Potential Failure Mode and Effects Analysis FMEA Fourth Edition» FOREWORD ‘ 4" Edition The FMEA 4" Edition is a reference manual to be used by suppliers to Chrysler LLC, Ford Motor ‘Company, and General Motors Corporation as a guide to assist them in the development of both Design and Process FMEAs. The manual does not define requirements; itis intended to clarify ‘Summary of Changes in the 4th edition FMEA Reference Manual ‘The DFMEA and PFMEA methods described in the 4" edition FMEA Reference Manual include those associated with design atthe system, subsystem, interface, and component level and the process at manufacturing and assembly operations. General Changes ‘© The formatting used in the 4* edition is intended to provide easier reading. © Anindex is included. © Icons are used to indicate key paragraphs and visual cues are used. «Additional examples and verbiage have been provided to improve the utility of the manual and to provide a closer tie into the FMEA process as it develops. «Reinforcement of the need for management support, interest, and review of the » FMEA process and results. ‘Define and strengthen the understanding of the linkage between DFMEA and PEMEA as well as defining the linkages to other tools. ‘Improvements to the Severity, Occurrence, Detection ranking tables so that they are ‘more meaningful to real world analysis and usage. ‘+ Altemative methods are introduced that are currently being applied in industry. © Additional appendices which have example forms and special case application of FMEA. © The focus on the “standard form” has been replaced with several options that represent the current application of FMEA in industry. ‘© The suggestion that RPN not be used as the primary means for assessing risk. The need for improvement has been revised including an additional method, and the use of thresholds on RPN is clarified as a practice that is not recommended. Chapter I provides general FMEA guidelines, the need for management support and having a defined process for developing and maintaining FMEAs, and the need for continuous improvement. ‘Chapter Il describes the general application of the FMEA methodology, which is common between DFMEA and PFMEA processes. This includes the planning, strategy, action plans, and the need for management support and responsibility in FMEAS. ‘Chapter III focuses on DFMEA (Design Failure Mode Effects and Analysis), establishing the scope of the analysis, use.of block diagrams, various types of DFMEAs, formation of the teams, ® basic procedure for analysis, action plans, and follow-up, alternatives to RPN, and connection to PFMEAs and validation plans.‘Chapter 1V focuses on PFMEA (Process Failure Mode Effects and Analysis), establishing the scope of the analysis use of flow diagrams, formation of teums, basi procedure for analysis, ‘seton plans, the connection to DFMEAS ad the development of control plans. ‘The Appences have several examples of forms for DMFEA. iferent applications and procedures foc addressing design and ‘The Supplier Quality Requirements Task Force would ike otha he following indvidals, and their companies, who have contributed thir time and efforts to the development of his edition of the FMEA Reference Manual Willam Hanghey, ReliaTrain is a copyright of Chrysler LLC, Ford Motor Company and General Motors Comortion, wih all rights reserved. Additional copies may be obained from AIAG @ sews alagors Supply chain organization of Chrysler LLC, Ford Motor Company or Gener ‘Motors Corporation have permission to copy forms sod inthis anal. TABLE OF CONTENTSSTANOLA Puc SATAVLChapter ‘Geoeral FMEA Guidelines 1@ Chapter I »®@ General FMEA Guidelines nesay amy 29 J wont ano 002 pau ‘pur paseou “poissadas oq UR> 394 auf oy WO auOpR ermal am ou, Ane ened Jo sone sy enor su, “909 sswlojaap sed por pall 2x0 EU paren 51 oq pus Soooud , VAHL’ 2m) JO opimemeydit pee Sydionad 209 9 oqUDSp YEMEN pL . FenueRl yo esoding ssunpp!eo VaR T2090 panda @« Ierood mace pose oops onde VEL sseoold VaWs ‘nbjaypa omjowopanede 2m oy samp pou? sons pow (VANS) SITY SAU ie Spo sie oecng Jo ten mf EoNpON ne SL uoyonpoUy ‘SuPpRD Van TID peterChapter General FMEA Guidelines ‘Scope of Manual “The analytical methods presented inthis manual are applicable to any product or process However, this manval will fous on thos pica eae win aoe ina and Implementation approach will vary dependi structure ofthe company concerned, although the principles will bethe same: ‘+ The scope will cover FMEA produced inhouse and by mali- ‘er supplier + Address Design and Process FMEA, a applicable. “+ Accomplish this by having the FMEA. process an integral part ofthe APQP process. + Patofengincering technical eviews, including: the esponiiliy and ownership for n® ve Chap General FMEA Guidelines FMEA Explained MEAS av an inogal put of mining ik st supporting Clear statements, concise terminology an focus om the acial cffects are Key 1 the effective identifeaton and mitigation of tise issuesuoneyuewe|duyy pue Bujwuelg ‘AB2}2RS "mg ono pursuant Vana weeds ‘sang seeigatieg Suuanog + ‘por vonmusuop Seumoejrue Myquseseieap 0) suy9 Jo uopstodioout 2x) SURI) “pooowajéur uoog sary soonoe popusuioas rp umsua oy splosst poral pus Sosznaud “Sieop Say sumone) a9 0 pave 8 am ing pot fou powsu2y Sn tose popu ey Som yo sau fons ono psa at AL. yuewerosduy snonupued pue dn-mojjo4 seuepino van m2t2p(Chapter Introduction ‘Surategy, Planing, Implementation [PMEA development, ether design or proces, uses a common, spproach to addres: ‘+ Potent produc or process flue lo met expectations “+ Potent contequeness ‘+ Potential causes oF the failure mode Application of current contols + Level fis Risk eduesion Basic Structure Approach Before the FMEA document is stared the team must define the scape ofthe project and collect existing information whichis recessay for an effective and efficient FMEA development process ‘The purpose of the recommended FMEA formas described in this mance i to organize the collection and display of relevant FMEA information, Specific formate may vary based on the needs ofthe organization andthe requirements ofthe eustomer. Fundamentally, he forma ized should addres: ‘© Functions, requirements, and deliverables of the product ot press being analyzed, ‘allure modes when functional requirements are not met, 1 Etects and consequences of te fallure mode, ‘+ Potential causes ofthe failure mode, “Actions and controls to eddress the cates ofthe failure mode, sd, ‘© Aetons vo prevent ecurence ofthe flue mode. ‘There is no single or unique process for FMEA development; ‘however there are common elements as described below, Chapter ‘Seategy, Planing, Implementation n@ Identify the Team ional resources: FMEA development tople Seep "Fanctiong, equiemens and expectations ee , peach Eft and consoqoences ofthe fare = ‘oth the organization's proceses at oa Sownstream customer. ‘Causes of ie potential Taare Frequensy of occurence of penal lie Seat ConoTs preveRTON seat Some deeeTON Recommended actions eared‘suanayioeds "sap aunty peat o 9949 op Sox2.9p 0 om Anessa! ems poe Sect ‘suonoony 2m 2ug2p ofc ove euteND a Jo SBPeEMOTT ss200%d 22 onpnd owed on ow suonaypds papa ‘agua "jd 2} “pu pines 257, peg op Sonoeye siiieue YANN 241 “Bnpad imo tn wopezyntio 10 coted ot REGSN CNA sede Yap 296 UNESP OV} Bo 99 of POON “sso0Ad ‘VW 3p palopisuo oq or szuo}RD feu mo} ae ag, yowO}SsND ey euyeC ogmuswoyday Sunes “Beng deg @u vans ona por pons ppm pe pep» Suge sede Vay 9930 Aponog ap susqqssade3s, adoag ayy ona ogee Smee orang u ade 7Chapter Swategy, Planning, Implementation (Chapter it Seategy, Planing, Implemesation ’ Identify Potential i@ Identify Controls Failure Modes: Controls are those activities that prevent or detect the cause of le i dead ey rnin ed rte wee Stree aes ‘provide the retest ret, Identifying and Assessing Risk ‘ne of the Inport see in the FMEA proces i te tsvessment of os This nevi nthe ape, eve Sensor, and dest: Identify Potential Severity isn ascent ofthe lev ofp of fl on Effects eessones ——— ‘ceureenceis ow oe th cas ofa ia may ose onl fesse ied sh lect of he fe ; Dotctlon is an assesment of how wal the prods or proces Imad as prsved by tester, The eect or ipa of he rm re sade os pecsved by cuter The ae contol dlc the eau the furor the ar mee oe epeence Tee ctor ny besa ial caso Cramizatons need to undentan their coniomerrequenets Soli he End User. j free asm Determining potential effcisinlaes the amas of the Recommended Consequence of dhe fey sd the svey or soosnr of Aotions and Results thee comeguenet Actions and Results 1 ‘The intent of recommended actions isto reduce overall risk and Ttbod tht he flue mode wil occ, The recommended Identify Potential aeions ads reduton of the eve, occurence aed Causes ection, sat “he foning ca be sed to sss he ppopcnte coas Foetal caus offre f dened ata indication of how the oa file cold osu, esrb i terms of ating tn can be ‘wee, nding bt ited toned or canbe contol, Pots cans of fae my be + Bang. design resinemens iaidag, reality we fm naan of dain wets, he consequence of wien seve, + Reviewing cagincring ring and spinon, + Confming inomortion in stemblyneatctsing proces nd + Reviewing rested FMEAS, cou! plans and operons Responsiliy an ing o compet the rommendd ection shothbe rere. Once setions are completed and results captured, the updated rans fo seve, erarece ad dactonsboa ao be 2 asishjeuy sjaay3 pue apow aunjley uBiseq vawid Ml 4eydeyo Stsxquy siya pur oPOWY ome OG | patra] sus Suyodoou po sypOoaE Suneunays ‘saoust Hexo8-00 yhany wea ay oF OdEaE Hmaup Suppnoid sepojou one Aupqiuodea wousbouny fan Snpou seoard euodeae WU oA;2L9 we Bese pov amon todas pn Semen Sarones memes SX py nouotemee soso Vaped At sino uae & Ayniqisuodsay jueweBeuey, ne ogee ape ons daaChapter 1 Introduction Customer Defined Increasing the probabil Design Foilre Mode and Efets Analysis ‘The Design Failure Mode Effects Analysis, refered t0 as FMEA, support the design process in reducing the risk of failures by: + Aiding in the objective evaluation ofthe design, including aneinal requirments and design alteratives, + Evaluating the ial design for manufsering, assembly, serve, ond recycting requirement lopment, and validation a Design Fllre Mode and fess Analysis Team Approach Manufacturing, Assembly and Serviceabilty Considerations ‘The DFMEA can also tke into consideration the technical ond pliysial limits of product erviceablity and recycling ace the product has entered feld use, for exampleLs I | seysinbalsig = ———|_ more” wai | | ‘jon afomburrd urn pg) a0 ony oO PARA | Soyo mmcodaoy feu em Sapeedsis oq soe sim e =r ora) ao | ‘apo csp rns 2 te. np Jo wep oo sey Vas 2 xn pu Cy VWAW UBIseq e Jo jusUUdojenag i ‘youscpod eng anda ob Boe oe np ES secu 24 pos 9POHY sie CBiSIQ made _ssiqeuys2ua pow apont aie whSog deiChapter tt 2 s 3 e 3 3 é 2 5 & 8 5 a vm Hin {rom wat Stesopeara sted a -ssfiouy so2y pow apo amneg oso made ‘wins 9 mo Bay wes sousbasad aso Bu v suonoury pow ves susuoaadao efoayap uy ms as Son Foo ‘uv soususdxa Saudis hq pauoddes “9001 55 J0 30 4. ‘oom Agen BON KEN + (asd) woutoydag womens Kien) « anew 99q:51 6 sous dysoonerauony + (wo eH IONE + 3p SSuaerp ‘sopmusyes ‘sper dou seounebas wisp 2492029 pow pursepun ue 3 ay fk 5tNOd P1001 2590 Seaunosay UopeUUE}y pue sj00} 204 ‘Aygemanyneny 29) uBio + Agus sos esac + seg + Suxddnyg pow turfeyreg + sounmmddy sonuouotig + vomery pm + (un) ssouysmy pun vonmqs “sion suopeiadg ain + qyoidafesn onpand sworsng 5X9 Ain pee Suypeoy + (wonoung 0 J0291) Ainge « suonenBoy wou3K0D + fons + uo wiep 290. poe tonpoud ai Jo oodind am spun KaBsie> 4] ED + soot Sutaoyaj 9 2pr/04 ‘eu 5 seu, -w8s9p 2 Jo susuasnbal apne (PORN) 2p Jo wonedin s1'ssoad Vand aq ut das m.OCy ‘squewounbay jeuopoung, -askqmey asaya poe apo sme uso aideat Design Fallare Mode and Effects Analysis (Chapter it Design Failure Mode and EMets Analysis @ Example DFMEA . “The example used withthe sample form deals witha Front Door i i +] + © Window regulator = ‘+ Provide proper surfice for appearance items © Paiat © Sofi ‘+ Maintain integrity of immer door panel The final DEMEA include analysis of requirements, The fuclades pat of the ana ‘euirement: "Ma erty of ner doo: panel h f Header of the Design FMEA Form (fields A-H) che b at| a2 res heer‘vansa>n Sudan oy ayquodsossoubu9 2 J0(Keeduos) sonectaeo ayn Bupeyou vopeuosay yoewe> pus suru (4) ke pasedosa (0) wea, e109 a Sone, ou pus poraydusoo sem WANA [eUIBUO ayp ayEp oyp Ja @) sevea vans -amy sen ep upon preps 210 psoas pose PVE 2 (3) ee Koy peasyeu og wap oun Aa p29 09 oud pt (ot0 aponepopuonh oy 0 (@) (s)uresBosy(s)1204 19POW -sgronte ‘se voperunBio Aides 9 Jama ony “jqsuodsa wisap 8 oyy dnoid 30 wsunsedep pu ‘wonETURBIO "WHO 0 13 (0) Amqusuodsey uB}seq (dog 29 1208295) poosyun 90g Yoyo (g) soquiny pue eureN jueuodwiog 40 “wesksqng ‘weIshS (v) sequin WANs ‘secu 12949 Poe aPOMY ame iso dea, ze [ve q FF "isc se) Poe apOHL ame BISAcove eign File Mode and Effects Analysis dob ly Me iF b SAMPLE at| a2 Chapter tt Design Fallre Mode and fet Analysis Body of the DFMEA Form (fields a~ n) ‘The body of the FMEA consis the analyse of risks elated to the potential les, and improvement action being taken.” Item / Function / Requirements (a) requirements and with thoes used in other dsign development locurents and analysis to ensure traceability. Requlement becomes 28 Hf ttam ond Functon are split to separa columns 09. a1 an 22 The eer a he ed ofeach eading indict the area ferred onthe sample orm01 peo ors 20 wore fol 48 8 pou) Tehuaod © Jo asne> ay 29 one Aer opou san razed 2, -Somvorsweg oi po ‘suodst ‘sussoa> “Buous-suos-deng ised 4p monat xnonp apm aq wo sees ai Jo ss5u52}N09 2) Jo UoREpHEA 9 “Fepom amIR 9m YE SiO UY jenaiod, rom ajo ena Asanboruca ‘ooo fesa200 10 us eq ino pnon amy 2x eH 9pm) oondunese a, (@) apow aanyres jenueiog ststqryse9U3 Pu apond ame SIC dee song aden sama wopenuzauy (ena YH 1 t ze [12 T1dWwys q eae | mee | po ties Hi > Py 2 rol fy u poy faolf| ceca [| ames | cae 4 3 I eS + ‘ssdmay Soa pos SPORE aE WSO og VaWsa aes PHL 10, os a sadecot Dein Far Modan ects Assi nar sin Fe Mode nd tes Anas i fa Lida ‘This page intentionally left blank. oe Veil does oop { —— Vehicle stops in excess of pete dee Stops vehicle wit are an rare \ { Brake i bi i ‘Table IIL3 Example Potential Failure Modes_o1g98 aap oy 2ygeensuUEIS ramao» 2m pocsonan 29H ped pasassoq soumdues-now ore, sounyduoo-vou Ksowny peed fotos oH, ood wo E — wats daca wou hoxepdiny pared 00009 oH A rea oa wan {sytosso a fa pean sora a 60 apo go 30 aga poop ae amy Jo RR eNEIOG (0) eanea 40 (sey [enua}ed é sfsseny Se Pow apo aan og tm exoy | oon y eterna | ay | sme A piste ‘ere _sEdjeuy noog pur opoyy aimeg uBisog meeChapter I Design Flue Mode and Bets Analysis (Chapter Itt Design Fllre Mode and Efects Analysis 9 Severity (S) (a) k | Criteria: i tot Sovery of fact on Product Rank hf h fifi‘seeooid vanisa 2 Jo wed 8 pores o1e spoyo sseonNd 1) SNSLS -aisod se irdiuoo jesauon oe pone 39 pus esjyoaus 2a, "spout mmpou enusiod Ana i "qqssod ‘eanjje 30 (s)wsyueyoeyy(sjasneg [eNUB}Od ‘2aooud Ubs9p 04) SSBUNRRH 8 Jo URE} Ue St YN ‘oy Uf poyop) pou snge) uBsop poreooste Ue IROL | Impede ‘se psoas uBsep 8a PEEUDIOD SnSVOEEND y | -eBesn sou pur Goquits opsuereseun see00.d | .o romped ypode Agog! fou! Hou 2po9ds OUD | aes Mod Bn or oem oes emO> AL (0) uoneouisse19 ssiqeuy 22g pm spony singed Bisoa uuande ‘isha see pe apoyy sues wSisog rider(Chapter Design Failure Mode and Erfets Analysis Chapter tt Design Faire Mode and Efe Analysis 9 Potential Cause(s) of Failure Mode (f2) n t ; t weakness, the consequence of which the falure mode, causes aro the circumstances tat induce or acral 2 fabure A =i“yar uot Snevonasny Bed san, @e— _sedqeuy aay pom 2popy amr WHS tmsrdey, sesnep rwnaareg aydumesa S111 81, (op pes 29 YO] MDNR LIPID EAH | arsed ancy | PEER OW Om ENON Siero ao raemoeamirtomaiormycye| ommimens| __ememowipren SeSenEreea tees paceman ares Fedemamnrg | “min en os m oie artery | neo son eae ape pane | Peete te seteortied| sane ep 08 1m 0 apnea oR me — sen nim mp oc EO — caen [eons —] sstroy apo po seschapter tt Design Failure Mode and fects Analysis F 9 w i \mple DFMEA Form with Mltmal Information Elements & Example Entles Chapter Design Filre Mode and Effects Analysis Occurrence (0) (g) What i the service history and field experience with sinitr ‘components subsystems, oF 4 Heth item a cearyover or similar toa previous + How significant are changes from a previous levwe uatAtewopeony Bed se, sdimuy 12g Pom apoyy sie soQ aide4, “aan poppe ip 0 ep rope eee pune a Pa AD “agen px oe op 10 ay pare gm oom a om eh ma npn NO “amp nomen ap | “pemstpn eon op stp yu gyn pe ey {eoruonysus ory] SOP (eryexwen yo Auneneuey ubrsoa) ‘vanua-eenea jo fM vansa- ene jo ooveunso9 seu emuauinesg "5818 secu s25ye pus 2pops sumed wHisag 37 cou mae?(Chapter I ttre Mode and Effects Analysis. i he ace f kid fi c 2 mame] ae | eo g Example Earls Chapter it Design Fire Mode and Efets Analysis Current Design Controls (h) ‘Curent Design Contols are those activites conducted as pant of the design process that have been completed or commited to and inate (prevent) the cause ofthe mechanism of flue or the mode fom occuring, or reduce eae of oreurece, Ted approech isto ft use proveton contol, posable. The inal occurence rankings Ww be afeted by the contol provided they are Iniogated 2 part of the tet Detection control should include idntifeation of hate activities ‘hich detec te failure mode well as thse tt detect thestosiee> wag woqaea pu wopuanos4 yo Sdwexa STL AL, BITS ro s20p eo SOW samme syst S949 pus poy aes Uisag nr rdey, soquneg adwesg 9 syourg womULe ssaymey 2g pm apo IRA UIC mandea,Chapter Design Failure Mode and Efets Analysis thet Chapter 1 Design Failure Mode and fects Analysis Detection (D) (9) of one (1) i reseed for fore pravenion through proven design eckson,yom 8H Ayswopeaney aed a syshqry sr953 PE 9POWY STE KIO mnsdey, nanos 2 sas Sens eat eanpoes tanto pat in "He (oe vas avo 9) seeoreann oa to oa Mens sms (20's san mp 42) wm | ape rs yoy Toray nega ora , SOT Aavespen Narada ee a canmaee eee sent nea a | a ial ‘gpa ener 99 wm er z “oe eeu oe 0 awrion | 1 | | eget mtn tenn STII | Siler sony a a ore eel a ats een pm on | : sen en tl ‘ome sag aap SH “im? “nus end nae pat 6] wuneao%arave synmtecy mann 96 | z pe ied a nd sssdeuy sey pus spon ame Bisa onan tenuag ubiseg Aq wonseied jo poowsNT 0 ze seeelcteaeeen| S| oe = }——~ st aa ou = ‘mts(Caper tt Design Failure Mode and Effects Analyst 7 t | Chapter tt Design Fllure Mode and Eets Analysis ‘xganzation and customers Risk Evaluation; Risk Priority Number (RPN) ()) ‘One approach to assist inaction prioiizaton has been toute the‘ssday moaya pi 2poyy ames wis9g idey | sasha sig pur apo aug ws2q rdsuChapter tt Design Failte Mode and Efets Analysis Chapter tt =o? Design Failure Mode and Effects Analysis + To Redace Occurrence (0) Ranking: ‘occurrence ranking can be effected by ‘reduce the detection raking). Additonal, the be considered99 pnogs sfurue poss IY Wau") (9s) onze Bynes oxy poo pF ISIE sBoryre wons9p wm ‘souatinaoo “hues Sunes oy puooal per Sars} p ‘pajduca u2eq smy ONE saRsauoontONRH! 3—) 22YY (4) New pue uopse}eq ‘eouenns99 ‘Ayjson0s, "2p wop2}duo> rue puw uae oH ap JO ondusap jug ian “partauayda u59q my sonae 2 SUV ‘aunjeo) Sst Jo uoeaydde ain Jo 2fdunxs we pian mop ssc s29y Pe apo AINE USA meg 4 sed 20 poe 2pOHK ame WISAgChapter Design Failure Mode and Etfects Analysis Prevention co | Gea | “rome = ee = Se [ces Sem = Baie = Se = = See =~ [ana [aaa = Ez = ES Be. Sand MS Virb. i an ‘Table LT Examples of Causes, Controls and Recommended Actions Maintaining DFMEAs @ Chapter tit Design Failure Mode and Eels Analysis Leveraging DFMEAS 1s new project or application is functionally similar to the existing product, a single DFMEA may be wsed wih customer Linkages Boundary (Block) Diagram, P= Diagram, etc. : SI Th Design Verification Plan & Report (OVP&R), PFMEA, elc,sisfjeuy si904a pue epoyy eunjIey ssa001g AL4ajydeyg ‘secu sat pus opoyy amyed 300K ‘vaniaa poe ‘vavisa 29 Jo suyues Kuan pow seye 2p B==U 93 rpoys pou sn wllsep oxy ayo oe '25> ST BL =AY Fonposd fenusiod aus oyu neat Ue apou Ste (VARIO) isa © 20 2pou amy (VaNdd) s200%g 0 “tdum> Joa "vaWidd pre VaWsa of soning sya aorsodun NOC ‘ay oydres poe ampsoaid unis oon Pie sel sep ore ce 2am WUnd Pm VEEC vaWdd (Qreana) vodew 9 uejg uoneoyHeA UB}seq ety 612943 Peo 2POH age LISI sm vde4,| chapter Process Failure Mode and Effects Analysis Introduction ‘The process FMEA, refered 1 as PFMEA, supports ‘manufacturing process development in reducing the risk of failures by: + Henifying and evaluating the process. fetions and requirements, + Identifying and evaluating, potential produet and proces- related flue made, and the effets ofthe potential files ‘on the proces and eustoners, 1 denitying the potntis| manufacturing ot assembly process Mest ables on which 10 focus process edetlon or increased detction ofthe haptertv Process File Moe sod Eets Analysis Customer Defined “he efiion of “Casome” for PEMEA should normaly be the End User" However, the customer cans be a serge Team Approach Design Considerations ‘consideration and possible implementation. 5 See dscusion in Chap I, Casomer Defined‘wes moy ssooad opduex> uns) Za anf 205 ‘21 uoneMaaja aq) Mm WeIESIED 8q COKE YAW OL, sey s892084 pane9g 0 24071 WO AL 2uN8L dey $se204q 70097 YBIH ‘sscuy s293 poe apoyy suey staoang Aven Gp V3Wdd 0) aBeyuy pue weiBeig Moly sseD01g ‘op sts Sezmoemume Sump see 430 aos a asso doc fen #8 por st BED AC ar Vand st os nay eae we may oa OL “ssu=anbat sg 229 poe pokes funq svopndo Aguas pur famine af PERKS 2 sopearya Jo woudojnap 29 hm Uog pm VERE V ‘saysinbalaig (raratgen ox 081) am po op opts ona Bux sda van "VEN 9 Sin wa ape en aod aso WAINd Sse00/g e Jo juouidojeneg ‘askuy seyja pe por ame s20014 Arad,Process Failure Mode and Effi Analysis Chapter 1 Process Faire Mode and Effets Analysis Ouperv Department;_exsaso Ge eaeeemiee GP omartoot \d Information S er Tools and information Sources Pretre, BA DieConnel a nmnber,_"=IR — pane OMEN ——— Otter soures of information that are useful in providing the — — (001,105 Mat, NOS, NO Drawings and design records J} Nodemece exsma (cums) noocofomances mun base onion as) Quality and Retabity History Research Information After esabishing the scope of the analysis effog, the team sould (001, Ro3, Mt |) Nosurtace damage ‘Atroncontori Sper sfactniyrapoctonL_| tere \7 sey [) rant @ Operator Activity with inspection (C)) Transporation —=taps (Pant Tme)(@) feet eee rer eee > Firs Time Tough (FFT) 5 »yes 0.0 pas ay ae apy Gn Jo pu mH @ (uno 3) parte oq snd om ha pavene 94 402m on mp sheaBand px (ea pons (@) -areoy Loner Ajddns a zie oy “jssuodsar uBep sxa0id 51 04x doo 20 wawnsedsp pur “oonezwet30 “AO =X) JON Iqsuodsoy sse001g ‘Pazhteu Buroq sao ax yy 25 wouedaio> 40 wsGaqne “uss 949 Jo soqumu pay sum) one, (q) wey “uy 0 0 pormna 29 of uonasny om sequoseP Seo Ma, (HEV Spey) ug YAW ssez0lq o1p jo sepeaH ‘sores ap on jgnndanse 99, ssout pages wos Aun ‘se> ue up -suOHMdD ue spsou souoyTo pue Yonezindio ap uo SuIpaedap tty S01 poppe 29 ur sean paw peypou! aq wo 5p no) *Wa0 20 ka parade Keun 1g 2Wo9 wamupupur ay soIIICD | "HNDLIS. VaNNad 3m J0 sisAeue pow sutsmnonp sre 29) eNO 2p (5 pron covemar sip o} serdar 9 wy oon ny 24 uuod WaWad a\dwexg € sséqeuy 92g pew apoyy aye sso00ug ated we ‘ine adams 9 soatayg woqeuLopaT eMTEY HM NMS VANCES PEWS AT RE, 2 2 iN »_€ Hf} We al] Hee = a - i ili}); i | i = i la es = ne : i 3 ie 7 | ; -sefory saoya pow opoyy amie s.0Ng averProcess Failure Mode and Effects Analysis. ® — it - ni L = mye z= rf iid ik - i : lu iil > Wo 3 HiiliN * ‘Table 1V.1 Sample PFMEA inital Taformation Elements & Example Entries Go CChaptertV Process Failure Mode and Efcts Analysis Key Date (E) FMEA Date (Original) (F) Enter the dat the orginal PPMEA was completed andthe nes revision date. Core Team (G) ion (eg name, organization, telephone may be included ina referenced Prepared By (H) En ‘and contact information including the 3) ofthe engineeeam leader responsible cA. the analysis of sks related to vement ction being taken” Process Step / Process Function / Requirements (a) process step, “Process Step", “Function, and "Requrcments” a‘Ze pUe 16 “Be -suuroo ered Of ds O18 ‘oroung sseooig Bue deg ssB20ig C8 ulooen sBwaanbON, (ze) swewexnboy nats 18 wopaung seopoid pe dois second » ze sowooey ubRDONG ses :) dang sse201g ‘Hecmuy saya pee apoHy ame ss22013 Aveda q + Pp 2 TW 4 fa 4 SEF siseuy ssa uw apoy ase 20014 on)Chapter Proces Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (Cuprertv Process Failure Mode and Eets Analysis Potential Failure Mode (b) Potential fiture mode is defined asthe mannet in which the process could potently fil to mee the process requirements (cluding the design intent). i (3) @ design issues which ‘result in process concems, thote aries shouldbe communicated tothe design team for esoltion. Lis the potential flare mode(s) forthe particule operation in « tema ofthe oes tegen (eared ie proces fow dag) Asume dat Er sl oe = Sayan osy cco Poa ihren ose = sed ina tre typ tae by he Stoner Sethcermpl ble bbe i aaa a ol : steietion | __Reaurement | Potential Failre Mode 9 @e Speen — Far Fa ara Hi £ F Speed ae Wg a ae GSD 7 tact ctl | eatiy sae FT| Soe prod any re s screw in right front hole como af] : Seana ly aed | Savant i Saale aaa | Soe eat oa ow} torque specification ‘Screw torqued too low = ° ‘Table IV.2 Example of Process StepFunctio/Requirements Colams on PFMEA Form ‘cading Potenlal Fllure Modes If the requirements have been well defined, then the potest ‘ate ode ey Kenia by deming he codon b ingle requirement url indicates that he well defined thatthe lure could ocurbut may not ainHscjouy saey3 por apoy ame ss201g « " = = nn ae NS = { e ili Hf 7 i 7 a fl i > i _ i| : i "seu sma Pee IPOH ane s22014r cope tv Pees Fie Mode and ite Ansys tape Process ait Mod nd ets Aris an: Tecate, ation or epraton a which he et ors see nina coca neces =| | GIO Example of Effects oat Requirement allure Mode Effect. 2, What the poe impact onthe End User? — — te Indepeadnt of ary cots plane or implemented ncn = seams | Bar Wepre cuchcponing cone what be End User would = sciatic Ts intention may be eae wile sence the Brea, Onc detemined, po 10 eeesin 3 Example todo rend coal tae: ‘ovat da afaied Noi porta + Noie pea eae | Wiegand tapi aad + Highton (a) seni Unto + Unless odor face in saon, Tasty egas—Srsw pee et] Manocrig ond eminent operon nae (ser go Water fomtole (ccaenlalg ees cae Seer iy sated] Seer lysed Ed Ur Looe + Vaile Suhionand ne. . Mewicarag ad Dit lp ‘sete Sota Poor ‘ewok dato aed @ ad 5 saraatigh —| Ea ther Toe SaTangedTo | Sow oRT woTigh | End Coes Looe ar 2. What would happen iam eect was detected pear to ee ioe ‘acing the End User? spelbeatee tetas of wre at : ; tom The poeta eet at th cent of scaling neon so fo becon ould cde! Mafcorng od eat tobe coud, Examples could wigand + Une studown fewer died ren ene San rgiediwoTow | End Usay Looe + Yaxtld cxcln dete pda + 100% of pra scrapped ieee or od 1+ Decreased ine ped eae 1 Added mapowerto msn rege tine te ‘oe Sod eae hte, mor tn one pal fee Hed wen Mag taataneS on my 0 std tr proses Sry carne wot aso whan Soca “Table 13 Example of Eee rovesutng Sort ong |axkeus 69 ou pnoYs | Jo wu! © I sopoU nye “OF ‘BE 6 Somen Gunes 1} evel Apow & popuouniosO! OU H ‘Gompppin 19295) sft ssaooud fnpeaput sy au aa19 “Gpwowisueo way f46de pow wale ‘opues MoNNReNd UO aaiBe PIROHS w=) 24h ‘2u0120 uonenjeng perseBing "vanes tenes a unin Sunques onnmas © sy Ayonag "apo Jy oi 035 ou ne peoorse agen ag 5 Ka (P) (S) Ayana stsaeay seu Pl opopy ayy st00044 etenaa| ages, | mans ‘ese | waco i -ssfqery sag pi apoyy aug 520084‘42149 wonentea ADs Varta vOWHENS 129 UTE, et Seva ect on Pract Sevety of Eacton Process (Custemer Eee) artactngiassomty Etec) pe rae ns ee encarta poses | See pega eo epee ego emne eager recess" ee Soa pine pn tome enema iim tai easicnrmt ES et ae a sit nen terms ete racers avardeng a? | everest sremecietecte a ssn ee i eee || earn —_ SS a : ———— | | E % Q @ ® Se @ S i 2 z i i £ g z poe spoye anna sr20044“wma ws oo porns a apes amy sad! tod arf sop ago suena Any sus pase we oe "Yaa om BHUENE ‘seauop pr s2e009 30 2}8umsg WALTER 9982 99 10m pons (2r> ‘oyesursa [et 10 J0u9 so}eadD "2) ‘sen snonfigury ‘aie oq pine (pausaur poem yes 49 paqjsuy ou jas 3) Suopsurypo 30 sau cea 2.209 sees ore J su snes mel se @) spow eanjted 30 (s)esneg jejus}oq “youu Suseusuo omy yy Ao sn 24 payoa 99 prooys aouiiue ojagnndsas utp 219 “VaNEd 2 Ut OL 306 Jo Aauanzs wun poops nsuarerys ods WASH, aM jon ecard uo posea 04 iim 3 2719 2onpa1 0 Bein wo, pou sume a 30 sin of Jo amt> (pono) ayant mopuanaig, prsue>o sjanuo ss20%4 Jo sodA om aay pou ame agp 129 J0 Buse sod wan 24, 0) Yomand ZH 30 FuoRduorap az jaNnO ssI904 WAU (u) sjonuog sse001g yu0uing sishcuy soya pu pon sane 20014 atzidey NU EE I if babojo il all; i He a HR] as is eal | ral 2 i i = F i - i 3 rm sisqeuy sioayyg Pu 2poyy aunted sss00N AL amdeyTeahoa SE Sa = Se Soe |ome [See oy Bases Enos oo Sena ES SS. SES SL ee "|e (Ses ae al ee = Ese Es raps [oo (Eseeeo Eid ——— = eres ae 4 li Wy Hi Hi il F vena = Tomar | Teg ictop | Toga nn box edie ttolbwbysccap | pena ap pose ale pom! ‘naire Seige ‘Table TVA Examples of Ceuses and Controls Process Failure Mode and Elects Analysis ‘This poge Intentionally left blank,“sognjesufjsopsxooaid uonad ySnan ‘onuenoud aang J0j pawl s (1) eu Jo omen Supues sul “serpy 05 6 181 Sun pom 9 preys voy jeu ono (pp oj pogipou jy wana "Auoraeees toy) Ge por Mott Soytet © pov tuaw Gopenyts to sa Prog mon ‘suewio uopenieng posseBng Sunes uopotep oxy sousnguy ou nous puw woygad pos, ua jo s2v9isp0 oi 16 of AUN are END Aenb Wopury soond om spy Bu way wy Waka 0 spout any ote ol enon anaes oan =n geo me -numjes eq ‘2 ane Bury samy om puoaoy Yond ap Jo wondaasep 2p Jo ued se popu 2q yao yse> Jo Bunga womsarep Of { popeannaoas 5 PaUEDp onus au0 eH toa UN, pono 290} sry tenuoo vor=sep posumd ap Aesu38 “Fung! Jano] ano 1 sopuo wi “VAN tmp ap Jo doos aun URN SopuEL @ (a) uoneeg ‘ssfreuy seg Poe opoyy arma sean » (yu pu 3 1 t 7 t assay seu pus op0y4 sue s7001g(Chapter V Process Failure Mode and E stan sage Opportunity for Criteria: | Detection | Likelthood of Detection by Process Control | ‘No detection | No cunt process contol; Cannot detectors not cepportunity | analyzed. ‘Not ikely to detect | Flare Mode andor Error (Cause snot eal detected | (¢4.randor audits). Failure Mode detection postprocessing by pert through viswaViactiefudible means, Faye Mode denn n-atuio yoperr wh lefudible means or por procesing through atutbute grogog (oMno-go, manso torque licker wreneh et) Failure Mode detection postprocessing by operatar || Tllare Mode deection postprocessing by automated | | (Caper 1V Process allure Mode and Efets Analysis ‘This page Intentionally left blank,sou oxdwwerg 2 suourg wopeaaoyuy eemony We MO Vane SNS [AT Ges ea NYG! s 2 HH SS = oO z o 5 | fom 2 FE e Bu = Zz = ines - Hi] | 44 shes wo onea sun “Vaya Ynplpe ap Jo adobe 24) UH, 7 | i (qo eps (0) eutang #(6) 680409 NL | 5 on om ven sal sey an ce ms ( (Nad) soquiny AOU spi fe ff suopenjeag ¥sry 5 i Ryie - ul 3 . : uopay Bujujuusyeq Ee t a a zh ssf sey poe apoyy aug 820004 Ave4 syshry saa Po apON ante S990 AL erdeChapter Process Failure Mode and Etfects Analysis m | it) hf h fifi] _& Chapter Process Failure Mode and Eets Analysis ‘Another concern with using the threshold eppossh is that here inmospeifie REN vale that requires mandatory action, Unfortunately, establishing such thresholds may promote the ‘wrong behavior causing team members to spead ime tying 0 preferable to detection actions. At example ofthis is heute of process design error proofing rather tan random quali checks ‘or asocited inspection. ‘The intent of any recommended ation is wo reduce rankings in the following order: severity, acumence, and detection, ‘Example approaches to reduce these ae explained below:(4 munjoo) stone Pepuouuuosas por (y munjon) sjonu0s "J wunjoD) sesnes 4Jo voneandde Sq) Jo s}dexd ur sepHoad mopea SAT FIL souap vopae2p (Sus payspou 50 MAN « PoTauoq du 24 wes won aapseooanuans vwousassd'™ ey oF step0ud oy 0 syedreay aye pe apo auneg ss30084 ‘OVIV Teme 245 HD Bd IAD 5 5 iy Aldwys elotia| cet, | mason it ites Ty 4 By 4 =eqee _ashqeuy 22g pue poy suNgEg HOLLChaprectV Process Filue Mode and Effects Analysis || . Hi - . = j = i a i if j i ~ nf “ ih? ans [in = ‘TableIV.1 Sample PFMEA Form wlth Mlolnal Information Elements & Example Entres (Chapter Process Failure Mode and Efets Analysis Action Results (m-n) ‘This section ides the resus of any completed ations snd their effet on $0, rankings and RPN. Action(s) Taken and Completion Date (m) Aer the action has been implemented, ene bri descition ‘ofthe ation taken and actual compton de Severity, Occurrence, Detection and RPN (n) ‘Afer the preventveconectve action has been completed, Aetemine and record the resulting sever, occurence, and etection rankings. CCatealte and record the eesuling ation (sk) prot indiator @e.RPN). ‘All revised rankings should be reviewed. Actions slons do not improvement.m ‘2a se yous ae 30 WS wo 304 (VAN) ‘spo siny seszond eaiod fa) sie Jo osteo {Bisop jenurod usaang dss ses SogooUNDD ZEpORY eopmasoye eo01d 20 sdas Suymoqjeesar a wo sanoay VaWAad SOM oqouy ued uo soenaey Vad 2UL "MIAMI st VEN. ‘vada OL ‘sol dysuonepsaye] wopemoU VANE SAL >20315 savinoms | Py seers Mmol4 S5990!d 'VSWIO om on 8poyuouy pt toed jo oem ays oes40 0 Aum xE8 agp tuned Suess 26 5 YaWd Pos AyewxzepaNy ‘SVAWNdd BuyBe12n97 poe afuxy> sap ssacond 20 snposd amouar 9q plnogs Pe aumoop Say ‘SWaWdd BuueuleW suon>y pur sosnues “sme 3 sqdenexg SAL TEL pemtataees ewe ueren ade sob, “oan sng “Seon na bart ae ombnaaien orpootemare aces | endo} soy nog eae | “ewtotn ‘ovs| sommes | josenmot | vagnqae | mgedie | "aang | fume mean | won| nguum| “aouse| cmon] “ssmmr | orem me Somer | “win |_peremn| oowoe | “haes| Agemy | ‘amor so ‘aor “ape sn see sense pene eed sy'ecwsrser | anaense| sauce | ware | Const cahorwsasie | sapien | sume | ""NMasos | Goran | anaon feocreoneal | “emia | wren | ans | "Soar | popes ru, no ores naj eg 203) “an | pan (ett Anges | —seanee| “tie | omnzip step "Siero | sopoten | Sana | mane | canoe sean et onononoen| "rin | seria | goen| ognnog | emmies| era oe 40 mr | ee eee ee ‘ysiqruy soya paw spoyy sansa S004 vandeChapter1V To Control Plan Proces Failare Mode and Effects Analysis fae mode i heat of he proces to manic te a ito et of Remon os a i When the tam develops the Control Plan, they neod 10 assure thatthe PEMEA coment conta ore consent with dh coal ‘methods speciied inthe Control Plan. 1 Guides for Cool Pan development are incuedin Cheyer, Ford, GM; Advanced ProdictQuatiy Plasieg and Conral Pla APQP). AIAG. 9 APPENDICES‘sano dares wi 8 pos oso yee} nyo sue a 9 AONB aA PEA ‘OVIV OME yf OMIT PPE NO PON BE HRA 2G pop TER WIE) tamep fq Sues noyeoy © sq woradinoy pov eayey, suonsy poe aq uopofdueD SEL pO yeguodsoy sep sunjoo sped yen UO 2y Woy oguanaud wsonuog digeuoneal a OHS HDG OL, © ‘aunoo aauauns39 2910 ‘ye 2m on wumjos sjanwop wopmENaLA Tile VUES D MOL y(oresejn yu yt) us SSE UO & ‘suuod VaWIG sunoy ede :y xipuaddy Voapenddy rug duns‘Sample Forms “Appendix A Sample Forms Ie eal — He Dosen = | nye | ie ln 5 id | Deca ror Op noonesmog dus ey omen aera eed —t (Zieh = ‘esa wand |=nff peed ac ani sung ydsFo @}0 ‘Appeadis A PFMEA Forms ‘Sample Forms ‘Fo A: Basic frm (with minima infermation)* ‘© With Prevention and Detection Controls as separate columns + Fom B: Foo A wih Process SteyFunction and Requirements as separate columns (© Toassit inthe dteiniation of fallre modes + Form C: Form A with Prevention Contos Column 1 the leflof te Occurence column (© To better show the relationship between prevention controls to occurence raking ‘+ Form: Form B and € combined + Form £: Foo D with separte columns for Cureot Detection Process Controls (Cause and Faure Mode) © To highlight the need to consider cause relied controls + Form F: Fo B wih separate colons for Responiiliy snd Target Completion Due and Actions Taken and Completion Date + Form H: Form D and G combined (5 Tis frm wa adapted om that provided inthe Cheyer, Fr and GM; FMEA Mona! Elton, MAG. "Preventive and Detesive Contos may bein the same clu each cont feted with 2°" oD" rpenively.ues vantaa smog odes ‘yiuog vinta, N ff i ill i “a seen a sung jdong a DenesAppendix A Sample Forms Appendix A ‘Sample Forms Ez 1" BE | il | | Hil 7 } H Il : a Hl || alll i il els i i hh Hla = t ii i la lu | HIN | HElN FIMEA Form OW EMEA FormD sa dmoa vawaa uno oda V mpuoddy 6) 0 out awe vawad sung duesrauune noe sie ereeTs ANALYSES re q - ie ——— | = = Pim el SL ee ued Vad uog dens“Yana werskeans emoedse eu u pepnou oa nove varia WeIets out uw poyIUaD Om Latym SeoeHOR OU, ‘vans pao waits suopse.eU) See HT a mpdsy wouuosaua |, oun aM oe ‘swershsqne 20110 ys eoeps9qu weMPUL pu use deqng "uIEKS Jo Seu! 29 2A san 2 pond go soo) Amun 9 spay samy od aes Bop) Conppe ur HORRY 58 aus om) Aenea st VANE WIEKS © Boy sH200 EL WAIN 12407 wayskg :q xipueddy ‘vari por waists a mpeoddy‘Appendix B System Level FMEA Appendix B System Level FMEA, @|@ Relationships Multiple Levels of Design FMEAs Mor ty an ho of IME a en hie i ‘elatioships, This sa two way linkage (ee Figure B.3): ‘From Lover to Higher Lave: To effect of a ale mode at a ‘ven level oa fale mode athe next igh level Component Level failure mode ot any sublevel may ulimlely become a system ‘Bile mode with customer user rested effects. ‘From Higher to Lower level: The linkage fom a higher level 19 ‘nena te atts il pris mene ot @\@ i si!sn mony eet be decoy! of ‘Suvetaltat ofeot upp open ‘Provan oun penance Potent Fabre Hod Pott Flt Mtl seat since Fonction: 132 | 133-ssord pn sooo ay: Bupuns uy wot a 58 esenag) san a “Yad Tempo om jo odes 2 SA, Nekdi = (Q) x (0) x (5) ‘fupes (q) vor2stp pus (0) 2ousnna00 9) Susiae om Jo roopoud a 5} BquME AON YEE 34, Nd& 0} S8AneWaTY sjuauissessy ysIy eAneUsesly :9 xIpueddy suotesssesy ry aneuiy ‘pueddy |e Vang parr uml, se3n pus ax uo 0U3 Jano} yxou 24 0} ojo hood sussueypenY eanKeSAppendix Alternative Risk Assessments Alternative: SO (S x 0) ‘Setetoninproversents for those with the highest SO vale. Alternative: SOD, SD Some organizations have chosen to use SOD or SD as : 3. SOD is the norarthtc combination ofthe Detection, D=5 ‘The reulng SOD is 735, Example (SD) Severiy, S=7 Detection, The SOD, when sored prone the scenarios fi fd Lastly by detection, a 7h? 3 pm _ 3 [tt ot rar] > scene Appendix D Atenative Analysis Techniques Appendix D: Alternative Analyses Techniques Fallue Moe and fects Analysis oe of many tech used to es _ thre Design Review Based on Failure Modes (ORBFM) Design Review Bascd on Failure Modes is 2 snaysis of concerns related toa design change. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)Ateraive Anlyss Techniques ‘Appendix D Alemative Analyst Tecniques ‘Appendix D like Figure D2 FTA Tree Structure noel ved suofoy popuoUluiooee eeraiennng fe en) ALT Ly Ae Revell] (ileal al HL UA GA ea Gen anesensea oped | 3 68} monte [emanae a 3s W4EUC - pow anyey uo paseg me}Aoy uBjsoq FigoreD.t Example of DRBFM Elements 19 138References and Suggested Readings References and Suggested Readings 1549091, ped mem Par pein pln cfr Aled, HLS Ang and Win, Ting (1950). "Probl Conceps lnEnlaeringPloming and Da Ven t= Deo Ron Rll Wiy Pies ‘Kase, M. (2007, “Payee of Fire Approsch to FMEA", Tere ProcedingsReliabitiy and Mainainably Spaposin Krasch M. (2005). Foul Tree Anlyaisin Proc Reishi inrovemen”, Tara Proceedings ela and Metnalably Symposia. ‘0°Conner PDT, (2002 Prec Relist Egineeing in edo, (Wie) ‘Stu Ho Da and Ming-© Wang (199), Relablty Ants nEnlneeringdpileaon, Van Noted ‘Wet, D1. (2005). The Sx Sigme Prcttonrs Glee Dota Aalst, SPC Press, Kaos pp.31!- aS aust, M. 200), Sytem Relist Theory Cn), Wiley, 2008, 50 ning by Seti aod Ocoee) 186 SOD (asking bned on Seve, Oosumance