FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART (QQ.

1-114)
Question
1. Of Man's Last End
ARTICLE 1. Whether it belongs to man to act for an end?
(Human Acts - free will act is any thought, word, deed, desire, or omission which comes
from a man acting with full knowledge of what he is doing, who is free to act or to refrain from
action, and who gives the full assent of his will to the act.
Acts of Man - Other acts performed by a man, but inadvertently, or without full
knowledge, freedom, and choice, are indeed acts of a man, but they are not human acts. )
It is evident that human acts are acts for an end, that is, acts done for the purpose of attaining
an end.

ARTICLE 2. Whether it is proper to the rational nature to act

for an end?
(Every agent (doer, actor, performer) acts to an end. There is purpose in every activity. But only
man, among earthly creatures, chooses or moves himself to an end by exercising freewill.)

ARTICLE 3. Whether human acts are specified by their end?

(That which specifies any single human act is the end or purpose it seeks to achieve. Hence we
say that a human act is specified by its end.)

ARTICLE 4. Whether there is one last end of human life?

(There is one ultimate end and purpose to be attained by human beings, and to this end

all

human acts tend.)

ARTICLE 5. Whether one man can have several last ends?

(The ultimate end towards which man tends in all his human acts is his crowning good,

his
ultimate and perfect fulfillment. This is a single end; man cannot possibly tend to several last
ends.)

ARTICLE 6. Whether man will all, whatsoever he wills, for

the last end?
(Back of all his free will acts is man's drive towards supreme and universal good, wholly
complete, perfectly satisfying. Even in his sinful acts, a man is seeking good, that is,
satisfaction, although he is perversely seeking it in the wrong place. )

ARTICLE 7. Whether all men have the same last end?

(All human beings have the same nature, that is, the same human essence equipped for normal

human operations. Therefore all men have the same last end, the same ultimate goal. This last
end is complete and enduring satisfaction or fulfillment; such fulfillment is called beatitude or
happiness.)

ARTICLE 8. Whether other creatures concur in that last end?

(Man differs from all other earthly substances, minerals, plants, animals. For, while all these
things are the products of divine goodness and exist to reflect and manifest that goodness, they
do not seek to attain the infinite good subjectively; only man does that.)

2. Of Those Things in Which Man's Happiness Consists

ARTICLE 1. Whether man's happiness consists in wealth?
( Man's happiness is not to be found in wealth, whether this be natural wealth which serves his
normal needs (such as food, clothing, housing), or artificial wealth which can provide the items
of natural wealth, that is, money.)

ARTICLE 2. Whether man's happiness consists in honors?

(Nor can man's full happiness consist in honors bestowed because of some excellence in him.)
ARTICLE 3. Whether man's happiness consists in fame or
glory?
( Fame and glory are consequent upon an imperfect happiness, and are, in some sense, the
product of it. They cannot, therefore, be the essential elements of perfect happiness.)

ARTICLE 4. Whether man's happiness consists in power?

( power looks on to something further; it cannot itself be the ultimate goal.
ARTICLE 5. Whether man's happiness consists in any bodily
good?
(Man's ultimate happiness does not consist in goods of the body - life, health, strength, beauty,
agility, etc. - for these goods preserve the body and its perfections. Merely to preserve life
cannot be the end of life.)

ARTICLE 6. Whether man's happiness consists in pleasure?

(mental enjoyments presuppose the end already attained; enjoyment follows upon possession of
some good or end; what is consequent upon the end cannot itself be the end.)

ARTICLE 7. Whether some good of the soul constitutes

man's happiness?
(The goods of the soul - its essence, faculties, acts, habits, perfections - cannot constitute
man's ultimate end. Hence this ultimate end is not the soul itself, nor the goods belonging to the
soul.)

ARTICLE 8. Whether any created good constitutes man's

happiness?
(No created good is universal, essential, and boundless; only the uncreated goodcan be the
ultimate end of man. And this uncreated good is God.)

3.
What
Is
Happiness
ARTICLE 1. Whether happiness is something uncreated?
ARTICLE 2. Whether happiness is an operation?
ARTICLE 3. Whether happiness is an operation of the
sensitive part, or of the intellective part only?
ARTICLE 4. Whether, if happiness is in the intellective part,
it is an operation of the intellect or of the will?
ARTICLE 5. Whether happiness is an operation of the
speculative, or of the practical intellect?

ARTICLE 6. Whether happiness consists in the consideration

of speculative sciences?
ARTICLE 7. Whether happiness consists in the knowledge of
separate substances, namely, angels?
ARTICLE 8. Whether man's happiness consists in the vision
of the divine essence?
4. Of Those Things That Are Required for Happiness
ARTICLE 1. Whether delight is required for happiness?
ARTICLE 2. Whether in happiness vision ranks before
delight?
ARTICLE 3. Whether comprehension is necessary for
happiness?
ARTICLE 4. Whether rectitude of the will is necessary for
happiness?
ARTICLE 5. Whether the body is necessary for man's
happiness?
ARTICLE 6. Whether perfection of the body is necessary for
happiness?
ARTICLE 7. Whether any external goods are necessary for
happiness?
ARTICLE 8. Whether the fellowship of friend is necessary for
happiness?
5.
Of
the
Attainment
of
Happiness
ARTICLE 1. Whether man can attain happiness?
ARTICLE 2. Whether one man can be happier than another?
ARTICLE 3. Whether one can be happy in this life?
ARTICLE 4. Whether happiness once had can be lost?
ARTICLE 5. Whether man can attain happiness by his natural
powers?
ARTICLE 6. Whether man attains happiness through the
action of some higher creature?
ARTICLE 7. Whether any good works are necessary that man
may receive happiness from God?
ARTICLE 8. Whether every man desires happiness?
6.
Of
the
Voluntary
and
the
Involuntary
ARTICLE 1. Whether there is anything voluntary in human
acts?
ARTICLE 2. Whether there is anything voluntary in irrational
animals?

ARTICLE
act?
ARTICLE
ARTICLE
ARTICLE
ARTICLE
ARTICLE

3. Whether there can be voluntariness without any

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Whether
Whether
Whether
Whether
Whether

violence can be done to the will?

violence causes involuntariness?
fear causes involuntariness simply?
concupiscence causes involuntariness?
ignorance causes

involuntariness?
7.
Of
the
Circumstances
of
Human
Acts
ARTICLE 1. Whether a circumstance is an accident of a
human act?
ARTICLE 2. Whether theologians should take note of the
circumstances of human acts?
ARTICLE 3. Whether the circumstances are properly set
forth in the third book of Ethics?
ARTICLE 4. Whether the most important circumstances are
"why" and "in what the act consists"?
8.
Of
the
Will,
in
Regard
to
What
It
Wills
ARTICLE 1. Whether the will is of good only?
ARTICLE 2. Whether volition is of the end only, or also of the
means?
ARTICLE 3. Whether the will is moved by the same act to the
end and to the means?
9.
Of
That
Which
Moves
the
Will
ARTICLE 1. Whether the will is moved by the intellect?
ARTICLE 2. Whether the will is moved by the sensitive
appetite?
ARTICLE 3. Whether the will moves itself?
ARTICLE 4. Whether the will is moved by an exterior
principle?
ARTICLE 5. Whether the will is moved by a heavenly body?
ARTICLE 6. Whether the will is moved by God alone, as
exterior principle?
10. Of the Manner in Which the Will Is Moved
ARTICLE 1. Whether the will is moved to anything naturally?
ARTICLE 2. Whether the will is moved, of necessity, by its
object?

ARTICLE 3. Whether the will is moved, of necessity, by the

lower appetite?
ARTICLE 4. Whether the will is moved of necessity by the
exterior mover which is God?
11. Of Enjoyment, Which Is an Act of the Will
ARTICLE 1. Whether to enjoy is an act of the appetitive
power?
ARTICLE 2. Whether to enjoy belongs to the rational
creature alone, or also to irrational animals?
ARTICLE 3. Whether enjoyment is only of the last end?
ARTICLE 4. Whether enjoyment is only of the end
possessed?
12.
Of
Intention
ARTICLE 1. Whether intention is an act of the intellect or of
the will?
ARTICLE 2. Whether intention is only of the last end?
ARTICLE 3. Whether one can intend two things at the same
time?
ARTICLE 4. Whether intention of the end is the same act as
the volition of the means?
ARTICLE 5. Whether intention is within the competency of
irrational animals?
13. Of Choice, Which Is an Act of the Will with Regard to the Means
ARTICLE 1. Whether choice is an act of will or of reason?
ARTICLE 2. Whether choice is to be found in irrational
animals?
ARTICLE 3. Whether choice is only of the means, or
sometimes also of the end?
ARTICLE 4. Whether choice is of those things only that are
done by us?
ARTICLE 5. Whether choice is only of possible things?
ARTICLE 6. Whether man chooses of necessity or freely?
14.
Of
Counsel,
Which
Precedes
Choice
ARTICLE 1. Whether counsel is an inquiry?
ARTICLE 2. Whether counsel is of the end, or only of the
means?
ARTICLE 3. Whether counsel is only of things that we do?
ARTICLE 4. Whether counsel is about all things that we do?

ARTICLE 5. Whether the process of counsel is one of

analysis?
ARTICLE 6. Whether the process of counsel is indefinite?
15. Of Consent, Which Is an Act of the Will in Regard to the Means
ARTICLE 1. Whether consent is an act of the appetitive or of
the apprehensive power?
ARTICLE 2. Whether consent is to be found in irrational
animals?
ARTICLE 3. Whether consent is directed to the end or to the
means?
ARTICLE 4. Whether consent to the act belongs only to the
higher part of the soul?
16. Of Use, Which Is an Act of the Will in Regard to the Means
ARTICLE
ARTICLE
ARTICLE
ARTICLE

1.
2.
3.
4.

Whether
Whether
Whether
Whether

use
use
use
use

is an act of the will?

is to be found in irrational animals?
regards also the last end?
precedes choice?

17. Of the Acts Commanded by the Will

ARTICLE 1. Whether command is an act of thereason or of
the will?
ARTICLE 2. Whether command belongs toirrational animals?
ARTICLE 3. Whether use precedes command?
ARTICLE 4. Whether command and the commanded act are
one act, or distinct?
ARTICLE 5. Whether the act of the will is commanded?
ARTICLE 6. Whether the act of the reason is commanded?
ARTICLE 7. Whether the act of the sensitive appetite is
commanded?
ARTICLE 8. Whether the act of the vegetal soul is
commanded?
ARTICLE 9. Whether the acts of the external members are
commanded?
18. Of the Good and Evil of Human Acts, in General

ARTICLE 1. Whether every human action is good,or are there

evil actions?
ARTICLE 2. Whether the good or evil of a man's action is
derived from its object?
ARTICLE 3. Whether man's action is good or evil from a
circumstance?
ARTICLE 4. Whether a human action is good or evil from its
end?
ARTICLE 5. Whether a human action is good or evil in its
species?
ARTICLE 6. Whether an action has the species of good or
evil from its end?
ARTICLE 7. Whether the species derived from the end is
contained under the species derived from the object, as
under its genus, or conversely?
ARTICLE 8. Whether any action is indifferent in its species?
ARTICLE 9. Whether an individual action can be indifferent?
ARTICLE 10. Whether a circumstance places a moral action
in the species of good or evil?
ARTICLE 11. Whether every circumstance that makes an
action better or worse, places a moral action in a species of
good or evil?
19. OF THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF THE INTERIOR ACT
OF THE WILL
ARTICLE 1. Whether the goodness of the will depends on the
object?
ARTICLE 2. Whether the goodness of the will depends on the
object alone?
ARTICLE 3. Whether the goodness of the wil depends on
reason?
ARTICLE 4. Whether the goodness of the will depends on the
eternal law?
ARTICLE 5. Whether the will is evil when it is at variance
with erring reason?
ARTICLE 6. Whether the will is good when it abides by erring
reason?
ARTICLE 7. Whether the goodness of the will, as
regards the means, depends on the intention of the end?

ARTICLE 8. Whether the degree of goodness or malice in the

will depends on the degree of good or evil in the intention?
ARTICLE 9. Whether the goodness of the will depends on its
conformity to the Divine will?
ARTICLE 10. Whether it is necessary for the human will, in
order to be good, to be conformed to the Divine will, as
regards the thing willed?
20. OF GOODNESS AND MALICE IN EXTERNAL HUMAN
AFFAIRS
ARTICLE 1. Whether goodness or malice is first in the action
of the will, or in the external action?
ARTICLE 2. Whether the whole goodness and malice of the
external action depends on the goodness of the will?
ARTICLE 3. Whether the goodness and malice of the
external action are the same as those of the interior act?
ARTICLE 4. Whether the external action adds any goodness
or malice to that of the interior act?
ARTICLE 5. Whether the consequences of the external action
increase its goodness or malice?
ARTICLE 6. Whether one and the same external action can
be both good and evil?
21. OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF HUMAN ACTIONS BY
REASON OF THEIR GOODNESS AND MALICE
ARTICLE 1. Whether a human action is right or sinful, in so
far as it is good or evil?
ARTICLE 2. Whether a human action deserves praise or
blame, by reason of its being good or evil?
ARTICLE 3. Whether a human action is meritorious or
demeritorious in so far as it is good or evil?
ARTICLE 4. Whether a human action is meritorious or
demeritorious before God, according as it is good or evil?
22. OF THE SUBJECT OF THE SOUL'S PASSIONS
ARTICLE 1. Whether any passion is in the soul?
ARTICLE 2. Whether passion is in the appetitive rather than
in the apprehensive part?
ARTICLE 3. Whether passion is in the sensitive appetite
rather than in the intellectual appetite, which is called the
will?

23. HOW THE PASSIONS DIFFER FROM ONE ANOTHER

ARTICLE 1. Whether the passions of the on cupiscible part
are different from those of the irascible part?
ARTICLE 2. Whether the contrariety of the irascible passions
is based on the contrariety of good and evil?
ARTICLE 3. Whether any passion of the soul has no
contrariety?
ARTICLE 4. Whether in the same power, there are any
passions, specifically different, but not contrary to one
another?
23. OF GOOD AND EVIL IN THE PASSIONS OF THE SOUL
ARTICLE 1. Whether moral good and evil can be found in the
passions of the soul?
ARTICLE 2. Whether every passion of the soul is evil
morally?
ARTICLE 3. Whether passion increases or decreases the
goodness or malice of an act?
ARTICLE 4. Whether any passion is good or evil in its
species?
25. OF THE ORDER OF THE PASSIONS TO ONE ANOTHER
ARTICLE 1. Whether the irascible passions precede the
concupiscible passions, or vice versa?
ARTICLE 2. Whether love is the first of the concupiscible
passions?
ARTICLE 3. Whether hope is the first of the irascible
passions?
ARTICLE 4. Whether these are the four principal passions:
joy, sadness, hope and fear?
26. OF THE PASSIONS OF THE SOUL IN PARTICULAR: AND
FIRST, OF LOVE
ARTICLE 1. Whether love is in the concupiscible power?
ARTICLE 2. Whether love is a passion?
ARTICLE 3. Whether love is the same as dilection?
ARTICLE 4. Whether love is properly divided into love of
friendship and love of concupiscence?
27. OF THE CAUSE OF LOVE
ARTICLE 1. Whether good is the only cause of love?
ARTICLE 2. Whether knowledge is a cause of love?
ARTICLE 3. Whether likeness is a cause of love?

ARTICLE 4. Whether any other passion of the soul is a cause

of love?
28. OF THE EFFECTS OF LOVE
ARTICLE 1. Whether union is an effect of love?
ARTICLE 2. Whether mutual indwelling is an effect of love?
ARTICLE 3. Whether ecstasy is an effect of love?
ARTICLE 4. Whether zeal is an effect of love?
ARTICLE 5. Whether love is a passion that wounds the lover?
ARTICLE 6. Whether love is cause of all that the lover does?
29. OF HATRED
ARTICLE 1. Whether evil is the cause and object of hatred?
ARTICLE 2. Whether love is a cause of hatred?
ARTICLE 3. Whether hatred is stronger than love?
ARTICLE 4. Whether a man can hate himself?
ARTICLE 5. Whether a man can hate the truth?
ARTICLE 6. Whether anything can be an object of universal
hatred?
30. OF CONCUPISCENCE
ARTICLE 1. Whether concupiscence is in the sensitive
appetite only?
ARTICLE 2. Whether concupiscence is a specific passion?
ARTICLE 3. Whether some concupiscences are natural, and
some not natural?
ARTICLE 4. Whether concupiscence is infinite?
31. OF DELIGHT CONSIDERED IN ITSELF
ARTICLE 1. Whether delight is a passion?
ARTICLE 2. Whether delight is in time?
ARTICLE 3. Whether delight differs from joy?
ARTICLE 4. Whether delight is in the intellectual appetite?
ARTICLE 5. Whether bodily and sensible pleasures are
greater than spiritual and intellectual pleasures?
ARTICLE 6. Whether the pleasures of touch are
greater than the pleasures afforded by the other
senses?
ARTICLE 7. Whether any pleasure is not natural?
ARTICLE 8. Whether one pleasure can be contrary
to another?
32. OF THE CAUSE OF PLEASURE

ARTICLE 1. Whether operation is the proper cause of

pleasure?
ARTICLE 2. Whether movement is a cause of pleasure?
ARTICLE 3. Whether hope and memory causes pleasure?
ARTICLE 4. Whether sadness causes pleasure?
ARTICLE 5. Whether the actions of others are a cause of
pleasure to us?
ARTICLE 6. Whether doing good to another is a cause of
pleasure?
ARTICLE 7. Whether likeness is a cause of pleasure?
ARTICLE 8. Whether wonder is a cause of pleasure?
33. OF THE EFFECTS OF PLEASURE
ARTICLE 1. Whether expansion is an effect of pleasure?
ARTICLE 2. Whether pleasure causes thirst or desire for
itself?
ARTICLE 3. Whether pleasure hinders the use of reason?
ARTICLE 4. Whether pleasure perfects operation?
34. OF THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF PLEASURES
ARTICLE 1. Whether every pleasure is evil?
ARTICLE 2. Whether every pleasure is good?
ARTICLE 3. Whether any pleasure is the greatest good?
ARTICLE 4. Whether pleasure is the measure or rule by
which to judge of moral good or evil?
35. OF PAIN OR SORROW, IN ITSELF
Index
Prologue
ARTICLE 1. Whether pain is a passion of the soul?
ARTICLE 2. Whether sorrow is the same as pain?
ARTICLE 3. Whether sorrow or pain is contrary to pleasure?
ARTICLE 4. Whether all sorrow is contrary to all pleasure?
ARTICLE 5. Whether there is any sorrow contrary to the
pleasure of contemplation?
ARTICLE 6. Whether sorrow is to be shunned more than
pleasure is to be sought?
ARTICLE 7. Whether outward pain is greater than interior
sorrow?
ARTICLE 8. Whether there are only four species of sorrow?
36. OF THE CAUSES OF SORROW OR PAIN

ARTICLE 1. Whether sorrow is caused by the loss of good or

by the presence of evil?
ARTICLE 2. Whether desire is a cause of sorrow?
ARTICLE 3. Whether the craving for unity is a cause of
sorrow?
ARTICLE 4. Whether an irresistible power is a cause of
sorrow?
37. OF THE EFFECTS OF PAIN OR SORROW
ARTICLE 1. Whether pain deprives one of the power to
learn?
ARTICLE 2. Whether the effect of sorrow or pain is to burden
the soul?
ARTICLE 3. Whether sorrow or pain weakens all activity?
ARTICLE 4. Whether sorrow is more harmful to the body
than the other passions of the soul?
38. OF THE REMEDIES OF SORROW OR PAIN
ARTICLE 1. Whether pain or sorrow is assuaged by every
pleasure?
ARTICLE 2. Whether pain or sorrow is assuaged by tears?
ARTICLE 3. Whether pain or sorrow are assuaged by the
sympathy of friends?
ARTICLE 4. Whether pain and sorrow are assuaged by the
contemplation of truth?
ARTICLE 5. Whether pain and sorrow are assuaged by sleep
and baths?
39. OF THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF SORROW OR PAIN
ARTICLE 1. Whether all sorrow is evil?
ARTICLE 2. Whether sorrow can be a virtuous good?
ARTICLE 3. Whether sorrow can be a useful good?
ARTICLE 4. Whether bodily pain is the greatest evil?
40. OF THE IRASCIBLE PASSIONS, AND FIRST, OF HOPE AND
DESPAIR
ARTICLE 1. Whether hope is the same as desire of cupidity?
ARTICLE 2. Whether hope is in the apprehensive or in the
appetitive power?
ARTICLE 3. Whether hope is in dumb animals?
ARTICLE 4. Whether despair is contrary to hope?
ARTICLE 5. Whether experience is a cause of hope?

ARTICLE 6. Whether hope abounds in young men and

drunkards?
ARTICLE 7. Whether hope is a cause of love?
ARTICLE 8. Whether hope is a help or a hindrance
to action?
41. OF FEAR, IN ITSELF
ARTICLE 1. Whether fear is a passion of the soul?
ARTICLE 2. Whether fear is a special passion?
ARTICLE 3. Whether there is a natural fear?
ARTICLE 4. Whether the species of fear is suitably assigned?
42. OF THE OBJECT OF FEAR
ARTICLE 1. Whether the object of fear is good or evil?
ARTICLE 2. Whether evil of nature is an object of fear?
ARTICLE 3. Whether the evil of sin is an object of fear?
ARTICLE 4. Whether fear itself can be feared?
ARTICLE 5. Whether sudden things are especially feared?
ARTICLE 6. Whether those things are more feared, for which
there is no remedy?
43. OF THE CAUSE OF FEAR
ARTICLE 1. Whether love is the cause of fear?
ARTICLE 2. Whether defect is the cause of fear?
44. OF THE EFFECTS OF FEAR
ARTICLE 1. Whether fear causes contraction?
ARTICLE 2. Whether fear makes one suitable for counsel?
ARTICLE 3. Whether fear makes one tremble?
ARTICLE 4. Whether fear hinders action?
45. OF DARING
ARTICLE 1. Whether daring is contrary to fear?
ARTICLE 2. Whether daring ensues from hope?
ARTICLE 3. Whether some defect is a cause of daring?
ARTICLE 4. Whether the brave are more eager at first than
in the midst of danger?
46. OF ANGER, IN ITSELF
ARTICLE 1. Whether anger is a special passion?
ARTICLE 2. Whether the object of anger is good or evil?
ARTICLE 3. Whether anger is in the concupiscible faculty?
ARTICLE 4. Whether anger requires an act of reason?
ARTICLE 5. Whether anger is more natural than desire?
ARTICLE 6. Whether anger is more grievous than hatred?

ARTICLE 7. Whether anger is only towards those to whom

one has an obligation of justice?
ARTICLE 8. Whether the species of anger are suitably
assigned?
47. OF THE CAUSE THAT PROVOKES ANGER, AND OF THE
REMEDIES OF ANGER
ARTICLE 1. Whether the motive of anger is always
something done against the one who is angry?
ARTICLE 2. Whether the sole motive of anger is slight or
contempt?
ARTICLE 3. Whether a man's excellence is the cause of his
being angry?
ARTICLE 4. Whether a person's defect is a reason for being
more easily angry with him?
48. OF THE EFFECTS OF ANGER
ARTICLE 1. Whether anger causes pleasure?
ARTICLE 2. Whether anger above all causes fervor in the
heart?
ARTICLE 3. Whether anger above all hinders the use of
reason?
ARTICLE 4. Whether anger above all causes taciturnity?
49. OF HABITS IN GENERAL, AS TO THEIR SUBSTANCE
ARTICLE 1. Whether habit is a quality?
ARTICLE 2. Whether habit is a distinct species of quality?
ARTICLE 3. Whether habit implies order to an act?
ARTICLE 4. Whether habits are necessary?
50. OF THE SUBJECT OF HABITS
ARTICLE 1. Whether there is a habit in the body?
ARTICLE 2. Whether the soul is the subject of habit in
respect of its essence or in respect of its power?
ARTICLE 3. Whether there can be any habits in the powers
of the sensitive parts?
ARTICLE 4. Whether there is any habit in the intellect?
ARTICLE 5. Whether any habit is in the will?
ARTICLE 6. Whether there are habits in the angels?
51. OF THE CAUSE OF HABITS, AS TO THEIR FORMATION
ARTICLE 1. Whether any habit is from nature?
ARTICLE 2. Whether any habit is caused by acts?
ARTICLE 3. Whether a habit can be caused by one act?

ARTICLE 4. Whether any habits are infused in man by God?

52. OF THE INCREASE OF HABITS
ARTICLE 1. Whether habits increase?
ARTICLE 2. Whether habits increases by addition?
ARTICLE 3. Whether every act increases its habit?
53. HOW HABITS ARE CORRUPTED OR DIMINISHED
ARTICLE 1. Whether a habit can be corrupted?
ARTICLE 2. Whether a habit can diminish?
ARTICLE 3. Whether a habit is corrupted or
diminished through mere cessation from act?
54. OF THE DISTINCTION OF HABITS
ARTICLE 1. Whether many habits can be in one power?
ARTICLE 2. Whether habits are distinguished by their
objects?
ARTICLE 3. Whether habits are divided into good and bad?
ARTICLE 4. Whether one habit is made up of many habits?
55. OF THE VIRTUES, AS TO THEIR ESSENCE
ARTICLE 1. Whether human virtue is a habit?
ARTICLE 2. Whether human virtue is an operative habit?
ARTICLE 3. Whether human virtue is a good habit?
ARTICLE 4. Whether virtue is suitably defined?
56. OF THE SUBJECT OF VIRTUE
ARTICLE 1. Whether the subject of virtue is a power of the
soul?
ARTICLE 2. Whether one virtue can be in several powers?
ARTICLE 3. Whether the intellect can be the subject of
virtue?
ARTICLE 4. Whether the irascible and concupiscible powers
are the subject of virtue?
ARTICLE 5. Whether the sensitive powers of apprehension
are the subject of virtue?
ARTICLE 6. Whether the will can be the subject of virtue?
57. OF THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES
ARTICLE 1. Whether the habits of the speculative intellect
are virtues?
ARTICLE 2. Whether there are only three habits of the
speculative
intellect,
viz.
wisdom,
science
and
understanding?
ARTICLE 3. Whether the intellectual habit, art, is a virtue?

ARTICLE 4. Whether prudence is a distinct virtue from art?

ARTICLE 5. Whether prudence is a virtue necessary to man?
ARTICLE 6. Whether "eubulia, synesis, and gnome" are
virtues annexed to prudence?

INTROOOOOOOO!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!~

The Summa, Part II: Ethics

Structure
Part II of the Summa is divided into two parts. The first part comprises 114 quaestiones, and the second
part comprises 189. The two parts of the second part are usually presented as containing several
"treatises". The contents are as follows:

First part of Part II:

Treatise on the last end (qq. 1 to 5)

Treatise on human acts: Acts peculiar to humans (qq. 6 to 21)

Treatise on the passions (qq. 22 to 48)

Treatise on habits (qq. 49 to 54)

Treatise on habits in particular (qq. 55 to 89): Good habits, i.e., virtues (qq. 55 to 70)

Treatise on law (qq. 90 to 108)

Treatise on grace (qq. 109 to 114)

Second part of Part II:

Treatise on the theological virtues (qq. 1 to 46)

Treatise on the cardinal virtues (qq. 47 to 170)

Treatise on prudence (qq. 47 to 56)

Treatise on justice (qq. 57 to 122)

Treatise on fortitude and temperance (qq. 123 to 170)

Treatise on gratuitous graces (qq. 171 to 182)

Treatise on the states of life (qq. 183 to 189)

Content in general[edit]
The first part of the Summa is summed up in the premise that God governs the world as the
"universal first cause". God sways the intellect; he gives the power to know and impresses the species
intelligibiles on the mind, and he sways the will in that he holds the good before it as aim, creating
the virtus volendi. "To will is nothing else than a certain inclination toward the object of the volition which
is the universal good." God works all in all, but so that things also themselves exert their proper
efficiency. Here the Areopagitic ideas of the graduated effects of created things play their part in St.
Thomas's thought. The second part of the Summa (two parts, Prima Secundae and Secunda
Secundae) follows this complex of ideas. Its theme is man's striving for the highest end, which is the
blessedness of the visio beata. Here, St. Thomas develops his system of ethics, which has its root
in Aristotle.
In a chain of acts of will, man strives for the highest end. They are free acts, insofar as man has in
himself the knowledge of their end (and therein the principle of action). In that the will wills the end, it
wills also the appropriate means, chooses freely and completes the consensus. Whether the act is
good or evil depends on the end. The "human reason" pronounces judgment concerning the character
of the end; it is, therefore, the law for action. Human acts, however, are meritorious insofar as they
promote the purpose of God and his honor.
By repeating a good action, man acquires a moral habit or a quality that enables him to do the good
gladly and easily. This is true, however, only of the intellectual and moral virtues (which St. Thomas
treats after the manner of Aristotle); the theological virtues are imparted by God to man as a
"disposition", from which the acts here proceed; while they strengthen, they do not form it. The
"disposition" of evil is the opposite alternative. An act becomes evil through deviation from the reason
and from divine moral law. Therefore, sin involves two factors: its substance (or matter) is lust; in form,
however, it is deviation from the divine law.
Sin has its origin in the will, which decides (against reason) for a "changeable good". Since, however,
the will also moves the other powers of man, sin has its seat in these too. By choosing such a lower

good as its end, the will is misled by self-love, so that this works as cause in every sin. God is not the
cause of sin since, on the contrary, he draws all things to himself; but from another side, God is the
cause of all things, so he is efficacious also in sin as actio but not as ens. The devil is not directly the
cause of sin, but he incites the imagination and the sensuous impulse of man (as men or things may
also do).
Sin is original sin. Adam's first sin passes through himself to all the succeeding race; because he is the
head of the human race and "by virtue of procreation human nature is transmitted and along with nature
its infection." The powers of generation are, therefore, designated especially as "infected". The thought
is involved here by the fact that St. Thomas, like other scholastics, believed in creationism; he therefore
taught that souls are created by God. Two things, according to St. Thomas, constituted man's
righteousness in paradise the justitia originalis, or the harmony of all man's powers before they were
blighted by desire, and the possession of the gratis gratum faciens (the continuous, indwelling power of
good). Both are lost through original sin, which, in form, is the "loss of original righteousness." The
consequence of this loss is the disorder and maiming of man's nature, which shows itself in "ignorance;
malice, moral weakness, and especially inconcupiscentia, which is the material principle of original sin."
The course of thought here is as follows: when the first man transgressed the order of his nature
appointed by nature and grace, he (and with him the human race) lost this order. This negative state is
the essence of original sin. From it follow an impairment and perversion of human nature in which
thenceforth lower aims rule, contrary to nature, and release the lower element in man.
Since sin is contrary to the divine order, it is guilt and subject to punishment. Guilt and punishment
correspond to each other; and since the "apostasy from the invariable good which is infinite," fulfilled by
man, is unending, it merits everlasting punishment.
God works even in sinners to draw them to the end by "instructing through the law and aiding by
grace." The law is the "precept of the practical reason." As the moral law of nature, it is the participation
of the reason in the all-determining "eternal reason"; but since man falls short in his appropriation of this
law of reason, there is need of a "divine law"; and since the law applies to many complicated relations,
the practicae dispositiones of the human law must be laid down.
The divine law consists of an old and a new. Insofar as the old divine law contains the moral law of
nature, it is universally valid; what there is in it, however, beyond this is valid only for the Jews. The new
law is "primarily grace itself" and so a "law given within"; "a gift superadded to nature by grace," but not
a "written law." In this sense, as sacramental grace, the new law justifies. It contains, however, an
"ordering" of external and internal conduct and so regarded is, as a matter of course, identical with both
the old law and the law of nature. The consilia show how one may attain the end "better and more
expediently" by full renunciation of worldly goods.

Since man is sinner and creature, he needs grace to reach the final end. The "first cause" alone is able
to reclaim him to the "final end." This is true after the fall, although it was needful before. Grace is, on
one side, "the free act of God", and, on the other side, the effect of this act, the gratia infusa or gratia
creata, a habitus infusus that is instilled into the "essence of the soul," "a certain gift of disposition,
something supernatural proceeding from God into man." Grace is a supernatural ethical character
created in man by God, which comprises in itself all good, both faith and love.
Justification by grace comprises four elements: "the infusion of grace, the influencing of free will toward
God through faith, the influencing of free will respecting sin, and the remission of sins." It is a
"transmutation of the human soul," and takes place "instantaneously". A creative act of God enters,
which, however, executes itself as a spiritual motive in a psychological form corresponding to the nature
of man. Semipelagian tendencies are far removed from St. Thomas. In that man is created anew, he
believes and loves, and now, sin is forgiven. Then begins good conduct; grace is the "beginning of
meritorious works." Aquinas conceives of merit in the Augustinian sense: God gives the reward for that
toward which he himself gives the power. Man can never of himself deserve the prima gratis,"
nor meritum de congruo (by natural ability; cf. R. Seeberg, Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte, ii. 105
106, Leipsic, 1898).
After thus stating the principles of morality, in the Secunda Secundae, St. Thomas comes to a minute
exposition of his ethics according to the scheme of the virtues. The conceptions of faith and love are of
much significance in the complete system of St. Thomas. Man strives toward the highest good with the
will or through love; but since the end must first be "apprehended in the intellect," knowledge of the end
to be loved must precede love; "because the will can not strive after God in perfect love unless the
intellect have true faith toward him." Inasmuch as this truth that is to be known is practical, it first incites
the will, which then brings the reason to "assent"; but since, furthermore, the good in question is
transcendent and inaccessible to man by himself, it requires the infusion of a supernatural "capacity" or
"disposition" to make man capable of faith as well as love. Accordingly, the object of both faith and love
is God, involving also the entire complex of truths and commandments that God reveals, insofar as they
in fact relate to God and lead to him. Thus, faith becomes recognition of the teachings and precepts of
the Scriptures and the Church ("the first subjection of man to God is by faith"). The object of faith,
however, is, by its nature, object of love; therefore, faith comes to completion only in love ("by love is
the act of faith accomplished and formed").
Treatise on Law
According to Question 90, Article Four of the Second Part of the Summa, law "is nothing else than an
ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him who has care of the community, and
promulgated." All law comes from the eternal law of Divine Reason that governs the universe, which is
understood and participated in by rational beings (such as men and angels) as the natural law. The

natural law, when codified and promulgated, is the human law. In addition to the human law, dictated by
reason, man also has the divine law, which, according to Question 91, is dictated through revelation,
that man may be "directed how to perform his proper acts in view of his last end," "that man may know
without any doubt what he ought to do and what he ought to avoid," because "human law could not
sufficiently curb and direct interior acts," and since "human law cannot punish or forbid all evil deeds:
since while aiming at doing away with all evils, it would do away with many good things, and would
hinder the advance of the common good, which is necessary for human intercourse." Human law is not
all-powerful; it cannot govern a man's conscience, nor prohibit all vices, nor can it force all men to act
according to its letter, rather than its spirit. Furthermore, it is possible that an edict can be issued
without any basis in law as defined in Question 90; in this case, men are under no compulsion to act,
save as it helps the common good. This separation between law and acts of force also allows men to
depose tyrants, or those who flout the natural law; while removing an agent of the law is contrary to the
common good and the eternal law of God, which orders the powers that be, removing a tyrant is lawful
as he has ceded his claim to being a lawful authority by acting contrary to law.