SALVADOR H. LAUREL, petitioner, vs.

RAMON GARCIA, as head of the Asset

Privatization Trust, RAUL MANGLAPUS, as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and
CATALINO MACARAIG, as Executive Secretary, respondents.||| (Laurel v.
Garcia, G.R. No. 92013, 92047, [July 25, 1990], 265 PHIL 827-864)
Facts:
The subject property in this case is one of the four (4) properties in Japan acquired
by the Philippine government under the Reparations Agreement entered into with
Japan on May 9, 1956, the other lots being:
(1) The Nampeidai Property at 11-24 Nampeidai-machi, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo which has
an area of approximately 2,489.96 square meters, and is at present the site of the
Philippine Embassy Chancery;
(2) The Kobe Commercial Property at 63 Naniwa-cho, Kobe, with an area of around
764.72 square meters and categorized as a commercial lot now being used as a
warehouse and parking lot for the consulate staff; and
(3) The Kobe Residential Property at 1-980-2 Obanoyamacho, Shinohara, Nada-ku,
Kobe, a residential lot which is now vacant.
The properties and the capital goods and services procured from the Japanese
government for national development projects are part of the indemnification to the
Filipino people for their losses in life and property and their suffering during World
War II.
The Reparations Agreement provides that reparations valued at $550 million would
be payable in twenty (20) years in accordance with annual schedules of
procurements to be fixed by the Philippine and Japanese governments (Article 2,
Reparations Agreement). Rep. Act. No. 1789, the Reparations Law, prescribes the
national policy on procurement and utilization of reparations and development
loans. The procurements are divided into those for use by the government sector
and those for private parties in projects as the then National Economic Council shall
determine. Those intended for the private sector shall be made available by sale to
Filipino citizens or to one hundred (100%) percent Filipino-owned entities in national
development projects.
The Roppongi property was acquired from the Japanese government under the
Second Year Schedule and listed under the heading "Government Sector", through
Reparations Contract No. 300 dated June 27, 1958. The Roponggi property consists
of the land and building "for the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy" (Annex M-D to
Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 503). As intended, it became the site of the
Philippine Embassy until the latter was transferred to Nampeidai on July 22, 1976
when the Roppongi building needed major repairs. Due to the failure of our

government to provide necessary funds, the Roppongi property has remained

undeveloped since that time.
A proposal was presented to President Corazon C. Aquino by former Philippine
Ambassador to Japan, Carlos J. Valdez, to make the property the subject of a lease
agreement with a Japanese firm Kajima Corporation which shall construct two
(2) buildings in Roppongi and one (1) building in Nampeidai and renovate the
present Philippine Chancery in Nampeidai. The consideration of the construction
would be the lease to the foreign corporation of one (1) of the buildings to be
constructed in Roppongi and the two (2) buildings in Nampeidai. The other building
in Roppongi shall then be used as the Philippine Embassy Chancery. At the end of
the lease period, all the three leased buildings shall be occupied and used by the
Philippine government. No change of ownership or title shall occur. (See Annex "B"
to Reply to Comment) The Philippine government retains the title all throughout the
lease period and thereafter. However, the government has not acted favorably on
this proposal which is pending approval and ratification between the parties.
Indeed, on August 11, 1986, President Aquino created a committee to study the
disposition/utilization of Philippine government properties in Tokyo and Kobe, Japan
through Administrative Order No. 3, followed by Administrative Orders Numbered 3A, B, C and D.
On July 25, 1987, the President issued Executive Order No. 296 entitling non-Filipino
citizens or entities to avail of reparations' capital goods and services in the event of
sale, lease or disposition. The four properties in Japan including the Roppongi were
specifically mentioned in the first "Whereas" clause.
Amidst opposition by various sectors, the Executive branch of the government has
been pushing, with great vigor, its decision to sell the reparations properties
starting with the Roppongi lot. The property has twice been set for bidding at a
minimum floor price at $225 million. The first bidding was a failure since only one
bidder qualified. The second one, after postponements, has not yet materialized.
The last scheduled bidding on February 21, 1990 was restrained by his Court. Later,
the rules on bidding were changed such that the $225 million floor price became
merely a suggested floor price
Issues:
(1) Can the Roppongi property and others of its kind be alienated by the
Philippine Government?; and
(2) Does the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have the authority
and jurisdiction, to sell the Roppongi property?
Held:

1. No. The nature of the Roppongi lot as property for public service is expressly
spelled out. It is dictated by the terms of the Reparations Agreement and the
corresponding contract of procurement which bind both the Philippine government
and the Japanese government.
There can be no doubt that it is of public dominion unless it is convincingly shown
that the property has become patrimonial. This, the respondents have failed to do.
As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It
cannot be alienated. Its ownership is a special collective ownership for general use
and enjoyment, an application to the satisfaction of collective needs, and resides in
the social group. The purpose is not to serve the State as a juridical person, but the
citizens; it is intended for the common and public welfare and cannot be the object
of appropriation.
The applicable provisions of the Civil Code are:

"ART. 419. Property is either of public dominion or of private ownership.

"ART. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
"(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and
bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar
character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended
for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.
"ART. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the
preceding article, is patrimonial property."
The Roppongi property is correctly classified under paragraph 2 of Article 420 of the
Civil Code as property belonging to the State and intended for some public service.
Has the intention of the government regarding the use of the property been
changed because the lot has been idle for some years? Has it become patrimonial?
The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual
Embassy service does not automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any such
conversion happens only if the property is withdrawn from public use (Cebu Oxygen
and Acetylene Co. v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481 [1975]). A property continues to be part
of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership "until
there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from
being such (Ignacio v. Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335 [1960]).

The respondents enumerate various pronouncements by concerned public officials

insinuating a change of intention. We emphasize, however, that an abandonment of
the intention to use the Roppongi property for public service and to make it
patrimonial property under Article 422 of the Civil Code must be definite.
Abandonment cannot be inferred from the non-use alone specially if the non-use
was attributable not to the government's own deliberate and indubitable will but to
a lack of financial support to repair and improve the property (See Heirs of Felino
Santiago v. Lazarao, 166 SCRA 368 [1988]). Abandonment must be a certain and
positive act based on correct legal premises.
A mere transfer of the Philippine Embassy to Nampeidai in 1976 is not
relinquishment of the Roppongi property's original purpose. Even the failure by the
government to repair the building in Roppongi is not abandonment since as earlier
stated, there simply was a shortage of government funds. The recent Administrative
Orders authorizing a study of the status and conditions of government properties in
Japan were merely directives for investigation but did not in any way signify a clear
intention to dispose of the properties.

2. No. It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the government
on his or her own sole will. Any such conveyance must be authorized and approved
by a law enacted by the Congress. It requires executive and legislative concurrence.
Resolution No. 55 of the Senate dated June 8, 1989, asking for the deferment of the
sale of the Roppongi property does not withdraw the property from public domain
much less authorize its sale. It is a mere resolution; it is not a formal declaration
abandoning the public character of the Roppongi property. In fact, the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations is conducting hearings on Senate Resolution No.
734 which raises serious policy considerations and calls for a fact-finding
investigation of the circumstances behind the decision to sell the Philippine
government properties in Japan. LexLib
The resolution of this Court in Ojeda v. Bidding Committee, et al., supra, did not
pass upon the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 296. Contrary to respondents'
assertion, we did not uphold the authority of the President to sell the Roppongi
property. The Court stated that the constitutionality of the executive order was not
the real issue and that resolving the constitutional question was "neither necessary
nor finally determinative of the case." The Court noted that "[W]hat petitioner
ultimately questions is the use of the proceeds of the disposition of the Roppongi
property." In emphasizing that "the decision of the Executive to dispose of the
Roppongi property to finance the CARP . . . cannot be questioned" in view of Section
63 (c) of Rep. Act. No. 6657, the Court did not acknowledge the fact that the
property became alienable nor did it indicate that the President was authorized to

dispose of the Roppongi property. The resolution should be read to mean that in
case the Roppongi property is re-classified to be patrimonial and alienable by
authority of law, the proceeds of a sale may be used for national economic
development projects including the CARP.
Moreover, the sale in 1989 did not materialize. The petitions before us question the
proposed 1990 sale of the Roppongi property. We are resolving the issues raised in
these petitions, not the issues raised in 1989.
Having declared a need for a law or formal declaration to withdraw the Roppongi
property from public domain to make it alienable and a need for legislative authority
to allow the sale of the property

THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL

RESOURCES, THE REGIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, DENR-REGION VI,
REGIONAL TECHNICAL DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS MANAGEMENT
BUREAU, REGION VI PROVINCIAL ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES
OFFICER OF KALIBO, AKLAN, REGISTER OF DEEDS, DIRECTOR OF LAND
REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF TOURISM SECRETARY,
DIRECTOR OF PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY, petitioners,
vs.
MAYOR JOSE S. YAP, LIBERTAD TALAPIAN, MILA Y. SUMNDAD, and ANICETO
YAP, in their behalf and in behalf of all those similarly situated,
respondents.
Facts:
G.R. No. 167707
Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay, Aklan, with its powdery white sand
beaches and warm crystalline waters, is reputedly a premier Philippine tourist

destination. The island is also home to 12,003 inhabitants4 who live in the boneshaped islands three barangays.5
On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
approved the National Reservation Survey of Boracay
Island,6 which identified several lots as being occupied or claimed by named
persons.7
On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No.
18018 declaring Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas in the
Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves under the administration of the
Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). President Marcos later approved the issuance of
PTA Circular 3-829 dated September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No. 1801.
Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from
filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for
titling purposes, respondents-claimants
Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y. Sumndad, and Aniceto Yap filed a
petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.
In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA
Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied
lands. They declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-ininterest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They
declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them.10
Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing
Circular did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island was
classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of private ownership. Under Section
48(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act,
they had the right to have the lots registered in their names through judicial
confirmation of imperfect titles.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the petition
for declaratory relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified
land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as "public
forest," which was not available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code,11 as amended.
The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA
Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of title was
governed by CA No. 141 and PD No. 705. Since Boracay Island had not been
classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had cannot ripen
into ownership.

During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and the OSG stipulated on the following

facts: (1) respondents-claimants were presently in possession of parcels of land in
Boracay Island; (2) these parcels of land were planted with coconut trees and other
natural growing trees; (3) the coconut trees had heights of more or less twenty (20)
meters and were planted more or less fifty (50) years ago; and (4) respondentsclaimants declared the land they were occupying for tax purposes.12
The parties also agreed that the principal issue for resolution was purely legal:
whether Proclamation No. 1801 posed any legal hindrance or impediment to the
titling of the lands in Boracay. They decided to forego with the trial and to submit
the case for resolution upon submission of their respective memoranda.13
The RTC took judicial notice14 that certain parcels of land in Boracay Island, more
particularly Lots 1 and 30, Plan PSU-5344, were covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 19502 (RO 2222) in the name of the Heirs of Ciriaco S. Tirol. These lots
were involved in Civil Case Nos. 5222 and 5262 filed before the RTC of Kalibo,
Aklan.15 The titles were issued on August 7, 1933.
RTC RULING
The RTC upheld respondents-claimants right to have their occupied lands titled in
their name. It ruled that neither Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular No. 3-82
mentioned that lands in Boracay were inalienable or could not be the subject of
disposition.18 The Circular itself recognized private ownership of lands.19 The trial
court cited Sections 8720 and 5321 of the Public Land Act as basis for
acknowledging private ownership of lands in Boracay and that only those forested
areas in public lands were declared as part of the forest reserve.
FACTS:
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 106426 classifying Boracay Island into
four hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes) and six
hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural land (alienable
and disposable). The Proclamation likewise provided for a fifteen-meter buffer zone
on each side of the centerline of roads and trails, reserved for right-of-way and
which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes.
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr. Orlando Sacay,27 Wilfredo Gelito,28
and other landowners29 in Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for
prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064.30 They allege
that the Proclamation infringed on their "prior vested rights" over portions of
Boracay. They have been in continued possession of their respective lots in Boracay
since time immemorial. They have also invested billions of pesos in developing their
lands and building internationally renowned first class resorts on their lots.31

Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a proclamation

reclassifying Boracay into agricultural land. Being classified as neither mineral nor
timber land, the island is deemed agricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902
and Act No. 926, known as the first Public Land Act.32 Thus, their possession in the
concept of owner for the required period entitled them to judicial confirmation of
imperfect title.
Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitioners-claimants do not have a
vested right over their occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an unclassified
public forest land pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No. 705. Being public forest, the
claimed portions of the island are inalienable and cannot be the subject of judicial
confirmation of imperfect title. It is only the executive department, not the courts,
which has authority to reclassify lands of the public domain into alienable and
disposable lands. There is a need for a positive government act in order to release
the lots for disposition.
ISSUE OF THE TWO CONSOLIDATED CASES:
WON private claimants (respondents-claimants in G.R. No. 167707 and
petitioners-claimants in G.R. No. 173775) have a right to secure titles over
their occupied portions in Boracay.
HELD:
NO. The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the
State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and
charged with the conservation of such patrimony.45 The doctrine has been
consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions.46

All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State.47 Thus, all lands that have not been acquired
from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of
the inalienable public domain.48 Necessarily, it is up to the State to determine if
lands of the public domain will be disposed of for private ownership. The
government, as the agent of the state, is possessed of the plenary power as the
persona in law to determine who shall be the favored recipients of public lands, as
well as under what terms they may be granted such privilege, not excluding the
placing of obstacles in the way of their exercise of what otherwise would be ordinary
acts of ownership.49
Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine. Upon the Spanish
conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all lands, territories and possessions in the
Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown.50 The Regalian doctrine was first
introduced in the Philippines through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas,

which laid the foundation that "all lands that were not acquired from the
Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain."
. On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926 was superseded by Act No. 2874, otherwise
known as the second Public Land Act. This new, more comprehensive law limited
the exploitation of agricultural lands to Filipinos and Americans and citizens of other
countries which gave Filipinos the same privileges. For judicial confirmation of title,
possession and occupation en concepto dueo since time immemorial, or since July
26, 1894, was required.69
After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No. 141 amended Act No. 2874 on
December 1, 1936. To this day, CA No. 141, as amended, remains as the existing
general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the public
domain other than timber and mineral lands,70 and privately owned lands which
reverted to the State.71
Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement under Act No. 2874
of possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since time
immemorial or since July 26, 1894. However, this provision was
superseded by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942, which provided for a simple
thirty-year prescriptive period for judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
The provision was last amended by PD No. 1073, which now provides for
possession and occupation of the land applied for since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.
The issuance of PD No. 89275 on February 16, 1976 discontinued the use of Spanish
titles as evidence in land registration proceedings.76 Under the decree, all holders
of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their lands under Act No.
496 within six (6) months from the effectivity of the decree on February 16, 1976.
Thereafter, the recording of all unregistered lands77 shall be governed by Section
194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344.

On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and updated by PD No. 1529, known
as the Property Registration Decree. It was enacted to codify the various laws
relative to registration of property.78 It governs registration of lands under the
Torrens system as well as unregistered lands, including chattel mortgages.79
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In
keeping with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again
emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such as an official
proclamation,80 declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes.81 In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or
disposable lands only to those lands which have been "officially delimited and
classified."82

The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands
of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming
ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable.83 To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or
disposable.84 There must still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain
as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act
of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a
legislative act or a statute.85 The applicant may also secure a certification from the
government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number
of years is alienable and disposable.86
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action,
report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of
evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private
claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and
disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot
accept the submission that lands occupied by private claimants were already open
to disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot
be assumed. They call for proof.
Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under CA No. 141. Neither do they have vested rights over
the occupied lands under the said law. There are two requisites for judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely:
(1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
of the subject land by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest
under a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or from June
12, 1945; and (2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable
land of the public domain.128

As discussed, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801 did
not convert portions of Boracay Island into an agricultural land. The island remained
an unclassified land of the public domain and, applying the Regalian doctrine, is
considered State property.
Private claimants bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, relying on the
Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801, must fail because of
the absence of the second element of alienable and disposable land. Their
entitlement to a government grant under our present Public Land Act presupposes
that the land possessed and applied for is already alienable and disposable. This is

clear from the wording of the law itself.129 Where the land is not alienable and
disposable, possession of the land, no matter how long, cannot confer ownership or
possessory rights.130
Neither may private claimants apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under
Proclamation No. 1064, with respect to those lands which were classified as
agricultural lands. Private claimants failed to prove the first element of open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of their lands in Boracay since June
12, 1945.
We cannot sustain the CA and RTC conclusion in the petition for declaratory relief
that private claimants complied with the requisite period of possession.
The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to prove the
first element of possession. We note that the earliest of the tax declarations in the
name of private claimants were issued in 1993. Being of recent dates, the tax
declarations are not sufficient to convince this Court that the period of possession
and occupation commenced on June 12, 1945.
SIDE NOTE: DOES THAT MEAN THAT THE INVESTORS SHOULD BE OUSTED DESPITE
ALL THE IMPROVEMENTS THEY HAVE MADE THROUGH THE YEARS?
NO. The Court is aware that millions of pesos have been invested for the
development of Boracay Island, making it a by-word in the local and international
tourism industry. The Court also notes that for a number of years, thousands of
people have called the island their home. While the Court commiserates with
private claimants plight, We are bound to apply the law strictly and judiciously. This
is the law and it should prevail. Ito ang batas at ito ang dapat umiral.
All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not be eligible to
apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141,
as amended, this does not denote their automatic ouster from the residential,
commercial, and other areas they possess now classified as agricultural. Neither will
this mean the loss of their substantial investments on their occupied alienable
lands. Lack of title does not necessarily mean lack of right to possess.
For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders of
improvements. They can take steps to preserve or protect their possession. For
another, they may look into other modes of applying for original registration of title,
such as by homestead131 or sales patent,132 subject to the conditions imposed by
law.
More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to acquire
title to their occupied lots or to exempt them from certain requirements under the
present land laws. There is one such bill133 now pending in the House of

Representatives. Whether that bill or a similar bill will become a law is for Congress
to decide.