A LIFE IN BRIEF

Andrew Jackson, seventh president of the United States, was the dominant actor in
American politics between Thomas Jefferson and Abraham Lincoln. Born to obscure
parents and orphaned in youth, he was the first "self-made man" and the first westerner
to reach the White House. He became a democratic symbol and founder of the
Democratic Party, the country's most venerable political organization. In his two-term
presidency, he expanded executive powers and transformed the president's role from
chief administrator to popular tribune.
Jackson was born in 1767 in Waxhaw, South Carolina, to Scotch-Irish immigrants. He
fought as a boy in the Revolutionary War, studied law, and in 1788 moved west to
Nashville. In 1791 he began living with Rachel Donelson Robards, whose husband had
abandoned her. They were formally married after her divorce in 1794. Charges of
adultery arising from the episode dogged Jackson's later political career. After serving
as Tennessee prosecutor, judge, congressman, and senator, he won fame as a Major
General in the War of 1812 with smashing victories against the Creek Indians in 1814
and the British at New Orleans in January 1815.
Jackson's triumph at New Orleans quickly became the stuff of legend and made him
America's greatest military hero since George Washington. In 1818 he led an army in
pursuit of Seminole Indians into Spanish Florida, touching off an international furor.
After Spain ceded Florida, Jackson served briefly as territorial governor and was then
senator from Tennessee in 1823-25. In a confused, four-candidate presidential race in
1824, Jackson led the popular and electoral vote but lost in the House of
Representatives to John Quincy Adams through the influence of Speaker Henry Clay.
Jackson challenged Adams again in 1828 and defeated him, in a campaign which
centered on Jackson's image as a man of the people battling aristocracy and corruption.
In 1832 Jackson easily defeated Henry Clay.
Jackson's presidency defined itself in two central episodes: the nullification crisis and
the "Bank War." Jackson took office amid mounting sectional acrimony over the
"American System" program of fostering economic development through transportation
subsidies and through protective tariffs on imports to aid American manufacturers.
Many Southerners believed these policies promoted Northern growth at their expense.
Jackson curbed the American System by vetoing road and canal bills beginning with the
Maysville Road in 1830. However, in 1832 the state of South Carolina declared the
existing tariff unconstitutional, null and void. The state took steps to block tariff
collections within its borders. Though he favored a lower tariff, Jackson acted quickly to
uphold federal supremacy by force if necessary. In a ringing proclamation, he declared
the Union indivisible and branded nullification as treason. Congress reduced the tariff in
1833, defusing the crisis.
The Second Bank of the United States was a corporation chartered by Congress to
provide a national paper currency and manage the government's finances. Like
Thomas Jefferson, Jackson believed such a bank to be dangerous and unconstitutional.

In 1832 he vetoed a bill to extend the Bank's charter beyond its scheduled expiration in
1836. Jackson's veto message counterposed the virtuous plain people against the
Bank's privileged stockholders. The next year Jackson moved the federal government's
deposits from the Bank to state-chartered banks, triggering a brief financial panic and
prompting the Senate to censure him in 1834. Undeterred, Jackson launched a broader
assault against all forms of government-granted privilege, especially corporate charters.
His Farewell Address in 1837 warned of an insidious "money power."
Jackson's Bank War and its populistic, egalitarian rhetoric shaped the platform and
rhetoric of his new Democratic party. (His policies also arguably helped trigger a
financial panic in 1837, which deepened into a severe depression.) By casting himself
as the people's tribune against the moneyed elite and their tools in government, he
introduced an enduring theme in American politics.
He also carved out a stronger role for the presidency. Jackson replaced many
government officials on partisan grounds, inaugurating the "spoils system." Catering to
his core regional constituency of Southern planters and Western frontiersmen, he
condemned antislavery agitation, favored cheaper public lands, and strong-armed
Indian tribes into removing west of the Mississippi. In a confrontation between Georgia
and the Cherokee Nation, Jackson backed state authority against tribal sovereignty and
refused to protect Indians' treaty rights despite their recognition by the United States
Supreme Court. Jackson wielded executive powers vigorously, defying Congress,
vetoing more bills than all his predecessors together, and frequently reshuffling his
Cabinet.
Strong-willed and sharp-tempered, a fierce patriot and rabid partisan, Jackson was
always controversial, both as a general and as president. He personalized disputes and
demonized opponents. In a notorious episode, Jackson broke open his first Cabinet and
forced a rupture with Vice-President John C. Calhoun by championing the character of
Peggy Eaton, the vivacious and controversial wife of the secretary of war. Yet behind
Jackson's towering rages often lay shrewd calculation of their political effects.
Jackson secured the presidential succession in 1836 to his faithful lieutenant and
second vice-president, Martin Van Buren. He then retired to The Hermitage, his cotton
plantation near Nashville, where he died in 1845.

LIFE BEFORE THE PRESIDENCY

Andrew Jackson was born on March 15, 1767, in the Waxhaw settlement, a community
of Scotch-Irish immigrants along the border between North and South Carolina. Though
his birthplace is in dispute, he considered himself a South Carolina native. His father
died before his birth, and Andrew's mother and her three small boys moved in with her
Crawford relatives. Jackson attended local schools, receiving an elementary education
and perhaps a smattering of higher learning.
The Revolutionary War ended Jackson's childhood and wiped out his remaining

immediate family. Fighting in the Carolina backcountry was especially savage, a brutish
conflict of ambushes, massacres, and sharp skirmishes. Jackson's oldest brother Hugh
enlisted in a patriot regiment and died at Stono Ferry, apparently from heatstroke. Too
young for formal soldiering, Andrew and his brother Robert fought with American
irregulars. In 1781 they were captured and contracted smallpox, of which Robert died
shortly after their release. While trying to retrieve some nephews from a British prison
ship, Andrew's mother also fell ill and died.
An orphan and a hardened veteran at the age of fifteen, Jackson drifted, taught school a
little, and then read law in North Carolina. After admission to the bar in 1787, he
accepted an offer to serve as public prosecutor in the new Mero District of North
Carolina, west of the mountains, with its seat at Nashville on the Cumberland River.
Arriving in 1788, Jackson thrived in the new frontier town. He built a legal practice,
entered into trading ventures, and began to acquire land and slaves.
He also took up with Rachel Donelson Robards, the vivacious daughter of the late John
Donelson, one of Nashville's founders. The Donelsons were a prominent Nashville
clan. Rachel was married but separated from her husband, Lewis Robards of Kentucky.
In 1791 she and Jackson began living as man and wife. They formally married in 1794
after Robards procured a divorce in Kentucky. These circumstances came back to
haunt Jackson in his presidential campaigns, when opponents charged him with bigamy
and wife-stealing. Jackson's defenders then claimed that he and Rachel had believed
she was already divorced and free to remarry in 1791, but this seems unlikely.
Whatever the technicalities, frontier Nashville saw nothing wrong in their liaison at the
time. Rachel's marriage to Robards was already irretrievably broken, and Jackson was
a man of prospects. From the beginning, Andrew and Rachels marriage was a perfect
love match. The couple were deeply devoted to each other, and remained so
throughout their lives.
Jackson's rise in Tennessee politics was meteoric, attesting to his strength of character.
In quick succession he was a delegate to the state constitutional convention in 1795,
then Tennessee's first congressman, then a senator. After a year he resigned to take a
job closer to home, as judge of Tennessee's superior court. In 1802 he challenged
Governor John Sevier for election as major general in command of the state militia.
Jackson's senior by more than twenty years, Sevier was a veteran of the Revolution and
of many Indian campaigns, and the state's leading politician. Jackson beat him for the
generalship, but the aftermath brought the two men to a showdown in the streets of
Knoxville, followed by preparations for a duel.
The Sevier feud was only one of many explosive quarrels involving Jackson. Jackson's
hot temper, prickly sense of honor, and sensitivity to insult embroiled him in a series of
fights and brawls. The most notorious of these affairs, in 1806, began with a minor
misunderstanding over a horse race and ended in a duel with pistols between Jackson
and Charles Dickinson. Dickinson, a crack shot, fired first and hit Jackson in the chest.
Jackson gave no sign of being hurt but coolly stood his ground, aimed carefully, and
killed his foe. Jackson carried Dickinson's bullet for the rest of his life. Later, in 1813,

during a hiatus in his military service during the War of 1812, Jackson fought in a
Nashville street brawl against the Benton brothers, Jesse and Thomas Hart. There he
took a bullet that nearly cost him an arm.
Jackson was brave in a fight and steadfast to his friends. Still these affrays marked him
as a violent and dangerous man, and helped block his further political advance.
Jackson resigned his judgeship in 1804 and devoted his efforts thereafter to his militia
command and his business ventures. He speculated in land, acquired slaves, bred and
raced horses, and engaged in merchandising. In 1804 he bought a cotton plantation
outside Nashville, The Hermitage, where he and Rachel lived the rest of their lives.
At mid-life, Jackson's political career had apparently reached an end. He thirsted not for
higher office but for military action. Potential foes were everywhere: the Indian tribes
who still hovered near Tennessee's borders, their Spanish abettors in Florida and
Mexico, and above all Jackson's old enemy, the British. Jackson's yearning for activity
led him to befriend Aaron Burr when the latter came through Tennessee in 1805
seeking recruits for his shadowy schemes of conquest. Jackson cut loose from Burr in
time to avoid imputations of treason, but he was still eager for the field. With mounting
outrage he watched the inept efforts of presidents Jefferson and Madison to win redress
from Great Britian for its violations of American sovereignty and interests.
In June of 1812, the United States finally declared war on Great Britain. That
November, a Tennessee force was ordered to the defense of New Orleans. Jackson
led two thousand men as far as Natchez, where he received a curt War Department
communication dismissing his troops without pay or provisions. On his own authority,
Jackson held the command together for the return home. His willingness to share his
men's privations on this march earned him the nickname "Old Hickory."
In the fall of 1813, Indian hostilities finally brought an end to Jackson's inactivity. At Fort
Mims in Mississippi Territory (now southern Alabama), warlike Creeks known as "Red
Sticks" had overwhelmed and slaughtered more than four hundred whites. Jackson led
a force of Tennesseans and allied Indians deep into the Creek homeland, where he
fought a series of engagements. At the culminating battle of Horseshoe Bend in March
1814, Jackson annihilated the main Creek force. The campaign broke the Creeks'
power of resistance and overawed the other Southwestern tribes, including those that
had fought as Jackson's allies. In the next few years, Jackson negotiated treaties by
which the Creeks, Choctaws, Chickasaws, and Cherokees surrendered millions of acres
of land in Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and west Tennessee.
After this striking success as a militia commander, Jackson was commissioned United
States Major General in May 1814 and given command of the southern frontier. The
British were planning an attack on New Orleans, strategic gateway to the American
interior. To block them, Jackson assembled a motley force of regulars, volunteers,
militia, free blacks, and pirates. The British made landfall and advanced to near the city,
where Jackson had fortified a line straddling the Mississippi River. On January 8, 1815,
British General Sir Edward Pakenham led a frontal assault on Jackson's position. On

the west bank some inexperienced Americans broke and ran, but in the main attack on
the east bank Jackson's men mowed down the advancing enemy with artillery and rifle
fire. British casualties exceeded two thousand; Jackson lost thirteen dead, fifty-eight
wounded and missing.
Unbeknownst to both sides, the Treaty of Ghent ending the war had been signed two
weeks earlier, so the battle had no effect on the outcome. Still, this epic victory, with its
incredible casualty ratio and its stirring image of American frontiersmen defeating
hardened British veterans, passed immediately into patriotic legend. Jackson became a
hero second in the national pantheon only to George Washington.
Jackson remained in the regular army after the war. Late in 1817 he received orders to
subdue the Seminole Indians, who were raiding across the border from Spanish Florida.
Liberally interpreting his vague instructions, Jackson effected a lightning conquest of
Florida itself. He captured its bastions at St. Marks and Pensacola and arrested, tried,
and executed two British nationals whom he charged with abetting the Indians. Foreign
diplomats and some congressmen demanded that Jackson be repudiated and punished
for his unauthorized invasion, but at the urging of Secretary of State John Quincy
Adams, President James Monroe stood firm. Whether anticipated by the administration
or not, Jackson's action served American ends of nudging Spain to cede Florida in an
1819 treaty. A private controversy smoldered for years between Jackson, Monroe, and
Secretary of War John C. Calhoun over whether Jackson had in fact exceeded orders.
It finally broke open in 1831, contributing to a political rupture between then-president
Jackson and his vice-president Calhoun.
Jackson resigned his army commission and was appointed governor of the new Florida
Territory in 1821. He presided over the transfer of authority from the Spanish, then
resigned and came home to Tennessee, where his friends were planning to promote
him for the presidency in 1824.

CAMPAIGNS AND ELECTIONS

1824
The Virginia presidential dynasty was coming to an end with the second term of James
Monroe. Three seasoned members of his Cabinet vied for the succession: Secretary of
State John Quincy Adams of Massachusetts, Secretary of the Treasury William Harris
Crawford of Georgia, and Secretary of War John C. Calhoun of South Carolina. Henry
Clay of Kentucky, the brilliant Speaker of the House of Representatives and a rival of
Jackson's for popularity in the new western states, was also an aspirant.
Compared to these men, Jackson had scanty qualifications as a statesman, with only
brief and undistinguished service in Congress and as a territorial governor. Where all
presidents since Washington had served extensive administrative and diplomatic
apprenticeships, Jackson had never held a Cabinet post or even been abroad. He

spoke no foreign languages and wrote even English roughly. On the other hand, his
heroics as a general had a far greater hold on the public imagination than the
governmental experience of his competitors.
All five men were Jeffersonian Democratic-Republicans, but in the absence of
organized opposition party affiliation had ceased to be much of a political marker. In
past years, Jeffersonians had selected their presidential candidate through a
congressional party caucus. Held in Washington where congressmen were gathered
anyway, the caucus was a convenient mechanism to unite the party against the
Federalist foe. But the withering of Federalism after the War of 1812 had undercut its
rationale. Once seen as a necessary device for ensuring victory, the caucus now
seemed a gratuitous intrusion upon the popular will, a means to deprive the voters of
any meaningful choice at the polls. A poorly attended caucus nominated Crawford in
1824, but his consequent image as the insider's choice rather harmed than helped his
chances. Other candidacies were put in play by various means. The Tennessee
legislature nominated Jackson for the presidency in 1822 and, to burnish his
credentials, elected him to the Senate the next year.
There was no organized national presidential campaign in 1824. Candidacies built on a
regional base: Adams was the favorite in New England, Jackson in the Southwest, Clay
in the Ohio valley, Crawford in his native Virginia. Calhoun dropped out, settling for the
vice-presidency on the Adams and Jackson tickets. Following tradition, the candidates
did not actively seek votes or make promises. Jackson and Adams were generally
understood to support the current Monroe administration, Crawford (despite his Cabinet
post) and Clay to oppose it.
Many political professionals, especially Clay, did not take Jackson's candidacy entirely
seriously at first. The returns showed their mistake. He proved to be the only aspirant
with a truly national popular following. Along with the entire Southwest, Jackson carried
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and the Carolinas, for a total of eleven states out of twentyfour. He led the field with 43% of the popular vote and 99 electoral votes, less than a
majority. Adams ran second, with 84 electoral votes. Crawford had 41, Clay 37.
Since no candidate had a majority in the electoral college, under the Twelfth
Amendment to the constitution the choice between the top three now fell to the House
of Representatives, where each state delegation cast one vote. Speaker Clay, out of
the running, announced his support for Adams, warning that Jackson was a mere
"military chieftain" unfit by training or temperament for the presidency. With his aid,
Adams drew the votes of thirteen states, a majority, on the first ballot in the House.
Promptly Adams named Clay as Secretary of State, the traditional stepping-stone to the
presidency. Jackson swore that a "corrupt bargain" had swindled him out of the office.
Promptly he began to gird for a rematch in 1828.
1828
The four years of John Quincy Adams's administration constituted one long,

acrimonious, and in the end one-sided presidential campaign. Determined not to be

paralyzed by his status as a minority president, Adams overreached with controversial
policy initiatives. He threw his support behind the "American System," Henry Clay's
program of congressional aid to economic development through transportation
subsidies and protective tariffs. Adams's activism backfired, as Jackson and his
publicists mounted a cry to clean out the corruptionists and restore purity and economy
in government. Major constituencies swung behind Jackson: Vice-President Calhoun
and his South Carolina following, Crawfordites shepherded by Martin Van Buren of New
York, and disaffected Clay men in the west led by Thomas Hart Benton of Missouri-Jackson's former Tennessee antagonist, now a political ally.
This diffuse coalition included both friends and foes of the American System. To break
it, Adams men tried to smoke out Jackson's position. Jackson refused to be pinned
down, while his followers fended off questions about his qualifications and experience
by touting his battlefield exploits, indomitable patriotism, and opposition to aristocracy
and corruption. A good deal of mud was slung on both sides, much of it aimed at
Jackson's marriage, his violent escapades, and the incidents of ferocious discipline and
of disrespect for civilian authority that dotted his military career. Adams men painted
him as a grasping and bloodthirsty character, a budding tyrant in the model of Caesar or
Napoleon, whose election would spell the death of the republic. Jacksonians branded
Adams as a corruptionist, an aristocrat, and--ridiculously--a libertine.
In the end, none of the slanders could touch Jackson's invincible popularity. He won
easily in 1828, with 56% of the vote and 178 electoral votes to Adams's 83. Jackson
carried New York and Pennsylvania as well as the entire West and South. He was the
first president elected from west of the Appalachians and, at that time, the oldest man to
assume the office. But his victory was touched with grief. As if in response to the
torrent of abuse, Rachel sickened and died on December 22.
1832
Jackson stood for re-election in 1832. By this time he had come out publicly against the
American System. He had also created a new issue by vetoing the recharter of the
Bank of the United States. The American System men, now calling themselves
National Republicans, nominated Henry Clay. A third party also took the field: the
quixotic Anti-Masonic Party, formed in reaction to exposures of political favoritism and
corruption by members of the fraternal order of Freemasons. Strong in some northern
states, the Anti-Masons nominated former attorney general William Wirt. They were
generally anti-Jackson, but thoughts of uniting with the National Republicans collapsed
when Clay refused to denounce the Masonic order, of which both he and Jackson were
members.
The 1832 campaign introduced the national nominating convention in place of the old
discredited congressional caucus as a means of selecting a candidate. The National
Republicans and Anti-Masons held conventions and adopted formal addresses to the
public. Jackson's followers, popularly though not yet officially known as Democrats, met

in Baltimore to endorse Jackson's choice of Martin Van Buren for Vice-President. To

show their unanimity, they also adopted a rule requiring a two-thirds vote for
nomination--a rule that would later deprive Van Buren of the Democratic presidential
nomination in 1844.
Despite the new issues and innovations in party organization, the election was
essentially a replay of 1828. Jackson again carried Pennsylvania, New York, and nearly
the entire South. He defeated Clay handily, with 55% of the popular vote and 219
electoral votes to the latter's 49. Jackson read his victory as a popular ratification of his
policies, especially the Bank veto. Opponents chalked it up to his untouchable personal
popularity.

DOMESTIC POLICY
Rotation in Office and the Spoils System
Jackson entered the White House with an uncertain policy agenda beyond a vague
craving for "reform" (or revenge) and a determination to settle relationships between the
states and the Indian tribes within their borders. On these two matters he moved
quickly and decisively.
During the campaign, Jackson had charged the Adams bureaucracy with fraud and with
working against his election. As president, he initiated sweeping removals among
highranking government officials--the Washington bureau chiefs, land and customs
officers, and federal marshals and attorneys. Jackson claimed to be purging the
corruption, laxity, and arrogance that came with long tenure, and restoring the
opportunity for government service to the citizenry at large through "rotation in office."
But haste and gullibility did much to confuse his purpose. Under the guise of reform,
many offices were doled out as rewards for political services. Newspaper editors who
had championed Jackson's cause, some of them very unsavory characters, came in for
special favor. His most appalling appointee was an old army comrade and political
sycophant named Samuel Swartwout. Against all advice, Jackson made him collector
of the New York City customhouse, where the government collected nearly half its
annual revenue. Swartwout absconded with more than $1 million--a staggering sum for
that day--in 1838.
Jackson denied that political criteria motivated his appointments, claiming honesty and
efficiency as his only goals. Yet he accepted an officeholder's support for Adams as
evidence of unfitness, and in choosing replacements he relied exclusively on
recommendations from his own partisans. A Jackson senator from New York, William
L. Marcy, defended Jackson's removals by proclaiming frankly in 1832 that in politics as
in war, "to the victor belong the spoils of the enemy." Jackson was never so candid--or
so cynical. Creating the "spoils system" of partisan manipulation of the patronage was
not his conscious intention. Still, it was his doing.

Indian Removal
Indian nations had been largely erased or removed from the northeastern United States
by the time Jackson became president. But in the southwest, the Cherokees,
Chickasaws, Choctaws, and Creeks still occupied large portions of Georgia, Alabama,
Mississippi, and Tennessee. For many years, Jackson had protested the practice of
treating with Indian tribes as if they were foreign nations. Jackson did not hate Indians
as a race. He was friendly with many individual Indians, and had taken home an Indian
orphan from the Creek campaign to raise in his household as a companion to his
adopted son. But Jackson did believe that Indian civilization was lower than whites',
and that for their own survival tribes who were pressed by white settlement must
assimilate as individuals or remove to the west out of harm's way. Confident that he
could judge the Indians' true welfare better than they, Jackson when employed as an
Indian negotiator in his army years had often used threats and bribery to procure
cessions of land. Formalities notwithstanding, he regarded tribes resident within the
states not as independent sovereign entitites but as wards of the government and
tenants-at-will.
The inherent conflict between tribal and state authority came to a head just as Jackson
assumed office. The Cherokee nation had acquired many of the attributes of white
civilization, including a written language, a newspaper, and a constitution of
government. Under its treaties with the federal government, the tribe claimed sovereign
authority over its territory in Georgia and adjoining states. Georgia, Alabama, and
Mississippi countered by asserting state jurisdiction over their Indian domains.
Jackson backed the states. He maintained that the federal government had no right to
defend the Cherokees against Georgia's encroachments. If the Indians wished to
maintain their tribal government and landownership, they must remove beyond the
existing states. To facilitate the removal, Jackson induced Congress in 1830 to pass a
bill empowering him to lay off new Indian homelands west of the Mississippi, exchange
them for current tribal holdings, purchase the Indians' capital improvements, and pay
the costs of their westward transportation. This Indian Removal Act was the only major
piece of legislation passed at Jackson's behest in his eight years as president.
Indian removal was so important to Jackson that he returned to Tennessee to conduct
the first negotiations in person. He gave the Indians a simple alternative: submit to
state authority or emigrate beyond the Mississippi. Offered generous aid on one hand
and the threat of subjugation on the other, the Chickasaws and Choctaws submitted
readily, the Creeks under duress. Only the Cherokees resisted to the bitter end.
Tentatively in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia in 1831 and more forcefully in Worcester v.
Georgia the next year, the Supreme Court upheld the tribes' independence from state
authority. But these legal victories pointed out no practical course of resistance for the
tribe to take. Tacitly encouraged by Jackson, Georgia ignored the rulings. Jackson
cultivated a minority faction within the tribe, and signed a removal treaty with them in
1835. Though the vast majority of Cherokees rejected the treaty, those who refused to
remove under its terms were finally rounded up and transplanted westward by military

force in 1838, under Jackson's successor Martin Van Buren. The Cherokees' sufferings
in this forced exodus became notorious as the "Trail of Tears."
Meanwhile, dozens of removal treaties closed out pockets of Indian settlement in other
states and territories east of the Mississippi. A short military campaign on the upper
Mississippi quelled resistance by Black Hawk's band of Sacs and Foxes in 1832, and in
1835 a long and bloody war to subdue the Seminoles in Florida began. Most of the
tribes went without force.
Given the coercion that produced them, most of the removal treaties were fair and even
generous. Their execution was miserable. Generally the treaties promised fair
payment for the Indians' land and goods, safe transportation to the West and
sustenance upon arrival, and protection for the property of those who chose to remain
behind under state jurisdiction. These safeguards collapsed under pressure from
corrupt contractors, unscrupulous traders, and white trespassers backed by state
authority. Jackson's desire to economize and avoid trouble with the state governments
further undercut federal efforts to protect the tribes. For this record he bore ultimate
responsibility. Jackson did not countenance the abuses, but he did ignore them.
Though usually a stickler for the precise letter of formal obligations, he made promises
to the Indians that the government did not and perhaps could not fulfill.
The American System and the Maysville Road Veto
When Jackson took office, the leading controversies in Congress concerned the
"American System" of economic development policies propounded by Henry Clay and
furthered by the previous Adams administration. As a senator in 1824, Jackson had
backed the System's twin pillars of a protective tariff to foster domestic industry and
federal subsidies for transportation projects (known as "internal improvements"). These
policies were especially popular in the country's mid-section, from Pennsylvania west
through Ohio to Indiana, Illinois, and Missouri. They were widely hated in much of the
South, where they were regarded as devices to siphon wealth from cotton planters to
northern manufacturers.
Many Americans judged the American System by its impact on their local interests.
Jackson had supported it on national grounds, as a means to build the country's
strength and secure its economic independence. Poor transportation in particular had
hamstrung the American military effort in the War of 1812. But the unseeemly scramble
in Congress for favors and subsidies and the rising sectional acrimony over the tariff
during the Adams presidency turned Jackson against the System. As a nationalist, he
deplored sectional wrangling that threatened disunion, and he came to see protective
tariffs and transportation subsidies as vehicles for corruption and for the advancement
of special privilege.
Jackson announced his new policy by vetoing a bill to aid the Maysville Road in
Kentucky in 1830. A string of similar vetoes followed, essentially halting federal internal
improvement spending. Reversing himself on the tariff, Jackson renounced protection

in 1831 and endorsed a reduction in rates. Invoking Jeffersonian precedent, he urged a

return to simple, frugal, minimal government.
At the same time, Jackson reproved the increasingly strident Southern sectional
opposition to the tariff headed by his own Vice-President, John C. Calhoun of South
Carolina. Radical South Carolinians blamed the tariff for all their economic woes and
misfortunes. They denounced it as an unconstitutional exercise of congressional
power, a measure to illegitimately channel wealth from South to North under the guise
of an import tax. Drawing on the Virginia and Kentucky resolutions against the Alien
and Sedition Acts in 1798, Calhoun fashioned an argument that an individual state,
acting through a formal convention, could interpose its authority to declare null and void
any federal law that it deemed to violate the constitution. Jackson thought this
nullification doctrine treasonous and absurd. At a political dinner in 1830 he stamped
his disapproval on it by staring at Calhoun and toasting, "Our federal Union: It must be
preserved."
The Eaton Affair
Jackson was already becoming estranged from Calhoun over a simmering Washington
scandal. Jackson's Secretary of War, John Henry Eaton, was an old army comrade of
Jackson's, his campaign biographer, and Tennessee neighbor. He was the president's
one personal confidant in a Cabinet made up of near-strangers. Just before the
inauguration, Eaton had married Margaret O'Neale Timberlake, the vivacious daughter
of a Washington hotelier. Scandalous stories circulated about "Peggy" O'Neale, whose
first husband, a purser in the navy, had died abroad under mysterious circumstances
not long before her marriage to Eaton. Rumor said that he committed suicide over her
dalliance with Eaton. Cabinet wives, including Calhoun's wife Floride, regarded Peggy
with abhorrence and conspicuously shunned her.
In the snubbing of Mrs. Eaton, Jackson saw the kind of vicious persecution that he
believed had hounded his own Rachel to her death. He also believed he spied a plot to
drive out Eaton from his Cabinet, isolate him among strangers, and control his
administration. The master of the plot, Jackson came to decide, was Calhoun. He was
also shown evidence that during the controversy over his Florida incursion back in
1818, Calhoun had criticized him in Monroe's Cabinet while publicly posturing as his
defender. Jackson now accused Calhoun of treachery, initiating an angry
correspondence that ended with the severing of social relations between the two.
The Eaton scandal cleaved Jackson's own household. His niece, White House hostess
Emily Tennessee Donelson, refused to associate with Mrs. Eaton, and Emily's husband,
Jackson's nephew and private secretary Andrew Jackson Donelson, backed her up.
The one Cabinet officer who stood apart from the snubbing was a man with no wife to
contend with--Secretary of State Martin Van Buren of New York, a widower. Jackson
was drawn to Van Buren both by his courtliness to Peggy Eaton and his policy views.
Van Buren wished to return to the minimalist, strict constructionist governing philosophy
of the old Jeffersonian party. In practical political terms, he sought to rebuild the

coalition of "planters and plain republicans"--put concretely, an alliance of the South with
New York and Pennsylvania--that had sustained Jefferson. Van Buren opposed the
American System, but on broad philosophical rather than narrow sectional grounds.
As Jackson separated from Calhoun, he became more intimate with Van Buren. By
1831 the Eaton imbroglio threatened to paralyze the administration. Eaton and Van
Buren created a way out: they resigned, giving Jackson an occasion to demand the
resignations of the other secretaries and appoint a whole new Cabinet. To reward Van
Buren, Jackson named him as minister to Great Britain, the highest post in the
American diplomatic service. The nomination came before the Senate, where VicePresident Calhoun, on an arranged tie vote, cast the deciding vote against it. Van
Buren, who had already assumed his station abroad, came home as a political martyr,
Jackson's choice for vice-president in 1832, and his heir apparent to the presidency.
The Nullification Crisis and the Compromise of 1833
As Van Buren rose and Calhoun fell, the tariff controversy mounted to a crisis. In 1832
Congress passed a new tariff that reduced some rates but continued the protectionist
principle. Some Southerners claimed this as a sign of progress, but South Carolinians
saw it as reason to abandon hope from Washington. In November, a state convention
declared the tariff unconstitutional and hence null and void. South Carolina's legislature
followed up with measures to block the collection of federal custom revenues at the
state's ports and to defend the state with arms against federal incursion.
Jackson responded on two fronts. He urged Congress to reduce the tariff further, but
he also asked for strengthened authority to enforce the revenue laws. Privately, and
perhaps for calculated political effect, he talked about marching an army into South
Carolina and hanging Calhoun. In December he issued a ringing official proclamation
against nullification. Drafted largely by Secretary of State Edward Livingston, the
document questioned Carolinians' obsession with the tariff, reminded them of their
patriotic heritage, eviscerated the constitutional theory behind nullification, and warned
against taking this fatal step: "Be not deceived by names. Disunion by armed force is
treason. Are you really ready to incur its guilt?"
While Jackson thundered, Congress scrambled for a solution that would avoid civil war.
Henry Clay, leader of the congressional opposition to Jackson and stalwart of the
American System, joined in odd alliance with John C. Calhoun, who had resigned his
lame-duck vice-presidency for a seat in the Senate. They fashioned a bill to reduce the
tariff in a series of stages over nine years. Early in 1833 Congress passed this
Compromise Tariff and also a "force bill" to enforce the revenue laws. Though the ClayCalhoun forces sought to deny Jackson credit for the settlement, he was fully satisfied
with the result. South Carolina, claiming victory, rescinded its nullification of the tariff
but nullified the force bill in a final gesture of principled defiance. The Compromise of
1833 brought an end to tariff agitation until the 1840s. First with internal improvements,
then with the tariff, the American System had been essentially stymied.

The Bank Veto

The congressional Clay-Calhoun alliance foreshadowed a convergence of all Jackson's
enemies into a new opposition party. The issue that sealed this coalition, solidified
Jackson's own following, and dominated his second term as president was the Second
Bank of the United States.
The Bank of the United States was a quasi-public corporation chartered by Congress to
manage the federal government's finances and provide a sound national currency.
Headquartered in Philadelphia with branches throughout the states, it was the country's
only truly national financial institution. The federal government owned one-fifth of the
stock and the President of the United States appointed one-fifth of the directors. Like
other banks chartered by state legislatures, the Bank lent for profit and issued paper
currency backed by specie reserves. Its notes were federal legal tender. By law, it was
also the federal government's own banker, arranging its loans and storing, transferring,
and disbursing its funds. The Bank's national reach and official status gave it enormous
leverage over the state banks and over the country's supply of money and credit.
The original Bank of the United States was chartered in 1791 at the urging of Secretary
of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton. Opposition to it was one of the founding tenets of
the Jeffersonian Democratic-Republican party. That party, then in power, allowed the
Bank to expire when its twenty-year charter ran out in 1811. But the government's
financial misadventures in the War of 1812 forced a reconsideration. In 1816 Congress
chartered the Second Bank, again for twenty years.
Imprudent lending and corrupt management brought the Second Bank into deep
disrepute during the speculative boom-and-bust cycle that culminated in the Panic of
1819. Calls arose for revocation of the charter. But the astute stewardship of new Bank
president Nicholas Biddle did much to repair its reputation in the 1820s. By 1828, when
Jackson was first elected, the Bank had ceased to be controversial. Indeed, most
informed observers deemed it indispensable.
Startling his own supporters, Jackson attacked the Bank in his very first message to
Congress in 1829. Biddle attempted to conciliate him, but Jackson's opposition to
renewing the charter seemed immovable. He was convinced that the Bank was not
only unconstitutional--as Jefferson and his followers had long maintained--but that its
concentrated financial power represented a dire threat to popular liberty.
Under the advice of Senators Henry Clay and Daniel Webster, Biddle sought a
congressional recharter in 1832. They calculated that Jackson would not dare a veto on
the eve of the election; if he did, they would make an issue of it in the campaign. The
recharter bill duly passed Congress, and on July 10 Jackson vetoed it.
The veto message was one of the defining documents of Jackson's presidency. Clearly
intended for the public eye, parts of it read more like a political manifesto than a
communication to Congress. Jackson recited his constitutional objections and
introduced some dubious economic arguments, chiefly aimed at foreign ownership of

Bank stock. But the crux of the message was its attack on the special privilege enjoyed
by private stockholders in a government-chartered corporation. Jackson laid out an
essentially laissez-faire vision of government as a neutral arbiter, phrased in a resonant
populism:
It is to be regretted that the rich and powerful too often bend the acts of
government to their selfish purposes. Distinctions in society will always exist
under every just government. Equality of talents, of education, or of wealth can
not be produced by human institutions. In the full enjoyment of the gifts of
Heaven and the fruits of superior industry, economy, and virtue, every man is
equally entitled to protection by law; but when the laws undertake to add to these
natural and just advantages artificial distinctions, to grant titles, gratuities, and
exclusive privileges, to make the rich richer and the potent more powerful, the
humble members of society--the farmers, mechanics, and laborers--who have
neither the time nor the means of securing like favors to themselves, have a right
to complain of the injustice of their Government. There are no necessary evils in
government. Its evils exist only in its abuses. If it would confine itself to equal
protection, and, as Heaven does its rains, shower its favors alike on the high and
the low, the rich and the poor, it would be an unqualified blessing.
Though some original Jackson men were flabbergasted and outraged at his turn against
the Bank, the veto held up in Congress. It became the prime issue in the ensuing
presidential campaign, with both sides distributing copies of Jackson's message.
Jackson read his re-election as a mandate to pursue his attack on the Bank further.
Removal of the Deposits
As soon as the nullification crisis was resolved, Jackson took his next step. The Bank's
open involvement in the presidential campaign convinced him more than ever of its
inherent corruption. To draw its fangs until its charter ran out in 1836, he determined to
withdraw the federal government's own deposits from the Bank and place them in
selected state-chartered banks.
This was a maneuver requiring some delicacy. Under the charter, the Secretary of the
Treasury, not the President, had authority to remove the deposits. He had also to
explain his reasons to Congress, where the House of Representatives had just voted by
a two-to-one margin that the deposits should stay where they were. Jackson
canvassed his Cabinet on removal. Most of them opposed it, but he got the support
and arguments he needed from Attorney General Roger Taney. Jackson drew up a
paper explaining his decision, read it to the Cabinet, and ordered Treasury Secretary
William John Duane to execute the removal. To Jackson's astonishment, Duane
refused. He also refused to resign, so Jackson fired him and put Taney in his place.
Taney ordered the removal, which was largely complete by the time Congress
convened in December 1833.
Even many congressional foes of the Bank could not countenance Jackson's

proceedings against it. He had defied Congress's intent, rode roughshod over the
Treasury Secretary's statutory control over the public purse, and removed the public
funds from the lawfully authorized, responsible hands of the Bank of the United States
to an untried, unregulated, and perhaps wholly irresponsible collection of state banks.
To many, Jackson seemed to regard himself as above the law.
Fortunately for Jackson, Bank president Nicholas Biddle over-reacted and played into
his hands. Regarding the removal of deposits as a declaration of open war, Biddle
determined to force a recharter by creating a financial panic. Loss of the deposits
required some curtailment of the Bank's loans, but Biddle carried the contraction further
than was necessary in a deliberate effort to squeeze businessmen into demanding a
recharter. This manipulation of credit for political ends served only to discredit the Bank
and to vindicate Jackson's strictures against it.
Congress did not even consider recharter, but it did lash out at Jackson. Clay men and
Southern anti-tariffites could not agree on the American System; they could not all
agree on rechartering the Bank; but they could unite in their outrage at Jackson's highhanded proceedings against it. In the 1833-1834 session, Jackson's congressional foes
converged to form a new party. They took the name of Whigs, borrowed from
Revolutionary-era American and British opponents of royal prerogative.
Whigs held a majority in the Senate. They rejected Jackson's nominees for government
directors of the Bank of the United States, rejected Taney as Secretary of the Treasury,
and in March 1834 adopted a resolution of censure against Jackson himself for
assuming "authority and power not conferred by the Constitution and laws, but in
derogation of both." Jackson protested the censure, arguing that the Senate had
adopted the moral equivalent of an impeachment conviction without formal charges,
without a trial, and without the necessary two-thirds vote. Led by Thomas Hart Benton,
Jackson's defenders mounted a crusade to expunge the censure from the Senate
journal. They succeeded in 1837, at the end of Jackson's presidency, after Democrats
finally won majority control of the Senate.
Hard Money
The Bank, defeated, retired from the fray after the 1834 session. When its charter
expired it accepted a new one from Pennsylvania and continued to operate as a state
institution. Meanwhile the state banks, cut loose from central restraint and gorged with
federal funds, went on a lending spree that helped fuel a speculative boom in western
lands. Everything came crashing down in the Panic of 1837, which broke just as
Jackson retired from office. The ensuing depression plagued Martin Van Buren's
presidency and lingered on into the 1840s.
Jackson's unsatisfactory experiment with the state banks helped drive his economic
thinking toward more radical extremes. He renounced all banknote currency and
demanded a return to the "hard money" of gold and silver. To that end, and to curb
rampant speculation, he ordered the issuance of a "Specie Circular" in 1836 requiring

payment in coin for western public lands. By the end of his presidency he was attacking
all chartered corporations, including manufacturing concerns, turnpike and canal
companies, and especially banks, as instruments of aristocratic privilege and engines of
oppression. His Farewell Address in 1837, largely drafted by Taney, warned of an
insidious "money power" that threatened to subvert American liberty.
Slavery and Abolition
During Jackson's presidency, the momentous question of slavery intruded forcefully into
politics. Northern evangelical opponents of slavery known as abolitionists organized
and began to bombard the nation and Congress with pleas and petitions to rid the
republic of this great wrong. Defenders of slavery responded with denunciations and
with violence. They demanded in the interest of public safety that criticism of slavery be
not only answered, but silenced. Some, especially the South Carolina nullifiers, linked
abolitionism to the tariff as part of a systematic campaign of Northern sectional
oppression against the South.
There is nothing to show that Jackson ever pondered slavery as a fundamental moral
question. Such thinking was not in his character: he was a man of action, not of
philosophy. He grew up with the institution of slavery and accepted it uncritically. Like
his neighbors, he bought and sold slaves and used them to work his plantation and wait
on his needs. Jackson reacted to the abolitionist controversy in purely political terms.
He perceived it as a threat to sectional harmony and to his own national Democratic
party, and on that ground he condemned the agitation of both sides.
During Jackson's administration, Congress began adopting annual "gag rules" to keep
discussion of abolition petitions off the House and Senate floor. In 1835, abolitionists
sent thousands of antislavery tracts through the mails directly to southern clergy,
officials, and prominent citizens. Many of these were never delivered, intercepted by
southern postmasters or by angry mobs. Jackson and Postmaster General Amos
Kendall approved their action. Jackson recommended federal suppression of
"incendiary publications" and damned the abolitionists' "wicked attempts" to incite a
slave rebellion. His Farewell Address in 1837 warned of the dangers of sectional
fanaticism, both northern and southern.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Generally, foreign affairs were not a prominent concern of Jackson's administration. His
agents negotiated a number of treaties to secure foreign trade openings and settle
outstanding damage claims. Of these, only an agreement with Britain over the West
Indies trade, which Jackson reached by repudiating the demands of the previous
Adams administration, was in any way controversial.
Late in Jackson's presidency, however, an unseemly dispute with France nearly brought
the two nations to the brink of war. In an 1831 treaty, France agreed to pay claims for

Napoleonic depredations on American shipping. But the French Chamber of Deputies

refused to appropriate the necessary funds. Jackson finally lost patience and asked
Congress to authorize reprisals if the money was not paid. The French government
then demanded retraction of this insult as a condition of payment. Jackson responded
in effect that what he said to Congress was none of a foreign government's business.
The impasse deepened through 1835: ministers were recalled and military preparations
begun. Finally, under British urgings, the French agreed to construe a conciliatory
passage in a later message of Jackson's as sufficient apology. France paid the debt
and the crisis passed without repercussions.
The same could not be said of Jackson's dealings with Mexico. Jackson craved the
Mexican border province of Texas for the United States, and he made its purchase the
first priority of his presidential diplomacy. Given the instability of Mexico's government
and its suspicions of American designs, a Texas negotiation required great discretion
and patience. Jackson's chosen agent, Anthony Butler, possessed neither of those
qualities, and Jackson's own careless instructions encouraged Butler's clumsy dabbling
in the diplomatic underworld of bribery and personal influence. His machinations,
combined with the flow of American settlers into Texas, aroused Mexican
apprehensions of American designs there. In 1835, American emigrants to Texas led
by Jackson's old Tennessee comrade Sam Houston mounted a successful revolt
against Mexico and declared their independence. Jackson prudently declined to
endorse American annexation of Texas or even to recognize the new republic without
prior congressional approval. Still, his earlier inept efforts to buy the province helped
sow seeds of mutual distrust that would bear fruit in war between the United States and
Mexico a decade later.

LIFE AFTER THE PRESIDENCY

Throughout Jackson's presidency, he yearned for a quiet retirement at The Hermitage,
but when the time for it came he found that he could not let go of politics. He yearned to
see his policies carried through and his reputation vindicated. Martin Van Buren, his
handpicked successor as president, had become his closest political confidant.
Throughout Van Buren's term Jackson peppered him with advice, exhortations, and
warnings. He summoned all of his failing energies in behalf of Van Buren's Independent
Treasury financial plan and his unsuccessful reelection bid in 1840.
William Henry Harrison's defeat of Van Buren staggered Jackson, but he soon found
cause for rejoicing in Harrison's sudden death and the reversion of his successor John
Tyler to Democratic policies on banking and the tariff. To his great satisfaction,
Jackson's influence was again enlisted, this time in support of the annexation of Texas.
Jackson backed annexation with enthusiasm. When Van Buren declared against it,
Jackson helped start the movement to jettison him in favor of Tennessean James K.
Polk for the 1844 Democratic nomination. Jackson lived long enough to see his loyal
disciple Polk installed in the presidency to carry on his work.

Honors and tributes enriched Jackson's retirement. He was the living symbol of
democracy, and an endless parade of admirers trekked to The Hermitage to do him
homage. Jackson accepted public tributes with an air of diffident humility, but he
seemingly never tired of them. In 1840 he dragged himself to New Orleans for a
twenty-fifth anniversary celebration of his great triumph. Conscious of his importance
and jealous of his reputation, Jackson spent much time arranging his papers and
making preparations for Amos Kendall's projected biography.
Gradually the weight of age and illness bore down on Jackson. His health had been
precarious for many years, yet he had recovered from the brink so many times that
friends half-seriously questioned his mortality. Jackson knew better. He had long
anticipated death, and faced it without fear. He died at The Hermitage on June 8, 1845,
surrounded by family and friends, and was buried in his garden next to Rachel.

FAMILY LIFE
As a refuge from his turbulent military and political career, Jackson craved the comfort
and security of a family circle. His close blood relations all died before he turned fifteen,
but his marriage to Rachel gave him a surrogate family in the huge Donelson clan.
Jackson looked out for his many nephews, stood surety for them, gave them advice,
and furthered their careers. One of these young men, Andrew Jackson Donelson, went
to West Point and became Jackson's military aide and later presidential private
secretary, while his wife and first cousin, Emily Tennessee Donelson, served as
Jackson's White House hostess.
Jackson's home life with Rachel at The Hermitage had been happy and utterly
conventional. Her death just after the 1828 election staggered Jackson. He entered the
White House as a bereaved widower and continued to grieve for Rachel through the
remainder of his life. The one great disappointment in their marriage had been that it
was childless. In 1809 they had adopted at birth a son of Rachel's brother Severn
Donelson, whom they named Andrew Jackson, Jr., and raised as their son. He, his wife
Sarah Yorke Jackson, and their children kept Jackson company at The Hermitage in his
declining years.

IMPACT AND LEGACY

Andrew Jackson left a permanent imprint upon American politics and the presidency.
Within eight years, he melded the amorphous coalition of personal followers who had
elected him into the country's most durable and successful political party, an electoral
machine whose organization and discipline would serve as a model for all others. At
the same time, his controversial conduct in office galvanized opponents to organize the
Whig party. The Democratic party was Jackson's child; the national two-party system
was his legacy.

Jackson's drive for party organization was spurred by his own difficulties with Congress.
Unlike other famously strong presidents, Jackson defined himself not by enacting a
legislative program but by thwarting one. In eight years, Congress passed only one
major law, the Indian Removal Act of 1830, at his behest. During this time Jackson
vetoed twelve bills, more than his six predecessors combined. One of these was the
first "pocket veto" in American history. The Maysville Road and Bank vetoes stood as
enduring statements of his political philosophy.
Jackson strengthened himself against Congress by forging direct links with the voters.
His official messages, though delivered to Congress, spoke in plain and powerful
language to the people at large. Reversing a tradition of executive deference to
legislative supremacy, Jackson boldly cast himself as the people's tribune, their sole
defender against special interests and their minions in Congress. In other ways too,
Jackson expanded the scope of presidential authority. He dominated his Cabinet,
forcing out members who would not execute his commands. In two terms he went
through four secretaries of State and five of the Treasury. Holding his official
subordinates at arm's length, Jackson devised and implemented his policies through a
private coterie of advisers and publicists known as the "Kitchen Cabinet." His bold
initiatives and domineering style caused opponents to call him King Andrew, and to take
the name of Whigs to signify their opposition to executive tyranny.
Jackson was no deep thinker, but his matured policy positions did bespeak a coherent
political philosophy. Like Jefferson, he believed republican government should be
simple, frugal, and accessible. He cherished the extinction of the national debt during
his administration as a personal triumph. Believing that social cleavages and inequities
were fostered rather than ameliorated by governmental intervention, he embraced
laissez faire as the policy most conducive to economic equality and political liberty.
Jackson was both a fiery patriot and a strident partisan. Regarding the national union
as indivisible and perpetual, he denounced nullification and secession while reproving
policies like the tariff which fostered sectional divisiveness. His aggressive Indian
removal policy and his espousal of cheaper western land prices reflected his
nationalism's grounding in the southwestern frontier.
Jackson's powerful personality played an instrumental role in his presidency. He
indulged in violent hatreds, and the extent to which his political positions reflected mere
personal animus is still debated. Jackson demonized many of those who crossed him,
including John C. Calhoun, Henry Clay, Bank of the United States president Nicholas
Biddle, and Cherokee Indian chief John Ross. Jackson's own character polarized
contemporaries and continues to divide historians. Some praise his strength and
audacity; others see him as vengeful and self-obsessed. To admirers he stands as a
shining symbol of American accomplishment, the ultimate individualist and democrat.
To detractors he appears an incipient tyrant, the closest we have yet come to an
American Caesar.
THE AMERICAN FRANCHISE

The party that Andrew Jackson founded during his presidency called itself the American
Democracy. In those same years, changes in electoral rules and campaign styles were
making the country's political ethos more democratic than it had been before. Both
circumstances combined to fix the identity of this era in Americans' historical memory as
the age of Jacksonian Democracy.
The currency of this label began with contemporaries. In 1831-1832, the Frenchman
Alexis de Toqueville toured the United States. His classic Democracy in America
identified democracy and equality as salient national traits. Tocqueville saw America as
"the image of democracy itself, with its inclinations, its character, its prejudices, and its
passions." To Tocqueville and other visitors, both favorable and critical, the United
States represented the democratic, egalitarian future; Europe the aristocratic past. Not
surprisingly, Andrew Jackson's partisans (and some sympathetic historians) were eager
to appropriate this identity exclusively to themselves, counterposing their Democracy's
democracy to the opposing Whig party's "aristocracy." This identification, however,
should not be accepted uncritically.
The Jacksonian Democratic Party
The Democratic party and its program emerged in stages out of the largely personal
following that had elected Andrew Jackson president in 1828. As progressively defined
by Jackson during his two terms, the party's outlook was essentially laissez faire.
Anointing themselves as Thomas Jefferson's true heirs, Democrats stood for simple,
frugal, and unintrusive government. They opposed government spending and
government favoritism, especially in the form of corporate charters for banks and other
enterprises. They claimed that all such measures invariably aided the rich, the
privileged, and the idle--the aristocracy--against the humble yet meritorious ordinary
working people.
Again following Jefferson, the Democracy espoused anticlericalism and rigorous
separation of church and state. At a time of great evangelical fervor, Democrats stood
aloof from the nation's powerful interdenominational (but primarily PresbyterianCongregational) benevolent and philanthropic associations; and they denounced the
intrusion into politics of religious crusades such as Sabbatarianism, temperance, and
abolitionism. Democrats thus garnered adherents among religious dissenters and
minorities, from Catholics to freethinkers.
Under Jackson and his successor Van Buren, Democrats pioneered in techniques of
party organization and discipline, which they justified as a means of securing popular
ascendancy over the aristocrats. To nominate candidates and adopt platforms,
Democrats perfected a pyramidal structure of local, state, and national committees,
caucuses, and conventions. These ensured coordinated action and supposedly
reflected opinion at the grass roots, though their movements in fact were often directed
from Washington. The "spoils system" of government patronage inaugurated by
Jackson inspired activity and instilled discipline within party ranks.

Jackson and the Democrats cast their party as the embodiment of the people's will, the
defender of the common man against the Whig "aristocracy." The substance behind
this claim is still in dispute. After the War of 1812, constitutional changes in the states
had broadened the participatory base of politics by erasing traditional property
requirements for suffrage and by making state offices and presidential electors
popularly elective. By the time Jackson was elected, nearly all white men could vote,
and the vote had gained in power. In 1812 only half the states chose presidential
electors by popular vote; by 1832, all did except South Carolina. Jackson and the
Democrats benefitted from and capitalized upon these changes, but in no sense did
they initiate them.
The presence of a class component in Jacksonian parties, setting Democratic plain
farmers and workers against the Whig bourgeoisie or business elite, is argued to this
day. One can read Democratic hosannas to the plain people as a literal description of
their constituency or as artful propaganda. Once the popular Jackson left the scene,
the two parties were very nearly equal in their bases of popular support. Presidential
elections through the 1840s were among the closest in history, while party control of
Congress passed back and forth.
Close competition and nearly universal white-male suffrage turned political campaigns
into a combination of spectator sport and participatory street theater. Whigs as well as
Democrats championed the common man and marshaled the masses at barbeques and
rallies. Both parties appealed to ordinary voters with riveting stump speeches and by
crafting candidates into folk heroes. Whigs answered the popularity of "Old Hickory"
Andrew Jackson, hero of New Orleans, with figures like "Old Tippecanoe" William Henry
Harrison, victor of the rousing "log cabin" presidential campaign of 1840. With both
parties chasing every vote, turnout rates spiraled up toward 80 per cent of the eligible
electorate by 1840.
The Democratic Spirit of the Age
Looking beyond the white male electorate, many of the Democrats' postures seem
profoundly anti-egalitarian and anti-democratic, judged not only by a modern standard
but against the goals of the burgeoning humanitarian and reform movements of that
time. On the whole, Democrats were more aggressively anti-abolitionist than Whigs,
and they generally outdid them in justifying and promoting ethnic, racial, and sexual
exclusion and subordination. Jackson's original political base had been in the South. In
the 1830s and 1840s the two parties competed on nearly even terms throughout the
country, but in the next decade the Democracy would return to its sectional roots as the
party of slaveholders and their northern sympathizers.
Yet even if Jackson's Democrats had no exclusive hold on democratic principles, they
still partook of the spirit of a democratic age. As Tocqueville famously observed, "the
people reign in the American political world as the Deity does in the universe. They are
the cause and the aim of all things; everything comes from them, and everything is

absorbed in them." To Tocqueville, Americans' energetic voluntarism, their enthusiasm

for societies, associations, reforms, and crusades, their vibrant institutions of local
government, the popular style and leveling spirit of their manners, customs, pastimes,
art, literature, science, religion, and intellect, all marked democracy's pervasive reign.
From this perspective, the fact that Andrew Jackson--a rough-hewn, poorly educated,
self-made frontiersman--could ascend to the presidency mattered more than the policies
he embraced. His rhetorical championship of the plain people against the aristocrats,
whatever its substance or sincerity, was itself the sign and harbinger of a massive social
shift toward democracy, equality, and the primacy of the common man. Jackson stands
in this light not as the leader of a party, but as the symbol for a democratic age.