CHAPTER 7

RECONNAISSANCE
The tactical concepts of Soviet ground forces
require timely, accurate, and continuous information
on the enemy, terrain, and weather. Reconnaissance, as
defined by the Soviets, is the collection of information
about the location, activity, disposition, composition,
size, armament, combat readiness, and intentions of
the enemy. The Soviets recognize that reconnaissance
will be met by enemy countermeasures and deception.
They employ multiple, overlapping collection means
to insure success of their reconnaissance efforts.

Principles of Soviet Reconnaissance

* Aggressiveness. The decisive actions and initiative used by commanders and headquarters
to obtain necessary information by all means
available.
* Continuity. The conduct of reconnaissance at
all times regardless of the intensity of combat,
time of day, or weather conditions. Established
contact with the enemy must not be broken and
observation must be continuously maintained.
* Timeliness. The gathering and reporting of
reconnaissance information in sufficient time to
counter enemy actions.
* Reliability. The degree to which the intelligence information accurately portrays the
enemy situation. This involves verifying the
intelligence with data from other sources and
assigning additional reconnaissance missions
to confirm or deny the information.
* Accuracy. The accurate determination of
coordinates of important enemy targets such as
missile installations, nuclear capable artillery,
nuclear storage sites, etc.

ELEMENTS USED IN RECONNAISSANCE

The effective ranges of the reconnaissance means at
front level vary at each level of command. These ranges
are also dependent on weather and terrain.
Aerial reconnaissance by high performance aircraft
normally is conducted by aviation units at front and
army level. Aviation units conduct visual, photo, and
electronic intercept and direction-finding reconnaissance missions. Ranges of reconnaissance aircraft vary.
Missions of 350 to 400 km usually are flown bypairs of
aircraft to support armies or divisions. Long-range
missions in excess of 400 km also are flown in support

offront operations. Visual reconnaissance is a secondary mission of all aircraft in the divisional tactical area.
In-flight observations are transmitted to the maneuver
elements on the tactical air net.
Helicopters flying in the vicinity of the FEBA depend
on local air superiority. When air superiority is denied,
helicopters are used to emplace observation posts or
reconnaissance patrols rather than perform as air
reconnaissance platforms. All helicopters performing
any missions may be expected to pass tactical information to those headquarters and units with whom they
have radio communications.
From front to regiment, there are chemical defense
units which monitor nuclear and chemical contamination. Chemical defense troops from these units
provide direct combat support to the maneuver units
down to company level. Equipped with radiologicalchemical reconnaissance vehicles, these troops
monitor radiation and chemical agents and mark
contaminated areas. Helicopters or fixed-wing aircraft
also may conduct NBC reconnaissance.
Soviet artillery from front to division has organic
target acquisition units which obtain and transmit
meteorological and topographic information. The
division artillery regiment has a target acquisition
battery which gathers information from a topographic
survey platoon, sound/flash ranging platoon, a reconnaissance platoon, a surveillance radar section, and a
meteorological section.
Engineer units fromfront to regimental level maybe
used in reconnaissance detachments. Engineer
specialists normally accompany maneuver unit reconnaissance patrols. The Soviets are particularly aware of
the need for engineer intelligence to assist in maintaining a rapid rate of advance. The reconnaissance
resources of the division's combat engineer battalion
also include mine detection equipment and the means
for detailed bank and bed survey of water obstacles.
Airborne or airmobile forces may be employed
behind enemy lines to locate enemy headquarters,
communications systems, and nuclear weapons. They
also may be given the mission to attack these targets.
Radio intercept and radio direction finding are the
primary electronic means of gathering enemy intelligence. Radio intercept is the ability to monitor and
understand message content. Radio direction finding
is designed to locate broadcast stations.
Medical reconnaissance is conducted to identify
areas potentially dangerous to health, including the
presence of biological agents.

FM 100-2-1

Rear services officers reconnoiter and establish

observation posts to facilitate recovery and repair of
damaged equipment, to identify sites for forward
supply points, and to determine local sources of
supply.

CONTROL OF
RECONNAISSANCE ELEMENTS
Soviet divisions and regiments have dedicated
reconnaissance organizations, i.e., a reconnaissance
battalion for the division and a reconnaissance
company for the regiment. These units gather and
produce intelligence which will assist the accomplishment of the division and the regimental mission. At
division, reconnaissance elements are controlled by
the chief of reconnaissance and supported by a small
staff. The division's long-range reconnaissance
company can operate up to 100 km forward of the
main body; other elements of the battalion operate up
to 50 km forward. Regimental reconnaissance
company elements may operate up to 25 km forward
and closer once contact is established.
During tactical movement, a divisional reconnaissance battalion usually moves one or more hours
ahead of leading elements of the division. The division
normally moves on two or more routes and the reconnaissance battalion organization depends on the
division formation. The battalion may form one or two
reconnaissance groups and several patrols; however,
this depends on the combat situation and the overall
mission of the division. Even when the reconnaissance
battalion advances on more than one route, movements of each element are controlled by the battalion
commander. At each successive objective, he establishes a reconnaissance base from which he directs the
employment of reconnaissance groups and patrols
operating in advance of the base. Radio contact is maintained with the division headquarters. The battalion
commander is expected to be able to implement supplementary reconnaissance missions or to make
changes in the direction or rate of advance. He is also
expected to request additional support from the main
body if his unit becomes too heavily engaged with an
enemy unit.
Generally, elements of the battalion seek to avoid
sustained combat with an enemy force. They cross
open areas at high speeds and cross closed and broken
terrain by bounds, moving from one vantage point to
another. At the vantage points, they may dismount
from the vehicles to get better observation. Upon
contact with an enemy element, reconnaissance
subunits attempt to use feints and flanking maneuvers
7-2

to determine the strength, composition, and disposition of enemy elements. Whenever possible, reconnaissance subunits bypass enemy groupings and
continue the advance along the prescribed route.
Engineer reconnaissance detachments and
chemical defense specialists usually accompany reconnaissance patrols at division and regiment. Other
specialists accompany reconnaissance patrols as
needed.

Typical Reconnaissance Patrol Tasks

* Identify, locate, and report on enemy headquarters, nuclear weapon systems, troop locations, communication centers, and movement
of enemy units.
-," Determine the disposition of enemy defenses,
locate enemy boundaries and artillery positions,
iand provide topographical information on
(approaches to enemy defensive positions.
* Report enemy emplacement of demolitions
and the location of minefields.
* Determine obstacle-crossing sites and provide
hydrographic information on water obstacles.
* Monitor areas of suspected NBC contamination.
SIdentify routes for advance, withdrawal, and
lateral communications.
* Identify key terrain.
.* Identify possible sites for friendly communication installations.
-

RECONNAISSANCE ORGANIZATIONS
To obtain timely intelligence Soviet commanders
sometimes organize and dispatch reconnaissance
groups. These groups may be formed by the commander from army through regiment. A reconnaissance group is a temporary tactical subunit formed for
the execution of a specified reconnaissance mission.
The composition of such groups, usually reinforced
platoons or companies, depends on the situation and
the assigned mission. In an attack, a division could form
a reconnaissance group consisting of a motorized rifle
company, reinforced with a platoon of tanks and
engineer and NBC reconnaissance squads. Reconnaissance groups conduct reconnaissance by observation
as well as by more active methods such as ambushes
and raids. In an extreme case, they may destroy covering subunits of a withdrawing enemy. Along with their
primary reconnaissance mission, they may be assigned
missions to destroy enemy means of nuclear attack and

FM 100-2-1

to seize and hold important terrain features in the

enemy rear until the arrival of the main attacking force.
A reconnaissance detachment is a temporary
tactical subunit of reinforced company or battalion
strength. The basic subunit (motorized rifle or tank) is
almost always reinforced with elements of the other
arm to make it a balanced combat force. Depending on
the mission, specialized reconnaissance elements such
as artillery, engineers, or NBC may be assigned or
attached. A reconnaissance detachment of battalion
strength is assigned a zone approximately 7 kilometers
wide and 35 kilometers in depth, or it maybe assigned
an axis of advance. A reconnaissance detachment fulfills its mission by observation, by ambush, and by
direct attack if necessary.
A separate reconnaissancepatrol is a temporary
tactical subunit composed of a reinforced squad or a
platoon. It normally is assigned a specific objective
and/or route instead of a zone. A squad-sized patrol
may operate away from its parent unit at a distance of8
kilometers during the day and 3 kilometers at night,
while a platoon-sized patrol may operate at a distance
of up to 15 kilometers during the day and up to 5
kilometers at night. A separate reconnaissance patrol
accomplishes its mission by observation, but may
engage in limited combat if necessary. Limited combat
in this case means that the patrol may use reconnaissance by fire to determine enemy positions when no
other means are available. The separate reconnaissance patrol also is frequently used to capture
prisoners for intelligence exploitation.
Combat reconnaissancepatrolsin reinforced small
subunit strength are employed to attack known or

suspected enemy positions to gain information. Their

mission is to cause the enemy to react and thereby
reveal his dispositions, strength, and fire plan. The
patrol conducts its reconnaissance byfeints or demonstrations employing fire and maneuver against actual
or suspected enemy positions. These positions
generally are assigned to the patrol as reconaissance
objectives by the controlling headquarters.
A reconnaissance in force is employed when
ordinary air and ground reconnaissance activities fail
to provide sufficient intelligence on which to base a
plan of attack. Like the combat reconnaissance patrol,
the reconnaissance in force is intended to force the
enemy to expose his defensive system. Its specific
objectives are to fix the true trace of enemy defense
and to locate troop concentrations and weapons; to
determine the enemy defensive fire system and the
types and locations of fortifications and obstacles; to
locate tactical reserves, boundaries between units, and
secondary troop dispositions; to capture prisoners and
documents; and to seize and hold important objectives
which permit surveillance of the defensive position
until the main force attack takes place. The subunit
which conducts a reconnaissance in force for a
division is normally a reinforced battalion and for regiment, a reinforced company. Reconnaissance in force
is conducted to convince the enemy that an all-out
attack is under way. The attack is made on a comparatively wide frontage and is accompanied by feints
and demonstrations by subunits in contact in other
sectors. An artillerypreparation normally precedes the
assault.

7-3

CHAPTER 8

FIRE SUPPORT
CONCEPT
The Soviet concept of fire support embraces all
combat support provided to the ground-gaining arms
by rocket and artillery troops and aviation using
conventional ammunition. Nuclear fires are excluded
from this concept. The Soviets consider nuclear
weapons to be so powerful that they cannot be said to
support the combat operations of the ground-gaining
arms. Instead, they constitute a separate and independent element of combat power which can accomplish the missions of destroying major enemy combat
formations, command and control facilities, and
logistics centers.
Even though Soviet military doctrine distinguishes
between fire support and nuclear attack, the two are
closely related. First, fire support units must plan and
deliver nuclear strikes. Second, they must adjust the
fire plan to take into account the effects of nuclear
strikes on the enemy. Finally, nuclear strikes greatly
affect the tempo of combat activity, which, in turn,
influences the type of fire support required (mobile
fire support systems, such as combat aircraft, will be
more in demand) and the kind of logistics support
needed (fuel and ammunition).
Artillery support is planned and coordinated by the
chief of rocket troops and artillery (CRTA) assigned to
the staff of the supported maneuver element at each
level of command. (At regimental level, the artillery
staff officer is called the chief of artillery.) The CRTA is
not the commander of the organic field artillery unit.
Air support normally is planned by the aviation commander and his staff atfrontandarmylevel and coordinated by air representatives at lower levels of command (in some cases down to maneuver battalion)
who function as forward air controllers.

FIRE SUPERIORITY
Fire superiority is a firepower advantage over the
enemy in the course of a given battle or operation. Fire
superiority is a unit's ability to execute its own fire missions successfully while suppressing substantive
counterfire by the enemy. The Soviets believe that fire
superiority is relatively assured for the side'that opens
fire first; achieves surprise; renders highly accurate,
effective fire; masses fires effectively either through
maneuver by fire or maneuver of the fire support
means. To achieve and maintain fire superiority, a
Soviet unit maintains continuous fire on the fire support means of the enemy, especially his artillery.

In the offense, fire superiority is achieved by fire

preparation and normally is maintained during the
entire battle. In the defense, fire superiority may be
achieved in selected sectors for a given period of
time-for example, in a sector selected for a counterpreparation or a counterattack.

TARGET DAMAGE CRITERIA

Target damage is the effect of fires on a given military
target and results in total, partial, or temporary loss of
the target's combat effectiveness.

Categories of Target Damage

Destruction. A destroyed target has completely lost its combat effectiveness. Prepared
defenses are considered destroyed when they
are no longer usable without major reconstruction. A point target is considered destroyed
when there is a 90 percent probability that it has
suffered serious damage. An area target is considered destroyed when it is highly probable (90
percent) that no less than 50 percent of the
target's subelements or no less than 50 percent
of the target area has suffered serious damage.
Suppression. A suppressed target has
suffered sufficient damage to lose its combat
effectiveness temporarily or to restrict its ability
to maneuver or effect command and control. An
area target is considered to be suppressed when
it is highly probable (90 percent) that no less
than 25 to 30 percent of the target's subelements, or 25 to 30 percent of the target's
area, has suffered serious damage.
Harassment. Harassment fire is conducted
sporadically to prevent troop movement in the
open and to lower the morale of the enemy.

PHASES OF FIRE SUPPORT

Offensive fire support is divided into four phases: fire
support for a force's movement forward, fire preparation, fires in support of the attack, and fire
accompaniment.
Fire support for a force's movement forward
consists of long-range fires designed to protect a force
moving from an assembly area to the line of departure.
8-1

FM 100-2-1

Firepreparationfor the attack or counterattack is

the combat support rendered by rocket forces,
artillery, and combat aircraft before the attack by
maneuver elements. Fires for the preparation are preplanned and may be delivered simultaneously or
sequentially. In the offense, the preparation immediately precedes an attack. It also could be used before
the introduction of second echelon or reserve forces.
In the defense, it is used before the execution of a
counterattack The preparation is intended to destroy
and to suppress enemyweapon systems, command and
control elements, and troops in the tactical and
immediate operational depth of the enemy's defenses.
The Soviets strive to achieve fire superiority early in
order to deny any real opposition by the enemy.
Fire preparation consists of artillery and air preparation and includes fires from rocket forces, artillery
(including mortars), combat aircraft, and sometimes
tanks and other direct fire weapons. Targets for the
preparation phase are allocated (depending on the
target's type, dimensions, degree of fortification,
mobility, and depth in the enemy's defenses) to rocket
forces, artillery, or aviation.
The length and organization of the preparation will
depend on the nature of the enemy's defenses, the type
and density of fire support means being used for the
preparation, the role of nuclear strikes in the attack
plan, and the nature of the ground attack. It could last
up to 50 minutes or longer or it could be repeated
against well-fortified, deeply echeloned defenses.
The preparation consists of intense artillery and air
strikes against nuclear delivery systems, artillery and
mortar batteries, antitank weapons, enemy
strongpoints, and command and control centers.
Firesin supportof the attack are rendered by rocket
and artillery forces and combat aircraft during the
maneuver unit's assault on enemy defenses. Fire support involves the destruction or suppression of enemy
troops and weapon systems forward of friendly attacking troops. This phase is designed to prevent the
enemy from restoring fire, command and control, and
observation systems that were disrupted during the
preparation phase. Fires continue to suppress enemy
troop activity and weapon systems and to maintain fire
superiority, thereby facilitating the forward movement of assaulting tank and motorized rifle troops.
The fire in support of the attackphase is planned and
organized at army, division, and sometimes regimental
level. It starts immediately after the end of the fire
preparation and continues at least until Soviet attacking units have overrun enemy front-line battalions.
Fireaccompanimentis rendered by rocket, artillery,
and combat aviation forces to maneuver forces attack8-2

ing in the depth of the enemy's defenses. Fire

accompaniment includes artillery, rocket, and air
strikes against troops and weapon systems opposing
the attacker's advance as well as against enemy
reserves deep in the rear. During this phase, previously
established fire superiority must be maintained. Fire
strikes must destroy nuclear delivery systems, enemy
aircraft remaining on the ground, artillery units, command and control centers, antitank weapon systems,
and enemy troops. Fires must keep the enemy from
using his reserves for counterattacks and must support
the commitment of the attacker's second echelon
forces to insure a high rate of speed.
Rocket, artillery, and combat aviation units coordinate mutually supporting fires with each other and
with the supported maneuver unit. The fire
accompaniment phase begins with the end of the fire
support phase and continues until the supported
maneuver forces have accomplished their missions.
The Soviets consider fire support (artillery and air)
the most decisive element in modern combat. They
stress the need to integrate all means of fire support
closely and to execute a well-coordinated fire support
plan throughout the depth of the enemy's defenses.

FIRE SUPPORT ZONES

The Soviets distinguish between close and longrange fire support zones. The close fire support zone
extends as far as the range of the attacker's direct fire
weapons-approximately 3 kilometers into the
enemy's defenses. Domination of the close fire support
battle is important to ensure the destruction of
forward defending troops and their supporting
weapons.
The depth of the long-range fire support zone has
increased greatly since World' War II because of
improved mobility of modern weapon systems and
combat fighting vehicles. In the tactical context (division and lower), the long-range fire support zone
extends out to the limit of a division's subsequent (or
final) objective. Domination of the long-range fire support battle is very important today because of critical
targets such as nuclear weapons and delivery systems
deep in the enemy's rear area.

AIR SUPPORT
Air support is extremely important for maintaining a
high rate of advance. Maneuver units could outrun
their artillery support. Artillery units could outrun
their logistic support. In any case, air support is needed
to cover and support the advance of maneuver units.

FM 100-2-1

In the past decade, the Soviets have tried to integrate

air support into the total fire support effort. Major field
exercises feature joint air and ground operations. The
quantity and quality of fire support means available to
the commander have been increased in recent years.
Helicopters have become increasingly important in
execution of both the close and long-range fire support battles and have begun noticeably to influence
Soviet thinking about the tactics of ground combat.
Combat helicopters provide fire support to tank and
motorized rifle units during both the offense and
defense. Helicopters are used also for reconnaissance
and heliborne operations, as observation platforms for
artillery forward observers and as mobile means of
control and communications.
The establishment of army aviation has given ground
maneuver formations a vertical dimension. The helicopter now provides combined arms and tank armies
with a highly maneuverable, versatile platform for
reconnaissance, command and control, and fire support. General-purpose and attack helicopter units can
move with armies and divisions at the high rates of
advance they will seek to achieve in conducting combined arms operations in depth.

FIRE SUPPORT ASSETS

Divisional and nondivisional artillery units are being
expanded. Older, towed howitzers are being replaced
by self-propelled versions. A 122-mm howitzer battalion is being added to the tank regiment of the tank
and motorized rifle divisions. The addition of largecaliber, self-propelled howitzers and long-range
multiple rocket launchers to the artillery available to
army and front commanders greatly enhances their
ability to provide area and counterbattery fire support
to subordinate divisions as they maneuver at considerable depth in the enemy's rear.
The increasing densities of artillery enable entire
battalions to fire missions that were previouslyfired by
individual batteries. Improvements in target acquisition radar allow the Soviets to achieve greater surprise
and shorter, more intense fire preparations. Fire
missions may be initiated without registration from
battalions and batteries. Artillery pieces may be laid
using shorter, emergency occupation procedures.
Soviet artillery battalions are beginning to receive
electronic field artillery computers. Automation of
gunnery computations should help Soviet artillerymen
to reduce their mission times and to deploy their firing
batteries with more flexibility.
The size of helicopter forces has been expanding at a
constant rate. Older combat helicopters are being

replaced with newer models equipped with ATGMs

that have greater standoffrange. Newer attack helicopters can maneuver after missile launch. Assault helicopter tactics are being more closely aligned with
ground maneuver unit tactics, while fixed-wing aviation is being reorganized to provide more flexible
employment.
Third-generation high-performance aircraft with
improved avionics, ECM-ECCM equipment, and
increased combat radius and payload have replaced
older models. The Soviet Union has in production or
development precision-guided munitions (PGM)
similar to those deployed by US forces.
The deployment of a wide array of mobile and semimobile air defense missile and gun systems has given
ground formations greater freedom of maneuver,
while simultaneously freeing aircraft from air defense
missions for ground support roles.

TRENDS IN FIRE SUPPORT

Soviet fire support concepts are undergoing
considerable modification. The introduction of a
significant variety of modem equipment in a relatively
short time has raised command, control, and coordination problems. The need to improve interaction
between supporting and supported units is constantly
emphasized, as officers are exhorted to learn the
tactics and the capabilities of the unitswhich comprise
the combined arms team.
Present Soviet efforts are directed toward upgrading
employment procedures and personnel proficiency to
maximize the capabilities of new fire support assets.
The Soviet aim is to achieve ever greater rates of
advance and deeper penetrations into the enemy's
rear, while minimizing the enemy's capability to
release destructive power on attacking Soviet forces.
Soviet fire planning and execution are still
extremely centralized. While this could be an
advantage in the preparation and during fires in support of the attack, it could cause considerable difficulty
in the accompaniment phase.
The command and control system for air support is
even more centralized than that of the artillery. Communications are limited between air and ground commanders, especially below division level. This is true
even in attack helicopter units, where close coordination with ground units is critical. The Soviets
recognize the limitations of their present command
and control system. They are trying to improve communications equipment and coordination to enhance
the ground commander's influence over combat support assets.
8-3

CHAPTER 9

ARTILLERY SUPPORT
ARTILLERY ASSETS
In the Soviet ground forces, the branch of rocket
troops and artillery is responsible for the following:
* Surface-to-surface guided missiles and free flight
rockets of fronts, armies, and divisions.
* Field artillery (multiple rocket launchers, field
guns, howitzers, and mortars 120-mm and larger).
* Antitank artillery (See Chapter 10).
Motorized rifle units from division to battalion are
assigned their own organic field artillery element-an
artillery regiment to a division, an artillery battalion to
a regiment, and a mortar battery to a battalion. The
same is true of the tank division except that the tank
battalion has no organic artillery or mortar unit.
Both the motorized rifle and tank divisions are
assigned their own surface-to-surface missile (SSM)
battalion.
The combined arms army, and sometimes the tank
army, has an artillery regiment or brigade with at least
two long-range gun battalions and a howitzer battalion. The army usually has an SSM brigade and may
also have an MRL regiment.
A front would contain an artillery division made up
of several long-range gun and howitzer regiments/brigades, an MRL brigade, and at least one
antitank regiment/brigade. It may be supported by a
heavy artillery brigade in addition to the artillery division, A front would also have at least one SSM brigade.
(For more information on fire support organization,
see FM 100-2-3).
Allocation Procedures
The following are general procedures for the allocation of artillery by a higher headquarters to a maneuver
force for the execution of a given operation:
* Front and army normally allocate artillery battalions in accordance with the importance of the
missions to be carried out by armies and divisions.
.e A division will allocate some of its organic and
attached artillery to leading regiments.
* A regiment may attach some artillery to leading
maneuver battalions.
* Motorized rifle regiments in a division second
echelon normally retain their organic artillery.
* Second echelon divisional artillery may be
temporarily attached to first echelon divisions.
* Second echelon divisions, regiments, and battalions are not normally reinforced with additional
artillery until they are committed.

Organization for Combat

The command and organizational structure, which
insures flexibility in concentrating artillery fire, is
established by temporary, mission-oriented groupings.
Organizing artillery into army, divisional, and regimental artillery groups provides maneuver commanders continuous artillery support with the
required degree of centralized control. Artillery
groups usually consist of at least two battalions of
similar or mixed type units, to include field guns,
howitzers, and multiple rocket launchers. Command
and control of the group is provided by a designated
commander and staff, usually the commander and staff
of the artillery regiment or battalion which is the core
of the group.
Army Artillery Group (AAG). Front artillery
assets normally are allocated among committed
armies, proportionate to the importance of the
assigned tasks. When an army commander receives
front artillery assets, he decides, based on the concept
of the operation, what artillery will be suballocated to
his first echelon divisions. The division executing the
major army mission gets the most artillery. The remaining artillery battalions may be formed into an AAG
which will then assume the primary counterbattery
mission for the army.
Division Artillery Group (DAG). The division
commander also allocates artillery, resulting in the
formation of a DAG and several regimental artillery
groups. The division may organize more than one DAG
if necessary due to span of control, number of
battalions available, and assigned missions. The DAG
may vary in size from two to four battalions and is
employed in general support of the division. The DAG
assists the army with the counterbattery mission or, if
capable, may perform this mission itself.
Regimental Artillery Group (RAG). Regimental
artillery groups are formed from organic and attached
artillery and reinforcing nondivisional artillery battalions assigned to provide support to the first echelon
maneuver regiments. Normally RAGs are composed of
two to four artillery battalions and temporarily are
assigned the numerical designation of the supported
regiment. The RAG destroys targets that hinder the
advance of the attacking forces. An example of the
formation of artillery groups is illustrated on the
following page.

FM 100-2-1

Formation of Artillery Groups (Example)

- C,

_------

--

---

TO OTHER
ARMIES

4 BNS

TO OTHER
1st ECHELON
DIVISIONS

4 BNS

TO OTHER
1st ECHELON
REGIMENTS

NOTES:
1. The artillery division has 20 battalions of field guns, howitzers, and multiple rocket launchers.
2. In addition to its organic artillery division, the front may be allocated a heavy artillery brigade from the
Reserve of the Supreme High Command, but these assets are not likely to be suballocated to armies.
3. A first echelon division may receive artillery battalions from a second echelon division.
4. Antitank and SSM battalions are not normally included in artillery groups.
5. The regimental howitzer battalion is part of the RAG.
6. An artillery battalion or battery assigned to a RAG may be further allocated to amotorized rifle ortank
battalion.

9-2

FM 100-2-1

Artillery groups established for the defense are

normally maintained intact until the offense is
resumed Groups formed to support the offense are
generally dissolved or reorganized when the supported maneuver units enter the exploitation phase of
an operation. DAGs and RAGs are formed or dissolved
in accordance with plans and orders of higher headquarters. Through his CRTA, the division commander
may assign specific artillery units to provide support to
designated maneuver units. In a fluid situation, such as
in exploitation or pursuit, artillery support will be provided to lead maneuver units. Through the division
command and control net, the division commander
retains the ability to form new groups as the situation
may require. When groups are dissolved, army and
front assets may revert to centralized control to provide long-range reinforcement for divisional and regimental artillery.
An artillery battalion or battery assigned to a RAG
could be directed to support a maneuver battalion.
The release from centralized control wouldpermit the
artillery subunit to carry out missions in support of the
specific maneuver battalion while remaining subordinate to the RAG. Motorized rifle battalions also have a
significant organic capability in the mortar battery. Its
deployment is coordinated with that of other artillery
weapons, as authorized by the maneuver battalion
commander.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

At regiment and above, an artillery officer who plans
and coordinates artillery fires serves on the staff of
maneuver unit commanders. He is called the chief of
artillery at regiment and the chief rocket troops and
artillery (CRTA) at division and above. The artillery
staff officer (chief of artillery or CRTA) is responsible
for controlling the artillery units organic or attached to
his maneuver unit, although he does not command
them. The commander of the organic artillery unit
assigned to the maneuver unit is directly responsible
for the performance of his artillery unit.
At maneuver battalion level, the commander of an
attached artillery subunit acts as the fire support
coordinator to the battalion commander.
The division CRTA controls the division artillery
regiment (including the MRL battalion), the SSM
battalion, the AT battalion, and the ATGM batteries,
mortar batteries, and howitzer battalions of the
subordinate maneuver regiments, though he does not
command any of these units. The CRTA also has the
authority to inspect the artillery units in the division
and to hold them accountable for their technical
proficiency.
In combat, the artillery groups form the basic
framework for the control of artillery fires in the division. Decisions about the employment of artillery are
made on a centralized basis. The division commander,
with recommendations from his CRTA, exercises

The Role of the CRTA in the Motorized Rifle Division

DIVISION

ARTILLERY
COMMAND BATTERY

-ARTILLERY
REGIMENT

--

'

m
ATGM BATTERIES
OF THE MOTORIZED
RIFLE REGIMENTS

-m

mmmm

mmm

SSM
BATTALION

m -

m - m-

ANTITANK
BATTALION

MORTAR BATTERIES
OF THE MOTORIZED
RIFLE BATTALIONS

HOWITZER BATTALIONS
OF THE MOTORIZED
RIFLE AND TANK
REGIMENTS

NOTE: The CRTA coordinates the fires of all the above units through the command battery, though he
commands none of the units. The mortar batteries must satisfy the requirements of their battalion
commanders, and the howitzer battalions and ATGM batteries must satisfy the requirements of their
regimental commanders.

9-3

FM 100-2-1

control over all organic and allocated artillery within

the division. The following procedures are observed:
* The division commander specifies the artillery
organization for combat and the tasks to be carried out
by the artillery.
* The CRTA conducts and coordinates fire planning.
* Artillery commanders normally are collocated
with the commanders of the supported maneuver
force.
* The DAG commanders report directly to the
CRTA.
* RAG commanders report directly to the supported
maneuver regimental commander while retaining
cntact with the CRTA.
*o Artillery battery and battalion commanders keep
their supported maneuver commanders informed and
report to their controlling artillery headquarters.
The division CRTA coordinates the artillery fires of
the division through the command battery, though he
commands none of the units. The mortar batteries
must satisfy the requirements of their battalion commanders, and the artillery battalions and ATGM batteries must satisfy the requirements of their regimental
commanders.

Command Relationships
An attachedartillery battalion or battery is under the
operational control of the maneuver force commander. A supporting artillery battalion or battery
remains under the control of its parent artillery
organization, with its fires delegated to a particular
maneuver force.
An artillery battalion attached to a maneuver battalion takes its orders from the maneuver battalion
commander. Its batteries can be assigned to support
motorized rifle/tank companies, but the battalion still
can be called on to support the maneuver regiment
and to receive missions from the RAG commander.
A supporting battalion remains subordinate to the
parent artillery unit or the RAG; but, if it has no regimental missions, it will fire missions for the motorized
rifle or tank battalion that it is tasked to support. Its batteries, however, cannot be tasked separately to support
subordinate companies of the maneuver unit, even
though supporting and supported commanders may
be collocated. Thus, a supporting artillery battalion
will carry out missions for the maneuver battalion only
if the RAG commander permits or specifically directs
the action.
The fire plan of an attachedbattalion will reflect the
specific support of the battalion to which it is attached,
but the fire plan. of a supportingbattalion will reflect
9-4

the tasks of the motorized rifle regiment and its RAG.

The senior commander who allocates the artillery unit
can change the mission of attached or supporting
artillery during the course of combat. The period of
attachment normally will cover the time needed to
accomplish a particular tactical mission. Such a period
could vary from a matter of hours to several days.

Coordination and Communications

The artillery commander normally is collocated
with the commander of the maneuver unit he is supporting and thereby effects coordination face-to-face.
Provision also is made for the artillery commander to
enter the VHF (FM) command net of the supported
unit. Except when subunits have been detached for
special missions, artillery commanders retain rigid
control of the deployment ofweapons and observation
posts to provide continuous artillery support in all

phases of combat.
Radio and wire are the primary means of communication, although Soviet artillery units also use
messengers as well as visual and sound devices. By
regulation, communications are established from
senior to subordinate and from supporting unit to
supported unit.

Radio Communications of a
Division's Artillery Regiment

FM 100-2-1

Soviet artillery units may send radio traffic over supported unit command nets, artillery command nets,
and fire direction nets. Artillery group command nets
(e.g., RAG or DAG) have battalion commanders as
substations. Battalion nets have battery commanders
and the battalion command observation post as substations. Batteries have their own nets but can switch to
the battalion fire direction net if required. The battalion command observation post has direct radio
communications with battery firing positions on the
fire direction net.
Towed artillery units rely primarily on the R107
(VHF) portable radio for internal radio communications, whereas self-propelled units use the R123

Towed Artillery Battalion Radio Nets

(VHF) vehicular radio, which is installed in every

howitzer. At higher levels of command, longer-range
HF (AM) radios such as the R130 are also used for
artillery command communications.
The Soviets use wire communications whenever
subunits remain in one location for any length of
time-normally in assembly areas of defensive
positions. To provide redundancy, artillery wire nets
normally parallel the wire nets of the supported units.
Soviet subunits also use pyrotechnics, especially in
coordinating prearranged artillery fire with the
advance of attacking maneuver forces. Signal flags are
used to acknowledge fire commands at the gun position, for convoy control, and for signaling between the

I I II

II

II

FOP

ARTY RECON

BTRY FIRING POSITION

LOP

FRED)

BTRY

FIRE
DIRECTION

I
COMMAND NET
OF SUPPORTED
MANEUVER UNIT

I
ARTY REGT/GROUP
COMMAND NET

NBC AIR
WARNING
BROADCASTS

BNCOP

NOTE: Inself-propelled battalions equipped with the new artillery command and reconnaissance vehicles
(ACRV), the R123 vehicular VHF radio is used in place of the R107. Besides replacing R107s shown here,
the R123 is also found ineach self-propelled howitzer. The LOP normally communicates with the BN COP,
-but may also communicate with the BTRY COP.

9-5

FM 100-2-1

firing point and the truck park (prime movers and

ammunition carriers) in a battery firing position.

FIRE CONTROL
AND TARGET INTELLIGENCE
Observation Posts
Artillery fire is controlled through a network of
observation posts. The network of artillery observation
posts established in a division zone may include
command observation, forward observation, mobile
observation, lateral observation, dummy observation,
close-in, and alternate observation posts. The number
and type of observation posts depend on the mission.
During high-speed offensive operations, personnel in
these posts often operate out of armored command
and reconnaissance vehicles. The most important
types of observation posts are discussed below.
The command observationpost (COP) serves as
both an observation post and command post. The COP
is located where the artillery commander can observe
his zone or sector of fire, study the target area and
terrain, follow the progress of friendly forces, and
direct or coordinate artillery fires. In most cases it will
be collocated with the forward command posts of the
supported maneuver unit commander.
The COP normally is manned by the artillery
commander, and fire direction, communications, and
reconnaissance personnel. Although both battalions
and batteries have fire direction centers (FDCs) at the
firing position, fire direction computations normally
are accomplished at the COP and the FDC
simultaneously.
Artillery commanders may establish one or more
forward observationposts (FOP) to supplement the
COP. At the battery and battalion levels, the FOPs are
manned by the headquarters platoon leader, a scout,
and a radioman. A FOP may be located with the supported unit commander or with one of the advance
maneuver elements. FOPs are employed especially in
the offense, during combat in the depth of the enemy's
defenses. When the COP can no longer cover its zone
of responsibility-or if the commander displaces,
causing the COP to displace-the FOP assures continuous close fire support for the maneuver forces.
A mobile observation post (MOP) may function
either as a COP or FOP. The Soviets have a number of
artillery command and reconnaissance vehicles
(ACRV) that are used as MOPs. The crew of the MOP
consists of five men: commander, driver/mechanic,
RTO/gunner, navigator, and rangefinder operator.
The vehicle contains day/night observation and range9-6

finding equipment, topographic survey equipment,

artillery fire direction computer equipment (manual
and electronic), and communications equipment. The
topographic survey equipment provides constant position data on the vehicle's location. Communication
equipment consists of crew intercom, two radio sets,
two telephones, and two reels of wire. The latter are
used to establish communications with supplemental
observation posts that are established by the crew of
the mobile observation posts, using instruments
carried in the vehicle.
In the offense, the mobile observationpost advances
closely behind lead motorized rifle or tank subunits,
conducting reconnaissance and fire missions on the
move or during short halts. During a march, the mobile
observation post moves as part of an artillery reconnaissance party in the lead security element of the supported motorized rifle or tank unit. In the defense,
mobile observation posts may form part of the combat
outposts in the forward security zone.
A lateral observationpost (LOP) is established in
addition to the COP or FOP so that the same sector of
the battlefield can be observed from two of the
observation posts. At battalion level and higher
artillery echelons, the LOP is used for .accurately
locating targets, reference points, and registration
points and for adjusting fire. LOPs also are used to
study enemy defenses, dispositions, and activity. The
LOP also is used for observing high-burst or center-ofimpact registrations. The controlling observation post
is usually the COP, and the LOP is situated on the flank
in a position that will give good observation of the
artillery unit's zone of responsibility.
A dummy observationpost may be used to confuse
the enemy as to the actual position of the COP. After
the COP is established and functioning, scout
observers construct a dummy COP. They use materials
found on the battlefield to simulate radio antennas and
other equipment. Although field training regulations
call for a dummy observation post, it normally is used
only in static situations.

Reconnaissance and Target Acquisition

Observation posts frequently combine several target
intelligence capabilities (i.e., flash ranging and visual
observation). Lone ground observers can be located in
trees or buildings. Air observers may use light observation helicopters such as the Mi-2/HOPLITE.
Artillery reconnaissance patrols are used primarily
to locate enemy artillery units, especially those capable
of nuclear strikes. The patrols may set up observation
posts behind enemy lines to adjust the artillery fire.

FM 100-2-1

They also report on enemy organization and

deployment. Intelligence data from other observation
posts and stations are transmitted to the COP, which
apparently relays them to the firing position.
A target acquisition battery is organic to the Soviet
division artillery regiment. This battery and the division reconnaissance battalion provide the bulk of the
division's artillery intelligence. The battery subunits
include the following:
* Radar section. (This has a mortar- and artillerylocating capability.)
* Sound ranging platoon.
* Surveillance radar section.
* Reconnaissance platoon.
* Topographic survey platoon.
* Meteorological survey section.
The sound ranging platoon is capable of operating a
six-microphone sound ranging base that can locate
targets up to a range of 20 kilometers in a zone 6 to 8
kilometers wide.

EQUIPMENT
Soviet field artillery is subdivided into field guns,
howvitzers, mortars, and multiple rocket launchers.
Until the mid-1970s, Soviet field artillery was all towed,
with the exception of multiple rocket launchers,
which are mostly truck-mounted. Towed guns are
lightweight, low-cost, and simple. Their disadvantages
are lack of cross-country mobility and absence of gun
crew protection against nuclear, chemical, or conventional counterbattery strikes. The Soviets continue to
bring self-propelled weapons into their field artillery
inventory.
Fieldguns are used by the Soviets for* Killing troops in the open.
* Destroying buildings above ground level.
* Engaging of rapidly moving targets.
* Bombarding of distant targets such as artillery batteries, headquarters, and columns moving in the rear
areas.

* Destroying tactical nuclear delivery means.

Howitzers are used by the Soviets for hitting indirect
targets and for destroying or neutralizing enemy defensive positions. Tank and motorized rifle divisions have
three howitzer battalions in their artillery regiment.
Each motorized rifle regiment and some tank regiments have one battalion of howitzers. This enables
the regimental commander to engage targets of opportunity quickly.
Tracked, self-propelled (SP) howitzers have been
introduced in recent years, considerably enhancing
the Soviet artillery's ability to give continuous support

to motorized rifle and tank regiments in a conventional, nuclear, or chemical environment. The SP
howitzers are equipped with filtration and overpressure NBC protection systems. Ammunition resupply
for self-propelled howitzers is likely to be limited as
long as they have to depend on wheeled trucks for
logistic support.
The self-propelled howitzers are complemented by
a new, tracked, artillery command and reconnaissance
vehicle (ACRV). There are two of these ACRVs in each
battery, one for the battery command observation post
(COP) and one for the battery fire direction center
(FDC). Two ACRVs are also assigned to the battalion
headquarters. One serves as the battalion COP and one
as the battalion FDC. A surveillance variant of the BMP
is also in service with the artillery.
The Soviets use multiple rocket launchers(MRLs)
to deliver strikes at decisive moments in a battle. The
MRL is an excellent area coverage weapon. The area
covered by a salvo and its rapid ripple fire make it an
excellent delivery system for chemical agents.
Each motorized rifle battalion has an organic 120mm mortar battery. These indirect fire support
weapons are also used to assist the regiment in accomplishing its mission. For more information on fire support equipment, see FM 100-2-3.

ARTILLERY AMMUNITION
Conventional shells consist of HE, fragmentation,
and HE fragmentation types. The HE shells are used for
destroying fortifications. Fragmentation shells are
intended mainly for attacking personnel and equipment in the open. The HE fragmentation shells are
fitted with fuzes for either instantaneous or delayed
detonation and are the standard projectiles for all
howitzers and guns. A time-delay fuze is also fitted for
airburst effects.
The impact area of fragments from one HE
fragmentation shell are* 122mm: 800 square meters.
* 152mm: 950 square meters.
The sizes of craters caused by one HE shell can vary
according to the surface struck, its condition, and also
the type of fuze. These are average dimensions for
point detonation fuzes striking flat ground:
* 122mm: 1.5 meters at widest point and 0.5 meter
maximum depth.
* 152mm: 1.5 meters at widest point and 1.5 meters
maximum depth.
Field artillery pieces (152-mm and smaller) have an
antitank capability, and about 10 percent of their
combat load may be armor-defeating ammunition.
9-7

FM 100-2-1

Smoke is used to obscure the view from observation

posts and fire positions, especially antitank positions.
Smoke shells are most likely to be used when the wind
is blowing towards or across the enemy position.
Smoke is also used for marking enemy positions, and
deceiving the enemy by concealing the size and direction of an attack. (For more information on the use of
smoke, see Chapter 13, FM 100-2-1).
Illuminating shells are used widely by the Soviets in
night combat to observe enemy movements, to acquire
targets for all arms, and to provide reference points.
The standard illuminating shell lights up an area of up
to 1.5-km radius for 30 seconds. One gun firing two to
three rounds per minute is required to provide
continuous illumination for every 750 to 1,000 meters
of frontage. Other types of ammunition include* Nuclear.
* HE rocket-assisted projectiles.
* Chemical.
* Incendiary.
* Canister.
* Propaganda.
Planning for ammunition consumption is based on
the unit offire, which is a fixed number of rounds per
weapon or weapon system that is used for planning and
accounting purposes. It is not an authorized allowance
or daily expenditure rate. For example, the unit of fire
for the 122-mm howitzer is 80 rounds. For each operation, planning factors for ammunition expenditure are
established in units of fire. Ammunition distribution
and stockage also are measured in units of fire.
TACTICAL DEPLOYMENT
OF AN ARTILLERY BATTALION
Battalion firing positions normally are laid out in the
form of a large triangle with three batteries dispersed
to each of the three points of the triangle. Normally,
batteries in the battalion area emplace 500 to 1500
meters apart. The triangle will form a forward or
reverse wedge pointed toward or away from the
enemy (see illustration at right).
The battery firing position is selected by the artillery
battalion commander. Certain factors must be considered in the selection of a firing position. Wooded
areas, foothills, and thickets are the most desirable
areas for concealed gun positions. If a concealed position is desired in the vicinity of a heavily populated
area, gun positions are located in orchards or garden
plots. The entrance to and exit from all gun positions is
concealed as much as possible.
For an unconcealed or open gun position, sufficient
range must be allowed for the battery to accomplish a
9-8

Combat Formation of an Artillery Battalion

AXIS OF ADVANCE

II

I
4=

o\

-\
o'

x\

\\
\

BTRY

\\

\%

\
1ST BTRY

2D

1-10

/
(
,
FORWARD OP

OP

TEMPORARY
FIRE POSITION

COP 20 BTRY/

PRIMARY
FIRING
POSITION

S /

\
\ \

LATERAL OP

cm

MTR RIFL BN COP \

\

Ir

\
S

.
ARTY BN COP

S \

- ..
NOTE: Within the battalion firing position, batteries are normally separated from each other by 500 to
1500 meters.

'\

ALTERNATE
FIRING POSITION

FM 100-2-1

direct fire mission at the weapon's maximum effective

direct fire range. The fire position also should afford
cover for the gun crews and their ammunition and
should have interlocking fires with adjacent weapons.
Unconcealed firing positions could be found near
fences, thickets, and roads, or in ditches.
Within the batteries themselves, gun positions
normally are laid out at right angles to the axis of
advance. The battery is deployed in a straight line with
equal intervals between guns. This pattern of deployment reduces emplacement/displacement time. It also

Artillery Battery Firing Position

simplifies the computation procedures required for

battery fire missions because it reduces the need for
individual piece corrections. The Soviets continue to
favor this disposition, despite its obvious vulnerability
to enemy counterbattery fire and air attacks, because
they rely largely on manual computation in their fire
direction procedures. The reduced computation and
mission time enables batteries to complete missions
and relocate more quickly, thereby reducing their
exposure to enemy fire and compensating somewhat
for the vulnerability inherent in the formation.

WEAPON PIT

"

(RPK OR RPG-7)

15-

20 M

t-E
GUN POSITION OP
ANTITANK
MINES

(Most likely tank

approach)

TOWING
VEHICLES

Up to

300 M

./

I'Ar1 I

GUN PIT

j.

IV',/

- m

WITH
CREW
DUGOUT

COMMAND POST
OF BATTERY
SENIOR OFFICER

-0
o

PLATOON COMMAND POST

20-40 MI
O-

AMMO ACCESS
(immediate ammo)

/fAMMO
Minimum 400 M

-[

SHELTER

"

NOTE: Slit trenches and crew shelters may be dug beside gun pits and command posts. Positions may be
linked by communication trenches.

200-500 M

(NOT TO SCALE)
9-9

FM 100-2-1

Soviet artillery does use formations that vary the

interval between guns and disperse the guns in depth
with the aid of electronic field artillery computers. The
Chief of Soviet Rocket Troops and Artillery, Marshal
Peredel'skiy, indicated in December 1980 that such
computers were available and being deployed. Even
with computers, the Soviets may retain the linear
formation for the sake of speed and simplicity. They are
trying to reduce the time that a firing battery remains
in position after the first round is fired to as little as 4
minutes. Soviet artillerymen are now required to
render effective fire from emergency positions
without firing a registration. Under these conditions,
the linear deployment retains its utility and attractiveness to Soviet artillery commanders.
Possible variants in battery firing position deployment are illustrated' below.

Main and alternate gun positions are selected for a

battery in the offense, but only a main one is used in a
meeting engagement. Main, temporary, alternate, and
dummy sites are used in defense.
In the offense, minimal work is done on gun
positions. When time allows, positions will be
developed progressively and camouflage nets may be
used to conceal gun pits.
Battery firing positions are organized by platoons
(two firing platoons of three guns each). Each platoon
has a platoon headquarters and three gun sections. The
platoon leader of the first firing platoon is the senior
firing position officer and performs most of the functions carried out by the battery executive officer in a
US Army howitzer battery. (The battery commander is
normally at the COP with the supported unit

commander.)

Deployment of a Howitzer Battery (Variants)

I---- Up to 110 M ----

I"--Up

to 100 M --I

/.

/P

30 M

i
i
i

S/

\
Up to
200 M

Up
OM

40-50 M

40 M

_--,

40-50 M

---

I ,
-=---

40 M

.Senior Battery Officer (Commander of the Firing Position)

9-10

30-50 M -'

.--

--

_I

Up to 110 M--

Platoon Leader of Second Platoon

Base Piece

FM 100-2-1

TACTICAL DEPLOYMENT
OF MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHERS
Rocket launchers are used to place heavy fire on
important targets at decisive moments in an engagement. They also may be used for roving gun missions
and counterbombardment. Rocket launcher batteries
move forward 1 to 5 kilometers from their camouflaged positions to occupy fire areas, usually loaded
and accompanied by one or more ammunition trucks
per launcher. To evade counterbattery fire, rocket
launchers normally move to either a camouflaged position or to a new fire area immediatelyafter firing. Since
they move often, rocket launchers are seldom dug in.

Some protection from fire and observation may be

gained by siting the battery behind high cover.
During meeting engagements, the battery may
deploy in line on one or both sides of a road. The headquarters and ammunition trucks may remain drawn up
at the side of the road.
Normally bullhorns are used on the battery fire
position. A land line is laid when time permits. The battery COP issues fire control orders by radio or field
telephone. Deployment of a BM-21 rocket launcher
battery is illustrated below.

Deployment of a BM-21 Rocket Launcher Battery

NOTES:
1. After firing, rocket launchers return to camouflaged position or move to a new fire area.
2. Indefense each BM-21 might beemplaced ina
firing position, and land line would be laid.

15-50 M

3. Launchers may be fired remotely from crew

shelter trenches using 60-meter cable.

II jI

I iVI
I
300 M

I I, r
I'I ii
II'l I
\

,1

j1I

-5 KM

-4

-- I

I
r

I-10-300 M-.]
LEGEND:

Battery COP

0
.1

Multiple Rocket Launcher

CP of Battery Senior Officer

Shelter Trenches

for Launcher Crews

E:z

Ammunition
launcher)
(upto 3 per Trucks

9-11

FM 100-2-1

METHODS OF FIRE
The following Soviet definitions are furnished as
necessary background:
Rapid fire is a method of conducting artillery fire
whereby the weapon is fired as quickly as possible
while not exceeding its maximum rate of fire and not
sacrificing accuracy. When the command for rapid fire
is given, each individual weapons crew begins to fire
independently when ready.
Systematic fire is a method of artillery fire where
every round (salvo) is fired on command at a set
interval. This method is used for firing on observed
targets during registration (individual rounds) or
when the unit is firing a destruction mission (salvos).
Systematic fire is used against unobserved targets in
the course of fire assaults* of a given duration, during
controlling fire*, and during harassing fire, usually
alternating with rapid fire. The tempo of systematic fire
against observed targets depends on the capabilities
and equipment of the observer, whereas the tempo of
fire against an unobserved target is determined by the
amount of time allotted for the expenditure of a given
amount of ammunition. The tempo of systematic fire is
constant during a fire assault but may be intermittent
for harassing fire. Systematic fire may be fired by a
single weapon, a firing platoon, or an entire battery. On
receiving the mission, the firing unit also receives a
rate of fire and an ammunition expenditure
requirement.
Counterbatteryfire is the use of artillery to accomplish the suppression and/or destruction of enemy
artillery batteries located in screened firing positions.
(The Soviets no longer officially use this term but state
that the concept it represents is still valid and necessary.) Combat with enemy artillery is one of the Soviet
Army artillery's most important missions because it
enables Soviet ground forces to achieve fire superiority
on the battlefield. However, combat with enemy
artillery today requires more than counterbattery fire.
It now requires the destruction of the enemy command and control centers as well as his artillery and
requires the cooperation of the other combat arms and
combat aviation.
Maneuver byp re is the shifting of a unit's fire from
one target (or group of targets) to another without
changing firing positions. This is a combined arms concept in which the artilleryplays a critical role. It is used
to mass fires on the most important enemy objectives
and troop formations to destroy them in a short period
of time or to redistribute fires to destroy several targets
simultaneously. Maneuver by fire also may be used to
shift the main combat effort from one direction to
*These methods of fire are identified and discussed insubsequent paragraphs.

9-12

another. In the offense, maneuver by fire is used in the

depth of the enemy's defenses to suppress enemy
strongpoints, to repulse counterattacks, and to cover
by fire the attacking unit's flanks. In the defense,
maneuver by fire is used to destroy the enemy as he
deploys to attack; repulse the attack; support a counterattack; protect gaps in the defenses, including gaps
created by enemy nuclear strikes; seal off enemypenetrations; render assistance to neighboring units; and
support a unit that is defending all directions. Wide use
of maneuver by fire helps compensate the defending
unit for having fewer weapons and enables the
defending commander to achieve fire superiority at
the critical time in decisive sectors. Plans for maneuver
by fire are normally a part of the defensive fire plan. In
such planning, artillery units are assigned several supplementary sectors of fire covering areas along the supported unit's flanks and the gaps between units.
In conducting fire with direct aiming (often
confused with "direct fire"), the gunner of the artillery
weapon can aim the piece using direct visual contact
with the target. An artillery gunner who can sight
directly on the target will usually engage it with direct
fire, but because of the target's range or characteristics
of the weapon, he may engage it with indirect fire. A
mortar crew, for example, could sight directly on a
target but would have to engage it with indirect fire.
The Soviets write at great length about direct aiming
advantages like the reduction in mission time and a
drastic reduction in ammunition expenditure. Direct
fire is recommended against targets at relatively short
ranges (under 1,200 meters). Indirect fire with direct
aiming is considered feasible at ranges out to 3
kilometers and perhaps farther, depending on the
weapon sighting equipment and visibility.
Offensive Fire
The offensive fire assault is characterized by
surprise and a high density of fire on the target. Several
batteries or battalions fire against an individual target.
Fire assaults constitute the major subelements of an
artillery preparation for an attack. All (or at least the
larger part of) the artillery of a division or army carry
out these assaults simultaneously on a large group of
targets. Targets may be destroyed or suppressed byfire
assaults (see TargetDamage Criteria,Chapter8). The
number of fire assaults is determined by the nature of
the target to be destroyed (dug-in, covered, armored,
etc.), the number of rounds allocated for its suppression/destruction and the time required for
available artillery to expend the rounds allocated. The
duration of the fire assault is determined bythe tactical

FM 100-2-1

situation and by the maximum rate of fire of the

weapons firing the mission. Soviet experience in
World War II indicates that a fire assault would not
exceed 15 to 20 minutes. A fire assault of a given
duration typically begins with rapid fire (2 to 4 rounds
per minute per weapon) and continues with
systematic fire at a rate that will use the allocated
ammunition in the time allotted for the mission. When
a target must be destroyed in the shortest possible
time, the duration of the assault is not fixed and the
mission is conducted at rapid fire until the allocated
ammunition is expended. A fire assault also is fired at
the rapid rate of fire when a target is to be destroyed
rather than suppressed and when a moving target or a
target deployed in the open is to be suppressed. In the
time intervals between fire assaults, controlling fire
(see below) may be used against the target.
Controllingfire is directed at an enemy target in the
intervals between fire assaults on the same target. Controlling fire is intended to deny the enemy the freedom
to conduct combat activity or to allow escape before
the next fire assault. It normally is used when the interval between fire assaults exceeds 15 minutes. Usuallyit
is conducted by a single battery firing at a systematic
rate offire, rapid fire, or a combination of the two, and
will expend one tenth to one fifth of the rounds allocated for the engagement.
Safety Distances for Fire Support
The minimum safety distance between
artillery and aircraft fire and friendly troops
varies depending on the weapon caliber, type of
projectile, and the range from which the
projectiles are being fired.
GUNS AND HOWITZERS:
* Firing without registration over troops
in the open at
500 M
* Range less than 10 KM
700 M
* Range greater than 10 KM
inarmored vehicles or fortifications at
in armored vehicles or fortifications at
300 M
* Range less than 10 KM
* Firing after registration over
" Troops inthe open
* Troops in armored vehicles or
fortifications

400 M
200 M

MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHERS:

AIR STRIKES:

1000 M

200-700 M

Afire concentrationis conducted simultaneously by

several batteries or battalions against a common target.
The fire concentration is used against enemy troop
concentrations, strongpoints, artillery batteries,
command and control centers, and other targets. The
dimensions of the fire concentration target area
depend on the fire mission and the firepower of the
artillery subunit firing the mission.
Batteries and battalions conduct fire concentration
with all weapons firing at once on the center of the
target area. Depending on factors such as target
disposition and whether the target is "observed," all'
weapons may fire on the same elevation and deflection
settings or some units may be assigned different
settings.
Massed fire is conducted against an important
enemy objective by all or most of a given formation's
artillery to destroy it in the shortest possible period of
time. It consists of one large fire concentration or
several large fire concentrations fired simultaneously.
Before massed fire is conducted, target areas are designated and each area is assigned a codename. If the
dimensions of the target area do not exceed 800 by
800 meters, all participating artillery groups (regiments, battalions) will fire simultaneously on the
center of the target area, applying the principles used
for fire concentrations. If the target area is larger than
800 by 800 meters, it is subdivided into numbered
targets or target sectors. (Areas have codenames;
targets and sectors have numbers.) The targets/target
sectors are then distributed among the assigned
artillery groups or subunits for destruction or suppression with fire concentrations. To the extent possible,
the mission will be fired simultaneously.
Successivefire concentrationsare used in the attack
when the supported maneuver unit has begun the final
assault on enemy defensive positions. Successive fire
concentrations are used when the successive suppression/destruction of specific targets or target
groupings (such as strongpoints, weapon systems, and
command/control points deployed to the front and on
the flanks of attacking troops) is required. Although
successive fire concentrations are used primarily to
support the offense, it can be used to support counterattacks in the defense. Successive fire concentrations
may be single or double. In conducting a single
successive fire concentration, the artillery unit fires
initially on the single line of targets closest to the
attacking troops and shifts the single fire concentration to progressively deeper lines or groups of
enemy targets as the supported attacking troops
advance. A double successive fire concentration
requires the simultaneous fire of two artillery groups.
9-13

FM 100-2-1

The first group fires on the line of targets closest to the

supported attacking troops, while the second group
fires on the next line of targets. The first artillery group
then shifts its fires from the first line of concentration
to the second line, while the second group shifts its
fires from the second line to the third-and so forth. In
a double successive fire concentration every line of
targets, except the first, is attacked twice.
The first line of concentration covers the defender's
forward positions. Subsequent lines of concentration
are 300 to 1,000 meters apart through the depth of the
enemy's defenses. On each successive fire concentration, concentration sectors are assigned to every
battalion or battery firing the mission. The duration of
fire on the intial line of concentration (line of targets)
is determined by the amount of time required to get
the attacking troops from the line of attack (where
normally they deploy into attack formation, and
preparatory fires become supporting fires) to the
artillery fire troop safety line. The duration of fire on
subsequent lines of concentration is determined by
the distance between the lines of concentration and is

Successive Fire Concentrations

Sector TIGER
(5 min +)

Sector LYNX
(5 min +)

initiated on a signal from the combined arms division

commander when the ground assault begins. The
supported maneuver regiment or battalion
commander gives a signal to shift fire to each subsequent line of concentration . The successive fire
concentration was used widely with the rolling
barrage (see below) during World War II and it is still
given prominence today.
The rollingbarragenormally is used in the support
phase of the attack. It is a continuous curtain of fire
which is successively shifted from one phase line to
another in front of attack troops. Like the successive
fire concentration, it may be fired against a single line
or against two lines simultaneously, and fire is shifted
in a similar way. The rolling barrage differs from the
successive fire concentration in that it is planned
assuming a uniform distribution of targets throughout
the target area. It then shifts fire between phase lines
that are uniformly spaced. (The successive fire
concentration focuses on targets that require concentrated fires, and the intervals between lines of concentration are determined by target location.) Fire

Line of Attack
(Fire support
phase
commences)

Safety Line
(fire shifted
from LION
to TIGER)

Sector LION
(5 min +)

r/
4

The fire preparation

10II

9
2

8~

I
I

I
I

-- 0.2-

0.4 KM

--

-5

i.e., 3-4 KM

--- *

Up to 2 KM

0.2~
KM -

range of enemy
in

A TGMs;

must begin

efore attackers are

bE

"---0.3-1 KM --- I-0.3-1

phase

3-5 KM

400-1000 M --.

NOTES:
1. Average target size (200 x 300 meters) would be engaged by up to one artillery battalion.
2. Targets would have already been engaged by preparatory fire.
9-14

(NOT TO SCALE)

FM 100-2-1

concentrations may be superimposed on the rolling

barrage to insure the destruction of the most
important targets.
In the rolling barrage, concentrations are planned
on phase lines every 400 to 800 meters, depending on
the density of targets in the target area. Intermediate
phase lines are planned for every 100 to 200 meters.
Artillery units will fire on each phase line for at least 5
minutes at a rate of 4 to 6 rounds per 100 meters per
minute and on each intermediate line for 1 or 2
minutes at the same rate.
A rolling barrage is divided into battalion and battery
sectors. Standard sector widths are as shown below.

Sector Width for Rolling Barrage

TYPE
WEAPON

Per
Weapon

METERS
Per
Battery

Per
Battalion

Field guns

20-25

150

450

Howitzers

35

200

600-650

OF

The division or regimental commander gives the

order to shift from a phase line, but fire is shifted automatically from intermediate lines in accordance with a
timed firing program. Phase lines are given the names
of animals of prey (lion, tiger, etc.).
The depth of a rolling barrage depends on the nature
of the enemy's defenses, the attack plan, and the availability of artillery and ammunition. Normally, the
rolling barrage is conducted through the depth of the
defenses of the enemy's first echelon battalions. The
rolling barrage requires a great deal of ammunition and
is not, therefore, the most likely method of offensive
fire. It may be used, however, to support a penetration
of well-prepared defensive positions and assault river
crossings.
Defensive Fire
Barrierfire is a continuous curtain of defensive fire
across the approach of attacking tanks and infantry. It is
used normally in the defense but also may be employed
in offensive operations against enemy counterattacks.
Barrier fire is used with fire concentrations, massed
fires, and directly aimed fire from tanks and guns.
Barrier fire is further divided into standing barrier fire,
fired on one line of concentration, and rolling barrier
fire on successive lines of concentration.
Standing barrierfie is fire placed on a single line of
concentration to disrupt an enemy attack. In the

defense, standing barrier fire normally is planned well

in advance. It is fired in front of and to the flanks of the
defensive positions, and is observed from a ground
observation point. All the artillery of a formation
except rocket artillery is used to fire the standing
barrier fire. Each battalion or battery is assigned a fire
concentration sector on the line of fire concentration.
The width of each unit's sector is computed based on
50 meters of coverage per gun (howitzer) or mortar.
Every standing barrier fire line of concentration is
assigned a code name.
The line of concentration for the standing barrier
fire must be no closer than 300 to 500 meters from
friendly troops for troop safety and so gunners can fire
antitank weapons in direct fire at enemy tanks and
APCs as they come through the barrier fires. Standing
barrier fires begin the moment enemy tanks and infantry approach the planned line of fire concentration and
continue at rapid fire until the infantry is cut off from
the tanks and halt their attack. If the infantry goes
around the fire concentration line, the fires will be
shifted to the new approach.
Standing barrier fire is used with other artillery fire
and fire from tanks and infantry. For example, if dismounted infantry should lie down to escape the effects
of the standing barrier fire, a fire concentration would
be fired to destroy them. Tanks penetrating the
barriers would be destroyed with direct fire.
Rolling barrierfire is placed on several successive
lines of concentration, each closer to Soviet defending
troops. Lines of concentration for the rolling barrier
fire are planned for terrain that can be observed from a
ground observation point. Distances between lines of
fire concentration will be 400 to 600 meters and more.
The final line of concentration closest to friendly
troops will be 300 to 400 meters from forward defensive positions. Every battalion or battery participating
in the fire mission will be assigned a sector of fire on
each of the lines of fire concentration. The width of
each sector is based on the assignment of 25 meters of
coverage for each gun (howitzer) or mortar. The
entire barrier fire concentration area is given a general
codename, and each individual line of concentration is
given a number in sequence beginning with the one
farthest from the defensive positions. Lines of concentration might be coded "Lion-1," "Lion-2," or "Shark1," "Shark-2," etc. The rolling barrier fire begins the
moment the lead tanks or APCs approach the initial
line of fire concentration. The fire continues on that
line until the bulk of the advancing force has moved
out of the zone where rounds are impacting. Then the
fire is shifted to the next line of concentration. Fires
continue to be shifted until surviving enemy APCs or
9-15

FM 100-2-1

tanks have passed through the last zone of fire

concentration.
FIELD ARTILLERY CONDUCT OF FIRE
Massed artillery, "hub-to-hub" weapons, unsophisticated fire direction procedures, and weak logistical
support may have been the case during World War II,
but are not descriptive of Soviet artillery today.
There are numerous historical examples in which
Soviet artillery massed against German forces,
particularly in the latter stages of World War II. The
Soviets have studied these battles, observed conflicts
since that time (especially the 1973 Arab-Israeli
conflict), conducted exhaustive weapon effects
studies, and incorporated these findings into
professional papers.
Soviet offensive doctrine calls for intense artillery
preparations of short duration, if possible, that require
a certain number of rounds by type to be delivered to
achieve destruction. Defensive doctrine calls for
prolonged, high volumes of artillery fire in depth to
break up and to destroy the enemy's attack. To achieve
surprise and to limit susceptibility to enemy fires,
Soviet artillery tries to be short but violent in the
Rffense and more prolonged in the defense. The fires
are massive and are concentrated on critical points in
the offense or are dispersed throughout the sector
in the defense. This requires not only a numerical
superiority in artillery pieces but also rapid fire, long
range, and mobility. Above all, the Soviets stress the
importance of thoroughly integrated fire- and
maneuver plans.
While the regimental artillery battalion provides the
flexibility and responsiveness required in a fluid
combat situation, numerous longer-range tube
artillery and multiple rocket launcher battalions from
division, army, and front provide massive reinforcing
fires when required. In this way, the Soviets seek to
achieve the densities of fire that they believe necessary
without sacrificing the mobility that artillery units
need to survive and to perform their mission on the
modern battlefield.
In the offensive, an artillery battalion leapfrogs its
batteries forward individually in bounds of some 3 to 4
kilometers. By day, it takes a towed howitzer battery
about 30 minutes to move, from receipt of the movement order until it is ready to fire the first round in its
new position. At night, the same move requires about
40 minutes.
An artillery march column has 25- to 30-meter
intervals between vehicles and 100 meters between
batteries. A column normally moves at a speed of 15 to
9-16

25 kilometers per hour, each subunit being headed by

its commander. An artillery battalion occupies some
1.5 to 2.5 kilometers of road space, depending on
vehicle spacing.
The ability of field artillery to keep up with
maneuver units may be reduced if numerous small
attacks require the artillery to deploy. There also are
problems in moving artillerypieces across water obstacles. Normally the Soviets use amphibians or ferries for
towed artillery, or wait for a bridge to be constructed
before the bulk of field artillery crosses. When minefields are encountered, artillery often is delayed until
combat engineers have cleared a lane.
These problems have diminished considerably for
units equipped with self-propelled howitzers. First of
all, the 122-mm SP howitzer is amphibious. Both the
152-mm and 122-mm self-propelled howitzers have
excellent mobility on the road and cross-country. The
152-mm SP howitzer requires only one fifth of the time
required by an equivalent towed battery to move from
one position to another and be ready to fire.
Because of the increased mobility of self-propelled
artillery, the Soviets probably move artillery batteries,
platoons, and individual guns within an assigned firing
position area to escape enemy counterbattery fire.
Within his assigned area, the battery commander
selects a primary position and one or more temporary
firing positions each 300 to 400 meters away from the
previous position. The battery/platoon fires a mission
of 3 to 4 minutes duration and then moves to an alternate position. This technique might be used during a
long offensive preparation or in the defense when
forward or rearward movement is limited. Such
frequent and disjointed movement within a firing
battery would force fire direction personnel to make
numerous time-consuming corrections in elevation
and deflection for each firing platoon and possibly for
each weapon. Therefore, it is probable that this is practiced only in artillery units with electronic fire direction computers. Average reaction times from receipt of
fire orders to first rounds on the ground (on
preplanned targets) are as indicated below:

Reaction Times for First Rounds of Fire

Mortar battery ............
1 to 1.5
Artillery battalion ...........
2 to 3
MRL battery .................
4
RAG ...
..............
....... 4
DAG ..........
................
5

minutes
minutes
minutes
minutes
minutes

The standard reaction time for shifting fire is 2

minutes.

FM 100-2-1

Time Frames for Repositioning of Artillery

I-

TIME IN MINUTES REQUIRED FOR

EVACUATION OF
WEAPONS

122-mm HOW 0-30

152-mm HOW, D-1

152-mm HOW, 020

130-mm GUN, M46

122-mm MRL, BM21

120-mm MORTAR

UNIT

OCCUPATION OF

MOVEMENT

FIRE POSITIONS OR
ASSEMBLY AREAS

(PER KM)

FIRE POSITIONS

BY DAY

BY NIGHT

BY DAY

BY NIGHT

BY DAY

BY NIGHT

BTRY

5-7

3 (20 kph)

3.5

10-12

18

BN

11

14

3.5

23

32

BTRY

5-7

3.5

10-15

15-20

BN

11

14

3.5

23

32

BTRY

10

13

3.5

12

18

BN

11

14

3.5

23

32

BTRY

10

13

3.5

12

18

BN

11

14

3.5

23

32

BTRY

3-5

6.5

3.5

10-12

18

BN

3.5

23

32

BTRY

NOTE:
Officially, self-propelled artillery (152-mm SP, 122-mm SP) can emplace or displace in5 minutes; but
self-propelled batteries may require as little as one fifth of the time required by equivalent towed artillery
to relocate and be ready to fire.

Battery firing procedures of Soviet tube artillery

differ significantly from those of the US Army. The most
significant difference is probably the location of the
battery commander. During the conduct of fire, the
Soviet battery commander (a captain or senior lieutentant) is placed in a command observation post
several kilometers to the front of the firing battery.
From this observation point, he conducts target
observation, assists in the computation of fire missions,
maintains contact with the ground forces his battery
supports, and controls the actions of his firing battery.
The Soviets place great emphasis on the experience of
the senior officer and his ability to make the most tactically sound decisions about target identification,
acquisition, and engagement.

In executing his duties as battery commander/forward observer/computer, he is assisted by several

individuals assigned to the reconnaissance section and
headquarters platoon. These include the headquarters
platoon commander, the commander of the reconnaissance section, an observer, a range finder, a computer,
and a radio telephone operator.
Operations in the firing position also have many
dissimilarities when comparing Soviet doctrine with
that of the US Army. The Soviet's method of fire
direction, gun-supervision, and gun positioning are all
different. The only similarity between a US and Soviet
firing battery is probably that each has six guns,
although the Soviet battery is broken down into two
platoons containing three guns each. The battery FDC
9-17

FM 100-2-1

is manned by the batterysenior officer (platoon leader

of the first firing platoon), assisted by fire direction
computation and communications personnel, and has
direct radio communications with the battery COP,
the battalion COP, and the battalion FDC. The battery
senior officer relays firing data to the guns.
The command "to battle" is acted on with the same
sense of urgency in the Soviet firing battery as the
command "fire mission" in the US firing battery, but
the individual steps to bring fire on the target vary
significantly. As stated, the battery commander in the
COP decides what targets of opportunity will be taken
under fire. He also decides how to attack the targets
relayed to him by the maneuver forces he is
supporting.
In the Soviet system, there are four individuals
responsible for the preparation of firing data:
* The battery commander.
* The commander of the headquarters platoon.
* The computer located in the COP.
* The computer located in the firing position.
The computer positioned in the firing position is
usually the first to solve the gunnery problem. The
senior officer in the firing battery immediately relays
the data to the gun platoons. The data is then set on the
six guns in preparation to fire.
The battery commander and the computer in the
COP also are required to solve the gunneryproblem to
provide a separate check on the data supplied by the
firing battery computer. If, for some reason, the data
from the COP is ready before that ofthe firing position,
the battery commander transmits his data directly to
the firing position. If a discrepancy exists between the
firing data supplied by the two computers, the battery
commander decides which is the more accurate. This
system demands that the battery commander be as
proficient in computing the various gunneryproblems
as the computers. The Sovietsfeel thatthe independent
computation of each gunnery problem by four
different computers significantlyreduces the chances
for a large error.This technique also insures that a fire
direction system is readily available in the event that
either the fire direction capability at the COP or the
firing position is destroyed or suppressed.
When the battalion controls the conduct of fire,
the observation, computation, and firing are conducted similarly to battery level. The battalion commander, normally a major, is located at the battalion
COP near the command post of the supported conmmander. Target acquisition and fire direction computation personnel assist him in acquiring targets,
computing fire missions, and adjusting fire. Normally
the battalion chief of staff will be in charge of the
9-18

battalion firing position. He will be assisted by fire

direction computer personnel. Depending on the type
of mission, battalion dispersion, and time available,
battalion fire direction personnel may compute the
gunnery problem for the entire battalion or run check
computations while each battery computes the data
for its own guns. In any case, all computers should
begin computation silultaneously because all battalion
stations hear the battalion commander transmit the
fire mission.
The order to commence fire comes from the
battalion commander. The battalion commander can
require each battery commander to adjust fire for his
own unit by weapon or by battery salvos. Battery and
battalion COPs may be supplemented by forward
ground or air observation posts. Lone ground
observers can be located in trees or in the garrets of
buildings. Teams are sometimes located forward in
armored vehicles. Air observers may use light observation helicopters to see deeper into the enemy's area.
(Air observation is considered essential to the success
of counterbattery missions.) Forward and air
observers transmit target data to the COP where
computation is accomplished.
As electronic computers are introduced into Soviet
field artillery battalions, the procedures can be
expected, to change to accommodate and exploit the
new capability. It is unlikely that there will be more
than one computer available to each battalion, so fire
mission computation and fire control are likely to be
centralized at battalion. Battery fire direction
personnel will probably receive from battalion fully
computed data that is ready to be passed to the guns.
They may run check computations manually on a
routine or random basis.
Centralizing electronic computation at battalion
level is consistent with establishing the battalion
(rather than the battery) as the basic firing unit in
Soviet artillery. It may be some time before these
changes in organization, doctrine, and equipment are
seen in all the field artillery units of the Soviet Army.
However, the forward areas will probablybe equipped
first.

FIRE PLANNING
The fire planning process includes target
acquisition, organization for combat, assignment of
tactical missions, determination of ammunition
requirements, and formulation of a detailed fire plan.
The fire plan is coordinated and approved at the
highest level of participating units and includes input
from subordinate units.

FM 100-2-1

Planners are guided by the following principles and

targeting priorities when developing offensive fire
plans:

Principles of Fire Planning

PLANNING GUIDANCE
* Nuclear fires, chemical strikes, conventional
fires, and tactical air support are included in a
single, coordinated plan.
* Fire preparations precede major offensive
actions, whether or not nuclear weapons are to
be used.
* All artillery may be deployed for firing with
direct aiming at regimental and lower levels.
* Fires of tanks and antitank artillery may be
used during preparations.
TARGET PRIORITIES
FOR OFFENSIVE FIRES
* Nuclear-capable artillery and missiles and
their control systems.
* Command posts, observation posts,
communications, and radar stations.
* Enemy defensive strongpoints, especially
ATGM positions.
* Conventional artillery and air defense units.
* Reserves and service support units.
The fires of all artillery units within a division are
incorporated into the army or front fire plan. The
artillery unit commander at each level coordinates the
fires under his control. He determines new requirements and missions and, with the chief of rocket troops
and artillery or chief of artillery (depending on the
level), makes suggestions to the combined arms commander concerning adjustments in tactical organization as the situation develops.
The division CRTA submits requests and
recommendations for the employment of nuclear fires.
The fires of nuclear weapons organic to the division
and/or nuclear strikes allocated to the division from
army level are integrated with air strikes, conventional
fires, and the overall scheme of maneuver.
Prearranged signals are used for requesting and
shifting nonnuclear fire to successive lines and objectives. The CRTA indicates exactly where to establish
artillery observation posts, trying to place them
together with the observation posts of the maneuver
commanders.

The basis for division artillery fire planning is established by the division commander, his CRTA, and other
staff members during the reconnaissance of the area of
anticipated action. During such reconnaissance, the
organization for combat and means of coordination
may be refined. The artillery representative receives
information from the maneuver commander that
forms the basis for determining the following:
* Targets to be fired on by artillery.
* Priority of each target.
* Sequence in which targets will be attacked.
* Time for attack of each target.
An overriding factor in fire planning is the
availability of nuclear fires. Doctrine emphasizes the
planning of nuclear fire with conventional fire support
in all types of military operations.
Extracts from an example fire plan for a 122-mm
howitzer battalion supporting the attack of a
motorized rifle battalion are given at the right. The
attack is made from positions in contact. This extract
has two major parts: preparatory fires and fires in
support of the attack. Fires in support of the attack
consist of preplanned, successive fire concentrations
delivered on three lines to a depth of 2.5 kilometers.
The first line, WOLF, includes the platoon strongpoints
on the forward edge of the defense, designated as
sector 11. When the assaulting forces reach a safety
line about 200 meters from line WOLF, fires are lifted
on call to the deeper line, RAT.
Besides successive fire concentrations, other on-call
fires are preplanned; these consist of fire concentrations, fire at individual targets, and barrier fires.
Barrier fires are planned where enemy counterattacks
are expected. They may coincide with the lines of successive fire concentrations.
The firing during the preparation phase is based on a
time schedule shown in the fire plan and supplemented with radio, telephone, and visual signals. In
addition, signals are prescribed to call for fire, to cease
fire, and to shift fire.

Signals for Fire

ACTION

VISUAL

RADIO/
TELEPHONE

Call for Fire

Green Flares

Hurricane

Cease Fire

Red Flares

Stop

Shift Fire

Three-Star Flare

Storm

Illustrative Fire Plan, 122-mm Howitzer Battalion

TIME

SIGNALS

METHOD OF FIRE AND TARGETS

- IL-O

- FP--

1ST
BATTERY

2ND
BATTERY

3RD
BATTERY

_- ---

H-40
to
H-27
(113 Min)

FIRE ASSAULT: Artillery and mortar bat- i * Green flares

teries, CPs, radar, platoon strongpoint of * SNOWSTORM 2121
companies in first echelon of defense.
(Radio/telephones)

TGT 60
90 rds
Sector 11
120 rds

TGT 18
140 rds
Sector 11
90 rds

TGT 40
80 rds
Sector 11
120 rds

H-27
to
H-17
(10 Min)

FIRE ASSAULT: Platoon strongpoints

within deeper defensive positions;
destruction of targets by direct fire;
controlling fires against artillery and
mortar batteries.

* Star flares
* HAIL 3131
(Radio/telephones)

Sector 16
120 rds
TGT 69
14 rds

Sector 16
165 rds

Sector 16
165 rds

H-17
to H-5
(12 Min)

FIRE ASSAULT: Platoon strongpoints

within companies of first echelon of
defense.

* Yellow flares

Sector 11
120 rds

Sector 11
150 rds

Sector 11
150 rds

H-7
to
H-1

OVERLAPPING FIRE: 1st Battery fires

at artillery and mortar batteries. (Overlaps H-Hour transition from preparatory
to supporting fires.)

* Yellow flares
. RAIN 4141
(Radio/telephones)

Target 60
60 rds

TIME

METHOD OF FIRE AND TARGETS

SIGNALS

1ST
1ST
BATTERY

2ND
2ND
BATTERY

3RD
3RD
BATTERY

H-Hr

SUCCESSIVE FIRE CONCENTRATIONS

* Line 1 WOLF
" Green flares
* HURRICANE 5555
(Radio/telephones)

Overlapping
Fires, as
above

45 rds

45 rds

* Line 2 RAT
" Star flares
" THUNDER 6666
(Radio/telephones)

50 rds

50 rds

50 rds

" Line 3 TIGER

* Yellow flares
* TYPHOON 7777
(Radio/telephones)

32 rds

32 rds

32 rds

to
H-5

I'

On Line 1 WOLF
(Sector 11)

ON
CALL

5 minute fires on Line 2 RAT

(Sector 21)

ON
CALL

5 minute fires on Line 3 TIGER

(Sector 16)

ON
CALL

FIRE CONCENTRATIONS
Individual targets
BARRAGE FIRES

* RAIN 4141
(Radio/telephones)

TOTAL ROUNDS
PREPARATORY 1584

Readiness to open fire on Targets 20, 25, 32, 33, 69, 71

Targets A and B

NOTE: These fire concentrations and barrage fires are contingency plans and will beused depending oon
the progress of the attack.

TOTAL ROUNDS, PLANNED

SUPPORTING 1152
Foldin 9-19

FM 100-2-1

Fire planning for an attack is a deliberate and precise

process. Weapons and ammunition, target characteristics, and the plan of the maneuver commander are
considered in terms of the target damage criteria. (See
Target Damage Criteria,Chapter8). If ammunition is
limited, the maneuver commander may have to accept
a lower level of damage.
In the example fire plan, 1.9 units of fire are
expended to attack the prepared enemy defense. Thus,
the total expenditure of rounds is expected to be 18
guns x 1.9 units of fire x 80 rounds per unit offire, or
2,736 rounds.
Of the total, 1.1 units of fire are planned for preparatory fires (1,584 rounds) and 0.8 units of fire (1,152
rounds) for the rest of the day.
If time is available, it is normal to lay out on the
ground the ammunition planned for use during the
preparation. The ammunition loaded on battery and
battalion (possibly regimental) transport is kept for
later use.

FIELD ARTILLERY IN THE OFFENSE

There are four phases of artillery support for an
attack against a defending enemy: fire support for a
force's movement forward, preparation, support of the
attack, and accompaniment.
Firesupportfor a force's movementforward is used
to cover a unit's movement to contact with the enemy.
It may be used to cover a first echelon's movement
from an assembly area to an attack position, or to cover
a follow-on force's movement forward before actual
commitment to battle.
Artillery preparationfor an attack is the phase of
artillery fire that precedes the tank and infantry assault
against the enemy. The artillery preparation is to suppress and/or destroy a defending enemy with
organized, thoroughly planned, massed fires so as to
deny him the opportunity to organize resistance.
During the preparation phase, artillery fires are
directed against enemy troops, weapon systems, command and control centers, supporting communication
systems, and defensive structures.
The duration and organization of the artillery
preparation is determined by the overall attack plan,
the nature ofthe enemy's defenses, the level of destruction required, the number and type of fire preparation
missions allocated to rocket troops and aviation, and
whether and in what quantity nuclear or chemical
weapons are employed. The length of the preparation
depends on the time required to achieve the planned
level of destruction. In an attack from the march, the
preparation lasts until first echelon maneuver units are
Foldout for 9-19

9-20

readyto deploy into attack formation. The fire preparation might consist of several artillery strikes, the first
and last of which normally would be the most powerful. The final strike concentrates on the enemy's
artillery and mortar batteries, and overlaps the end of
the fire preparation phase and the start of the fire support phase. Suppression of enemy defenses may take
place simultaneously throughout the entire tactical
and immediate operational depth of the enemy's
defenses. (Tactical and immediate operational depth
are determined by the enemy's division and corps rear
boundaries, respectively).
The fire preparation phase might last up'to 50
minutes. Because of the mobility of potential targets
and the threat of enemy counterbatteryfire, the Soviets
are striving to increase the intensity and to reduce the
length of the preparation phase-possibly to less than
15 minutes. They are adding more artillery to the force
structure, and are giving special emphasis to the addition of multiple rocket launcher units.
Artillery support of the attack starts when the
supported maneuver units begin their assault and continues with their advance through the enemy's defensive positions. The artillery fires on the enemy immediately in front of and on the flanks of attacking Soviet
troops, shifting fires in sequential bands progressively
deeper into the enemy's defensive positions (normally
successive fire concentrations or rolling barrage).
Artillery support tries to keep the fire superiority
attained during the artillery preparation phase and suppresses enemy defenses during the attack.
Artillery support fires must coincide with the
advance of the supported maneuver unit. The length of
time artillery fires on the initial barrage line or line of
targets is determined by the time required for the supported attacking troops to move from the line of attack
to a safety line. Fires are shifted from line to line on the
command of the maneuver unit commander.
In the artillery accompanimentphase, artillery units
support maneuver units as they exploit their success in
the rear of the enemy's defenses. The accompaniment
phase begins at the end of the support phase and continues until the attacking forces have accomplished
their mission-this normally would refer to the division mission of the day. During the accompaniment
phase, artillery units displace with the units they support and fire on newly located targets or targets that
have survived the preparation and support phases.
Priority of fires go to the enemy's tactical nuclear
weapons, artillery and mortars, and antitank weapons.
Artillery operations in this phase coincide with the
operations of the supported units and aviation support
elements. During the accompaniment phase, artillery

FM 100-2-1

units provide fires to the maneuver units as they attack

enemy defenses from the march, fight meeting
engagements, force water obstacles, commit the
second echelon or reserve to battle, or repulse an airborne assault. If the enemy counterattacks, the
artillery, in conjunction with tanks and motorized rifle
troops, fires on the counterattack force as it advances
and deploys for the attack. During pursuit, accompanying artillery fires- on the withdrawing enemy and
destroys or. sippresses enemy units left behind to
cover the withdrawal.
In the accompaniment phase, artillery units fire
various types of missions, depending on the tactical
situation. If the attackers encounter an enemy strongpoint in the depth of the enemy's defenses, the supporting artillery attacks the target with a fire concentration or massed fires. For repulsing a counterattack,
the artillery employs defensive fire tactics such as
standing barrier fire or rolling barrier fire. In supporting a unit that must overcome an enemy occupying hasty defensive positions, force a water obstacle, or
commit its second echelon, the artillery might have to
conduct a short preparation (4 to 10 minutes)
followed by supporting fires (successive fire concentrations). The antitank reserve normally is used to
repulse enemy counterattacks, to provide security for
the flanks of supported units, or to reinforce hasty
defensive positions assumed by the attackers in the
course of the attack.
In this phase, the supporting artillery must conduct
wide-ranging maneuvers in depth and across its front,
using both fire and movement, and be prepared to
reorganize and reorient its fires (maneuver by fire) to
reinforce maneuver units moving on the main direction of attack. (The main direction of attack might
change during the course of the attack).

The fire and maneuver of artillery units during all

phases are planned in the initial fire plan. The artillery
accompaniment part of the plan is then refined continuously during the course of the attack. The artillery
accompaniment is conducted in close cooperation
with aviation elements and other forces and systems
(e.g., tactical rockets) executing the fire accompaniment phase.
The Soviets plan to achieve certain density norms
for artillery, depending on the tactical situation. In the
penetration of well-prepared enemy defenses, for
example, high numbers of tubes per kilometer of
frontage are desirable, even under nuclear-threatened
conditions. However, modern artillery and methods of fire control will allow lower densities than
those which were considered standard during World
War II.
Some average guidelines for desired densities are* Attack of a well-prepared defense, in the direction
of a main attack: 60 to 100 tubes per kilometer of
frontage.
* Attack on a hasty defense in the direction of a main
attack: 60 to 80. tubes per kilometer of frontage.
* Attack on a supporting axis: 40 tubes per kilometer
of frontage.
These densities include all calibers of guns,
howitzers, and mortars. Densities computed in
number of tubes may increase by 50 to 75 percent
when multiple rocket launchers are included.
Based on the fire plan, artillery is deployed to
provide preparatory fires and the initial fire support of
the attack. The figure below provides tactical deployment guidelines for Soviet artillery.
The prime mission of artillery in the meeting
engagement is to gain and keep fire superiority over
the enemy.

I-

Tactical Deployment Norms

DISTANCES

MORTARS

GUNS & HOWITZERS

MULTIPLE ROCKET
LAUNCHERS

Between Weapons

16-60 M

20-40 M

15-50 M

500-1500 M
(normally about
1000 M)

1000-2000 M

3-6 KM (DAG)
1-4 KM (RAG)

3-6 KM

Between Batteries

From the FEBA

500-1000 M

9-21

FM 100-2-1

In the meeting engagement, artillery is used* To neutralize enemyfire support means, especially
nuclear-capable means.
* To impede maneuver and deployment of enemy
forces.
* To cover the deployment and support the attack of
friendly forces.
In anticipation of a meeting engagement, code
designation for fire requests on particular areas and
terrain features are planned in detail; a chart of
selected reference points is distributed. Although
basic fire planning is carried out by the CRTA, artillery
often receives orders and amendments to orders by
radio while on the move. Detailed fire planning is
conducted by units initially engaging the enemy. As the
battle develops, and as additional artillery is deployed,
the fire plan is refined and enlarged to provide maximum fire at critical points. Accompanying artillery is
positioned to facilitate prompt fires for each maneuver
unit as it is committed. Reinforcing artillery displaces
at a greater distance to be in the best location to
support the battles with maneuver by fire.
In apursuit,long-range artillery, moving forward by
bounds, delivers interdiction fire on crossroads and
communication routes to slow the enemy's retreat and
to disrupt the approach of his reserves. The more
mobile artillery units available to the tactical commanders (self-propelled weapons, multiple rocket
launchers, and mortars) normally are attached to
parallel pursuit units. Control of forward artillery is
decentralized to a great degree to meet the requirements of a fluid situation. Nuclear strikes may be
employed on the retreating enemy force. Tactical air
support is increasingly important during the pursuit,
when the artillery does not have sufficient time to
emplace.

FIELD ARTILLERY IN THE DEFENSE

Fires in the defense consist of fire strikes, by all
available delivery means, planned against the likely
approaches to the defense positions. Close coordination is stressed between nuclear, chemical, and conventional artillery and aircraft delivery means. Intelligence efforts concentrate on determining enemy
formations and locating their nuclear delivery means.
As in the offense, "maneuver by fire" in the defense
means the shifting of concentrated fires. An essential
part of maneuver by fire is the ability to shift fires as the
enemy maneuvers. It is used to bring a high volume of
fire against the enemy's most important attack groupings, against targets in his rear, and for covering
friendly flanks with fire.
9-22

The artillery organization for combat in the defense

is similar to that in the offense. Artillery groups are
located so that they can execute their primary mission
and still be capable of massing fires in support of
forward defense positions, particularly against armor.
Fire planning supports the defensive mission of the
force. The defensive plan provides for* Destruction or neutralization of enemy nuclear
and nonnuclear weapons. Counterpreparation and
counterbattery fires are planned for this purpose.
* Neutralization of enemy command and control
facilities.
* Neutralization of enemy march columns and troop
concentrations.
* Interference with the deployment of the attacking
enemy.
* Support of friendly units, to include forces in the
security zone.
* Neutralization of the enemy in front of the forward
defenses.
* Neutralization of enemy units that have penetrated
the defenses through extensive use of on-call fires and
direct fire artillery.
* Delivery of fire in support of counterattacks and
counteroffensives.
* Covering by fire the gaps and flanks in friendly
sectors, engineer obstacles, and natural obstructions.
* Contamination of terrain and obstacles.
* Firing of smoke rounds.
* Illumination.
Artillery weapons are deployed in concealed and
dispersed positions to employ flanking, interlocking,
and suppressive fires at very close ranges and with
great intensity. Each battery prepares primary, alternate, and night-firing positions. Selected artillery units
will occupy temporary firing positions, located well
forward, to provide fire support to units in the security
zone.
Roving batteries and guns are employed to confuse
the enemy as to the deployment and fire plans for
friendly artillery. The regimental chief of artilleryplans
in detail the deployment of a roving unit. The plans
include positions, missions, method offire and number
of rounds to be fired from each position, itinerary and
duration of the mission. The roving unit may leave
camouflaged decoys in a position to create the
impression that it is still occupied.

FIRING NORMS
Firing norms are established for ammunition
expenditure, the area coverage expected, the effect of
the target, and the density of fire over time. When

FM 100-2-1

establishing these norms, Soviet artillery planners

consider several variables which are listed in the tables
they publish for use in the field.
The norms change as any one or more of the
variables change. These variables include* Type of target (e.g., equipment or personnel,
deliberate or hasty defensive positions, hard- or softskinned vehicles, point or area disposition, etc.).

* Type and caliber of weapon engaging the target.

* Range to the target.
* Whether the target is under direct observation
during the artillery attack.
A general table of ammunition expenditure norms
to which most subsequent tables refer is given below.
Time is not considered. These norms might apply to
any of the methods of fire described. Note that the

targets are unobserved and situated at a range of 10

kilometers or less from the artillery. The table is based
on the assumption that the rounds are fired by batteries that have made deliberate (as opposed to emergency) occupation of their firing positions. This means
that the batteries are laid based on survey data and that
they are firing with meteorological data that is no more
than 3 hours old.

Ammunition Expenditure Norms

NORMS GOVERNING AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE FOR THE DESTRUCTION OR SUPPRESSION OF STATIONARY UNOBSERVED
TARGETS AT RANGES OF 10 KM OR LESS. (DELIBERATE OCCUPATION OF FIREING POSITION - SURVEY LAY, RECENT MET)

TARGET

REQUIRED
EFFECT

ROCKET
ARTILLERY

RIFLED BARREL

MORTARS

CALIBER IN MILLIMETERS

CALIBER IN MILLIMETERS

,
WLU
J

76

85

100

122

130

152

203

(Missile) launcher

Target
destruction

800

720

540

300

280

200

70

Battery (platoon) of armored

self propelled artillery (mortars)

Target
suppression

1000

900

720

450

360

270

120

Battery (platoon) of unarmored self-propelled or

dug-in towed artillery (mortars)

Target
suppression

540

480 I 360

240

220

180

100

Target
suppression

250

220

150

90

80

60

30

_ Battery (platoon) of towed

artillery inthe open
5

SAM battery

Target
suppression

250

240

200

150

150

100

60

Signal and radar vans or radar

control point in the open

Target
suppression

420

360

280

180

180

120

60

Dug-in troops and weapons in prepared

defense strongpoint positions

Suppression of 1 hectare of target area

480

450

320

200

200

150

60

Dug-in troops and weapons, -tanks, infantry

fighting vehicles, and APCs in hastily prepared defensive positions, and assembly areas

Suppression of 1 hectare of target area

400

350

250

150

150

110

45

Suppression of 1 hectare of target area

50

45

30

20

15

Suppression of 1 hectare of target area

480

450

320

200

200

150

9 Troops and weapons in assembly

area in the open
10

11

Command post in dug-out

shelter or other overhead cover
Command post inthe open
(or mounted invehicle)
12 ATGM, anti tank gun or other
12 individual target inthe open

82

120

160

-V

-a C.

240 ?u

140

60

510

360

200

450

220

120

560

400

240

400

240

160

100

400

320

180

180

90

40

20

150

120

60

200

100

350

180

80

40

300

240

120

200

100

50

320

240

100

300

140

85

45

240

180

80

35

10

10

60

200

100

50

320

240

100

25

20

10

30

20

15

140

80

35

----Suppression of 1 hectare of target area

Target
suppression

120

100

80

50

50

40

15

250

240

180

140

140

100

50

240

9-23

FM 100-2-1

Calculation of Fire Coverage --

---

FIRE COVERAGE IS CALCULATED IN

NUMBER OF ROUNDS PER HECTARE.
A HECTARE IS 10,000 SQUARE METERS,
THE EQUIVALENT OF 2.47 ACRES.

= 10,000 M 2 = 2.47 acres

100 M
DESTRUCTION
POINT TARGET - 90 percent probability that target is no longer combat effective.
AREA TARGET - High probability (at least 90 percent) that at least 50 percent of the elements comprising the target are no longer
combat effective and/or that at least 50 percent of the target area has been destroyed (rendered ineffective for combat).
SUPPRESSION
AREA TARGET - High probability (at least 90 percent) that 25-30 percent of the elements comprising the target grouping are no
longer combat effective and/or that 25-30 percent of the target area has been destroyed.

At ranges of 10 kilometers or less, coverage is determined using the table on page 9-23. To compute the
ammunition expenditure on unobserved targets
located at distances greater than 10 kilometers, the
Soviets use the following formula:

Nd=

N1O

10

Minimum Target Size

SUPPRESSION BY:
Battery of
122-mm
Howitzers

RANGE
Up to 6 KM
100 M x 150 M
(1.5 hectares)

--

RANGE
Over 6 KM
100 M x 200 M
(2 hectares)

WHERE:

Nd

The number of rounds of ammunition expended per hectare of target

area at a given distance beyond
10 kilometers.

The actual distance to be fired,

rounded off to the nearest kilometer.

N10

The number of rounds to be fired

per hectare of target area per
norms established for the same
weapon system at a distance of 10
kilometers or less.

Based on expenditure norms, the Soviets establish

minimum target dimensions for firing batteries. The
minimum target size (example at right) varies with
range to target and weapon dispersion factors.
Foldout for 9-23

9-24

A target smaller than the minimum is attacked

with the same amount of ammunition required
for the minimum size target.
Each weapon is assumed to be able to suppress an
area, given in hectares, the size of which depends on
the time allotted and the type of target. Examples A and
B, Target Area Suppressions (shown at right) illustrate
the area coverage of an unobserved platoon strongpoint given different mission times. The firing unit is a
122-mm howitzer battalion.
In Example A, the range is 10 kilometers; in Example
B, 15 kilometers. The Soviets will not always fire 100
percent of the suppression norm depending on the
importance of the target or because of limitations on
time and/or ammunition. A unit might also fire less
than 100 percent because the target is being engaged
by more than one artillery unit.

a,

FM 100-2-1

Target Area Suppressions

EXAMPLE A THE AMOUNT OF TARGET AREA IN HECTARES THAT CAN BE SUPPRESSED BY A 122-mm
HOWITZER BATTALION FIRING AT A RANGE OF 10 KM OR LESS.
TARGET: Hastily prepared strongpoint position (see target number 8, Ammunition Expenditures
Norms, page 9-23).
AMOUNT: 100% of norm = 150 rounds per hectare of target.
TARGET AREA (HECTARES)
100%

75%

50%

TIME ALLOWED FOR ARTILLERY

STRIKE IN MINUTES

BATTALION

6.0

2.0

4.0

3.0

10

9.6

3.2

6.4

2.1

4.8

15

13.2

4.4

8.8

2.9

6.6

2.2

20

16.2

5.4

10.8

3.6

8.1

2.7

BATTERY

BATTALION

BATTERY

BATTALION

BATTERY

EXAMPLE B THE AMOUNT OF TARGET AREA IN HECTARES THAT CAN BE SUPPRESSED BY A 122-mm
HOWITZER BATTALION FIRING AT A RANGE OF 15 KM.
TARGET: Hastily prepared strongpoint position, (see target number 8, Ammunition Expenditure
Norms, page 9-23).
AMOUNT: 100% of norm = 225 rounds per hectare of target.
(Product of formula Nd = D N10 applied to expenditure norm of 150, or 1.5 x 150=225.
10
TARGET AREA (HECTARES)

STRIKE IN MINUTES

BATTALION

100%

75%

50%

TIME ALLOWED FOR ARTILLERY

BATTERY

BATTALION

BATTERY

BATTALION

6.4

3.2

8.8

4.4

BATTERY

10.8

NOTE: A dash in place of a number indicates that the number of hectares covered was less than 2 for a
battery and less than 3 for a battalion.

9-25

FM 100-2-1

To achieve the optimum coverage in a battalion

concentration, the following guidelines apply:
* Target Unobserved (Corrections not Possible).
Range setting: If the target is 100 meters deep or less,
all tubes will fire on a single elevation setting. If the
target is deeper than 100 meters, all tubes will be fired
on three different elevation settings with the interval
between settings equal to one third of the depth of the
target. (See illustration below.)
Deflection settings: Each battery will fire on a single
deflection setting that insures coverage of the entire

frontage of the battalion's target. As a result, each ofthe

three batteries in the battalion superimposes its fire on
that of the other two.
* Target Observed (Fire Adjusted). When the target
is observed and fire can be adjusted on the target, the
battalion target area normally will be subdivided into
three roughly equal target groupings. Two batteries
will be assigned target groups side by side across the
target's frontage, and the third battery will attack
targets in the depth of the target area. (See illustration
at right.)

Distribution of Rounds on an Unobserved Area Target

<---

TARGET DEPTH (d)

FIRING UNIT - TUBE ARTILLERY BATTALION

OI
*

.4

4-

.4

.4

.4 -

i li
*I
OI

ARTILLERY
BATTALION
C7

F-

z
0

0WJ

.4

U_
W

U)

b+

LEGEND:

d
b

RANGE SETTINGS

1st Battery Burst

2d Battery Burst

3d Battery Burst

a Interval between deflection settings of the six guns in any one battery
b Basic Range Setting
d Depth of Target (greater than 100 meters)

9-26

FM 100-2-1

Range settings: Each battery will fire on a single

elevation setting if the depth of the target is 100 meters
or less. If the depth of the target exceeds 100 meters,
each battery will fire on three different range settings
so that the interval between lines of concentration is
equal to one-third of the depth of the target.
Deflection settings: If the target coverage per weapon
is 25 meters or less, each battery will fire all tubes on a
single deflection setting. If the target coverage (sheaf)
per weapon is 25 meters to 50 meters, then the battery
will fire on two different deflection settings. Mortar
batteries will always fire on a single deflection setting.
Target coverage per piece is obtained by dividing the
target frontage by the number of weapons in the firing
battery.
Until recently, the time required for mission
accomplishment was not a major consideration in
Soviet artillery planning except as a factor in coordination with supported maneuver units. Minimum time
requirements may still not be officially incorporated

into Soviet artillery manuals as "norms," although such

a change is now being called for by the Soviet Chief of
Rocket Troops and Artillery.
The Soviets now are striving to reduce drastically the
time required for fire missions. Among the reasons
given, the most important are* Target mobility. Targets on today's battlefield are
normally armored, highly mobile, and can relocate
within minutes from the time they come under fire.
* Increased effectiveness offire. The same ammunition allocation is much more effective against a target
when the entire allocation is fired within a short
period of time. This is especially true for the initial fire
assault of a long fire preparation and for short, intense
fire preparations.
* Increased survivability. The Soviets assess that
enemy target acquisition capabilities have improved
considerably, allowing enemy artillery to acquire and
fire on Soviet artillery batteries within 4 minutes from
the time the first Soviet round is fired.

Battery Target Grouping Assignments for an Observed Target

TARGET GROUP
1st Battery

-I

ARTILLERY BATTALION FIRING UPON

A PLATOON STRONGPOINT (EXAMPLE)

ARTILLERY BATTALION

300M

Platoon command post

TARGET GROUP
3d Battery
TARGET GROUP
2d Battery

200 M

APC in defensive position

Antitank grenade launcher

ATGM emplacement

})

Recoilless rifle
(NOT TO SCALE)

9-27

FM 100-2-1

As a result of this perception of the threat, Soviet

artillery planners try to reduce mission times to 4
minutes. This goal is especially important for the
accompaniment phase. However, in a large-scale
attack, the preparation and support phases often will
be longer. When the enemy is defending and the
Soviets have overwhelming fire superiority, they
perceive their own vulnerability to enemy counterbattery fire to be greatly reduced.
When the rounds strike a target over a shorter
period of time, the result is an increase in the density of
fire on the target. In Soviet artillery computations,
density of fire is measured by the number of rounds
striking a hectare of the target area in one minute.
Apparently, the Soviets have not yet formally established minimum density "norms", but their publications strongly suggest that 25 to 30 rounds per hectare
per minute is the minimum acceptable density against
most types of targets. Densities might even be higher
for a moving target.
The Soviets consider highly dense artillery fire to be
extremely effective in* Suppressing or destroying enemy defensesespecially ATGM positions.
* Suppressing or destroying moving armored
targets-since the effect is so intense and sudden that
the target is unable to escape or take cover.
The Soviets are developing technical, operational,
and organizational solutions to the problems of
reducing mission times and increasing fire density,
such as those identified below.

Solutions for Increasing Fire Effectiveness

The Soviets are introducing qualitative and

quantitative changes in field artillery equipment and
organizations, and revising their deployment doctrine.
The density of artillery fire support assets in combined
arms formations has been greatly increased. The
introduction of improved munitions, self-propelled
weapons, electronic fire direction computers, and
improved target acquisition assets has enhanced the
mobility and reaction time of artillery fire support.
Although the Soviets apparently continue to
compute combat power ratios on the density of
artillery weapons, the current emphasis is on density of
fire rather than weapons. The artillery battalion has
been designated as the basic tactical and fire unit.
Missions that previously were fired by a single battery
now are assigned to two or three battalions. Artillery
units practice conducting fire missions without first
firing registration and by adjusting fires with ground
surveillance, counterbattery radars, and sound-ranging
equipment. Batteries are assigned two or three
alternate firing positions within a battalion firing
position and are expected to reposition after one or
two fire missions.
The Soviets consider that these measures will insure
their artillery fire superiority by simultaneously
contributing to the battlefield survivability of Soviet
artillery and the destruction of the enemy's artillery.
Achieving the desired mobility and firing norms will
depend, in part, on the wider fielding of automated
systems for intelligence analysis and firing data
computation.

_~

TECHNICAL
* Increasing the rate of fire of newer
generations of artillery weapons.
* Using improved rangefinders to reduce
adjustment time on the target and to eliminate
the need for registration for many types of
missions.
* Using electronic computers to reduce mission
computation time.
OPERATIONAL
* Firing accurately from emergency occupied,
positions.
9-28

* Firing for effect without registration.

* Using entire battalions to fire missions that
previously were fired by individual batteries.
ORGANIZATIONAL
* Using more artillery to accomplish the same
mission. This is the reason for designating the
battalion as the basic firing unit.
* Providing organic artillery to all. maneuver
regiments. Tank regiments, formerly without
organic artillery, now have up to a battalion of
122-mm howitzers.

CHAPTER 10

ANTITANK SUPPORT
ANTITANK WEAPONS SYSTEMS
The Soviets divide antitank weapons into two categories: general and special.
General weapon systems include missiles, aircraft,
tanks, and artillery. These systems are designed to
destroy a wide variety of battlefield targets, but maybe
employed successfully against tanks and other
armored vehicles. According to the Soviets, any
artillery-type weapon (over 20 mm) should have an
antiarmor capability. All conventional artillery up to
152-mm caliber has good direct fire antitank capability
and carries some armor-defeating ammunition. The
122-mm towed and SP howitzers and the 152-mm SP
howitzer with their 360 degree traverse are particularly effective in this role. Field artillery often is used
for direct fire. Antiaircraft guns could engage ground
targets if required.
Special antitank weapon systems consist of antitank
guided missiles (ATGMs), antitank guns, grenade
launchers, and recoilless guns. These weapons are
designed specifically to destroy tanks and their crews
by direct fire. The Soviets consider ATGMs to be very
effective antitank weapons, but limited by minimum
ranges, low rate of fire, and visibility requirements.
Soviet antitank forces therefore have been structured
with a mix of ATGMs and direct fire weapons (guns
and grenade launchers). The direct fire weapons provide quick-response fires at medium, short, and pointblank ranges, on broken ground, and under favorable
visibility conditions.
The Soviets state that in a nonnuclear environment,
direct fire from antitank guns, ATGMs, and tanks is the
principal and most reliable means of destroying tanks.
However, if nuclear weapons are employed, they will
constitute the principal antitank fire support means.
The capabilities of nuclear weapons, combined with
the variety of delivery systems, allow for the destruction of whole tank units at practically all depths of the
battlefield.
The Soviets believe that the high density of armored
vehicles and improved techniques for their employment on the battlefield demand particularly careful
and complete integration of general and special antitank weapon systems available at every level into the
antitank fire support plan. The plan is developed in
detail and coordinated at the highest level. Special
emphasis is placed on careful terrain analysis to
identify high-speed armor approaches and on the
organization of surveillance and earlywarning systems.
Flanks and likely armor approaches are covered by

mutually supporting antitank weapons sited in depth.

During tactical moves, antitank elements are placed
throughout march columns.

ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT

Since neither front nor army has a fixed organizational structure, the antitank units at these levels will
also vary. Normally, the front would have at least one
antitank regiment assigned to its artillery division.
Frontand army antitank assets can be allocated to first
echelon divisions, be assigned to the army combined
arms reserve, or form the nucleus of an army antitank
reserve.
The motorized rifle division antitank battalion
normally consists of an ATGM battery and two gun batteries. A gun battery has two platoons and a fire control
section. Whenever possible, the battalion is reinforced
by engineer units who assist in construction of antitank
obstacles. There are no antitank guns in Soviet tank
regiments or at Soviet tank division level. The only
ATGMs are in the tank division's motorized rifle regiment. All motorized rifle regiments have an ATGM
battery.
An ATGM battery consists of three platoons. Each
platoon has three BRDM-2s mounting six AT3/SAGGER or five AT-5/SPANDREL ATGMs. In addition, platoon and battery commanders have BRDM-2
scout cars which mount 14.5-mm machine guns and
carry target illumination equipment for night combat.
The 14.5-mm machine guns on the command BRDMs
are for engaging enemy infantry and soft-skinned
vehicles.
Each BRDM-2 SAGGER launch vehicle carries six
missiles ready for launching and eight in reserve. Each
SPANDREL launch vehicle carries five ready-to-fire
missiles and an estimated ten reserve missiles. Additional missiles are carried by three trucks.
The antitank platoon of a BTR-equipped motorized
rifle battalion consists of three squads. One is
equipped with two 73-mm recoilless guns SPG-9. The
other two each have two manpack ATGM consoles
(AT-3 or AT-4). Each squad is transported in a BTR.

TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT
Antitank units can be employed as a special antitank
reserve, as an element of a combined arms reserve, or
they may be integrated into a combined arms
10-1

FM 100-2-1

formation itself (usually in the defense). The most frequent type of tactical employment is' as a special
antitank reserve.
Regimental, divisional, and sometimes army antitank
reserves are formed both in attack and defense. They
may consist of guns and guided missiles and generally
will include an engineer mobile obstacle detachment
(MOD) to lay hasty minefields. Tanks also may be
included if the role of the antitank reserve is to deploy
rapidly to meet tank threats. When additional assets
(flamethrowers, tanks, combat engineers) are
attached to the antitank reserve, these elements
normally are subordinate to the antitank artillery
commander.
Command relations of antitank units under conditions of attachment or support are comparable to
those of field artillery units. (See section on Command
and Control, Chapter 9).
If the antitank unit is designated as an antitank
reserve, the unit commander is assigned missions
directly by the combined arms commander. If the antitank artillery unit is part of a combined arms reserve,
the unit commander is assigned missions by the
commander of the combined arms reserve.
Antitank units may deploy in line, in two lines,
echeloned right or left, or they may form a horseshoe
or circle. These formations may be adopted by
platoons within a battery or by the batteries of a battalion. Siting of the weapons within a platoon or
battery is guided by the principles of defense in depth
and mutually supporting fires.
The most common formation for the antitank
battalion is two lines of batteries. Two batteries are
placed in the first echelon and one in the second. They
are sited to provide mutual support. Battery fire positions are located up to 1,000 meters apart. Alternate
fire positions for the battery in the second line
normally are chosen on the flanks.
The echelon right (or left) battle formation is
chosen when it is necessary to cover tank approaches
from both the front and one of the flanks. The subunits
are again sited for mutual support.
Weapons sited at the top of a horseshoe formation
open fire at extreme ranges, inviting enemy tank
attacks so that the other guns can open flank fire. If
enemy tanks penetrate the kill zone of a horseshoe, fire
will be delivered simultaneously by all weapons.
Antitank guns usually are sited about 100 meters
apart, but occasionally may be up to 300 meters; batteries and platoons are usually 300 to 500 meters apart,
but may be up to 1,000 meters. Subunits normally are
sited with overlapping fields of fire. Antitank battalion
and battery commanders control fire from command
10-2

observation posts, normally collocated with one ofthe

fire positions. The battery reconnaissance section
deploys as a forward observation post to give warning
of approaching enemy tanks. Antitank minefields may
be laid by a mobile obstacle detachment 1.5 to 2
kilometers in front of antitank fire positions on the
main tank approaches.
An ATGM battery can deploy with distances of 30 to
300 meters between vehicles and up to 1,500 meters
between platoons; however, normal frontages are 500
meters per platoon and 1,500 meters per battery. Battery and platoon commanders control the fire of the
launchers from observation points that usually are
sited slightly to the rear and preferably on high ground.
In good tank country, platoons are likely to be in line,
but in broken country, one or more subunits will be in
depth and platoons may be deployed independently.
Within platoons, vehicles may be one-up, two-up, or
echeloned to a flank. Whenever possible, ATGMs will
be sited on high ground, clear of close or wooded
country.
Normally each launcher is given an 80 degree arc of
fire overlapping with each ofits neighbors. Missiles are
nearly always launched when the BRDM is stationary,
preferably behind cover, or in defense, from a prepared
emplacement. A normal drill is to fire not more than
two missiles, then move at least 200 meters to a new
firing position. Missiles also may be fired and controlled remotely from a position up to 80 meters away.
Standard time for setting up in this mode is about 1.5
minutes.

THE OFFENSE
During an attack, the antitank reserve usually moves
behind advancing first echelon tanks and infantry in
the most exposed direction of attack, ready to repulse
enemy armored counterattacks. The combined arms
commander or the CRTA chooses successive firing
lines to cover likely tank approaches. Firing positions
are selected by the antitank unit commander.
The antitank reserve advances to successive firing
lines in coordination with the progress ofthe attacking
force and the orders of the combined arms commander to whom it is attached.
In preparation for an attack, antitank units are
located on the most likely enemy armor approaches or
may be positioned well forward to participate in the
artillery preparation phase of the attack. They may be
called upon to conduct fire with direct aiming against
the enemy's armored vehicles. Antitank guns can
conduct indirect observed fire (particularly when
there is insufficient artillery).

FM 100-2-1

During the artillery preparation phase, antitank units

are responsible for* Containing enemy armor.
* Covering the deployment of the attacking units.
* Engaging armored and antitank targets on the forward edge of the enemy position as part of the
preparatory fires.
During the support phase of the attack, antitank
subunits cover the flanks and support the deployment
of the second echelon and reserve.
During the accompaniment phase, fire positions are
selected in the depth of the enemy positions from
which to defeat armored counterattacks. Having
received orders to deploy to one of these positions, the
antitank unit commander will lead his weapons
forward, put out observation posts, and move himself
to a position from which he can direct fire. He will
establish close cooperation with the maneuver force
commander and the mobile obstacle detachment.
In anticipation of a meeting engagement, antitank
subunits march with the advance guard or at the head
of the main force. They must be prepared to deploy
immediately and to provide fire support. At the
beginning of a meeting engagement, antitank units will
deploy in the threatened sector on an assigned firing
line, covering the deployment of the combined arms
force.
THE DEFENSE
The antitank fire support plan is developed in
greater detail in the defense than in the offense. The
Soviets believe that the basic system of fire in the
defense is antitank fire. The antitank fire plan is
designed to place an enemy armored force under continuous fire from the point of its first detection until it
is destroyed in a first echelon kill zone.
ATGMs are given an engagement zone that extends
out to 3 km from the forward edge. Tanks firing from
defilade positions first engage attacking tanks at 2 to
2.5 km in front of the defensive positions. The engagement zone for antitank guns extends out to about 1.5
km. SPG or RPG weapons engage enemy armor at
ranges less than 1000 meters..
In the defense, antitank units have these missions:
* Destroy enemy tanks and APCs forward of the first
echelon.
* Destroy tanks and APCs that have penetrated the
first defensive echelon.
* Cover gaps in the defense.
* Support the counterattack.
Fixed-wing aviation, surface-to-surface missiles, and
massed artillery fires may be employed against

detected armor concentrations in assembly areas. Aircraft, especially ATGM-equipped attack helicopters,
are the most effective weapon for engaging moving
armor forces at greater ranges. Minelaying helicopters
also may be used to lay hasty antitank minefields.
Indirect artillery and MRL fires are effective in isolating tanks from supporting forces and causing tank
crews to secure the hatches. Although indirect
artillery and MRL fires increase the vulnerability of
attacking tanks to special antitank weapons (by stripping them of their supporting forces), the smoke and
dust of the explosions can simultaneously degrade the
effectiveness of direct fire support weapons by impairing gunner visibility.
At the start of a defensive action, the antitank reserve
normally occupies camouflaged positions from which
it can cover the most likely tank approaches. The
Soviets state that each tank, ATGM, or antitank gun
firing from a prepared camouflaged defensive position
can defeat two to three attacking tanks. The commander selects from one to three firing lines to which
his weapons may deploy on each possible approach.
Subunit reconnaissance and engineer preparation of
routes. and fire positions follow, if time allows.
An antitank unit maybe integrated into the defensive
first echelon, occupying designated positions in either
a battalion defensive area or company strongpoint.
This type of deployment is usually by platoon, with the
separation between platoons insuring mutually supporting fires. Battle formation depends on the mission
and terrain and must insure the following:
* Concentration of fire on tanks by direct sighting
along armor avenues of approach.
* Covering by fire of approaches to antitank barriers.
* Close coordination between the weapons of the
antitank subunits and the antitank weapons of the
company strongpoint or the battalion defense area.
* All-round defense of each platoon.
As the antitank reserve for a defending combined
arms formation, an antitank subunit's tactical deployment is based on mission and terrain and must insure
the following:
* Coordinated and concentrated fires on armor
approaches.
* Echelonment of the firing positions in depth.
* Conduct of flanking fire on enemy tanks.
* Maneuver of the unit within the area of deployment and to firing lines.
If the defending units are forced to withdraw,
ATGMs and antitank guns cover the withdrawal of
forward elements. Antitank units break contact and
withdraw to a new firing position when enemy armor
has closed to 500 meters.
10-3

CHAPTER 11

AIR DEFENSE
CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES
The objective of the Soviet tactical air defense
system is to reduce the effectiveness of enemy air
attacks. This can be achieved by forcing enemy aircraft
to expend their ordnance while still beyond the effective or optimum ranges of their weapons or by destroying the aircraft when they come within effective range
of Soviet air defense weapons.
There are two important concepts in Soviet tactical
air defense. First, air defense is considered to be an
integral element of the combined arms concept.
Secondly, air defense of ground forces is achieved by a
variety of weapons and equipment that together form a
system of air defense.
Soviet air defense of maneuver units includes
three phases. The first phase includes all actions
taken to destroy enemy aircraft while they are still
on the ground at airfields or in marshaling areas.
Soviet aviation resources and surface-to-surface
missiles play the major role in this phase. The
second phase includes all actions taken to destroy
enemy aircraft while in flight but still at some distance from Soviet ground forces. Soviet aviation
plays a sizable role in these actions, and mediumrange air defense missile units also may have
some role. The third phase entails the destruction
of enemy airplanes and helicopters that have
penetrated into the air space of Soviet maneuver
elements. This role primarily belongs to Soviet
tactical air defense forces. These threephases may
overlap, and all three maybe conducted simultaneously. This chapter discusses only the third phase.
The mission of the Soviet tactical air defense
forces is to protect ground force units and other
potential targets from attacks byfixed-wing ground
attack aircraft and armed helicopters. To accomplish this mission, it is not necessary for Soviet air
defense units to destroy every attacking enemy
aircraft. If the Soviet tactical air defense system
can prevent enemy air crews from pressing their
attacks or can force them to expend their ordnance
prematurely, for the most part it will have accomplished its mission. Soviet ground forces then are
able to continue their missions.
The basic principles that have influenced Soviet air
defense developments and apparently form Soviet
tactical air defense doctrine are:
* Firepower. The Soviets use a variety of air
defense weapons, both missiles and guns, and a
force structure that provides a significant number

of these

weapons,

with

suitable

mix of

capabilities to ground force commanders.

* Surprise. Soviet writers emphasize the
principle of surprise.They are aware of not only the
physical destruction that can be achieved by an
attack on an unsuspecting enemy, but also of the
psychological effects of violent and unexpected
fires on aviation crews. The psychological effects
often are only temporary, but they can reduce the
effectiveness of attacking air crews at critical
moments.
* Mobility and maneuver of air defense
weapons. The Soviets' mobile tactical air defense
system allows air defense units to maneuver with
tank and motorized rifle forces.
* Continuous activity by air defense units.
Comprehensive air defense coverage can be
guaranteed only if air defense units are constantly
active and provided with adequate logistic support.
* Aggressive action,, initiative, and originality
on the part of air defense unit commanders. The
Soviets recognize that air defense unit commanders must exploit the full capabilities of their
equipment if they are to carry out their missions
successfully. This demands aggressive action,
initiative, and originality on their part. The future
battlefield will be a fluid and volatile environment.
Air defense unit commanders must be responsive
to changes in the tactical situation. For example, if
the supported unit's mission is modified, the air
defense unit commander must reevaluate his own
unit's deployment in light of the new requirements. The air defense unit commander also must
be aware of changes in the tactics employed by
enemy air forces.
* Coordination of actions between supported
maneuver units and supportingair defense units
and between air defense units. This principle
emphasizes the Soviet perception of airdefense as
a single system composed of its various parts
rather than a series of separate, distinct actions
that bear no relation to each other or the conduct of
the ground battle. Air defense is an integral
element of the ground battle.
* All-round security. The Soviets recognize that air
attack can come from any quarter and that it is not
enough to provide security for only the units close to
the forward edge and only in the direction of enemy
forces.
11-1

FM 100-2-1

ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT

The Soviet inventory of tactical air defense weapons
includes a variety of missiles, guns, and support equipment. There are air defense weapons at nearly every
level. As with other weapon systems, the Soviets have
incorporated recent technological developments into
newly designed air defense weapons while improving
other weapons already in production. They have
developed a variety of air defense missiles while continuing to develop antiaircraft artillery (AAA).
A BMP-equipped motorized rifle battalion has an air
defense platoon containing nine SA-7 surface-to-air
missile (SAM) launchers. A BTR-equipped motorized
rifle company has an air defense squad containing
three SA-7 launchers. While tank companies are not
known to have SA-7s, most Soviet tanks are equipped
with turret-mounted antiaircraft machine guns. All
Soviet tactical units receive training in the employment of massed, small arms weapon fire. This technique is practiced routinely to engage low-flying
enemy aircraft, usually under the supervision of the
company commander when he has been notified that
enemy aircraft are approaching his position.
The SA-7s of the BTR-equipped motorized rifle
company usually are employed as a squad, with the
company commander retaining tight control. SA-7
gunners are not routinely attached to the platoons of
the company. In a prepared defense, the battalion commander or regimental chief of air defense may control
the employment of the company's SA-7s.
No air defense unit is organic to BTR-equipped
motorized rifle battalions or tank battalions, although
there may be an SA-7 squad assigned to protect the battalion command post or other points designated by the
battalion commander. SA-7 SAM squads can be
employed in any tactical unit, and also at higher' levels.
Armored vehicles of the battalion command group are
equipped with vehicle-mounted antiaircraft machine
guns.
The Soviet practice of positioning the command
post in the key sector of the battalion's area in the
defense provides an element of protection. The
primary means of air defense for the maneuver battalion, however, is provided by its companies and the
air defense elements attached from regimental or divisional assets. Usually such attachment is practiced by
the Soviets and is the rule when the battalion is
engaged in independent or semi-independent actions.
The systemic nature of Soviet tactical air defense
measures can be seen in the maneuver regiment. There
is a chief of air defense in the regiment. His
responsibilities include planning and directing air
defense activities within the regiment. He advises the
commander on allocation and deployment of the
11-2

regiment's. air defense assets, and he may sometimes

control the employment of SA-7 SAMs of the subordinate motorized rifle battalions or companies.
Soviet tank and motorized rifle regiments have an
organic air defense battery equipped with the ZSU-234 self-propelled antiaircraft gun (SPAAG) and the SA-9
SAM. The battery consists of a headquarters, a platoon
of four ZSU-23-4s, a platoon of four SA-9 SAM
launchers, and support and service elements. The regimental headquarters has a squad of three SA-7 SAM
gunners.
The ZSU-23-4 has a relatively small engagement
envelope and is considered a limited area or point
defense weapon. Normally it is employed with
individual SPAAGs located within several hundred
meters of one another. When the four guns of a ZSU23-4 platoon are employed in pairs, the pairs are
usually kept within approximately 1,500 meters of one
another. Typical missions for these weapons may
involve two to four ZSU-23-4s protecting a battalion in
the regiment's first echelon or on a road march.
The SA-9 has an engagement envelope significantly
larger than that of the ZSU-23-4 and is an area defense
weapon. It provides the regimental commander with
an organic air defense missile capability that can
encompass his entire unit. The SA-9 normally is
deployed between the first and second echelons of a
regiment, a location from which it can protect both
first and second echelon subunits without being
exposed to direct fire from enemy ground forces.
Probable missions of SA-9 units include protecting the
regimental command post, the regiment's organic
artillery battalion, and other organic or attached
elements in the regiment's sector.
A number of the new SA-13 SAM systems have been
deployed in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany
since 1980. SA-13 units are replacing SA-9 units. Unlike
the SA-9, the SA-13 is a tracked vehicle with greater
cross-country mobility.
Introduction of the SA-6 or the SA-8 SAM into the
divisional air defense regiment significantly improved
air defense mobility and firepower. The transportererector-launchers (TEL) of both missiles are highly
mobile. The SA-6 is mounted on a nonamphibious
tracked vehicle, and the SA-8 is mounted on an
amphibious wheeled vehicle.
Employment of the SA-6 or the SA-8 has a major
impact on the division's combat capability. The
division now has an organic air defense system that
provides a significant degree of protection to the
entire division. The range of the SA-6 provides for
greater depth in the division's air defense system,
especially against aircraft employing standoffweapons.

FM 100-2-1

While the range of the SA-8 is significantly less than

that of the SA-6, its higher road speed and amphibious
capabilities make it especiallywell suited for pursuit or
exploitation.
A Soviet army usually has one or two SAM brigades
equipped with the SA-4 SAM. Generally, the missions of
army-level air defense units are to augment divisional
air defense capabilities in the forward area and to
engage and destroy aircraft that get past the divisions'
air defense systems.
The Soviets have developed extensive and effective
radar target detection and fire control systems. Their
radars can be assigned to two general categories:
surveillance and fire control. Surveillance includes
early warning, target acquisition, and height finding
radars. Some fire control radars also have limited target
acquisition capability.
It is important to view Soviet radars as systems rather
than as separate units. Because the majority of target
acquisition radars are concentrated above division
level, most target information is accumulated and
processed at army and front air defense operations
centers and passed down to divisions. High level commanders select the weapon system that can best
engage a given target. Target detection and monitoring
by front, army, and division target acquisition radars
provide the necessary data for engagement without
unnecessarily exposing the air defense firing battery
and TEL-mounted (particularly SA-8) radars to detection by enemy forces and subsequent neutralization by
electronic countermeasures or destruction. (For more
information on air defense organization and equipment, see FM 100-2-3.)

MISSIONS
Frontheadquarters plays a major role in the control
of air defense assets of its subordinate units. The
front's own air defense weapons are used for various
missions, depending on the situation. Some may augment the air defense weapons of armies of the front.
Others may provide general, front-wide air defense
coverage or fill gaps between armies. In any event,
front air defense assets are used primarily to insure
continuous coverage in both detection and engagement capabilities. Front air defense weapons usually
are located somewhere to the rear of army air defense
weapons to engage aircraft that penetrate forward air
defenses.
SA-4 units of Soviet armies provide medium- to highaltitude air defense and augment the air defense assets
of divisions. Their engagement envelope extends from
the army's rear to about 45 kilometers beyond the

forward edge of the battie area (FEBA) for first

echelon armies. Laterally, this SA-4 coverage overlaps
the envelope of adjacent armies.
The mission of the division's air defense regiment is
to protect the maneuver regiments and other units or
facilities within the division's area of activity. First
echelon maneuver regiments, division headquarters,
and the division's artillery and rocket units have the
highest priorities for protection. The division commander is assisted by a chief of air defense, a field grade
officer, who with his staff plans and directs the
division's air defense operations.
Air defense regiments equipped with the SA-6 or the
SA-8 SAM are capable of including all elements of the
division in their engagement envelopes. Typical
employment of the regiment's five missile firing batteries might involve two batteries providing support
directly to the two first echelon maneuver regiments,
while the remaining three batteries provide protection
for the division headquarters, rocket and artilleryunits,
and the remainder of the division. Units to the rear of
first echelon maneuver regiments are protected by the
engagement envelopes of the first echelon regiments
and the missile batteries directly supporting them. The
ranges of the SA-6 and the SA-8 allow them to be
deployed several kilometers behind the line of contact,
thus reducing their exposure to enemy ground-based
weapons. From these positions, the missile batteries
can still engage-targets well forward of the FEBA.
SA-7 SAMs employed in the rear area provide local
air defense against enemy aircraft that penetrate the
division's primary air defense network. Control of the
SA-7s is probably highly centralized to prevent engagement of friendly aircraft by mistake.
Front through division air defense assets are
employed to create an area defense. Radars provide an
unbroken detection envelope extending well into
enemy territory and across the entire zone of operations. Enemy aircraft that manage to get past Soviet
fighters probably are engaged first by front and army
SA-4 missile units. While gaps mayappear in the missile
engagement envelope, significant effort is devoted to
maintaining continuous coverage.
If enemy aircraft penetrate the air defense systems of
front, army, and divisional air defense regiments, they
will be engaged by the short-range SA-7 and SA-9 SAMs
and the ZSU-23-4 antiaircraft guns of the maneuver
regiments. Tank, motorized rifle, and artillery units in
the division's first and second echelons and the air
defense subunits themselves are expected to be the
primary targets of enemy air attacks. The ZSU-23-4
platoon of the maneuver regiment, directly supplemented by the regiment's SA-9 SAMs and further
11-3

FM 100-2-1

supplemented by divisional air defense batteries, provides the key regimental air defense.

SUPPORT IN THE OFFENSE

Soviet ground force air defense weapons can fully
support fast-moving tank and motorized rifle forces in
dynamic offensive combat. Air defense units offront
and army conduct basically an area defense, engaging
enemy aircraft at some distance from the supported
maneuver divisions and themselves. Divisional air
defense regiments conduct primarily an area defense,
though there is a significant element of point defense
in support of the division's maneuver regiments.
Operations by air defense batteries and the SA-7 SAM
sections are largely of the point type due to the
capabilities of their weapons and the units they defend.
Air defense actions are most complex in the
maneuver regiment. As the supported unit performs its
assigned missions, it continuously changes its location
and combat formation. The air defense unit commander must respond to these changes and redeploy
his own weapons to provide continuous and effective
protection to the regiment's elements.
Allocation of air defense units is weighted in favor of
maneuver units in areas where the threat is perceived
to be the greatest. For example, a motorized rifle regiment in the division's first echelon usually receives
additional air defense support from one or more batteries of the division's air defense regiment. These batteries need not operate in the maneuver regiment's
formation. The range of their radars and missiles allows
them to provide support to the first echelon from locations farther to the rear. Iocating these missile batteries to the rear also decreases the likelihood of their
being destroyed by enemy ground fire or aircraft.
A motorized rifle battalion attacking in a regiment's
first echelon often is supported by ZSU-23-4s of the
regiment's antiaircraft artillery platoon. In his combat
order, the regimental commander assigns the ZSU
platoon the mission of supporting particular battalions
for a specified period. This period can begin before a
battalion moves into an assembly area, in which case
the air defense element provides protection to the battalion during the road march to the assembly area.
Alternatively, the ZSU-23-4 platoon may join the
maneuver battalion in the assembly area, though the
Soviets prefer to have both subunits arrive at the
assembly area at approximately the same time. Failure
of the air defense subunit to join the maneuver battalion at the designated time leaves the battalion
exposed to possible enemy air attack. In either case,
the ZSU-23-4 platoon leader reports to the maneuver
11-4

battalion commander, and direct communications are

established. The ZSU-23-4 platoon maintains communications with the regimental air defense battery. It
also receives information from the divisional air
defense target identification and warning network.
This communications system provides for timely
receipt of information on the tactical air situation.
The maneuver battalion commander and the ZSU23-4 section or platoon leader work closely to integrate their weapons into an effective air defense plan.
As the battalion occupies the assembly areas, air defense weapons deploy in accordance with this fire
plan. Light discipline is strictly enforced, and radio listening silence is employed to reduce the likelihood of
detection by enemy signal intelligence units. If the assembly area is to be occupied for an extended period,
such as overnight, the ZSU-23-4s and the weapons and
vehicles of the battalion are usually dug in.
The battalion commander provides guidance for the
placement of the ZSU-23-4s and the SA-7 SAMs.
Observation posts and firing positions are selected to
provide comprehensive observation and interlocking
fires on the most likely approach routes for low-flying
aircraft and armed helicopters. When the entire
platoon is employed, the two pairs of ZSU-23-4s are
kept within mutually supporting range. As a rule, one
gun crew is on alert in each of the ZSU-23-4 pairs
except when warning of an air attack is received, at
which time both crews go to alert status.
The SA-7 SAM squads of the three motorized rifle
companies supplement the coverage provided by the
ZSU-23-4 section or platoon. The three gunners of one
company's SA-7 squad maybe placed near the ZSU-234 section or platoon. The ZSU subunit leader may be
given some degree of control over these SA-7 gunners
in such a situation. The SA-7 squad of another
motorized rifle company could cover a less likely
avenue of approach. Placement of these SA-7 gunners
is similar to that in an air defense ambush. The three
SA-7s of the third motorized rifle company may be
retained with the battalion in the assembly area to
provide close-in protection. Observation posts are
collocated frequently with SA-7 firing positions.
Besides the ZSU-23-4s and SA-7 SAMs, the battalion
employs its vehicle-mounted machine guns, ATGMs,
and massed small arms for close-in defense. When the
battalion is reinforced by a tank company, the antiaircraft machine guns on tanks provide additional air
defense firepower in the assembly area.
To attack the battalion in its assembly area with
conventional ordnance, an enemy aircraft must first
penetrate the engagement envelopes formed by
missile units of front, army, and divisions. The

FM 100-2-1

attacking aircraft then come within range of the regimental and battalion defense systems. The ZSU-23-4s
engage enemy aircraft immediately as they come
within range. SA-7 gunners engage enemy aircraft that
maneuver to avoid ZSU-23-4 fires or pass over the SA-7
firing positions. Finally, small arms and vehiclemounted weapons engage enemy aircraft that pass
over the maneuver battalions' positions.
In an attack, the exact location of tactical air defense
weapons depends on the mission of the supported
unit, the attack formation chosen by its commander,
and considerations of terrain, fields of fire, and
observation. If the maneuver unit is attacking on a
broad frontage, sections of two ZSU-23-4s are usually
deployed in a line formation to provide protection to
the dispersed elements of the supported unit. When
attacking on a narrow frontage, the two ZSU-23-4 sections of the platoon are deployed in column toprovide
greater control and increased concentration of
platoon fire.

SA-7 gunners ride in armored personnel carriers or

the BMP. Employment of a BTR company's SA-7
gunners in a group, close to the company commander,
is preferred. It offers greater control and increased
probability of a target's destruction. It also reduces the
possibility of firing on a friendly aircraft.
When two maneuver battalions attack on line in the
first echelon of a regiment, each normally is supported
by a ZSU section. While the ZSU-23-4 sections remain
within mutually supporting range, they are located far
enough apart to reduce the chances of their simultaneous destruction by conventional weapons. The
two guns of each section usually are located from 150
to 250 meters apart to insure adequate freedom of fire
for engaging low flying targets (see below).
The air defense platoon command element usually
follows the ZSU-23-4 sections at a distance of approximately 200 meters. Trucks carrying additional
ammunition for the ZSUs follow at a distance of 1.5 to
2.5 kilometers to the rear of the firing sections.

Air Defense Support for a Motorized Rifle Battalion Assault

--

-- - -

-- -----

-C -

L ---

-L--Je _- -~I

Not more than

400 M --

150-250 M

P
Approximately
-- 200 M --'

~L

I~~

~b

Pl~j~

LEGEND:
I

(NOT TO SCALE)

SA-7/Grail

SAM Section

ZSU-23-4
Wa Self-propelled AA Gun

Command APC

11-5

FM 100-2-1

Basic employment

techniques for air defense

weapons in a meeting engagement do not differ significantly from those for the attack. Two ZSU-23-4s of the
platoon normally are placed in a regiments' advance
guard. SA-9 SAMs and any reinforcing elements from
the division's air defense regiment most likely remain
with the maneuver regiment's main force. Air
observers are posted on all vehicles, and SA-7 gunners
are prepared to engage designated targets in their
sectors of observation and fire.
An additional concern is the need to protect air
defense weapons, especially ZSU-23-4s with the
advance guard, from enemy direct fire. The advance
guard battalion also may be protected by SA-6 or SA-8
SAM batteries operating from the regiment's main
body.
A motorized rifle battalion in a pursuit may be augmented by air defense elements from its regiment or
possibly a battery from the division's air defense regiment. Air defense during pursuit is especially
important, since the enemy will likely use air power to
reduce the rate of advance and the strength ofpursuing
Soviet forces.
SUPPORT IN THE DEFENSE

The Soviets believe that the motorized rifle and tank

battalions in a division's defending first echelon regiments will be priority targets for attacking enemy
aircraft. Therefore, regimental air defense weapons are
deployed well forward, with the ZSU-23-4 platoon
usually supporting first echelon motorized rifle battalions. The SA-9 SAM platoon is probably located in
the rear of the first echelon battalions or in the forward
area of the second echelon, protecting the regiment's
artillery battalion and command post. If the air threat is
great, batteries of the divisional air defense regiment
may be allocated to any of the maneuver regiments.
Remaining divisional air defense batteries protect the
division main command post and division artillery and
rocket units.
A ZSU-23-4 platoon leader normally is given a
mission order by his air defense battery commander to
provide protection to a specific maneuver battalion or
battalions for a given period of time. During this time,
the ZSU-23-4 platoon leader reports directly to the
maneuver battalion commander. The platoon leader
also maintains communications with his battery headquarters and the division's target Identification and
warning net.
The maneuver battalion commander has overall
responsibility for the organization and conduct of air
defense by his own battalion and any attached
11-6

elements. The ZSU-23-4 platoon leader is responsible

only for the performance of his own platoon.
When the platoon leader reports to a maneuver
battalion commander, he is informed of the battalion's
mission and disposition and the commander's tactical
plan. He may receive further instructions from the battalion commander, and they may conduct a joint terrain reconnaissance.
The platoon leader identifies likely routes of
approach for enemy aircraft, paying special attention
to routes suitable for low-flying aircraft and helicopters. Positions for air defense weapons are also reconnoitered. If the battalion commander has directed that
air defense ambushes and roving units are to be
deployed, the ZSU-23-4 platoon leader designates
primary and alternate positions on a map and establishes schedules for their movement. These positions
and schedules are then coordinated with the battalion
commander.
Battalion air defense preparations begin at the
company level. Air observation posts are established in
each company area close to the command observation
posts, on terrain affording good visibility or along likely
routes of enemy air approach. Schedules for rotating
air observers are established, and sectors of observation and fire are designated for each post to maintain
360-degree observation of the air space surrounding
the battalion's defensive area. SA-7 SAM firing positions
are established in each motorized rifle company's area.
These positions often are collocated with air observation posts near the perimeters of the companies' positions to extend the engagement envelopes as far as
possible. While tank companies have no organic SA-7
SAMs, they do establish their air observation posts as
part of the battalion's air defense warning system.
Company commanders determine sectors of fire for
employment of massed fires of small arms and vehiclemounted weapons, including tank-mounted antiaircraft machine guns. ATGMs can be used to engage
troop-carrying and armed helicopters. Signals for
warning and engagement are coordinated, with
primary reliance on visual signals and field telephone
communications. Finally, personnel camouflage their
vehicles, equipment, and positions as a passive air
defense measure.
As in other combat actions, the ZSU-23-4s may be
deployed in pairs (sections), with pairs of guns not
more than to 1,500 meters apart. Positions for the ZSU23-4s are usually well within a battalion's defensive
area, which affords them a measure ofprotection from
enemy observation and direct ground fire. This enables
the ZSU-23-4s to provide protection to the entire battalion. Air observation posts are established in the

FM 100-2-1

battalion rear area and at the battalion command

observation post. The ZSU-23-4 platoon or section
command post usually is located near the battalion
command observation post.
The fires of the battalion's organic and attached air
defense weapons are combined into an integrated air
defense fire plan. The division target identification and
warning network provides information about the
enemy air situation. (Note the graphic illustration
below. )

The battalion's air defense capabilities are only part

of an overall air defense system. Preparations in the battalion are directed primarily against low-flying aircraft
that have penetrated the overall air defense network
and are attacking the battalion. Before aircraft can
reach the outer limits of the battalion's air defense
network, they must penetrate the SAM engagement
envelopes of the SA-4 SAMs offront and army, the SA-6
or SA-8 SAMs of the division, and the SA-9 SAM platoon
of the maneuver regiment's air defense battery.

Air Defense of a Motorized Rifle Battalion in a Defensive Posture

~ZZ~

LEGEND:
A
C
--

Air observation post

SA-7/Grail SAM section (3 launchers) launch position
ZSU-23-4 (positioned for 360-degree coverage)

SSector of observation/fire for SA-7 section

SLimits of fire for infantry and tank weapons

when employed

against aircraft

11-7

FM 100-2-1

The Soviets believe that it is better to engage a

hostile aircraft prematurely and waste some ammunition than to wait and allow the aircraft to expend its
ordnance from an advantageous position. Aircraft are
fired on continuously as long as they remain within
range.
Aircraft posing the greatest threat are engaged on a
priority basis. The preferred engagement technique is
to continue firing at an already engaged target rather
than to switch from target to target--unless a lateracquired target seriously threatens the air defense elements. Air observers and weapon crews outside the
attacked sector maintain observation and readiness to
fire to preclude enemy success through simultaneous
air attacks from several directions.
Company commanders usually direct the firing of
their SA-7 SAMs and the employment of massed small
arms fires. A helicopter usually is engaged by the
massed small arms fire of a single platoon; high-performance aircraft are engaged by all weapons of the
company. Between attacks, air defense weapons are
repositioned to reduce the likelihood of destruction in
subsequent attacks and to deceive the enemy as to the
strength and composition of air defense units.
Second echelon battalions of a motorized rifle regiment are located several kilometers behind the FEBA
and usually do not have attached air defense elements.
They benefit from the efforts of all air defense elements
located to their front.
Second echelon maneuver regiments develop their
air defense plan in coordination with the division's
chief of air defense. It is also likely that one or more of
the division's air defense batteries will be located in
the defensive areas ofthese second echelon regiments.
In all cases, second echelon regiments take both
active and passive air defense measures. Air observation posts are established, SA-7 SAM and massed unit
fires are planned, and camouflage measures are taken.
One problem identified by Soviet writings on air
defense of defending maneuver units is that their commanders often forget that air defense is an integral part
of combined arms actions. Such an oversight can result
in a poorly organized system of air defense, uncoordinated actions by organic and supporting air defense
elements, and unnecessary losses of personnel and
equipment to enemy air attacks.
Lesser problems involve maintaining continuous air
observation and insuring that first echelon units have
current and accurate information about the air situation. A problem less frequently mentioned is the high
ammunition and missile expenditure rate that must
result from the policy of early, multiple, and prolonged
engagement of targets.
11-8

Air defense units play a significant role in defending

Soviet ground forces against attacks by enemy airborne
and airmobile troops. When an enemy airborne operation is detected,frontalaviation attempts to intercept
and destroy enemy transport aircraft while they are at
the marshaling airfields and en route to the drop zones.
Front, army, and division SAM units engage the
transport aircraft entering their respective air defense
zones. Regimental air defense units near the drop
zones also engage the transport aircraft. The ZSU-23-4
fires on paratroops and equipment descending to the
ground. Vehicle-mounted machine guns and small
arms fire also are used in this role.
Enemy airmobile units are engaged primarily by
antiaircraft artillery and SA-7 and SA-9 SAMs. ZSU-23-4
guns are effective in combating airmobile forces flying
at very low altitudes to avoid radar detection. The
importance of visual surveillance in the early detection
of these approaching helicopters is stressed repeatedly
in Soviet writings. Vehicle-mounted machine guns and
small arms fire also engage helicopters. Additionally,
antiaircraft artillery attack enemy airborne and airmobile forces that have landed.

AIR DEFENSE RECONNAISSANCE

The Soviet concept of reconnaissance in air defense
includes airspace surveillance and evaluation of the
terrain for suitable weapon positions and likely routes
of approach for low-flying aircraft-both groundattack fighters and armed helicopters. Surveillance of
the surrounding air space is continuous to maintain
current data on the enemy air situation.
Terrain reconnaissance usually is conducted by the
commander of the supported unit and the commander
of the supporting air defense element. They conduct a
preliminary map reconnaissance to tentatively identify
positions for deployment of air defense weapons in
defensive areas, along routes ofmarch, or in areas to be
seized by advancing Soviet forces. Significant emphasis
is placed on identification of all potential attack routes
for low-flying enemy aircraft of all types. Routes of
approach suitable for armed helicopters and positions
from which these helicopters might employ ATGMs
are of special concern. The Soviets consider armed
helicopters to be a serious threat to their tank and
motorized rifle forces. Soviet commanders are trained
to observe areas masked by trees or folds in the terrain
that might be used by enemy aircraft using nap-of-theearth (NOE) flight techniques to avoid radar
detection.
The Soviets use electronic and electro-optical
means and visual observation to conduct air

FM 100-2-1

surveillance. Radar is used for technical surveillance,

providing an all-weather detection capability.
Whenever possible, preliminary target data is passed
from higher-level radar units to air defense commanders and their firing batteries. This reduces the
vulnerability of battery radars and radar-equipped gun
carriages and missile launchers to electronic countermeasures. Ideally, only aircraft that have been positively identified as hostile are engaged.
The Soviets are well aware of developments in electronic countermeasures and radar-homing ordnance.
Radar personnel receive extensive training in countermeasures against enemy aircraft that use jamming
devices and radar-homing weapons.
The development of technical reconnaissance
means has not reduced the importance ofvisual reconnaissance. Soviet commanders are taught that an effective system of visual surveillance often mayprovide the
first warning of an enemy air attack-especially one
conducted by attack helicopters using NOE flight techniques. This is especially true at the subunit level.
Air observers are posted in all units operating close
to enemy forces or in areas where enemy air attack is
likely. Visual air surveillance is conducted on a 360degree basis, and observers are assigned sectors of air
space to monitor. According to the Soviets, an aircraft
can be detected at ranges from 2 to 5 kilometers when
the observer is assigned a 60- to 90-degree sector of
observation and at ranges of 6 to 7 kilometers when
assigned a 30-degree sector. Of course, terrain and visibility affect these distances. Using binoculars can
increase detection ranges to about 12 kilometers. Aircraft flying at high altitudes may be detected at ranges
of up to 50 kilometers when more sophisticated
optical rangefinding equipment is used.

PROTECTION OF MARCH COLUMNS

The Soviets anticipate that their units may be subjected to heavy attacks by both ground-attack fighters
and armed helicopters when conducting road
marches. Accordingly, marching regiments are protected by their organic air defense weapons and by air
defense weapons from their division.
Air attack is considered likely at chokepoints where
rapid movement is impeded by terrain or other obstacles. These chokepoints include bridges, mountain
passes, built-up areas, and similar locations.
Air observers are designated on all vehicles, and air
defense elements, including SA-7 gunners, remain
ready to engage targets at all times. Vehicle-mounted
weapons are also employed. To reduce the likelihood
of detection of the column by enemy electronic intelli-

gence (ELINT), radars on the vehicles may not be used

unless the requirement for their use outweighs the risk
of detection. Additional radars from the division's air
defense regiment may be used if increased radar
coverage is desired. Two radars are usually used, and
they are set up at critical points along the march route.
Usually only one radar moves at a time. If the commander decides not to use the additional radars during
the march, one is placed in the advance guard and the
other in the main force of the unit. Both remain ready
for use at any time.
SA-7 gunners engage low-flying aircraft under the
direction of their company commanders. Individual
SA-7 gunners are assigned specific sectors of observation and fire to preclude several gunners engaging one
target while additional targets approach from other
directions. Tight control over the SA-7 gunners
reduces the expenditure of missiles.
Regimental air defense weapons, particularly the
ZSU-23-4 SPAAGs, play a major role in the defense of
units making tactical marches. While one or two pairs
of ZSU-23-4s may be employed to protect units on the
march, the use of all four seems to be the rule. ZSU-234s are employed within 1,500 meters of each other to
insure mutual support. Individual self-propelled antiaircraft guns maintain at least 50 meters between
themselves and other vehicles to insure an unobstructed field of fire for engaging low-flying aircraft.
Targets can be engaged by the ZSU-23-4 moving at
slow speeds or during the short halt which yields more
accurate fire. Whenever a column stops, even for brief
periods, the ZSU-23-4s pull off to the right side of the
road with the rest of the column and remain ready for
action.
When the threat of air attack is great, or when the
commander directs, weapons of the division's air
defense regiment are employed to protect columns.
The SA-6 and the SA-8 SAMs-especially the SA-8, with
its high degree of road mobility, amphibious capability,
and integral radars-are well suited to providing air
defense protection for columns. These weapons
provide large engagement envelopes which could have
a significant impact on enemy aircraft using limitedrange, standoffweapons. It is highlylikely that SAM batteries are used to protect columns, especially those
moving up from the rear.
Air defense batteries relocate as necessary to provide continuous and effective protection to the supported unit. Soviet commanders maintain effective
protection by leaving at least one battery in firing position to cover for the one(s) moving. Air defense
elements attached to a maneuver unit usually move as a
part of that unit.

FM 100-2-1

AIR DEFENSE
AMBUSHES AND ROVING UNITS
Soviet commanders employ special techniques to
increase flexibility and effectiveness in their air
defense. Among these are the use of air defense
ambushes and roving air defense elements. Air defense
elements used for both these techniques are similar in
task organization and usually consist of a single antiaircraft gun, section, or platoon. SA-7 SAM squads also
may be used independently, or with other weapons.
Air defense ambushes and roving units are used to
cover gaps in air defenses, to provide air defense
coverage on less likely approach routes for enemy aircraft, and to deceive the enemy as to the disposition of
other air defense elements. These tactics often are
employed when the air defense assets are thought to
be inadequate.
Air defense ambushes are most frequently
positioned along less likely but possible approach
routes for enemy aircraft. They usually consist of one
or more ZSU-23-4s or SA-7 SAMs. The ZSU-23-4, with
its inherent mobility and high rate of fire, is especially
well suited for both ambushes and roving units. When
necessary, radar elements of the divisional air defense
regiment may support a unit operating from ambush.
Engagement is made only of those targets that
approach on the designated route or in self-defense.
Air defense units are immediately repositioned after
engagement or discovery by the enemy.
Employment of roving air defense units is similar to
that of ambushes. The primary difference is that while
an ambushing unit lies in wait for approaching enemy
aircraft, a roving unit moves to the most likely areas of
enemy air attack and occupies a series of predesignated positions in the supported unit's area. The roving
unit occupies these positions according to a prearranged schedule or on order of the air defense unit
commander.
The Soviets believe that sudden and intense ground
fire from an unexpected location or direction can be
highly effective in destroying attacking aircraft. They
believe that such fire can seriously degrade air crew
performance and cause them to fire their weapons prematurely or force them to break off their attack The
Soviets also think that ambushes and roving air defense
units can make the enemy believe that significant air
defense elements are located in areas where there are
actually only a few weapons. This can reduce the effectiveness of enemy reconnaissance and the likelihood of
enemy air attack in the area concerned.

PROTECTION OF RIVER CROSSINGS

Soviet air defense plays a major role in river crossings
by protecting the crossing site and forces from air
11-10

attack. They accomplish this mission by creating

envelopes of protected air space above and around the
crossing sites.
SA-7 gunners generally operate with the maneuver
companies. As the battalion approaches the near riverbanks, SA-7 gunners move with the motorized infantry
and are posted at key locations with assigned sectors of
observation and fire. During the crossing, the SA-7
gunners cross with the companies, ready to engage
enemy aircraft. On reaching the opposite bank, they
are again assigned positions and designated sectors of
observation and fire. The SA-7 gunners may also take
part in air defense ambushes if terrain or threat
considerations so dictate.
A platoon of four ZSU-23-4s often accompanies a
reinforced motorized rifle battalion operating as an
advance guard of a motorized rifle regiment.
During the motorized rifle battalion's march to a
river, the ZSU-23-4 platoon usually moves at the rear of
the forward security element. Normally, the ZSU-23-4
platoon is employed in two pairs. In some situations,
only one pair may be located with the forward security
element while the other pair is with the advance guard
main body.
If the battalion is opposed while approaching the
near bank, the ZSU-23-4s may engage ground targets.
However, their vulnerability to antitank and other
direct fire weapons makes such employment very
risky. Air defense commanders seek alternative
approach routes to the near bank if the threat of direct
fire is significant. The ZSUs take up firing positions on
the near shore, usually 300 to 500 meters from the
water's edge, and not more than 1,500 meters apart.
From these positions, they engage aircraft attacking
the crossing site and, if necessary, support crossing elements with direct fire.
After motorized rifle subunits have crossed, ZSU-234s usually cross the river with the tank company on
ferries or by bridge. While crossing, the ZSU-23-4s
remain ready to engage attacking aircraft.
On reaching the far shore, they take up firing
positions jointly agreed on by the maneuver unit commander and the ZSU-23-4 platoon commander. Air
defense assets on the far shore at this point in the
crossing consist of an SA-7 squad and the two ZSU-234s. These air defense weapons provide an engagement
envelope above and around elements of the battalion
on both sides of the river. As the rest of the battalion
crosses and the regiment's main body reaches the near
bank, ZSU-23-4s on the near shore usually are replaced
by other air defense weapons-possibly by the regiment's SA-9 SAM platoon. Replacement of the ZSU-234s by other regimental or divisional air defense

FM 100-2-1

weapons allows the ZSU-23-4 platoon to move forward

and continue supporting elements on the far shore.
Major problems identified by Soviet articles
discussing air defense of river crossings are how to
insure comprehensive radar and visual observation and
how to deal simultaneously with threats on multiple
axes of approach. Other problems include difficulties
in maintaining continuous 360-degree fire coverage
and providing adequate ammunition resupply to firing
elements on the far shore. The ammunition problem is
especially critical for the ZSU-23-4s. Commanders are
cautioned often to be sure that ammunition carriers
are moved to the far shore to guarantee continuity of
fire. The Soviets believe that these problems can be
overcome and that well-trained, well-led air defense
units can successfully support river crossings.

the division of air space among the various systems. To

accomplish this, they use a combination of
geographical, altitude, and time divisions of the air
space to be defended.
A hypothetical geographic division of the air space
might include establishing a boundary parallel to and
well forward of the FEBA, beyond the maximum range
of SA-4 SAMs. Frontalaviation engages enemy aircraft
forward of this boundary, and ground-based air
defense systems engage aircraft to the rear of this
boundary. There also may be "safe corridors" through
the engagement envelopes of ground-based systems
for safe passage of Soviet aircraft beyond the line of
contact. These corridors may be used in conjunction
with time periods in which SAM units refrain from
engaging aircraft unless directly attacked. Time
periods also may be established during which all aircraft are fired on or during which no aircraft is fired on.

AIR DEFENSE OPERATIONS

IN MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN
Air defense units operating in mountainous terrain
have unique problems. The rugged terrain makes it
extremely difficult to maintain the unit integrity of
both maneuver and air defense units. This makes maintaining comprehensive air surveillance and air defense
fire support more difficult and results in a greater
degree of decentralization than normal. These difficulties affect fire control and operations of air defense
batteries, platoons, and even sections. The importance
of the SA-7 is greatly increased in mountain operations.
Because ofthe restrictive nature of mountainous terrain and the typically limited road networks in such
areas, maneuver units often have to move in several
widely separated columns. Air defense weapons are
placed forward in each column. Radar equipment and
ZSU-23-4 SPAAGs, when present, usually move from
high point to high point along routes of advance to
obtain the best radar coverage, observation, and fields
of fire. SA-7 SAM squads probably have greater freedom
to engage than is normally the case. At times, authority
to engage is even delegated to section leaders. Greater
use is made of air defense ambushes using ZSU-23-4s,
SA-7 SAMs, and the fires of motorized rifle units.
Elements of the division's air defense regiment may
directly support one or more of the division's columns.
The employment of highly mobile SA-6 or SA-8 SAMs in
divisional air defense regiments greatly increases the
capability to support mountain combat.

AIR SPACE CONTROL

The Soviets have a multitude of air defense systems
in their forces. Soviet commanders are concerned with

WEAKNESSES
The greatest potential weaknesses of the Soviet air
defense system are that command and control could
fail under the intense pressures of combat; Soviet commanders might fail to vigorously push their air defense
assets forward at the same pace as their maneuver
forces; and it may be difficult to supply air defense units
with sufficient ammunition and repair parts during
prolonged, fast-moving offensive operations.
If the air defense "umbrella" is not moved forward
when necessary, Soviet tanks and motorized rifle units
become exposed to enemy ground attack aircraft and
armed helicopters, and they may suffer major losses.
The only alternative to taking these losses would be to
slow the pace of the advance, which would significantly reduce chances of success.
There is also the question of how Soviet air defense
systems, including the personnel manning the
weapons and equipment, will react when subjected to
intensive and repeated attacks by large numbers of
modern aircraft using sophisticated electronic warfare
equipment and highly lethal advanced ordnance that
will probably impose a high attrition rate on air
defense units.
An underlying theme in Soviet writings is criticism
of some maneuver unit commanders for failure to
recognize fully that air defense is an integral element of
combined arms combat. In tactical exercises,
maneuver unit commanders often "forget" about the
air threat and fail to employ their air defense
capabilities effectively.
Other problems frequently mentioned are failure to
organize effective and continuous air surveillance and
11-11

FM 100-2-1

failure to supply air defense units with sufficient

ammunition and other materiel. In both cases, the
effectiveness of these units is greatly reduced.
Air defense command and control relationships are
subject to conflicting pressures for centralization and
decentralization. Factors favoring centralized control
include the greater efficiency and effectiveness of centralized target detection systems and the increased
ranges of modern SAMs. Factors favoring decentralized
control include the need for flexibility to support fastpaced operations by maneuver units and the many
unforeseen contingencies that can arise in local
situations.
The regimental air defense staff sometimes plays a
role in the employment of company air defense
weapons, and there may be occasions when the division air defense staff dictates how maneuver regiments
employ their air defense batteries. There also may be
situations in which army orfront directs the employment of divisional air defense assets. In general, the

Soviets impose enough centralization to optimize efficiency while allowing sufficient decentralization for
effectiveness.
Caution must be exercised when attempting to
balance the "weaknesses" outlined above against the
overall capabilities of the Soviet air defense system,
Most of these weaknesses have been clearly identified
by the Soviets themselves, and they are working to correct them. The most pervasive shortcomings appear to
be with individual commanders rather than with
system failures. It is highly unlikely that these problems
would be so prevalent that they would seriously
degrade the overall effectiveness of the Soviet air
defense system in combat.

TRENDS
The most evident trends in Soviet tactical air
defense developments in recent years have been the
progressive increase in the size of the engagement
envelope and the lethality of the weapons. New
weapons systems are being introduced and modifications are being made to previouslyfielded systems. The
SA-8 has been modified to carry six, rather than four,
ready-to-fire missiles. The SA-13, currently being intro-

11-12

duced into service to replace the SA-9, is mounted on a

tracked chassis and has good cross-country mobility.
The more recently fielded weapons systems have
redundant missile guidance capability, providing an
enhanced ability to conduct successful engagements
in a sophisticated countermeasures environment.
Continuing qualitative improvements are expected.
An improved man-portable SAM can be expected.
While the ZSU-23-4 is an exceptionally good weapon,
its limited range, lack of an amphibious capability, light
armor protection for crew members, and reduced
effectiveness against more modemrn aircraft make it a
likely candidate for replacement. Western developments in remotely-guided standoff weapons will
probably influence future Soviet air defense weapon
development.
Overall, the division's air defense capabilities have
progressed from a point defense system to an area
defense system. The combination of the SA-6 and SA-8
SAMs with the area defense weapons offront and army
and the point defense weapons within the division
gives Soviet ground forces a comprehensive, overlapping, and mobile area air defense system.
With the increasing lethality of air defense weapons
and their deployment at lower levels in the force structure, effective control of the air space becomes more
complex The Soviets stress the need for the various air
defense forces to adopt common terminology and to
conduct operations with a single integrated plan under
unified command and control. This emphasis on unity
of effort may be reflected in the apparent reorganization of air defense elements formerly under PVO
Strany and PVO of the Ground Forces into a single
service, the Air Defense Forces (Voyska PVO).
Soviet ground-based tactical air defense systems
present a formidable threat to any potential air enemy.
Soviet air defense efforts appear to be nearly "state of
the art" when viewed as a whole, and they are unsurpassed by any systems currently deployed by other
nations. Soviet air defense weapons are deployed in
variety and quantities unmatched by any other military
force. Soviet air defense doctrine is comprehensive in
threat evaluation and formulated response. It is
cohesive in organization and equipment. It responds
effectively to ground forces' support requirements.

CHAPTER 12

AIR SUPPORT
CONCEPT
Fixed-wing combat aircraft and attack helicopters
provide air fire support to Soviet ground maneuver
formations. Air support assets are an integral element
of combined arms formations at front, army, and
division levels. The majority of the aircraft and helicopters were introduced during the past decade and
have significantly increased offensive air support
capabilities.
Tactical fixed-wing aircraft support fronts and
armies in theaters of military operations (TVDs).
These assets accomplish the missions of air defense
cover, air reconnaissance, and ground support. The
aircraft also can conduct battlefield and rear area
interdiction.
The support role of helicopters has greatly
expanded concurrently with the rapid expansion of
the number of helicopters. Attack helicopters are
routinely employed in exercises to provide immediate
air support to motorized rifle and tank regiments and
battalions. Helicopters also perform a variety of
logistic, intelligence, liaison, and communications
functions. In addition, helicopter support for
airmobile operations is a common feature of major
Soviet field exercises.
The flexibility and maneuverability of tactical
aviation assets give them a key role in modem combat.
According to the Soviets, aviation has particular advantages over other combat forces in that it can" Conduct independent operations.
" Execute rapid, wide maneuvers.
" Combat enemy air, ground, and naval forces.
" Execute missions under diverse tactical and
environmental conditions.
* Concentrate forces quickly for the execution of
unexpected missions.
* Be redirected after launch to a different target.
Tactical aviation assets can provide continuous fire
support to ground maneuver formations. Air fire
support is responsive to rapid changes in the battlefield situation and can keep pace with mobile ground
formations. Furthermore, aviation assets generally can
strike targets that are out of range of artillery.

AIR SUPPORT DOCTRINE

The Air Operation
A massive air operation is the Soviet approach to the
initial stage of a nonnuclear theater offensive. It

employs initial, massive nonnuclear air strikes

throughout the theater of operations.
The increase in the number of Soviet ground attack
aircraft in the last decade and the concurrent improvements in their range, armaments, and avionics have
provided Soviet military strategists with a viable, nonnuclear offensive option for gaining the operational
initiative and creating the conditions of victory in the
period directly after the outbreak of hostilities. The
concept of the air operation entails Soviet fixed-wing,
ground attack aircraft from frontal aviation and intermediate-range aircraft from strategic aviation and naval
aviation committed to a series of massive strikes
against priority theater targets over a period of several
days. With a small proportion of available air resources
assigned to the neutralization of enemy air defenses
and the creation of approach corridors, the majority of
the aircraft attack enemy nuclear weapon systems,
command and control centers, and airfields.
During the initial hours of the air operation, the
commitment of fixed-wing aircraft to priority theater
targets precludes their use for direct air support of
ground force operations, and ground force commanders rely on combat helicopters to fill this role.
Integrated fires of artillery, attack helicopters, and
operational and tactical missiles assist in the creation
of corridors through the enemy's forward air defenses.
Missile strikes and attacks by air assault, special
purpose, and partisan forces are planned against airfields, nuclear delivery and storage sites, and command
and control facilities.
The air operation is simultaneously a concentrated
effort to establish air superiority and a principal component of the overall Soviet effort to achieve total fire
superiority to deprive the enemy of his nuclear attack
capabilities. The air operation is distinguished from a
general offensive in that the strikes are not in direct
support of a coincidental advance by ground maneuver
formations.
Due to its scale, an air operation is probably a TVDplanned and directed operation. However, an air
operation on a smaller scale may be conducted in the
course of a front operation to establish local air
superiority.
As the number of priority targets is reduced in the
course of the operation, ground attack aircraft are
reassigned to the air support role according to a prearranged plan. Through this plan the ground force
commanders regain the use of air support resources.
12-1

FM 100-2-1

Air Support of Ground Forces

Besides the air operation at the onset of theater-level
hostilities, Soviet doctrine calls for air support of
ground forces in offensive operations. The Soviets
recognize four stages of air support within an offensive
operation: support of movement forward, air preparation, air support, and air accompaniment, which correspond to the phases of the fire support plan. The
major difference between the phases is their time of
deployment, although there are some differences in
targeting, command, and aircraft used. (See page 12-8,
Support in the Offense.)

ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT

Soviet tactical aviation assets are organized on a
functional/mission-related basis. The Soviets consider
that homogenous formations of fighters, fighterbombers, reconnaissance aircraft, etc., increase firepower and strike capability, promote firm control and
maneuverability, and enhance the capability to
conduct sustained operations. Tactical aviation assets
consist generally of fighter, fighter-bomber, helicopter, and reconnaissance units, as well as
miscellaneous support units.
The distribution of these assets among the different
levels of command is currently in flux. The ongoing
aviation reorganization shows an apparent desire to
centralize control over most fixed-wing tactical
aircraft and to decentralize control over the attack
helicopters.
Frontal aviation organizations are located in 12 of
the 16 military districts within the USSR and with each
of the Groups of Soviet Forces in the GDR, Poland,
Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. The strength and
composition of the aviation assets of a front can vary
considerably. Frontal aviation may include two or
three air divisions and independent regiments of
reconnaissance aircraft.
An air division typically contains either fighter or
fighter-bomber aircraft, usually organized into three
regiments of three squadrons each (see FM 100-2-3).
Divisions are commanded by major generals or
colonels; regiments by lieutenant colonels or colonels;
squadrons and flights by majors and captains,
respectively.
Concurrently with the rapid expansion of rotarywing assets, the Soviets have organized a steadily
increasing number of independent attack helicopter
regiments (see FM 100-2-3). These independent
attack helicopter regiments are apparently a principal
component of what the Soviets refer to as army aviation, and are probably subordinate to army-level
maneuver force commanders.
12-2

The aviation element in selected motorized rifle and

tank divisions has been upgraded to squadron strength.
The division aviation element formerly contained six
to eight light, general-purpose helicopters. Selected
divisions now have an organic aviation squadron that
includes up to 12 HIP and HIND ATGM-equipped
attack helicopters, in addition to the general-purpose
helicopters.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

The command and control structure of frontal
aviation is integrated with that of the ground forces to
insure close and continuous coordination in a combined arms offensive. At front level, the deputy commander for aviation serves as chief of aviation on the
front staff.

Aviation Control Element

At army and division level, an aviation control
element normally is assigned to the staff of the commander. At army, this element generally consists of
these personnel: an air controller, an intelligence
officer, a liaison officer, and communications
personnel. Aviation control elements at division level
are similar to, but smaller than, those at army level.
Aviation control elements advise on the use of air
assets, transmit air support requests to the aviation
organizations, maintain communications and control
with aircraft in the battle area, and advise the commander of air reconnaissance information. The aviation control element is separated into two sections.
Each of these sections has a specially-equipped BTR60. One section chief is collocated with the commander, and the other is collocated with the chief of
staff.

Forward Air Controller

A forward air controller is assigned to ground force
regiments when fixed-wing aircraft or combat helicopters are assigned for their support. The Soviet
forward air controller is an air forces officer and
generally a pilot. His tasks are to advise the regimental
commander, to serve as the communications link
between the regiment and the aviation control
element at division, and to direct attacking aircraft'to
their targets. He is equipped with a vehicle and the
equipment required to maintain communications with
the division and the airfield. The forward air controller
can call up air support at the request of the supported
ground unit commander.

FM 100-2-1

It is rare to find an air representative in a ground

force battalion. However, a forward air controller may
be assigned when air support is provided in a particularly important or difficult battalion action.
Normally, however, a battalion commander has no
direct communications with air support resources.
For mutual recognition and target designation,
radioelectronic means such as radio beacons are used
widely by the forward air controllers. Signal flares,
colored smoke, beacon lights, and cloth panels are
used when there is visual contact. When aircraft are
operating against objectives that cannot be observed
by ground troops or forward air controllers, target
designation is carried out mainly using reconnaissance
information obtained by the aircraft crews themselves.
The crews use flares, aircraft maneuvers, and radioelectronic means for signaling, for communicating,
and for making mutual identification.

Difficulties in Coordination
Judging from Soviet military writings, the method of
coordination between the air and ground forces,
especially at lower levels, is not always successful. The
procedures worked out by air and ground force commanders before the launch of combat air missions
often inhibit flexibility in mutual cooperation and prevent changes required by the situation that evolves
after the missions are underway. Problems also arise
because many ground force commanders do not have
in-depth knowledge of the combat capabilities of aviation, and air forces commanders often are unfamiliar
with the development of the ground battle except in
general terms. Ground force unit commanders sometimes hesitate to call for air support unless the support
has been planned beforehand. As one Soviet commentator stated recently, "The aviators fight according
to their rules, and the combined arms troops according to theirs." The plans for mutual cooperation
worked out before the actions are often incomplete
and account for only the situation when aircraft
approach the FEBA. Lower-level ground force commanders are not always informed of the fighterbomber and combat helicopter resources allocated for
immediate missions. The combined arms commanders
do not always know the location and condition of aviation during the battle, the aviation's readiness to
commit reserves, or the types of air strikes available. A
failure by higher headquarters to supply damage
assessment data to ground commanders causes
unnecessary firing at previously destroyed targets.
To resolve the problems of mutual cooperation successfully, Soviet military experts suggest wider adop-

tion of automated control systems to speed and

simplify collecting, transmitting, and processing
information at all levels of command and control. More
frequent joint tactical briefings, technical conferences,
and meetings between lower-level ground force and
air commanders also are suggested in Soviet military
publications.
Night and Weather Conditions
At present, the Soviets are striving to increase the
effectiveness of air support in poor weather and at
night. Soviet air operations slow considerably under
these conditions because of inadequate aircraft and
ground-based equipment and shortcomings in flight
personnel training. Also, some of the mutual identification and target designation systems used during
complex weather conditions and for night flying are
unsophisticated The Soviets are evidently making
efforts to correct these shortcomings. It is believed
that about 20 percent of the third-generation, fixedwing aircraft introduced in the 1970s and frontal
aviation's combat helicopters are equipped with radioelectronic and infrared instruments. This equipment
enables pilots to carry out sorties at night and in poor
weather at low altitudes, and to search for, to detect,
and to destroy targets. Even when modern, sophisticated equipment is used, the Soviets believe that-for
air support of ground troops-it is important to train
pilots to navigate by landmarks, to search for targets
visually, and to determine the distances to targets
without technical aids.
Effective frontal aviation operations in support of
advancing troops depend a great deal on providing
appropriate airfields. In some regions it is possible to
use certain types of modem aircraft from unpaved
airfields. Some captured enemy airfields also could be
used. When appropriate airfields are available, thirdgeneration aircraft with their increased operational
range and load capability enable the Soviets to provide
air support to ground forces advancing at high speed.
However, the Soviets have been seeking a type of aircraft that could operate from small, unpaved airfields
and insure reliable air support to their ground forces.
To help fulfill this need, the combat helicopter has
emerged as a weapon system that can provide adequate support with the required flexibility.

PLANNING AND PREPARATION

Planning and preparation of air support before an
offensive begin with the .front commander's orders
to his aviation commander(s) and to his army
12-3

FM 100-2-1

commanders. The order specifies the air units to be

committed, the ground armies to, be supported, and
the time of attack
With this information, the combined arms commander and his aviation staff reconcile the air assets
allocated by the front commander with the air support
requirements of the ground force divisions. A
maneuver division commander consults his aviation
staff and develops his requirements by determining the
targets to be attacked in his sector and estimating his
immediate missions. Available air support is divided
among preplanned, on-call, and immediate air support
missions. An on-call mission is one in which the target
may be predesignated, but the timing of the strike
remains at the discretion of the ground force commander. If combat helicopters are to be used, air support is divided specifically between the fixed- and
rotary-wing aircraft, depending on the targets, flight
distances, and disposition of enemy antiaircraft
defenses. After these determinations are approved and
integrated with thefrontfiresupport plan, the aviation
commander issues specific orders to his air divisions
and regiments concerning targets, numbers of sorties,
air approach corridors, communications codes, and
mission timing. The air representatives at army, division, and regiment then confirm, for the respective
commanders, the air resources allocated to them.
Normally, the frontal aviation commander holds a
percentage of his forces in reserve to meet unforeseen
demands of division commanders. Division commanders also can withhold a percentage of their allocated air assets as reserves.
When a regiment has been assigned specific air
support, the regimental commander explains his
objectives to the commander ofthe supporting air unit
and the forward air controller assigned to his regiment.
He also seeks their recommendations.
Both front and army commanders pay particular
attention to coordination of artillery and missile fire
with preplanned and on-call air strikes so that artillery
and missile fire can neutralize or suppress enemy antiaircraft defenses before the arrival of attack aircraft.
Coordinating the delivery of nuclear strikes is an
important function for the ground and air commanders and their staffs. The commander of combined
arms forces decides the employment tactics for
nuclear weapons immediately within the ground force
zone of advance to the depth of the range of his tactical
missiles. He has to determine the target and the type,
method, and time of delivery of nuclear strikes for his
own missiles and for the carrier aircraft operating in
the zone of advance. Aviation missions for delivery of
nuclear strikes beyond the range of ground force
12-4

missiles have to be assigned by the commander in

charge of the entire operation (usually the front
commander or above).
The Soviets normally maintain strict centralization
in controlling air support resources. The supporting
aviation will not always be under the operational
control of the combined arms commander. Instead, air
support resources may be apportioned into regimentflights or aircraft sorties with the required quantity of
munitions. These resources are allocated temporarily
to the combined arms commander for the destruction
of selected objectives. The combined arms commander may not know which air force unit or formation will accomplish the missions he requested.
Such centralized control allows a rapid reallocation
of air support resources to accomplish the most
important missions that suddenly arise during operations. Air force units that were not originally assigned
for ground support may sometimes take part in
delivering airstrikes against ground objectives. Decentralized employment of aviation (especially combat
helicopters) will be used when operations are being
waged on separate and disconnected axes. In that case,
aviation assigned for air support will be transferred to
the operational control of the combined arms commander, for employment according to his needs.

PREPLANNED AIR SUPPORT MISSIONS

As preplanned target assignments are received by air
regiments and squadrons, they are studied closely to
determine the best tactical approach. Large-scale maps
and, in some cases, scale models of the terrain and
targets are used to familiarize pilots with their assignments and to determine the optimum flight path and
approach maneuvers.
Once airborne, the aircraft proceed to a designated
checkpoint behind friendly lines where they confirm
their target assignment with ground control. The
emphasis placed on strict adherence to predetermined
timing and flight paths indicates the probable use of
"safe" corridors through friendly antiaircraft defenses.
Aviation control elements and forward air controllers
maintain communications with attack aircraft either
directly or through radio relay aircraft.
As the aircraft approach the target area, forward air
controllers establish communications and make sure
targets are correctly identified by the pilots. When the
target is in sight and has been confirmed by the forward air controller, the flight leader assigns individual
targets and orders the attack. Aircraft follow the
original flight plan through friendly antiaircraft
defenses unless changed by ground control.

FM 100-2-1

IMMEDIATE AIR SUPPORT MISSIONS

A request for immediate air support is submitted by
the ground commander to the next higher headquarters and then forwarded, through the chain of
command. If a request for air support does not exceed
the division commander's allocated assets, he can
order the air strike through his aviation control
element. Otherwise, army or front approval must be
obtained, depending on the size of support requested.
As with preplanned support, the aviation control
element at each command level participates directly in
the evaluation of each air support request and in the
coordination of the strike mission.
Aircraft designated for immediate missions can be
airborne in holding areas or on the ground at airfields.
Occasionally, an aircraft on armed reconnaissance
patrol can be diverted to respond to an air support
request within its area of operations. The Soviets
recognize three levels of combat readiness for frontal
aviation aircraft and crews. Aircraft in categories one
and two respond to ground force requests for immediate air support. Before takeoff, pilots receive a short
briefing that designates a checkpoint toward which to
proceed and, possibly, the target location. On reaching
the checkpoint, the pilots contact the air representative of the ground force units being supported to
receive target designation or confirmation. Approach,
attack, and recovery air control procedures remain the
same as in preplanned air support missions.

AVIATION EMPLOYMENT
The Soviets emphasize that aviation can provide
responsive and continuous fire support if its employment is guided by the following principles:
* The early attainment of air superiority.
* Coordination and integration with other arms.
* Employment in mass.
* Strict, centralized control.

Air-Ground Coordination
The Soviets consider that the coordinated use of the
airspace over the battlefield and aerial delivery of
ordnance close to friendly troops are among the most
complex problems of modern combat. A consideration in their emphasis on early attainment of air
superiority is simplification of the airspace management problem. To reduce air-ground coordination
problems as much as possible, attack helicopters,
fixed-wing ground attack aircraft, and artillery are not
normally employed simultaneously in the same fire
zone. Attacks by fixed-wing aircraft and artillery fire
sometimes coincide in time, but they are assigned

separate target sectors. Attack helicopters normally

are employed after the completion of the artillery
preparation. However, it is possible to use both simultaneously. In such a situation, the helicopters are
assigned entrance and exit corridors parallel to and
between artillery fire concentrations, and under the
trajectory of artillery rounds.
The Soviets constantly emphasize that familiarity
among the different elements of the combined arms
force of each other's tactics and equipment, and
relationships of mutual trust and understanding, must
be firmly established in peacetime if effective cooperation and coordination is to be maintained during
combat. The peacetime distribution of air assets
among the military districts and groups of forces and
within the force structure reflects the Soviet desire to
establish a peacetime organization that closely
corresponds to the wartime 'structure of combined
arms formations. The aviation command and control
structure is closely aligned with that of ground
maneuver formations to insure effective, continuous,
combined arms coordination.
The Soviets prefer to use experienced pilots from
the supporting aviation unit as forward air controllers.
They prefer to have qualified helicopter pilots direct
helicopter strikes and qualified fighter-bomber pilots
direct fighter-bomber strikes. However, either forward
air controller may direct strikes by both types of supporting aviation so long as adequate air-ground
communications can be established.
The forward air controller provides pilots the target
location (either in grid coordinates or in relation to a
predetermined reference point), the time to execute
the strike, and information on the ground situation.
The forward air controller normally does not attempt
to mark the target, but frequently uses pyrotechnics to
mark friendly troop locations. He may give the pilots a
signal when they should climb and identify their target.
The pilot has primary responsibility for pinpointing the
target. However, the forward air controller assesses
and adjusts the strikes for successive target runs. Communications security between the forward air
controller and aircrews is maintained by the
transmission of brief coded messages and prearranged
signals.
Minimum safety distances between friendly troops
and air strikes during peacetime exercises vary
between 200 and 700 meters. In actual combat, the
Soviets likely accept less rigid safety distances.
Control and target identification posts are established as necessary to exercise command and control
of helicopters and aircraft in a designated air sector.
The posts support the introduction of aviation into an
12-5

FM 100-2-1

area of combat operations and also may direct ground

strikes. The posts also accomplish direct coordination
between ground-attack and fighter aircraft and ground
air defense units. These posts are equipped with radar,
communications, and automated equipment and may
be ground- or air-based.

Control Versus Mass

According to the Soviets, strict centralized control is
one of the "ecisive conditions for the successful
conduct of combat operations" by aviation.
Centralized control and mass are viewed as corollary
principles, providing for the fullest exploitation of the
mobility and maneuverability of aviation.
Aviation assets may be dispersed to avoid
destruction by the enemy's nuclear or massive conventional fire strikes. However, through centralized
control they are rapidly reconcentrated to deliver
massive strikes against the enemy's main attack or in
support of their own main attack. Centralized control
also is alleged to enhance the planning and execution
of surprise strikes on the enemy, to allow the maintenance of a strong air reserve, and to simplify coordination among aviation assets performing different
missions in the same air space (e.g., air defense, ground
support, reconnaissance).
In a rapidly changing combat situation, centralized
control expedites the reallocation of aviation assets to
accomplish important missions that suddenly arise
during combat operations, such as destruction of
enemy nuclear weapons, aviation, and reserves. At
times, aviation assets that were not originally assigned
ground support roles may be tasked to strike ground
objectives. In contrast, it would seem that decentralized control of aviation assets, especially attack
helicopters, is desired when combat operations are
conducted on separate, disconnected axes. In such
cases, combined arms commanders control and
employ allocated aviation assets according to the
needs of their maneuver forces.

Reconnaissance and Targeting

The principal method for gathering target intelligence is air reconnaissance. The front commander's
staff prepares an overall reconnaissance plan that
details tasks for tactical aviation assets. Tactical
aviation reconnaissance focuses on the tactical and
operational depths of the enemy, although targets at
strategic depths also may be assigned.
Air reconnaissance is conducted to determine the
enemy's intentions and collect intelligence for
12-6

planning air and ground operations. There are four

major categories of targets for air reconnaissance:
* Nuclear weapon systems and storage depots.
* Active and potential enemy airfields.
* Defensive positions and systems (air defense,
command and control centers, electronic warfare
centers).
* Enemy reserves, supply depots, and approach
routes (particularly key intersections and bridges).
Aircraft crews on any mission are expected to
immediately report observed enemy activity. Primary
responsibility for air reconnaissance is borne by dedicated reconnaissance regiments. These regiments
have specially equipped reconnaissance aircraft.
Airborne electronic intelligence collectors also are
available from aviation assets.
Perishable target intelligence data is transmitted by
radio from the aircraft to ground command posts.
Greater effort is being made to develop and improve
methods for secure transmission of reports from the
aircraft to data collection and processing centers. The
processing of data from an air reconnaissance mission
takes 2 to 8 hours, although procedures for interpreting reconnaissance data are being modernized to
speed up this process.
In training exercises, the Soviets have shown some
reservations about employing armed reconnaissance
flights on battlefield and rear area interdiction
missions ("free hunting" flights) until air superiority is
established. Armed reconnaissance efforts would be
directed toward disrupting the enemy's resupply
operations and troop movements through the
immediate exploitation of reconnaissance data: (by a
flight of a reconnaissance aircraft and two to four
attack aircraft). Targets for interdiction missions are
nuclear storage areas, enemy airfields, troop reserves,
and command and control centers. Targets may be
located up to 480 kilometers behind the front lines.
Interdiction of enemy efforts to deploy and concentrate his forces against a rapid and highly mobile attacking force is considered particularly effective when the
enemy lacks in-depth reserves and relies on moving
forces laterally to blunt offensive operations.
The classification (characteristics and configuration) and location of targets are the bases for planning
strikes): Targets are classified as single, multiple, line,
or area. (See examples in the upper chart at right.)

Mission Execution
Air strikes in direct support of ground maneuver
formations are primarily preplanned, with some oncall. The combined arms commander identifies the

FM 100-2-1

targets, times, and desired damage for air strikes. The

aviation commander determines the force, size, ordnance, and attack technique that will accomplish the
strike mission.
Preplanned strikes are planned in great detail and
integrated with other forms offire support. Large scale
maps and, in some cases, terrain models are used to
familiarize pilots with targets, to plan approach and
departure routes, and to develop attack techniques.
Attack variations are developed and practiced to provide pilots with a ready response to changes in the
situation.
The plan for preplanned strikes normally covers the
first 1 to 2 hours of combat operations, but maycover a
period of up to 24 hours in a static situation. The plan
specifies the targets, strike force, time, location, attack

technique and ordnance, communication codes, and

approach and departure routes.
A portion of available air assets is held in readiness to
execute immediate missions against unexpected
targets. On-call strikes are made against predesignated
targets, with the timing of strikes left to the discretion
of maneuver force commanders. Aircraft and helicopters designated for on-call missions can be
airborne in holding areas or on the ground at forward
airfields.
The Soviets recognize three levels of combat readiness for fighter-bomber aircraft and crews, which are
described in the lower chart below. These categories
are probably also applicable to other types of groundattack aviation assets. Aircraft in categories one and
two respond to on-call missions.

Classification of Air Strike Targets

ATTACK TECHNIQUE

CLASSIFICATION

EXAMPLE

SINGLE (OR POINT)

Rocket launcher, tank or armored vehicle,

parked aircraft, or helicopter. Radar firing point,
observation point, or bunker.

Single aircraft using low-level or dive delivery

of ordnance. ARM employed against radars.
Single helicopter using ATGM or rockets.

MULTIPLE

Group of 10-20 single targets occupying an

area of 1-1.5 km.

LINE

Tactical march column (usually 1 km or longer),

train, runway.
Dispersal or assembly areas of a battalion or
larger unit, supply depot, large command and
control center, forward airfield.

Attack by a small group (2-8) of aircraft or

helicopters with the appropriate ordnance,
Attack by a single aircraft or a small group
along the long axis of the target. Helicopters
attack column from the flank.

AREA

Massive and concentrated air strikes, delivered

from various altitudes and directions.

Levels of Combat Readiness

CATEGORY

CREW AND AIRCRAFT POSITION

DURATION OF
READINESS

TIME BEFORE
TAKEOFF

ONE

Aircraft are fully serviced and armed. Combat crews are

briefed on their mission and are inthe aircraft ready to start
engines. Ground personnel are assisting the combat crews.

1-2 hours

3-5 minutes

TWO

Aircraft are fully serviced and armed. Combat crews are

briefed and are in the vicinity of aircraft ready to take off
within a specified short period of time after receiving a
mission order.

2-4 hours

15 minutes

THREE

Aircraft are refueled and serviced. Cannons are loaded.

External systems (bombs, rockets, missiles, fuel tanks, etc.)
are not loaded. Combat crews are known, but briefing on air
and ground situation is given before takeoff.

2-4 days

1-2 hours

12-7

FM 100-2-1

The Soviets prefer to use helicopters for immediate,

time-sensitive strikes close to friendly forces. The
reduced logistic requirements of combat helicopters,
compared to those of fixed-wing aircraft, very often
allow deployment close to the main battle area which
enhances their ability to respond to on-call missions.
The Soviets indicate that helicopters have other advantages over high-performance aircraft, such as the
ability to concentrate and maneuver undetected for a
strike and the enhanced capability of helicopter pilots
to evaluate more rapidly and exactly the battlefield
conditions. The Soviets, concerned for the
vulnerability of helicopters to high-performance
fighters, prefer to employ them in ground support only
to the range of their air defense umbrella.
Conversely, fixed-wing aircraft are employed more
frequently in strikes on previously reconnoitered,
fixed or semifixed targets, in the immediate rear, or at
greater depths. The vulnerability of high-performance
aircraft to ground-based air defenses when executing
ground attacks necessitates a low-altitude, high-speed
target approach and minimum time in the target area.
Making such an approach, the pilot has only 3 to 6
seconds to identify his target and, after attacking his
target, should clear the target area within 10 seconds.
The Soviets emphasize the importance of deception
and surprise in paralyzing hostile antiaircraft defenses.
Aircraft approach the target area at the lowest
permissible altitude given weather and terrain restrictions. Ideally, the approach altitude over enemy territory is 50 to 100 meters. Radio transmission is reduced
to a minimum or prohibited entirely. Detected gaps in
enemy radar coverage are exploited, and decoy flights
in advance of attacking aircraft can be used to distract
defending antiaircraft systems. If more than one pass is
necessary to destroy the target, attacking flights
approach the target from different directions to minimize antiaircraft effectiveness or approach from the
direction of bright sunlight to minimize visual detection and recognition. Electronic countermeasures play
a large role in neutralizing air defenses.
As long as modem antiaircraft defense relies on
radioelectronic equipment, neutralizing its operation
through interference is considered by the Soviets to be
a major way to reduce aircraft losses. Soviet aircraft
possess radioelectronic jamming equipment, which
they believe will help them overcome the enemy
antiaircraft defenses. The Soviets also expect their
aircraft losses would be reduced due to the destruction of enemy antiaircraft defense weapons by fire
delivered by the ground troops. The ground force
radiotechnical facilities can also create interference in
enemy systems of control.
12-8

SUPPORT IN THE OFFENSE

Besides the air operation at the onset oftheater-level
hostilities, Soviet doctrine calls for air support of
ground forces in offensive operations. The Soviets
recognize four stages of air support within an offensive
operation: support for movement forward, air preparation, air support, and air accompaniment, which correspond to the phases of the fire support plan. The
major difference between the phases is their time of
deployment, although there are some differences in
targeting, command, and aircraft.
Supportformovementforwardisto protect units as
they move up from assembly areas.
Air preparationtakes place prior to the onset of a
ground offensive, across a specified frontage. It can be
simultaneous with the preparation fire of both the
artillery and missile units and requires close, detailed
coordination with these forces with regard to targeting and timing. Air strikes in the preparation phase
generally extend no farther than the enemy's
immediate operational depth (i.e., enemy corps rear
area). Depending on the combat situation, the
duration of an air preparation can be from 10 minutes
to over an hour. The targets are those that conventional artillery and missiles cannot destroy because of
their distance, mobility, or "hardening." The plan for
the preparation phase specifies in detail the targets,
strike aircraft, time, location, attack technique and
ordnance, and approach and departure rates. In special
situations, such as amphibious assaults, long-range
aviation and/or naval aviation may participate in air
preparation attacks.
Air supportbegins after ground forces start an offensive. Its targets are at tactical and immediate depths
and include enemy nuclear weapons, command and
control systems, and enemy reserves. The majority of
air strikes are preplanned, but immediate air attack
missions against centers of resistance are made at the
request of ground force commanders within the
limitations of their allocated resources. The air support phase closely follows the operational plan prepared before the onset of the offensive and is an extension of the strong artillery fires associated with Soviet
offensive operations. As in the air preparation stage,
the targets generally are those beyond the destruction
capabilities of artillery and missiles.
Air accompaniment occurs as Soviet ground forces
penetrate deeply into enemy defenses. The specific
point at which air accompaniment begins is not clear,
but it is during the advanced stage of offensive operations when the progress of the ground forces has outstripped the prepared fire support plan, and reassessment and reallocation of air resources are necessary.
After allocating air resources before an offensive, the

FM 100-2-1

front commander plays little further direct role in the

conduct of air support unless large reallocations are
required. However, in the air accompaniment phase,
the role of the front commander is again emphasized,
indicating the probability of significant reallocations of
air resources supporting maneuver forces to adjust to
the developments in the combat situation.
Air cover for airborne and airmobile operations is a
type of air accompaniment mission which might take
place concurrently with the preparation phase or support phase over the FEBA.
Both fixed-wing aircraft and combat helicopters are
used in the three stages of air support for offensive
ground operations. The increasing numbers of combat
helicopters deployed enable them to play a greater
role in the support of ground forces freeing fixed-wing
aircraft for missions against deeper targets such as
nuclear weapon depots and airfields.
In a meeting engagement, air support assets,
especially attack helicopters, screen and support
Soviet units as they maneuver into position. Also, air
strikes are employed against enemy columns moving
forward to reinforce engaged units. Soviet exercise
scenarios frequently have attack helicopters employed
in flanking attacks against reinforcing or counterattacking enemy armor columns.
In a pursuit, air support assets (either highperformance aircraft or helicopters) attack withdrawing enemy units through armed reconnaissance
and in ambushes along withdrawal routes. Combat
helicopters also can be assigned to support forward
detachments outside the range of artillery fire.

SUPPORT IN THE DEFENSE

In the defense, air fire support is integrated into the
overall defensive fire plan. The air fire support plan
extends to the immediate operational depth of the
enemy and seeks to disrupt his attack plans.
Several variations of the air fire support plan are
developed in detail. Variations of the plan take into
account the anticipated actions of the enemy and his
most probable avenues of approach. An aviation counterpreparation is planned for each variation. The objective of the counterpreparation is to launch a powerful,
surprise, concentrated strike of short duration to
preempt the enemy's plan. The targets of the counterpreparation are" Nuclear warheads and delivery systems.
" Artillery in firing positions.
" Aviation on airfields.
" Armored or mechanized forces preparing to
attack.

" Major command and control points, headquarters,

and communications centers.
" River-crossing sites and equipment, ammunition,
and fuel dumps.
Variations of the plan also provide for air strikes
against attacking forces that are out of range of artillery
and tactical rockets, and concentrated fire by all fire
support weapons or forces that have reached, or penetrated, forward defensive positions.
Helicopters with ATGMs are employed to counterattack armored or mechanized forces. The helicopter
force seeks routes that allow it to approach the flank of
the enemy force undetected. If terrain variations do
not provide adequate concealment for the force,
smoke may be employed to conceal its approach.
During withdrawal, helicopters support rear guard
units by attacking advancing enemy units from ambush
and by laying minefields.
TRENDS
The Soviets are attempting to resolve problems
about the provision of more reliable and continuous
air fire support to ground forces. In this respect, their
efforts seem to be concentrated in two areas: improved
accuracy of munitions delivery and improved air and
ground interaction.
The Soviets have already introduced a new generation of helicopter-mounted ATGMs with greater
standoff range and accuracy. They also have in production or development precision-guided munitions
(PGM), "smart bombs" which are similar to those
deployed by US forces. A new air-to-surface missile, the
AS-X, is expected to have a range of approximately 40
kilometers with electro-optical guidance and low altitude (150 meters) firing capability.
Soviet discussion on organizational forms of aviation
has centered on improved interaction with maneuver
formations, including organization of support for
army-level operations, organization of bomber "strike
groups," and development of improved night air
reconnaissance and fire support of ground maneuver
units.
Subordination of some aviation assets to the army
commander has been accepted in practice, as the
Soviets frequently refer to "army aviation." The issue
now appears to be the optimum composition and
strength of the army-level aviation force. Discussion
focuses on a mixed air regiment ofreconnaissance and
liaison aircraft and up to a division-sized unit of ground
attack aviation.
Considerable interest also has been expressed in
forming aviation "strike groups." The strike groups
12-9

FM 100-2-1

would be capable of conducting independent operations against key targets at operational and strategic
depths of the enemy, both during and subsequent to
the conduct of an air operation. It also would deliver
strikes in support of ground maneuver formations at
operational and tactical depths. A strike group would
be two to three air divisions strong, would consist primarily of fighter-bomber and bomber (probably
BACKFIRE and BADGER) aircraft, and would be
subordinate directly to the Soviet High Command.
A third area of expressed interest is the improvement of nighttime aerial reconnaissance and ordnance
delivery in support of ground maneuver formations.
Despite heavy emphasis on night combat, the Soviets

12-10

recognize limitations in their capability to maintain

continuity of air support at night. They see a need for
improved target designation and mutual identification
procedures between air and ground units at night,
even to the extent of forming special helicopter units
for night combat.
As new equipment is introduced and when organizational modification is accomplished, Soviet aviation
will be able to provide increased support to combined
arms forces. Improved accuracy of ordnance delivery,
greater flexibility in employment, and increased
responsiveness to combined arms commanders will
enhance air-ground coordination.

CHAPTER 13

SMOKE
The Soviets employ smoke extensively on the battlefield. It probably will be used every time the situation
permits. The Soviets distinguish between toxic and
nontoxic smokes in their doctrinal literature. This
distinction drives their planning on when they should
mask. They intend to force the enemy to use his chemical protective systems which will generally lower his
effectiveness.
A number of different agents may be used together.
For instance, chloride mixtures produce a particulary
effective liquid agent. Liquid chloride agents are composed primarily of titanium, silicon, or tin tetrachlorides. Smokes, such as the S-4 compound, (chlorosulfonic acid, sulfur trioxide, and sulfuric acid) maybe
seeded with particulates to block portions of the electromagnetic spectrum more fully. The vast quantities
of white phosphorus on the battlefield suggest also
that random mixtures of this agent will combine with
other obscurants, both man-made and natural.
Soviet forces are well equipped for the use of smoke.
Their munitions and equipment include-* Smoke grenades.
* Smoke barrels, drums, and pots.
* Spray smoke generators.
* Mortar and artillery smoke rounds.
* Combat vehicle engine exhaust smoke systems.
Smoke delivery systems are plentiful, as are smokefilled artillery projectiles, smoke bombs, spray tanks,
and generator systems. Conventional wisdom, stemming from Soviet open writings, holds that some 7 to
10% of all artillery units of fire are smoke rounds,
mostly white phosphorus (WP) and more recently
plasticized white phosphorus (PWP).
The Soviets maintain that when firing is done from a
position covered with smoke at targets outside the
smoke, effectiveness decreases approximately 10
times. When only the targets are concealed by smoke,
effectiveness decreases four times.
In recognition of the need to counter target acquisition and guidance systems operating in the IR and
microwave regions of the electromnagnetic spectrum,
the Soviets are developing smokes and aerosols
capable of attenuating such radiation.

TYPES OF SMOKE SCREENS

The Soviets recognize three basic types of smoke
screens: blinding, camouflaging, and decoy. Each type
is classified as being frontal, oblique, or flank in nature,
depending on the placement of the screen. Smoke

screens are either stationary or mobile depending on

prevailing winds and the dispensing means used. Each
basic type is intended to serve a different tactical
purpose, but all may be employed simultaneously.
The intent of blinding smoke screens is to blind
enemy gunners, observation posts, and target acquisition systems and to restrict the enemy's ability to
engage Soviet forces effectively. The blinding smoke
screen normally is produced by the Soviet S-4 mixture
and WP and/or PWP. The casualty effects and
collateral damage produced by WP and PWP are
significantly greater than those of other agents. These
smokes probably are preferred for use against enemy
positions. The WP and PWP can be delivered by rocket
launchers, artillery, mortars and fixed-wing aircraft or
helicopters. S-4 probably is delivered by spray tanks
mounted on aircraft.
Blinding smoke rounds are included in the artillery
preparation for an attack and in fires in support of the
attack. Likely targets are enemy defensive positions,
rear assembly areas, counterattacking forces, fire support locations, and subsequent objectives.
The screening properties of a blinding smoke
screen, coupled with the dust, HE combustion effects,
and incendiary effects of phosphorus, create an
environment in which fear and confusion are added to
the measured effectiveness of the smoke.
The purpose of camouflage smoke is to provide
freedom of movement for units, to conceal the location of units and the nature and direction of an attack,
to provide protection against the thermal radiation of
nuclear explosions, and to degrade night-vision sights.
The camouflage smoke screen is used on or to the front
of friendly troops. These screens normally are
employed up to the point where forces deploy to the
attack formation. The number, size, and location of
camouflage smoke screens vary depending on terrain,
weather, and the tactics conducted. Soviet writings
describe a battalion-level exercise in which four separate camouflage screens were established to cover the
battalion's deployment to company columns, movement toward the forward edge of the battle area
(FEBA), and final deployment to attack formation, a
distance of approximately 3 kilometers.
Camouflage smoke screens normally are established
by using a combination of smoke barrels, smokepots,.
combat vehicles with smoke-generating systems,
decontamination vehicles, vehicles mounting smokegenerating devices, and/or aircraft. The smoke
generators of armored or TMS-65 decontamination
13-1

FM 100-2-1

vehicles establish a smoke screen very quickly.

However, they can be easily detected, so normally they
are used only when cover is available or well behind
friendly lines. Smoke-generating vehicles start at the
center of the line to be smoked and travel in opposite
directions along that line at approximately 15 kmph.
Two vehicles are sufficient to lay a smoke screen long
enough to cover a battalion advancing to the attack.
For larger smoke screens, the line is divided into segments, with two vehicles assigned to each segment.
The Soviets state that camouflage smoke screens
should cover an area at least five times the width of the
attacking unit's frontage.
The Soviets are concerned with the threat of enemy
helicopter-mounted ATGM systems. Consequently,
Soviet doctrine calls for advancing forces to move as
close behind the smoke screen as possible. The higher
the smoke screen, the higher a helicopter must go to
observe troop movement behind the smoke screen
and the more vulnerable the helicopter is to groundbased air defense weapons. The TMS-65, which can lay
a smoke screen approximately 400 meters high, is an
excellent dispenser for this purpose. There is
considerable observation-free maneuver space behind
a screen of this height. Conversely, smokepots provide
a 5- to 10-meter high screen which screens against
ground observation, but leaves the force vulnerable to
helicopters "hugging the deck" and "popping up" to
shoot.
Soviet literature and training indicate that the
Soviets do not consider "neutral" smokes to be harmful
to personnel or equipment given the relatively limited
exposure expected during the movement to attack.
Consequently, Soviet troops rarely wear protective
clothing when operating in camouflage smoke.
A decoy screen is established to deceive an enemy as

ito the actual location offriendly forces and a probable

direction of attack. The site and location of decoy
screens depends upon the type of combat action, time
;available, terrain, and weather conditions. An example
of the use of decoy screens is a river crossing in which
several possible crossing sites are screened simultaneously. If the enemy fires into the decoy screen, black
smoke devices and fires will be ignited to simulate
burning vehicles or equipment. Other "disinformation" which should be expected includes speakers
emitting sounds of tanks operating.

METEOROLOGICAL
INFLUENCES ON SMOKE
Local meteorological conditions impact greatly on
the employment of smoke. The command and control
13-2

of troops maneuvering in smoke is extremely difficult

even when the use of smoke is planned and commanders have had an opportunity to conduct reconnaissance and to prepare their troops. When meteorological conditions are not considered, smoke
unexpectedly covering friendly forces can lead to disorientation, loss of command and control, and tactical
disaster. Careful analysis of meteorological conditions
in the planning process cannot be overemphasized.
The meteorological conditions that most affect the
employment of smoke are wind, lower-atmosphere
stability, temperature, relative humidity, and
precipitation.
Wind direction is usually specified according to its
relation to the line of the FEBA and is classified as head,
tail,oblique,orflank. A wind that blows at an angle of
60 to 90 to the FEBA is considered either a head or
tail wind, depending on whether it is blowing from
one's FEBA to that of the enemy (tail) or vice versa
(head). An oblique wind blows across the FEBA at an
angle of 30 to 60 . A flank wind blows parallel to, or
not more than 30 from, the FEBA. A tail wind is highly
favorable when forces are attempting to establish a
blinding smoke screep.
Wind speed data help to predict the drift rate and life
span of a smoke screen and the quantity ofsmoke agent
required. The Soviets classify wind speed as being
favorable, moderate, dr unfavorable as shown below.

Wind Effects on Smoke Operations

WIND SPEED
0-1.5 meters/sec ..............
1.5-3.0 meters/sec ..............
3.0-5.0 meters/sec ..............
5.0-8.0 meters/sec ..............
Greater than 8.0 meters/sec ...

CONDITION
Unfavorable
Moderate
Favorable
Moderate
Unfavorable

Under favorable conditions, the smoke cloud is disrupted very little, its life span is optimum, and the
quantity of smoke agent required is minimal. Under
moderate conditions, a relatively large quantity of
smoke agent is required; however, the life span of the
cloud still permits tactical use. A high density of smoke
may be achieved under moderate wind speeds. If the
wind direction changes frequently, there is a danger of
ineffective dispersal. With unfavorable wind speeds,
the smoke cloud disperses too rapidly or not at all.
Three conditions of atmospheric stability are
recognized: stable, neutral, and unstable. Stable
conditions exist when the lower layers of the air are

FM 100-2-1

cooler than the upper layers. This usually occurs at

night and in the early morning when there is a cloudless sky. During this time, intermixing of air in the
atmosphere is very limited, and the smoke tends to
drift along the earth's surface. Neutral conditions exist
when the air temperature is the same at the earth's surface as it is at the upper layers. This usually occurs
when there is cloud formation and the wind speed
exceeds 2 to 3 meters per second. This condition
favors the employment of smoke. In unstable conditions, the lower layers are warmer than the upper
layers, thus causing an intensive intermixing of the air

by vertical air movements. These conditions normally

occur on cloudless days, and/or when wind speeds
exceed 12 to 14 meters per second. Under these
conditions a smoke cloud quickly disperses.
Heavy rain is unfavorable for smoke. Falling raindrops wash the smoke out of the air, and lead to the
accelerated dispersion of a smoke cloud.
Favorable meteorological conditions for employing
smoke occur when a wind is stable in direction with a
speed of 3 to 5 meters per second and a stable or
neutral atmospheric condition exists. Average conditions for using smoke include a wind speed of 1.5 to 3

Munition Expenditure Norms for Producing

a 1-km Smoke Screen for 15 Minutes
WEAPON

WIND DIRECTION
HEAD OR TAIL
Number
Number
of tubes
of rounds

82-mm mortar

OBLIQUE (450)
Number
Number
of rounds
of tubes

FLANK
Number
of tubes

Number
of rounds

12

1000

8-12

750

500

120-mm mortar

300

220

150

122-mm howitzer

300

220

150

NOTES:

1. The wind speed is assumed to be 3 to 5 meters per second.

2. Ifthe wind speed is 6 to 7 meters per second, the ammunition consumption should be multiplied by
1.5.
3. An artillery battery of 6 pieces, regardless of the caliber of its weapon, can produce a smoke screen-

- over a 500- to 700-meter front if the wind isa crosswind.

- over a 150- to 200-meter front if the wind-is a head or tail wind.
If a front exceeds these dimensions, it must bedivided among the batteries.
4. When there isalayer of snow over 20 cm indepth, the ammunition consumption should bemultiplied
by a factor of 1.5 to 2.
Munition Expenditure Norms for Producing
a 120- to 200-Meter Smoke Screen for 15 Minutes

WEAPON

82-mm mortar
120-mm mortar or
122-mm howitzer

REQUIRED ROUNDS
WITH FLANKING WINDS

REQUIRED. ROUNDS
WITH HEAD WINDS
Up to 5
meters per
second

More than 5
meters per
second

Up to 2
meters per
second

3-5
meters per
second

6-7
meters per
second

More than 7
meters per
second

120

200

25

40

60

90

40

70

12

18

25

40
13-3

FM 100-2-1

meters per second or 5 to 8 meters per second with

neutral atmospheric conditions. Unfavorable conditions consist of wind speeds of less than 1.5 or greater
than 8 meters per second, gusty winds, winds that are
unstable in direction, strong unstable atmospheric
conditions, and heavy rain.
An analysis of worldwide environmental conditions
shows that certain areas are better suited for smoke
use than others. For example, in Western Europe the
winds are normally stable, the relative humidity is
normally high, and the average number of cloud-free
days is low (approximately 36 to 38 per year). As a
result, Western Europe provides highly favorable
conditions for the use of smoke. The Middle East,
especially the desert regions, is not very favorable
because of the low relative humidity.
Smokepots also may be used to establish a smoke
screen. To estimate the number of pots required to
maintain a smoke screen for a particular operation, the
Soviets use the following formula:

N= N

AT
LWD

WHERE:
= number of smokepots required
= area of smoke screen (square meters)
= time to maintain smoke screen (minutes)
= length of impenetrable smoke screen from one
pot (meters)
W = width of smoke cloud at end of screen from one
pot (meters)
D = duration of smoke formation from one pot
(minutes)
N
A
T
L

For safety, N is increased by 10 percent to 15

percent. Additionally, as the amount required is
affected by available light and meteorological conditions, the required number may be reduced by 30 percent to 40 percent at night and increased by up to 50
percent if the wind is gusty or has a velocity greater
than 5 meters per second.
Soviet guidelines for the use of smoke areSBefore and during an attack, smoke should be
placed on enemy firing positions and observation

13-4

points. Artillery, mortar, and aircraft are to be the

primary means of dissemination.
* Artillery, aircraft, smokepots, and barrels are to be
used to create screening smoke throughout the tactical depth of the enemy's defense and to screen the
flanks of attacking units.
* Screening smoke of 2 to 3 hours' duration should
be placed along a wide front to cover units conducting
river-crossing operations. Screens are to be placed on
both sides of the river; floating pots and barrels also
may be placed in the river. Decoy screens are
employed at one or more other likely crossing sites in
an attempt to deceive the enemy.
* Important locations and possible targets such as
troop concentrations, crossing sites, bridges, railroad
junctions, and unloading areas are to be screened as
the situation dictates.
* Avenues of approach to these locations also should
be screened, with particular attention being given to
eliminating reference points that could aid enemy aviation in targeting the screened location.
* Reliable communications and continuous coordination between units using smoke and forward air
warning and air defense posts is essential.
Maneuver forces should be covered by smoke
screens set down on a broad front.
* Camouflage, blinding, and decoy smoke screens
should be used to conceal the direction and time of
attack and to minimize losses.
Smoke may be used to mark targets for friendly
aircraft and for signaling purposes.
* Smoke should be used to screen logistics routes
and activities such as the repair and evacuation of
tanks, evacuation of casualties, etc., that are within
range of enemy fire and observation.
* Smoke should be used to cover the movements of
guns into firing positions and from position to position.
* Smoke should be used to screen the activities of
engineer units when clearing minefields and to mark
passages through engineer barriers.
Soviet smoke doctrine and capabilities are
impressive. However, very little training has been
observed, except for limited driving drills. When
vehicle drivers cannot see to drive, and young commanders cannot see to command, it must be expected
that there will be confusion, and perhaps a hesitancy to
use their doctrine as fully as they would like.

FM 100-2-1

CHAPTER 14

ENGINEER SUPPORT
The Soviets recognize that execution of combined
arms operations requires extensive use of engineer
support. This support is influenced bythe requirement
to maintain high speed offensive operations, by the
widely-dispersed nature of combined arms operations,
and by the increased lethality of conventional and
nuclear weapons.

ORGANIZATION
There are two types of Soviet engineers: sapper, or
combat engineers found at regiment and division, and
more skilled engineers organized and trained for
specific missions. The latter type of engineer normally
is organic to army and front.
Engineer troops are assigned down through regimental level in all Soviet maneuver divisions, and
platoons are sometimes detailed to battalions for
specific operations.
At army level, engineer units could include a ponton
bridge regiment, an assault crossing battalion, and a
general engineer regiment or brigade. At front level,
there might be a general engineer regiment or brigade,
along with specialized ponton bridge regiments and
assault crossing battalions.
Motorized rifle or tank divisions have an engineer
battalion with various vehicle-launched bridges,
ponton bridges, and heavy amphibious ferries, along
with trucks, and mine-clearing, construction, and
demolition equipment. The engineer battalions in tank
divisions have a larger number of heavy amphibious
ferries to support the divisions' armored vehicles.
Airborne divisions have an engineer battalion of lesser
strength, with no heavy vehicle-launched bridging
equipment, ferries, or ponton bridge sections.
The engineer battalion at division level is capable of
performing the following missions* Provide engineer staff planning for organic and
attached engineer troops.
* Construct, repair, and maintain roads, bridges,
fords, and culverts.
* Support stream and river crossings with necessary
equipment.
* Coordinate organic and attached engineer troops
in water crossings.
* Assist in emplacement of obstacles and mines.
Provide technical assistance in preparation of field
fortifications.
* Conduct engineer reconnaissance and develop
engineer intelligence.

* Provide personnel and equipment for water

purification and supply of potable water.
* Assist in assault of fortified positions by furnishing
sappers.
Most of the tasks described above are done by
sappers. Engineers carry out more specialized work
such as the construction and operation of floating
bridges and ferries.
The engineer company in a motorized rifle regiment
of a motorized rifle or tank division is organized into a
mine warfare platoon, a technical (construction)
platoon, and a bridge platoon. The company has
several APCs, vehicle-launched bridges, and assorted
mine-clearing equipment.
From his senior commanders, the battalion commander receives engineer support to enable his unit to
cross natural and man-made obstacles, and to
construct defensive positions and barriers.
The Soviets may assign motorized rifle or other
troops to perform engineer tasks when necessary.
Troops of all arms and services are trained to perform
some engineer tasks such as building weapons
emplacements and trenches, emplacing and clearing
mines by hand, and camouflaging weapons and
equipment.
Motorized rifle and tank regiments, however, rely
heavily on their organic engineer company to* Provide limited mine warfare capability.
* Execute route reconnaissance and route opening.
* Support crossing of water and dry gaps with trucklaunched and tank-launched bridging.
* Provide earth-moving capability for road work and
entrenchments.
" Execute camouflage and demolitions.
The Soviet concept of engineer support includes the
attachment of support units from higher levels to those
front line units in contact with the enemy from assets
of senior commanders. Engineer unit tactical employment does not always follow strict organizational lines.
Tactical employment of combat engineer, engineer
reconnaissance, and road and bridge subunits
generally involves the formation of one or more of the
following functional groupings:
" Mobile Obstacle Detachment (MOD).
" Movement Support Detachment (MSD).
" Engineer reconnaissance patrol.
Each engineer unit organic to a maneuver unit is
commanded by a chief ofengineer services (CES). The
CES is responsible for the organization of engineer
support, maintenance and use of engineer equipment,
14-1

FM 100-2-1

and combat readiness of the engineer units. He

concentrates engineer efforts to support a main offensive effort or critical defense sector. At each level, the
CES coordinates with the chief of engineer services at
the next higher level.
The CES at regimental level is usually a major. He
participates fully in the staff,and coordinates with the
other chiefs of services, and the chief of staff. He contributes to the reconnaissance plan, the combat order,
river crossing, and NBC defense plans. In accordance
with the commander's decisions, he plans engineer
support, the disposition of engineer subunits, and the
use of combat units assigned to engineer tasks.

ENGINEER SUPPORT IN THE OFFENSE

In the offense, the primary mission of the engineers
is to assist in maintaining a high rate of advance.
Emphasis is on clearing and maintaining routes for the
advance of maneuver elements. This includes the
clearance or removal of mines and other obstacles,
crossing of water obstacles, assisting in flank protection and protection against counterattacks. Engineer
reconnaissance, performed independently or with
other reconnaissance, plays a significant role in
achieving a high rate of advance. Basic engineer tasks
also include the support of logistic operations in the
rear area.

Engineer Reconnaissance
Engineers are included in all reconnaissance
elements of tank and motorized rifle units. The mission
of engineer reconnaissance is to report on the condition of the routes of advance for the main body. The
unit performing the route reconnaissance must determine the following:
* Obstacles to be overcome.
* Engineer equipment required.
* Conditions of crossing sites.
* Location and quantity of materials which can be
used to improve the march route.
* Nature of the terrain and the location of areas that
do not afford natural concealment.
Engineer reconnaissance provides information
about assembly areas, detours around obstacles, and
warning of minefields and craters. Reconnaissance of
water obstacles is done to find fording sites and suitable entry and exit points for amphibious combat
vehicles. Detailed reconnaissance is required for
bridge and ferry sites.
When the situation warrants, engineer reconnaissance patrols are formed for specific missions. An
14-2

engineer reconnaissance patrol may consist of one or

two BRDM scout cars or APCs. It is usually commanded by an officer. Reconnaissance of tank fording
sites require divers and a tracked amphibian with river
reconnaissance devices. An engineer reconnaissance
patrol is equipped with portable mine detectors and
route marking flags and may have a vehicle-mounted
mine detector for mounted mine reconnaissance of
roads and trails.

Movement Support
Information gathered as a result of engineer reconnaissance is used to determine the selection of march
routes requiring the least amount of engineering
preparation and the employment of engineer assets for
route clearing.
The movement support function includes all
engineer activities which facilitate the movement of
maneuver forces. A movement support detachment
(MSD) is task organized from division or regimental
engineer assets based on the mission and the availability of assets. It can be from platoon to company
strength and is equipped with route and mine
clearance vehicles and equipment. The MSD can fill
craters, clear mines, prepare bypasses from major
obstructions, and identify contaminated areas. It
normally does not include bridging equipment with
the exception of that needed for its own movement.
Maneuver regiments have their own truck- and tanklaunched bridges and normally do not require bridging
support from the MSD.
During marches, the MSDs travel in advance of the
main body clearing obstructions reported by division
reconnaissance elements. The division engineer battalion can form two or three MSDs. These detachments
are employed on main routes, and, where possible,
under the protection of an advance guard or forward
security element. On other routes, the leading regiments provide MSDs from their organic engineer
resources. A common MSD at this level might consist
of an engineer platoon with one or two dozers and up
to three tanks fitted with dozer blades. MSDs are protected by up to a platoon of infantry or tanks and
should be accompanied by chemical reconnaissance
personnel.

Minefield Breaching
The normal Soviet method of breaching minefields
during an assault or rapid advance is to employ mine
plows fitted to the lead tanks. Although engineers
reconnoiter the minefield, the initial breaching is not

II
FM 100-2-1

zaIx.
~N.

ql

I-

'

Movement Support Detachment

VARIANT 1
1
RECONNAISSANCE AND
BARRICADE DESTRUCTION
GROUP

2
ROAD-BRIDGE
GROUP
*

3
ROUTE MARKING
GROUP
6

* Tank w/Mine Plow

* Truck-launched Scissors Bridge

* Combat Engineer Squad,

APC-Mounted
- Explosives
- Mine Detectors
- Mine Probes

* Tracked Dozer
* Carriers for Bridge and
Road Personnel

* Bridge-laying Vehicle

* Truck-mounted Crane

* Chemical Dosimetrists

* Motorized Rifle Platoon (-1 Squad)

* Motorized Rifle Platoon, APC-Mounted,

w/Marking Equipment

_...r

c'

VARIANT 2
1
RECONNAISSANCE AND
BARRICADE DESTRUCTION
GROUP

ROAD-BRIDGE GROUP
2
ROAD GROUP

3
BRIDGE GROUP

4
ROUTE MARKING
GROUP AND
RESERVE

* Tank w/Mine Plow

* Tractor Dozer

* Combat Engineer
Squad

* Motorized Rifle Squad

* Combat Engineer Squad,

APC-Mounted
- Explosives
- Mine Detectors
- Mine Probes

* 1/2 Engr Squad

w/Explosives

* Truck-launched
Scissors Bridge

* 1/2 Engr Squad w/Marking

Equipment

* Bridge-laying Tank
* Chemical Dosimetrists

* Carriers for
Bridge and Road
Personnel
* Truck-mounted
Crane
* Motorized Rifle
Platoon (-1 Squad)

primarily an engineer task KMT-4 and KMT-6 plows

normally are employed on the scale of one per platoon
of three to four tanks. Engineers assist in the fitting of
these and plow-roller combinations (KMT-5s) which

are commonly used for minefield reconnaissance. The

Soviets estimate clearing speeds of about 10 kmph for
plow-fitted tanks and up to 22 kmph for roller-fitted
tanks. Combat vehicles other than those on a tank
14-3

FM 100-2-1

chassis have to wait until the full width of the lane is

cleared. This is often done by tanks with plows or
rollers towing a line charge across the minefield
behind them and then setting off the charge.
The Soviets employ a mine-clearing device mounted
on the BTR-50PK APC (two to each divisional
engineer battalion). This piece of equipment fires an
explosive hose (line charge) across the minefield
which is then detonated. It clears a lane about 180
meters long by 6 to 8 meters wide. This equipment is
particularly useful during an assault river crossing
when there are minefields on the far bank and amphibious APCs may have to operate initially in the bridgehead without tank support.
Another mine-clearing device is the BDT explosive
line charge. It consists ofthree separate linear charges,
a nose section, and a detonator box. Each linear charge
may be assembled to any desired length by connecting
2-meter sections together with threaded collars. The
light, sheet metal, 5-cm-diameter, tubular sections are
filled with cast TNT explosive at 9 kg per linear meter.
The BDT is versatile, in that it may be used as a single,
double, or triple charge. The forward end section is
fitted with a roller to facilitate insertion of the charge
into a minefield. The BDT is assembled in a rear area
and towed by a tank to the edge of the minefield; then it
is pushed into the minefield and fired. The triple line
charge clears a 6-meter wide path along the entire
length of the charge. A squad of men can assemble a
500-meter long triple charge in 1 to 1.5 hours.
Bangalore torpedoes also are used. Sections, 2meters in length and carrying 6 kilograms of explosive,
are connected by collars. The depth of clearance of a
path 1 to 2 meters wide is limited only by the manageable weight that can be manually pushed into the
minefield.
The number of lanes to be cleared depends on the
terrain and the number of columns in the assault
echelon. For a leading battalion in a main attack, six to
eight lanes may be required, one for each assaulting
platoon. In supporting attacks as few as two may be
sufficient. However, an average of four to six can be
expected with at least two developed into permanent
lanes 6 to 8 meters wide for the passage of artillery and
logistic vehicles. Engineer sappers mark minefield
lanes and provide traffic control through the minefield.
The routes leading from a start line to each lane are
marked with red triangular metal flags and black and
white tapes. Illuminating markers may be used at night.
Routes through friendly minefields are marked by signs
of various shapes placed not less than 20 meters apart
on both sides of the route. If possible, they are positioned so as not to be visible from enemy positions.
14-4

Mine Laying
Minefield laying is most rapidly accomplished using
armored tracked minelayers (three to each divisional
engineer battalion). Hand emplacement and towed
minelayers are also utilized. Special teams called
mobile obstacle detachments (MODs) are formed
from regimental and division engineers assets. Their
mission is the rapid laying of mines in the most likely
enemy avenues for attacks or counterattacks. MODs
are positioned on the flanks of a march formation to be
prepared for rapid deployment and normally are in
close proximity of the antitank reserve. An MOD consists of up to three armored tracked minelayers or
truck-towed minelaying trailers and two to three vehicles carrying mines for resupply. Both the tracked
minelayers and the minelaying trailers dispense mines
at predetermined spacings of 4 or 5.5 meters. Minelaying helicopters, which dispense mines from a chute
while flying at a height of about 5 meters, may also be
employed. Antitank minefield density is usually from
750 to 1000 mines per kilometer. Using the division's
three armored tracked 'minelayers, a three-row
antitank minefield up to 1,000 meters in length can be
surface laid in half an hour on suitable ground. In the
same time, a regimental MOD (three minelaying
trailers) might lay some 500 meters of minefield.

Assault River Crossings

The Soviets stress that water obstacles should be
crossed from the march to preclude major halts in the
offense. Doctrine includes crossing these obstacles at
multiple points along a broad front to overwhelm
enemy defenses. Doctrine also calls for river crossings
to be made at night; however, Soviet units rarely train
in night river crossings. Smoke is used extensively to
mask assault crossings conducted during daylight.
hours.
Engineer river crossing capability is found at the
regimental engineer company organic to motorized
rifle and tank regiments, the division engineer battalion, and special engineer battalions and regiments at
front and army level. A more detailed discussion of
Soviet river crossings can be found in FM 100-2-2.

ENGINEER SUPPORT IN THE DEFENSE

Engineer support for the preparation of defensive
positions consists of the following actions:
* Engineer reconnaissance of the enemyand terrain.
* Preparation of fortifications for protection of
weapons, personnel, and equipment.
* Construction of obstacles (coordinated with the
fire plan and natural obstacles).

FM 100-2-1

* Construction of routes for blocking and counterattacking forces.

* Support of camouflage and deception measures.
* Provision of water supply.
Engineer tasks during the defense are implementation of obstacle plans, particularly antitank obstacles,
to block enemy penetrations. A mobile obstacle
detachment (MOD) may join antitank reserves to
counter enemy tank threats. Another task for the MOD
is repair of existing routes and creation of new routes
to support the maneuver of forces. A third task is
reacting to the effects of nuclear strikes by the enemy
(fire fighting, structure repair, removal of essential
debris).
In first echelon units, engineer fortification of defensive areas is done preferably at night, or under conditions of reduced visibility. Mechanized digging
capability is used for trenches, revetments, and
shelters in those areas not subject to direct enemy
observation or fire.
During the combined arms commander's personal
reconnaissance, he makes final decisions about the
disposition of units, strongpoints, fire support systems,
the obstacle and barrier system, and the type of
engineer preparation required. He considers the cover
and concealment (camouflage) potential of the terrain, and devotes special attention to determining
those areas where he can employ earth-moving
machines and prefabricated fortification
constructions.
Engineer troops assist in reconnaissance and
preparation of the defense by determining the protective and camouflage features of the terrain and aiding
in selection of positions for command posts and
subunit strongpoints. Engineers also determine road
and bridge conditions in the defensive area, availability
of local materials for construction ofpositions, and the
status of the water supply. Engineer observation posts
usually are manned by two or three engineers with a
periscope range finder and possibly photographic
equipment. The posts are located approximately2 to 3
kilometers apart along the front. They monitor the
conditions of roads, barriers, bridges, and the water
supply as well as assist in monitoring radiation and
contamination levels in the defensive area.
To some extent fortification, shelters, and vehicle
revetments are constructed by all troops. The
engineers are charged with constructing the more
complex fortifications. In addition, engineer troops
normally construct barrier systems which are coordinated with the overall system of fire. The first priority
in the barrier system is given to antitank obstacles.
Additional maneuver routes for the rapid and con-

cealed employment of counterattack or blocking

forces are prepared by engineers, to include mine
clearance within the defensive area, if required.
As an example, in establishing a prepared defense,
personnel of a motorized rifle battalion in the first
echelon may construct the basic trenches and company and platoon strongpoints. Basic revetments for
tanks, APCs, command observation posts, antitank
guided missiles (ATGMs), and mortars may be constructed by engineers. Engineers employing digging
machines may construct fortifications for the
battalion's second echelon-covered shelters and
bunkers, communications trenches, and alternate
ATGM and mortar positions. Primary, temporary, and
alternate artillery firing positions; ammunition
bunkers; personnel shelters; and prime mover revetments are prepared by the gun crews. Obstacles are
created on approaches into the defensive position, in
front of artillery and air defense firing positions, in the
undefended gaps between strongpoints, and on flanks.
Antipersonnel minefields are emplaced forward of the
FEBA to give added protection to antitank minefields
or to protect gaps between defensive strongpoints.
Existing roads are cleared, improved, and marked.
Maneuver routes to the front and flanks and supplyevacuation routes are prepared, usually by the
engineer elements of the senior combined arms commander. Dummy positions may be constructed. Effectiveness of all camouflage measures is checked
periodically by aerial observation. Once established by
engineers, water supply points usually are operated
and monitored by motorized rifle troops.
The Soviets contend that a tank, protected by a revetment, is significantly more effective in defense than an
attacking enemy tank, and is superior in its direct fire
capability and camouflage. Therefore, particular attention is given to masking and protecting aspects of the
terrain and to preparing revetments with cleared fields
of fire. Tank defensive positions in subunit strongpoints are prepared with primary and alternate positions (about 200 meters apart) for all-around defense.
The primary revetments are constructed first, while
alternate positions and ammunition storage areas
follow in work priority.

CAMOUFLAGE AND WATER SUPPLY

The Soviets believe that camouflage measures are
important in all combat actions. Under all conditions,
camouflage is an individual as well as an organizational
responsibility. Individual soldiers and crew members
are expected to make use of natural vegetation to
camouflage equipment and positions. Engineer tasks
14-5

FM 100-2-1

are characterized by efforts to minimize the necessity

for camouflage byproper site selection and reconnaissance of the natural camouflaging and concealing
properties of the terrain. Camouflage nets maybe used
in place of natural foliage. Smoke also is employed to
conceal movement and to deceive the enemy.
It is in the defense that camouflage is applied in the
greatest detail. Here, the intent of camouflage is to
compel enemy reconnaissance to report incorrect
data on troop deployment through concealment and
deception. Soviet guidelines state that camouflage
should be convincing in its realism, that it be applied
constantly and consistently through the whole area,
and that it be diverse. In organizing for camouflage,

14-6

allowances must be made for proper use of the

masking effect of terrain features, for the season and
time of day, as well as the weather and other visibility
factors. Troops are dispersed also and their dispersal
areas frequently relocated, but not at the expense of
either security or control. All troops are made aware of
factors that adversely affect camouflage, such as light,
sound, motion, incorrect coloration or contrast, shape,
skylining, and trackage.
In all combat operations, engineers are responsible
for supplying water and for determining its suitability
for human consumption. Where NBC weapons have
been employed, medical service and chemical defense
troops assist in evaluating the water.

CHAPTER 15

ELECTRONIC WARFARE
SOVIET EW CAPABILITIES
For years the Soviets have recognized the
importance of electronic warfare (EW) and have made
a major investment in electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM), as well as lethal and nonlethal
countermeasures. Soviet writings on EW are included
under broader topics such as security, command and
control, reconnaissance, air defense, and camouflage.
This treatment of electronic warfare in the context of
routine operations indicates that the Soviets consider
EW to be integral to all combat actions.
Technical advancements in both electronic warfare
support measures (ESM) and electronic countermeasures (ECM) have been noted in all Soviet forces.
Ground forces continue to introduce new jammers, as
well as a new series of improved signals intelligence
(SIGINT) vehicles. The air forces have numerous
aircraft devoted to EW as escort and standoff jammer
platforms. Also since 1979, there has been increased
emphasis on Soviet offensive, penetrating air forces
equipped with ECM and accompanied by dedicated
EW aircraft. Strategic fixed jammers are located
throughout the Soviet Union. Soviet writings on EW indicate a close parallel to US practices and capabilities:
* Communication and electronic reconnaissance
(COMINT/ELINT) *-Employed for intelligence
collection, to include targeting for artillery and air.
* Electronic countermeasures (ECM)*-Employed
to neutralize enemy communications and electronics
through jamming and deception.
* Electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM)*-ECCM capabilities are achieved through strict enforcement of signal security, equipment redundancy, alternate subsystems, system design, and operator skill.
Communications is the basic means to ensure
troop control. Loss of communications is the
loss of troop control, and the loss of troop
control in battle invariably leads to defeat.
LTC L. Titov
Voyenny Vestnik No. 7, 1971

electronic combat (REC). REC doctrine adds a new

dimension to the US view of electronic warfare. REC
combines signals intelligence, direction finding,
intensive jamming, deception, and destructive fires to
attack enemy organizations and systems through their
means of control. The purpose of REC is to limit, delay,
or nullify the enemy's use of his command and control
systems, while protecting Soviet systems by electronic
counter-countermeasures. An estimated goal of the
system is to destroy or to disrupt a majority of the
enemy's command, control, and weapon system
communications, either by jamming or by destructive
fires.
The Soviets recognize the impossibility of
completely depriving enemy forces of their sources of
control for extended periods of time. Accordingly,
Soviet REC planners have established mathematical
models to estimate "critical times" in command and
control procedures. This critical time is defined as the
sum of the times required to complete a sequence of
steps in control:
* Collection and reporting of data.
* Evaluation and decision.
* Issuance of orders and preparation.
* Completion of action.
Soviet Radioelectronic Combat (REC)

* Organizal
* Systems
* Equipmel
MEANS OF C"
* Command
* Observatio

SOVIET RADIOELECTRONIC
COMBAT (REC)
The Soviets have developed their electronic warfare
capabilities into an integrated system called radio-

* Guidance S
* Communicati
Centers

s
\

* Radio and Radar

anI]

*US Terminology.
15-1

FM 100-2-1

Against this background, the aim of radioelectronic

combat is to disrupt the enemy's critical time phasing
to the extent that perishable information (on which
decisions and orders are based) becomes obsolete.

TARGET PRIORITIES
Communication control points, are assigned a
priority according to their expected relative impact on
the battle. They are selected with the intention of
eliminating them by either physical destruction or by
jamming. Although REC target priorities are
dependent on the command level and may be altered
as the tactical situation develops, they generally are * Artillery, rocket, and air force units that possess
nuclear projectiles or missiles and their associated
control system.
* Command posts, observation posts, communications centers, and radar stations.
* Field artillery, tactical air force, and air defense
units limited to conventional firepower.
* Reserve forces and logistics centers.
* Point targets that may jeopardize advancing Soviet
forces, e.g., dug-in tanks, antitank guided missile
emplacements, bunkers, and direct fire guns.

INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS
Essential to the success of Soviet REC objectives is
the collection of accurate and timely intelligence.
Soviet forces require knowledge of the enemy's electronic order of battle with details of operational
procedures, equipment types, emission characteristics, and locations. Some technical intelligence
information concerning US electronic equipment is
obtained from open source material, such as technical
manuals and field manuals. These manuals may include
ways in which communications and electronics
equipment is employed, transmitter power output,
kinds of antennas normally used with different
equipment, and frequency bandwidth. Other vital
information is obtained by the reconnaissance, target
acquisition, and intelligence assets available at the
various command levels. Locating targets of specific
interest to the REC effort is accomplished best through
the use of electronic intercept and direction finding
(DF) measures.

ELECTRONIC INTERCEPT
AND DIRECTION FINDING
Radio intercept and radio direction finding are the
primary means of gathering enemy intelligence
15-2

through electronic means. Radio intercept is the

ability to monitor and understand message content,
while radio direction finding is designed to locate
transmitting stations. As demonstrated byEgyptian use
of Soviet equipment during the October 1973 Middle
East War, the Soviets have an extensive intercept
capability for radio transmissions and radar emissions.
Intercept units are moved forward immediately
behind leading regiments and have the capability to
intercept enemy transmissions within the following
distances from the FEBA:
* Artillery ground radar - about 25 km
* VHF - about 40 km
* HF ground waves - about 80 km
* HF skywave - unlimited
These ranges are greatly extended when airborne
intercept is employed.
Soviet ground based and airborne intercept
equipment generally lacks the technical sophistication
of the latest Western equipment, but is simple, rugged,
and easy to maintain.
The Soviet DF capability is equivalent to that for
intercept. Various types of mobile directional antenna
systems can be used in a radio direction finding (RDF)
role. Forward area mobile elements include a VHF
tactical radio direction finder with an Adcock antenna,
as well as the POLE DISH radar direction finder.
Tactical FM radios operating on low power can be
picked up by Soviet RDF units at distances in excess of
10 kilometers and high power signals detected at
distances up to 40 kilometers. RDF operational
accuracies are usually within + 3.5 degrees.
Direction finding is used* To provide approximate locations of electronic
emitters.
* To provide locations which, when applied with
SIGINT, terrain analysis, or other means, can be refined
to a target area of sufficient accuracy for artillery fires.
* To develop a "picture" of the battlefield which
reveals the disposition and possible intentions of
enemy units.
* To provide adequate locations for firing on most
radars and jammers.
Because of the length of transmission, the
peculiarity of their signal, and power output, jammers
can be easily located and identified as targets for attack
by suppressive fires. Ground radars, due to signal
characteristics, may be located with greater precision
than radio emitters, often within 50 to 200 meters.
Information from DF resources is evaluated quickly,
but usually requires further confirmation by other
sources. DF targets within conventional artilleryrange,
which are extremelyperishable and considered to be a

FM 100-2-1

serious threat, are given priority and engaged

immediately,
The chart below illustrates Soviet ground-based
electronic intercept and DF capabilities. About 25
seconds after the communications begin, the enemy
targeting sequence can continue even if friendly
communications cease. Accordingly, the danger point
is reached when radio transmissions exceed 20 to 25
seconds.
Besides the targets located by direction finding, it is
expected that others will be developed due to the

enemy's lax signal security and poor electronic

counter-countermeasures.

ELECTRONIC
COUNTERMEASURES (ECM)
REC doctrine establishes a requirement to jam at
critical times enemy command and control and
weapon system communications when they cannot be
destroyed by firepower. Available equipment includes
the R-330A and R-834 radio jammers. Additionally,

Intercept and Direction Finding

Communication initiated
..

..

by US transmitter

During search of VHF band, COMINT oper ator identifies US

transmitter and flashes alert to RDF net control stations
Concurrently, he notifies COM lINT analysts.

A(NCS).

COMINT
OPERATOR

RDF NCS flashes

.

COMINT ANALYSTS
COMINT analysts
forward information
to plotting and
analysis section.

RDF

and

requesting bearings
from each station to
target transmitter.

0b

STATION/RDF 2

ROF stations acquire bearings and

report back to
RDF NCS/RDF 2.

RDF net control station reports approximate location to the

plotting and analysis section.
.

Jamming Mission

About 25 seconds after

he communications
egin, the Soviet tareting sequence can
c ontinue even if US
ommunications are
t erminated. This is the
d anger point-commmunications longer
t)han 20 to 25 seconds.

-t

NCS/RDF 2

Plotting and analysis section refines approximate location provided by RDF net control by applying collateral
information, map analysis, and COMINT. Within 2 to 3
minutes the information is fed to appropriate mission.

Fire Mission

Combat Mission

FM 100-2-1

newer and more technically-advanced jammers are

being deployed by Soviet ground forces. Radar
jammers include the BRICK series of noise jammers.
Soviet technical writings concerning ECM have
dealt with these missions:
* Jamming in support of air defense operations, suppressing radar bombing equipment, radio navigation
equipment, and radio control links for air-to-surface
missiles (ASMs)
and surface-to-surface missiles
(SSMs).

* Jamming in support of ground operations, suppressing nuclear delivery systems, radars, radio control
links for ASMs and SSMs, command posts, and
communications centers.
The principal means of jamming discussed in Soviet
writings are-

* Radar jamming by using barrage and spot noise,

pulse, chaff, and decoys.
* Electronic jamming of command guidance
systems-using pulse and simulation techniques.
* Radio noise jamming of AM and FM signals.
Jamming targets will include the tactical air control
system, which uses HF radios for immediate air
requests, VHF-FM radios to link forward air
controllers, and UHF radio links for strike control.

USE OF FIREPOWER
Integral to Soviet REC doctrine is the use of physical
destruction means. Soviet forces can physically attack
in three ways: indirect fire, ground attack, and air
attack.
* Indirect fire. This includes artillery, mortars,
rockets, and surface-to-surface missiles.
* Ground attack. The Soviets may attempt to
destroy C3 elements by using special purpose forces,
agent-saboteurs, airborne and heliborne forces, or
other elements operating behind the front lines.
* Air attack. The Soviets may decide to attack with
high performance aircraft or attack helicopters.
Aircraft may use conventional ordnance (bombs,
cluster bomb units (CBUs), rockets, cannon, or
machine gun fire) or precision-guided munitions
(smart bombs and ASMs).
Ground forces also may be used to plant a
transmitter within the enemy perimeter for beacon
bombing.

GROUND BASED EW CAPABILITIES

Electronic warfare units are found at various
command levels from front down to division level. A
typical front could include at least a radio and radar
15-4

intercept regiment, a radio intercept regiment, au air

defense jamming regiment, and a radio jamming regiment. EW units available to the army commander
normally would be of battalion size. Within the division, the EW capability is centered in the divisional
reconnaissance battalion. The battalion can conduct
limited intercept and direction finding, as well as traditional ground reconnaissance.
Based on Soviet historical experiences and their current capabilities, it appears that the destructive aspects
of REC are emphasized near the FEBA, probablywithin
the division. More elaborate applications of REC, such
as large deception plans, would be prepared at army
level, or higher, with subordinate divisions implementing them.
Front,army, and divisional artillery units also have an
organic target acquisition capability. Generally, these
units contain* Surveillance and weapon locating radars.
* Radar intercept and direction finding sets.
* Sound ranging equipment with a range ofabout 14
km from the FEBA.
* Flash spotting observation posts.
Some knowledge of Soviet ground-based EW capabilities has been derived from the Arab use of Soviet
EW equipment during the October 1973 Middle East
war. It is unlikely that the systems observed represented the full array of EW systems available to Soviet
forces, nor were they the most modern. The EW means
used by the Arabs against Israeli ground forces

included* SIGINT monitoring of the clear text radio

communications.
* Direction finding of radio transmissions for
targeting.
* Barrage jamming to disrupt command channels.
* Intrusion to give false directions and orders.

AIRBORNE EW CAPABILITIES
Aviation supporting front operations includes
support squadrons with aircraft equipped to conduct
electronic warfare missions. These units can conduct
electronic reconnaissance missions and ECM against
radar, electronic guidance, and communications
systems. The most common air ECM operations are
spot or barrage jamming and dispensing chaff directed
against enemy air defense early warning and fire
control radars. Frontalaviation bombing operations
will be protected or camouflaged by aircrtft using
ECM in either a stand-off or escort role. Jamming
equipment, with an effective range up to 200 kilometers and covering frequencies used by NATO air

FM 100-2-1

ELECTRONIC COUNTERCOUNTERMEASURES (ECCM)

defense radars, is installed in these ECM aircraft. They
also may eject chaff to achieve jamming, deception, and
camouflage. Individual aircraft may carry selfscreening jammers and chaff dispensers.
Various Soviet aircraft have variants that are dedicated to EW activities. Included are modified versions
of the AN-12 CUB used for ECM and electronic intelligence (ELINT) collection, the COOT-A ECM or ELINT
variant of the IL-18 transport which supposedly carries
a side-looking airborne radar (SLAR), and fighter
variants such as the MiG-21 FISHBED H with a centerline pod, and the MiG-25 FOXBAT, which carries five
cameras and is believed to have a SLAR capability.
There are also ECM versions of the Yak-28 BREWER
(E-model) fixed-wing aircraft and the Mi-4 HOUND
helicopter (C-model). The Mi-4 contains multiple
antennas projecting from the front and rear of the
cabin, and, on each side, communication jammers.
Airborne electronic reconnaissance platforms
provide a much improved capability to intercept radio
and radar signals more frequently and at greater
distances than ground-based systems. These airborne
electronic reconnaissace platforms are aimed at the
detection and location of enemy battlefield surveillance radars, command posts, communication centers,
and tactical nuclear delivery systems. They also are
used in standoff or escort jamming roles.
Long-range EW aircraft include the BEAR D, BISON
C, BADGER D, and BADGER F variants.

SEABORNE EW CAPABILITIES
From all indications, the Soviets are engaged in
updating and expanding their naval EW capabilities.
The auxiliary intelligence gatherers (AGI) perform the
more overt functions and are the best known of all
Soviet intelligence gathering activities. These vessels,
many of which are basically trawlers, follow major
NATO exercises. The AGI have increased in number
from 4 in 1963 to 58 in 1981, and are used for collection of communication and electronic intelligence.
Additionally, the Soviet fleet includes over 160 survey
and research vessels, some of which could have electronic reconnaissance missions.
Naval aircraft are employed in long-range reconnaissance and ocean surveillance, with some aircraft
equipped to provide midcourse target data for antiship
missiles launched "over the horizon" from surface
ships, submarines, and other aircraft. Reconnaissance
aircraft now in use include about 50 of the larger Tu95/BEAR D turbo-prop planes, about 100 twin-jet Tu16/BADGER aircraft, and Tu-22/BLINDER jet aircraft
that have a supersonic speed.

The Soviet objective for ECCM is the satisfactory

operation of their electronic equipment in the face of
enemy disruption. Thus physical protection of the
equipment is included, as well as other practices
beyond the scope of western ECCM. Modern ECCM
features have been designed into the newer air defense
equipments used in the Yom Kippur War. However,
the greatest emphasis has been on organizational and
individual techniques that can be applied in the field.

Organizational ECCM Techniques

Physical destruction of the enemy jammer is an
important ECCM technique. More traditional techniques involve changing operating schedules and callsigns, alternate use of different radars, skip-echelon
communications, redundant communications links,
and the use of high ground between radio-relay
terminals and enemy territory. Operator ECCM
training and discipline also are organizational functions carried out at all echelons. For example, air
defense radar operators receive regular training in
both chaff and active jamming environments.

Individual ECCM Techniques

Operators are drilled thoroughly in the use of their
equipment and in built-in ECCM features. In many
cases, operator initiative is expected to overcome the
lack of complete ECCM circuitry. Operators can
change power, modulation, and antenna direction as
appropriate. Operators may initiate frequeicy
changes, but obviously must remain under organizational control. Soviet military writings continually
stress communications security (COMSEC) and
operator awareness of equipment capabilities and
limitations.

Antiradar Camouflage
The Soviets conceal military equipment against
detection by ground, airborne, and shipborne radars
by a technique called "antiradar camouflage."
Depending on the radar visibility of the objects to be
camouflaged, antiradar camouflaging is achieved by
creating false targets or by blending into the terrain
background those objects that might serve for
orientation. Equipment maybe concealed behind local
features or by making use of the camouflaging
properties of the ground relief. The Soviets use natural
cover, timber, brush wood, metallic nets, and corner
reflectors for radar camouflage. Mock-ups of military
equipment also can be used as antiradar reflectors.
15-5

FM 100-2-1

The Arab air defense system during the 1973 Middle

East War provided an insight into the equipment and
ECCM techniques of the Soviet forces. Their use
displayed* Signal security. The radars of the SAM and AAA,
which were moved forward to cover the initial assault,
were kept silent until after the initiation of the assault.
* Frequency spread.Each of the diverse air defense
systems operated within separate radar frequency
bands, so that no one jamming system could operate
simultaneously against all.
* Frequency diversity.Tracking and guidance radars
were able to change frequencies to overcome
jamming.
* Multiple and interchangeable missile guidance
systems. Some systems worked on pulsed radar, others
on continuous wave. Some of the radar tracking
systems also possessed optical tracking for continued

15-6

operations in a high ECM environment. Other systems

used infrared homing.
* Mobility. All tactical air defense systems were
extremely mobile and capable of quick change of
position after firing or being spotted by
reconnaissance.
SATELLITES
About 70 percent of Soviet space systems serve a
purely military role. Soviet military satellites perform a
wide variety of reconnaissance and collection
missions. Recent reconnaissance satellites have
improved intelligence collection processing capabilities. ELINT satellites can lock onto intercepted signals
to provide information concerning target location.
Large area radar surveillance satellites have also been
identified.

FM 100-2-1
CHAPTER 16

NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL,
AND CHEMICAL WARFARE
The Soviets anticipate the use of nuclear, biological,
and chemical (NBC) weapons, particularly nuclear
and chemical. The Soviets have developed and fielded a
wide range of NBC detection and warning devices,
individual and collective protective equipment, and
decontamination equipment that facilitates the
continuation of combat operations despite the
presence of contaminants. The Soviet groundforces'
capabilityto protect themselves againstNBC weapons
and to operate in contaminated environments is
unmatched by any other militaryforce in the world.
Another factor illustrating the Soviets' overall
preparedness for combat operations in an NBC
environment is the extensive psychological
conditioning that is combined with NBC training. The
Soviet soldier is conditioned to regard the employment of NBC weapons as a real possibility in modern
warfare. He is further conditioned to regard an NBC
environment not as a disastrous situation, but one in
which well-trained and skillful troops can survive and
which they can use to their advantage.
The Soviets readily admit that casualties would be
considerable in any future war involving the use of
NBC weapons. However, they insist that the timely use
of protective equipment, correct employment of
reconnaissance assets, and expeditious decontamination procedures can significantly reduce a
combat unit's vulnerability.
During the last decade, the Soviets have steadily
improved their capability for waging theater nuclear
and chemical warfare, while significantly improving
their conventional fire support capabilities. This force
modernization has introduced a degree of flexibility
previously unavailable to Soviet combined arms commanders and created multiple options for the employment of nuclear and chemical weapons. Consequently,
the Soviets have examined the possibility of waging a
theater conflict at different levels, with or without
nuclear weapons. They have developed what would
seem to be a more balanced view toward the complementary employment of nuclear and nonnuclear fire
support.
Confident that they can fight decisively with or
without nuclear weapons, the Soviets now consider
that a major conflict may be nonnuclear for at least an
initial period and may remain nonnuclear for the
duration of the conflict in certain "peripheral"
theaters. Despite the potential for a sustained period of
conventional or nonnuclear combat, a theater conflict
will be conducted under a "nuclear-scared" posture.

The Soviets classify both nuclear and chemical

weapons as "weapons of mass destruction" relative to
troop protective measures, but consider chemical
munitions to be "conventional" weapons when
discussing employment doctrine.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS
The Soviets classify nuclear weapons according to
yield or explosive power and type of burst. Nuclear
weapons are considered very high in explosive power
if their yield is over 500 kilotons, high if between 100
and 500, medium if between 15 and 100, and lowifup
to 15 kilotons. Types ofburst that maybe employed are
air, ground (surface), underground, and underwater.
Soviet training materials present detailed
descriptions of the destruction factors associated with
nuclear explosions-the shock wave, thermal and light
radiation, initial (penetrating) radiation, and residual
radioactive contamination of the ground. The Soviets
attribute the bulk of a nuclear weapon's destructiveness to its shock wave, although the actual distribution
of energy depends largely on the type of burst
employed. Following an atmospheric explosion, for
example, 50 percent of the resultant energy is said to
be released through the shock wave. Thermal and light
radiation accounts for 35 percent of the energy for
such a blast; initial radiation, 5 percent; and fallout, 10
percent for those weapons employed in the ground
burst mode.
In measuring both initial radiation and fallout, the
Soviets use roentgen (r) as the standard unit of
measurement of radiation absorbed dose. The Soviets
prefer to measure radiation dosage in roentgens rather
than rads and do not specify time periods for total
exposure doses when discussing the various degrees of
radiation sickness. One roentgen (r) equals 0.88.rads.
They state that a single dose of up to 50 r in the
course of 4 days or a continuous dose of up to 100 r
over 10 days is not considered dangerous. Doses
greater than 100 r are said to cause radiation sickness.
First-degree radiation sickness occurs when a total
dose of 100 to 200 r is absorbed. The latency period
lasts from 2 to 3 weeks, and symptoms include
lethargy, nausea, and intermittent fever. First-degree
radiaition sickness is curable. Second-degree radiation
sickness is caused by a total exposure dose of 200 to
300 r. The latency periods lasts about 1 week, after
which radiation induced symptoms appear. The
symptoms are similar to those experienced with
16-1

FM 100-2-1

first-degree radiation sickness but are more severe.

Recovery takes about 2 months with good medical
care. Third-degree radiation sickness is caused by a
total exposure dose of 300 to 500 r. The latencyperiod
is only a few hours, and the symptoms are still more
severe. With active medical treatment, recovery takes
several months. A dose greater than 500 r is usually
fatal. Radioactive contamination of an area, or fallout, is
measured in roentgens per hour. According to the
Soviets, an area is contaminated if 0.5 roentgens per
hour or more is measured.
Besides the shock wave, thermal and light radiation,
initial radiation, and fallout produced by nuclear
weapons, the Soviets mention secondary effects such
as fires and electromagnetic interference. Electromagnetic interference, or electromagnetic pulse
(EMP), originates with the release of nuclear
radiation. It is a pulse of short duration that covers
most of the usable frequency band to a range greater
than the other effects of the detonation. EMP can burn
out unprotected electronic equipment such as data
processing and intelligence equipment, weapons
systems, and radars.

NUCLEAR OPERATIONS
Planning
Although the opening stages of an offensive are likely
to be conventional, planning focuses on the necessity
to counter enemy employment of nuclear weapons, to
maintain the initiative and momentum of the offensive,
and to maintain fire superiority over the enemy (preempt his strike). The fire plans for divisions and higher
levels include contingency plans for nuclear strikes. At
all stages nuclear delivery means will be surveyed in
and target-ready to make a strike. The decision to
initiate tactical nuclear warfare would be made at the
highest level of government. The fire plan for the initial
massive nuclear strike, as it would include strikes by
the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF), is probably
developed at theater level and approved by the
Supreme High Command. Employment authority for
subsequent nuclear strikes probably is delegated to
front and may be as low as army command level. The
division chief of rocket troops and artillery (CRTA)
submits recommendations for the subsequent employment of the division's nuclear and chemical weapons
to the army commander for approval and integration
into army and front fire support plans.
In deliberately planned operations, nuclear fires are
planned in detail. In more mobile situations, as in
meeting engagements, exploitation, and pursuit, some
16-2

nuclear weapon systems are kept in high readiness to

fire on targets of opportunity.
Soviet target analysts favor airbursts and use larger
yields than their US counterparts. Strikes near the FEBA
are to be followed up by maneuver forces as closely as
safety and circumstances permit. Deep strikes may be
exploited with the use of airborne troops.
Nuclear allocations vary with the strength of the
enemy defense and the scheme of maneuver. A main
attack probably receives the highest percentage of
weapons; however, weapons also might be reserved
for other large, important targets.

Targeting
Soviet nuclear delivery systems that threaten the
European theater include intermediate-range ballistic
missiles (IRBM) and medium-range ballistic missiles
(MRBM) stationed in the Soviet Union. They also
include aircraft from both strategic and frontal
aviation, rockets and surface-to-surface missiles with
ranges from 70 to 900 kilometers, and 203-mm
howitzers and 240-mm mortars.
The following targets are considered suitable for
employment of tactical nuclear strikes:
* Enemy nuclear-delivery means-air, artillery,
missiles, and rockets. (These receive the highest

priority.)
* Headquarters of division and higher levels.
* Prepared defensive positions.
* Reserves and troop concentrations.
* Supply installations, especially nuclear ammunition storage points.
* Communication centers.
Soviet targeting analysts work on the assumption of
high reliability of nuclear delivery means. They usually
rely on one device per target. If a target is considered
to require more than one nuclear device, coverage will
be overlapping.
The suitability of targets is determined by their
priority category, missions, the current tactical situation, and the nuclear weapons available for use.

Offensive Employment
Once the 'decision to release nuclear weapons is
made, their use is governed by two principles: mass
and surprise. The initial nuclear strike will be accomplished suddenly, throughout the depth of the enemy's
combat deployment, and in coordination with nonnuclear fires. Initial nuclear strike objectives are* To destroy the enemy's main combat formations
and his command and control system.

FM 100-2-1

* To destroy the enemy's nuclear weapons.

* To isolate the battlefield.
* To breach the enemy's main line of defense and
define the main axes of attack .
Nuclear fires are employed to support the main
attack while other fire support means support
secondary or supporting attacks. The enemy's forward
defenses are targeted and destroyed rather than
avoided and bypassed. Nuclear strikes in effect are the
main attack. These strikes then are exploited by a highspeed air and ground offensive.
Subsequent nuclear strikes are integrated with the
maneuver and fire support plans and employed to reinitiate an offensive that has been slowed or stopped by
organized enemy resistance. Nuclear strikes also may
be used to eliminate the threat of a counterattack and
to clear resistance from the opposite bank in a river
crossing. In pursuit, nuclear strikes are planned on
"choke points" when retreating enemy forces present
lucrative targets.

Defensive Employment
If an enemy offensive can be severely degraded by
the impact of nuclear weapons, the defender may gain
the opportunity to switch quickly to an offensive role.
This drastic change in force correlation is sought when
nuclear weapons are employed on the defense.
Primary uses are* Destruction of enemy nuclear delivery means.
* Destruction of main attacking groups.
* Counterpreparations.
* Elimination of penetrations.
* Support of counterattacks.
* Denial of areas to the enemy by use of surface
bursts.
Radiologically contaminated barriers produced by
surface or subsurface bursts maybe used to prohibit or
slow the advancing enemy and to canalize large
elements into pockets to become a nuclear target.

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
Since the summer of 1979, information has been
obtained from a variety of sources that presents
evidence of an inadvertent release of anthrax bacteria
from a highly secured military installation in
Sverdlovsk. The available information and US technical
analysis point strongly to biological research and
development activities that exceed those normally
expected for biological warfare protection purposes.
If biological weapons are employed, they would
probably be targeted against rear area objectives such

as food supplies, water sources, troop concentrations,

convoys, and urban and rural population centers rather
than against front line forces. The Soviets realize that if
biological agents are employed against such targets,
they could seriously disrupt and degrade mobilization
plans as well as the subsequent conduct of a war. Some
biological agents are extremely persistent, retaining
their capabilities to infect for days, weeks, or longer.
The prolonged incubation period makes it difficult to
track down the initial location and circumstances of
contamination.
Biological weapons consist of pathogenic microbes
and the toxins caused by micro-organisms, both of
which are intended to incapacitate or kill people or
animals and destroy plants, food supplies, or material.
Almost a thousand different types ofpathogenic microorganisms are known to exist; however, not all of them
are adaptable for use in warfare as biological weapons.
Micro-organisms are classified as bacteria, viruses,
rickettsia, or fungi. Bacteria, which are resistant to
both low temperatures and freezing, cause diseases
such as bubonic plague, cholera, and anthrax. Viruses
are responsible for smallpox, variants of encephalitis,
and yellow fever. Rickettsia, bacteria-like microorganisms which are found living as parasites in
arthropods, can cause certain human diseases such as
rocky mountain spotted fever. Fungi are similar to
bacteria in that both exist in plants; however, fungi
have a more highly developed structure. Toxins are a
class of highly active poisons produced as a naturally
occurring by-product of some living organisms, or
through a chemical production method. A few wellknown diseases that are produced by toxins include
botulism, tetanus, and diphtheria. Toxins can retain
their potency for many weeks and, in some cases, for
months. Available delivery means mentioned by the
Soviets include rockets, artillery shells, mines, airdropped packets, aircraft sprayers, saboteurs, and
infected insects and rodents.
There is a degree of danger inherent in the use of
some pathogenic microbes because of the difficulty or
near impossibility involved in controlling an epidemic
caused by them. Some pathogenic microbes and toxins
derived from microbes are not contagious, while other
microbes cannot be transmitted without a suitable
vector.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS
The armed forces of the Soviet Union are better
equipped, structured, and trained than any other military force in the world to conduct offensive and defensive chemical warfare. Although the Soviets are aware
16-3

FM 100-2-1

of their overwhelming advantage, they continue to

steadily improve their chemical warfare capabilities.
Much of their training revolves around the use of lethal
agents. Reports from Afghanistan and Southeast Asia
show the Soviet's willingness to use chemical agents
when it is to their advantage.
The basic Soviet principle of chemical warfare is to
achieve surprise. They would use massive quantities of
chemical agents against unprotected troops or equipment. Chemical agents also may be used to restrict the
use of terrain.
Initially, the use of chemical weapons may be subject
to the same level of decision as nuclear weapons, but
they are likely to be used more freely once the initial
authority for employment has been given. In a nuclear
war, chemical weapons are used to complement
nuclear weapons. However, they may be used in a nonnuclear environment against an enemy whose
chemical defenses are weak or where their use would
be particularly advantageous.
Airfields, nuclear storage sites, and nuclear delivery
systems are targets for chemical attacks since such
targets can be neutralized without the necessity of pinpoint strikes. Also, contamination of key points along
rear area lines of communication can seriously disrupt
rear area resupply and reinforcement, while simultaneously keeping those points intact for subsequent
use by attacking Soviet forces.
In the offense, other likely chemical targets are* Troops occupying defensive positions across the
front of a Soviet attack. The troops may be neutralized
by nonpersistent agents delivered by multiple rocket
launchers.
* Nuclear delivery systems, troop concentration
areas, headquarters, and artillery positions. All types of
chemical agents delivered by field guns, multiple
rocket launchers, missiles, and aircraft are the most
likely.
* Bypassed pockets of resistance which pose a threat
to the flanks or rear of attacking forces. Defending
troops can be attacked directly or their movement
restricted by contamination.
In defense, persistent chemical agents are employed
to deny the enemy use of certain terrain and to canalize
attacking forces. Chemical agents are employed
against an attacking force to impede effective command and control and to destroy the momentum of the
attack by causing the attacking troops to adopt protective measures.
The Soviets have a variety of systems capable of
chemical delivery. They include aircraft, multiple
rocket launchers, artillery, mines, rockets, and
missiles.
16-4

The Soviets classify chemical agents according to the

effect they have on the organism. They identify six
major types: nerve, blood, blister, choking, psychochemical, and irritant. Nerve agents are fast-acting
chemical agents. Practically odorless and colorless,
they attack the body's nervous system causing convulsions and eventually death. A fatal dose consists of
only 2 to 10 milligrams. Nerve agents are further
classified as either G or V agents. G agents were
developed in Germany before and during World War II
and include the agents Tabun, Sarin, and Soman. The V
agents are quicker acting and more persistent than the
G agents. Blood agents cause death by blocking the
oxygen transferral mechanisms in the body. A common
blood agent is hydrogen cyanide.
Blister agents, such as mustard (H) or lewisite (L)
and combinations of the two compounds, can disable
or kill after contact with the skin, or after being inhaled
into the lungs or ingested. Contact with the skin can
cause painful blisters or blindness after eye contact.
These agents are especially lethal if inhaled. Incapacitants disrupt a victim's mental and physical capabilities. Consciousness may not be lost, however, and
the effects usually wear off without leaving permanent
physical injuries. Irritants, also known as riot-control
agents, cause a strong burning sensation in the eyes,
mouth, skin, and respiratory tract. The effects of these
agents, the best known being tear gas, are also
temporary. Victims recover completely without having
any serious aftereffects.
Chemical agents are categorized as persistent or
nonpersistent. Persistent agents, such as V-agents,
some G-agents, and the blister agent mustard, can
retain their disabling or lethal characteristics
depending on environmental conditions for days,
weeks, and in some cases, years. Nonpersistent agents
generally last a shorter period of time, depending on
weather conditions. Soviet military writings indicate
that nonpersistent agents would be used across the
front of a Soviet attack before a combat engagement.
Persistent agents would be used deep within the
enemy's rear and along troop flanks to protect
advancing units.
The Soviets possess antidotes for protection from
agents of potential adversaries as well as their own.
They have developed and fielded an antidote for
soman, which is an agent they possess but is not in the
US inventory.
Chemical agents believed to be in the Soviet inventory include the agents described in the chart at right.
Stockpiles of chemical agents greatly exceed those
available to the West and are sufficient to sustain large

scale use.

FM 100-2-1

Chemical Agents Reportedly Stockiled by the Soviet Union

TYPE OF
AGENT
NERVE

SYMBOL/NAME
G Series
GB/Sarin
GD/Soman (VR 55)

I p

- - I ~-~~ - -

SYMPTOMS IN MAN

EFFECTS ON MAN

RATE OF ACTION

Difficult breathing,
sweating, drooling,
nausea, vomiting convulsions, and dim vision.

At low concentrations,
incapicitates; kills if
inhaled or absorbed
through the skin.

Very rapid by inhalation; slower through

skin.

Incapacitates; kills if
contaminated skin is
not decontaminated

Delayed through skin;

more rapid through
eyes.

V Agent

rapidly.

BLOOD

AC/Hydrogen cyanide

Rapid breathing, convulsions, coma, and

death.

Incapacitates; kills if
high concentration is
inhaled.

Rapid.

BLISTER

HD/Mustard
HN/Nitrogen Mustard
L/Lewisite
HL/Mustard and Lewisite
CX/Phosgene Oxime

Mustard; nitrogen
mustard-no early symptoms. Lewisite and
mustard-searing of
eyes and stinging of
skin. Phosgene oximepowerful irritation of
eyes, nose and skin.

Blisters skin and

respiratory tract; can
cause temporary blindness. Some agents
sting and form wheals
on skin.

Blister delayed hours

to days; eye effects
more rapid. Mustard
lewisite and phosgene
oxime very rapid.

INCAPACITANT

None known, but a sleep

inducer has been reported
in Afghanistan.

Slowing of mental and

physical activity; disorientation and sleep.

Temporarily incapacitates.

Unknown.

IRRITANT

DA/Diphenylchloroarsine
DM/Adamsite
CN/Choroacetophenone .
CS/0-Chlorobenzalmalononitrile
PS/Chloropicrin

Causes tears, irritates

skin and respiratory
tract.

Incapacitates, nonlethal.

Very rapid.

SOVIET PROTECTION
AND WARNING EQUIPMENT
Most Soviet NBC equipment is dependable and
apparently in good supply. Some of it, as in the case of
the electrically fired warning flag dispenser, is rather
ingenious. However, other pieces of protective NBC
equipment have drawbacks. One deficiency is the low
level of human engineering that is applied to their
general design. An additional shortcoming is the
potential effect of weather on chemical and radiation
reconnaissance instruments, which are calibrated for

optimal use within rather narrow ranges of temperature (-40 degrees to +40 degrees C) and humidity (50
to 80 percent). In winter, the instruments are warmed
up chemically or electrically before use. The present
inventory of NBC equipment includes, but is not
limited to, detection and warning devices, individual
and collective protective equipment, and decontamination equipment. For information concerning
individual items of equipment, see FM 100-2-3.
16-5

FM 100-2-1

CHEMICAL DEFENSE TROOPS

There are approximately 80,000 to 100,000 fulltime
NBC defense personnel in the Soviet ground forces.
Although they are designated "chemical defense
troops," their responsibilities also include protection
against the effects of nuclear and biological weapons.
Like engineer and signal forces, chemical defense
troops are considered a vital element of combat
support. Although all troop branches of the ground
forces can be assigned to perform certain NBC
protection-related activities, chemical defense troops
are tasked with primary responsibility for insuring that
combat units function as capably as possible in an NBC
environment.
Chemical defense troops have two primary missions:
NBC reconnaissance and NBC decontamination. Their
basic missions include* Reconnoitering known or likely areas of NBC
contamination.
* Warning troops of the presence of NBC
contamination.
* Monitoring changes in the degree of contamination of troops positions.
* Monitoring the NBC contamination of personnel,
weapons, and equipment.
* Performing decontamination of personnel,
weapons, clothing, equipment, vehicles, troop positions, and sections of roads.
The basic chemical defense unit is the chemical
defense company which is organic to tank and
motorized rifle regiments. The company has an
authorized strength of 35 to 50 personnel. At division
level, there is a chemical defense battalion with an
authorized personnel strength of approximately 200
men. A chemical defense battalion is also organic to
each combined arms and tank army. These battalions
are larger than the ones organic to divisions and at full
strength consist of several hundred personnel. The
largest chemical defense troop unit is the chemical
defense brigade subordinate to military districts and
probably subordinate to Soviet groups of forces
stationed in non-Soviet Warsaw Pact nations.
The reconnaissance and decontamination elements
of chemical defense units are rarely employed as whole
units. Commanders from military districts through
regiments usually divide their chemical defense assets
and assign them to their various maneuver units in a
direct support role. No chemical defense units are
subordinate to manuever battalions or companies.
However, each tank and motorized rifle company has
an NBC noncommissioned officer heading a small
team of extra duty NBC specialists. Company- and
battalion-level NBC specialists are capable of checking
unit NBC equipment and conducting NBC training.
16-6

They also help decontaminate personnel and

equipment and perform limited NBC reconnaissance
when regimental NBC support is unavailable.

NBC TRAINING
Training of Soviet ground forces in NBC defense is
comprehensive and realistic. It covers recognition and
detection of NBC agents, operation of NBC measuring
and monitoring instruments, procedures for warning
troops of NBC attack, self-protection, self-administration of antidotes, and decontamination. Realism is
emphasized to the extent that live, albeit diluted,
agents are occasionally used during training exercises.
NBC protective training actually starts long before a
conscript enters military service. Soviet citizens are
required to attend civil defense instruction as early as
the second grade. This instruction takes place during
the years of formal education and continues at
factories and collective farms. Also, youth organizations such as the Pioneers, Komsomol, and DOSAAF
teach NBC defense subjects. So when the typical Soviet
male is drafted, he already knows how to use a protective mask. He is familiar with the effects of NBC
weapons and knows correct procedures for protecting
himself.
Ground forces' training programs integrate NBC
defense with other training. NBC training is conducted
along with firing exercises, tactical problems, field
exercises, and specialist-such as engineer-training.
While qualifying at a rifle range, troops frequently are
required to wear their protective suits and masks.
During tactical drills, such as penetration of an enemy
defensive position, NBC attacks are simulated.
Personnel receive orders to don protective gear, to
button up inside combat vehicles, and take other
appropriate actions. Following completion of their
mission, exercise personnel decontaminate weapons,
equipment, and themselves. During engineer training,
ground forces combat troops learn to perform
engineer duties required in a NBC environment. Such
duties include upgrading personnel shelters to provide
for NBC defense and clearing rubble and obstructions
following a nuclear blast.

Premilitary Training
The 1967 Soviet Law on Universal Military Service
instituted a program ofpremilitary training for Soviet
youth, both boys and girls. This training takes place in
general education schools, technical-vocational
schools, factories, and collective farms. Premilitary
training consists of 140 hours of instruction. Civil

FM 100-2-1

defense, and particularly NBC defense, subjects

account for 35 of the 140 hours of instruction.
Although premilitary training -in schools normally
begins with the ninth grade, Soviet youth receive
limited NBC training, primarily consisting of protective mask drills, in the second and fifth grades as well.
Premilitary training in NBC defense consists of both
theoretical and practical instruction, with the practical
accounting for more than half of the training received.
Theoretical training includes classes on the types of
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons found in
foreign armies; their physical properties and means of
employment; and the effects of weather and terrain on
their employment. During practical instruction
conducted in classrooms and on training fields, youths
learn how to defend themselves against NBC weapons,
construct shelters and slit trenches, administer first aid
for NBC-related wounds, use NBC protective masks,
conduct reconnaissance and rescue work in contaminated areas, and decontaminate personnel and
equipment.
Besides premilitary instruction at school and on the
job, Soviet youth must attend a summer camp for about
5 days. These camps emphasize field training in the
same military subjects taught previously in schools,
factories, and collective farms. Instruction in NBC
defense, equipment and procedures is an important
part of the program. The camps normally are set up at
training areas of nearby military units. Trainees
compete with one another in a program that is closely
integrated with a physical fitness program. Those who
excel are awarded badges.
Besides the NBC portion of the required 140 hours
of premilitary instruction, Soviet youths receive NBC
defense training through voluntaryparticipation in the
activities of DOSAAF, Komsomol, and Pioneers. The
annual military games (known as Zarnitsa and
Orlenok) conducted by the Pioneers and Komsomol,
respectively, also provide NBC defense training for
Soviet youths before induction. (More information on
DOSAAF, Komsomol, and Pioneers can be found in FM

100-2-2.)

Unit Training
Following basic training and on assignment to a unit,
a Soviet soldier's training builds from simple to
complex and from theory to practice. This is particularly true of NBC defense training, which begins
with theoretical classroom instruction on NBC
weapons and how to defend against them. It continues
with training drills conducted both in classrooms and
at specially equipped field training sites where troops

rehearse individual training topics. This three-tiered

training program culminates with field exercises
aimed at testing ground force capability to perform in
an NBC environment.
The chemical service chiefs of regiments and
divisions plan and supervise NBC defense training. At
battalion, a chemical instructor, probably a warrant
officer or NCO, performs this function.
Theory. Theoretical instruction normally is given by
platoon commanders and begins in classrooms with
lectures on the physical properties and effects of
chemical and biological agents and nuclear explosions. Trainees also learn how weather and terrain
influence the use of NBC weapons and the persistent
contamination of various objects by NBC agents.
Instructors familiarize troops with the types of NBC
weapons found in military organizations of the West
and their methods of employment. Training aids
include posters depicting the various stages of a
nuclear blast, mockups of munitions used to disseminate chemical and biological agents, and film strips
depicting the effects of NBC weapons.
During classroom sessions, information on the
destructive characteristics of NBC weapons is
balanced with instruction on protective aspects of the
terrain, man-made shelters, and defensive NBC equipment. While Soviet soldiers are taught to respect the
destructive power of NBC weapons, they are also
indoctrinated against viewing combat in an NBC
environment as hopeless. For example, while studying
the characteristics of the shockwave and fallout of a
nuclear burst, trainees also learn that the nature and
number of troop casualties depend on their position
and degree of protection at the moment of blast,
distance from the burst, and yield of the weapon.
Following classroom instruction,
Training Drills.
soldiers participate in drills to practice putting on
protective masks and protective suits, administering
antidotes, and decontaminating themselves and their
equipment. Specific drills are performed until proficiency is attained. Later, during the tactical exercise
phase of the training program, all the various NBC
defense measures are practiced. When participating in
the drills, troops normally train by squads and the
entire training effort is led by platoon commanders.
The soldiers are tested on their performance within
specified time limits. They also are evaluated on the
length of time that they are able to wear a mask and
protective suit while performing routine military tasks
such as marching, loading equipment, firing weapons,
and working with various types of instruments.
16-7

FM 100-2-1

Field Exercises. After attaining the necessary level

of competence, personnel are ready for the third stage
of NBC defense training: the performance of NBC
defense measures during field exercises. During
exercises such as an attack against a fortified position,
motorized rifle troops are made to cross simulated
zones of contamination in full protective gear, to
perform decontamination of weapons and equipment,
and to practice the administration of chemical agent
antidotes. Occasionally exercises are conducted with
training type agents.
During a march, simulated NBC attacks frequently
occur and subunits are forced to react accordingly.
They disperse along the road at specified intervals,
cross "contaminated" zones while observing correct
NBC defense measures, conduct brief halts to perform
limited decontamination, and then continue their
advance. Troops don masks and protective suits while
on the march and during the conduct of firing training.
During tactical exercises conducted under
simulated NBC conditions, maximum use is made of
available training aids and actual equipment to
heighten realism. Mockups of destroyed combat
vehicles obstruct march routes. Detonated minefields
produce craters to hinder cross-country movement.
Smoke-producing demolitions simulate nuclear
clouds of nuclear attacks. Soldiers are notified of NBC
attacks and contaminated areas as they would be
during actual combat by preestablished signals over
radios and by flares. During decontamination
procedures, troops train with actual equipment.
Combat troops also train jointly with chemical defense
units during exercises that involve the decontamination of heavy equipment.

Training of Chemical Defense Troops

Soldiers assigned to chemical defense units of the
ground forces also undergo a three-tiered training
program in NBC defense. However, NBC defense
training given to chemical defense troops is more
detailed and wider in scope than that presented to
regular ground force troops.
Following classroom instruction, chemical defense
troops are divided into groups according to specialty
and taken to training areas where they practice their
particular skills. When training with a large and
complex piece of equipment, such as a DDA
decontamination station, experienced service
personnel first demonstrate how to set it up and put it
into operation. Then the trainees themselves do the
work sequentially at a slow pace. After chemical
defense trainees acquire competence in individual
16-8

tasks, they perform the drill at a normal pace without

interruption within a prescribed time limit. Next, they
learn to work with their instruments in complicated
conditions, such as while wearing NBC protective
gear. Once proficiency is attained in this manner on a
particular piece of equipment, cross-training within
crews and between squads is practiced.
The third step in the training cycle is the
performance of NBC specialist tasks within the
framework of a tactical situation. While in the field,
chemical defense exercises include* Reconnoitering "contaminated" areas of terrain.
* Measuring the intensity of "contamination" and
posting warning signs.
* Transmitting NBC reconnaissance data by radio.
* Performing decontamination of vehicles,
personnel, and equipment.
Like other ground forces elements, chemical
defense personnel participate in competitions at the
end of the training year.
In combat, chemical defense troop units would be
divided. They would provide support directly to
combat units. To train for such a role, chemical
defense troops participate in the field training exercises of motorized rifle and tank units. Accordingly,
NBC reconnaissance specialists constitute part of a
forward detachment or advance guard of motorized
rifle and tank units conducting march and offensive
training. Decontamination units often set up their
stations and practice decontamination of troops.

Training of Chemical Defense Officers

Some officers assigned to the chemical defense
troops are graduates of officer training programs in
civilian educational institutions, although most are
trained at commissioning schools similar in many
respects to US military academies. The Soviets
presently maintain three service schools for chemical
defense officers: the Saratov Higher Military Engineer
School of Chemical Defense, the Tambov, and the
Kostroma Higher Military Command Schools of
Chemical Defense. All three provide students with a
general military education as well as specialist training
in NBC defense. The Saratov school involves a 5-year
curriculum and trains cadets in engineering for
technical positions in the chemical defense troops.
Graduates are commissioned as lieutenant-engineers
and are qualified as chemical engineers. The Tambov
and Kostroma institutions are 4-year schools that train
officers for command positions in the chemical
defense troops. Graduates receive the rank of
lieutenant.

FM 100-2-1

After an officer has served a number of years in a

chemical defense unit, he is eligible for further schooling in his speciality at the Timoshenko Military
Academy for Chemical Defense located in Moscow.
Applicants must have graduated from a higher military
school, such as the Tambov, Saratov, and Kostroma
schools; have at least 2 years of practical troop experience; and pass an entrance examination. Applicants
who are not accepted for resident study may apply for a
correspondence program. Most officers who attend
the academy are senior captains and majors. Successful
completion of the course is a prerequisite to further
advancement.

A significant characteristic of most NBC protective

suits, including Soviet models, is the physical burden
associated with prolonged wear, especially in warm
temperatures. The suits are bulky and uncomfortable.
When worn fully buttoned-up for an extended period
of time in hot weather, soldiers become fatigued
quickly and combat efficiency is lowered. In some
cases, heat prostration may result. Accordingly, the
Soviets have devised norms stipulating desired
maximum lengths of time for various temperature
ranges for wearing NBC protective suits.

Wearing Periods for NBC Protective Suits

PROTECTIVE MEASURES
Basic tactical measures for protection against NBC
weapons include dispersion, rapid movement, deception, and camouflage. Other measures call for
continuous contact with the enemy ("hugging") or
withdrawal from expected nuclear target areas.

NBC Protective Equipment

Basic personal protective measures begin with NBC
protective equipment. Such protective equipment
issued to the ground forces, when used correctly and
in combination, provides protection against harmful
agents that attack through both the respiratory system
and the skin. They also reduce the degree of injury
caused by thermal and light radiation emitted during a
nuclear explosion. More important, Soviet NBC
protective equipment enables combat troops to.
operate on contaminated terrain, which allows the
continuous conduct of combat operations. Troops don
their protective masks and cover themselves with their
protective capes the instant of an NBC attack. They don
their protective suits, gloves, and boots to the degree
required after the agents settle.
Troops normally are notified of an NBC attack or
contaminated areas by chemical observers who make
use ofpreselected signals: flares and radio transmission
of codewords. The warning then is passed on by voice
and vehicle horns. Troops having firsthand knowledge
of an NBC attack or contaminated area take appropriate action immediately, without awaiting the signal or
an order to do so. Vehicles with troops riding in open
beds or on top of them stop briefly to allow the troops
to don their protective masks and capes.
Depending on the location of troops, the
circumstances surrounding an NBC attack, and the
type of agent employed, various protective measures
are adopted, either separately or in combination.

MAXIMUM TIME
SPENT IN
PROTECTIVE SUIT
15 to 20 minutes
300 and above ..........
Up to 30 minutes
250 to 290 ..
......
40 to 50 minutes
200 to 240 ..
1.5 to 2 hours
15 0 to 190 . ... ......
More than 3 hours
Below 150 .

TEMPERATURE
(CENTIGRADE)

The Soviets use these norms as guidelines only,

realizing that certain situations may require troops to
wear protective suits beyond desired maximum times.
In most chemical environments, troops leave tie
bottom of the protective suit unbuttoned to reduce
the heat load.
Besides intensification of training, the Soviets
advocate the use of collective protection systems, such
as shelters and combat vehicles equipped with filter
and ventilation systems. When riding in non-NBC protected combat vehicles, personnel need only don
protective masks during an NBC attack or when
crossing contaminated terrain. They do not need to
wear protective suits, masks, gloves, or boots when
riding inside NBC protected vehicles. One drawback
of collective protection systems is that personnel
exiting a shelter or vehicle cannot return until they
completely decontaminate or remove their protective
clothing to avoid contaminating the inside of the
shelter or vehicle.
NBC Reconnaissance
This is performed by chemical defense personnel
assigned to reconnaissance elements of chemical
defense units. NBC reconnaissance involves two
general types of activity-NBC observation posts and
NBC reconnaissance patrolling.
16-9

FM 100-2-1

Although normally staffed with chemical defense

specialists, NBC observation posts can be manned by
combat troops who have received special training. The
functions of NBC observation posts are to detect NBC
contamination, to determine radiation levels and types
of toxic substances, to monitor the drift of radioactive
clouds, to notify higher headquarters of NBC information, as well as meteorological data, and to give the
general alarm to threatened troops. An NBC observation post normally consists of three or four observers
located near the command post of a combat unit.
During movement, the NBC observation post moves in
its own vehicle in close proximity to the combat unit
commander.
On detecting NBC contamination, the observers
measure the intensity of radioactivity or determine the
type of chemical or biological agent and report this
information to the supported commander. The commander plots the information on his map and reports
to the next higher headquarters. NBC reconnaissance
posts report directly to the supported commander
rather than to the commander of their chemical
defense unit. To accelerate the transmission of
information, a standardized radio message is used.
In the event of an enemy nuclear attack, observers
switch on their detection instruments immediately
after the shock wave passes. The observers estimate
the type and location of the burst and the direction of
movement of the contaminated cloud. They then give
the general warning and notify the unit commander.
When operating in chemical reconnaissance patrols,
chemical defense personnel travel in reconnaissance
vehicles specially equipped with NBC detection and
warning devices. The Soviets also have experimented
with the use of helicopters to perform NBC reconnaissance. Helicopters equipped with chemical and radiological area survey instruments are particularly useful
for performing reconnaissance of areas with extremely
high contamination levels. Helicopters also aid in
screening large areas of terrain when time is limited.
The reconnaissance assets of chemical defense
units, such as the chemical reconnaissance platoon of a
chemical defense company, can reconnoiter a large
contaminated area or be divided into squads and
attached to combat units to perform reconnaissance of
multiple routes. Before starting a mission, a chemical
reconnaissance patrol receives the following information from the chemical reconnaissance platoon leader:
* Enemy situation, route(s) or area to be
reconnoitered.
* Times for beginning and completing the reconnaissance; to what point, line, or level of radiation to
conduct the reconnaissance.
16-10

* Procedures for submitting reports and messages.

* Interval for switching on detection instruments.
* Signals to be used for warning troops of
contamination or enemy NBC attack.
* Location of the assembly area to be occupied by
the patrol following completion of the reconnaissance
mission.
Before a patrol begins its mission, personnel check
their individual NBC protection equipment and
detection instruments. They also examine the NBC
and communication equipment located on their
reconnaissance vehicle. As they begin their reconnaissance, patrol members don their individual
protective gear.
If only one route is to be covered, it is divided into 1
to 2 kilometer segments and reconnoitered by the
patrols in leapfrog fashion. When performing NBC
reconnaissance of multiple routes, one patrol is
assigned to each route. If NBC reconnaissance is being
conducted in support of a march, the patrol operates
well in front of the main body. The patrol may operate
as part of a forward security element or combat reconnaissance patrol, or it may move along a separate route.
The patrol leader normally makes reports to the
maneuver unit commander for every 2 or 3 kilometers
of route his patrol reconnoiters.
As a patrol performs its mission, a designated
crewman constantly observes the readings of the
onboard NBC survey meters. If radioactive or chemical
contamination is discovered, the patrol immediately
determines the radiation level or type of toxic substance present. The patrol leader plots contaminated
areas on his map, reports to his commander, and
orders his patrol to mark the contaminated areas with
warning flags that are dispensed mechanically from a
device mounted on the rear of the reconnaissance
vehicle. The patrol designates bypass routes around
contaminated areas or finds routes through the area
with the lowest levels of contamination.
In the event of nuclear contamination, bypass routes
normally are sought when radioactivity encountered
by a patrol measures above 30 roentgens per hour.
Otherwise, routes normally are found through the
contaminated area that have the lowest levels of
contamination. When establishing bypass routes, a
patrol returns to the assigned routes as soon as
practicable.
On completion of its mission, an NBC reconnaissance patrol moves to its assigned assembly area,
where final reports are made and patrol members are
debriefed. Patrol members also decontaminate themselves, their individual NBC protective gear, and their
vehicle and its equipment.

FM 100-2-1

Decontamination Procedures
Soviet doctrine prescribes that in the event of
contamination, a combat unit should conduct a partial
decontamination with organic equipment and solutions no later than one hour after having been subjected to NBC contamination. This entails a brief halt
while troops decontaminate themselves and their
clothing, their individual weapons, crew-served
weapons, and combat vehicles. If a unit is forced to
conduct partial decontamination in the contaminated
area, personnel remain in NBC protective gear while
doing so. Following the completion of partial
decontamination, the unit immediately resumes its
mission. After a unit accomplishes its mission, but no
later than 5 hours from the time of contamination, it
should undergo complete decontamination of
personnel, clothing, NBC protective gear, armament,
and equipment.
Complete decontamination of a maneuver unit is
performed by chemical defense troops. As with

chemical reconnaissance elements, decontamination

units of chemical defense companies and battalions
can operate either as a whole or in smaller elements.
Decontamination units deploy to areas where
contaminated combat units are located. They set up
near movement routes or establish centrally located
decontamination points to serve several troop units.
Before deploying his equipment, the commander of
a decontamination unit dispatches a reconnaissance
group to select a favorable site, mark off areas with
pegs for setting up the various pieces of equipment,
and establish and mark routes of entry and exit for the
site. Sites are selected that provide natural concealment, good approach routes, terrain protection, and
sources of uncontaminated water. After decontamination stations are set up, the decontamination unit
commander orders security measures against enemy
observation or attack. This normally includes making
use of natural concealment, employing camouflage,

Movement of Personnel for Decontamination

-~

and digging trenches. If natural concealment is insufficient, a smokescreen may be generated. Luminous
markers are emplaced to guide troops of contaminated
units to the decontamination stations.
Crews remain in their vehicles while the vehicles are
decontaminated. To decontaminate their vehicles,
operators drive in columns past two TMS-65s, one
located on each side of the road, operated by chemical
defense troops. If TMS-65s are not available, ARS- 12s or
14s may be used, although they are not as fast as the
TMS-65s. After decontamination, each vehicle is
checked for any remaining contamination.
Troops then proceed to the personnel
decontamination stations, which are set up in tents.
The major piece of equipment used to supply warm
water for showers and to decontaminate clothing is
the DDA-53 or DDA-66 steam chamber vehicle. (More
information on decontamination equipment can be
found in FM 100-2-3.)

-I

x-

~X

Wi D

W W
gAR1ER

x
STEPS

13

xD

7WI

I
x

X-X--XX-XXX--X

1. Initial reception of personnel for

decontamination.
2. Decontamination of weapons and
protective equipment.
3. Checking the decontamination of
weapons
and protective
equipment.
4. Removal of protective clothing
(except protective mask).
5. Treatment of outer clothing.
6. Stacking of individual weapons and
protective equipment.
7. Treatment of protective mask and
exposed parts of the body.

X-X-X-X-X-X-X-

8. Turn in of documents and valuables. Undressing. Turn in of clothing, footwear, equipment, and
underwear
9. Removal of protective mask.
10. Hygienic washing. Treatment of
face, neck, and hands.
11. Checking thoroughness of hygienic
washing.
12. Medical aid. Receipt of underclothing and footwear. Dressing.
13. Drinking water-gargle.
14. Receipt of individual weapons and
CBR protective clothing.

BARRIER
LEGEND
A Storage - clean.

Foldout for 16-11

DDA 53

Storage - contaminated.

16-11

FM 100-2-1

COMBAT IN AN NBC ENVIRONMENT

A maneuver unit commander receives much of his
initial information regarding the NBC situation in
combat orders issued by a higher unit. He supplements
this information with intelligence acquired by his own
reconnaissance assets. As he makes his estimate of the
situation, he considers:
* Effects of the present NBC situation on organization of forces for combat; influence of possible enemy
use of NBC weapons.
* Condition of NBC protective equipment, concealment and cover in the area of activity.
* Meteorological conditions that might influence
the movement of contamination.
Based on his estimate, the commander issues
instructions to his subordinates. These instructions
include missions for attached and organic NBC reconnaissance elements, special measures to be taken while
crossing contaminated terrain, the subunits
responsible for conducting rescue work in the event of
enemy NBC attack, and signals to be used for warning
of the enemy NBC attack.
Two different sets of NBC warning signals normally
are designated-one for nuclear attack or contaminated area encountered and one for chemical or biological agent situations. If an NBC warning signal is
given on a march or during an attack, exposed troops
must halt to don protective masks and protective suits
and then continue their mission. NBC protective gear
is removed only on the commander's order.
Once subjected to an NBC situation, the
commander is required to make periodic reports
regarding his unit's exposure to contamination.
Reports include the amount of contamination received
by platoons as a whole and by officers individually. If
exceptionally high levels of contamination are experienced, reports are made immediately.
If a unit is subjected to an enemy NBC strike, the
commander organizes reconnaissance of the area of
destruction or contamination, restores communications, and orders predesignated subunits to begin
rescue operations. In addition, he reports losses to his
superior and appoints replacement commanders.
Actions During the March
Before conducting a march, the commander issues
his march order, which designates those subunits
assigned to conduct NBC reconnaissance, signals used
to warn of NBC attack or contaminated areas, and

recovery procedures following an NBC attack. The

following is an example of a motorized rifle battalion
commander's instructions regarding NBC aspects of a
march.
16-12

Commander's Orders in an NBC Situation

-I

--

-I

During the march, a chemical reconnaissance

squad will advance with the combat reconnaissance patrol. The chemical reconnaissance
squad is responsible for marking contaminated
areas and measuring intensity levels of
contamination. Communications with the
squad will be through the commander of the
combat reconnaissance patrol. A chemical
observation post will be established at the battalion command post, and chemical observers
will be assigned to the companies.
The NBC warning signals are a red flare shot
into the air and the word Groza transmitted over
the radio.

By 2000 hours today, all units must verify the

supply and condition of their NBC equipment, to
include individual protective clothing, reconnaissance instruments, decontamination
equipment, and vehicle collective systems.
Following transit of contaminated areas, partial
decontamination will be performed on order of
the company commanders at the first halt.
If the enemy attacks our columns with NBC
weapons, wounded personnel will be evacuated
to the battalion medical point.

On my order, antiradiation tablets* are to be

taken by personnel.

Destroyed vehicles and equipment should be

moved to the side of the road. My deputy commander is in overall charge of all recovery
operations following an NBC strike.

Contaminated areas will be crossed at

maximum speed and with troops in NBC protective gear. Distance between vehicles during
transit will be 100 meters.

Prior to initiation of the march, a review is to be

conducted with battalion personnel regarding
actions on contaminated terrain and the
conduct of partial decontamination.

* Soviet antiradiation tablets are contained in individual medical kits. The Soviets have fielded anumber of
different types of tablets, some of which are mildly effective or are of very little benefit. At most, the
tablets can only treat initial symptoms of radiation sickness, such as headaches, dizziness, and nausea.

The Offense
If a force occupies an assembly area before initiation
of an attack, personnel and equipment are dispersed to
ensure maximum protection against enemy use of
NBC weapons. A distance of 50 meters is prescribed
for vehicle intervals. Companies are separated by at
least 1.5 kilometers. Commanders notify subordinates
of NBC warning signals and the measures to be taken
under NBC attack. Contingency plans are developed
governing the restoration of control, reconstitution of
combat units, and evacuation of personnel and
equipment.
If an enemy force employs NBC weapons during any
phase of the attack, Soviet forces are to take precautionary measures immediately. They don their protective gear, and continue their advance. They then
perform a partial decontamination as soon as possible.
If a defending enemy force conducts a withdrawal,
attacking units commence pursuit operations. Close
contact during pursuit restricts a withdrawing enemy's
use of NBC weapons since, in using them, he would
endanger his own troops.

Following an attack, subunits assemble as soon as

possible for complete decontamination performed by
chemical defense troops.
The Defense
Before occupying defensive positions, chemical
reconnaissance squads survey the area and mark any
contaminated sectors. Chemical observers are
assigned to company and battalion command posts and
to artillery firing positions. To attain reliable NBC
protection, chemical observation posts of two or three
observers are established throughout a defensive position at a ratio of one post for each 2 to 2.5 kilometers of
defensive area. During bad weather, more chemical
observation posts normally are set up. Observers
periodically switch on their NBC detection instruments and make reports as prescribed in the commander's combat order.
If a defending force is subjected to a NBC attack,
chemical reconnaissance squads determine the type

FM 100-2-1

and intensity of contamination and mark contaminated

sectors. Partial decontamination and first aid are performed, and defensive structure is reestablished.
Before a withdrawal, chemical reconnaissance
patrols reconnoiter withdrawal routes, mark contaminated sectors, and establish bypass routes. Withdrawing main body forces travel over multiple routes
and in dispersed formation for protection against
enemy NBC attacks.

Recovery Operations
Commanders at all levels plan recovery operations
to be undertaken in the event ofNBC attacks. Recovery
operations entail restoring control, reconnoitering the
area of destruction, conducting rescue work to
include repair of vehicles and evacuation of wounded,
extinguishing fires, performing decontamination of

personnel and equipment, and forming new combat

units from surviving ones and reinforcements.
Depending on the situation and availability of forces,
recovery detachments are either formed from organic
subunits or made available by higher headquarters. If
formed from organic units, they normally come from
the second echelon or reserve of a combat force.
Regardless of origin, recovery detachments are established and receive a general mission before the
conduct of an operation. The detachments usually
include chemical reconnaissance, motorized rifle,
engineer, medical, and vehicle repair personnel.
Following an NBC attack, the unit commander
orders the implementation of recovery measures and
gives the priority of their implementation. Chemical
reconnaissance patrols are normally the first to reach
the area of destruction. They determine the nature and
intensity of contamination and mark contaminated

Actions Performed During Recovery Operations

SIN

THE EVENT OF ENEMY NUCLEAR ATTACK

AREA RECONNAISSANCE:

Determination of approach routes to locations of affected units; measurement of

radiation levels. Determining degrees of destruction, presence of fires, and losses in
manpower and equipment. Selection of evacuation routes and points for gathering
sick and wounded and damaged equipment.

RESCUE WORK:

Determination of amount and sequence of rescue work. Finding wounded and sick
and getting them out of damaged equipment and combat vehicles.

PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT

EVACUATION:

Rendering first aid to wounded and sick. Removing them to collection points and
evacuating them to the medical post. Evacuation of damaged equipment from the
area.

DECONTAMINATION:

Decontamination of personnel, weapons, and equipment.

IN THE EVENT OF ENEMY CHEMICAL ATTACK

2<

CHEMICAL RECONNAISSANCE:

Determination of type of toxic agent used by enemy and designation of boundaries of

contaminated area. Selection of evacuation routes and areas for deployment of
medical post and decontamination station.

RESCUE WORK:

Finding the injured, getting them out of combat vehicles and engineering equipment.
Putting protective masks on wounded, administering first aid and chemical agent
antidotes.

PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT

EVACUATION:

Removal of wounded to medical post. Administration of antidotes as necessary.

Preparing wounded personnel and unmanned equipment for evacuation.

DECONTAMINATION:

Decontamination of personnel and degasification of equipment and weapons.

16-13

FM 100-2-1

sectors. The recovery detachment commander

appoints new unit commanders to replace casualties.
He selects locations for setting up a medical aid station,
NBC contamination station, damaged-vehicle collection point, and an area for reconstituting units. He also
designates routes for reinforcement and evacuation to
and from the area. He then reports to his next higher
commander on the situation and the measures taken.
Meanwhile, engineers assigned to the damage control
detachment clear rubble, extinguish fires, rescue
personnel, and build temporary roads. Personnel and
vehicles that are fit to return to duty are decontaminated first. The final step consists offorming new units
and equipping them with weapons and combat
vehicles. While the recovery detachment performs its
mission, elements from a combat unit's second
echelon or reserve that were not affected by the enemy
NBC attack provide security by screening against any
further enemy activity.

CONCLUSIONS
The Soviet Army is the best prepared force in the
world to conduct both offensive and defensive NBC
operations. Numbering 80,000 to 100,000 personnel,

16-14

chemical defense troops are capable of accomplishing

a number of tasks in. support of combat troops. They
have a wide variety of dependable equipment which,
for the most part, is in good supply. Individual items of
equipment are adequate to protect from contamination for hours, days, or longer, depending on the
nature and concentration of the contaminant. Antidotes provide protection from the effects of Soviet
agents as well as those of Western countries. Agent
detector kits and automatic alarms are available in adequate quantities and are capable of detecting all standard, agents. Timely detection and warning of an
attack, however, remain a problem.
Besides providing their troops with dependable
protective equipment, the Soviets place heavy
emphasis on individual NBC protective training which
attempts to psychologically temper personnel to the
demands of NBC warfare. Soviet troops are subjected
to realistic and stressful situations while learning the
technical skills needed to operate in NBC environments. Up-to-date instructional materials are widely
available. Training is generally comprehensive and
realistic. Individual protection, reconnaissance, and
decontamination are all stressed.

GLOSSARY
ACRONYMS
AAA .........
AAG .........
AAICV .......

AND ABBREVIATIONS
antiaircraft artillery
army artillery group
airborne amphibious infantry
combat vehicle
ACRV ........ artillery command and
reconnaissance vehicle
ACV ......... armored command vehicle
AGI ......... auxiliary intelligence gatherers
AICV.........amphibious infantry combat
vehicle
AMRP........ artillery mobile reconnaissance
post
An-(no.) ...... Soviet designation for aircraft
from Antonov design bureau
APC-T.......armor piercing capped
tracer round
API-T.........armor piercing incendiary
tracer round
AP-T ......... armor piercing tracer round
APVO ........ Aviation of National Air Defense
AS-(no.)......US designation for Soviet
air-to-surface missile
ASC ......... armored scout car
ASM ......... air-to-surface missile
ASW ......... antisubmarine warfare
AT-(no.) ...... US designation for Soviet
antitank guided missile
ATGM ........ antitank guided missile
BAF .......... battalion assault force
(naval infantry)
BVR.......... beyond-visual-range
CBU ......... cluster bomb unit
CES..........chief of engineer services
CINC ......... commander-in-chief
COMINT ..... communications intelligence
(US term)
COP ......... command observation post
CRP..........combat reconnaissance patrol
CRTA ........ chief of rocket troops and
artillery
DAG ......... division artillery group
DF ........... direction finding
DOI .......... date of introduction
DOSAAF ..... Voluntary Society of Assistance
to the Army, Aviation, and Navy
(premilitary training organization)
DZ ........... drop zone
ECM ......... electronic countermeasures
ELINT ........ electronic intelligence (US term)

EMP ........
electromagnetic pulse
ESM ......... electronic warfare support
measures (US term)

FAC .......... forward air controller

FEBA ........ forward edge of the battle area
(US acronym used in this manual
as the equivalent of the Soviet
term "forward edge")
FOP ..........

forward observation post

Frag-HE ...... fragmentation high-explosive

round
FROG .........

free rocket over ground

FS ..........
fin-stabilized round
FSE .......... forward security element
(of the Advance Guard)
GAZ-(no.) .... medium truck produced by
Gorkiy Motor Vehicle Plant
GRU ..... :...general staff's main intelligence
directorate
HE ........... high-explosive round
HEAT ........ high-explosive antitank round
HEI .......... high-explosive incendiary round
HEP.......... high-explosive plastic round
HVAP ........ hyper-velocity armor piercing
round

HVAPFSDS .. hyper-velocity armor piercing

fin-stabilized discarding Sabot
round
IFV ............ infantry fighting vehicle
II-(no.) ........ Soviet designation for aircraft
from Ilyushin design bureau
INA .......... information not available at the
UNCLASSIFIED level
IR ...........
infrared
IRBM ........ intermediate-range ballistic
missile
I-T .........
.. incendiary tracer round
KamAZ-(no.) .medium truck produced by
Kama River Motor Vehicle Plant
KGB ....... .. Committee for State Security
KrAZ-(no.),. .. heavy truck produced by
Kremenchug Motor Vehicle Plant
LMG ....... .. light machinegun
LOC........ .. line of communications
LOP........ .. lateral observation post
LRA ........ .. long range aviation
LuAZ-(no.).. .. light truck produced by
Lutsk Motor Vehicle Plant
LZ..........
.. landing zone
Glossary-1

FM 100-2-1

MAZ-(no.) .... heavy truck produced by

Minsk Motor Vehicle Plant
MCLOS ...... manual-command-to-line-ofsight guidance
Mi-(no.) ...... Soviet designation for helicopter
from Mil design bureau
MiG-(no.)..... Soviet designation for aircraft
from Mikoyan-Gurevich design
bureau
MOD........ Ministry of Defense; Minister
of Defense
MOD........Mobile Obstacle Detachment
(Engineer Element)
MOP ......... mobile observation post
MPA ........
Main Political Directorate
MRBM ....... medium-range ballistic missile
MRD......... motorized rifle division
MRL ......... multiple rocket launcher
MRR ........
motorized rifle regiment
MSD ......... movement support detachment
(engineer element)
MVD ......... Ministry of Internal Affairs
OMG......... operational maneuver group
POL .......... petroleum, oils, lubricants
PPO.......... primary party organization
PGM ......... precision-guided munitions
PVO..........air defense
PWP ......... plasticized white phosphorus
RAG ........ regimental artillery group
RAP.......... rocket-assisted projectile
RDF...........radio direction finding
REC.......... radioelectronic combat
REG ......... repair and evacuation group
rkh ..........
Russian abbreviation (literally:
radio-chemical) used as suffix in
Soviet designations for NBC
reconnaissance vehicles
RVGK .......
Reserve of the Supreme
High Command
SA-(no.) ...... US designation for Soviet
surface-to-air missile

Glossary-2

SACLOS ..... semiautomatic-command-to-lineof-sight guidance

SAM ... ...... surface-to-air missile
...... Shaft horsepower
shp ....
SLAR .. ...... side-looking airborne radar
SP ..... ...... self-propelled
SPAAG ...... self-propelled antiaircraft gun
SRBM.. ...... short-range ballistic missile
SRF.... ...... strategic rocket forces
SS ..... ...... spin-stabilized round
SS-(no.) ...... US designation for Soviet
surface-to-surface missile
SSM ... ...... surface-to-surface missile
STOL... ...... short takeoff and landing aircraft
Su-(no.) ...... Soviet designation for aircraft
from Sukhoi design bureau
TASM.. ...... tactical air-to-surface missile
TD ..... ...... tank division
TEL ....
...... transporter-erector-launcher
TELAR ....... transporter-erector-launcherand-Radar
TOP .... ...... technical observation point
TR ..... ...... tank regiment
Tu-(no.) ...... Soviet designation for aircraft
from Tupolev design bureau
TVD.... ...... theater of military operations
UAZ-(no. ).....light truck produced by
Ulyanovsk Motor Vehicle Plant
Ural-(no. ).....medium truck produced by
Ural Motor Vehicle Plant (not an
acronym)
UW .... ...... unconventional warfare
VOSO.. ...... Central Military Transportation
Directorate
VTA.... ...... military transport aviation
VTOL... ...... vertical takeoff and landing
VVS.... ...... Soviet Air Force
WP..... ...... white phosphorus
Yak-(no.) ..... Soviet designation for aircraft
from Yakovlev design bureau
ZIL-(no.) ...... medium truck from Likhachev
Motor Vehicle Plant

FM 100-2-1

NATO NICKNAMES
Air-To- Surface

Missiles
KANGAROO, AS-3
KELT, AS-5
KERRY, AS-7
KINGFISH, AS-6
KIPPER, AS-2
KITCHEN, AS-4
Aircraft
BACKFIRE, Tu-26
BADGER, Tu-16
BEAR, Tu-95
BLACKJACK, Tu-?
BLINDER, Tu-22
BREWER, Yak-28
CAMBER, 11-86
CANDID, 11-76
CLINE, An-32
COALER, An-72
COCK, An-22
COOT, 11-18
CUB, An-i 2
CURL, An-26
FARMER, MiG-19
FENCER, Su-24
FIREBAR B, Yak-28P
FISHBED, MiG-21
FITTER A, Su-7B
FITTER C, Su-17
FLANKER, Su-27
FLOGGER B, MiG-23
FLOGGER D, MiG-27
FOXBAT, MiG-25
FOXHOUND, MiG-31
FRESCO, MiG-17
FULCRUM, MiG-29

Antitank Guided
Missiles

Surface-To-Air
Missiles

SAGGER, AT-3
SPANDREL, AT-5
SPIGOT, AT-4
SPIRAL, AT-6
SWATTER, AT-2

GAINFUL, SA-6
GAMMON, SA-5
GANEF, SA-4
GASKIN, SA-9
GECKO, SA-8
GOA, SA-3
GRAIL, SA-7
GUIDELINE, SA-2

Helicopters
HALO A, MI-26
HARE, MI-i
HARKE, MI-lO, MI-10K
HIND, MI-24
HIP, MI-8
HOMER, MI-12
HOOK, MI-6
HOPLITE, MI-2
HOUND, MI-4

Surface-To-Surface
Missiles
SCALEBOARD, SS-12
SCUD A, SS-lb
SCUD B, SS-1c

Radars
BIG FRED, MT-SON
END TRAY, RMS-1
FIRE CAN, SON-9,SON-9A
FLAP WHEEL
FLAT FACE, P-15
GUN DISH
LONG TROUGH
PORK TROUGH
PORK TROUGH 2, SNAR-6
SMALL FRED, BMP- SON
SMALL YAWN

Glossary-3

FM 100-2-1

FM 100-2-1
16 JULY 1984

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

JOHN A. WICKHAM, JR.

General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:
ROBERT M. JOYCE
Major General, United States Army
The Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, ARNG, and USAR: To be distributed in accordance with DA Form 12-11 B. Requirements for Handbook on Agressor Military Forces (Qty rqr block no. 287); Agressor Order of Battle
Book (Oty rqr block no. 288) and Operations of Army Forces in the Field (Qty rqr block no. 405).
Additional copies may be requisitioned from the US Army Adjutant General Publications Center,
2800 Eastern Boulevard, Baltimore, MD 21220.

* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE:

1984-739-033:211