..

-'
!.1ift

THE ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

COlVlJ\lANDER
FRANK H. SCHOFIELD, U. S. N.

RECEIV
AT Trn:

s u !\1 ~IE R c 0

I" FER

I:~~:OEPARTMENT

U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

Newport, R. I.
June, 1912.

1
THE ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

Lecture D elivered by

AT THE

SUMMER

CONFERENCE

U. S. N A\' AL \V AR COLLEGE

Newport, R. I.
June, 1912.

BUI"\t; U 0~ '"'l;' - _.) .

: CCOUNTS

The Estimate of the Situation.

Lecture No. I
In tl1t.! pHJl4!r (Ill TrnininJ,! fl)r ".,.nr <:ornmnnO un ntttmpt \\aq
of th_, estimate of thP 'i111utiou to tbe
.CIWt'lll 1<,:(11t'Ult or h'A.ining. It is a mt>tbnd hf Uflp)~inr knowltd~t u11d juclJ(nu:nt LO toncretc situationR
It i~oe n nnturnl mthocl out ""'''tl lttJ<on!';(ion:-.1,\ in ewr~ t.la_y lifi. A sil nnl ion nriss re~)uieiu" lUtiou. "''' d~de whu.t tht.t situntion Jrqnirtl(, \Ve
tl1iuk or whnt diOicu ltit..., ha''t.:l to b ... cwereomt", whnt wny~ we
uuu.lt~ 10 dJO\\ tlw nJnhou

IHW~

trud<.

or

()\'(t'COIII in~

tlwm. autl fmaUy how we

\\ill ~'1,

nhout.

1 h~

ru this i tho "hoi~ prOI'cos. of tlw Etimntc nl' tl"' !'ihw-

tion. For

t'XlltuJ)]t 1 -

:\ifun/um

rnur Jllb
Ditf'fllll"'

Your lUll hns blO\\U pf'f.

To g~~t tht bat.
Hat is rtllliug- a.ltlUl! tllt' .rrmuul UWU> rrom
~Hu. ~t01).., o,tWiir.uall.v. thtu ttOt~ nn . Ev..
t-ntually it '' 1l1 hring up.
Yon mar walk uft~r ot, hut \\ill J>ruhably
haw a t-onsidorabl~ walk nnol \\ill I"'" tiu....
)fay )USl- thl' hat . Y nu tun~ M4uc1 a. hoy t"
run aftr it. You tlon'l ...,. IMY urul ran not wait for ont". You tn8\' run nftt-r it.
~cnuself This i..;: tll"' snrtst 'wn, nncl ...a.Yt'~
tillle.

~o-

Yuu flttid
1<1 ntn aitor tht lull you,...<lf.
Ht.rt~ is tJ mllhml or rt'8SOIIiug. It !olhlllc.l"\ till' ttst of (vrrytln.)'
ljf(\ Jt. hfl!l; Hlc)Od th~ ttst in pell~C' time t1aiuiUJ.( rcu Wtll" (Ommnntl,
for u ('tntury. II iM. su far as we kuuw, llll" mtt b(.ft/ wtty or CJU\ln
in.iug u wtu )'.it uutiou. h. is NC) far a~ wt know tht. Oihl I.WH.!t wny of

inn.,.tigutiug onilitnry J>rubltlll!<. l<'or lht pro..,nt w~ will stick

to tiJi methotl Tn thi~ paper an elfor-t will I """"' to rl..erihe
tho moUtod. Th" hn.' bet>n cion~ in oth,r )'flint nnol 111 ul her pAJI'
f'l"S
\\t BTl' fj11it~ ntw tn this particuhlr ronn or trnining. 'Yo
leant a littlt oa<h year n!Jout th~ methods invnlv.-1 nnol thoir ap
pliontioo. To Lriug tudt branch of tbo ,ubjo'<'t up to tlat< we
makto U*" ur tlW rfrurl~ Of utl.u:rs ;mc.J ;l<ld our hWil ttfort to tlhil""Th~ fir-.t J)OJW.r (lfl tht E~timatt or th .. ~ihmtlon prt"'4:JHnl In "
~unmwr ('oufN,ut wus pnpart'(l by Ccumnamltr )harhl(! und rt>ru.J
to th ('uofer.-n or l!!llJ. The
PJl:r WM prtpArt<l hy
C.ornm.andtr Vt)l!thn-...nug 1mc1 read to th~ Cnnfrtlli't of l!Jl 1.
Thi latt<-r pnpor \Ill.' slightly r~YtS<'<I and eonsi<l<'rnhly Amplithl
I:L'>t WIT11tr Tt uow fonn)\ Hw fl.rst 21 pn~ts cf 1'4turts uu tht
.\,pplientOI1' HyMh'nt or Solving War Problem. woth lhnmple
!:>bowing th< ,\tlnptntin" or th~ l-;ystt'm to :-!twnl Probl<ms." llot.h
or Hll~e JliiiWI'Iol llfl\'t hNH fJC'r.Jy 11NN1 in tlw (H't 1f)JI I'Utinn or I hit-~
ptlftC"J". ' J'Iu uwlltoc1 dt.:Kribt<l in thO$ purtrM i~ Ow nu.tl hu~l tll'.seriho.t in this Jlll~t'l'.

"''''>0"

.. \n J.:.~ttinwtt u/ Uu Situulhm iR tht't lof;!irtll Jn"UC'ft4s nt' thought

11 tonrr.1 tt pr'ohlt-m lr:uls tn n tltHnih1 dw1~iuu.

whi,h npplwtl tn

'l'he Estimat<' of a :\IilitaQ' Situation imoives a thorough study

from th<> commanders point of viC\\, of all the conditions affecting
the situation. This study is made, according to the method prescribed, tmder three heads as follows:
(1)

The Mission.

(2) Enemy Porces.

able Intentions.

Their Strength, Disposition, and Prob-

( 3)
Our Own Forces. Their Strength.Disposition, and Course
Open to 'Gs.
The stud,\ of the situation culminates in,

(4 )

The Decision.

A problem that is presented must be studied until the situation it

describes is thoroughly realizrd.
The data given in the statem<'nt of the problem is lmown to the commander whose estimate
and Olders eonstitute the first requirements of the problem.
The problem solvrr must imagine himself that commander. lie
should picture on the chati the situation that confronts him. the
forces and their disposition. Pins and pieces of colorcd blotting
paper ar<> useful for his purpose.
He must study distances, local
(onditions tinH' of year, relation of the area of the problem to the
t~Pater of war,
and above all h<> must slndy his instructions. ~\ll this is preliminary to ih<' dctermination of missiou. All
this must hr done with care for there is no sure1 aid to 1he <'xec:ution of a military task than a clear (onception and an rqually
clear statrmcnt of what that task is. f{ome may consid<'t this uuIlPCCssary. that no one is apt to misconeeive his mission ot he led
astray in its execution throu~h nr~lect to definitely and roncisely
state that mission to himself. l~xperience has shown that th'e
stat~ment of a ptohlcm to men whose strategic and ta<'tieal ideas
have not b<.'cn coordinated b.\ training will result in marked dir
ersity in the statements of thr missw11.
I thm,;e is not uniformity in the dcteemination of the mission there will he wide diversity
of decisions.
'Ve are " orking for unity of action. If the statement of the
same prohlPm to all can provoke tlw same statemrnt of mission
fro~n each. thrn wp have taken a sure and n ecessat>y step to\rard
llllll!J of action.
Given a situation we will then all have the
:-;ame tmder:-;tanding of tho task that situation imposes.
liow shall we arriw at uniformit.\' in the statenwnt of the
11Hssw11.
Th<> first sttp is a clear comprehension of instructions.
TI::.ually tlw mission flows dirr C'tly from instructions or Ot'd<'rs of a
superior . Those ordrrs may he c1uite g<'neral and may leave much
to subordinate initiative.
In such a ca<;p tlw mis:sio11 is thr task imposed by thr situation
as a nccessar_\' :-;tep in the accomplishment of the general mission
laid down in instru<-tions. The Jfi.~sion in any Estimate of the
Situation is tlw ta~k whieh must he undertaken to m<'c1 that situation. It is uot the task whieh vou think may lun-e to h nudertaken lat"r nor does it comprehe;1d that task. It leads up to and
makes ready fol' tlw ac:complislunrnt of other tasks indicated by
instructions and by the probable flow of ewnts. In wal' new in-

formation is constantly coming in. ::>ome information is so important that it clearly constitutes a new situation. A mission is then
determined which projects intention a eetiain distance into the
future. The mission will projeet into the future only so far as
the commander can be reasonably certain that events will not intrrpose to. provoke a change of mis~ion.
. .
It is 1mportant that the relahon between nusswn and orders
from snp<'riors be thoroughly grasped. EYery military sHua,
nation incident to a state of war derives its importance from its
relation to the war as a whole. The most sueeesful conduct of
war requires that each act of war be direct<'d towards the attainment of the object of the war. War is not simply :fighting, it is
fighting for the attainment of a definite purpose. Now since each
act of war should be in batmony with th,e general purpose it is
evident that there must be a supreme control to direct the a:cts'
war. This control is exercised by the Commander-in-Chief. lie
is congnizant of the general purpose,
lie plans the way that purpose is to attained.
liis- plan as.signs tasks to forcL's.
'!'he
success of his
plan dep<'nds in part on how intelli~<'ntly
his subordinates execute the portions of the plan alloted to
them. If they, on their o\Yn initiative, change their pati of the
plan the Commander-in-Chi<' then is no longer working with a
plan that is a whole but "ith several plans of parts. The plan of
the part may sn<ce<>d hut the suc<>ess may be 'vorthless brcause
it does not fit into the plan of the whole. The Jlission must normally be derived from the orders yon have received. Thcrr is
110lhing so important in 1rar as obediencr.
\Ve do not advise
mechanical obedience. .Ask :first ''What was my superiors in-tention regarding this order? What may have been his vi<'ws on
this subject? What information did he baYC when the order was
issued? what additional information haYe I now 1 liow would
this irlforma.iion have affeH<'d my superiors order?'' It is only
thus tha't dead met1lanical obedience is avoidNl and active cibNlien~e combined with initiative is produced.
Thei'e 'is another point that comes in here that is discussed by
Ingc>lfingen as follows:
:cIt is never a good thing in war to criti-:
cise the measures of superior authorities not even quietly in your
own mind, because you cannot place yourself in their positions.
In war all orders from superior authority should be considered as
decrees of fate, like rain and sunshine. day and night, ~md no
other thought should be given them than how to execute the h:!st and
hOw to und~rstand the intentions of superiors in the most ('0111lete manner. Criticism is apt to spoil your pleasme and k<>tnness
in your work and besides is useless because in your position it cannot be wrll founded . . . . . . . . . . . . at a later time when
history lays bare all ewnts of war the motives which influ<'nced
supl'riots in designing th<'ir measures . . . . . . . . . . may b<' stndied
fo r self improvement and made the subject of independent reflection.''
r
liaving determined the mission and clearly fixed it in onr minds
as the guide of all our efforts we must next investigate the (lifficul-

of

ties that will oppose the accompllshmPnt or the m!SSIOII. This investigation is recorded under the heading ''Enemy Polcc-Thei1
Strrngfh, Disposition, and Pr1Jbablc Intention,~.''
l'nder this
heading in problem sohing it is not necessary to repeat the information given in the problem but rather to state the deductions and
inferences from such information. In problem work the information of the enemy given in problem is usually the information
that the problem maker, regarded as reasonable. It is sometimes the degree of information calculated to develop the motive
of the problem,
In actual war information is always incomplete,
often inaccurate, sometimes entirely lacking. It has to be sifted,
weighed, tested to establish its reliability.
Information of the enemy is important, but an estimate of
his information of us is also important. The initiative is largely a matter of information. If we know and he does not know,
that is one thing, if we know and he knows too, that is quite another thing. A Problem Solver must therefore consider all he knows
of the enemy, and then record all his deductions and inferences
concc.>rning the enemy.
The attitude to adopt throughout the solution of the problem is
one of determination to find out. The considerations should be
arranged so that each one, once determined forms a necessary step
in a complete survey of the situation. The estimate is not for the
purpose of justifying a decision previously arrived at. It is a
reasoned solution of a problem where each step in the process approaches a decision, which, without those steps could be arrived
at by accident only.
Although the part of the estimate now under discussion deals with
the enemy forces it will be found impracticable to omit here all
discussion of our own forces.
'l'he effort should be in this part of the estimate, to arrive at
the enemy's point of view, to think as he would think of us, to consider all the plans that he would consider, and to estimate which of
those plans would be most injurious to us. This is the most difficult part of the estimate. The intentions of the enemy are frequently not divined. Clauswitz said:- "There are always only
three eases possible, and: when all these have been 'P-rovided for, the
fourth invariably happens."
Wellington said:- ' The great thing
is to know from this side of the hill what the enemy is doing on
the other."
It will not be possible in most cases to arrange the appropriate
reply for all the possible intentions of the enemy. But all courses
of the enemy should nevertheless be carefully considered to avoid being taken by surprise. The strategist must always be ready
with a remedy for a new situation but he will rarely issue tlw remedy until the situation arises. On., must endeavor never to be
caught in a situation that has not be<'n forseen and considered as
a possibility. It is only by a thorough and pains taking consideration of the enemy's possible intentions that surprise can be
avoided. .Anyone familar with military history knows the great
moral value attached to surprise.

The third step in the estimate deals with om own forces and is
recorded tmder the heading "Our Own Forces, their Strength, Disposition and Gowses Open to Them." Here again it is not necessary to repeat the data of the problem but rather the deductions
from the data as applied to our nwn view point of our own forces.
There should be a thorough examination of the courses of action
open to us. This examination of courses should not be made as of
courses of action in the abstract, but as courses of action related to
an active enemy ready to profit by our errors.
Each course of action should be clearly outlined and definitely
considered. No cowt'le of action should be considered that is not
calculated to attain the mission. Having clearly outlined a course
of action, examine it. Does it accord with the mission T What is
its prospects of succc.>ss? What will be the penalty of failure T
Does it build for the future 1 Is it what the enemy will expect f
Arrangements for the sure attainment of the mission are of
first importance, then for an attainment of the mission that will
bring the maximum ultimate profit.
It is convenient to examine
the different courses of action in what may at first appear their
oroer of merit. When all reasonable courses of action have been
examined and weighed one of the courses of action is decided upon.
This is called the decision.
The decisio1~ is the way adopted to attain the mission. It comprehends a definite plan for the immediate future. The decision
should not project plan so far into the future as to muke a change
in orders a probable ne<'essity. Change in orders are almost
invariably injurious.
The decision should be such that
''Once reached must be unwaveringly carried out with our whole
energy.'' Buddecke says this conidition, this unwavering execution of decision, "is of so great importance in tactical affairs that
the best course of action, if carried out half heartedly, will come to
naught. while a mistake in the choice of course can often be entirely
offset by decided and confident action."
The decision must not, betray indecision. The decision is the
basis of oders to be written to subordinates. Those orders must
show resolution.
"Resolution is not a heaven-sent gift. It is a
quality of mind, the product of keen desire to perfom a certain act,
and the sure knowledge of how to accomplish it.''
lngelfing'en says "Indecision on the part of the Commander-inChief may quickly destroy the powers of the troops and render in
a short time the whole army unfit for battle.
Hence in war it is
better to undertake something with firm determination than to
vacillate hither and thither, order counter order, disorder. In war
we should adhere to what we see to be good enough and not be led
astray by seeking for something better.''
Dodge says in his Life of Xapoeon,
"Many a general fails
by forgetting his first and better intention and in being led astray
by an unimportant gain to do what is not natural strategic sequence. A sense of proportion, of the relative value of things, is
one of the highest qualities in the captain as in every other workman.''
7

Captain Eltinge in his Psychology of War. says. "T_he le_a de

whose ideas are not clearly d~fined and whose mtention 1s vaCillat
ing will get only half hearted action from his tro?ps, w~ile ~n th
other hand, a determined man who bas one clear 1dea, w1ll h1msel
be surprised to see how the troops respond.''
In the solution of problems as in the actual practice of war th
need of a ground work of sound military knowledge is constant!
experienced. If it happens that a strategic problem is presente
there is a demand for knowledge of strategic principles.
I
it is a tactical problem then tactical knowledge and experience are required! in its solution. The problems to be present-.
ed in this part of the summer course are principally of the strategic variety. 'l'hey deal with wide movements and extended areas.
It is quite natural, therefore for the beginner to feel that there
should be some guide to his first efforts in the field of strategy. It
is a simple matter to collect a long list of strategic maxims and
principles but after the list is completed there is always the difficulty of rightly applying these deductions from experience.
Captain Little, who has for many years been on duty here -at
the War College, is fond of telling us that a p1inciple applies when
it applies and it don't apply when it d()n't apply.
The point he makes is that we cannot apply an abstract strategic
or tactical principle in an abstract manner. 'Ye must gather in
the spirit of all the principles and from that extract an understanding that will be a sure guide in the exercise of judgement.
Lawyers say that nothing is so misleading as a legal ma."'l:im;
Corbett says ''a strategical maxim is in every way less to be trusted in action.'' Moltke in discussing the solution of a problem explained the application of principles as follows:- ''Strategy is not
of a kind like the abstract sciences.
These have their invariable
and precise truths upon which we can build, and from which we
can draw further conclusions. We read much in theoretical book
about th!e advantage of operating on interior lines. In spite of
that we must still ask ourselves in each case what at the moment is
the most advantageous. Strategy is the application of common
'l'he difficulty lies in its execution
sense to the conduct of war.
for in that we are dependent on an infinite number of factors. We
have to make the best practical use of the means at hand.''
In all of this work it is necessary to constantly bear irl mind that
its value lies not so much in the visible product of our labor as
in the training we gE>t while forging the product. .The gain to each
of us lies not in knowing what the acceptable solution is but in
the training and experience derived from solving the problem
Solutions may not agree with the so called acceptable solution and
still may be as good or better. If the acceptable solution were the
product of a master of war and were, therefore. presmnably the
best solutions possible, even then knowledge of those solutions
.would be valuable only after the problem had been solved independently. This knowledge would then enable us to compare the
best we each had done with the best that any one could do and to
see wherein we were at fault or had fallen short. This compari-

son would be a part of training, its value would lie in the guide
to better efforts it would afford.
'\e have not all the same degree of experience. So that eYen
if we each had acquired or were endowed with the same strategic
insight there would still : rE>main a difference. in the mer!t of solutions depending upon the extent of experience on whtch they
were based and the accuracy with which we had judged that experience.
In concluding this paper attention is earnestly called to the
posibilities for good that lie in the formal application of the principles of the Estimates of the Situation to the problems that present themselves daily to men of our profession. If each situation
presented in ordin~ry peac~ time procedure, were s~stm:naticall_y_
examined to determme the JOb and the method of domg 1t and 1f
that method were followed in spite of difficulties we would go far,
-we would make up in efficiency for at least a part of what we
fail to obtain in material. We all make effort, cYery man in the
Xavy makes effort, but is it the most effi.cient? If we each understood the general aim more thoroughly and the relation of our own
effort to the general aim more precisely, there would surely be
great improvement. It is not necessary to indicate specific instances where great improvement would result from a more formal adherence to this method of reasoning. These will occur to
each of us as we become more familiar ,dth the method and its
advantages.
The habit of mind induced by practicing the method of the
Estimate of the Situation is a scientific habit, one that compels
action to flow from reason, one that forbids the acceptance o opinion that is based solely on prestige.
One of the most important principles of the systrm is that there
is always a main task on which the principal effort must be dir
ected. This idea is not in opposition to a suitable distribution of
effort but emphasizes the importance of always keeping clenrly
in mind the main thing. Further, we find it is not enough to
have a vague and general conception as a guide to effort.-There
must be a definite and immediate task on the accomplishment o
which all the ability and energy available must be concentrated.
Our present task is training for war command,- training to deYelop to a maximum efficient to co-ordination of effort, unity of
action in war.
The following is a brief outline of the method o hamlling problems.
Each member of the Conference will receiYe a copy of the problems to be solved. Each member will prepare and hand in at the
scheduled time his solution. It is earnestly requested that these
solutions be legibly written. The paper to be used is that in the
8" by 13" ruled pads. Each solution should be bound book fashion with the binders to be found in the Secretary's Office. A
margin of an inch and a quarter should be left on the left hand
edge for binding.

Information regardng thu strength and disposition of the enemy forces is very indefinite.
All that is known is that
there is a large convoy of transports with nn escort steaming towards our \Vest Coast. The escort would likely be a formidable
on, for such a moYement on the part of the enemy would indicate
that he was directing his maximum effort towards invasion; and
the protection necessary for the transport of a large body of troops
would entail the employment of a naval force \'ery considerably
superior to any force that we might at present be able to send
against it.
The necessity of guarding the convoy, however, entails a tactical weakness which might be taken advantage of.
Judging from the position :in which this force was sighted and
its course, it seems most probable that it is proceeding on a great
circle course from the enemy home country to the Puget Sound
region. The enemy, therefore. probably intends to occupy that
region as the first step in his invasion.
This force will probably be proceeding with a strong screen well
advanced from his train and from the main body of the Escort.
At night he will probably adopt a close screening formation around
his train .

Four days is the average time allowed for ea<:l~ prob~em but as
the first of these days is )Ion day, the problems will be 1ssued Saturday so that the enthusiastic may consider them over Sunday.
The solution submitted are carefully examined by a member of
the Staff. He prepares a critique of the solutions and presents
this together with an acceptable solution to the Conference. The
problem individual solutions, and the solution presented as acceptable: are then open for general discussion. The critiqu~ is
divided into two parts and the discussion similarly divided
'fhe first part of the critique will be on the Estimate of the Sitnation and the soundness of the resulting decisions.
The
second part of the critique will be on the orders and discussion,
will be directed towards the interpretation of the order and ordier
form rather than towards the soundness of the measures prescribed by the order.
The solution of the following problems was prepared by Com
mander Volgelgesang to illustrate the form and method of the
Estimate of the Situation.
PROBLEM.
.SITUATION :-War was declared between ORfu."\l'GE and
BLUE 18 January 1909. The BLUE Main Fleet left GUAL~TAN
Al\IO on that date for the Pacific via UAGELLA..."\l' Strait.
The
Pacific Detachment under command of Rear Admiral J - is at
SEATTLE. This detaehment consists of 6B, 4C, 5V, and 3 colliers.

OUR OWN FORCES :-Their Strength, Disposition and the

Courses of Action Open to Us.
Our own force consists of 6 B, 4 C, 5 V, and 3 colliers. This
force, though small, represents all that we have in this theatre of
war.
There is nothing else with which to oppose the evident purpose of the enemy, and the situation demands immediate and well
directed activities.
The Courses of Action Open to Us are:1. To ~emain within the waters of the Puget Sound region; to
tlehver an attack upon the Convoy in those waters in
case that the enemy objective.
2. To proceed to gain contact with the enemy forces to determine their strength and disposition with a view of attacking the convoy before it arrives on our Coast.
Ina~muc.h as the strength of the enemy escort is not known,
.and smce 1t may be much stronger than the forces in this command,
tt would be extremely hazardous to await his entrance into the
Strait of San Juan de Fuca before preparing an attack.
The enemy will realize that be will be opposed by whatever
fore~ we may. ~ave; and if he reach the Straits, unmolested he will
be m a position to guard the entrance, after his Convoy shall
have passed; against any force that may try to enter; arui he will
be able. ~o push ahead a strong reconnoitering force to uncover
the positiOn of any naval force of ours that may be inside the
Strai~S or the Sound. He would then be able either to defeat or
contam that force ~n~ it could n~ longer menace his Convoy.
Our naval force ms1de the Straits could for a time be under th<'
protection of the series of Puget Sound fortifications; but they

On 10 February 1909, at 9 a. m. Rear Admiral J - receives information that a large ORANGE convoy of transports with es
cort was sighted at 6 a. m. 8 February in Lat. 51 30' N., Long.
160 W., steaming eastward, speed about ten knots.
The Pacific Detachment is organized as follows:l
Division Ten
Division .Thi,-teen
Rear Admiral J Captain.WB-1, B-2, B-3,
C-1, C-2, C-3, C-4.
Division Eleten
Destmye,. Division. Seven
Rear Admiral HCommander FB-4, B-5, B-6.
V-1, V-2, V-3, V-4, V-5.
Rear Admiral J - commands.
REQUIRED:- Rear Admiral J's Estimate of the Situation.
ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION.
Mlf::JSLOX :-To prevent this enemy from landing on our
Coast.
ENEMY /I'ORCES :-Their Strength, Disposition, and Probable Intentions.

11

10

could be contained behind those fortifications, and the work of

landing the enemy troops could be carried on with security.
Employed in this way our naval force would come in the category of what .Admiral :Jiahan has called a ''foliress fleet''; and
which he designates as a faulty and \icious employment of an
ae:tive naval force.
'fhe fortifications would most likely fall because they could be
taken in reverse; and when that time comes, this force, employed
behind those defenses, wiU be lost, without aceomplishing its
mission or seriolL<5ly menacing the progress of the Enemy's campaign.
.
The first Com-se mentioned must therefore be rejected.
The
Second Course menti,oned conserves the mobility of this force; and
tends to clelll' up the situation by providing us with information relative to the strength and disposition of the enemy's escort, which is
an absolute neccessity in order that proper di,spositious can be made
with a view to harassing and attacking the Convoy.
Bad weather conditions, likely to be met with at this season of
the year in the ~orthern Pacific Ocean, may cause a considerable
elongation of the enemy's formation beyond his power to successfully protect; it may even cause a scattering of his force.
These
conditions should be favorable to our purpose and they are possible advantages that we should be in a position to grasp.
DECISIO.Y :-To proceed to sea with my entire force with a
vie"- to attacking the Enemy Convoy.
This completes Rear ~'ulmiral J's Estimnte of the Situation.
Having anhecl at the above decision. based upon the reasoning which precedes it. Rear .Admiral J then concerns himself with
the tactics of the dispositions he intends to make of his forces
and arrives at the following tactical decisions as a basis of his
orderR.

T.\.CTICAL
J.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

DECISIO~S.

To proceed at noon.
To follow great circle course ftom 'l'atoosh towards point where
t.'nemy was sighted.
To form a scoutin~ line of 4 C 50 miles in achance of :Jiain
Body with 25 miles between vessels.
To keep armored cruisers and destroyers together.
To send colliers to rendez,ous 60 miles S. W. of Cape Disappointment.
To appoint a rendezYons for combatant wssels 20 miles West
mag. of Tatoosh Id.
To use Cipher B for wirelrss.
To remain in B-1 ''--ith main body.

12

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