THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. 108725-26. September 25, 1998.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and FARMERS COOPERATIVE
MARKETING ASSOCIATION (FACOMA), San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro, petitioners, vs. THE HON. EMILIO L. LEACHON, JR.,
Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 46, 4th Judicial Region, San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; STATUTE; REPEALS BY IMPLICATION ARE NOT
FAVORED UNLESS IT IS MANIFEST THAT SUCH IS THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT; CASE
AT BAR. To every legislative act attaches the presumption of constitutionality.
(Misolas vs. Panga , 181 SCRA 648; Alvarez vs. Guingona, Jr., 252 SCRA 695) Unless
otherwise repealed by a subsequent law or adjudged unconstitutional by this Court,
a law will always be presumed valid and the rst and fundamental duty of the court
is to apply the law. ( Lim vs. Pacquing, 240 SCRA 649; National Federation of Labor
vs. Eisma, 127 SCRA 419) Then, too, it is a basic rule of statutory construction that
repeals by implication are not favored unless it is manifest that such is the
legislative intent. (Napocor vs. Province of Lanao del Sur, 264 SCRA 271) This
doctrine is premised on the rationale that the will of the legislature cannot be
overturned by the judicial function of construction and interpretation. (Ty vs.
Trampe, 250 SCRA 500; Frivaldo vs. Comelec, 257 SCRA 727; Agujetas vs. Court of
Appeals, 261 SCRA 17) Presidential Decree No. 772, otherwise known as the AntiSquatting Law, enjoys this presumption of constitutionality. At the time the
respondent Judge rendered the questioned Decision and issued the orders of
dismissal in 1993, Presidential Decree No. 772, Anti-Squatting Law, was still
eective. Neither has this Court declared its unconstitutionality, notwithstanding
the social justice provision of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution, specically on
urban land reform and housing.
CSTEHI

2.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SOCIAL JUSTICE; URBAN LAND REFORM AND
HOUSING; EVICTION AND DEMOLITION OF URBAN OR RURAL POOR DWELLERS
MUST BE DONE IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND IN A JUST AND HUMANE
MANNER; CONSTRUED. Under Sec. 10, Art. XIII of the 1987 Constitution, what
makes the eviction and demolition of urban or rural poor dwellers illegal or unlawful
is when the same are not done in accordance with law and in a just and humane
manner. The constitutional requirement that the eviction and demolition be in
accordance with law and conducted in a just and humane manner does not mean
that the validity of legality of the demolition or eviction is hinged on the existence
of a resettlement area designated or earmarked by the government. What is meant
by "in accordance with law" and "just and humane manner" is that the person to be
evicted be accorded due process or an opportunity to controvert the allegation that
his or her occupation or possession of the property involved is unlawful or against

the will of the landowner; that should the illegal or unlawful occupation be proven,
the occupant be suciently notied before actual eviction or demolition is done;
and that there be no loss of lives, physical injuries or unnecessary loss of or damage
to properties. Precisely, the enactment of an anti-squatting law aords the alleged
"squatters" the opportunity to present their case before a competent court where
their rights will be amply protected and due process strictly observed. By ling the
proper informations in court, complainants have complied with the rst
requirement of due process, that is, the opportunity for the accused to be heard and
present evidence to show that his or her occupation or possession of the property is
not against the will or without the consent of the landowner and is not tainted by
the use of force, intimidation, threat or by the taking advantage of the absence of or
tolerance by the landowners.
3.
REMEDIAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION; REQUISITES BEFORE THE
COURT CAN ASSUME JURISDICTION THEREOF; CASE AT BAR. A constitutional
question will not be decided unless it is properly raised in appropriate cases (Tropical
Homes, Inc. vs. National Housing Authority, 142 SCRA 540). Before the court can
assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question, the following requisites must
rst be met: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy, including a conict of
rights susceptible of judicial determination; (2) the constitutional question must be
raised by a proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the
earliest opportunity; and (4) the resolution of the constitutional question must be
necessary for the resolution of the case. (Board of Optometry vs. Colet, 260 SCRA
88) In the case at bar, the respondent Judge dismissed subject cases motu proprio,
after the prosecution had rested the same and without giving the three accused an
opportunity to present their evidence. What is more, there is no showing that the
issue of constitutionality of P.D. 772 was ever posed by the accused. Consequently,
such an issue cannot be given due course for the simple reason that it was not
raised by the proper party at the earliest opportunity.
DAHSaT

DECISION
PURISIMA, J :
p

The People of the Philippines, represented by the Provincial Prosecutor of Occidental

Mindoro, and the private complainant, Farmers' Cooperative Marketing Association
(FACOMA), brought this special civil action for certiorari and mandamus, to annul
the orders, dated January 18 and February 4, 1993, respectively, of Presiding Judge
Emilio L. Leachon, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro, who dismissed Criminal Case Nos. R-2877 and R-2828, and denied herein
petitioners' motion for reconsideration. Petitioners further pray that respondent
Judge be ordered to proceed with the trial of said cases.
dctai

The antecedent facts that matter are, as follows:

On August 7, 1990, pursuant to the Resolution of the Municipal Trial Court of San

Jose, Occidental Mindoro, the Provincial Prosecutor of Occidental Mindoro led two
separate informations for violation of P.D. 772, otherwise known as the AntiSquatting Law, against Noli Hablo, Edmundo Mapindan and Diego Escala, docketed
as Criminal Case Nos. R-2877 and R-2828, before the Regional Trial Court of
Occidental Mindoro presided over by respondent judge.
The cases proceeded to trial. After presenting its evidence, the prosecution rested
the cases, sending in a written offer of evidence on November 14, 1991.
On August 18, 1992, almost a year after the prosecution had rested, the respondent
Judge issued an Order dismissing the said cases motu proprio on the ground of "lack
of jurisdiction."
From the aforesaid order of dismissal, petitioners appealed to this Court via a
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, which was referred to the Court
of Appeals for proper disposition.
On December 24, 1992, the 12th Division of the Court of Appeals came out with a
decision reversing the appealed Order of dismissal, ordering continuation of trial of
subject criminal cases, and disposing, thus:
"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING considerations, the petition is given due
course and the orders of respondent judge dated August 19, 1992 and
September 1, 1992 are set aside and declared null and void. Respondent
judge is hereby directed to proceed with the hearing of the case, i.e., with
the presentation of evidence by the accused, then the rebuttal or
surrebuttal evidence, if necessary and thereafter, to decide the case on the
basis of the evidence adduced. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED."

On January 19, 1993, instead of conducting the trial, as directed by the Court of
Appeals, the respondent judge dismissed the cases motu proprio, once more, opining
that P.D. 772 is rendered obsolete and deemed repealed by Sections 9 and 10,
Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provide that "urban or rural poor
dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwellings demolished except in accordance
with law and in a just and humane manner."
Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration interposed on January 29, 1993, having
been denied by the respondent Judge on February 4, 1993, petitioners found their
way to this court via the instant petition.
The issue posited here is whether or not the respondent judge acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing subject
criminal cases for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law, and in declaring the said law
as repugnant to the provisions of the 1987 Constitution.
To begin with, to every legislative act attaches the presumption of constitutionality.
(Misolas vs. Panga, 181 SCRA 648; Alvarez vs. Guingona, Jr., 252 SCRA 695). Unless
otherwise repealed by a subsequent law or adjudged unconstitutional by this Court,

a law will always be presumed valid and the rst and fundamental duty of the court
is to apply the law. (Lim vs. Pacquing, 240 SCRA 649; National Federation of Labor
vs. Eisma, 127 SCRA 419)
Then, too, it is a basic rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are
not favored unless it is manifest that such is the legislative intent. (Napocor vs.
Province of Lanao del Sur, 264 SCRA 271) This doctrine is premised on the rationale
that the will of the legislature cannot be overturned by the judicial function of
construction and interpretation. (Ty vs. Trampe, 250 SCRA 500; Frivaldo vs.
Comelec, 257 SCRA 727; Agujetas vs. Court of Appeals, 261 SCRA 17)
Presidential Decree No. 772, otherwise known as the Anti-Squatting Law, enjoys
this presumption of constitutionality. At the time the respondent Judge rendered
the questioned Decision and issued the orders of dismissal in 1993, Presidential
Decree No. 772, Anti-Squatting Law, was still eective. Neither has this Court
declared its unconstitutionality, notwithstanding the social justice provision of
Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution, specifically on urban land reform and housing.
Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution, provides:
"Sec. 9.
The State shall, by law, and for the common good, undertake, in
cooperation with the private sector, a continuing program of urban land
reform and housing which will make available at aordable cost decent
housing and basic services to underprivileged and homeless citizens in
urban centers and resettlement areas. It shall also promote adequate
employment opportunities to such citizens. In the implementation of such
program the State shall respect the rights of small property owners."

"Sec. 10.
Urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their
dwellings demolished, except in accordance with law and in a just and
humane manner.
cdasia

No resettlement of urban or rural dwellers shall be undertaken without

adequate consultation with them and the communities where they are to be
relocated."

Presidential Decree No. 772, on the other hand, states:

"Sec. 1.
Any person; with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or
taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner, succeeds in
occupying or possessing the property of the latter against his will for
residential, commercial or any other purposes, shall be punished by
imprisonment ranging from six months to one year or a ne not less than
one thousand or more than ve thousand pesos at the discretion of the
Court, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
If the oender is a corporation or association, the maximum penalty of ve
years and the ne of thousand pesos shall be imposed upon the president,
director, manager or managing partners thereof."

In dismissing subject criminal cases for anti-squatting, respondent Judge

ratiocinated that "if all the accused in these cases were convicted and ordered
evicted, it will run counter to the said specic constitutional provisions because the
conviction and eviction will not be in a just and humane manner as the government
has not yet undertaken the resettlement of urban and rural dwellers (referring to all
accused in the cases at bar) and neither has the government consulted all the
accused as to where they should be relocated."
From the aforequoted portion of the questioned disposition below, it can be gleaned
that the reason of respondent Judge in dismissing subject cases is that the eviction
of the accused was not eected in a just and humane manner as the government
has not yet established a resettlement area for the accused, and those who would
be evicted have not been consulted as to the place of their relocation. The import of
the Order of dismissal under scrutiny is that should the eviction be in a just and
humane manner, the same shall be valid and upheld.
The Court holds that the respondent judge did not err in so construing the aforecited
constitutional provision. Under the Constitution, what makes the eviction and
demolition of urban or rural poor dwellers illegal or unlawful is when the same are
not done in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner.
However, respondent Judge erred in predicating the validity or legality of eviction on
the existence of a resettlement plan and area. The constitutional requirement that
the eviction and demolition be in accordance with law and conducted in a just and
humane manner does not mean that the validity or legality of the demolition or
eviction is hinged on the existence of a resettlement area designated or earmarked
by the government. What is meant by "in accordance with law" and "just and
humane manner" is that the person to be evicted be accorded due process or an
opportunity to controvert the allegation that his or her occupation or possession of
the property involved is unlawful or against the will of the landowner; that should
the illegal or unlawful occupation be proven, the occupant be suciently notied
before actual eviction or demolition is done; and that there be no loss of lives,
physical injuries or unnecessary loss of or damage to properties.
Precisely, the enactment of an anti-squatting law aords the alleged "squatters" the
opportunity to present their case before a competent court where their rights will be
amply protected and due process strictly observed. By ling the proper informations
in court, complainants have complied with the rst requirement of due process, that
is, the opportunity for the accused to be heard and present evidence to show that
his or her occupation or possession of the property is not against the will or without
the consent of the landowner and is not tainted by the use of force, intimidation,
threat or by the taking advantage of the absence of or tolerance by the landowners.
Furthermore, what gives impetus to P.D. 772 is the constitutional mandate that
"no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
Far from contravening, P.D. 772 conforms with the 1987 Constitution, in that it
protects the rights of a property owner against unlawful and illegal intrusion.
It should likewise be noted that a constitutional question will not be decided unless

it is properly raised in appropriate cases (Tropical Homes Inc. vs. National Housing
Authority, 142 SCRA 540). Before the court can assume jurisdiction over a
constitutional question, the following requisites must rst be met: (1) there must
be an actual case or controversy, including a conict of rights susceptible of judicial
determination; (2) the constitutional question must be raised by a proper party; (3)
the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary for the resolution of the
case. (Board of Optometry vs. Colet, 260 SCRA 88)
In the case at bar, the respondent Judge dismissed subject cases motu proprio, after
the prosecution had rested the same and without giving the three accused an,
opportunity to present their evidence. What is more, there is no showing that the
issue of constitutionality of P.D. 772 was ever posed by the accused. Consequently,
such an issue cannot be given due course for the simple reason that it was not
raised by the proper party at the earliest opportunity.
But the foregoing antecedent facts and proceedings notwithstanding, the petition
cannot now prosper because on October 27, 1997, Republic Act No. 8368, entitled
"An Act Repealing Presidential Decree No. 772 Entitled 'Penalizing Squatting and
Other Similar Acts' " was enacted. Section 3 of the said Act provides that "all
pending cases under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 772 shall be dismissed
upon the effectivity of this Act."
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED, without any pronouncement as to
costs.
LLpr

SO ORDERED.

Romero and Kapunan, JJ ., concur.

Narvasa, C .J ., concurs in the result.