authority, the Congress of the Philippines,
subject to the conditions that the Constitution itself has set forth; viz: (1)
That there must be compelling reasons to justify the imposition of the
death penalty; and (2) That the capital offense must involve a heinous
crime. It appears that the fundamental law did not contemplate a simple
'reimposition' of the death penalty to offenses theretofore already provided
in the Revised Penal Code or, let alone, just because of it. The term
'compelling reasons' would indicate to me that there must first be a
marked change in the milieu from that which has prevailed at the time of
adoption of the 1987 Constitution, on the one hand, to that which exists at
the enactment of the statute prescribing the death penalty, upon the other
hand, that would make it distinctively inexorable to allow the re-imposition
of the death penalty. Most importantly, the circumstances that would
characterize the 'heinous nature' of the crime and make it so exceptionally
offensive as to warrant the death penalty must be spelled out with great
clarity in the law, albeit without necessarily precluding the Court from
exercising its power of judicial review given the circumstances of each
case. To venture, in the case of murder, the crime would become 'heinous'
within the Constitutional concept, when, to exemplify, the victim is
unnecessarily subjected to a painful and excruciating death or, in the
crime of rape, when the offended party is callously humiliated or even
brutally killed by the accused. The indiscriminate imposition of the death
penalty could somehow constrain courts to apply, perhaps without
consciously meaning to, stringent standards for conviction, not too unlikely
beyond what might normally be required in criminal cases, that can, in
fact, result in undue exculpation of offenders to the great prejudice of
victims and society.
Today, I reiterate the above view and until the exacting standards of the Constitution are
clearly met as so hereinabove expressed, I will have to disagree, most respectfully, with
my colleagues in the majority who continue to hold the presently structured Republic Act
No. 7659 to be in accord with the Constitution, an issue that is fundamental, constant
and inextricably linked to the imposition each time of the death penalty and, like the
instant petition, to the legal incidents pertinent thereto.
Accordingly, I vote against the lifting of the restraining order of the Court even as I, like
everyone else, however, must respect and be held bound by the ruling of the majority.

PANGANIBAN, J., separate opinion;

I agree with the Court's Resolution that, without doubt, this Court has jurisdiction to
issue the disputed Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on January 4, 1999. I will not

repeat its well-reasoned disquisition. I write only to explain my vote in the context of the
larger issue of the death penalty.
Since the solicitor general has demonstrated that Congress will not repeal or amend RA
7659 during its current session which ends on June 15, 1999 and that, in any event, the
President will veto any such repeal or amendment, the TRO should by its own terms be
deemed lifted now. However, my objections to the imposition of the death penalty
transcend the TRO and permeate its juridical essence.
I maintain my view that RA 7659 (the Death Penalty Law) is unconstitutional insofar as
some parts thereof prescribing the capital penalty fail to comply with the requirements of
"heinousness" and "compelling reasons" prescribed by the Constitution of the
Philippines. * This I have repeatedly stated in my Dissenting Opinion in various death
cases decided by the Court, as well as during the Court's deliberation on this matter on
January 4, 1999. For easy reference, I hereby attach a copy of my Dissent promulgated
on February 7, 1997.
Consequently, I cannot now vote to lift TRO, because to do so would mean the
upholding and enforcement of law (or the relevant portions thereof) which, I submit with
all due respect, is unconstitutional and therefore legally nonexistent. I also reiterate that,
in my humble opinion, RA 8177 (the Lethal Injection Law) is likewise unconstitutional
since it merely prescribes the manner in which RA 7659 ( the Death Penalty Law) is to
implemented.
Having said that, I stress, however, that I defer to the rule of law and will abide by the
ruling of the Court that both RA 7659 and RA 8177 are constitutional and that death
penalty should, by majority vote, be implemented by means of lethal injection.
FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, I vote to deny the solicitor general's Motion for
Reconsideration.
G.R. No. 117472 February 7, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO.
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
SEPARATE OPINION
Death Penalty Law Unconstitutional
In his Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration 1 dated August 22, 1996 filed by his
newly-retained counsel, 2 the accused raises for the first time a very crucial ground for
his defense: that Republic Act. No. 7659, the law reimposing the death penalty, is
unconstitutional. In the Brief and (original Motion for Reconsideration filed by his

previous counsel, 3 this transcendental issue was nor brought up. Hence, it was not
passed upon by this Court in its Decision affirming the trial court's sentence of death. 4
The Constitution Abolished Death Penalty
Sec. 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed,
unless for compelling reasons involving heinouscrimes, the Congress
hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be
reduced to reclusion perpetua. (Emphasis supplied)
The second and third sentences of the above provision are new and had not been
written in the 1935, 1973 or even in the 1986 "Freedom Constitution." They proscribe
the imposition 5 of the death penalty "unless for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes, Congress provides for it," and reduced "any death penalty already imposed"
to reclusion perpetua. The provision has both a prospective aspect (it bars the future
imposition of the penalty) and a retroactive one (it reduces imposed capital sentences to
the lesser penalty of imprisonment).
This two-fold aspect is significant. It stresses that the Constitution did not merely
suspend the imposition of the death penalty, but in fact completely abolished it from the
statute books. The automatic commutation or reduction to reclusion perpetua of any
death penalty extant as of the effectivity of the Constitution clearly recognizes that, while
the conviction of an accused for a capital crime remains, death as a penalty ceased to
exist in our penal laws and thus may longer be carried out. This is the clear intent of the
framers of our Constitution. As Comm. Bernas ex-claimed, 6 "(t)he majority voted for the
constitutional abolition of the death penalty."
Citing this and other similar pronouncements of the distinguished Concom delegate,
Mme. Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera emphasized, 7 "It is thus clear that when Fr.
Bernas sponsored the provision regarding the non-imposition of the death penalty, what
he had in mind was the total abolition and removal from the statute books of the death
penalty. This became the intent of the frames of the Constitution when they approved
the provision and made it a part of the Bill of Rights." With such abolition as a premise,
restoration thereof becomes an exception to a constitutional mandate. Being an
exception and thus in derogation of the Constitution, it must then be strictly construed
against the State and liberally in favor of the people. 8 In this light, RA 7659 enjoys no
presumption of constitutionality.
The Constitution Strictly Limits
Congressional Prerogative to Prescribe Death

To me, it is very clear that the Constitution (1) effectively removed the death penalty
from the then existing statutes but (2) authorized Congress to restore it at some future
time to enable or empower courts to reimpose it on condition that it (Congress) 9 finds
"compelling reasons, involving heinous crimes." The language of the Constitution is
emphatic (even if "awkward" 10): the authority of Congress to "provide for it" is not
absolute. Rather, it is strictly limited:
1. by "compelling reasons" that may arise after the Constitution became
effective; and
2. to crimes which Congress should identify or define or characterize as
"heinous."
The Constitution inexorably placed upon Congress the burden of determining the
existence of "compelling reasons" and of defining what crimes are "heinous" before it
could exercise its law-making prerogative to restore the death penalty. For clarity's sake,
may I emphasize that Congress, by law; prescribes the death penalty on certain crimes;
and courts, by their decisions, impose it on individual offenders found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of committing said crimes.
In the exercise of this fundamental mandate, Congress enacted RA 7659 11 to "provide
for it" (the death penalty) (1) by amending certain provisions of the Revised Penal
Code; 12 (2) by incorporating a new article therein; 13 and (3) by amending certain
special laws. 14
But RA 7659 did not change the nature or the elements of the crimes stated in the Penal
Code and in the special laws. It merely made the penalty more severe. Neither did its
provisions (other than the preamble, which was cast in general terms) discuss or justify
the reasons for the more sever sanction, either collectively for all the offenses or
individually for each of them.
Generally, it merely reinstated the concept of and the method by which the death
penalty had been imposed until February 2, 1987, when the Constitution took effect as
follows: (1) a person is convicted of a capital offense; and (2) the commission of which
was accompanied by aggravating circumstances not outweighed by mitigating
circumstances.
The basic question then is: In enacting RA 7659, did Congress exceed the limited
authority granted it by the Constitution? More legally put: It reviving the death penalty,
did Congress act with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of the very limited power or
jurisdiction conferred on it by Art. III, Sec. 19? The answer, I respectfully submit, is YES.
Heinous Crimes
To repeal, while he Constitution limited the power of Congress to prescribe the death
penalty ONLY to "heinous" crimes, it did not define or characterize the meaning of

"heinous". Neither did Congress. As already stated, RA 7659 itself merely selected
some existing crimes for which it prescribed death as an applicable penalty. It did not
give a standard or a characterization by which courts may be able to appreciate the
heinousness of a crime. I concede that Congress was only too well aware of its
constitutionally limited power. In deference thereto, it included a paragraph in the
preambular or "whereas" clauses of RA 7659, as follows:
WHEREAS, the crimes punishable by death under this Act are heinous for
being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their
inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are
repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of
decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society.
In my humble view, however, the foregoing clause is clearly an insufficient definition or
characterization of what a heinous crime is. It simply and gratuitously declared certain
crimes to be "heinous" without adequately justifying its bases therefor. It supplies no
useful, workable, clear and unambiguous standard by which the presence of
heinousness can be determined. Calling the crimes "grievous, odious and hateful" is not
a substitute for an objective juridical definition. Neither is the description "inherent or
manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity." Describing blood as blue
does not detract from its being crimson in fact; and renaming gumamela as rose will not
arm it with thorns.
Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an introduction to
show its intent or purposes. It cannot be the origin of rights and obligations. Where the
meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand nor
restrict its operation, much less prevail over its text. 15 In this case, it cannot be the
authoritative source to show compliance with the Constitution.
As already alluded to, RA 7659 merely amended certain laws to prescribe death as the
maximum imposable penalty once the court appreciates the presence or absence of
aggravating circumstances. 16
In other words, it just reinstated capital punishment for crimes which were already
punishable with death prior to the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution. With the possible
exception of plunder and qualified bribery, 17 no new crimes were introduced by RA
7659. The offenses punished by death under said law were already to punishable by the
Revised Penal Code 18 and by special laws.
During the debate on Senate Bill No. 891 which later became RA 7659, Sen. Jose Lina,
in answer to a question of Sen. Ernesto Maceda, wryly said: 19
So we did not go that far from the Revised Penal Code, Mr. President, and
from existing special laws which, before abolition of the death penalty, had
already death as the maximum penalty.

By merely reimposing capital punishment on the very same crimes which were already
penalized with death prior to the charter's effectivity, Congress I submit has not fulfilled
its specific and positive constitutional duty. If the Constitutional Commission intended
merely to allow Congress to prescribe death for these very same crimes, it would not
have written Sec. 19 of Article III into the fundamental law. But the stubborn fact is it did.
Verily, the intention to 1) delete the death penalty from our criminal laws and 2) make its
restoration possible only under and subject to stringent conditions is evident not only
from the language of the Constitution but also from the charter debates on this matter.
The critical phrase "unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes" was an
amendment introduced by Comm. Christian Monsod. In explaining what possible crimes
could qualify as heinous, he and Comm. Jose Suarez agreed on "organized murder" or
"brutal murder of a rape victim". 20 Note that the honorable commissioners did not just
say "murder" but organized murder; not just rape but brutal murder of a rape victim.
While the debates were admittedly rather scanty, I believe that the available information
shows that, when deliberating on "heinousness", the Constitutional Commission did not
have in mind the offenses already existing and already penalized with death. I also
believe that the heinousness clause requires that:
1. the crimes should be entirely new offenses, the elements of which have an
inherent quality, degree or level of perversity, depravity or viciousness
unheard of until then; or
2. even existing crimes, provided some new element or essential ingredient
like "organized" or "brutal" is added to show their utter perversity,
odiousness or malevolence; or
3. the means or method by which the crime, whether new or old, is carried
out evinces a degree or magnitude of extreme violence, evil, cruelty,
atrocity, viciousness as to demonstrate its heinousness. 21
For this purpose, Congress could enact an entirely new set of circumstances to qualify
the crime as "heinous", in the same manner that the presence of treachery in a
homicide aggravates the crime to murder for which a heavier penalty is prescribed.
Compelling Reasons
Quite apart from requiring the attendant element of heinousness, the Constitution also
directs Congress to determine "compelling reasons" for the revival of the capital penalty.
It is true that paragraphs 3 and 4 of the preamble of RA 7659 22 made some attempt at
meeting this requirement. But such effort was at best feeble and inconsequential. It
should be remembered that every word or phrase in the Constitution is sacred and
should never be ignored, cavalierly-treated or brushed aside. Thus, I believe that the
compelling reasons and the characterization of heinousness cannot be done wholesale
but must shown for each and every crime, individually and separately.

The words "compelling reasons" were included in the Charter because, in the words of
Comm. Monsod, "in the future, circumstances may arise which we should not preclude
today . . . and that the conditions and the situation (during the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission) might change for very specific reasons" requiring the return
of the constitutionally-abhorred penalty.
In his sponsorship of House Bill No. 62 which later evolved into RA 7659, Congressman
Pablo Garcia, in answer to questions raised by Representative Edcel Lagman tried to
explain these compelling reasons: 23
MR. LAGMAN: So what are the compelling reasons now, Mr.
Speaker? . . .
MR. GARCIA (P.). The worsening peace and order condition in the
country, Mr. Speaker. That is one.
MR. LAGMAN. So the compelling reason which the distinguished sponsor
would like to justify or serve as an anchor for the justification of the
reimposition of the death penalty is the alleged worsening peace and
order situation. The Gentleman claims that is one the compelling reasons.
But before we dissent this particular "compelling reason," may we know
what are the other compelling reasons, Mr. Speaker?
MR. GARCIA (P.) Justice, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN. Justice.
MR. GARCIA (P.). Yes, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN. Justice is a compelling