In 1981, the microcomputer industry value chain structure consisted of IBM as the single major buyer, multiple semiconductor companies as suppliers, and new entrants like AMD. IBM had strong buyer power and was able to force Intel to license its microprocessors to other companies. By 1985, Intel decided to be the sole supplier of its 386 CPU, capturing more value. Competition increased by 1998, with OEMs as major buyers and Intel adopting dual suppliers. Intel's "Intel Inside" campaign was successful in increasing its value capture. By 2003, there were more competitors like PDAs and smartphones, squeezing the value chain spread. AMD became a major player through technology breakthroughs, increasing competition with Intel. However, Intel was able to
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Intel Draft 1
In 1981, the microcomputer industry value chain structure consisted of IBM as the single major buyer, multiple semiconductor companies as suppliers, and new entrants like AMD. IBM had strong buyer power and was able to force Intel to license its microprocessors to other companies. By 1985, Intel decided to be the sole supplier of its 386 CPU, capturing more value. Competition increased by 1998, with OEMs as major buyers and Intel adopting dual suppliers. Intel's "Intel Inside" campaign was successful in increasing its value capture. By 2003, there were more competitors like PDAs and smartphones, squeezing the value chain spread. AMD became a major player through technology breakthroughs, increasing competition with Intel. However, Intel was able to
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In 1981, the major buyer in the value chain structure of x86
microcomputer industry was IBM. The major suppliers were multiple
semiconductor companies. As semiconductor industry required secondsource manufacturing partners during that time, AMD and other couple of companies such as Fujitsu, Siemens, etc. entered the market as new entrants. Overall, from a value chain perspective, this could be categorized as a one buyer, one firm and multiple supplier structure. The spread of the value chain is relatively large as buyers of IBM PCs were relatively unsophisticated and willing to pay a premium for the IBM branded product. Winning IBM contract means winning the whole industry design (Andy Grove, 1980) was a felicitous summary indicating the strong buyers power during that period. IBM was able to force Intel license its microprocessors to other companies to ensure adequate supply, which resulted in a reduced captured value for Intel with the sales margin stagnant around 3% between 1981 and 1982. As Intel management realized that it was giving away its technology but not getting fair value return by adopting the second-source strategy, in 1985 they made a bold decision to be the sole-source manufacturer for the new 386 CPU, which was well received by Compaq. It was an instant success due to the fact computer users were willing to pay a premium for the enhanced performance which boosted the selling price to be $150 compared to $40 of the 286 chip. Therefore, Intel captured an increased value. On the flip side, the FTC investigation on antitrust violations during 1990s was a drag on Intels captured value since it deprived of certain advantages previously possessed when negotiating with customers and could adversely affected the pricing. In 1998, there was more competition in the PC industry. Hence, from a value chain perspective, the major buyers were the OEMs, which marketed finished computer systems. In terms of suppliers, Intel adopted a dual supplier strategy when possible in order to secure quality and timeliness of the equipment. In addition, Intel also formed a consortium that included several other major chip markets to fund the technical work and to reach the critical mass needed to gain industry acceptance. AMD was still a player in the semiconductor market. However, it does not create major threat to Intels market share due to its successful Intel Inside campaign and limited breakthrough of its own technology. Initially, Intel Inside as a brand identity involved setting up a co-op fund that made a concession on its price to reimburse up to half of the participating OEMs advertising costs, which effectively increased the value spread by increasing the opportunity cost of suppliers when doing businesses with others. In the meantime, Microsoft and other software companies have become complementors in the value chain to help boost the Intels success. Microsoft and Intel had incentives to promote two shared goals: growth in the overall PC market and improvement in the PC performance. In addition to the increased value spread, the cooperation between the two companies also raised barriers to imitation and made it even more difficult for competitors to grab a piece of the pie. This
commonality of interests yielded much fruitful captured value for Intel as
shown in its steadily growing margin between 1998 and 2000. In summary, this is a multiple buyer, one firm and multiple supplier structure. The spread of the value chain has increased due to the introduction of the complementors. In 2003, the major buyers and suppliers remained similar as those in 1998. However, there were more competitions from outside of the PC market such as personal digital assistants (PDAs), network computers, smart phones and other wireless devices. These can be categorized as substitutes to the PC industry and hence created threat to the microprocessor market. Also, the PC industry life cycle was undergoing significant change, which set a friction on Intel when negotiating with both buyers and suppliers. During the period of 2000 and 2003, average prices for microprocessors continued to fall and Intel captured less value as the margin went down below 20%. In the meantime, AMD has couple of technology breakthroughs. In 2003, AMD signed joint manufacturing technology development agreement to develop future generation manufacturing technologies. Hence, AMD has become another major player in addition to Intel in the microprocessor market and stirred up a fierce competition which could significantly reduce Intels added value. However, it was noticeable that Intels sales and margin bumped up from 2003 onwards due to its capability to change the rules of the game in the mobile PC domain where Intel had roughly 89% market share. The mobile market primarily targeted the corporate buyers which were more technically literate and less price-sensitive. To stimulate demand and create a higher willingness-to-pay, in 2003 Intel introduced an entire system (CPU, chipsets, and other functions) with better performance including longer battery life, seamless wireless networking, etc.). In summary, this is a multiple buyer, multiple firms and multiple supplier structure. The spread of the value chain was squeezed due to the introduction of substitutes. While we would perceive it is true that PC sales have slowed for several years with the advent of tablets and smartphones, we find it hard to fully agree that it is the most recommended solution to reinvigorating Intels business by shifting the focus to tablets and smartphone. We believe Intel should still count on the development and release of new microprocessors which are more compatible with the exciting features catering to users needs. On top of the technological advancement, there needs to be a new platform or product to really drive additional PC sales, like Microsoft's new Surface Book laptop, which serves to increase the consumers willingness-topay. Meanwhile, Intel should seek to work extensively with strategic complementors in launching the desired features like improved battery life, wireless charging, instant touch-screen power to boost the willingness-to-pay. Although it is inevitably true that Intels communications and networking segments may perform well and gain certain share of the market, we are
predicting that microprocessors will remain its core business and continue to grow organically.