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INDIA: TAINTING THE UNs

BLUE HELMETS
ASIAN CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

C-3/441-C, Janakpuri, New Delhi 110058 INDIA
Phone/Fax: +91 11 25620583, 25503624
Website: www.achrweb.org
Email: [email protected]
Asian Centre For Human Rights

BLUE HELMETS
June 2014
India: Tainting the UNs Blue Helmets
Published by:
Asian Centre for Human Rights
C-3/441-Second Floor, Janakpuri, New Delhi 110058 INDIA
Tel/Fax: +91 11 25620583, 25503624
First published June 2014
Asian Centre for Human Rights
No part of this publication can be reproduced or transmitted in any form or

by any means without prior permission of the publisher.
ISBN: 978-81-88987-38-2
Suggested contribution Rs. 795 /-
Contents
Introduction: Tainted Peacekeeping.......................................................................................1
Chapter 1: Indias Involvement in UN Peacekeeping........................................................... 6

i. The History of Indias Contribution to UN Peacekeeping ............................................. 6
ii. Indias Policy on UN Peacekeeping Operations.............................................................. 8
Chapter 2: Overview of Indian Army and UN Peacekeeping............................................... 9

i. Indian Army Recruitment, Selection and Promotion Policies.......................................... 9
Recruitment of Officers ................................................................................................. 9

Recruitment of JCOs and Other Ranks (Jawans)............................................................ 10
Training......................................................................................................................... 10
Indian Army Act, 1950 ................................................................................................ 11

ii. Selecting Indian Army for UN Peacekeeping Missions................................................... 12
Selection of the Indian Army Personnel: Preference Given to

Those Deployed for Counter-Insurgency in India ......................................................... 12
Pre-Deployment Training and the Centre for UN Peacekeeping..................................... 15
Chapter 3: Congo Gate: Offences Committed by Indian Forces
During UN Assignments........................................................................................................17

i. Cooperation with the Enemy: Report of the Office of

Internal Oversight Services............................................................................................17
Purchase of Counterfeit Gold and Unlawful Detention.................................................. 17

Sale of UN Rations to Members of FDLR..................................................................... 17
INDBATT Purchased Cannabis from FDLR.................................................................. 18
Failure to Support the Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation,
Reintegration and Resettlement Process......................................................................... 18
INDBATT and FDLR Exchanged Ammunition for Ivory.............................................. 18
INDBATT Fraternized with Armed Members of FDLR................................................ 18

ii. Sexual Exploitation and Abuse: Indictment by OIOS and

Indias Court of Inquiry ................................................................................................19
Sexual Exploitation and Abuse: The OIOS investigation................................................ 19

The Response of Indian Army........................................................................................20
2004 OIOS Inquiry at Bunia, DRC and the
Issue of Command Failure ............................................................................................21
Further Abuses .............................................................................................................. 22
iii. Indian National Context for the Crimes in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo.................................................................................................................22
Selling Illegal Arms: Is it Anything New?....................................................................... 23
Sexual Assaults: A Regular Feature.................................................................................24
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iii
INDIA: TAINTING THE UNs BLUE HELMETS
Chapter 4: Overview of Indian Police and UN peacekeeping............................................... 26

i. Central Police Forces Recruitment and Selection Criteria .............................................. 27
Recruitment of Officers.................................................................................................. 27
Recruitment of Constables.............................................................................................28

ii. State Police Recruitment and Selection Criteria ............................................................. 28
Recruitment of State Police............................................................................................28

Training for Central and State Police Forces................................................................... 29
Training for IPS Officers................................................................................................ 29
iii. Selection of Central Police Forces and State Police for UN Peacekeeping........................ 30
Deployment of Formed Police Units from Central Armed Police Forces......................... 31
Selection Criteria for the CAPFs: Minimum Two Years in
Insurgency Affected Areas..............................................................................................31
Deployment of UN Civilian Police Officers.................................................................... 32
Deployment of Officers on Secondment with UN Missions........................................... 33
Selection by States......................................................................................................... 34

iv. Selection Through UNSAAT Test: No Verification to

Exclude Human Rights Violators .................................................................................34
Chapter 5: Impunity for sexual abuses in India and its impact on

UN Peacekeeping missions.....................................................................................................37

i. The Extent of Human Rights Violations by the Army, Paramilitary

Forces and Police...........................................................................................................37
ii. Impunity to the Armed Forces.......................................................................................39
iii. Indias Refusal to Remove the Requirement of Prior

Sanction for Sexual Violence Committed by the Armed Forces...................................... 42

iv. No Need to Adjudicate Good Faith, Prior Sanction is Absolute:

Pathribal Killings and the Supreme Court of India......................................................... 43
Chapter 6: Conclusions and Recommendations ................................................................... 46

Annex 1: Patterns of Deployment for the UN Keeping Missions by India................................. 48
Annex 2: Investigation by the Office of Internal Oversight Services into
Allegations of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in the United Nations Organization
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 5 January 2005........................................... 52
Annex 3: Overview Report of Allegations of Misconduct by Indian Peacekeepers
Deployed with the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of
Congo by the OIOS (ID Case No. 0648/06), 7 February 2008................................................. 65
Annex 4: Standard Annex H to the Memorandum of Understanding
Signed with the Government of India by the United Nations.................................................... 78
Annex 5: Policy Guidelines for Considering Officers for Various UN assignments,
Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, 27 February 2013.......................................... 80
iv
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Annex 6: Nomination Procedures for Positions in the UN DPKO and DFS

Requiring Official Secondment From National Governments of Member
States of the United Nations Organization................................................................................88
Annex 7: Standards for Verification of Character and Antecedents
for Recruits of the Army, Policy Compendium of Recruitment of
Junior Commissioner Officer and other Ranks. ........................................................................ 92
Annex 8: Judgement of the Armed Forces Tribunal in the Case of
Col Harvinder Singh Kohli Vs Union of India and Others........................................................ 98
Annex 9: RTI appeal before the First Appellate Authority of the
Indian Army with Respect to Disclosure of CoI Report into Sexual
Exploitation by the 6th Sikh Regiment in the DRC................................................................... 118
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ACHR Asian Centre for Human Rights
AR
Assam Rifles
AEC
Army Education Corps
AMC
Army Medical Corps
AMS
Assessment for Mission Service
BSF
Border Security Force
CDT
Conduct and Disciplinary Team
CIVPOL
Civilian Police
CoAS
Chief of Army Staff
CoI
Court of Inquiry
Congo
Republic of Congo
CoS
Chief of Staff
CPFs
Central Police Forces
CRPF
Central Reserve Police Force
CUNPK
Centre for UN Peacekeeping
DPKO
Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC
Democratic Republic of Congo
EME
Electronics & Mechanical Engineers
FDLR
Forces Dmocratiques de Libration du Rwanda
FPU
Formed Police Unit
GOC
General Officer Commander
IAPTC
International Association of
IHQ
Integrated Headquarters
INDBATT Indian Military Contingent/Battalion

INGO
International Nongovernmental Organization
IPS
Indian Police Service
vi
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ITBP
Indo-Tibetan Border Police
JCO
Junior Commissioned Officer
J & K
Jammu and Kashmir
MEA
Ministry of External Affairs
MHA
Ministry of Home Affairs
MoD
Ministry of Defence
MoFA
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MoU
Memorandum of Understanding
MONUC
UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
MPV
Multipurpose Vehicles
MS
Mission Services
NDA
National Defence Academy
NGO
Nongovernmental Organization
NSG
National Security Guards
OHCHR
Office of United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
OIOS
UNs Office of Internal Oversight Services
ONUC
Opration des Nations Unies au Congo
PBOR
Personnel Below Officer Rank
PET
Physical Efficiency Test
PKO
Peacekeeping Operations
PR
Permanent Representative
PST
Physical Standards Test
PTC
Peacekeeping Training Centres
RMP
Recruitable Male Population
RTI
Right to Information
SAT
Selection Assistance Team
SAAT
UN Selection Assistance and Assessment Team
SC
Supreme Court
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vii
SPAT
UN Special Police Assessment Teams
SPS
State Police Service
SSB
Sashastra Seema Bal
SSC
Staff Selection Commission
SVPNPA
Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel National Police Academy
UN
United Nations
UNSAS
UN Standby Arrangement System
UPSC
Union Public Service Commission
viii
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Introduction: Tainted Peacekeeping

India is one of the largest contributors to UN peacekeeping operations. India has supported some
43 peacekeeping operations since the 1950s. It is currently the third largest troop contributor. Over
163,000 Indian personnel have served the UN in the last 60 years.1 More Indian soldiers have lost
their lives in the defence of UNs peace than any other nation: 154 Indian soldiers have died serving
the UN2
Yet, Indias record with the UN is being increasingly tarnished by repeated reports of violations of
the Code of Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets, particularly, sexual abuse and exploitation by the Indian
peacekeepers. This report makes very clear that if nothing is done to address the causes of these
crimes; there will be further abuses, damage to UN Peacekeeping operations, Indias reputation,
and further suffering of many victims. This report investigates the cases, the causes and proposes
domestic reform to prevent further abuse.
The allegations of abuse are extremely serious. An investigation by the UN Office of Internal
Oversight Services (OIOS) examined allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by the peacekeepers
in the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). Though the OIOS
report of 5 January 2005 did not identify the country of the peacekeepers, the OIOS made eight
recommendations including to the MONUC Force Commander and the Contingent commanders
being instructed to ensure discipline over the personnel under their command.3 Indian troops were
already posted with the MUNOC and therefore, the Contingent commanders were aware of the
recommendations of the OIOS.
This OIOS report appears to have made no impact. In May 2008, following further complaints, the
OIOS began a second investigation this time relating to allegations of sexual abuse and exploitation,
this time specifically by Indian Peacekeeping contingent. The investigation revealed evidence
suggesting Indian contingents involvement in sexual exploitation and abuse.4
Three Army officers - a Lieutenant Colonel and two Majors were arrested by the South African
police in Pretoria in March 2008 on charges of rape while posted with the North Kivu brigade of
the Mission.5 The UN pressed for appropriate action and Indias Defence Minister A.K. Antony
promised a thorough and time-bound probe.6
1. See Dipankar Banerjee, Contributor Profile: India, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, 27 January 2013,
available at: http://www.ipinst.org/~ipinst/images/pdfs/india_banerjee130201.pdf, last accessed on 13 August 2013.
2. Out of 3,135 peacekeepers killed during missions, India has lost 154, followed by Nigeria with 139, Pakistan with 133,
Ghana with 131, Canada with 121 and Bangladesh with 113. See UN Peacekeeping, Fatalities, Nationality and Mission
up to 31 July 2013, available at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/fatalities/documents/stats_2.pdf, last accessed on 12
August 2013.
3. Investigation by the Office of Internal Oversight Services into allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse in the United
Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN General Assembly Document No. A/59/661
dated 5 January 2005.
4. See UN Secretary-General Department of Public Information, Secretary-General Concerned by Probe Outcome Indicating
Peacekeepers Previously in Democratic Republic of Congo May Have Committed Sexual Exploitation, 12 August 2008, available
at: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2008/sgsm11741.doc.htm, last accessed on 14 August 2013.
5. 3 Army officers on UN Congo mission accused of rape, The Indian Express, 18 March 2008, available at: http://www.
indianexpress.com/news/3-army-officers-on-un-congo-mission-accused-of-rape/285654/#sthash.BtJbPNkV.dpuf
6. See Agency, Antony orders swift probe into Congo charge, The Times of India, 14 August 2008, available at: http://articles.
timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2008-08-14/india/27925519_1_indian-soldiers-monuc-congolese, last accessed on 14 August 2013.
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Yet by August 2008,7 there were further abuses, as the Conduct and Discipline Unit of the UN
reportedly launched an investigation against Major R.S. Ghumman, belonging to the Jammu and
Kashmir Rifles battalion, on charges of sexual exploitation and abuse after he was allegedly found
in the company of sex workers in a hotel in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) on 6 July
2010.8
Earlier between July and November 2007, the OIOS conducted investigations into allegations
of misconduct by Indian peacekeepers deployed with MONUC (ID Case No. 0648/06). In the
confidential report dated 7 February 2008, the Indian military contingent (INDBATT) were found
responsible for purchase of counterfeit gold and unlawful detention, sale of UN rations to members
of insurgent Forces Democratiques de Liberation du Rwanda (FDLR); purchase of cannabis from
FDLR, exchange of ammunition for ivory from FDLR etc.
The persistent violations by the Indian peacekeepers show that the OIOS inquiries have had little
or no impact on the conduct of the Indian peacekeepers. But the abuses and the lack of action
should not be surprising. India has a very poor domestic record on human rights and an equally poor
record on investigation and prosecution of the human rights violators especially from the Indian
Army.
Troops are mainly selected for UN peacekeeping based on their performance; with the priority going
to performance in counter-insurgency operations. For example, all Indian troops selected for the
MUNOC were chosen based on their outstanding performances in counter-insurgency operations.9
Indian policy gives explicit preference to Persons Below Officer Rank (PBOR) who have proven themselves
while serving in counter-insurgency operations.10 For the Central paramilitary forces/Central Armed
Police the selection criteria again emphasize personnel, who have served for at least two years in
the hard/extreme hard areas like Jammu and Kashmir, North East region or the Naxal Affected
states.11
But performance is unpicked in this report. Outstanding performance does not just include genuine
bravery or other action but also appears to include the perpetration of gross human rights violations
including extrajudicial executions. As the case of Colonel Harvinder Singh Kohli popularly known
as the Ketchup Colonel12 exposes, extrajudicial executions are often rewarded with promotion
for individual officers and medals for the brigade/company. The case of Ketchup Colonel further
7. Ibid.
8. UN sex glare on major, The Telegraph, 16 July 2010 available at http://www.telegraphindia.com/1100716/jsp/nation/
story_12690103.jsp
9. The Press Information Bureau of the Government India stated that the following contingents were chosen based on their
excellent performances in counter-insurgency operations: 1) the 5th Garhwal Rifles, 2) the 10th Assam Regiment, 3) the
19th R&O Flight, 4) the 6th Battalion of the Sikh Regiment, 5) the 5th Bihar Regiment and 6) the 18th Grenadiers. See
Press Information Bureau, Government of India, Indian Contingent to UN Peacekeeping Mission in Congo, 20 March
2008, available at: http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=36810, last accessed on 12 August 2013.
10. Provided in the Naib Subedar K.C. Jena vs Union of India & Ors. on 1 February, 2010 [W.P.(C) No.7994/2009 & C.M.
No.4481/2009] judgement available at http://delhicourts.nic.in/Feb10/Naib%20Subedar%20K.C.%20Jena%20Vs.%20
UOI.pdf
11. See criteria for selection of officers for deployment with UN/Foreign Missions, available at http://bsf.nic.in/doc/recruitment/r46.pdf
12. See TNN, Army revisits Ketchup Colonel case this week, Times of India, 7 July 2010, available at: http://articles.
timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2010-07-07/india/28311861_1_bosses-defence-ministry-harvinder-singh-kohli, last accessed
on 12 August 2013. See also Judgment of the Armed Forces Tribunal, Col Harvidner Singh Kohli vs Union of India and
others, TA/254/09 in W.P.C. No.7827/2009, Judgment 11 January 2010, available at: http://aftdelhi.nic.in/benches/principal_bench/judgments/court_2/ta25409harvinder11012010.pdf, last accessed on 12 August 2013.
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demonstrates that there appear to be incentives to engage in extrajudicial executions, and other gross
violations of human rights during counter insurgency operations.
If Indian peacekeepers are selected from those who have performed in counter insurgency and,
if those counter insurgency operations routinely involve gross violations of human rights, then
logically it is difficult to resist the conclusion that perpetrators of gross human rights violations are
being selected for the UN peacekeeping duties.
This logic is supported by strong evidence. Those who passed the UN administered Selection
Assistance and Assessment Team (SAAT) Test, (selected in the UN SAAT held in UN CIVPOL
Centre from 23 to 30 May 2013)13 include: Sanjeev Kumar, Assistant Sub-Inspector of Punjab Police
accused of custodial torture,14 Superintendent of Police Altaf Ahmad Khan of Jammu and Kashmir
Police accused of rape and custodial death,15 Head Constable Shiv Charan of Chandigarh Police
already arrested by police on the charge of kidnapping and extortion,16 and Inspector Atul Soni of
Punjab Police arrested under Section 25 of the Arms Act for carrying 52 live cartridges of different
calibers at the Indira Gandhi International Airport in New Delhi while boarding a Philippines
Airlines flight to Manila.17
The Government of India and the Army routinely deny the involvement of security forces in human
rights violations but the human rights violations in these conflict afflicted areas are well documented.
They are widespread and systematic.
As the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns
following his visit to India reported to the UN Human Rights Council of June 2013, According
to the NHRC, 2,560 deaths during encounters with police were reported between 1993 and 2008. Of
this number, 1,224 cases were regarded by the NHRC as fake encounters. The police, the central armed
police forces, and the armed forces have been accused of fake encounters. Complaints have been lodged,
particularly against the Central Reserve Police Force, the Border Security Forces, and the armed forces acting
under the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA).. Encounter killings have become virtually a part
of unofficial State policy. 18
Indias security forces are provided impunity under Section 6 of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act
since 1958 and under Section 197 of Indias Criminal Procedure Code. Both these provisions make
it mandatory to seek prior sanction from the concerned state government or Central Government
before any action can be taken. Unsurprisingly permission is rare, if ever, granted.
The UN Human Rights Committee in July 1997 held that the bar to commence criminal prosecutions
or civil proceedings against members of the security and armed forces, acting under special powers, without
the sanction of the central Government contributes to a climate of impunity and deprives people of remedies to
13. Merit List of UN SAAT (UN Selection and Assistance and Assessment Team) held in UN CIVPOL Centre from 23 to 30
May 2013
14. ASI booked for making inmates dance in nude, The Tribune, 7 February 2005
http://www.tribuneindia.com/2005/20050207/punjab1.htm#32
15. Lesson in irony: Gallantry award goes to rape accused, Tehelka, 17 August 2012, available at: http://archive.tehelka.com/
story_main53.asp?filename=Ws170812JK.asp
16. Head Constable held for kidnapping, extortion, The Tribune, 27 February 2006
17. Held with live ammo, Punjab cop gets bail, The Tribune, 14 June 2012, available at: http://www.tribuneindia.
com/2012/20120614/punjab.htm#12
18. UN Human Rights Council Document No. A/HRC/23/47/Add.1 dated 26 April 2013 available at http://www.ohchr.org/
Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session23/A.HRC.23.47.Add.1_EN.pdf
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which they may be entitled in accordance with article 2, paragraph 3, of the Covenant. It recommended
that the requirement of governmental sanction for civil proceedings be abolished and that it be left to the
courts to decide whether proceedings are vexatious or abusive. 19
The Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions in his report of June
2013 after his visit to India stated: This provision effectively renders a public servant immune from
criminal prosecution. It has led to a context where public officers evade liability as a matter of course, which
encourages a culture of impunity and further recurrence of violations. Security officers who committed
human rights violations are frequently promoted rather than brought to justice. Promoting rather than
prosecuting perpetrators of human rights violations is not unique to Punjab... [but] throughout the
country.20
In most of the cases referred to India by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) or
the OIOS, India has systematically failed to take any action. India failed to live upto its commitment
of providing full support for the implementation of a policy of zero tolerance with regard to conduct
and discipline of troops including, sexual exploitation and abuse.21
Only after repeated requests from the UN, the Government of India started taking limited measures,
but only with respect to sexual exploitation and abuse by the Indian troops during their deployment
with the MUNOC.22
In November 2012, Chief of Army Staff General Bikram Singh, who himself was the Deputy Force
Commander under the MUNOC at the time of commission of the crimes, told the media that the
Court of Inquiry (CoI) had found one person responsible for sexual abuse and three others for
command and control failure.23 However, in his reply of 1 April 2013 to the Director of the Asian
Centre for Human Rights (ACHR), Major General Anil Mehta of the Army Headquarters stated
that the investigation on the subject incident is still not completed and disclosure of information at this stage
is likely to impede the process of investigation and therefore could not provide the information requested
by ACHR.24 The two contradictory versions of the events suggest either Chief of Army Staff General
Bikram Singh or Major General Anil Mehta is lying.
This report presents and analyses the current selection policies and practices for deployment in the
UN peacekeeping operations by the Indian Army, the Central Paramilitary forces and the State
Police.
It also sets out the role of various oversight mechanisms in place in India and examines the response
of the Government of India to the allegations of violations and abuses committed by Indian
peacekeepers, in particular the Army, during their deployment on UN peacekeeping operations.
19. Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee:India,08/04/1997, CCPR/C/79/Add.81 are available at http://
www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/CCPR.C.79.Add.81.En?OpenDocument
21. See Permanent Mission, India, India and UN: Peacekeeping & Peacebuilding, available at: http://www.un.int/india/
india_and_the_un_pkeeping.html, last accessed on 12 August 2013.
22. This topic is discussed in further detail in Chapter 3: Congo Gate.
23. See Gautam Datt, Indian armys shame: Indictment of 4 Indian peacekeepers for sexual misconduct on a UN posting in Congo
dents the armys honour, India Today, 25 November 2012, available at: http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/indian-armyshamed-action-against-jawan-for-fathering-child-congo-india-today/1/234613.html, last accessed on 14 August 2013.
24. See RTI Reply to Mr Suhas Chakma by Major General Anil Mehta Vide No.B/87008/AG/PM/RTI2356 dated 1 April
2013.
ACHR
This report concludes that Indias engagement with UN peacekeeping operations is here to stay
as it forms part of Indias strategic engagement with Africa and the Middle East. It is therefore in
Indias interest to promote better national vetting mechanisms prior to sending the troops for UN
peacekeeping operations to ensure that criminal elements in the Army or Police do not blemish Indias
outstanding track record for global peace; and establish transparent and exemplary accountability
against those found guilty.
At national level, India already has such vetting procedures for appointments into the Army and
paramilitary forces. But vetting for deployment with the UN peacekeeping misions would imply
tackling the use of human rights violations in domestic counter insurgency operations, something
India appears reluctant to do.
The Asian Centre for Human Rights hopes that the Government of India will consider the
recommendations of this report to further contribute to the UN peacekeeping operations and ensure
those deployed uphold Indias reputation.
Suhas Chakma
Director
ACHR
Chapter 1: Indias Involvement in UN Peacekeeping

i. The History of Indias Contribution to UN Peacekeeping
As a founding member of the UN, India has contributed to the goal of the UN of maintaining
international peace and security through peacekeeping.25 Since 1950, India has responded, whenever
possible, to the request of the UN for troops for peacekeeping missions and has taken part in over
43 peacekeeping missions, contributing over 163,000 personnel.26 To date, India remains among the
largest and most reliable troop contributing countries to UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs).27
India first deployed troops for peacekeeping during the Korean War as a part of the Neutral Nations
Repatriation Commission in 1953-54, which involved the facilitation of the withdrawal of the sick
and wounded and provision of a custodian force.28 This was followed by a troop deployment to
Indo-China (Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos) from 1954-1970 to assist with monitoring, ceasefire
compliance and repatriation of prisoners of war, among others.29 Indias first armed troop contingent
was deployed from 1956 until 1967 in Gaza in the wake of the conflict between Israeli and Egyptian
forces.30 Since the end of the Cold War, India has been engaged in most of the UNs peacekeeping
missions so far.31 In addition to providing troops for deployment, India has also provided military
observers for many of the UN missions as requested.32
India is currently the third largest contributor of troops (military and police) to the UN peacekeeping
operations, after Pakistan and Bangladesh.33 As of 30 June 2013, a total strength of 7,878 personnel
25. India signed the Declaration by the UN on 1 January 1942 and participated in the UN Conference of International
Organization from 25 April to 26 June 1945. See Permanent Mission, India, India and United Nations, available at:
http://www.un.int/india/india%20&%20un/introduction.pdf, last accessed on 13 August 2013. The UNs other activities
include, but are not limited to, conflict prevention and mediation, peacemaking, peace enforcement and peacebuilding.
See UN Peacekeeping, Peace and Security, available at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peace.shtml, last
accessed on 14 August 2013.
27. See UN Peacekeeping, Military, available at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/military.shtml, last accessed on 14
August 2013. See also Indian Army, Peacekeeping Operations, available at: http://indianarmy.nic.in/Site/FormTemplete/
frmTempSimple.aspx?MnId=+IvGBXbiT8qBLIigysA5Fw==&ParentID=neWZ5Gt5GCLqW1+og+7E9g==&flag
=JtlWd96zlWX233lJPME5Uw==, last accessed on 14 August 2013.
28. See Permanent Mission, India, India and UN, Indias contribution to UN Peacekeeping Missions, available at: http://
www.un.int/india/india%20&%20un/contribution.pdf, last accessed on 12 August 2013.
29. See Id.
30. See Id.
31. India participated in the following past missions since 1950: (1) Korea (1950-1954), (2) Indo-China (1954-1970), (3)
Middle East (UNEF, 1956-1967), (4) Congo (ONUC, 1960-64), (5) Cambodia (UNTAC, 1992-1993), (6) Mozambique (ONUMOZ, 1992-1994), (7) Somalia (UNITAF and UNOSOM II, 1993-1994), (7) Rwanda (UNAMIR, 19941996), (8) Angola (UNAVEM, 1989-1999), (9) Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL, 1999-2001), and, (10) Ethiopia-Eritrea
(UNMEE, 2006-2008). See UN Peacekeeping, Past Peacekeeping Operations, available at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/past.shtml, last accessed on 13 August 2013. See also Blue Helmets for Africa: Indias Peacekeeping in
Africa by Frank van Rooyen, OCCASIONAL PAPER NO. 60, South African Institute of International Affairs, May 2010,
available at: http://www.saiia.org.za/occasional-papers/blue-helmets-for-africa-indias-peacekeeping-in-africa, last accessed
on 12 August 2013.
32. India has provided military observers in the IranIraq (19881991) and IraqKuwait border disputes (1991 onwards),
Namibia (19891991), Angola (19891991), Central America (19881992), El Salvador (19911995), Liberia (1993
1997), and EthiopiaEritrea (2000 until 2008). See UN Peacekeeping, Past Peacekeeping Operations, available at: http://
www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/past.shtml, last accessed on 13 August 2013. See also Blue Helmets for Africa:
Indias Peacekeeping in Africa by Frank van Rooyen, OCCASIONAL PAPER NO. 60, South African Institute of International Affairs, May 2010, available at: http://www.saiia.org.za/occasional-papers/blue-helmets-for-africa-indias-peacekeeping-in-africa, last accessed on 12 August 2013.
33. As of 30 June 2013, Pakistan had contributed 8,230 persons for peacekeeping operations; Bangladesh had contributed
ACHR
(6,821 troops, 1,012 police and 45 UN Military Experts on Mission (UNMEM) were deployed in
10 out of 15 UN peacekeeping missions across the world.34
Additionally, India has contributed prominent military advisers, force commanders, elite military
contingents, observers and dedicated staff officers.35 The Indian Army has also deployed female
officers as Military Observers and Staff Officers, in addition to contributing female officers as part
of Medical Units on UN Missions. As part of its policy for active participation in UN peacekeeping
activities, India keeps one brigade of troops for the UN Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS) for
deployment in emergency situations.36 India also provided the first full Female FPU for peacekeeping
work in 2007 to the UN Operation in Liberia.37 More than 100 female police officers from India
were sent to Liberia to train the local police and provide support for the work of the UN in that
country.38 India also deployed personnel of Indian Air Force and Indian Navy for the PKOs.
During the past 63 years, Indian troops have paid the ultimate price in various peacekeeping missions.
India has suffered the highest number of casualties, with a total of 154 Indian soldiers losing their
lives while serving in UN PKOs as of 31 July 2013.39
Lastly, in addition to personnel and equipment contributions for peacekeeping, India contributes
financially to the UN peacekeeping budget. Over the past several years, Indias contribution has
been increasing:40
7.986; and India had contributed 7,878 persons. See UN Peacekeeping, Contributors, Ranking of Military and Police
Contributors To UN Operations, available at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2013/jun13_2.pdf, last
34. See Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Operations, Monthly Summary of Contribution (Police, UN Military Experts on
Mission and Troops), available at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2013/jun13_1.pdf, last accessed on
12 August 2013. See also UN Peacekeeping, Past Peacekeeping Operations, available at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/past.shtml, last accessed on 13 August 2013. These include: 1) UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), 2) UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), 3) UN
Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), 4) UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), 5) UN Interim Force in
Lebanon (UNIFIL), 6) UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), 7) UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), 8) UN
Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), 9) UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), and, 10) UN
Operation in Cte dIvoire (UNOCI). See also UN Missions Contributions by Country, available at: http://www.un.org/
en/peacekeeping/contributors/2013/jun13_5.pdf, last accessed on 12 August 2013.
35. For example the Indian Army has provided the following military personnel for missions: General Thimayya in Korea
& Cyprus, Lt Gen Dewan Prem Chand in Cyprus & Namibia, Lt Gen Satish Nambiar in Yugoslavia, Maj Gen Inderjit
Rikhye in Sinai, West Irian & Yemen, Maj Gen PS Gyani in Yemen, Sinai & Cyprus, Maj Gen V Jaitley in Sierra Leone
Maj Gen LM Tiwari in Lebanon, Maj Gen (now Lt Gen) Rajender Singh, SM, VSM in Ethiopia-Eritrea, Lt Gen RK
Mehta, PVSM, AVSM, YSM, VSM as Military Adviser to the Secretary General in UN HQ, Lt Gen JS Lidder, UYSM,
AVSM in Sudan and Maj Gen Bikram Singh, AVSM, SM, VSM as Divisional Commander in Congo, in addition to many
contingent commanders. See India Army, Operations/UN Mission, UN Peacekeeping, available at: http://indianarmy.nic.
in/Site/FormTemplete/frmTempSimple.aspx?MnId=F21fZ7AbaIwUHZa61BNZ4A==&ParentID=BFVG9WrbpFJzU
mW3xQcbgw==&flag=FUyAl0na1plHx5Xj0PuHyQ==, last accessed on 13 August 2013.
36. See UN Peacekeeping: Indias Role in UN Peacekeeping Missions, Indian Embassy to Austria and Montenegro and Permanent Mission of India to the International Organisations in Vienna, available at: http://www.indianembassy.at/?page_
id=1259, last accessed on 12 August 2013.
37. See BBC News, Female peacekeepers reach Liberia, 30 January 2007, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
africa/6314263.stm, last accessed on 13 August 2013.
38. See UN News Centre, In a first for UN peacekeeping, all-female police unit arrives in Liberia, available at: http://www.
un.org/apps/news/story.asp?newsid=21391&cr=#.UgnjN7_3KfQ, last accessed on 13 August, 2013.
39. Out of 3,135 peacekeepers killed during missions, India has lost 154, followed by Nigeria with 139, Pakistan with 133,
Ghana with 131, Canada with 121 and Bangladesh with 113. See UN Peacekeeping, Fatalities, Nationality and Mission
up to 31 July 2013, available at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/fatalities/documents/stats_2.pdf, last accessed on 12
August 2013.
40. See Questions asked by Mr. Amir Alam Khan during Rajya Sabha Budget session 2010, Indian contribution to UNs Budget, Unstarred Question No. 3745, answered on 29.04.2010, available at: http://164.100.47.4/newrsquestion/ShowQn.
aspx, last accessed on 12 August 2013. See also Lok Sabha Question No. 628 answered on 3.08.2011 respectively by Ms.
Preneet Kaur, Minister of State in the Ministry of External Affairs, available at: http://164.100.47.132/LssNew/psearch/
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(a)
2007 2008 Rs. 26.95 crore (US $5,778,925.15);
(b)
2008 2009 Rs. 30.02 crore (US $6,437,229.43);
(c)
2009 2010 Rs. 36.55 crore (US $7,837,466.21); and
(d)
2010 2011 Rs. 41.56 crore (US $8,911,767.32).
ii. Indias Policy on UN Peacekeeping Operations

Indias support for peacekeeping activities flows from her commitment to the UN Charter. Indias
participation in PKOs is based on an analysis of the situation demanding intervention and on
an assessment of national interests. Decisions about whether to participate in a PKO follow set
procedures, which include a case by case examination by the Cabinet Committee on Security and
the advice/approval of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). Troop requests are received from
the DPKO by the Permanent Mission, India and then forwarded to the MEA in Delhi. If the MEA
tentatively clears the request, the proposal is forwarded to the Ministry of Defence (MoD) for detailed
examination. The proposal is then examined from a military perspective by a tri-service joint board
under the Director General of Staff Duties at the Army Headquarters. The boards recommendations
are then sent to the MEA, where its UN Division may consider the proposed participation further
from a political angle. After approval, the External Affairs Minister will announce the decision either
through a statement in Parliament, if it is in session, or through a press statement from the ministrys
spokesperson. 41
Indias policy on peacekeeping is governed by the following principles:42

All means for the peaceful settlement of disputes chosen by the conflicting parties
should be exhausted before establishing a peacekeeping operation;
PKOs should strictly adhere to the principles of the UN Charter, in particular the
principles of full respect for the sovereignty of States, their territorial integrity and nonintervention in their internal affairs;
PKOs should be considered at the request of the Member States involved and should be
under the command and control of UN;
The resources for peacekeeping activities should not be at the expense of resources for
developmental activities of the UN; and
It is important to ensure that the distinction between PKOs and other activities of the
UN, including humanitarian assistance, is maintained.
QResult15.aspx?qref=105423, last accessed on 12 August 2013.

42. India has held talks with both the United States and United Kingdom on peacekeeping issues. A number of meetings were
held between these countries in order to exchange views on policy and operational aspects of peacekeeping and for planning joint activities and identifying institutional cooperation in peacekeeping. See UN Peacekeeping: Indias Role in UN
Peacekeeping Missions, Indian Embassy to Austria and Montenegro and Permanent Mission of India to the International
Organisations in Vienna, available at: http://www.indianembassy.at/?page_id=1259, last accessed on 12 August 2013.
ACHR
Chapter 2: Overview of Indian Army and UN Peacekeeping

i. Indian Army Recruitment, Selection and Promotion Policies
The Indian Army is the fourth largest standing army in the world.43 Recruitment in the Indian
Army is open and voluntary.44 Every citizen of India and subject of Nepal45, regardless of caste, class,
religion and community is eligible for recruitment provided they meet the physical, medical and
educational criteria.46
The Indian Army recruits, like other armies have two categories officers and Junior Commissioned
Officers (JCOs)/other ranks known in the vernacular as Jawans.47
Recruitment of Officers
The Union Public Service Commission (UPSC) is in charge of officer recruitment. University
graduates are eligible for the Combined Defence Services Examination. It is held twice a year and is
an all-India competitive examination.48
The UPSC also holds entrance examinations for the National Defence Academy (NDA) twice a
year.49 Anyone having completed Higher Secondary education is eligible to sit.50
For technical branches, the Womens Special Entry Scheme and the National Cadet Corps Special
Entrance Scheme entrance is made through the respective recruiting directorates of the Army.51
43. See Global Security.org, Worlds Largest Armies, available at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/armies.htm,
last accessed on 14 August 2013.
44. See Indian Army, About, Introduction, available at: http://indianarmy.nic.in/Site/FormTemplete/frmTempSimple.aspx?M
nId=hHK+uFUPkHhwyVTm++dAEQ==&ParentID=IviztcsUv+GZDOU2+LPAxA==&flag=TAcoW9ZOvslj3/
hWFp+pFA==, last accessed on 12 August 2013.
45. Under Section 11 of the Army Act of 1950, subjects of Nepal are also eligible for enrolment in the Indian Army.
46. See Indian Embassy, India, Chapter 4, Defence, available at: https://www.indianembassy.org/indiainfo/india_2000/chapters/chp04.pdf, last accessed on 12 August 2013. See also Join India Army, Officers Life in the Army, What Army Offers
You, available at: http://joinindianarmy.nic.in/inner.aspx?status=2&menu_id=138&id=1, last accessed on 12 August
2013.
47. See Join India Army, Officers Life in the Army, What Army Offers You, available at: http://joinindianarmy.nic.in/inner.aspx?status=2&menu_id=138&id=1, last accessed on 12 August 2013. See also Join Indian Army, JCO & Other
Ranks, Eligibility Criteria for Recruitment of JCOs and Other Ranks, available at: http://joinindianarmy.nic.in/inner.
aspx?status=l1&menu_id=299&id=2, last accessed on 12 August 2013. Jawan is a private soldier or male constable in
India. See Macmillan Dictionary Online, available at: http://www.macmillandictionary.com/dictionary/british/Jawan, last
48. After passing the examination, cadets are trained at the Indian Military Academy, Dehradun, in all aspects of combat, tactics
using computers and other modern tools and technologies. Upon successful completion of the Indian Military Academy,
Dehradun, a cadet is commissioned as a Lieutenant in the Indian Army. See Join Indian Army, Officers, Type of Commission, Permanent Commission, available at: http://joinindianarmy.nic.in/inner.aspx?status=2&menu_id=98&id=1, last
See also Join Indian Army, Entry Schemes Men, Graduate UPSC, IME (DE), available at: http://joinindianarmy.nic.in/
inner.aspx?status=3&menu_id=60&id=1, last accessed on 13 August 2013.
49. See available at: http://joinindianarmy.nic.in/inner.aspx?status=2&menu_id=138&id=1, last accessed on 12 August
2013.
50. Successful candidates join the NDA for three years. Upon completion of the NDA, cadets attend the Indian Military
Academy, Dehradun. As stated previously, from the Indian Military Academy, Dehradun, cadets are commissioned as a
Lieutenant in the Indian Army. See Join Indian Army, Officers, Type of Commission, Permanent Commission, available
at: http://joinindianarmy.nic.in/inner.aspx?status=2&menu_id=98&id=1, last accessed on 12 August 2013.
51. Persons in Standard XI and XII who have taken physics, chemistry and mathematics and who have achieved an cumulative score of 70 percent and above, can apply for the 10 + 2 Technical Entry Scheme. Over the next five years, the Army
will then provide the candidate with an opportunity to earn an engineering degree and commission the candidate as an
officer on completion of four years of training, all free of cost. This is a non-UPSC entry. See Join Indian Army, Life in the
Army, What Army Offers You, available at: http://joinindianarmy.nic.in/inner.aspx?status=2&menu_id=138&id=1, last
ACHR
Prior to being commissioned, candidates must complete required courses and a medical examination.
They are subject to a character and background investigation and interview or training required by
their academy.52
Recruitment of JCOs and Other Ranks (Jawans)
Jawans are recruited in open recruitment rallies held across the country throughout the year and
India.53 These recruitment rallies are advertised in local media.54
The Indian Army has established education, age, height, chest measurement, weight and physical
standards for both Jawan and officer recruitment.55 There are exemptions made to allow persons
from more remote, mountainous and/or disadvantaged regions in India.56
Recruitment begins with a preliminary screening at the rally site. Document checking, physical
fitness tests, physical measurements, and a medical test follow this initial process.57 Candidates who
pass these initial tests sit for a written examination. Successful candidates are then sent for basic
training.58
Candidates are required to sign a declaration stating, among others, that they have not been arrested
nor convicted by a criminal court nor involved in a case registered by police.59
Training
Prospective soldiers are sent to train at various pre-commission training academies, i.e. the National
Defence Academy, Pune; the Indian Military Academy, Dehra Dun; and the Officers Training
Academy, Chennai. Further specialised training is provided to officers depending on the need for
specialisation. 60
52. See Join Indian Army, Officers, Type of Commission, Permanent Commission, available at: http://joinindianarmy.nic.in/inner.aspx?status=2&menu_id=98&id=1, last accessed on 12 August 2013. See also Verification of Potential Enrollee for Indian Army, Ministry of Defence (Army), available at: http://odisha.edespatch.com/PDF_DEST/L00261/2012/6/25403_1.
pdf, last accessed on 13 August 2013.
53. See Id. See also Indian Embassy, India, Chapter 4, Defence, available at: https://www.indianembassy.org/indiainfo/
india_2000/chapters/chp04.pdf, last accessed on 12 August 2013.
54. See Id. There are 11 Zonal Recruiting Officers, two Gorkha recruiting Depots, one Independent Recruiting Office and 59
Army Recruiting Office, in addition to 47 Regimental Centers, which carry out recruitment through rallies in their respective areas of jurisdiction. See also Recruitment and Training, Pages 142-143, 2013 Annual Report, Ministry of Defence,
Government of India, available at: https://mod.gov.in/writereaddata/AR_2013/Eng/ch10.pdf, last accessed 12 August
2013.
55. See Join Indian Army, JCO & Other Ranks, Eligibility Criteria for Recruitment of JCOs and Other Ranks, available at:
http://joinindianarmy.nic.in/inner.aspx?status=l1&menu_id=299&id=2, last accessed on 12 August 2013.
56. Ibid.
57. See also Recruitment and Training, Pages 142-143, 2013 Annual Report, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, available at: https://mod.gov.in/writereaddata/AR_2013/Eng/ch10.pdf, last accessed 12 August 2013. The documents include
birth certificate, educational qualification certificate, passport photographs, etc. See also Join India Army, Common Instructions for Interview at all SSBs, available at: http://joinindianarmy.nic.in/inner.aspx?status=l1&menu_id=269&id=1,
58. See Recruitment and Training, Pages 142-143, 2013 Annual Report, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, available
at: https://mod.gov.in/writereaddata/AR_2013/Eng/ch10.pdf, last accessed 12 August 2013.
59. See Verification of Potential Enrollee for Indian Army, Ministry of Defence (Army), available at: http://odisha.edespatch.
com/PDF_DEST/L00261/2012/6/25403_1.pdf, last accessed on 13 August 2013.
60. See Indian Army Act, 1950, Chapter VI, available at: http://indianarmy.nic.in/Site/RTI/rti/DSR/DSR_VOLUME_1/
CHAPTER_06/91.htm, last accessed on 13 August 2013.
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ACHR
During basic training, the Government of Indias MoD carries out a background check of all
recruits.61 This must comply with the instructions of IAFK-1152.62 The recruiting officer starts the
background checking process or Verification Roll (IAFK-1152) on enlistment.63 Once completed,
it is kept with the recruits record or Sheet Roll.64
Finally before a candidate joins the Army or paramilitary force, the enrolling officer must read
and explain conditions of service, in addition to requiring that the candidate answer a set series of
enrollment questions including on criminal antecedents. Failure to answer honestly, if later discovered,
is subject to court martial and penal sentences up to five years (Army Act, 1950.65 These questions
relate, amongst others, to a detailed examination of possible involvement in criminality.66
Indian Army Act, 1950
Once selected, the recruit is subject to the rules and regulations of the Army Act67 which specifies
61. According to the MoD this is done in an effort to keep out undesirable and anti-national elements from the Armed Forces.
Undesirable persons according to the Indian Army have been defined as: (a) members associated with anybody/party
declared unlawful; (b) persons wanted by the police and who get enrolled for political motives to spread anti-government
propaganda and dissatisfaction; (c) persons engaging in activities prejudicial to interest of the Nation/State or promote on
grounds of religion, race, language, caste or community, feelings of enmity or hatred between different sections of people;
(d) deserters from the Armed Forces, Police, and Para Military Forces; (e) Bad Character registered with police authorities
and economic offenders; (f) Members involved in subversive activities including member of any Organisation, which aims
to change society by violent means; and; (g) Candidates inducted by Intelligence Agencies with fake documents. See PartVIII; Section-II: Verification of Potential Enrollee for Indian Army, Ministry of Defence (Army), available at: http://odisha.edespatch.com/PDF_DEST/L00261/2012/6/25403_1.pdf, last accessed on 13 August 2013. Details to be confirmed
in the background check include, but are not limited to, the candidates home address, education background (including
schools attended and degrees/certificates obtained), family members, profession(s), previous government service, details
of Sarpanchs and Namberdars and details of the witness(es) who has(ve) signed the Character/ Pre-Verification Certificate.
See Part-VIII; Section-II: Verification of Potential Enrollee for Indian Army, Ministry of Defence (Army), available at:
http://odisha.edespatch.com/PDF_DEST/L00261/2012/6/25403_1.pdf, last accessed on 13 August 2013.
62. See Army Act, 1950, Chapter IV, Section 139, available at: http://indianarmy.nic.in/Site/RTI/rti/DSR/DSR_VOLUME_1/
CHAPTER_04/62.htm, last accessed on 13 August 2013.
63. idem
64. It is important to note that the process of character and background verifications for Gorkha recruits from Nepal are conducted by the civil authorities in accordance with the instructions issued to the recruiting officers. See Section 138 of the
Army Act of 1950, available at: http://indianarmy.nic.in/Site/RTI/rti/DSR/DSR_VOLUME_1/CHAPTER_04/62.htm,
65. Section 44
66. See ITBP Rules available at http://mha.nic.in/pdfs/ITBP-Rule-1994.pdf under which the enrollment form requires candidate to answer

12. (a) Have you ever been arrested?;

(b) Have you ever been prosecuted?

(c) Have you ever been kept under detention or imprisoned?

(d) Have you ever been convicted by court of law for any offence?

(e) Have you ever been bound down?

(f) Have you ever been fined by a court of law?

(g) Have you ever been interned, externed or otherwise dealt with under any law in force in India or outside? If so, state
particulars.

(h) Are you facing any prosecution in any court in India or abroad?

(i) Have you ever been debarred from any examination or rusticated by any University or any other educational authority/Institution?

(j) Have you ever been debarred/disqualified by any public service commission from appearing at its examination/selection?

(k) Is any case pending against you in any University or other educational authority/institution at the time of filling up
this enrolment form?

(l) Whether discharged/expelled/withdrawn from any training institution under the Government or otherwise.
67. All of the applicable acts and security legislations, which pertain to the branches of the military, have similar provisions
concerning the various types of offences and punishments. For example the ITBP Act, Section 16(d) and (e); the SSB
Act, Section 16(d) and (e); the Assam Rifles Act, 2006, Section 21 (d) and (e); and the BSF Act, Section 14(d) and (e)
have verbatim provisions with respect to offences related to enemy or terrorist. See ITBP Act, 1992, available at: http://
mha.nic.in/pdfs/ITBP-Act1992.pdf, last accessed on 14 August 2013; see also SSB Act, 2007, available at: http://mha.nic.
in/pdfs/SSB-Act2007.pdf, last accessed on 14 August 2013; see also Assam Rifles Act, 2006, available at: http://www.icrc.
ACHR
11
what constitutes an offence and sets out punishment.68
ii. Selecting Indian Army for UN Peacekeeping Missions

U.N peacekeeping deployment is based on requests from DPKO. Deployment ranges from six
months to one year, depending on the concerned peacekeeping mandate.69 Expenses for personnel
and equipment are reimbursed by the UN as stipulated in the agreement signed between the member
state and the UN.70
Selection for the UN missions is considered coveted. Security personnel who serve on UN missions
earn approximately four times his/her monthly pay, upwards of $2,200 a month for an officer and
$1,100 for a Jawan, in addition to other allowances.71 Compensation for injury or death is far
greater than that offered domestically. Should an Indian deployed on UN mission die, then $70,000
is paid to the next of kin as compensation. Disability compensation is awarded on a sliding scale
based on the injury. 72 The Delhi High Court described the posting with the UN Mission as the life
time opportunity in the case of Naib Subedar K.C. Jena vs Union of India & Ors. on 1 February 2010
[W.P. (C) No.7994/2009 & C.M. No.4481/2009].73
Selection of the Indian Army Personnel: Preference given to those deployed for counterinsurgency in India
The MoD coordinates UN peacekeeping troop selection and deployment. The peacekeepers are
selected as a unit, known as a troop contingent. Additionally, a small number of PBOR are deployed
as staff in Mission/Force/Sector headquarters. These are selected from the Corps roster and nominated
by the MoD (Army) based on quota rules.74
org/applic/ihl/ihl-nat.nsf/0/14e8a1a5f08963b1c12576c000393618/$FILE/The%20Assam%20Rifles%20Act,%202006.
pdf, last accessed on 14 August 2013; see also CRPF Act, 1949, available at: http://crpf.nic.in/crpf_actrule/acte.pdf, last
accessed on 14 August 2013; and see also BSF Act, 1968, available at: http://bsf.nic.in/doc/bsfActRules.pdf, last accessed
on 14 August 2013.
68. The Army Act, 1950 (this list is not intended to be exhaustive, but merely exemplary of the types of crimes that are included in the acts): 1. Offences in relation to enemy or terrorist, 2. Unbecoming/disgraceful conduct, 3. Intoxication, 4.
Irregularity in connection with arrest or confinement, 5. Extortion and corruption, 6. Offences in respect to property, 7.
Falsifying official documents and false declarations, 8. Violation of good order and discipline, 9. Absence without leave,
10. Insubordination and 11. Miscellaneous offences. See Army Act of 1950, available at: http://indianarmy.nic.in/Site/
RTI/rti/DSR/DSR_VOLUME_1/CHAPTER_04/62.htm, last accessed on 12 August 2013; see also ITBP Act, 1992,
available at: http://mha.nic.in/pdfs/ITBP-Act1992.pdf, last accessed on 14 August 2013; see also SSB Act, 2007, available
at: http://mha.nic.in/pdfs/SSB-Act2007.pdf, last accessed on 14 August 2013; see also Assam Rifles Act, 2006, available at: http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl-nat.nsf/0/14e8a1a5f08963b1c12576c000393618/$FILE/The%20Assam%20
Rifles%20Act,%202006.pdf, last accessed on 14 August 2013; see also CRPF Act, 1949, available at: http://crpf.nic.
in/crpf_actrule/acte.pdf , last accessed on 14 August 2013;and see also BSF Act, 1968, available at: http://bsf.nic.in/doc/
bsfActRules.pdf, last accessed on 14 August 2013.
69. For example, see UN OIC, Security Council Resolution 2000 (2011, available at: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.
asp?symbol=S/RES/2000%20(2011), last accessed on 12 August 2013.
70. See UN, Peacekeeping Operations, Financing Peacekeeping, available at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/
financing.shtml, last accessed on 12 August 2013.
71. Rotting Olives: Corrupt Indian peacekeepers in the Congo are marring a legacy, The Outlook, 02 June 2008 available at
http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?237577
72. Lok Sabha Starred Question No. 528 answered on 14.05.2012 by Mr. A K Anthony, Defence Minister, Government of
India
73. The judgment is available at http://delhicourts.nic.in/Feb10/Naib%20Subedar%20K.C.%20Jena%20Vs.%20UOI.pdf
74. These rules are amended from time to time for the EME, AMC and AEC. See RTI reply No.A/810027/RTI/10827 dated
8 October 2012 received from Lt. Col. GSO-1 (RTI) for CPIO of Indian Army.
12
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The MoD has a deployment policy.75 The policy states that personnel who are
called for U.N service, the only thing that can prevent from deployment is the disciplinary action or
who does not fulfill medical or service requirements laid down by the MoD. 76
The policy sets out the selection criteria for Jawans to join a unit on a UN mission.77 PBOR face a
selection panel made up of a Colonel as Presiding Officer and two members (one Lieutenant Colonel
and one Captain/Major).78
The selection panel is instructed to consider the following criteria:

(i)
Seniority of rank,
(ii)
PBOR who meet eligibility criteria laid down by the Army Headquarters, and,
(iii) Preference to PBOR who have proven themselves while serving in counter-insurgency
operations/Operation Vijay79/Operation Meghdoot80/HHA.81
The process explicitly favours those who have a proven record in counter-insurgency operations.
For example, all of the Indian troops selected for MUNOC were chosen based on performances in
counter-insurgency operations.82
75. General Staff Shakha/General Staff Branch SD-3 (UN) Policy on Detailment of Attached Personnel on UN Missions
76. See 71362/Policy/General Staff Branch SD-3 (UN), 22 November 2004 provided in the judgment details of Naib Subedar
K.C. Jena v. Uoi & Ors, W.P. (C) No.7994/2009 & C.M. No. 4481/2009, High Court of Delhi at New Delhi, 1 February 2010. The judgment is available at: http://delhicourts.nic.in/Feb10/Naib%20Subedar%20K.C.%20Jena%20Vs.%20
UOI.pdf, last accessed on 12 August 2013.
77. For example the policy states that a PBOR (a) [s]hould not have applied for discharge/release/ premature retirement on
compassionate grounds; (b) [s]hould have a minimum of six months residual service after return from a UN mission;
(c) [s]hould not have served earlier in any mission/assignment abroad except IPKF; (d) [s]hould not be involved in any
disciplinary case and there should be no discipline/Criminal case pending against him; (e) [s]hould be medical category
SHAPE 1; (f) PBOR awarded Red Ink Entry under Army Act Section 34, 35, 36. 38, 40(a), 41, 46(a), 52 and 53,
will be debarred from participating in UN Missions; (g) PBOR who have been awarded a Red Ink Entry under any
other section of the Army Act, will be debarred from participating in UN mission for a period of three years from the
date of such award; (h) [a]ll PBOR due for promotion or attending a promotion cadre/career course during the period
in which the unit is likely to be away on a UN mission will become eligible only if they render an ADVERSE CAREER
CERTIFICATE (appxA) duly countersigned by the Officer Commanding their respective units; (i) [t]here should be a
clear gap of three months between an individuals screening for extension of service/age and the convening of a Board of
Officers for short listing eligible AEC PBOR for UN missions, failing which the name of that particular individual will be
considered only in the next Board of Officers convened for the same purpose; and (j)PBOR not approved for extension of
service/age by the Screening Board, will not be posted to units proceedings on UN missions or will not be allowed to accompany the unit on its UN missions. See 71362/Policy/General Staff Branch SD-3 (UN), 22 November 2004 provided
in the judgment details of Naib Subedar K.C. Jena v. Uoi & Ors, W.P. (C) No.7994/2009 & C.M. No. 4481/2009, High
Court of Delhi at New Delhi, 1 February 2010. The judgment is available at: http://delhicourts.nic.in/Feb10/Naib%20
Subedar%20K.C.%20Jena%20Vs.%20UOI.pdf, last accessed on 12 August 2013.
78. See Naib Subedar K.C. Jena v. Uoi & Ors, W.P. (C) No.7994/2009 & C.M. No. 4481/2009, High Court of Delhi at New
Delhi, 1 February 2010, available at: http://delhicourts.nic.in/Feb10/Naib%20Subedar%20K.C.%20Jena%20Vs.%20
79. Vijay was launched on 16 May 1999 during the Kargil war when Pakistani troops intruded into Indian side. See 1999
Kargil Conflict, GlobalSecurity.Org, available at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/kargil-99.htm, last accessed on 12 August 2013.
80. Operation Meghdoot is Indian militarys capture of the majority ofSiachen Glacier. See Indian Air Force, Op Meghdoot,
available at: http://indianairforce.nic.in/show_page.php?pg_id=72, last accessed on 12 August 2013.
81. As part of the consideration given to PBOR who have served and/or proven themselves in counter-insurgency operations,
the policy states that [a]part from adding up numeral awards earned by each candidate for Honours and Awards and
service rendered by them in Counter Insurgency Operations/ Operation Vijay/Operation Meghdoot/HHA, the Selection Panel is required to give 1/12 (mark) X No. of months (01 Mark for each completed year) on Counter Insurgency
Operations subject to a minimum of 30 days service. See 71362/Policy/General Staff Branch SD-3 (UN), 22 November
2004 provided in the judgment details of Naib Subedar K.C. Jena v. Uoi & Ors, W.P. (C) No.7994/2009 & C.M. No.
4481/2009, High Court of Delhi at New Delhi, 1 February 2010. The judgment is available at: http://delhicourts.nic.in/
Feb10/Naib%20Subedar%20K.C.%20Jena%20Vs.%20UOI.pdf, last accessed on 12 August 2013.
82. The 5th Garhwal Rifles was nominated for their outstanding performances in 1971 War, Op Battle Axe in Mizoram, Op
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There are well-documented cases of serious human rights abuses committed by the Army during
counter-insurgency operations. Two units who received such nominations, the 5th Garhwal Rifles
and 10th Assam Regiment, participated in Operation Rhino from September 1991 to January
199283 against the United Liberation Front of Assam. The Indian Army carried out massive
search-and-arrest operations, leading to arbitrary arrests and detentions and other serious human
rights violations, including extrajudicial killings, rape, torture, assault and harassment. Human
rights groups in Assam reported that as many as 40 people were killed in army custody in 1991
and early 1992.84 Instead of investigations being launched into the actions (or inactions) of these
battalions/units, the highly sought after positions in UN peacekeeping missions were given as a
reward to these Units for participation in the Operation Rhino.
To further emphasize the extent of importance the Indian Army places on participation in counterinsurgency operations, there are credible instances where security forces, including the army personnel,
engaged in extrajudicial executions, (called fake encounters), for the purpose of promotion. In a
rather infamous case involving the Indian Army, a colonel involved in counter-insurgency operations
in 2003 faked the killing of five civilians as militants in his regiments custody.85 In an effort to boost
the image of the brigade and earn awards, the colonel, Harvinder Singh Kohli, received orders to
report the five captured militants as kills.86 Instead of succumbing to his superiors pressure to kill
militants, Kohli had five civilians pose as slain militants (complete with tomato ketchup sprayed on
the bodies to resemble blood) near Bara Nagadung under Kachar district of Assam on the night of
17 and 18 August, 2003 in an effort to appease his superiors as the kill had already been reported
to higher authorities.87 Kohli was ultimately dismissed from service for his participation in the faked
Rakshak in the state of Jammu & Kashmir during 1993 95, Op Rhino in Assam, Op Vijay and Op Parakram. The 10th
Assam Regiment earned its coveted place on the Mission for its outstanding performances in Op Blue Star, Op Falcon,
Op Rakshak I & II in the state of Jammu & Kashmir during 1995-97, Op Vijay and Op Rhino. The 19th R&O Flight had
participated in all major operations including Op Meghdoot, Op Trident and Op Falcon. The 6th Battalion of the Sikh
Regiment which left for UN peacekeeping duties in Congo in January 2008 was nominated for UN duties based on its
outstanding performance in the 1971 war and in counter-insurgency operations in the northeastern region and Jammu
and Kashmir. The 5th Bihar Regiment was nominated for the coveted UN Mission in Congo for their outstanding performances in Operation RHINO in Assam during 1995-98 and Op RAKSHAK/Op PARAKRAM. The 18thGrenadiers
were chosen and nominated for UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) due to its excellent performance during operationsRakshakandVijay. In fact, Colonel Kushar Thakur, Commanding Officer of 18th Grenadiers, after successful capture
of the Tiger Hill during the Kargil war, reportedly asked for and obtained, a UN mission as a reward for his battalion. See
Press Information Bureau, Government of India, Indian Contingent to UN Peacekeeping Mission in Congo, 20 March
2008, available at: http, last accessed on 12 August 2013. See also Indo-Asian News Service, Indian Army battalion leaves
for Congo UN mission, IANS,3 January 2008, available at: http://www.india-forums.com/news/national/67517-indianarmy-battalion-leaves-for-congo-un-mission.htm, last accessed on 14 August 2013. See also Press Information Bureau,
Government of India, 5 Bihar Infantry Battalion Group, Earmarked to Represent the Country in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Africa, as Part of the United Peace Keeping Mission MONUC, available at: http://pib.nic.in/release/
rel_print_page1.asp?relid=49162, last accessed on 12 August 2013. See also Kargil heroes 18 Grenadiers head for Sierra
Leone, 15 May 2000, Rediffmail.com, available at http://www.rediff.com/news/2000/may/15josy1.htm, last accessed on
12 August 2013.
83. See No End in Sight: Human Rights Violations in Assam, April 18, 1993 Vol. 5 Issue 7, Human Rights Watch, available
at: http://www.hrw.org/reports/pdfs/i/indonesa/indones2934.pdf, last accessed on 12 August 2013.
84. See Id.
85. See TNN, Army revisits Ketchup Colonel case this week, Times of India, 7 July 2010, available at: http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2010-07-07/india/28311861_1_bosses-defence-ministry-harvinder-singh-kohli, last accessed on
12 August 2013.
86. See Rajat Pandit, TNN, Govt dismisses leniency plea for ketchup colonel, Times of India, 4 April 2008, available at:
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2008-04-04/india/27762141_1_ketchup-colonel-major-general-ravindersingh-severe-reprimand-and-loss, last accessed on 13 August 2012.
87. See TNN, Army revisits Ketchup Colonel case this week, Times of India, 7 July 2010, available at: http://articles.
timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2010-07-07/india/28311861_1_bosses-defence-ministry-harvinder-singh-kohli, last accessed
on 12 August 2013. See also Judgment of the Armed Forces Tribunal, Col Harvidner Singh Kohli vs Union of India and
14
ACHR
killing, but his superior who issued the order in an effort to receive commendations for the battalion
was reinstated, receiving only a severe reprimand and a loss of seniority.88
As the case of Colonel Kohli demonstrates, the incentive to engage in extrajudicial executions,
regardless of whether they actually occur or not for the purpose of promotion exists and is a real
motivating force within the Indian Army. Outstanding performances do not only include genuinely
countering terrorists but also grave human rights violations including extrajudicial executions.
Further, the Delhi High Court in its 2010 judgement in the case of Naib Subedar K.C. Jena vs Union
of India & Ors on the Armys policy for deployment in UN missions held that while the policy set
forth eligibility requirements, it failed to prescribe a method for selection, therefore allowing room
for potential feelings of discrimination or disruption in the cohesion of the battalions to arise. 89
Pre-Deployment Training and the Centre for UN Peacekeeping
The Indian Army claims to provide a comprehensive and progressive training program structured
for military observers, contingent teams, trainers of the contingents and other support units. 90 At
the apex is the Army Headquarters Staff Duties Directorate under the Deputy Chief of Army Staff
(Training & Coordination), responsible for developing policy and assigning various contingents
and personnel for training and other mission duties. ACHR was unable to obtain any independent
assessment of quality of the training.
The Centre for UN Peacekeeping (CUNPK) is charged with the training of UN Peacekeepers.
CUNPK was established in 2000 in New Delhi as a joint venture of the Ministries of Defence
and External Affairs and United Services Institution of India.91 CUNPK provides pre-deployment
peacekeeping training for the Indian Army. Units undergo peacekeeping orientation training for
four to six weeks depending on operational needs. Further, nominated units are concentrated in New
Delhi for six months before their deployment in the mission area to undergo mission-orientation
others, TA/254/09 in W.P.C. No.7827/2009, Judgment 11 January 2010, available at: http://aftdelhi.nic.in/benches/principal_bench/judgments/court_2/ta25409harvinder11012010.pdf, last accessed on 12 August 2013.
88. An anonymous complaint was filed about the fake encounter. Initially Col. Kohli pleaded guilty and was dismissed from
service despite being promised a plea deal of a two-year seniority loss. After dismissal, Col. Kohli submitted that the fake
encounter had been staged on the orders of his superior, Brig. Rao, and that this was done with the knowledge of the
brigadiers boss. As a result, Brig. Rao was also court martialled and was cashiered from service, which basically entails
loss of rank and retirement benefits. However in March 2007, the Army revoked the court martial ordered and Brig. Raos
punishment was reduced to a severe reprimand and loss of seniority of seven years (later reduced to five years).Kohli
asked the Delhi High Court to review his case, and after review the CoAS recommended that Kohli be reinstated with
a loss of seniority of five years and a severe reprimand. However the special secretary in the MoD did not recommend
Kohlis reinstatement. As a result, Kohlis case was referred to the Armed Forces Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi.
The Tribunal in its judgement dated 11 January 2010 dismissed the plea of Kohli stating that the punishment was not disproportionate and shocking, and that Kohli was required to honest towards his duties.See TNN, Army revisits Ketchup
Colonel case this week, Times of India, 7 July 2010, available at: http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2010-0707/india/28311861_1_bosses-defence-ministry-harvinder-singh-kohli, last accessed on 12 August 2013; see also Rajat Pandit, TNN, Govt dismisses leniency plea for ketchup colonel, Times of India, 4 April 2008, available at: http://articles.
timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2008-04-04/india/27762141_1_ketchup-colonel-major-general-ravinder-singh-severe-reprimand-and-loss, last accessed on 13 August 2012; see also Marching orders for Ketchup Brigadier, The Times of India,
25 June 2006, available at: http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2006-06-25/india/27798618_1_marching-ordersketchup-colonel-court-martial, last accessed on 13 August 2013;see also Judgment of the Armed Forces Tribunal, Col Harvidner Singh Kohli Vs Union of India and others, available at http://aftdelhi.nic.in/benches/principal_bench/judgments/
court_2/ta25409harvinder11012010.pdf, last accessed on 12 August 2013.
89. See Naib Subedar K.C. Jena v. Uoi & Ors, W.P. (C) No.7994/2009 & C.M. No. 4481/2009, High Court of Delhi at New
Delhi, 1 February 2010, available at: http://delhicourts.nic.in/Feb10/Naib%20Subedar%20K.C.%20Jena%20Vs.%20
90. See CUNPK, Role, available at: http://www.usiofindia.org/CUNPK/#Role, last accessed on 14 August 2013.
91. See Id.
ACHR
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training. During training, personnel are made conversant with the history of the UN, past conflicts,
background of the mission area, cultural, religious understanding, conflict procedures in the conflict
area, in addition to information about other UN organizations operating in the conflict area. The
administration behind equipping the contingent for the mission is carried out at CUNPK.92
The centre also prepares contingent officers to train their troops in UN peacekeeping techniques;
military observers to monitor cease-fire agreements and withdrawal of forces; staff officers to perform
duties in headquarters of peacekeeping missions and other levels; and logistics training.93
In October 2005, CUNPK became the Secretariat of the International Association of Peacekeeping
Training Centres (IAPTC) providing various training courses.94
92. Detailed information available on the website of CUNPK, New Delhi, India, available at: http://www.usiofindia.org/
CUNPK/, last accessed on 14 August 2013.
93. Additionally International Training Capsules are conducted for 1) Military Contingent Officers, 2) Military Observers and
3) Staff and Logistics Officers, who have been selected for deployment. The centre also provides similar training facilities
to personnel from foreign countries. The main purpose of training capsules is to prepare personnel for specialized duties
while serving under the UN flag. Furthermore, seminars, joint working groups and command post exercises at the national and international level are regularly organised. CUNPK, New Delhi, India, available at: http://www.usiofindia.org/
CUNPK/, last accessed on 14 August 2013.
94. The CUNPK offers international and national courses, including but not limited to, the UN Military Contingent Officers
course; UN Military Observers course; and UN Staff & Logistic Officers course. The National UN Course, offered to
Indian Armed Forces Officers selected for the UN peacekeeping missions, aims to prepare them for effective execution of
their tasks as part of UN peacekeeping missions. The course includes introduction to role, the organisation and function
of the UN, the organisation and function of DPKO and Department of Field Support (DFS); principles, techniques and
nature of PKOs; the code of conduct for peacekeepers; negotiation and mediation techniques; logistics and administrative
aspects in peacekeeping; and mission specific computer-based and/or map exercises. See CUNPK, New Delhi, India, available at: http://www.usiofindia.org/CUNPK/, last accessed on 14 August 2013.
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ACHR
Chapter 3: Congo Gate: Offences Committed by Indian Forces

During UN Assignments
i. Cooperation with the Enemy: Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services
A confidential report dated 7 February 2008 accessed by Asian Centre for Human Rights into
allegations of misconduct by Indian peacekeepers deployed with the U.N in the Democratic
Republic of Congo (MONUC) by the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (ID Case No.
0648/06) shows that on 4 July 2006, OIOS was notified of allegations of misconduct of the Indian
military contingent (INDBATT) deployed with MONUC in North Kivu province. Between July
and November 2007, OIOS conducted field-based investigations. The OIOS received a total of 44
allegations.
The OIOS broadly grouped the 44 allegations under five themes:
Allegations of misconduct against INDBATT forces and the Forces Democratiques de
Liberation du Rwanda (FDLR);
(a)
(b) Allegations of misconduct between INDBATT forces and the rebel faction led by
Laurent Nkunda;
(c)
Allegations of misconduct by General Satyanarayan, the then commander of the North

Kivu Brigade;
(d)
Allegations of illicit gold transactions by INDBATT personnel not related to negative

forces; and,
(e) Allegations of misconduct in the handling of UN rations, fuel and other

miscellaneous.
Out of the 44 allegations, OIOS found five allegations unfounded, 17 were based on hearsay statements
and were not pursued; 12 allegations did have sufficient evidence of INDBATT misconduct, but were
not pursued due to time and resource constraints; four were partially supported by circumstantial
evidence obtained by OIOS; and six allegations were supported by corroborative evidence.
The six supported allegations included i) the purchase of counterfeit gold and unlawful detention;
ii) the sale of UN rations to members of FDLR; iii) the purchase of cannabis by INDBATT from
FDLR; iv) the failure to support the Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration
and Resettlement of armed groups (DDRRR process; v) the exchange of ammunition by INDBATT
to FDLR for ivory; and vi) INDBATTs fraternization with armed members of FDLR. No action is
known to have been taken by the Government of India and DPKO on these findings.
Purchase of Counterfeit Gold and Unlawful Detention
OIOS concluded that members of INDBATT had paid an undetermined amount of money to an
individual (with FDLR connections) in exchange for unwrought gold, which was later determined
to be counterfeit. This incident led to the seller being illegally detained by members of INDBATT
until he repaid the money.
Sale of UN Rations to Members of FDLR
OIOS interviewed a number of people who stated that the Indian contingent deployed in the latter
part of 2005 was involved in the sale of rations to local people, including members of the FDLR.
ACHR
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These statements were corroborated by a number of witnesses. One witness claimed that he entered
into a commercial relationship with a peacekeeper and purchased quantities of UN rations several
times a week and sold them at a profit to members of the local community. This witness provided
OIOS with a notebook in which he had recorded the details of some of the transactions relating
to rations sales. Lastly a former lieutenant colonel in the FDLR claimed that Indian peacekeepers
deployed in the latter part of 2005 were either selling UN rations to buy gold or were bartering
UN rations for gold.
INDBATT Purchased Cannabis from FDLR
A former major in the a FDLR told OIOS that he had heard reports that a junior FDLR officer
in the area of North Kivu had provided cannabis to an Indian officer in exchange for UN rations.
OIOS interviewed one witness who claimed to have provided a small quantity of cannabis to an
Indian peacekeeper on three occasions in late 2005 or early 2006. A MONUC interpreter who
facilitated conversations between the two men corroborated the supply of cannabis by this witness
to the peacekeepers.
Failure to Support the Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration and
Resettlement Process
OIOS received a number of complaints alleging that INDBATT had not supported, and in some
cases had deliberately undermined the Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration
and Resettlement (DDRRR) process in North Kivu. The allegations included handing over of
FDLR combatants surrendered to an Indian military facility to their commanders; discouraging
FDLR from entering the DDRRR process and advance warning of planned FARDC/MONUC
military action given to FDLR officers; among others. OIOS investigation of the allegations were
corroborated through witness statements.
INDBATT and FDLR Exchanged Ammunition for Ivory
OIOS investigations with witnesses revealed that INDBATT and FDLR exchanged ammunition
for ivory in the Rutshuru area of North Kivu. One of the witnesses told OIOS that one of the
FDLR soldiers later provided him with a sample of the same ivory that was allegedly traded for the
ammunition brought by INDBATT. OIOS took possession of the sample, which was then examined
by the Provincial Director of the Congolese Institute for the Conservation of Nature, who verified
that the sample was ivory and estimated it to have come, from a two-year-old elephant.
INDBATT Fraternized with Armed Members of FDLR
OIOS received allegations that members of INDBATT habitually fraternized with armed members
of the FDLR and failed to disarm them, despite the latters categorization as negative forces.
OIOS received further information and complaints stating that the FDLR comfortably resided,
congregated and patrolled in areas that were under INDBATT control without hindrance or
restraint from INDBATT. OIOS investigators personally observed many armed FDLR members
openly walking around town, in close proximity to and even in front of the INDBATT camp,
seemingly unconcerned about being stopped or disarmed by members of INDBATT.
OIOS found that there was direct corroborative evidence to suggest that INDBATT was complacent
to the presence of armed FDLR elements in its area of responsibility.
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ACHR
ii. Sexual Exploitation and Abuse: Indictment by OIOS and Indias Court of
Inquiry
Sexual exploitation and abuse: The OIOS investigation
In May 2008, following further complaints, OIOS began a second investigation this time relating to
allegations of sexual abuse and exploitation by the INDBATT. On 12 August 2008, UN SecretaryGeneral Ban Ki-moon issued a press statement saying that he was deeply troubled by the outcome
of the OIOS investigation. The report revealed evidence suggesting Indian contingent involvement
in sexual exploitation and abuse.95 Ban Ki-moon called on the Indian authorities to investigate and
where necessary take appropriate legal action. 96 DNA testing commissioned by the UN in the DRC
showed that the children had distinctive Indian features confirming the allegations of sexual abuse
and exploitation by the INDBATT.97
In August 2008, Indias Defence Minister A.K. Antony promised a thorough and time-bound
probe.98 The Government of India repeatedly assured the UN that the allegations if proven, would
lead to strict and exemplary action.99
The Indian Army, prior to the U.N statement, ordered an internal inquiry. Brigadier Inderjeet
Narayan, commander of the North Kivu brigade of Indian peacekeepers, headed the inquiry. The
investigation followed a visit to the DRC by the Vice-Chief of Army Staff, Lieutenant-General M
L Naidu in May 2008.100 Given the timing of the investigation it is clear that the Indian authorities
were aware of the issues prior to the public statement issued by the UN Secretary General. ACHR is
unaware of any action resulting from this inquiry.
The allegations impacted Indias standing at the UN. On 19 November 2008, the UN Security
Council voted to send 3,000 reinforcements to the DRC. On 21 November 2008, the DRCs
Foreign Minister Alexis Tambwe Mwamba diplomatically requested that no further Indian troops be
part of the reinforcements. He stated in a letter to the UN that, In view of the numerous abuses of
power carried out by certain troops within MONUC, the (Congolese) people would not understand
if soldiers from the same country would be used to boost numbers within MONUC.101
In March 2009 after the Sikh Regiments withdrawal, the UN asked India to send no replacements.
India was forced to cancel the deployment of some 200 Indian Air Force personnel.102 In response,
96. See Id.
97. See Varinder Bhatia, Indian Army probes reports of its UN peacekeepers fathering kids in Congo, The Indian Express, 07 June
2011, available at: http://www.indianexpress.com/news/indian-army-probes-reports-of-its-un-peacekeepers-fatheringkids-in-congo/800244/, last accessed on 14 August 2013.
101. See AFP, No more Indian troops please - Congo tells UN chief, The Daily Star, Dhaka, Bangladesh, 27 November 2008, available
at: http://archive.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=65073, last accessed on 14 August 2013.
102. See China View, India cancels new UN peacekeeping mission in Congo over scandal, 9 March 2009, Xinhua, available at http://
ACHR
19
India reportedly threatened to withdraw all its troops, potentially collapsing the UN peacekeeping
mission in the DRC. DRC President Joseph Kabila responded with a letter to the Indian Prime
Minister expressing gratitude for the Indian contribution to peacekeeping in the DRC.103 In June
2009, 285 Indian Air Force officers were dispatched to join the UN peacekeeping mission in the
DRC.104
The response of Indian Army
India initially only recalled the 6th Sikh Battalion from the peacekeeping mission in the DRC. But no
investigation was carried out on their return to India. In August 2010 the UN communicated with
India reminding the Government of India of its public commitment to investigate. In January 2011,
the Army Headquarters wrote to the Western Command to conduct an inquiry.105
In May 2011, the Army ordered a Court of Inquiry (CoI) into the conduct of the 6th Sikh Battalion.
The investigation focused on 12 officers and 39 soldiers allegedly involved in cases of sexual abuse
and fathering children while in the DRC.106
There are serious concerns over the way the CoI conducted its investigation. ACHR consistently
maintained that the CoI constituted by the Indian Army was biased and did not intend to establish
culpability. First, the CoI was being conducted in India and not at the place of offence, i.e. DRC,
where the victims were allegedly sexually abused. Second, the victims who were allegedly sexually
abused and gave birth to the children in DRC were not given any opportunity to testify before the
CoI. ACHR filed a complaint with the National Human Rights Commission of India (NHRC) on
24 August 2011 to address these shortcomings. The NHRC took no action and merely passed the
complaint onto the Ministry of Defence.107
In November 2012, Chief of the Army Staff (CoAS) General Bikram Singh claimed that the CoI had
concluded its investigation. He stated that the DNA sample of one Jawan had matched with one of
the children allegedly fathered by Indian troops in the DRC. The CoI found three other personnel
responsible for a Command and Control failure.108 One of the officials includes a Major, while other
two are a JCO and a Havildar (equivalent to the rank of sergeant). According to the CoI, three
personnel would face administrative action for Command and Control failure and the jawan would
face disciplinary action.109
news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-03/09/content_10975745.htm, last accessed on 14 August 2013.
103. See Varun Vira, India and UN Peacekeeping: Declining Interest with Grave Implications, Small War Journal, 13 July 2012
available at: http://smallwarsjournal.com/node/12949, last accessed on 14 August 2013.
104. See Press Information Bureau, Government of India, IAF contingent for UN peacekeeping mission at Congo flagged off, 18 June
2009, available at: http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=49236, last accessed on 14 August 2013.
105. See Varinder Bhatia, Indian Army probes reports of its UN peacekeepers fathering kids in Congo, The Indian Express, 07 June
2011, available at: http://www.indianexpress.com/news/indian-army-probes-reports-of-its-un-peacekeepers-fatheringkids-in-congo/800244/, last accessed on 14 August 2013.
106. The CoI was presided over by Brig. M M Masur, Cdr, 9th Artillery Brigade, and includes Col. Sunil, Deputy Commander,
32nd Infantry Brigade and Col. P V Ramakrishnan, Commanding Officer, 299th Fd Regt. See Varinder Bhatia, Indian Army
probes reports of its UN peacekeepers fathering kids in Congo, The Indian Express, 07 June 2011, available at: http://www.indianexpress.com/news/indian-army-probes-reports-of-its-un-peacekeepers-fathering-kids-in-congo/800244/, last accessed
on 14 August 2013.It was reported that Major R.S. Ghumman, who was part of the UN peacekeeping force in Congo,
slashed his wrists in an attempt to commit suicide after the probe against him was ordered. He has been accused of hiring
sex workers in Congo and violating curfew rules. See Gautam Datt, Indian armys shame: Indictment of 4 Indian peacekeepers
for sexual misconduct on a UN posting in Congo dents the armys honour, Indian Military News, 25 November 2012, available
at: http://indianmilitarynews.wordpress.com/tag/congo-sex-abuse-case/, last accessed on 14 August 2013.
107. Please refer to http://nhrc.nic.in/display.asp?fno=219/99/4/2011-AF
108. http://www.thesundayindian.com/en/story/congo-sex-scandal-four-army-men-indicted/254/43787/
109. See Gautam Datt, Indian armys shame: Indictment of 4 Indian peacekeepers for sexual misconduct on a UN posting in Congo
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However, Major General Anil Mehta of the Army Headquarters contradicted the CoAS on
1 April 2013. On 27 December 2012, ACHR had filed an application under the Right to
Information Act with the Army Headquarters seeking a copy of the CoI report. In a reply of 1
April 2013, Major General Anil Mehta stated that the investigation on the subject incident is
still not completed and disclosure of information at this stage is likely to impede the process of
investigation.110
2004 OIOS inquiry at Bunia, DRC and the issue of command failure
As per the OIOS, media reports in early 2004 indicated the recurrence of acts of sexual exploitation
and abuse of DRC women and girls by UN peacekeepers serving with MONUC in Bunia. Between
May and September 2004, the OIOS carried out an investigation at the request of MONUC and
DPKO.111
Interviews with Congolese women and girls confirmed that sexual relations with peacekeepers were
a regular occurrence, usually in exchange for food or small sums of money. The allegations involved
girls under the age of 18, with some as young as 13. 112
The OIOS report submitted to the UN General Assembly stated, Many of the 72 allegations
originally reported to MONUC could not be substantiated or even fully investigated because of
their non-specific nature. 113
Nevertheless, OIOS was able to compile 20 case reports. One substantiated case involved an
international civilian post. The remaining 19 cases involved peacekeepers from 3 contingents. Of
those, six cases were fully substantiated. In another two cases, the identification of the perpetrators
was not fully corroborated. In the remaining 11 cases, the victims and witnesses were unable to
clearly identify the perpetrators.
However, dozens of interviews with the girls themselves and with the young Congolese men who
facilitated the encounters, as well as with aid workers, revealed a pattern of sexual exploitation by
peacekeepers contrary to the standards set by the DPKOs Ten Rules: Code of Personal Conduct for
Blue Helmets and the Missions own code of conduct.114
It is not clear whether 19 cases involved peacekeepers from 3 contingents that included peacekeepers
from India. The MUNOC in a press release of 11 September 2003 reported that so far, over 2,500
dents the armys honour, India Today, 25 November 2012, available at: http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/indian-armyshamed-action-against-jawan-for-fathering-child-congo-india-today/1/234613.html, last accessed on 14 August 2013.
110. See RTI Reply to Mr Suhas Chakma by Major General Anil Mehta Vide No.B/87008/AG/PM/RTI2356 dated 1 April
2013.
114. Investigation by the Office of Internal Oversight Services into allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse in the
United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN General Assembly Document No. A/59/661 dated 5 January 2005.
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21
troops from Bangladesh, Uruguay, Indonesia and India have been deployed in Bunia in addition to
280 Pakistanis troops.115
However, what is clear is that the OIOS made eight specific recommendations including that
senior MONUC managers must become more involved and demand accountability from both
civilian administrators and contingent commanders in the Mission and that MONUC must
take steps to ensure that administrators and officers demonstrate implementation of all existing
regulations and policies aimed at preventing sexual abuse and exploitation (Recommendation
3). It also recommended that DPKOs and MONUC should undertake a programme to provide
regular briefings for troops on their responsibilities to the local population and on prohibited
behaviours and to ensure that all troops and civilians on UN missions were fully conversant with
UN policies on the subject of sexual exploitation and abuse (Recommendation 4); and that the
MONUC Force Commander, in conjunction with contingent commanders, should enforce strict
discipline over the personnel under their command (Recommendation 5).116
However, the inquiry or recommendations by the OIOS had little impact on the Indian troops
as the OIOS in the following years had to order further investigation into sexual exploitation and
misconduct by Indian troops.
Further abuses
On 12 March 2008, South African Police detained three Indian officers serving with MONUC after
a woman was allegedly raped. The accused, a Lieutenant Colonel and two Majors of the Indian Army
posted with the North Kivu brigade of the Mission had gone on a holiday to Pretoria. The accused
were released following intervention of the Indian Embassy in Johannesburg. Rather than seeking
action against allegations of sexual abuse Indias Defence Minister Mr A K Antony reportedly asked
the UN to report on why officers had been able to go to an unsecured location.117 UN Secretary
General Ban Ki-moon publicly demanded disciplinary action against them.118
In July 2010, an inquiry was launched by the Conduct and Discipline Unit of the UN against
Major R.S. Ghumman of the Jammu and Kashmir Rifles on charges of sexual exploitation and
abuse after he was allegedly found in the company of sex workers in the DRC. Major Ghumman
was reportedly found accompanying sex workers on 6 July 2010 while leaving a pub in North
Kivu province. Peacekeeping rules expressly forbid visiting sex workers. The Indian CoAS and the
Adjutant Generals Branch were informed of the investigations.119
iii. Indian national context for the crimes in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
The conduct of the Indian troops in the DRC is unsurprising given poor respect for human rights
within the Indian Army while deployed in counter insurgency operations in India.
115. DR of Congo: UN continues to boost troop strength in Bunia, UN News Centre, 11 September 2003, available at http://
www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=8220&Cr=democratic&Cr1=congo
116. DR of Congo: UN continues to boost troop strength in Bunia, UN News Centre, 11 September 2003, available at http://
www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=8220&Cr=democratic&Cr1=congo
117. 3 Army officers on UN Congo mission accused of rape, The Indian Express, 18 March 2008, available at: http://www.
indianexpress.com/news/3-army-officers-on-un-congo-mission-accused-of-rape/285654/#sthash.BtJbPNkV.dpuf
story_12690103.jsp
story_12690103.jsp
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India rightly rewards its soldiers for their performance in counter insurgency operations but it does
not sufficiently examine how performance is being defined within the security forces during counter
insurgency.
The Indian Army has been deployed in counter insurgency since its independence. There is now a
vast body of well-documented evidence that demonstrates that violations of international human
rights norms and humanitarian law appear to be part of the modus operandi of counter insurgency
strategy operations in India.
Hence, if deployment to UN peacekeeping is reward for combat performance it implies the strong
possibility that the soldier in question is being rewarded for what may often constitute not just
crimes under Indian law but equally international crimes.
It can be stated with certitude that offences committed in the DRC were nothing new and are
regularly committed in India.
Selling Illegal Arms: Is it Anything New?
One of the issues on which the UN found corroborative evidence relates to Indian army exchanging
ammunition for ivory with the Forces Democratiques de Liberation du Rwanda (FDLR) in the
DRC.
This is replicated in practice in the domestic sphere. There are regular reports of the involvement of
security personnel in arms sales to insurgents in India. A 2007 PIL filed before the Supreme Court
of India exposed the extent of illegal arm sales by the Indian Army. The PIL raised the issue of the
illegal sale of weapons by Indian Army Officers and government officials to arm traders and others
in sensitive districts of Rajasthan.
The PIL argued that the weapons sold could fall in the hands of criminals and terrorists. On 7
September 2007, the Supreme Court issued notices to the MoD and the Rajasthan Government.
On 8 September 2007 the Army ordered a CoI into the matter.120 In 2010, the Army reported to
the Supreme Court that 72 officers, including a serving Colonel and three Lt Colonels, posted in
sensitive border districts of Rajasthan, and in the Indian Army Training Team (IMTRAT) in Bhutan
had been involved in illegal arms sales. In the 2008 CoI report, the Army also provided the names of
the Colonel and three Lt. Colonels along with the number of weapons sold. 121
In July 2011, the MoD informed the Supreme Court that it had initiated court-martial proceedings
against 10 officers involved in weapons sales to arm dealers and others in Rajasthan.122 In July
2012, the Supreme Court asked the MoD to report on the action taken against the 72 personnel
found guilty in Army proceedings of illegal sale of weapons. The Court also directed the Rajasthan
120. See Satya Prakash, Gunrunning scandal: Army indicts 65 officers, The Hindustan Times, 14 July 2011, available at: http://
www.hindustantimes.com/India-news/NewDelhi/Gunrunning-scandal-Army-indicts-65-officers/Article1-721234.aspx,
121. Colonel Neeraj Rana (five weapons of army officers), Lt. Col. V S Rathore, a Sena Medal recipient, Lt. Col. VS Rathore
(a Sena Medal recipient), (17 weapons of army officers including his own weapon), Lt. Col. S S Rathore (five weapons
of army officers including his own) and Lt. Col B S Shekhawat (11 weapons of army officers). Forty-five officers and one
JCO had sold their non service pattern weapons without taking sanction of competent authority in violation of SAO 1/S/96
and the Arms Act 1959. Of these, 10 officers had since retired. Twenty-five officers who were posted at IMTRAT, Bhutan,
were found to have imported ammunition excess of their authorization. See Dhananjay Mahapatra, Court martial against
10 armymen starts, The Times of India, 15 July 2011, available at: http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-07-15/
india/29777530_1_nsp-weapons-weapons-and-deposit-col-s-s-rathore, last accessed on 14 August 2013.
122. See Id.
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23
government to report on the progress of investigation into 14 FIRs registered against government
officials, who had allegedly aided and abetted the illegal weapon sales.
The State Government of Rajasthan through its affidavit informed the Supreme Court in February
2013 that the State police had registered 14 FIRs, of which the one filed by the Jaipur anticorruption bureau on 18 July 2007 pertained to 284 cases of illegal sale of weapons by the Army.
During investigation, 304 more cases of illegal sale of arms came to light on perusal of records
as well as 41 cases pertaining to licences issued from the state of Punjab. The investigation in 13
cases was complete.123
The Army informed the Supreme Court about the court martial proceedings and punishment given
to 72 officers and a Junior Commissioned Officer (JCO) found involved in the illegal sale and
purchase of non-service weapons. Of the 29 officers of the rank of lieutenant colonel, colonel and
major found involved in the sale of weapons, 15 were punished with severe reprimand and a fine of
Rs 500, two were reprimanded and the rest were awarded punishment ranging from one to three
years loss of service either of promotion or pension. The 25 officers posted in IMTRAT, who were
found to have imported ammunition in excess of the authorized 50 rounds, were all let off with
severe displeasure (non-recordable). 124
During the hearing in February 2013, the Supreme Court observed that the punishment awarded
does not appear to be adequate and directed the Army headquarters to submit records of Court of
Inquiry proceedings and the General Court Martial (GCMs) records and asked Additional Solicitor
General to elaborate on his proposition that the courts must be very circumspect while interfering
with the findings of CoIs and GCMs.125
Paramilitary forces and police are also regularly reported to have been involved in illegal arms sales. In
April 2010, the Special Task Force of Uttar Pradesh Police arrested five security personnel, including
two members of the CRPF and a retired police sub-inspector. They were arrested on suspicion
of supplying arms and ammunition to anti-social groups, including Maoist insurgents. The police
reported that they had recovered over 5,000 live cartridges and 16 magazines for Insas rifles, .25
bore guns, SLR and AK-47s and 245 kg of empty shells.126
Sexual Assaults: A Regular Feature
The accusation of rape and other sexual assault against the Indian Army personnel deployed during
counter insurgency operations are also frequently reported.
The Justice J S Verma Committee set up by the Prime Minister of India in the wake of 16th December
2012 gang rape of Nirbhaya recognised occurrences of sexual offences against women in border
areas/conflict zones (Jammu & Kashmir (J&K), the North-East, Chhattisgarh, Odisha and Andhra
Pradesh). It stated that
123. Why jail for common man and reprimand for Army men? SC asks, The Times of India, 20 February 2013 available at
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2013-02-20/india/37199904_1_army-officers-army-personnel-reprimand
124. Why jail for common man and reprimand for Army men? SC asks, The Times of India, 20 February 2013 available at
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2013-02-20/india/37199904_1_army-officers-army-personnel-reprimand
125. Ibid
126. See HT Correspondents, CRPF men held for supplying arms to Naxals, Hindustan Times, 1 May 2010, available at: http://
www.hindustantimes.com/India-news/NewDelhi/CRPF-men-held-for-supplying-arms-to-Naxals/Article1-537807.aspx,
24
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impunity for systematic or isolated sexual violence in the process of Internal Security
duties is being legitimized by the Armed Forces Special Powers Act, which is in force
in large parts of our country. The brutalities of the armed forces faced by residents
in the border areas have led to a deep disenchantment, and the lack of mainstreaming
of such persons into civil society. Serious allegations of persistent sexual assault on the
women in such areas and conflict areas are causing more alienation.127
In J&K, anywhere between 23 and 100 women and girls from Kunan Poshpora were allegedly raped
by the Rajputna Rifles during cordon and search operation on the night of 23-24 February 1991.
The Army denied the allegations. The J&K State Human Rights Commission which registered
the case in 2004 in its concluding order in October 2011 acknowledged that the then Director
Prosecution had severely botched up the investigations to exonerate the involved armed forces, and
ordered his prosecution, together with ordering compensation to the victims, but passed no direction
for prosecution against the soldiers involved.128
On 7 April 2013, Mr Wajahat Habibullah, current chairman of the National Commission for
Minorities, stated that the government deleted important portions of his confidential report on the
Konan Pushpora mass rape case in which he had recommended a police probe, upgradation of the
level of investigation, entrusting the case to a gazetted police officer and seeking an order from
the 15th Corps Commander to ensure Army cooperation in the probe. Habibullah was Divisional
Commissioner, Kashmir when troops of the Rajputna Rifles allegedly raped the women in Kunan
Poshpora. The government used his report to give a clean chit to the Army.129 It is pertinent to
mention that the Second Battalion of the Rajputna Rifles were nominated for the UN mission
in DRC in 2006 and deployed between the third week of July and the second week of August
2006.130
127. See Full Text of the Justice Verma Committee Report, 23 January 2013, available at:http://www.prsindia.org/uploads/
media/Justice%20verma%20committee/js%20verma%20committe%20report.pdf, last accessed on 14 August 2013.
128. Human rights panel asks Jammu and Kashmir govt to reopen army mass rape case, India Today, 21 October 2011
129. See Muzamil Jaleel, Habibullah breaks silence: Govt deleted key portions of my report on J&K mass rape case, The Indian Express,
7 July 2013, available at:http://www.indianexpress.com/news/habibullah-breaks-silence-govt-deleted-key-portions-of-myreport-on-j-k-mass-rape-case/1138601/0
130. See in, Rajputna Rifles battalion for UN mission in Congo, The Hindu, 15 July 2006, available at: http, last accessed on 14
August 2013.
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25
Chapter 4: Overview of Indian Police and UN peacekeeping

India follows federal set up and the law and order is a subject of the State Governments while the
Central Government also has its own Central Armed Forces to aid the State Governments.
The Indian Police Act, 1861 governs the Indian Police. It was enacted expressly as a punitive response
to the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857. The Act was designed to establish a paramilitary force that could act
without accountability. This Act has not been reformed adequately.
There is little dispute that the police perpetrated what would be described today as a pattern of
systematic and widespread human rights violations under the British. But after independence the
police remain largely unreformed. Sporadic attempts to reform have been made but were not
sustained. Unsurprisingly human rights violations remain systemic and perpetrated with high levels
of impunity.
The massive human rights violations perpetrated by the Police during the emergency imposed
by Mrs Indira Gandhi in June 1975 raised public debate about the need for police reform.
The first government formed after the Emergency under the Janata Party attempted reform
including the establishment of the National Police Commission (NPC) on 15 November 1977. The
NPC produced eight reports between February 1979 and May 1981 containing recommendations
for wide reforms.131 Successive governments failed to implement the recommendations of the
NPC.
In 1996, a retired police officer filed a Writ Petition ((civil) 310 of 1996) before the Supreme Court
of India seeking implementation of the recommendations of the NPC. In 2006 the Indian Supreme
Court ruled on five issues ordering the:

(i)
establishment of State Security Commissions to select the Director General of Police
(ii)
Selection and Minimum Tenure of Director General of Police, Minimum Tenure of the
Inspector General of Police & other officers
(iii)
Separation of Investigation
(iv) Establishment of Board in each State which shall decide all transfers, postings,
promotions and other service related matters of officers of and below the rank of
Deputy Superintendent of Police and
(v)
Police Complaints Authority.132
While these measures were supported by the police, the issue of impunity enjoyed by the police
through the requirement of prior sanction under Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code has
not been addressed. Nonetheless, from 2007, various State governments began enacting legislation
in keeping with the Supreme Courts decision133 but the amendments to the Police Act failed to
131. The National Police Commission (NPC), Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, available at http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&catid=91%3Ashiva&id=686%3Apolice-indianational-police-commission&Itemid=100
132. Prakash Singh & Ors vs Union Of India And Orsavailable at http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/1090328/
133. For example see the following: Assam Police Act 2007, Bihar Police Act 2007, Chhattisgarh Police Act 2007, Haryana
Police Act 2007, Himachal Pradesh Police Act 2007, Punjab Police Act 2007, Rajasthan Police Act 2007, Sikkim Police
Act 2007, Tripura Police Act 2007, Uttarakhand Police Act 2007, Delhi Police Amendment Bill 2010, Goa Police Bill
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address the lack of accountability.

State Police in India fall under the jurisdiction of the respective State governments.134 As a result,
police organizations are identified by the name of the State to which they belong for example
Rajasthan Police. The police in each State are divided into armed and unarmed branches.
The Central Government of India has created seven Central Police Forces (CPFs) i.e. para-military
forces under the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA). These are primarily paramilitary in nature, to
assist State Governments in exceptional circumstances. The seven CPFs are the Assam Rifles (AR),
the Border Security Force (BSF), the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), the Central Reserve
Police Force (CRPF), the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP), the Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB) and
the National Security Guard (NSG). A number of these CPFs are deployed in counter-insurgency
operations.
The Assam Rifles is under the operational control of the Indian Army. All other paramilitary forces
are led by India Police Service officers. Each paramilitary force is governed by a separate legislation.
i. Central Police Forces Recruitment and Selection criteria

Recruitment of Officers
Recruitment for Officer rank in all seven CPFs is done by direct recruitment, transfer on deputation
from the Defence Forces, any other armed forces of the central government/state government,
promotion, transfer or reemployment.
Recruitment in CPFs is an ongoing process. The UPSC and the Staff Selection Commission (SSC)
are in charge of the recruitment process.
The UPSC and the SSC recruit officers through written examinations. Graduates are eligible to
apply. Entry to the forces starts at the Sub-Inspector level. There are vacancies for technical graduates,
education officers, medical officers, and other specialists.135
Written examinations are followed by a Physical Standards Test (PST), a Physical Efficiency Test
(PET) and a Medical Standards Test conducted by the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Personality
Test/Interview conducted by UPSC/SSC.136 The final selection is based on the merit list, which
is drawn up on the basis of marks obtained by the candidates in the Written Examination and
Interview/Personality Test and satisfactory police background checks. 137
2008, Karnataka Police (Amendment) Bill 2007, Karnataka Police Draft Act 2007, Kerala Police Draft Act 2008, Kerala
Police Bill 2008, Kerala Police (Amendment Act) 2007, Tamil Nadu Police Bill 2008 and West Bengal Police Draft Act
2007; available at: http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=597&Item
id=502, last accessed on 14 August 2013.
134. According to article 246 of the Indian Constitution and section 3 of the IPA, the police force is a state subject and is not
dealt with at the central [government] level. Each state government has the responsibility to draw guidelines, rule and
regulations for their [respective] police forces. These regulations are found in the state police manuals. See Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, Police Reforms: India Police Structure and Organisation, available at http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/programs/aj/police/india/history/default.htm, last accessed on 14 August 2013, and Report of the Review
Committee on the Recommendations of National Police Commission & Other Commissions/Committees on Police Reform (March
2005), p. ii, as cited in Ebba Marlensson, The Indian Police System a reform proposal, Foundation for Democratic Reforms,
available at: http://www.fdrindia.org/publications/IndianPoliceSystem_PR.pdf, last accessed on 14 August 2013.
135. See Information available on the websites of the UPSC, available at: http://upsc.gov.in/ and the SSC, available at: http://
ssc.nic.in/SSC.html, last accessed on 12 August 2013.
136. See Id.
137. See Id.
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27
Recruitment of Constables
Recruitment is done through the SSC and the relevant Force Recruitment Boards, who conduct
recruitment rallies. Recently, the MoHA has issued a modified scheme for common recruitment
of Constables in CPFs to be conducted by SSC. The new scheme, according to the MoHA, aims
at making the process of recruitment more fair, objective, efficient, effective and transparent by
maximizing the use of technology, including biometric technology, in the recruitment process.138
Candidates, who are enrolled in or have completed Class X, are between 18 to 23 years of age and
meet the other requisite eligibility criteria may apply for the posts of constable. Those who meet
the eligibility criteria then go through the PST and the PET followed by written examinations and
medical tests. The final selection of the candidates is made in order of merit and upon a successful
completion of his background and character investigation.139
ii. State Police Recruitment and Selection criteria

Recruitment of State Police
There are four levels of recruitment for the State Police. These include:

1.
The Indian Police Service (IPS),
2.
Deputy Superintendent of Police level,
3.
Sub-Inspector/Assistant Sub-Inspector level, and,
4.
Constable level.140
Police Constable is the lowest rank in the force and recruitment for this rank is conducted directly.
While for other ranks, vacancies are filled either by direct recruitment or by promotion.141
Each level of recruitment has varying qualifications, age limits, physical standards and educational
qualifications. For example, an applicant for the constable level must be between the ages of 18 to
20-27 (depending on the state) and only requires a high school certificate to qualify. Additionally, the
selection process for constables involves physical measurement, efficiency test, written examination,
interview, medical examination and police background checks. 142
138. See Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Vacanies in CPFs, Statement by the Minister of State in the MoHA,
Shri Mullappally Ramachandran, 8 March 2011, available at: http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=70706, last
139. See Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs Police II Division, Revised Scheme for Common Recruitment of
Constables in Central Police Forces (CAPFs) & ABOs to be conducted by Staff Selection Commission, available at: http,
140. See Ebba Martensson, The Indian Police System a reform proposal, Foundation for Democratic Reforms, available at: http://
www.fdrindia.org/publications/IndianPoliceSystem_PR.pdf, last accessed on 14 August 2013.
141. See Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, Police Reforms: India Police Structure and Organisation, available at http://
www.humanrightsinitiative.org/programs/aj/police/india/history/default.htm, last accessed on 14 August 2013.
142. See Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, Police Reforms: India Police Structure and Organisation, available at http://
www.humanrightsinitiative.org/programs/aj/police/india/history/default.htm, last accessed on 14 August 2013, and Report of the Review Committee on the Recommendations of National Police Commission & Other Commissions/Committees on
Police Reform (March 2005), p. ii, as cited in Ebba Marlensson, The Indian Police System a reform proposal, Foundation for
Democratic Reforms, available at: http://www.fdrindia.org/publications/IndianPoliceSystem_PR.pdf, last accessed on 14
August 2013.
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Recruitment to the post of Deputy Superintendent of Police requires a written examination followed
by an interview. Both the Deputy Superintendent of Police and the Sub-Inspectors are either directly
recruited or promoted.
Normally the State Public Service Commission recruits Sub-Inspectors. For these positions, the
selection process includes physical efficiency test, written examination, and mental ability test,
followed by an interview.143
IPS recruits are selected through written tests, personality tests and interviews. A person can either
be directly recruited through the Combined Civil Services Examination conducted by the UPSC
every year and by promotion of the State Police Service (SPS) officers. Directly recruited IPS officers
are allocated to the different State cadres/Joint cadres.144 At minimum, applicants to the IPS must
have graduation degree.145
Training for Central and State Police Forces
The MoHA makes very broad claims over the importance of training within the IPS. One of the
important requirements is effective and efficient discharge of duties by the police forces.146 ACHR is
unaware of any independent assessment of this claim.
Training includes recruits training at the time of induction in service, specialised training in different
disciplines, in-service training to improve the skills of the police personnel and to sensitise them about
a range of policing issues, e.g. human rights, gender sensitization and community participation.147
Most of the Central/State Police Forces have established training institutions. The training curricula
and schedules are designed to support the role and tasks of the respective forces.148 A number of
training institutes set up for the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) provide specialised skills, not
only to the personnel of the CAPFs, but also to personnel from the State Police Forces. The Police
personnel of States/UTs/CAPFs/CPOs are also sent abroad for training.
Training for IPS Officers
IPS officer recruits have 15 weeks Foundational Course training at the Lal Bahadur Shastri
National Academy of Administration at Mussorie in Uttarakhand. A further 44 weeks basic/
professional training is provided at the Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel National Police Academy (SVPNPA)
in Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh.
143. See Id.

144. The promotion of SPS officers to IPS is done on the basis of recommendations made by a Selection Committee constituted
under the chairmanship of Chairman/Member, UPSC. The Government of India, in consultation with the concerned State
Government, decides the total number of vacancies for directly recruited and promoted officers in a particular year. See
Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Annual Report 2007-2008, Chapter VII, Page 69, http://www.mha.
nic.in/pdfs/ar0708-Eng.pdf, last accessed on 14 August 2013.See also Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, Police
Reforms: India Police Structure and Organisation, available at http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/programs/aj/police/
india/history/default.htm, last accessed on 14 August 2013,The promoted officers, however, serve in the same cadre. See
Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Annual Report 2007-2008, Chapter VII, Page 69, http://www.mha.nic.
in/pdfs/ar0708-Eng.pdf, last accessed on 14 August 2013.
145. See Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Annual Report 2007-2008, Chapter VII, Page 69, http://www.mha.
nic.in/pdfs/ar0708-Eng.pdf, last accessed on 14 August 2013.
147. See Id.
148. See Id.
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29
Officers then have 34 weeks Practical Training in the States where they will serve. SPS officers on
their promotion to IPS also have six weeks induction training at SVPNPA, Hyderabad. Selected IPS
officers are also given specialized training in different fields related to policing institutions in India
and abroad.149
Periodic compulsory training for the IPS officers is being imparted and linked to promotion and the
functional requirements of the prospective assignments of the officers. Currently, these are carried
out in five phases as compared to the earlier two-phase compulsory training given to the officers
within the first two years of their service. The next three phases of training are given to the officers
during the period seven to nine years, 14 to 16 years and 24 to 26 years of service.150
iii. Selection of Central Police Forces and State Police for UN Peacekeeping
The MoHA, Government of India is responsible for the deployment of police personnel for UN
assignments. The peacekeepers deployed as police in these missions come from various state police
and central police forces.
The MoHA notifies the State governments/UTs/CPOs/other organisations requesting them to
nominate police officers to constitute a panel of officers to be nominated for deployment with various
UN peacekeeping missions. The nominated officers have to fulfill eligibility conditions (listed in
footnote).151 The sponsoring organizations have the responsibility to ensure that the nominated
officers fulfill these eligibility conditions. Failure to meet the eligibility conditions may result in the
cancellation of the candidature and even repatriation of the officer at his own cost.
No one can apply without nomination from a police force. Nominated officers are further shortlisted. These shortlisted officers are then called to undergo a week long English training, left hand
driving, shooting skills and finally to appear before the UN Selection Assistance and Assessment Team
(SAAT) for the UN SAAT Test. The nominated candidate has to bring UN Personal History Profile
(P-11) personal history form. The form includes declarations about prior criminal conviction.
150. See Id.
151. The eligibility criterion includes the following: i) The Level of officers deputed-from Head Constables to SSP from
all States, Union Territories (TTs), CAPFs and other organizations; ii) The candidate should be at least a graduate;
iii) Possesses a four wheeler valid driving license; iv) Must have completed 08 years of active police service/experience
including training period as on date of calling nominations; v) Above 25 years of age as on date of calling nominations; vi)
Must have good command over English Language (spoken as well as written); vii) IPS officer as per the batch prescribed
in the vacancy circular (IPS officers should not be debarred from Central Deputation/ Foreign training); viii) Nominated
officers should be clear from disciplinary/ vigilance angle; ix) Necessary cadre clearance from the State Government/
CAPFs/any other lending organization concerned should be available; x) The officers, having previously done a UN mission, must have completed a cooling off period of three years as on the date of issue of circular starting from the date of
repatriation/ end of previous UN mission; xi) Female police officers may be given preference; xii) Officers proceeding on
retirement/ superannuation within a period of three years from the date of issue of the circular calling nominations may
not be nominated; xiii) The officers whose names are received through proper channel will be further short listed depending upon the eligibility criteria so that a panel of officers proportionate to the number of anticipated vacancies is prepared.
These short listed officers will then be called to undergo one week training in English, left hand driving and shooting skill
and subsequently to appear before the UN SAT for the UN SAAT Test; xiv) The nominated candidate should bring UN
P-11 personal history form, duly filled, and Bio data form in soft and hard copies as per the specimen circulated with the
call letter for nominations. See Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs (Police Division II) PMA Cell, Nomination of Police Officers for deployment with UN Peacekeeping Missions (UN SAT 2012-2013),No.21023/21/2012-PMA, 24
April 2012, available at: http://www.police.mizoram.gov.in/uploads/attachments/UNSAT-240412.pdf, last accessed on 14
August 2013.
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ACHR
There are three types of UN assignments for which the MoHA makes nominations. These include
1) deployment of UN CIVPOL (Civilian Police Officers); 2) deployment of officers on secondment
with UN missions; and 3) deployment of Formed Police Units (FPUs) from CAPFs with UN
missions.
Deployment of Formed Police Units from Central Armed Police Forces
The deployment of FPUs is made after a UN-administered Special Police Assessment Teams (SPAT)
test. Passing the SPAT is the minimum requirement for any FPU deployment with a UN Mission.
Passing the test does not guarantee deployment. The selection of officers who qualify to sit in SPAT
is carried out according to the procedure established.152
Selection criteria for the CAPFs: Minimum two years in insurgency affected areas
The CAPFs are selected by the Departmental Screening Committee based on various criteria. The
criteria state that, Preference shall be given to such personnel, who have served for at least two
years in the hard/extreme hard areas like Jammu and Kashmir, North East region or Naxal Affected
states.153
152. Policy Guidelines for Considering Officers for Various UN Assignments, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India
dated February 27th, 2013 available at http://mha.nic.in/pdfs/PolicyGuid-270213.pdf. As per the policy:

a) It is the responsibility of CAPFs to carry out the selection process and prepare a main panel of equal numbers of troops
to be deployed with the UN Mission. A reserve panel of 25 personnel is also presented for the SPAT test.

b) Both the main panel and the reserve panel then take the UN SPAT assessment;

c) While preparing the panel, CAPFs should include reserve panelists who passed the SPAT test in the previous year but
could not be deployed, if such personnel wish to be considered for UN deployment;

e) The selection process should be carried out at least two months in advance of actual deployment to expedite deployment.;

f) Immediately after the SPAT assessment, the list of personnel should be provided to the MoHA to obtain political
clearance from Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and for obtaining the approval of the competent authority i.e. UN
for rotation;

g) In the case, where an advance party is required for deployment, the MoHA needs to informed promptly with the list
of personnel to obtain UN DPKO approval to transport personnel to the U.N mission; and,

h) Once the rotation process has been started, the concerned CAPFs will detail a focal point (a gazetted officer) and he
will be responsible for Coordinating the visit of UN SPAT for the assessment
Liaise with UN DPKO office in Delhi, Airport authorities to get exception of Passengers Service Fee and Airport
Development Fee during their rotation; and
Liaise with MEA for speedy political clearance and preparation of Passports and completing visa formalities including
flight landing clearance etc, name of focal point along with his official telephone number, mobile number and e-mail
ID may be intimated to MHA for further submission to UN DPKO.
However, the following categories of personnel are not included in the panel: Low Medical Category;
Officers/personnel required undergoing mandatory promotion/ professional courses for their eventual promotion to
higher ranks;
Officers/ men whose integrity is doubtful; and,
Officers/ men against whom disciplinary/vigilance case is pending/contemplated.
153. See criteria for selection of officers for deployment with UN/Foreign Missions, available at http://bsf.nic.in/doc/recruitment/r46.pdf. It provides the following criteria:
Eligibility: The nomination is made centrally by Force Headquarters strictly on seniority basis by selecting them as per the
gradation list.
APAR: The required bench mark/grade for consideration is Very Good and at least three APARs out of the last five
should be in the bench mark/grade of Very Good. For remaining two APARs, APARs graded as Good can be considered. However, there should be no adverse remarks in the APARs being considered for deputation.
Service: Service condition will also be taken into consideration as per the requirement/directive received from MHA for the
particular UN/ Foreign mission.
Disciplinary/Vigilance: Must be clear from disciplinary/vigilance angle.
Decoration: Due weightage shall be given to gallantry awardees.
Preference shall be given to such personnel, who have served for at least 02 years in the hard/extreme hard areas like Jammu
and Kashmir, North East region or Naxal Affected states.
Screening Committee: A Departmental Screening Committee comprising of the following will scrutinize the nominations
and made appropriate recommendations for consideration by the DG:
ACHR
31
It is clear that all the CPFs deployed for UN duties are selected because of their posting in the Jammu
and Kashmir, North East region or the Naxal Affected states.
As on 25 October 2012, the ITBP have been involved in 3243 counter insurgency operations,154
and have been deployed with the UN mission in Angola (1997-1998), Bosnia & Herzegovina,
Cambodia (1992, 1993, 1997), Congo, Haiti, Kosovo, Mozambique (1992-1994), Namibia (19891990), Sierra Leone, Sudan and Western Sahara.155 One company of the ITBP has been deployed in
UN Peace Keeping Mission in DRC since November 2005.156
The BSF personnel have participated in various peacekeeping missions in Namibia (1989), Cambodia
(1992), Mozambique (1994), Angola (1995), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1996, 1997, 1998, 1999),
Haiti (1997), Kosovo (2003), etc.157 Currently, a BSF contingent of 135 personnel is deployed
with the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission (UNOSM) and in MONUSCO. The
contingent, part of an FPU, comprises seven officers, seven subordinate officers and 121 members of
other ranks. The current contingent is the seventh consecutive contingent sent to Congo.158
The CRPF personnel have been deployed in Namibia, Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia. Presently, a
contingent of 240 personnel of the CRPF is deployed with the UN Mission in Kosovo, assisting the
activities of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.159
In 2010, the Assam Rifles, the only paramilitary force which is under operational control of the
Indian Army, sent its personnel for its first UN assignment for the UNs stabilisation mission in
Haiti. Since then, an Assam Rifles contingent has been deployed there every year160 on a rotational
basis.
Deployment of UN Civilian Police Officers
Deployment of UN CIVPOL officers is made after UN SAAT test conducted by the UN. Passing
the UN SAAT test is the minimum requirement for CIVPOL deployments with UN missions.
However, passing of the UN SAAT does not guarantee deployment.
The MoHA adopted policy guidelines for considering officers for various UN assignment on 27
February 2013. These laid down the selection procedure and conditions of deployment for UN
CIVPOL.161

i) In case of FPUs
Chairman - Addl DG
Members - IG (Pers), FHQ
IG of one of Frontier (or) FHQ

ii) In case of independent observers/ on secondment basis
Chairman - SDG, FHQ
Members - IG (Pers), FHQ
IG(G), FHQ
154. ITBP turns 50, ITPB Press Release dated 25 October 2012, available at: http://itbpolice.nic.in/eKiosk/writeReadData/
PRESS/Press%20Release%20%20on%20date%2025-10-12.pdf
155. Sentinels at the summit, The Hindu, 6 August 2012
156. Central Police Organisations, Part II, Editor, D Banerjea, 2005
157. See http://bsf.nic.in/en/un.html
158. See http://forceindia.net/servicenews8_sep2012.aspx
159. See http://crpf.gov.in/Pages/UNMissions.aspx
160. Assam Rifles team leaves for Haiti, The Hindu, 28 June 2012
161. The policy guidelines for considering officers for various UN assignment provides:

i) Based on the results of the UN SAAT, a panel of officers is prepared in order of merit. Validity of UN SAAT test is
generally for a period of 18 months;
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ACHR
The national UN CIVPOL Centre, New Delhi functioning under an ITBP Battalion is responsible
for the UN SAAT test and pre-departure formalities of officers selected for UN CIVPOL
deployments.
The national UN CIVPOL Centre examines the documents of personnel viz. surrender certificate of
personal passport, disciplinary/vigilance clearance, names in the identity card with selection order,
Arms/ Ammunitions/Validity of Driving Licence, etc.
Deployment of Officers on Secondment with UN Missions
Seconded police officers are deployed to UN mission as and when DPKO circulates vacancies via the
Permanent Mission of India to the UN. The eligibility criteria and terms and conditions of each post
are detailed by DPKO. The MoHA carries out a selection process for these positions.162

ii) The names of UN SAAT cleared officers are forwarded to UN However, UN does not consider the merit position of
a candidate as the sole criteria for selection for deployment;

iii) The general period of deployment of a UN CIVPOL officer in the mission is 12 months. In order to give exposure to
maximum number of officers, generally, no extension beyond this period of 12 months is given. However, in exceptional cases, on the basis of recommendations of the UN peacekeeping operations, the cases for short-term technical
extension may be considered by MoHA based on individual merit;

iv) On being selected, the officers are liable to accept the UN Mission assignments as offered by the UN DPKO. No
individual request for deployment with any desired mission by an officer will be entertained;

v) If any officer leaves the mission prematurely at his own or on any other personal reasons, he/she is liable to bear all the
expenses, including travel cost from the mission field. To this extent, an undertaking is obtained from all the CIVPOL
Officers prior to their departure, clearly stating that in the case of their pre-mature repatriation from the mission due
to failure in the mission driving test or any other reasons, they will bear the repatriation expenses at their own;

vi) The cases of such officers, who are selected for the deployment but are not relieved by the state governments/organizations due to operational exigencies, may be re-considered for further deployment depending upon the availability of
officers in the UN SAAT list and other considerations;

vii) The officers, who were selected for deployment with UN mission(s) and did not accept the offer of appointment at
their own due to their personal reasons, will not be eligible for further deployment;

viii) The officers, who qualified UN SAAT and could not be deployed during the validity of UN SAAT, are eligible to reappear in the fresh UN SAAT

ix) An undertaking is obtained from all the officers prior to their UN CIVPOL deployment that, they will not overstay
in mission;

x) Officers overstaying mission without specific approval of the competent authority will be dealt with strictly and the
authorities/organizations concerned shall initiate disciplinary proceedings against such officers on receipt of instructions from MHA;

xi) All officers on completion of their tour of duty will report to national UN CIVPOL Centre for de-briefing and getting
relieving order after depositing the official passport; and,

xii) State governments/organizations should not allow any officer to re-join the duty at their home state/ parent department without the proper relieving orders and surrender certificate of the official passport issued by the national UN
CIVPOL Centre, ITBP, Madangir, New Delhi.
162. The MoHA guidelines provide:

(a) All the vacancies so received are circulated amongst all the CAPFs, CPOs and other organizations as well as all State
Governments and UT Administrations through Registered Speed Post, e-mail and also posted on the MoHA website.
All positions are also sent through e-mail to the relevant authorities including Directors General of Police of State
Governments and UT Administrations;

(b) The level of secondment vacancies being circulated by UN DPKO shall have the eligibility as under:
(i) D-1 & D-2 IGP/ADG or equivalent.

(ii) P-5 DIG/IG.

(iii) P-4 SP /DIG

(iv) P-3 Dy SP/SP

(v) P-2 Inspector/Dy.SP

(c) The eligible officers may apply for the level equivalent to their ranks or one level below;

(d) All vacancies are time bound and the nominations of eligible and willing officers are to be submitted to MHA by the
given date itself;

(e) The nominations received after due date will not be considered;

(f) In case of CAPFs officers, only the nominations forwarded by Director Generals of the force concerned shall be considered;

(g) In case of State Governments and UT Administrations Police Officers, including IPS officers, only the nominations
received through the State Governments and UT Administrations authority concerned will be accepted and considered. The nominations received directly from the Director General of Police or copy endorsed to this Ministry will be
treated as applied directly and will not be considered;
ACHR
33
Selection by States
Information received from Delhi Police under the Right to Information Act, 2005 states that the
selection of police personnel for deployment to UN peacekeeping mission is being made through a
Screening Committee constituted by the Commissioner of Police, Delhi.163
This is the standard practice for all the State governments and Union Territories.
iv. Selection through UNSAAT Test: No verification to exclude human rights

violators
Despite the rigorous procedures for selection through the UN SAAT Test, those accused of serious
human rights violations have been selected by India. The Merit List of the UN SAAT held in UN
CIVPOL Centre from 23 to 30 May 2013 includes those who have been charged for rash driving
against requirement of driving skill, custodial torture, carrying of unauthorized cartridges, rape and
custodial death as detailed below.
Case 1: Case of rash driving against Inspector Ajay Khajuria, CISF
On 3 April 2010, a case of rash driving was registered against Inspector Ajay Khajuria of the Central
Industrial Security Force (CISF) at Seemapuri police station in Northeast Delhi. Inspector Khajuria
had allegedly hit a scooter driven by a 70-year-old man at Dilshad Garden under Seemapuri Police
Station with his car. Following the incident, Inspector Khajuria denied the charge and alleged that
he was beaten up and stabbed by two youths called up by the senior citizen. However, according

(h) In the case of State/ UT Cadre IPS Officers on central deputation, the nominations of eligible/ willing officers be
forwarded to this Ministry by the Head of the department/Directors General of CAPFs concerned;

(i) The nominations in respect of State Cadre Officers who are on central deputation and on the verge of their repatriation to parent cadre after completion of central deputation tenure should not be considered/forwarded to this Ministry;

(J) In the cases of IPS officers, their nominations are forwarded but their final deployment shall be subject to disciplinary/
vigilance clearance to be received from the Police Division (IPS-II) of MHA;

(k) The nominations of Arunachal Pradesh, Goa-Mizoram-Union Territory cadre officers posted in NCT of Delhi/ UTs
forwarded by the Commissioner of Police, Delhi Police will be considered subject to the disciplinary/ vigilance clearance from the UT Division, MHA and cadre clearance from the Joint Secretary (UT), MHA;

(l) On receipt of nominations, the same is put-up for obtaining approval of SS(IS)/Home Secretary for nominating suitable officers as per the eligibility criterion of UN DPKO. In case, where there are large numbers of applications/ posts
are to be considered, a meeting under the Chairmanship of SS (IS) may be called. The names are selected based, inter
alia, on the following criterion:

a. For every vacancy, normally a maximum of three names are forwarded to UN,

b. The name of any officer is forwarded for a maximum of two secondment positions in a calendar year,

c. The education criterion laid by UN, the requirements of previous UN experience required, if any as well as cooling off
requirements and language requirements for the post are the main criterion followed for nomination, and,

d. Instructions issued by the Department of Personnel and Training [DoP&T] from time to time are kept in view.

(m) Officers, who after nomination do not go for the deployment without any reasonable justification, will be debarred
for 03 years from applying for UN deployment; and,

(n) On nomination by MHA, the officials shall ensure the following:

i) Fill-up the P-11 properly. Some vacancy positions are circulated with P-11 especially endorsed by UN DPKO for that
position. In such, cases, the endorsed P-11 form should only be used.

ii) Signatures of the candidate have to be endorsed on the P-11 form both in hard as well as soft copies.

iii) Photographs have to be affixed on the P-11 form both in hard as well as soft copies.

iv) Employment and Academic Certificate, in which vacancy announcement number is to be mentioned, should be attached wherever required.

(v) P-11 (CV) and bio-data in respect of nominated officers should be sent through soft & hard copy through electronic
mail to MHA.

vi) Officers are required to follow utmost precautions and care while filling their P-11 (CV) as this can become a cause
for resection of their nominations even after recommendation of their names by MHA.
163. See
RTI
reply
No.XXIV/29/Spl/ID-1351/2012/13333/RTI/Estt./PHQ
dated
19.12.2012
received
from Public Information Officer cum Additional Deputy Commissioner of Police Establishment PHQ: Delhi
34
ACHR
to Deputy Commissioner of Police, SS Yadav, a police investigation found that prima facie it was
Inspector Khajuria who hit the scooter.164
Inspector Ajay Khajuria was selected for the UN Selection and Assistance and Assessment Team
(UN SAAT) test held at UN CIVPOL Centre in New Delhi from 23 to 30 May 2013. Inspector
Ajay Khajuria with ID No. 104517 passed the test and was put on the merit list.165 Driving skill is
one of the requirements for deployment in UN peacekeeping mission.
Case 2: Case of custodial torture against ASI (LR) Sanjeev Kumar of Punjab Police
In February 2005, a case was registered by police against Sanjeev Kumar, Assistant Sub Inspector
(ASI) of Punjab Police for custodial torture of three persons at Division No. 2 Police Station,
Pathankot, Punjab. ASI Kumar while he was posted in the police station allegedly took out three
detainees identified as Subhash Chander, Raj Kumar and Gurmail Singh in an inebriated condition
and forced them to strip and dance in the nude before subjecting them to physical torture.166
ASI (LR) Sanjeev Kumar of Punjab Police was selected for the UN SAAT test held at UN CIVPOL
Centre in New Delhi from 23 to 30 May 2013. ASI Kumar with ID No. 26/FIU passed the test and
was put in the merit list.167
Case 3: Arrest of Inspector Atul Soni of Punjab Police for carrying unauthorized live
cartridges
On 12 June 2012, Inspector Atul Soni of Punjab Police was arrested and a case under Section 25
of the Arms Act was registered against him for carrying 52 live cartridges of different calibers at the
Indira Gandhi International Airport in New Delhi. The CISF officials upon physically checking
Sonis bag seized 46 live 9mm rounds, three live 7.65 mm rounds, three live .32 mm rounds, four
empty 8mm cartridges and one magazine of a 9mm pistol. Soni was to board a Philippines Airlines
flight to Manila along with his family members. He was granted bail by a city court on 13 June 2012,
but was directed not to leave the country and his passport was seized. A police officer is authorised
only to carry cartridges of a single bore and that too while on duty. Inspector Soni did not have any
authorization for carrying the seized ammunition.168
Inspector Atul Soni of Punjab Police was selected for the UN SAAT test held at UN CIVPOL Centre
in New Delhi from 23 to 30 May 2013. Inspector Soni with ID No. 921712963 cleared the UN
SAAT test.169
164. CISF inspector beaten up, but FIR not lodged, The Times of India, 9 April 2010
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2010-04-09/delhi/28133906_1_senior-citizen-police-station-cisf-inspector
May 2013
166. ASI booked for making inmates dance in nude, The Tribune, 7 February 2005
http://www.tribuneindia.com/2005/20050207/punjab1.htm#32
May 2013
168. Held with live ammo, Punjab cop gets bail, The Tribune, 14 June 2012, available at: http://www.tribuneindia.
com/2012/20120614/punjab.htm#12
May 2013
ACHR
35
Case 4: Gallantry awards to SP Altaf Ahmad Khan of Jammu & Kashmir Police accused of
rape and custodial death
On 15 August 2012, Superintendent of Police Altaf Ahmad Khan of Jammu and Kashmir Police
was awarded the Presidents Police Medal for Gallantry. This is despite the fact that the police officer,
then Deputy Superintendent of Police, Handwara, was accused of raping a minor girl in custody
at Handwara police station on 3 July 2004. The victim was hospitalised for nearly 50 days and her
uterus had to be removed. The State Human Rights Commission, which intervened in the case,
indicted the officer. The officer was also accused in the custodial death of a youth identified as Nazim
Rashid Shalla in Sopore in North Kashmir in 2011.170 Earlier in January 2012, SP Altaf Ahmad
Khan was also conferred gallantry award by the Army.171
SP Altaf Ahmad Khan e was selected for the UN SAAT test held at UN CIVPOL Centre in New
Delhi from 23 to 30 May 2013. SP Khan with ID No. KPS 993595 cleared the UN SAAT test.172
Case 5: Kidnapping and extortion charges against Head Constable Shiv Charan of Chandigarh
Police
In February 2006, Head Constable Shiv Charan of Chandigarh Police was arrested by police on
the charge of kidnapping and extortion. He was produced before court on 26 February 2006,
which remanded him to 14 days judicial custody. Head Constable Shiv Charan kidnapped a person
identified as Partap Singh and demanded a ransom of Rs. 70,000 for his release.173 Head Constable
Shiv Charan was nominated for the 6th Batch of Pre SAT Training from 18 October 2010 to 22
October 2010.174
170. Lesson in irony: Gallantry award goes to rape accused, Tehelka, 17 August 2012, available at: http://archive.tehelka.com/
story_main53.asp?filename=Ws170812JK.asp
171. 2 controversial J&K policemen on army honour list, The Hindustan Times, 25 January 2012, available at: http://www.
hindustantimes.com/India-news/Srinagar/2-controversial-J-amp-K-policemen-on-army-honour-list/Article1-802190.aspx
May 2013
173. Head Constable held for kidnapping, extortion, The Tribune, 27 February 2006
174. HC orders transfer of 7 cops for assaulting girl, The Indian Express, 19 March 2013, available at: http://m.indianexpress.
com/news/hc-orders-transfer-of-7-cops-for-assaulting-girl/1090083/
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ACHR
Chapter 5: Impunity for sexual abuses in India and its impact on

UN Peacekeeping missions
i. The extent of human rights violations by the Army, paramilitary forces and police
India has faced a range of insurgencies almost since independence. As of March 2013, 197 out of
total 640 districts are formally declared as affected by internal armed conflicts. These 197 districts
include: 71 districts notified as disturbed under the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA)
in Assam,175 Arunachal Pradesh,176 Manipur,177 Meghalaya,178 Nagaland,179 and Tripura180 in north
east India and 20 out of 22 districts in Jammu and Kashmir; and 106 districts declared as Left
Wing Extremism affected in nine states of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya
Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal.181 The MoHA has banned around
35 armed opposition groups (AOGs) as terrorist organisations under the Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1967.182
The intensity of the conflicts can be measured by the number of fatalities suffered in the conflicts.
According to the MoHA, a total of 13,846 civilians and 4,807 security force personnel have been
killed in Jammu and Kashmir (up to 2011) since the inception of the insurgency in the state.183 The
Government has also claimed that as many as 8,873 terrorists were killed in Jammu and Kashmir
from 2001 to 2010.184
In North East India, around 3,986 civilians and 855 security forces were killed from 2001 to 2010,185
while 2,870 extremists were killed according to official data available from 2001 to 2006.186
Further, in the Naxalite conflict, which has been described as the single biggest internal security
challenge ever faced by the country by Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh, at least 9,060 persons
including 5,159 civilians, 1,676 security forces and 1,661 Naxalites have been killed from 2002 to
2010 in more than nine states namely Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya
Pradesh, Maharashtra, Odisha, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal.187
175.
176.
177.
178.
Entire state of Assam with 27 districts is notified as disturbed.

Three districts are notified as disturbed in Arunachal Pradesh while eight districts share border with Assam.
Entire state of Manipur with nine districts, except Imphal Municipality area, is notified as disturbed.
As per the notification of the Ministry of Home Affairs, Disturbed Area under the AFPSA includes areas that fall within a
20-km belt in Arunachal Pradesh and Meghalaya along their border with Assam. Five districts of Meghalaya share border
with Assam .
179. Entire state of Nagaland with 11 districts is notified as disturbed.
180. In Tripura, 34 out of 70 police Stations in eight districts are notified as fully disturbed and six police stations as partially
disturbed.
181. For details on the disturbed areas and Naxal affected areas, see Nobodys children Juveniles of Conflict Affected Districts
of India, Asian Centre for Human Rights, 22 March 2013 available at http://www.achrweb.org/reports/india/JJ-Nobodys_Children2013.pdf
182. See http://www.mha.nic.in/uniquepage.asp?Id_Pk=292 for the list of the organizations banned by the Ministry of Home
affairs.
183. Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, Annual Report 2011-2012, P 7, available at http://www.mha.nic.in/pdfs/
AR(E)1112.pdf
184. Annual reports of Ministry of Home Affairs from 2001 to 2010, Government of India
185. Annual Reports, 2001-2010 of the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India
186. 2006-2007 Annual Report of Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India
187. Annual Reports of Ministry of Home Affairs from 2001-2010 and Naxal Management Division of Ministry of Home Affairs available at: (http://mha.nic.in/uniquepage.asp?Id_Pk=540)
ACHR
37
The claim of the Indian Army that it has a zero tolerance policy towards human rights violations
is not supported by evidence. The Indian Armys Human Rights Cell claims that out of the 1,508
allegations investigated from 1993 to December 2001, 1,454 allegations were false. Out of the 54
allegations found to have merit, a total of 129 Army personnel, including 36 officers, were found
guilty of human rights violations. Most of these violations occurred in J&K involving 59 personnel
and the North-East involving 70 personnel. Compensation was awarded in only 34 cases with 15
cases being from Jammu and Kashmir and 19 from the North-East.188 The Indian Army however
never disclosed the names of the guilty or the nature of human rights violations committed by
them.
The figures of human rights violations of the India Army sit uneasily with the scale of allegations of
human rights violations committed by them.
The UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions voiced concerns on
unmarked graves found in Jammu and Kashmir containing bodies of victims of extrajudicial executions
from the 1990 to 2009 periodA total of 2,700 unmarked graves containing over 2,943 bodies have been
discovered, some of these graves containing more than one body.189 Since October 2012, the Supreme
Court of India has been adjudicating a PIL, which alleged that a total of 1,528 extrajudicial killings
have been committed in Manipur alone since 1979.190
However, the Assam Rifles, a paramilitary force whose personnel have been deployed in the counterinsurgency operations in North East India including Manipur claimed that there was only one case
of human rights violation by the force from 2002 to August 2011191
In the areas where the India Army are deployed after declaring those areas as disturbed in North East
India and Jammu and Kashmir, the Army operates alongside the central paramilitary forces like the
ARs, BSF, CRPF, ITBP, SSB and the State Police. Further, the central paramilitary forces and many
of State paramilitary forces like Mizoram Reserve Battalion and Nagaland Reserve Battalion have
been exclusively deployed to counter the Naxals in nine Naxal affected States.
Human rights violations by the Army, paramilitary forces and the State Police have been rampant
and widespread.
The UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns noted
that, According to the NHRC, 2,560 deaths during encounters with police were reported between
1993 and 2008. Of this number, 1,224 cases were regarded by the NHRC as fake encounters.
The police, the central armed police forces, and the armed forces have been accused of fake
encounters. Complaints have been lodged, particularly against the Central Reserve Police Force,
the Border Security Forces, and the armed forces acting under the Armed Forces (Special Powers)
188 . Since its inception, the Human Rights Cell of the Indian Army has received 1,532 allegations of human rights violations
against its personnel as on 31 December 2011. Investigations have been carried out in 1508 allegations, while 24 allegations were under investigation. See Indian Army, Human Rights Cell and Handling of Human Rights Violation Cases in
the Army, Annexure I, available at: http://indianarmy.nic.in/Site/FormTemplete/frmTempSimple.aspx?MnId=nQjxBck+
038W2DHiW6kG8Q==&ParentID=PopFg45UpU0Gpy+a22KR9g==, last accessed on 14 August 2014.
190. 1,528 victims of fake encounters in Manipur: PIL, The Times of India, 2 October 2012 available at http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-10-02/india/34217532_1_fake-encounters-security-forces-killings
191. 1 Proven Rights Violation Case by Assam Rifles in 9 Yrs, The Outlook, 26 August 2011, available at: http://news.outlookindia.com/items.aspx?artid=732651
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Act (AFSPA)..192 In fact, the National Human Rights Commission of India in 2004 stated that
extrajudicial executions, euphemistically called encounter killings have become virtually a part of
unofficial State policy.193 The NHRC stated that a total of 1,504 cases of deaths in police custody
and 12,727 cases of deaths in judicial custody were reported from 2001 to 2010.194 The BSF posted
along the Indo-Bangladesh borders in West Bengal alone reportedly killed about 1,000 people both
Indian and Bangladeshi nationals during 2001 to 2010.195
The Police in India are also involved in counter-insurgency operations. The Punjab Police, for
instance, was responsible for counter-insurgency operations in the State from 1985 to 1995. It
committed flagrant violation of human rights on a mass scale according to the Supreme Court of
India. Indias Central Bureau of Investigation following inquiry into illegal mass cremations of those
arrested and killed by Punjab Police found that 585 fully identified bodies, 274 partially identified
bodies and 1238 unidentified bodies (total 2097) had been cremated by the Punjab Police in the
three crematoriums of Amritsar, Tarn Taran and Majitha.196
There has been no accountability for these offences. The UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial,
summary or arbitrary executions stated, The situation is aggravated by the fact that security officers
who committed human rights violations are frequently promoted rather than brought to justice. The Special
Rapporteur has heard of the case of Mr. Sumedh Singh Saini, accused of human rights violations committed
in Punjab in the 1990s, who was promoted in March 2012 to Director General of Police in Punjab.
Promoting rather than prosecuting perpetrators of human rights violations is not unique to Punjab. The
Special Rapporteur heard this complaint from families of victims throughout the country. 197
ii. Impunity to the armed forces

Impunity for public servants was an integral part of colonial administration by the British in India.
After independence, India embedded good faith clause in all the legislations to protect virtually all
illegal and criminal acts by public servants through requirement of prior sanction from the concerned
193. NHRC, Report on Prevention of Atrocities Against Scheduled Castes & Scheduled Tribes, 2004, p.106.
194. Torture in India 2011, Asian Centre for Human Rights, available at http://www.achrweb.org/reports/india/torture2011.
pdf
195. Trigger Happy: Excessive Use of Force by Indian Troops at the Bangladesh Border, Human Rights Watch, See http://www.
hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/bangladesh1210Web.pdf
196. See orders of the National Human Rights Commission of India at http://nhrc.nic.in/punjab.htm. Two writ petitions were
filed before the Supreme Court of India being W.P. (Crl.) No. 497/95, Paramjit Kaur Vs. State of Punjab and others;
and Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 447/95, Committee for Information and Initiative on Punjab Vs. State of Punjab. Serious
allegations were made in the writ petitions about large scale cremations resorted to by the Punjab Police of persons allegedly killed in what were alleged as encounters. The main thrust of the Writ Petitions was that there were extra-judicial
executions and hasty and secret cremations rendering the State liable for action. The two writ petitions relied upon a
Press Note issued on 16th January 1995 by the Human Rights Wing of the Shiromani Akali Dal under the caption Disappeared cremation ground. The Press Note had alleged that a large number of human bodies had been cremated by the
Punjab Police after labelling them as unidentified. The Supreme Court was apparently disturbed by the gravity of the
allegations and it ordered an inquiry by the CBI into the allegations. Accordingly, the CBI, after completing its enquiry,
submitted its fifth and final report to the Supreme Court on 9th December 1996. The Supreme Court after examining
the report relating to cremation of dead bodies on December 11, 1996 after examining the final report (5th) of the CBI
observed: The report indicates that 585 dead bodies were fully identified, 274 partially identified and 1238 unidentified.
Needless to say that the report discloses flagrant violation of human rights on a mass scale, and directed the CBI to take
further action into the matter and register the cases, where necessary, hold investigations and proceed in accordance with
law on the basis of the material collected during investigation The CBI shall, after every three months, place a status
report regarding the investigation in this Court.
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39
authorities for prosecution or institution of suit or other legal proceeding. In fact, other public
servants who are tried by judges have been given the same protection as judges under Section 197
of the Criminal Procedure Code.
In the context of armed conflicts, India provides special protection to its armed forces. India has been
facing insurgency almost since its independence. The first major insurgency in the post independent
India was in erstwhile Assam in 1950s by the Nagas who demanded independence from India. India
responded by enacting the Armed Forces Special Powers Act, 1958,198 a far more draconian version
of the Armed Forces Special Powers Ordinance, 1942199 introduced by the British to deal with
civilian protests called by Mahatma Gandhi asking Britain to leave India.
The AFSPA, among others, empowers non-commissioned officers to fire upon or otherwise
use force, even to the causing of death, against any person who is acting in contravention of any
law or order for the time being in force in the disturbed area. Section 6 of the AFSPA guarantees
immunity to the armed forces as it provided that No prosecution, suit or other legal proceeding
shall be instituted, except with the previous sanction of the Central Government, against any person
in respect of anything done or purported to be done in exercise of the powers conferred by this
Act.
As the insurgency spread to the remaining part of the North Eastern States i.e. Assam, Arunachal
Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura, the AFPSA was imposed in all these
States.
By the 1980s, insurgency by Sikh separatist groups demanding secession from India rocked Punjab.
In October 1983, Punjab was put under Presidents rule and the Armed Forces (Punjab and
Chandigarh) Special Power Act, 1983 was enacted on 8 December 1983.200 As the insurgency began
in Jammu and Kashmir in late 1989, the Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act,
1990 was enacted on 11 September 1991.201
198. Section of 4 of AFSPA provided the following special powers to the armed forces: Any commissioned officer, warrant officer, non-commissioned officer or any other person of equivalent rank in the armed forces may, in a disturbed area,- (a)
if he is of opinion that it is necessary so to do for the maintenance of public order, after giving such due warning as he
may consider necessary, fire upon or otherwise use force, even to the causing of death, against any person who is acting in
contravention of any law or order for the time being in force in the disturbed area prohibiting the assembly of five or more
persons or the carrying of weapons or of things capable of being used as weapons or of fire-arms, ammunition or explosive
substances; (b) if he is of opinion that it is necessary so to do, destroy any arms dump, prepared or fortified position or
shelter from which armed attacks are made or are likely to be made or are attempted to be made, or any structure used
as a training camp for armed volunteers or utilized as a hide-out by armed gangs or absconders wanted for any offence;
(c) arrest, without warrant, any person who has committed a cognizable offence or against whom a reasonable suspicion
exists that he has committed or is about to commit a cognizable offence and may use such force as may be necessary to
effect the arrest; (d) enter and search without warrant any premises to make any such arrest as aforesaid or to recover any
person believed to be wrongfully restrained or confined or any property reasonably suspected to be stolen property or any
arms, ammunition or explosive substances believed to be unlawfully kept in such premises, and may for that purpose use
such force as may be necessary.
199. See the Armed Forces Special Power Ordinance at http://indianarmy.nic.in/Site/RTI/rti/MML/MML_VOLUME_3/
CHAPTER__01/452.htm. Section 2 of the Ordinance provides, Power to certain officers of the armed forces to order use
of force in certain circumstances.(1) Any officer not below the rank of Captain in (the Indian) Military Forces and
any officer holding equivalent rank either in (the Indian) Naval or Air Forces may, if in his opinion it is necessaryfor
the proper performance of his duty so to do, by general or special order air writing require anypersonnel under his
command to use such force as may be necessary, even to the causing of death, against any person who

(a) fails to halt when challenged by a sentry, or

(b) does, attempts to do, or appears to be about to do, any such act as would endanger ordamage any property of
any description whatsoever which it is the duty of such officerto protect;and it shall be lawful for such personnel, when so ordered, to use such force against such person.
200. See http://punjabrevenue.nic.in/armsact.htm
201. See http://mha.nic.in/pdfs/Armed%20forces%20_J&K_%20Spl.%20powers%20act,%201990.pdf
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As Punjab, Jammu and Kashmir and many others States were put under the Presidents rule, the
Government of India amended Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure202 and took away the
powers of the State Governments for providing sanction for prosecution when the State was under
Presidents rule. This amendment made obtaining sanction to proceed with investigations virtually
impossible.
In fact, when India established the National Human Rights Commission in 1993 to address increasing
international concerns, the army and the Central Armed Forces were kept out of the purview of the
NHRC under Section 19 of the Protection of Human Rights Act (PHRA) of 1993.203 The NHRC
has been barred from investigating human rights violations by the armed forces as it does with
human rights violations by the police under Section 13 of the PHRA.
The UN Human Rights Committee examined human rights violations in these conflict situations
and the measures taken by the Government of India to provide impunity to the law enforcement
personnel while examining Indias third periodic report on 24-25 July 1997.
The UN Human Rights Committee regretted that some parts of India have remained subject to
declaration as disturbed areas over many years - for example the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act has been
applied throughout Manipur since 1980 and in some areas of that state for much longer - and that, in these
areas, the State party is in effect using emergency powers without resorting to article 4, paragraph 3, of the
Covenant. The Committee also held the bar to commence criminal prosecutions or civil proceedings
against members of the security and armed forces, acting under special powers, without the sanction of the
central Government contributes to a climate of impunity and deprives people of remedies to which they may
be entitled in accordance with article 2, paragraph 3, of the Covenant. It recommended that, the
requirement of governmental sanction for civil proceedings be abolished and that it be left to the courts to
decide whether proceedings are vexatious or abusive. It urges that judicial inquiries be mandatory in all
cases of death at the hands of the security and armed forces and that the judges in such inquiries, including
those under the Commission of Enquiry Act of 1952, be empowered to direct the prosecution of security and
armed forces personnel. The Committee regretted that the National Human Rights Commission is
202. The following amendments were enacted on 2 May 1997

[(3A) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (3), no court shall take cognizance of any offence, alleged to
have been committed by any member of the Forces charged with the maintenance of public order in a State while acting
or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty during the period while a Proclamation issued trader clause (I) of
article 356 of the Constitution was in force therein, except with the previous sanction of the Central Government.
(3B) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Code or any other law, it is here by declared that any sanction accorded by the State Government or any cognizance taken by a court upon such sanction, during the period commencing on the 20th day of August, 1991 and ending with the date immediately preceding the date on which the Code
of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1991, receives the assent of the President, with respect to an offence alleged to
have been committed during the period while a Proclamation issued under clause (1) of article 356 of the Constitution
was in force in the State, shall be invalid and it shall be competent for the Central Government in such matter to accord
sanction and for the court to take cognizance thereon.
203. Section of 19 of the Protection of Human Rights Act provides that 19.Procedure with respect to armed forces
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, while dealing with complaints of violation of human rights by
members of the armed forces, the Commission shall adopt the following procedure, namely:
(a) it may either on its own motion or on receipt of a petition, seek a report from the Central Government;

(b) after the receipt of the report, it may, either not proceed with the complaint or, as the case may be make its recommendations to that Government.
(2) The Central Government shall inform the Commission of the action taken on the recommendations within three
months or such further time as the Commission may allow.
(3) The Commission shall publish its report together with its recommendations made to the Central Government and the
action taken by that Government on such recommendations.
(4) The Commission shall provide a copy of the report published under sub-section(3) to the petitioner or his representative.
ACHR
41
prevented from investigating directly complaints of human rights violations against the armed forces
and recommended that these restrictions be removed and that the National Human Rights Commission
be authorized to investigate all allegations of violations by agents of the State.204
India until today has not implemented any of these recommendations. It refused to submit any
further report until today. Its Fourth Periodic report to the UN Human Rights Committee has been
pending since 31 December 2001.205
iii. Indias refusal to remove the requirement of prior sanction for sexual violence
committed by the armed forces
The brutal gang rape of Nirbhaya on 16 December 2012 in Delhi206 shocked India and the
international community. The Government of India set up a Committee headed by Justice J S
Verma. The Justice Verma Committee in its report submitted on 23 January 2013 recommended
that in case of sexual offences by the public servants, prior sanction shall not be required and the
relevant legal provision be amended.207
Thereafter, the Government of India enacted the Criminal Law Amendment Act 2013 and complied
with the recommendations of the Justice Verma Committee to amend Section 197 of the Criminal
Procedure Code. The Amendment states that for the removal of doubts that no sanction shall be
required in case of a public servant accused of any offence alleged to have been committed for
various sexual offences as defined under section 166A, section 166B, section 354, section 354A,
section 354B, section 354C, section 354D, section 370, section 375, section 376, section 376A,
section 376C, section 376D or section 509 of the Indian Penal Code under Section 18 of the
Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013.208
However, the Government of India refused to implement another key recommendation of Justice
Verma Committee to amend Section 6 of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958 which
provides immunity to the security forces including in cases of sexual violence including rape.209
In a reply dated 8 May 2013 to a question in the Rajya Sabha, the Minister of State in the MoHA
stated that the recommendations of amending the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958 have
not been incorporated in the Criminal Law (Amendment) Ordinance, and subsequent Criminal Law
(Amendment) Act 2013 because of multitude and divergence of opinion on the issues.210
204. Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee:India,08/04/1997, CCPR/C/79/Add.81 are available at http://www.
unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/CCPR.C.79.Add.81.En?OpenDocument
205. See http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/5038ebdcb712174dc1256a2a002796da/80256404004ff315c125638c005dca9f?
OpenDocument
206. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2012_Delhi_gang_rape_case
208. The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 is available at http://egazette.nic.in/WriteReadData/2013/E_17_2013_212.
pdf
210. Rajya Sabha Unstarred Question No. 4590 dated 8 May 2013 asked by Member of Parliament Smt. Jharna Das and answered by Shri R.P.N. Singh, Minister of State in the Ministry of Home Affairs, available at: http://mha.nic.in/par2013/
par2013-pdfs/rs-080513/4590.pdf
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ACHR
The Government of India has essentially legalised rape by the armed forces in conflict situations
by making it mandatory to seek prior sanction of the Government of India for prosecution of the
accused security personnel. A sanction that is rarely, if ever given.
iv. No need to adjudicate good faith, prior sanction is absolute: Pathribal killings and
the Supreme Court of India
In Chittising Pora village, District Anantnag, Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), 36 Sikhs were killed by
terrorists on 20 March 2000. Immediately thereafter, a search for the terrorists started in the entire
area and 5 persons, purported to be terrorists, were killed at village Pathribal Punchalthan under
Anantnag district by personnel of the 7th Rashtriya Rifles (RR) on 25 March 2000 in an encounter.
The 7th RR on 25 March 2000 claimed the 5 persons to be responsible for massacre of the Sikhs at
Chittising Pora and Major Amit Saxena, the then Adjutant, 7th RR sent a complaint bearing No.
241/GS(Ops.) dated 25 March 2000 to Police Station Achchabal, District Anantnag for lodging
FIR stating that during a special cordon and search operation in the forests of Panchalthan from
0515 hr. to 1500 hrs. on 25.3.2000, an encounter took place between terrorists and troops of
that unit and that 5 unidentified terrorists were killed in the said operation. On the receipt of the
complaint, FIR No. 15/2000 under Section 307 of Ranbir Penal Code (RPC) and Sections 7/25
of the Arms Act, 1959 was registered against unknown persons. A seizure memo was prepared
by Major Amit Saxena on 25 March 2000 showing seizure of arms and ammunition from all
the 5 unidentified terrorists killed in the aforesaid operation which included AK-47 rifles (5),
AK-47 Magazine rifles (12), radio sets (2), AK-48 ammunition (44 rounds), hand grenades (2)
detonators (4) and detonator time devices (2). The said seizure memo was signed by witnesses,
Farooq Ahmad Gujjar and Mohammed Ayub Gujjar, residents of Wuzukhan, Panchalthan, J&K.
The 7th RR deposited these recovered weapons and ammunition with 2 Field Ordnance Depot.
However, the local police insisted that the Army failed to hand over the arms and ammunition
allegedly recovered from the terrorists killed in the encounter, which tantamount to causing the
disappearance of evidence, constituting an offence under Section 201 of the RPC. In this regard,
there had been correspondence and a Special Situation Report dated 25.3.2000 was sent by Major
Amit Saxena, the then Adjutant, to Head QuarterI, Sector RR stating that, based on police inputs,
a joint operation with STF was launched in the forest of Pathribal valley on 25 March 2000, as a
consequence, the said incident occurred. However, it was added that ammunition allegedly recovered
from the killed militants had been taken away by the STF.
There had been a series of processions in Kashmir to protest against the killing of these 5 persons
alleging that they were civilians and had been killed by the RR personnel in a fake encounter. The local
population treated it to be a barbaric act of violence and there had been a demand for independent
inquiry into the whole incident. On the request of the Government of J&K, a Notification dated
19.12.2000 under Section 6 of Delhi Police Special Establishment Act, 1946 (hereinafter called as
Act 1946) was issued. In pursuance thereof, Ministry of Personnel, Government of India, also
issued Notification dated 22.1.2003 under Section 5 of the Act 1946 asking the Central Bureau of
Investigation (CBI) to investigate four cases including the alleged encounter at Pathribal resulting in
the death of 5 persons on 25.3.2000.
The CBI conducted the investigation into the Pathribal incident and filed a chargesheet in the court
of Chief Judicial Magistrate-cum- Special Magistrate, CBI, (hereinafter called the CJM) Srinagar,
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43
on 9.5.2006, alleging that it was a fake encounter, an outcome of criminal conspiracy hatched by
Colonel Ajay Saxena, Major Brajendra Pratap Singh, Major Sourabh Sharma, Subedar Idrees Khan
and some members of the troops of 7th RR who were responsible for killing of innocent persons.
Major Amit Saxena prepared a false seizure memo showing recovery of arms and ammunition in
the said incident, and also gave a false complaint to the police station for registration of the case
against the said five civilians showing some of them as foreign militants and passed false information
to the senior officers to create an impression that the encounter was genuine and, therefore, caused
disappearance of the evidence of commission of the offence under Section 120-B read with Sections
342, 304, 302, 201 RPC and substantive offences thereof. Major Amit Saxena was further alleged to
have committed offence punishable under Section 120-B read with Section 201 RPC and substantive
offence under Section 201 RPC with regard to the aforesaid offences.
The CJM on consideration of the matter found that veracity of the allegations made in the
chargesheet and the analysis of the evidence cannot be gone into as it would be tantamount to
assuming jurisdiction not vested in him in view of the provisions of Armed Forces J&K (Special
Powers) Act, 1990, which offer protection to persons acting under the said Act.211
The CJM, Srinagar, granted opportunity to the Army to exercise the option as to whether the
competent military authority would prefer to try the case by way of court-martial by taking over
the case under the provisions of Section 125 of the Army Act, 1950. On 24 May 2006, the Army
officers filed an application before the court pointing out that no prosecution could be instituted
except with the previous sanction of the Central Government in view of the provisions of Section
7 of the Act 1990 and, therefore, the proceedings should be closed by returning the chargesheet
to the CBI.
The CJM in his order of 24 August 2006 dismissed the application holding that the said court had
no jurisdiction to go into the documents filed by the investigating agency and it was for the trial
court to find out whether the action complained of falls within the ambit of the discharge of official
duty or not. The CJM himself could not analyse the evidence and other material produced with the
chargesheet for considering the fact, as to whether the officials had committed the act in good faith
in discharge of their official duty; otherwise the act of such officials was illegal or unlawful in view
of the nature of the offence.
Aggrieved by the order of CJM, the General Officer Commanding of the 7th RR filed a revision
petition before the Sessions Court, Srinagar and the Sessions Court directed the CJM to give one
more opportunity to the Army officials for exercise of option under Section 125 of the Army Act.
The General Officer Commanding of the 7th RR approached the High Court against the order of the
Sessions Court. The High Court vide impugned order dated 10.7.2007 affirmed the orders of the
courts below and held that the very objective of sanctions is to enable the Army officers to perform
their duties fearlessly by protecting them from vexatious, malafide and false prosecution for the act
done in performance of their duties. However, it has to be examined as to whether their action falls
under the Act 1990. The CJM does not have the power to examine such an issue at the committal
211. Section 7of the Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act, 1990, 7. Protection of persons acting in good faith
under this Act. No prosecution, suit or other legal proceeding shall be instituted, except with the previous sanction of the Central
Government, against any person in respect of anything done or purported to be done in exercise of the powers conferred by this Act.
44
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proceedings. At this stage, the Committal Court has to examine only as to whether any case is made
out and, if so, the offence is triable.
Thereafter an appeal was filed before the Supreme Court of India by the GOC of the 7th RR, among
others, claiming immunity under Section 7 of the Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special
Powers Act, 1990.
Though the CBI contented that killing innocent persons in a fake encounter in execution of a
conspiracy cannot be a part of official duty and thus, in view of the facts of the case no sanction is
required, the Supreme Court in May 2012 held that it has no hesitation to hold that sanction of the
Central Government is required in the facts and circumstances of the case and the court concerned
lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance unless sanction is granted by the Central Government.212
ACHR is of the opinion that the Supreme Court had failed to appreciate that protection is provided
to persons acting in good faith. How extrajudicial executions of innocent persons after entering
into criminal conspiracy become an act of good faith has not been explained by the Supreme Court
in its judgement on the Pathribal killings.
212. Judgement of the Supreme Court of India dated 1 May 2012 in CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 257 of 2011 General Officer
Commanding Appellant Versus CBI & Anr. With CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.55 of 2006 available at http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/69000120/
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45
Chapter 6: Conclusions and recommendations

There is no doubt that India pays significant importance to UN peacekeeping operations. This is
demonstrated for instance by Indias then President Dr APJ Abdul Kalam administering a six point
oath on 5 February 2007 to over 3,500 Indian Army troops deployed with the UN peacekeeping
missions in the DRC and Sudan. The oath stressed the traditions of the Indian Army and the role of
each individual in the peacekeeping missions. It reminded the Peacekeepers that they represent India,
a great nation. It spoke about moral character and regimental coordination. It emphasised the role
of the Peacekeepers to assist the citizens of the nations in which they are deployed for peacekeeping.
Then the CoAS assured the President that the troops would uphold the oath administered to them
and all troops being deployed on UN mission would also be administered this oath.213
About a year later, the scandals of the UN peacekeepers in the DRC exploded. Indias image as a
prominent UN peacekeeping nation remains tainted and the government has failed to take appropriate
steps to address the issue.
On paper, there is vetting for selection of the PBOR while officials are required to fill up P-11 form
of the UN. Among others, all PBOR who have any disciplinary case and criminal case pending
against them or have been awarded Red Ink Entry under Section 34 of the Army Act of 1950
relating to offences pertaining to the enemy and punishable with death, Section 35 pertaining to
offences in relation to the enemy and not punishable with death, Section 36 on offences punishable
more severely on active service than at other times, Section 38 on desertion and aiding desertion,
Section 40(a) relating to use of criminal force to or assaults his superior officer, Section 41 relating
to disobedience to superior officer, Section 46 relating to certain forms of disgraceful conduct,
Section 52 on offences in respect of property and Section 53 relating to extortion and corruption
will not qualify for UN peacekeeping duties.
However, in practice the army personnel enjoy virtual impunity. Special laws such as the Armed
Forces Special Powers Act, 1958 and Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code makes prior
permission from the concerned Government mandatory for prosecution of the accused army and
police personnel and the permission is seldom given. The army personnel and the police continue
with the same sense of impunity in their places of deployment on UN peacekeeping missions.
If any incident of violations during peacekeeping operations is found following inquiry, the UN is
faced with a fait accompli as it is the troop contributing countries which are expected to take necessary
actions as per the national laws. The secrecy with respect to the Court of Inquiry into sexual offences
by the 6th Sikh Regiment in the Democratic Republic of Congo shows that all actions are geared
towards shielding the guilty.
Indias engagement with United Nations peacekeeping operations is here to stay. It forms part of the
strategic engagement with Africa214 and the Middle East.
213. See Government of India, Press Information Bureau, Dr. AP J Abdul Kalam Administers Six Points Oath to Indian Troops Bound
for UN Peacekeeping Missions, 5 February 2007, available at: http://pib.nic.in/release/rel_print_page1.asp?relid=24571, last
214
. See The Second Africa-India Forum Summit 2011: Addis Ababa Declaration at http://www.indiaafricasummit.nic.
in//?1503 which at Para 14 provides that Africa recalls, with appreciation, Indias principled support to and continuing
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It is in Indias national interest to promote better national vetting mechanisms prior to sending the
troops for the UN peacekeeping operations to ensure that criminal elements in the Army do not
blemish Indias track record on peacekeeping.
At national level, India has in place such vetting procedures such as policy clearance for any criminal
cases for appointments for members of the Army and paramilitary forces. There is no reason why the
Government of India cannot ask similar questions for each and every army/police being deployed
for UN missions as provided in the Acts establishing the forces and in conformity with the Code of
Conduct for UN peacekeepers and the December 2012 UN policy on human rights screening.
Asian Centre for Human Rights recommends the following to the Government of India:

Considering the problems of selecting troop contingents which does not provide for
verification of individuals, put in place effective human rights screening policies for
the selection and deployment of security forces personnel on peacekeeping duties, and
make them publicly available;
Introduce national vetting procedures to comply with ANNEX H: WE ARE UNITED

NATIONS PEACEKEEPING PERSONNEL of the Memorandum of Understanding
signed with the UN and the December 2012 UN policy for human rights screening of
UN personnel;
Ensure that army and police personnel engaged in counter-insurgency operations

are subjected to vetting by the National Human Rights Commission with respect to
allegations of human rights violations;
Issue necessary guidelines/instructions to provide that no immunity shall be provided

for any offence committed as part of UN peacekeeping operations;
File charges against the Army personnel deployed as peacekeepers in DRC against
whom there is evidence of involvement in rape and sexual violence under the Army Act
of 1950 as per the report (ID Case No. 0648/06) of the Investigations Division of the
Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) received from the Conduct and Discipline
Team of the UN Mission in the DRC; and
Make public the armys Court of Inquiry (CoI) report into sexual abuse by the personnel
of the 6th Sikh Battalion during their deployment with the MONUC.
Asian Centre for Human Rights recommends the following to the United Nations, in particular, the
Department of the Peacekeeping Operations:

Withhold the salaries of those suspected of involvement in serious human rights

violations and establish criminal accountability;
Name and shame the peacekeepers who are found responsible for sexual exploitation
and abuse while in UN Peacekeeping missions; and
Make all the reports of inquiry into sexual exploitation and abuses by the OIOS
public.
involvement with UN peacekeeping operations, especially in the African continent, India appreciates the role of African
counties in maintaining peace and security in the Continent and their participation in peace keeping missions in other parts
of the world.
ACHR
47
Annex 1: Patterns of deployment for the UN Keeping Missions by

India
Patterns of deployment of Indian peacekeepers
Available as on 10th November 2013 at : http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml
Year
JAN
2013
7,840
7,845
7,812
7,795
7,868
7,878
7,859
7,858
7,860
7,864
2012
8,093
8,110
8,134
8,133
8,134
8,145
8,109
8,104
7,889
7,899
7,846
7,839
2011
8,680
8,665
8,657
8,513
8,488
8,504
8,423
8,408
8,192
8,093
8,174
8,115
2010
8,759
8,783
8,765
8,771
8,775
8,920
8,919
8,925
8,935
8,704
8,711
8,691
2009
8,640
8,633
8,631
8,617
8,612
8,607
8,753
8,767
8,752
8,759
8,759
8,757
2008
9,376
9,379
8,964
8,998
8,862
8,896
8,875
8,719
8,724
8,834
8,738
8,693
2007
9,612
9,608
9,471
9,387
9,342
9,332
9,348
9,345
9,352
9,316
9,343
9,357
2006
7,339
8,996
9,061
9,057
9,061
9,054
9,290
9,279
9,246
9,276
9,256
9,483
2005
5,154
5,908
6,009
6,081
6,001
6,176
6,191
6,321
6,505
6,878
7,200
7,284
2004
2,922
2,919
2,919
2,930
2,925
2,928
2,934
2,937
3,044
3,042
3,490
3,912
2003
2,750
2,748
2,742
2,735
2,761
2,719
2,870
2,933
2,922
2,922
2,945
2,882
2002
2,885
2,883
2,877
3,029
3,019
3,022
3,016
2,857
3,013
2,942
2,855
2,746
2001
1,761
2,099
2791
2,796
2,772
2,852
2,853
2,843
2,883
2000
2,297
1,359
2,520
2,548
4,662
4,471
4,371
4,283
4,507
4,469
4,407
2,738
1999
891
886
865
742
768
722
775
780
787
796
799
1,998
1998
369
337
347
347
343
340
297
311
305
302
919
1997
1,209
1,211
1,082
871
879
652
649
636
585
584
347
353
1996
1,986
1,987
1,750
1,180
1,209
1,214
1,166
1,203
1,200
1,201
1,208
1,211
1995
856
857
1,024
1,119
1,343
1,388
2,189
2,188
2,198
2,199
2,084
2,078
1994
5,882
5,897
5,891
5,864
5,914
5,462
5,411
5,173
5,163
4,906
5,209
540
1993
1,799
1,796
1,787
1,795
2,647
2,664
2,687
2,473
5,064
5,935
5,883
5,904
1992
47
38
65
96
1,455
1,559
1,753
1,749
1,750
1991
18
26
24
24
33
33
33
33
35
35
1990
40
48
FEB
MAR
APL
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
DEC
ACHR
Patterns of deployment of Indian Army

Year
JAN
FEB
MAR
APL
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
2013
6,743
6,764
6,754
6,736
6,816
6,821
6,819
6,818
6,814
6,812
2012
6,994
7,000
7,010
7,017
7,021
7,018
7,003
6,992
6,777
6,783
6,745
DEC
6,744
2011
7,539
7,531
7,538
7,400
7,383
7,381
7,364
7,307
7,098
7,008
7,004
6,997
2010
7,944
7,973
7,970
7,975
7,975
7,971
7,969
7,966
7,976
7,727
7,725
7,550
2009
7,956
7,958
7,962
7,959
7,945
7,945
7,962
7,964
7,942
7,941
7,946
7,942
2008
8,779
8,779
8,343
8,380
8,228
8,232
8,230
8,079
8,079
8,080
7,964
7,963
2007
9,037
9,034
8,902
8,816
8,772
8,764
8,768
8,769
8,778
8,776
8,776
8,775
2006
6,849
8,510
8,572
8,568
8,573
8,570
8,798
8,797
8,823
8,830
8,825
9,039
2005
4,756
5,550
5,649
5,713
5,730
5,901
5,918
6,049
6,337
6,668
6,728
6,810
2004
2,534
2,536
2,528
2,541
2,536
2,540
2,547
2,546
2,666
2,664
3,093
3,515
2003
2,205
2,205
2,205
2,200
2,241
2,198
2,350
2,534
2,533
2,529
2,543
2,530
2002
2,216
2,217
2,217
2,371
2,381
2,379
2,377
2377
2,376
2,375
2,292
2,203
2001
1,114
1,426
2117
2,119
2,120
2,177
2,175
2,183
2,215
2000
2,047
2,109
2,272
2,278
3,957
3,766
3,765
3,677
3,816
3,818
3,745
2,098
1999
765
760
752
619
647
621
622
622
635
635
635
1,745
1998
169
149
157
157
156
146
146
161
161
161
778
1997
1,081
1,080
949
740
730
452
450
443
390
390
150
150
1996
1,917
1,916
1,634
1,070
1,100
1,099
1,043
1,080
1,081
1,081
1,081
1,081
1995
823
808
956
1,050
1,271
1,320
2,120
2,120
2,129
2,134
2,018
2,012
1994
5,854
5,849
5,843
5,835
5,885
5,340
5,289
5,051
5,041
4,797
5,101
432
1993
1,342
1,338
1,334
1,339
2,178
2,192
2,227
2,420
5,016
5,901
5,854
5,876
1992
47
38
65
20
1,350
1,319
1,347
1,346
1,348
1991
18
26
24
24
33
33
33
33
35
35
1990
40
ACHR
49
Patterns of deployment of Indian Military Experts on Mission

Year
50
JAN
FEB
MAR
APL
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
DEC
2013
75
48
50
51
46
45
48
48
51
51
2012
77
72
76
77
69
73
67
74
74
77
77
73
2011
84
85
85
85
86
88
71
89
86
81
81
79
2010
78
79
83
79
84
74
76
87
86
84
82
84
2009
84
82
81
73
74
74
81
69
78
76
73
77
2008
89
90
86
86
84
84
80
82
85
84
85
90
2007
84
85
81
86
89
86
88
82
89
89
89
89
2006
97
97
96
97
96
94
102
94
94
91
88
83
2005
55
55
57
59
59
63
64
63
61
81
91
93
2004
41
36
41
40
44
45
44
48
51
51
51
54
2003
41
41
33
31
37
38
38
39
41
44
45
45
2002
33
33
35
35
34
37
34
36
35
40
36
39
2001
29
29
29
33
32
32
36
32
32
2000
26
26
28
30
32
32
32
32
30
20
22
23
1999
11
12
11
11
12
15
24
27
27
1998
20
10
11
11
10
10
16
15
15
15
15
1997
37
40
39
39
39
39
39
27
26
25
25
23
1996
56
58
39
29
29
29
28
28
28
28
33
38
1995
33
49
49
50
52
49
50
50
51
50
53
53
1994
28
48
48
29
29
47
47
47
47
34
33
33
1993
28
30
28
33
48
55
47
49
47
32
29
28
1992
76
45
43
40
37
36
1991
1990
ACHR
Patterns of deployment of Indian Police

Year
JAN
FEB
MAR
APL
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
DEC
2013
1,022
1,033
1,008
1,008
1,006
1,012
992
992
995
1,001
2012
1,022
1,038
1,048
1,039
1,044
1,054
1,039
1,038
1,038
1,039
1,024
1,022
2011
1,057
1,049
1,034
1,028
1,019
1,035
988
1,012
1,008
1,004
1,089
1,039
2010
737
731
712
717
716
875
874
872
873
893
904
1,057
2009
600
593
588
585
593
588
710
734
732
742
740
738
2008
508
510
535
532
550
580
565
558
560
670
689
640
2007
491
489
488
485
481
482
492
494
485
451
478
493
2006
393
389
393
392
392
390
390
388
329
355
343
361
2005
343
303
303
309
212
212
209
209
107
129
381
381
2004
347
347
350
349
345
343
343
343
327
327
346
343
2003
504
502
504
504
483
483
482
360
348
349
357
307
2002
636
633
625
623
604
606
605
444
602
527
527
504
2001
618
644
645
644
620
643
642
628
636
2000
224
224
220
240
673
673
574
574
661
631
640
617
1999
115
114
102
112
112
92
145
146
137
137
137
226
1998
180
178
179
179
177
184
135
135
129
126
126
1997
91
91
94
92
110
161
160
166
169
169
172
180
1996
13
13
77
81
80
86
95
95
91
92
94
92
1995
19
19
20
19
19
18
18
15
13
13
1994
75
75
75
75
75
75
75
1993
429
428
425
423
421
417
413
1992
60
197
366
366
366
1991
1990
ACHR
51
Annex 2: Investigation by the Office of Internal Oversight

Services into allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse in the
United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, 5 January 2005
A/59/661
United Nations
General Assembly
Distr.: General
5 January 2005
Original: English
Fifty-ninth session
Agenda items 114, 118 and 127
Human resources management
Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of
the Office of Internal Oversight Services
Financing of the United Nations Organization Mission
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Investigation by the Office of Internal Oversight Services

into allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse in the
United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo
Summary
Media reports in early 2004 indicated the recurrence of acts of sexual
exploitation and abuse of Congolese women and girls by United Nations
peacekeepers serving with the United Nations Organization Mission in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) in Bunia. MONUC and the
Department of Peacekeeping Operations subsequently approached the Office of
Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) to conduct an investigation into the allegations.
The investigation was conducted in Bunia between May and September 2004.
Interviews with Congolese women and girls confirmed that sexual contact with
peacekeepers occurred with regularity, usually in exchange for food or small sums of
money. Many of these contacts, which were further confirmed by evidence from
others adduced by the OIOS team, involved girls under the age of 18, with some as
young as 13.
Many of the 72 allegations originally reported to MONUC could not be
substantiated or even fully investigated because of their non-specific nature.
Nevertheless, OIOS was able to compile 20 case reports. One case that was
substantiated involved an international civilian post. The remaining 19 cases
involved peacekeepers from 3 contingents. Of those, six cases were fully
substantiated. In another two cases, the identification of the perpetrators was not
fully corroborated. In the remaining 11 cases, the victims and witnesses were unable
05-20055 (E) 060105
*0520055*
52
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A/59/661
to clearly identify the perpetrators. However, dozens of interviews with the girls
themselves and with the young Congolese men who facilitated the encounters, as
well as with aid workers, revealed a pattern of sexual exploitation by peacekeepers
contrary to the standards set by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in its
Ten Rules: Code of Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets and the Missions own code
of conduct.
OIOS has made recommendations for corrective action based on the
investigative findings, which are set out in 20 reports submitted to the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations and MONUC. The recommendations have all been
accepted by the Department. OIOS wishes to express its appreciation to the
management of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and MONUC for their
assistance with the investigation.
Contents
Paragraphs
Page
I.
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
14
II.
Investigative activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
518
A.
Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
56
B.
Allegations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
711
C.
Case studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1218
III.
Applicable legal provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1923
IV.
Investigative findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2438
A.
Problem of sexual exploitation and abuse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2429
B.
Environmental factors contributing to sexual abuse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3036
C.
Problems in obtaining cooperation from the contingents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3738
10
V.
Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3947
10
VI.
Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4857
12
ACHR
53
A/59/661
I. Introduction
1.
Two reports, in March and May 2004, from Congolese women and a media
organization alleged that United Nations peacekeepers with the United Nations
Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) in Bunia
were involved in the sexual abuse and exploitation of local Congolese girls. In April
2004, the MONUC External Affairs/Code of Conduct Officer reviewed the situation
in Bunia and reported to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for
MONUC. According to that report, 24 allegations had been received involving
soldiers from almost all of the Bunia-based contingents, as well as military
observers and civilian staff.
2.
Because of the scope and seriousness of the allegations, the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General and the Under-Secretary-General for
Peacekeeping Operations requested the Office of Internal Oversight Services
(OIOS) to undertake a full investigation. Three OIOS investigators conducted an
assessment mission in MONUC, including in Bunia, in May 2004. The investigators
met with parties having knowledge of the allegations, observed the environment,
prepared an investigation plan and assembled an investigation team.
3.
In total, the investigation team consisted of 11 male and female investigators
from nine nationalities and with varied professional skills; there were at least six
investigators on the ground in Bunia at any given time. The team, while
predominately composed of OIOS investigators, included one MONUC security
officer, one civilian police officer and three female Congolese interpreters. In
addition, the Ituri Brigade Military Police Commander served as the military liaison
officer with the team. The team operated in Bunia for four months, from June to
September 2004.
4.
Bunia is situated in the Ituri District in the far north-eastern part of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and serves as the headquarters and logistics base
of MONUC, sector 6. At the time of the investigation, nearly 11,000 military
personnel were deployed by MONUC in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and
of that number some 4,500 were deployed in Ituri.
II. Investigative activities

A.
Methodology
5.
Both before and during the investigation, OIOS held meetings with concerned
parties at United Nations Headquarters and at MONUC, including military
personnel from the office of the MONUC Force Commander, the contingent
commanders in Bunia, MONUC senior managers, staff of United Nations agencies
and non-governmental organizations with responsibilities in the region, and
Congolese citizens, as well as staff of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations
and the Office of Legal Affairs at Headquarters. The purpose was to discuss the
strategies for the investigation, answer procedural questions and seek support and
general assistance.
6.
In an effort to satisfy confidentiality requirements, as strictly stipulated in the
mandate of OIOS (ST/SGB/273, para. 18 (b) and (c)), the investigation team also
54
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A/59/661
made a special effort to protect the identities of the vulnerable victims and
witnesses, especially because many were under 18 years of age, by assigning
numbers instead of using their names.
B.
Allegations
7.
A total of 72 allegations, received primarily by MONUC staff, were
investigated. For the most part, the allegations lacked specifics as to names of
victims, witnesses and perpetrators. The investigation team set out to gather
sufficient information on which to base its investigations, which included talking to
the original sources of the allegations. Allegations that could lead to the
identification of potential witnesses, victims or perpetrators were given priority and
investigations of those cases were conducted by the team. A small unit continued to
try to identify sources, victims and others in connection with the remaining
allegations.
8.
Of the 72 allegations, 68 concerned military contingent personnel and
4 involved international civilian posts. Three of the allegations involving civilians
were not substantiated, but in the fourth the team determined that the person had
acted inappropriately towards local women employed by the Mission and had
downloaded and stored pornographic material on his office computer.
9.
Of the 68 allegations involving military contingent personnel, OIOS closed 44
cases after preliminary investigations established that the victims and/or witnesses
could not be identified or traced. OIOS closed seven additional cases that had been
previously investigated and the results brought to the attention of MONUC
administrators. Similarly, OIOS closed three other cases that could not proceed to
the identification stage because the alleged perpetrators had already been rotated out
of the mission area.
10. From the remaining 14 allegations, OIOS developed 19 cases involving
military personnel. In six cases, the allegations against the peacekeepers were fully
substantiated, and under-age girls were involved in all of them. In two cases, the
evidence was convincing but not fully substantiated. In the remaining 11 cases,
evidence was received of sexual exploitation by peacekeepers, but it was not
corroborated. MONUC and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations have
received reports of the 19 cases for action. In none of those cases did the
peacekeepers admit to the alleged sexual contact.
11. In many of the interviews conducted by the investigation team during its four
months of field work, particularly of the younger girls, aged 11 to 14 years, it
became clear that for most of them, having sex with the peacekeepers was a means
of getting food and sometimes small sums of money. The boys and young men who
facilitated sexual encounters between peacekeepers and the girls sometimes received
food as payment for their services as well. In addition to the corroborated cases
reported in the next section, interviews with other girls and women indicated the
widespread nature of the sexual activity occurring in Bunia between peacekeepers
and the local population. Although many of them could not identify the particular
peacekeepers involved, their reports of regular sexual contact were detailed and
convincing. A number of the girls said that they had never looked at the faces of the
peacekeepers or that they were not able to differentiate among non-Congolese. For
the youngest of the girls, recounting the events was extremely difficult. Many of
ACHR
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them had been raped during the conflict and the trauma of their lives made pressing
them for evidence in these cases very delicate. In future, the likelihood that victims
will be able to identify perpetrators and that witnesses will be able to corroborate
the evidence can be increased by ensuring that incidents are reported shortly after
their occurrence (rather than weeks or months later as in the present cases), by
facilitating more contact between the girls and skilled, sensitive investigators able to
draw the girls out and by developing programmes to make the girls feel safe.
Examples of the cases demonstrate the nature of the sexual exploitation and the
extreme youth of many of the girls. None of the peacekeepers identified admitted to
the contacts, but the evidence against them is strong and has been corroborated.
C.
Case studies
Case A
12. The girl, identified by OIOS as V046A, was 14 years old and lived with her
family. Owing to a lack of funds, she did not attend school. She told the OIOS
investigators that she had had sexual relations with a MONUC soldier who was
known to her (PK1). Each time this soldier gave her $1 or $2 or two eggs in return.
A witness, W046A, age 15, had introduced V046A to the soldier in return for bread.
Another witness, W046B, age 12, had also helped the soldier to meet with V046A
for sex.
13. The victim and two witnesses clearly described the soldier and noted that he
had a broken arm. OIOS investigators, through the Ituri Brigade Military Police
Commander, were able to trace the medical records of a soldier who had been
treated for a broken arm at the contingent hospital in Bunia. The name and MONUC
identification number of this soldier matched those of the soldier identified by the
witnesses. OIOS investigators could not interview the soldier because he had been
repatriated.
Case B
14. The victim in case A, V046A, also told OIOS that one of the witnesses,
W046B, had introduced her to another MONUC soldier (PK2). She had had sexual
intercourse with this soldier in return for $3 and a packet of milk. V046A further
stated that PK2 had wanted to have sexual intercourse with her on a second
occasion, but she had refused as he did not have money or food for her. The witness
admitted to having facilitated sex between V046A and the soldier in return for bread
and jam. The victim and witness positively identified the soldier both in the photo
array and during the physical line-up. In his interview with OIOS investigators, the
soldier denied having had sexual relations with any Congolese women or girls.
Case C
15. The girl, V030A, was 14 years old and did not attend school. She said that a
MONUC soldier whom she had met at a camp behind the Mdecins sans frontires
hospital had given her food during their first four meetings but did not have sex with
her. On the fifth occasion he requested her to have sex and she agreed. In return for
sex, the soldier gave her $2, chocolate and bread. The victims statement was
corroborated by two other girls, aged 11 and 15, and two male witnesses, aged 18
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and 20. The soldier was identified by V030A. The two witnesses confirmed the
identification and stated that they had brought V030A to him for the purpose of
sexual relations. The soldier was interviewed by OIOS investigators and denied
having had any involvement with local Congolese girls or women.
Case D
16. The girl, V002B, who was 13 years old, told the OIOS investigators that she
had had sex with a MONUC soldier who was known to her (PK3) at Ndoromo camp
on at least four occasions. She reported that she and her friends would go to the
camp to have sex with different soldiers. She stated that she had received cash
ranging from $3 to $5 after each sexual encounter. Another victim, V002A, who was
14 years old, confirmed the statement of V002B. Both victims were able to identify
the soldier from photographs and line-ups. The soldier was interviewed by OIOS
investigators and denied any involvement with local Congolese women or girls.
Case E
17. The witness, W054A, is a local Congolese male, age 25, and a former militia
soldier who confirmed to the OIOS investigators that he had been procuring girls for
MONUC soldiers for sexual relations. Those soldiers were involved in sexual
activity with a group of four girls: two aged 17, one 16 and another 14, who were
supplied by W054A. The evidence established that one soldier, PK4, had had sexual
relations several times with V054B, age 17, and in return he had given her some
food. Witness W054A was able to identify the soldier in a photo array and
corroborated his identification in a physical line-up. The victim was also able to
identify the soldier in the line-up. The soldier was interviewed by OIOS
investigators and denied any involvement with local Congolese women and girls.
Case F
18. In this case, the evidence established that a MONUC soldier had had sex with
victim V054C, 14 years old, on several occasions. In exchange for sex, he gave her
food. Witness W054A identified the soldier in both the photo array and the line-up.
The victim corroborated this identification in the line-up.
III. Applicable legal provisions

19. The evidence in these cases demonstrates that peacekeepers were involved in
exploitative behaviour by having sexual relations with local Congolese girls, all of
whom in these cases were younger than 18, with five of the six victims being
14 years of age or younger. In addition, the MONUC code of conduct and the
Secretary-Generals bulletin on special measures for protection from sexual
exploitation and sexual abuse (ST/SGB/2003/13) provide that sexual activity with
children (persons under 18) is prohibited regardless of the local age of majority or
consent and that the mistaken belief in the age of the child is not a defence.
20. Sexual exploitation and abuse is prohibited conduct under rule 4 of the Code
of Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets and the MONUC code of conduct. The
MONUC code of conduct specifically defines an act of sexual abuse and/or
exploitation as any exchange of money, employment, goods or services for sex. In
each of the substantiated cases, the perpetrators effectively breached the Code of
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Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets and the MONUC code of conduct by
exchanging money and food for sex with girls under 18 years of age. Failure to
observe these strict standards of conduct renders the perpetrators liable to
disciplinary action for serious misconduct as defined in section III of the
Department of Peacekeeping Operations Directives for Disciplinary Matters
Involving Military Members of National Contingents. All troop-contributing
countries recognize the Code of Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets as binding.
21.
Subsequent to the establishment of the MONUC code of conduct, the
Secretary-General promulgated the bulletin on special measures for protection from
sexual exploitation and sexual abuse (see para. 19 above). This bulletin is binding
on United Nations staff and its provisions are similar to those contained in the
MONUC Code of Conduct. Both documents elaborate on the standards found in the
Code of Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets. Section 1 of the bulletin defines sexual
exploitation as any actual or attempted abuse of a position of vulnerability,
differential power, or trust, for sexual purposes, including, but not limited to,
profiting monetarily, socially or politically from the sexual exploitation of another.
Sexual abuse is defined as actual or threatened physical intrusion of a sexual
nature, whether by force or under unequal or coercive conditions. Section 2 of the
MONUC code of conduct has similar provisions and also provides that sexual
exploitation and abuse is defined, among other things, as any sexual misconduct that
has a detrimental effect on the image, credibility, impartiality or integrity of the
United Nations. As the cases reported above demonstrate, those factors were present
in abundance in Bunia.
22. By section 7 of the Secretary-Generals bulletin on observance by United
Nations forces of international humanitarian law (ST/SGB/1999/13), United Nations
forces conducting operations under United Nations command and control are
prohibited from committing acts of sexual exploitation and abuse and have a
particular duty to protect women and children from such assaults. Thus such sexual
contact is not only prohibited, but also is a significant failure in the responsibility of
peacekeepers to protect the most vulnerable members of Congolese society. The
need for the contingents to be close to the local population in order to protect them
from militia attacks provides not only an opportunity to supply the required care,
but also, unfortunately, an opportunity to exploit the dire needs of vulnerable
children, thereby violating the directive.
23. Similarly, in demanding or seeking sexual favours from these vulnerable
victims, the peacekeepers abused their positions of power. By virtue of not only
their unequal social positions but also their relative wealth the ability to bestow
small amounts of money or food on the girls and the facilitators the peacekeepers
could take advantage of the local population, which has little means of its own.
IV. Investigative findings

A.
Problem of sexual exploitation and abuse

24. The sexual exploitation and abuse of young girls in Bunia by local factions
arose during the conflict that erupted in that region, in which numerous girls were
raped and many were left without families or means of support. The later presence
of international peacekeepers added another dimension and augmented the problem.
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In the existing conditions, many children were rendered homeless and orphaned or
their families were unable to provide basic necessities, thereby causing them to
resort to other means of support.
25. Although there were allegations involving women over the age of 18, the
majority of the victims identified in the investigation were between 12 and 16 years
of age. They were poor village children whose lives had been significantly affected
by civil war and whose encounters with foreigners prior to the arrival of MONUC in
their land had been limited. Most were illiterate, with only a handful reportedly
having attended school. OIOS had difficulty gaining full access to most of these
young victims, some of whom were under care and receiving psychological
counselling, while others lived outside Bunias secure zone.
26. The Congolese males who helped to introduce the girls to the peacekeepers
were mainly young boys aged 8 to 18, and a few young men aged 20 to 25. They
facilitated the peacekeepers access to the girls and so functioned as procurers or
pimps while living at the internally displaced persons camp or on the streets. They
reported having been paid $1 and/or food for each girl brought to the peacekeepers.
However, in many cases, they said, the peacekeepers gave nothing in exchange for
the girls. Some of them were former child soldiers from the Congolese militia. A
few of the boys attended school; the rest had dropped out because of a lack of funds
for school fees or a lack of interest. Some of the older ones did manual labour at the
military camps and therefore were familiar with the peacekeepers.
27. The venues for the sexual activities were identified as various prearranged
meeting places, such as inside the guard posts, in mostly rundown shelters, in the
bush near the military camps at rented or abandoned accommodations, or even on
bare ground behind buildings, under mango trees. The activities usually occurred
just after dark, normally between 7 and 10 p.m.
28. The peacekeepers implicated in the allegations and interviewed by OIOS were
not officers but rather enlisted or non-commissioned personnel serving at guard
posts or at the camps. They were between 24 and 45 years of age. For most of them,
MONUC was their first mission assignment. Although the cases investigated by the
OIOS team involved only some peacekeepers from three of the Bunia-based
contingents, it cannot be assumed that members of other contingents did not engage
in similar improper activities, given the credible reports received by the OIOS team
from many of those interviewed, including victims, witnesses and others in the
region. Nor can it be assumed that some contingents were necessarily more involved
in those activities than others. Often, though, it is the demands and requirements of
the contingent commanders that have the greatest impact on the conduct of the
contingent troops. OIOS reports only on the cases it has investigated.
29. It should be noted that it was the intention of OIOS to name the troopcontributing countries whose soldiers had been identified as having exploited and
abused the local female population in Bunia. Instead, however, the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations has, as recommended in the present report, provided the
relevant troop-contributing countries with the investigative reports on the cases
concerning their contingents so that they can take appropriate action. At the same
time, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations is currently developing a more
robust policy to address sexual exploitation and abuse issues.
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Environmental factors contributing to sexual abuse

30. As a result of the ethnic conflict that broke out in the Ituri District in May
2003, many area residents were displaced and impoverished. The internally
displaced persons camp, sheltering 10,000 people, is located inside the boundary of
Bunia town, adjacent to the MONUC logistics base. The military camps are also
located in close proximity to the local population. Although this provides the
necessary security buffer against the militias, it also allows for informal interaction
between peacekeepers and the local population, creating an environment for
exploitation and abuse to occur.
31. One of the major causes encouraging the abuse is poverty resulting from the
separation of families by internal conflict. Most of the victims and witnesses are
extremely vulnerable, not only because of their youth, but also because they are
living alone, with other children or with older relatives in extended families who are
unable to provide for them. The victims and a significant number of the boys are not
in school because they cannot afford the fees.
32. Hunger has encouraged children to try to make contact with members of the
MONUC troops to seek food or a little money. Food insecurity is brought about by
the populations inability to access their farmlands because of fear of attacks from
the militia. Consequently, the population that was once self-sufficient in food
supplies is finding it difficult to subsist. There is a scarcity of employment
opportunity in the town, and the food supply in the camp is reportedly inadequate. A
breakdown of family and community structures is the result.
33. OIOS also noted the paucity of programmes and facilities to empower, protect
or assist vulnerable women and children. Lacking work opportunities, many are
without alternative sources of food, clothing and other necessities.
34. At present, the inadequate security perimeter fencing around the military
camps also enables the peacekeepers, and their illegal visitors, to move about the
camp unnoticed by their supervisors or the few camp guards. Patrols by the military
police were insufficient to discourage peacekeepers from engaging in sexual
misconduct. The efforts of contingent commanders to enforce discipline were also
found to be inadequate. Although the contingent commanders had asserted that their
troops were not allowed outside their camps unless on duty, the OIOS team
observed peacekeepers in public places, especially restaurants, in the town, not
always in uniform. This created not only opportunities for interaction with the local
populace, but also potential security problems. For example, in September 2004, an
incident occurred where Congolese militia abducted a MONUC peacekeeper who
was allegedly in civilian attire among the local population in an area outside the
designated secure zone.
35. Although MONUC has prepared directives on the prevention of sexual
exploitation and abuse, at present, little has been done to implement an effective
prevention programme in Bunia. Although an instruction circular was issued
establishing the MONUC Personnel Conduct Committee, the Committee exists only
on paper, as no agreement on its terms of reference has been reached by those
responsible for finalizing it.
36. The teams interviews with the implicated peacekeepers also raised doubts as
to whether they had received an adequate briefing on the Code of Personal Conduct
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for Blue Helmets before being deployed in the Mission. They claimed that they had
not been apprised of the Code of Conduct, although some of their senior officers
maintained that a briefing had been held. Moreover, at present, it does not appear
that even after the allegations surfaced the standards of conduct were reinforced
with the troops. Such gaps have contributed greatly to the problem; if they are not
addressed, the problem is likely to escalate, especially with the expected influx of
additional troops to be deployed in the country.
C.
Problems in obtaining cooperation from the contingents

37. At the start of the investigation, OIOS investigators met with representatives
of the contingents in Bunia to advise them formally of the investigation and to elicit
their assistance and cooperation. The contingent commanders agreed and expressed
their willingness to provide the necessary cooperation.
38. As the investigation progressed, contact was maintained with the contingents
both directly and through the assistance of the Bunia Brigade Commander, Chief of
Staff of Administration, Legal Adviser, Provost Marshal and Deputy Provost
Marshal. Although one contingent was timely in responding to OIOS requests for
assistance, issues arose with two of the other contingents concerning their
willingness to assist in identifying possible perpetrators. On several occasions, the
commanders of these contingents either failed to provide the requested information
or assistance or actively interfered with the investigation. In order to resolve such
problems, OIOS sought and received direct support from a number of senior
managers of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.
V. Conclusions
39. The OIOS investigation into allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse of
local Congolese women and girls found that the problem was serious and ongoing.
Equally disturbing was the lack of a protection and deterrence programme even at
the present time.
40. The investigation was hampered by problems in obtaining the requisite
assistance and cooperation from two military contingents and in obtaining access to
some of the witnesses and victims. Nonetheless, the OIOS team was able to
investigate 72 allegations against both military and civilian MONUC personnel.
This resulted in 20 case reports. One case involved an international civilian post,
while the other 19 cases involved military personnel. In six of those cases, the
perpetrators were positively identified. In another two cases the identification was
not fully corroborated. In the remaining 11 cases, the victims and witnesses were
unable to clearly identify the perpetrators.
41. The majority of the cases were closed after a preliminary investigation, largely
because they were duplicative or too vague to allow for positive identification of a
victim, witness or perpetrator. Very few of the allegations involved civilian
personnel, and in three of the four cases that did, the allegations were not
substantiated. In the fourth, the person was found to have engaged in inappropriate
conduct with two female Congolese MONUC staff members, as well as to have
downloaded and stored pornographic material on his office computer.
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42. The OIOS investigation also addressed factors that influenced the lack of
corroboration in the identification of perpetrators. The investigators found that most
victims were unable to make positive identifications because, for example, they had
had only one encounter with the perpetrator and did not take note of identifying
characteristics; they had met the perpetrators in the dark and either did not look at
their faces or did not see them properly; they were very young and unfamiliar with
those not native to their areas and were therefore unable to distinguish one nonCongolese person from another; and they did not recall events weeks or months
later.
43. OIOS identified the following factors as contributing to the problem of sexual
exploitation of the local community: poverty affecting the general population,
especially the internally displaced persons at the camp; food insecurity of the
general population; idleness among non-school-going children; the erosion of family
and community structures; discrimination against women and girls; insecurity of the
perimeter fencing, encouraging interaction between the military and the general
population; inadequate patrols by military police and insufficient enforcement of
military discipline; the absence of any programmes for off-duty peacekeepers; the
lack of a sexual harassment and abuse prevention programme in MONUC; and a
lack of facilities or programmes aimed at protecting the vulnerable population.
44. The troop rotations also have kept many of the peacekeepers from having to
account for their actions. OIOS noted with great concern that, despite knowledge
that the investigation was ongoing, sexual activities between the military and the
local population apparently continued. This was evidenced by the presence of
freshly used condoms near military camps and guard posts and by the additional
allegations of recent cases of solicitations brought to the attention of the OIOS team
during the last days of the investigation. It was clear that the investigation did not
act as a deterrent for some of the troops, perhaps because they had not been made
aware of the severe penalties for engaging in such conduct, nor had they seen any
evidence of a negative impact on individual peacekeepers for such behaviour.
Without strong reinforcement of the legal requirements and prompt sanctions for
violations, they may well continue this behaviour.
45. Of equal concern is the fact that the prevention programme required by the UnderSecretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations and the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General for MONUC has not been put in place in the Mission. Few military or
civilian staff seemed aware of the directives, policies, rules and regulations governing
sexual contact that they were obligated to follow. Although many peacekeepers are
conducting themselves appropriately under difficult circumstances, those who engage in
conduct that violates legal norms must be made aware that there will be sanctions and
penalties. The hundreds of interviews conducted by the OIOS team reveal a pattern of
activity that cannot be allowed to continue.
46. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General for MONUC provided the
following comments:
I firmly believe that emphasis needs to be placed on the accountability of the
officers of contingents to which the perpetrators belong, from contingent to
company and platoon commanders. It is clearly evident that while there has
been no shortcoming insofar as disseminating the code of conduct and the
Secretary-Generals zero-tolerance policy on matters of sexual exploitation
and abuse, the same cannot be said for the enforcement of this. In certain
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instances, it is apparent that the feeling of impunity is such that not only have
the policies not been enforced, but the command structures have not always
given investigators their full cooperation. I also consider it imperative that the
results of Member States actions against the perpetrators of these abuses be
made available to the United Nations and that the Mission highlight to
incoming commanders the gravity and extent of the problem and underscore
the commanders responsibility to prevent similar acts during their mandate.
Only such stern deterrents, in my view, will enable us to stamp out sexual
exploitation and sexual abuse in the peacekeeping environment.
47. OIOS concurs with the position outlined by the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General for MONUC and looks forward to collaborative efforts between
Member States and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations on deterrence
modalities.
VI. Recommendations
48. Based on the findings of this investigation, OIOS offers recommendations that
may alleviate the problem, at least at MONUC, but that may be applied in other
missions as well. OIOS is aware of the substantial work being done by the adviser to
the Secretary-General on this issue and, in particular, notes that his work will
address the responses of the troop-contributing countries to this problem.
Recommendation 1
49. Upon review of the individual cases in which peacekeepers have been
implicated, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations should request the relevant
troop-contributing country to take appropriate action against the military personnel
identified and to advise the Department as to the action undertaken (ID Rec.
No. IV04/141/01);1
Recommendation 2
50. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations and MONUC, as a matter of high
priority, should implement a strong prevention programme, with emphasis on
protecting the most vulnerable girls (those under 18 years of age), and establish a
rapid-response detection programme, utilizing personnel experienced in such cases,
beginning in Bunia on an expedited basis and then expanding to the other regions of
MONUC (ID Rec. No. IV04/141/02);
Recommendation 3
51. Senior MONUC managers must become more involved and demand
accountability from both civilian administrators and contingent commanders in the
Mission. MONUC must take steps to ensure that administrators and officers
demonstrate implementation of all existing regulations and policies aimed at
preventing sexual abuse and exploitation (ID Rec. No. IV04/141/03);
The symbols in parentheses in this section refer to an internal code used by OIOS for recording
recommendations.
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Recommendation 4
52. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations and MONUC should undertake a
programme to provide regular briefings for troops on their responsibilities to the
local population and on prohibited behaviours and to ensure that all troops and
civilians on United Nations missions are fully conversant with United Nations
policies on the subject of sexual exploitation and abuse (ID Rec. No. IV04/141/04);
Recommendation 5
53. The MONUC Force Commander, in conjunction with contingent commanders,
should enforce strict discipline over the personnel under their command (ID Rec.
No. IV04/141/05);
Recommendation 6
54. MONUC should identify and implement measures that ensure that all military
compounds are adequately secured to prevent unauthorized entry and egress as well
as ad hoc trading between troops and the local population (ID Rec.
No. IV04/141/06);
Recommendation 7
55. MONUC should collaborate, perhaps under the auspices of the Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, with other non-governmental organizations
and United Nations agencies in the Bunia area to find ways of strengthening the
existing programmes to empower and protect the vulnerable population to allow for
alternative means of survival (ID Rec. No. IV04/141/07);
Recommendation 8
56. Given that this problem is not unique to MONUC, and with new missions
being opened in areas where similar problems can arise, it is recommended that the
Department of Peacekeeping Operations consider a wider application of prevention
and detection policies to protect against sexual abuse and exploitation by
peacekeepers. This may include the designation of local officials or nongovernmental organizations to receive reports of sexual exploitation and abuse; the
central reporting of all cases to mission senior management on an expedited basis;
the development of mission-based rapid-response teams; the development of
educational programmes for the troops on their responsibilities and on sanctions for
sexual exploitation and abuse; the public naming and shaming of those found to
have engaged in sexual exploitation and abuse; and the permanent exclusion from
peacekeeping missions of those troops who engage in sexual exploitation and abuse
and of their contingents commanders (ID Rec. No. IV04/141/08).
57. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations has agreed with all eight of the
recommendations, which it feels will help guide it in moving forward to establish
procedures to attempt to eliminate the problem.
(Signed) Dileep Nair
Under-Secretary-General for Internal Oversight Services
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Annex 3: Overview report of allegations of misconduct by

Indian peacekeepers deployed with the United Nations Mission
in the Democratic Republic of Congo by the OIOS (ID Case No.
0648/06), 7 February 2008
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Annex 4: Standard Annex H to the Memorandum of

Understanding signed with the Government of India by the
United Nations

DFS/UNMIL/IND/O2

ANNEX H
WE ARE UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING PERSONNEL
The United Nations Organization embodies the aspirations of all the people of the world for
peace.
In this context the United Nations Charter requires that all personnel must maintain the highest
standards of integrity and conduct.
We will comply with the Guidelines on International Humanitarian Law for Forces Undertaking
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and the applicable portions of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights as the fundamental basis of our standards.
We, as peacekeeping personnel, represent the United Nations and are present in the country to help
it recover from the trauma of a conflict. As a result we must consciously be prepared to accept special
constraints in our public and private lives in order to do the work and to pursue the ideals of the
United Nations Organization.
We will be accorded certain privileges and immunities arranged through agreements negotiated
between the United Nations and the host country solely for the purpose of discharging our
peacekeeping duties. Expectations of the world community and the local population will be high
and our actions, behavior and speech will be closely monitored.
We will always:

Conduct ourselves in a professional and disciplined manner, at all times;
Dedicate ourselves to achieving the goals of the United Nations;
Understand the mandate and mission and comply with their provisions;
Respect the environment of the host country;
Respect local laws, customs and practices and be aware of and respect culture, religion,
traditions and gender issues;
Treat the inhabitants of the host country with respect, courtesy and consideration;
Act with impartiality, integrity and tact;
Support and aid the infirm, sick and weak;
Obey our United Nations superiors/supervisors and respect the chain of command;
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Respect all other peacekeeping members of the mission regardless of status, rank, ethnic
or national origin, race, gender, or creed;
Support and encourage proper conduct among our fellow peacekeeping personnel;
Report all acts involving sexual exploitation and abuse;
Maintain proper dress and personal deportment at all times;
Properly account for all money and property assigned to us as members of the mission;
and
Care for all United Nations equipment placed in our charge.
We will never:

Bring discredit upon the United Nations, or our nations through improper personal
conduct, failure to perform our duties or abuse of our positions as peacekeeping
personnel;
Take any action that might jeopardize the mission.
Abuse alcohol, use or traffic in drugs;
Make unauthorized communications to external agencies, including
unauthorized press statements;
Improperly disclose or use information gained through our employment;
Use unnecessary violence or threaten anyone in custody;
Commit any act that could result in physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering
to member of the local population, especially women and children;
Commit any act involving sexual exploitation and abuse, sexual activity with children
under 18, or exchange of money, employment, goods or services for sex;
Become involved in sexual liaisons which could affect our impartiality, or the well-being
of others;
Be abusive or uncivil to any member of the public;
Willfully damage or misuse any United Nations property or equipment;
Use a vehicle improperly or without authorization;
Collect unauthorized souvenirs;
Participate in any illegal activities, corrupt or improper practices; or
Attempt to use our positions for personal advantage, to make false claims or accept
benefits to which we are not entitled;
We realize that the consequences of failure to act within these guidelines may;
Erode confidence and trust in the United Nations;
Jeopardize the achievement of the mission;
Jeopardize our status and security as peacekeeping personnel; and
Result in administrative, disciplinary or criminal action.
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Annex 5: Policy Guidelines for Considering Officers for various

UN assignments, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India,
27 February 2013
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Annex 6: Nomination Procedures for Positions in the UN

DPKO and DFS Requiring Official Secondment From National
Governments of Member States of the United Nations
Organization
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Annex 7: Standards for Verification of Character and

Antecedents for Recruits of the Army, Policy Compendium
of Recruitment of Junior Commissioner Officer and other
Ranks. (Available at: http://odisha.edespatch.com/PDF_DEST/
L00261/2012/6/25403_1.pdf)
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Annex 8: Judgement of the Armed Forces Tribunal in the case of

Col Harvinder Singh Kohli Vs Union of India and others
IN THE ARMED FORCES TRIBUNAL

PRINCIPAL BENCH, NEW DELHI
TA/254/09
IN W.P.C. No. 7827/2009
COLONEL HARVINDER SINGH KOHLI

R/O. D-501 LAGOON APARTMENTS
AMBIENCE ISLAND
GURGAON-122 022.
THROUGH : MS. REKHA PALLI, ADVOCATE
MS. POONAM SINGH, ADVOCATE
...PETITIONER
VERSUS
1. THE UNION OF INDIA
THROUGH THE SECRETARY
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
SOUTH BLOCK
NEW DELHI-110 011.
2. THE CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF
SOUTH BLOCK
NEW DELHI-110 011.
3. THE GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING-IN-CHIEF

EASTERN COMMAND
FORT
KOLKATTA-21
4. THE GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING
3 CORPS
C/O. 99 APO
5. MAJOR GENERAL RAVINDERS SINGH (RETD.)
EX GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING
57 MOUNTAIN DIVISION
(SERVICE THROUGH AGS BRANCH,
1
98
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MP DIRECTORATE, ARMY HQ, SENA BHAWAN

NEW DELHI)
6. BRIGADIER S.S.RAO
EX COMMANDER, 73 MOUNTAIN BRIGADE
DY GOC 36 INFANTRY DIVISION
C/O. 56 APO
THROUGH : SH. ANKUR CHHIBER, ADVOCATE
LT COL NAVEEN SHARMA
...RESPONDENTS
CORAM :
HONBLE SH. S.S.KULSHRESTHA, MEMBER
HONBLE SH. S.S.DHILLON, MEMBER
JUDGMENT
DATE : 11.01.2010
1.
Challenge in this appeal is to the finding and order of the
Court Martial dated 06.08.2004 whereby the petitioner was dismissed

from service in gross violation of Army Rule 52 and 54 and also the
subsequent orders dated 18.03.2008 and 20.02.2009 passed by Union of
India on the post confirmation petition and also the order dated
20.02.2009 of Union of India declining to interfere with the sentence
awarded to the petitioner.
2.
It is contended by the petitioner that from the date of his
entry in the Artillery Regiment he worked with all sincerity and

2
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99
dedication in field areas and at high altitude. ACRs dossier also reflects
his outstanding performance. The petitioner assumed command of 175
Field Regiment on 01.04.2000 and was also empanelled for promotion to
the rank of Colonel by a duly constituted Selection Board and was
promoted to the rank of Colonel on 01.09.2000. The petitioner remained
in command of the said unit. In December 2003, he commanded
successfully and apprehended number of Militants in North East. Brig.
S.S.Rao (Respondent no.6) then Commander of 73 Mountain Brigade
started pressuring petitioner to report kills by showing encounter so as to
boost the image of the Brigade Commander and also to bring laurels to
the Unit. The petitioner refused to succumb to such pressure and
expressed his inability to kill innocent people. The respondent no.6
continued to mount pressure on the petitioner. On 17.08.2003 his Unit
received a message that Respondent no.6 would visit the Unit in the
afternoon the same day. He visited the unit the very same day at 12:30
hrs. and was received by Major J.S.Babbar, Captain Amitabh Kumar and
Lt Sharma. The Unit again informed the respondent no.6 on his arrival
that they had five militants in their custody. Respondent no.6 then
directed to show them as kills to which the petitioner did not agree as
the order itself was illegal. Respondent no.6 thereafter advised him to
send a party which should fire in the air near Village Bara Nagadung so
as to give impression to the villagers that an encounter with militants was
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in progress and subsequently these five militants who were in custody

could be deemed to have been killed in their encounter and report sent
accordingly. Respondent no.6 also advised that after managing such
killing the bodies should be shown to have been left behind mentioning
because it was raining in the night and the terrain was bad but the
recovered arms had been brought back. On the following day, a search
party be sent which should report on return that the bodies were found
missing. The petitioner and his other colleagues had to carry out the
orders of respondent no.6 and for that he had been dragged to face GCM
proceedings. There was no ill design motive on the part of the petitioner
to have made false report about their killing except that he ensured the
compliance of the directions of his superiors. The complicity of the
respondent no.5 and 6 is well proved from the materials on record
including from the taped version but while awarding punishment to them
they were dealt differently and lenient punishment was awarded to them.
He also made representation to the Chief of Army Staff who also
recommended for lenient punishment keeping in view the orders passed
against other officers who were associated in the said crime but the Union
of India discriminated in the matter of petitioner and gave him severe
punishment by way of dismissal from service.
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101
3.
It is further alleged that on the anonymous complaint about
fake encounter on the night intervening 17th and 18th of August, 2003 the
petitioner was made scapegoat whereas the entire scheme was hatched by
respondent no.6. Further the compliance of statutory Rule 57 (a) and 63
was not ensured resultantly in the entire trial being vitiated.
4.
This petition was resisted by the respondents contending
that the petitioner along with Maj J.S.Babbar were tried by a GCM. Five
charges were levied against the petitioner for having committed civil
offence i.e. criminal conspiracy whereby false reporting of an encounter
for the purposes of bringing laurels to his Unit and also made a false
statement about that killing which could make out case u/s.57(a) R/w.
Section 34 IPC. He also sent false report to senior officers knowing about
the killing which was prejudicial to the good order and military
discipline. He pleaded guilty against all the five charges made against
him. His statutory petition u/.s164(2) of the Army Act was also rejected
by UOI. Apart from it for setting up false case in obedience of alleged
orders given by Respondent no.6 he planned fake encounter and
forwarded citations including photographs etc. There is ample evidence
on record to substantiate the charges levied against the petitioner coupled
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with his plea of guilt. Further it is also contended that for such fraud
played by the petitioner he deserves severe punishment.
5.
To answer rival contentions of the parties it shall be useful
to extract all the five charges which were made against the petitioner.
They are as under:
First Charge
Army Act Section 69
Read with IPC Sec
120 B
(Against both accused)
COMMITING A CIVIL OFFENCE,

THAT IS TO SAY, CRIMINAL
CONSPIRACY, CONTRARY TO
SECTION 120 B OF THE INDIAN
PENAL CODE
in that they together,
at field, on or about 17 August 2003,
while
performing
duties
of
Commanding Officer and Battery
Commander of 175 Field Regiment
respectively, agreed to cause to be
done an illegal act to wit, using
evidence known to be false, whereby a
plan was made to fabricate an
encounter with militants of ASSAM
COMMANDO GROUP on night
17/18 August 2003, and the said act
was done in pursuance of the
agreement.
Second Charge
Army Act Section 57(a)
Read with IPC Sec 34
(against both accused)
IN A REPORT MADE BY THEM

KNOWINGLY
MAKING
A
FALSE STATEMENT
in that they together,
at field, on 18 August 2003, while
in the capacity as aforesaid in the
first charge in a special situation
report made by them and
forwarded to HQ 73 Mountain
Brigade furnished details about an
encounter of 175 Field Regiment
personnel with the elements of
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103
ASSAM C OMMANDO GROUP

on night 17/18 August 2003, well
knowing that no such encounter
had in actual fact taken place.
Third Charge
Army Act Section 57(a)
(Against accused no.1
only)
IN A DOCUMENT SIGNED BY
HIM KNOWINGLY MAKING A
FALSE STATEMENT
in that he,
at field, on 12 September 2003,
while in the capacity as aforesaid
in the first charge, in a citation
dated 12 September 2003, made in
respect of Accused no.2, stated as
follows:
Displayed exceptional gallantry,
command ability and leadership in
the face of hostile fire and the
column eventually succeeded in
killing five ASSAM COMMANDO
GROUP terrorists and recovering
one 9 mm Browning pistol, two
double barrel breech loading rifles,
four single barrel breech loading
rifles, 250 grams of Gun powder,
lead pellets and incriminating
documents.
Well knowing the said statement to
be false.
Fourth Charge
IN A DOCUMENT SIGNED BY
Army Act Section 57 HIM KNOWINGLY MAKING A
(a) (Against accused FALSE STATEMENT
no.1 only)
in that he,
at field, on 12 September 2003,
while in the capacity as afore
stated in the first charge in a
citation dated 12 September 2003,
made in respect of JC-264960K
Naib Subedar (TA) Jaswant Singh
of 175 Field Regiment, stated as
follows:
Displayed
gallantry
and
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leadership of an exceptional order

in the face of hostile fire. Used his
ingenuity and self initiative with
utter disregard to personal safety
to come in close proximity to two
militants who were holed up in
dead ground and were firing
indiscriminately and shot down
both of them. In the process, he got
bullet shots on his bullet proof
jacket.
Well knowing the said statement to
be false.
SIXTH CHARGE
AN ACT PREJUDICIAL TO
Army Act Section 63 GOOD ORDER AND MILITARY
(Against Accused no.1) DISCIPLINE
in that he,
at field, between 15 November and
15 December 2003, while in the
capacity as afore stated in the first
charge
improperly
advised
following person of 175 Field
Regiment to make false statements
about killing of five militants and
recovery of arms and ammunition
on night 17/18 August 2003, before
a Court of Inquiry, converted vide
Headquarters
57
Mountain
Division
convening
order
no.57380/175 Fd Regt/A dt 11
November 2003.
(a) JC-264960K Nb/Sub (TA)
Jaswant Singh
(b) 14370396F Hav (GD) Jarman
Singh
(c) 15135496A L/Nk (DMT) Harjit
Singh
(d) 14374350W Hav (GD) Gita
Singh
(e) 14398781F Hav (TA) Karnail
Singh
(f) 14354149K Hav (Opr) Manjit
Singh
Gnr
(DMT)
(g) 15140118L
Gurmail Singh
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105
(h) 15137666X
L/Nk
(GD)
Gurminder Singh
(i) 13492512Y Hav (Opr) Jaspal
Singh
(j) 1442655H L/Nk (Opr) Sarabjit
Singh
(k) 15149740A Gnr (GD) Jasveer
Singh
6.
The petitioner admitted his guilt before the GCM and the
certificate as required under Army Rule 115 (2) was also given by the
GCM mentioning that all the charges were read and explained to the
petitioner who pleaded guilty. Caution was also given to him that such
plea of guilt would be read against him. This was the position of the five
charges read and explained to the petitioner. On 04.08.2004 in the GCM
the accused again pleaded guilty, but the GCM anyhow observed that it
appears that on account of tremendous and environmental/organisational
pressures the petitioner is accepting his guilt and so the GCM construed
such plea of guilt to be not bonafide and treated his statement to be Not
Guilty. The petitioner appears to have understood the benevolent
approach of the GCM but he insisted upon recording his plea of guilt
and asserted that it should all be read in that manner and those statement
of his should not be taken to negate his plea of guilt. Such note of his
plea of guilt was taken by the GCM. The petitioner also owned his
responsibility for such design. All these factors were taken into
consideration by the GCM and his plea of guilt was recorded. On the
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basis of such plea of guilt the petitioner was convicted for all the five
charges and was punished by way of dismissal from service.
7.
The first and the foremost point agitated from the side of
the petitioner is that the petitioner being Commanding Officer of the

Artillery Unit declined to carry out the order of the respondent no.6 for
killing of the five militants who were caught by his Unit but on his
directions he had no option except to prepare the case of killing and he
had to manufacture the evidence. Such obeying of the Command was
undoubtedly his fault but his culpability was not more than the Senior
Officer whose fault was viewed with leniency while awarding
punishment to them. It was obvious from the charges and for which there
was admission from the side of the petitioner that would undoubtedly be
admissible in evidence. Such plea of guilt was deliberate and voluntarily.
At the second occasion when the GCM intended to convert his statement
construing it to be not guilty instead of guilty, he insisted for
mentioning his specific plea of guilt in the matter. Under Army Rule
115(2), there is a statutory provision which lays down the precautionary
rules so as to ensure voluntariness and the accused being placed free from
threat and influence of the superior. The accused through out pleaded
guilty and even the GCM had also taken all precautions while explaining
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107
him and the certification u/s.115(2) was also given by them. Such plea of
guilt is admissible in evidence. It is a relevant fact that a judgment of
conviction can be based on such admission, where it is found to be
truthful, deliberate and voluntarily.
8.
The declaration of the Commanding Officer of the Unit is
generally taken as the gospel truth unless the correctness of such

declaration is disputed or challenged with cogent proof showing facts to
the contrary. Here in this case there is ample evidence of making false
declaration. Even the petitioner nowhere desired that he managed false
papers so as to show the killing of militants in an encounter and thereafter
sent report to citation so that all concerned including Unit get
commendations. Such act on the part of the petitioner was inconsistent
with the interest of military service and not befitting the status, position
and dignity of the Commanding Officer. Whether he ensured false
encounter on the instructions of senior officers, would be immaterial. It
was observed by the Apex Court in the case of Union of India and
Others Vs. Harjeet Singh Sandhu (2001) 5 SCC 593, in the background
of Rule 14 of the Army Rules, it was held that any wrongful act or any act
of diligency which may or may not involve moral turpitude would be
misconduct under the Rule 14. Identical view was expressed by
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Supreme Court in the case of Baldev Singh Gandhi Vs. State of Punjab
and Others (2002) 3 SCC 667, that the expression misconduct means
unlawful behaviour, misfeasance, wrongful conduct, misdemeanour etc.
The petitioner in the capacity of Commanding Officer, did not maintain
absolute integrity, devotion to duty and did an act complained of bears
forbidden quality or character.
9.
The petitioner was commanding the Unit and it was
expected on his part to have maintained high discipline and moral

integrity. Morale and discipline are the very soul of an Army Officer and
no other consideration, howsoever important, can out-weigh the need to
strengthen the morale of the Armed Forces and to maintain discipline
amongst them. He being the Commanding Officer was accountable for
his acts or omissions and not to have been swayed by the wrongful
command of his seniors. He cannot take the plea that he was faithfully
discharging the orders of his superiors. The Doctrine of full faith and
credit applies to the act done and performed. His duty is to faithfully
discharge his duties to elongate the public purpose and to be in
accordance with the procedure prescribed. It is undisputed as from the
charter of duties, the responsibilities of the Commanding Officer that he
is required to act in accordance with the rules. Commanding Officer is the
12
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109
ultimately responsible and accountable for the action done and decision
taken by him. He was also under obligation not to succumb to the illegal
command of senior to prepare forge papers showing killing of five
militants.
10.
It is next contended that the petitioner had no ill design to
prepare the forged papers so as to bring name and fame to his Unit or to
superior officers. It was pursuant to the directions of his seniors he had to
submit the papers showing encounter. The GCM and the Chief of Army
Staff had taken strict view of the offence where fraud is proved against
the petitioner but only because it is found to have been committed on
account of the directions of the superior officers, the same may not lead
to the conclusion that the petitioner was not involved in this conspiracy.
The forged papers were prepared under his supervision and he would be
liable for the acts of criminal misconduct.
11.
There is ample evidence to fasten the culpability of the
petitioner and charges have also been established. He has also admitted
his guilt. It is at this juncture the conduct in the matter of preparing false
report and stage managing the supposed killing of five militants on the
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part of the petitioner without demur, which in turn make the principle of
estoppels by conduct applicable in his case. The Supreme Court in Tata
Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. Vs. Union of India and others (2001 (2) SCC
41) dealt with the issue of estoppel by conduct rather exhaustively vide
paragraphs 20 and 21 stated the law pertaining thereto as below :
Estoppel by conduct in modern times stands
elucidated with the decisions of the English Courts in
Pickard v. Sears (1837: 6Ad. & El. 469) and its
gradual elaboration until placement of its true
principles by the Privy Council in the case of Sarat
Chunder Dey v.Gopal Chunder Laha (1898 L.R. 19
I.A.203) whereas earlier Lord Esher in the case of
Seton, Laing Co. v. Lafone (1887: 19, Q.B.D.68)
evolved three basic elements of the doctrine of
Estoppel to wit:
Firstly,
where
man
makes
fraudulent
misrepresentation and another man acts upon it to its

true detriment: Secondly, another may be where a
man makes a false statement negligently though
without fraud and another person acts upon it: And
thirdly there may be circumstances under which,
where a mis-representation is made without fraud
and without negligence, there may be an Estoppel.
Lord Shand, however, was pleased to add one further
element to the effect that there may be statements
made, which have induced other party to do that from
which otherwise he would have abstained and which
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111
cannot
properly
be
characterised
as
mis-
representation. In this context, reference may be

made to the decisions of the High Court of Australia
in the case of Craine v. Colonial Mutual Fire
Insurance Co. Ltd.(1920: 28 C.L.R. 305). Dixon, J. in
his judgment in Grundt v. The Great Boulder Pty.
Gold Mines Ltd. (1938: 59 C.L.R. 641) stated that:
In measuring the detriment, or demonstrating its
existence, one does not compare the position of the
representee, before and after acting upon the
representation,
upon
the
assumption
that
the
representation is to be regarded as true, the question

of estoppel does not arise. It is only when the
representor wishes to disavow the assumption
contained in his representation that an estoppel
arises, and the question of detriment is considered,
accordingly, in the light of the position which the
representee would be in if the representor were
allowed to disavow the truth of the representation.
(In this context see Spencer Bower and Turner:
Estoppel by Representation 3rd Ed.). Lord Denning
also in the case of Central Newbury Car Auctions
Ltd. v. Unity Finance Ltd. (1956 (3) All ER 905)
appears to have subscribed to the view of Lord Dixon,
J. pertaining to the test of detriment to the effect as to
whether it appears unjust or unequitable that the
reprsentator should now be allowed to resile from his
representation, having regard to what the representee
has done or refrained from doing in reliance on the
15
112
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representation, in short, the party asserting the

Estoppel must have been induced to act to his
detriment. So long as the assumption is adhered to,
the party who altered the situation upon the faith of it
cannot complain. His complaint is that when
afterwards the other party makes a different state of
affairs, the basis of an assertion of right against him
then, if it is allowed, his own original change of
position will operate as a detriment.(vide Grundts:
High Court of Australia (supra)).
Phipson on Evidence (Fourteenth Edn.) has the
following to state as regards estoppels by conduct.
Estoppels by conduct, or, as they are still sometimes
called, estoppels by matter in pais, were anciently acts
of notoriety not less solemn and formal than the
execution of a deed, such as livery of seisin, entry,
acceptance of an estate and the like; and whether a
party had or had not concurred in an act of this sort
was deemed a matter which there could be no
difficulty in ascertaining, and then the legal
consequences followed. [Lyon v. Reed (1844) 13 M &
W. 285, 309] The doctrine has, however, in modern
times, been extended so as to embrace practically any
act or statement by a party which it would be
unconscionable to permit him to deny. The rule has
been authoritatively stated as follows: Where one by
his words or conduct willfully causes another to
believe the existence of a certain state of things and
induces him to act on that belief so as to alter his own
16
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113
previous position, the former is concluded from

averring against the latter a different state of things
as existing at the same time. [Pickard v.Sears (1837) 6
A.& E. 469,474] And whatever a mans real intention
may be, he is deemed to act willfully if he so conducts
himself that a reasonable man would take the
representation to be true and believe that it was meant
that he should act upon it. (Freeman v. Cooke: 1848
(2) Exch.654, 663).
Where the conduct is negligent or consists wholly of
omission, there must be a duty to the person misled.
{Mercantile Bank v. Central Bank (1938 AC 287, 304
and National Westminster Bank v. Barclays Bank
International (1975 Q.B. 654] This principle sits
oddly with the rest of the law of estoppel, but it
appears to have been reaffirmed, at least by
implication, by the House of Lords comparatively
recently. [Moorgate Mercantile Co. Ltd. v. Twitchings
(1977) AC 890 (H.L.)] The explanation is no doubt
that this aspect of estoppel is properly to be
considered a part of the law relating to negligent
representations, rather than estoppel properly socalled. If two people with the same source of
information assert the same truth or agree to assert
the same falsehood at the same time, neither can be
estopped as against the other from asserting
differently at another time. [Square v. Square (1935)
P.120]
114
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The Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that
12.
as the other officer including senior officer were dealt with leniently
while awarding sentence/punishment to them and so he should be kept at
par with those superior officer in the award of punishment, more so in the
circumstances that he obeyed their command. It is also said that Chief of
Army Staff also recommended for lenient punishment in his matter. In
our view seeing the conduct of the petitioner in making false declaration,
citation and papers and also succumbing to the pressure of the seniors for
carrying out wrongful orders cannot be viewed with leniency. It is not
possible to exceed his prayer even on equitable grounds. In this regard it
shall be useful to quote the principle of equality as enshrined in the case
of Prem Chand Somchand Shah Vs. Union of India, (1991) 2 SCC
pg.48. It is as under :
As regards the right of equality guaranteed under Act
14 the position is well settled that the said right
ensures equality amongst equals and its aim is to
protect
persons
similarly
placed
amongst
discriminatory treatment. It means that all persons

similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike both in
privileges
and
liabilities
imposed
conversed,
discriminatory may result if persons dissimilarly

situate and treated equally. Even amongst persons
similarly situate differential treatment would be
permissible between one class and the other. In that
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115
event it is necessary that the different treatment

should be founded on an intelligible differtia which
distinguishes persons or things that are grouped
together from things left out of the group and that
differential must have a rational relation to the object
sought to be achieved by the statute in question.
13.
The petitioner, in order to successfully invoke the right
guaranteed under Act 14 of the constitution will have to establish that he

and his other officers whether senior or junior are similarly situated. The
petitioner being Commanding Officer had more responsibilities. He
cannot equate his position with that of other officers. Again when lenient
view was taken in the matter of other officers and in what enveloped
circumstances that punishment was awarded but it shall not be of the
point to mention that equality it is trite, cannot be claimed in illegality.
(See Panche De vs State of Rajasthan (2009) 2 SCC pg.589).
14.
Lastly it is submitted by the Learned Counsel for the
petitioner that the petitioner owned his responsibility for the entire
mishap and innocently pleaded guilty though he was under pressure for
forging the documents. Once the superior officers have been exonerated
and the junior officer was not dismissed from service, his case shall also
be considered sympathetically. Penalty from dismissal from service was
19
116
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imposed by the authorities concerned on the recommendation of the

GCM and no interference is warranted unless the punishment is
shockingly disproportionate. The petitioner has also failed to show
mitigating circumstances in his favour. The punishment awarded by the
authorities cannot be characterised as disproportionate and shocking. In
passing, reference may also be made that undue sympathy to impose
inadequate sentence would do more harm to the military discipline and
justice system and that was also taken into consideration by the
authorities while rejecting the representation of the petitioner. Moreover
the petitioner being the Commanding Officer he was required to be more
honest towards his duties and the personnel attached with him. He cannot
claim parity with his senior or the subordinate for the said offence in
which they are said to be involved. They were not on equal pedestal and
so he cannot be treated at par with them in the award of sentence.
15.
We do not find any justified ground to interfere in the
impugned order. Petition dismissed.
S.S.DHILLON
(Member)
S.S.KULSHRESHTA
(Member)
PRONOUNCED IN THE OPEN COURT

TODAY ON DATE 11.01.2010
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117
Annex 9: RTI appeal before the First Appellate Authority of the

Indian Army with respect to disclosure of CoI report into sexual
exploitation by the 6th Sikh Regiment in the DRC
118
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119
Asian Centre for Human Rights is dedicated

to promotion and protection of human rights
and fundamental freedoms in the Asian
region by:
n
providing accurate and timely information

and complaints to the National Human
Rights Institutions, the United Nations
bodies and mechanisms as appropriate;
conducting
investigation,
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situations or individual cases;
increasing the capacity of human rights

defenders and civil society groups
through relevant trainings on the use of
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setting processes on human rights;
providing legal, political and practical

advice according to the needs of human
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and
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Asian Centre for Human Rights is dedicated

to promotion and protection of human rights

providing accurate and timely information

increasing the capacity of human rights

providing input into international standard

providing legal, political and practical

by securing the economic, social and

INDIA: TAINTING THE UNs

ASIAN CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Asian Centre For Human Rights

INDIA: TAINTING THE UNs

Asian Centre For Human Rights

India: Tainting the UNs Blue Helmets

First published June 2014

Asian Centre for Human Rights

No part of this publication can be reproduced or transmitted in any form or

i. The History of Indias Contribution to UN Peacekeeping ............................................. 6

ii. Indias Policy on UN Peacekeeping Operations.............................................................. 8

Chapter 2: Overview of Indian Army and UN Peacekeeping............................................... 9

i. Indian Army Recruitment, Selection and Promotion Policies.......................................... 9

Recruitment of Officers ................................................................................................. 9

ii. Selecting Indian Army for UN Peacekeeping Missions................................................... 12

Selection of the Indian Army Personnel: Preference Given to

i. Cooperation with the Enemy: Report of the Office of

Purchase of Counterfeit Gold and Unlawful Detention.................................................. 17

ii. Sexual Exploitation and Abuse: Indictment by OIOS and

Sexual Exploitation and Abuse: The OIOS investigation................................................ 19

INDIA: TAINTING THE UNs BLUE HELMETS

Chapter 4: Overview of Indian Police and UN peacekeeping............................................... 26

i. Central Police Forces Recruitment and Selection Criteria .............................................. 27

ii. State Police Recruitment and Selection Criteria ............................................................. 28

Recruitment of State Police............................................................................................28

iv. Selection Through UNSAAT Test: No Verification to

Chapter 5: Impunity for sexual abuses in India and its impact on

i. The Extent of Human Rights Violations by the Army, Paramilitary

ii. Impunity to the Armed Forces.......................................................................................39

iii. Indias Refusal to Remove the Requirement of Prior

iv. No Need to Adjudicate Good Faith, Prior Sanction is Absolute:

Chapter 6: Conclusions and Recommendations ................................................................... 46

INDIA: TAINTING THE UNs BLUE HELMETS

Annex 6: Nomination Procedures for Positions in the UN DPKO and DFS

INDIA: TAINTING THE UNs BLUE HELMETS

Army Education Corps

Army Medical Corps

Assessment for Mission Service

Border Security Force

Conduct and Disciplinary Team

Chief of Army Staff

Central Police Forces

Central Reserve Police Force

Centre for UN Peacekeeping

Department of Peacekeeping Operations

Democratic Republic of Congo

Electronics & Mechanical Engineers

Forces Dmocratiques de Libration du Rwanda

Formed Police Unit

General Officer Commander

INDBATT Indian Military Contingent/Battalion

International Nongovernmental Organization