5/2/99 - Motor Vehicle Incident Claims the Life of Volunteer Fire Fighter-North

Carolina

SUMMARY

A 28-year-old male volunteer fire fighter (the victim) died after the engine he was
driving veered off the road, overturned onto the passenger side and struck a tree. The
incident occurred while returning to the station. A volunteer fire department was
dispatched to a motor-vehicle incident involving injuries. The Assistant Chief, who
was first to arrive via his privately owned vehicle, assessed the scene and determined
that no one was injured. He canceled Engine 252 and the rescue truck, which were en
route to the scene. While driving to the station, the victim apparently steered the
Engine toward the shoulder of the road to provide more room for oncoming traffic.
As he approached the shoulder, the right rear dual tires went off the road. Due to the
insufficient hard shoulder and the steep incline of the ditch beside the road, the victim
was unable to get the Engine back onto the road. Continuing off the road and into the
ditch for approximately 280 feet, the Engine overturned onto the passenger side,
striking a large tree. The victim was killed instantly. NIOSH investigators conclude
that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should:

• ensure all drivers of large apparatus complete state certified driver/operator

• ensure all drivers of fire department vehicles are responsible for the safe and
prudent operation of the vehicle under all conditions

INTRODUCTION

On May 2, 1999, a male volunteer fire fighter died after the Engine he was driving
veered off the road and struck a tree. The victim was returning to the station from a
motor vehicle incident when the right rear dual tires of the Engine went off the road.
The Engine continued off the road, overturned onto the passenger side and struck a
tree, killing the victim. On May 4, 1999, the U.S. Fire Administration notified the
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) of this incident. On
May 12, 1999, two Safety and Occupational Health Specialists from NIOSH,
Division of Safety Research, investigated the incident. They conducted interviews
with a State Trooper from the Highway Patrol, the Chief, Assistant Chief, and other
fire fighters from the volunteer fire department who responded to the incident. They
obtained a copy of the witnesses' statement, vehicle maintenance records, training
records, standard operating procedures (SOPs), field sketches, and the death
certificate. The incident site and the vehicle were photographed. The volunteer fire
department involved in the incident serves a population of 1,500 in a geographic area
of 25 square miles and is comprised of 35 volunteer fire fighters. The Engine
involved in this incident was a 4 year-old, HME-custom cab 1871, long four-door.
The body of the Engine, manufactured by Marrion, measured 8 feet wide and 32 feet,
2-inches long and it had a T-shaped, 1,000 gallon water tank, equipped with baffles.
The Engine was equipped with air brakes and a secondary braking system (output
shaft retarder) which was in operation at the time of the incident. The gross vehicle
weight was 42,000 lbs., and at the time of the incident, the water tank was full,
adding 8,500 lbs.to the total weight of the Engine. The maintenance records revealed
no known problems with the Engine; however, the required state inspection expired
in April 1999. The weather conditions 24-48 hours prior to this incident included
heavy rain; however, at the time of the incident, the road was dry. On the day of the
incident conditions were clear and sunny. The victim had a current Class C driver's
license. Note: A Class C license is required by the State Department of Motor
Vehicles for any single vehicle with a gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of less
than 26,001 lbs. Although the Engine weighed 42,000 lbs., the state does not require
a class B or higher license (Commercial Driver License) for volunteer departments to
operate a vehicle weighing in excess of 26,000 lbs. The victim was wearing his seat
belt (lap and shoulder) at the time of the incident. In the past year, the victim received
6.5 hours of driver training and 3 hours of pump operations training through the
department. The department requires drivers to demonstrate their driving skills to the
Captain before being qualified to drive an apparatus. The victim had 5 years of fire
fighting experience which included 3 years experience as a certified driver.

INVESTIGATION

On May 2, 1999, at 1505 hours, a call came into Central Dispatch for a motor vehicle
incident involving personal injury. Engine 252 with one fire fighter (the victim),
Rescue 2 with one fire fighter, and the Assistant Chief, traveling by privately owned
vehicle (POV), responded to the incident. The Assistant Chief arrived first on the
scene and assessed the incident. Determining that the incident was minor and no one
was injured, he canceled Engine 252 and the rescue truck. Returning to the station,
the victim was driving Engine 252, heading southwest on a two-lane state highway.
The pavement markings consist of a solid yellow line for the southwest direction, a
dashed line for the northeast direction of travel and white edge lines. The shoulder of
the southwest lane was narrow and dropped from a steep slope into a ditch. The road
measures 19 1/2 feet wide from shoulder to shoulder, with a hard shoulder measuring
1 foot, 10 inches on the southwest side (the direction of the victim's travel) and a hard
shoulder measuring 5 feet, 6 inches on the northeast side. On the southwest side, the
hard shoulder has a 4-inch drop to the soft shoulder. Although the lane was wide
enough to accommodate the Engine, the victim steered the apparatus toward the
shoulder to provide additional room for oncoming traffic. Note: The Engine
measured 8 feet wide, leaving 1 foot, 3/4-inches available in the victim's lane.
The road surface dipped, possibly causing the victim to oversteer the apparatus as he
veered it to the right. The Engine's right rear dual tires dropped off the hard shoulder
onto the soft shoulder, and the victim tried unsuccessfully, to steer the Engine back
onto the roadway. The Engine continued off the roadway, slid into the ditch and
overturned onto the passengers' side. The Engine continued sliding on its side until
the cab struck a large tree, killing the victim instantly. The Engine traveled 280 feet
from the point where the rear tires dropped off the road until it struck the tree (see
Figure 1). The driver of the rescue truck, who was approximately 100 yards behind
Engine 252 when it went off the roadway, immediately stopped his vehicle and
radioed for assistance. Note: The ordnance speed is 45 mph; however, at the time
of the incident, the road was under construction and the speed limit signs were
removed. Therefore, in the absence of a speed limit sign, the ordnance speed was
changed to 55 mph. The driver of the rescue truck stated he was traveling 45
mph at the time of the incident. Basing his estimate on distance traveled, tire
impressions and the witness statement, the State Trooper, determined the
Engine's speed as approximately 50 mph. The rescue truck driver called for
immediate assistance from the Assistant Chief, who was still on the scene at the first
incident. He sent a fire fighter from the first incident to the incident involving the
victim. At 1524 hours, Central Dispatch notified a State Trooper who was within a
mile of the incident. The State Trooper arrived within seconds and was first on the
scene, followed at approximately 1527 hours by the fire fighter from the first motor
vehicle incident. The fire fighter began assisting the State Trooper in assessing the
victim's condition. After the Assistant Chief was relived from the first motor vehicle
incident, he arrived on the scene at 1529 hours and established scene control. Within
minutes of the Assistant Chief's arrival, an ambulance arrived, and Central Dispatch
radioed the Assistant Chief to determine if a medical helicopter was needed. The fire
fighter assisting the State Trooper climbed onto the side of the Engine to reach the
victim, and he and the State Trooper determined that the victim was unresponsive
with no pulse. Due to the visible condition of the victim, he was pronounced dead at
the scene. The Assistant Chief radioed Central Dispatch that a helicopter was not
needed. Using his cellular telephone, the Assistant Chief then called Central Dispatch
and asked them to page the Chief so he could be notified of the incident. The State
Trooper took all notes and pictures required for his report and then turned the scene
over to the fire department to begin extrication. At 1535 hours, two additional backup
crews consisting of five fire fighters arrived by POV to assist with the extrication. At
approximately 1545 hours, the Chief arrived on the scene and assumed scene control.
At this time, the extrication was still in progress. A heavy tow truck was called to help
pull the Engine away from the tree so that the victim, who was lodged inside the
crushed cab, could be removed. The victim was removed at 1735 hours and
transferred via ambulance to the local hospital.

CAUSE OF DEATH

According to the death certificate, the cause of death was blunt trauma to the upper
abdomen.
RECOMMENDATIONS AND DISCUSSION

Recommendation #1: Fire departments should ensure that all drivers of large
apparatus complete state-certified driver/operator classes.

Discussion: The State offers a course for fire apparatus driver/operator certification
consisting of a written and practical examination. In addition to passing a written
examination, students must demonstrate their driving ability by completing an
obstacle course set up by the instructor. Once the course is completed, students are
given a certificate valid for 5 years, and during this time, students must complete
continuous education classes to maintain their certification. This course-offered free
of charge upon request to all fire departments-is optional for all volunteer
departments. This course would provide drivers with additional standardized training.
Additionally, fire departments' driver training should be in accordance with NFPA
1451, Standard for a Fire Service Vehicle Operations Training Program and NFPA
1002, Fire Apparatus Driver/Operator Professional Qualifications. These standards
state that departments should establish and maintain a driver training education
program and each member should be provided driver training not less than twice a
year. During training, each driver should operate the vehicle and perform tasks that
the driver/operator is expected to encounter during normal operations to ensure the
vehicle is safely operated in compliance with all applicable state and local laws.

Recommendation #2: Fire Departments should ensure all drivers of fire department
vehicles are responsible for the safe and prudent operation of the vehicle under all
conditions.

Discussion: Fire departments should ensure driver/operators' of fire service vehicles