This case involves whether a petitioner who was a contractual employee of the National
Irrigation Administration (NIA) was entitled to benefits under R.A. No. 6683, which provides
early retirement benefits. The Civil Service Commission denied the petition, finding contractual
employees were not covered. The Supreme Court ruled the petitioner was qualified, finding no
substantial difference between casual, emergency, and contractual employees, who are all
tenurial with no fixed term. The Court applied the doctrine of necessary implications, finding
what is implied in a statute is as much a part of it as what is expressed, and the statute aimed to
cover all temporary employees regardless of label.
This case involves whether a petitioner who was a contractual employee of the National
Irrigation Administration (NIA) was entitled to benefits under R.A. No. 6683, which provides
early retirement benefits. The Civil Service Commission denied the petition, finding contractual
employees were not covered. The Supreme Court ruled the petitioner was qualified, finding no
substantial difference between casual, emergency, and contractual employees, who are all
tenurial with no fixed term. The Court applied the doctrine of necessary implications, finding
what is implied in a statute is as much a part of it as what is expressed, and the statute aimed to
cover all temporary employees regardless of label.
This case involves whether a petitioner who was a contractual employee of the National
Irrigation Administration (NIA) was entitled to benefits under R.A. No. 6683, which provides
early retirement benefits. The Civil Service Commission denied the petition, finding contractual
employees were not covered. The Supreme Court ruled the petitioner was qualified, finding no
substantial difference between casual, emergency, and contractual employees, who are all
tenurial with no fixed term. The Court applied the doctrine of necessary implications, finding
what is implied in a statute is as much a part of it as what is expressed, and the statute aimed to
cover all temporary employees regardless of label.
This case involves whether a petitioner who was a contractual employee of the National
Irrigation Administration (NIA) was entitled to benefits under R.A. No. 6683, which provides
early retirement benefits. The Civil Service Commission denied the petition, finding contractual
employees were not covered. The Supreme Court ruled the petitioner was qualified, finding no
substantial difference between casual, emergency, and contractual employees, who are all
tenurial with no fixed term. The Court applied the doctrine of necessary implications, finding
what is implied in a statute is as much a part of it as what is expressed, and the statute aimed to
cover all temporary employees regardless of label.
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Chua vs.
Civil Service Commission
GR No. 33140, October 23, 1978 Doctrine of Necessary Implications, What is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed Facts: R.A. No 6683 provides for benefits of early retirement and voluntary separation from the government service as well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. Deemed qualified are those enumerated on Sec 2 of the Act: Sec. 2. Coverage. This Act shall cover all appointive officials and employees of the National Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, as well as the personnel of all local government units. The benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees, regardless of age, who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years of government service as of the date of separation. Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines including those of the PC-INP are excluded from the coverage of this Act. Petitioner believing that she is qualified to avail the said benefits she filed for an application to the NIA, which denied said application and instead she was offered separation benefits equivalent to month basic payment for every year of her service. The Civil Service Commission denied the petition as well alleging that contractual employees are not qualified for the benefits and in a s much as her employment her services is co-terminous with the NIA project which is contractual in nature. Issue; W/N petitioner is entitled of the benefit under R.A. No 6683 Held: The petitioner is qualified to receive the benefits under R.A. No. 6683. What substantial differences exist, if any, between casual, emergency, seasonal, project, co-terminous or contractual personnel? All are tenurial employees with no fixed term, noncareer, and temporary. A co-terminous employee is a non-career civil servant, like casual and emergency employees. We see no solid reason why the latter are extended benefits under the Early Retirement Law but the former are not. It will be noted that Rep. Act No. 6683 expressly extends its benefits for early retirement to regular, temporary, casual andemergency employees. But specifically excluded from the benefits are uniformed personnel of the AFP including those of the PC-INP. It can be argued that, expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The legislature would not have made a specific enumeration in a statute had not the intention been to restrict its meaning and confine its terms and benefits to those expressly mentioned or casus omissus pro omisso habendus est A person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. Yet adherence to these legal maxims can result in incongruities and in a violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details involved in its application. There is always an omission that may not meet a particular situation. What is thought, at the Case Digest and Notes - Cristina Alas-as
time of enactment, to be an all-embracing legislation may be inadequate to provide for the
unfolding events of the future. So-called gaps in the law develop as the law is enforced. One of the rules of statutory construction used to fill in the gap is the doctrine of necessary implication. The doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed. Every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms. Ex necessitate legis. And every statutory grant of power, right or privilege is deemed to include all incidental power, right or privilege. This is so because the greater includes the lesser, expressed in the Maxim, in eo plus sit, simper inest et minus.
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