Fdic Oversight: Examining and Evaluating The Role of The Regulator During The Financial Crisis and Today

FDIC OVERSIGHT: EXAMINING
AND EVALUATING THE ROLE OF

THE REGULATOR DURING THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS AND TODAY
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

AND CONSUMER CREDIT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
MAY 26, 2011
Printed for the use of the Committee on Financial Services
Serial No. 11234
(
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON
66872 PDF
2011
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES

SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama, Chairman
JEB HENSARLING, Texas, Vice Chairman
PETER T. KING, New York
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma
RON PAUL, Texas
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois
GARY G. MILLER, California
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia
SCOTT GARRETT, New Jersey
RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas
PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina
JOHN CAMPBELL, California
MICHELE BACHMANN, Minnesota
THADDEUS G. McCOTTER, Michigan
KEVIN McCARTHY, California
STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico
BILL POSEY, Florida
MICHAEL G. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia
BLAINE LUETKEMEYER, Missouri
BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan
SEAN P. DUFFY, Wisconsin
NAN A. S. HAYWORTH, New York
JAMES B. RENACCI, Ohio
ROBERT HURT, Virginia
ROBERT J. DOLD, Illinois
DAVID SCHWEIKERT, Arizona
MICHAEL G. GRIMM, New York
FRANCISCO QUICO CANSECO, Texas
STEVE STIVERS, Ohio
STEPHEN LEE FINCHER, Tennessee
BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts, Ranking

Member
MAXINE WATERS, California
CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois
ZQUEZ, New York
NYDIA M. VELA
MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
BRAD SHERMAN, California
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts
N HINOJOSA, Texas
RUBE
WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
CAROLYN MCCARTHY, New York
JOE BACA, California
STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
DAVID SCOTT, Georgia
AL GREEN, Texas
EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri
GWEN MOORE, Wisconsin
KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota
ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado
JOE DONNELLY, Indiana
CARSON, Indiana
ANDRE
JAMES A. HIMES, Connecticut
GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
JOHN C. CARNEY, JR., Delaware
LARRY C. LAVENDER, Chief of Staff
(II)
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SUBCOMMITTEE
ON
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
AND
CONSUMER CREDIT
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia, Chairman

JAMES B. RENACCI, Ohio, Vice Chairman
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
JEB HENSARLING, Texas
PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina
THADDEUS G. McCOTTER, Michigan
KEVIN McCARTHY, California
STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico
LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia
BLAINE LUETKEMEYER, Missouri
BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan
SEAN P. DUFFY, Wisconsin
FRANCISCO QUICO CANSECO, Texas
MICHAEL G. GRIMM, New York
STEPHEN LEE FINCHER, Tennessee
CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York,

Ranking Member
LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois
MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
N HINOJOSA, Texas
RUBE
CAROLYN MCCARTHY, New York
JOE BACA, California
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
DAVID SCOTT, Georgia
ZQUEZ, New York
NYDIA M. VELA
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
JOHN C. CARNEY, JR., Delaware
(III)
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CONTENTS
Page
Hearing held on:

May 26, 2011 .....................................................................................................
Appendix:
May 26, 2011 .....................................................................................................
1
45
WITNESSES
THURSDAY, MAY 26, 2011
Bair, Hon. Sheila C., Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) ...................................................................................................................
APPENDIX
Prepared statements:
Bair, Hon. Sheila C. .........................................................................................
ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED
FOR THE
RECORD
Luetkemeyer, Hon. Blaine:

Written responses to questions submitted to Hon. Sheila C. Bair ...............
Westmoreland, Hon. Lynn:
Written statement of Jeff Betsill .....................................................................
Written statement of Richard R. Harp ...........................................................
Written statement of Tom Reese .....................................................................
(V)
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FDIC OVERSIGHT: EXAMINING

AND EVALUATING THE ROLE OF
THE REGULATOR DURING THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS AND TODAY
Thursday, May 26, 2011
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
AND CONSUMER CREDIT,
COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:38 a.m., in room
2128, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Shelley Moore Capito
[chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Members present: Representatives Capito, Renacci, Royce, Manzullo, McHenry, Westmoreland, Luetkemeyer, Huizenga, Duffy,
Canseco, Grimm, Fincher; Maloney, Baca, Scott, Velazquez, and
Carney.
Chairwoman CAPITO. First of all, I want to apologize for the
delay. We are having a little organizational issue here.
So this hearing will come to order. And I would like to thank the
members of the subcommittee and our witness, the chairman of the
FDIC, for coming today.
It sounds like we are going to have our first series of votes
around noon or 12:30, so we will hopefully have this concluded by
then, because we are going to be in a lengthy series of votes. That
is the plan for this hearing.
Today we are joined, as we know, by FDIC Chairman Sheila
Bair, who will be leaving her position in July of this year.
First of all, I would like to thank the chairman for her dedicated
service. I think one thing you could say is that it hasnt been a dull
5 years for you. You have had a lot of activity. And I thank you
for your service to our country.
It is my hope that this will provide a forum for our members to
gain a better understanding of the role of the FDIC in the financial
crisis, the Corporations new role in the regulatory regime presented by the Dodd-Frank Act, and the current state of FDIC-insured banks in general.
The recent passage of Dodd-Frank further enhances the role of
the FDIC in our Nations regulatory structure, as they will be
charged with unwinding failed large financial institutions as provided in the Orderly Liquidation Authority, or OLA.
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I am interested to hear from Chairman Bair about the FDICs
ability to balance these new powers with the traditional role of a
prudential regulator.
Insuring deposits is the FDICs duty with which most people are
familiar. An unfortunate effect of the financial crisis has been an
increase in bank failures across the country. The rate of bank failures has increased dramatically over the last 2 years, with 140 failing in 2009, and 157 in 2010.
These failures have significantly depleted the Deposit Insurance
Fund, known as the DIF, and the FDIC has been forced to utilize
emergency assessments on banks to replenish the fund, as well as
requiring banks to pre-pay premiums for the years 2010 through
2012.
Despite these efforts, the Deposit Insurance Fund still has significant challenges. I look forward to hearing from Chairman Bair
on this and the status of the Deposit Insurance Fund.
Although I fully understand the need to replenish the Fund, I am
concerned about the future needs for pre-payments of premiums.
This could have an unintended consequence, I believe, of reducing
the amount of funds available for lending.
The one common thing I hear from the community banks across
my district is that they feel hamstrung by the regulators in their
ability to lend. So we need to find a balance here to ensure we have
a safe and sound Deposit Fund, while not encumbering lending by
our institutions.
Regulatory burden is not limited to the assessments placed on
banks. I am very interested to learn what measures Federal financial regulators are taking to ensure new regulations are not duplicative with other agencies or existing regulations.
We need to ensure that new regulations provide enough flexibility for small institutions to meet the needs of their customers
and not be encumbered by a one-size-fits-all regulation geared to
the largest institutions in our Nation. A diverse financial institution is good for all market participants.
I am very interested to hear from Chairman Bair how she envisions the FDIC working with the newly created Consumer Financial Protection Bureau on enforcement of consumer protection regulation.
Finally, I would like to touch on the Orderly Liquidation Authority that was granted to the FDIC by the Dodd-Frank Act. I know
that Chairman Bair sincerely believes that these new powers effectively end too-big-to-fail. And I sincerely hope that she is correct.
I still have reservations about this resolution authority and
would prefer to see a different formand we have talked about
this several timesof resolution where there is absolutely no taxpayer exposure.
Let us work together to ensure that the message is clear to market participants: There will be no more government bailouts.
I would now, if she is ready, like to introduce the ranking minority member, the gentlelady from New York, Mrs. Maloney, for the
purpose of making an opening statement.
Mrs. MALONEY. I just want to join you, Madam Chairwoman, in
welcoming our distinguished and outstanding Chairman Bair. I
know that this is her last appearance before our committee.
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And I wanted to express my deep appreciation for your service,
especially during the most recent financial crisis and your attention
to communities, to details, to Members of Congress. I truly believe
you have done an incredibly outstanding job.
Thank you.
The FDIC was forced to take significant measures during the crisis, and continues to act in the wake of the crisis to ensure the
health of our banking system.
Your involvement and leadership was critical during this difficult
time. We can now say that we are recovering from a crisis, not a
depression. And I think you played a meaningful and significant
role in our being able to say that.
This hearing is very timely because it is happening during your
last few weeks in your tenure at the FDIC, but also because it is
happening during a period of recovery, when we have the benefit
of hindsight.
During this most recent crisis, we saw 8.5 million jobs lost and
over $15 trillion in household wealth lost in America. And although
we are trending up in terms of job creation, it is slower than any
of us would like.
This crisis highlighted how important it is to have a sound financial system in terms of the functioning of our overall economy. We
know of the fear that can set in on Main Street when institutions
on Wall Street are challenged and in some cases failing.
And we know that overleveraged, overcapitalized financial institutions contribute to the problem. Structured finance products that
were unregulated, opaque, and highly risky ran rampant. And you,
the regulators, did not have the tools you needed to rein them in.
Congress changed that with the enactment of Dodd-Frank last
year. The law now gives the regulators the authority to wind down
failing institutions and more power to regulate the institutions.
And we made significant changes that directly affect FDIC-insured institutions. For example, we made the $250,000 deposit insurance limit permanent to increase public confidence in their financial institutions. And you played a meaningful role in helping
to make that happen.
We changed the formula for deposit insurance assessment, so
larger institutions that are engaged in riskier activities will pay
more than smaller institutions that pose less of a potential threat
to the FDIC.
And we increased the minimum level required in the DIF to provide a better cushion in troubled economic times so that smaller
banks are protected from having to foot the bill if there is a need
to raise additional funds.
All of the actions we took in Dodd-Frank were meant to both
help prevent another economic crisis and to help soften the blow
when unanticipated things happen.
So I am looking forward to hearing from Chairman Bair, because
I know there are a number of new requirements on regulators, how
you believe the system has fared since the crisis, what you see as
challenges going forward, and to hear any words of wisdom you
have for us before you leave your position.
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I just want to underscore again how much I appreciate your service. I am looking forward to the next chapter. I know you will continue to make meaningful contributions to our great country.
Thank you for your leadership and your service.
Chairwoman CAPITO. Thank you.
I would like to recognize Mr. Royce for a minute-and-a-half for
the purpose of an opening statement.
Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
And, Chairman Bair, I would just like to welcome you. Thank
you for your years of service. I have enjoyed our conversations. As
you know, I am still concerned that Dodd-Frank hasnt ended toobig-to-fail, but has left us with a number of massive institutions
with a much lower cost of capital, that are going to continue to expand at the expense of their competitors because their borrowing
costs are lower.
There is a 78-basis-point advantage, I think, according to the
studies that you have done.
And, at the end of the day, it is a system that enables the use
of government funds in resolving an institution, and relies on the
prudence of regulators during a crisis to avoid overpayment to
creditors and counterparties.
I think that the very fact that you have that lower cost of capital
just shows that it is human naturethat the way we set this up;
there is the presumption. We have created additional moral hazard
in the equation.
So while I hope that this committee works to eliminate the Orderly Liquidation Authority in a move to a more objective enhanced
bankruptcy, I believe we can take steps in the near term, in the
meantime, to tighten up the resolution authority and minimize
some of the unintended, and frankly probably some of the intended,
consequences of this legislation.
I appreciate your efforts in this regard and certainly your
thoughts today, especially on this particular theme.
Thank you very much.
I would like to recognize Mr. Luetkemeyer for a minute-and-ahalf for the purpose of an opening statement.
Mr. LUETKEMEYER. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Years ago in another life, when I was a bank examiner, our mission was to work in cooperation with institutions to ensure that
they understood the regulations to which they are subjected. There
now seems to be a shift in the attitude of the regulators. Instead
of a partnership, I hear time and time again that relationships between financial institutions and the regulators are more like a
game of gotcha.
Like many of my colleagues, I have heard stories of overzealous
examiners who practice little or no regulatory forbearance. One
bank in my district has been profitable and sound for many years
but was put on the problem list at a recent examination.
And it was noted to me that the examiner had been scolded the
previous day for having not done a good enough job in predicting
another bank that he had recently been in be put on the list. That
bank, by the way, since then has had no problems since it was put
on the problem list, similar to what it was prior to that.
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The bottom line is we need regulators to do their job. We need
the FDIC and other agencies to promote sound financial practices
and ensure consumer protections. No more, no less.
What we do not need are overzealous examiners who have no regard for any sort of forbearance or upper management to stick its
head in the sand and refuse to recognize what is going on in the
field or in our economy.
I urge the FDIC to take a look at your practices, communicate
with your examiners, and work with institutions so that together
we can work to get our economy moving again.
I look forward to the discussion. I yield back.
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
I would like to recognize the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Canseco,
for 1 minute, for the purpose of an opening statement.
Mr. CANSECO. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, for holding this
hearing on the oversight of a very important Federal agency.
My hope is that todays hearing addresses a simple yet very important question: Did the Dodd-Frank Act institutionalize too-bigto-fail or did it really level the playing field and disallow further
taxpayer bailout, as some politicians and regulators have argued?
I am concerned that recent developments, including market data
showing borrowing costs are currently much lower at big banks
than small ones, and the continuing questions surrounding the
FDICs new authority lead us to believe that too-big-to-fail is still
very much alive, and the taxpayers could yet again be asked to
pick up the bailout tab in the future.
I look forward to hearing from Chairman Bair today on this important and ongoing issue.
Thank you.
I would like to recognize our newest member of the subcommittee, and welcome him to the subcommittee, Mr. Fincher
from Tennessee, for 1 minute for the purpose of an opening statement.
Mr. FINCHER. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
And thank you, Chairman Bair, for coming today and taking
time for us.
It is a privilege to be here this morning to discuss the issues and
concerns regarding the FDIC and its role during the financial crisis
of 2008.
As the newest member of the Financial Services Committee, I am
pleased to have the opportunity to deal with, hopefully, what are
going to be things that are going to fix the problems in the future.
I was not in Congress in 2008 when the financial crisis roared
across the communities of our district. However, as a small business owner, I felt its effects firsthand as the bottom dropped out
of our economy.
One major principle that I did take away from those terrible days
was that access to credit is vital in helping our small businesses
function. Until our financial institutions, in my opinion, are allowed to responsibly do their jobs again and loan money to qualified borrowers, we are not going to see businesses creating new
jobs.
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But too many times, Washington is not the answer. It is the
problem. We need to make sure that we do what is right.
Again, thank you for your service. And I look forward to hearing
what you have to say today.
I yield back.
I would like to recognize Mr. Westmoreland, from Georgia, for 2
minutes for the purpose of an opening statement.
Mr. WESTMORELAND. Thank you, Chairwoman Capito, for calling
this hearing. I think this is a very important hearing.
I would like to throw out some numbers for Chairman Bair: 63,
that is the number of banks that have failed in Georgia since 2008;
12, that is the number of bank failures in Georgia in just 2011; and
10, that is the number of banks headquartered in my district that
have failed since 2008, including on this past Friday.
This number is much larger if you factor the banks that have
failed that only have branches in the district.
Chairman Bair, these numbers are unacceptable. Therefore,
today I will be introducing a bill directing the FDIC Inspector General to study FDICs loss share agreements, banks failing due to
paper losses, the lack of an ability to modify or work out an application of the FDIC policies by examiners in the field.
This study is not only vital for surviving banks. It is so the FDIC
and this committee can learn from the problems that have faced
Georgia over the last 3 years.
It is my hope that the FDIC and my colleagues will support this
bill so we can have an honest assessment of the FDICs handling
of this bank crisis. Georgia is in a vicious cycle right now, going
the wrong way. Failures begot more write downs and more failures.
I have borrowed a lot of money from banks in my business career, and I know there will be more failures in Georgia this year.
But I am here to say that when a Georgia bank fails, my office
will be here asking why, searching for answers, and holding the appropriate regulators accountable.
And with that, Madam Chairwoman, I yield back.
That concludes our opening statements.
I would like to now introduce Ms. Sheila Bair, Chairman of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, for the purpose of making
an opening statement.
And, again, thank you for coming today.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE SHEILA C. BAIR, CHAIRMAN,
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION (FDIC)
Ms. BAIR. Chairman Capito, Ranking Member Maloney, and

members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the state of the banking industry and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and on future challenges to our economic and financial stability.
Much has been written and said about the events associated with
the recent financial crisis and the factors that led up to it. My written testimony summarizes four factors that I consider the most important: excessive reliance on debt financing; misaligned incentives
in finance; regulatory arbitrage; and an inadequate resolutions
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framework that allows some financial companies to become too-bigto-fail.
The FDIC was created in 1933 in response to the most serious
financial crisis in American history to that time. Our mission then,
as now, is to promote financial stability and public confidence in
banking through bank supervision, deposit insurance, and the orderly resolution of failed banking institutions.
Working with our regulatory counterparts, the FDIC has played
an instrumental role in addressing the recent crisis. Our actions
have helped restore financial stability and pave the way for economic recovery. My written testimony includes a comprehensive account of those actions.
I am proud of all that the FDIC has accomplished during the
past 5 years. My greatest satisfaction lies in the knowledge that
through 368 failures, including the largest failures in FDIC history,
we kept pace with the depositors we were established to protect.
We have maintained the FDICs 78-year record of no losses to
any insured depositor. And we did it without borrowing a penny
from taxpayers.
But we still have important work to do. Our first task must be
to follow through on the Dodd-Frank Act reforms that will end toobig-to-fail. At the height of the crisis, we lacked the necessary tools
to resolve large, complex financial companies in an orderly manner
and were forced to authorize government bailouts that further insulated these companies from the market discipline that applies to
smaller banks and practically every other private company.
Too-big-to-fail really represents state capitalism. Unless reversed, the result is likely to be more concentration and complexity
in the financial system, more risk-taking at the expense of the public, and in due time, another financial crisis.
The Dodd-Frank Act provides the tools to restore market discipline and put an end to the cycle of government bailouts under
too-big-to-fail. These tools will be effective and the large systemically important institutions, or SIFIs, will be resolvable in the
next crisis only if regulators show the courage today to fully exercise their authorities under the law.
The success of this new resolution framework critically depends
on the ability to collect information about potential SIFIs to determine whether they are, in fact, resolvable under bankruptcy. It will
also require the willingness of the FDIC and the Federal Reserve
Board to actively use their authority to require structural changes
at SIFIs that better align business lines, legal entities, and funding
well before a crisis occurs.
Unless organizations are rationalized and simplified in advance,
there is a real danger that their complexity could make a SIFI resolution far more costly and more difficult than it needs to be.
These authorities are being shaped now in the interagency rulemaking process. If properly implemented, they can make our financial system more stable by restoring market discipline to systemically important institutions.
But if we fail to follow through on these measures now, when
market conditions are relatively calm, we will have no hope of preventing bailouts in the next crisis.
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My testimony describes the role played by excessive leverage
among both banks and non-bank financial companies in bringing
the crisis about. Strong capital standards are of fundamental importance in maintaining a safe and sound banking system that supports economic growth.
Supervisory processes will always lag innovation and risk-taking
to some extent. And restrictions on activities can be difficult to define and enforce. Hard and fast objective capital standards, on the
other hand, are easier for supervisors to enforce and provide an additional cushion to absorb losses when mistakes are inevitably
made.
Skeptics argue that requiring banks to hold more capital will
raise the cost of credit and impair economic performance. But the
experience of the crisis shows that the social costs of debt financing
are extremely high in such a downturn, and that the lack of an
adequate capital cushion makes lending highly procyclical.
While there will always be business cycles, the massive
deleveraging which occurred during the financial crisis led to the
most severe downturn since the Great Depression.
Loans and leases held by FDIC-insured institutions alone have
declined by nearly $750 billion from peak levels, while unused loan
commitments have declined by $2.5 trillion. Trillions more in capital flows were lost with the collapse of the securitization market
and other shadow providers of credit.
I would also like to highlight the urgent need for Congress and
the Administration to address the rapid growth in U.S. Government debt, which has doubled in just the past 7 years. Financial
stability critically depends on public investor confidence, which can
never be taken for granted.
There is no greater threat to our future economic security and financial stability than an inability to control the size of U.S. Government debt.
But as strongly as I feel about this issue, I feel just as strongly
that a technical default on U.S. Government obligations would
prove to be calamitous.
Any signal that policymakers might fail to make good on these
obligations risks permanently destroying the inviolable trust that
investors have placed in our Nation for more than 2 centuries.
I urge Congress to reaffirm this trust by committing to a responsible increase in the debt ceiling.
As I conclude, I would like to share with you one of the central
lessons I have drawn from my experience as FDIC chairman. It is
that the most important attribute of effective regulation is the
courage to stand firm against weak practices and excessive risktaking in the good times.
It is during a period of prosperity that the seeds of crisis are
sown. It is then that overwhelming pressure is placed on regulators
to relax capital standards, to permit riskier loan products, and to
allow higher concentrations of risk both on and off balance sheets.
The history of the crisis shows many examples when regulators
acted too late or with too little conviction, when they failed to use
authorities they already had or failed to ask for the authorities
they needed to fulfill their mission. As the crisis developed, many
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in the regulatory community were too slow to acknowledge the danger and remained behind the curve in addressing it.
The fact is that regulators are never going to be popular or glamorous, whether they act in a timely manner to forestall a crisis or
fail to act and allow it to take place. The best they can hope to
achieve is the knowledge that they exercised the statutory authority entrusted to them in good faith and to its fullest effect in the
interests of financial stability and the broader economy.
Thank you very much. I would be happy to answer your questions now.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Bair can be found on page
46 of the appendix.]
Chairwoman CAPITO. Thank you, Chairman Bair.
We will now begin the questioning portion of the hearing. And
I will begin my 5 minutes of questioning.
We have had ongoing discussions with you and your staff concerning the relationship of the FDIC and the CFPB for consumer
protection. It is my understanding that the FDIC just recently announced a new consumer division within the Corporation.
I am interested in how that is going to work in relation to CFPB.
If the CFPB comes down with regulations understanding that
smaller institutions are exempted out in theory, do you envision a
consumer protection within the FDIC that then takes the regulations that come from the CFPB and modifies them for the other institutions?
There has to be some coordination here. Are we creating a twotiered system here?
Ms. BAIR. Under the statute, for institutions with assets less
than $10 billion, the supervision and enforcement remains with the
primary banking regulators.
Chairwoman CAPITO. Right.
Ms. BAIR. And we have most of the smaller banks. So the lions
share of our institutions stay with us in terms of examination and
enforcement of rules.
We have never had the authority to write consumer rules. That
authority has been with the Federal Reserve. And now most of that
is being transferred to the CFPB. So this coordination issue for us
is not new. We have never had the ability to write the rules. The
Fed has written the rules.
We have coordinated with them. We provide input to them and
comment, and obviously, examine and enforce the rules that they
promulgate.
The CFPB Director, when that person is installed, will be on the
FDIC board. And I think that will help assure coordination, appropriately so.
I am hoping that this will help also increase the understanding
of the CFBPs Director about broader banking regulatory issues on
the safety and soundness side, some of the concerns of the FDIC,
and our perspective on the various issues that we have to deal with
on a day-to-day basis.
In terms of creating the new division, I do want to emphasize
that we did not create new examination staff. Actually, the examination staff reporting structures in the regions stay the same.
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This is an organizational change. There were a very few additional administrative staff to support the organizational separation
of consumer and depositor protection from risk management. It
was really more to make sure that the FDIC had an appropriate
policy focus on consumer protection.
And I would say the focus is for more effective consumer regulation.
I am sensitive to the concerns of community banks that have
been expressed, that perhaps sometimes under consumer compliance, as well as risk management, there has been more of a focus
than there should be on the kind of gotcha violations that other
members expressed concern about, such as reporting violations or
what have you.
We have tried to refocus the examination force on those areas
where there is actually consumer harm. And I think that has been
a good outcome of this new policy-level focus of the FDIC on consumers.
This will be a way for us to have a better focus on consumer protection, making consumer protection supervision more effective as
applied to banks, and enabling better coordination with the new
consumer agency, which, again, I think will have somewhat of an
advantage because the Director of the CFPB eventually will be on
our board.
Chairwoman CAPITO. Okay. I want to go to another question
quickly. But it sounds like the structure that is being enacted while
these institutions under $10 billion are exemptedit sounds as
though they really arent going to be exempted, which is their fear,
becauseor not their fear, their fear of the unknown more than
anything elsebecause it will be coordinated through your institution.
Ms. BAIR. That is right. The exemption is just with regard to examination and enforcement. It is not really an exemption. It preserves what we have always done. The primary banking regulator
will be the entity that examines and enforces for compliance with
consumer rules.
The consumer agency now has rule-writing for all institutions. So
whatever rules they write, those will apply to all institutions.
Chairwoman CAPITO. Right.
Ms. BAIR. They can, on their own, exempt small banks. I have
spoken in favor of a two-tiered regulatory structure. I think in certain areas it is appropriate. We will have an ability to engage and
have input with the new consumer agency because eventually that
person will be on our board as well.
Chairwoman CAPITO. Okay. Over the last several years, there
has been increasing consolidation of the banking industry.
Ms. BAIR. Right.
Chairwoman CAPITO. Some of the opening statements talked
about the advantages that the larger institutions have. The smaller
banks, the smaller institutions and community banks are concerned about being able to staff the regulatory issues, the legal
issues that they now see in front of them because of Dodd-Frank.
How do you see this playing out, the consolidation? Is this a concern for you? And I think it is a concern for, really, Main Street
America.
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Ms. BAIR. Right, right. It is a concern. We have a Community
Banking Advisory Committee. And we have talked with them a lot
about this.
I think on the process side, the Dodd-Frank Act did have some
important reforms for community banks. Certainly, raising the deposit insurance limit to $250,000 had been long advocated by community banks and will help them address funding disparities by
having a higher deposit insurance limit.
Also, the change in our assessment base is going to probably save
them about $4 billion in assessments over a period of time in assessment fees. So there were some process improvements in the
Dodd-Frank Act that will benefit community banks..
However, there are some concerns with the Durbin amendment.
And I commend you on your leadership on that issue.
We are trying very hard to make sure that the law is implemented as Congress intended, which was to insulate community
banks from the lions share of the reforms that really were targeted
at larger institutions. And we will continue that focus.
We are obviously very concerned about the differentials in funding costs as well. That existed pre-crisis. It has existed for far too
long.
The rules need implementation. We will talk more about that
later. Title II can help get these funding costs up for large banks,
as will higher capital requirements.
Mrs. Maloney?
Mrs. MALONEY. Thank you.
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, for holding this hearing and
giving us this opportunity to be with Sheila Bair one last time.
I would like to ask you to respond to what critics have claimed,
that the new Orderly Liquidation Authority promotes bailouts because it allows the FDIC to pay creditors 100 cents on the dollar.
Ms. BAIR. Right.
Mrs. MALONEY. And isnt it true that this is erroneous in light
of the fact that the law requires the FDIC to ensure that creditors
bear losses?
Ms. BAIR. That is right.
Mrs. MALONEY. And secondly, the FDICs authority to pay creditors more than they would have received in a liquidation bankruptcy is very limited and is subject to the requirement that creditors bear losses.
So your comments, please, Madam Chairman.
Ms. BAIR. Thank you.
I think it is important and we clearly have a job ahead of us in
terms of educating folks about our process and assuring them that
it is every bit as harsh as bankruptcy. It is basically the same creditor priority that you see in bankruptcy.
The statute limits our ability very narrowly to differentiate
among creditors in a way that is consistent with our traditional receivership powers.
And basically, that is two situations. First, to continue with essential operationsthings like paying the IT folks to keep IT services going; paying your security people; and paying the employees.
That is also recognized in bankruptcy.
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The second situation relates to maximizing value, and is simply
a mathematical determination. We see this in bank resolutions.
Frequently when we bid out a bank, the potential acquirers will
pay us a premium to cover all insured and uninsured deposits, because it impairs franchise value to impose losses on their larger
uninsured depositors.
So it actually maximizes our recoveries to cover the uninsured
deposits and sell all the deposits to the acquirer, as opposed to imposing a loss on those uninsured depositors, because we are making more money with the premium that the acquirer pays.
That is an example where you would maximize value by differentiating. And again, that is pretty much a mathematical formula. To
emphasize it more, we have said in an interim final rulemaking
that we dont think there would ever be any situation where a
longer-term creditorthat is one longer than a yearwould either
maximize value or be necessary for essential operations.
And for unsecured creditors with shorter terms, they are probably going to take losses as well. But again, they would have to
meet these narrow tests.
We have tried very hard to assure people that the losses imposed
on creditors will be every bit as harsh as it is in bankruptcy. The
97 cents on the dollar issue, I think that comes from an analysis
that our staff did on the Lehman bankruptcy and how it might
have been resolved under Title II.
So the 97 cents was simply a reflection of what we think the recoveries would be for the senior debt holders based on the capital
cushions and subordinated debt cushions that existed in Lehman
at the time of its failure, and our prediction of what the losses
would have been on their bad assets.
The recovery in Lehman, as it would be with any other Title II
resolution, will be driven by the extent of losses and the amount
of equity and subordinated debt under their senior debt holders.
But I would say, as a matter of market discipline, if senior debt
holders want to protect themselves, they should look at the equity
capitalization levels and the sub-debt below them.
Mrs. MALONEY. To put it in a framework that is helpful to us,
could you explain the extent to which having the Orderly Liquidation Authority during the financial crisis could have prevented bailouts and mitigated systemic effects?
Ms. BAIR. It would have. We have the ability, if you have time,
and there was a lot of time with Lehman. There were months of
alarm signals before the institution finally failed.
Firstly, under the Dodd-Frank Act, all systemic entities, including all bank holding companies above $50 billion, are required to
have resolution plans on file with us. So we we will have a blueprint on resolvability well before any time that they would get into
trouble.
The bankruptcy trustee and others who have analyzed the Lehman bankruptcy have all spoken to the need for advanced planning
to resolve these larger complex financial institutions. So there
would have been a game plan in place.
We would have been in the institution months in advance. We
anticipate having an ongoing presence in these large SIFIs, just as
we do with larger bank holding companies now.
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I think just the fact that there was a resolution process that
would have imposed losses on shareholders and creditors, would
have replaced the board, and would have replaced management,
that, in and of itself, would have been a strong incentive for the
leadership of Lehman to right their own ship and go out and sell
themselves at a reasonable price, which they were unwilling to do.
We see this all the time with banks. Banks know that if they fail
and they go into our process, their shareholders are wiped out;
their unsecured creditors are wiped out; their boards are gone; and
their executives lose their jobs.
It is a powerful incentive to take care of yourself. About 25 percent of banks that are on our projected failure list end up not failing because they go out and they recapitalize. They are very motivated. And I think that would be an important factor that we didnt
have during the crisis.
It also, frankly, provides us a defense against blackmail, right?
During the crisis, a lot of institutions were coming in and saying,
You know, if we go down, you are going to have all these problems. And there was no orderly process to put them into.
Now, we have a process. Even if it is an emergency situation, we
can put them into a bridge and provide temporary liquidity support, but their shareholders and unsecured creditors are all exposed to loss and their boards are gone. And actually under the
Dodd-Frank Act, there is a claw-back of up to 2 years of compensation for management if you have a failed entity.
Chairwoman CAPITO. The gentlewomans time has expired. Sorry.
Ms. BAIR. There are just a lot of tools that we would have in the
future that we didnt have going into the crisis.
Chairwoman CAPITO. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Renacci?
Mr. RENACCI. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
And thank you, Chairman Bair, for being here.
I want to focus today on the composition of your board of directors, and under Dodd-Frank the new composition, which includes
the Director of the CFPB being one of the members on your board.
Coming from the private sector and the business sector and sitting on many boards, I was always concerned. And I think the
setup of all boards, there was always concern about apparent, perceived, direct, indirect conflict of interest.
Knowing that you are going to have to work on a regular basis
with one of the individuals who would be the Director of the CFPB,
I am a little concerned that there is a conflict of interest, especially
when it comes to your seat on the FSOC, basically.
Because as we know right now, FSOC can review, stay, and block
a CFPB rule, but it takes two-thirds to do that.
Ms. BAIR. Right.
Mr. RENACCI. I know my colleague, Mr. Duffy, introduced some
legislation last week or the week before to try and talk a little bit
about this.
But when you have to work with somebody on your board on a
regular basis, and then you go over to FSOC and you have a vote,
and it takes today 7 out of 10 to block a rule by the Director who
sits on your board
Ms. BAIR. Right.
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Mr. RENACCI. and that person also has a vote out of the 10,
and you would have a vote out of the 10, you start to limit down
the ability to really have oversight by using the Financial Stability
Oversight Council.
Ms. BAIR. Right.
Mr. RENACCI. So my concern is, when you have that kind of conflict of interest, is it good policy? Is it good procedure? I have actually drafted a bill that I am going to introduce next week which
would simply replace the Director of the CFPB with the Chairman
of the Fed.
And the reason I am doing that is because I believe we need to
focus on safety and soundness, and get any perceived conflict of interest out of the way.
Ms. BAIR. Right.
Mr. RENACCI. I just want to hear your thoughts on that potential
conflict of interest.
Ms. BAIR. I think it is a good question. I think a lot of people
had suggestions during the consideration of Dodd-Frank about who
should replace the OTS on the FDICs Board, and the Fed was one
option. I was supportive of that. I said I would like some reciprocity. I think that would be helpful.
The advantage and the argument for putting the consumer bureau head on the FDIC Board is that perhaps it might help sensitize that person to some of the safety and soundness issues that
are associated with deposit insurance and the intersection with
consumer protections.
Frankly, there is a close connection. They are really two sides of
the same coin. To the extent people were worried about the consumer bureau head not being aware of the larger context of bank
regulation, it might help educate that person to have them on the
FDIC Board. That is the argument for it.
Again, we wouldnt mind some reciprocity. If you go to a commission structure for the CFPB, that might be a nice thing to have as
well.
But, we are fine with it. Again, earlier iterations did have the
Fed on the Board. We were fine with that, too. We would have
liked some reciprocity if that was the structure.
But in terms of the conflict, I would also point out, though, that
FSOC actually has the ability to intercede with pretty much all the
regulators, if they think one of the regulators is doing something
that could create systemic risk or is not appropriately addressing
systemic risk.
So arguably, there could be a conflict for the OCC for instance,
as well. If the OCC wasnt doing as good a job as they should in
regulating large banks, and the FSOC was going to intervene in
that, I guess you could make the same argument there.
So these are difficult questions. And I think we can certainly live
with what is in the law right now.
Mr. RENACCI. It is interesting, as you mentioned, you would
bring on that Director so they can be briefing on the safety and
soundness aspect.
Ms. BAIR. Right.
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Mr. RENACCI. And I read the CFPBs mission statement yesterday, and out of the 764 words, there is no talk about safety or
soundness in their mission, which is
Ms. BAIR. A safe and sound banka bank that doesnt failis
the best bank for customers. As good a job as we do with protecting
depositors, it is always better to avoid a failure.
Similarly, consumer abuses eventually, as we saw with the mortgages, can have profound safety and soundness ramifications, too.
So there really needs to be a lot of cross-communication and collaboration on this. I couldnt agree more.
Mr. RENACCI. Thank you.
In regard to the Orderly Liquidation Authority, there have been
a number of examples. And I have Continental Illinois Bank, $400
billion in assets, 57 offices in 14 States. It took 7 years to resolve
at a cost of $1 billion to the fund.
The Bank of Clark County, Washington, $440 million in assets,
50 bank employees, a 3-day weekend to resolve.
Citigroup, $1.9 trillion in assets, the time, the energy, the staff
that you neededand I know I am running out of time, but maybe
I can catch you on the second round.
I would like to find out how you believe that the manpower, time,
and strain on the fund will take to wind down simple institutions,
and how you will be able to be able to exercise authority over much
larger institutions.
So I will yield back.
Chairwoman CAPITO. We will give you lots of time to think about
that.
Mr. Baca, from California, for 5 minutes.
Mr. BACA. Thank you, Ms. Blair, for being here.
I understand that the FDIC has issued an internal financial final
report and proposed rule to implement an Orderly Liquidation Authority.
Could you briefly discuss these rules, particularly to the extent
to which they would align an orderly liquidization process without
a bankruptcy or a failed bank resolution, and ensure that creditors
bear losses and the institution itself does not survive?
Ms. BAIR. The statute is very clear: It bans bailouts. And the
claims priority that we follow is pretty much the same claims priority that is followed in bankruptcy.
To the extent the government would need to provide liquidity
support to keep the institution operational as it is broken up and
sold off, those are administrative expenses that are paid off the top
back to the government before any other expenses are paid.
So it really is a process that is every bit as harsh as bankruptcy.
It resembles bankruptcy in the claims priority. And I think we
need to reassure folks on that.
The purpose of this was to end too-big-to-fail, not to reinforce it.
We have engaged with the rating agencies on this. Some have decided to continue or have sought comment on whether they should
continue to have a bump up for large institutions.
And we say to them: read the statute. The statute prohibits bailouts. They actually think the Congress is going to do it. They just
cant imagine that the Congress, even if the regulators cant, that
the Congress would not step in.
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So I know you dont want to do that. I know you dont want to
face the Secretary of the Treasury and the Chairman of the Federal
Reserve coming up and asking for $700 billion to do a lot of things
that none of us like to do.
The tools are there to require credible resolution plans. The tools
are there to require structural changes as well as downsizing if
they cannot come up with a plan that shows that they can be resolved in an orderly way.
Mr. BACA. But do you think they will downsize?
Ms. BAIR. I think some of them may need to. I think some of
them are already.
Mr. BACA. And who will enforce that?
Ms. BAIR. It is jointly with the Fed and the FDIC. And the FSOC
as a group can also, with a supermajority vote, require a divestiture if that is necessary.
Mr. BACA. It seems that many people overlook or underestimate
the importance of the rapid resolution or living will requirement,
which the Feds and the FDIC jointly are in process of implementing.
Could you please discuss the importance of a living will, both as
an ongoing regulatory tool that will help ensure appropriate risk
management and that mitigate against failure of large complex financial institutions as a planning took that will make disorderly
resolutions less likely and hopefully a rare event at large and financial failures.
Ms. BAIR. It is a statutory requirement jointly of the Fed and the
FDIC. It requires that the institutions have plans in place that can
show the orderly resolution through a bankruptcy process. It is a
very high standard.
For several institutions, this is going to require some structural
changes. I think they have thousands of legal entities that have
been accumulated over the years, through acquisition activity or
what have you, that they just never bothered to rationalize.
And so getting their business operations aligned with their legal
structureso that if they start to fail, there is a strategy to be able
to break them up and market them in marketable-size piecesis
going to be a key part of this.
I think for those with international operations, there may be
some level of subsidiarization that is required. That is that they
need to separate themselves as a separate legal entity in certain
foreign jurisdictions, perhaps where they have significant business
activities.
There are several banks, though, in particular Santander and
HSBC, that already operate with a subsidiarization model, and
they do so quite profitably.
So it may not be required for all of them, but I think it is the
kind of thing that we need to look at and may be required for some
if they cant otherwise show that they could be resolved on an orderly way even in an international context.
Mr. BACA. Thank you. I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Luetkemeyer for 5 minutes for questions.
Mr. LUETKEMEYER. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
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Chairman Bair, recently the FDIC completed a pilot program on
small dollar loans and had a couple of different programs, one for
under $1,000, and another one for under $2,500. Can you just
recap some of your findings on that?
Ms. BAIR. Our small dollar loan pilot program?
Mr. LUETKEMEYER. Yes, on your pilot program.
Ms. BAIR. We were very pleased. It was very successful. The delinquency rates were a little bit higher than they are for other
forms of lending. But the default rates and losses were very much
in line.
The banks that participated in the pilot were very pleased and
gave us the information, which we have, in turn, made more broadly available to banks in general.
There is a particular need for small dollar credit right now. The
options for a lot of consumers are not good. They can be very high
cost.
Having proven models to provide reasonably priced small dollar
lending was important to us. We were very pleased, as well as the
banks, with their success.
Mr. LUETKEMEYER. Okay. What interest rate did you see on the
small dollar loans actually worked?
Ms. BAIR. What industry?
Mr. LUETKEMEYER. Yes, what interest rate?
Ms. BAIR. These were consumer loans. Oh, interest rate. I am
sorry.
Mr. LUETKEMEYER. Interest rate, yes. What interest rate did
Ms. BAIR. They were all below 36 percent, which is pretty high.
We have guidance out that says that we will actually give CRA
credit for those who can offer this
Mr. LUETKEMEYER. Did they think they could make any money
at that?
Ms. BAIR. Sorry?
Mr. LUETKEMEYER. Did they think that they could make any
money at that?
Ms. BAIR. They did make money. Most of them were significantly
lower than 36 percent, usually around 18, 16, 12 percent. And they
did make money, because they all
Mr. LUETKEMEYER. My information says that after 2 years, the
FDIC, according to your report, found that the interest rate cap
was not profitable for the participating bank.
Ms. BAIR. Was not what? I am sorry.
Mr. LUETKEMEYER. I said that after 2 years, the FDIC program
my information says that after 2 years, your pilot program showed
that the interest rate cap was not profitable for participating
banks.
Ms. BAIR. There was no interest rate cap. There is guidance that
says for the pilot, we wanted them to stay below 36 percent. But
that is a voluntary program.
And, I am sorry, Congressman. If we could take a look at the
document you are looking at, because those were profitable. And
they were significantly below 36 percent.
Mr. LUETKEMEYER. Okay. We will work out the differences on
that later. Thank you.
Ms. BAIR. Sure.
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Mr. LUETKEMEYER. With regards to the insurance fund, how
solid are we right now?
Ms. BAIR. We are still in negative territory, but we should be in
positive territory by June 30th, by the end of the second quarter.
The fund at the end of the first quarter was a negative $1 billion.
That is up from a trough of negative $20.9 billion in 2009.
So it is improving. That represents our equity position, not our
cash position. Our cash position is a positive $45 billion.
But the funds equity position should be in positive territory by
the end of the second quarter.
Mr. LUETKEMEYER. Do you anticipate any future assessments
Ms. BAIR. No.
Mr. LUETKEMEYER. to make up the difference in that
Ms. BAIR. No. No. As a matter of fact, we had a scheduled 3 basis
point increase that we did not impose because the industry is recovering and our projected losses are going down.
Mr. LUETKEMEYER. Okay. With regards to interchange fees, the
other day we had Chairman Bernanke in front of us and asked him
a question, whenever your regulators go in and you take a look at
a bank, and they have to chalk off 13 percent of their income, are
you going to forget about that lost income? Or are you going to require them to make that up somewhere?
And he really had no answer to that.
Ms. BAIR. Yes.
Mr. LUETKEMEYER. He said, well, it is up to the bank to decide
how they want to do that, but we certainly want to see them to
continue to be capitalized.
Yes, that is true. But his regulation is going to havewhen he
comes up with his interchange fee regulation, it is going to have
a dramatic impact on the bottom line for a lot of the institutions.
Ms. BAIR. Right.
Mr. LUETKEMEYER. What are your thoughts on that?
Ms. BAIR. We are concerned about it. In fairness to the Fed, they
are implementing a provision that was in the Dodd-Frank Act.
Mr. LUETKEMEYER. Right.
Ms. BAIR. and doing it as they see is consistent with the statute.
We are very concerned about it, especially for the community
bank impact. The statute specifically says, community banks under
$10 billion in assets are supposed to not be subject to this cap.
As a practical matter, can you really protect them, particularly
if network providers are not required to take the higher fees they
could continue to charge.
Mr. LUETKEMEYER. Right.
Ms. BAIR. We also think the 12 cents is too low. We filed a comment letter which I am happy to share with you. We think they
should take anti-fraud measures into account. And that can be a
significant expense.
We also think they should do more to take in the incremental
costs of small banks that provide for debit card usage. I think the
cost structure they considered was mainly for the large institutions. Obviously, their incremental costs are less than the smaller
banks.
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I dont know how they are going to come out with it. I think Congress may or may not still take some more time with this. If they
dont, I am hoping that if this goes final, that 12 cent-limit is
raised, and that they can find a legal justification for requiring that
networks accept two-tier pricing to protect the smaller banks.
Mr. LUETKEMEYER. Thank you. And just a comment: I appreciate
your comment on the capital requirements.
Ms. BAIR. Right.
Mr. LUETKEMEYER. I think that is important, even during good
times, to retain adequate level of capital
Ms. BAIR. That is right.
Mr. LUETKEMEYER. My dad told me that a long time ago. He
lived through the Depression. And he lived to be able to explain
why it was a good thing and show here with this last crisis why
it actually worked.
Thank you very much for your comment.
Mr. Scott, from Georgia?
Mr. SCOTT. Thank you very much.
Chairman Bair, I just want to first of all start off by thanking
you for the excellent service you have done as the Chairman of the
FDIC, and especially for responding to me. Each time I call your
office, you get right on the phone and talk with me and help us to
handle things.
As you know, my State of Georgia has had just a plethora of very
serious problems. Unfortunately, we have led the Nation in bank
closures.
But I want to ask you this first question: A number of banks,
community banks especially, in my State of Georgia, are under regulatory orders from the FDIC. And I understand these orders are
driven primarily by the performance of their loan portfolios and
capital levels.
These regulatory orders often require a bank to reduce their concentration in real estate loans to some artificial level. And that is
forcing them to not renew even performing loans for some borrowers. That seems to hurt everyone, especially in States like Georgia that are so centered on real estate.
The borrower has to find a new bank, which we know is difficult
in these economic times, while the bank loses a performing loan.
Surely there is a better way to enforce FDIC rules and regulations so that they dont hurt the very consumers that they are designed to protect and the banks that they are designed to oversee.
What might you say would be a better way?
Ms. BAIR. Congressman, thank you for asking that question, because I think our policies are not consistent with what you are
being told.
And, again, I will say this to all members here: If there are specific examples where you feel that our policies are not being applied
by our examiners, I personally want to know about it.
I do stay engaged with the examiners. I do conference calls. I
visit the regions. I cannot tell you how focused I personally have
been on this.
And the rule is quite simply this: if the loan is performing, if you
have a creditworthy borrower with cash flow to keep making pay-
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ments on that loan, it doesnt matter what the collateral is. If the
loan is a good loan, it doesnt need to be written down, no additional reserves, nothing, it is a fine loan.
If you are just refinancing the unpaid principal, and you have a
creditworthy borrower who can continue to make payments, you
dont have to write down that loan, even if the collateral has declined in value.
If you are extending new credit, new money, yes, the bank needs
to go make an appraisal of the collateral, because you are expending new money. That is just a basic tenet of banking.
But regarding existing loans or refinancing of existing loans, if
the borrower is creditworthy and can make the payments, you do
not have to do an appraisal and you do not have to do a writedown.
That is the rule. I went through this again yesterday as part of
my hearing prep because I hear this a lot. And it is very frustrating to me.
And, again, if you have specific examples, I do want to know
about it.
Mr. SCOTT. Okay, let me just ask you specifically then, what
should my banks in Georgia do? You are saying that is not the way
it should be. They are saying it is the way it is. So what should
they do?
Ms. BAIR. They could call me directly. Or, we have an Ombudsman that is set up as a confidential process. So, they can do it on
a confidential basis.
Also, they can call Sandra Thompson, the head of our Division
of Risk Management.
Mr. SCOTT. Who was that again, please?
Ms. BAIR. Her name is Sandra Thompson. She is the head of our
Division of Risk Management.
There are any number of avenues to bring this to our attention.
We do want to know about it.
I have found a couple of cases where policies were misapplied,
and we corrected it very quickly.
I will tell you, though, other times when we drilled down, what
we found was that the borrower really did have some problems.
There may be a different perception about what a creditworthy borrower is, and sometimes that can be a judgment call.
We individually review every single allegation. I promise you
that.
Mr. SCOTT. Right. Thank you very much.
Just last week, two more banks failed in my home State of Georgia: First Choice Community Bank; and Park Avenue Bank. And
this brings the number of banks that have closed this year to 10,
which is by far the most of any other State.
And unfortunately this is not unusual news, as banks in Georgia
continue to struggle.
Can you tell me what, in your opinion, makes small banks especially vulnerable to closure?
Ms. BAIR. Early on, we had a lot of failures of banks that had
grown too fast. They had taken deposits and grown their balance
sheets very quickly, had not adhered to good underwriting, and had
clearly made a lot of out-of-area lending, which is something that
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generally is not good, unless you very carefully manage that exposure.
Later, as we progressed into economically troubled times, more
problems arose from weaknesses in risk management. But, they
were succumbing to economic conditions as well.
If the losses are mounting and the capital is insufficient to curb
those losses and if they cant raise additional capital, there is not
a lot we can do about it. Under the statute, we have a prompt corrective action process that we follow. It is fairly rigid about when
the banks
Mr. SCOTT. Very quickly, are there any specific things you could
say right now that the FDIC can do to assist them?
Ms. BAIR. I think we do try to work with them. I know we have
a different role than they do. But it is not a confrontational role,
and we dont want that.
We tell our examiners they need to understand what is going on
in the bank. They need to talk to management. They need to listen
to management.
They must exercise their own independent judgment about the
health and safety of that bank. But that should be informed by robust conversations with the bank management and the board. And
we do that.
Certainly, anything that we can do with an appropriate balance
to help them recapitalize is in our interest. We dont want these
banks to fail. It costs us money every time it happens.
But, nonetheless, if they cant raise their capital and the losses
are mounting, if you delay the closing of the bank for a long time,
the losses will go even higher. That was the lesson learned during
the S&L crisis, and which is why we have prompt corrective action
now, and why we follow it.
Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Chairman Bair.
And thank you, Madam Chairwoman, for your generosity of time.
Mr. Westmoreland, from Georgia, 5 minutes.
Mr. WESTMORELAND. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Ms. Bair, in a meeting I had 2 weeks ago with your staff, they
informed me that it is unlikely that the FDIC will wind down the
use of loss share agreements in Georgia.
Setting aside my strenuous objection to this, I have serious concerns about the loss-share agreements that will begin to mature in
2 years. As the stop-date of a loss-share agreement approaches, I
have serious concerns that the banks with these agreements will
begin to rapidly sell off assets to take advantage of the agreement.
This could lead to yet another downturn in real estate and make
it harder for people to obtain loans.
What is the FDICs plan for these maturities of loss-share agreements?
Ms. BAIR. I am not sure where you got this 2-year figure. In
practice, the terms of the loss-share agreements generally coincide
with the tenure of the loans.
But there is no cut-off point in 2 years where there is no longer
any loss-share and it is going to get dumped on the market. That
is not how it works.
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Actually, we think that the loss-share prevented a lot of property
going onto the market, because it facilitated our ability to sell the
whole bank, with the deposits and the assets, to another insured
depository institution. If we had not provided loss-share, the bank
probably wouldnt have taken the assets.
We would have had to sell it on the open market at an extreme
liquidation discount, or held it ourselves and managed it, which is
inefficient and costly and difficult.
So actually, I think the loss-share has helped keep a lot of assets
in the hands of other, better-capitalized, stronger depository institutions. It has kept the property off the market. Also, I want to emphasize that we have very stringent rules in loss-share agreements
about loss mitigation.
If a loan restructuring will have greater value than a foreclosure,
we want the loan restructured. We have very specific rules about
that. And we audit that. If they dont do that, they can lose their
loss-share payment.
Mr. WESTMORELAND. You all might want to send some folks out
with your regulators who actually go out and do the work in the
field, and see where the disconnect is. There is certainly
Ms. BAIR. I would. I do hear this. And again, if you have some
specific examples, we would love to hear them
Mr. WESTMORELAND. The problem with giving examples is these
banks are afraid to death of retaliation.
Ms. BAIR. Yes.
Mr. WESTMORELAND. And so we would be glad to give you examples, but trying to get some of these guys to come forwardI have
been trying to do it for a long time now, and they areI am being
serious. They are desperately afraid of retaliation.
And if you all think loss-share agreements are helping
Ms. BAIR. Right.
Mr. WESTMORELAND. then that could be the problem, because
they are not.
But let me ask beforeand I dont want to cut you off, but I do
want to ask you one other question.
Despite the occasional lip service that some of these regulators
give for talking about they want these community banks to continue to be able to provide service to small business and local customers, the examiners continue to second-guess bank management
policies and downgrade loans based not on the current status of the
loan. In other words, some of these loans are performing loans.
But based on a scenario where there is no economic recovery, and
virtually every examination ends with significant downgrades not
supported by professional outside loan review or by independent accountants, if the FDIC is serious about allowing banks to serve
their customers, why are the banks being second-guessed on even
the best-documented loans?
And I dont understand how a bank can get all As on a report
card, and 6 months later get all Fs and do everything but call
the board members crooks.
Ms. BAIR. Again, it is hard to respond without knowing what the
facts would be in the individual case. I would say that if the loan
is performing, if the borrower has success, and the loan continues
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to perform, it is a good loan, even if the collateral has gone down
in value. Even if it needs to be refinanced, it is a good loan.
Again, if you have examples, I do want to know about them. I
will personally assure the banker that there will not be any retribution by bringing this to our attention.
So I really dont know what else I can say. I think examiners do
need to exercise independence of judgment. They need to listen to
bank management, and understand their reasoning. But bank
managers are not always right. There have been some big mistakes.
I think we are, hopefully, for the most part, through this. But
early in this crisis, we did have a lot of very dramatic downgrades
from banks that had very good supervisory ratings to ones that
went to troubled status. And for that reason, we are putting more
of an emphasis on what we call forward-looking CAMELS and
asking banks to stress their portfolios and stress conditions.
But that is just from a risk-management perspective. That
doesnt mean if the economy tanks unexpectedly that they have to
start holding more capital now. No, we just want them to be prepared and think through all the scenarios.
Mr. WESTMORELAND. And listen, I appreciate those comments.
But I really hope that some of your senior management, or whatever, can go into some of these banks. And as my colleague from
Georgia mentioned, we have a tremendous amount of them that
are either under consent orders, cease-and-desist, on the problem
bank list, that is still to come.
And this is sucking wealth out of these communities.
And the loss-share agreement and the immediate write-down is
doing a reverse situation on our local economies. It is killing us. We
need some help.
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, for your generosity.
Ms. BAIR. If I could just indulge the Chair, I am actually going
to be in Atlanta soon. I will go you one further. I am happy to go
to your district and meet with a group of bankers personally if that
would be helpful to you.
Mr. WESTMORELAND. I may take you up on that.
Chairwoman CAPITO. Mr. Carney, from Delaware, for 5 minutes.
Mr. CARNEY. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
And thank you for being here today, Chairman Bair.
I would just like to add my voice to those who have expressed
concern about banks being told that they had to do away with performing loans and creditworthy borrowers not getting access to
that. So I would like to take you up on your offer to entertain those
kinds of referrals and that discussion.
I have heard it a number of times from the borrowers and from
the banks themselves.
I would just like to touch on and follow up on a couple of questions. And the first one is you addressed the issue of bailouts of
banks and what the tools are that you have today that you didnt
have under Dodd-Frank.
And the question really is, are you better positioned today? Are
the regulators better positioned today to prevent government bailouts of those troubled financial institutions then they were before?
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And you did it a minute ago, but if you could just highlight some
of those things, how the incentives have changed, how your tools
have been strengthened, and so on.
Ms. BAIR. Yes, they have. We now have the authority to resolve
the entire financial institution, whereas before, our receivership
authority only went to the insured bank. And so now, at least for
large bank holding companies, there is a whole list of authorities
to put them into receivership, into our process, if that would avoid
systemic consequences.
And as I said before, the process is very rigorous, every bit as
harsh as bankruptcy. Any temporary liquidity support that might
be provided is paid off the top. There is no guarantee of liabilities.
All unsecured creditors are exposed to loss.
On the remote chance that there could be some remaining loss
for the governmentthat has to be assessed against the industry.
There is no way that taxpayers would paythere are bells and
whistles on this thing, and belts and suspenders. We pushed for
that.
We actually wanted a pre-funded reserve. We wanted an assessment to actually provide a pool of liquidity in advance, so we
wouldnt even have to borrow from the U.S. Treasury for even that
temporary liquidity support. We didnt get that.
But nonetheless, even if there is temporary borrowing that is
necessary, that gets paid off the top. In the unlikely event there
would be losses after being paid off the top, that would be assessed
against the industry.
Mr. CARNEY. You mentioned some things that management
some incentives management has to resolve it themselves.
Ms. BAIR. Yes, the boards are gone. The executive management
is gone.
Mr. CARNEY. These are really strong, you know
Ms. BAIR. It is quite harsh. Yes it is. And, there is the 2-year
claw-backa potential for a 2-year claw-back of compensation, too,
for senior executives. So, yes. Which is why, again, I think a lot of
the benefit is prophylactic as well. Managers, knowing what this
process is now, dont have the option of going to a bailout. The fact
that this process is there and will be the scenario if they fail is
going to give them a strong incentive to go out, raise capital, and
sell themselves if necessary.
Mr. CARNEY. The second question is really to follow up on my
friend, Mr. Renaccis, question about the conflict between the
CFPB, potentially, and the safety and soundness regulators. What
is your view on that? And as it relates as well to the governing bodies that you discussed with my colleague from the other side?
Ms. BAIR. Right. I think there is a close intersection. And it will
require a lot of collaboration with the new consumer head. There
is a statutory requirement that the consumer agency consult with
the bank regulators in writing rules.
Again, I think the fact that the consumer head would be on our
board will help further that sensitivity and knowledge and awareness of the intersection of safety and soundness with consumer protection.
So I think it can work. Again, it is all about
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Mr. CARNEY. Do you have some reservations? You seem to express some.
Ms. BAIR. Not really, no. Early on when the Congress was considering this, we were sympathetic to a board approach. We have a
board. I like boards. Even though it is more difficult for me, I am
not a dictator. I have to go get my five votes.
The chairman of a committee has to do that. But I think it is a
good process. Either way, thoughyou have the OCC with a single
headso you have both models in the financial regulatory sphere.
So, no, I wouldnt say I have reservations. I think there are arguments pro and con for either approach. But the statute provides an
approach that we support and one we think we can work with.
Mr. CARNEY. So the kinds of things that the CFPB might be
doing around consumer protections, do you see a big conflict with
safety and soundness issues?
Ms. BAIR. No. There actually can be some safety and soundness
advantages, particularly with regard to the ability of the consumer
bureau to now examine and enforce consumer protection rules for
non-banks. One of the things that put pressure and led to a lot of
bad lending by insured banks was competitive pressure from the
non-bank sector.
You had a lot of non-bank mortgage originators who really had
no regulation whatsoever. They were selling these loans to the
securitization trusts. They werent retaining any of the risks of
these loans which was really driving down lending standards.
Having a more robust enforcement mechanism for the non-banks
I think will actually help level the competitive playing field and
make sure we dont have competitive pressure on banks to lower
their standards.
Mr. CARNEY. Thank you. I see my time has expired. Thank you
for your service. I appreciate it.
I would like to recognize Mr. Canseco, from Texas, for 5 minutes
for questioning.
Mr. CANSECO. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Good morning, Madam Chairman.
Lehman Brothers, the FDICs report on the possible orderly liquidation; the FDIC said that had the resolution authority granted
to them under Dodd-Frank been in place in September of 2008, the
estimated losses to Lehmans creditors would have only been 3
cents on every dollar.
However, officials at the Federal Reserve, including Chairman
Bernanke, have stated that one of the primary reasons that the
Fed did not step in to save Lehman was because the estimated
losses were so large and Lehman did not have sufficient collateral
to post to the Fed.
Chairman Bernanke stated in his testimony to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, There was not nearly enough collateral to
provide enough liquidity to meet the run on Lehman. The company
would fail anyway. And the Federal Reserve would be left holding
the very illiquid collateral, a very large amount of it.
So my question to you is, the FDIC seems to think that there
was significant value in Lehman while the Federal Reserve
thought that the risk was too large to lend to it.
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How could the FDIC and the Federal Reserve come to such different conclusions?
Ms. BAIR. I think a couple of things. First of all, the 97 cents on
the dollar as the senior debt holder, that assumes that the sub-debt
and equity is wiped out. So it is not all Lehman creditors. As you
do with bankruptcy, you work your way up the capital stack with
equity at the bottom, and sub-debt later.
Because of the significant equity and sub-debt cushions, we think
that the senior bond holders would have taken very small haircuts.
That is based on very aggressive assumptions about what the loss
rates would have been on their bad assets.
I think there is a difference between what collateral was available to the Fed to lend, as well as the Feds legal constraints
against lending into a failing institution. That really drove Chairman Bernankes comments.
But the value of available unencumbered assets shouldnt be confused with the broader franchise value of the institution and the
ability of significant sub-debt and equity to absorb losses, which
the Fed could not rely on because there was no resolution process,
which we have now.
Mr. CANSECO. Was this difference of conclusions between the two
agencies discussed when the Federal Reserve and the FDIC issued
the proposed rule for living wills?
Ms. BAIR. Congressman, I dont think there really is a difference.
I think Chairman Bernanke was talking about the availability of
quality collateralthey have very high standards for collateral
when they lend. And they actually lent well over $100 billion into
the broker-dealer.
Because of the bankruptcy process, the derivative counterparties
had the ability to pull all their collateral outthe Fed lent a lot
already for liquidity needs and it was still a very disruptive process.
I dont think we are inconsistent in what we are saying. But we
certainly, to your question about living wills, have closely collaborated on the living will rule. It is a joint proposal.
Mr. CANSECO. Going back to the Lehman bankruptcy, the FDIC
called its past experience with orderly wind downs of financial institutions instructive. The paper argues that the FDIC is readily
equipped to handle the authority given it under Dodd-Frank because from 1995 through 2007, the agency was responsible for the
orderly wind-down of 56 financial institutions.
But a closer examination begs questions as to just how ready the
FDIC is to handle its new responsibilities. According to data from
the FDICs Web site, the total asset of those 56 financial institutions wound down from 1995 to 2007 was about $12.23 billion, or
an average of $218 million per bank. Most of the banks were much
smaller than that.
So Lehman Brothers had $639 billion in assets when it failed.
This was the largest bankruptcy in American history. And Lehmans assets were 50 times greater than all the combined assets
of the banks the FDIC shut down over a 12-year period.
What makes the FDIC think it has the resources available to
wind down such a large institution?
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Ms. BAIR. More recent history may better attest to our capabilities. We have moved about $650 billion in failed bank assets over
the past 212 years, since the beginning of 2008. WaMu, obviously,
was over $300 billion and was resolved over a weekend in a process
that would have been very similar to the process we would have
used for Lehman.
We insure these banks. We understand them. And, Congressman, I get this question sometimespeople try to paint us as understanding only little banks. But, we insure these big banks. We,
regrettably, participated in some of the bailouts of these very large
banks. Nobody questioned our expertise or authority to do that.
So, I think we are quite prepared. I will match the expertise of
my staff on capital markets, on derivatives, on complex financial
structures against anybody at the Fed or the OCC or the Treasury.
We have very smart people who do this for a living.
We really are the only agency in the world that has the long experience in resolving large and small financial institutions.
And others look to us. We are doing training in Europe and
China. Others look to us for expertise as they are setting up their
own resolution regimes.
Mr. CANSECO. I notice that my time is up. But I sure hope that
the FDIC has changed its own personnel and operating structure
for the benefit of our financial system.
Ms. BAIR. Congressman, I am very sensitive to this. We are designed to expand and contract very quickly. We also have reservoirs of contractor help, because our work is cyclical. And we are
used to it.
We are not perfect. This is a challenge for us. But, I think certainly compared to the expertise shown in the bankruptcy processyou saw what happened with Lehmanthis is a good approach. And I want to prove to you that it can work.
Mr. CANSECO. Thank you.
Chairwoman CAPITO. The gentlewoman from New York, Ms.
Velazquez, for 5 minutes.
Ms. VELAZQUEZ. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Thank you, Honorable Sheila Bair.
Last Congress, this committee held a hearing to examine community bankers concern that regulators were being overly restrictive.
How has the FDIC addressed these concerns to work with banks
that want to increase small business lending?
And I am concerned, as the ranking member of the House Small
Business Committee, we held a joint hearing with this committee
to address the lack of access to affordable capital for small businesses. So I would like for you to comment on this.
Ms. BAIR. I think this has been a major impediment in the
broader economic recovery. And, certainly, given your expertise
with the small business sector, you know that much better than I
do.
I think there are a variety of reasons. Risk aversion, perhaps, is
part of it. But I think borrower demand is part of it, as well. Borrower demand is driven by a couple of different factors. One is, I
think, uncertainty about how robust the economic recovery is. If
they borrow money and commit capital to expand, or if we are in
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another downturn a year from now, I think this is the problem that
is dampening borrower demand.
I also think because so much small business lending is
collateralized by real estate, and real estate values have dropped
so substantially, they dont have the collateral anymore to borrow
against as they did pre-crisis.
We encourage lending. We focus on it. I was very disappointed
when small business loan balances were down in the first quarter
and even though C&I lending was up, small business lending was
down. Commercial and industrial lending, the broader category,
was up.
We are trying to strike a very strong balance. We want our
banks to lend. We especially want them to lend to small businesses. But, I think they obviously need to find creditworthy borrowers to do that, and a lot of the creditworthy borrowers are still
standing on the sidelines.
Ms. VELAZQUEZ. Okay.
The FDIC recently implemented the Dodd-Frank mandate to expand the deposit insurance assessment fee, which will result in
community banks paying 30 percent less in premiums while large
banks pay more. What effect on small business lending will the
new assessment systems will have?
Ms. BAIR. I think if you are doing this for small banks, this is
small business. I think it will help them. It will ease their assessment burden in a way that is quite consistent with our loss exposure based on the funding structures that larger institutions employ.
So I think it will certainly help them. To the extent the small
banks do about 40 percent of the small business lending done by
insured depository institutions, it should free up resources to help
them in that regard.
Ms. VELAZQUEZ. Under the proposed rules for qualified residential mortgages, home buyers will have to put down 20 percent of
the purchase price. As a Member who represents New York, we are
very much concerned about this because it will have a significant
potential impact in high-cost areas like New York City.
Should QRM requirements be based on local market conditions
instead of an across-the-board increase?
Ms. BAIR. No. The QRMs are meant to be an exception to the
general rule that if you are issuing a securitization, you need to retain 5 percent of the risk.
And I think that 5 percent risk retention is important. The fact
that securitizers did not have skin in the game with these loans,
by and large, or meaningful skin in the game, led to a lot of the
lax underwriting and abuses that we saw in the mortgage market.
So the 5 percent risk retention, in my view, should be the rule.
The QRM is the exception. As such, it is meant to be a narrow
niche part of the market, not what the more broadly available
standards will be.
If you retain 5 percent of the risk or if you retain all of it with
a portfolio loan, you have broad flexibility to underwrite the loan
within prudential standards. So it only applies to what I think is
going to be a small slice of the market.
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Ms. VELAZQUEZ. Have you looked at any other alternatives to a
20 percent downpayment that could reduce the number of defaults
in the future?
Ms. BAIR. The staff of all the agencies looked at this very carefully. Loan to value ratios are a significant driver of whether a loan
defaults and what the losses are when the loan does default. And
so no, we are out for comment on exactly that question, among others. And I anticipate this is a huge issue. We will get a lot of comments on it.
But, the analytical work that the staff did indicates that a 20
percent downpayment is a really strong indicator of credit quality.
Ms. VELAZQUEZ. But you understand my point that it is not
fair
Ms. BAIR. I do understand your point.
Ms. VELAZQUEZ. for places like Massachusetts
Ms. BAIR. I think for low- and moderate-income families, this is
a huge issue. And I think, what is a meaningful downpayment for
a lower-income person can be very different from what a meaningful downpayment is for those with other means.
The question is, how do we meet those needs?
And I think, again, my view is that with the 5 percent risk retention, you will have a robust market that will have prudent but
more flexible underwriting standards to meet that swath. And, of
course, we have the continuation of FHA programs.
Ms. VELAZQUEZ. Thank you.
I would like to recognize Mr. Royce, from California, for 5 minutes for questioning.
Chairman Bair, let me first say that I think a lot of my colleagues here have been pretty impressed over time with the
straightforward way that you respond to questions. It is not always
the rule around here.
Second, let me just say that I have laid out for you the arguments that I think are made by the studies that there is this 88
basis point advantage, this presumption that is out there
Ms. BAIR. There is.
Mr. ROYCE. in terms of the systemically significant firms.
And I think that the studies of the FDIC show the same relative
Ms. BAIR. They do, absolutely.
Mr. ROYCE. magnitude.
So to go back to the markup or the conference committee, I put
forward several amendments to try to overcome this tendency. One
in particular required the FDIC to estimate at the outset of the
resolution process what creditors would have received in bankruptcy and limit payment to bankruptcy less a haircut of 20 percent, which would act as sort of an insurance mechanism against
future write-downs.
If following the resolution process under that scheme there were
additional funds, then the FDIC would have the authority to pay
back all or part of that 20 percent premium. But I thought that
might solve out in the market this presumption.
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Let me go through the two arguments I made during the conference committee. We didnt carry this argument, but I think it
still holds true.
First, there is this strong presumption that the regulators are
going to err on the side of bailouts, especially for the most interconnected and largest firms that will likely get preferential treatment through the resolution process.
With this understanding, creditorsand we are talking especially here about short-term creditors. Those creditors, by the way,
are going to be considered essential under the FDICs proposed
rule, right?
So they are going to know that lending to these large complex
financial firms, subject to the resolution authority, is basically riskfree or it is very close to that, because if these firms fail, creditors
are going to be made immediately whole or very close to whole.
And as a result, these firms are going to be able to borrow more
cheaply. They are going to grow even larger. They are going to become more significant, systemically significant. And that is going to
compound the too-big-to-fail problem.
Now, there is a second problem also that arises. And that, to go
back to it again, is the claw-back provision. Once that money is out
the door to creditors, it is going to be very difficult to recover. And
I think that is, again, why you see this basis point difference, bankruptcy over here for these firms versus resolution authority for the
large one.
It is not hard to foresee a situation where a recently bailed-out
creditor strongly argues that handing over these sums may jeopardize their unstable firm. And this is an argument that regulators, having just bailed out these same creditors in the name of
preserving financial stability, may find very difficult to resist.
Additionally, there is no guarantee that a given creditor will be
able to pay back the difference between the advances and what
they would have received in bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy
Code and under this mandate.
So, I am just going to go to the Dallas Fed President, Richard
Fisher, who recently said this about these arguments that I have
made in the past: A credible big bank resolution process that imposes creditor losses will be difficult to enforce, especially when
regulators are explicitly directed to mitigate disruptions to the financial system, as they are in the reform bill.
So I understand that you believe regulators need broad authority
to handle a crisis, but I think that the unintended consequences
here have to be considered. And if we were to look to tightening
the language while working with the resolution authority mechanism, are there steps we can take to minimize the potential for
abuse down the road? And the argument, the amendment I made
earlier, does that hold water with you? Is there a way to get at
that?
Ms. BAIR. So, a couple of things.
We are all for tightening as much as we can. We do not want
bailouts. We want market discipline back.
As deposit insurer, there is obviously moral hazard associated
with providing deposit insurance for these entities that have in-
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sured banks. So we need market discipline to complement the regulatory process as a weapon against excessive risk-taking.
So whatever we can do to tamp this down, believe me, we will
work with you.
We are trying to do a lot of this through regulation. We put a
rule out that basically said that if you hold debt with a term over
a year, forget it, there will never be any differentiation. Please do
not interpret that to mean that if you hold debt with a term less
than a year, you are going to get it, because you are not. Shortterm creditors are very much subject to loss absorption.
I think one of the advantages of the government being able to
provide liquidity is, for instance, if you had unsecured commercial
paper, you could haircut that. Even though you would lose the
funding, you replace it with government funding, and those creditors absorb the losses.
The presumption for the short-term creditors should be that they
are taking losses, too. Again, the only time I can see that wouldnt
happen is if the acquirer wanted to maintain those customer relations.
And you might then find that, for instance, with a derivatives
book. If they want to buy the failed institutions derivatives book,
maybe we dont need to impose losseseven if there are some
counterparties that are unsecured or undercollateralized. We find
that now with uninsured deposits.
But that is going to be a mathematical determination. Whatever
is going to maximize recoveries, that is what we will do.
So I do think we want it narrow. The statute does have some significant limitations. We are trying to tighten those even more with
regulation. I am happy to look at language and talk with you about
this further.
Believe me, there is no entity more so than the FDIC that wants
to end too-big-to-fail.
Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Chairman Bair.
Chairwoman CAPITO. Mr. McHenry, from North Carolina, for 5
minutes.
Mr. MCHENRY. I thank the Chair.
And, Chairman Bair, thank you so much for being here. I echo
Mr. Royces comments. I appreciate your forthrightness. I know you
have testified many times during your government service. And we
thank you for your service.
I wanted to ask you, based on something you had in your written
statement, the Dodd-Frank Act, you said, if properly implemented,
will not only reduce the likelihood of future crises, but will provide
effective tools to address large company failures when they do
occur without resorting to taxpayer-supported bailouts or damaging
the financial system.
I think we would like to believe that we wont have future taxpayer bailouts. Many of us have concerns that, as constructed, it
still leaves that door open. And I think that is Mr. Royces point.
But we look at the breakneck pace of rulemaking, and you see
regulators in many respects overwhelmed with the volume and the
pace.
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Ms. BAIR. Right.
Mr. MCHENRY. Do you have concerns about the pace and the
quality of the rulemaking?
Ms. BAIR. I think from the FDICs perspective, we are comfortable with it. We did not have the huge number of rulemakings
that the SEC and the CFTC did. So I think we feel like we are proceeding at a reasonable pace. And for anything major, we are giving 60-day comment periods.
And so I think, at least from the FDICs perspective, we are comfortable with implementation so far.
I do understand, especially in the derivatives area, some of the
market regulation issues. There is a lot being done there at once.
Frankly, there were a lot of problems, especially with the derivatives oversight.
So I think the rulemaking needs to continue. Whether perhaps
some sequencing could be done, that might have some merit. But,
on the other hand, it is important to continue to proceed. And I do
think the market needs to understand that at some point these
rules will be in place.
And I think, frankly, they need that to adapt as well. Markets
can be very resilient. Once they know what the rules are, our financial sector is pretty good at complying with them and figuring
out how to do it.
But, some sequencing might well have some merit.
Mr. MCHENRY. What about harmonization?
Ms. BAIR. I think we are doing a pretty good job there, even on
the international front. I know you hear different things from
some. The FSOC is still getting its sea legs, but I think it is forcing
all of us to get together and talk regularly and have our staffs talk
regularly.
And so I think there has been a good deal of harmonization, including on the international front. I think we have made a lot of
progress in harmonizing international capital standards. In addition to resolution authority, I cant overemphasize the need for
strong capital buffers.
So I think there has been some good work on harmonization, and
we should continue to focus on that. But I know there is concern
about treatment of commercial end users in the derivatives rules.
And we are talking with each other about that.
I do think, though, it may be that at some times you want some
differentiation among end users. For instance, you are probably
going to want more risk aversion with an insured bank than you
are with an entity that is completely outside the safety net.
So there may be some reasons for differentiation. But I think we
are working hard at harmonization.
Mr. MCHENRY. You mentioned two things that are of interest,
this international harmonization
Ms. BAIR. Right.
Mr. MCHENRY. Basel III, ensuring sort of an international
level playing field.
Ms. BAIR. Right.
Mr. MCHENRY. You also mentioned capital standards. I hear a
lot from my community banks about their concern about
Ms. BAIR. Right.
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Mr. MCHENRY. raising capital standards. And I understand
there is a balance here. We want to make sure that we have safety
and soundness. But we also want to ensure lending and economic
recovery.
Are you wrestling with that? Do you believe that is
Ms. BAIR. I
Mr. MCHENRY. Do you weigh that when you are going through
this process?
Ms. BAIR. You do need to weigh it. But I think the primary focus
has been with large institutions capital requirementgetting that
sector to deleverage.
And I think, back to the earlier point Congressman Royce was
making about funding differentials, if you have higher capital
standards, since capital is more expensive than debt, that will not
only provide a better buffer for loss absorption, but it will help differentiate funding costs, or reduce the differentiation in funding
costs.
So I think the capital discussions have been targeted primarily
at the larger institutions. There have been a few issues with smaller institutions holding companies, regarding the quality of capital.
A lot of the holding companiesnot the banks; it is not allowed
for banksuse something called trust preferred securities that
ended up to not have loss-absorbing capacity in the crisis. And I
know there have been some concerns there. That is really the only
capital issue relating to small institutions.
Mr. MCHENRY. My time is short, but I want to ask you about the
QRM. I think that private mortgage insurance should be a part of
this to ensure a lower downpayment and an insured product that
should be a part of the QRM. Can you comment on that?
Ms. BAIR. Again, that is out for comment. My only caution on
thatI started worrying when the government was relying on credit rating agencies, for instance.
And so then we say, we will have better standards, review standards, if there is a private sector mortgage insurer. We need to
know, who are the mortgage insurers? How well are they regulated? How good are their resources if we get into a down cycle?
I think those are the things really to think about. And mortgage
insurance can be a good product, but do we want demand for it
driven by markets or driven by regulations, giving them an extra
penny, frankly, for having a lower downpayment.
I know you care about the markets the way I do. I think that
may be the trade-off that we should think hard about.
Mr. MCHENRY. Thank you.
Mr. Duffy for 5 minutes.
Mr. DUFFY. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Good morning, Chairman Bair.
Was it you who said that you thought that consumer protection
and safety and soundness were two issues on the same side of the
coin?
Ms. BAIR. Right. Yes, it was me.
Mr. DUFFY. Why is that?
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Ms. BAIR. I think because consumer abuses generally will end up
costing banks money. Mortgages are the prime example for any financial institution, not just banks. Mortgages are a prime example.
Banks and other entities were making loans that the consumers
couldnt affordand more of it was done outside of the banks.
Eventually, the loans defaulted and a lot of losses occurred. So it
didnt help the consumer. It didnt help the financial institution either.
Mr. DUFFY. And so when we see these two going together, and
we want to make sure our consumers are protected and treated
fairly, and they are engaging in transactions that are transparent.
And we also want banks to be profitable, and make sure that they
are not going under.
Do you have a concern when we separate consumer protection
from safety and soundness? I think it was Mr. Renacci who commented that in the mission statement of the CFPB, there is no reference to safety and soundness.
Ms. BAIR. Right.
Mr. DUFFY. Does that give you some pause or some concern? Or
are you okay with the oversight that comes from FSOC? It has
been a political issue.
Ms. BAIR. Right.
Mr. DUFFY. And I dont meanI dont want to
Ms. BAIR. No, I know. Yes, we support the consumer agency.
There were different iterations of its structure early on in the process, but we support the final outcome.
We think it is a positive thing, actually, that the consumer bureau will be on our board, because that will provide additional
interaction to make sure that safety and soundness and consumer
protection are considered together.
That will work both ways, too, I think.
Mr. DUFFY. But it is not on the CFPB.
Ms. BAIR. I am sorry?
Mr. DUFFY. The CFPB doesnt have that consideration for safety
and soundness
Ms. BAIR. Right. We are all for reciprocity.
But, given that, we are fine with how the Dodd-Frank Act came
out. And I do think it is important to understand, for the rule-writing piece of this, that has always been separate from the examination and enforcement process.
Mr. DUFFY. But if you look at theI know you have talked about
reciprocity. And you really dont have reciprocity, but for your
FSOC, right, to review the rules that are coming from the CFPB.
Ms. BAIR. Right.
Mr. DUFFY. And one of my concerns is that the standard is so
high. You need 7 out of 10 votes
Ms. BAIR. Right.
Mr. DUFFY. to overturn a rule from the CFPB. And the Director is one of the voting members. So it is really seven out of nine.
Ms. BAIR. Right.
Mr. DUFFY. It is incredibly high. And the risk there, it has to be
systemic risk. We are talking about playing Russian roulette with
our economy.
Ms. BAIR. Right.
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Mr. DUFFY. I introduced a bill that would reduce the requirement
to just a simple majority, and take the director off, a 54 majority
of some pretty significant folks who sit on FSOC.
Ms. BAIR. Right.
Mr. DUFFY. And we talked about reducing the standard that if
the rule was inconsistent with the safe and sound operation of
United States financial institutions, it could be overturned.
Do you think that is reasonable that we have a little different
standard in how we can coordinate consumer protection with safety
and soundness?
Ms. BAIR. There are a lot of things about the Dodd-Frank Act
that all of us would have written differently. At the end of the day,
it was a compromise product.
But we can support the final product. I think it can work.
Mr. DUFFY. But can we improve upon it?
Ms. BAIR. Sorry?
Mr. DUFFY. Can we improve upon it?
Ms. BAIR. I fear you are going to draw me into a situation
where
Mr. DUFFY. I will be gentle with you.
Quickly, I am from a more rural district, with all community
banks and credit unions. We dont have big Wall Street banks in
my district.
And I hear this nonstop from my local bankers. They are talking
about how they are crushed by so many rules and so many regulations, and the impact that it has on them, as they say, Listen, we
dont have the ability to diversify this cost over a large base. And
you make me hire a lawyer or a compliance officer
Ms. BAIR. Yes.
Mr. DUFFY. and our costs go up. It makes it more difficult for
us to compete with bigger banks. Or sometimes they will go on,
We cant even stay in the market anymore. And that is the lifeblood of our economy.
Ms. BAIR. Right.
Mr. DUFFY. And this is nonstop coming from them. I dont know
if you are hearing the same thing or trying to figure out how can
we still be safe
Ms. BAIR. Right.
Mr. DUFFY. but still have rules that allow our local bankers,
who didnt have anything to do with the financial crisis, to do business.
Ms. BAIR. I think they have a point. I think every time you have
a new rule or a new compliance requirement for safety and soundness or a consumer requirement, the incremental costs of doing
that are going to be significantly higher than they are for a large
institution.
We can and should do a better job of taking that into account.
I have said this, and I will say it again; all the problems we have
had with servicing, and we have had a lot of them, but as near as
we can tell, these are problems of scale that affect the very large
servicers. So, we should have two tiers of regulation.
If there are going to be a lot of new rules for servicing, we dont
see a basis for layering all of that on the smaller banks as well.
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From a diversification standpoint, smaller banks have really been
relegated to specialty commercial real estate lenders.
We would love to see them diversify their balance sheets, start
doing more mortgages again or car loans or whatever.
But the regulatory barriers to getting back into those lines of
business may be an impediment.
And servicing is one example. I would love to see community
banks start making more mortgages again. I think they do a better
job with the customer.
So I am very sensitive to this. And I think we should look at
more structured, two-tiered regulation, because the issues are completely different
Mr. DUFFY. So that is something you are looking at?
Ms. BAIR. Absolutely. And we have an advisory committee on
community banking. They have given us a number of good ideas for
making regulations more effective and streamlined when it comes
to smaller banks.
When we do a FIL, we already, at the very top, say whether this
even applies to community banks or not. I require the staff to do
an analysis of community bank impact and why we need this to
apply to community banks.
We are looking at more automation, too, in the forms banks have
to fill out, putting those all on a system we have called
FDICconnect. So instead of doing a new form every year, they can
go in and update the old one.
So we are trying on a number of fronts to deal with this.
Mr. DUFFY. And I appreciate that, because, again, we hear that
from the community banks and the credit unions.
Ms. BAIR. Yes.
Mr. DUFFY. To get them to agree on some issues, it is pretty impressive. That interchange are two things that they will talk about.
And I appreciate you looking at that. Thank you.
And I yield back.
The Chairman has consented to go to a second round of questioning, if that isyou were consented upon.
And we are still going to be called for votes here in the next
probably 15 to 20 minutes.
So I will go ahead and start the second round, and I appreciate
you spending the time with us.
We had a recent hearing and we also had a discussion in the
markup for the bill for the CFPB on the differences or the interchangeability or not of safety and soundness and profitability for
banks.
One witness said that safety and soundness is used as a code
word by the institutions as profitability. And so by trying to reshape or reform maybe in the CFPB or something and using safety
and soundness, we were being accused of protecting the profits of
an institution.
And while a safe and sound bank may realize a profit, and I
think that is a good thing, a profitable bank is not necessarily safe
or sound.
Could you comment on this assertion in the interchangeability of
that and how you see those two different phrases differently?
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Ms. BAIR. I do think they areand I have said this throughout
my careertwo sides of the same coin. I think if a product does
not serve consumers or your customers long-term benefit, this is
going to be a product that eventually loses money for you and could
result in significant litigation exposure as well.
We certainly saw that with all the lax funding on mortgages. We
are seeing a lot of additional litigation on overdraft protection. So
I think having some sensitivity of good business practices for the
consumer side is important. Products that dont serve consumer
needs are eventually going to lose money.
They will probably default, or the customers will start abusing
them, or they could result in litigation exposure.
On the other hand, since these are insured banks, you need to
have a full analysis of changes, whether it is safety and soundness
or consumer protection, of how that is going to impact the financial
health of the institution, I would say, not the profitability.
And so I think both factors need to be weighed. But again, I
think with the consumer bureau needing to consult with the bank
regulators and also serving on our board, I think there are ways
now built into Dodd-Frank to facilitate that kind of communication
and consideration of those factors.
Chairwoman CAPITO. So, safe and sound consumer products will
in the long run, in your opinion, and I agree with this, bring about
a profitability for the institution?
Ms. BAIR. Sustainable profitability.
Chairwoman CAPITO. Yes. And I think that while there is a distinction between safety and soundness and profitability, I think
that, as you said, the unsafe product or the non-well research product or the one that takes it too far is eventually going to be a nonprofitable instrument for the institution.
My final question, we have talked a little bit about a commissionand I dont want to draw you into a big political argument
on that. But in looking at your own commission or corporation, you
serve as the chair. The vice chairyou have a vice chair. You have
an OCC, who is acting. We have no appointment there.
Ms. BAIR. Right.
Chairwoman CAPITO. We have the OCS, which is going to be
grandfathered out, or however, in July, no longer exist on July
21st.
We have the CPFB chair, but we dont have one. And I think I
wouldnt be stretching the imagination to say it is going to have to
beit cant be a Senate-confirmedit would be highly unlikely
that it would be Senate-confirmed because of the timing.
And then we have your independent director who has also is on
an expired term.
This really concerns me. We are losing your expertise and longevity and history. And I know you are not really going far, but in
all fairness to you and to the Corporation, this needs to live on.
Ms. BAIR. Right.
Chairwoman CAPITO. What are we going to do about it? I guess
for me, it is a political statement. I say to the President, get these
appointments out. Get them Senate-confirmed. Let us have some
stability here. Or we are going to end up innot a la la land kind
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of situation, but an ever-changing transitional situation where it
causes me concern.
Do you have concerns about that?
Ms. BAIR. I have profound concerns. I am frustrated that there
is not greater urgency and prioritization of this issue on the part
of the Administration, as well as on the part of the Senate.
And I am very worried about my agency. We could go down to
three or two board members after I leave.
There are some nominations in process. But the names are not
up yet. There are still some vacancies where, as far as I know, no
candidates have been vetted.
And so thank you for flagging that, because I think that this is
very urgent, when the financial system is healing, but it is not out
of the woods yet. There are a lot of unknown factors out there. We
need strong people in these jobs. And there are still reforms to be
implemented in a commonsense, effective way.
And you are right, having a two-member or three-member board
making these kinds of decisions is not a good thing.
Chairwoman CAPITO. Mrs. Maloney?
Mrs. MALONEY. Thank you.
And I thank you for raising your concern on having a Director
of the CFPB in place on July 21st. This is a grave concern to me
also.
The difficulty is that 44 Senators have signed a letter saying that
they will not confirm anyone unless bills that they want, that
passed out of this committee, and other policy positions that they
want such as moving the funding of the CFPB to the political appropriations process, which if we look at what happened to the
SEC and the CFTC, they were basically cut, making it more difficult for them to do their job.
So in other words, politicizing the funding of it. They said that
they would not confirm anyone. I believe this is a tremendous
abuse of the confirmation process, basically holding the entire Congress hostage, that you have to write legislation like we want.
In this case, not what I am saying, but roughly five or six major
editorial boards from the United States have said in their editorials, and good government groups and others have said, to remove it from politics or the Democratic and Republican perspective,
that these bills would gut, dismantle, disrupt, and destroy the
CFPB, the Consumer Financial Protection Agency.
So this is a huge problem. They basically have given the President no choice but to make an interim appointment because they
are saying they will have to gut the entire agency and make it basically a non-performing, toothless situation.
So I believe the CFPB has a role to play in protecting consumers.
Too often, consumers concerns were a second thought, a third
thought, or not thought about at all. And we maybe would have
been able to prevent the subprime crisis. I cant imagine any consumer agency approving products that the degree of probability
that they would end up on the street or hurting the family and the
overall finances of our country were greater than the mortgage
working them.
The joke in New York during this time was if you cant afford
your rent, go out and buy a house. It was so easy to get a mort-
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gage, a faulty mortgage, that became clogged in the system and
helped bring down the financial crisis that we had.
So we have a disagreement, a basic choice. It is a basic disagreement between the Republican Party and the Democratic Party. The
Democratic Party supports the CFPB. The Republican Party has
come forward with a series of bills that would dismantle, destroy,
and gut the CFPB.
And you have Republican Senators saying, We will not confirm
anyone unless you do exactly what we want, using it, taking hostage the entire legislative process to get what they want.
They have forced the President, really with no other choice, since
he supports the CFPB. And I would say the overwhelming majority
of the American people do. The American people would like someone looking at their loans, at their credit cards, at their student
loans, and making sure that they are fair; not giving anyone an advantage, but making sure that there is a fair playing field that consumers can understand what the terms are; that they are in plain
print out there for everyone to understand.
So we have a basic disagreement between the Republican and
Democratic Parties.
But I do want to address my questions to our distinguished guest
today in the area in which she has played such a fundamental role.
I would like to go back to the too-big-to-fail, which is a huge issue.
And I understand it is the next focus of the hearings we will be
having on this committee.
Some have argued repeatedly that the financial reform law, particularly the Orderly Liquidation Authority, perpetuates, rather
than eliminates, too-big-to-fail. So I would like to ask you, what is
your assessment of the allegation that the Authority perpetuates
too-big-to-fail?
Ms. BAIR. I do not believe it in any way perpetuates too-big-tofail. Too-big-to-fail was with us pre-crisis. It was reinforced by the
bailouts. And we need to end too-big-to-fail now.
And the Dodd-Frank Act gives us the tools to end it. It quite specifically bans the bailouts in language that we supported and wanted in.
So I think it is there. The tools are there. The clear legislative
intent is there. And I think, as I indicated in my testimony, implemented effectively, it will end too-big-to-fail.
Mrs. MALONEY. My final question, and my time is running out,
is which parts of the financial reform law do you think are the
most critical to ending too-big-to-fail?
Ms. BAIR. I think Title I and Title II, which gives us the Orderly
Liquidation Authority powers for systemic non-banks. We already
have it for banks. Title I is important, which requires the Fed to
impose higher prudential standards and particular capital requirements on larger entities, as well as requires, jointly with the FDIC,
living wills or resolution plans where they must demonstrate that
they are resolvable.
Mrs. MALONEY. I thank you for your testimony today. I thank
you for your distinguished service to our country.
And I thank you for your really nonpartisan response to questions and policies. I think you have done a magnificent job for our
country.
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Thank you.
Mr. Renacci, from Ohio?
Mr. RENACCI. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, again.
And Chairman Bair, I do want to thank you again for being here,
and your testimony, and your service to our country also.
The one question I asked before, several people have already
asked you, and I heard your answer. So I am going to move to another topic. And it regards the Orderly Liquidation Authority. I
know several times in your testimony today, you have talked about
how you believeor at least the impression I got was that you believe the FDICs authority over liquidation is better than bankruptcy.
Ms. BAIR. Yes.
Mr. RENACCI. There are a number of
Ms. BAIR. for financial institutions.
Mr. RENACCI. for financial institutions.
There are a number of people in the bankruptcy community who
believe that if the bankruptcy laws were changed, that bankruptcy
would be better.
Ms. BAIR. Right.
Mr. RENACCI. And I know a lot of it deals with derivatives and
making sure there is some timing on derivatives.
Can you give me some ideas or thoughts where you might believe
that bankruptcy would be better? Because one of the issues of
bankruptcies, of course, is that we are looking out for the creditors
as we wind things down. So I would like to hear your thoughts on
some things that could be changed in the Bankruptcy Code that
would actually make bankruptcy better.
Ms. BAIR. I think you are right. How derivatives are treated is
really very important. First of all, we would love to work with this
committee and the Judiciary Committee on this. We deal a lot with
bankruptcy courts because banks that we resolve are frequently
part of holding company structures that go into bankruptcy. So we
are quite familiar with some of the strengths and weaknesses of
the process.
I think how bankruptcy treats derivatives is a big problem. And
having the ability to require counterparties to continue to perform
on their derivatives contracts is important. Now they have the ability to terminate their contract and claim their collateral, which can
be quite disruptive and was a major factor in the disruptions that
surfaced with Lehman.
So we would love to work with the Congress to make bankruptcy
work better. For most of these financials companiesfor instance
CIT, we were opposed to any kind of bailout assistance for CIT. We
didnt think they were systemic. They werent. They went into a
bankruptcy process.
It was just fine. It was financial. They relied on a lot of shortterm funding through commercial paper, but they were the size
where their bankruptcy was not systemic. And bankruptcy worked
just fine. And I think there are ways to make bankruptcy work
even better.
For the larger entities, though, I think there will be a couple of
things that we can do that bankruptcy courts will never be able to
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do. First, we will be able to have a continuing on-site presence with
these entities. We will be able to plan.
We will have ongoing access to information about their
counterparty exposures and the concentration of their overseas operations. The bankruptcy court is just never going to be able to do
that.
Similarly, we will be able to pre-plan and work with the international regulatory community, as an institution becomes more
troubled, to find and identify any potential obstacles to resolving
our domestic entity if they have foreign operations.
We do that now. We resolved banks with international operations.
We had a West Coast bank that owned branches through a subsidiary in China and Hong Kong. Several months in advance, we
contacted the regulatory authorities there. We identified what we
needed to do to make sure there was a smooth sale in our receivership process.
And we did. We were able to keep the branches and subsidiary
in Asia open. We got the regulatory approvals for the new buyer
to take the failed bank.
So it is hard to see how the bankruptcy court could ever engage
in that kind of bilateral international coordination in the event of
a failure, or be involved in pre-planning.
Finally, we can provide immediate liquidity support, which can
be very important to maintaining franchise value. They have debtor-in-possession financing mechanisms in bankruptcy, but generally those cannot be done immediately the way liquidity support
can be provided by the FDIC.
Mr. RENACCI. Thank you.
I yield back.
Chairwoman CAPITO. I am going to take the liberty and ask a
question before I go to Mr. Carney, real quick, to piggyback on his
question.
When you say you can provide immediate liquidity support, is
that through the ability to go to the Treasury?
Ms. BAIR. That is. Under the bill, yes. For banks, we have the
Deposit Insurance Fund that we use. But yes, for non-banks, it
would be through the credit with Treasury. Yes.
Chairwoman CAPITO. And I think that is where the rub is, really,
in terms of the perception. Because if you
Ms. BAIR. I think that is right.
Chairwoman CAPITO. if you can go to the Treasury, you are
going to the taxpayer.
Ms. BAIR. Right.
Chairwoman CAPITO. And can you help with that distinction?
Ms. BAIR. Again, we wanted a pre-funded reserve, and that
passed the House, but didnt pass the Senate. But I do think it is
very important to emphasize that any funds that are provided
through that Treasury line are paid back and have priority over everything else. As assets are sold, they are paid off the top.
I cant believe there would ever be any losses on that because you
are not guaranteeing any liabilities for the non-bank institutions.
So whatever assets are sold, those recoveries go to Treasury first.
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And if in the unlikely event there would be losses, there would
be an assessment on the industry, just the way we assess now for
deposit insurance.
So I really think there are a lot of safeguards against taxpayers
ever taking exposure on this. And I would say in turn, the fact that
the industry would have to pay for any losses if that would occur,
in and of itself will create industry pressure against any creditor
differentiation, because they will know that if the receiverwe
would never do this anywaybut if the receiver started trying to
show favoritism, those losses would be assessed against the industry. And there will be a lot of industry pressure not to do that.
Chairwoman CAPITO. Mr. Carney, from Delaware.
Mr. CARNEY. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I am happy to
yield any time you might need.
Chairman Bair, thank you again. I have been really enjoying the
hearing this morning. And I want to reiterate the comments that
my colleagues have made on both sides of the aisle about your candor and straightforward answers. We dont always get that.
And I think it has a positive effect on the Members and the questions they ask, by the way, as well.
You said a minute ago that you thought the financial system was
healing, but not out of the woods yet. Could you expand a little bit
on that?
Ms. BAIR. Yes. I think they are still working some troubles out.
Loan volume is down. And, again, I think there may too much
risk aversion with some banks, but I think there is also a lack of
borrower demand. And banks need to make loans to make money.
That is what they are supposed to be doing with their funds, and
that is what they need to do to make money.
I think, longer term, as I have said in testimony and as I said
in an op-ed last November, I think we are worried about the fiscal
situation. We are in a very low-interest-rate environment and have
been for some period of time.
That means there are more low-interest assets on banks balance
sheets. And even though the maturities have been shortening, obviously banks are heavily exposed to interest-rate volatility because,
particularly, their liabilities are shorter than their assets.
So I think anything that would undermine confidence in the fiscal strength of the United States Government could have an adverse, potentially volatile impact on interest rates.
And so we are very much worried about that and hope very much
that these discussions can produce a long-term deficit reduction
plan.
Also, as I mentioned in my testimony, we are not out of the
woods with the housing market yet, either.
Mr. CARNEY. Yes, that was my next, kind of, line of questioning.
You said that we need to get mortgagesmortgage lending going
on. What are the barriers there?
I hear, as I said a minute ago, from my bankers and from borrowers that the regulators are tightening down, not allowing them
to make those loans.
Ms. BAIR. Actually, I think I would put more of a priority on
business lending and small business lending. I think certainly
mortgages and housing is an important part of our economy, but
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I think we need to accept, going forward, it will be a smaller part
of our economy
Mr. CARNEY. Right.
Ms. BAIR. and probably needs to be. It got bloated and overheated. But I do think ultimately, there needs to be a GSE exit
strategy. We know that model didnt work. And I think
Mr. CARNEY. Do you have a view on what model might work?
Ms. BAIR. I think what we have said is that it is really outside
my portfolio to
Mr. CARNEY. That is okay. There are just a few of us here now.
Ms. BAIR. I will say this. I think it could go one way or the other.
Regarding this hybrid model where you had a private for-profit
shareholder-return-driven entity with an implied government backstopproviding this government support was absolutely the wrong
model. What you got was the privatization of gains and the socialization of losses.
So going forward, I would say if you are going to continue to
have government support, make it explicit; charge for it up front,
the way we do at the FDIC. Make sure it is actuarially sound, in
terms of what is being charged for the credit support. And make
that explicit.
These implicit backstops
Mr. CARNEY. Explicit and narrower?
Ms. BAIR. Explicit the way the FDIC charges insurance premiums for deposit insurance. If you are going to be guaranteeing
mortgages, have the government determine the amount and charge
a guarantee fee that accurately reflects risk. Yes. Or get out, one
way or the other.
Mr. CARNEY. And so, what aboutthere was some back-and-forth
about lending standards.
Ms. BAIR. Right.
Mr. CARNEY. What is your view of that? Twenty percent is a
huge
Ms. BAIR. Again, Congressman
Mr. CARNEY. I dont see how that works.
Ms. BAIR. That is supposed to be the exception, not the rule.
There are mortgages out there with 20 percent downpayments,
but that is meant to be a niche exception to the general rule that
if you are going to securitize mortgages, you need to retain 5 percent of the risk.
So the QRM standard is a way to get around the 5 percent risk
retention. If you retain 5 percent risk, you have a lot of flexibility
on the underwriting side.
Mr. CARNEY. Okay.
What sounds reasonable to you, in terms of the downpayment
or
Ms. BAIR. I think it is a combination of factors. Clearly, with a
borrower with a strong credit history, with a low debt-to-income,
there may be other flexibilities that you can provide. And we provide that with banks now, with portfolio lending.
I think you need to have some downpayment. I dont want to
Mr. CARNEY. Let me squeeze one more question in. I only have
a short amount of time.
Ms. BAIR. Sure.
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Mr. CARNEY. It is about credit agencies. You mentioned credit
agencies. Do you have a view of what we should be doing there?
Ms. BAIR. I think that one thing we are doing is getting rid of
all references to credit rating agency ratings in our regulation.
That is required by the Dodd-Frank Act. Pre-Dodd-Frank, we had
already started telling banks that they needed to do their own
independent analysis of the creditworthiness of the securities they
invest in. They cant rely just on the ratings.
We used to use ratings for our deposit insurance assessments.
We have gotten rid of that. So I think that has been in process for
some time.
If you are not using credit ratings, what are you going to replace
them with?
And so, that is really the hard question. And I dont think we
have figured that out yet.
Mr. CARNEY. Thanks very much.
Ms. BAIR. Sure.
Chairwoman CAPITO. Thank you. This concludes our hearing.
The Chair notes that some members may have additional questions
for this witness which they may wish to submit in writing. Without
objection, the hearing record will remain open for 30 days for members to submit written questions to this witness and to place her
responses in the record.
Again, thank you so much
Ms. BAIR. Thank you.
Chairwoman CAPITO. for, I think, a very productive hearing
today. Good luck to you. And we appreciate, again, your great service to our country.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:41 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
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APPENDIX
May 26, 2011
(45)
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Fdic Oversight: Examining and Evaluating The Role of The Regulator During The Financial Crisis and Today

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FDIC OVERSIGHT: EXAMINING

AND EVALUATING THE ROLE OF

SUBCOMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES

MAY 26, 2011

Printed for the use of the Committee on Financial Services

Serial No. 11234

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

VerDate Nov 24 2008

11:26 Sep 01, 2011

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES

BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts, Ranking

LARRY C. LAVENDER, Chief of Staff

VerDate Nov 24 2008

11:26 Sep 01, 2011

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia, Chairman

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York,

VerDate Nov 24 2008

11:26 Sep 01, 2011

VerDate Nov 24 2008

11:26 Sep 01, 2011

Hearing held on:

Luetkemeyer, Hon. Blaine:

VerDate Nov 24 2008

11:26 Sep 01, 2011

VerDate Nov 24 2008

11:26 Sep 01, 2011