Abalos vs Macatangcay

G.R. No. 155043 September 30 2004

FACTS:
Spouses Arturo and Esther Abalos are the registered owners of a parcel of land with
improvements. Arturo made a Receipt and Memorandum of Agreement in favor of
Macatangay, binding himself to sell to latter the subject property and not to offer the same
to any other party within 30 days from date. Full payment would also be effected as soon
as possession of the property shall have been turned over to Macatangay. Macatangay
gave an earnest money amounting to P5,000.00 to be deducted from the purchase price of
P1,300,000.00 in favor of the spouses.
Subsequently, Arturo and Esther had a marital squabble brewing at that time and
Macatangay, to protect his interest, made an annotation in the title of the property. He
then sent a letter informing them of his readiness to pay the full amount of the purchase
price. Esther, through her SPA, executed in favor of Macatangay, a Contract to sell the
property to the extent of her conjugal interest for the sum of P650,000 less the sum
already received by her and Arturo. She agreed to surrender the property to Macatangay
within 20 days along with the deed of absolute sale upon full payment, while he promised
to pay the balance of the purchase price for P1, 290,000.00 after being placed in
possession of the property. Macatangay informed them that he was ready to pay the
amount in full. The couple failed to deliver the property so he sued the spouses.

RTC dismissed the complaint, because the SPA could not have authorized Arturo to sell the
property to Macatangay as it was falsified. CA reversed the decision, ruling the SPA in
favor of Arturo, assuming it was void, cannot affect the transaction between Esther and
Macatangay. On the other hand, the CA considered the RMOA executed by Arturo valid to
effect the sale of his conjugal share in the property.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale of property is valid.

RULING:
No. Arturo and Esther appear to have been married before the effectivity of the Family
Code. There being no indication that they have adopted a different property regime, their
property relations would automatically be governed by the regime of conjugal partnership
of gains. The subject land which had been admittedly acquired during the marriage of the
spouses forms part of their conjugal partnership.

Under the Civil Code, the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. This
right is clearly granted to him by law. More, the husband is the sole administrator. The
wife is not entitled as of right to joint administration.
The husband, even if he is statutorily designated as administrator of the conjugal
partnership, cannot validly alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal
partnership without the wifes consent. Similarly, the wife cannot dispose of any property
belonging to the conjugal partnership without the conformity of the husband. The law is
explicit that the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husbands consent,
except in cases provided by law.
More significantly, it has been held that prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership,
the interest of each spouse in the conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere expectancy, which
constitutes neither a legal nor an equitable estate, and does not ripen into title until it
appears that there are assets in the community as a result of the liquidation and
settlement. The interest of each spouse is limited to the net remainder or remanente
liquido (haber ganancial) resulting from the liquidation of the affairs of the partnership
after its dissolution. Thus, the right of the husband or wife to one-half of the conjugal
assets does not vest until the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership, or
after dissolution of the marriage, when it is finally determined that, after settlement of
conjugal obligations, there are net assets left which can be divided between the spouses or
their respective heirs.
The Family Code has introduced some changes particularly on the aspect of the
administration of the conjugal partnership. The new law provides that the administration of
the conjugal partnership is now a joint undertaking of the husband and the wife. In the
event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal partnership, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. However, the power of administration does not include the power to
dispose or encumber property belonging to the conjugal partnership. In all instances, the
present law specifically requires the written consent of the other spouse, or authority of
the court for the disposition or encumbrance of conjugal partnership property without
which, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
Inescapably, herein Arturos action for specific performance must fail. Even on the
supposition that the parties only disposed of their respective shares in the property, the
sale, assuming that it exists, is still void for as previously stated, the right of the husband
or the wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership. Nemo dat qui non habet. No one can give what he has not.

Bautista vs Silva G.R. No. 157434. September 19, 2006

Facts:
Spouses Berlina Silva and Pedro Silva were the owners of a parcel of land with a
Transfer Certificate of Title No B371-89 which was registered on august 141980 in their
names.
In March 3, 1988 Pedro, for himself and as attorney in fact of his wife Berlina thru
a Special Power of attorney purportedly executed by Berlina in his favor executed a Deed
of absolute Sale over the said parcel of land in favor of defendants spouses Claro Bautista
and Nida Bautista
That as a consequence, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 37189 was cancelled and in lieu
thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title No. V-2765 of the Registry of Deeds for the Valenzuela
Branch was issued in the names of Spouses Claro Bautista and Nida Bautista on March 4,
1988.
Based on the evidence presented, the RTC also found that the signature appearing
on the Special Power of Attorney (SPA) as that of Berlina Silva is a forgery, and that
consequently the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Pedro in favor of Spouses Bautista is
not authorized by Berlina.
The RTC rendered judgment declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 3, 1988
executed by Pedro M. Silva, for himself and as attorney-in-fact of Berlina F. Silva, in favor
of defendants-spouses Claro Bautista and Nida Bautista over the parcel of land, described
and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. B-37189 Metro Manila District III, null and
void and the resulting Transfer Certificate of Title No. V-2765 of Valenzuela Registry in the
name of Spouses Claro Bautista and Nida Bautista cancelled and that Transfer Certificate
of Title No. B-37189 reinstated. CA Affirmed the decision of the Lower Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the special power of attorney on behalf of the spouse being a
forgery and the deed of sale executed by the husband is null and void, the nullity [thereof]
does not include the one half share of the husband.
Ruling:
It is null and void. In Domingo v. Reed, 53 we found that the special power of
attorney relied upon by the buyers contained a defective notarial acknowledgment in that
it stated there that only the agent-wife signed the document before the notary public while
the principal-husband did not. Such flaw rendered the notarial acknowledgment of no
effect and reduced the special power of attorney into a private document. We declared the
buyer who relied on the private special power of attorney a buyer in bad faith.
In Lao v. Villones-Lao, 54 and Estacio v. Jaranilla, 55 we found that the buyers knew of
circumstances extrinsic to the special power of attorney which put in question the actual
execution of said document. In Domingo Lao, the buyer knew that the agent-wife was
estranged from the principal-husband but was living within the same city. In the Estacio
case, we found admissions by the buyers that they knew that at the time of the purported

execution of the special power of attorney, the alleged principal was not in the Philippines.
In both cases we held that the buyers were not in good faith, not because we found any
outward defect in the notarial acknowledgment of the special powers of attorney, but
because the latter had actual notice of facts that should have put them on deeper inquiry
into the capacity to sell of the seller. aDcETC
In the present case, petitioners knew that Berlina was in Germany at the time they were
buying the property and the SPA relied upon by petitioners has a defective notarial
acknowledgment. The SPA was a mere photocopy 56 and we are not convinced that there
ever was an original copy of said SPA as it was only this photocopy that was testified to by
petitioner Nida Bautista and offered into evidence by her counsel. 57 We emphasize this
fact because it was actually this photocopy that was relied upon by petitioners before they
entered into the deed of sale with Pedro. As admitted to by petitioner Nida Bautista, upon
inspection of the photocopy of the SPA, they gave Pedro an advanced payment of
Php55,000.00; this signifies that, without further investigation on the SPA, petitioners had
agreed to buy the subject property from Pedro.

But then said photocopy of the SPA contains no notarial seal. A notarial seal is a mark,
image or impression on a document which would indicate that the notary public has
officially signed it. 58 There being no notarial seal, the signature of the notary public on
the notarial certificate was therefore incomplete. The notarial certificate being deficient, it
was as if the notarial acknowledgment was unsigned. The photocopy of the SPA has no
notarial acknowledgment to speak of. It was a mere private document which petitioners
cannot foist as a banner of good faith. IHCacT
All told, it was not sufficient evidence of good faith that petitioners merely relied on the
photocopy of the SPA as this turned out to be a mere private document. They should have
adduced more evidence that they looked beyond it. They did not. Instead, they took no
precautions at all. They verified with Atty. Lucero whether the SPA was authentic but then
the latter was not the notary public who prepared the document. Worse, they purposely
failed to inquire who was the notary public who prepared the SPA. Finally, petitioners
conducted the transaction in haste. It took them all but three days or from March 2 to 4,
1988 to enter into the deed of sale, notwithstanding the restriction on the capacity to sell
of Pedro. 59 In no way then may petitioners qualify as buyers for value in good faith.
That said, we come to the third issue on whether petitioners may retain the portion of
Pedro Silva in the subject property. Certainly not. It is well-settled that the nullity of the
sale of conjugal property contracted by the husband without the marital consent of the
wife affects the entire property, not just the share of the wife. 60 We see no reason to
deviate from this rule.

SPOUSES AGGABAO V. PARULAN, JR. AND PARULAN

G.R. No. 165803, [September 1, 2010]
FACTS:
In January 1991, real estate broker Marta K.Atanacio offered 2 lots located in
Paraaque to the petitioners. On February 2, 1991, the petitioners met up with Elena
Parulan at the site of the property and showed them the following documents: (a.)
Owners original copy of the TCT of the 2 lots; (b.) tax declarations; (c.) a copy of the
special power of attorney dated January 7, 1991 executed by Dionisio authorizing Elena to
sell the property. The petitioners paid P200,000.00 as earnest money for which Elena
executed a handwritten Receipt of Earnest Money which stipulated that the peitioners
would pay an additional payment of P130, 000.00 on February 4, 1991; P650,000.00 on or
before February 15, 1991 and P700, 000.00 on March 31, 1991 once Elena turned over
the property.
On February 4, 1991, the petitioners, accompanied by the broker, went to the
Office of the Register of Deeds to verify the TCTs shown by Elena. There they discovered
that one of the lots had been encumbered to Banco Filipino, but that the encumbrance had
been cancelled due to the full payment of the obligation. They noticed that the loan
was effected through and SPA executed by Dionisio in favor of Elena. The other lot on the
other hand had an annotation of an existing mortgage in favor of Los Baos Rural Bank,
with the same SPA with a court order authorizing Elena to mortgage the lot to secure the
loan.
The petitioners and the broker next inquired about the mortgage and the court order at
the Los Baos Rural Bank. There, they met with Atty. Zarate, related that the bank had
asked for the court order because the lot involved was conjugal property.
Following their verification, the petitioners delivered P130,000.00 as additionaldown
payment on February 4, 1991; and P650,000.00 to the Los Baos Rural Bank on February
12, 1991, which then released the owners duplicate copy of TCT to them.
On March 18, 1991, the petitioners delivered the final amount of P700,000.00 to Elena,
who executed a deed of absolute sale in their favor. However, Elena did not turn over the
owners duplicate copy of the TCT claiming that said copy was in the possession of a
relative who was then in Hongkong. She assured them that the owners duplicate copy of
TCT would be turned over after a week.
On March 19, 1991, TCT was cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of
the petitioners. Elena did not turn over the duplicate owners copy of TCT as promised. In
due time, the petitioners learned that the duplicate owners copy of TCT had been all along
in the custody of Atty. Jeremy Z. Parulan, who appeared to hold an SPA executed by his
brother Dionisio authorizing him to sell both lots. At Atanacios instance, the petitioners
met on March 25, 1991 with Atty. Parulan at the Manila Peninsula. They were accompanied
by one Atty. Olandesca. They recalled that Atty. Parulan smugly demanded P800,000.00
in exchange for the duplicate owners copy of TCT, because Atty. Parulan represented the
current value of the property to be P1.5 million. As a counter-offer, however, they

tendered P250,000.00, which Atty. Parulan declined, giving them only until April 5, 1991
to decide. Hearing nothing more from the petitioners, Atty. Parulan decided to call them on
April 5, 1991, but they informed him that they had already fully paid to Elena.
Thus, on April 15, 1991, Dionisio, through Atty. Parulan, commenced an action
(Civil Case No. 91-1005 entitled Dionisio Z. Parulan, Jr., represented by Jeremy Z. Parulan,
as attorney in fact, v. Ma. Elena Parulan, Sps. Rex and Coney Aggabao), praying for the
declaration of the nullity of the deed of absolute sale executed by Ma. Elena, and the
cancellation of the title issued to the petitioners by virtue thereof. In turn, the petitioners
filed on July 12, 1991 their own action for specific performance with damages against the
respondents. Both cases were consolidated for trial and judgment in the RTC.
On July 26, 2000, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 136, in Makati City annulled the
deed of absolute sale executed in favor of the petitioners covering two parcels
of registered land the respondents owned for want of the written consent of respondent
husband Dionisio Parulan, Jr. The CA affirmed the RTC decision.
ISSUE:
Which between Article 173 of the Civil Code and Article 124 of the Family Code should
apply to the sale of the conjugal property executed without the consent of Dionisio?
HELD:
Article 124, Family Code, applies to sale of conjugal properties made after the effectivity of
the Family Code.
RATIO:
The petitioners submit that Article 173 of the CivilCode, not Article 124 of the Family Code,
governed the property relations of the respondents because they had been married prior
to the effectivity of the Family Code; and that the second paragraph of Article 124 of the
Family Code should not apply because the other spouse held theadministration over the
conjugal property. They argue that notwithstanding hisabsence from the country Dionisio
still held the administration of the conjugal property by virtue of his execution of the SPA
in favor of his brother; and that even assuming that Article 124 of the Family Code
properly applied, Dionisio ratified the sale through Atty. Parulans counter-offer during the
March 25, 1991 meeting.
To start with, Article 25427 the Family Code has expressly repealed several titles under the
Civil Code, among them the entire Title VI in which the provisions on the property
relations between husband and wife, Article 173 included, are found.
Secondly, the sale was made on March 18, 1991, or after August 3, 1988, the effectivity of
the Family Code. The proper law to apply is, therefore, Article 124 of the Family Code, for
it is settled that any alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property made during the
effectivity of the Family Code is governed by Article 124 of the Family Code.
Article 124 of the Family Code provides:
Article 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall
belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands decision shall

prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be
availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in
the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers
of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without
authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In theabsence of such
authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the
transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse
and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by
the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or
both offerors.
Thirdly, according to Article 256 of the Family Code, the provisions of the Family
Code may apply retroactively provided no vested rights are impaired. In Tumlos v.
Fernandez, the Court rejected the petitioners argument that the Family Code did not apply
because the acquisition of the contested property had occurred prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code, and pointed out that Article 256 provided that the Family Code could
apply retroactively if the application would not prejudice vested or acquired rights existing
before the effectivity of the Family Code. Herein, however, the petitioners did not show
any vested right in the property acquired prior to August 3, 1988 that exempted their
situation from the retroactive application of the Family Code.
Fourthly, the petitioners failed to substantiate their contention that Dionisio, while holding
the administration over the property, had delegated to his brother, Atty. Parulan, the
administration of the property, considering that they did not present in court the SPA
granting to Atty. Parulan the authority for the administration.
Nonetheless, we stress that the power of administration does not include acts of
disposition or encumbrance, which are acts of strict ownership. As such, an authority to
dispose cannot proceed from an authority to administer, and vice versa, for the two
powers may only be exercised by an agent by following the provisions on agency of the
Civil Code (from Article 1876 to Article 1878). Specifically, the apparent authority of Atty.
Parulan, being a special agency, was limited to the sale of the property in question, and
did not include or extend to the power to administer the property.
Lastly, the petitioners insistence that Atty. Parulans making of a counter-offer during the
March 25, 1991 meeting ratified the sale merits no consideration. Under Article 124 of the
Family Code, the transaction executed sans the written consent of Dionisio or the proper
court order was void; hence, ratification did not occur, for a void contract could not be
ratified. On the other hand, we agree with Dionisio that the void sale was a continuing
offer from the petitioners and Ma. Elena that Dionisio had the option of accepting or
rejecting before the offer was withdrawn by either or both Ma. Elena and the petitioners.
The last sentence of the second paragraph of Article 124 of the Family Code makes this
clear, stating that in the absence of the other spouses consent, the transaction should be
construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person,
and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or
upon authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
Quiao vs Quiao G.R. No. 183622, July 4, 2012

FACTS:
Brigido Quiao (petitioner) and Rita Quiao (respondent) contracted marriage in 1977. They
had no separate properties prior to their marriage. During the course of said marriage,
they produced four children. In 2000, Rita filed a complaint against Brigido for legal
separation for cohabiting with another woman. Subsequently, the RTC rendered a decision
in 2005 declaring the legal separation of the parties pursuant to Article 55. Save for one
child (already of legal age), the three minor children remains in the custody of Rita, who is
the innocent spouse.
The properties accrued by the spouses shall be divided equally between them subject to
the respective legitimes of their children; however, Brigidos share of the net profits earned
by the conjugal partnership shall be forfeited in favor of their children in accordance to par.
9 of Article 129 of the FC.
A few months thereafter, Rita filed a motion for execution, which was granted by the trial
court. By 2006, Brigido paid Rita with regards to the earlier decision; the writ was partially
executed.
After more than 9 months later, Brigido filed a motion for clarification asking the RTC to
define Nets Profits Earned. In answer, the court held that the phrase denotes the
remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of each
of the spouses and debts.
Upon a motion for reconsideration, it initially set aside its previous decision stating that
NET PROFIT EARNED shall be computed in accordance with par. 4 of Article 102 of the FC.
However, it later reverted to its original Order, setting aside the last ruling.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Art 102 on dissolution of absolute community or Art 129 on dissolution of
conjugal partnership of gains is applicable in this case. Art 129 will govern.
2.

Whether the offending spouse acquired vested rights overof the properties in the
conjugal partnership NO.

3.

Is the computation of net profits earned in the conjugal partnership of gains the
same with the computation of net profits earned in the absolute community? NO

Ruling:

1.

Art 129 will govern. First, since the spouses were married prior to the promulgation of
the current family code, the default rule is that In the absence of marriage settlements, or
when the same are void, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of
gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property relations between husband and
wife.
Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the spouses marriage the operative law is
already the Family Code, the same applies in the instant case and the applicable law in so
far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is concerned
is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code.

2.

No, The petitioner is saying that since the property relations between the spouses is
governed by the regime of Conjugal Partnership of Gains under the Civil Code, the
petitioner acquired vested rights over half of the properties of the Conjugal Partnership of
Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil Code, which provides: All property of the
conjugal partnership of gains is owned in common by the husband and wife.
While one may not be deprived of his vested right, he may lose the same if there is due
process and such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence.
In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due process. First, he was
well-aware that the respondent prayed in her complaint that all of the conjugal properties
be awarded to her. In fact, in his Answer, the petitioner prayed that the trial court divide
the community assets between the petitioner and the respondent as circumstances and
evidence warrant after the accounting and inventory of all the community properties of the
parties. Second, when the decision for legal separation was promulgated, the petitioner
never questioned the trial courts ruling forfeiting what the trial court termed as net
profits, pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family Code. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim
being deprived of his right to due process.

3.

When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the wife
become joint owners of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever property each spouse
brings into the marriage, and those acquired during the marriage (except those excluded
under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the common mass of the couples properties.
And when the couples marriage or community is dissolved, that common mass is divided
between the spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in the proportion the parties
have established, irrespective of the value each one may have originally owned.
In this case, assuming arguendo that Art 102 is applicable, since it has been established
that the spouses have no separate properties, what will be divided equally between them
is simply the net profits. And since the legal separationshare decision of Brigido states
that the in the net profits shall be awarded to the children, Brigido will still be left with
nothing.

On the other hand, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of gains
under Article142 of the Civil Code, the husband and the wife place in common fund the
fruits of their separate property and income from their work or industry, and divide
equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or
benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage. From the
foregoing provision, each of the couple has his and her own property and debts. The law
does not intend to effect a mixture or merger of those debts or properties between the
spouses. Rather, it establishes a complete separation of capitals.
In the instant case, since it was already established by the trial court that the spouses
have no separate properties, there is nothing to return to any of them. The listed
properties above are considered part of the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what
remains in the above-listed properties should be divided equally between the spouses
and/or their respective heirs. However, since the trial court found the petitioner the guilty
party, his share from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the
common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. Again, lest we be
confused, like in the absolute community regime, nothing will be returned to the guilty
party in the conjugal partnership regime, because there is no separate property which may
be accounted for in the guilty partys favor.

ALAIN M. DIO vs. MA. CARIDAD L. DIO, G.R. No. 178044, January 19, 2011
Facts:
January 1998 petitioner and respondent got married. On May 2001, petitioner filed an
action for Declaration of Niullity of Marriagw against respondent citing psychological
incapacity under article 36. Petitioner alleged that respondent failed in her marital
obligation to give love and support to him, and had abandoned her responsibility to the
family, choosing instead to go on shopping sprees and gallivanting with her friends that
depleted the family assets. Petitioner further alleged that respondent was not faithful, and
would at times become violent and hurt him. The trial court declared their marriage void
ab initio.
The court ruled that A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be issued
upon compliance with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code. It later altered it to A
DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after liquidation, partition
and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code
ISSUE:
WON the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage
shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties properties
under Article 147 of the Family Code.

Ruling:
The court erred. The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City that in a
void marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties during the
period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.7
Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and
not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless
void, such as petitioner and respondent in the case before the Court.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:
1.
The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2.
They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3.
Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void
All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the
Family Code applies to the property relations between petitioner and respondent.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to
marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40
and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to
marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which
should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.

Since the property relations of the parties in art 40 and 45 are governed by absolute
community of property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate,
partition and distribute the properties before a decree of annulment could be issued. That
is not the case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because the
marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.
In this case, petitioners marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 3615 of
the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of
properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership.
In Valdes, the Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a void marriage during
the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family
Code. The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be
liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496
of the Civil Code, [p]artition may be made by agreement between the parties or by
judicial proceedings. x x x. It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in
the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.