E-D-R-, AXXX XXX 907 (BIA June 17, 2016)

U.S.
Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review

Board of Immigration Appeals
Office of the Clerk
5107 leesburg Pike, Suite 2000
Falls Church, Virginia 22041
DHS/ICE Office of Chief Counsel - CHL

5701 Executive Ctr Dr., Ste 300
Charlotte, NC 28212
, EIIIIIII
Name:
A-907
Date of this notice: 6/17/2016
Enclosed is a copy of the Board's decision and order in the above-referenced case.
Sincerely,
DoYUtL CtYvu
Donna Carr
Chief Clerk
Enclosure
Panel Members:
Holiona, Hope Malia
Kendall-Clark, Molly
Guendelsberger, John
E!lisM
Userteam: Docket
For more unpublished BIA decisions, visit

www.irac.net/unpublished/index/
Cite as: E-D-R-, AXXX XXX 907 (BIA June 17, 2016)
Immigrant & Refugee Appellate Center, LLC | www.irac.net
McKinney, Jeremy L.
McKinney Perry & Coalter
P.O. Box 1800
Greensboro, NC 27402
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Falls Church, Virginia 22041
File: 907 - Charlotte, NC

In re:
Date:
rallll
JUN 1 7 2016
APPEAL
ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Jeremy L. McKinney, Esquire
ON BEHALF OF DHS: Susan Leeker
Assistant Chief Counsel
CHARGE:
Notice: Sec.
212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), I&N Act [8 U.S.C. l 182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I)] Immigrant - no valid immigrant visa or entry document
APPLICATION: Asylum; withholding of removal; Convention Against Torture

The respondent, a native and citizen of Guatemala, appeals from the Immigration Judge's
October 8, 2014, decision denying his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and
protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). See sections 208 and 241(b)(3) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1158, 1231(b)(3); 8 C.F.R. I208.16(c). The
appeal will be sustained and the record will be remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this decision.
We review an Immigration Judge's findings of fact, including findings regarding witness
credibility and what is likely to happen to the respondent, under a "clearly erroneous" standard.
8 C.F.R. 1003.l(d)(3)(i); Matter of Z-Z-0-, 26 I&N Dec. 586 (BIA 2015). We review all
other issues, including questions of law, discretion, and judgment, under a de novo standard.
8 C.F.R. 1003.l(d)(3)(ii).
The respondent applied for asylum and related relief based on his claim that four men who
appeared to be Guatemalan police officers shot at him and threatened him because he had
witnessed them throwing the bodies of two children into a landfill off the side of the road (I.J. at
2-3). The respondent testified that at about two o'clock in the morning on January 6, 2012, while
driving with a friend Daniel - he witnessed four police officers toss the bodies of two
children over the edge of the road (I.J. at 2; Tr. at 20-22). The police chased the respondent and
Daniel and shot at them (I.J. at 2-3; Tr. at 23). Later he received an anonymous text telling him
to keep his mouth closed (I.J. at 3; Tr. at 28). In August 2012, he was in a car accident and
1
During the course of these proceedings, the respondent submitted a motion to amend his name
in the court records.
See Respondent's Motion filed October 18, 2013.
IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS
A205 661 907

learned that the brake lines on his car had been cut (I.J. at 3; Tr. at 31-32). He was certain the
police were behind the text threat and the cut brake lines (I.J. at 3; Tr. at 28-33). In September
2012, the police again shot at him as he was loading coffee beans onto a truck (I.J. at 3; Tr. at 3334). The respondent testified that Daniel - committed suicide because the police were
threatening him and his family (I.J. at 3; Tr. at 24-25).
First, we find the Immigration Judge's adverse credibility finding is clearly erroneous.
Under section 208(b)(l)(B)(iii) of the Act, an Immigration Judge may base a credibility
determination on any inaccuracies or falsehoods in the applicant's statements without regard to
whether they go to the heart of the applicant's claim. The Immigration Judge found the
respondent's testimony inconsistent with his credible fear interview regarding whether he saw
the officers actually kill the children (I.J. at 7; Tr. at 21-23; Exh. 1, notes at 3 and 5). He also
found the respondent's testimony inconsistent with his affidavit regarding whether he could
determine if the bodies were those of girls or boys (Tr. at 50-52; Exh. 2, tab A at 5). The
respondent explained to the Immigration Judge, as he does on appeal, that these inconsistencies
were due to translation errors (I.J. at 7; Tr. at 50-52, 53-54). See Respondent's Brief at 8-12.
We find his explanation sufficient especially where his removal hearing testimony was internally
consistent and the underlying claim at the hearing is consistent with the claim at the credible fear
interview. Also, the record reflects that there is no verbatim transcript of the credible fear
interview and the interview was translated telephonically.
The Immigration Judge also found the respondent's testimony inconsistent with the
statement from his brother-in-law,
regarding the death of Daniel
. The respondent testified that Daniel killed himself (I.J. at 3; Tr. at 24-25), whereas, Mr.
states that Daniel "died as a result of an attempt on his life" (Exh. 3, tab C at 57).
However, these statements taken in context are not necessarily inconsistent because the
respondent testified that Daniel killed himself because of the threats he was receiving.
The respondent's admittedly inconsistent statement made to immigration officers on his
arrival in the United States and the Immigration Judge's demeanor finding are not sufficient to
support an adverse credibility finding (I.J. at 8). See Qing Hua Lin v. Holder, 736 F.3d 343, 353
(4th Cir. 20 13) (generally agreeing with concerns expressed by sister circuits "over the agency's
unqualified reliance on statements made in airport interviews."). The Immigration Judge's
2
The Immigration Judge denied the respondent's applications, concluding that the
respondent's testimony was not credible (I.J. at 6-8). He also found that even if the respondent
was credible, he did not provide sufficient corroboration to meet his burden of proof for relief
(I.J. at 8-11). Next, the Immigration Judge determined that the respondent's proposed social
group - witnesses of criminal conduct committed by Guatemalan police - is not a cognizable
particular social group (I.J. at 11-14). He found alternatively that even if the respondent's group
constituted a particular social group, the respondent did not establish that his membership in that
group was at least one central reason for the persecution (I.J. at 14-15). Because the respondent
did not establish his eligibility for asylum he could not meet the higher standard of proof for
withholding of removal under section 241(b)(3) of the Act. Finally, the Immigration Judge
denied the respondent's CAT claim because it was based on speculative suppositions rather than
evidence (I.J. at 15-16).
A205 661 907

demeanor finding rested on his single observation that "the respondent testified with a flat affect
and no emotion about shocking events involving the purported murders of two children by the
police" (1.J. at 8). The Immigration Judge did not take into account cultural differences and the
effects of trauma. See Ilunga v. Holder, 777 F.3d 199, 212 (4th Cir. 2015). Accordingly, we
will presume the respondent's hearing testimony was credible.
Third,we find the Immigration Judge's particular-social-group determination requires further

fact-finding. The respondent argues that his proposed group - witnesses of criminal conduct
committed by Guatemalan police - is a cognizable particular social group. The Board recently
clarified the elements required to establish a cognizable particular social group. See Matter of
W-G-R-, 26 I&N Dec. 208 (BIA 2014); see also Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 227 (BIA
2014). An applicant for asylum or withholding of removal based on membership in a particular
social group must establish that the group 1) is composed of members who share a common
immutable characteristic, 2) is defined with particularity, and 3) is socially distinct within the
society in question. See Matter of W-G-R-, supra, at 212-18; Matter of M-E-V-G-, supra, at 237.
To satisfy the particularity requirement,a group must be discrete and have definable boundaries.
See Matter of W-G-R-, supra, at 214. Social distinction (formerly known as social visibility)
means that the group must be perceived as a group by society, regardless of whether society can
identify the members of the group by sight. Id. at 216-17. To demonstrate social distinction,an
applicant must provide evidence showing that society in general perceives, considers, or
recognizes persons sharing the particular characteristic to be a group. Id. at 217 ("Although the
society in question need not be able to easily identify who is a member of the group,it must be
commonly recognized that the shared characteristic is one that defines the group.").
The Immigration Judge concluded that the characteristic that defines the respondent's
proposed group is not immutable. He found that the shared experience "is not generally
recognizable to the larger community unless the observer and his experience are made public to
others" (1.J. at 13). The Immigration Judge appears to have conflated the immutable
characteristic and social distinction requirements. An immutable characteristic is defined as a
characteristic the members "either cannot change,or should not be required to change because it
is so fundamental to their individual identities or consciences." See Matter of W-G-R-, supra, at
212 (quoting Matter ofAcosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211,233 (BIA 1985).
We also disagree with the Immigration Judge's finding that the group lacks social distinction
because there was insufficient evidence to conclude the "respondent's relationship to the
3
Second, we reverse the Immigration Judge's corroboration ruling. The Immigration Judge
concluded that even if the respondent was credible, he failed to meet his burden of proof for
asylum under section 208(b)(1 )(B)(ii) of the Act because he failed to provide sufficient
corroborating evidence (1.J. at 11). Yet, the Immigration Judge gave less weight to the
respondent's corroborating evidence, including a psychological report and the results of a
polygraph,because he found that the respondent was not credible. For example,the Immigration
Judge stated that "[G]iven the Court's determination that the respondent's testimony was not
credible, the probative value of the clinician's assessment that the respondent suffers from post
traumatic stress syndrome (PTSD) as a result of his past experience in Guatemala is extremely
low,if non-existent" (1.J. at 9).
A205 661 907
Fourth, we find clear error in the Immigration Judge's determination that the respondent did
not establish a nexus between the harm he suffers and fears and a protected ground. See Matter
of J-B-N- & S-M-, 24 l&N Dec. 208, 214 (BIA 2007) (holding that a persecutor's actual motive
is a matter of fact to be determined by the Immigration Judge and reviewed by us for clear error).
The Immigration Judge found that the respondent did not know the reasons for the police killing
the children and disposing of their bodies (I.J. at 14-15). The respondent need not show why the
police were engaged in criminal activity. Instead, the relevant inquiry is whether the respondent
can establish, by direct or circumstantial evidence,that the police were motivated to harm him on
account ofa protected ground. See INSv. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478,483 (1992) (finding that
an asylum applicant must provide some evidence, direct or circumstantial, of his persecutor's
motives).
In light ofthe foregoing, the Immigration Judge can reevaluate the respondent's eligibility for
asylum,withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. The case
will be remanded to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings consistent with this decision.
ORDER: The appeal is sustained and the record is remanded to the Immigration Judge for
further proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion and for the entry of a new decision.
4
decedents was known to the public" (I.J. at 14). To demonstrate social distinction, an applicant
must provide evidence showing that society in general perceives, considers, or recognizes
persons sharing the particular characteristic to be a group. See Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I&N Dec.
208,217 (BIA 2014); ("Although the society in question need not be able to easily identify who
is a member of the group, it must be commonly recognized that the shared characteristic is one
that defines the group."). On remand, the Immigration Judge can further consider the evidence
of record in making this determination.

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U.S.

Executive Office for Immigration Review

DHS/ICE Office of Chief Counsel - CHL

For more unpublished BIA decisions, visit

Immigrant & Refugee Appellate Center, LLC | www.irac.net

U.S. Department of Justice

Executive Office for Immigration Review

Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Falls Church, Virginia 22041

File: 907 - Charlotte, NC

APPLICATION: Asylum; withholding of removal; Convention Against Torture

Immigrant & Refugee Appellate Center, LLC | www.irac.net

A205 661 907

Immigrant & Refugee Appellate Center, LLC | www.irac.net

A205 661 907

Third,we find the Immigration Judge's particular-social-group determination requires further

Immigrant & Refugee Appellate Center, LLC | www.irac.net

A205 661 907

Immigrant & Refugee Appellate Center, LLC | www.irac.net

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