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Patent Aggregating Companies Their Strategies, Activities, and Options for Producing Companies
DISSERTATION
of the University of St. Gallen,
School of Management,
Economics, Law, Social Sciences
and International Affairs
to obtain the title of
Doctor of Philosophy in Management
submitted by
Frauke Rther
from
Germany
Approved on the application of

Prof. Dr. Oliver Gassmann
and
Prof. Dr. Beat Bernet
Dissertation no. 4039

Springer Gabler Wiesbaden, 2012
The University of St. Gallen, School of Management, Economics, Law, Social

Sciences and International Affairs hereby consents to the printing of the present
dissertation, without hereby expressing any opinion on the views herein expressed.
St. Gallen, May 11, 2012
The President:
Prof. Dr. Thomas Bieger
Patent Aggregating Companies
Frauke Rther
Patent Aggregating
Companies
Their strategies, activities and options
for producing companies
RESEARCH
Frauke Rther
St. Gallen, Switzerland
Voestalpine
Linz, sterreich
Bernhard Schmidt
Langenhagen, Deutschland
Doctoral thesis, University of St.Gallen, 2012
ISBN 978-3-8349-4454-2
DOI 10.1007/978-3-8349-4455-9
ISBN 978-3-8349-4455-9 (eBook)
The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie;

detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de.
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Preface
This thesis is the result of my research carried out at the Institute of Technology
Management at the University of St. Gallen. Particular thanks and gratitude go to my
supervisor, Professor Oliver Gassmann. Oliver, I thank you that you believed in me,
often more than I believed in myself. And thank you for giving me the opportunity and
the freedom to pursue my academic interests and aspirations. I would also like to thank
Professor Beat Bernet for co-supervising my thesis.
I would also like to thank Professor Beth Webster for supporting my research
sabbatical at the Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia, University of
Melbourne. Beth, thanks for always pushing and encouraging me. Even though I often
felt like a deer caught in the headlights, your constant support made a real difference to
my work. I am deeply grateful to the Swiss National Science Foundation for providing
me with financial support during my time in Melbourne.
For contributing valuable input to this work, I am thankful to several colleagues and
students at the Institute of Technology Management. Thank you Martin Bader,
Matthias Bitzer, Lukas Burkhardt, Pascal Oesch, Carsten Vollmar, Bastian
Widenmayer, Marco Zeschky, and Nicole Ziegler who was not only a challenging
discussion partner but also read and commented on the entire manuscript. Also thanks
to all my other team members for the great time we spent together, especially the nonacademic hours in academic environment long live the Bergfest on Spritwoch and its
inventors Sascha Friesike and Michael Daiber. I would also like to thank Ursula
Elssser for her constant support and ever-present sympathetic ear.
Without my friends, I would not have finished my research, and I am deeply grateful
that they are still my friends despite my moods, temper, and sometimes long spans of
silence. Rebecca Frhlich Hasisister and Schager of my life, thank you that you are
my best friend always anytime anywhere. I just say 17 and R.F.F.R. Sonja Hh
Zuckerpuppe, I never thought I could survive without your culinary support, but the
moral support you gave me the last years rescued me from more severe things than an
empty stomach. Bettina Maisch my Silvester-Mate, my favorite career change will
always be Klofrau, because I met an amazing woman when I performed the job of
proctoring an exam. Thank you for everything you did and said to me, especially on
New Years Eve 2010. Sabine Ravimonica Puschel, words are not enough to show
VI
you my gratitude for your friendship and your Genihase-sitting; you were my sunshine
in St. Gallens rain. Nicole Ziegler LOML, you are now the impossible high standard
for all my future colleagues. I will miss you for the rest of my career. Thanks for being
there, listing, and going with me through all ups and downs of an ITEM life. I also
raise my glass to the Wednesday all-stars Julia Bendul, Jochen Binder, Antonia Erz (
Tonlein, thanks so much for your effort that Lilifee could come home and all the time
you spent with me), Dennis Herhausen, Philip Schnaith ( Don Philipo,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H1BKxYyJJJ4 for all the http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=smh834dsYu8 and http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KklLsdWaoBU), and
Friederike Wolter, and say thank you for all the memorable hours and that nobody
forced me to cook.
A tower of strength has always been my aunt Dr. Magrit Ritterhoff. Tante Magrit,
thank you for everything. You cannot imagine what your steady presence means to
me. I am especially thankful to my brother Cord Rther, his wife Birthe and my
beloved niece and nephews Espe, Lasse, and Tjorven. I am so grateful that you never
questioned me and I always found refuge with you during my time in St. Gallen. Last
but not least, I would like to thank the most important persons in my life, my parents
Almut and Hans-Heinrich Rther. Mama und Papa, auch wenn wir rumlich weit
entfernt waren hat Eure Liebe, Zuversicht und immerwhrende Untersttzung dafr
gesorgt, dass Ihr mir in meinem Herzen ganz nah wart. Ihr fangt mich auf wenn ich zu
fallen drohe und ihr habt mir Wurzeln und Flgel gegeben. I dedicate this thesis to my
family.
Melbourne and St. Gallen, April 2012
Frauke Rther
VII
Index
Contents ....................................................................................................................... IX
Figures ....................................................................................................................... XIII
Tables ......................................................................................................................... XV
Abbreviations ........................................................................................................... XVI
Abstract ................................................................................................................... XVII
Zusammenfassung................................................................................................. XVIII
1 Introduction............................................................................................................. 1
1.1 Motivation ......................................................................................................... 1
1.2
Research objectives and questions ................................................................ 12
1.3
Terms and definitions..................................................................................... 13
1.4
Research concept and methodology .............................................................. 15
1.5
Thesis structure .............................................................................................. 21
Leveraging companies patent portfolios State of the art .............................. 24

2.1 Fundamentals of patent management .......................................................... 24
2.2
Options to leverage patent portfolios............................................................ 28
2.3
Third parties as enablers of transactions ..................................................... 37
2.4
Reference framework ..................................................................................... 45
Exploring the phenomenon of patent aggregating companies ......................... 48

3.1 Setting of patent aggregating companies...................................................... 48
3.2
Process of patent aggregation ........................................................................ 54
3.3
Strategies of patent aggregating companies ................................................. 63
3.4
Summary ......................................................................................................... 68
Potentials offered by patent aggregating companies ......................................... 69

4.1 External potentials offered by patent aggregating companies ................... 70
4.2
Internal potentials offered by patent aggregating companies .................... 80
4.3
Summary ......................................................................................................... 91
Typology of patent aggregating companies ........................................................ 93
VIII
5.1
Four archetypes of patent aggregating companies...................................... 94
5.2
Archetype 1 Merchant ................................................................................ 99
5.3
Archetype 2 Gardener............................................................................... 115
5.4
Archetype 3 Collector................................................................................ 127
5.5
Archetype 4 Patron.................................................................................... 140
5.6
Summary and evaluation of potentials ....................................................... 151
Leveraging patent portfolios by utilizing patent aggregating companies ..... 154

6.1 Managing the utilization of patent aggregating companies ..................... 154
6.2
Development of patent aggregating companies ......................................... 166
6.3
Meeting demand for learning effect as driving factor .............................. 171
6.4
Summary ....................................................................................................... 179
Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 181

7.1 Contribution to management theory .......................................................... 181
7.2
Implications for management practice ....................................................... 185
7.3
Further research and trends........................................................................ 187
References .................................................................................................................. 192

Appendix .................................................................................................................... 211
IX
Contents
Contents ....................................................................................................................... IX
Figures ....................................................................................................................... XIII
Tables ......................................................................................................................... XV
Abbreviations ........................................................................................................... XVI
Abstract ................................................................................................................... XVII
Zusammenfassung................................................................................................. XVIII
1 Introduction............................................................................................................. 1
1.1 Motivation ......................................................................................................... 1
1.1.1
1.1.2
1.1.3
1.2
Research objectives and questions ................................................................ 12
1.3
Terms and definitions..................................................................................... 13
1.4
Research concept and methodology .............................................................. 15
1.5
Thesis structure .............................................................................................. 21
Leveraging companies patent portfolios State of the art .............................. 24

2.1 Fundamentals of patent management .......................................................... 24
2.1.1
2.1.2
2.2
2.3
Internal and external exploitation of patents ........................................ 28

Impediments to optimally leverage patent portfolios ........................... 34
Third parties as enablers of transactions ..................................................... 37
2.3.1
2.3.2
2.4
Reasons why firms patent ........................................................................ 25

Reasons why companies buy patents ...................................................... 27
Options to leverage patent portfolios............................................................ 28
2.2.1
2.2.2
The market for technologies and the emergence of a new player ......... 1
Practical challenges in leveraging corporate patent portfolios .............. 5
Deficits in current research ....................................................................... 8
Bridging patent supply and patent demand .......................................... 38

Non-practicing entities and their intermediation of patent transactions
................................................................................................................... 41
Reference framework ..................................................................................... 45
Exploring the phenomenon of patent aggregating companies ......................... 48

3.1 Setting of patent aggregating companies...................................................... 48
3.1.1
General information ................................................................................. 48
3.1.2
3.2
Process of patent aggregation ........................................................................ 54
3.2.1
3.2.2
3.2.3
3.2.4
3.3
Basic strategy I: Generate revenues ....................................................... 63

Basic strategy II: Serve an objective ...................................................... 64
Eight business models of patent aggregating companies ...................... 66
Summary ......................................................................................................... 68
Potentials offered by patent aggregating companies ......................................... 69

4.1 External potentials offered by patent aggregating companies ................... 70
4.1.1
4.1.2
4.1.3
4.2
4.3
Potentials for risks reduction .................................................................. 70

Potentials for market fostering ............................................................... 74
Potentials for resource enhancement ..................................................... 77
Internal potentials offered by patent aggregating companies .................... 80
4.2.1
4.2.2
4.2.3
Selection of patents ................................................................................... 55

Structuring of patent portfolios .............................................................. 57
Additional value adding activities........................................................... 59
Exploitation of patents ............................................................................. 60
Strategies of patent aggregating companies ................................................. 63
3.3.1
3.3.2
3.3.3
3.4
Venture creation and funding of patent aggregating companies ........ 51
Potential for market interaction ............................................................. 80

Potentials for cost effectiveness ............................................................... 83
Potentials for decision making ................................................................ 89
Summary ......................................................................................................... 91
Typology of patent aggregating companies ........................................................ 93

5.1 Four archetypes of patent aggregating companies...................................... 94
5.2
Archetype 1 Merchant ................................................................................ 99
5.2.1
5.2.2
5.2.3
5.2.4
5.3
Patent trading funds characteristics ..................................................... 99

Patent trading funds case study: Alpha Patentfonds ........................ 101
Patent acquisition companys characteristics...................................... 106
Patent acquisition companys case study: Intellectual Ventures ....... 109
Archetype 2 Gardener............................................................................... 115
5.3.1
5.3.2
5.3.3
5.3.4
Royalty monetization companys characteristics ................................ 115

Royalty monetization companys case study: Pete Invest MedTech . 118
Patent incubating funds characteristics .............................................. 121
Patent incubating funds case study: Patent Select............................. 123
XI
5.4
Archetype 3 Collector................................................................................ 127
5.4.1
5.4.2
5.4.3
5.4.4
5.5
Archetype 4 Patron.................................................................................... 140
5.5.1
5.5.2
5.5.3
5.5.4
5.6
6
Patent pooling companys characteristics ............................................ 140

Patent pooling companys case study: MPEG LA .............................. 142
Non-commercial patent aggregators characteristics ......................... 145
Non-commercial patent aggregators case study: Golden Rice PDP 147
Summary and evaluation of potentials ....................................................... 151
Leveraging patent portfolios by utilizing patent aggregating companies ..... 154

6.1 Managing the utilization of patent aggregating companies ..................... 154
6.1.1
6.1.2
6.1.3
6.2
6.2.2
6.2.3
6.3
Trend 1: From aggregation of interest to aggregation of investments

................................................................................................................. 167
Trend 2: Responses to organized patent enforcement ........................ 169
Trend 3: From enforcement agents to innovation intermediaries .... 170
Meeting demand for learning effect as driving factor .............................. 171
6.3.1
6.3.2
6.3.3
6.4
Value generating options and patent aggregating companies ........... 154

Constraints in utilizing patent aggregating companies ...................... 157
Framework for the utilization of patent aggregating companies ...... 163
Development of patent aggregating companies ......................................... 166
6.2.1
Patent enforcement companys characteristics ................................... 127

Patent enforcement companys case study: Acacia Research ............ 130
Defensive patent aggregators characteristics ..................................... 134
Defensive patent aggregators case study: Allied Security Trust ...... 137
Monetary benefits of utilizing patent aggregating companies ........... 171

Non-monetary benefits of utilizing patent aggregating companies ... 173
Benefits depend on the type of patent aggregating company............. 174
Summary ....................................................................................................... 179
Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 181

7.1 Contribution to management theory .......................................................... 181
7.2
Implications for management practice ....................................................... 185
7.3
Further research and trends........................................................................ 187
References .................................................................................................................. 192

Appendix .................................................................................................................... 211
XIII
Figures
Figure 1: Relevant literature streams and research gap .................................................. 9
Figure 2: Research questions ........................................................................................ 12
Figure 3: Players and relationships in the patent aggregating ecosystem .................... 14
Figure 4: Structure of the thesis .................................................................................... 23
Figure 5: Map of value generating options for leveraging patent portfolios ................ 34
Figure 6: Transfer of patents and technology market intermediaries ........................... 39
Figure 7: Reference framework to analyze patent aggregating companies .................. 46
Figure 8: Year of formation and geographic location of sample companies................ 49
Figure 9: The different paths of venture creations........................................................ 53
Figure 10: The process of patent aggregation ............................................................... 55
Figure 11: Patent exploitation options of patent aggregating companies ..................... 61
Figure 12: Business models of patent aggregating companies and their strategies...... 67
Figure 13: Overview of external and internal potentials .............................................. 69
Figure 14: External potentials for risks reduction ........................................................ 70
Figure 15: External risks of R&D ................................................................................. 71
Figure 16: External potentials for market fostering ...................................................... 75
Figure 17: External potentials for resource enhancement ............................................ 77
Figure 18: Internal potentials for market interaction .................................................... 81
Figure 19: Internal potentials for cost effectiveness ..................................................... 84
Figure 20: Principal-agent problem and patent aggregating company approach ......... 86
Figure 21: Screening and selection process of Patent Select ........................................ 87
Figure 22: Internal potentials for decision making ....................................................... 89
Figure 23: Summary of patent aggregating companies potentials .............................. 92
Figure 24: Typology of patent aggregating companies ................................................ 97
Figure 25: Summary of patent trading funds .............................................................. 101
Figure 26: Structure of the organization and relations of participants ....................... 103
Figure 27: Selection of patents in the structuring phase of the patent aggregating
process of Alpha Patentfonds II ................................................................ 105
Figure 28: Summary of patent acquisition companies ............................................... 108
Figure 29: Process of IP to EPSTM transaction............................................................ 112
Figure 30: Summary of royalty monetization companies........................................... 117
Figure 31: Summary of patent incubating funds ........................................................ 123
XIV
Figure 32: Exemplary structure of the organization and relations of participants

illustrated on the investment fund Patent Portfolio I................................. 125
Figure 33: Summary of patent enforcement companies ............................................. 130
Figure 34: Sales and EBIT of Acacia from 2003 to 2010, in million USD................ 131
Figure 35: Summary of defensive patent aggregators ................................................ 136
Figure 36: Structuring phase of Allied Security Trust................................................ 139
Figure 37: Summary of patent pooling companies ..................................................... 142
Figure 38: Summary of non-commercial patent aggregators ..................................... 147
Figure 39: Patent aggregating process of Golden Rice PDP ...................................... 150
Figure 40: Value generating options that can include patent aggregating companies 155
Figure 41: Constraints that affect the utilization of patent aggregating companies ... 158
Figure 42: Management framework for utilizing patent aggregating companies ...... 164
Figure 43: The three major trends that drive the evolution of patent aggregating
companies .................................................................................................. 167
Figure 44: Resulting benefits for the original patent owner ....................................... 175
XV
Tables
Table 1: Empirical base of research .............................................................................. 19
Table 2: Research sample of patent aggregating companies ........................................ 20
Table 3: Evaluation of potentials by business model ................................................. 153
XVI
Abbreviations
EPO
European Patent Office
EU
European Union
EUR
Euro
FDA
US Food and Drug Administration
FTO
Freedom to Operate
IP
Intellectual Property
IPR
Intellectual Property Rights
IPO
Initial Public Offering
LLC
Limited Liability Company
NPE
Non-practicing Entity
M&A
Mergers and Acquisitions
MNE
Multinational Enterprise
n/a
Not Available
OUH
Only Used Here
PA
Patent Aggregating Activities
PAC
Patent Aggregating Company
R&D
Research and Development
RFID
Radio Frequency Identification Domain
SME
Small and Medium-sized Enterprise
SPV
Special Purpose Vehicle
US
United States
USD
United States Dollar
XVII
Abstract
Entering the post-industrial age, knowledge has become an important asset for
sustained competitive advantage. Therefore, patents, which in their historical meaning
protect technical knowledge, have moved from a legal matter to a strategic issue. They
are now longer only used to protect companies products and processes but have
developed to a currency that facilitates the trade of innovation. Producing companies
have recognized this shift and increasingly license or sell patents, often with only
moderate success due to the lack of internal capabilities and impediments to the
market for patents and technologies. In recent years, a new acquirer type has emerged.
Patent buyers and licensees are no longer solely producing companies but also third
parties that seem to have none of the traditional acquisition motives. Even though
these third parties do not produce goods and therefore, do not need patents in their
historical meaning, they acquire patents and aggregate patent portfolios. Until now,
little is known about patent aggregating companies. Their strategies, activities, and
their evolution over time, as well as how producing companies can utilize them to
leverage their patent portfolios are the subjects of this thesis.
Due to scarce empirical insights into patent aggregating companies, this thesis applies
a qualitative, case-study based research approach. Based on data on 27 patent
aggregating companies, existing literature on patent management, the market for
technology, and technology market intermediaries are extended by examining the
strategies, activities, and business models of patent aggregating companies. The case
study analysis reveals that patent aggregating companies have eight different motives
to aggregate patents. Further, the analysis shows that patent aggregating companies
differ significantly regarding the competencies and rewards they offer to the original
patent owners. These differences allow for deriving four archetypes. In addition, the
archetypes allow patent managers of producing companies that wish to optimize their
patent leveraging activities to select a suitable patent aggregating company.
The results conceptualize patent aggregating companies for the first time and go
beyond the general picture of patent aggregating companies as enforcement agents.
Findings show that since the founding of the first patent aggregating company, the
business models have changed and now fulfill the function of innovation
intermediaries. The results offer significant managerial implications for the leveraging
activities of patent portfolios.
XVIII
Zusammenfassung
Historisch gesehen sind Patente juristische Titel, die das technische Wissen von
Unternehmen schtzen. Durch den konomischen Wandel und dem damit
verbundenen Eintritt in die Wissensgesellschaft hat sich die Bedeutung von Patenten
zunehmend verndert. Heute dienen sie Firmen verstrkt als Whrung im Handel von
Innovationen und Wissen. Trotz steigender Anzahl von Patenttransaktionen und
Lizenzgeschften haben viele Firmen allerdings immer noch Schwierigkeiten, diese
erfolgreich durchzufhren. Gleichzeitig ist zu beobachten, dass produzierende Firmen
nicht lnger die einzigen Teilnehmer auf dem Patentmarkt sind, sondern dass auch
Firmen ohne eigene Forschung, Entwicklung oder Produktion immer hufiger als
Kufer von Patenten in Erscheinung treten. Obwohl Letztere scheinbar keine Patente
bentigen, aggregieren sie grosse Patentportfolios. Sie werden daher als Patent
Aggregatoren bezeichnet. Welche Strategien diese Patent Aggregatoren dabei
verfolgen, welche Aktivitten sie betreiben und wie sie entstanden sind ist bisher kaum
untersucht. Auch wie produzierende Firmen Patent Aggregatoren fr die effizientere
Nutzung des eigenen Patentportfolios einsetzten knnen, ist unklar. Diese Punkte sind
Gegenstand der Untersuchung in dieser Arbeit.
Aufgrund der wenigen Erkenntnisse zu Patent Aggregatoren wird in dieser Arbeit ein
qualitativer, Fallstudien-basierter Forschungsansatz verwendet. Durch die
Untersuchung von Strategien, Aktivitten und Geschftsmodellen von 27 Patent
Aggregatoren wird die bestehende Literatur zu Patentmanagement, TechnologiemarktIntermediren und dem Patentmarkt ergnzt. Die Fallstudienanalyse zeigt, dass Patent
Aggregatoren acht unterschiedliche Motive beim Kauf von Patenten verfolgen. Zudem
unterscheiden sie sich hinsichtlich ihrer Kompetenzen und der Entlohnung an den
Patentbesitzer. Basierend auf diesen unterschiedlichen Ausprgungen konnten vier
Archetypen von Patent Aggregatoren identifiziert werden. Diese Archetypen eignen
sich auch als Hilfestellung fr produzierende Unternehmen, um die Suche nach
geeigneten Partnern fr die eigene externe Patentverwertung zu vereinfachen.
In der vorliegenden Forschungsarbeit wird erstmals eine Konzeptualisierung der
verschiedenen Ausprgungen von Patent Aggregatoren vorgestellt. Die Ergebnisse
dieser Arbeit relativieren zudem die bliche Annahme, dass Patent Aggregatoren nur
als Auftragsklger wirken und zeigen, dass sich diese Firmen von Auftragsklgern zu
Innovationsintermediren entwickelt haben.
Motivation
1 Introduction
Patent aggregating companies, that is, companies that do not produce physical goods
but amass large patent portfolios, have emerged recently in the international market for
patents and technologies. Until now, little has been known about their strategies,
motives, and of how they have evolved over time. Producing companies are not yet
aware of how they could interact with or react to patent aggregating companies. The
following chapter introduces the phenomenon of patent aggregating companies and
derives a definition for this type of company. Laying out practical challenges in
corporate patent management helps to derive the research objective and the research
questions. In addition, the research concept and the empirical sample are described.
1.1 Motivation
Entering the post-industrial age, knowledge has become an important asset for
sustained competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Grant, 1996; Kogut & Zander, 1993;
Nonaka, Toyama, & Nagata, 2000; Nonaka, 1994). Knowledge can be distinguished
between tacit (informal, unstructured, uncodified) and explicit (formal, structured,
codified) (Polanyi, 1962, Polanyi, 1967). As knowledge becomes more explicit,
intellectual property rights (IPR) can be applied to protect it. Therefore, IPR are
explicit knowledge resources and the most visible type of knowledge (Nonaka et al.,
2000). The most important high technology IPR are patents (Pitkethly, 2001). The
following parts describe the relevance of patents for todays companies. The first part
describes patents as a good transacted in the market for patents and technologies and
the two different types of buyers interested in them: producing companies and
companies that do not have production and research and development (R&D). The
second part describes the challenges producing companies face in their patent
management. The third part reveals the deficits in current research.
1.1.1 The market for technologies and the emergence of a new player
Patents are legal rights with a possible economic value. The patent system was created
to give the owner of an invention the right to exclude third parties to sell or use the
invention (EPO, 2009). On the one hand, this exclusion of others helps the inventor to
Introduction
monopolize rewards from R&D. On the other hand, society benefits because the patent
discloses information that promotes the state of the art (Gassmann & Bader, 2011).
Traditionally, producing companies have conducted R&D internally and set up closed
innovation processes. However, during the last decades the environment companies
operate in has dramatically changed. Shorter product and technology life cycles
(Chesbrough, 2003b; Christensen, Olesen, & Kjr, 2005; Granstrand, 2004; Grindley
& Teece, 1997); a growing awareness of knowledge (Harris, 2001; Nonaka et al.,
2000; OECD Publishing, 1996); increased costs of R&D (Keupp & Gassmann, 2009;
Reepmeyer, Gassmann, & Rther, 2011); and global competition (Gassmann, 2006)
have forced firms to change their innovation process and shift to more open models of
innovation (Chesbrough, 2003b; Chesbrough, 2006; Gassmann, 2006). In this new era
of open innovation patents, are no longer used only internally but serve as legal
instruments to trade technologies (Arora & Gambardella, 2010b; Gambardella, Giuri,
& Luzzi, 2007; Gans & Stern, 2003; Scotchmer, 2006). Firms increasingly license or
sell patents to external partners (Anderson, 1979; Chesbrough, 2003a; Lichtenthaler,
2005, Lichtenthaler, 2007c; Parr & Sullivan, 1996), and a market for patents and
technologies has emerged (Arora, Fosfuri, & Gambardella, 2001a; Guilhon, 2001;
Lamoreaux & Sokoloff, 2007; Teece, 1981).
The market for technology is a broad term and denotes trade in technology
disembodied from physical goods (Arora & Gambardella, 2010b). Two different forms
of patent transactions are possible. On the one hand, patents can be licensed or sold in
combination with the technology and knowledge of the firm. In this case, the term
external technology exploitation or technology transfer is used as well (Anderson,
1979; Ford & Ryan, 1977; Marcy, 1979). On the other hand, the sole legal right of
exclusion is transferred without any knowledge or other intellectual assets of the firm
(Lichtenthaler, 2007c; McDonough III, 2006; Shrestha, 2010).
Even though markets for technology already existed at the beginning of the 20th
century (Lamoreaux & Sokoloff, 2007), structured activities and growth have started
to emerge in the last decades (Arora et al., 2001a; Guilhon, 2001). On behalf of the
OECD, Sheehan, Martinez, and Guellec (2004) surveyed 105 firms in Europe (68
firms), North America (20), and Asia-Pacific (17, mostly from Japan). The
interviewees state that in almost 60% of the analyzed companies, in- and out-licensing
notably increased during the 1990s. Some pioneering companies achieve significant
strategic and monetary benefits by trading or licensing patents (Rivette & Kline,
Motivation
2000). A successful practice firm is IBM Corp. Through adopting an active licensing
program, IBMs licensing revenues increased from a mere USD 30 million in 1990 to
more than USD 1.2 billion in 2004 (Lichtenthaler, 2007b). In the 1980s, Texas
Instruments changed its business strategy and focused on exploiting the portfolio of
patents that it had accumulated. Many companies used the patents without permission.
Therefore, Texas Instruments started to enforce the patents covering the basic design
of integrated circuits, and generated large royalty revenues with this strategy. For
instance, a licensing agreement with several Japanese companies netted Texas
Instruments USD 1.5 billion in licensing revenue by 1993 (Kline, 2003). Another
example for exploiting its patent portfolio successfully is Dow Chemicals. In 1993,
Dow introduced a new corporate strategic roadmap that implied management to save
costs and to leverage the patent portfolio more effectively. Results of this new strategy
were savings in taxes and maintenance fees of USD 50 million and an increase in
licensing revenues from USD 25 million to more than USD 125 million (Davis &
Harrison, 2001).
Patent licensing activities have increased not only in single companies, but also on an
overall basis. Athreye and Cantwell (2007) analyze the trend in worldwide royalty and
licensing revenues between 1950 and 2003 and find that they rose dramatically in the
late 1980s and through the 1990s. The authors estimated that the international royalty
and licensing revenues increased from ca. USD 35 billion in 1990 to ca. USD 70
billion in 2000. Kamiyama, Sheehan, and Martinez (2006) found similar results. They
analyze OECD data on international receipts IP (including patents, copyrights,
trademarks) and find that the total payments increased from USD 8.3 billion in 1985 to
USD 120 billion in 2004. More than 90% of all receipts went to the three major OECD
regions: the European Union (EU), Japan, and the United States (US).
In addition to patent licensing activities, patent sales activities have also increased.
Due to their private nature, these transactions are hard to quantify (Arora &
Gambardella, 2010a; Monk, 2009). Therefore, reliable data on the size of patent sales
are not available but professionals agree that patent sales have become more common
and are steadily increasing (e.g., Aronoff, 2011; Laurie, 2007; Pluvinage, 2011; Wild,
2010a). Using the USPTO Patent Assignment Database, Serrano (2010) shows that
13.5% of all granted patents are traded at least once over their life cycle. The study
shows that patents covering technologies in the mechanical field are transferred far
less than patents covering technologies in the field of drugs and medical.
Introduction
For several reasons, producing companies often acquire the patents sold by other
producing companies. A recent patent transaction that attracted media attention was
the bankruptcy auction of the Nortel Networks Corporations patent portfolio in June
2011. Nortel, a Canadian multinational telecommunications equipment manufacturer,
filed for bankruptcy in January 2009. The patent portfolio, the most valuable asset of
Nortel, went into auction. The patent portfolio consisted of ca. 6,000 patents and
patent applications covering a wide range of technologies, including wireless, data
networking, semiconductors, and Smartphone technologies. The patent portfolio was
bought by Rockstar Bidco, a consortium of Apple, Microsoft, EMC, Ericsson, Sony,
and Research In Motion, for USD 4.5 billion. The motives to buy these patents varied
from acquiring essential patents for a certain standard to increasing the size of the
patent portfolio for licensing negotiations, and to block competitors access to the
Smartphone related patents (Watson, 2010). Another example is the patent acquisition
of VisEn Medical, a US-based producer of fluorescence in vivo imaging agents. In
January 2010, VisEn acquired the fluorescence imaging agent IP portfolio and related
technology platforms from Bayer Schering Pharma, a German pharmaceutical firm for
an undisclosed amount. The acquired patent portfolio includes over 45 issued patents
worldwide covering a wide range of fluorescence agent constructs and imaging
methods. The main objectives of VisEn in acquiring this portfolio were to strengthen
the patent position in in vivo fluorescent imaging agents, and to fill the pipeline of
preclinical agent products and clinical imaging agents (Intellectual Property Today,
2010).
Besides producing companies that acquire patents based on defensive, financial, or
strategic, and mainly intuitive and reasonable objectives, companies that do not
produce goods have emerged as transaction partners in recent years. Even though they
have none of the traditional acquisition motives, they are now significant players in the
market for patents and technologies. For instance, in 2000 the Golden Rice product
development partnership aggregated 11 patents from the agricultural companies
Syngenta, Bayer AG, Monsanto, Novartis, Orynova, and Zeneca Mogen (Krattiger &
Potrykus, 2007). The Golden Rice product partnership was founded to aggregate the
patents and does not have any production or R&D. Another example that does not
produce is Intellectual Ventures. In January 2009, Intellectual Ventures acquired the
patent portfolio formerly developed and owned by Transmeta Corporation from
Novafora, Inc., a producer of digital video processors, for an undisclosed amount. The
Motivation
acquired patent portfolio contained more than 140 US patents and a substantial number
of pending patent applications and some international patents and patent applications
(Intellectual Ventures, 2009). Also in 2009, Allied Security Trust, a private company
without production, bought 286 patents from the Japanese IT company NEC. The
patents cover computer, graphics, microprocessor, and display technologies (Allied
Security Trust, 2010). Acacia Research is another active patent buyer without
production. For instance, in November 2011, Acacia acquired 65 US and foreign
patents from the semiconductor manufacturer Renesas for an undisclosed amount
(Wild, 2010b). These four examples show that even though these companies do not
produce goods and therefore do not need patents in their historical meaning, they
acquire patents and aggregate large patent portfolios. In the following sections, these
companies are indicated as patent aggregating companies.
1.1.2 Practical challenges in leveraging corporate patent portfolios
Corporate leaders have recognized patents as a powerful instrument of corporate
strategy (Cohen, Nelson, & Walsh, 2000; Davis, 2004; Grindley & Teece, 1997; Kash
& Kingston, 2001; Rivette & Kline, 2000), and patents are no longer a legal matter but
a strategic issue (Smith & Hansen, 2002). Companies have extended their patent
departments to patent management divisions (Carlsson, Dumitriu, Glass, Nard, &
Barrett, 2008), aligned patent strategy with corporate strategy (Cohen et al., 2000; Hall
& Ziedonis, 2001), and now focus on leveraging their patent portfolios optimally
(Davis & Harrison, 2001; Lichtenthaler, 2008b).
As patent management has received growing attention, the use of patents has
developed from a primarily defensive and internal application (e.g., securing market
shares by preventing competitors from entering the market, enforcing patents against
infringers) to an active part of the companys strategy (e.g., licensing, sales of patents,
external source of finance). From a patent management perspective, opening up the
innovation process requires a shift from the traditional patent protection approach to a
patent leverage approach using patents as means to exchange knowledge through
selling and licensing. Therefore, literature distinguishes between internal patent
exploitation and external patent exploitation (Kamiyama et al., 2006; Lichtenthaler,
2007c, Lichtenthaler, 2008a; OECD Publishing, BMWi, & EPO, 2005; de
Rassenfosse, in press; Tietze, 2011). The internal exploitation of patents includes the
protection of own products from copying or securing freedom to operate (Granstrand,
Introduction
2000). Most companies have gained experience and able successfully to conduct the
tasks of internal exploitation (Carlsson et al., 2008).
Firms increasingly exploit their patents externally. External patent exploitation occurs
as licensing agreements, technology, or patent sales, or as a basis for collaborations
with other companies (Birkenmeier, 2003; Ford, 1985; Shrestha, 2010; Vickery,
1988). Depending on the motives of the partners and on the characteristics of the
exploited patents, the extent of external patent exploitation can vary. A patent can be
licensed or sold in combination with (Anderson, 1979; Ford & Ryan, 1977; Marcy,
1979) or without (Lichtenthaler, 2007c; McDonough III, 2006; Shrestha, 2010) other
technology knowledge of the firm.
Even though companies have realized that external patent exploitation is an integral
part of leveraging patent portfolios, most companies still have major difficulties in
conducting external patent exploitation projects successfully (Arora et al., 2001a). A
recent survey proved that companies are willing to exploit 40% of their patent
portfolio (on average) externally. However, until now, most of them have not been
able to do so because transaction partners cannot be identified or transaction prices
determined (Berneman, Cockburn, Agrawal, & Iyer, 2009). In contrast to product
markets, the market for patents and technologies remains far from functioning well
(Arora, Fosfuri, & Gambardella, 2001b; Caves, Crookell, & Killing, 1983; Cesaroni,
2004; Cesaroni & Mariani, 2001; Teece, 1981) because it lacks transparency regarding
essential market information. Companies willing to trade are not able to gather
information about buyers, suppliers, and technologies and patents offered. This lack of
transparency in essential market information leads to high transaction costs (Arora et
al., 2001a; Arora & Gambardella, 2010a; Caves et al., 1983; Ford & Ryan, 1981;
Gambardella, 2002; Lichtenthaler & Ernst, 2007; Monk, 2009). Also, uncertainty
regarding the quality of the patents (Gans, Hsu, & Stern, 2008; Troy & Werle, 2008),
the value of the patents and the technology (Gambardella, Harhoff, & Verspagen,
2008; Scherer & Harhoff, 2000), and the transaction process (Lichtenthaler, 2004;
Lichtenthaler, 2007a) prevent successful external exploitation of patents. Several
empirical studies found that firms often still under exploit their patent portfolio (Elton,
Shah, & Voyzey, 2002; Giuri et al., 2007; Rivette & Kline, 2000), implying that
patents hold unused commercial potential.
As many firms are not able to overcome these market imperfections on their own, to
find other corporate transaction partners and to exploit patents successfully, they seek
Motivation
help from service providers that are able to support or fulfill certain tasks. Therefore, a
new business model has emerged: technology market intermediaries (Howells, 2006;
Nambisan & Sawhney, 2007; Sapsed, Grantham, & DeFillippi, 2007). Technology
market intermediaries may contribute to reduce market inefficiencies (Morgan &
Crawford, 1996) through additional market knowledge in respect of technologies
(Spulber, 1999), networks of potential transaction partners (Bryant & Reenstra-Bryant,
1998), and valuation experiences (Howells, 2006). Based on these competencies,
technology market intermediaries could increase the number and the performance of
external patent exploitation projects.
The number of technology market intermediaries is steadily growing. According to
OECD Publishing et al. (2005), market intermediaries have become more numerous
and diverse as demand for technology transfer and patent valuation have grown (p.
10). However, not all scholars advocate the emergence of technology market
intermediaries and their benefits for producing companies. For instance,
Lichtenthaler and Ernst (2008b) stated that, the general facilitating role of
intermediaries in technology transactions has to be questioned. Intermediary services
have a positive effect on licensing revenues, but they do not significantly affect a
firms
licensing
performance
relative
to
competitors
(p.
1025).
Lichtenthaler and Ernst (2008b) recommended: [] firms need to develop internal
resources for externally leveraging technology. Technology intermediaries should be
regarded as a complement to internal activities, and they do not represent a substitute
for internal resources (p. 1027).
In summary, producing companies have recognized the shift from patents being only
legal matters to serving as a strategic tool (e.g., Cohen et al., 2000; Davis, 2004;
Grindley & Teece, 1997; Hall, 1992; Kash & Kingston, 2001; Rivette & Kline, 2000;
Smith & Hansen, 2002). Therefore, most companies have established patent
management divisions that fulfill the tasks of leveraging patent portfolios (e.g., Davis
& Harrison, 2001; Lichtenthaler, 2008b). To leverage portfolios optimally, patents are
internally (e.g., Arundel & Patel, 2003; Bader, 2006; Blind, Edler, Frietsch, &
Schmoch, 2006a; Granstrand, 2000; Thumm, 2004) and externally (e.g., Cohen et al.,
2000; Lichtenthaler, 2007b; Pitkethly, 2001; de Rassenfosse, in press; Rivette & Kline,
2000) exploited. In external patent exploitation transactions, the partners are other
producing companies or patent aggregating companies. As producing companies still
have difficulties in exploiting patents externally (e.g., Arora et al., 2001a;
Introduction
Lichtenthaler & Ernst, 2009; Monk, 2009), and technology market intermediaries are
limited beneficially (Lichtenthaler & Ernst, 2008a, Lichtenthaler & Ernst, 2008b), the
question arises: are patent aggregating companies, as experienced buyers in the market
for patents and technologies, an alternative approach for producing companies to
leverage their patent portfolios optimally.
1.1.3 Deficits in current research
Patent aggregating companies reside within the context of patent management, market
for patents and technologies, and intermediary literature. Literature on patent
management refers to various fields of protecting innovations and inventions, for
example, on patent strategy and on why firms acquire patents, or leveraging patent
portfolios and external patent exploitation. Literature on the market for patents and
technologies investigates market structures, market efficiencies, and players in the
market. Literature on intermediaries refers to bridging companies that bring together
supply and demand. Literature on the intersection of literature on intermediaries with
literature on the market for patents and technologies deals with technology market
intermediaries. These companies match supply and demand of patents, technologies,
and innovation. Figure 1 illustrates the relevant literature streams and their
connections. In the intersection of the three literature streams, patent aggregating
companies and their utilization are located. Therefore, identifying deficits in current
research publications from the three literature streams requires consideration.
Motivation
Patent management
Reasons to
patent
External patent
exploitation
PAC and their

utilization
Markets for patents

and technologies
Technology
market
intermediaries
Intermediaries
Figure 1: Relevant literature streams and research gap
Publications from the literature streams, patent management, market for patents and
technologies, and technology market intermediaries, show several deficits regarding
patent aggregating companies. These deficits are described in the following
paragraphs.
During the last decade, the academic interest in external patent exploitation and the
companies involved has increased, and the literature stream on the market for patents
and technologies has developed. However, existing research is limited to the structure
of the market, its inefficiencies, and producing companies or technology market
intermediaries as main players in the market. The few studies recognizing patent
buyers without own products classify these companies either as technology market
intermediaries (e.g., Benassi & Di Minin, 2009; Monk, 2009; Tietze & Herstatt, 2010)
or as threat in the market for patents and technologies (e.g., Chien, 2009; Geradin,
Layne-Farrer, & Padilla, 2011; Golden, 2007; Johnson, Leonard, Meyer, & Serwin,
2007). Literature on non-corporate patent buyers is restricted to anecdotic evidence
(e.g., Hetzel, 2010; Holden, 2011; Lipfert & Ostler, 2008; Pluvinage, 2011). Studies
that approach patent aggregating companies without products but are active players in
10
Introduction
the market for patents and technologies in a more general and comprehensive manner
do not exist.
In the literature on patent management, an extensive body of publications exists on the
reasons why companies patent and acquire patents (e.g., Blind et al., 2006a, Blind,
Edler, Frietsch, & Schmoch, 2006b; Chesbrough, 2003b; Cohen et al., 2000; Duguet &
Kabla, 1998; Giuri et al., 2007; Hall & Ziedonis, 2001; Pitkethly, 2001; Shapiro,
2001). However, most of these studies focus on the motives of producing companies.
Even though literature recognizes that companies without products but acquire patents,
exist, little research has been conducted on them. Most studies analyze the motives of
so called non-practicing entities, companies that own patents but do not have physical
products and therefore, are non-practicing (e.g., Chien, 2009; Henkel & Reitzig, 2007;
Lemley, 2007; Merges, 2009; Reitzig, Henkel, & Heath, 2007; Rubin, 2007). Several
authors find that these companies buy infringed patents to enforce them (e.g., Ball &
Kesan, 2009; Golden, 2007; Gregory, 2007; Henkel & Reitzig, 2007; Reitzig et al.,
2007). Analysis of the motives of other patent acquiring companies without products
that do not focus on infringed patents is scarce. The only study that exists in this area
focuses on one company that acquires embryonic technology (Gredel, Kramer, &
Bend, in press). A systematic and comprehensive analysis of the patent aggregating
companies motives to amass patents is lacking.
Literature on technology market intermediaries is fragmented and exists in academic
and, to a certain extent, exists in non-academic literature. Academic, as well as nonacademic publications mainly describe patent aggregating companies as technology
market intermediaries. From a practitioner point of view, Millien and Laurie (2008)
provide a collection of various IP business models. Based on the companies selfdescription and on personal experiences as patent managers and patent management
consultants, Millien and Laurie classify emerging and established IP business models
in 17 different types, among them four different types of patent aggregating
companies. In the academic literature, Benassi and Di Minin (2009) analyze patent
brokers and their activities. They develop a typology of patent brokers that includes
the identification of two types of patent aggregating companies. Other recent studies
are limited to the distinction of defensive and offensive patent aggregating companies
(Kelley, 2011; Pluvinage, 2011; Wang, 2010).
During the last decade, publications on non-practicing entities have emerged as a sub
stream in the literature on technology market intermediaries. Most publications on
Motivation
11
patent aggregating companies are located in this sub stream and treat patent
aggregating companies as non-practicing entities, companies that buy infringed patents
and enforce them against large electronic companies. Luman III and Dodson (2006)
describe the emergence of these companies and of how they affect innovation,
companies, and society negatively. Reitzig et al. (2007) discuss the profitability of
these companies and of how producing companies can counteract. Studies also analyze
the impact of these companies on innovation (Shrestha, 2010), the market for patents
(McDonough III, 2006), and on the characteristics of patents bought by these
companies (Fischer & Henkel, 2009).
Within the sub stream of literature on non-practicing entities, patent aggregating
companies are often connoted as either positive (Rubin, 2007) or negative (e.g.,
Henkel & Reitzig, 2008). Often patent aggregating companies are lumped together
undifferentiated. Either they are suspected of acquiring patents only as litigation
opportunity (so called patent trolls, e.g., Chien, 2009); or they are appreciated as
white knight in underdeveloped markets for technology (so called patent elves, e.g.,
Geradin et al., 2011). Non-academic literature describes how customers of patent
aggregating companies benefit from them or the influence they have on the patent
market and other companies (e.g., Hetzel, 2010; Holden, 2011; Lipfert & von Scheffer,
2006; McCurdy & Reohr, 2008; Millien & Laurie, 2008; Pluvinage, 2011). A
profound analysis of the business models and buying motives of patent aggregating
companies, as well their interaction with producing companies has a limited
availability in the literature stream of technology market intermediaries. The few
studies focus mainly on the business model of non-practicing entities.
In summary, analyzing studies that explain the reasons for patenting, the reasons why
corporate buyers acquire patents, and which business models in the IP sector exist and
what they do, shows that existing literature is not able to explain where the differences
in the business models of patent aggregating companies are, why these companies
aggregate large patent portfolios, and how they have developed over time. Academic
research on their activities and on how producing companies can utilize patent
aggregating companies to leverage their patent portfolios does not exist. A
comprehensive description and analysis of patent aggregating companies is lacking.
12
Introduction
1.2 Research objectives and questions

This research is inspired by the practical need for assisting producing companies to
leverage their patent portfolios. In this respect, it has been argued that many
companies have started to exploit patents externally but still are not able to overcome
the problems in the market for patents and technologies. As patent aggregating
companies have emerged as significant and experienced buyers in the market for
patents and technologies, producing companies may use them to leverage their patent
portfolios. Hence, little is known about patent aggregating companies, and they have
not been addressed sufficiently in the existing literature to date. The main objectives of
this study are to shed light on patent aggregating companies and their business models,
and to develop a management framework that helps producing companies to leverage
their patent portfolios optimally. Thus, this research aims at answering the following
question (Figure 2):
Patent aggregating companies as option for producing companies?

"Why" question Rationale
"How" question Operation and

utilization
Why do patent aggregating

companies build up large patent
portfolios?
How are patent aggregating

companies utilized to leverage
patent portfolios of producing
companies?
Figure 2: Research questions
To provide answers to these questions, this research focuses on the analysis of the
patent aggregating company itself. Analyzing patent aggregating companies, their
business models, strategies, and activities comprehensively, this study develops results
on how patent aggregating companies can generate benefits for producing companies.
Thus, this research contributes to existing theory and literature on the market for
patents and technologies by shedding light on new and important players, the
evolvement of these players, and by developing a typology that conceptualizes these
players. Furthermore, this research aims at translating empirical and theoretical
insights from patent aggregating companies into managerial relevant practice by
Research objectives and questions
13
providing a management framework for producing companies on how patent

aggregating companies can be utilized for leveraging patent portfolios. Thus, the study
moves beyond the existing literature by deriving deep insights and managerial
recommendations in contrast of merely treating it as an empirical phenomenon.
1.3 Terms and definitions

The term patent aggregating companies and its concept is not a frequently cited term in
the literature. To distinguish patent aggregating companies from other companies such
as producing companies, technology market intermediaries, and sub-groups of patent
aggregating companies the following definition describes patent aggregating
companies in this research:
Patent aggregating companies are firms that focus on amassing patents, see R&D not
as a core competency, and do not produce or manufacture own physical goods.
Aggregating patents is used as the general term for acquiring ownership or
commercialization rights on a patent. As patents can be exploited, monetized,
advanced, or defended without ownership rights, some patent aggregating companies
conclude contracts with the original patent owner to exploit/commercialize/monetize
the patents exclusively, and ownership of the patent does not change to the patent
aggregating company. Acquiring a patent and transferring the ownership to the patent
aggregating company is a permanent and irrevocable action and cannot be limited. In
the following research, the term amassing and aggregating is used as a synonym. In
cases where the difference between acquiring ownership rights and acquiring
commercialization rights is important for the analysis of patent aggregating companies
and their strategies and business models, it is mentioned explicitly.
The above-stated definition does not quantify the number of patents a patent
aggregating company amasses. As patent aggregating companies are a young
phenomenon and the business models are emerging and vanishing quickly, the number
of patents they aggregate is heterogeneous. In this research, companies that have
amassed 10 patents or more and have patent aggregation as their main business model
are designated as patent aggregating companies.
In addition, companies that focus on R&D are excluded. Especially in the hightechnology industry, several companies exist that account large R&D expenditures and
14
Introduction
at the same time acquire patents but do not have their own production. These
companies create an ongoing stream of innovation and use patents to protect their
innovation. The developed technology is not used to produce goods, but the patents are
licensed to operating companies that manufacture products and employ the
technology. Laurie (2006) defines these types of companies as IP factories.1 IP
factories are excluded from the term patent aggregating companies.
A patent aggregating company acquires patents (and ownership rights) or
commercialization rights from the original patent owner (supply side of the patent
aggregating company). The patent aggregating company may sell the patents to a new
patent owner or out-license the patents to a licensee (demand side of the patent
aggregating company). Figure 3 illustrates the relation between a patent aggregating
company and its supply and demand side.
Patents (ownership rights)

Commercialization rights
Original patent
owner
Lump sum payment
Upfront payment
Partial royalties
Patent
aggregating
company
Lump sum payment

Upfront payment
Royalties
New patent owner or
licensee
Patents (ownership rights)
Exclusive license
Non-exclusive license
Figure 3: Players and relationships in the patent aggregating ecosystem
The original patent owner can be a natural person, such as a single inventor, or a
research institution, a university, or a corporate entity, such as a small and medium
enterprise (SME) or a multinational enterprise (MNE). Either the original patent owner
can be the inventor or have acquired the ownership rights from third parties.
One example for this type of companies is Tessera Technologies, an US based company that invests
in, licenses, and delivers innovative miniaturization technologies for next-generation electronic
devices. In the year ended on December 31, 2009 Tessera had R&D and other related costs of USD
65.9 million by total revenues of USD 299.4 million. Beside generating patents, Tessera also
acquires patents. A recent example for Tessera's acquisition activities is the purchase of 64 patents
and patent applications from ALLVIA, a US-based Through-Silicon Via development company
(Tessera Technologies, 2011).
Terms and definitions
15
For transferring ownership rights or commercialization rights to the patent aggregating

company, the original patent owner is remunerated with different compensation
elements, such as lump sum payments, upfront payments, or royalties in a profitsharing model. In general, royalties are paid periodically and are often tied to
performance targets, such as annual revenues. The final compensation elements
depend on the contractual agreement. In certain cases, additional compensation
elements, such as payments for R&D and service contracts, or back-licenses to the
original patent owner for specific fields of use are possible.
The new patent owner or the licensee can be a natural person, such as a single
inventor, a research institution, or university, or a corporate entity, such as a SME or
MNE. The new patent owner buys patents and with it, ownership rights from the
patent aggregating company and pays, depending on the contractual agreement, a lump
sum payment or upfront payment and royalties. A licensee takes an exclusive or a nonexclusive license from the patent aggregating company and pays, depending on the
contractual agreement, royalties or an upfront payment and royalties. A license is a
legal contract where the patent aggregating company grants exploitation rights over a
patent to a licensee. With an exclusive license, the licensee has the sole exploitation
right. Typically, a license is granted for a limited period of time and to specific
industrial or geographical markets.
1.4 Research concept and methodology

The awareness regarding the exploitation of patents, as well as technology market
intermediaries has tremendously increased during the last decades. Patent aggregating
companies have emerged as new empirical phenomenon and empirical insights in this
type of companies are scarce. This research aims to contribute to existing literature on
the market for patents and technologies, technology market intermediaries, and
external patent exploitation by building representation of observable elements,
generating questions, and presenting propositions relevant to explaining phenomena
(Eisenhardt, 1989a; Kromrey, 1998). In inductive research, new findings are derived
from existing literature, as well as the insights that originate directly from the data
analysis. The data are generated in field research. Theory is built through connecting
and disconnecting data and existing literature throughout the entire research process
16
Introduction
(Mintzberg, 2007), so that sufficient depth is provided to achieve an understanding of

these interrelations and dynamics (D'Iribarne, 1996).
Research methodology
Patent aggregating companies have emerged as a very young empirical phenomenon.
Due to the novelty and complexity of the topic, this study applies an exploratory,
qualitative research design. Therefore, case study research according to
Eisenhardt (1989a) and Yin (2009) is employed. Case study research allows an
understanding the phenomena under investigation while addressing detailed questions
to gain deeper insights into patent aggregating companies strategies, motives, and
activities (Yin, 2009).
More precisely, the research follows a multiple-case approach with the patent
aggregating company as the unit of analysis. A multiple-case approach allows for
cross comparison. These cross comparisons capture the specific aspects of all sites and
set the aspects in their natural perspective.
In qualitative research, the analytical process is an iterative one. Constant alternations
between data collection and data analysis are accomplished. The data analysis of this
research follows Eisenhardts (1989) approach to building theory from case study
research. A reference framework is built from existing literature and theoretical
insights relevant to explaining the phenomenon are the basis of the phenomenons
exploration (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Miles, 1979). The reference framework selects and
explains the main aspects to be studied within the case studies (Voss, Tsikriktsis, &
Frohlich, 2002). The derivation of the framework from literature ensures that the
subsequent collection of qualitative data is based on a sound theoretical approach. In
addition, it guides the data collection. Throughout the study, mini-cases and narratives
are used to illustrate theoretical concepts for the potentials of patent aggregating
companies and of how to realize them.
The main criteria in qualitative empirical research are the reliability and validity of
results. Usually, three types of validity can be differentiated: construct validity,
internal validity, and external validity. According to Yin (2009), in this research,
construct validity is ensured by using multiple sources of evidence and establishing a
chain of evidence between the questions asked, data collected, and conclusion drawn.
To ensure internal validity in this research, three strategies are employed. The
collected data comes from multiple sources (Lamnek, 1995; Yin, 2009). Semi-
Research concept and methodology
17
structured interview data are combined with the results of thoroughly conducted desk
research, internal documentation, and presentations by experts and management. In
addition, member checking is conducted. To determine the accuracy of the qualitative
findings, the informants serve as a check throughout the analysis process in an ongoing
dialog. Peer examination was conducted with the peer examiners Professor Gassmann
(ITEM-HSG, University of St. Gallen), Professor Webster (Melbourne Institute of
Applied Research and Social Science, University of Melbourne), and the faculty of the
research group Industrial Organization of the Melbourne Institute of Applied
Research and Social Science. To ensure external validity, the primary strategy is to
provide a detailed description of the research and to set up a detailed case study
protocol and database (Yin, 2009). This strategy allows anyone interested in testing
transferability to compare results (Merriam, 1998). Reliability is to ensure that another
researcher could repeat the research with the same procedure (Eisenhardt, 1989a).
Therefore, in this study, data collection and analysis are described in detail to increase
transparency (e.g., the researchers role, the informants position, case selection
criteria, context of data collection). Furthermore, the triangulation of data strengthens
not only the internal validity, but also supports reliability.
Research sample
Current research offers little information regarding motives, strategies, and activities
of patent aggregating companies. Therefore, several case studies have been selected
and studied in detail to gain an in-depth understanding of their natural setting,
complexity, and context (Punch, 2005). The research was carried out in two phases
during 2009 and 2011.
The first research phase included interviews with corporate patent experts and noncorporate patent experts to explore technology market intermediaries and patent
service provider in general. It is based upon 93 interviews with 68 patent service
providers and technology market intermediaries predominantly based in Europe and
the US. The interviews stems from seminar works, scientific industry studies, and
participated contracted research projects at the Institute of Technology Management at
the University of St.Gallen under the supervision of the author. All companies are
engaged with patent transactions. The various company contacts represent a wide
range of industries, technology categories, and business models. The inter-industry
scope of companies represents the heterogeneity of the explorative phase.
18
Introduction
In the second research phase, an in-depth analysis of companies with diverse but
distinctive business models was conducted. Based on the case firms investigated in
phase one, the selected firms have the highest potential for learning new insights with
respect to their business models, strategies, and activities, as the firms have been
proven to be successful in the intransparent market for patents. Thus, sampling has
been conducted according to theoretical rather than random sampling (Eisenhardt,
1989a). While random sampling is typically found in theory testing on a broad scale,
theoretical sampling is the preferred sampling strategy when new or existing theory is
developed or advanced (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Yin, 2009). In qualitative research, there is
no ideal number of case studies. Due to the broad spectrum of business models, this
research presents in-depth case studies of 27 firms that show very distinct strategies
and high activity in the market for patents.
Table 1 shows the analyzed companies and therefore, the empirical base of this
research.
1
2
19
Research Phase
Number of
Interviews
Companies
Phase I
Literature review
and explorative
interviews on
external patent
exploitation and
technology market
intermediaries
93
1790 Capital Management, 5i Principles Group, 5iTech,

Acacia Research, Alliacense, Allied Security Trust,
Alpha Gasser Patentverwertungs AG, Alpha
Patentfonds Management GmbH, Altitude Capital,
Anadeus Ltd, Blueprint Ventures, Burford Group
Limited, Capital Royalty L.P, Caisse des Depots,
Chipworks, Coller Capital, CONSOR, CreativE1,
Credite Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Drakes Bay Company,
European Investment Funds, Fergason Licensing,
Finance Systems, Gathering 2.0, General Patent Corp,
ICAP Ocean Tomo, IgniteIP, Inflexion Point, Innovaro,
Intellectual Ventures, IP Auctions GmbH, IP
Bewertungs AG, IP Exchange Chicago, IP Navigation
Group, IP Trade, IPEG Consultancy BV, Juris Capital,
Kratos Ventures, Marqera, MPEG LA, New Venture
Partners, NineSigma, NW patent funding, Ocean Tomo,
Ocean Tomo Indexes, Open Invention Network, Papst
Licensing, Paradox Capital, Patent board, PATEV, PCT
Capital, Pete Invest MedTech2, Plutus IP, Rambus,
Rembrandt IP, Royalty Pharma, RPX, Sisvel, Steinbeis
TIB, TPL, Techquity, Thinkfire, Tynax, UBM
TechInsights, Via Licensing, Wi-LAN, Yet2.com
Phase II
In-depth case
studies of patent
aggregating
companies
44
Acacia Research, Allied Security Trust, Alpha Gasser

Patentverwertungs AG, Alpha Patentfonds
Management, Capital Royalty, Coller Capital,
CreativE1, Deutsche Bank, Fergason Licensing, Finance
System, General Patent Corporation, IgniteIP,
Intellectual Ventures, IP Bewertungs AG, IP Navigation
Group, MPEG LA, Open Invention Network, Papst
Licensing, Patent Freedom, PATEV Associates, Pete
Invest MedTech2, RPX, Steinbeis TIB, Techquity
Capital
Total
137
68
The name of the company has been disguised for confidentiality reasons. In this research, the
company is referred to under a fictitious name. The name CreativE replaces the firms actual name.
company is referred to under a fictitious name. The name Pete Invest MedTech replaces the firms
actual name.
Table 1: Empirical base of research
20
Introduction
The selection procedure was part of the iterative interview process within the first
phase. The selection criteria for the case studies included a focus on pioneering
activities in the market for technologies and patents. In addition, the selected
companies had to amass patents rather than only transfer them or consult patent sellers.
In addition, the selected case study firms represent the two main regions where patents
and technologies are traded: Europe and the US. The case study selection focused on
firms that aggregate patents from industries with a high propensity to patent and a high
relevance of patents as a high-technology industry or a life science industry. As patent
aggregating companies are very heterogeneous, companies of all sizes were selected.
Location
Headquarters
USA
Headquarters
Europe
Focus on acquisition of patents from industry:

Electrical engineering
Life science
No industry focus
Acacia
Alliacense
Allied Security Trust
Fergason Patent
IP Holdings
MPEG LA
RPX
Sipro Lab
Open Inv. Network
Via Licensing
Capital Royalty
Pete Invest MedT1
Royalty Pharma
AlseT
Coller Capital
IgniteIP
Intellectual Ventures
IP Navigation
Rembrandt
Techquity
CreativeE2
Golden Rice PDP
IP Holdings
MPEG LA
Alpha Patentfonds
Eco-Patent Commons
Papst Licensing
Patent Invest Fond
Patent Select
actual name.
2
company is referred to under a fictitious name. The name CreativE replaces the firms actual name.
Table 2: Research sample of patent aggregating companies
21
About more than two-thirds of the in-depth case studies are from US-based patent
aggregating companies (see company list Table 2). Detailed case studies are described
for Alpha Patentfonds, Intellectual Ventures, Pete Invest MedTech 2, Patent Select,
Acacia Research Corporation, Allied Security Trust, MPEG LA, and Golden Rice
product development partnership while mini cases provide examples throughout the
text. These emphasize differences in strategies and motives, as well as in the activities
of patent aggregating companies.
Data Collection
In all phases, data has been collected through personal face-to-face or telephone semistructured interviews of 4590 minutes in length. The main interview partners were
typically founders, CEO, CPO, CFO, partners, managing directors, or vice presidents
of patent aggregating companies. Informants in top management positions were
interviewed mainly to secure the information on the strategic direction and the
activities of the patent aggregating companies. Some of the respondents have been
interviewed more than once for follow up questions and approval of earlier data. To
ensure consistency, the same semi-structured interview guide has been used
throughout all interviews. Whenever possible, this interview guide has been sent to the
interviewee in advance. All interview data is complemented by written company
information, such as internal memorandums, presentations, and publicly available
information to increase validity. In addition, follow-up interviews have been
conducted to confirm the case study interpretations from the interview data. This
triangulation through combining multiple sources of evidence contributes to
confirming the validity and reliability of the research data (Voss et al., 2002; Yin,
2009).
1.5 Thesis structure

This thesis is structured as follows (also see Figure 4):
Chapter 2 reviews the relevant literature regarding patent management, internal and
external patent exploitation, and patent intermediaries. It provides the basic
understanding of patent management and of how producing companies leverage their
2
actual name.
22
Introduction
patent portfolios. Drawing on the reviewed literature, a reference framework for the
analysis of patent aggregating companies is developed. To gain deeper insight into
patent aggregating companies, the reference framework uses four defining
characteristics: setting, strategy, organization, and process.
As patent aggregating companies are still a black box, Chapter 3 explores the
empirical phenomenon and provides insight into the general setting of patent
aggregating companies, their history, and the ventures funding. The process of patent
aggregation is analyzed and decomposed into four phases, and the strategies of patent
aggregating companies identified. Based on the empirical data, eight business models
of patent aggregating companies are distinguished.
Chapter 4 analyzes the potentials patent aggregating companies offer producing
companies. Patent aggregating companies can create opportunities in the environment
of producing companies, as well as within the company. Therefore, external and
internal potentials are distinguished.
Chapter 5 identifies four different archetypes of patent aggregating companies: (1) the
merchant, (2) the gardener, (3) the collector, and (4) the patron. The archetypes differ
regarding their competencies and the rewards they provide to the original patent
owners. Two different business models represent each archetype, and their
characteristics are illustrated with eight cases studies.
Chapter 6 provides recommendations how producing companies can utilize patent
aggregating companies to leverage their patent portfolios. Based on value creating
options and on constraints in the utilization of patent aggregating companies, a
management framework is developed. The patent aggregating business, as well as the
market for patents and technologies, are highly dynamic conditions and change fast.
As the management framework reflects the current situation of patent aggregating
companies, the development of patent aggregating companies and the main driver of
the development are analyzed.
Chapter 7 concludes this thesis and presents implications of this study from both a
theoretical and an empirical point of view. The outlook describes further research and
trends.
Thesis structure
Introduction
Motivation and
research goal
Exploring the phenomenon

Process of patent
aggregation
Internal potentials
Theoretical
foundation
Typology and case studies of patent aggregating companies

The Merchant
The Gardener
The Collector
The Patron
Alpha
Patentfonds
Intellectual
Ventures
Pete Invest
MedTech
Patent Select
Acacia
Research
Allied Security
Trust
MPEG LA
Golden Rice
Leveraging patent portfolios by utilizing patent aggregating companies

Management
framework
Strategies of patent
aggregating
companies
Potentials of patent aggregating companies

External potentials
Reference
framework
First empirical
insights
Patent
intermediaries
Possible
solution
Options to
leverage patent
portfolios
Setting of patent
aggregating
companies
4
Thesis
structure
Leveraging companies' patent portfolios State of the art

Fundamentals of
patent
management
Research
concept
Development of
patent aggregating
companies
Driving factor of
development
Implication for
management practice
Further research and

trends
Conclusion
Implication for
management theory
Figure 4: Structure of the thesis
Empirical in-depth
investigation
Terms and
definitions
Recommended
approach
23
24
State of the art
2 Leveraging companies patent portfolios State of the art

Based on the derived research objectives (section 1.-1313864729), the following
chapter provides a review from the literature streams of patent management,
technology market intermediaries, markets for technologies, open innovation, and
knowledge management. The last part of this chapter derives a reference framework
from literature. This reference framework serves as a guideline for the data collection
and data analysis and it is defined through the four key characteristics of patent
aggregating companies business models: setting, strategy, organization, and process.
Therefore, the literature is reviewed and presented according to its relevance to answer
the research questions and to build the reference framework:
(1) Literature that analyzes why firms patent or acquire patents from the literature
streams patent management, open innovation, and knowledge management. This
analysis serves as theoretical basis for the analysis of patent aggregating
companies motives to acquire patents.
(2) Literature that describes how producing companies leverage their patent portfolios
from the literature streams of patent management and open innovation. It serves as
the basis to understand for which opportunities producing companies could utilize
patent aggregating companies.
(3) Literature that illustrates what technology market intermediaries are, which
activities they perform, and non-practicing entities as a controversial sub-group
from the literature streams of technology market intermediaries. It provides a basic
understanding of the business models, the recent discussions, and the
differentiation of patent aggregating companies. Further, it shows that besides
patent aggregating companies strategies, operational factors distinguish the
different business models.
2.1 Fundamentals of patent management

The growing number of patent applications over the last century underlines the trend
that patents have become an important corporate asset and a critical driver for business
profitability in the knowledge economy (Teece, 2000) is underlined by the growing
number of patent applications over the last century. Since 1985, the worldwide yearly
patent filings have more than doubled. The World Intellectual Property Organization
Fundamentals of patent management
25
(WIPO, 2010) reports that 1.9 million patent applications were filed worldwide in
2008. The major patent application countries are the US with 456,321 patent
applications, followed by Japan with 391,002 and China with 289,838 patent
applications. At the European Patent Office (EPO), 146,150 patents were filed in 2008.
Thus, more and more firms have started to accumulate patent rights. The following
part presents the reasons why firms patent and acquire patents.
2.1.1 Reasons why firms patent
The intention of the patent system is that firms can exclude third parties from using
their invention and therefore, are able to appropriate returns from innovation (Levin,
Klevorick, Nelson, & Winter, 1987; Teece, 1986). Therefore, the traditional motive for
patenting is to use patents to protect innovations from imitation and to secure freedom
to operate (FTO). Firms apply for patent protection to improve their competitive
position (Hanel, 2006). However, the reasons to patent have changed and have become
more complex and comprehensive (Blind et al., 2006b). Concomitant, the relative
relevance of the traditional protection motive has been reduced (Blind et al., 2006a).
An increasingly important motive to patent is to block competitors (e.g., Blind,
Cremers, & Mueller, 2009; Thumm, 2004). Duguet and Kabla (1998) observe that
protection of own innovations from imitation and blocking competitors are the two
central motives why firms patents. Blind et al. (2006a) differentiate between offensive
blockade, a firm patents to prevent other firms from using their own inventions in the
application filed of the patenting company, and defensive blockade, a firm patents to
prevent being restricted in its own technological field. Empirical studies identify two
more defensive patenting motives. Firstly, companies patent to prevent competitors
from developing around their technology (Arundel & Patel, 2003). Secondly,
companies patent to build up large portfolios to prevent patent infringement lawsuits
or to improve their own negotiation position in cases of litigation. In this case, patents
are generated as bargaining chips in negotiations (Cohen et al., 2000; Granstrand,
2000; Hall & Ziedonis, 2001; Noel & Schankerman, 2011).
In addition to the defensive motive, companies patent nowadays for a variety of
reasons. Increasingly, companies file patents to have a neutral R&D controlling
instrument that serves as indicator to assess and reward R&D personnel (Blind &
Thumm, 2004) and to internal evaluate the R&D productivity (Arundel, van de Paal, &
26
State of the art
Soete, 1995). During the last decades, patents are filed to pursue market strategies, and
companies patent to access international markets (Duguet & Kabla, 1998) or to create
a tool for reputation management in external evaluations with strategic or financial
partners (Cohen, Goto, Nagata, Nelson, & Walsh, 2002). Companies are increasingly
monetary motivated and file patents to generate licensing revenues (Pitkethly, 2001) or
additional cash flows from patent sales (Rivette & Kline, 2000) and to access other
forms of company funding (de Rassenfosse, in press).
The motives to patent differ between industries. Cohen et al. (2000) argue that the
number of patentable elements in a commercializable new product is important in
affecting the reasons why companies use patents and hence, why they patent in the
first place. They distinguish between complex versus discrete product industries.
Industries with products that comprise many separately patentable elements are
complex product industries. Examples for complex product industries are hightechnology industries, such as the medical devices industry, semiconductor industry,
or telecommunication industry. Industries with products that comprise only one or
very few separately patentable elements are discrete product industries. Examples are
the chemical or pharmaceutical industry.
Companies operating in complex product industries rarely have full control over all
essential patents they need to produce their products. Several competitors have patents
that all players in this technological field need. Therefore, all players are depending on
each other and use patents as exchange potential or negotiation material. Various
studies confirm that the share of cross-licensing in high-technology industries is above
average (Anand & Khanna, 2000; Giuri et al., 2007; Grindley & Teece, 1997; Hall
& Ziedonis, 2001). As patents have to be shared and transferred, they become a
currency, and patent thickets3 arise in complex product industries as an exchange
forum for complementary technologies (Reitzig, 2004b). Companies operating in
discrete product industries are able to make products with full control over all essential
patents. Therefore, they use patents to secure market access, to block competitors, and
Defined by Shapiro (2001), patent thickets are a dense web of overlapping intellectual property
rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new
technology (p. 119). Patent thickets arise mainly in complex industries, such as the medical
devices industry, semiconductor industry, or telecommunication industry. Literature argues that
patent thickets may raise transactions costs that arise from circumvention and long negotiations and
contracting between players that increases costs over the positive impact on R&D incentives
(Cockburn, MacGarvie, and Mller, 2010).
Fundamentals of patent management
27
to secure freedom to operate (Kash & Kingston, 2001; Roberts, 1999). However, not
all studies support this result. Blind et al. (2006a) did an analysis of 522 German
companies and could not observe differences in the reasons to patent between complex
and discrete product industries. Most literature generally agrees on the fact that patents
in the chemical or pharmaceutical industry are an important and effective means to
protect innovations (e.g., Cohen et al., 2000; Levin et al., 1987; Mansfield, 1986).
Besides the general motives to patent and the differences in the industries literatures
discussion of patenting behavior and of why firms patent focuses on geographical
regions, especially the US, Europe, and Japan (e.g., Carlsson et al., 2008; Cohen et al.,
2002; Ernst, 1995; Granstrand, 2000, Granstrand, 2004; Pitkethly, 2001). So far, all
publications focus on the reasons why companies that produce goods patent.
2.1.2 Reasons why companies buy patents
Apart from their own patenting activities, companies can also build up patent
portfolios by acquiring patents. Compared with the amount and intensity of studies on
the reasons why firms patent, the reasons why firms buy patents is analyzed to a much
smaller extent and often only as a by-result. Literature streams that observe the
motives for acquiring patents are mainly studies on open innovation and knowledge
acquisition. Since Chesbroughs seminal work (2003a), literature on open innovation
is burgeoning, and patents play a crucial role because they are the legal basis of the in
and out flows of knowledge (e.g., Arora, 1995; Chesbrough, 2003b; Chesbrough,
2006; Lichtenthaler, 2007b). The open innovation process encompasses inbound,
outbound, and coupled activities (Gassmann, 2006). Acquiring knowledge and patents
from external sources is part of the inbound activities (Chesbrough, 2003a). The
reasons why firms acquire patents in the open innovation process are mainly
technological and help companies benefit from external innovation and R&D activities
(e.g., Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Grindley & Teece, 1997; von Hippel, 1988; Pisano,
2006; van de Vrande, Vanhaverbeke, & Gassmann, 2010; Westney, 1993). The
technological motives to acquire patents include the objective to fill the development
pipeline and acquire new ideas (Nambisan & Sawhney, 2007); to allow for more
varied product development (Atuahene-Gima, 1992; Cesaroni, 2004); to enter new
markets (Contractor, 1980); to establish new products or to go into a new line of
business (Cesaroni, 2004; Jones, Lanctot, & Teegen, 2001); to reduce R&D costs
28
State of the art
(Hoffmann & Schlosser, 2001; Mohr & Spekman, 1994); and to reduce the risks of
R&D failures (Reepmeyer et al., 2011).
In addition to technological reasons, defensive reasons are increasingly important for
companies. To guard against the risk of patent litigation, companies acquire patents so
they can strike back against or neutralize threats of enforcement lawsuits brought by
their competitors (e.g., Chien, 2009; Ziedonis, 2004). Therefore, the defensive reasons
to acquire patents are quite similar to several reasons of why firms patent. Also the
motive to build up large portfolios that are used as bargaining chips against other
patentees, competitors, or suppliers, and therefore, can prevent enforcement lawsuits is
important (e.g., Hall & Ziedonis, 2001; Williamson, 1983). Buying patents and taking
the patents from the open market eliminates the chance of litigations (Ziedonis, 2004).
Thus, it reduces not only the threat of litigation, but for the acquiring company, it also
generates the freedom to operate (Shapiro, 2001). So far, studies focus on the reasons
why companies that produce goods acquire patents.
2.2 Options to leverage patent portfolios

As the number of patent applications grows and with them the size of companies
patent portfolios (Blind et al., 2009; Hall, 2005; Hall & Ziedonis, 2001), firms have
established dedicated resources to manage patent portfolios (Bianchi, Chiaroni,
Chiesa, & Frattini, 2011b; Grindley & Teece, 1997). Most companies now leverage
patents as an integral part of business strategy (e.g., Arora et al., 2001b; Cohen et al.,
2000; Davis, 2004; Rivette & Kline, 2000). Patents can be leveraged in two different
ways, either through internal or external exploitation (Benassi, Corsaro, & Geenen,
2010). For the many companies leveraging patents externally, it is still a difficult and
often unsuccessful task because they face several impediments to external patent
exploitation (e.g., Arora et al., 2001a; Caves et al., 1983; Gans & Stern, 2010;
Guilhon, 2004). The following part describes the different options a company has to
leverage its patent portfolio. Secondly, the impediments to external patent exploitation
and technology transfer are illustrated.
2.2.1 Internal and external exploitation of patents
According to Kelley (2011), patents can generate value from three different
perspectives: financial, strategic, and defensive. Patents create financial value through
Options to leverage patent portfolios
29
monetary benefits and cash flows that directly result from transactions of the patents
and include, for instance, received royalties or sales proceeds. The strategic value of
patents is represented by the impact a patent has in the product market. In addition,
patents create a defensive value by avoiding litigation and the costs of patent litigation,
for instance, searching for circumvention in the case of injunction (Kelley, 2011).
To extract the three forms of value, the literature distinguishes two ways in which a
company can leverage the patent portfolio: either through internal or external patent
exploitation (Benassi et al., 2010; Lichtenthaler, 2005). Whereas in the past, studies
discussed that the two ways can only be conducted exclusively, studies increasingly
discuss that external exploitation can, and in several cases should be conducted
simultaneously to internal exploitation (e.g., Lichtenthaler & Lichtenthaler, 2009;
Mathews, 2003). In some cases, the internal exploitation of patents is a prerequisite for
a successful external exploitation (Arora et al., 2001b). In other cases, the external
patent exploitation is precondition for a successful product business (Koruna, 2004;
Lichtenthaler, 2006).
The traditional way of patent exploitation, resulting from the nature of the patent
system, is internal exploitation. The economic rationale behind the creation of a patent
system is that inventors are rewarded with a temporary monopoly from their invention
for disclosing their invention to the public (Gassmann & Bader, 2011). The EPO
(2009) defines a patent as a legal title which protects a technical invention for a
limited period. It gives the owner the right to prevent others from exploiting the
invention in the countries for which it has been granted. All patents are published, so
everyone can benefit from the information they contain (p. 5). Patents are negative
rights and do not allow the owner the exploitation of the patented invention, but
exclude third parties to sell or use the invention. On the one hand, society benefits
because the patent discloses an invention that promotes the state of the art. On the
other hand, this exclusion of others helps the inventor to monopolize his/her rewards
from R&D. Therefore, patents generate a strategic value by protecting innovation from
imitation or copying.
Often it is not possible to sustain the competitive advantage with only one patent.
Therefore, patents can create strategic value by preventing circumvention (e.g.,
Arundel & Patel, 2003; Ball & Kesan, 2009), by blocking the companys core
technology and potential substitution technologies (e.g., Hanel, 2006; Thumm, 2004),
and erecting entry barriers for market access (e.g., Caves, Whinston, & Hurwitz, 1991;
30
State of the art
Gilbert & Newbery, 1982). In addition, to strategic value, internally exploited patents
generate defensive value and ensure freedom to operate for the patent owner
(Lichtenthaler, 2011). Freedom to operate ensures that R&D and the production of
goods can be conducted without interfering with third parties rights. Often, the
exclusive internal exploitation of patents is mainly considered for protecting the firms
technological core competencies.
Patents are externally exploited in the secondary market for patents, also called market
for patents and technologies (e.g., Arora et al., 2001a; Gambardella et al., 2007;
Svensson, 2007). The market for patents and technologies is a broad term and denotes
trade in technology disembodied from physical goods (Arora & Gambardella, 2010b).
To exploit patents externally, the patent owning company has to decide between
assigning or licensing patents to a third party (Benassi et al., 2010).
By assigning patents to the other transaction party, the original patent owner transfers
the ownership rights to the new patent owner. By licensing patents to the other
transaction party, the original patent owner authorizes the licensee to use the patent,
patents, or patent portfolio. The patent owner can assign or license either only the sole
legal right of exclusion (McDonough III, 2006) or the right or exclusion in
combination with additional technology or knowledge (Marcy, 1979).
The classic option of assigning the ownership rights to another party is selling patents.
By selling the patents, the patent owner can generate financial value and realize the
remaining value from unused inventions and patents. These patents can result from
terminated research projects, cover technology that lies outside the core competency of
the company, be remnants from a shift in business strategy, acquired in corporate
M&A transactions, and they are now unrelated to products or cover technology in a
different stage of the actual product life cycle (Lichtenthaler, 2005). Patent sales also
generate financial value through costs reduction. Instead of abandoning patents that are
not practiced, the sale of patents can save renewal fees beside the onetime cash inflow
through the selling price. One successful example for financial value generation from
costs savings is Dow Chemical. In the 1990s, Dow changed its patent strategy. Instead
of abandoning patents, Dow could sell its unused patents. Beside the acquisition price,
this saved more than USD 50 million (Davis & Harrison, 2001).
Patents can also generate strategic value if they are transferred together with
technology. In some cases, the patent owners develop an invention but face constraints
31
that impede the commercialization of the innovative product (e.g., Bianchi, Chiaroni,
Chiesa, & Frattini, 2011a; Zahra & Nielsen, 2002). To overcome these constraints,
companies can sell patents, technologies, and knowledge to a third company (Gredel et
al., in press). On the one hand, this transaction generates cash flows that can be
reinvested in R&D or commercialization efforts of the sold or another technology
(Lipfert & Ostler, 2008). On the other hand, through a grant back license and the
additional resources of the transaction partner, the original patent owner and the new
patent owner can commercialize the innovative technology jointly.
Another option to generate financial value from patents is to create a spin-off and
transfer patents and technologies to this new company (Chesbrough, 2003c;
Davenport, Carr, & Bibby, 2002). An example for a successful spin-off is Actelion.
Roche restructured its cardiovascular therapy area and abandoned the Bosentan project
in 1997. After that, four managers from this project founded the company Actelion,
and Roche assigned the patents that cover Bosentan to Actelion. Actelion started the
clinical development phase 3, changed the original indication of Bosentan, and
brought the drug to the market. Therefore, Roche received cash flows from a project
that the company originally stopped, and Actelion could commercialize a new drug
without early development risks (Reepmeyer, 2006).
Another option to generate value from patents is to donate patents (Bader, Gassmann,
Ziegler, & Ruether, in press). Donating patents to a non-profit organization generates
financial value not through direct cash inflows but through tax savings (Carlsson et al.,
2008). Donating patents to an open source community generates strategic and
defensive value. The basis of open source communities is that participants give access
to inventions free of charge so that all other participants can build on each others
innovations (Yanagisawa & Guellec, 2009). Open source is particularly relevant in
software development (von Krogh & von Hippel, 2003) but increasingly, companies
from other industries become aware of its potential (e.g., developing a cure for
tuberculosis in developing countries (Dhanaraj, in press). By participating in open
source projects and donating patents, companies can generate strategic value through
developing business models that sell complementary services to open source products
(e.g., Cusumano, 2004; Dahlander, 2005; Fitzgerald, 2006; Watson, Boudreau, York,
Greiner, & Wynn, JR., 2008) or through developing products with the innovative
power of outsiders, which is offered to the company free of charge (e.g., Andersen-
32
State of the art
Gott, Ghinea, & Bygstad, in press; Dahlander, 2005; Dahlander & Wallin, 2006;
Tapscott & Williams, 2008).
In licensing transactions, the patent owner keeps the ownership right and transfers only
the right to use to a licensee. With this licensing transaction, patent owners can realize
complementary value from their patents or multiply the technology. Several value
generating options of licensing can be identified. The enforcement of patents is one
option to generate financial value from patents. Stick (also known as enforcement or
assertion) licensing is based on actual patent infringements and can be conducted by
companies that have evidence of a patents use without authorization (Gassmann
& Bader, 2011; Lichtenthaler, 2010; Reinhardt, 2008). The transaction party has
already developed and marketed a product. Therefore, stick licensing is a reactive and
offensive approach that gives the licensee the right to use the patent without any
additional technology or knowledge transfer (Gassmann & Bader, 2011).
Besides generating financial value, the original patent owner can also generate
strategic value with patent licensing. In contrast to the reactive and offensive stick
licensing, a company can choose the option of carrot licensing, also known as
opportunity or enablement licensing (Gassmann & Bader, 2011; Lichtenthaler, 2010;
Reinhardt, 2008). Carrot licensing is an active and defensive approach and the original
patent owner searches for potential licensees interested in the technology (Gassmann
& Bader, 2011). The potential licensee does not use the patent before the licensing
contract is concluded. According to Anand and Khanna (2000), licensing is the most
significant method for technology transfer and the most commonly observed
contractual agreement between companies. The strategic value for the patent owner is
generated through the enabler function of the carrot license. The licensee, a company
potentially in other industries or markets, is able to commercialize a new product
based on the license. Therefore, the original patent owner can enter new markets or
applications without producing the product (e.g., Adam, Ong, & Pearson, 1988;
Contractor, 1980). Often the licensee has more capabilities in the specific markets or
the specific applications (Gredel et al., in press).
In addition to internal exploitation, a patent owner can use these patents to establish an
industry standard based on their technology (e.g., Blind & Thumm, 2004; Conner,
1995; Reitzig, 2004a). Even if the technology is already commercialized in products,
in several industries, a successful penetration of the market is only possible if other
companies also use this technology (Ehrhardt, 2004). With licensing agreements
33
between the relevant players and any third party, it is possible to spread the
technology, create a standard, and ensure that consumers adopt the technology.
Patents can also be the basis for co-operation between companies, for example, in joint
ventures. Instead of injecting liquid assets into the joint ventures, patents can be used
as initial currency (e.g., Parr & Sullivan, 1996; Reinhardt, 2008). Patents exploited in
joint ventures can generate strategic value. A joint venture is often set up to develop or
commercialize new products and strengthen the market position of the involved
companies (Granstrand, 2000). Additionally, spillover R&D effects may occur and the
results, or partial results, from the joint venture transferred back to the original patent
owner and fuel the internal R&D (Koruna, 2004).
Besides the financial and strategic value, a company can also generate defensive value
in licensing transactions (Lichtenthaler, 2011). In complex industries, many products
include a large range of technologies. A single firm is no longer able to develop all
needed technologies internally and in cumulative technology fields, the innovations
build on another (Grindley & Teece, 1997). All companies are dependent on each
other (e.g., Cohen et al., 2000; Kash & Kingston, 2001). To generate freedom to
operate, prevent infringement and thus enforcement lawsuits, a company can exploit
their patents, besides internal exploitation, in cross-licensing agreements (e.g.,
Grindley & Teece, 1997; Hall & Ziedonis, 2001; Reitzig, 2004b; Shapiro, 2001).
Figure 5 summarizes the different value generating options companies can chose to
leverage their patent portfolios. The options are organized regarding the value this
choice creates and the strategic need that the patent owner has.
34
State of the art
Types of value
Collateralization
Selling with tech
Stick licensing
Selling without tech
Financial
value
Spin off
Abandon
Strategic
value
Erecting entry barriers
Donation
Standardization
Blocking core tech
Selling with tech
Joint ventures
Blocking substitution tech
Carrot licensing for

selected applications
Protect innovation
Prevent circumvention
Ensure FTO
Open Source
Cross licensing
Defensive
value
External exploitation
Internal exploitation
Strategic needs
of companies
Decision
Own use
Capturing remaining
value
Realizing complementary
value/ multiplication
Keep
Assign
License
Figure 5: Map of value generating options for leveraging patent portfolios
2.2.2 Impediments to optimally leverage patent portfolios

Even though firms are aware of the increasing importance of patents and the potentials
of external patent exploitation, several authors assume that companies do not use all
their patents in the patent portfolio optimally and still have large leveraging potentials
(Rivette & Kline, 2000). Giuri et al. (2007) analyze the value and use of more than
9,000 European patents and find that on average, 17.4% of all patents in a patent
portfolio are exploited neither internally in products or for blocking competitors, nor
for licensing or cross-licensing. Whereas in the mechanical engineering industry, the
portion of unused patents is 14.3%, patent portfolios in the pharmaceutical and
chemical industry have 22.3% unused patents and an even larger optimization
potential (Giuri et al., 2007). That patents are not leveraged optimally is often not a
function of ignorance but a function of incapability. Berneman et al. (2009) find that in
general, companies are willing to exploit 40% of their patent portfolio (on average)
externally, but are mostly not able to conduct the exploitation of their patents on their
35
own. The reasons why so many companies have problems acting in the market for
patents and technologies are diverse and range from the patent as economic good itself
to inefficiencies in the market.
Patents are inherently creative, unique, and idiosyncratic in their scope, depth,
strength, and importance (Sneed & Johnson, 2009). These characteristics distinguish
patents substantially from tangible assets and cause the difficulties for firms to exploit
patents externally. Early studies find that because of the uniqueness and idiosyncrasy
of patents, companies have major difficulties in identifying potential marketable
technologies (e.g., Arora et al., 2001a; Ford & Ryan, 1977; Lichtenthaler, 2007a;
Teece, 1998). Ford and Ryan (1977) also find that companies are not able to do a
successful marketing of intangible products.
One significant attribute of patents is that they are highly context specific (Arora et al.,
2001a). Therefore, the utilization potential and the value of a patent can vary
according to the respective situation, the respective company environment, and the
respective patent owner (Arora et al., 2001a; Reitzig, 2003). in transferring patents,
technologies, and knowledge to a different context, a resource intensive adaption to
this context may be required. in addition, many patents are not suitable for a transfer to
a different context and are only relevant for the application they were applied for
(Rings, 2000).
Another obstacle that prevents external patent exploitation is the existence of
uncertainty. Patent transactions are hindered through uncertainty regarding a patents
value and its tradability (Troy & Werle, 2008). Legal and technical validity determine
the intrinsic value of a patent, and they can be both subject to change (Jarboe &
Furrow, 2008). Even after granting a patent, this decision can be reversed at a later
point in time through oppositions of competitors, incomplete documentation, or
plagiarism. Therefore, the legal validity is not guaranteed during the life of a patent, a
fact that leads to uncertainty (Jarboe & Furrow, 2008). Technical validity refers to a
patents position within existing knowledge. Patents are granted if they are initially
new and not part of the body of knowledge. As technology changes, improves, and
moves on, a patent may be no longer new and become obsolete when the underlying
knowledge is replaced by more advanced innovation, leading to uncertainty (Arora
& Gambardella, 2010a).
36
State of the art
Patent valuation assigns a monetary amount to the patent that reflects the economic
value of the patent (Ensthaler & Strbbe, 2006). Therefore, even though a patent is
protected legally and up-to-date technologically, the economic and strategic value of a
patent is still subject to uncertainty (Troy & Werle, 2008). Valid patents do not
necessarily generate cash flows, which are often used to calculate the monetary value
of patents, and the general ability to generate cash flows is difficult to predict. This is
especially significant in industries with a complex technological environment and fastchanging consumer tastes (Jarboe & Furrow, 2008). Hence, the uncertainty regarding
future cash flows is large.
In general, patent valuation and the determination of transaction prices are preconditions for patent transactions (Kamiyama et al., 2006). However, a standard
valuation approach and reliable data on past transactions are lacking (Arora et al.,
2001a). Literature offers several patent valuation methods based on the three basic
approaches, cost, market, and income approach (for further information see for
example, Parr & Smith, 2008), but all methods cannot overcome the general problems
of how to deal with the uniqueness of patents (Granstrand, 2000; Troy & Werle, 2008)
or the uncertainty regarding future economic benefit (Arora et al., 2001a; Pitkethly,
1997). The absence of valuation methods results in the situation where the value of a
patent is not determinable in an objective way (Pitkethly, 1997).
Additional to the firms internal problems and the contextual factor of patents,
structural factors of the market, often intertwined with the first two, arise. Due to the
complexity of technologies and inventions, as well as their own characteristics, patents
are difficult to evaluate for companies and persons that have not participated in the
development of the invention. Hence, the economic value of a patent is difficult to
estimate for outsiders and asymmetric information between patents buyers and patent
sellers exist (Caves et al., 1983; Troy & Werle, 2008). As a result, information
asymmetries prevent efficient market clearing (Tietze, 2011). In general, markets for
patents and technologies lack transparency regarding essential market information.
Companies willing to trade are not able to gather information about buyers, suppliers,
and technologies and patents offered (Lichtenthaler & Ernst, 2008a).
In summary, uncertainty, problems in patent valuation, and the absence of data on past
transactions lead to a lack of transparency in essential market information and
efficiency in the market for patents and technologies and to high transaction costs for
the actors in the market for patents and technologies (e.g., Arora et al., 2001a; Arora
37
& Gambardella, 2010a; Caves et al., 1983; Ford & Ryan, 1981; Gambardella, 2002;
Lichtenthaler & Ernst, 2007; Monk, 2009; Tietze, 2011; Troy & Werle, 2008).
2.3 Third parties as enablers of transactions

Along with the development of the market for patents and technologies, its high
transaction costs, and its lack of transparency, a new business model has emerged:
technology market intermediaries (e.g., Hargadon & Sutton, 1997; Howells, 2006;
Nambisan & Sawhney, 2007; Sapsed et al., 2007). In general, technology market
intermediaries have a broad focus and transfer technology, innovation, and patents
equally (Benassi & Di Minin, 2009; Monk, 2009; Wang, 2010). According to
Chesbrough (2006), these companies are called innovation intermediaries. Their main
function is to support owners of a technology to find a buyer or licensee. Patents are
the legal mechanism for transferring technologies (e.g., Arora, 1995; Chesbrough,
2003b), and a sub-group of these intermediaries focuses more on the transfer of
patents.
Technology market intermediaries focus on business-to-business related transactions
and facilitate the transactions of patents (Tietze, 2011). Therefore, companies can
utilize them to leverage optimally their patent portfolios (e.g., Benassi & Di Minin,
2009; Kelley, 2011; Millien & Laurie, 2008; Yanagisawa & Guellec, 2009). The
development and role of technology market intermediaries is investigated from
different perspectives and a number of different sources. Five major fields of research
that analyze the role of technology market intermediaries can be identified.
Literature on technology transfer and diffusion focuses on the influence of
intermediaries on the speed of diffusion and the reception of new products
(Hgerstrand, 1952), as well as the complementary skills an intermediary can offer in
technology transfer processes (Shohert & Prevezer, 1996). Literature on innovation
management focuses on the innovation process and on which activities intermediaries
are involved in. In addition, the role of intermediaries as facilitators of the knowledge
transfer process is emphasized (Hargadon & Sutton, 1997). Literature on systems and
networks of innovation focuses on the economic impact of intermediaries and on how
intermediaries influence the entire innovation system. Intermediaries support the
information flow, and they are linked with principal agent models (Klerkx & Leeuwis,
2009; Lynn, Mohan Reddy, & Aram, 1996; Stankiewicz, 1995). Literature on service
38
State of the art
organizations focuses on the role of intermediaries in the context of service innovation

and service activities (Bessant & Rush, 1995). Literature on patent litigation focuses
on the role of intermediaries as creators of credible threats of litigation and providers
of liquidity in the market for patents. This stream of literature focuses on
intermediaries, which transfer the sole patent right without additional know-how or
technology (McDonough III, 2006; Shrestha, 2010). The following part aligns the
different streams of literature and describes the business models of technology market
intermediaries and non-practicing entities, a controversy discussed sub-group of patent
intermediaries.
2.3.1 Bridging patent supply and patent demand
Technology market intermediaries are agents that fulfill a wide variety of tasks and
functions in the external patent exploitation process between two or more partners
(according to Howells, 2006). The literature is highly fragmented, and a large variety
of terms for this type of agent exists. They are also called intermediary firms
(Stankiewicz, 1995), bridgers (Bessant & Rush, 1995), brokers (Benassi & Di Minin,
2009; Hargadon & Sutton, 1997), or superstructure organizations (Lynn et al., 1996).
In the literature, technology market intermediaries are mainly associated with
innovation processes or external technology exploitation projects.
In general, technology market intermediaries are defined as organizations that match
the supply and demand of patents, in combination with or without technology or
additional knowledge. Therefore, they aim to facilitate patent based transactions.
These organizations do not innovate, develop technologies, or conduct contract
research (according to Benassi & Di Minin, 2009). The activity of patent
intermediation is the core activity of technology market intermediaries, not only a
corresponding service (Winch & Courtney, 2007). Their position in patent transfers is
distinct (see Figure 6).
Third parties as enablers of transactions
6XSSO\RISDWHQWV
DQGDGGLWLRQDO
NQRZKRZ
39
Demand of patents
(and additional
know-how)
Direct Transfer
Technology market
intermediaries
Universities
Public
owned
Universities
Research
institutions
Parastatal
owned
Research
institutions
Industrial
firms
Service
providers
Indirect
Privately owned
profit-oriented
Transfer
Special
forms
Industrial
firms
Service
providers
Source: According to (Reinhard & Schmalholz, 1996)

Figure 6: Transfer of patents and technology market intermediaries
The direct transfer of patents indicates a transaction between two parties without the
participation of a third party as a middleman. Transactions of patents conducted with
an intermediary between two parties are denoted as indirect transfer of patents (see
Figure 6).
Due to high transaction costs and the resulting imperfections in the market for patents
and technologies, the concept of intermediaries has been transferred from financial
markets, where it first occurred (Stigler, 1951), to the market for patents and
technologies. External patent exploitation is more complex than commercializing
goods on product markets (Callon & Muniesa, 2005). To conduct a transaction
successfully, firms can develop their own competencies or rely on the services of
technology market intermediaries (Nambisan & Sawhney, 2007; Sapsed et al., 2007).
Intermediaries have accumulated experiences in the market for technology (Morgan
& Crawford, 1996); therefore, they may contribute to reduce the inefficiencies in the
market for technology (Bryant & Reenstra-Bryant, 1998). From a transaction costs
economics perspective (Williamson, 1975), technology market intermediaries could
facilitate the markets by reducing operative costs benefiting from economies of scale
and scope and bargaining asymmetry (Benassi & Di Minin, 2009).
40
State of the art
The functions performed by technology market intermediaries depend on the type of

agent, the type of business model, and if patents are transferred with or without knowhow. Morgan & Crawford (1996), state: Technology broking is not a well-defined
activity and the heterogeneous nature of the participants is a key characteristic of the
industry (p. 363). Some intermediaries offer services supporting the entire external
patent exploitation process, others serve as additional resources for specific tasks (e.g.,
valuation of patents and determination of transaction price). For the innovation
process, Howells (2006) identifies ten functions of technology market intermediaries.
These ten functions can be clustered into three categories: (1) facilitating
collaboration, (2) connecting, and (3) providing service (Lopez-Vega, 2009).
Only a few publications attempt to systemize technology market intermediaries or
patent intermediaries. Benassi and Di Minin (2009) conceptualize the heterogeneous
activities of patent intermediaries according to the characteristics commitment and
value added to the exploitation process and derive seven different types of patent
brokers. Those seven patent intermediaries include two business models that aggregate
patents: aggregators and the enforcers. This study shows also that most authors allude
to the topic of patent aggregating companies in their investigation of patent
intermediaries (e.g., Gredel et al., in press; Wang, 2010; Yanagisawa & Guellec,
2009).
Kelley (2011) identifies patent aggregating companies in her analysis of the player in
the patent marketplace. She categorizes the players into buyers, sellers, and
facilitators. Patent buyers are either financial buyers or other buyers. According to
their motivation, Kelley (2011) distinguishes financial buyers roughly between patent
assertion firms, defensive aggregators, and Intellectual Ventures without analyzing
activities or motives in detail.
Analyzing the activities of patent brokers, Benassi and Di Minin (2009) identify
several activities conducted by patent intermediaries, such as patent valuation and
evaluation, selection of patents, negotiation with transaction partners, or assisting
transactions. With regard to patent aggregating companies, the authors find that their
activities exceed the completion of contracts as the patent aggregator and the patent
enforcer takes over high risk. Among the 19 business models
Yanagisawa and Guellec (2009) identify, three business models focus on aggregating
patents: patent pool administration, IP aggregation and licensing, and defensive patent
aggregating funds and alliances. However, Yanagisawa and Guellec (2009) describe
41
the activities of these business models only shortly without depth and empirical data.
To discuss the role patent intermediaries play in the patent market, Wang (2010) splits
patent intermediaries into companies that assist patent acquisitions (brokers) and those
companies that acquire patents. The latter group is further divided into defensive
aggregators, companies that acquire patents to provide their subscribers with freedom
to operate, and offensive aggregators, companies that develop and acquire patents to
realize revenues through licensing and asserting patents. In addition, Wang (2010)
focuses mainly on identifying the players and does not give information on the
activities of technology market intermediaries or patent aggregating companies. Gredel
et al. (in press) analyze patent-based investment funds and their position as innovation
intermediaries for SME. Analyzing two case studies, they identify the type of targeted
patents. Motives to cooperate are analyzed from the position of the original patent
owner that aims to improve their financial situation. The analysis of activities of the
patent-based investment fund is set to the advancement of the acquired technology.
2.3.2 Non-practicing entities and their intermediation of patent transactions
During the last decade, a business model of patent intermediaries has developed that
has provoked controversy. The points of contention range from ethical issues
regarding the use of the patent system, to definitional issues if these companies are
patent intermediaries at all. The companies in question do not produce but they exploit
patents externally. According to their external exploitation strategy, non-practicing
entities enforce patents vigorously. Their actions are legal and within the system. The
main point of criticism on these companies is that they do not try to exploit the
invention itself and use the patent in its historical meaning hence, to protect the
innovation from imitation. In the literature, authors use the terms non-practicing
entities (NPE) (e.g., Shrestha, 2010), non-producing entities (Johnson et al., 2007),
patent trolls (e.g., Fischer & Henkel, 2009), or patent sharks (e.g., Reitzig et al., 2007).
However, the range of business models of these companies is wide, and a common
definition does not exist. The different terms used for these companies are often
negatively connoted.
Central to the description of a non-practicing company is that they use patents that do
not cover their own products to gain revenues from licensing. Hence, they do not
practice their patents. Some companies create these patents in their own R&D
departments (e.g., Rambus, Qualcomm, Tessera); others buy patents from distressed
42
State of the art
securities or other willing-to-sell firms and enforce these patents (e.g., IPCom,
Millennium IP, Ronald A Katz Technology Licensing). Between these two types, a
wide field of business models exists.
Definitions are heterogeneous, and several authors attempt to name the company and
to describe the business model. Former Vice President and Assistant General Counsel
of Intel Peter Detkin coined the term patent troll, which is widely used today. Even
though the term troll is heavily connoted, it is used in academic literature (e.g.,
Chien, 2009; Fischer & Henkel, 2009; Geradin et al., 2011; Golden, 2007; Gregory,
2007; Lemley, 2007; McDonough III, 2006; Merges, 2009; Reitzig et al., 2007;
Shrestha, 2010). For example, Reitzig et al. (2007c) describe patent trolls as patent
holding individuals or (often small) firms who trap R&D intensive manufacturers in
patent infringement situations in order to receive damage awards for the illegitimate
use of their technology (p. 134).
[....] We denote patent sharks or trolls as individuals or firms that seek to
generate profits mainly or exclusively from licensing or selling their (often
simplistic) patented technology to a manufacturing firm that, at the point in time
when fees are claimed, already infringes on the sharks patent and is therefore
under particular pressure to reach an agreement with the shark. (Reitzig et al.,
2007, p. 137)
The term non-practicing entity is more neutral than patent troll is. However, the
literature is ambiguous whether a NPE is the same type of company as a patent troll.
Magliocca (2007) states that a NPE is a troll: There is simply no way to subdivide
NPE into good NPE and bad NPE. There is no judicially-manageable bright line
between supposed patent trolls and inventors who cannot practice their inventions
because of resource limitations or managerial considerations (p. 52). Other authors
differentiate between NPE and troll. For instance Layne-Farrar and Schmidt (2009)
state:
This result leads us to reject the prevalent definition of a patent troll as any nonpracticing or non-innovating entity. Indeed, NPE are the least likely to exhibit
troll behaviors. Instead, a better gauge is the presence of special conditions for a
patent hold-up and the exploitation of irreversible investments, regardless of the
business model of the patent holder. (p. 1139)
43
From an extensive literature review, the following criteria, used to distinguish between
trolls and non-trolls, are identified:
x Non-producing (e.g., Bessen, Ford, & Meurer, 2011) A company is a patent troll
if it gains revenue from licensing but does not produce goods or services. That
leads to difficulties with the classification of single inventors, think tanks, and
universities.
x Products are not commercialized (e.g., Golden, 2007) This criterion seems to be
similar to non-producing but many firms do not produce their products themselves.
They are only orchestrators that have out-sourced their production and do only
selected steps in the value chain (e.g., Nike, Adidas, Apple).
x Does not conduct own R&D (e.g., Rubin, 2007) A company is a patent troll if it
gains revenue from licensing but does not have own R&D. This criterion excludes
think tanks, universities, and inventors clearly from being a troll.
x Acquires patents (e.g., Fischer & Henkel, 2009) A company is a patent troll if it
buys patents instead of own development. However, this includes many producing
industry firms because buying patents is central for open innovation.
x Owns patents which do not cover the core business (e.g., Rubin, 2007) This
criterion could include companies that have more business divisions or small
companies that are dependent on each single invention.
Additionally, literature defines trolls by analyzing their behavioral patterns:
x A troll does not target ex ante license revenues but searches for infringements
(Reitzig et al., 2007). This increases the revenues because firms may not have an
alternative to pay, otherwise they would have to shut down production.
x A troll litigates low quality patents and gains overly licensing revenues (Fischer
& Henkel, 2009).
Academic literature focuses either mainly on patent characteristics that are interesting
for NPE, or on the business models of NPE. Describing the business model, NPE can
be seen as opportunistic licensers that are able to benefit from a large gap between the
acquisition price of a patent and the royalties it receives in patent enforcement cases
(Magliocca, 2007). Thus, NPE may simply be seen as corporations that acquire undervalued patents in an attempt to profit through licensing and enforcement (Johnson et
al., 2007). According to Magliocca (2007), companies have this arbitrage opportunity
if the costs of patents are low, if substituting the disputed technology is unreasonable,
44
State of the art
and the outcome of infringement litigation is uncertain. Even though these

characteristics are quite general, it is important to state that companies are involved in
this arbitrage scheme if the profitability is large and higher revenues offset the costs.
Therefore, NPE target industries and technological areas with comparable high
revenues.
Literature distinguishes a three-step process for the patent aggregating activities of
NPE: building up patent portfolios, waiting for producing companies to infringe the
patents, and enforcing the infringed patents (Henkel & Reitzig, 2008). In the first
phase, NPE build up large patent portfolios either from patenting their inventions or
from acquiring or exclusively in-licensing patents from other corporations. In the
second phase, NPE either screen the market to detect already occurred infringements
or wait until infringement occursHenkel and Reitzig (2007) find that NPE advisedly
wait until infringing companies face the already high costs of substituting the
infringing technology. As the costs of inventing around or substituting unreasonable
high, the infringing company would rather take a license. As Henkel and
Reitzig (2007) state, when patents are hidden, companies unknowingly lack vital
information when creating new products, (p. 131), which leads to inadvertent
infringement. Therefore, critics accuse NPE of timing their invention, waiting until the
infringed product is on the market, and of when costs of abandoning the product are
too high. At this point, the infringing company is under high pressure, and the
likelihood that it takes a license is high. In the third phase, NPE contact or
immediately sue the infringing company and offer a license or a settlement. In
infringement cases between producing companies, the defendant and plaintiff often
agree on cross-licensing. Due to the fact that NPE do not need access to the other
parties patent portfolios to produce, the infringing company either has to settle or to
litigate (Luman III & Dodson, 2006). NPE are in a good position because
condemnation payments, the threat of injunction, the high litigation costs, and the
uncertainty regarding the outcome of the lawsuit drive companies to settle the case and
take a license.
Part of the controversy discussion on NPE is that there is disagreement amongst
scholars regarding the benefit and detriment of NPE. From an original patent owners
perspective, proponents argue that NPE provide capital and bargaining power to single
inventors and that SMEs that lack the resources to enforce patents themselves (Ball
& Kesan, 2009). Enforcing the patents fosters innovation and technological progress
45
and rewards single inventors and SMEs with returns on innovation. NPE transfer
patents and licenses from the original patent owner to companies that already use the
patents, and therefore, conduct forced intermediation. Based on the force factor, from a
patent user perspective, opponents argue that NPE distract producing companies from
their core business (Williams & Gardner, 2006). As patent enforcement is the core
business of NPE, they can focus revenue generation from it, whereas producing
companies have to shift resources no longer available for core activities. Additionally,
producing companies face the threat of permanent injunction, which could lead to
unreasonable actions on the part of the producing company (Luman III & Dodson,
2006). In sum, this behavior leads to higher product prices because producing
companies often pass the costs of royalty payments and patent litigation to consumers
(Davis, 2008).
Also on a macro level, the benefits or detriments of NPE are discussed. Advocates
draw on the argument that NPE aggregate patents. Hence, NPE create a market for
patents. With an increasing number of transactions, patent valuation methods may
improve and transaction costs decrease. Thus, NPE foster the development of the
market for patents and technologies (Fischer & Henkel, 2009; McDonough III, 2006).
Even though patents are transferred in the market for patents and technologies,
opponents invoke that NPE acquire and litigate only weak or obscure patents with a
broad scope (Shrestha, 2010) therefore, harming the innovation system. Patents with a
broad scope have a higher likelihood that a larger number of products and processes
will infringe upon it (Merges & Nelson, 1990). Fischer and Henkel (2009) show that
NPE prefer to acquire patents with a broad scope. However, compared with litigated
patents from producing companies, NPEs patents are, on average, of higher
technological quality and legal sustainability.
2.4 Reference framework

This research aims at contributing to literature and theory on patent management,
markets for patents and technology, and as technology market intermediaries. As such,
it tries to answer the question whether patent aggregating companies can be utilized
for patent portfolio leveraging activities of producing companies. Therefore, the
phenomenon of patent aggregating companies has to be explored, and information on
strategic, organizational, and operational aspects has to be gathered. In order to
46
State of the art
produce sound results, as well as to facilitate and guide data collection and analysis, a
reference framework is constructed (Miles & Huberman, 2004). In addition, it
enhances the understanding of the phenomenon and allows for a broader evaluation of
the relevant aspects within the empirical data. Therefore, the framework is based on
insights from a broad literature review and it thus builds the foundation for data
collection.
The reference framework is based on the literature on patent management and on
technology market intermediaries (see Figure 7). Literature on patent management
serves as basis for the context between the producing company and the patent
aggregating company. Additionally, this stream of literature emphasizes the
importance of the motives and strategies regarding patenting and the acquisition of
patents for companies. The literature on technology market intermediaries implies that
operational aspects of intermediaries are the major factor for the producing companies
utilization decisions. Operational aspects, in combination with organizational aspects,
are the key determinant for the success of patent aggregating companies.
Patent exploitation resources

Patent exploitation performance
Patent exploitation options
Patent aggregating companies

Setting
Strategy
Organization
Process
Environment of market for technologies and patents
Figure 7: Reference framework to analyze patent aggregating companies
Reference framework
47
The reference framework serves as the basis for the empirical investigation in the case
of firms and serves as a guideline to ensure that all topics relevant for the exploration
of patent aggregating companies are covered. According to the nature of explorative
research, the process of data gathering and data analysis is iterative. Therefore, the
reference framework is adopted on the basis of new information resulting from the
analysis of the empirical data. Adapting the reference framework is based on the aim
to reflect reality better and serves as a sound base to develop results that extend the
extant literature and theory on patent management and technology market
intermediaries.
48
3 Exploring the phenomenon of patent aggregating companies

As patent aggregating companies have emerged as a recent empirical phenomenon, the
knowledge of their activities and strategies is limited. These companies are still a black
box; therefore, their utilization by producing companies is difficult. To shed light on
patent aggregating companies, this chapter provides a comprehensive analysis of
patent aggregating companies and their settings, activities, and strategies. Based on
empirical data from interviews and second sources, the first part of this chapter
illustrates a general picture of patent aggregating companies. The second part
describes the process of patent aggregation. The last part illustrates the strategies of
patent aggregating companies and derives eight business models.
Appendix 1 gives an overview of the patent aggregating companies that were analyzed
to detect general patterns, the setting the companies operate in, their processes and
activities, and their strategies.
3.1 Setting of patent aggregating companies

Before exploring the activities and strategies of patent aggregating companies, the
following part provides general information about the age, history, and geographical
location of the sample companies. Light is also shed on the different ways of venture
creation and funding of the analyzed patent aggregating companies.
3.1.1 General information
The dates of formation of the analyzed companies support that patent aggregating
companies are a young phenomenon: 20 out of 27 patent aggregating companies were
founded in or after 2000. Figure 8 provides an overview on the number of founded
patent aggregating companies per year.
Setting of patent aggregating companies
Headquarters in
Europe
Headquarters in
the US
1990 - 1995
Total
1996 - 1999
2000
Acacia
Sipro
49
2001
2002
AlseT
IP Holdings
MPEG
Royalty Pharma
2004
2005
Coller Capital
2006
2007
Via Licensing
Alliacense
Rembrandt IP
Fergason Patent
Pete Invest MedTech
Papst
2003
Ignite IP
Golden Rice
2008
2009
2010
AST
Capital Royalty
IP Nav
OIN
Techquity
RPX
Patent Invest
Eco Patent
Collateralization
Patent Select
CreativeE
Alpha
Figure 8: Year of formation and geographic location of sample companies
Analyzing the history of the seven companies founded before 2000 more closely, only
Sipro Lab, Pete Invest MedTech, and MPEG LA were in the patent aggregating
business before 2000. At date of formation in 1993, Acacia Research was a venture
capital firm and started todays business model in 2003. Coller Capital was founded as
a private equity firm in 1990. It became involved in patent aggregation in 2006 when
an executive with experience in leveraging research and technology assets joined the
management team. Papst Licensing started to monetize the patents of the
manufacturing mother company in 1993 and became involved in patent aggregation in
2000. Founded in 1996, Royalty Pharma closed its first patent deal in 2000.
Figure 8 shows two peaks of funding activities: one in 2000 and one in 2005. The turn
of the millennium is also known as new economy or dotcom era. This time is
characterized by the rise of startup companies from so-called sunrise industries as
information technology, multimedia, biotechnology, or telecommunication. A high
research intensity and large numbers of patent applications characterize these
industries. When the dotcom bubble burst in 2000, many of the new economy ventures
went insolvent and patents were available for little money. After a worldwide
recession, the economy recovered in 2004 and 2005. In this time, R&D expenditures
and patent applications revived and investors returned to the markets. These two
general economic conditions could have fostered the formation of patent aggregating
companies.
50
Most of the analyzed patent aggregating companies are headquartered in North

America. Figure 8 shows that 18 companies are headquartered in the US, only Sipro
Lab is located in Canada. The remaining eight companies are headquartered in Europe.
Additionally, regional clusters can be observed. From the 18 US companies, 7 are
located in California, 6 on the east coast, and 3 in Texas. This distribution reflects the
characteristics of the US patent ecosystem. California, especially Silicon Valley, is
home to the American high-technology industry, which is a large source for patents.
Many patent aggregating companies, therefore, are closely located to their source of
patents. During the last years, Wall Street has recognized patents as a financial asset
(Yurkerwich, 2008). Therefore, New York is an interesting location for business
models in these areas. The third cluster located in Texas can be explained by the US
court system. The US District Court for the Eastern District of Texas has become
known for patent litigation lawsuits (Barry et al., 2010; Taylor, 2007; Williams, 2006)
and therefore, offering new business opportunities for companies focusing on patent
assertion.
All companies gave, at least rough, information on their number of employees but only
a few of the analyzed companies agreed on disclosing quantitative information
regarding their operation (12 out of 27). The average size of the companies is around
20 employees. Whereas Intellectual Ventures has the most employees (ca. 800), most
other firms (23 out of 27) have between 5 and 50 employees. The median is ten
employees and supports the observation that patent aggregating companies operate
with few employees. The number of acquired patents or patent portfolios is
confidential for most of the companies. Intellectual Ventures seems to be the biggest
player in the patent market. In private transactions, but also as main buyer at the
Ocean Tomo Live Patent Auctions (Ewing, 2010), Intellectual Ventures has acquired a
patent portfolio of several thousand patents. In July 2011, Intellectual Ventures
announced that its patent portfolio consists of more than 35,000 US and international
patents and patent applications. Intellectual Ventures is also the biggest spender in the
sample and seems to be the biggest spender in the market for patents (Benassi & Di
Minin, 2009; Holden, 2011; PatentFreedom, 2011b; Yurkerwich, 2008). Until now,
the company has spent ca. EUR 1.15 billion to acquire patents and patent applications.
51
3.1.2 Venture creation and funding of patent aggregating companies

Different paths of venture creation can be observed (see Figure 9 for a graphical
overview of the different paths). Only 2 out of the 27 patent aggregating companies
are continuations of pre-existing activities. As mentioned above, Acacia was founded
as a venture capital company with the focus on dotcom companies. After the burst of
the technology bubble, many investment companies failed and Acacia was stranded
with the patents. Out of this situation, Acacia changed its business strategy and no
longer invested in R&D and start ups but started to out-license the stranded patents.
Being successful with this business model, Acacia acquired more patents and became
a patent aggregating company. Acacia realized
there was a huge market need for an outsourced patent licensing company to
assist patent owners in generating licensing revenues from their patented
technologies. From that point forward we focused our companies efforts
exclusively on building the leading outsourced patent licensing company.
(Ryan, 2011).
The other company that changed its business model is Papst Licensing. Papst
Licensing evolved from the producer of small electric motors and electronic cooling
fans, Papst-Motoren GmbH & Co KG. In the beginning of the 1990s, this producing
company faced financial difficulties and had to sell its producing business to a
competitor (EBM). Around 600 patents and pending applications were acquired from
Papst Motoren and transferred to the newly founded company Papst Licensing, which
was founded to monetize and enforce these patents through out-licensing. After
gaining experiences in patent licensing and enforcement, Papst Licensing started to
offer its services to third parties and to acquire their patents.
In 4 out of the 27 patent aggregating companies, amassing patents is an additional
business model to the original existing business model. Coller Capital is a private
equity business, but with an overall increasing interest in IP and a new partner with
patent market experience, the IP investment group was established. In addition, the
patent aggregating business model of Pete Invest was set up as an additional product.
The remaining 21 patent aggregating companies are founded with their recent
strategies and business model. The creation of these patent aggregating companies can
be divided into three paths of venture creation. Professionals or companies already
working in patent transactions pursued the first path of venture creation. By founding a
52
patent aggregating company, they leveraged their experiences and knowledge and
additionally diversified their existing businesses. This is, for instance, the case of
Alliacense, a fully owned subsidiary of the TPL Group. The TPL Group is a service
provider for IP management founded in 1988. Through Alliacense, the TPL Group
now manages the licensing programs of five patent portfolios containing around 120
patent families.
A group of companies created by daring entrepreneurial activities and often backed by
large financial resources pursed the second path, and these can further be divided into
two subgroups. On the one hand, professionals, often attached to multinational
technology corporations, with deep insides in the patent market spotted the emerging
opportunity of the patent aggregating business, drafted a business plan, and were able
to attract large amounts of funding. For instance, the founders of Intellectual Ventures
used to be senior managers of Microsoft and Intel. Based on their business plan, their
knowledge, and their contacts, they were able to collect large funds of corporate
investors, such as Apple, Nokia, Sony, and Microsoft, as well as financial investors,
such as JP Morgan or Charles River Venture. On the other hand, entrepreneurs or
financial institutions that recognized patents as an asset class ahead of time have
founded patent aggregating companies. Their path of venture creation was firstly to
close an investment fund with institutional investors or high net worth individuals and
secondly, to acquire large amounts of patents. Patent Invest Fond is an example for the
later subgroup. Finance System initiated the funds of Patent Invest Fond. Sales partner
Credit Suisse collected ca. EUR 20 million in total.
The third group includes companies or individuals that teamed up with other
companies or individuals to pursue the same goal. Based on increasing patent
enforcement activities, high-technology companies often face the threat of difficult
licensing negotiations, permanent injunctions, or expensive litigation lawsuits. To
reduce these threats, several high-technology companies, among them Ericsson, IBM,
Hewlett-Packard, Motorola, and Sun Microsystems, founded Allied Security Trust.
Allied Security Trust is a member based defensive organization that acquires patents
that could be a threat to its members.
53
Path of patent aggregating companies' venture creation

Based on pre-existing activities
New venture creation
Patent aggregating company

1.
Pre
activities
PA
Pre
activities
PA
PAC
PA
PA
1.
Pre
activities
2a.
Core
activities
Patent aggregating company

2.
Parent company
PAC
MNE
Patent
Investors
2b.
PA
PAC
PA
PAC
3.
PA
PA - patent aggregating activities

PAC - patent aggregating company
Figure 9: The different paths of venture creations
Even though the acquisition of patents requires significant financial resources,

different models of funding can be observed. In addition, the ownership of the
analyzed patent aggregating companies differs. Only 2 out of the 27 companies are
public companies. While Acacia went public in 2003, the RPX initial public offering
(IPO) took place recently. On May 5, 2011, RPX raised approximately USD 159.6
million, with shares trading at USD 19. Both companies use the generated money for
patent acquisition purposes. Before the IPO, the private equity firms Kleiner Perkins
Caufield & Byers and Charles River Ventures funded RPX, as well as their patent
acquisitions. All other analyzed companies are private entities. Even though they are
all privately held, they differ substantially regarding the funding of their patent
aggregating activities. In analyzing the funding structures of the patent aggregating
activities, five different funding schemes can be identified. The first scheme is the
member model. For instance, its members founded Allied Security Trust. These
members also fund the patent acquisition activities. The second scheme is the capital
market model. The privately held Capital Royalty, for example, funds its aggregating
54
activities by securitizing the acquired royalty interests at the capital market. The third
scheme is the venture capital model. This model, for instance, is applied at Collar
Capital. Private equity company Collar Capital has collected a private equity fund
used to acquire patents. The fourth scheme is the privateer model. Fergason Patent
Property is privately owned and started its business exploiting the patents of the single
inventor and entrepreneur Dr. James Fergason. Until now, all additionally acquired
patents are funded based on prior generated licensing revenues of the original patent
portfolio. The fifth scheme is the volunteer model. MPEG LA, for instance, aggregates
the patents licensed by patent owners to licensees and is the medium to administer this.
Patent owners are highly interested in pooling their patents, thus a funding for the
aggregation activities is not necessary.
3.2 Process of patent aggregation

In analyzing the activities of patent aggregating companies, a general process of how
patent aggregating companies amass patents and work with them can be derived (see
Figure 10). The process of operation can be subdivided into the following four phases:
(1) Selection of patents.
(2) Structuring one or more patent portfolios by acquiring ownership rights in patents
or commercialization rights.
(3) Value adding, the phase where the patent aggregating company accomplishes
several activities.
(4) Exploitation of patents.
Process of patent aggregation
55

Setting
Process
Strategy
Organization
Figure 10: The process of patent aggregation
3.2.1 Selection of patents

In the selection phase of the patent aggregating process, the strategic direction of the
planned patent portfolio is shaped. The patent aggregating company determines the
industry and the geographical scope, as well as the breadth of transaction of the
targeted patents and identifies the patents and original patent owners.
Among the patent aggregating companies, the sectoral focus of the patents they
acquire varies. Almost half of the companies in the sample focus on technologies of
either the electrical engineering industry, which includes digital media, electronics,
information and communication technology, medical devices, semiconductors, or
software; or the life science industry, including pharmaceutical products, chemicals,
and biotechnology. This specialization reflects the importance of patents in these two
industries. In the life science industry, patents are generally used to secure the market
power of firms. Firms can gain and enforce important monopolistic status for these
industries by using patents. Especially in the pharmaceutical industry, blockbuster
products are highly dependent on patents, since patents allow the inventing firm to
hinder generic companies in producing the respective drug. High-technology
companies have a different use of patents. In electrical engineering, the
interdependence between firms resulting from their patent portfolios is very high.
Companies are not able to market new products autonomously without being
56
contingent on third party patents. Consequently, companies often apply for patents in
order to block competitors, or to strengthen their positions in cross-licensing
negotiations. Large numbers of patent applications are filed to prevent inventing
around single patents, a practice that results in patent thickets. Patent aggregating
companies specialize on patents from these two industries because high-technology or
life science patents are very likely to obtain financial returns. The remaining half of
the samples companies also acquires patents from electrical engineering and the life
science industry, but interviewees pointed out that they are open to all industries to
prevent the exclusion of a valuable opportunity.
In addition to an industry focus, patent aggregating companies focus on specific
geographic markets. The US patent market is rich with opportunities to generate large
revenues from patent transactions, and patent enforcement seems more lucrative than
in Europe. Therefore, most aggregating activities focus on the US market, and patent
aggregating companies buy mainly US patents. Many of the patent aggregating
companies also have offices in Europe and Asia. These offices deal with local
companies to acquire their US patents. Exceptions are Alpha Patentfonds, CreativE
and Patent Select. The patent portfolio of CreativE holds mainly patent documents
from the UK, Germany, and France. Alpha Patentfonds focuses on the acquisition of
German patent documents.
The amassed patents can be divided into two categories. Patents in the first category
are aggregated to amass the sole legal right of exclusion, without the underlying
technology or additional knowledge transfer. Usually in this case, the patent is already
granted, and the technology is in a later stage of the technology lifecycle. For instance,
Rembrandt IP Management is primary interested in acquiring patents that are currently
infringed. Based on this approach, Rembrandt transfers only the legal rights and does
not utilize the technology. Patents in the second category cover technologies in an
early stage of the technology lifecycle but also technologies already in use. They are
aggregated in combination with the technology and additional knowledge that can be
used to develop embryonic technology further. For instance, Techquity Capital is
primarily interested in patents that demonstrate a fundamental contribution to the
technology area they relate to and have the potential to be developed further.
57
3.2.2 Structuring of patent portfolios

The activities in the structuring phase aim at creating a portfolio that optimally fits the
general objective of the patent aggregating company. An optimal structured patent
portfolio is one of its success factors. Therefore, this phase focuses on approaching the
original patent owner, negotiating and obtaining the patents, and bundling them to
powerful patent portfolios.
Most patent aggregating companies approach patent owners actively, but increasingly
patent owners become active and offer their patents. Patent aggregating companies are
increasingly approached as the name of the patent aggregating company becomes
known in public. One example for this shift in the contacting approach is Acacia. At
the beginning, it was exclusively Acacia reaching the patent owners. Based on
research of patent attorneys and engineers, the company contacted the owners and
started negotiating. Based on its track record and its visibility as a public company,
patent owners now increasingly call Acacia, and the company has shifted to an passive
acquisition approach. Independent from its recognition, Sipro Lab follows an active
approach. After defining the strategy for the intended patent portfolio, the company
publishes patent calls on its website, as well as actively detects and approaches
patent owners based on their large network.
Before starting negotiations and bundling activities, the patent aggregating companies
evaluate the offered patents extensively. The evaluation criteria and the extent of the
evaluation process depend on the strategic direction established for the patent
portfolio. In general patent management, patents are evaluated from a legal, an
engineering, and a business perspective. For all patent aggregating companies, the
legal perspective is of great importance. Without a valid patent, the patent aggregating
company would lose the basis for further activities. Depending on the business model
of the patent aggregating company, the importance of the technical or the business
perspective is ambiguous. Intellectual Ventures, for instance, invests in a broad range
of industries and evaluates the patents regarding the technical quality of the invention,
the legal quality of the patent, the volume and potential of the market a patent is
commercialized in, existing litigations, involved parties and results, and the expected
performance of a product the patent covers. However, since autumn 2008, the
evaluation process contains a showstopper. Intellectual Ventures invests only in
58
patents that are commercialized in products, therefore, the criterion evidence of use
must be sufficient.
Golden Rice PDP has a different evaluation procedure. Golden Rice PDP mainly
evaluates if the patents cover the intended technological application. The business
potential is only of marginal interest. In contrast, Patent Select has a major focus on
the commercialization potential of the underlying technology and therefore, relies on
criteria like market potential, market volume, quality and potential of invention, or
remaining R&D costs, until the technology is ready for the market. The legal
dimension of patents is also checked, but the scope of patents is still changeable in
further development.
Several patent aggregating companies employ service providers in the structuring
phase of the patent aggregating process. Service providers mainly act as middlemen
between the supply and demand of the patents, as well as support in the evaluation
process. Allied Security Trust, for instance, often works with patent brokers. Allied
Security Trust screens the market with the help of a network of more than 300 brokers
that offer patents for sale. The advantage of this proceeding is twofold: on the one
hand, Allied Security Trust preserves the anonymity of its members. Patent owners
often increase their asking price if they realize that a company with substantial
financial resources shows interest in their patents. By engaging a patent broker, the
negotiations start at a more realistic price and are often less time consuming. On the
other hand, Allied Security Trust can save internal resources. Allied Security Trust
works with a small team. Cooperating with a patent broker helps those team members
focus on their core business. To evaluate the patents, CreativE works closely with a
service provider specialized in patent valuation and patent evaluation. This service
provider offers a legal check conducted by a patent attorney, as well as a market
analysis conducted by a business specialist. By working with a service provider,
CreativE is able to save personal resources and obtain an expert opinion for different
areas of technology without building up internal competencies in this area.
Bundling patents to new patent portfolios is a continuous process and heavily
dependent on negotiations and aggregation success, as well as the value-adding
activities of the patent aggregating company. The actual allocation of the patent
portfolio may differ from the initial planned allocation, because negotiations may not
result in transactions.
59
3.2.3 Additional value adding activities

The degree of value added to a patent or a patent portfolio varies depending on the
business model of the patent aggregating company. In general, the activity of patent
aggregation itself is one of the most value-adding activities. Bundling patents leads to
significant added value, because a patent portfolio has presumably a higher value than
the sum of the single patents the portfolio is composed of (Chesbrough, 2006;
Parchomovsky & Wagner, 2005). Patents are negative rights, and exclude third parties
from using the invention, but they do not allow the patent owner to produce anything.
Therefore, a single patent often has only a minor blockade function and can easily be
circumvented.4 Aggregating several single patents from one technology to a patent
portfolio increases the overall value of each patent. Aggregating activities that enhance
embryonic technologies create additional technical value. Already commercialized
technologies are more predictable to evaluate and do not need further activities to
market the products, whereas embryonic technologies require significant financial and
managerial effort to create marketable products. Additionally, embryonic technologies
that are successfully brought to the market foster the overall technological
development.
Beyond the business model of patent aggregation itself and its associated value-adding
activities, the most important activity that some patent aggregating companies perform
is further development of the technology. IgniteIP for instance, focuses mainly on the
commercialization of technologies and handles patents mainly as the right to the
technologies. To commercialize the patents in the next process step, IgniteIP invests in
further development. Mandated research institutions, universities, or companies
conduct research and development. Results of the development are prototypes,
components, or marketable products. Therefore, it transfers the embryonic
technologies to technologies close to market entry. Accompanied by the technology
development, IgniteIP also adds value to the patent itself by expanding the
geographical scope of the patent, increasing the patent family, or drafting or adjusting
patent applications.
Another important value-adding activity is the expansion of the existing patent
portfolio. Due to the dynamics in the product market, as well as the patent market, new
4
Some exceptions apply in the pharmaceutical industry. In this industry, a patent often covers one
product, and the success of the product and the generated revenues heavily depend on the patent.
60
technologies or newly available patents supplement existing patent portfolios. Via

Licensing, for instance, calls regularly for patents to update their portfolio and to
secure clients access to the standardized technology. Allied Security Trust focuses on
reducing the exposure of patent litigations for clients. Therefore, Allied Security Trust
monitors the market closely and supplements its existing patent portfolio with patents
that could be a threat to its members.
In the value-adding phase, patent aggregating companies prepare the communication
documents for their patent portfolios. These communication documents can take
several forms. CreativE, for example, aggregates patents that other companies use
without having been granted a license. In this phase of the process, CreativE prepares
all documents that show that products of certain companies use the patents without a
license and of how they use the patents. The prepared documents serve as basis for the
next phase and the negations and technical meetings with the infringing company.
Alpha Patentfonds, for instance, prepares the sales documents in this phase. The sales
documents contain all relevant legal, technical, and commercial information about the
technology or the patents. Alpha Patentfonds uses the sales documents to approach
potential customers, and they are of particular importance if the technology is offered
to companies in other markets or other areas of application. Therefore, the documents
have to be comprehensible for all types of buyers.
A different form of value adds for instance, Pete Invest MedTech. Pete Invest
MedTech does not add value to the patents or the technology but creates value outside
of the traditional licensing business. The licensing deal is already signed when Pete
Invest MedTech steps in. The major value created by this patent aggregating company
is indirectly related to the patents and is focused more on the global financing of the
patent owner. In the value-adding phase, Pete Invest MedTech raises money from
investors based on the patent and transfers the capital to the patent owners.
3.2.4 Exploitation of patents
In the last phase of the patent aggregating process, the patents amassed by the patent
aggregating company are exploited. Patent aggregating companies, in general, have
four different ways to utilize their patents:
x Licensing that can be subdivided into stick licensing and carrot licensing
61
x Assigning patents that can be subdivided into selling and realizing. Releasing
means offering third parties the use of the patents without receiving financial
compensation in return
x Refinancing them at the capital market or more specifically securitizing the cash
flows resulting from a patent at the capital market.
Whereas the first two types of patent exploitation satisfy the demand for patents or the
underlying technology, the last type satisfies the demand of financial investors and
provides capital for the patent owner. Figure 11 illustrates the ways in which patent
aggregating companies exploit their patents.
Supply of patents
Demand of patents
Patent
aggregating
company
Variety of players
Patents
Stick licensing
Release
Research
Institutions
Industrial
Firms
Sell
Underlying
technology
Universities
Individuals
Carrot licensing
Other PAC
Securitization
Figure 11: Patent exploitation options of patent aggregating companies
Out-licensing patents is an active patent management strategy of producing

companies. Thereby, producing companies follow three main approaches in outlicensing: carrot (also known as opportunity) licensing, stick (also known as
enforcement or assertion) licensing, and cross-licensing (Reinhardt, 2008). According
to Lichtenthaler (2010), carrot licensing is a proactive approach and describes a
technology transfer to licensees that have not used the technology yet. Stick licensing
62
is a reactive approach and is based on actual infringements of the companys patents.

The patent owning company detects these infringements and offers the infringer a
license.
A long time part of corporate patent management, patent aggregating companies have
adopted these commercialization strategies and applied the approaches of stick and
carrot licensing to exploit their patents. For instance, Patent Select proactively offers
interested parties licenses to its patent portfolio. The patents cover new technologies
close to a commercialization stage. Additionally, knowledge is transferred to support
and accelerate the final commercialization of the technology. Therefore, Patent Select
satisfies the demand of new technology and the products of medium sized and large
producing companies. In contrast, CreativE follows a stick licensing approach. Based
on its strategy to acquire patents covering densely patented technologies only,
CreativE detects companies that use the patents and proofs the infringement. Potential
infringers are contacted to close licensing agreements. If the infringing company does
not react after requests for technical meetings, CreativE takes the case to court. The
results from negotiations are licensing agreements that allow the licensees to use the
patents and give freedom to operate. Licensees are all kinds of producing companies
applying the technology. CreativE does not transfer any additional knowledge.
A different approach of patent aggregating companies is to sell the patents to other
companies. The offered legal rights can be single patents or patent applications, patent
families, or patent portfolios and, depending on the objective of the buyer, transferred
with or without additional knowledge. Alpha Patentfonds, for example, identifies
potential buyers based on an intensive market research or its personal network and
offers the legal rights for sale. Interested companies are mainly producing companies
and other patent aggregating companies. They buy the patent portfolios and generate
freedom to operate or access new technologies and enter new markets.
Some patent aggregating companies exploit their patent portfolios without gaining
monetary returns. By giving non-monetary licenses to interested patent users, the
covered technology is diffused and innovation in these areas is fostered. The users do
not enter a financial commitment but rather enter a non-financial commitment. EcoPatent Commons, for example, makes patents on sustainable technologies that bring
environmental benefits available to anyone free of charge. The users are corporations,
but single inventors and research institutions that work on innovation to protect the
environment also use them.
63
The securitization of patents is another approach to exploit patents. In this approach

the patent aggregating company does not directly exploit the patent, but it uses the
existing licensing agreements and royalty streams for exploitation. Therefore, the
patent aggregating companies do not act as middlemen, but rather meet the demands of
capital market investors by creating financial instruments based on patents and royalty
payments. AlseT IP, for instance, uses securitization of patents as a new asset class that
enables financing of commercial products and technologies based on their future
royalty income. AlseT IP issues bonds backed by the cash flow generated from the
patents. Investing in these bonds, financial investors participate in the evolution of
technology. The original patent owners, mainly SME or research institutions, receive
an immediate cash flow. The licensee is unaffected by this transaction.
3.3 Strategies of patent aggregating companies

All analyzed patent aggregating companies amass patents, but they differ substantially
regarding their reasons why they amass patents and in which business strategies they
follow. Comparing the empirical data of the 27 case firms, 8 different strategic
objectives why patent aggregating companies amass patents can be derived.
The eight objectives can be divided into two groups. The first group contains
objectives to generate revenues by exploiting the patents. The second group contains
objectives to serve members or customers of the patent aggregating company, or the
society on a for- or non-profit basis. In this context, patents are only a means for
achieving the objective. The exploitation of them follows more diverse objectives than
sole revenue generation.
3.3.1 Basic strategy I: Generate revenues
The first group of patent aggregating companies that amass patents to generate
revenues applies four different strategies of patent exploitation. One exploitation
strategy follows a generic exploitation approach, and patent aggregating companies
pursuing this strategy generate revenues from selling and out-license patents in various
forms. For instance, Intellectual Ventures acquires large amounts of patents to exploit
them in every possible way. The company sells patents, establishes licensing
programs, enforces patents when they are infringed, or invests in additional R&D
when the technology is still embryonic. The basis for Intellectual Venturess business
64
model is their ability to benefit from arbitrage. On the one hand, Intellectual Ventures
has broad experience in patent transactions and a large network to detect good patents;
on the other hand, the company is able to buy them at a lower price than it would cost
to reinvent the acquired patents. Additionally, Intellectual Ventures benefits from the
fact that patent portfolios have a greater value than a single patent.
Patent aggregating companies that stick license infringed patents follow another way
to generate revenues from patents. For instance, IP Navigation pursues this very
specific exploitation strategy and acquires only patents that are already infringed. The
infringing company is contacted and negotiation is offered or infringement lawsuits
are filed immediately. Therefore, the infringed patents are exploited through stick
licensing.
Patent aggregating companies that carrot license technologies that are advanced during
their ownership pursue another specific strategy to generate revenues from aggregated
patents. IgniteIP pursue this strategy and focuses on promising technologies by
acquiring the patents that cover these technologies. After investing in further R&D,
IgniteIP follows a carrot licensing approach and out-licenses the advanced technology.
Patent aggregating companies also pursue a strategy that resembles the strategy of
patent brokers, and first acquire patents or the exclusive right to exploit the patents and
after that, sell them. Patent Invest Fond, for instance, pursues this strategy. Patent
Invest Fonds strategy is to generate revenues from aggregating patents, bundle them
to new portfolios, and sell these bundles at a higher price. Thereby Patent Invest Fond
uses its extensive network and sells patents for other applications and industries.
3.3.2 Basic strategy II: Serve an objective
The second group of patent aggregating companies amasses patents as means to pursue
four different objectives. One objective of patent aggregating companies is to offer
attached companies an insurance against infringement. For instance, RPX monitors the
market and detects patents that could be a litigation threat for attached companies.
RPX aggregates the harmful patents before other producing or patent aggregating
companies can acquire these patents and therefore, provides an insurance against
patent litigation lawsuits for its attached producing companies.
Another goal patent aggregating companies pursue is to provide access to technology
to a broad range of users to foster innovation and society. Golden Rice PDP, for
Strategies of patent aggregating companies
65
instance, administers patents and technology that cover technology from the Golden
Rice Project. In this project, a strain of rice that contains pro-vitamin A was
genetically engineered. By collecting suitable patents from several patent owners,
Golden Rice PDP is able to neutralize licensing issues and make patents available free
of charge for defined humanitarian research and use in developing countries by
resource-poor farmers.
Certain patent aggregating companies amass patents to solve problems arising from
patent thickets and to establish technology standards. For instance, Via Licensing
amasses patents to provide producing companies access to the Advanced Audio
Coding (AAC) technology. AAC is a compression and encoding scheme for digital
audio. Compared to MP3, AAC achieves better sound quality and is the standard audio
format for Apple products, such as iPhone, iPod, and iPad, as well as for Nintendo
DSi, and PlayStation 3. Via Licensing has aggregated patents from AT&T, Dolby
Laboratories, France Telecom, Philips Electronics, LG Electronics, Microsoft, NEC
Corporation, Nokia, NTT, Panasonic, Sony, and Ericsson to provide access to
essential patents for practicing the AAC technology.
Some of the patent aggregating companies provide capital to companies and use
patents only as security. Royalty Pharma, for instance, is a patent aggregating
company that uses patents for this purpose. An example is the agreement between
Royalty Pharma and Yale University in 2000. In this deal, Royalty Pharma acquired
the royalty streams of Zerits, a drug for the treatment of HIV infection developed by
Bristol-Myers Squibb, and securitized the royalty streams at the capital market. Yale
University discovered a novel technology for HIV treatment, named d4T, and licensed
this technology to Bristol Myers Squibb for the development of Zerits. The US Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) approved Zerits in 1994. Royalty Pharma issued
USD 115 million in debt and equity securities to fund the acquisition payment of the
patents. Royalty Pharma provided Yale University an alternative source of capital and
intended to use the future royalties to pay back the issued securities. The acquired
patents served as security if the collected funds could not be paid back to the investors
otherwise.
66
3.3.3 Eight business models of patent aggregating companies

The reason why patent aggregating companies amass patents determines the business
model of the patent aggregating companies. All patent aggregating companies acquire
patents from the original patent owners and give the owners some reward, but the
reason why they aggregate patents and what they do with the patents differs in eight
distinctive ways. Analyzing the 27 case companies, the following eight business
models can be derived (alphabetical order):5
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Business model patent acquisition company: Aggregates large numbers of

patents and technologies from a large number of original patent owners to low
prices; bundles new portfolios or conducts further R&D; sells and stick or carrot
licenses the patents to generate revenues and profit from arbitrage.
Business model patent enforcement company: Aggregates patents that are already
used and stick licenses them to generate revenues.
Business model patent incubating fund: Aggregates promising, often embryonic
technologies, and the patents that cover the technologies; enhances technology by
conducting further R&D; and sells or carrot licenses technology to generate
revenues.
Business model patent trading fund: Aggregates large numbers of patents from a
large number of original patent owners to low prices; bundles new portfolios; and
sells new bundles within but also across industries to generate revenues.
Business model defensive patent aggregator: Aggregates patents used by its
attached companies that could create a litigation threat for the attached
companies.
Business model non-commercial patent aggregator: Aggregates patents and
technologies from several patent owners often without giving direct monetary
rewards; offers the patents to a broad range of users without charge.
The terms used to name the eight business models build on prior research and internet documents. In
prior research and in internet documents, several denominations and terms are used overlapping,
unlimited, and/or synonymous. For instance, von Scheffer (2008), p. 5 mentions the terms patent
incubating funds or patent trading funds. Millien and Laurie (2008), p. 54 use the terms patent
licensing and enforcement funds as well as IP acquisition funds. Yanagisawa and Guellec (2009),
p. 11 use the term defensive patent aggregation funds. Except for the concept of patent pools,
which is described for example, in Aoki and Schiff (2008), a distinction and definition of the terms
is lacking so far.
Strategies of patent aggregating companies
(7)
(8)
67
Business model patent pooling company: Aggregates large amounts of patents

covering certain technologies from several original patent owners; offers a single
license to all patents of different owners.
Business model: royalty monetization company: Aggregates patents that are
already licensed out and produces steady royalty streams as security for capital
provided to original patent owners.
Figure 12 summarizes the business models of patent aggregating companies, assigns

them to one of the two general strategies, and displays which company shows which
business model.
Patent aggregating companies acquire large amounts of patents to.
generate revenues (basic strategy I)

Patent acquisition company: Selling,
stick- and carrot licensing applying
arbitrage strategies
(Coller Capital, Intellectual Ventures,
Techquity)
Patent enforcement company: Sticklicensing infringed patents
(Acacia, Alliacense, CreativE, Fergason
Patent, IP Navigation, Papst, Rembrandt)
Patent incubating fund: Carrot licensing
refined technologies
(IgniteIP, IP Holdings, Patent Select)
Patent trading fund: Mainly selling
patents
(Alpha Patentfonds, Patent Invest)
serve an objective (basic strategy II)

Defensive patent aggregator: Offering
insurance against infringement lawsuits
to members
(Allied Security Trust, OIN, RPX)
Non-commercial patent aggregator:
Offering technology access to a broad
range of users to foster innovation and
society (Golden Rice, Eco-Patent
Commons)
Patent pooling company: Offering access
to standards
(MPEG, Sipro Lab, Via Licensing)
Royalty moentization company: Offering
alternative source of capital
(AlseT, Capital Royalty, Pete Invest
MedTech, Royalty Pharma)
Figure 12: Business models of patent aggregating companies and their strategies
68
3.4 Summary
During the last two decades, companies that do not produce physical goods have
emerged as buyers in the market for patents and technologies. As little is known about
these patent aggregating companies, an explorative analysis is conducted on
companies that are visible and have a certain, observable, track record in patent
aggregation. This analysis confirms that patent aggregating companies are a young
phenomenon, since the first company started aggregating activities in 1996. Patent
aggregating companies are established based either on pre-existing activities or by
entrepreneurs, patent professionals, or financial institutions.
Patent aggregating companies are very heterogeneous regarding their number of
employees, their patent portfolios, and their capital endowments. Whereas most
companies operate with a number of employees around 57, one company exceeds all
companies regarding size and asset under management. Patent aggregating companies
follow a general process to amass patents. This process consists of the four phases:
selection, structuring, value adding, and exploitation. Depending on the patent
aggregating company, each phase is of different importance. They amass either the
sole legal right of exclusion or patents, in addition to technology and knowledge.
Two basic strategies regarding why patent aggregating companies amass patents can
be identified: to generate revenues and to serve an objective. Four different ways of
how they generate revenues can be recognized: (1) through a broad exploitation
strategy and selling, stick and carrot licensing; (2) through stick licensing of infringed
patents; (3) through carrot licensing of refined technologies; (4) through selling
patents. Also four different objectives for which patent aggregating companies use
patents as means to pursue these objectives can be identified: (1) they offer an
insurance against infringement lawsuits to members; (2) they offer technology access
to a broad range of users to foster innovation and society; (3) they offer access to
standards; (4) they offer an alternative source of capital. The identification of the eight
different strategies of patent aggregating companies answers research question 1: Why
do patent aggregating companies build up large patent portfolios?
From the eight different strategies, eight distinctive business models are identified:
patent acquisition companies; patent enforcement companies; patent incubating funds;
patent trading funds; defensive patent aggregators; non-commercial patent
aggregators; patent pooling companies; and royalty monetization companies.
Potentials offered by patent aggregating companies
69
4 Potentials offered by patent aggregating companies

As an intermediary step in examining whether patent aggregating companies are an
option for producing companies, the potentials offered by patent aggregating
companies are analyzed. The focus is on potentials that patent aggregating companies
can provide for producing companies that want to leverage their patent portfolio, and
not on how the patent aggregating companies can be beneficial for patent buyers or
licensees, capital market investors, or the economy or society. Potentials can be found
either internally, that means in the producing company itself, or externally in the
market environment (Figure 13).
Potentials for risk reduction

Increase hedging alternatives
Potentials for resource enhancement

Increase capacity of leveraging
patents
External
potentials
Potentials for market fostering

Increase alternatives for
leveraging patents
offered
by PAC
Potentials for market interaction
Increase adequacy of leveraging
patents
Internal
potentials
Potentials for decision making

Increase set of strategic choices
Potentials for cost effectiveness

Increase resource utilization
Figure 13: Overview of external and internal potentials
External potentials describe opportunities created by patent aggregating companies for

the producing company in the environment. The producing company can benefit from
them by utilizing patent aggregating companies but cannot actively influence them.
This is in contrast to internal potentials that lie in the producing company itself.
In the following, case studies and examples from literature demonstrate how patent
aggregating companies can realize the external and internal potentials.
70
4.1 External potentials offered by patent aggregating companies

External potentials offered by patent aggregating companies are potentials for risk
reduction, market fostering, and resource enhancement. Patent aggregating companies
offer producing companies new opportunities to hedge risks. Not only do hedging
opportunities have to exist but leveraging options and an environment also have to be
present. In addition, the producing company has to seize the opportunities.
4.1.1 Potentials for risks reduction
External potentials for risks reduction can be realized through hedging of R&D risks
and hedging of enforcement risks (summarized in Figure 14). Realizing risks reduction
increases the hedging alternatives for producing companies.
Potentials for risks reduction
R&D risks' hedging

Reduce external risks of
product development
Lower possibility of
infringement lawsuit
Insures against loss of
royalty streams
Enforcement risks'
hedging
Reduce financial risk of
infringement lawsuit
Prevent reputation loss
Avoid suing competitors
Increase hedging alternatives
Figure 14: External potentials for risks reduction
R&D projects are considered typically to be high-risk projects (see Gassmann, Kobe,
& Voit, 2001), and the commercialization of R&D is exposed to two main types of
risk: failures related with R&D and the results of R&D, and failures related with the
enforcement of the legal right on the invention. Stevens and Burley (1997) found that
across most industries, 3,000 raw ideas are required to produce one substantially new
commercially successful industrial product. Developing in the wrong direction,
External potentials offered by patent aggregating companies
71
therefore, is costly. Another risk connected with R&D is the inadvertent use of other
companies patents. Even if the invention and the patent are commercialized, for
instance, via out-licensing, R&D results could still remain subject to risk because
licensees could fail to pay the royalties. If the patents are enforced, the producing
company faces risks related with infringement lawsuits. Patent aggregating companies
can reduce risks from R&D, as well as the risks from enforcing the patents.
R&D risks hedging
Patent aggregating companies can reduce producing companies external R&D risks
by taking over the tasks of further development and commercialization and providing
rents of innovation immediately to the producing company. Figure 15 gives an
overview of what can go wrong in the process of product development. External risks
of R&D can be divided into market and technology risks. These two risks describe the
financial uncertainty of an innovation regarding the achievement of an attractive
financial return (Rogers, 2003).
External risks of R&D
Market
Assumption about application
attractiveness turns out to be false
Market test of prototype fails
Miss right timing for market
introduction
Technology
Major setback in technology and
application development
Potential of new core technology
not recognized or overestimated
Longer technology
commercialization than estimated
Source: Adapted from Becker (2003).

Figure 15: External risks of R&D
By involving patent aggregating companies and selling the patents and the covered
technology, producing companies can achieve an attractive financial return before the
product is actually commercialized. Therefore, the problems listed in Figure 15 are no
longer prevalent and transferred to the patent aggregating company.
Techquity acquires patents and the covered technologies from corporate sellers as
SMEs and MNEs. Thereby, Techquity focuses on technologies that have yet to be
72
commercialized in products, but have a proven technical value in applications and

benefit future markets. The original patent owners receive a rent from their innovation
before it is commercialized in products, without carrying the market and technology
risks of further product development. Furthermore, they receive a back license.
However, both facts, the risks transfer, as well as the back license, may lead to lower
rents of innovation but protect the original patent owner from a total loss of financial
returns in case of any undesired development.
For producing companies, patent aggregating companies can lower the risk of being
involved in infringement lawsuits as a defendant. This is especially true in industries
characterized by large numbers of patent applications, overlapping sets of patents, and
patent thickets, as producing companies constantly face the threat of, often
inadvertently, unauthorized use of patents. Even with conducting serious patent
monitoring and the freedom to operate analyses, producing companies are not always
able to detect all relevant patents and may develop new products that inadvertently
infringe patents of competitors or other companies. In some technological areas, where
many companies face the same problem, the involvement of a patent aggregating
company can solve this problem. Assigning own patents to a patent aggregating
company allows producing companies access to patents of other companies that cover
the same technological area. This organized cross-licensing procedure reduces the risk
of infringing patents and of being involved in a lawsuit.
Even a young technology, patent thickets are already observable in the Radio
Frequency Identification domain (RFID). The fifty largest RFID innovators hold
approximately 3,000 patents. To prevent a flood of litigation lawsuits resulting from
this growing patent thicket, 20 leading companies in the RFID domain, amongst them
3M, France Telecom, Hewlett-Packard, LG Electronics, and Motorola, formed the
RFID Consortium and hired Via Licensing to establish a patent pool and submit a
business plan to the US Department of Justice, which reviewed the patent pool and the
RFID Consortium in order to ensure its arrangement does not threaten any antitrust
laws.6
Patent aggregating companies can insure producing companies against loss of royalty
streams through prepaying future royalties and taking over the risk of total (or partial)
failure of the licensee. Fishman (2003) identifies two scenarios in which this insurance
Via Licensing has established the patent pool. In 2009, patent pool administrator Sisvel Group took
over the administration and licensing of the UHF RFID patent licensing program.
73
scheme could be applied. The most straightforward case is that a licensee defaults to
pay the royalty. Reasons for this could be insolvency of the licensee, failure of the
product in the market, or obsolete technology. Another insurance scenario is an
invalidated patent. If the patent is invalidated, the licensee is discharged from paying
financial commitments. Patent owners can avoid suffering losses caused from unpaid
royalties by reassigning patents to patent aggregating companies and receiving
discounted and adjusted royalty payments.
Enforcement risks hedging
Patent aggregating companies can reduce the financial risks of infringement lawsuits,
in which a producing company acts as plaintiff. If a patent owned by a producing
company is infringed, the patent owner has few alternatives other than patent
litigation. In general, patent litigation is usually lengthy, it is always very expensive,
and it is often unsuccessful.
On average, patent litigation lawsuits in the US last about two years (Barry et al.,
2010) but can be many times longer.7 For instance in 2007, an infringement lawsuit of
Microsoft vs. Eolas Technologies and University of California was settled after eight
years (Bloomberg News, 2007).8 Patent litigation lawsuits in the US cost on average
USD 3 million to 10 million (Towns, 2010).9 Additionally, results of patent litigation
at the appellate level show that patentees only won some 25% of the cases (Janicke &
Ren, 2006). These numbers show that enforcing patents is a risky business.10
The average duration of patent litigation lawsuits in Europe depends on the country. Whereas on
average, litigation lawsuits in Germany are shorter than in the US (11.5 years), litigation lawsuits
in France are only slightly shorter (1.52 years). In Italy (3 years) and England (23 years to finish
hearings and to come to a trial), the average duration of litigation lawsuits is even longer than in the
US (Aoki and Hu, 2003).
8
Microsoft said Thursday that it had settled an eight-year patent dispute that resulted in a USD 521
million jury verdict against it. Terms of the accord were not disclosed. The dispute centered on a
feature within Microsofts Internet Explorer Web browser that allows embedded links. The patent is
owned by the University of California and licensed to Eolas Technologies, a closely held company
formed by a university researcher, Michael Doyle. (Bloomberg News, 2007)
9
The costs for patent litigation lawsuits in the US vary depending on the amount of money at risk. In
2011, for patent infringement suits with less than USD 1 million at risk, the median costs are USD
600,000. In patent infringement suits dealing with USD 1 to 25 million at risk, the median costs are
USD 2 million and increase further to more than USD 5 million if the value in litigation exceeds
USD 25 million (AIPLA, 2011).
10
This is aggravated by the fact that in the US, non-specialist judges or juries consisting of lay people
often decide the outcome of infringement lawsuits. The assessment of infringement requires
technological knowledge and is complex process. Therefore, the outcome of a litigation lawsuit is
difficult to predict (Luman III and Dodson, 2006).
74
Assigning (potentially) infringed patents to patent aggregating companies can reduce

the financial risks resulting from the lawsuit.
Papst Licensing takes over the enforcement risks of mainly European companies
operating in the US market. After a thorough analysis of the potentially infringed
patent, Papst Licensing buys the patent from the original patent owner and usually
compensates the original patent owner through a sales price that consists of an upfront
payment and a variable success related component (back end). Therefore, the original
patent owner already receives a payment independent of an enforcement result and
participates in case of a monetization success.
Additionally, patent aggregating companies can reduce risks that result only indirectly
in financial losses. Producing companies have two major reasons for not being
involved in patent enforcement cases. First, in some communities, the enforcement of
patents and the patent system in general are considered to hinder innovation (e.g., The
Economist online, 2010). Therefore, companies perceived as very innovative can
reduce the risk of reputation loss resulting from being involved in patent litigation and
still receive a rent for their innovation through selling infringed patents to a patent
aggregating company. In this case, patents are enforced but the original patent owner
is not involved. Second, producing companies operating in markets with oligopolistic
structures often abandon the option of patent enforcement. Due to the small number of
competitors, a litigation case could stir a flood of lawsuits and end in a zero sum game.
Assigning infringed patents to a patent aggregating company leaves the original patent
owner out of the lawsuit while receiving a rent for the innovation.
4.1.2 Potentials for market fostering
External potentials for market fostering comprise liquidity, market clearing, and
innovative business models, as summarized in Figure 16. Offering these potentials,
patent aggregating companies can increase the alternatives for leveraging patents for
producing companies.
75
Potentials for market fostering
Liquidity and
market clearing
Act as reliable buyer
Create demand in the
market for patents
Set prices for patents
Innovative business
models
Develop new business
models that could create
demand and may reduce
inefficiencies
Increase alternatives for leveraging patents
Figure 16: External potentials for market fostering
The options for leveraging producing firms patent portfolios have increased since
patents are viewed as valuable and separate from a companys core business. The
external exploitation of patents is executed in market for patents and technologies
(Granstrand, 2000) and patents (Gambardella et al., 2007), but still this market lacks
transparency, liquidity, and information symmetries. As active players, patent
aggregating companies can provide liquidity and support the pricing of patents. As the
current patent market environment can be classified as a period of trial and error
(Malackowski, Cardoza, Gray, & Conroy, 2007), new business models emerge and
vanish. Patent aggregating companies already have experience in the market for
patents and technologies and can enhance the success and the reliability of new
business models.
Liquidity and market clearing
As buyer in the market for patents and technologies, patent aggregating companies can
enhance the liquidity of patents and foster the development of the market for patents.
Liquidity of an asset is defined as the time and costs associated with the
transformation of a given asset position into cash and vice versa (Jorion, 2009, p.
607). In other words, liquidity refers to the ability to unwind a position on short notice
without influencing the market price. Therefore, liquidity should encompass the
following three components: (1) time required to sell an asset; (2) transaction costs
incurred when selling the asset; (3) the degree of uncertainty in the liquidation value of
76
the asset (Murphy, 2008). Due to the high specificity of patents, the limited context a
patent can be applied, and potential circumvention opportunities, it takes a long time
span and high search and transaction costs to transform patents into cash. Therefore,
patents are illiquid assets. Patent aggregating companies, appearing as regular buyers
of vast amounts of patents, can lead the patent market from a search market with
multiple decentralized buyers and sellers that are not aware of each other, to a
centralized market (McDonough III, 2006; Shrestha, 2010). Hence, patents become a
more of a liquid asset through a centralized demand and the coordinating function of
Additionally, patent aggregating companies can clear the market by equalizing prices
(McDonough III, 2006). In markets with information asymmetries, participants cannot
assess the value of a patent and therefore, are not able to set a consistent price. That
leads to market failure. Patent aggregating companies act as buyers and sellers in the
market and have more experience in pricing and better access to information.
Therefore, patent aggregating companies are more able to set market clearing prices.11
One example of a company with vast experience often named as the smartest buyer in
the market is Allied Security Trust (Hetzel, 2010). To buy a patent, Allied Security
Trust needs the commitment of its members. The members also independently value
the patents and determine the amount they contribute to the bid. Based on the
accumulated patent management and patent valuation experience of high-technology
companies, Allied Security Trust determines the price.
Innovative business models

By developing new business models, either separate to the aggregating activities or
additional to them, patent aggregating companies can create additional demand and
provide additional expertise and resources. Therefore, they may help to reduce market
inefficiencies. According to the EPO, OECD, and UKIPO (2006), the IP marketplace
is nowadays in a probe and learn period where the number of intermediaries is rising
(p. 1). As many firms are not able to overcome market imperfections on their own,
new business models that bring together supply and demand emerge and vanish.
Therefore, patent aggregating companies, already working in the market for patents
11
McDonough III (2006) alludes to the opportunity that large buyers of patents can use market
imperfections to benefit themselves by setting prices too low. He indicates that this problem is
likely to abate over time as buyers and sellers become more experienced in setting transaction
prices.
77
and identifying new business opportunities, can develop new models and make one
step forward towards the development of a market for IP transfers [and]
contribute to the maturation of the IP market (EPO et al., 2006, p. 1).
4.1.3 Potentials for resource enhancement
By utilizing patent aggregating companies, producing companies can realize external
potentials for resource enhancement through access to human and financial resources,
as well as through networks. Figure 17 summarizes the potentials for resource
enhancement. Having access to external resources can increase the capacity for
leveraging patents.
Potentials for resource enhancement
Access to resources
Networks
Access to human
resources
(complementary
expertise, overcome lack
of dedicated resources)
Access to financial
resources (liquidity
through unused patents,
increase capital base
through capital market
investors)
Cooperation with other

producing companies
(cross licensing, defining
standards, security
measures)
Collaborations with
patent intermediaries for
other projects of
company
Increase capacity of leveraging patents
Figure 17: External potentials for resource enhancement
Companies own resources can enable them to achieve competitive advantage and lead
to superior long-term performance. Literature distinguishes between physical,
organizational, financial, and human resources (Barney, 1991) and knowledge (Kogut
& Zander, 1992). Leveraging patent portfolios successfully requires resources and
competencies of producing companies. Firms can release resources internally for
78
patent leveraging projects and develop their own competencies, or seek assistance
from third parties (Nambisan & Sawhney, 2007; Sapsed et al., 2007), for instance,
Access to resources
Patent aggregating companies can enhance access to external resources. According to
Arora et al. (2001b), the external acquisition of resources is of growing importance in
companies strategic options. Patent aggregating companies enable producing
companies to access to financial and human resources.
Human resource. On the one hand, patent aggregating companies complement
companies internal resources with complementary expertise (Morgan & Crawford,
1996; Nambisan & Sawhney, 2007), and producing companies have to build up fewer
internal resources to leverage their patent portfolio successfully (Shohert & Prevezer,
1996). Complementary expertise provided by patent aggregating companies is mainly
highly specific resources that are also highly cost intensive, for example, patent
lawyers.
Alpha Patentfonds offers producing companies industry and market expertise that
increases opportunities to leverage the patent portfolio. Companies that sell patents to
Alpha Patentfonds often have their own patent departments and therefore, are able to
evaluate the quality of the patent, as well as the technological applicability. Despite the
patent management expertise, the original patent owners do not have any expertise in
external patent transactions, limited resources to sell abandoned patents, and only
limited access to potential buyers. Alpha Patentfonds has the necessary access to
buyers and the negotiation and implementation expertise that leads to a successful
completion of external patent portfolio leveraging activities.
Additionally, many producing companies follow an ad hoc approach for exploiting

patents externally and therefore, lack dedicated resources (Lichtenthaler & Ernst,
2008b). Patent aggregating companies can help producing companies to overcome this
human resource bottleneck by providing additional human resources.
CreativE acquires most patents from companies that do not have their own patent
department or own patent lawyers, such as SMEs, research institutions, or single
inventors. Therefore, these companies are not able to detect infringements and
companies that potentially use their patents to enforce the patents. By acquiring
potentially infringed patents, CreativE provides indirect human resources to these
companies through monitoring the market for potential infringers, analyzing products
79
of competitors for using the patents, and finally employing specialized and
experienced patent lawyers to enforce the patents.
Financial resources. SMEs and privately held producing companies have constraints
regarding the financing of R&D because they cannot access capital through normal
capital market instruments. Additionally, the access to debt capital borrowed by banks
has become more difficult through increasingly strict regulations like Basel II (Bessler,
Bittelmeyer, & Lipfert, 2003). Patent aggregating companies can help producing
companies to increase liquidity and access capital markets without the companies
becoming involved with traditional debt and equity instruments.
Patent Select aggregates patents from SMEs, single inventors, research institutions like
universities, but also from MNEs. Often the original patent owner does not have the
financial resources to commercialize the results from own R&D or holds patents that
diverge from the general strategic direction of the company. Patent Select acquires
patents covering promising technologies not used by the original patent owner and
commercializes them. Therefore, the original patent owner receives liquid assets that
can be reinvested in company activities, for example, R&D. The advantage of Patent
Selects business model is that it taps capital market investors. An investment fund
structure finances the funds used to acquire the patents, as well as the enhancement.
Investors can profit from patents as new asset class and risk diversification
opportunities.
Networks
Patent aggregating companies can enhance the cooperation between producing
companies and establish interfirm networks. Cooperation and interfirm networks can
help to increase the supply side innovations, patents, and products but can also act as a
common defensive shield. The interfirm networks are based on formal long-term
agreements. They can be a source of strategic advantage because they can facilitate
entry to a new market, share costs and risks, or help to establish a new technology
standard in a particular market or industry. Patent aggregating companies can optimize
the different collaborations and interfirm networks. For example, in high-technology
industries, such as consumer electronics, telecommunications, or information
technologies, a proliferation of patents is observable and may result in patent thicket
(Aoki & Schiff, 2008). To secure a wide adoption of innovative technologies for
products, which also represents the commercial interests of patent owners, companies
have to collaborate to give access to overlapping and necessary patents.
80
MPEG LA administers patents of a video compression technology. The technology

reduces the number of bits in a file. Based on the lower number of bits, videos can be
transmitted faster and made available over lower bandwidth carriers. MPEG LA offers
a one-stop shopping for the licenses necessary to produce MPEG-2 products. The
license offers non-discriminatory access to all essential patent of the MPEG standard.
To offer these licenses producing, companies, such as Alcatel Lucent, Canon,
Columbia University, France Tlcom, Fujitsu, Hitachi, Mitsubishi, Philips, Bosch,
Samsung, or Toshiba collaborate and pool their patents that MPEG LA administers.
The network and collaboration agreement is expanded regularly to update the patent
pool, and new licensors and essential patents are included. The patent aggregating
company MPEG LA has established the interfirm network and ongoing collaboration
of the original patent owners.
Additionally to enhancing interfirm networks, patent aggregating companies can

promote access to indirect contacts with patent intermediaries or patent service
providers and therefore, foster future patent leveraging activities. Patent aggregating
companies often employ third parties for their own patent aggregation and patent
commercialization activities. Based on this network of experts, producing companies
have references for certain tasks and can benefit from the selection and employment
done by the patent aggregating companies without having the search and selection
costs and the risk to employ unskilled third parties.
4.2 Internal potentials offered by patent aggregating companies

Besides realizing the external potentials of the market and industry environment in a
macro-context, patent aggregating companies can also offer internal potentials by
helping to perceive leveraging opportunities, organizing micro-processes, and
expanding the scope of action. Internal potentials offered by patent aggregating
companies are potentials for market interaction, cost effectiveness, and decisionmaking.
4.2.1 Potential for market interaction
Internal potentials for market interaction include market understanding and
opportunity identification. Figure 18 provides a summary of the potentials for market
Internal potentials offered by patent aggregating companies
81
interaction. Realizing these potentials raises the adequacy of the offered patents and
the market orientation of the transactions.
Potentials for market interaction
Market understanding
Increase understanding
of patent demand
Provide company with
relevant market
knowledge within own
and other industries
Opportunity
identification
Evaluate opportunities
within the company's
portfolio
Overcome "only used
here" syndrome
Identify potentially
interested parties
Increase adequacy of leveraging patents
Figure 18: Internal potentials for market interaction
Leveraging patents through external patent exploitation is a much more complex task
than commercializing goods on product markets (Callon & Muniesa, 2005). Prior
studies have identified that major managerial difficulties are the identification of
external patent exploitation opportunities and the determination of transaction prices
(e.g., Arora et al., 2001a; Lichtenthaler, 2007a; Morgan & Crawford, 1996; Tschirky
& Escher, 2000). Additionally, reliable data about the size, structure, and demand in
the market for patents is not available (Yanagisawa & Guellec, 2009). Patent
aggregating companies can serve as an interface to the market place because they have
information and experience advantage over producing companies that seldom act in
the market of patents or have separate units for patent management and for instance,
technology scouting.
Market understanding
Patent aggregating companies operate regularly in the market for patents and therefore,
can provide producing companies access to market data. With this data, producing
companies are able to understand the market demand for patents regarding its
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structure, size and capacity, potential growth, and competition. Understanding the
patent demand is a prerequisite for developing patent portfolio leveraging strategies.
Patent aggregating companies can supply information about what potential patent
buyers or licensees need and want and, if the patent owner participates in future
royalties, to a certain degree, what they are willing to pay. Producing companies can
use this information to determine a patent portfolio leveraging strategy and to adjust
the innovation strategy to the market demand. Providing market information, patent
aggregating companies are also able to apply their industry spanning network and
knowledge and provide producing companies with market knowledge and application
potentials of the patents in other industries.
Opportunity identification
Many producing companies still leverage their patent portfolios mainly internally.
Often they own technical solutions for certain problems, innovative technologies, or
patents but they face the difficulty of identifying possible applications in their industry
and in completely different industries from the firms own product business
(Lichtenthaler, 2005). Additionally, managers fear that they might give away
corporate crown jewels when they sell or exclusively out-license patents (Kline,
2003). If patent aggregating companies are going to acquire certain parts or the entire
patent portfolio, they can conduct an analysis of the producing firms patent portfolio,
as well as support producing companies by structuring and enriching internal analysis,
therefore, reducing the difficulties of opportunities detection.
IP Holdings invests in, develops, incubates, and assists in the commercialization of
novel and promising technology. The patent aggregating company particularly
emphasizes the development and protection of patents. Additionally, IP Holdings
offers management and audit services. In the patent aggregating process, IP Holdings
audits patent portfolios of SMEs, universities, and other patent owners; identifies core,
non-core and obsolete technologies; and based on this, detects external exploitation
opportunities. The idea incubator acquires breakthrough technologies and disruptive
innovation from life science or electrical engineering and these are further advanced
and commercialized.
Patent aggregating companies can help to overcome the cultural problem, which is still
immanent in many producing companies, of the only-used-here (OUH)-syndrome
(Boyens, 1998). The OUH-syndrome is defined as an attitude to the external
exploitation of knowledge that is more negative than an ideal economic attitude would
83
be (Boyens, 1998). A consequence of the OUH-syndrome is that companies cannot

benefit fully from all patent portfolio leveraging options, for instance, companies fail
to establish industry standards based on their own technologies or they are not able to
gain access to patents in bilateral contracts as cross-licensing agreements
(Lichtenthaler & Ernst, 2006). According to Lichtenthaler and Ernst (2006) the main
reasons for the OUH-syndrome are the fear of strengthening competitors, a lack of
experience with external patent exploitation, and the legal and organizational effort of
external patent leveraging activities. Patent aggregating companies can provide track
records of successful transactions that build up trust and reduce companies internal
inhibitions based on inexperience. Through shifting the complete transaction process
to the patent aggregating company, the producing company can save organizational
and legal effort. In the contracts, producing companies can exclude certain companies
as receivers for their technology or their patents. These contractual agreements can
reduce apprehensions regarding competitors strengthening.
4.2.2 Potentials for cost effectiveness
Internal potentials for cost effectiveness comprise organizational learning and
transaction costs. Figure 19 gives an overview of the potentials for cost effectiveness.
Based on the competencies of patent aggregating companies, producing companies can
increase their resource utilization with regard to patent portfolio leveraging activities.
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Potentials for cost effectiveness
Organizational learning
Spill-over
Increase company's
ability to leverage
patents through
collaboration
Transaction costs
Diminish uncertainty
Decrease asymmetric
information
Reduce transaction
costs
Increase resource utilization
Figure 19: Internal potentials for cost effectiveness
For most producing companies, transactions of patents, and therefore the leveraging of
the patent portfolio, are difficult to realize. According to Tietze (2011), the main
obstacles of efficient transactions are uncertainty and information asymmetry,
actually leading to high transaction costs. Tietze (2011), remarks that, these three
are intertwined and hardly can be distinguished clearly (p. 60). As mentioned before,
many producing companies follow an ad hoc approach for exploiting patents
externally and lack dedicated resources (Lichtenthaler & Ernst, 2008b). Therefore,
patent transactions and patent leveraging activities are characterized by high
transaction costs.
By developing internal competencies of patent transactions and patent portfolio
leveraging activities, a firm may reduce its transaction costs (Cohen & Levinthal,
1990; Lane, Koka, & Pathak, 2006). Patent aggregating companies already have the
necessary competencies in the market for patents and technologies and therefore, can
help producing companies to build up internal competencies by learning from them
(Kale, Dyer, & Singh, 2002; Lichtenthaler & Ernst, 2008b; Silverman, 1999).
The main transaction partners of Patent Select are research institutions and SMEs.
Patent Select acquires the patents to advance and subsequently out-licenses them. The
original patent owner is not only compensated by lump sum payments or shared
royalties, but also involved in the enhancement of the patents. For instance, Patent
85
Select acquired a technology from a German SME that already had strong
competencies to commercialize the technology in the domestic market but lacked
market knowledge for specific international markets. Working closely with Patent
Select and its network of international sales specialists, the SME was able to build up
international marketing competencies and apply the new competencies for later
products.
According to Lavie (2006) and Lichtenthaler and Ernst (2008b), the patent owner may
generate inbound spillover rents from non-shared resources of the patent aggregating
company. Therefore, transferring patents to a patent aggregating company and
working with it may help the patent owner to realize learning effects that exceed the
resources a patent aggregating company provides (Howells, 2006)
Transaction costs
Uncertainty. By using their particular technical, legal, and commercial expertise and
their knowledge of supply and demand, patent aggregating companies help to reduce
uncertainty. Uncertainty regarding the quality of patents (Gans et al., 2008), the
transaction process (Lichtenthaler, 2004), the applicability in new environments
(Caves et al., 1983), and especially the value of the patents and the technology
(Gambardella et al., 2008; Scherer & Harhoff, 2000) hinders market transaction and
prevents patent owners from successfully exploit patents externally. The value of a
patent is not a fixed parameter, but it is among other things dependent on the actual
utilization of the patent (Hall & Ziedonis, 2001). Therefore, the transaction price is
difficult to determine, and often the asking price of buyer and seller differs
substantially. Literature offers a broad range of valuation approaches,12 but all
approaches struggle with the same phenomenon that confronts the actors: uniqueness
of a patent (Granstrand, 2000) and the difficulty comparing the traded patents (Parr
& Smith, 2008), an elementary precondition for finding a transaction price.
Based on the experiences of past transactions and data collected in these transactions,
patent aggregating companies are able to value patents and reduce the uncertainty
regarding the transaction price.
IP Bewertungs AG, the patent manager of the Patent Select, has developed a valuation
method for patents on the basis of experience and on data of patents already priced and
12
An intensive overview of the different patent valuation approaches can be found in

Parr and Smith (2008).
86
traded gathered from different sources, such as expired license agreements,

remunerations of employees inventions, and patent sales (e.g., out of liquidations).
With this data and academic literature,13 value-indicators were located and significant
correlations between indicators and values identified. The result is a valuation method
that follows a market-approach with value indicators that was certified on customers
request by chartered accountant KPMG in February 2004. Patent Select applied the
market-approach with value indicators to value the targeted patents and as basis for the
transaction price negotiations.
Asymmetric information. Patent aggregating companies can reduce information

asymmetries between the original patent owner who offers patents for sale or outlicensing and potential patent buyers respective licensees. Todays technologies and
inventions are complex and often difficult to evaluate for companies and persons that
have not participated in the development of this invention. Hence, the economic value
of a patent is difficult to estimate for outsiders and asymmetric information between
patents buyers and patent sellers exist. Based on the asymmetric information, a
classical lemon market (Akerlof, 1970) arises.14
Patents/ licenses
Economic
problem
Original patent
owner
(Agent)
PAC
approach
Original patent
owner
(Agent)
$ / commitment
Asymmetric information
Hidden characteristics
Adverse Selection
Patents/
licenses
Screening
Patent
aggregating
company
(Principal)
Patents/
licenses
$ /commitment
New patent owner/

licensee
(Principal)
New patent owner/

licensee
(Principal)
Figure 20: Principal-agent problem and patent aggregating company approach
13
14
The selection of the patent value indicators is based on the following empirical studies: Narin,
Noma, and Perry (1987); Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001), Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004);
Harhoff, Scherer, and Vopel (2003a); Harhoff and Reitzig (2004); Reitzig (2004).
Is the patent market a market for lemons, the seller would sell low value patents. The buyer knows
that and only buys at low prices. Sellers of patents with high economic value could sell patents only
to a low price and therefore, they would leave the market. In this case, the market for patents would
be small and populated by low value patents.
87
Analyzing the market for patents in the context of principal-agent problems

(Eisenhardt, 1989b; Jensen & Meckling, 1976), the original patent owner (agent) has
superior information about the economic value of the patent (hidden characteristics).
Resulting from this lack of information, the potential patent buyer (principal) might
make an undesired decision and buy an unwanted patent (adverse selection). To reduce
information asymmetries and increase the chances of patent transaction for the original
patent owner, the patent aggregating company steps in as principal and acquires the
patent. The patent aggregating company invests money in evaluating the patent,
conducting a due diligence, and buying the patent, therefore, reducing the information
asymmetries through the idea of screening (Figure 20). Through investing financial
and human resources, the patent aggregating companies additionally signals the
quality of the patents.
Patent Select reduces asymmetric information resulting from hidden characteristics
and adverse selection through a resource intensive screening process (Figure 21).
Identification
Identification of
patents
(database
query, legal
status)
Quantitative
valuation
Qualitative
audit
Realization
analysis
Based on
quantitative
scoring model
Analyses of
legal strength
and
commercialization potential
Identification of
target clients
and
exploitation
strategy
Quantitative pre-selection
Purchase
Purchase of
patents
Qualitative analysis
Source: According to Lipfert and von Scheffer (2006).
Figure 21: Screening and selection process of Patent Select
In general, Patent Select aggregates embryonic technologies from SMEs or research

institutions. Due to the novelty of the technology, information asymmetries regarding
the economic value of the patents are large and potential patent buyers cannot assess
the quality and the potential. Therefore, the original patent owners are not able to sell
the technology and the resulting patents on the market for patents and technologies.
Patent Select reduces the problem of hidden characteristics through a five-step
selection process: identification, quantitative valuation, qualitative audit, realization
analysis, and purchase. Investing resources in the screening and taking risks in the
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acquisition, Patent Select signals quality to other potentially interested parties in the
market for patents and technologies.
Transaction costs. Patent aggregating companies exploit the amassed patents by

satisfying the demand for patents or the underlying technology (see section 3.2).
Therefore, patent aggregating companies act as intermediaries, matching the supply of
patents and the demand for patents or technologies from corporate buyers or other
patent aggregating companies. Based on this intermediary function, patent aggregating
companies can reduce transaction costs. The patent aggregating company in an
intermediary form is located between the traditional choices of Institutional Economics
hierarchy and market.15 As an alternative to the direct transaction of patents, they serve
as a governance mode to execute risky transactions. Patent aggregating companies are
highly specialized and have comprehensive market knowledge. Therefore, they can
also reduce operative costs, through for instance, reducing costs of searching
transaction partners by leveraging internal and external contacts.
All licensing executives of Alpha Patentfonds have already worked in different
industries. Therefore, Alpha Patentfonds is not only able to identify the opportunity to
transfer patents to other industries, but it is also able to realize this transfer based on
the industries spanning network.
Search costs are also reduced by transferring this task to patent aggregating companies
that are able to reduce the actual number of transactions, as well as the number of
unsuccessful approaches to potential buyers.
MPEG acts as a single source for facilitating, organizing, and operating patent pools. A
major task of MPEG is to offer licenses necessary for a particular technology standard
or from multiple patent holders in a single transaction. The producing company that
seeks to leverage patents by standardizing technology is able to offer not only own
patents but all relevant patents in the technology area without large operative costs.
Additionally, multiple patent users are approached by MPEG and provided with a
multiple license in one step. That reduces search costs and therefore transaction costs.
15
Transaction costs economics states two alternative governance modes to perform transactions:
hierarchy and market. Depending on various factors, either market or hierarchy is a better
environment to perform transactions. Transactions based on standardized agreements as
commodities are better performed in markets. Transactions that need to be controlled for
opportunistic behavior are better performed in hierarchy (Williamson, 1975). Transaction costs
economics subsequently recognize that hybrid governance modes, as trilateral governance in
occasional transactions with high specific goods, are possible (Williamson, 1985).
89
Based on the experiences of amassing patents, patent aggregating companies are able
to realize economies of scale and reduce the costs of negotiating and executing
contracts.
Acacia controls over 180 patent portfolios. Based on the experiences of these
aggregating activities, the company has developed a semi-standardized due diligence
process with selected experts. Additionally, the negotiations follow certain structures
and terms, derived from past successful transactions. As a result, the negotiating and
the executing process is conducted efficiently.
4.2.3 Potentials for decision making

Patent aggregating companies offer potentials for decision making that affect the
company strategy and its innovation strategy. Figure 22 summarizes the potentials for
decision making and how they can be realized. Utilizing patent aggregating companies
and realizing the potentials for decision making increases the set of strategic choices.
Potentials for decision making
Company strategy
Promote setting
standards
Facilitate entry to new
markets
Innovation strategy
Raise capital to reinvest
in innovation
Provide
commercialization
alternative for inventors
ideas
Increase set of strategic choices
Figure 22: Internal potentials for decision making
Company strategy
Patent aggregating companies offer alternatives to set the general strategic direction of
producing companies. Especially in certain industries, the commercialization of a
90
product is only successful if the firm is able to find external adopters of its technology
(Conner, 1995; Lichtenthaler, 2005; Reitzig, 2004a). Therefore, companies from
certain industries, such as information technology, communication, and chemical
industry and medical devices, attempt to establish industry standards of the companys
specific technology (Ehrhardt, 2004; Rosenbloom & Cusumano, 1987). If the efforts to
establish a standard fail, the company faces severe strategic problems, such as loss of
market shares or entire markets.16 Patent aggregating companies can support
companies by establishing standards and help to overcome obstacles that the company
would not be able to tackle by itself due to size, resources, or capital constraints.
MPEG LA administers the patent pool MPEG-2. Approximately 1,500 companies have
licensed MPEG-2 Patent Portfolio, which includes 880 essential patents in 57 countries
owned by 25 patent owners. The MPEG-2 technology is covered with patents owned
by many parties. Only when MPEG LA offered a viable solution, access to essential
patents not accessible for single companies was possible, and the standard was
established. Today MPEG-2 is the core technology of most digital television and DVD
formats and the most widely employed standard in consumer electronics history.
Historically, out-licensing of patents is used as a mode to enter new or foreign markets

(Contractor, 1980). For this, the technology has to be ready to market, and
collaboration parties have to be available. SMEs often do not have the resources or the
network to establish this cooperation. Assigning patents to a patent aggregating
company fosters entry to new markets. The original patent owner can be connected to
foreign companies by assigning patents and working closely with the patent
aggregating company. This connection can be used for future projects.
16
The race of DVD technologys replacement is an example of a failed standardization attempt and
the resulting loses in market share. This race took place between the Blu-ray disc and HD DVD
optical disc for storing high definition video and audio. Hitachi, LG, Panasonic, Pioneer, Philips,
Samsung, Sharp, Sony, and Thomson formed the Blu-ray Disc Foundation in May 2002 (Royal
Philips Electronics, 2002). Toshiba, NEC, Sanyo, and Memory-Tech Corporation formed the HD
DVD Promotion Group in September 2004 (Toshiba, 2004). Due to essential decisions by major
film studios and retail distributors, changing business alliances, and Sony's decision to include a
Blu-ray player in the PlayStation 3 video game console, Toshiba announced on February 19, 2008,
it would cease developing, manufacturing, and marketing HD DVD players and recorders (Toshiba,
2008). The Blu-ray format was established as standard for video and audio players. Analysts
estimate the sales volume of Blu-ray players of USD 1.3 billion in 2010 and expect a mass-market
penetration and spiking to nearly USD 6.9 billion by 2013 (Gruenwedel, 2011).
91
Innovation strategy
Patent aggregating companies can extend alternatives for decisions on innovation
strategies. Companies that conduct own R&D often have to prioritize research projects
due to financial constraint. Even promising research projects have to be terminated
because R&D budgets are limited. A smaller number of R&D projects limits the R&D
portfolio diversification and increases the risk of the company. Failed projects have a
serious negative effect since projects that could compensate the failure are missing.
Assigning patents and projects promising, embryonic, or no longer fitting with the
company strategy to patent aggregating companies transfers potential future cash flows
to the present and increases the budget that can be invested in R&D and the innovation
process. Therefore, more innovations can be generated, and more projects can be
selected for further development. Additionally, patent aggregating companies provide
alternative ways of commercialization and therefore, offer incentives for inventors.
The chance to generate actual rent from their innovation, outside the normal product
commercialization space, motivates inventors. Motivated employees stay with their
company and deliver more innovation. That increases the selection opportunities for
later product commercialization.
4.3 Summary
Based on empirical data on patent aggregating companies, as well as derived from
literature, this chapter identifies external and internal potentials of patent aggregating
companies (Figure 23).
Relating to the general research questions: Patent aggregating companies as option for
producing companies?, the analysis of the potentials shows that patent aggregating
companies can help original patent owners to perceive and to realize patent portfolio
leveraging opportunities. Additionally, original patent owners can benefit on a micro
level, as patent aggregating companies expand their scope of action.
92

R&D risks'
hedging
Enforcement
risks' hedging
Potentials for
risks reduction
Access to
resources
Networks
Potentials for
resource
enhancement
External
potentials
Potentials for
market fostering
Liquidity and
market clearing
Innovative
business models
offered
by PAC
Market
understanding
Opportunity
identification
Potentials for
market
interaction
Internal
potentials
Potentials for
decision making
Company
strategy
Innovation
strategy
Potentials for
cost
effectiveness
Organizational
learning
Transaction costs
Figure 23: Summary of patent aggregating companies potentials
As many producing company still face resource constraints and therefore, are often not
very successful in the market for patents and technologies, patent aggregating
companies can help to overcome these constraints. Patent aggregating companies offer
complementary expertise and help to overcome the lack of resources. Within the
company, potentials that provide relief from resource constraints can be realized.
Collaborating with a patent aggregating company can lead to learning effects, and the
original patent owner can start to build up their own resources.
From a macro perspective, patent aggregating companies can foster the development
of the market for patents and technologies, which is the basis for all leveraging
activities. Therefore, by utilizing patent aggregating companies, the company not only
realizes direct potentials, but also paves the way to a more efficient market for patents
and technologies.
Typology of patent aggregating companies
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5 Typology of patent aggregating companies

All patent aggregating companies acquire patents from producing companies and
compensate the original patent owners in a certain way. However, this distinction is
not sufficient to provide recommendations on how patent aggregating companies can
be utilized by producing companies to leverage patent portfolios. Depending on
whether the producing company divests only the sole legal right or also plans to
transfer technology, different types of patent aggregating companies have to be
considered.
In the following chapter, the results from the data analysis of the 27 case companies
are used to identify four archetypes of patent aggregating companies. The four
archetypes differ significantly regarding their competencies and the rewards they offer
the original patent owners. The typology allows helps patent managers of producing
companies that wish to optimize their patent leveraging deal with the selection of
patent aggregating companies. Therefore, it serves as basis for a management
framework developed in section 6.1.
The four archetypes of patent aggregating companies are derived based on three
distinctive differences. Two different business models of patent aggregating
companies represent each archetype. A case study illustrates the characteristics of each
business model and explains the representation of the different archetypes. The
illustration of the case study companies is guided by the reference framework
developed in section 2.4 and describes the setting, strategy, organization, and the
process of patent aggregation of the following eight patent aggregating companies:
Alpha Patentfonds, Intellectual Ventures, Pete Invest MedTech 17, Patent Select,
Acacia Research Corporation, Allied Security Trust, MPEG LA, and Golden Rice
PDP.
17
actual name.
94
5.1 Four archetypes of patent aggregating companies

Based on their strategies and motives patent aggregating companies have to amass
patents, eight types of business models are derived in section 3.3.3: (1) patent
acquisition companies; (2) patent enforcement companies; (3) patent incubating funds;
(4) patent trading funds; (5) defensive patent aggregators; (6) non-commercial patent
aggregators; (7) patent pooling companies; and (8) royalty monetization companies.
All eight identified business models aggregate patents from original patent owners and
give the owners some benefit in return, but after aggregating the patents, they proceed
with the patents in eight different ways.
Analyzing the data and reflecting the needs of the original patent owner regarding their
patent portfolio leveraging activities, patent aggregating companies differ not only
regarding their motives to amass patents, but also regarding their competencies and the
rewards they offer the original patent owner. Additionally, the empirical findings
show that patent aggregating companies differ regarding the breadth of transaction.
Competency
Producing companies can leverage their patents by either using the business case or
the legal case a patent is related to. Therefore, patent aggregating companies amass
patents on one of the two necessary competencies:
i.
ii.
Business competency.
Nuisance competency.
Business competency. Patent aggregating companies that amass patents based on their
business competency have knowledge and detailed information on the underlying
technologies. Business competency enables a patent aggregating company to
understand the R&D process, the technology, and the product respective business case.
Nuisance competency. Patent aggregating companies that amass patents based on their
nuisance competency have legal knowledge and broad experiences in patent
monitoring. Nuisance competency enables a patent aggregating company to
understand the market for patents, what third parties might do with patent owners
technology, and which legal potential is offered by the infringement case.
Four archetypes of patent aggregating companies
95
Rewards
Producing companies focus on gaining maximal rent from innovation. By utilizing
patent aggregating companies for leveraging activities, a producing company can be
rewarded in two ways:With monetary short-term rewards that provide producing
companies with (additional) cash flows.
i.
With monetary and non-monetary long-term rewards that not only include cash
flows but also strategic advantages and indirect effects on cash flows.
Monetary short-term rewards. An option to leverage patent portfolios is to focus on

generating revenues through selling or out-licensing patents and technologies that do
not have any strategic impact on future business. Instead of abandoning these patents,
selling or out-licensing them to patent aggregating companies generates lump sum or
upfront payments and partial royalties and reduces the costs of the patent portfolio by
saving renewal fees. Even if patents still have a strategic impact on future business,
producing companies leverage their infringed patents by selling them to patent
aggregating companies for the benefit of a lump sum payment over fees received from
litigation.
Monetary and non-monetary long-term rewards. Assigning patents to patent
aggregating companies does not only have a short-term monetary dimension, but also
a strategic dimension. For instance, by donating patents to non-profit organized patent
aggregating companies, producing companies can claim tax deductions and create a
new marketing tool. Future royalty streams can be transferred to the present and are
available for immediate R&D financing. Standards can be created, and new markets
are entered based on this standard. Alternatively, learning effects are realized from
working together with patent aggregating companies.
Breadth of transaction
Producing companies have to decide whether to leverage their patent portfolios
internally, externally, or internally and externally. If they decide to exploit the
portfolio externally, another important decision is the breadth of the transaction. Two
strategic options are available:
i.
ii.
Transferring the sole legal right of exclusion (patent).

Transferring the legal right of exclusion in combination with further knowledge
and technology.
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Sole legal right. Producing companies can sell or out-license the sole legal right of
exclusion. In this case, the buyer or licensee only receives the right to use the R&D
results but does not receive any further information about the technology or the
development process.
Legal right and transfer of technology and knowledge. On the other side, to leverage
the patent portfolio optimally, producing companies sell or out-license patents and
further knowledge. Drawing from the contributions to knowledge management,
knowledge is categorized into information and know-how (Kogut & Zander, 1992).
Information means knowledge that can be transferred within or outside firms without
loss of integrity once the syntactical rules required for deciphering it are known, for
example, blueprints. Know-how comprises accumulated skills and expertise.
Therefore, the producing company offers more than the right to use the patent.
Empirical findings show that patent aggregating companies differ regarding how they
support producing companies to leverage their patent portfolios. Patent trading funds,
patent acquisition companies, patent incubating funds, and royalty monetization
companies are patent aggregating companies that evaluate and exploit patents mainly
on the business case and therefore have the internal competencies to understand
technologies and develop business cases. In contrast, patent enforcement companies,
defensive patent aggregators, non-commercial patent aggregators, and patent pooling
companies focus on the legal title and its exploitation and offer competencies to
understand other companies use of patents.
Whereas patent acquisition companies, patent trading funds, patent enforcement
companies, and defensive patent aggregators reward original patent owners with
monetary short-term rewards, the rewarding of patent incubating funds, royalty
monetization companies, non-commercial patent aggregators, and patent pooling
companies is based on long-term rewards that would be difficult to achieve for the
patent owner without the patent aggregating company.
97
Business competency
Gardener
Patent trading
fund
Royalty monetization
company
Patent acquisition
company
Patent incubating
fund
Collector
Nuisance competency
Competency
Merchant
Patron
Patent enforcement
company
Patent pooling
company
Defensive patent
aggregator
Non-commercial
patent aggregator
NA
Monetary shortterm rewards
Rewards
Monetary and non-monetary longterm rewards
1 Companies that aggregate only patents
1
2
2 Companies that aggregate patents and underlying technologies
Figure 24: Typology of patent aggregating companies
Based on the two dimensions competency and rewards for patent owners, four
archetypes of patent aggregating companies can be differentiated:
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
Merchant
Gardener
Collector
Patron
The competencies and the offered rewards define the four archetypes of patent
aggregating companies. Figure 24 illustrates the typology of patent aggregating
98
companies. The vertical axis represents the competencies of patent aggregating

companies, and the horizontal axis represents the rewards patent aggregating
companies offer to the original patent owners. Two distinct business models represent
each archetype but they differ regarding the breath of transaction. The bar within the
archetypes indicates the breadth of transaction. Business models under the bar
aggregate patents or patents and technologies. Business models above the bar
aggregate only the sole legal right of exclusion.
Merchant. The business models patent acquisition company and patent trading fund
represent the archetype merchant. The merchant evaluates the patents based on
potential markets, as well as potential infringement. They acquire patents and provide
short-term rewards. Both business models aggregate patents to generate revenues, but
they do it in two different ways. The patent trading fund aggregates only the sole legal
right of exclusion. In contrast, the patent acquisition company acquires patents, as well
as knowledge or technology.
Gardener. The business models patent incubating fund and royalty monetization fund
represent the archetype gardener. These two business models have complete different
reasons to aggregate patents but both companies are able to evaluate technologies and
market potentials and provide long-term rewards to the patent owners. Through the
engagement with the gardener, the producing company is able to foster innovation and
finance business growth. Patent incubating funds acquire technologies mainly and use
patents as a means of transfer. Royalty monetization companies are interested in
existing royalties and therefore, acquire only the sole legal right.
Collector. The business models patent enforcement companies and defensive patent
aggregator represent the archetype collector. Resulting from a competency, a monetary
reward, and a breadth of transaction point of view, producing companies can utilize
the patent enforcement company and the defensive patent aggregator in the same way
because both focus on the same patents and compete for infringed patents. The choice
of which one is utilized is based on the type itself. Both types help producing
companies to prevent being involved in litigation lawsuits while at the same time
receiving a certain rent from the used invention. Therefore, both business models have
nuisance competency and offer monetary short-term rewards to the original patent
owner.
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Patron. The business models non-commercial patent aggregator and patent pooling
company represent the archetype patron. Both business models solve enforcement
issues for the original patent owner and have nuisance competency. The noncommercial patent aggregator, which amasses patents as well as technologies, and the
patent pooling company, which focuses only on patents, provide the original patent
owners with additional non-monetary rewards and create opportunities for reputation
enhancement and gain indirect from R&D.
5.2 Archetype 1 Merchant

The archetype merchant features business competency and provides patent owners
with monetary short-term rewards. As patent trading funds and patent acquisition
companies evaluate patents and their business cases and reward patent owners with
lump sum payments, these two business models represent the archetype merchant.
5.2.1 Patent trading funds characteristics
Patent trading funds aggregate patents to generate revenues from acquiring patents or
commercialization rights, bundling them to new portfolios, and selling these bundles at
a higher price. Patent trading funds buy large amount of patents with a probability in
mind that only a certain percentage can be resold. These companies focus solely on
reselling the patents. Patent trading funds act as brokers in the market for patents.
Patent trading funds offer investors an opportunity to invest in patents as an asset
class. Large financial resources from institutional or private investors back the funding
of the aggregating activities, and they operate in a classical investment fund design.
As patent trading funds function in a certain way as brokers, senior management often
has patent management experience or a technical background. Additionally, they act as
collector and administrator of the invested funds. Several managers also have
experience in the financial industry. For legal cases or technical specifications, patent
lawyers, patent attorneys, and engineers are employed. The patent trading fund collects
investments from private equity, institutional investors, high net worth individuals, or
other private investors.
Patent trading funds aggregate patents from all kind of sources. The original patent
owners are single inventors, research institutions, SMEs, and MNEs. The original
100
patent owner can recoup R&D investments from abandoned research projects and
generate additional short-term cash flows through the actual purchase price, as well as
costs saving through transferring the renewal fees to the patent trading fund. Hence,
the original patent owner can hedge R&D risks in a certain way.
The patent incubating fund initiates the acquisition process either actively or passively,
and it is started before closing the investment fund (so called asset pool18) or after
closing the investment fund (so called blind pool19). Patents are evaluated regarding
the criteria fit of targeted technology to the portfolio, application possibilities in other
technologies and different markets, market structure and market potential, the legal
position of the patent (validity, extent of protection, remaining patent duration), and
the anticipated performance and costs of exploitation. After aggregating patents from
different companies, the patent trading fund bundles them to new portfolios. Patent
trading funds act as the broker and search for the right counterparty to sell the patents.
On the one hand, these parties could be from the patents original industry. On the
other hand, patent trading companies are specialized to bundle patents that are then
transferable to a completely different industrial sector and could be the entry to new
markets or new applications. The contacted companies are corporate buyers of
medium or large size, as well as of other patent aggregating companies. In cases of
already used patents, the patent trading fund contacts these companies and offers
freedom to operate through selling or non-exclusively licenses. In the summary
(Figure 25), the cash flows between the involved parties, as well as the transactions of
the patents between the original patent owner, the patent trading fund, and the new
patent owner respective licensee are illustrated.
18
19
In an asset pool, the patent portfolio is already known at the time of the investment decision. That
means that the investor only carries the exploitation risk (can the patent be exploited successfully
and generate return) (Lipfert & Ostler, 2008).
A blind pool first raises money from investors before it invests the raised capital. Therefore, the
investors do not know which assets are going to be bought. Blind pools comprise three types of
risks for investors: search risk (is the management able to identify valuable patents); purchase risk
(is the patent owner of the identified patent willing to sell); and exploitation risk. Due to the higher
risks, yield expectations of blind pools are higher compared with asset pools (Lipfert & Ostler,
2008).
Archetype 1 Merchant
101
Patent trading fund
Examples
Cash flow and transaction structures
Alpha Patentfonds
Patent Invest
Investors
Investment
Original patent
owners
Return
Patents/
comm. right
Royalties/
lump sum
Patent
trading fund
Lump sum/
(partial royalties)
Strategy
Generates revenues
by selling newly
created bundles of
patents
Operates through
quantity of patents
New patent owners/

licensee
Patent portfolio/
non-excl. license
Organization
Process
Backed by large
financial resources
Knowledge in patent
management and
patent law
Large industry
spanning networks
Selects US and international patents from all industries

mainly resulting from terminated research projects.
Structures portfolio with active and passive approach,
evaluates technology and legal position of patent.
Adds value through bundling, preparing convincing
documents, applying technology across industries.
Exploits through selling, stick- and carrot licensing.
Figure 25: Summary of patent trading funds
The unique characteristic of a patent trading fund is that by aggregating patents, it acts
as a match maker between supply and demand, within industries and across industries,
backed by funds of private and institutional investors.
5.2.2 Patent trading funds case study: Alpha Patentfonds
Setting. Alpha Patentfonds is an umbrella term for three investment funds that offer
institutional and private investors the opportunity to invest in patents as a new asset
class. The three investment funds are Alpha Patentfonds I initiated in 2007, Alpha
Patentfonds II initiated in 2008, and Alpha Patentfonds III, where the initiation was
split into two tranches in 2008 and 2009. Alpha Patentfonds is headquartered in
Frankfurt, Germany. The assets under management of the funds differ. Alpha
Patentfonds I has assets under management of EUR 32.7 million; Alpha Patentfonds II
EUR 49.3 million; Alpha Patentfonds III tranche 2008 EUR 10.3 million; and tranche
2009 EUR 6.23 million. All three funds are closed-end funds20 and blind pools. The
20
A closed-end fund offers only a limited number of shares and rarely issues new shares after the fund
is launched. Shares are only redeemable when the fund liquidates; before this date, the investor has
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initiator of Alpha Patentfonds is the European American Investment Bank (Euram

Bank) with the head office in Vienna, Austria. Vevis Gesellschaft fr Vermgenswerte
placed Alpha Patentfonds in a public placement. The minimum subscription is EUR
10,000. The predicted return before tax is between 17.4% p.a. (Alpha Patentfonds I
and II) and 19.6% p.a. (Alpha Patentfonds III Tranche 2009). The planned terms of the
funds are four years (Alpha Patentfonds I and II) and five years (Alpha Patentfonds
III) with an option for a one-year extension. It was planned that Alpha Patentfonds I
ends on March 31, 2011. Due to a change in the market environment, the life of the
fund has been extended.21
Strategy. Alpha Patentfonds aggregates an exclusive right of commercialization from
the original patent owners. Therefore, Alpha Patentfonds is the exclusive vendor of the
patents. The original patent owner still owns the patent but after signing the
commercialization contract, Alpha Patentfonds is in charge of the exploitation of the
patent and owns the commercialization rights. The main objective of Alpha
Patentfonds is to generate maximum proceeds. The preferred exploitation alternative is
the sale of the patents, but if licensing agreements offer higher returns, Alpha
Patentfonds also out-license patents.
Organization. Alpha Patentfonds is the investment company. A Luxembourg-based
portfolio company aggregates and exploits the patents. Each investment fund has its
own portfolio company. Beside the initiator and the sales partner, Alpha Patentfonds
has three partners that have been responsible for the selection and the exploitation of
the patents. When the funds were set up, Alpha Gasser Patentverwertungs KG
coordinated the whole process of patent aggregation. Steinbeis TIB identifies,
evaluates, and selects the patents. In the beginning of 2010, Alpha Gasser
Patentverwertungs KG merged with Steinbeis TIB that now also coordinates the whole
process. The original setting planned that Steinbeis TIB also exploits the patents but
since January 2010, Charles River Associates has been in charge of the exploitation of
the amassed patents. In some cases, additional consultants are employed for certain
21
to sell the shares at the stock exchange. Additionally, a close-end fund is closed to new capital after
it has started operation.
According to Lippert (2011) Alpha Patentfonds has changed its exploitation strategy. Instead of
gaining cash inflows through patent sales, Alpha Patentfonds now out-licenses patents and realizes
cash inflows over the next 16 years.
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stages of the patent aggregating process. For instance, in August 2011, IP Navigation
Group was retained as a strategic patent advisor to monetize 400 patent assets that the
portfolio company of the Alpha Patentfonds II acquired from the BT Group (Business
Wire, 2011). Figure 26 illustrates the structure and organization of the investment fund
Alpha Patentfonds III.
Sales through:
Vevis Gesellschaft f.
Verm.werte mbH & Co KG
Investment
potentially
Consultants
Service provider for patent
selection and (e)valuation
Steinbeis TIB
exploitation
Charles River Associates
Initiator
Euram Bank
HQ: Vienna, Austria
Put option for
participation capital
Investors
Consultancy
agreement
Return
Investment company:
Alpha Patentfonds 3 GmbH & Co KG
Head quarters: Frankfurt, Germany
Participation capital
Service agreement
Portfolio company:
Patentportfolio 3 S.r.l,
Head quarters: Luxembourg
Service agreement Responsible for acquisition, selection,
evaluation, and exploitation of patents
Upfront payment
Cost transfer
Participation in
exploitation results
Exclusive
Patents/
right of
excl. license
exploitation
Original patent
owners
Lump sum/
royalties
New patent
owners/ licensees
Optional:
back-license
Figure 26: Structure of the organization and relations of participants
Process. Alpha Patentfonds aggregates patents, without any further knowledge or

technology, from all technological areas. Alpha Patentfonds aggregates only granted
patents that are ready for implementation. Only in exceptional cases and as part of a
patent portfolio, are patent applications or patents covering embryonic technologies
acquired. It focuses on patent owners and companies located in the German speaking
part of Europe. Often MNEs are involved and due to international company structures,
German, US, and other international patents are aggregated.
Alpha Patentfonds approaches patent owners both actively and passively. When the
company started, Alpha Patentfonds approached almost 90% of all patent owners. As a
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result of the global financial crises and an increasing visibility of Alpha Patentfonds,
this ratio has changed and the company approaches now only 40% of the patent
owners actively. Additionally, patent attorneys connect Alpha Patentfonds to
promising patent owners.
For structuring the patent portfolio, Alpha Patentfonds follows a four-stage process
(illustrated in Figure 27). Based on a database of more than 75,000 patent documents
covering a large variety of technologies, an algorithm is used to extract patents that
fulfill requirements regarding bibliographic data. In addition, patents are consolidated
to patent families and patent portfolios. In the second stage, an automatic screening
evaluates all remaining ca. 10,000 patent documents regarding the remaining life of
the patent, geographic location (at least one national patents has to be granted), proof
of concept or prototype, and commercial viability. These criteria are basic indicators
for a potentially successful exploitation. As a result, 2,500 out of the 10,000 patents
are chosen for further analysis. The patent owners of the 2,500 patents are approached.
If they are interested in an exploitation through Alpha Patentfonds, they sign a letter of
intent that explains their intention to assign the commercialization rights to Alpha
Patentfonds and the analysis of the patent potential starts. This analysis of potentials
evaluates 38 single criteria from five dimensions that are of relevance for external
patent exploitation: (1) legal status; (2) market dimension (e.g., commercialization
options, technology lifecycle, revenue potentials, opportunities); (3) financial
dimension (e.g., production costs, development costs, investments in production); (4)
the technology dimension (e.g., unique selling proposition of technology, marketing
value, technological advantage); and (5) anonymous interest of potential buyers. Based
on the results of the selection process, the patents are aggregated.
After aggregating the patents, an information memorandum is generated for each
patent or patent family. This memorandum contains the relevance of the technology
for the potential buyers strategy, the coverage of the technology, potential and
existing markets, freedom to operate situation, images, and the contract details. This
document is used to approach and convince potential buyers. In addition, business
cases are developed to strengthen the selling position.
Stage 1: Generation of population

Basis of 73,837 patent documents from a
wide range of technological areas and
applications
Stage 2: First analysis
Consolidation of patent documents to
patent families, selection of 10,000 patents
105
Basis of 73,837 patent documents
Filter: patent bibliographic criteria,

automatic selection based on
algorithms
10,000 patents
Stage 3: Pre-selection
Selection of 2,500 patents that satisfy
criteria of remaining life, proof of concept,
market implementation
Filter: certain criteria regarding

legal and economical
characteristics
2,500 patents
Stage 4: Analysis of potential and final
selection
Approach of patent owner, signing letter of
intent, analysis of potential
Filter: certain criteria regarding

legal and economical
characteristics
Selection and aggregation of 246 patent families
Figure 27: Selection of patents in the structuring phase of the patent aggregating process of Alpha
Patentfonds II
The main objective of Alpha Patentfonds in the exploitation phase is to generate the
maximum proceeds from exploitation. The main channel of patent exploitation is the
sale of the patents, but in certain cases, out-licensing is considered. Alpha Patentfonds
identifies potential buyers based on the existing network and through analysis of patent
application data, the market and technology environment, and the potential players in
this field. In some cases, patent owners have excluded companies, competitors, or
other players from the list of potential buyers. Depending on the technology and the
market structure, different strategies of contacting potential buyers are applied. For
instance, patents that could be interesting for many companies offer the opportunity
either to contact the companies sequentially or to arrange a bidding process. After
approaching potentially interested parties, Alpha Patentfonds presents the technology
and is responsible for negotiations, the signing of the contract, and the post-deal
compliance. Additionally, the company supports the buyer in the due diligence
106
process. Alpha Patentfonds forecasts that 54% of the aggregated patent portfolio is
going to be successfully exploited.
Value for original patent owner. By assigning the commercialization right to Alpha
Patentfonds, the original patent owner generates an additional cash inflow. The patent
owner receives an upfront payment and does not have to cover renewal, valuation, or
exploitation costs. If Alpha Patentfonds is able to exploit the patent successfully, the
patent owner receives an additional 50% of the proceeds. In particular, SMEs,
universities, and single inventors often lack the resources, the network, or the
competency to exploit their innovation commercially. In collaboration with Alpha
Patentfonds, the patent owner is able to commercialize the invention in a specific way
and recoup R&D investments. MNEs have the competencies to exploit the patents, but
often they lack resources to sell, for instance, patents from abandoned research
projects. In some cases, back licenses are possible. That prevents the rise of
competitors in the patent owners own application area.
5.2.3 Patent acquisition companys characteristics
Patent acquisition companies aggregate patents to generate revenues from every
possible type of patent exploitation. They establish licensing programs, enforce the
acquired patents, invest in additional R&D, or apply other exploitation strategies. The
basis for this type of business is their ability to benefit from arbitrage. On the one
hand, patent acquisition companies are able to detect good patents and buy them at a
lower price than it would cost to reinvent these patents. On the other hand, they are
able to benefit from the fact that patent portfolios have a greater value than a single
patent. Therefore, patent acquisition companies try to increase the value of patent
portfolios through the size of it while at the same time, lowering the funding risks.
The business model of patent acquisition companies is based on the quantity of patents
they aggregate. Therefore, large financial resources as venture capital or private equity
investors, as well as high net worth individuals and institutional investors back patent
acquisition companies and their aggregating activities.
The senior management of patent acquisition companies has vast experience in patent
management, patent exploitation, or patent law, often from former positions in large
industrial companies. A large network in the patent industry is necessary to detect
opportunities, and knowledge of patents is important to evaluate opportunities. In
107
specific cases, patent acquisition companies also work with external experts as patent
lawyers, financial service providers, or engineers.
Patent acquisition companies amass patents from different industries. Based on a
general exploitation strategy, they are able to profit from the different relevance of
patents in the different industries. In addition, the transaction breadth is ambiguous.
Patent acquisition companies buy patents that are infringed, are close to a technology
that is heavily used, or cover a technology that has potential for further development or
commercialization. Additionally, they aggregate patents from all relevant geographical
markets.
Patent acquisition companies aggregate patents from single inventors, research
institutions, and small and large corporate sellers. A producing company can utilize a
patent acquisition company to hedge R&D risks. Producing companies can sell patents
and technologies of minor or no strategic relevance, which do not fit the companys
portfolio any longer, to the patent acquisition company. As a result, the producing
company can generate additional short-term cash flows through the actual purchase
price, as well as realize cost savings through transferring the liability of the renewal
fees to the patent acquisition company. In cases of infringed patents, the original
owner is not able or does not want to enforce the patent his/her. For smaller companies
not able to commercialize the product or develop the technology further, the option
selling the patents to a patent acquisition company generates at least cash flows
through the purchase price. In most cases, the original patent owner receives a lump
sum payment and does not participate on future revenues.
The patent acquisition company initiates the acquisition process either actively or is
approached by the patent owners. After the patent is evaluated regarding its legal
position (validity, extent of protection, remaining patent duration), the market structure
and the market potential of the targeted product market, existing licensing agreements,
pending infringement cases, comparable licensing agreements, and expected
performance and costs of exploitations, the patent acquisition company acquires the
patent and pays a lump sum to the original patent owner. After acquisition, the main
activities of the patent acquisition company are bundling the patents to promising new
portfolios or taking advantage of the experience of the employees to exploit
undervalued patents. Promising new portfolios could be structured focusing on the
opportunity of large infringement lawsuits or to new applications in products. In some
cases, the patent acquisition company conducts or mandates other research institutions
108
for further R&D. For the new patent portfolios, the patent acquisition company
searches for licensees or buyers. In stick licensing, companies that potentially infringe
the patents are detected, and the patent acquisition company offers a license or files a
lawsuit. Another opportunity is that already infringed patent portfolios are offered for
sale to financial investors or other patent aggregating companies as patent enforcement
companies, patent trading funds, or defensive patent aggregators. In carrot licensing or
patent sales, companies active in the area of the patents application are approached
and the new created patent portfolios are offered. Additionally, a transfer of
knowledge, as blueprints or process know-how, is possible. In the summary in Figure
28, the cash flows between the involved parties, as well as the transactions of the
patents between the original patent owner, the patent acquisition company, and the
new patent owner respective licensee are illustrated.
Patent acquisition company

Examples
Coller Capital
Techquity Capital
Investors
Investment
Original patent
owners
Patents
Return
Patent acquisition
company
Lump sum
payment
Lump sum/
royalties
New patent owners/

licensees
Patents/
excl. license/
non-excl. license
Strategy
Organization
Process
Generates revenues
from every possible
type of patent
exploitation.
Operates through
quantity of patents
Backed by large
financial resources
Knowledge in patent
management and
patent law
Large networks
Selects US and international patents from all industries,

acquires also technologies.
Structures portfolio with active approach, evaluates
technology and legal position of patent.
Adds value through creating new portfolios or further
research.
Exploits through selling, stick- and carrot licensing.
Figure 28: Summary of patent acquisition companies
The unique characteristic of a patent acquisition company is that by aggregating

patents, it generates revenues and operates the business based on the mere quantity of
its patent portfolio.
109
5.2.4 Patent acquisition companys case study: Intellectual Ventures

Setting. Intellectual Venture was founded in 2000 by Nathan Myhrvold, former Chief
Technology Officer of Microsoft, Edward Jung, former Chief Software Architect of
Microsoft, Peter N. Detkin, former Vice President and Assistant General Counsel of
Intel, and Greg Gorder, former partner at Perkins Coie LLP. The patent aggregating
company is headquartered in Bellevue, Washington.
To generate capital for its activities, Intellectual Ventures has set up four investment
funds: Invention Science Fund I, Invention Development Fund I, and Invention
Investment Fund I and II. The Invention Science Fund invests in fundamental research
and completely new ideas. This fund also finances Intellectual Ventures think tank.
The Invention Development Fund invests in the development of already existing ideas
that patents do not yet cover. Invention Investment Fund I and II finance the
acquisition of patents. Invention Investment Fund I was closed in August 2008 and had
a volume of USD 1.5 billion. Sixty to seventy percent of the investors are operating
companies; the remaining are from the financial service industry. Invention Investment
Fund II has capitalized more than USD 2.5 billion so far. The majority of the investors
(ca. 60 to 70%) is from the financial service industry. In total, Intellectual Ventures
has collected USD 5.5 billion of investor capital.
Intellectual Ventures distinguishes between strategic and financial investors. Strategic
investors are mainly operating companies that non-exclusively in-license parts of
Intellectual Venture patent portfolios, as well as hold an equity stake in the underlying
asset portfolio. Therefore, they have not only financial but also defensive motives to
engage with Intellectual Ventures. Interestingly, this structure leads to the situation
where some companies are investors but at the same time are responsible for a large
amount of the return paid to investors. In contrast, financial investors have purely
financial motives and, similar to private equity investors receive equity stakes.
Investors of Intellectual Ventures are technology companies (amongst others Adobe,
Amazon.com, Apple, Google, Microsoft, Nokia, SAP), university pension funds
(amongst others Brown University, Cornell University, Stanford University, University
of Pennsylvania), individuals, and financial investors and foundations (amongst others
Bush Foundation, Charles River Ventures, Hewlett Foundation, McKinsey and Co.,
TIFF Private Equity, World Bank).
110
Intellectual Ventures owns more than 35,000 US and international patents and patent
applications, where ca. 3,000 patents and patent applications are in-house generated or
within its inventor network developed. The patent aggregating company has spent
more than USD 1.5 billion to acquire patents and patent applications in more than
1,600 acquisition deals. Until now, Intellectual Ventures has generated more than USD
2 billion in licensing revenues from ca. 30 licensees.
Strategy. According to official publications, Intellectual Ventures sees itself as an
invention capitalist and states to invest expertise and capital in the development of
inventions. As owner of one of the worlds largest and fastest growing patent
portfolios it intends to create an active market for invention that connects buyers,
sellers, and inventors. Therefore, Intellectual Ventures purchases inventions from
individual inventors and businesses and combines them into market-specific portfolios,
which the company then licenses broadly. Additionally, Intellectual Ventures partners
with a worldwide network of inventors helping to monetize inventions. Intellectual
Ventures acquires patents on a large scale. Based on its large portfolio, Intellectual
Ventures offers licenses or sells the patents.
Organization. Intellectual Ventures holds more than 1,100 subsidiaries because for
each patent acquisition, a Limited Liability Company (LLC) is formed. Additionally,
subsidiaries that represent Intellectual Ventures in Asia, Australia, North America, and
Europe, are established in eight countries. The company operates and finances its
activities mainly through investment funds, which operate in a private equity fashion.
In addition to internal expertise, Intellectual Ventures has a wide network of inventors,
external engineering, law experts, and freelancers that find patents for and advise
Intellectual Ventures. For a long time, Intellectual Ventures did not litigate patents in
its own name but negotiated with potential infringers on the basis of Intellectual
Ventures large patent portfolio. A large patent portfolio is expensive to enforce, but
for the defendant, it is even more important to defend on the large patent portfolio.
Even though Intellectual Ventures did not file lawsuits before December 2010 in its
own name, several patents previously owned by Intellectual Ventures appeared in
litigation cases from other companies. Some of these companies were identified as
shell companies of Intellectual Ventures (Avancept, 2001).
Process. Intellectual Ventures acquires patents that cover a broad technology market.
The technologies are from agriculture; automotive; communications; computer
111
hardware; construction; consumer electronics; eCommerce; energy; financial services;

health technologies; information technology; life sciences; materials science; medical
devices; nanotechnology; physical sciences; security; semiconductors; and software.
Intellectual Ventures aggregates US and international patents, and patent applications
with or without the transfer of technology or knowledge.
According to Intellectual Ventures, a significant source of patents are single inventors
not interested in founding their own businesses, but universities, research institutions,
MNEs, and SMEs also sell patents to Intellectual Ventures. Additionally, Intellectual
Ventures focuses on the acquisition of patents from companies in financial distress or
that are already insolvent. During the last years, Intellectual Ventures has been the
biggest buyer in the Ocean Tomo patent auctions. In the nine auctions held from April
2006 to March 2009, Intellectual Ventures bought 229 of the 302 sold lots.22
Besides this traditional ways of buying patents, Intellectual Ventures has designed two
innovative financial instruments to acquire patents: IP Financing BridgeTM and IP to
EPSTM. With the construct IP Financing BridgeTM, Intellectual Ventures offers
companies a new source of M&A financing and at the same time, acquires new patent
portfolios. Typically, liquid assets, companies own stocks or debt financing finance
M&A deals. If all three financing opportunities are not available or are too expensive
for a company that plans to acquire another company, Intellectual Ventures provides
cash for the M&A transaction. The agreement to provide cash to an acquiring
company is based on a contract for assigning the patents of the target company to
Intellectual Ventures. If the offer for the target company is successful, the acquisition
company assigns the target companys patent portfolio to Intellectual Ventures and
receives a grant-back license. Intellectual Ventures benefits from this structure by
receiving a large patent portfolio in one transaction. That prevents contacting many
single patent owners and offers potentials for transaction cost savings and a lower
transaction price.
Offering IP to EPSTM to companies with significant amounts of R&D expenditures and
substantial and well-established patent portfolios, Intellectual Ventures follows a new
way to acquire exclusive rights to sublicense. In the IP to EPSTM arrangement, the
patent owner assigns the selected patents to a new subsidiary, which the patent owner
22
Intellectual Ventures bought 75.8% of the traded patents at the Ocean Tomo auctions. Forty other
companies bought the remaining 24.2% (Ewing, 2010).
112
wholly owns (Figure 29, step 1). The subsidiary, an unrestricted and bankruptcy
remote vehicle, grants a free grant-back license. Intellectual Ventures acquires an
exclusive right to sublicense the patents to any interested licensee from the subsidiary.
It pays a fixed guaranteed lump sum and a share of the licensing profits. Additionally,
it covers all maintenance and prosecution costs. To reduce further risks, the patent
owner receives put rights and claw-back rights. These rights prevent the patent owner
from being involved in litigation regarding the assigned patents or allowing them to
regain defensive rights when required (Figure 29, step 2).
Step 1
Step 2
Original patent owner
Original patent owner
Patent portfolio
Patent portfolio
Available patents
Subsidiary
Grant
Back
License
Available patents
Subsidiary
Available patents
Claw
back
Intellectual
Ventures
Acquisition
entity
Call/put
Excl. right to license
Payments
Licensing
entity
Figure 29: Process of IP to EPSTM transaction
Intellectual Ventures has changed its selection criteria over the years. Based on
different dynamics regarding the funding of its two investment funds, Invention
Investment Fund I and Invention Investment Fund II, the selection strategy has
changed. From 2004 to 2007, Intellectual Ventures had a very broad view on the
patents it was interested in. The patent aggregating company bought patents from a
broad range of industries, along with patents and patent applications from technology
lifecycle stages and all commercialization stages, ranging from commercialized
products to technologies without any commercial interest yet. The focus of the patent
selection was to generate a very large patent portfolio. The average acquisition price
for a patent family was USD 35,000. Since 2007, Intellectual Ventures has been more
selective and focuses mainly on patents with evidence of use or patents already in
litigation. Targeted patents have to defend an existing cash flow, be part of an
international standard, have to be already in litigation, or have to be claims charts
113
against companies that infringe the patents. The average acquisition price for a patent
family is now ca. USD 200,000.
Intellectual Ventures mainly starts the structuring phase of the patent portfolio. The
patent aggregating company has subsidiaries in Australia, New Zealand, Canada,
China, India, Ireland, Japan, Korea, and Singapore, as well as a large network of
freelancers. The freelancers serve as patents scouts either actively finding patents or
sent by Intellectual Ventures to contact patent owners with interesting patents. They
also serve as contact persons for patent owners willing to sell.
After Intellectual Ventures has detected an interesting patent, the department
evaluation services performs a qualitative evaluation of the patent using a detailed
questionnaire. Questions to be answered are: technical quality of invention; legal
quality of invention; is there a large addressable market or is it suitable for defensive
licensing; is it already involved in litigation (who is involved and how far is the case);
has it been licensed (to whom, details); are companies left to license; comparable
licensing programs in the industry; is it infringed today (which claims, industry, how
large is addressable market, evidence of use); technology lifecycle: technology not
commercialized is it going to be adopted within the next 1 to 5 years (market
research, white papers, trends driving technology); legacy technology how fast the
market shrinks; related to a market standard or obligated to a standard setting
organization; how are infringements to be detected; is reverse engineering necessary;
are there any claim charts; what is a reasonable royalty rate; what are comparables to
justify the rates; is the technology core to the business; does the seller claim a grant
back license; what is the threshold were the seller to get involved; and the priority
date. Currently, Intellectual Ventures develops additional analytical tools for patent
evaluation to make the evaluation process more transparent and to justify the selection.
The main value adding activity is the bundling of enormous patent portfolios. As
Intellectual Ventures owns an own research laboratory, in some cases R&D for
embryonic technologies is conducted internally or within the network of inventors.
To exploit the patents, Intellectual Ventures sells or licenses the acquired patents. The
divesture of patents or patent portfolios is done for defensive, as well as offensive
reasons. The patent aggregating company also offers a service called IP for Defense
(IPfD). This service allows companies that have signed up to the IPfD program to
purchase patents from Intellectual Ventures. The transferred patents are designated for
114
counter-assertion. Additionally, Intellectual Ventures sells patents for offensive

reasons. For a long time, Intellectual Ventures did not litigate. Therefore, the patent
aggregating company sold patents to other companies that enforced the infringed
patents. Intellectual Ventures main exploitation approach is out-licensing and it offers
licensing programs for companies to gain freedom to operate.
Even though founder and CEO Nathan Myhrvold stated, litigation is a huge failure
and a disastrous way of monetizing patents (as cited in Orey & Herbst (2006) in
2006, Intellectual Ventures now enforces its patents actively under its own name. In
December 2010, Intellectual Ventures changed its tactic and filed three patent
infringement lawsuits against nine companies. The first defendants were software
companies (Check Point Software Technologies, McAfee, Symantec, Trend Micro),
semiconductor firms (Altera, Lattice Semiconductor, Microsemi), and memory chip
makers (Elpida Memory, Hynix Semiconductor). More lawsuits were filed in July 2011
against Dell and Hewlett Packard. Therefore, Intellectual Ventures now actively
follows a stick licensing approach. In becoming a licensee, companies at the same time
become strategic investors of Intellectual Ventures and hold equity stakes of the patent
aggregating company. Until 2009, licensing agreements were mainly closed with
MNEs. As licensing activities have started to increase, smaller companies have
become involved with Intellectual Ventures for amounts in the range of USD 5 million
to USD 10 million.
Value for original patent owner. By assigning patents to Intellectual Ventures, the
original patent owner can generate an additional cash inflow. In general, the patent
owner receives a lump sum payment and does not have to cover renewal, valuation, or
exploitation costs. Sometimes, Intellectual Venture and the original patent owner agree
on profit sharing. In this case, the original patent owner receives only a small upfront
payment and is rewarded with a profit-sharing back-end. SMEs, universities, and
single inventors often lack the resources, the network, or the competency to exploit
their innovation commercially. In assigning the patents to Intellectual Ventures, the
patent owner is able to commercialize the invention in a specific way and recoup R&D
investments. In addition, in stages where the invention is not yet ready for the market,
the patent owner does not have to take the risk of further, potentially fruitless,
development but can still benefit from the invention. MNEs have the competencies to
exploit the patents themselves but often these companies lack resources to sell for
instance, patents from abandoned research projects.
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Additionally to traditional selling transactions, patent owners can benefit from

Intellectual Ventures financial products IP Financing BridgeTM and IP to EPSTM. For
companies in an acquisition process, IP Financing BridgeTM serves as a bridge loan to
finance the acquisition if other financial assets are not available or too expensive. In
case of a successful transaction, the bridge loan does not have to be repaid. Instead,
Intellectual Ventures gains ownership of the target companys patent portfolio, and the
company that acquires another company receives a grant back license.
Using IP to EPSTM instead of selling the patents, the original patent owner can leverage
R&D risks and smooth volatile rents from its invention while still able to exploit its
invention. An additional benefit is that normally a patent sale or a onetime patent
settlement is classified as other income and does not affect earnings on the balance
sheet. Structuring the deal correctly, Intellectual Ventures cash payment to the patent
owner is treated as earnings. The patent owner also saves costs by shifting
maintenance and prosecution costs to Intellectual Ventures.
5.3 Archetype 2 Gardener

The archetype gardener features business competency and provides patent owners with
monetary and non-monetary long-term rewards. As royalty monetization companies
and patent incubating funds evaluate patents and their business cases and reward
patent owners not only with lump sum payments but also with continuous payments to
improve the financial situation, organizational learning opportunities, the transfer from
commercialization risks, and insurance against losses of future cash flows, these two
business models represent the archetype gardener.
5.3.1 Royalty monetization companys characteristics
Royalty monetization companies aggregate patents as security for the capital they
provide to patent owners. They collect funds of private and institutional investors to
pass to capital seeking companies, and the patents serve as security and are used to
ensure that the investors regain at least part of their invested money.
Royalty monetization companies are investment companies that bring together
investors from capital markets with companies looking for alternative sources of
capital. To provide companies with capital, the patent aggregating company either
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purchases certain royalty streams or lends money based on royalty streams. In a

royalty purchase transaction, the capital seeking company receives an upfront payment
and assigns all or a portion of their future royalty inflows to the royalty monetization
company. In general, the original patent and royalty owner does not have to pay the
money back but at the same time, they do not have any rights on the remaining
assigned royalties. If the royalty monetization company lends money to the capital
seeking company, it retains residual ownership of the royalties once the bond is repaid.
In many of the cases, the provided upfront payment is structured as a royalty bond. In
a royalty bond, royalty interests are bundled, securitized, and sold at the capital
market. As security, the royalty monetization company acquires the patents and
concomitant licenses through a special purpose vehicle (SPV) in a true sale
transaction.
Senior managers of royalty monetization companies have a financial or scientific
background. In royalty monetization transactions, the product that the patent covers
and the resulting cash flows have to be evaluated rather than the patent itself. For a
legal assessment of the patents, royalty monetization companies employ external
resources, such as a patent attorney or a patent valuation service firm. Additionally,
legal and financial advisors are employed to design the securities to be sold.
Royalty monetization companies focus mainly on patents from the pharmaceutical
industry, ones that are already licensed to third parties and cover products approved, or
in stage III of the approval process by the FDA. For the investment in royalties, steady
and long-term cash flows are necessary. This requirement is difficult to meet in other
industries. Patents serve only as security, and royalty monetization companies
aggregate only the legal right of exclusion without any underlying knowledge.
Royalty monetization companies are mainly engaged with research institutions or
small and medium biotechnology or biopharmaceutical companies. Royalty
monetization companies take over the risk from out-licensing the R&D results and
insure the original patent owners against a loss of royalty payments. Hence, a
producing company can utilize a royalty monetization company to hedge R&D risks.
Instead of waiting for the royalties and reinvesting them annually, the original patent
owners receive the equivalent immediately and can reinvest it in new R&D projects,
marketing activities, or other company related activities and create a long-term
advantage. Selling the royalties and patents to the royalty monetization company is
also insurance for the original patent owner. The lump sum payment the patent owner
Archetype 2 Gardener
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receives is a form of non-recourse debt. If the royalty payments stop unforeseen, the
royalty monetization company has to deal with the loss of cash flows. The original
patent owner has received the originally expected amount of money.
Basis for the work of royalty monetization companies are existing licensing
agreements between the original patent owner (licensor) and another company
(licensee) that generate predictable cash flows. The licensing agreements are closed
without the involvement of the royalty monetization company. In general, patent
owners approach royalty monetization companies and offer royalty streams and
patents after the licensing deal is closed. In a royalty purchase transaction, royalty
monetization firms invest from already collected blind pools. In royalty bond
transactions, the royalty monetization company designs a bond-like financial
instrument. Buying the bond at the capital market, investors know which royalties and
patents are the underlying for the bond. The SPV issues bonds that raise the patents
purchase price paid to the original owner. The royalty interests from the license of the
patent back the bonds. After transferring the patents to the SPV, the licensee pays the
royalties not to the licensor but to the SPV. In the summary (Figure 30) the cash flows
between the involved parties and the transfer of the patents or licenses between the
original patent owner and the SPV are illustrated.
Royalty monetization company
Examples
AlseT
Capital Royalty
Pete Invest MedTech
Royalty Pharma

Patents
Original patent
owners
company
SPV
Upfront
Return
Investors
Investment
Excl. license
Royalties
Licensee
Strategy
Organization
Process
Provides alternative
source of capital to
patent owners, take
patents as security.
Securitization is
based on existing
licensing agreements
and steady royalties.
Investment vehicle
for capital market
investors
Financial and
scientific knowledge
of management
Cooperation with
patent attorneys
Selects patents, mainly from life science industry, that

are already out-licensed and generate reliable cash
flows.
Structures portfolio with active and passive approach.
Adds value designing capital market instrument.
Exploits patent only indirectly through refinancing them
at the capital market.
Figure 30: Summary of royalty monetization companies
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The unique characteristic of a royalty monetization company is that by aggregating

patents, it shifts future royalties to the present and provides the original patent owner
with immediate capital and an insurance against loss of royalties.
5.3.2 Royalty monetization companys case study: Pete Invest MedTech
Setting. Pete Invest MedTech 23 is a division of Pete Invest Partners. Pete Invest
Partners is US-based private equity company that focuses on secondary private equity
and secondary venture capital investments. The founder founded it in the 1991 when
he had the opportunity to acquire a significant number of venture capital and leveraged
buyout fund positions. The company extended its business and founded Pete Invest
MedTech in 1999 to offer a platform for investors to invest in royalty and revenue
interests of drug and medical device products.
Until now, Pete Invest MedTech has established three investment funds: Pete Invest
Sector Funds I (asset under management ca. USD 300 million), Pete Invest Sector
Funds II (asset under management ca. USD 600 million), and Pete Invest Sector Funds
III (asset under management more than USD 1 billion). The funds invest in royalties
and revenues streams of healthcare products. The number of investments Pete Invest
MedTech has made varies between the funds. The first fund financed ca. 20
investments with an average deal size of USD 15 million. The second fund focused on
larger investments and financed ca. 19 investments with an average size of USD 45
million. The third fund is still being invested and the size of the investment varies. It
plans to invest in ca. 40 deals, with an average investment of ca. USD 30 million.
Main investors of the funds are pension funds, high net worth individuals, and family
offices.
With these funds, Pete Invest MedTech focuses mainly on purchasing royalty streams.
The company has only been involved in three royalty bonds. One of the biggest deals
with large publicity was the issuance of more than USD 200 million of asset-backed
notes. A portfolio of healthcare royalty interests and revenue interests in more than 20
biopharmaceutical products, medical devices, and diagnostics selected from two thirds
investments made by Pete Invest Sector Funds II backed the notes.
23
actual name.
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Strategy. Pete Invest MedTech is an investment company that offers financial investors
the opportunity to participate in the success of life science products that are covered by
patents and are uncorrelated to other assets. To generate an optimal rate of return, Pete
Invest MedTech purchases royalty interests or revenue interest from promising life
science products that have already completed all of the development activities. Early
stage products are only considered when they are in a pool with approved products.
Patents are aggregated to serve as security. Pete Invest MedTech does not conduct
further patent management or patent exploitation.
Organization. Pete Invest MedTechs experiences are in the area of healthcare
(including clinical research, sales, and marketing operations) and finance (structured
finance, venture capital, investment banking, and capital markets). The main objective
of the company is to structure transactions that suit capital seeking transaction
partners, as well as return demanding investors. Therefore, internal competencies are
the evaluation of the potential of healthcare products and transaction structuring.
Pete Invest MedTech operates with a network of experts, and it commissions several
service providers for each deal. Placement agents, for instance, raise the capital for the
funds. They contact potential investors, introduce Pete Invest MedTech to large
institutional investors, set up introductory meetings, and help to craft an offering
memorandum and prepare the pitch.
Process. Pete Invest MedTech focuses on the acquisition of royalty streams of life
science products that have completed all development activities and are ready to or
already commercialize. Therefore, the company diversifies its investments across
products, specialties, clinical and regulatory stages of development, and geographic
markets. Only the patent without any underlying technology or knowledge is
transferred to a SPV held by Pete Invest MedTech. Patent owners whose royalties are
monetized by Pete Invest MedTech are small and medium biotechnology companies,
academic and research institutions, and big pharmaceutical companies. Most often,
Pete Invest MedTech acquires royalty streams from medium sized companies, with
USD 10 million to USD 100 million sales per year.
Pete Invest MedTech selects its investments depending on the potential of the life
science product. Investments in royalties are passive investments without any
influence on the outcome after the actual investment. Pete Invest MedTech acquires
revenue streams from its transaction partner but these revenue streams do not result
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from the ultimate product but are paid by a third company that has licensed the
product. That creates additional risks for Pete Invest MedTech, hence the structuring
phase and the due diligence process are essential steps in the patent aggregating
process. In general, Pete Invest MedTech follows a passive acquisition approach, and
patent owners who want to monetize royalties approach the company. Only approved
products that are already licensed enter further evaluation and due diligence process.
After this initial check, Pete Invest MedTech focuses on an analysis of the underlying
patents. The company commissions a patent law firm to evaluate the types of patents
involved in the product, the strength of the patent portfolio, if the patent portfolio
comprises the product, and the opportunities to circumvent. The results show the
strength of the patents at stake. Based on the results, Pete Invest MedTech analyzes
other players and patents associated with the respective patent and determines the
strength, quality, breadth, and the term of the patent. If the patent evaluation is finished
with a positive result, Pete Invest MedTech evaluates the commercial potentials and
the licensee of the product internally. After developing a forecast model and talking to
a number of key opinion leaders, a third party, which can be a consulting firm, an
individual consultant, or another specific expert, is employed to build their own
forecast model and challenge Pete Invest MedTechs assumptions. In cases of a
positive due diligence process and an investment of Pete Invest MedTech, the
underlying patents are transferred to a SPV.
Due to the passive nature of the investment, Pete Invest MedTech is not involved in
any value adding activities and only rarely in the exploitation phase. If the patent is
transferred to the SPV, it only serves as security, and further value adding activities are
not conducted. Only in the case of bankruptcy of the original patent owner would Pete
Invest MedTech attempt to sell or out-license the patent to reduce loss in the payback
cash flows. However, this has not happened yet.
Value for original patent owner. By assigning patents and transferring royalty interest
to Pete Invest MedTech, the patent owner can transfer commercialization risks to the
patent aggregating company. Transferring the royalty streams to Pete Invest MedTech
also reduces the financial risk of loss of royalties in the future. Additionally,
companies that are engaged with Pete Invest MedTech have a capital need. Life
science products often create large royalty streams over a considerable time period.
Transferring the future royalty streams to the present can satisfy the urgent demand for
capital. Advantage of royalty monetization is its non-dilutive nature and the fact that it
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is also available for companies that cannot tap the debt market. Receiving immediate
capital companies can invest in R&D, marketing, or sales activities.
5.3.3 Patent incubating funds characteristics
Patent incubating funds aggregate patents to exploit the underlying technology and to
generate revenues from a carrot licensing approach. They aggregate patents, invest in
further R&D, and out-license the enhanced technology to other companies.
Patent incubating funds offer investors an opportunity to invest in patents as asset
class. Therefore, large financial resources from institutional or private investors back
the funding of the aggregating activities and they operate in a classical investment
fund design. The difference between patent incubating funds and patent trading funds
is that by investing in patent incubating funds, investors participate in value creation,
whereas by investing in patent trading funds, investors participate in arbitrage.
Patent incubating funds operate mainly as collector and administrator of the invested
funds. Therefore, the senior management has a general management background or
experience in the financial industry. To select, advance, and exploit the patent
portfolios, patent incubating funds use a large network of engineers, patent service
providers, research institutes, patent attorneys, patent lawyers, and patent
intermediaries.
The quality of the aggregated patents is as important as the commercialization
opportunities of the technology. Therefore, patent incubating funds focus mainly on
promising, often embryonic, technologies from a broad range of industries that have
the potential of successful commercialization in products. Not only is the legal right
transferred but so is additional knowledge.
Patent incubating funds aggregate patents mainly from single inventors, research
institutions, universities, and SMEs. A producing company can utilize a patent
incubating fund to hedge R&D risks. Often the original patent owner does not have the
financial resources to develop the technology further and to commercialize it. Patent
incubating funds also acquire the terminated research projects of MNEs with
promising technology and high quality patents. In selling these patents and
technologies to a patent incubating fund, the producing company can generate cash
flows through the actual purchase price, and realize costs saving through transferring
renewal fees and further R&D costs to the patent incubating fund. In addition, options
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exist for a back license and long-term monetary rewards through participating in the
royalties of the commercialized technology.
The patent incubating fund collects investments from private equity, institutional
investors, high net worth individuals, or private investors. The acquisition process is
initiated either actively or passively by the patent incubating fund and it is started
before or after closing the investment fund. The collected funds are invested firstly in
the aggregation of patents. For this, the evaluation of the patents focuses especially on
the quality and future prospects of the underlying technology. Determinates of the
evaluation process are the commercialization potential of the technology, the expected
time to market, the market structure and the market potential of the targeted product
market, the legal position of the patent (validity, extent of protection, remaining patent
duration), and the anticipated performance and costs of exploitations. After
aggregating the patents, the patent incubating fund mandates external R&D institutes
for the advancement of technologies and patents. In the advancement phase,
technologies are improved or scaled up, or industrial proof-of-concepts are achieved.
Improvements, as well as circumvent solutions, are patented continuously, and the
newly created patents improve the strength and the scope of the patent portfolio.
Additionally, the patent portfolio is advanced to protect the technology in international
markets. The collected investment fund also finances further development and
advancement, and includes, for instance, prototyping or expanding the geographical
scope of the patents. After the advancement phase, the fund follows a carrot licensing
approach and searches interested companies. These companies are either large
companies filling their product pipeline with the offered technology, or smaller
companies benefiting from the new technology by diversifying their product portfolio
without being involved in the risk of R&D. In most of these deals, a transfer of
knowledge or technology is involved. The patent incubating funds objective is to sell
or exclusively out-license the advanced technology to a sharply higher price and repay
investors, and after deducting additional R&D costs and administration fees, this is at a
higher rate of return than the return of traditional investment funds. In the summary
(Figure 31), the cash flows between the involved parties and the transactions of the
patents between the original patent owner, the patent incubating fund, and the new
patent owner respective licensee are illustrated. Additionally, the involvement of the
mandated R&D institution is illustrated.
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Patent incubating fund
Examples
IgniteIP
IP Holdings
Patent Select
Investors
Investment
Original patent
owners
Patents/
excl. license
Return
Patent
incubating fund
Upfront payment/
partial royalties
Royalties/
lump sum
New patent owners/

licensee
Patent/
excl. license
Contracted
service fee
R&D result
R&D institution or
original patent
owner
Strategy
Organization
Process
Generates revenues
from refining and
exploiting promising
technologies
Operates through
quality of technology
Backed by large
financial resources
Knowledge in
management
Cooperates with
external service
providers with patent
knowledge
Selects US and international patents and technologies

from all industries, sellers are often SME, universities
and single inventors.
evaluates technology and legal position of patent.
Adds value through further R&D.
Exploits through selling and carrot licensing.
Figure 31: Summary of patent incubating funds
The unique characteristic of a patent incubating fund is that by aggregating patents, it

is able to incubate embryonic technologies through the employment of a large network
of service providers based on funding of private and institutional investors.
5.3.4 Patent incubating funds case study: Patent Select
Setting. Patent Select is the umbrella term for three investment funds that offer private
investors the opportunity to invest in patents as a new asset class. Deutsche Bank and
Clou Partners initiated all three investment funds. In 2006, Patent Select I was
initiated, Patent Select II and Patent Portfolio I followed in 2007. The asset under
management of the funds differs between EUR 24.7 million (Patent Select I) and EUR
130 million (Patent Portfolio I). All three funds are closed end funds. Patent Select I
and II are constructed as asset pools; Patent Portfolio I is a partly blind pool. Deutsche
Bank sold Patent Select I and II as public placements. The minimum subscription for
the two Patent Select funds was EUR 50,000. They were offered to private clients. The
subscription capital of the public placed Patent Portfolio I was EUR 10,000. The
predicted return before tax is ca. 12%. The planned terms of the funds are six to eight
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years. The funds invest ca. 5 to 7% of the shareholders equity to aggregate patents.
The two Patent Select funds each aggregated 12 patents respective patent families, and
Patent Portfolio I aggregated 22. The largest portion of the total shareholders equity is
used to finance the development phase.
Strategy. Patent Select acquires embryonic technologies not ready for product
commercialization and the patents that cover these technologies. Patent owners
transfer the patent rights to Patent Select and give up their ownership rights but are
still involved contractually for providing their knowledge in the further development.
After transferring the patents, Patent Select starts with further development, additional
R&D, and other advancement measures to develop a product ready for market. After
concluding this, Patent Select exploits the patents, depending on the application and
the market, through carrot licensing or sales.
Organization. The main involved parties in Patent Select are Deutsche Bank, Clou
Partners, and, until August 2010, IP Bewertungs AG. Deutsche Bank, the largest
German financial institution, together with Clou Partners, is the initiator of the funds.
As initiator, they are in charge of the set up of the funds and in compiling the
prospectus of the investment opportunity. Figure 32 shows the structure of the
investment fund Patent Portfolio I. Neunzehnte Paxas and ZEA Beteilungsgesellschaft
are in charge of the fund management. At the time of initiating the funds, IP
Bewertungs AG was mandated as service provider. The service provider is in charge of
the identification, selection, evaluation, allocation, and management of the patents. In
July 2010, IP Bewertungs AG filed for insolvency and was replaced with new service
providers for the exploitation of patents.
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Sales through:
Deutsche Bank
HQ: Frankfurt, GER
Investors
Return
Investment
Trustee and Founder:

Neunzehnte Paxas
General partner:
ZEA Beteiligungsgesellsch.
Company agreement
potentially
Consultants
selection, (e)valuatuion,
management, and exploitation
IP Bewertungs AG
HQ: Hamburg, GER
Consultancy
agreement
Service
agreement
Investment company:
Dritte Patentportfolio Beteiligungs
gesellschaft mbH & Co KG
Head quarters: Schnenberg, GER
Purchase price
Cost transfer
Participation rate
Original patent and
technolgy owners
Patents/
Patents/
exclusive
right of
excl. license
exploitation
Initiator
Deutsche Bank
HQ: Frankfurt, GER
Initiator
Clou Partners
HQ: Munich, GER
Lump sum/
royalties
New patent
owners/ licensees
Additional technology
and knowledge transfer
Figure 32: Exemplary structure of the organization and relations of participants illustrated on the
investment fund Patent Portfolio I
Process. Patent Select aggregates embryonic or still unmarketable technology and

patents that cover these technologies from all technological areas except those
covering military or genetic engineering. These patents do not fit the Reputational
Risk and Corporate Governance Criterias of initiator Deutsche Bank. Patent Select
also evaluates patents from all geographic areas but due to the strength of the German
Patent Office, many aggregated patents are German. Even that Patent Select evaluates
patents from all kind of companies and inventors, universities or research institutions
and SMEs develop most aggregated inventions.
Based on a large network of service providers and presence on global technologies
fairs, the patent owners are mainly actively approached. Patent Select decomposes the
evaluation process in a quantitative pre-selection stage and a qualitative audit of
interesting patents (see Figure 21 for the different stages of the evaluation process).
After passing the pre-selection, the qualitative audit starts. The technologies and
patents are evaluated regarding asset criteria and funds criteria. Asset criteria
contain (1) technical criteria (e.g., considering the market standard, examining the
technology lifecycle and existing trends, is time to market shorter than 36 months); (2)
legal criteria (e.g., attribute analysis, status, scope of patent, freedom to operate,
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potential for circumvention, infringements); and (3) economic criteria (e.g., evaluating
the market and exploitation potential, market segment, market volume). The funds
criteria focus on the sufficiency of patents for an investment fund and evaluate the fit
of expected time to exploitation to the term of the fund, as well as the expected R&D
costs to reach exploitation potential. Along with this, Patent Select drafts a strategy
plan for commercialization. Based on the results of the evaluation and the strategy
plan, Patent Select acquires the patents.
In the phase of value-adding activities, which is two to four years, Patent Select
mandates, for instance, R&D institutions to develop technologies that are ready to be
commercialized in products. For instance, research laboratories enhance technologies
from the life science industry to manufacture marketable products. Engineering
technologies are further developed, and proof of concept is delivered by producing
prototypes. Additionally, exhibitions and technology fairs promote the inventions.
During this phase, the original patent owner is still involved. The original patent owner
conducts some of the development activities or is involved through a consultancy
contract.
Patent Select often approaches potential licensees or patent buyer before the
advancement of patents starts. With this strategy, Patent Select is able to offer
customized solutions, for example, prototypes or adjustments regarding certain
environmental influences or already existing production facilities, to interested parties
and can increase the success rate of exploitation and the exploitation return. The
patents are exploited through carrot licensing or sales, depending on the market
structure, the number of potentially interested parties, and scope of application. For
instance, exploiting a technology that dispenses liquid in a new way and has 40
different applications an approach offering exclusive licenses for different regions or
applications would be chosen. For a patent that covers a technology for only few
applications in a monopolistic market, the patent is sold to the only interested party.
Due to the strict selection process and the focus on few patents of high quality, Patent
Select forecasts that all aggregated patents and patent families are going to be
exploited successfully.
Value for original patent owner. By assigning patents to Patent Select, the original
patent owner can generate an immediate additional cash inflow and future
participation rates. In particular, SMEs, universities, and single inventors often lack
the resources, the network, or the competencies to develop their invention further and
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present proof of concepts or prototypes to potentially interested parties. Assigning the

patents to Patent Select, the invention is further developed and commercialized in
products, and the patent owner is able to recoup R&D investments. Also, in stages
where the invention is not yet ready for the market, the patent owner does not have to
take the financial risk of further, potentially fruitless, development but can still benefit
financially from the invention. Often the original patent owner conducts the
advancement phase. Therefore, the original owner not only profits financially but also
through organizational learning and adaption of competencies without carrying the
financial risk of the learning and the R&D processes. Being closely involved in the
development process, patent owners are able to extend their network and use the
licensing partners for further cooperation, for example, internationalization of future
products. The patent owner receives a relatively, low upfront payment and does not
have to cover renewal, valuation, or exploitation costs. Patent Select acquires patents
to moderate prices because after exploiting the technology through Patent Select, the
original patent owner receives partial proceeds. This payment scheme also sets
incentives for the original patent owner to stay involved in further development.
5.4 Archetype 3 Collector

The archetype collector features nuisance competency and provides patent owners
with monetary short-term rewards. As patent enforcement companies and defensive
patent aggregators detect infringements, base their work on the legal case of patents,
and reward patent owners with a lump sum payments, these two business models
represent the archetype collector.
5.4.1 Patent enforcement companys characteristics
Patent enforcement companies aggregate patents to generate revenues from a stick
licensing approach. They enforce the aggregated patents and establish licensing
programs.
Patent enforcement companies are the pioneering category of patent aggregating
companies and have emerged at an early development stage of the patent aggregating
business. Patent enforcement companies developed from producing or service
companies, from a single inventor, or based on entrepreneurial spirit. Due to the
heterogeneity of business history, patent enforcement companies have several sources
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of funding. They can be public companies, privately owned but also backed by large
financial investors, depending on the initial point of business and the initial objectives.
Furthermore, the funding of the patent transactions varies. While some patent
enforcement companies use only internally generated financial resources for patent
aggregating activities, others are provided with investments of private equity firms to
finance patent aggregating activities.
Based on the different business histories, the professional background of senior
management is diverse and can span from engineers that were inventors in the
beginning, to patent professionals, to hedge fund managers or investment bankers.
Internal resources are often limited and mainly focus on strong legal and licensing
knowledge. Patent enforcement companies rely on a large network of external
resources, such as patent lawyers and engineers that they mandate for specific cases.
Patent enforcement companies focus mainly on patents covering technology in the
high-technology industry, such as semiconductor, software, information and
communication technology, wireless, consumer electronics, but are not limited to these
technologies. However, the industry is only of lower priority. Patent enforcement
companies focus on patents already in use and possibly infringed covering products in
large markets. Patent enforcement companies aggregate only the legal right of
exclusion without any underlying knowledge or technology. The aggregated patents
often have a broad scope and overlap with other patents. Until now, patent
enforcement companies have aggregated mainly US patents, but they increasingly
target German, French, or UK patents.
Patent enforcement companies aggregate patents from single inventors, research
institutions, and small and large corporate sellers and take over the enforcement risks
from producing companies. In case of single inventors, research institutions and
SMEs, the original owner does not have the financial resources to enforce the patents.
In case of MNEs, the original patent owners often do not want to be involved in patent
infringement suits due to strategic or reputational reasons. For instance, in
oligopolistic markets, a patent enforcement lawsuit could start a chain of reactions
where all players sue each other. To prevent this, the MNE sells the potentially
infringed patent to a patent enforcement company. Another strategic reason is risk
diversification. Litigation lawsuits are expensive and the outcome is often uncertain.
By selling infringed patents, the producing company can generate additional shortterm cash flows through the actual purchase price. If the original patent owner is not
Archetype 3 Collector
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involved in the enforcement activities, they receive a lump sum payment and do not
participate on the generated revenues. In cases where the patent owner is involved in
the enforcement activities, the generated licensing revenues are split between the
original patent owner and the patent enforcement company. Additionally, the
producing company is able to save the costs of litigation.
The acquisition process is initiated either actively or passively by the patent
enforcement company. After the patent is evaluated regarding its legal position (e.g.,
validity, remaining patent duration), potential infringements, comparable licensing
agreements, and expected performance and costs of a litigation lawsuit, the infringed
patents or their exclusive licenses are assigned to a SPV owned by the patent
enforcement company. In some cases, patent enforcement companies create new
patent portfolios that cover a certain technology and bundle patents from various
patent owners; in other cases, the patent portfolio contains only one patent family. The
fund then contacts potential users of the patents either by letter and negotiation or by
filing a lawsuit immediately. If the targeted companies, which are producing
companies of all sizes, in fact use the patent, they are forced to take a non-exclusive
license from the patent enforcement company. In the summary (Figure 33), the cash
flows between the involved parties and the transfer of the patents or licenses between
the original patent owner, the patent enforcement company, and the licensees are
illustrated.
130

Patent enforcement company
Examples
Acacia
Alliacense
CreativeE
Fergason Patent
IP Navigation
Papst Licensing
Rembrandt IP

Investors
Investment
Original patent
owners
Patents/
excl. license
Return
Patent enforcement
company
Lump sum/
share of
royalties
Varying
SPV(s)
Royalties
Licensees
Non-excl.
license
Strategy
Organization
Process
Buys infringed
patents and generate
revenues from stick
licensing
Operates through
quality of patents
Knowledge in patent
law
Large networks of
external resources
Selects mainly US patents from high tech industries that

are already used.
evaluates legal position of patent.
Adds value through proofing the infringement and taking
over the litigation risks.
Exploits through stick licensing.
Figure 33: Summary of patent enforcement companies
The unique characteristic of a patent enforcement company is that by aggregating

patents, it exploits aggressively already infringed patents with legal means.
5.4.2 Patent enforcement companys case study: Acacia Research
Setting. Starting as a venture capital company in 1993, Acacia Research Corporation,
based in Newport Beach, California, is today a large and well-known patent
aggregating company. After the burst of the dotcom bubble and being stranded with
patents and technologies from venture capital investments, Acacia started its patent
aggregating and patent licensing business in 2003. In the same year, Acacia went
public. The company is listed at the NASDAQ with the ticker symbol ACTG. Analyst
coverage is provided, for instance, by Barclays Capital (Darrin D. Peller), J.P. Morgen
(Paul Heller), or GARP Research & Securities (George Sakellaris).
Acacia controls 536 US patents in 332 patent families. These patents are pooled in
more than 180 patent portfolios. The patents cover technologies used in a wide variety
of industries, for instance, communication technology, consumer electronics, database
technology, or software. Between 2005 and 2010, Acacias patent portfolio grew by
131
ca. 430%, and between 2008 and 2010 by ca. 120%. Within the last 10
has completed more than 1,000 licensing agreements covering 99
Acacias sales have increased significantly since going public and
company generated a profit for the first time. Figure 34 illustrates the
EBIT of Acacia since its initial public offering.
years, Acacia
technologies.
in 2010, the
sales and the
131.83
140
120
100
80
67.34
52.6
60
38.76
34.83
40
20
48.23
19.57
0.69
Sales
EBIT
4.28
0
-20
-5.61
-5.58
-6.17
-5.32
-7.15
-13.63
-5.42
-40
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
Source: Thomson One Banker retrieved on September 6, 2011

Figure 34: Sales and EBIT of Acacia from 2003 to 2010, in million USD
Acacia is ranked amongst the five most litigious patent aggregating companies.
According to PatentFreedom (2011a), Acacia has been involved in 384 cases with
1134 counterparties in US courts until the end of 2010.
Strategy. Acacias mission states that the company
assist patent owners with the prosecution and development of their patent
portfolios, the protection of their patented inventions from unauthorized use, the
generation of licensing revenue from users of their patented technologies and, if
necessary, with the enforcement against unauthorized users of their patented
technologies.' (Acacia Research Corporation, 2010).
Thereby, Acacia sees itself mainly as partner of research institutes, universities, small
companies, and inventors who do not have the scale or the size to establish their own
licensing program. To pursue this mission, Acacia contacts patent owners that have
infringed or potentially infringed patents. If the patent owner is interested to assign the
132
patents to Acacia, the patents are transferred to a LLC that is founded and held by
Acacia. The patent aggregating company than takes action and follows a stick
licensing approach by enforcing the patents in negotiations and litigation lawsuits.
During the last years, the business model has started to shift from asserting only
patents from single inventors and SMEs in single cases to long-term cooperations with
MNEs to assert large patent portfolios. The advantage for Acacia is that MNEs have
larger portfolios, with much deeper patent portfolios with a higher quality.
Organization. Acacia is a listed company with shares outstanding of USD 42.9
million.24 Ninety-six percent of outstanding shares are free float; 145 institutional
investors own 71.30% of the free float; and insiders own 3.88% of the free float.25 The
most important direct shareholders are CEO Paul Ryan and Director Robert Harris.26
The top three institutional investors are Eagle Asset Management (4.83% of free float),
Vanguard Group (4.52% of free float), and Columbia Partners (4.33% of free float).
Acacia holds more than 80 subsidiaries because for each licensing program, an LLC is
formed. The company operates and finances its activities mainly from its own
corporate treasury. Acacia formed a subsidiary together with institutional investors in
August 2010 that serves as investment fund to acquire and license patents. Information
on this fund is limited.
In addition to internal expertise, Acacia has a wide network of engineering experts and
30 law firms. Due to the wide range of targeted industries, external engineering
experts are consulted for opinions and evaluations of technologies from their specific
areas. As patent enforcement is the core pillar of revenue generation, external highly
specialized law firms are employed for the enforcement of certain portfolios. Law
firms also support Acacia in the due diligence process.
Process. Acacia has the resources to evaluate commercially valuable patents in any
technology area or industry, but until now it has focused mainly on patents from high
technology, for instance, communications; computers and peripherals; consumer
electronics; digital media; ecommerce; energy and lighting; internet; medical devices;
semiconductor; software; or wireless and mobile. Acacia focuses on the aggregation of
US patents without additional knowledge or technology. At the beginning of its patent
24
Status quo per September 6, 2011, data retrieved from Thomson Reuters. Closing stock price on
September 5, 2011 of ACTG was USD 41.79.
25
Status quo per September 6, 2011, data retrieved from Thomson Reuters.
26
Reported on August 8, 2011, data retrieved from Morningstar, Inc.
133
aggregating activities, Acacia mainly aggregated patents from research institutes,

universities, SMEs, and inventors. During the last years, it has increasingly aggregated
patents from MNEs.
Acacia traditionally starts the structuring process. The patent aggregating company
regularly monitors the patent landscape and identifies patents that are already used or
are anticipated to be widely used by third parties. Based on the results of the
monitoring activities, Acacia contacts the patent owners. During the first years of
business activity, Acacia exclusively reached patent owners through patent attorneys
and engineer screening. Becoming aware of patent infringements, licensing
opportunities, and the existence of Acacia, patent owners increasingly approach the
patent aggregating company and offer their patents.
Acacia follows a semi-standardized, two-stage evaluation and due diligence process
that sorts out almost 97% of all patents or patent portfolios that were identified in the
beginning. In the first stage of the due diligence process, Acacia conducts a
preliminary analysis examining bibliographic data, general legal information, and the
technology landscape. Only 10% of all patents or patent portfolios enter the second
stage. In this stage, Acacia conducts a worldwide prior art search, performs reverse
engineering, and identifies potential infringers. Additionally, all patents are evaluated
from (1) a legal (e.g., is the patent well drafted, does it withhold the scrutiny of
litigation); (2) an engineering (e.g., prior art of different types of technology,
technology lifecycle, technological standards); and (3) a licensing and business
perspective (e.g., profit margins, reasonable licensing rates, revenues of covered
products). Based on experienced multidisciplinary teams, Acacia has the resources to
conduct the evaluations and reviews internally. However, for specific technologies,
external experts, such as law firms or engineers are employed. From the patents that
have entered the second stage of due diligence, only 70% are viable for Acacias
exploitation strategy and are acquired by the company.
The contractual agreement Acacia enters with the original patent owners is internally
called a partnering arrangement. Through LLCs, which are formed for each licensing
program, Acacia acquires the patent or the patent portfolio, with title changes at the
US patent office, or it acquires the exclusive right to license a patent portfolio. In
exchange, the original patent owner, called a partner, receives an upfront payment
for the purchase of the patent portfolio or patent portfolio rights, a percentage of the
net recoveries from the licensing and enforcement of the patent portfolio, or a
134
combination of the two. Based on this arrangement, Acacia and the original patent
owner equally share the economic value of the patent.
To exploit the patents, Acacia follows a stick licensing approach. Potential users of the
patents are approached to meet and negotiate the case and enter litigation lawsuit only
if negotiations cannot be closed or Acacia directly sues the infringing companies and
starts a litigation lawsuit. The targeted result of both approaches is an agreement on a
non-exclusive license, either to a specific portfolio or to all of Acacias portfolios. In
the past, Acacia has settled 95% of all litigation lawsuits out of court and rarely sells
patents, and only if a major player wants to have an exclusive license. However,
selling a patent must generate more revenue than licensing to the entire market.
Value for original patent owner. By selling patents to Acacia, the original patent
owner can transfer enforcement risks to the patent aggregating company, as well as
generate an immediate additional cash inflow. SMEs, universities, and single inventors
often lack the resources and experience to enforce infringed patents. MNEs often do
not want to enforce patents and prefer to stay out of certain litigation lawsuits. On the
other side, producing companies can experience disadvantages from not enforcing
patents. Selling the patents to Acacia resolves this problem. The patent owner receives
an upfront payment and participates on the royalties if Acacia is able to enforce the
patents.
5.4.3 Defensive patent aggregators characteristics
Defensive patent aggregators acquire patents to provide the attached producing
companies with an insurance against patent litigation lawsuits initiated from NPE. It
generates revenues through membership fees and patent selling but not through patent
enforcement. Therefore, patents are the only means to fulfill the requirements of the
members. Defensive patent aggregators compete with patent enforcement companies
for the same patents.
Defensive patent aggregators are the youngest category of patent aggregating
companies and have emerged only recently. Therefore, the three companies in the
sample cover 100% of the actual population. In this population, two major funding
schemes are observable. Either defensive patent aggregators are established as an
interest group of large producing companies and are financially backed by these
founding members, as well as additional members, or they are privately founded and
135
backed by large financial resources as venture capital firms. Depending on the funding
scheme, defensive patent aggregators are not for profit or profit oriented. All business
models are member based. To profit from the defensive patent aggregator, a company
becomes a member and pays an annual fee. Depending on the defensive patent
aggregators and the amount of fees, the annual fees are used to acquire patents or to
cover the administrative costs. In the latter case, the acquired patents are paid from
extra fees.
The senior management of defensive patent aggregators has experience in patent
management and patent transactions gained in prior work for patent intermediaries or
high-technology companies. Defensive patent aggregators often employ patent
intermediaries to preserve anonymity and to obtain a realistic price in buying
transactions.
Defensive patent aggregators focus on patents covering technologies in the hightechnology industry, such as semiconductor, software, information and communication
technology, wireless, and consumer electronics, but are not limited to these
technologies. They aggregate patents already used by their attached producing
companies that could become a threat if another company buys these patents, for
instance, patent enforcement companies, patent acquisition companies, or patent
trading funds. Defensive patent aggregators amass only the legal right of exclusion
without any underlying knowledge. Until now, defensive patent aggregators have
acquired mainly US patents.
Defensive patent aggregators acquire patents from single inventors, research
institutions, SMEs, and MNEs, but also from other patent aggregating companies, such
as patent acquisition companies, patent enforcement companies, or patent trading
funds. Defensive patent aggregators take over the enforcement risks from producing
companies. Compared with selling patents to corporate buyers, defensive patents funds
can place bids higher than the willingness to pay for a single company. This is due to
their membership structure and the joint fund of corporate buyers. At the same time,
the original patent owner can enforce the patent without risking losing the lawsuit or
investing the large amount of money affiliated with a patent litigation lawsuit and
without getting in touch with patent enforcement companies or patent acquisition
companies. Avoiding transactions with these categories of patent aggregating
companies deletes the risk of reputation damage by selling it to a publicly unpopular
company. By selling infringed patents, the producing company can generate additional
136
short-term cash flows through the actual purchase price. Additionally, the producing
company is able to save the costs of litigation.
The main objective of a defensive patent aggregator is to prevent patent litigation
against its members. Therefore, patents that hold legal exposure to one or more of the
members are acquired. The patent market is monitored constantly and available patents
are bought. Depending on the business model, the member companies can influence
the purchase decisions or not. The attached producing companies receive nonexclusive licenses from the aggregated patent portfolios. Interested companies can join
the defensive patent aggregator if relevant patents are acquired. After a time span of
around one to two years to give non-member companies the possibility to join and
provide the members with a license, some companies sell the patents to other
producing companies or to patent enforcement companies, patent acquisition
companies, or patent trading funds. In the summary (Figure 35), the cash flows
between the involved parties and the transfer of the patents is illustrated.
Defensive patent aggregator

Examples

Open Invention
Network
RPX Corp
Members/
investors
Membership fee/
investment
Non-excl. license/
return
Patents
Defensive
patent aggregator
Original patent
owners
Lump sum
Strategy
Organization
Process
Provides attached
companies insurance
against litigation
Operates with
patents that in use of
members and are
potential targets for
NPE
Knowledge in patent
law and patent
monitoring
Large networks of
external resources
Decisions are
partially influenced by
members
Selects US patents from high tech industries that are

already used by attached companies.
Structures portfolio with active approach, evaluates
legal position of patent and threat for attached
companies.
Adds value not directly to the patents.
Exploits patents only indirectly through membership.
Figure 35: Summary of defensive patent aggregators
137
The unique characteristic of a defensive patent aggregator is that by aggregating

patents and members, it is able to reduce the high costs of monitoring the patent
market and the costs of acquisition of patents that hold large legal exposure for a
single company.
5.4.4 Defensive patent aggregators case study: Allied Security Trust
Setting. Allied Security Trust is an US patent defensive organization with headquarters
in Lambertville, New Jersey. In January 2007, four companies from the hightechnology industry founded Allied Security Trust as a company that should help the
member companies to analyze and potentially purchase patents that may otherwise be
used against the members in some type of aggressive action. Amongst the current
members are Ericsson, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, Intel, Motorola, Oracle, and Philips.
Allied Security Trust currently has 21 members, from Europe, North America, and
Asia.27 To become a member, a producing company must operate in the hightechnology field, that includes software, information technology, communication
technology, consumer electronics, internet, or medical devices, and generate operating
revenues from production and services of USD 500 million per year. Allied Security
Trust is open to new members. To join, new members have to pay a onetime fee of
USD 150,000. Allied Security Trust is not a charitable organization but was designed
without the objective to generate profits. It sees itself more as a trade association that
serves the needs of its members. According to its charter and the trust agreements, the
company is prohibited to assert patents.
Strategy. The mission of Allied Security Trust is to support members in dealing with
aggressive actions performed by patent enforcement companies or patent acquisition
companies. For this, Allied Security Trust identifies patents, purchases these patents on
behalf of the member companies, therefore, taking member-threatening patents from
the market. After purchasing and licensing the patents to the specific members, Allied
Security Trust sells the patents to producing companies, as well as all kinds of patent
aggregating companies.
Organization. Allied Security Trust is a member-owned trust. The annual membership
fee for each member is USD 200,000. This fee covers all costs of the operating
business of Allied Security Trust. Additionally, the members pay a certain amount for
27
Status quo August 2011.
138
the patent acquisitions relevant for them. This amount is determined by each member
separately depending on its own evaluation of the patents into question. Allied Security
Trust works together with a worldwide network of patent brokers and patent
intermediaries that offer patents to the company. Additionally, a network of experts
supports Allied Security Trust upon request, providing third-party reports and opinions
on certain patents or patent portfolios.
Process. Allied Security Trust members evaluate single granted patents, patent
applications, and patent portfolios with up to thousands of patents from hightechnology technologies that are offered at the market and could be turned into a
litigation threat for the member companies. Often Allied Security Trust bids against
patent aggregating companies as patent enforcement companies, patent trading funds,
or patent acquisition companies, as well as operating companies. The acquired patents
are mainly US patents and their foreign counterparts, and come from a worldwide
network of over 300 brokers, operating companies, law firms, academic institutions,
individual inventors, and other patent holders with patents for sale.
The organization monitors the market for patents constantly. The patent seller who
offers patents to the trust mainly initiates the structuring process of Allied Security
Trust. Allied Security Trust analyzes the offered patents regarding the relationship of
the selling agent, family members, foreign counterparts, and fitting technology areas.
All patents are evaluated taking the position of a potentially enforcing company. In the
offered patent of interest, Allied Security Trust classifies the patents by two criteria: (1)
potential products that may use the patent and that could be the basis for litigation
lawsuits (e.g., routers, digital cameras, web-browsing technologies), and (2) the
technology that the patent covers (e.g., antennas, imaging, liquid crystal). This
information is delivered to the member companies that evaluate the patent and decide
about the purchase. Based on the classification, Allied Security Trusts advice and their
own investigation, the members decide if the patent meets their specific technical,
product, and quality interest. In this case, each member company conducts an
evaluation of the patent for itself and based on the evaluation, decides to participate in
a bid and states the amount it is willing to pay for the patent. Allied Security Trust
gathers all decisions and coordinates the process without disclosing the identity of the
participating members. When the members are interested to make a bid, Allied
Security Trust forms an LLC for each transaction. Based on the gathered amount,
Allied Security Trust places an offer to the patent seller. If the offer is too low and the
139
patent seller refuses to sell, Allied Security Trust contacts the interested members and,
if the members are still interested, gathers additional funds and increases the bid. After
acquiring the patents, Allied Security Trust grants a license to the members that funded
the acquisition. On average, 20 to 30% of the members participate in a given
acquisition. Allied Security Trust does not disclose the companies involved. The
license granted is fully paid up, perpetual, irrevocable, worldwide, and non-exclusive.
In addition, members that did not participate in the patent acquisition can obtain a
license. In this case, they receive a Subsequent License Option and pay the highest
price paid by a member in the acquisition transaction. The license proceeds generated
by new licensee are returned to the original bidders.
Figure 36 illustrates the process conducted in the structuring phase of Allied Security
Trust.
Monitoring
Patent
market
Monitoring of
patent market,
close contact to ca.
250 patent sellers
Gather information,
classify patents
Evaluation
Members
Purchase
Research on
patent and
evaluation on
danger potential
conducted by each purchase

member in
decision
question
Decision about
purchase price
Forming of LLC for

each transaction
Starting negotiation
If necessary further
coordination with
members about
increase of budget
Purchase of patent
Licensing
Giving license to
all members that
have participated
at the deal
Giving license to
potential new
members
Figure 36: Structuring phase of Allied Security Trust
To prevent a free rider problem and secure the status as defensive organization Allied
Security Trust divests the patents ca. one year after purchase. The patent portfolio is
offered first to the original bidding members. If none of the original bidders is
interested in purchasing the patent portfolio, the patents are offered to third parties.
These third parties are producing companies and any other interested parties, whether
they are patent aggregating companies or non-practicing entities. The proceeds
received from selling the patents are transferred to the original bidding members, and
they recoup some of their initial investments. To date, Allied Security Trust has
returned 96% of the initial investment to the involved member companies.
140
Value for original patent owner. By selling patents to Allied Security Trust, the
original patent owner generates an immediate additional cash inflow. In addition, the
original patent owner can stay out of litigation lawsuits but at the same time react to
infringements. Especially SMEs, universities, and single inventors often lack the
resources and experience to enforce infringed patents. MNEs often do not want to
enforce patents and stay out of certain litigation lawsuits. On the other side, producing
companies can experience disadvantages from not enforcing patents. Selling the
patents to Allied Security Trust resolves this problem. Even though Allied Security
Trust does not assert the patents, the original patent owner receives rent from its
innovation without initiating a litigation lawsuit. Additionally, Allied Security Trusts
philosophy is to pay market prices. The original owner receives an appropriate upfront
payment and does not have to cover renewal costs.
5.5 Archetype 4 Patron

The archetype patron features nuisance competency and provides patent owners with
monetary and non-monetary long-term rewards. As patent pooling companies and noncommercial patent aggregators evaluate and offer solutions for the legal cases of
patents and reward patent owners with continuous payments, the transfer of litigation
risks, and marketing tools, these two business models represent the archetype patron.
5.5.1 Patent pooling companys characteristics
A patent pooling company aggregates patents to solve licensing issues in technologies
that are characterized by a large number of patents owned by several patent owners. A
patent pooling company focuses on revenue generation for the patent owners but itself
receives only cash flow for its administrating function. Patents serve as means to
standardize technologies, as well as to solve the problem of patent thickets.
Patent pooling companies set up patent pools by or with the help of producing
companies, because standardizing a technology or using a standardized technology is
of major strategic interest for them. Patent pooling companies mainly administer the
pooled legal rights and do not buy patents. Hence, large scale funding for patent
acquisition activities is not necessary.
Archetype 4 Patron
141
The senior management of patent pooling companies has broad experience in patent
licensing and patent management.
Patent pooling companies focus on essential patents covering the basic technology of a
standard. Until now, they are mainly active in the high-technology industry but the
focus is slowly shifting to other industries, such as chemical, biotechnology, or
manufacturing. Patent pooling companies aggregate only the legal right of exclusion
without any underlying knowledge.
All original patent owners have the same objective for getting involved with a patent
pooling company. Based on this, the original patent owners transfer certain rights
concerning their patents to the patent pooling company. Original patent owners are
single inventors, research institutions, SMEs, and MNEs. Patent pooling companies
take over the enforcement risk from producing companies. Instead, enforcing patents
that are intertwined with other patents and starting an endless litigation game
between all patent owners, a producing company can transfer the patents to a patent
pooling company that consolidates all relevant patents. Assigning patents to a patent
pool generates steady long-term royalties for the patent owners without having the
costs to administer many licenses in-house. Additionally, the assigning patent owner
can also receive a license for the patent pool, generate freedom to operate its own
R&D, and has the opportunity to expand the market for its products because the
developed technology is more widely used.
The patent pooling company acts as an administrator of an agreement between two or
more patent owners. These patent owners have patents covering a standardized or to be
standardized technology and plan to license them on a broad scale. The patent pooling
company has two major functions. On the one hand, it aggregates additional patents to
complete the patent portfolio for a standardized technology. On the other hand, it outlicenses the patent portfolio on a non-exclusive basis to producing companies of all
sizes and collects the royalties. After deducting its administration fee, the patent
pooling company passes the royalties to the original patent owners. In the summary
(Figure 37), the cash flows and the transferred licensing rights between the involved
parties are illustrated.
142

Patent pooling company
Examples
MPEG LA
Sipro Lab
Via Licensing

Non-excl.
license
Original patent
owners
Royalties
Royalties
Royalties
Patent pooling
company
Non-excl.
license
Licensee
Non-excl.
license
Strategy
Organization
Process
Provides access to
essential patents for
practicing standards
Based on existence
of patent thickets and
depended on access
to all necessary
patents
Knowledge in patent
licensing and
negotiations
Large network
Selects patents that are needed to establish standard.

Structures portfolio with active and passive approach.
Adds value through offering one license to several
patents, enlarging the portfolio, negotiating with
additional patent owners.
Exploits through stick and carrot licensing.
Figure 37: Summary of patent pooling companies
The unique characteristic of a patent pooling company is that by aggregating patents, it

creates the opportunities to reduce transaction costs, to generate freedom to operate,
and to expand markets for producing companies in one single transaction.
5.5.2 Patent pooling companys case study: MPEG LA
Setting. MPEG LA is an US patent aggregating company. MPEG LA was founded in
1997 as result of the Moving Picture Coding Expert Groups (MPEG) standardization
attempts for coded representations of moving pictures, audio, and their combination. In
1992, the MPEG established the MPEG-1 standard, which is designed to produce
reasonable quality images and sound at low bit rates. After further development, the
MPEG-2 standard was established in 1994. This standard is designed to produce
higher quality images at higher bit rates. The main problem was that many patents of
several patent owners were essential to access the MPEG-2 technology. Due to the
large number of necessary licensing negotiations, an adoption of the MPEG-2 standard
seemed unlikely. Ken Rubenstein, co-head of the Patent Law Group of Proskauer
Rose and a Partner in the New York office, was mandated to identify all relevant
patent owners for the MPEG-2 standard. After identification and months of
Archetype 4 Patron
143
discussions and negotiations, the patent owners announced their licensing terms in
March 1995. As a separate and independent entity that licenses the patents in and out
and decides whether patents are a standard essential, MPEG LA was founded. MPEG
LAs operations started in 1997. The MPEG-2 patent pool had initially 8 licensors and
25 patent families. Today the MPEG-2 patent pool has aggregated 710 patents in 57
countries from 27 patent owners. The patent pool is licensed to 1835 licensees. MPEG
LA also administers six other patent pools: ATSC Broadcast standard includes 196
patents from eight patent owners, 133 licensees; AVC/H.264 (MPEG-4 part 10) Video
includes 1733 patent from 27 patent owners, 1227 licensees; VC-1 Video includes
519 patents from 18 patent owners, 236 licensees; MPEG-4 Visual (part 2) Video
includes 981 patents from 29 patent owners, 1086 licensees; MPEG-2 Systems (w/o
MPEG-2 Video) includes 204 patents from ten patent owners, 171 licensees; IEEE
1394 High Speed Data Network includes 270 patents from 10 patent owners, 232
licensees. Four more patent pools are in formation.
Strategy. The mission of MPEG LA is to aggregate a portfolio that comprises a large
number of patents covering a certain technology held by many different patent owners
that interfere with each other and make it difficult for all parties to use this technology.
MPEG LA includes all patents necessary to practice the particular technology. The
company offers a non-exclusive license of this patent portfolio to all companies that
are interested in practicing the technology and distributes the royalties between the
patent owners. MPEG LA is a service provider to licensors and licensees and serves as
administrator.
Organization. MPEG LA is a private company. The headquarters of MPEG LA are in
Colorado. The company has offices in Washington D.C., London, Tokyo, and
Shanghai. The internal competencies of MPEG LA focus on the relationship
management with licensees, as well as licensors and the financial administration,
communication, auditing, and reporting of royalties. Independent experts are employed
for the evaluation and another opinion regarding the essentially of the patents to the
specific technology. Additionally, external law firms handle the legal issues.
Process. MPEG LA aggregates patents covering a technology that faces the problems
of patent thickets and that are interesting for a large group of companies. MPEG LA
focuses on international patents from computer, consumer electronics,
telecommunications, and related high-technology industries. The patent aggregating
company amasses only the legal right without any technology or know-how. To pursue
144
its strategy of providing a precise license for accessing the defined technology, MPEG
LA aggregates mainly patents infringed by use of the defined technology. Patent
owners involved with MPEG LA are also SMEs but mainly MNEs from the electronic
high-technology industry. Additionally, research institutions, such as Fraunhofer
Gesellschaft, have assigned rights to license to MPEG LA.
MPEG LA follows an active approach to structure the patent portfolio. Based on their
webpage, the offices in Europe and Asia and their network of service providers MPEG
LA releases a call for essential patents when a patent pool is formed. Patent owners
react to this call and offer their patents to MPEG LA. To evaluate the essentially of a
patent for the defined technology, independent patent experts are employed. Kenneth
Rubenstein of Proskauer Rose heads the independent patent evaluation and is MPEG
LAs US patent counsel. Other members of the team include Gottfried Schull, Thomas
Rox, and Ralph Schippan of Cohausz & Florack in Dsseldorf for the evaluation of
European patents; Hideo Ozaki of Ohba and Ozaki in Tokyo for the evaluation of
Japanese patents; and Moon & Moon in Seoul for the evaluation of Korean patents. If
the offered patents are suitable for the patent pool, licensors are required to include all
of their essential patents.
MPEG LA gives companies the opportunity to practice a certain standard. Therefore,
MPEG LA offers interested companies a license to a patent pool that consists of all
essential patents to use the standard. The various sublicenses granted by the license are
worldwide, non-exclusive, and non-transferable. The licensee pays royalties for each
produced unit that uses the patents from the patent pool. The license reflects a balance
of royalty, revenues, and administrative fees. For the MPEG-2 patent pool, MPEG LA
has adjusted the royalty rate four times. Due to changing business conditions, the
royalty rate was reduced every time. MPEG LA treats the data of licensees
confidentially and does not disclose the names to patent owners, other licensees, or
third persons. MPEG LA refers always to its administerial function and does not
enforce the patents aggregated in the patent pool. If companies use patents of the
MPEG-2 standard and do not agree to take a license, MPEG LA informs the patent
owner about the situation. The patent owner decides whether to take action. Even
licensing thousands of patents to several thousand companies, MPEG LA has notified
patent owners about infringements less than 40 times.
Value for original patent owner. By assigning patents to MPEG LA, the original patent
owner receives cash flows without the internal costs of licensing negotiations,
Archetype 4 Patron
145
licensing programs, and licensing audits with several licensees. Additionally, MPEG
LA regularly evaluates patents that could be added to the patent pool. That increases
the adoption of a technology and could increase revenues from royalties and sales of
own products.
5.5.3 Non-commercial patent aggregators characteristics
A non-commercial patent aggregator amasses patents and technologies to neutralize
licensing issues in the areas of social or humanitarian importance and makes patents
available for a broad range of users. A non-commercial patent aggregator does not
focus on revenue generation but on fostering innovation and social welfare. Patents
and technologies serve as means for its fostering activities.
Often patents are donated to non-commercial patent aggregators. If a non-commercial
patent aggregator intends to buy patents, public authorities, non-profit organizations,
or companies with major interests in the non-commercial patent aggregator fund the
acquisition activities.
The senior management of non-commercial patent aggregators has a technical or
general management background, often applied in research institutions, development
aid agencies, or other public bodies. External resources as licensing agents, patent
attorneys, patent lawyers, patent intermediaries, or engineers are employed to identify
and select the patents and to make them available for users.
Non-commercial patent aggregators are always set up for a special purpose and
therefore, focus only on patents serving this purpose. Single interests do not drive the
special purposes but they are intended to serve the public, underprivileged groups, or
ecological development. Non-commercial patent aggregators aggregate the legal right
of exclusion and in certain cases, the underlying knowledge. Depending on the
purpose, the geographical application of the patents varies, and, for instance, includes
only patent documents granted in developing countries.
As the targeted patents are carefully selected and specifically applied, the original
patent owners are diverse. Depending on the purpose of the non-commercial patent
aggregator and the area the targeted technology is located in, they can range from
research institutions and universities to MNEs. Non-commercial patent aggregators
take over the enforcement risk from producing companies. Instead of enforcing patents
that cover areas of high public visibility and interest, a producing company can
146
transfer the patents to a non-commercial patent aggregator. On the one hand, it can
prevent suing social welfare increasing projects and risking damage to its reputation.
On the other hand, the companies circumvent the problem of not enforcing its patents.
Often producing companies donate patents to non-commercial patent aggregators and
can claim a tax deduction.28 Additionally, the donating company can use the donation
as a marketing tool and save R&D costs. Applying the donated patents and innovations
on this basis, the donating company receives access to the new inventors. If patents are
essential for the functioning of the non-commercial patent aggregators, patents are also
acquired or exclusively in-licensed.
A non-commercial patent aggregator follows its mission and does not focus on profit
generation. Based on this mission, patents that serve the targeted purpose are
identified, and the non-commercial patent aggregator or an external service provider
contacts patent owners. The only relevant determinant in the evaluation process is the
fit with the non-commercial patent aggregators mission. Having aggregated the
patents, the non-commercial patent aggregator administrates the patent portfolios and
enlarges them. In general, non-commercial patent aggregators administrate the noncommercial licensing program, but they do not enforce patents or exploit them in a
commercial way. In the summary (Figure 38), the relationships between the original
patent owners, the non-commercial patent aggregator, and the patent users are
illustrated. As the figure shows, in general, only cash flows as financial support are
transferred.
28
In the US, donating patents to a non-profit organization can reduce taxes. The donating company is
allowed to claim either the market value or the R&D costs that were necessary to develop the patent
as a tax deduction. Additionally, a percentage of revenues created with products from the donated
patent possibly can be deducted for up to 12 more years. For further information on charitable
donations of patents, see IRS Publication 526.
Archetype 4 Patron
147
Non-commercial patent aggregator
Examples
Golden rice
Eco-patent commons

Initiators
Financial
support
Original patent
owners
Patents/
license
Non commercial
patent aggregator
Applying
patents
Patent users
Commitment
Strategy
Organization
Process
Neutralizes licensing
issues and makes
patent available for a
broad range of users
No-profit orientation,
operates through
donations
Administered by non
profits organizations
Large network of
external service
providers for patent
selection and
management
Selects patents that target specific technology or

purpose.
evaluates technology and patents regarding fit.
Adds value through enlarging the portfolio and
convincing new donors.
Exploits through out-licensing gratuitously.
Figure 38: Summary of non-commercial patent aggregators
The unique characteristic of a non-commercial patent aggregator is that by aggregating

patents, it is able to follow a special purpose without profit orientation.
5.5.4 Non-commercial patent aggregators case study: Golden Rice PDP
Setting. The Golden Rice product development partnership (Golden Rice PDP) is a
result of an initiative of the Rockefeller Foundation accomplished by Professor Ingo
Potrykus of the Institute of Plant Sciences at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology
and Professor Peter Beyer of the University of Freiburg. The project started in 1992
and scientific results were first published in the journal Science in 2000. Due to
malnutrition, large parts of the population in less developed countries in Asia and
Africa suffer from chronic vitamin A deficiency. Vitamin A deficiency is responsible
for 1 to 2 million deaths, 500,000 cases of irreversible blindness, and millions of cases
of xerophthalmia annually, which leads to night blindness (Humphrey, West Jr., &
Sommer, 1992). The developed Golden Rice is genetically modified rice that produces
high level of beta-carotene, a precursor of vitamin A. The newly developed rice could
help to reduce vitamin A deficiency-related diseases.
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The key technology to produce Golden Rice is patented by the inventors who planned
to provide the technology free of charge and restrictions to farmers and research
institutes in developing countries. Problems arose when Golden Rice planned to be
commercialized because in the production of Golden Rice, 70 patents and patent
applications from 32 patentees are involved. To solve this problem and make Golden
Rice available for humanitarian use, the Golden Rice PDP was established.
Strategy. The mission of Golden Rice PDP is to transfer and introduce the newly
developed breed of rice to developing countries. To pursue this mission, Golden Rice
PDP gives access to the technology and the pertaining patents for defined
humanitarian research and the use of Golden Rice for subsistence farmers in
developing countries free of charge.
Organization. The general decision on licenses and strategic use of the Golden Rice
technology is made by the Golden Rice Humanitarian Board. This board consists of
representatives of Syngenta, Rockefeller Foundation, the World Bank, public and
private research institutes, as well as the inventors. It aims to facilitate further Golden
Rice research and to introduce Golden Rice to developing countries. The patents and
licensing agreements are administered within the global Swiss agribusiness company
Syngenta. The Golden Rice Project Manager is Dr. Jorge Mayer of Campus
Technologies Freiburg, University of Freiburg, Germany. The Golden Rice Network
initially deploys Golden Rice. This network consists of research institutions and
universities from the Philippines, India, Vietnam, Bangladesh, China, Indonesia, and
Germany. Dr. Gerard Barry of the International Rice Research Institute from the
Philippines coordinates it. The institutions of the Golden Rice Network are responsible
for introgressing the Golden Rice trait into local varieties.
Process. The Golden Rice PDP focuses on patents that cover the technology to
produce the newly developed rice breed Golden Rice. Because the core technology
was already developed, only the patents are of interest without any underlying
knowledge or technology. A freedom to operate analysis was conducted when the
technology was ready to be further developed for humanitarian purposes and
commercialization. The freedom to operate analysis, conducted by the International
Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications, showed that 70 patents and
patent applications from 32 companies and universities were applicable to the newly
developed breed of rice. The result of further analysis was that 11 patents had a high
potential to serve as a barrier to the deployment of Golden Rice in countries with the
Archetype 4 Patron
149
highest levels of vitamin A deficiency. Therefore, these patents that could prevent
deployment were automatically the targeted patents. The selection of patents, as well
as of patent owners only focused on the objective to generate freedom to operate for
the Golden Rice technology.
In the structuring phase in 2000, the Golden Rice PDP between the inventors and
Syngenta29 was established. Facing the challenge that patents could restrict Golden
Rice and the complex negotiation for licensing agreements, the inventors approached a
number of patent owners to find a private partner. On May 16, 2000, Syngenta
announced the collaboration to make rice containing vitamin A available free of
charge for humanitarian use. Syngenta was involved in a research project funded by
the European Commission of which Golden Rice was a small part. The company holds
patents that cover technologies necessary to produce Golden Rice from this project. To
aggregate the patent portfolio, the inventors assigned their exclusive rights to
Greenovation, a spin-off of the University of Freiburg that out-licenses university
biotechnology research projects. Greenovation assigned the exclusive rights to
Syngenta. The aggregation of the patent portfolio was completed when Syngenta gave
access to all patents of Syngenta and Syngenta Seeds and negotiated access to the
related patents of Bayer AG, Monsanto, Novartis, Orynova, and Zeneca Mogen. All
companies provide access to their technology free of charge for humanitarian research
and the use of Golden Rice in developing countries. Based on positive publicity in
TIME magazine, Monsanto offered a free license to the inventors. The increasing
public pressure led to the agreements with the other companies. Figure 39 illustrates
the patent aggregating process and the involved parties.
The research project developed the Golden Rice technology and provided a proof of
concept but did not develop marketable products. In the value-added phase, Syngenta
developed the proof of concept results into deliverable products.
29
The partnership was established with AstraZeneca. On November 13, 2000, AstraZeneca merged
with the seed and agrochemical division of Novartis to form Syngenta.
150
Structuring phase step 2
Structuring phase step 1
Syngenta
Humanitarian license
Greenovation
Exclusive right
Golden Rice
product
development
partnership
Exclusive right
Inventors
,QJR3RWU\NXV
3HWHU%H\HU
Monsanto
Novartis
Orynova
Zeneca Mogen
Exploitation phase
Licensees
Research Institutes
Resource poor
farmers
Bayer AG
License
Royalty rate
Licensees
Figure 39: Patent aggregating process of Golden Rice PDP
The patents of the Golden Rice PDP are exploited in two ways. Syngenta has the full
commercial rights to the invention worldwide and can therefore commercialize Golden
Rice in the developed world. In the beginning of the partnership, Syngenta estimated a
market for health conscious customers in industrial nations and planned to introduce
Golden Rice as nutritionally enhanced food. In 2005, Syngenta decided not to go
commercial with Golden Rice in developed countries. Additionally, Syngenta issued a
humanitarian license to the inventors who have the right to sublicense the Golden Rice
technology to national and international research institutes and resource poor farmers
in developing countries free of charge. Syngenta also has the right to license for
humanitarian use.30 The Golden Rice Humanitarian Board is the body that gives
advice on all issues and licensing agreements regarding the humanitarian use.
Value for original patent owner. By giving access to the technology for humanitarian
use, the original patent owner can prevent the enforcement of these patents. Enforcing
patents used in humanitarian projects can damage the reputation of the company.
30
The research project developed the Golden Rice technology and provided a proof of concept but did
not develop marketable products. In the value-added phase, Syngenta developed the proof of
concept results into deliverable products.
Archetype 4 Patron
151
Getting involved in non-commercial patent projects can prevent that and additionally
generate long-term benefits through reputation enhancement. Golden Rice is a highly
visible project. Assigning patents that help to improve conditions for people in
developing countries can be used for positive public relations, as well as counterargument in cases of critics on patenting, especially in the life science industry. In
particular, Syngenta has profited from the Golden Rice PDP. By assigning the patents
of the inventors to Syngenta and the right to the worldwide commercial use, the
company received a new almost marketable technology, financed by public funds,
with little R&D effort. Research institutes that develop the technology further have to
transfer the commercial rights of improvements to the technology to Syngenta.
5.6 Summary and evaluation of potentials

The analysis of the 27 case companies finds that patent aggregating companies differ
substantially regarding their strategies and motives to buy patents. That allows eight
different business models to be distinguished. The analysis also finds that patent
aggregating companies can be clearly distinguished regarding their competencies and
the rewards they offer to the original patent owners. Based on these results, four
archetypes are identified:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
The Merchant this archetype features business competency and provides patent
owners with monetary short-term rewards, such as lump sum payments.
The Gardener this archetype features business competency and provides patent
owners with monetary and non-monetary long-term rewards, such as continuous
payments to improve the financial situation, organizational learning
opportunities, the transfer from commercialization risks, and insurance against
losses of future cash flows.
The Collector this archetype features nuisance competency and provides patent
owners with monetary short-term rewards, such as lump sum payments.
The Patron This archetype features nuisance competency and provides patent
owners with monetary and non-monetary long-term rewards, such as continuous
payments, marketing tools, the transfer of litigation risks, and marketing tools.
Two business models represent each archetype. The business models differ regarding
the breath of transaction. For each archetype, one business model focuses on the
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aggregation of the sole legal right of exclusion. The other business model amasses
patents but also technologies, and knowledge.
The four archetypes of patent aggregating companies are able to realize the
aforementioned external and internal potentials to different degrees. Based on the
empirical findings and reflecting them on the typology and the potentials, Table 3
evaluates the different potentials by business model. The business models have a
different breath of transaction. Therefore, they differ slightly in the potentials they
offer. To describe the potentials accurately, the business models rather than the
archetypes are evaluated.
In line with the business competency they offer, the archetypes merchant and gardener
can realize particular external potentials. Their business models are based on market
knowledge and technology understanding. Therefore, the external potential of market
interaction can be realized, in contrast to the archetypes that only work with nuisance
competency.
In addition, the archetypes merchant and gardener are able to take over R&D risks.
Both archetypes amass patents that have a business case. Even though directly realized
in commercialized products, the original patent owner is able to recoup investments
from R&D. In certain cases, not only the past risks of R&D but also future R&D risks
are transferred. The archetypes collector and patron take over enforcement risks in a
certain way and offer the original patent owner an alternative way to patent litigation.
Merchant
Gardener
Collector
Access to resources (e.g.,

Capital Royalty, Paul
Capital Healthcare)
IgniteIP, Patent Select)
Network (e.g., Patent
Select)
Market penetration (e.g.,

AlseT)
(e.g., IP Holdings)
Patent
incubating
fund
Noncommercial
patent
aggregator
Network (e.g., Eco-Patent

Commons)
Liquidity and market

clearing (e.g., AST, RPX)
Defensive
patent
aggregator
Patent pooling
company

clearing (e.g., Acacia)
Patent
enforcement
company

clearing (e.g., Patent
Select)
(QIRUFHPHQWULVNV
KHGJLQJ Transaction costs (e.g.,
e.g., Sipro Lab)
MPEG LA)

Sipro Lab, MPEG LA,
Networks (e.g., Via
Licensing)
(QIRUFHPHQWULVNV
KHGJLQJ
e.g., Golden Rice)
(QIRUFHPHQWULVNV
e.g., AST, RPX)
RPX)
(QIRUFHPHQWULVNV
e.g., Alliacense, Papst)
Acacia)
5 'ULVNV
KHGJLQJe.g.,
IgniteIP, Patent Select)
5 'ULVNV
KHGJLQJe.g.,
AlseT, Royalty Pharma)
(e.g., Patent Select),
Transaction costs (e.g.,
IgniteIP)
(e.g., Alpha Patentfond),
Transaction costs (e.g.,
Alpha Patentfond)
5 'ULVNV
KHGJLQJe.g.,
Alpha Patentfonds, Patent
Invest)
R&D risks' hedging (e.g.,
Intellectual Ventures,
Techquity)
Cost effectiveness
Risk reduction
Internal potentials

AST, RPX), Networks (e.g.,
OIN)

IP Navigation, Papst)

Intellectual Ventures,
Tequity)
Royalty
monetization
company

clearing (e.g., Intellectual
Ventures)
(e.g., Intellectual Ventures)

Alpha Patentfonds, Patent
Invest)
Resource enhancement
Patent
acquisition
company

clearing (e.g., Alpha
Patentfonds, Patent Invest)
Market fostering
Market penetration (e.g.,

Alpha Patentfond),
Opportunity Identification
(e.g., Alpha Patentfond)
Patent trading
fund
Market interaction
External potentials
Table 3: Evaluation of potentials by business model
Patron
Company strategy (e.g.,

Eco-Patent Commons)

Eco-Patent Commons)

Patent Select)
Innovation strategy (e.g.,
Patent Select)
Innovation strategy (e.g.,

Techquity)
Decision making
154
Leveraging patent portfolios
6 Leveraging patent portfolios by utilizing patent aggregating

companies
Patent aggregating companies show eight characteristic business models and can be
classified in four general archetypes, which are distinct in the rewards they pay the
original patent owner and in the competencies they offer.
In the following chapter, a management framework is derived. This framework
provides guidelines for managers of producing companies for which patents and
circumstances for which patent aggregators can be utilized. As the patent aggregation
business and the market for patents and technologies are fast changing environments,
the management framework reflects the status quo and the recent strategies and
activities of patent aggregating companies. To understand the dynamics and to assess
the future direction of patent aggregating companies business models, in the second
part of the chapter, the development of patent aggregating companies is analyzed. In
the third part, the driving factor behind the development is identified.
6.1 Managing the utilization of patent aggregating companies

Producing companies have several options to generate value from their patent portfolio
(for an overview of value generating options, see Figure 5). Patent aggregating
companies cannot be utilized for all of them. The following part discusses for which
value generating options patent aggregating companies can be utilized and where the
limitations of patent aggregating companies utilizations are. In the last part, a
management framework is presented that aligns the typology of patent aggregating
companies, the value generating options they support, and the limitations producing
companies face, and this serves as a guideline for patent managers to make the final
decisions on the utilization of patent aggregating companies. As the patent aggregating
industry is a fast changing industry and new business models emerge as established
ones may vanish, the management framework reflects the current situation.
6.1.1 Value generating options and patent aggregating companies
As patent aggregating companies amass patents and usually acquire ownership rights
or exclusive rights to exploit the patents, these companies can be utilized in external
Managing the utilization of patent aggregating companies
155
patent exploitation projects, more specifically for external patent exploitation projects
that focus on donating, selling, or out-licensing patents. Figure 40 gives an overview
of the different value generating options that can be conducted with patent aggregating
companies and the business model of patent aggregating companies that can be
utilized for the specific value generating option.
Types of value
Collateralization
Royalty monet. company
Financial
value
Selling with tech
Stick licensing
Selling without tech

Patent trading fund
Donation
Standardization
Non-com. patent aggregator

Strategic
value
Selling with tech

Open Source
Defensive
value
Decision
Carrot licensing for

selected applications
Cross licensing
Non-com. patent aggregator

Strategic needs
of companies
Own use
Capturing remaining
value
Realizing complementary
Keep
Release
License
Figure 40: Value generating options that can include patent aggregating companies
For the objective of generating financial value from patents, producing companies can
sell patents with or without technology or enforce infringed patents and generate
licensing revenues from stick licensing. Additionally, patents that already generate
revenues from internal use or existing carrot licensing agreements can be used for
collateralization.
Patent owners can utilize royalty monetization companies for generating immediate
cash flows from patents that generate long-term cash flows. The patents are used to
156
protect a product internally (or they are already out-licensed). The resulting cash flows
(true royalties or product cash flows) can be sold to the royalty monetization company
and the patent, even used internally, can generate financial value.
Several business models of patent aggregating companies can be utilized for selling
patents. Producing companies divest patents mainly for financial reasons. In
transactions of patents and technologies, a producing company can sell the patents to a
patent acquisition company. Transactions of the sole legal right can also utilize the
patent acquisition company. For transferring the patent without additional technology
and knowledge, the producing company can approach several different business
models of patent aggregating companies and sell patents to patent trading funds, patent
enforcement funds, and defensive patent aggregators.
Patent enforcement actions can also generate financial value from patents. In some
cases, producing companies use patents to protect their own products from imitation,
in other cases, the patents are not used internally but they are used to assert patents
against infringers. Both ways, patents always generate a complementary value from
the patent. To enforce patents, producing companies can utilize patent enforcement
companies and sell the ownership rights or the exclusive rights of exploitation to the
patent enforcement company. Utilizing defensive patent aggregators, the producing
company receives cash flows. The transaction generates non-direct additional financial
value from enforcement, but the generated value is based on the same mechanism, and
the producing company is able to generate complementary value.
Besides the pure revenue generating aspect of utilizing patent aggregating companies,
producing companies can use several business models of the patent aggregation
companies to generate strategic value. An option to generate strategic value is the
donation of patents. To create strategic value in the form of potential innovation
inflows and from reputation and marketing effects, a producing company can utilize
non-commercial patent aggregators. By donating patents to a non-commercial patent
aggregator, the producing company releases a patent not internally used and captures
remaining value from this patent.
A patent, in addition with technology and knowledge, can also generate strategic value
if a producing company sells the patent to a patent incubating fund. In addition to the
cash inflows from the sale, the producing company can commercialize a product in the
long-term and therefore, secure or expand its market position. Learning effects and
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resource enhancements can back this development. Value from the multiplication of
the technology can be realized if the producing company utilizes the patent incubating
fund for a carrot licensing of the advanced technology.
A producing company with the strategic objective to standardize a technology, to
secure its market position, and to gain new market shares can utilize patent pooling
companies. In addition to the strategic value created from patents transferred to patent
pooling companies, these transactions generate a defensive value. Patents in a patent
pool serve as basis for cross-licensing agreements between players in a standard and
prevent patent infringements in the standardized technology.
The option of releasing patents for open source projects generates defensive value. A
producing company can utilize non-commercial patent aggregators for open source
transactions and hence, generate access to other technologies and innovation without
paying for it and, very importantly, without infringing patents.
6.1.2 Constraints in utilizing patent aggregating companies
Despite the potentials patent aggregating companies offer producing companies for
leveraging their patent portfolios, several constraints apply for the utilization of patent
aggregating companies. Hence, value-generating options are not always
straightforward to realize. Based on a comprehensive analysis of literature and
empirical data, four constraints can be derived. The four general constraints that affect
the utilization of patent aggregating companies and the choice of value generating
options are:
x Value of patents: Even though patent aggregating companies acquire vast quantities
of patents, they are not interested in worthless patents.
x Timing: Most patent aggregating companies have specialized business models.
They buy only patents at certain times, and they buy only patents covering
technologies in a certain stage of the product lifecycle.
x Industry: Patent aggregating companies are mainly interested in markets and
industries with a high relevance of patents and large revenue potentials.
x Feed the troll: In the last decade, a systemized and financial powerful patent
enforcement industry has evolved. Selling patents to patent aggregating companies
that focus on patent enforcement may fuel this system.
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Figure 41 gives an overview of the four constraints that hinder the straightforward
utilization of patent aggregating companies.
Value of
patents
Types of value
Financial
value
Strategic
value
Feed
the
troll
Timing
Defensive
value
Strategic needs
of companies
Decision
Own use
Capturing remaining Realizing complementary
value
Keep
Release
License
Industry
Figure 41: Constraints that affect the utilization of patent aggregating companies
Value of patents
The PatVal-EU project analyzed the value and use of more than 9,000 European
patents. An important result of the study is that about 17.4% of all patents in a patent
portfolio are so-called sleeping patents. Sleeping patents are defined as patents not
employed in internal use (protecting production processes or incorporated in a
product), licensing, cross licensing, licensing and internal use, or blocking competitors
(Giuri et al., 2007). Even unused, these patents may still have option value to the
holder.
An accurate valuation of patents is still difficult to conduct but several studies confirm
that the general distribution of patent values is highly skewed (e.g., Gambardella et al.,
2008; Griliches, 1990; Harhoff, Scherer, & Vopel, 2003a, Harhoff, Scherer, & Vopel,
159
2003b; Scherer, 1965). That means that only a small proportion of patents has a high
value. The majority of patents in a patent portfolio are on the low-value side and of
little value. Schankerman and Pakes (1986) find that only 5% of all patents generate
circa half the value of a patent portfolio. If the original patent owner tries to exploit
these patents economically, they produce a zero or even negative stream of profits
(Gambardella et al., 2007).
In general, producing companies are mainly willing to sell patents that are not in use,
more specifically, they are willing to sell above-mentioned sleeping patents. If these
sleeping patents result from research projects stranded due to strategy changes or from
companies that were acquired but do not fit the new companys strategy, these patents
may have a large economic value for third parties. However, only a few patents are on
the valuable tail of the value distribution, these sleeping patents have little economic
value for the patent owner, and often they have only little economic value for other
companies. Instead of abandoning the sleeping patents, firms try to sell them and often
see patent aggregating companies as buyers that acquire everything they are offered.
However, patent aggregating companies do not serve as a garbage dump. They buy
only patents with economical value. Even though patent aggregating companies
acquire patents in large quantities from a broad range of industries and technologies,
they have specific business models and focus on patents that can generate value in
different forms. If the original patent owner does not see a market, now or in the
future, for the technology, or the technology is already obsolete, it might be better to
abandon the patent instead of investing internal costs to become engaged with a patent
aggregating company. Some patent aggregating companies focus on buying embryonic
or already commercialized technologies but they do not buy patents without, recent or
future markets.
Timing
Original patent owners also face constraints regarding the timing. The first timing
refers to the acquisition phase of the patent aggregating company. The second timing
refers to the timing of selling patents in the right stage of the product life cycle.
Several patent aggregating companies do not amass patents all the time. Backed by
financial investors, they first acquire money and then amass the patents. That means
they have only a certain window of time for patent acquisition.
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Products and technologies pass through different stages, ranging from their invention
to their withdrawal from sales. This process is called the product lifecycle (Levitt,
1965). A generic product lifecycle can be divided into the two main phases: product
development and product commercialization, and their six different stages. During the
product development phase, the product does not generate revenues but the inventing
company has to invest in R&D. Once the product is introduced to the market, it
generates revenues. The amount of revenues and especially the annual growth rate of
revenues depend on the age of the product. At a certain point in time, most products
have reached their revenue peak, and sales start to decline.
Along with the product, lifecycle moves the technology lifecycle and the patents that
cover the technology. Discovered in basic research or as idea in the development, the
technology evolves from an embryonic technology to a legacy technology. In general,
patents cover the developed technologies and change during the lifecycle regarding
their claims, scope, and applications. Basic patents protect the results from basic
research. As the technology advances, the number of patents and the number of patent
applicants increase, different applications and substituting technologies are covered,
and blocking patents are filed.
Producing companies make the decision to sell patents and to become engaged with
patent aggregating companies in all stages of the product lifecycle. However, the
success of utilizing patent aggregating companies strongly depends on the match
between the patent aggregating company and the stage of the lifecycle the patent is
located in. Patent aggregating companies specialize in amassing patents covering
technologies from one certain stage of the product lifecycle. Patents that are filed to
cover basic research are only interesting for patent incubating funds. These patent
aggregating companies focus on conquering the stage of development and scaling up.
Patent aggregating companies that enforce patents or trade patents have business
models that are not able to exploit patents from embryonic technologies. Patents that
cover products or technologies in the product commercialization phase and therefore,
are already quite mature and easier to evaluate are interesting for a larger number of
patent aggregating companies. Nevertheless, the actual age of patents is an important
criterion for all patent aggregating companies. Patents close to their expiry date are not
interesting for any patent aggregating company regardless of the product lifecycle
stage.
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Industry
The value of patents, the patenting behavior of firms, and the strategic use of patents
differ across industries and technology classes (e.g., Ernst, 2001; Gassmann & Bader,
2011; Giummo, 2010; Giuri et al., 2007; Griliches, 1990; Lanjouw & Schankerman,
2001; Levin, 1986)
In the chemical and pharmaceutical industry patents are an important and effective
means to protect innovations (e.g., Cohen et al., 2000; Levin et al., 1987; Mansfield,
1986). Patents are effective when the development of new products is expensive, but
relatively cheap to imitate (Arundel & Patel, 2003). Studies show that in the chemical
and pharmaceutical industry, about 80% of patentable inventions is patented
(Mansfield, 1986). Patents are generally used to secure the market power of chemical
and pharmaceutical products (Gassmann & Bader, 2011). In particular, blockbuster
products in the pharmaceutical industry are highly dependent on patents, since
generics produced by other firms constitute a high threat to the revenue created by the
respective blockbuster product. The value of patents within the chemical and
pharmaceutical industries, on average, is of higher value than patents from other
industries (Giuri et al., 2007). Chemical and pharmaceutical industry differ
substantially regarding litigation rates, since there is a case filed for 20% of the
pharmaceutical patents, whereas the litigation rate for chemicals is very low. In
general, pharmaceuticals are the most litigated technology group of all assessed groups
(Lanjouw & Schankerman, 2001).
Seven of the top ten patent applicants at the EPO are companies from the technology
field of electrical engineering. The companies Philips and Siemens are ranked number
one and two with 2,556 and 1,708 patent applications, respectively in the year 2009
(EPO, 2009). A high interdependence between firms resulting from patents
characterizes the electrical engineering industry. Companies are not able to market
new products autonomously without being contingent on third-party patents (Blind et
al., 2009). Especially in the telecommunication industry, the interdependence between
firms is particularly distinctive (Gassmann & Bader, 2011; Leiponen & Byma, 2009).
This results in cross-licensing actions, which are prevailing and inevitable for
companies in this industry. As found by various researchers, the share of crosslicensing in electrical engineering is above average (e.g., Anand & Khanna, 2000;
Giuri et al., 2007; Grindley & Teece, 1997; Hall & Ziedonis, 2001). Consequently,
companies often only file for patents to block competitors (von Graevenitz, Wagner, &
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Harhoff, 2008), or to strengthen their positions in cross-licensing negotiations (Cohen

et al., 2000). Therefore, in the electrical engineering industry, patents are not an
effective means to protect innovations. Companies rate other means to secure profits
from R&D (e.g., a head start, establishment of effective production sales and service
facilities, and rapid movement down the learning curve) as much more effective than
patents (Mazzoleni & Nelson, 1998).
Based on the relevance of patents in the different industries and the patenting behavior
of firms in these industries, producing companies are limited regarding their choice of
patent aggregating companies. Often, business models of patent aggregating
companies work only in specific industries. To enforce acquired patents, the patent has
to be in use; infringement has to be easy to proof; infringers have to be easy to detect;
there must be a sufficient number of infringers or one infringer with a very large
market share and large revenues resulting from the infringed patents; and the outcomes
of litigation lawsuits have to be difficult to predict. All these factors are mainly
prevalent in the high-technology industry. In contrast, business models of patent
aggregating companies that transfer technologies, or license patents for different
applications have to operate in an environment where only few patents cover a
product. The buyer or licensee of the patent portfolio can only make limited use of the
patents if they are blocked by a web other legal rights. A general condition is that the
market for the protected product offers potential for large revenues. Patent aggregating
companies rarely buy patents covering technologies commercialized in niche markets
or from niche industries.
Feed the troll
Peter Detkin first coined the term patent troll in 2001. At this time, Peter Detkin
(now Vice Chairman of Intellectual Ventures, a patent acquisition company) was Vice
President and Assistant General Counsel of Intel. Using the term patent troll, Detkin
described a patent troll is somebody who tries to make a lot of money off a patent that
they are not practicing and have no intention of practicing and in most cases never
practiced (as cited in Sandburg, 2001). The term has since come into common use. A
growing amount of legal, as well as management literature, both academic and nonacademic, deals with the discussion on the term, the business models of patent trolls
and their impact on innovation, the patent system, and economic welfare (see section
2.3.2). Fact is that these types of companies enforce patents without having their own
physical products. Patent aggregating companies do not produce physical goods.
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Therefore, some business models of patent aggregating companies can also be called
patent trolls because their strategy is to buy patents and enforce them (For a discussion
on the definition, see section 2.3.2).
Patent trolls cause controversy, and emotions run high. On the one hand, an original
patent owner who sells patents to a so-called patent troll has several advantages
through this transaction: the patent owner is no longer engaged in the enforcement of
the patent, they have not to bear the risks of enforcement, and they generate an
immediate cash inflow. Without so-called patent trolls, many patents would not be
enforced due to a lack of financial or human resources, or to lacking engineering and
legal skills to detect and assert infringements. On the other hand, the infringer often
has to pay high royalties, and out of court settlements with mutually beneficial crosslicensing arrangement are not possible.
Original patent owners who are interested in selling patents to patent aggregating
companies that enforce infringed patents should assess the short-term benefits over the
costs of a systemized patent enforcement system conducted by third parties. As a
producing company, the original patent owner could be a profiteer one day and a prey
at the next. So-called patent trolls make no distinction between infringing companies
that are their clients or not. Therefore, selling infringed patents to a patent aggregating
company that enforces the patents fuels the system and may lead to the situation that
professionalized systematic patent enforcement costs the original patent owner more
than the enforcement of their patents rewards him.
6.1.3 Framework for the utilization of patent aggregating companies
It has been shown that patent aggregating companies can be utilized for several valuegenerating options, such as selling patents with or without technologies, licensing
patents to enforce them or to multiply technologies, donating patents, or selling
royalties. Even though they theoretically support many value generating options, the
utilization of patent aggregating companies is limited regarding their industry focus
and their targeted patents. Additionally, producing companies follow diverse strategic
or financial objectives in leveraging patent portfolios. Based on these three parameters,
the industry and patent focus, as well as the objectives of the companies, a typologybased management framework is suggested. Figure 42 visualizes the management
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framework for leveraging producing companies patent portfolios by utilizing patent

aggregating companies.
Competency
Nuisance competency
Business competency
monetary shortterm rewards
Merchant
Realizing remaining
value of matured
patents with
business case
Collector
Realizing value of
infringed patents
and transfer of
enforcement risks
Sales of patents
(Exclusive right to
exploit)
Rewards
monetary and non-monetary

long-term rewards
Gardener
Realizing lasting
company funding
and company
development
Broad
industry focus
Patron
Realizing strategic
positioning and
complementary
value
Electrical
engineering
Occasional life
science
Out-licensing
Donations
Sales of technologies
and royalties
Figure 42: Management framework for utilizing patent aggregating companies
Based on the R&D strategy and the patent strategy, a producing company decides
whether to exploit patents internally or externally. This decision has to be made before
deciding to utilize a patent aggregating company. Therefore, the management
framework assumes this strategic decision as granted and supports the operational
decisions of which patents can be leveraged with the support of which archetype of
patent aggregating company.
The strategic decision on how to leverage each patent is the basis for the management
framework. Therefore value generating options, expectations of rewards, patent
characteristics, market environment, and the companys industry are the parameters for
the management framework.
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Based on the systematic management of the patent portfolio, the producing company
decides about the internal and/or external exploitation of a patent. In patent audits, the
potential, the strategic fit, and the legal quality of the patent are analyzed. As a result,
the producing company decides whether to assign or to out-license the patent.
Patents covering mature technologies already used in the market but do not fit the
producing companys strategy any longer can be sold, and the original patent owner
generates an immediate cash inflow. To prevent internal costs of searching for
potential transaction partners, negotiating with transaction partners, and monitoring the
execution of the transaction, the producing company can offer the patents to the
archetype merchant. Utilizing the archetype merchant can help original patent owners
to realize the remaining value of mature patents but still have a business case.
Companies of all sizes, research institutions, and universities can utilize the archetype
merchant.
Companies of all sizes, research institutions, and inventors from high-technology
industries can also utilize the archetype collector. In addition to selling abandoned
patents, infringed patents can be sold to the archetype collector. Utilizing the archetype
collector can help the original patent owner to realize value from infringed patents and
transfer the enforcement risk. Companies that can control the exposure of litigation
lawsuits may generate more revenues from enforcing the patents without utilizing the
archetype collector. For utilizing the archetype collector, the original patent owner
always pays an indirect fee for the risk transfer. Discounted purchase prices reflect this
indirect fee.
If the results of the patent audit show that a patent covers a technology in the core
business of the company, other value generating options rather than selling may be the
first choice. In addition to an internal exploitation, patents can also be leveraged
externally by utilizing patent aggregating companies. Patents covering embryonic
technologies or patents that already generate steady cash flows can be transferred to
the archetype gardener. Utilizing the archetype gardener can help the original patent
owner to realize long-term company funding and company development. Companies
of all sizes and research institutions can utilize the archetype gardener. SMEs and
research institutions, in particular, benefit from engaging with the archetype gardener.
Large companies and research institutions from high-technology industries can also
utilize the archetype patron to leverage patents covering core technologies. Patents in
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areas with a high likelihood of infringement can be transferred to the archetype patron
without giving up future benefits from the patent. Utilizing the archetype patron can
help the original patent owner to realize a better strategic position in the product
market and to realize complementary value. However, original patent owners are
limited in the utilization of the archetype patron because this archetype has a limited
and very selective demand and can only be used in certain times and in specific
technological areas.
6.2 Development of patent aggregating companies

Patent aggregating companies are a new empirical phenomenon characterized by
continuously changing business models. An analysis of past trends may help to
understand the altering patent aggregating business. With a better understanding of the
past, future developments and modification of the utilization of patent aggregating
companies may better be estimated.
Analyzing the emergence, maturation, and utilization of patent aggregating companies
three major trends can be observed (see Figure 43):
x Trend 1: The first business models of patent aggregating companies were interest
groups; nowadays, patent aggregating companies serve as investment
opportunities.
x Trend 2: Emergence of new patent aggregating business models is not only the
action of entrepreneurs but also a reaction to existing business models.
x Trend 3: The assets patent aggregating companies focus on have expanded from
purely patent transfer to a transfer of technology and knowledge.
Development of patent aggregating companies
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Business competency
Gardener
Patent trading
fund
company
Patent
incubating
fund
Patent acquisition
company

Nuisance competency
Competency
Merchant
Collector
Patent enforcement
company

Defensive patent
aggregator
Patron

Patent pooling
company

Non-commercial
patent aggregator
Rewards
monetary shortterm rewards
monetary and non-monetary

long-term rewards
Figure 43: The three major trends that drive the evolution of patent aggregating companies
In the following sections the three trends are described in detail.

6.2.1 Trend 1: From aggregation of interest to aggregation of investments
Even though patent aggregating companies have emerged as a new phenomenon
associated with the development of market for patents and technologies and open
innovation, a predecessor was already formed in 1856. During the end of the 19th
century, the sewing machine manufacturers I. M. Singer Co., Wheeler & Wilson Co.,
and Grover & Baker Co. accused each other of infringing each others patents. The
lawyer and president of Grover & Baker Co. Orlando B. Potter proposed to pool the
respective patents, rather than to sue each other into bankruptcy. Hence, a group of
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joint interest was created. In addition, the sewing machine patent pool supported the
manufacturer interests sustaining artificially high prices for the licensed machines31
(Serafino, 2007). Recent patent pooling companies were set up to address
standardization issues and solve the problem of patent thickets, but the joint interests
of patent owners still driven them.
The first modern patent aggregating companies have emerged, taking advantage of the
combination of two factors: (1) an increasingly complex patent landscape, (2) patents
transition from legal rights to companys assets and an increase in patent transaction,
as well as the fact that many companies, for a long time, have not been aware of these
two factors. The number of patent applications is increasing, and patent offices in the
US and Europe show significant backlogs of patent applications. Therefore, it can no
longer be guaranteed that all granted patents are of high quality. That leads to an
increasing risk for producing companies regarding unintended patent infringements,
patent thickets, and uncertainty of patent granting. Since BlackBerry maker Research
in Motion agreed to pay USD 612.5 million to patent holding company NTP to settle a
long-running dispute in 2006 (Magliocca, 2007), the public has been aware of the
potential size of patent infringement lawsuits. Therefore, business models that take
advantage of infringed patents and that are driven by entrepreneurial spirit have
emerged. One interviewee stated he started his business when he met an entrepreneur
in his sector because it seemed to have such a large financial potential:
When I paid a visit to [his] office, it was like walking into Versailles. When I sat in the
chair in his office, my feet did not touch the ground. I got that. I have had psychology
classes and I understand what he was trying to do.
Especially during the turn of the century, entrepreneurs took the chance and founded
patent aggregating companies. Five out of six patent aggregating companies, created
by daring entrepreneurs, were founded in this time.
As the market for technology and patents has evolved, the risks related with these
assets and transactions are easier to evaluate, and large patent suits have come into the
public eye, patent aggregating companies have moved on from entrepreneurial driven
companies to investment vehicles of the financial industry. Large financial resources
31
On the day the last patent expired, I.M. Singer reduced the price of its sewing machines by 50% in
order to compete in an open market.
Development of patent aggregating companies
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from institutional or private investors back 12 of the 27 sample firms, with all of them,
except three, founded after 2004.
6.2.2 Trend 2: Responses to organized patent enforcement
Business models of patent aggregating companies have not only emerged because
single persons or entities recognized the business opportunity. Especially during the
last five years, business models have emerged as reaction to already existing, revenue
generating business models and their use of patents.
Patent enforcement companies aggregate patents to enforce them and generate
revenues through a stick licensing approach. In patent infringement lawsuits between
producing companies, often both companies use their own patent portfolios as basis
for negotiation. Agreements are often closed not only through licensing payments but
also through cross-licensing agreements. Patent enforcement companies are not
interested in cross-licensing agreements, and defendants have to pay full licensing
fees. As a reaction to this business model, defensive patent aggregators have emerged.
Many patents that are interesting for patent enforcement companies are freely
available in the market. A single producing company is not able to buy all relevant
patents to prevent a patent enforcement company from getting hold of them.
Therefore, defensive patent aggregators bundle interests of several companies and
acquire potential threatening patents. This action prevents infringement lawsuits
against producing companies. Therefore, the business model of defensive patent
aggregators is only a reaction to the business model of the patent enforcement
company and does not exist without it.
As patents are used to block competitors in certain areas, this behavior not only
impacts the revenue level of firms but in certain cases, also impacts the wellbeing of
the society or groups of people. For instance, to be forced to pay licensing fees, users
in less developed countries are excluded from certain patented technologies. In
addition, certain technologies that foster sustainability and resource saving
technologies face patent thickets or patent holdings of patent enforcement companies.
This situation prevents innovation and technological progress. Therefore, as reaction to
blocking positions and patent enforcement strategies of other patent aggregating
companies (as well as producing companies), the business model of non-commercial
patent aggregators has evolved. Patents held by a non-commercial patent aggregator
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do not exclude users from technology. Non-commercial patent aggregators offer,

mostly free of charge, access to technology and could be able to foster innovation or
improve the conditions of disadvantaged groups.
6.2.3 Trend 3: From enforcement agents to innovation intermediaries
Patent aggregating business started with a focus on aggregating the legal right of
exclusion. The first business models are based on the exclusion of third parties and the
enforcement of patents (patent enforcement companies, patent pooling companies). As
the innovation paradigm has changed from closed innovation to open innovation, the
transfer of patents and technologies has become important for a firms innovation
process. This change is also observable in the change of the patent aggregating
companies business models.
According to Chesbrough (2006), innovation intermediaries help technology providers
to find buyers or licensees for their technologies. In return, innovation intermediaries
allow technology buyers to use technologies they do not have developed in a rapid and
beneficial fashion. Innovation intermediaries occur in the two major forms of agents
and brokers (Chesbrough, 2006):
x Agents: These companies represent only one side of the technology transaction.
x Brokers (or market makers): These companies match buyers and sellers of a
technology, shape the terms of the transaction, and sometimes support the
commercialization of technologies.
Analyzing the activities of the archetype merchant, as well as the archetype gardener
(or more specifically patent incubating funds because royalty monetization companies
base their business models on existing licensing agreements) leads to the conclusion
that these archetypes are innovation intermediaries (according to Chesbrough, 2006).
While aggregating patents from original patent owners, these archetypes help firms to
exploit their technologies externally. Business models of both archetypes aggregate
patents and sell or out-license them to generate revenues. Therefore, they match the
supply and demand of technologies; hence, they are innovation intermediaries, or more
specifically, brokers or match makers (according to Chesbroughs (2006) definition).
Patent aggregating companies are no longer the sole buyer of enforceable rights but
have developed into transaction parties and transaction enablers in the market for
technologies.
Meeting demand for learning effect as driving factor
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6.3 Meeting demand for learning effect as driving factor

As markets for patents and technologies lack transparency and are characterized by
high transaction costs, third parties as enabler of transactions have emerged. Defensive
patent aggregators, patent acquisition companies, patent enforcement companies,
patent incubating funds, and patent trading funds acquire patents and fulfill a match
making function in a very broad sense; therefore, they can be seen as intermediaries in
the market for patents and technologies. The emergence and the activities of
intermediaries can be discussed from the perspectives of different economic theories.
From a transaction costs economics perspective (Williamson, 1975, Williamson,
1985), intermediaries can help buyers and sellers set up appropriate governance
mechanisms for executing risky transactions (Benassi & Di Minin, 2009). From a
network theory perspective (Burt, 1995), Burt (2005) suggests that intermediaries
emerge as a function of structural holes in a network structure (as cited in Benassi et
al., 2010).
The following part goes beyond explaining the emergence of intermediaries in the
market for patents and technologies. It discusses the development of patent
aggregating companies from enforcement agents to innovation intermediaries.
Drawing on a resource-based perspective (Barney, 1991; Lavie, 2006; Wernerfelt,
1984), the main driver for the trend that patent aggregating companies develop to
innovation intermediaries can be found with the original patent owners and their
demand for learning effects to adapt to the changing environment. Learning effects are
non-monetary benefits the patent owner can realize by transferring patents to the
patent aggregating company. The total benefits can be enunciated in a mathematical
expression that helps to explain the observed trend in a more formal way. Therefore,
the first two parts illustrate the elements of the benefit function. The subsequent part
explains the trend and the main driver.
6.3.1 Monetary benefits of utilizing patent aggregating companies
In Chapter 4, potentials offered by patent aggregating companies are illustrated. These
potentials result in both monetary (BM) and non-monetary benefits (BN) for the original
patent owner. By assigning patents to a patent aggregating company, the original
patent owner can realize the total benefits (BT) resulting from monetary and nonmonetary benefits.
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Monetary benefits are the pure financial compensation an original patent owner
receives in patent transactions. They result from the potential for resource
enhancement and access to financial resources offered by the patent aggregating
companies. For transferring the ownership rights to a patent aggregating company, the
original patent owner receives a lump sum payment (LP). A lump sum payment is a
single payment for a patent paid by the patent aggregating company. The original
patent owner receives an immediate cash flow, and future payments are not made.
Another form of compensation is an upfront payment (UF). An upfront payment is an
amount of money delivered at the time the contract is signed. Additionally, other types
of payments are made during the lifetime of the contract. In licensing agreements,
royalties are usage-based payments made by the licensee to the licensor for the right to
use a patent. Typically, the amount of the royalty payments is dependent on a
percentage of gross or net revenues derived from the use of the patent or a fixed price
per unit sold of an item. Royalties are paid over a certain period of time and depend on
the time the patent is used. If the original patent owner transfers the patent to a patent
aggregating company, which out-licenses the transferred patents, the two parties can
agree to share the royalties, and the original patent owner receives partial royalties
(PR). Some patent aggregating companies mandate the original patent owner to
advance the transacted technology. In this case, the original patent owner receives
compensation for its R&D efforts (RD). Additional direct monetary benefits, however,
not directly paid in cash by the transaction partner, are savings of patent maintenance
costs or other directly related costs (CS). Transferring the ownership of patents is
directly related to costs savings for the original patent owner because the patent
aggregating company then covers renewal fees, enforcement fees, and other
maintenance costs. Donating patents to non-profit organizations, the original owner is
allowed to claim tax deductions. This tax deduction directly affects the profits of a
producing company and results in tax savings (TS).
The actual compensation or compensation bundles depend on the contractual
agreements between the parties. However, the monetary benefits BM are a function of
above-mentioned factors:
BM = f(LP, UF, PR, RD, CS, TS)
(1)
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6.3.2 Non-monetary benefits of utilizing patent aggregating companies

Besides monetary benefits, the original patent owner can also realize non-monetary
benefits. These non-monetary benefits also result from the potentials patent
aggregating companies offer. They include all additional benefits that do not directly
influence the financial balance sheet of the original patent owner.
One non-monetary benefit is the transfer of risks (TR). Patent aggregating companies
offer producing companies the potential for risks reduction. Original patent owners can
benefit from the transfer of two types of risks: (i) the risks that result directly from
R&D activities, for instance, developing commercially unsuccessful inventions or loss
of royalty streams resulting from licensing agreements based on own R&D results; and
(ii) the risks that result from enforcing the patented R&D results, for instance, the costs
of patent infringement lawsuits or damaged reputation.
Patent aggregating companies offer the external potential for market fostering. As an
active buyer in the market for patents, they create demand for patents and offer
liquidity. In addition, new business models create demand. Patent aggregating
companies offer potential for market interaction and support producing companies in
identifying opportunities within companies patent portfolios. These potentials create
new or additional leveraging options for the original patent owner that then benefits
from a broader spectrum of opportunities (OA). Assigning patents to patent
aggregating companies opens up the opportunity for the original patent owner to invest
in R&D, innovation processes, or commercialization activities. All these activities
support the strategic position of the original patent owner.
Potentials for market interaction and patent aggregating companies as the buyer have
resulted in an additional benefit for the patent owner. In conventional patent
transactions between the original patent owner and a potential patent buyer, both
parties are known. Patent offerings in the open market disclose information about
changes in patent and technology strategies. If the identity of the patent owner is
known, this can also influence the price. Selling patents to a patent aggregating
company results in the non-monetary benefit of anonymity while satisfying the
demand for patents for other producing companies (AD).
Original patent owners often face personal constraints that lead to underutilized market
or technological opportunities. Patent aggregating companies offer potentials to
resource enhancement. Realizing these potentials, the original patent owner can benefit
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through additional human resources (HR), but also through additional or

complementary competencies (CO).
Licensing agreements always carry the risk of loss of royalties due to terminated
products or insolvent licensees. Transferring patents to patent aggregating companies
not only has the advantage of immediate cash inflows (monetary benefit) but the
original patent owner can also benefit from planning security (PS) and an opportunity
to extend the strategic scope.
A general benefit is the value of the grant back license (GB). The value of a grant back
license results in the inflow of new ideas and innovations; hence, the improvements or
innovations made by new patent owner or licensee have to be transferred to the
original patent owners. That can improve the own technological position without
having additional R&D expenditures.
Patent aggregating companies offer potentials for cost effectiveness and have
competencies in the market for patents. Collaborating with patent aggregating
companies gives the original patent owners the non-monetary benefit of learning
effects (OL). A close collaboration between patent aggregating companies and original
patent owners also offers learning potential for competencies regarding R&D or
commercialization of innovations.
In summary, the monetary benefits BN are a function of above-mentioned factors:
BN = f(TR, OA, AD, HR, CO, PS, GB, OL)
(2)
Hence, the total benefit a patent owner can generate by assigning patents to a patent
aggregating company is:
B T = BM + BN
(3)
6.3.3 Benefits depend on the type of patent aggregating company

As the trend from the function of transferring sole legal rights to an innovation
intermediary function is discussed in this part, the analysis focuses on the patent
aggregating companies that acquire patents and fulfill a match making function in a
very broad sense: defensive patent aggregators, patent acquisition companies, patent
enforcement companies, patent incubating funds, and patent trading funds.
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Figure 44 depicts the non-monetary benefits (BN) and the monetary benefits (BM) for
original patent owners that assign a patent to a patent aggregating company. BT shows
the total benefit for a patent owner resulting from this transaction. The relative height
and shape of the curves are only rough estimates because they also depend on a
number of secondary factors and company specific characteristics. The mathematical
expression of the benefits for the original patent owners is an attempt to explain the
observed trends by clarifying the situation a patent owner faces and a patent
aggregating company provides in a more formal way.
Benefit for original

patent owner
BT
BN
BM
Lump sum payment

No collaboration
Defensive
patent
aggregator
Customized compensation
Close collaboration
Patent
enforcement
company
Patent
acquisition
company
Patent
trading
fund
Patent
incubating
fund
Figure 44: Resulting benefits for the original patent owner
An empirical trend towards patent aggregating companies as innovation intermediaries

is observable. The changing strategies of the original patent owners, as well as the
changing market conditions are able to explain this trend. In patent transactions, the
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original patent owner no longer focuses on sole revenue generation by selling useless
patents but increasingly becomes aware of the diverse benefits patents offer. The total
benefit curve reflects this development.
The curve representing the monetary benefits (BM) is U-shaped. Defensive patent
aggregators and patent enforcement companies buy only infringed patents and have
the potential for large revenues from stick licensing. Therefore, these patent
aggregating companies pay relatively high prices, mainly as lump sum payments, for
the patents. As defensive patent aggregators act as insurance for the attached
companies and can only operate successfully when they get hold of the targeted
patents, they may pay even a higher price than patent enforcement companies may. In
addition, patent enforcement companies may display their experience and market
power and not offer the market price to companies. Patent acquisition companies buy
all sorts of patents and on average; they pay only low prices for the patents. Only in
very few cases, agreements on compensation bundles including other payments than a
lump sum payment are signed. As patent acquisition companies buy a broad range of
patents, it is possible that original patent owners will be able to sell patents they could
not exploit otherwise. Patent trading funds buy patents covering already
commercialized technologies and exploit them either through selling or through outlicensing agreements. As technologies are older and easier to evaluate, the price range
for the acquired patents is limited but often higher than prices paid by patent
acquisition companies as the technical applicability is already shown. In cases of
licensing agreement, royalties are paid over a longer period of time and therefore, have
to be discounted to estimate the monetary benefit. Therefore, the BM-curve does not
show large differences between these two business models. Patent incubating funds
aggregate patents covering embryonic technologies, invest in the advancement of
patents and technology, and exploit the technology through a carrot licensing
approach. The compensation or compensation bundle paid by the patent incubating
fund is customized to the situation of the original patent owner. Often patent
incubating funds pay upfront payments. If the technology is out-licensed, the original
patent owner participates on the royalties. As the original patent owner has important
tacit knowledge of the technology, patent incubating funds mandate them for further
development. That leads to additional cash inflows from the R&D contract. The
original patent owner receives royalties and payments for R&D efforts over a period of
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time. Due to the time factor, the payments have to be discounted, and the curve of
monetary benefits increases only slightly.
The curve representing the non-monetary benefits (BN) increases from the left hand
side of the horizontal axis representing points without collaboration between patent
aggregating company and original patent owner and fixed payment systems to the right
hand side, representing close collaboration between the parties and customized
compensation. All patent aggregating companies offer some elements of the BNfunction, such as risks transfer. However, defensive patent aggregators and patent
enforcement companies offer the smallest non-monetary benefit to the original patent
owner. Defensive patent aggregators may deliver a reputation and marketing tool for
not being involved with unpopular companies but this non-monetary benefit seems to
be smaller than some non-monetary benefit resulting from anonymity or competency
enhancement offered by patent enforcement companies. Compared with defensive
patent aggregators and patent enforcement companies, the collaboration with patent
acquisition companies, patent trading funds, and patent incubating funds offers larger
non-monetary benefits. Besides a hedging opportunity for R&D risks, they enhance
human and financial resources and support companies in the identification of
opportunities. The major difference between all business models also explains the
increase in the BN-curve and hence, the trend from enforcement agents towards
innovation intermediaries is the benefit of learning effects.
According to organizational learning theory (Fiol & Lyles, 1985; Huber, 1991; Levitt
& March, 1988), companies have to recognize the changing environment and change
their goals and actions to stay competitive. As the market for patents and technologies
has emerged and the innovation paradigm has changed to a more open approach,
external patent exploitation has become more important. Companies have to adapt to
these changes in the environment. For producing companies, external patent
exploitation and the transfer of technology and knowledge is not a core business
(Davis & Harrison, 2001; Lichtenthaler & Ernst, 2009). Often, these transactions are
conducted in ad hoc projects. Dedicated resources do not exist and therefore, external
patent and technology transactions are often unsuccessful (Lichtenthaler, 2011; Rivette
& Kline, 2000). According to the resource-based view, corporations can create a
competitive advantage through the development and intelligent application of core
resources and capabilities (Barney, 1991; Grant, 1996; Wernerfelt, 1984). Therefore,
by adopting a resource-based perspective on the original patent owner, the lack of
178
internal competencies leads to high transaction costs (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Lane
et al., 2006). Firms may influence their transaction costs by developing internal
competencies based on learning effects (Kale et al., 2002; Lichtenthaler
& Lichtenthaler, 2009; Silverman, 1999). Therefore, to adapt to emerging markets for
patents and technologies and to exploit patents and technologies externally and
optimally, companies take actions and increase their demand for learning effects
regarding innovation transfer. Patent acquisition companies, patent trading funds, and
patent incubating funds transfer patents and technologies. According to Chesbrough
(2006), they are an innovation intermediary.
In analyzing the five patent aggregating companies, it becomes apparent that the
benefit of the learning effects they offer increases from the defensive patent
aggregator, which does not offer any collaboration, to patent incubating funds, which
offer close collaboration. Defensive patent aggregators and patent enforcement
companies can be seen as patent intermediaries but not as innovation intermediaries. In
addition, the learning effect from their patent transaction is very limited. As defensive
patent aggregators often detect and buy interesting patents via patent brokers, the
original patent owner does not interact with the defensive patent aggregator.
Therefore, they are not able to benefit from learning effects. Patent enforcement
companies may offer marginal learning effects regarding negotiations or patent
enforcement. Patent acquisition companies are innovation intermediaries because they
also transfer technologies. However, they interact with the original patent owner only
to a limited extent and therefore, offer only limited benefits from learning effects. The
potential learning effects are mainly in the area of patent auditing or opportunity
identification. Patent trading funds collaborate with the original patent owner to a
certain degree. Consequently, the original patent owner can realize learning effects
regarding patent valuation, patent management, and applying technologies in other
industries. Patent incubating funds offer the largest learning effects. This is
represented by the graphical intersection of the BN- and the BM-curve that indicates
that the offered non-monetary benefits of patent incubating funds excel the sole
monetary benefits. Patent incubating funds advance the acquired technology in
collaboration with the original patent owner. Therefore, the original patent owner can
realize learning effects regarding R&D, commercialization of technologies and
patents, marketing, patent management, and patent exploitation competencies.
179
The discussion shows that with respect to the general economic environment of
changing innovation paradigm and maturing markets for patents and technologies,
revenue generation is only one part of a patent transaction. Non-monetary benefits
become increasingly important. In particular, the objective of patent owners to
establish their competencies of external patent exploitation and technology transfer has
become an important factor. In collaborations with third parties, original patent owners
can benefit from the experience and competencies of the partner and realize learning
effects to establish internal competencies. Recognizing this prospect, original patent
owners ask for learning effects from innovation intermediaries. The trend of patent
aggregating business models from enforcement agents to innovation intermediaries
reflects this behavior.
6.4 Summary
Patent aggregating companies can be utilized for several value creating options. Even
though a promising alternative for leveraging patent portfolios, the utilization of patent
aggregating companies is not free of constraints. The industry, in which the producing
company operates and hence, patents, is the basis for all opportunities to cooperate
with a patent aggregating company. The value of the patents and the technology phase
of the life cycle are important constraints that narrow down the selection of patent
aggregating companies. In addition, macro-economic impacts on the patent system
have to be considered. In sum, these constraints and the typology developed in Chapter
5 lead to a management framework that is able to show the patent managers of
producing companies which archetype of patent aggregating company is suitable for
which patent portfolio leveraging activity. Therefore, it answers the research question:
How are patent aggregating companies utilized to leverage patent portfolios of
producing companies?
As patent aggregating companies operate in a fast changing environment, not only is
the status quo important for the patent manager who seeks answers to the question
whether patent aggregating companies are an option for producing companies but also
the development and direction these business models head in is important. During the
last two decades, three major trends of patent aggregating companies development
could be observed: (1) Patent aggregating companies have developed from interest
groups to investment vehicle; (2) patent aggregating companies have emerged as a
180
reaction to existing business models; and (3) patent aggregating companies have
evolved from enforcement agents to innovation intermediaries. Reflecting the overall
research question: Patent aggregating companies are an option for producing
companies?, the last trend, in particular, is important for patent managers. As
producing companies now have to exploit their patents externally, and as part of the
open innovation paradigm have to trade technologies and knowledge to stay
competitive, it is important to build internal resources. Companies are aware of this
requirement and demand cooperation partners from whom they can learn how to
leverage the patent portfolio externally. Satisfying this demand, the business models of
patent aggregating companies have emerged from companies that buy infringed
patents without cooperating with the original patent owner to companies that trade
patents and technology and work closely with the original patent owner.
Contribution to management theory
181
7 Conclusion
With the objective to analyze the recent phenomenon of companies that do not have
R&D or produce physical goods but buy patents on a large scale, this study analyzes
27 patent aggregating companies from the US and Europe using an exploratory
research design. Based on the analyses and discussions of the previous chapters, the
following chapter summarizes the key findings, highlights the central contributions for
management theory and practice, and looks ahead to further research and trends.
7.1 Contribution to management theory

This thesis constitutes the first study of patent aggregating companies that goes beyond
examining descriptive issues based on the narrow focus of technology market
intermediaries or NPE. In the light of increasing interest in technology licensing and
external patent exploitation (Rivette & Kline, 2000) and markets for patents and
technologies (Arora & Gambardella, 2010a), it also constitutes the first study on
different motives, business models, and the development of patent aggregating
companies, as these companies fulfill a special intermediate function between patent
supply and patent demand. Thus, it contributes to overcoming the low emphasis on
empirical research into technology market intermediaries and external patent
exploitation, which has only recently been highlighted (Arora & Gambardella, 2010a;
Howells, 2006; Lichtenthaler & Ernst, 2008a; Tietze, 2011). This study provides the
following specific contributions:
Contribution 1: Clarification of the term patent aggregating companies
This study contributes to literature on markets for technology, external patent
exploitation, and technology market intermediaries by investigating and confirming
the new phenomenon of patent aggregating companies, defining this phenomenon, and
clarifying the strategies and business models of this new phenomenon.
The literature on the market for patents and technologies focuses mainly on producing
companies as seller and buyer, problems of producing companies, and technology
market intermediaries as facilitator of transactions. Publications that recognize buyers
that do not produce goods focus on companies that acquire only infringed patents to
enforce them, so called NPE. Therefore, the term patent aggregating company is often
182
Conclusion
used synonym with the definition of NPE. Only scattered publications recognize patent
aggregating companies with other motives, but they are limited to offensive and
defensive buying motives. In general, literature on patent management that analyzes
the reasons why firms patent or why companies acquire patents focuses on producing
companies and their patent strategies. Current research neglects companies that do not
have products, and therefore, may have different reasons to acquire patents. Only in
the context of NPE, publications mention that these types of companies acquire patents
to enforce them.
This study closes this gap in literature and finds that there is no single dominant
motive for patent aggregating companies. Rather, patent aggregating companies can be
grouped into eight different business models (defensive patent aggregator; noncommercial patent aggregator; patent acquisition company; patent enforcement
company; patent incubating fund; patent trading fund; patent pooling company; royalty
monetization company) according to their specific motive to aggregate patents. Based
on these results, the study shows that patent aggregating companies are not equatable
with NPE. To underline this finding, a definition of patent aggregating companies is
derived. This definition helps to distinguish them from other patent service providers,
patent intermediaries, and NPE. In addition, the detection of the different reasons to
aggregate patents goes beyond the conventional focus of why producing companies
patent or acquire patents. Thus, analyzing the reasons why patent aggregating
companies acquire patents enhances our understanding in patenting motives.
The definition and the different business models of patent aggregating companies
extend the understanding of the new players in the market for patents and technologies
and may serve as a base for future research.
Contribution 2: Conceptualizing patent aggregating companies and deriving a
typology of patent aggregating companies
This study contributes to literature on patent intermediaries and patent management by
investigating activities of patent aggregating companies and the services and benefits
they offer patent owners. Based on the results, four archetypes of patent aggregating
companies the merchant, the gardener, the collector, and the patron are identified.
Literature on technology market intermediaries investigates the activities
intermediaries conduct to match supply and demand. Most publications focus on the
single tasks the intermediaries perform in the transaction process (e.g., Benassi & Di
Contribution to management theory
183
Minin, 2009; Howells, 2006; Lopez-Vega, 2009; van Lente, Hekkert, Smits, & van
Waveren, 2003). A delineation of patent aggregating companies or a description of
their activities is lacking. Publications are limited to descriptive issues and often fail to
systemize technology market intermediaries. Only Benassi and Di Minin (2009)
attempt to derive a taxonomy of patent brokerage, which includes seven different
patent brokers, two of them patent aggregating companies according to the definition
proposed in this study. A further conceptual clarification of patent aggregating
companies is lacking. Especially in the light of the difficulties producing companies
face to leverage their patent portfolios optimally, a conceptualization of companies to
support producing companies is missing. Extant literature describes a lack of
transparency, asymmetric information, and high transaction costs in the market for
patents and technologies, but previous researchers have only identified the problems
companies face but are not able to provide solutions to these problems.
This study addresses this blank spot in literature and identifies four archetypes of
patent aggregating companies: the merchant, the gardener, the collector, and the
patron. These archetypes differ significantly regarding their competencies, the rewards
they offer the original patent owner, and the breath of transaction they focus on. The
results are of special interest for patent managers of producing companies that seek
support for leveraging the companys patent portfolio. The conceptualization in four
archetypes allows the manager to identify which archetype would best suit the
strategic objective of the patent portfolios leveraging activities and hence, could be
utilized by the producing company. The typology may be applied in a descriptive way
to analyze patent aggregating companies further. Additionally, it may be used in a
normative way to develop patent portfolio leveraging strategies that include or
purposely exclude patent aggregating companies. Thus, this typology may help
managers pursue a more systematic patent portfolio leveraging approach, and as a
conceptualization of patent aggregating companies, it may serve as a basis for future
research.
Contribution 3: Detection and explanation of trends in patent aggregating
companies business models
This study contributes to literature on technology market intermediaries, which
includes publications on innovation intermediaries, by analyzing the development of
patent aggregating companies and the driving factors behind the major trends.
Drawing on a resource-based perspective, the demand of producing companies for
184
Conclusion
learning effects has forced patent aggregating companies to evolve from enforcement
agents to innovation intermediaries.
Authors that analyze the emergence of technology market intermediaries are scarce.
Information asymmetries in the market for patents and technologies are the main
explanation why technology market intermediaries exist. Drawing on transaction costs
economics theory or network theory; attempts are made to clarify the question of
existence (e.g., Benassi & Di Minin, 2009). Even though the market for patents and
technologies is a constantly changing market and technologies market intermediaries
emerge and vanish fast (Benassi & Di Minin, 2009; Millien & Laurie, 2008), previous
research has not investigated why firms and entrepreneurs have moved on and now
follow other activities and business models and offer other services to the original
patent owners.
This study responds to this shortcoming in literature, analyzes trends and changes in
the business models of the 27 case firms, and reveals three major trends in the
development of patent aggregating companies. Overall, a trend that patent aggregating
companies shift the focus from amassing infringed patents to transferring patents,
technologies, and knowledge is noticeable. According to Chesbrough (2006), patent
aggregating companies have developed from enforcement agents to innovation
intermediaries. Integrating organizational learning theory and resource-based view of
the firm, this trend appears to result from the fact that original patent owners seek to
establish their own competencies of external patent exploitation and technology
transfer. Original patent owners no longer focus on sole revenue generation by selling
useless patents, but increasingly have become aware of the non-monetary benefits
from these transactions and the large learning potential innovation intermediaries
offer. To meet changing economic conditions, companies collaborate with experienced
partners. That enables companies to benefit from learning effects. Thus, original patent
owners have increased the demand for learning leading to the emergence of patent
aggregating companies as innovation intermediaries. The explanation of the trend
towards innovation intermediaries contributes to the discussion on innovation
intermediaries and their functions and broadens the application of the term innovation
intermediary. The trends of patent aggregating companies development further lay
emphasis on the changes and the transitory nature of business models in the market for
patents.
Implications for management practice
185
7.2 Implications for management practice

Patent aggregating companies have emerged as a recent, not yet well-understood
phenomenon. As patent aggregating companies are significant players in the market
for patents and technologies, they could help to overcome producing companies
impediments to external patent exploitation and to leverage producing companies
patent portfolios optimally. Therefore, this research on patent aggregating companies
gives some insights into the benefits patent aggregating companies might give
producing companies.
The insights gained in this study show the different strategies, motives, potentials, and
activities of patent aggregating companies. Based on these insights that are reflected
on literature, recommendations for patent managers of producing companies can be
drawn. Therefore, the managerial recommendations provided in the following part
refer to leveraging patent portfolios of producing companies and to what patent
managers should consider by utilizing patent aggregating companies.
Recommendations to utilize patent aggregating companies for leveraging patent
portfolios
Patent aggregating companies differ substantially regarding their business models,
their competencies, and the rewards they give to original patent owners. Therefore, a
patent manager cannot utilize every patent aggregating company for every value
generating option of patent exploitation. The management framework developed in
section 6.1.3 provides a guideline to select the suitable archetype of patent aggregating
company. In addition, to utilize patent aggregating companies optimally, the following
recommendations for patent managers in producing companies are provided:
Detach from the picture of the patent troll. Patent aggregating companies offer a wide
range of utilization opportunities beyond the traditional enforcement agent model.
Even though some patent aggregating companies buy patents to enforce them, many
other patent aggregating companies offer other benefits and potentials for patent
portfolio leveraging activities. It is important that patent managers of producing
companies see the wide range of patent aggregating companies and are open to using
it. In some cases, patent enforcement companies are opponents in infringement
lawsuits but knowing who these companies are and what they do helps managers to
react to them. Even though patent aggregating companies and the original patent
owner might be opponents in some cases, patent aggregating companies could take
186
Conclusion
over the enforcement risks in other cases. A critical examination is more beneficial
than a general damnation.
Before selecting a patent aggregating company, define the initial position of the
producing company. It is important that a company that plans to cooperate with a
patent aggregating company is aware of its own resources and competencies, and of
the inventory of its patent portfolio. To choose a suitable patent aggregating company
and to utilize it optimally, the patent manager has to analyze its resources and evaluate
its competencies. Only with this analysis, can the patent manager choose a patent
aggregating company that has additional or complementary resources and
competencies. Employing patent aggregating companies with similar resources and
competencies does not enhance the leveraging position and costs money without
benefiting from it because the producing company could conduct the offered services
without support. For the company, it is also important to know the inventory of the
patent portfolio and the value of the patents. Offering a whole, not-preselected, patent
portfolio to a patent aggregating company could result in three major disadvantages for
the producing company: (1) spending time and resources for communication and
collaboration with the patent aggregating company with uncertain return; (2)
potentially revealing patenting strategies or innovation strategies by disclosing all
relevant information for evaluation; (3) choosing a patent aggregating company that is
not suitable for the type of their patents that should be exploited. Evaluating the
patents initially helps to save costs, time, and resources for the producing company. A
thorough evaluation also prevents failings in external patent exploitation due to
uncovering patents with little value in the first place. Only in cases were patent
aggregating companies are employed for patent portfolio audits, is it justifiable that the
producing company hands over entire unevaluated portfolio.
Define the objectives that should be achieved by utilizing a patent aggregating
company. As patent aggregating companies offer different competencies and benefits,
it is important that the original patent owner define objectives regarding the financial
return, the intended organizational learning, and the relationship between the patent
aggregating company and the original patent owner. Based on this objective function,
the patent manager can select a patent aggregating company that is able to achieve the
objectives. In particular, the financial return and the relationship have to be aligned
with the results from the analysis of the initial position to prevent a misjudgment of the
situation and a derivation of unrealistic objectives. It is advisable that the patent
Implications for management practice
187
manager reflects the objective function on the patenting and innovation strategy. To
realize the full potential of external patent exploitation projects, the bigger context of
open innovation and as a next or combined step, the possible innovation acquisition
should be considered.
Understand the limitation of patent aggregation. Even with a tempting opportunity for
patent managers to give away unused patents, the business models of patent
aggregating companies do not fulfill a broad-spectrum function. After determining the
position, crafting the objectives, and identifying valuable patents, the patent manager
can select the suitable patent aggregating company based on the results of these
activities. If the evaluation shows only patents with low values, it is not advisable for
the patent manager to spend resources contacting patent aggregating companies. In
addition, the stage in the product life cycle or other patent inherent factors could
prevent cooperation with patent aggregating companies. Another limitation is the
industry focus of patent aggregating companies. Operating in certain industries
hampers cooperation with patent aggregating companies per se.
Focus on outcome but at the same time pursue objectives. To use patent aggregating
companies optimally, a patent manager should not only focus on the mere result of the
patent transaction but also try to utilize all offered potentials fully. If the patent
managers main objective of the collaboration is to benefit from the experience of a
patent aggregating company and to build up internal resources, he/she has to provide
necessary resources that are able to learn from the actions and after this, be able to
transfer the learning within the company. Even if the outcome is only limited
satisfactorily, the learning effect generates non-monetary benefits. Patent managers
should also utilize the network patent aggregating companies offer. Future transactions
or other company activities can directly benefit from the cooperation with a patent
aggregating company.
7.3 Further research and trends

As the first comprehensive study, this research explores the phenomenon of patent
aggregating companies and of how they can be utilized in producing companies
patent portfolio leveraging activities. Based on a rich empirical data set, the study
answers the specified research questions. The following comments encourage further
research into patent aggregating companies in order to gain deeper insights into these
188
Conclusion
types of companies and to overcome producing companies impediments to the market

for patents and technologies.
x This research analyzes the potentials patent aggregating companies offer and
describes the monetary and non-monetary benefits these companies can realize.
The research applies a qualitative approach to answer how and why questions. It
would be worthwhile to investigate the performance of the patent aggregating
companies and the success of their business models, for example, the actual
commercialization outcomes of patent aggregating companies that aggregate patent
to generate revenues. An analysis of quantifiable results would help to distinguish
between successful and unsuccessful business models. Only with actual
performance data, is it possible to evaluate the quality and superiority of patent
aggregating companies regarding patent identification, selection, enhancement, and
exploitation.
x Due to the activities in the market for patents and technologies that mainly take
place in the US or Europe, the selection of the empirical sample in this study
focuses on companies with headquarters on these two continents. Since many
production sides are located in Asia, and as China is now the country with the
largest number of patent application per year, research on patent aggregating
companies with headquarters in Asia could give insights into the developments and
business models there. A map of Asian patent aggregating companies could show
the differences between the continents, as well as give producing companies a
guideline how to interact with them.
x The original patent owner and its problems to leverage the patent portfolio
optimally is the drawn perspective for investigating patent aggregating companies
in this study. However, this perspective is only the supply side of the patent
aggregation process and therefore, only one part of the process. Equally interesting
is the demand side of the patent aggregating company. New results on how patent
aggregating companies can benefit or harm potential demanders of patents and on
how they interact could help producing companies to optimize patent management,
potential defense mechanism, and the acquisition of innovation.
x The original patent owner has not yet been a unit of analysis in the context of
patent aggregating companies. An interesting path for further research is
exploratory and explanatory studies on the original patent owner. Especially
interesting are interaction patterns with the patent aggregating company, as well as
Further research and trends
189
an assessment of the actual external patent exploitation performance of projects in

collaboration with patent aggregating companies. The derived results could give
additional information on the actual monetary and non-monetary benefits of
cooperating with patent aggregating companies. Also further guidelines for
establishing a patent exploitation process that incorporates patent aggregating
companies could optimize patent portfolio leveraging activities.
x Patent aggregating companies are perceived as significant buyers in the market for
patents and technologies. So far, scholars have not yet studied their actual impact
on the market for patents and technologies. An assessment of the buying power of
patent aggregating companies could contribute significantly to the scattered
literature on the size of the market for patents and technologies. In addition,
information on the size of the market could enhance the confidence of other players
in the market and increase activities and with this efficiency.
Patent aggregating companies are active in a highly dynamic environment. The market
for patents and technologies is far from functioning well and offers large financial
potentials for new business models, entrepreneurs, and ideas. However, these large
potentials are associated with high risks and the danger of failing. New business
models emerge, some established business models are increasingly successful; but at
the same time, many business models or patent aggregating companies vanish after
only a few years of operation. In the future, the two basic reasons enforcement of
patents and innovation transfer to buy patents will sharpen further the different
business models of patent aggregating companies. Nuisance competency and business
competency will be the driving factors for more specialized business models. Which of
the two reasons is going to dominate the future landscape of patent aggregating
companies is strongly dependent on the success of the patent aggregating companies
that act as innovation intermediaries during the next three to five years.
Most of the business models that transfer innovation, such as patent incubating funds
or patent trading funds, have not yet reached their exploitation and commercialization
phase. Therefore, they have not shown the long-term value they might add to the
economic environment. Depending on the success of these companies, the interest of
financial investors will grow further. Already today, large financial resources often
back patent aggregating companies. As patent aggregating companies prove the
sustainability of their business models, financial institutions will broaden their
investment spectrum for all types of investors. In addition to the success of the
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Conclusion
business models, external factors will drive future investment opportunities, such as
the establishment of a financial market for IPR in Europe. Based on sustainable
business models of patent aggregating companies and a financial market for IPR with
standardized contracts and patent aggregating companies as reliable and experienced
business partners, the market for patents and technologies could further develop, and
investments could be made on a stable basis. However, it will be important that the
invested funds do not fuel a system that is based on existing patents but that the
invested capital is used to finance the creation of patents, leading to R&D and further
innovation.
Whereas today, most patent aggregating companies acquire patents from all types of
original owners, the acquisition activities need to focus more on particular patent
owners and enforcement agents and on how innovation intermediaries might divide
their source of patents. It seems that patent enforcement agents might focus more on
MNEs and start to establish partnering agreements for all litigation activities with large
players. This trend seems inevitable as on the one hand, large companies are becoming
increasingly involved in resource intensive law suits that are not only costly but also
damaging to their reputation. On the other hand, enforcement agents are seeking for
business risks decreasing opportunities and prefer to partner with companies that have
large and strong patent portfolios rather than acquiring single patents from a variety of
patent owners. Based on governmental funding (e.g., French Brevet, a French funding
scheme that helps to create a market place for technologies of SMEs and single
inventors, or the technology trading agencies that are established to transfer university
inventions to producing companies), patent aggregating companies that transfer
innovation from SMEs to MNEs will burgeon and their effect might increase.
Today, patent aggregating companies that rely on patent enforcement are mainly active
in the US. Due to several system factors, the US system is a better basis for this type of
business model. In the European Union, a pan-European patent court has been
discussed for several years now. The establishment of such a pan-European court
could change the legal situation in Europe. Therefore, it could foster the way of
increasing patent enforcement and aggregating companies that operate based on patent
infringements.
In addition to innovation transfer and patent enforcement, patent aggregating
companies that focus on a non-commercial use of patents will strengthen. In the
pharmaceutical industry or in green technology, this type of patent aggregating
Further research and trends
191
company will become important. In times of natural catastrophes, such as floods and
droughts that destroy the harvest of whole countries, tools to repair damages, prevent
following losses, control resulting diseases, and relieve the distress become
increasingly important. As R&D expenditures for drugs are high and the prices in
developing countries must be low to be affordable for low incomes, consortia for the
development of drugs distributed in developing countries seems a good alternative to
handle high R&D costs. In addition, green technology has to be developed based on a
global perspective to help all affected regions.
Patent aggregating companies have emerged during the last decade and are still
changing, developing, and vanishing. As the market for patents and technologies has
grown to major importance, patent aggregating companies will stay major players in
this market. Depending on the development of the market regarding efficiency,
transparency, and the legal system, several more business models will emerge that use
these different characteristics. Producing companies have to accept the existence of
patent aggregating companies in their diversity and learn how to utilize them
optimally.
192
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Appendix
211
Appendix
Appendix 1: General information of analyzed patent aggregating companies
Patent
aggregating
company
Company information
Business data
Field of business
Acacia
Research
Corporation
(Acacia)
Headquarters in Newport
Beach, CA, USA
Originally incorporated in
California in 1993,
reincorporated in
Delaware in 1999 as
venture capital firm.
Started patent license
business in 2003, IPO in
2003 (NASDAQ: ACTG).
Key persons: Paul Ryan
(Chairman & CEO),
Robert Harris (Director &
President) - both founders
Ca. 50 full time

employees
Controls 180 patent
portfolios containing US
patents and certain foreign
counterparts
Completed more 1,000
licensing agreements
across 99 technology
programs
Area of activity:
Aggregates mainly US
patents from companies in
the US, Europe, Asia.
Business model:
Aggregates patents from
high-technology industry
that are already in use and
enforces these patents.
Alliacense
Headquarters in
Cupertino, CA, USA
Founded in 2004.
Subsidiary of IP
Management service
provider TPL Group.
Key persons: Mac
Leckrone (President),
Mike Davis (Senior Vice
President, Licensing)
Ca. 30 employees
Controls 224 US patents
in 124 patent families
Areas of activity:
Business model:
high-technology industry
that are already in use and
212
Appendix
Patent
aggregating
company
Company information
Business data
Field of business
Allied
Security Trust
Headquarters in
Lambertville, NJ, USA
Founded in 2007, among
the founding members are
Ericsson, HewlettPackard, IBM, Intel,
Motorola, Oracle, and
Philips. Currently 21
members, all operating
company with annual
revenues of USD 500
million per year and more.
Key persons: Dan
McCurdy (CEO), Kerry
G. Hopkin (CFO), Linda
Biel (Vice President)
Eight fulltime employees

Has acquired ca. 500
patents
Area of activity:
Defensively purchases1
mainly US patents from
companies in the US,
Europe, Asia. Members
are international
companies with
headquarters in North
America, Asia, and
Europe.
Business model:
Organization without
profit orientation,
provides members
freedom to operate by
acquiring patents which
may otherwise be asserted
against them by a nonpracticing entity, members
decide which patents are
bought, after providing
licenses to members
patents are resold on the
market and funds received
are returned to
participating members.
Appendix
213
Patent
aggregating
company
Company information
Business data
Field of business
Alpha
Patentfonds
Headquarters in Frankfurt,
Germany
Founded in 2007 by
Euram Bank (initiator),
Alpha Patentfonds GmbH
(portfolio company) and
Vevis (sales partner), in
2010 Charles River
Associates was mandated
for exploitation of patents
Three investment funds

(Alpha Patentfonds I closed Q3/2007, asset
under management EUR
32.7 million, number of
patent families 164; Alpha
Patentfonds II - closed
Q4/2008, asset under
management EUR 49.3
million, number of patent
families 246; Alpha
Patentfonds III - Tranche
2008: closed Q4/2008,
asset under management
EUR 10.3 million, number
of patent families 52 and
Tranche 2009: closed
management EUR 6.23
million, number of patent
families 31) - all funds
blind pools and public
placement
Area of activity:
Aggregates mainly
European patents from
companies with offices in
Germany, Austria, and
Switzerland.
Business model: Collects
funds of investors,
aggregates patents from
all industries, bundles new
patent portfolios, sells or
out-license new portfolios.
AlseT IP
(AlseT)
Headquarters in New
York, NY, USA
Founded in 2000, private
company
Key person: Laurence
Rosenberg (Senior
Managing Director)
Less than 25 employees
Area of activity:
Worldwide.
Business model: Acquires
patent backed royalty
streams from all
industries, bundles them
to portfolios, and
refinances these
transactions at the capital
market.
Capital
Royalty
Headquarters in Houston,
TX, USA
company
Key person: Charles Tate
(Chairman, Founding
Partner)
Ca. 20 employees
Investments range from
USD 20 million to USD
200 million (upfront
payment to patent owner)
Area of activity:
Worldwide.
Business model: Primary
and secondary market of
royalties investments,
aggregate royalty streams
of patents covering FDAapproved healthcare
products, refinances these
transactions at the capital
market.
214
Appendix
Patent
aggregating
company
Company information
Business data
Field of business
Coller Capital
Headquarters in London,
Great Britain
equity firm, IP investment
group at Coller Capital
was set up in 2006
Key person: Peter Holden
(Partner, Head IP
Investment Group Coller
Capital)
CreativE
Headquarters in Europe
Founded in a year
between 2000 and 2009 as
investment vehicle,
operations started in 2010
Ca. five employees

Three patent portfolios,
five to ten licensing
agreements in 2010
Area of activity: Mainly

Europe, expanding
worldwide.
Business model:
Aggregates patents that
cover consumer
electronics and are already
in use and enforces these
patents.
Eco-Patent
Commons
Based in Geneva,
Switzerland
Launched in 2008 by
IBM, Nokia, Pitney
Bowes, and Sony in
partnership with the
World Business Council
for Sustainable
Development (WBCSD)
that hosts the Commons
104 patents are donated

from twelve companies
and universities
Area of activity:
Worldwide.
Business model:
donors and provides
royalty free licenses to
foster research and
innovation to protect the
environment. No industry
focus but patents should
provide direct or indirect
environmental benefit.
Area of activity:
Worldwide.
Business model:
Aggregates patents and
exploits the patents in
different ways.
Appendix
215
Patent
aggregating
company
Company information
Business data
Field of business
Fergason
Patent
Property
(Fergason
Patent)
Headquarters in Menlo
Park, CA, USA
company
Key person: James L.
Fergason (Founder)
Ca. ten employees
Area of activity:
Worldwide.
Focus on patents covering
electronic displays and
liquid crystal technology
Business model:
Aggregates patents that
are already in use and
enforces these patents,
until now without filing
lawsuits.
Golden Rice
product
development
partnership
(Golden Rice
PDP)
Golden Rice Project

Management in Freiburg,
Germany
Scientific details were
first published in 2000
Key persons: Peter Beyer
(Creator of the
technology), Ingo
Portrykus (Creator of the
technology), Dr Jorge
Mayer (Golden Rice
Project Manager)
Free licenses of 70 patents

are donated by 32
different companies and
universities to enable the
production of Golden Rice
Area of activity:
Developing countries.
Business model: Nonprofit organization,
aggregates patents and
free licenses to enable the
production of Golden Rice
and makes the technology
available to resource-poor
farmers in developing
countries.
IgniteIP
Headquarters in Mountain
View, CA, USA
company
Key persons: Brandon
Williams (Managing
Director), Vlad Dabija
(Managing Director)
Ca. eight employees

Investments range from
USD 500,000 to USD 2
million.

United States.
Business model:
software, cleantech, and
biopharma from earlystage prospective
technologies, advances
patents through contract
R&D and exploits
technology by selling or
licensing.
216
Appendix
Patent
aggregating
company
Company information
Business data
Field of business
Intellectual
Ventures
Headquarters in Bellevue,
WA, USA
company
Key persons: Founders are
Nathan Myhrvold (CEO),
Edward Jung (CTO), Peter
N. Detkin (Vice
Chairman), Greg Gorder
(Vice Chairman)
Ca. 800 employees

Has aggregated a patent
portfolio of more than
35,000 US and
international patents and
patent applications
Generated more than USD
2 billion in licensing
revenue from 30 major
licensees
Area of activity:
Worldwide.
Business model:
various industries, either
already in use or
embryonic technologies,
and applies different
exploitation strategies.
IP Holdings
Headquarters in Suffern,
NY, USA
Founded in 2000 as idea
incubator of General
Patent Corporation and
spun off in the same year.
Still affiliated with
General Patent
Corporation. Managers
and employees work for
both companies.
Key person: Alexander
Poltorak (Chairman and
CEO of General Patent
Corporation)
IP Holdings has
aggregated patents and
bundled them to seven
portfolio companies
Area of activity:
Business model:
life science and electrical
engineering, invests in
development and
incubation, and assists in
the commercialization of
novel and promising
technology. Additionally,
IP Holdings provides IPrelated financial services
and IP brokerage.
Appendix
217
Patent
aggregating
company
Company information
Business data
Field of business
IP Navigation
Group
(IP
Navigation)
Headquarters in Dallas,
TX, US
Founded in 2005,
privately held, main
company of a
conglomerate that covers
the entire IP value chain
(identification of patents
through Patent Calls,
Consulting of patent
owners through IP
Navigation, enforcement
of patents through several
companies as e.g., Gemini
IP, Plutus IP, Orion IP,
Taurus IP, etc.)
Key person: Erich
Spangenberg (CEO and
Founder)
Conglomerate is operated
by eight employees
IP Navigation Group has
aggregated 41 patents
from single inventors and
research institutions and
generated 543 licensing
agreements.
Areas of activity:
Business model:
various industries that are
already in use and
MPEG
Licensing
Administration
(MPEG LA)
Headquarters in
Greenwood Village, CO,
USA
Founded in 1996
Key persons: Lawrence A.
Horn (President and
CEO), JP Gascon (CFO),
Alexis DeVane (General
Counsel)
Ca. 15 employees
Operates licensing
programs consisting of
more than 5,000 patents
with ca. 130 licensors and
5,000 licensees.
Generates revenues of
around USD 1 billion per
year
Area of activity:
Worldwide.
Business model:
Developed a many-tomany licensing model
where multiple users are
able to acquire essential
patent rights from
multiple patent holders in
a single transaction as an
alternative to negotiating
separate licenses.
Performs this approach in
electrical engineering and
life science industry.
218
Appendix
Patent
aggregating
company
Company information
Business data
Field of business
Open
Invention
Network
(OIN)
Headquarters in Durham,
NC, USA
Founded in 2005,
founding members are
IBM, NEC, Novell,
redhat, Philips, and Sony.
These companies still
finance the aggregation
activities.
Key Person: Keith Bergelt
(CEO)
Ca. three employees

210 aggregated patents, all
covering the system
software Linux

United States.
Business model: Nonprofit organization,
aggregates (acquiring or
receiving donations)
patents and offers free
licenses to users who
further develop the open
source software Linux.
The users do not pay
royalties but commit not
to use patents for blocking
Linux.
Techquity
Capital
(Techquity)
Headquarters in Austin,
TX, USA
company
Key person: Abha Divine
(Founder and Managing
Director)
Ca. five employees

United States.
Business model:
Aggregates portfolio of
high quality patents
covering embryonic and
prospective technologies,
advances technology and
develops further, and
licenses them broadly into
the market.
Papst
Licensing
GmbH &
Co.KG
(Papst
Licensing)
Headquarters in St.
Georgen, Germany
Based on manufacturing
company Papst-Motoren
GmbH & Co. KG,
founded in 1992 as Papst
Licensing GmbH to
monetize patent rights.
Since about 2000 in patent
aggregating business.
Key persons: Georg Papst
(CEO), Daniel Papst
(CPO), Constantin Papst
(CFO), Tobias Kessler
(senior counsel)
About 14 employees
Patent portfolio contains
about 140 patents, 20% of
these patents are acquired,
with over 150 license
agreements, mainly with
companies in IT, electrical
engineering, and
electronics.
Area of activity:
Worldwide.
Business model:
already in use and
monetizes/ enforces these
patents.
Appendix
219
Patent
aggregating
company
Company information
Business data
Field of business
Patent Invest
Fond
Headquarters in Pullach,
Germany
Founded in 2005 by
Finance System (initiator),
Patenthandel Portfolio I
(portfolio company) and
Credit suisse (sales
partner), partner in the
selection and exploitation
process are Steinbeis TIB
and PATEV
Fund was closed in

management ca. EUR 20
million, number of patents
30-128, minimum
invested capital EUR
50,000, blind pool and
private placement
Area of activity:
Worldwide.
funds of investors,
all industries, bundles new
patent portfolios, sells or
out-licenses new
portfolios.
Patent Select
Headquarters in
Schnefeld, Germany
Founded in 2006 by Clou
Partners and Deutsche
Bank (initiators), IP
Bewertungs AG (patent
management and selection
company)
Patent Select is the

umbrella term for 3
investment funds that
follow the same model
(Patent Select I - closed
management EUR 24.5
million, numbers of
patents ca. 12, asset pool,
public placement; Patent
Select II - closed
management EUR 32.7
ca. 12, asset pool, public
placement; Patent
Portfolio I- closed
management EUR 130
ca. 22, partly blind pool,
public placement)
Area of activity:
Worldwide.
funds of investors,
all industries, enhances
and develops technologies
and patents, sells or outlicenses advanced
technologies or patent
portfolios.
Pete Invest
MedTech
(Pete Invest
MedT)
Headquarters in the US
Founded in 1999 as
investment platform of
equity capital firm Pete
Invest
Ca. 15 employees working

for Pete Invest MedTech
(more than 100 working
for Pete Invest)
40 investments in
pharmaceutical royalties
streams, invested capital
USD 1.3 billion
Area of activity:
Worldwide.
streams from
pharmaceutical products,
bundles them to
portfolios, and refinances
these transactions at the
capital market.
220
Appendix
Patent
aggregating
company
Company information
Business data
Field of business
Rembrandt IP
Management
(Rembrandt
IP)
Headquarters in Bala
Cynwyd, PA, USA
company
Key persons: Paul
Schneck (Chairman),
Michael Johnson
(President), John Garland
(Vice President
Rembrandt Solutions)
Ca. ten employees

Has aggregated 235 US
patents in 174 patent
families
Area of activity: United

States.
Business model:
already in use and
Royalty
Pharma
Headquarters in New
York, NY, USA
Founded in 1996 with first
deal in 2000, private
company
Key persons: Pablo
Legorreta (Founder and
CEO), Susannah Gray
(Executive Vice President
and CFO)
14 employees
Owns royalty interests in
17 approved and marketed
biopharmaceutical
products, five products in
clinical trials and/or under
review with the FDA
In 2010 Royalty Pharma
owned royalty revenues of
USD 808.5 million

States.
streams from
biopharmaceutical
products, bundles them to
portfolios, and refinances
these transactions in
securitization transactions
at the capital market.
RPX Corp.
(RPX)
Headquarters in San
Francisco, CA, USA
Founded in 2008, IPO in
May 2011 (NASDAQ:
RPXC)$
Key persons: John Amster
(CEO), Geoffrey Barker
(Chief Operating Officer),
Eran Zur (President)
Ca. ten employees

RPX operates with a
membership structure.
Amongst its ca. 80 clients
are Dell, Google, IBM,
Microsoft, Nokia but also
smaller firms with venture
backed status. Annual fees
depend on the annual
revenues. Members do not
pay extra for patent
acquisition activities.
Has aggregated more than
1,600 US and
international patents and
invested more than USD
260 million.

States.
Business model: Forprofit organization,
provides members
freedom to operate by
acquiring patents already
in use, members cannot
decide which patents are
bought, after providing
licenses to all members
patents are resold on the
market. Patents cover
consumer electronics,
software, media,
communications, and
semiconductors.
Appendix
221
Patent
aggregating
company
Company information
Business data
Field of business
Sipro Lab
Telecom
(Sipro Lab)
Headquarters in Montreal,
Canada
company
Key person: Nathalie
Beaudoin (Licensing
Director)
Ca. 16 employees
Administers five patent
portfolios covering mobile
wireless technologies,
with more than 200
licensees
Area of activity:
Worldwide.
Business model:
Administers licensing
program where multiple
users are able to acquire
essential patent rights
from multiple patent
holders in a single
transaction as an
separate licenses.
Via Licensing
Corporation
(Via
Licensing)
Headquarters in San
Francisco, CA; USA
Founded in 2003 and is a
wholly owned subsidiary
of Dolby Laboratories,
Inc.
Key persons: Jean-Michel
Bourdon (President), Nate
Alvord (Vice President,
Licensing and Program
Management),
Ca. 35 employees
Manages eleven patent
portfolios with ca. 100
patent owners and 800
licensees
Area of activity:
Worldwide.
Business model:
Administers licensing
program where multiple
users are able to acquire
essential patent rights
from multiple patent
holders in a single
transaction as an
separate licenses.
Source: interviews, annual reports, company documents, articles, internet documents.

1
According to Biel (29.11.2011) Allied Security Trust does not consider itself a patent aggregator.
They do not hold patents and as a result will never asset them themselves.
222
Appendix
Appendix 2: Interview - Guideline

1. What is your position and what is your job description?
2. Please quantify: year of founding, location of headquarters, number of employees,
number of acquired patents/ patent applications, capital invested in patent
acquisitions, average price per aggregated patents.
3. How did your business involve and what is the history of your company?
4. How do you finance the patent aggregating activities? Have you raised a fund?
Who invests in your company or the fund? How do you find investors? What are
the funds characteristics?
Strategy of patent aggregating companies
5. How would you describes the companys business model?
6. How would you describe the companys overall strategy?
7. How would you describe your strategy compared to your competitors? How do
you differentiate from your competitors?
8. Why do you aggregate patents and what do you do with the patents you have
aggregated?
9. How would you describe your unique selling proposition?
10. How could your business model develop within the next five years?
Organization of patent aggregating companies
11. How would you describe your internal competencies? In which area and for which
tasks do you have internal resources?
12. Which services do you offer your clients?
13. Do you work with external partners? How does the cooperation work? How would
you describe your business model?
Process of patent aggregating companies
14. What is your industrial focus and from which industries do you acquire patents?
15. Please describe the typical legal and technological characteristics a patent you
aggregate have.
16. Do you aggregate sole legal rights or do you also transfer technology and
knowledge?
Appendix
223
17. How do you find potential patents? Who are the original patent owner you
aggregate patents from? How do you detect them? How do you approach them?
18. What are the main motivations for patent owners to utilize you?
19. How do you compensate the original patent owner?
20. Which other problems do you solve for the patent owner?
21. Who is the owner of the patent after you have aggregated the patents? Do original
patent owners have remaining rights on their patents?
22. How do you evaluate the patents? Which methods do you use to value them? What
are important evaluation criteria?
23. How would you describe your value adding activities?
24. What are your exploitation strategies for the patents you have aggregated? What
type of exploitation do you conduct?
224
Appendix
Appendix 3: List of interviews
Company
Interview partner
Position
Place
Date
Acacia
Research
Paul Ryan
CEO
Phone Interview
Mar 9, 2010
Phone Interview
Jun 22, 2010
Allied Security
Trust
Ms. A.
Confidential
Phone Interview
Mar 19, 2010
Phone Interview
Dec 6, 2010
Dan McCurdy
CEO
Phone Interview
Jun 10, 2011
Alpha Gasser
Patentverwertungs AG
Christian Frey
Head of Patent
Commercialization
Phone Interview
Jun 15, 2010
St. Gallen
Aug 11, 2009
Alpha
Patentfonds
Management
Bernd Herrmann
CEO
Interview
Jun 27, 2010
Capital Royalty
David Carter
Principal
Phone Interview
Jul 29, 2010
Mike Weinman
Managing Director
Phone Interview
Apr 21, 2011
Coller Capital
Peter Holden
Head of IP Investment
Group
Gothenburg
Sep 08, 2009
CreativE
Mr. K
Management
Phone Interview
Confidential
Deutsche Bank
Frank Rohwedder
Global Banking
Asset Finance and
Leasing
St. Gallen
Jul 29, 2009
Managing Partner
Phone Interview
Jun 16, 2010
Phone Interview
Feb 28, 2011
Phone Interview
Jun 15, 2010
Fergason
Licensing
Charles
McLaughlin
Finance System
Andreas Fritsch
CEO
Phone Interview
Apr 7, 2010
General Patent
Corporation
Alec Schibanoff
Vice President
Marketing
Phone Interview
April 07, 2011
IgniteIP
Brandon Williams
Managing Director
Phone Interview
Jul 16, 2010
Intellectual
Ventures
Mr. F.
Confidential
Phone Interview
Confidential
Mr. F.
Confidential
Phone Interview
Confidential
IP Bewertungs
AG
Guido von
Scheffer
Director
Hamburg
Aug 8, 2009
Stephan Lipfert
Director IP Management
Interview
Jun 25, 2010
Appendix
225
Company
Interview partner
Position
Place
Date
IP Navigation
Group
Erich
Spangenberg
Founder & CEO
Phone Interview
Nov 04, 2010
Phone Interview
Mar 31, 2011
IP Navigation
Group Europe
Lucia Alvarado
Vice President
Phone Interview
Apr 04, 2011
MPEG LA
Bill Geary
Vice President
Phone Interview
Apr 13, 2011
Open Invention
Network
Keith Bergelt
CEO
Phone Interview
Feb 22, 2010
Mr. B
Management
Phone Interview
Feb 17, 2011
Daniel Papst
Managing Director, CoFounder & CPO
Phone Interview
Apr 01, 2011
Papst Licensing
GmbH & Co
KG
Phone Interview
Feb 25, 2011
Phone Interview
Dec 1. 2010
Phone Interview
Aug 11, 2010
Pete Invest
MedTech
Mr. W
Partner
Phone Interview
Mar 21, 2011
Patent Freedom
Chris Reohr
CEO
Phone Interview
Mar 3, 2010
PATEV
Associates
Michael Beyer,
COO
Phone Interview
Jun 14, 2010
Phone Interview
May 3, 2011
RPX Corp.
Steinbeis TIB
Kevin Barhydt
Vice president
Phone Interview
Nov 23, 2010
Thomas
Westerlund
Vice President,
Structured Acquisitions
Phone Interview
Mar 23, 2011
Steffen Schnitzer
Senior Patent Manager
Zurich
May 25, 2010
Steinbeis TIB
Bernd Singer
Head of Key Account
Techquity
Capital
Abha Divine
Managing Director
Phone Interview
June 22, 2010
Zurich
May 25, 2010
Phone Interview
Mar 22, 2010
Phone Interview
Jul 22, 2010
Curriculum Vitae
NAME
Frauke Rther
DATE OF BIRTH
5. December 1979 in Soltau, Germany
EDUCATION
05/2011 - 04/2012 University of Melbourne, Australia
Visiting Scholar at the Intellectual Property Research Institute of
Australia (IPRIA)
03/2008 - 04/2012 University of St.Gallen (HSG), Switzerland
Research Associate and doctoral candidate at the Institute of
Technology Management (Prof. Dr. Oliver Gassmann)
10/2002 - 02/2008 Justus- Liebig-University Giessen, Germany
Studies of Business Administration, degree: Diplom Kauffrau
(Dipl.-Kffr.) (Master equivalent)
08/2005 - 05/2006 University of Wisconsin- Milwaukee, USA
Studies of Economics, degree: Master of Arts in Economics
(M.A.)
08/1999 01/2002 Volksbank Lneburger Heide eG, Soltau, Germany
Training as a bank clerk; degree: bank clerk before the Chamber
of Commerce and Industry
WORK EXPERIENCE
10/2007 02/2008 B.Metzler GmbH, Frankfurt am Main, Germany
Student Help in investment banking
06/2007 - 09/2007 B.Metzler GmbH, Frankfurt am Main, Germany
Internship in investment banking (Merger and Acquisitions)
08/2005 05/2006 University of Wisconsin- Milwaukee, USA
Teaching Assistant for Principles of Macroeconomics
01/2005 07/2007 Chair of Banking and Finance at JLU Giessen, Germany
Research Assistant
05/2002 - 07/2002 Assante Capital Management, Vancouver, Canada
Internship at the family office

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Patent Aggregating Companies Their Strategies, Activities, and Options for Producing Companies

Approved on the application of

Dissertation no. 4039

The University of St. Gallen, School of Management, Economics, Law, Social

St. Gallen, May 11, 2012

Prof. Dr. Thomas Bieger

Patent Aggregating Companies

Doctoral thesis, University of St.Gallen, 2012

ISBN 978-3-8349-4455-9 (eBook)

The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie;

Melbourne and St. Gallen, April 2012

Research objectives and questions ................................................................ 12

Terms and definitions..................................................................................... 13

Research concept and methodology .............................................................. 15

Thesis structure .............................................................................................. 21

Leveraging companies patent portfolios State of the art .............................. 24

Options to leverage patent portfolios............................................................ 28

Third parties as enablers of transactions ..................................................... 37

Reference framework ..................................................................................... 45

Exploring the phenomenon of patent aggregating companies ......................... 48

Process of patent aggregation ........................................................................ 54

Strategies of patent aggregating companies ................................................. 63

Potentials offered by patent aggregating companies ......................................... 69

Internal potentials offered by patent aggregating companies .................... 80

Typology of patent aggregating companies ........................................................ 93

Four archetypes of patent aggregating companies...................................... 94

Archetype 1 Merchant ................................................................................ 99

Archetype 2 Gardener............................................................................... 115

Archetype 3 Collector................................................................................ 127

Archetype 4 Patron.................................................................................... 140

Summary and evaluation of potentials ....................................................... 151

Leveraging patent portfolios by utilizing patent aggregating companies ..... 154

Development of patent aggregating companies ......................................... 166

Meeting demand for learning effect as driving factor .............................. 171

Summary ....................................................................................................... 179

Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 181

Implications for management practice ....................................................... 185

Further research and trends........................................................................ 187

References .................................................................................................................. 192

Research objectives and questions ................................................................ 12

Terms and definitions..................................................................................... 13

Research concept and methodology .............................................................. 15

Thesis structure .............................................................................................. 21

Leveraging companies patent portfolios State of the art .............................. 24

Internal and external exploitation of patents ........................................ 28

Third parties as enablers of transactions ..................................................... 37

Reasons why firms patent ........................................................................ 25

Options to leverage patent portfolios............................................................ 28

Bridging patent supply and patent demand .......................................... 38

Reference framework ..................................................................................... 45

Exploring the phenomenon of patent aggregating companies ......................... 48

General information ................................................................................. 48

Process of patent aggregation ........................................................................ 54

Basic strategy I: Generate revenues ....................................................... 63

Potentials offered by patent aggregating companies ......................................... 69

Potentials for risks reduction .................................................................. 70

Internal potentials offered by patent aggregating companies .................... 80

Selection of patents ................................................................................... 55

Strategies of patent aggregating companies ................................................. 63