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    United Airlines V Uy (Transpo)

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    brendamanganaan
    1) Willie Uy filed a complaint against United Airlines for damages arising from two causes of action: humiliating treatment by employees at the airport and loss of personal effects from a slashed bag. 2) While the action for loss of personal effects is covered by the 2-year limitation period in the Warsaw Convention, the action for employee misconduct is covered under the Civil Code which allows 4 years to file. 3) Even though the action for loss of personal effects was filed more than 2 years later, the airline employed delay tactics in responding to Uy's letters, so the 2-year period did not apply in this case as an exception. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision in favor of Uy.

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    United Airlines V Uy (Transpo)

    Uploaded by

    brendamanganaan
    505 views4 pages
    1) Willie Uy filed a complaint against United Airlines for damages arising from two causes of action: humiliating treatment by employees at the airport and loss of personal effects from a slashed bag. 2) While the action for loss of personal effects is covered by the 2-year limitation period in the Warsaw Convention, the action for employee misconduct is covered under the Civil Code which allows 4 years to file. 3) Even though the action for loss of personal effects was filed more than 2 years later, the airline employed delay tactics in responding to Uy's letters, so the 2-year period did not apply in this case as an exception. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision in favor of Uy.

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    United Airlines v Uy (Transpo)

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    1) Willie Uy filed a complaint against United Airlines for damages arising from two causes of action: humiliating treatment by employees at the airport and loss of personal effects from a slashed bag. 2) While the action for loss of personal effects is covered by the 2-year limitation period in the Warsaw Convention, the action for employee misconduct is covered under the Civil Code which allows 4 years to file. 3) Even though the action for loss of personal effects was filed more than 2 years later, the airline employed delay tactics in responding to Uy's letters, so the 2-year period did not apply in this case as an exception. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision in favor of Uy.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as docx, pdf, or txt
    505 views4 pages

    United Airlines V Uy (Transpo)

    Uploaded by

    brendamanganaan
    1) Willie Uy filed a complaint against United Airlines for damages arising from two causes of action: humiliating treatment by employees at the airport and loss of personal effects from a slashed bag. 2) While the action for loss of personal effects is covered by the 2-year limitation period in the Warsaw Convention, the action for employee misconduct is covered under the Civil Code which allows 4 years to file. 3) Even though the action for loss of personal effects was filed more than 2 years later, the airline employed delay tactics in responding to Uy's letters, so the 2-year period did not apply in this case as an exception. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision in favor of Uy.

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    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
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    of 4

    United Airlines v Uy

    G.R. No. 127768, Nov. 19, 1999


    FACTS:
    October 13, 1989 Respondent Willie Uy is a passenger of petitioner United Airlines,
    bound from San Francisco to Manila. While in San Francisco, it was found that one
    piece of his luggage was over the maximum weight allowance of 70 kg. per bag. A
    United Airlines employee rebuked him and in a loud voice, in front of the milling
    crowd, ordered him to repack his things accordingly. Wishing not to create a scene,
    Willie did as asked. Unfortunately, his luggage was still overweight so the airline
    billed him overweight charges. Willie offered to pay the charges with a
    Miscellaneous Charge Order (MCO) or an airline pre-paid credit but the same
    employee, and an airline supervisor, refused to honor it, contending that there were
    discrepancies in the figures. Thus, Willie was forced to pay the charges with his
    American Express credit card. Upon arrival in Manila, Willie discovered that one of
    his bags had been slashed and its contents, amounting to US$5,310.00, stolen.
    October 16, 1989 he sent his first letter of demand to United Airlines. The airline
    did not refute Willies allegations and mailed a check representing payment of his
    loss based on the maximum liability of US$9.70 per pound. Willie, thinking the
    amount to be grossly inadequate to compensate him for his losses as well as for the
    indignities he was subjected to, sent two more letters to petitioner airline, one
    dated January 4, 1990 and the other dated October 28, 1991, demanding out-ofcourt
    settlement
    of
    P1,000,000.00.
    June 9, 1992 Willie filed a complaint for damages before the Philippine courts. He
    had two causes of action: (1) the shabby and humiliating treatment he received
    from petitioners employees at the San Francisco Airport which caused him extreme
    embarrassment and social humiliation; and (2) the slashing of his luggage and the
    loss of personal effects amounting to US$5,310.00.
    For its part, United Airlines moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it
    was filed out of time. Under Art. 29 of the Warsaw Convention, the right to damages
    shall be extinguished if an action is not brought within 2 years. However, the second
    paragraph of the said provision stated that the method of calculating the period of
    limitation shall be determined by the law of the court to which the case is
    submitted. It is Willies position that our rules on interruption of prescriptive period
    should apply. When he sent his letters of demand, the 2-year period was tolled,
    giving
    him
    ample
    time
    to
    file
    his
    complaint.
    The trial court ordered the dismissal of the case, holding that Art. 29(2) refers not to
    the local forums rules in interrupting the prescriptive period but only to the rules of
    determining the time in which the action was deemed commenced (meaning
    filed). Willie filed his motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal only on

    the 14th day. The trial court denied his motion and 2 days later Willie filed his notice
    of appeal. United Airlines this time contended that the notice of appeal was filed
    beyond the 15-day reglementary period and should therefore be dismissed. The CA,
    however, took cognizance of the case in the interest of justice and ruled in favour of
    respondent. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
    ISSUE: Whether or not the action for damages is barred by the lapse of the
    2-year prescriptive period under Art. 29 of the Warsaw Convention

    HELD:
    Supreme Court held that although the 2-year prescriptive period under the Warsaw
    Convention has lapsed, it did not preclude the application of other pertinent
    provisions of the Civil Code. Thus, the action for damages could still be filed based
    on tort which can be filed within 4 years from the time cause of action accrued. As
    for the action pertaining to the loss of the contents of the luggage, while it was well
    within the bounds of the Warsaw Convention, the Supreme Court found that there
    was an exception to the applicability of the 2-year prescriptive period that is when
    the airline employed delaying tactics and gave the passenger the run-around.
    Applicability of the Warsaw Convention: Courts have discretion whether to apply
    them
    or
    not
    Within our jurisdiction we have held that the Warsaw Convention can be applied, or
    ignored, depending on the peculiar facts presented by each case. Thus, we have
    ruled that the Convention's provisions do not regulate or exclude liability for other
    breaches of contract by the carrier or misconduct of its officers and employees, or
    for some particular or exceptional type of damage. Neither may the Convention be
    invoked to justify the disregard of some extraordinary sort of damage resulting to a
    passenger and preclude recovery therefor beyond the limits set by said Convention.
    Likewise, we have held that the Convention does not preclude the operation of the
    Civil Code and other pertinent laws. It does not regulate, much less exempt, the
    carrier from liability for damages for violating the rights of its passengers under the
    contract of carriage, especially if willful misconduct on the part of the carrier's
    employees is found or established.
    Respondent's complaint reveals that he is suing on two (2) causes of action: (a) the
    shabby and humiliating treatment he received from petitioner's employees at the
    San Francisco Airport which caused him extreme embarrassment and social
    humiliation; and, (b) the slashing of his luggage and the loss of his personal effects
    amounting to US $5,310.00.

    While his second cause of action - an action for damages arising from theft or
    damage to property or goods - is well within the bounds of the Warsaw Convention,
    his first cause of action -an action for damages arising from the misconduct of the
    airline employees and the violation of respondent's rights as passenger - clearly is
    not.
    Action for damages arising from the misconduct of the airline employees and the
    violation of the respondents rights as passengers is covered under the Civil Code
    Consequently, insofar as the first cause of action is concerned, respondent's failure
    to file his complaint within the two (2)-year limitation of the Warsaw Convention
    does not bar his action since petitioner airline may still be held liable for breach of
    other provisions of the Civil Code which prescribe a different period or procedure for
    instituting the action, specifically, Art. 1146 thereof which prescribes four (4) years
    for filing an action based on torts.
    Exception to the Application of the 2-year prescriptive period: When airline
    employed delaying tactics
    As for respondent's second cause of action, indeed the travaux preparatories of the
    Warsaw Convention reveal that the delegates thereto intended the two (2)-year
    limitation incorporated in Art. 29 as an absolute bar to suit and not to be made
    subject to the various tolling provisions of the laws of the forum. This therefore
    forecloses the application of our own rules on interruption of prescriptive periods.
    Article 29, par. (2), was intended only to let local laws determine whether an action
    had been commenced within the two (2)-year period, and within our jurisdiction an
    action shall be deemed commenced upon the filing of a complaint. Since it is
    indisputable that respondent filed the present action beyond the two (2)-year time
    frame his second cause of action must be barred. Nonetheless, it cannot be
    doubted that respondent exerted efforts to immediately convey his loss to
    petitioner, even employed the services of two (2) lawyers to follow up his claims,
    and that the filing of the action itself was delayed because of petitioner's evasion.
    Verily, respondent filed his complaint more than two (2) years later, beyond the
    period of limitation prescribed by the Warsaw Convention for filing a claim for
    damages. However, it is obvious that respondent was forestalled from immediately
    filing an action because petitioner airline gave him the runaround, answering his
    letters but not giving in to his demands. True, respondent should have already filed
    an action at the first instance when his claims were denied by petitioner but the

    same could only be due to his desire to make an out-of-court settlement for which
    he cannot be faulted. Hence, despite the express mandate of Art. 29 of the Warsaw
    Convention that an action for damages should be filed within two (2) years from the
    arrival at the place of destination, such rule shall not be applied in the instant case
    because of the delaying tactics employed by petitioner airline itself. Thus, private
    respondent's second cause of action cannot be considered as time-barred under Art.
    29 of the Warsaw Convention.
    WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals reversing and setting
    aside the appealed order of the trial court granting the motion to dismiss the
    complaint, as well as its Resolution denying reconsideration, is AFFIRMED. Let the
    records of the case be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings
    taking its bearings from this disquisition.

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