Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 175399

October 27, 2009

OPHELIA L. TUATIS, Petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES ELISEO ESCOL and VISMINDA ESCOL; HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, 22nd
DIVISION, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY; REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 11, SINDANGAN,
ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE; and THE SHERIFF OF RTC, BRANCH 11, SINDANGAN,
ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks the annulment
of the following Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00737-MIN: (a)
Resolution2 dated 10 February 2006 dismissing the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
of herein petitioner Ophelia L. Tuatis (Tuatis); (b) Resolution 3 dated 25 July 2006 denying Tuatis
Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated 10 February 2006; and (c) Resolution 4 dated 9
October 2006 denying Tuatis Motion for Leave to File a Second Motion for Reconsideration. The
instant Petition further prays for the annulment of the Order5 dated 26 September 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, Branch 11, in Civil Case No. S-618,
ordering the Sheriff to immediately serve the Writ of Execution issued on 7 March 2002.
The dispute arose from the following factual and procedural antecedents:
On 18 June 1996, Tuatis filed a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages 6 against herein
respondent Visminda Escol (Visminda) before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. S-618.
Tuatis alleged in her Complaint that sometime in November 1989, Visminda, as seller, and Tuatis, as
buyer, entered into a Deed of Sale of a Part of a Registered Land by Installment 7 (Deed of Sale by
Installment). The subject matter of said Deed was a piece of real property situated in Poblacion,
Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte and more particularly described as "[a] part of a registered land
being known as Lot No. 251, Pls-66 covered under OCT [Original Certificate of Title] No. P-5421; x x
x with an area of THREE HUNDRED (300) square meters, more or less" (subject property).
The significant portions of the Deed of Sale by Installment stated:
That for and in consideration of the sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00), Philippine
currency, the SELLER [Visminda8] hereby SELLS to the BUYER [Tuatis], the above-described parcel
of land under the following terms and conditions:
1. That the BUYER [Tuatis] shall pay to the SELLER [Visminda] the amount of THREE
THOUSAND PESOS (P3,000.00), as downpayment;

2. That the BUYER [Tuatis] shall pay to the SELLER [Visminda] the amount of FOUR
THOUSAND PESOS (P4,000.00), on or before December 31, 1989;
3. That the remaining balance of THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P3,000.00) shall be paid by
the BUYER [Tuatis] to the SELLER [Visminda] on or before January 31, 1990;
4. That failure of the BUYER [Tuatis] to pay the remaining balance within the period of three
months from the period stipulated above, then the BUYER [Tuatis] shall return the land
subject of this contract to the SELLER [Visminda] and the SELLER [Visminda] [shall] likewise
return all the amount paid by the BUYER [Tuatis].9
Tuatis claimed that of the entire purchase price of P10,000.00, she had paid Visminda P3,000.00 as
downpayment. The exact date of said payment was not, however, specified. Subsequently, Tuatis
paid P3,000.00 as installment on 19 December 1989, and another P1,000.00 installment on 17
February 1990. Tuatis averred that she paid Visminda the remaining P3,000.00 on 27 February 1990
in the presence of Eric Selda (Eric), a clerk in the law office of one Atty. Alanixon Selda. In support of
this averment, Tuatis attached to her Complaint a certification10 executed by Eric on 27 May 1996.
In the meantime, Tuatis already took possession of the subject property and constructed a
residential building thereon.
In 1996, Tuatis requested Visminda to sign a prepared absolute deed of sale covering the subject
property, but the latter refused, contending that the purchase price had not yet been fully paid. The
parties tried to amicably settle the case before the Lupon Barangay, to no avail. 11
Tuatis contended that Visminda failed and refused to sign the absolute deed of sale without any valid
reason. Thus, Tuatis prayed that the RTC order Visminda to do all acts for the consummation of the
contract sale, sign the absolute deed of sale and pay damages, as well as attorneys fees.
In her Answer,12 Visminda countered that, except for the P3,000.00 downpayment and P1,000.00
installment paid by Tuatis on 19 December 1989 and 17 February 1990,13 respectively, Tuatis made
no other payment to Visminda. Despite repeated verbal demands, Tuatis failed to comply with the
conditions that she and Visminda agreed upon in the Deed of Sale by Installment for the payment of
the balance of the purchase price for the subject property. Visminda asked that the RTC dismiss
Tuatis Complaint, or in the alternative, order Tuatis to return the subject property to Visminda after
Vismindas reimbursement of the P4,000.00 she had received from Tuatis.
After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision14 on 29 April 1999 in Civil Case No. S-618 in Vismindas
favor. The RTC concluded:
Under the facts and circumstances, the evidence for [Tuatis] has not established by satisfactory
proof as to (sic) her compliance with the terms and conditions setforth (sic) in [the Deed of Sale by
Installment] x x x.
xxxx
In contracts to sell, where ownership is retained by the seller and is not to pass until the full
payment, such payment, as we said, is a positive suspensive condition, the failure of which is not a
breach, casual or serious, but simply an event that prevented the obligation of the vendor to convey
title from acquiring binding force x x x.

xxxx
As the contract x x x is clear and unmistakable and the terms employed therein have not been
shown to belie or otherwise fail to express the true intention of the parties, and that the deed has not
been assailed on the ground of mutual mistake which would require its reformation, [the] same
should be given its full force and effect.
EVIDENCE (sic) at hand points of no full payment of the price, hence No. 4 of the stipulation
applies[,] which provides:
"That failure (sic) of the Buyer [Tuatis] to pay the remaining balance within the period of three
months from the period stipulated above, then the Buyer [Tuatis] shall return the land subject of this
Contract to the Seller [Visminda] and the Seller [Visminda] [shall] likewise return all the (sic) amount
paid by the Buyer [Tuatis]."
This stipulation is the law between the [Buyer] and [Seller], and should be complied with in good faith
x x x.
[Tuatis] constructed the building x x x in bad faith for, (sic) she had knowledge of the fact that the
Seller [Visminda] is still the absolute owner of the subject land. There was bad faith also on the part
of [Visminda] in accordance with the express provisions of Article 454 [of the New Civil Code] 15 since
[she] allowed [Tuatis] to construct the building x x x without any opposition on [her] part and so
occupy it. The rights of the parties must, therefore, be determined as if they both had acted in bad
faith. Their rights in such cases are governed by Article 448 of the New Civil Code of the
Philippines.16
The RTC decreed the dismissal of Tuatis Complaint for lack of merit, the return by Tuatis of physical
possession of the subject property to Visminda, and the return by Visminda of the P4,000.00 she
received from Tuatis.
Tuatis filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 65037. In a
Resolution17 dated 29 August 2000, however, the appellate court dismissed the appeal for failure of
Tuatis to serve and file her appellants brief within the second extended period for the same. An
Entry of Judgment18 was made in CA-G.R. CV No. 65037 on 29 September 2000, as a result of
which, the appealed RTC Decision dated 29 April 1999 in Civil Case No. S-618 became final and
executory.
Visminda filed a Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution19 before the RTC on 14 January 2002.
The RTC granted Vismindas Motion in a Resolution dated 21 February 2002, and issued the Writ of
Execution20 on 7 March 2002.
Tuatis thereafter filed before the RTC on 22 April 2002 a Motion to Exercise Right under Article 448
of the Civil Code of the Philippines.21 Tuatis moved that the RTC issue an order allowing her to buy
the subject property from Visminda. While Tuatis indeed had the obligation to pay the price of the
subject property, she opined that such should not be imposed if the value of the said property was
considerably more than the value of the building constructed thereon by Tuatis. Tuatis alleged that
the building she constructed was valued at P502,073.00,22 but the market value of the entire piece of
land measuring 4.0144 hectares, of which the subject property measuring 300 square meters formed
a part, was only about P27,000.00.23 Tuatis maintained that she then had the right to choose
between being indemnified for the value of her residential building or buying from Visminda the
parcel of land subject of the case. Tuatis stated that she was opting to exercise the second option.

On 20 December 2004, Visminda deposited the amount of P4,000.00 to the office of the Clerk of
Court of the RTC, pursuant to the Decision of the trial court dated 29 April 1999. 24
In the intervening time, the Writ of Execution issued on 7 March 2002 was yet to be served or
implemented by the Sheriff. This prompted Visminda to write a letter to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) to complain about the said delay. The OCA endorsed the letter to the RTC.
On 26 September 2005, the RTC issued an Order 25 directing the Sheriff to immediately serve or
enforce the Writ of Execution previously issued in Civil Case No. S-618, and to make a report and/or
return on the action taken thereon within a period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order.
On 10 October 2005, Tuatis filed before the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration26 of the Order dated
26 September 2005, praying that the same be set aside in view of the pendency of her previous
Motion to Exercise Right under Article 448 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. However, before the
RTC could rule upon Tuatis Motion for Reconsideration, the Sheriff enforced the Writ of Execution
on 27 October 2005 and submitted his Return to the RTC on 2 November 2005, reporting that the
subject writ was fully satisfied.
Tuatis immediately filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition
and Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction,27 which was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 00737-MIN. Tuatis sought in said
Petition the annulment of the RTC Order dated 26 September 2005, as well as the issuance of an
order commanding the RTC and the Sheriff to desist from undertaking any further proceedings in
Civil Case No. S-618, and an order directing the RTC to determine the rights of the parties under
Article 448 of the Civil Code.
In a Resolution28 dated 10 February 2006, the Court of Appeals dismissed outright Tuatis Petition for
failure to completely pay the required docket fees, to attach a certified true or authenticated copy of
the assailed RTC Order dated 26 September 2005, and to indicate the place of issue of her
counsels IBP and PTR Official Receipts.
Tuatis filed a Motion for Reconsideration29 of the Resolution dated 10 February 2006, but said Motion
was denied by the appellate court in another Resolution dated 25 July 2006 on the ground that
Tuatis had not taken any action to rectify the infirmities of her Petition.
Tuatis subsequently filed a Motion for Leave to File a Second Motion for Reconsideration, 30 but it
was similarly denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated 9 October 2006, as Section 2,
Rule 5231 of the Rules of Court proscribes the filing of a second motion for reconsideration.
Hence, Tuatis filed the instant Petition, principally arguing that Article 448 of the Civil Code must be
applied to the situation between her and Visminda.
According to Tuatis, grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of their jurisdiction, was
committed by the RTC in issuing the Order dated 26 September 2005, and by the Sheriff in enforcing
the Writ of Execution on 27 October 2005. Tuatis insists that the Motion for Reconsideration of the
Order dated 26 September 2005 that she filed on 10 October 2005 legally prevented the execution
of the RTC Decision dated 29 April 1999, since the rights of the parties to the case had yet to be
determined pursuant to Article 448 of the Civil Code. 32 Tuatis reiterates that the building she
constructed is valued at P502,073.00, per assessment of the Municipal Assessor of Sindangan,
Zamboanga del Norte; while the entire piece of land, which includes the subject property, has a
market value of only about P27,000.00, based on Tax Declaration No. 12464 issued in the year
2000.33 Such being the case, Tuatis posits that she is entitled to buy the land at a price to be

determined by the Court or, alternatively, she is willing to sell her house to Visminda in the amount
of P502,073.00.
In addition, Tuatis attributes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of the Court of Appeals for dismissing outright her Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition
and Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, and subsequently denying her Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for
Leave to File a Second Motion for Reconsideration.
The Court grants the present Petition but for reasons other than those proffered by Tuatis.
Procedural deficiencies of Tuatis Petition before the Court of Appeals
It is true that Tuatis committed several procedural faux pas that would have, ordinarily, warranted the
dismissal of her Petition in CA-G.R. No. 00737-MIN before the Court of Appeals.
In its Resolution dated 10 February 2006, the Court of Appeals dismissed outright the Petition
for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction filed by Tuatis for failure to comply with the following
requirements for such a petition: (a) to completely pay the required docket fees, (b) to attach a
certified true or authenticated copy of the assailed RTC Order dated 26 September 2005, and (c) to
indicate the place of issue of her counsels IBP and PTR Official Receipts.
Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court lays down the requirements for original cases filed before
the Court of Appeals and the effect of non-compliance therewith, relevant portions of which are
reproduced below:
SEC. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with requirements. x x x.
xxxx
It shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies together with proof of service thereof on the
respondent with the original copy intended for the court indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall
be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment,
order, resolution, or ruling subject thereof, such material portions of the record as are referred to
therein, and other documents relevant or pertinent thereto. The certification shall be accomplished
by the proper clerk of court or by his duly authorized representative, or by the proper officer of the
court, tribunal, agency or office involved or by his duly authorized representative. The other requisite
number of copies of the petition shall be accompanied by clearly legible plain copies of all
documents attached to the original.
xxxx
The petitioner shall pay the corresponding docket and other lawful fees to the clerk of court
and deposit the amount of P500.00 for costs at the time of the filing of the petition.
The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient
ground for the dismissal of the petition. (Emphases ours.)
The sound reason behind the policy of the Court in requiring the attachment to the petition
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, or quo warranto of a clearly legible duplicate original or

certified true copy of the assailed judgment or order, is to ensure that the said copy submitted for
review is a faithful reproduction of the original, so that the reviewing court would have a definitive
basis in its determination of whether the court, body, or tribunal which rendered the assailed
judgment or order committed grave abuse of discretion.34 Also, the Court has consistently held that
payment of docket fees within the prescribed period is jurisdictional and is necessary for the
perfection of an appeal.35
Indeed, the last paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46 states that non-compliance with any of the
requirements stated therein shall constitute sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.
However, the Court, in several cases,36also declared that said provision must not be taken to mean
that the petition shall be automatically dismissed in every instance of non-compliance. The power
conferred upon the Court of Appeals to dismiss an appeal, or even an original action, as in this case,
is discretionary and not merely ministerial. With that affirmation comes the caution that such
discretion must be a sound one, to be exercised in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair
play, having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case.37
It must be borne in mind that the rules of procedure are intended to promote, rather than frustrate,
the ends of justice, and while the swift unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, it,
nevertheless, must not be met at the expense of substantial justice. Technical and procedural rules
are intended to help secure, not suppress, the cause of justice; and a deviation from the rigid
enforcement of the rules may be allowed to attain that prime objective for, after all, the dispensation
of justice is the core reason for the existence of courts.38
Hence, technicalities must be avoided. The law abhors technicalities that impede the cause of
justice. The court's primary duty is to render or dispense justice. A litigation is not a game of
technicalities. Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier's thrust. Technicality, when it
deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy,
deserves scant consideration from courts. Litigations must be decided on their merits and not on
technicality. Every party-litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
determination of his cause, free from the unacceptable plea of technicalities. Thus, dismissal of
appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the court is to encourage
hearings of appeals on their merits and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid,
technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure, not override, substantial justice. It
is a far better and more prudent course of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford
the parties a review of the case on appeal to attain the ends of justice rather than dispose of the
case on technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy
disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage, of justice. 39
In this case, the Court finds that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in
focusing on the procedural deficiencies of Tuatis Petition and completely turning a blind eye to the
merits of the same. The peculiar circumstances of the present case and the interest of substantial
justice justify the setting aside, pro hac vice, of the procedural defects of Tuatis Petition in CA-G.R.
No. 00737-MIN.
Perusal of the RTC Decision dated 29 April 1999
The RTC, in the body of its Decision dated 29 April 1999 in Civil Case No. S-618, found that Tuatis
breached the conditions stipulated in the Deed of Sale by Installment between her and Visminda; but
since both Tuatis and Visminda were guilty of bad faith, "[t]heir rights in such cases are governed by
Article 448 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines." 40
Article 448 of the Civil Code, referred to by the RTC, provides:

ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith,
shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the
indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the
price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be
obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such
case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the
building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in
case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof. (Emphases supplied.)
According to the aforequoted provision, the landowner can choose between appropriating the
building by paying the proper indemnity for the same, as provided for in Articles 546 41 and 54842 of
the Civil Code; or obliging the builder to pay the price of the land, unless its value is considerably
more than that of the structures, in which case the builder in good faith shall pay reasonable rent. 43
The Court notes, however, that the RTC, in the dispositive portion of its 29 April 1999 Decision,
which exactly reads
WHEREFORE, premises studiedly considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(1) DISMISSING the Complaint for lack of merit;
(2) ORDERING [Tuatis] to return the physical possession of the land in question to
[Visminda]; and,
(3) ORDERING [Visminda] to return the P4,000.00 she received as evidenced by Exhibit "B"
and Exhibit "C"44 to [Tuatis].45
utterly failed to make an adjudication on the rights of Tuatis and Visminda under Article 448 of the
Civil Code. It would seem that the decretal part of said RTC judgment was limited to implementing
the following paragraph in the Deed of Sale by Installment:
4. That failure of the BUYER [Tuatis] to pay the remaining balance within the period of three months
from the period stipulated above, then the BUYER [Tuatis] shall return the land subject of this
contract to the SELLER [Visminda] and the SELLER [Visminda] [shall] likewise return all the amount
paid by the BUYER [Tuatis].46
without considering the effects of Article 448 of the Civil Code.
It was this apparent incompleteness of the fallo of the RTC Decision dated 29 April 1999 that
resulted in the present controversy, and that this Court is compelled to address for a just and
complete settlement of the rights of the parties herein.
Finality of the RTC Decision dated 19 April 1999
The Court has not lost sight of the fact that the RTC Decision dated 29 April 1999 in Civil Case No.
S-618 already became final and executory in view of the dismissal by the appellate court of Tuatis
appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 650307 and the entry of judgment made on 29 September 2000.
Nothing is more settled in law than that when a final judgment is executory, it thereby becomes
immutable and unalterable. The judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and

regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the
highest Court of the land. The doctrine is founded on considerations of public policy and sound
practice that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments must become final at some definite point in
time. The only recognized exceptions are the corrections of clerical errors or the making of the socalled nunc pro tunc entries, in which case there is no prejudice to any party, and, of course, where
the judgment is void.47
Equally well-settled is the rule that the operative part in every decision is the dispositive portion or
the fallo, and where there is conflict between the fallo and the body of the decision, the fallo controls.
This rule rests on the theory that the fallo is the final order, while the opinion in the body is merely a
statement, ordering nothing.48
Jurisprudence also provides, however, that where there is an ambiguity caused by an omission or a
mistake in the dispositive portion of the decision, the Court may clarify such an ambiguity by an
amendment even after the judgment has become final. In doing so, the Court may resort to the
pleadings filed by the parties and the findings of fact and the conclusions of law expressed in the text
or body of the decision.49 Therefore, even after the RTC Decision dated 29 April 1999 had already
become final and executory, this Court cannot be precluded from making the necessary amendment
thereof, so that the fallo will conform to the body of the said decision.
If the Court does not act upon the instant Petition, Tuatis loses ownership over the building she
constructed, and in which she has been residing, allegedly worth P502,073.00, without any
recompense therefor whatsoever; while Visminda, by returning Tuatis previous payments
totaling P4,000.00, not just recovers the subject property, but gains the entire building without paying
indemnity for the same. Hence, the decision of the Court to give due course to the Petition at bar,
despite the finality of the RTC Decision dated 29 April 1999, should not be viewed as a denigration
of the doctrine of immutability of final judgments, but a recognition of the equally sacrosanct doctrine
that a person should not be allowed to profit or enrich himself inequitably at another's expense.
Furthermore, the Court emphasizes that it is not even changing or reversing any of the findings of
fact and law of the RTC in its Decision dated 29 April 1999. This Court is still bound by said RTC
judgment insofar as it found that Tuatis failed to fully pay for the price of the subject property; but
since both Tuatis and Visminda were in bad faith, Article 448 of the Civil Code would govern their
rights. The Court herein is simply clarifying or completing the obviously deficient decretal portion of
the decision, so that said portion could effectively order the implementation of the actual ruling of the
RTC, as clearly laid down in the rationale of the same decision.
Applying Article 448 and other related provisions of the Civil Code
Taking into consideration the provisions of the Deed of Sale by Installment and Article 448 of the
Civil Code, Visminda has the following options:
Under the first option, Visminda may appropriate for herself the building on the subject property after
indemnifying Tuatis for the necessary50 and useful expenses51 the latter incurred for said building, as
provided in Article 546 of the Civil Code.
It is worthy to mention that in Pecson v. Court of Appeals,52 the Court pronounced that the amount to
be refunded to the builder under Article 546 of the Civil Code should be the current market value of
the improvement, thus:
The objective of Article 546 of the Civil Code is to administer justice between the parties involved. In
this regard, this Court had long ago stated in Rivera vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila [40

Phil. 717 (1920)] that the said provision was formulated in trying to adjust the rights of the owner and
possessor in good faith of a piece of land, to administer complete justice to both of them in such a
way as neither one nor the other may enrich himself of that which does not belong to him. Guided by
this precept, it is therefore the current market value of the improvements which should be made the
basis of reimbursement. A contrary ruling would unjustly enrich the private respondents who would
otherwise be allowed to acquire a highly valued income-yielding four-unit apartment building for a
measly amount. Consequently, the parties should therefore be allowed to adduce evidence on the
present market value of the apartment building upon which the trial court should base its finding as
to the amount of reimbursement to be paid by the landowner. (Emphasis ours.)
Until Visminda appropriately indemnifies Tuatis for the building constructed by the latter, Tuatis may
retain possession of the building and the subject property.
Under the second option, Visminda may choose not to appropriate the building and, instead, oblige
Tuatis to pay the present or current fair value of the land.53 The P10,000.00 price of the subject
property, as stated in the Deed of Sale on Installment executed in November 1989, shall no longer
apply, since Visminda will be obliging Tuatis to pay for the price of the land in the exercise of
Vismindas rights under Article 448 of the Civil Code, and not under the said Deed. Tuatis obligation
will then be statutory, and not contractual, arising only when Visminda has chosen her option under
Article 448 of the Civil Code.
1avvphi1

Still under the second option, if the present or current value of the land, the subject property herein,
turns out to be considerably more than that of the building built thereon, Tuatis cannot be obliged to
pay for the subject property, but she must pay Visminda reasonable rent for the same. Visminda and
Tuatis must agree on the terms of the lease; otherwise, the court will fix the terms.
Necessarily, the RTC should conduct additional proceedings before ordering the execution of the
judgment in Civil Case No. S-618. Initially, the RTC should determine which of the aforementioned
options Visminda will choose. Subsequently, the RTC should ascertain: (a) under the first option, the
amount of indemnification Visminda must pay Tuatis; or (b) under the second option, the value of the
subject property vis--vis that of the building, and depending thereon, the price of, or the reasonable
rent for, the subject property, which Tuatis must pay Visminda.
The Court highlights that the options under Article 448 are available to Visminda, as the owner of the
subject property. There is no basis for Tuatis demand that, since the value of the building she
constructed is considerably higher than the subject property, she may choose between buying the
subject property from Visminda and selling the building to Visminda for P502,073.00. Again, the
choice of options is for Visminda, not Tuatis, to make. And, depending on Vismindas choice, Tuatis
rights as a builder under Article 448 are limited to the following: (a) under the first option, a right to
retain the building and subject property until Visminda pays proper indemnity; and (b) under the
second option, a right not to be obliged to pay for the price of the subject property, if it is
considerably higher than the value of the building, in which case, she can only be obliged to pay
reasonable rent for the same.
The rule that the choice under Article 448 of the Civil Code belongs to the owner of the land is in
accord with the principle of accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the principal and not the other
way around. Even as the option lies with the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is
preclusive.54 The landowner cannot refuse to exercise either option and compel instead the owner of
the building to remove it from the land.55
The raison detre for this provision has been enunciated thus: Where the builder, planter or sower
has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights arises between the owners, and it becomes necessary to

protect the owner of the improvements without causing injustice to the owner of the land. In view of
the impracticability of creating a state of forced co-ownership, the law has provided a just solution by
giving the owner of the land the option to acquire the improvements after payment of the proper
indemnity, or to oblige the builder or planter to pay for the land and the sower the proper rent. He
cannot refuse to exercise either option. It is the owner of the land who is authorized to exercise the
option, because his right is older, and because, by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the
ownership of the accessory thing.56
Vismindas Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution cannot be deemed as an expression of her
choice to recover possession of the subject property under the first option, since the options under
Article 448 of the Civil Code and their respective consequences were also not clearly presented to
her by the 19 April 1999 Decision of the RTC. She must then be given the opportunity to make a
choice between the options available to her after being duly informed herein of her rights and
obligations under both.
As a final note, the directives given by the Court to the trial court in Depra v. Dumlao 57 may prove
useful as guidelines to the RTC herein in ensuring that the additional proceedings for the final
settlement of the rights of the parties under Article 448 of the Civil Code shall be conducted as
thoroughly and promptly as possible.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court:
(1) GRANTS the instant Petition;
(2) ANNULS AND SETS ASIDE (a) the Resolution dated 21 February 2002 of the Regional
Trial Court of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, Branch 11, ordering the issuance of a writ
for the execution of the Decision dated 19 April 1999 of the said trial court in Civil Case No.
S-618; (b) the Writ of Execution issued on 7 March 2002; and (c) the actions undertaken by
the Sheriff to enforce the said Writ of Execution;
(3) DIRECTS the Regional Trial Court of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, Branch 11, to
conduct further proceedings to determine with deliberate dispatch: (a) the facts essential to
the proper application of Article 448 of the Civil Code, and (b) respondent Visminda Escols
choice of option under the same provision; and
(4) Further DIRECTS the Regional Trial Court of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, Branch
11, to undertake the implementation of respondent Visminda Escols choice of option under
Article 448 of the Civil Code, as soon as possible.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING*
Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD**
Associate Justice
ATT E S TATI O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C E R TI F I C ATI O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, it
is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
Per Special Order No. 755, dated 12 October 2009, signed by Chief Justice Reynato S.
Puno designating Associate Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing to replace Associate Justice
Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, who is on official leave.
*

Per Special Order No. 753, dated 12 October 2009, signed by Chief Justice Reynato S.
Puno designating Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad to replace Associate Justice Presbitero
J. Velasco, Jr., who is on official leave.
**

Rollo, pp. 4-22.

Penned by Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario with Associate Justices Romulo V. Borja
and Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal, concurring; rollo, pp. 38-39.
2

Rollo, pp. 45-46.

Id. at 58.

Id. at 55.

CA rollo, pp. 17-20.

Id. at 21.

In the Deed of Sale of a Part of a Registered Land by Installment, Visminda was referred to
as "Visminda Crampatanta, x x x married to Eliseo Escol x x x."
8

CA rollo, p. 21.

10

Id. at 22A-23.

11

Id. at 24.

12

Id. at 25-29.

The payments were each evidenced by a certification signed by Visminda that she
received the aforesaid amounts from Tuatis, which were marked as Exhibits B and C,
respectively, in the proceedings before the RTC; CA rollo, p. 22.
13

14

Penned by Judge Wilfredo G. Ochotorena; CA rollo, pp. 30-54.

Although the Decision mentioned Article 454 of the New Civil Code, the same was
apparently erroneous since the applicable provision was Article 453 of the said code, which
provides:
15

ART. 453. If there was bad faith, not only on the part of the person who built, planted
or sowed on the land of another, but also on the part of the owner of such land, the
rights of one and the other shall be the same as though both had acted in good faith.
It is understood that there is bad faith on the part of the landowner whenever the act
was done with his knowledge and without opposition on his part.
16

CA rollo, pp. 49-54.

Penned by Associate Justice B.A. Adefuin-De la Cruz with Associate Justices Cancio C.
Garcia and Renato C. Dacudao, concurring. Records, p. 123.
17

18

Records, p. 124.

19

Id. at 125-126.

20

CA rollo, pp. 76-77.

21

Id. at 55-59.

22

Id. at 60-61.

This amount was derived from Tax Declaration No. 12464, covering the subject property.
(CA rollo, p. 62.)
23

24

Records, p. 176.

25

CA rollo, p. 66.

26

Id. at 67-75.

Impleaded therein were the spouses Eliseo and Visminda Escol, the RTC of Sindangan,
Zamboanga del Norte, Branch 11 and the Sheriff of the said trial court. (CA rollo, pp. 1-16.)
27

28

CA rollo, pp. 81-82.

29

Id. at 85-89.

30

Id. at 94-106.

31

Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 2. Second motion for reconsideration. No second motion for reconsideration
of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained.

ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good
faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after
payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built
or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However,
the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than
that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the
land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties
shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the
terms thereof.
32

33

CA rollo, p. 62.

Durban Apartments Corporation v. Catacutan, G.R. No. 167136, 14 December 2005, 477
SCRA 801, 808; Quintano v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 144517, 13
December 2004, 446 SCRA 193, 202-203.
34

35

Carlos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 134473, 30 March 2006, 485 SCRA 578, 583.

In Garcia v. Philippine Airlines, Inc. (G.R. No. 160798, 8 June 2005, 459 SCRA 768, 780),
the Court held that "if, upon its initial review of the petition, the Court of Appeals is of the view
that additional pleadings, documents or order should have been submitted and appended to
the petition, it has the following options: (a) dismiss the petition under the last paragraph of
[Section 3,] Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; (b) order the petitioner to submit the required
additional pleadings, documents, or order within a specific period of time; or (c) order the
petitioner to file an amended petition appending thereto the required pleadings, documents
or order within a fixed period." (See also Lao v. Court of Appeals [382 Phil. 583, 604
(2000)]; Paras v. Judge Baldado [406 Phil. 589, 596 (2001)]; Hilario v. People [G.R. No.
161070, 14 April 2008, 551 SCRA 191, 201].)
36

Similarly, in La Salette College v. Pilotin (463 Phil. 785, 794 [2003]), the Court
recognized that, notwithstanding the mandatory nature of the requirement of
payment of appellate docket fees, its strict application is qualified by the following:
first, failure to pay those fees within the reglementary period allows only

discretionary, not automatic, dismissal; second, such power should be used by the
court in conjunction with its exercise of sound discretion in accordance with the
tenets of justice and fair play, as well as with a great deal of circumspection in
consideration of all attendant circumstances. (See also Public Estates Authority v.
Yujuico [404 Phil. 91, 101 (2001); Jose v. Court of Appeals [447 Phil. 159, 165
(2003); Villamor v. Court of Appeals [478 Phil. 728, 735-736 (2004), citing Buenaflor
v. Court of Appeals [400 Phil. 395, 401-402 (2000)].)
Philippine Merchant Marine School, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 432 Phil. 733, 741-742
(2002).
37

General Milling Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 442 Phil. 425, 428
(2002).
38

39

Aguam v. Court of Appeals, 388 Phil. 587, 595 (2000).

40

In accordance with Article 453 of the Civil Code which provides:

ART. 453. If there was bad faith, not only on the part of the person who built, planted
or sowed on the land of another, but also on the part of the owner of such land, the
rights of one and the other shall be the same as though both had acted in good
faith.
It is understood that there is bad faith on the part of the landowner whenever the act
was done with his knowledge and without opposition on his part. (Emphasis ours.)

ART. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the
possessor in good faith may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor.
41

Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the same
right of retention, the person who has defeated him in the possession having the
option of refunding the amount of the expenses or of paying the increase in value
which the thing may have acquired by reason thereof.
ART. 548. Expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure shall not be refunded to the
possessor in good faith; but he may remove the ornaments with which he has embellished
the principal thing if it suffers no injury thereby, and if his successor in the possession does
not prefer to refund the amount expended.
42

43

Macasaet v. Macasaet, 482 Phil. 853, 874 (2004).

Exhibits B and C are the certifications signed by Visminda, stating that she indeed received
the amounts of P3,000.00 and P1,000.00 from Tuatis on 19 December 1989 and 17
February 1990, respectively.
44

45

CA rollo, p. 54.

46

Id. at 21.

Mayon Estate Corporation v. Altura, G.R. No. 134462, 18 October 2004, 440 SCRA 377,
386.
47

Mendoza, Jr. v. San Miguel Foods, Inc., G.R. No. 158684, May 16, 2005, 458 SCRA 664,
676-677, cited in Florentino v. Rivera, G.R. No. 167968, 23 January 2006, 479 SCRA 522,
528-529.
48

49

Partosa-Jo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 82606, 18 December 1992, 216 SCRA 692, 697.

Necessary expenses have been variously described by the Spanish commentators as

those made for the preservation of the thing (4 Manresa's Comentarios al Codigo Civil, p.
258); as those without which the thing would deteriorate or be lost (Scaevola's Comentarios
al Codigo Civil, p. 408); as those that augment the income of the things upon which they are
expanded (4 Manresa's Comentarios al Codigo Civil, p. 261; 8 Scaevola's Comentarios al
Codigo Civil, p. 416). Among the necessary expenditures are those incurred for cultivation,
production, upkeep, etc. (4 Manresa's Comentarios al Codigo Civil, p. 257). (Mendoza v. De
Guzman, 52 Phil. 164, 171 [1928].)
50

Useful expenses are incurred to give greater utility or productivity to the thing. (Tolentino,
Civil Code, Vol. II (1992 ed.), p. 294.
51

52

314 Phil. 313, 324-325 (1995).

53

See Depra v. Dumlao, G.R. No. L-57348, 16 May 1985, 136 SCRA 475.

54

Philippine National Bank v. De Jesus, 458 Phil. 454, 459 (2003).

Technogas Philippines Manufacturing Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 471, 482
(1997).
55

56

Depra v. Dumlao, supra note 53 at 483.

57

The fallo in Depra v. Dumlao (ibid.) reads:

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial Court is hereby set aside, and this case is
hereby ordered remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo for further proceedings
consistent with Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code, as follows:
1. The trial Court shall determine
a) the present fair price of DEPRA's 34 square-meter area of land;
b) the amount of the expenses spent by DUMLAO for the building of the
kitchen;
c) the increase in value ("plus value") which the said area of 34 square
meters may have acquired by reason thereof, and
d) whether the value of said area of land is considerably more than that of the
kitchen built thereon.
2. After said amounts shall have been determined by competent evidence, the
Regional Trial Court shall render judgment, as follows:

a) The trial Court shall grant DEPRA a period of fifteen (15) days within which
to exercise his option under the law (Article 448, Civil Code), whether to
appropriate the kitchen as his own by paying to DUMLAO either the amount
of the expenses spent by DUMLAO for the building of the kitchen, or the
increase in value ("plus value") which the said area of 34 square meters may
have acquired by reason thereof, or to oblige DUMLAO to pay the price of
said area. The amounts to be respectively paid by DUMLAO and DEPRA, in
accordance with the option thus exercised by written notice of the other party
and to the Court, shall be paid by the obligor within fifteen (15) days from
such notice of the option by tendering the amount to the Court in favor of the
party entitled to receive it;
b) The trial Court shall further order that if DEPRA exercises the option to
oblige DUMLAO to pay the price of the land but the latter rejects such
purchase because, as found by the trial Court, the value of the land is
considerably more than that of the kitchen, DUMLAO shall give written notice
of such rejection to DEPRA and to the Court within fifteen (15) days from
notice of DEPRA's option to sell the land. In that event, the parties shall be
given a period of fifteen (15) days from such notice of rejection within which
to agree upon the terms of the lease, and give the Court formal written notice
of such agreement and its provisos. If no agreement is reached by the
parties, the trial Court, within fifteen (15) days from and after the termination
of the said period fixed for negotiation, shall then fix the terms of the lease,
provided that the monthly rental to be fixed by the Court shall not be less
than Ten Pesos (P10.00) per month, payable within the first five (5) days of
each calendar month. The period for the forced lease shall not be more than
two (2) years, counted from the finality of the judgment, considering the long
period of time since 1952 that DUMLAO has occupied the subject area. The
rental thus fixed shall be increased by ten percent (10%) for the second year
of the forced lease. DUMLAO shall not make any further constructions or
improvements on the kitchen. Upon expiration of the two-year period, or upon
default by DUMLAO in the payment of rentals for two (2) consecutive
months, DEPRA shall be entitled to terminate the forced lease, to recover his
land, and to have the kitchen removed by DUMLAO or at the latter's
expense. The rentals herein provided shall be tendered by DUMLAO to the
Court for payment to DEPRA, and such tender shall constitute evidence of
whether or not compliance was made within the period fixed by the Court.
c) In any event, DUMLAO shall pay DEPRA an amount computed at Ten
Pesos (P10.00) per month as reasonable compensation for the occupancy of
DEPRA's land for the period counted from 1952, the year DUMLAO occupied
the subject area, up to the commencement date of the forced lease referred
to in the preceding paragraph;
d) The periods to be fixed by the trial Court in its Decision shall be
inextendible, and upon failure of the party obliged to tender to the trial Court
the amount due to the obligee, the party entitled to such payment shall be
entitled to an order of execution for the enforcement of payment of the
amount due and for compliance with such other acts as may be required by
the prestation due the obligee.
No costs.