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[G. R. No. 107764. October 4, 2002]

EDNA COLLADO, BERNARDINA TAWAS, JORETO C. TORRES, JOSE

AMO, SERGIO L. MONTEALEGRE, VICENTE C. TORRES,

JOSEPH L. NUEZ, GLORIA SERRANO, DANILO FABREGAS,

FERNANDO T. TORRES, LUZ G. TUBUNGBANUA, CARIDAD T.
TUTANA, JOSE C. TORRES, JR., IMELDA CAYLALUAD, ROSALIE
TUTANA, NORMA ASTORIAS, MYRNA M. LANCION, NORBERTO
CAMILOTE,
CECILIA MACARANAS,
PEDRO
BRIONES,
REMEDIOS BANTIGUE, DANTE L. MONTEALEGRE, AIDA T.
GADON,
ARMANDO
T.
TORRES
and
FIDELITO
ECO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, thru the Director of Lands, respondents,
BOCKASANJO ISF AWARDEES ASSOCIATION, INC., LITA MENDOZA,
MORADO PREFIDIGNO, TERESITA CRUZ and CALOMA
MOISES,respondents/intervernors.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case
This Petition seeks to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated June 22, 1992, in CA-G.R. SP No. 25597, which declared null and
void the Decision dated January 30, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 71, in LRC No. 269-A, LRC Rec. No. N-59179,
confirming the imperfect title of petitioners over a parcel of land.
[1]

[2]

[3]

The Facts
On April 25, 1985, petitioner Edna T. Collado filed with the land registration
court an application for registration of a parcel of land with an approximate
area of 1,200,766 square meters or 120.0766 hectares (Lot for brevity). The
Lot is situated in Barangay San Isidro (formerly known as Boso-boso),
Antipolo, Rizal, and covered by Survey Plan Psu-162620. Attached to the
application was the technical description of the Lot as Lot Psu-162620 signed
by Robert C. Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge of the Survey Division, Bureau of
Lands, which stated, [t]his survey is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed. On
March 24, 1986, petitioner Edna T. Collado filed an Amended Application to
include additional co-applicants. Subsequently, more applicants joined
(collectively referred to as petitioners for brevity).
[4]

[5]

The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, and the
Municipality of Antipolo, through its Municipal Attorney and the Provincial
Fiscal of Rizal, filed oppositions to petitioners application. In due course, the
land registration court issued an order of general default against the whole
world with the exception of the oppositors.
Petitioners alleged that they have occupied the Lot since time
immemorial. Their possession has been open, public, notorious and in the
concept of owners. The Lot was surveyed in the name of Sesinando Leyva,
one of their predecessors-in-interest, as early as March 22, 1902. Petitioners
declared the Lot for taxation purposes and paid all the corresponding real
estate taxes. According to them, there are now twenty-five co-owners in proindiviso shares of five hectares each. During the hearings, petitioners
submitted evidence to prove that there have been nine transfers of rights
among them and their predecessors-in-interest, as follows:
1. SESINANDO LEYVA was the earliest known predecessor-in-interest of the
Applicants who was in actual, open, notorious and continuous possession of the
property in the concept of owner. He had the property surveyed in his name on 22
March 1902 (Exhibit W and W-1 testimonies of J. Torres on 16 December 1987 and
Mariano Leyva on 29 December 1987).
2. DIOSDADO LEYVA, is the son of Sesinando Leyva, who inherited the property. He
had the property resurveyed in his name on May 21-28, 1928 (Exhibit X and X-1;
testimony of Mariano Leyva, a son of Diosdado Leyva).
3. GREGORIO CAMANTIQUE bought the property from Diosdado Leyva before the
Japanese Occupation of the Philippines during World War II. He owned
and possessed the property until 1958.He declared the property for tax purposes,
the latest of which was under Tax Declaration No. 7182 issued on 3 February
1957 (Exhibit I and testimony of Mariano Leyva, supra).
4. ANGELINA REYNOSO, bought the property from Gregorio Camantique by virtue of
a Deed of Sale on 3 February 1958 (Exhibit H). During the ownership of the
property by Angelina Reynoso,Mariano Leyva the grandson of Sesinando Leyva,
the previous owner, attended to the farm. (Testimony of Mariano Leyva,
supra). Angelina Reynoso declared the property in her name under Tax Declaration
No. 7189 in 4 February 1958, under Tax Declaration No. 8775 on 3 August 1965,
under Tax Declaration No. 16945 on 15 December 1975, and under Tax
Declaration No. 03-06145 on 25 June 1978.
5. MYRNA TORRES bought the property from Angelina Reynoso on 16 October
1982 through a Deed of Sale (Exhibit G).
6. EDNA COLLADO bought the property from Myrna Torres in a Deed of
Sale dated 28 April 1984 (Exhibit P-1 to P-3).
7. Additional owners BERNARDINA TAWAS, JORETO TORRES, JOSE AMO,
VICENTE TORRES and SERGIO MONTEALEGRE who bought portions of
the property from Edna Collado through a Deed of Sale on 6 November
1985 (Exhibit Q to Q-3).

8. And more additional Owners JOSEPH NUNEZ, DIOSDADO ARENOS, DANILO

FABREGAS, FERNANDO TORRES, LUZ TUBUNGBANUA, CARIDAD TUTANA,
JOSE TORRES JR., RODRIGO TUTANA, ROSALIE TUTANA, NORMA ASTORIAS,
MYRNA LANCION, CHONA MARCIANO, CECILIA MACARANAS, PEDRO
BRIONES, REMEDIOS BANTIQUE, DANTE MONTEALEGRE, ARMANDO
TORRES, AIDA GADON and AMELIA M. MALAPAD bought portions of the
property in a Deed of Sale on 12 May 1986 (Exhibit S to S-3).
9. Co-owners DIOSDADO ARENOS, RODRIGO TUTANA, CHONA MARCIANO and
AMELIA MALAPAD jointly sold their shares to new OWNERS GLORIA R.
SERRANO, IMELDA CAYLALUAD, NORBERTO CAMILOTE and FIDELITO ECO
through a Deed of Sale dated 18 January 1987 (Exhibit T to T-9).[6]

During the hearing on January 9, 1991, only the assistant provincial

prosecutor appeared without the Solicitor General. For failure of the
oppositors to present their evidence, the land registration court issued an
order considering the case submitted for decision based on the evidence of
the petitioners. The court later set aside the order and reset the hearing to
January 14, 1991 for the presentation of the evidence of the oppositors. On
this date, counsel for oppositors failed to appear again despite due
notice. Hence, the court again issued an order submitting the case for
decision based on the evidence of the petitioners.
The Trial Courts Ruling
After appraisal of the evidence submitted by petitioners, the land
registration court held that petitioners had adduced sufficient evidence to
establish their registrable rights over the Lot.Accordingly, the court rendered a
decision confirming the imperfect title of petitioners. We quote the pertinent
portions of the courts decision, as follows:
From the evidence presented, the Court finds that from the testimony of the witnesses
presented by the Applicants, the property applied for is in actual, open, public and
notorious possession by the applicants and their predecessor-in-interest since time
immemorial and said possession had been testified to by witnesses Jimmy Torres,
Mariano Leyva, Sergio Montealegre, Jose Amo and one Chona who were all crossexamined by Counsel for Oppositor Republic of the Philippines.
Evidence was likewise presented that said property was declared for taxation purposes
in the names of the previous owners and the corresponding taxes were paid by the
Applicants and the previous owners and said property was planted to fruit bearing
trees; portions to palay and portions used for grazing purposes.

To the mind of the Court, Applicants have presented sufficient evidence to establish
registrable title over said property applied for by them.
On the claim that the property applied for is within the Marikina Watershed, the Court
can only add that all Presidential Proclamations like the Proclamation setting aside the
Marikina Watershed are subject to private rights.
In the case of Municipality of Santiago vs. Court of Appeals, 120 SCRA 734, 1983
private rights is proof of acquisition through (sic) among means of acquisition of
public lands.
In the case of Director of Lands vs. Reyes, 68 SCRA 193-195, by private rights means
that applicant should show clear and convincing evidence that the property in question
was acquired by applicants or their ancestors either by composition title from the
Spanish government or by Possessory Information title, or any other means for the
acquisition of public lands xxx (underscoring supplied).
The Court believes that from the evidence presented as above stated, Applicants have
acquired private rights to which the Presidential Proclamation setting aside the
Marikina Watershed should be subject to such private rights.
At any rate, the Court notes that evidence was presented by the applicants that as per
Certification issued by the Bureau of Forest Development dated March 18, 1980, the
area applied for was verified to be within the area excluded from the operation of the
Marikina Watershed Lands Executive Order No. 33 dated July 26, 1904 per
Proclamation No. 1283 promulgated on June 21, 1974 which established the Bosoboso Town Site Reservation, amended by Proclamation No. 1637 dated April 18, 1977
known as the Lungsod Silangan Townsite Reservation. (Exhibit K).
[7]

In a motion dated April 5, 1991, received by the Solicitor General on April

6, 1991, petitioners alleged that the decision dated January 30, 1991
confirming their title had become final after the Solicitor General received a
copy of the decision on February 18, 1991. Petitioners prayed that the land
registration court order the Land Registration Authority to issue the necessary
decree in their favor over the Lot.
On April 11, 1991, the Solicitor General inquired from the Provincial
Prosecutor of Rizal whether the land registration court had already rendered a
decision and if so, whether the Provincial Prosecutor would recommend an
appeal. However, the Provincial Prosecutor failed to answer the query.

According to the Solicitor General, he received on April 23, 1991 a copy of

the land registration courts decision dated January 30, 1991, and not on
February 18, 1991 as alleged by petitioners in their motion.
In the meantime, on May 7, 1991, the land registration court issued an
order directing the Land Regulation Authority to issue the corresponding
decree of registration in favor of the petitioners.
On August 6, 1991, the Solicitor General filed with the Court of Appeals a
Petition for Annulment of Judgment pursuant to Section 9(2) of BP Blg. 129 on
the ground that there had been no clear showing that the Lot had been
previously classified as alienable and disposable making it subject to private
appropriation.
On November 29, 1991, Bockasanjo ISF Awardees Association, Inc., an
association of holders of certificates of stewardship issued by the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR for brevity) under its Integrated
Social Forestry Program (ISF for brevity), filed with the Court of Appeals a
Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Petition-In-Intervention. They
likewise opposed the registration and asserted that the Lot, which is situated
inside the Marikina Watershed Reservation, is inalienable. They claimed that
they are the actual occupants of the Lot pursuant to the certificates of
stewardship issued by the DENR under the ISF for tree planting purposes.
The Court of Appeals granted the motion to intervene verbally during the
preliminary conference held on April 6, 1992. During the preliminary
conference, all the parties as represented by their respective counsels agreed
that the only issue for resolution was whether the Lot in question is part of the
public domain.
[8]

The Court of Appeals Ruling

In a decision dated June 22, 1992, the Court of Appeals granted the
petition and declared null and void the decision dated January 30, 1991 of the
land registration court. The Court of Appeals explained thus:
Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is enshrined in the 1935 (Art. XIII, Sec. 1), 1973
(Art. XIV, Sec. 8), and 1987 Constitution (Art. XII, Sec. 2), all lands of the public
domain belong to the State. An applicant, like the private respondents herein, for
registration of a parcel of land bears the burden of overcoming the presumption that
the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain (Director of Lands vs.
Aquino, 192 SCRA 296).

A positive Act of government is needed to declassify a public land and to convert it

into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes (Republic vs.
Bacas, 176 SCRA 376).
In the case at bar, the private respondents failed to present any evidence whatsoever
that the land applied for as described in Psu-162620 has been segregated from the
bulk of the public domain and declared by competent authority to be alienable and
disposable. Worse, the technical description of Psu-162620 signed by Robert C.
Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge, Survey Division, Bureau of Lands, which was
attached to the application of private respondents, categorically stated that "This
survey is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed."
That the land in question is within the Marikina Watershed Reservation is confirmed
by the Administrator of the National Land Titles and Deeds in a Report, dated March
2, 1988, submitted to the respondent Court in LR Case No. 269-A. These
documents readily and effectively negate the allegation in private respondent Collados
application that said parcel of land known as Psu-162620 is not covered by any form
of title, nor any public land application and are not within any government
reservation (Par. 8, Application; Emphasis supplied). The respondent court could not
have missed the import of these vital documents which are binding upon the courts
inasmuch as it is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department to classify
public lands. They should have forewarned the respondent judge from assuming
jurisdiction over the case.
x x x inasmuch as the said properties applied for by petitioners are part of the public
domain, it is the Director of Lands who has jurisdiction in the disposition of the same
(subject to the approval of the Secretary of Natural Resources and Environment), and
not the courts. x x x Even assuming that petitioners did have the said properties
surveyed even before the same was declared to be part of the Busol Forest
Reservation, the fact remains that it was so converted into a forest reservation, thus it
is with more reason that this action must fail. Forest lands are inalienable and
possession thereof, no matter how long, cannot convert the same into private
property. And courts are without jurisdiction to adjudicate lands within the forest
zone. (Heirs of Gumangan vs. Court of Appeals. 172 SCRA 563; Emphasissupplied).
Needless to say, a final judgment may be annulled on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, fraud or that it is contrary to law (Panlilio vs. Garcia, 119 SCRA 387,
391) and a decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck
down at any time (Suarez vs. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA 339).
[9]

Hence, the instant petition.

The Issues
The issues raised by petitioners are restated as follows:
I

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR GRAVELY ABUSED ITS

DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT
GRANTING THE APPLICATION OF THE PETITIONERS FOR CONFIRMATION
OF TITLE;
II

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR GRAVELY ABUSED ITS

DISCRETION IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION FOR
ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT FILED BY THE REPUBLIC LONG AFTER THE
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT HAD BECOME FINAL;
III

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR GRAVELY ABUSED ITS

DISCRETION IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE INTERVENORS PETITION
FOR INTERVENTION WHICH WAS FILED OUT OF TIME OR LONG AFTER
THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT HAD BECOME FINAL.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
First Issue: whether petitioners have registrable title over the Lot.
There is no dispute that Executive Order No. 33 (EO 33 for brevity) dated
July 26, 1904 established the Marikina Watershed Reservation (MWR for
brevity) situated in the Municipality of Antipolo, Rizal. Petitioners even
concede that the Lot, described as Lot Psu-162620, is inside the technical,
literal description of the MWR. However, the main thrust of petitioners claim
over the Lot is that all Presidential proclamations like the proclamation setting
aside the Marikina Watershed Reservation are subject to private rights. They
point out that EO 33 contains a saving clause that the reservations are subject
to existing private rights, if any there be. Petitioners contend that their claim of
ownership goes all the way back to 1902, when their known predecessor-ininterest, Sesinando Leyva, laid claim and ownership over the Lot. They claim
[10]

that the presumption of law then prevailing under the Philippine Bill of 1902
and Public Land Act No. 926 was that the land possessed and claimed by
individuals as their own are agricultural lands and therefore alienable and
disposable. They conclude that private rights were vested on Sesinando
Leyva before the issuance of EO 33, thus excluding the Lot from the Marikina
Watershed Reservation.
Petitioners arguments find no basis in law.
The Regalian Doctrine: An Overview
Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be
clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. The
Spaniards first introduced the doctrine to the Philippines through the Laws of
the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, specifically, Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the
Novisima Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias which laid the foundation that
all lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or
by grant, belong to the public domain. Upon the Spanish conquest of the
Philippines, ownership of all lands, territories and possessions in the
Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown.
[11]

[12]

[13]

[14]

The Laws of the Indies were followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or

the Mortgage Law of 1893. The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the
systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as possessory claims. The
Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law partly amended the Mortgage Law as
well as the Law of the Indies. The Maura Law was the last Spanish land law
promulgated in the Philippines. It required the adjustment or registration of all
agricultural lands, otherwise the lands would revert to the state.
[15]

Four years later, Spain ceded to the government of the United States all
rights, interests and claims over the national territory of the Philippine Islands
through the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898. In 1903, the United States
colonial government, through the Philippine Commission, passed Act No. 926,
the first Public Land Act, which was described as follows:
Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of
the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition of lands of the public
domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling and leasing
of portions of the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms
and conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It
also provided for the issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands,
for the establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion of
imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and
grants in the Islands. In short, the Public Land Act operated on the assumption

that title to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the government;
and that the governments title to public land sprung from the Treaty of Paris and
other subsequent treaties between Spain and the United States. The term public
land referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still remained in the
government and are thrown open to private appropriation and settlement, and
excluded the patrimonial property of the government and the friar lands.
[16]

Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of
1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of
lands creates the legal presumption that the lands are alienable and
disposable.
Act 2874, the second Public Land Act, superseded Act No. 926 in 1919.
After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, Commonwealth Act No. 141 (CA
141 for brevity) amended Act 2874 in 1936. CA 141, as amended, remains to
this day as the existing general law governing the classification and
disposition of lands of the public domain other than timber and mineral lands.
[17]

In the meantime, in order to establish a system of registration by which

recorded title becomes absolute, indefeasible and imprescriptible, the
legislature passed Act 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act,
which took effect on February 1, 1903. Act 496 placed all registered lands in
the Philippines under the Torrens system. The Torrens system requires the
government to issue a certificate of title stating that the person named in the
title is the owner of the property described therein, subject to liens and
encumbrances annotated on the title or reserved by law. The certificate of title
is indefeasible and imprescriptible and all claims to the parcel of land are
quieted upon issuance of the certificate. PD 1529, known as the Property
Registration Decree enacted on June 11, 1978, amended and updated Act
496.
[18]

[19]

[20]

The 1935, 1973, 1987 Philippine Constitutions

The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions adopted the Regalian doctrine
substituting, however, the state, in lieu of the King, as the owner of all lands
and waters of the public domain. Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his separate
opinion in Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,
explained thus:
[21]

[22]

One of the fixed and dominating objectives of the 1935 Constitutional Convention
was the nationalization and conservation of the natural resources of the
country. There was an overwhelming sentiment in the Convention in favor of the
principle of state ownership of natural resources and the adoption of the Regalian
doctrine. State ownership of natural resources was seen as a necessary starting point

to secure recognition of the states power to control their disposition, exploitation,

development, or utilization. The delegates to the Constitutional Convention very well
knew that the concept of State ownership of land and natural resources was introduced
by the Spaniards, however, they were not certain whether it was continued and applied
by the Americans. To remove all doubts, the Convention approved the provision in the
Constitution affirming the Regalian doctrine.
Thus, Section 1, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution, on Conservation
and Utilization of Natural Resources barred the alienation of all natural
resources except public agricultural lands, which were the only natural
resources the State could alienate. The 1973 Constitution reiterated the
Regalian doctrine in Section 8, Article XIV on the National Economy and the
Patrimony of the Nation. The 1987 Constitution reaffirmed the Regalian
doctrine in Section 2 of Article XII on National Economy and Patrimony.
[23]

[24]

[25]

Both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions prohibited the alienation of all
natural resources except agricultural lands of the public domain. The 1987
Constitution readopted this policy.Indeed, all lands of the public domain as
well as all natural resources enumerated in the Philippine Constitution belong
to the State.
Watershed Reservation is a Natural Resource
The term natural resource includes not only timber, gas, oil coal, minerals,
lakes, and submerged lands, but also, features which supply a human need
and contribute to the health, welfare, and benefit of a community, and are
essential to the well-being thereof and proper enjoyment of property devoted
to park and recreational purposes.
[26]

In Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, et al .,

the Court had occasion to discourse on watershed areas. The Court
resolved the issue of whether the parcel of land which the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources had assessed to be a watershed area is
exempt from the coverage of RA No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (CARL for brevity). The Court defined watershed as an area
drained by a river and its tributaries and enclosed by a boundary or divide
which separates it from adjacent watersheds. However, the Court also
recognized that:
[27]

[28]

The definition does not exactly depict the complexities of a watershed. The most
important product of a watershed is water which is one of the most important human
necessit(ies). The protection of watershed ensures an adequate supply of water for
future generations and the control of flashfloods that not only damage property but

also cause loss of lives. Protection of watersheds is an intergenerational responsibility

that needs to be answered now.
Article 67 of the Water Code of the Philippines (PD 1067) provides:
Art. 67. Any watershed or any area of land adjacent to any surface water or overlying
any ground water may be declared by the Department of Natural Resources as a
protected area. Rules and Regulations may be promulgated by such Department to
prohibit or control such activities by the owners or occupants thereof within the
protected area which may damage or cause the deterioration of the surface water or
ground water or interfere with the investigation, use, control, protection, management
or administration of such waters.
The Court in Sta. Rosa Realty also recognized the need to protect
watershed areas and took note of the report of the Ecosystems Research and
Development Bureau (ERDB), a research arm of the DENR, regarding the
environmental assessment of the Casile and Kabanga-an river watersheds
involved in that case. That report concluded as follows:
The Casile barangay covered by CLOA in question is situated in the heartland of both
watersheds. Considering the barangays proximity to the Matangtubig waterworks, the
activities of the farmers which are in conflict with proper soil and water conservation
practices jeopardize and endanger the vital waterworks. Degradation of the land
would have double edge detrimental effects. On the Casile side this would mean direct
siltation of the Mangumit river which drains to the water impounding reservoir
below. On the Kabanga-an side, this would mean destruction of forest covers which
acts as recharged areas of the Matangtubig springs. Considering that the people have
little if no direct interest in the protection of the Matangtubig structures they couldnt
care less even if it would be destroyed.
The Casile and Kabanga-an watersheds can be considered a most vital life support
system to thousands of inhabitants directly and indirectly affected by it. From these
watersheds come the natural God-given precious resource water. x x x
Clearing and tilling of the lands are totally inconsistent with sound watershed
management. More so, the introduction of earth disturbing activities like road building
and erection of permanent infrastructures.Unless the pernicious agricultural activities
of the Casile farmers are immediately stopped, it would not be long before these
watersheds would cease to be of value. The impact of watershed degradation threatens
the livelihood of thousands of people dependent upon it. Toward this, we hope that an
acceptable comprehensive watershed development policy and program be

immediately formulated and implemented before the irreversible damage finally

happens.
The Court remanded the case to the Department of Agriculture and
Adjudication Board or DARAB to re-evaluate and determine the nature of the
parcels of land involved in order to resolve the issue of its coverage by the
CARL.
Sta. Rosa Realty gives us a glimpse of the dangers posed by the misuse
of natural resources such as watershed reservations which are akin to forest
zones. Population growth and industrialization have taken a heavy toll on the
environment. Environmental degradation from unchecked human activities
could wreak havoc on the lives of present and future generations.Hence, by
constitutional fiat, natural resources remain to this day inalienable properties
of the State.
Viewed under this legal and factual backdrop, did petitioners acquire, as
they vigorously argue, private rights over the parcel of land prior to the
issuance of EO 33 segregating the same as a watershed reservation?
The answer is in the negative.
First. An applicant for confirmation of imperfect title bears the burden of
proving that he meets the requirements of Section 48 of CA 141, as
amended. He must overcome the presumption that the land he is applying for
is part of the public domain and that he has an interest therein sufficient to
warrant registration in his name arising from an imperfect title. An imperfect
title may have been derived from old Spanish grants such as a titulo real or
royal grant, a concession especial or special grant, a composicion con el
estado or adjustment title, or a titulo de compra or title through purchase. Or,
that he has had continuous, open and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership
for at least thirty years preceding the filing of his application as provided by
Section 48 (b) CA 141.
[29]

Originally, Section 48(b) of CA 141 provided for possession and

occupation of lands of the public domain since July 26, 1894. This was
superseded by RA 1942 which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive
period of occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of an imperfect
title. The same, however, has already been amended by Presidential Decree
No. 1073, approved on January 25, 1977, the law prevailing at the time
petitioners application for registration was filed on April 25, 1985. As
amended, Section 48 (b) now reads:
[30]

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in

open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation
of title, except when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
Interpreting Section 48 (b) of CA 141, the Court stated that the Public
Land Act requires that the applicant must prove the following:
(a) that the land is alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of the same must either be since time
immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. When the conditions
set by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires a
right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being
issued.
[31]

Petitioners do not claim to have documentary title over the Lot. Their right to
register the Lot is predicated mainly upon continuous possession since 1902.
Clearly, petitioners were unable to acquire a valid and enforceable right or
title because of the failure to complete the required period of possession,
whether under the original Section 48 (b) of CA 141 prior to the issuance of
EO 33, or under the amendment by RA 1942 and PD 1073.
There is no proof that prior to the issuance of EO 33 in 1904, petitioners
had acquired ownership or title to the Lot either by deed or by any other mode
of acquisition from the State, as for instance by acquisitive prescription. As of
1904, Sesinando Leyva had only been in possession for two years. Verily,
petitioners have not possessed the parcel of land in the manner and for the
number of years required by law for the confirmation of imperfect title.
Second, assuming that the Lot was alienable and disposable land prior to
the issuance of EO 33 in 1904, EO 33 reserved the Lot as a watershed. Since
then, the Lot became non-disposable and inalienable public land. At the time
petitioners filed their application on April 25, 1985, the Lot has been reserved
as a watershed under EO 33 for 81 years prior to the filing of petitioners
application.
The period of occupancy after the issuance of EO 33 in 1904 could no
longer be counted because as a watershed reservation, the Lot was no longer
susceptible of occupancy, disposition, conveyance or alienation. Section 48
(b) of CA 141, as amended, applies exclusively to alienable and disposable

public agricultural land. Forest lands, including watershed reservations, are

excluded. It is axiomatic that the possession of forest lands or other
inalienable public lands cannot ripen into private ownership. In Municipality
of Santiago, Isabela vs. Court of Appeals, the Court declared that
inalienable public lands [32]

x x x cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription. Prescription, both acquisitive and

extinctive, does not run against the State.
The possession of public land, however long the period may have extended, never
confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations with regard
to public land does not operate against the State, unless the occupant can prove
possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required
number of years to constitute a grant from the State.
Third, Gordula vs. Court of Appeals is in point. In Gordula, petitioners
did not contest the nature of the land. They admitted that the land lies in the
heart of the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve, which Proclamation No.
573 classified as inalienable. The petitioners in Gordula contended, however,
that Proclamation No. 573 itself recognizes private rights of landowners prior
to the reservation. They claim to have established their private rights to the
subject land. The Court ruled:
[33]

We do not agree. No public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant,
express or implied from the government; it is indispensable that there be a showing of
a title from the state. The facts show that petitioner Gordula did not acquire title to the
subject land prior to its reservation under Proclamation No. 573. He filed his
application for free patent only in January, 1973, more than three (3) years after the
issuance of Proclamation No. 573 in June, 1969. At that time, the land, as part of the
Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve, was no longer open to private ownership as it
has been classified as public forest reserve for the public good.
Nonetheless, petitioners insist that the term, private rights, in Proclamation No. 573,
should not be interpreted as requiring a title. They opine that it suffices if the claimant
had occupied and cultivated the property for so many number of years, declared the
land for taxation purposes, [paid] the corresponding real estate taxes [which are]
accepted by the government, and [his] occupancy and possession [is] continuous,
open and unmolested and recognized by the government. Prescinding from this
premise, petitioners urge that the 25-year possession by petitioner Gordula from 1944
to 1969, albeit five (5) years short of the 30-year possession required under
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141, as amended, is enough to vest upon petitioner
Gordula the private rights recognized and respected in Proclamation No. 573.

The case law does not support this submission. In Director of Lands vs. Reyes, we
held that a settler claiming the protection of private rights to exclude his land from a
military or forest reservation must show x x x by clear and convincing evidence that
the property in question was acquired by [any] x x x means for the acquisition of
public lands.
In fine, one claiming private rights must prove that he has complied with C.A. No.
141, as amended, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, which prescribes the
substantive as well as the procedural requirements for acquisition of public lands. This
law requires at least thirty (30) years of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and possession of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition, immediately preceding the filing of the application for free
patent. The rationale for the 30-year period lies in the presumption that the land
applied for pertains to the State, and that the occupants and/or possessors claim an
interest therein only by virtue of their imperfect title or continuous, open and
notorious possession.
Next, petitioners argue that assuming no private rights had attached to the
Lot prior to EO 33 in 1904, the President of the Philippines had subsequently
segregated the Lot from the public domain and made the Lot alienable and
disposable when he issued Proclamation No. 1283 on June 21,
1974. Petitioners contend that Proclamation No. 1283 expressly excluded an
area of 3,780 hectares from the MWR and made the area part of the Bosoboso Townsite Reservation. Petitioners assert that Lot Psu-162620 is a small
part of this excluded town site area.Petitioners further contend that town sites
are considered alienable and disposable under CA 141.
Proclamation No. 1283 reads thus:
PROCLAMATION NO. 1283
EXCLUDING FROM THE OPERATION EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 33, DATED
JULY 26, 1904, AS AMENDED BY EXECUTIVE ORDERS NOS. 14 AND 16,
BOTH SERIES OF 1915, WHICH ESTABLISHED THE WATERSHED
RESERVATION SITUATED IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF ANTIPOLO,
PROVINCE OF RIZAL, ISLAND OF LUZON, A CERTAIN PORTION OF THE
LAND EMBRACED THEREIN AND RESERVING THE SAME, TOGETHER
WITH THE ADJACENT PARCEL OF LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, FOR
TOWNSITE PURPOSES UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF CHAPTER XI OF THE
PUBLIC LAND ACT.

Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and

pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS,
President of the Philippines, do hereby, exclude from the operation of Executive Order
No. 33 dated July 26, 1904, as amended by Executive Orders Nos. 14 and 16, both
series of 1915, which established the Watershed Reservation situated in the
Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon, certain portions of land
embraced therein and reserve the same, together with the adjacent parcel of land of
the public domain, for townsite purposes under the provisions of Chapter XI of the
Public Land Act, subject to private rights, if any there be, and to future subdivision
survey in accordance with the development plan to be prepared and approved by the
Department of Local Government and Community Development, which parcels are
more particularly described as follows:
Lot A (Part of Watershed Reservation)
A parcel of land (Lot A of Proposed Poor Mans Baguio, being a portion of the
Marikina Watershed, IN-2), situated in the municipality of Antipolo, Province of
Rizal, Island of Luzon, beginning at a point marked 1 on sketch plan, being N-74-30
E, 8480.00 meters more or less, from BLLM 1, Antipolo, Rizal; thence N 33 28 W
1575.00 m. to point 2; thence N 40 26 W 1538.50 m. to point 3; thence N 30 50W
503.17 m. to point 4; thence N 75 02 W 704.33 m. to point 5; thence N 14 18 W
1399.39 m. to point 6; thence N 43 25 W 477.04 m. to point 7; thence N 71 38 W
458.36 m. to point 8; thence N 31 05 W 1025.00 m. to point 9; thence Due North
490.38 m. to point 10; thence Due North 1075.00 m. to point 11; thence Due East
1000.00 m. to point 12; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 13; thence Due East
1000.00 m. to point 14; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 15; thence Due East
1000.00 m. to point 16; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 17; thence Due East
1075.00 m. to point 18; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 19; thence Due South
1000.00 m. to point 20; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 21; thence Due South
1000.00 m. to point 22; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 23; thence Due South
1000.00 m. to point 24; thence Due South 1075.00 m. to point 25; thence Due West
1000.00 m. to point 26; thence Due West 1000.00 m. to point 27; thence Due West
636.56 m. to point of beginning.Containing an area of three thousand seven
hundred eighty (3,780) Hectares, more or less.
Lot B (Alienable and Disposable Land)
A parcel of land (Lot B of Proposed Poor Mans Baguio, being a portion of alienable
and disposable portion of public domain) situated in the municipality of Antipolo,
Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon.Beginning at a point marked 1 on sketch plan
being N 74 30 E., 8430.00 m., more or less, from BLLM 1. Antipolo, Rizal; thence
Due West 363.44 m. to point 2; thence Due West 1000.00 m. to point 3; thence Due

West 100.00 m. to point 4; thence Due West 1000.00 m. to point 5; thence Due West
1075.00 m. to point 6; thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point 7; thence Due North
1000.00 m. to point 8; thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point 9; thence Due North
1000.00 m. to point 10; thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point 11; thence Due North
509.62 m. to point 12; thence S. 31 05 E 1025.00 m. to point 13; thence S 71 38 E
458.36 m. to point 14; thence S 43 25 E 477.04 m. to point 15; thence S 14 18 E
1399.39 m. to point 16; thence S 75 02 E 704.33 m. to point 17; thence S. 30 50 E
503.17 m. to point 18; thence S 40 26 E 1538.50 m. to point 19; thence s 33 23 e
1575.00 m to point of beginning. Containing an area of one thousand two hundred
twenty five (1,225) Hectares, more or less.
Note: All data are approximate and subject to change based on future survey.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I Have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the
Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 21 day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen
hundred and seventy-four.
st

(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS

President
Republic of the Philippines
Proclamation No. 1283 has since been amended by Proclamation No.
1637 issued on April 18, 1977. Proclamation No. 1637 revised the area and
location of the proposed townsite.According to then DENR Secretary Victor O.
Ramos, Proclamation No. 1637 excluded Lot A (of which the Lot claimed by
petitioners is part) for townsite purposes and reverted it to MWR coverage.
Proclamation No. 1637 reads:
[34]

PROCLAMATION NO. 1637

AMENDING PROCLAMATION NO. 1283, DATED JUNE 21, 1974, WHICH
ESTABLISHED THE TOWNSITE RESERVATION IN THE MUNICIPALITIES OF
ANTIPOLO AND SAN MATEO, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, ISLAND OF LUZON BY
INCREASING THE AREA AND REVISING THE TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION
OF THE LAND EMBRACED THEREIN, AND REVOKING
PROCLAMATION NO. 765 DATED OCTOBER 26, 1970 THAT RESERVED
PORTIONS OF THE AREA AS RESETTLEMENT SITE.
Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Natural Resources and pursuant to the
authority vested in me by law, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the
Philippines, do hereby amend Proclamation No. 1283, dated June 21, 1974 which

established the townsite reservation in the municipalities of Antipolo and San Mateo,
Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon, by increasing the area and revising the technical
descriptions of the land embraced therein, subject to private rights, if any there be,
which parcel of land is more particularly described as follows:
(Proposed Lungsod Silangan Townsite)
A PARCEL OF LAND (Proposed Lungsod Silangan Townsite Reservation amending
the area under SWO-41762 establishing the Bagong Silangan Townsite Reservation)
situated in the Municipalities of Antipolo, San Mateo, and Montalban, Province of
Rizal, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the E., along lines 1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-1213-14-15-16-17-18-19-20-21-22-23 by the Marikina Watershed Reservation (IN-12);
on the S., along lines 23-24-25 by the portion of Antipolo; on the W., along lines 2526-27-28-29-30 by the Municipalities of Montalban, San Mateo; and on the N., along
lines 30-31-32-33-34-35-36-37-38-39-40-41-42-43-44 by the Angat Watershed
Reservation. Beginning at a point marked 1 on the Topographic Maps with the Scale
of 1:50,000 which is the identical corner 38 IN-12, Marikina Watershed Reservation.
xxx xxx xxx
NOTE: All data are approximate and subject to change based on future survey.
Proclamation No. 765 dated October 26, 1970, which covered areas entirely within
the herein Lungsod Silangan Townsite, is hereby revoked accordingly.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the
Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 18th day of April, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen
hundred and seventy-seven.
(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President of the Philippines
A positive act (e.g., an official proclamation) of the Executive Department
is needed to declassify land which had been earlier classified as a watershed
reservation and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural
or other purposes. Unless and until the land classified as such is released in
an official proclamation so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural
lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not
apply.
[35]

[36]

The principal document presented by petitioners to prove the private

character of the Lot is the Certification of the Bureau of Forest Development
dated March 18, 1986 that the Lot is excluded from the Marikina Watershed
(Exh. R). The Certification reads:
Republic of the Philippines
Ministry of Natural Resources
BUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT
REGION IV
EL AL Building
100 Quezon Avenue, Quezon City
MAR 18 1986
VERIFICATION ON THE STATUS OF LAND:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that the tract of land situated in Barangay San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal,
containing an area of 1,269,766 square meters, as shown and described on the reverse
side hereof, surveyed by Geodetic Engineer Telesforo Cabading for Angelina C.
Reynoso, is verified to be within the area excluded from the operation of Marikina
Watershed Reservation established under Executive Order No. 33 dated July 26, 1904
per Proclamation No. 1283, promulgated on June 21, 1974, which established the
Boso-Boso Townsite Reservation, amended by proclamation No. 1637 dated April 18,
1977 known as Lungsod Silangan Townsite Reservation.
Subject area also falls within the bounds of Bagong Lipunan Site under P.D. 1396
dated June 2, 1978 under the sole jurisdiction of the Ministry of Human Settlements,
to the exclusion of any other government agencies.
This verification is made upon the request of the Chief, Legal Staff, R-4 as contained
in his internal memorandum dated March 18, 1986.
Verified by:
(Sgd) ROMEO C. PASCUBILLO
Cartographer II
Checked by:
(Sgd) ARMENDO R. CRUZ

Supervising Cartographer
ATTESTED:
(Sgd) LUIS G. DACANAY
Chief, Forest Engineering &
Infrastructure Section
The above certification on which petitioners rely that a reclassification had
occurred, and that the Lot is covered by the reclassification, is contradicted by
several documents submitted by the Solicitor General before the land
registration court.
The Solicitor General submitted to the land registration court a
Report dated March 2, 1988, signed by Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio
of the then National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration,
confirming that the Lot described in Psu-162620 forms part of the MWR. He
thus recommended the dismissal of the application for registration. The
Report states:
[37]

COMES NOW the Administrator of the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Commission and to this Honorable Court respectfully reports that:
1. A parcel of land described in plan Psu-162620 situated in the Barrio of San Isidro,
Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, is applied for registration of title in the
case at bar.
2. After plotting plan Psu-162620 in our Municipal Index Map it was found that a portion
of the SW, described as Lot 3 in plan Psu-173790 was previously the subject of
registration in Land Reg. Case No. N-9578, LRC Record No. N-55948 and was
issued Decree No. N-191242 on April 4, 1986 in the name of Apolonia Garcia, et al.,
pursuant to the Decision and Order for Issuance of the Decree dated February 8,
1984 and March 6, 1984, respectively, and the remaining portion of plan Psu162620 is inside IN-12, Marikina Watershed. x x x
WHEREFORE, this matter is respectfully submitted to the Honorable Court for
its information and guidance with the recommendation that the application in the
instant proceedings be dismissed, after due hearing (Underlining supplied).

Likewise, in a letter dated November 11, 1991, the Deputy Land

Inspector, DENR, Region IV, Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office, Antipolo, Rizal, similarly confirmed that the Lot is within the MWR. The
letter states:
[38]

That the land sought to be registered is situated at San Isidro (Boso-boso), Antipolo,
Rizal, with an area of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY SIX POINT ZERO SEVEN

SIXTY SIX (126.0766) hectares, more particularly described in Psu-162620, which is

within the Marikina Watershed Reservation under Executive Order No. 33 dated July
2, 1904 which established the Marikina Watershed Reservation (IN-12) x x x.
xxx
That the land sought to be registered is not a private property of the Registration
Applicant but part of the public domain, not subjected to disposition and is covered by
Proclamation No. 585 for Integrated Social Forestry Program hence, L.R.C. No. 269A is recommended for rejection (Underlining supplied). Copy of the letter is attached
herewith as Annex 3 and made an integral part hereof.
Lastly, the Solicitor General pointed out that attached to petitioner Edna T.
Collados [as original applicant] application is the technical description of the
Lot signed by Robert C. Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge of the Survey Division
of the Bureau of Lands. This technical description categorically stated that the
Lot is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed.
[39]

The evidence of record thus appears unsatisfactory and insufficient to

show clearly and positively that the Lot had been officially released from the
Marikina Watershed Reservation to form part of the alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain. We hold that once a parcel of land is included
within a watershed reservation duly established by Executive Proclamation, as
in the instant case, a presumption arises that the land continues to be part of
such Reservation until clear and convincing evidence of subsequent
declassification is shown.
It is obvious, based on the facts on record that neither petitioners nor their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the Lot for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title. Even if they submitted sufficient proof that the Lot had been excluded
from the MWR upon the issuance of Proclamation No. 1283 on June 21,
1974, petitioners possession as of the filing of their application on April 25,
1985 would have been only eleven years counted from the issuance of the
proclamation in 1974. The result will not change even if we tack in the two
years Sesinando Leyva allegedly possessed the Lot from 1902 until the
issuance of EO 33 in 1904. Petitioners case falters even more because of the
issuance of Proclamation No. 1637 on April 18, 1977. According to then
DENR Secretary Victor Ramos, Proclamation No. 1637 reverted Lot A or the
townsite reservation, where petitioners' Lot is supposedly situated, back to the
MWR.

Finally, it is of no moment if the areas of the MWR are now fairly populated
and vibrant communities as claimed by petitioners. The following ruling may
be applied to this case by analogy:
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest
cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or
planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. Forest lands do not have to be
on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees,
nipa palms and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as
forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not
have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land
classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may
form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
[40]

Second Issue: Whether the petition for annulment of judgment

should have been given due course.
Petitioners fault the Court of Appeals for giving due course to the
Republics petition for annulment of judgment which was filed long after the
decision of the land registration court had allegedly become final and
executory. The land registration court rendered its decision on January 30,
1991 and the Solicitor General received a copy of the decision on April 23,
1991. Petitioners point out that the Solicitor General filed with the Court of
Appeals the petition for annulment of judgment invoking Section 9(2) of BP
Blg. 129 only on August 6, 1991, after the decision had supposedly become
final and executory. Moreover, petitioners further point out that the Solicitor
General filed the petition for annulment after the land registration court issued
its order of May 6, 1991 directing the Land Registration Authority to issue the
corresponding decree of registration.
[41]

[42]

The Solicitor General sought the annulment of the decision on the ground
that the land registration court had no jurisdiction over the case, specifically,
over the Lot which was not alienable and disposable. The Solicitor General
maintained that the decision was null and void.
Petitioners argue that the remedy of annulment of judgment is no longer
available because it is barred by the principle of res judicata. They insist that
the land registration court had jurisdiction over the case which involves private
land. They also argue that the Republic is estopped from questioning the land

registration courts jurisdiction considering that the Republic participated in the

proceedings before the court.
It is now established that the Lot, being a watershed reservation, is not
alienable and disposable public land. The evidence of the petitioners do not
clearly and convincingly show that the Lot, described as Lot Psu-162620,
ceased to be a portion of the area classified as a watershed reservation of the
public domain. Any title to the Lot is void ab initio. In view of this, the alleged
procedural infirmities attending the filing of the petition for annulment of
judgment are immaterial since the land registration court never acquired
jurisdiction over the Lot. All proceedings of the land registration court involving
the Lot are therefore null and void.
We apply our ruling in Martinez vs. Court of Appeals, as follows:
[43]

The Land Registration Court has no jurisdiction over non-registrable properties, such
as public navigable rivers which are parts of the public domain, and cannot validly
adjudge the registration of title in favor of private applicant. Hence, the judgment of
the Court of First Instance of Pampanga as regards the Lot No. 2 of certificate of Title
No. 15856 in the name of petitioners may be attacked at any time, either directly or
collaterally, by the State which is not bound by any prescriptive period provided for
by the Statute of Limitations.
We also hold that environmental consequences in this case override concerns
over technicalities and rules of procedure.
In Republic vs. De los Angeles, which involved the registration of public
lands, specifically parts of the sea, the Court rejected the principle of res
judicata and estoppel to silence the Republics claim over public lands. The
Court said:
[44]

It should be noted further that the doctrine of estoppel or laches does not apply when
the Government sues as a sovereign or asserts governmental rights, nor does estoppel
or laches validate an act that contravenes law or public policy, and that res judicata is
to be disregarded if its application would involve the sacrifice of justice to
technicality.
The Court further held that the right of reversion or reconveyance to the State
of the public properties registered and which are not capable of private
appropriation or private acquisition does not prescribe.
Third issue: Whether the petition-in-intervention is proper.

The Bockasanjo ISF Awardees Association, Inc., an association of holders

of certificates of stewardship issued by the DENR under its Integrated Social
Forestry Program, filed with the Court of Appeals on November 29, 1991 a
Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Petition-In-Intervention.
According to intervenors, they are the actual occupants of the Lot which
petitioners sought to register. Aware that the parcels of land which their
forefathers
had
occupied,
developed
and tilled belong
to
the
Government, they filed a petition with then President Corazon C. Aquino and
then DENR Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, to award the parcels of land to
them.
Secretary Factoran directed the Director of Forest Management Bureau to
take steps for the segregation of the aforementioned area from the MWR for
development under the DENRsISF Programs. Subsequently, then President
Aquino issued Proclamation No. 585 dated June 5, 1990 excluding 1,430
hectares from the operation of EO 33 and placed the same under the DENRs
Integrated Social Forestry Program. Proclamation No. 585 reads:
PROCLAMATION NO. 585
AMENDING FURTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 33, DATED JULY 26, 1904
WHICH ESTABLISHED THE MARIKINA WATERSHED RESERVATION (IN-12)
AS AMENDED, BY EXCLUDING CERTAIN PORTIONS OF LANDS
EMBRACED THEREIN SITUATED AT SITIOS BOSOBOSO, KILINGAN,
VETERANS, BARANGAYS SAN JOSEPH AND PAENAAN, MUNICIPALITY OF
ANTIPOLO, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, ISLAND OF LUZON.
Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources and
pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President
of the Philippines, do hereby exclude from the operation of Executive Order No. 33,
which established the Marikina Watershed Reservation, certain parcel of land of the
public domain embraced therein situated in Sitios Bosoboso, Veterans, Kilingan and
Barangay San Joseph and Paenaan, Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal and
place the same under the Integrated Social Forestry Program of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources in accordance with existing laws, rules and
regulations, which parcel of land is more particularly described as follows:
A PARCEL OF LAND, within the Marikina Watershed Reservation situated in the
Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, beginning at point 1 on plan, being
identical to corner 1 of Marikina Watershed Reservation; thence
xxx xxx xxx

Containing an area of One Thousand Four Hundred Thirty (1,430) Hectares.

All other lands covered and embraced under Executive Order No. 33 as amended, not
otherwise affected by this Proclamation, shall remain in force and effect.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the
Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 5 day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen
hundred and ninety.
th

(Sgd.) CORAZON C. AQUINO

President of the Philippines
Pursuant to Proclamation No. 585, the chief of the ISF Unit, acting through
the Regional Executive Director of the DENR (Region IV), issued sometime
between the years 1989 to 1991 certificates of stewardship contracts to bona
fide residents of the barangays mentioned in the proclamation as qualified
recipients of the ISF programs. Among those awarded were intervenors. The
certificates of stewardship are actually contracts of lease granted by the
DENR to actual occupants of parcels of land under its ISF programs for a
period of twenty-five (25) years, renewable for another twenty-five (25) years.
The DENR awarded contracts of stewardship to ISF participants in
Barangay San Isidro (or Boso-boso) and the other barangays based on the
Inventory of Forest Occupants the DENR had conducted.
[45]

[46]

According to intervenors, they learned only on July 31, 1991 about the
pendency of LRC Case No. 269-A before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo,
Rizal. On August 8, 1991, they filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to
Admit Opposition in Intervention before the land registration court to assert
their rights and to protect their interests.
However, shortly after the filing of their opposition, intervenors learned that
the land registration court had already rendered a decision on January 30,
1991 confirming petitioners imperfect title. Intervenors counsel received a
copy of the decision on August 9, 1991.
On August 14, 1991, intervenors filed a motion to vacate judgment and for
new trial before the land registration court. According to intervenors, the land
registration court could not act on its motions due to the restraining order
issued by the Court of Appeals on August 8, 1991, enjoining the land
registration court from executing its decision, as prayed for by the Solicitor
General in its petition for annulment of judgment. The intervenors were thus

constrained to file a petition for intervention before the Court of Appeals which
allowed the same.
Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent parts:
[47]

Section 1. Who may intervene. A person who has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so
situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in
the custody of the court, or an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to
intervene in the action. The Court shall consider whether or not the intervention will
unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and
whether or not the inertvenors rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
Sec. 2. Time to intervene. The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before
rendition of judgment by the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall
be attached to the motion and served on the original parties.
As a rule, intervention is allowed before rendition of judgment by the trial
court, as Section 2, Rule 19 expressly provides. However, the Court has
recognized exceptions to this rule in the interest of substantial justice. Mago
vs. Court of Appeals reiterated the ruling in Director of Lands vs. Court
of Appeals, where the Court allowed the motions for intervention even when
the case had already reached this Court. Thus, in Mago the Court held that:
[48]

It is quite clear and patent that the motions for intervention filed by the movants at this
stage of the proceedings where trial had already been concluded x x x and on appeal x
x x the same affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the instant petition for certiorari to
review said judgment is already submitted for decision by the Supreme Court, are
obviously and, manifestly late, beyond the period prescribed under x x x Section 2,
Rule 12 of the rules of Court.
But Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, like all other Rules therein promulgated, is simply
a rule of procedure, the whole purpose and object of which is to make the powers of
the Court fully and completely available for justice. The purpose of procedure is not
to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival
claims of contending parties. It was created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate
and promote the administration of justice. It does not constitute the thing itself which
courts are always striving to secure to litigants. It is designed as the means best
adopted to obtain that thing. In other words, it is a means to an end.
To be sure, the Court of Appeals did not pass upon the actual status of
intervenors in relation to the Lot as this was not in issue. Neither was the

validity of the certificates of stewardship contracts which intervenors allegedly

possessed inquired into considering this too was not in issue. In fact,
intervenors did not specifically seek any relief apart from a declaration that the
Lot in question remains inalienable land of the public domain. We cannot fault
the Court of Appeals for allowing the intervention, if only to provide the rival
groups a peaceful venue for ventilating their sides. This case has already
claimed at least five lives due to the raging dispute between the rival camps of
the petitioners on one side and those of the DENR awardees on the other. It
also spawned a number of criminal cases between the two rival groups
including malicious mischief, robbery and arson. A strict application of the
rules would blur this bigger, far more important picture.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated June 22, 1992 declaring null and void the Decision dated
January 30, 1991 of Branch 71, Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, in LRC
No. 269-A, LRC Rec. No. N-59179 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.