BPI Vs CIR, 473 SCRA 205, Oct. 17, 2005

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BPI vs CIR, 473 SCRA 205, Oct.

17, 2005
Facts
Petitioner BPI On two separate occasions, particularly on 06 June
1985 and 14 June 1985, sold United States (US) $500,000.00 to the Central
Bank of the Philippines (Central Bank), for the total sales amount of
US$1,000,000.00.
On 10 October 1989, the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) issued
Assessment No. FAS-5-85-89-002054,[3]finding petitioner BPI liable for
deficiency DST on its afore-mentioned sales of foreign bills of exchange to
the Central Bank,
Petitioner BPI received the Assessment, together with the attached
Assessment Notice,[4] on 20 October 1989. Petitioner BPI, through its
counsel, protested the Assessment
Petitioner BPI did not receive any immediate reply to its protest letter. However, on
15 October 1992, the BIR issued a Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy [6] against
petitioner BPI for the assessed deficiency DST for taxable year 1985, in the amount
of P27,720.00. It served the Warrant on petitioner BPI only on 23 October 1992. [7]

Then again, petitioner BPI did not hear from the BIR until 11 September 1997,
when its counsel received a letter, dated 13 August 1997, denying its request for
reconsideration.

Petitioner BPI raised in its Petition for Review The defense of prescription of the
right of respondent BIR Commissioner to enforce collection of the assessed
amount. It alleged that respondent BIR Commissioner only had three years to
collect but she waited for seven years and nine months to deny the protest.

The CTA ruled that the BIR can still collect since the statute of limitations has not
yet prescribed. The ruling was predicated on the fact that the petitioner filed its
protest on the subject assessment on 1989 and that said protest stopped the
running of the prescriptive period of the commissioner to collect.

The CTA ruled too that the sales of foreign currency by petitioner to central bank is
not subject to DST.

Respondent BIR appealed the decision to the CA. The CA agreed with the CTA that
the prescription period has not prescribed but it disagreed and reversed the
decision of the CA that the sale of foreign currencies is NOT subject to DST.

The court then ordered to pay the amount as deficiency DST for the
aforementioned taxable year.

Hence the petition before the court.

Issue: whether or not the right of respondent BIR Commissioner to collect from
petitioner BPI the alleged deficiency DST for taxable year 1985 had prescribed;

Ruling: Yes.

The period for the BIR to assess and collect an internal revenue tax is limited to
three years by Section 203 of the Tax Code of 1977. The three-year period of
limitations on the assessment and collection of national internal revenue taxes set
by Section 203 of the Tax Code of 1977, as amended, can be affected, adjusted, or
suspended, in accordance with the following provisions of the same Code.

As enunciated in these statutory provisions, the BIR has three years, counted from
the date of actual filing of the return or from the last date prescribed by law for the
filing of such return, whichever comes later, to assess a national internal revenue
tax or to begin a court proceeding for the collection thereof without an
assessment.
In the present Petition, there is no controversy on the timeliness of the
issuance of the Assessment, only on the prescription of the period to collect the
deficiency DST following its Assessment. Counting the three-year prescriptive

period, for a total of 1,095 days,[21] from 20 October 1989, then the BIR only had
until 19 October 1992 within which to collect the assessed deficiency DST.
NOTES:
Under Section 223(c) of the Tax Code of 1977, as amended, it is not essential
that the Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy be fully executed so that it can suspend
the running of the statute of limitations on the collection of the tax.
It is enough that the proceedings have validly began or commenced and that their
execution has not been suspended by reason of the voluntary desistance of the
respondent BIR Commissioner. Existing jurisprudence establishes that distraint
and levy proceedings are validly begun or commenced by the issuance of the
Warrant and service thereof on the taxpayer.[22]

It is only logical to require that the Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy be, at the very
least, served upon the taxpayer in order to suspend the running of the prescriptive
period for collection of an assessed tax, because it may only be upon the service of
the Warrant that the taxpayer is informed of the denial by the BIR of any pending
protest of the said taxpayer, and the resolute intention of the BIR to collect the tax
assessed.

If the service of the Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy on petitioner BPI on 23


October 1992 was already beyond the prescriptive period for collection of the
deficiency DST, which had expired on 19 October 1992, then what more the letter
of respondent BIR Commissioner, dated 13 August 1997 and received by the
counsel of the petitioner BPI only on 11 September 1997, denying the protest of
petitioner BPI and requesting payment of the deficiency DST?

Even later and more unequivocally barred by prescription on collection was the
demand made by respondent BIR Commissioner for payment of the deficiency DST
in her Answer to the Petition for Review of petitioner BPI before the CTA, filed on
08 December 1997.

GROUND TO TOLL THE PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD


There is no valid ground for suspending the running of the prescriptive
period for collection of the deficiency DST assessed against petitioner BPI.

The statute of limitations on assessment and collection of taxes is for the


protection of the taxpayer and, thus, shall be construed liberally in his favor.

Though the statute of limitations on assessment and collection of national internal


revenue taxes benefits both the Government and the taxpayer, it principally intends
to afford protection to the taxpayer against unreasonable investigation. The
indefinite extension of the period for assessment is unreasonable because it
deprives the said taxpayer of the assurance that he will no longer be subjected to
further investigation for taxes after the expiration of a reasonable period of time.

In order to provide even better protection to the taxpayer against unreasonable


investigation, the Tax Code of 1977, as amended, identifies specifically in Sections
223 and 224[26] thereof the circumstances when the prescriptive periods for
assessing and collecting taxes could be suspended or interrupted.

To give effect to the legislative intent, these provisions on the statute of limitations
on assessment and collection of taxes shall be construed and applied liberally in
favor of the taxpayer and strictly against the Government.

The statute of limitations on assessment and collection of national internal revenue


taxes may be waived, subject to certain conditions, under paragraphs (b) and (d) of
Section 223 of the Tax Code of 1977, as amended, respectively. Petitioner BPI,
however, did not execute any such waiver in the case at bar.

NO WAIVER

The waiver of the statute of limitations, whether on assessment or collection,


should not be construed as a waiver of the right to invoke the defense of
prescription but, rather, an agreement between the taxpayer and the BIR to extend
the period to a date certain, within which the latter could still assess or collect
taxes due.

The waiver does not mean that the taxpayer relinquishes the right to invoke
prescription unequivocally.[28]
A valid waiver of the statute of limitations under paragraphs (b) and (d) of
Section 223 of the Tax Code of 1977, as amended, must be:
(1) in writing;
(2) agreed to by both the Commissioner and the taxpayer;
(3) before the expiration of the ordinary prescriptive periods for assessment
and collection; and
(4) for a definite period beyond the ordinary prescriptive periods for
assessment and collection.

The period agreed upon can still be extended by subsequent written agreement,
provided that it is executed prior to the expiration of the first period agreed upon.
The BIR had issued Revenue Memorandum Order (RMO) No. 20-90 on 04 April
1990 to lay down an even more detailed procedure for the proper execution of
such a waiver.

RMO No. 20-90 mandates that the procedure for execution of the waiver shall be
strictly followed, and any revenue official who fails to comply therewith resulting in
the prescription of the right to assess and collect shall be administratively dealt
with.

In the Petition at bar, petitioner BPI executed no such waiver of the statute of
limitations on the collection of the deficiency DST per Assessment No. FAS-5-8589-002054.

Without a valid waiver, the statute of limitations on collection by the BIR of the
deficiency DST could not have been suspended under paragraph (d) of Section 223
of the Tax Code of 1977, as amended.

The protest filed by petitioner BPI did not constitute a request for reinvestigation,
granted by the respondent BIR Commissioner, which could have suspended the
running of the statute of limitations on collection of the assessed deficiency DST
under Section 224 of the Tax Code of 1977, as amended.

The Tax Code of 1977, as amended, also recognizes instances when the running of
the statute of limitations on the assessment and collection of national internal
revenue taxes could be suspended, even in the absence of a waiver, under Section
224 thereof

Of particular importance to the present case is one of the circumstances


enumerated in Section 224 of the Tax Code of 1977, as amended, wherein the
running of the statute of limitations on assessment and collection of taxes is
considered suspended when the taxpayer requests for a reinvestigation which is
granted by the Commissioner.

This Court gives credence to the argument of petitioner BPI that there is a
distinction between a request for reconsideration and a request for
reinvestigation.
Revenue Regulations (RR) No. 12-85

NOTE:
PROTEST TO ASSESSMENT

SEC. 6. Protest. The taxpayer may protest administratively an


assessment by filing a written request for reconsideration or
reinvestigation. . .
...

For the purpose of the protest herein

(a) Request for reconsideration. refers to a plea for a reevaluation


of
an assessment on
the
basis
of
existing
records without need of additional evidence. It may involve both a
question of fact or of law or both.

(b) Request for reinvestigation. refers to a plea for re-evaluation


of an assessment on the basis of newly-discovered or additional
evidence that a taxpayer intends to present in the reinvestigation. It
may also involve a question of fact or law or both.

The two types of protest can no longer be used interchangeably and their
differences so lightly brushed aside. It bears to emphasize that under Section 224
of the Tax Code of 1977, as amended, the running of the prescriptive period for
collection of taxes can only be suspended by a request for reinvestigation, not a
request for reconsideration.
The protest letter of petitioner BPI did not specifically request for either a
reconsideration or reinvestigation. A close review of the contents thereof would
reveal, however, that it protested Assessment based on a question of law, in
particular, whether or not petitioner BPI was liable for DST on its sales of foreign
currency to the Central Bank in taxable year 1985. The same protest letter did not
raise any question of fact; neither did it offer to present any new evidence. the BIR
itself referred to the protest of petitioner BPI as a request for reconsideration.
[32]
These considerations would lead this Court to deduce that the protest letter of
petitioner BPI was in the nature of a request for reconsideration, rather than a
request for reinvestigation and, consequently, Section 224 of the Tax Code of 1977,
as amended, on the suspension of the running of the statute of limitations should
not apply.
Even if, for the sake of argument, this Court glosses over the distinction
between a request for reconsideration and a request for reinvestigation, and
considers the protest of petitioner BPI as a request for reinvestigation, the filing
thereof could not have suspended at once the running of the statute of limitations.
Article 224 of the Tax Code of 1977, as amended, very plainly requires that the
request for reinvestigation had been granted by the BIR Commissioner to
suspend the running of the prescriptive periods for assessment and collection.

That the BIR Commissioner must first grant the request for reinvestigation
as a requirement for suspension of the statute of limitations is even supported by
existing jurisprudence.
NOTE: As had been previously discussed herein, the statute of limitations on
assessment and collection of national internal revenue taxes may be suspended if
the taxpayer executes a valid waiver thereof, as provided in paragraphs (b) and (d)
of Section 223 of the Tax Code of 1977, as amended; and in specific instances
enumerated in Section 224 of the same Code, which include a request for
reinvestigation granted by the BIR Commissioner. Outside of these statutory
provisions, however, this Court also recognized one other exception to the statute
of limitations on collection of taxes in the case of Collector of Internal Revenue v.
Suyoc Consolidated Mining Co.[
PRINCIPLE OF ESTABLE. SUYOC CASE
In the Suyoc case, this Court expressly conceded that a mere request for
reconsideration or reinvestigation of an assessment may not suspend the running
of the statute of limitations. It affirmed the need for a waiver of the prescriptive
period in order to effect suspension thereof. However, even without such waiver,
the taxpayer may be estopped from raising the defense of prescription because by
his repeated requests or positive acts, he had induced Government authorities to
delay collection of the assessed tax.

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