Pelayo vs.

Lauron
FACTS:
On November 23, 1906, a physician named Arturo Pelayo filed a complaint
against Marelo Lauron and Juana Abellana. On the night of October 13th of the
same year, the plaintiff was called to render medical assistance to the
defendants daughter-in-law, who was about to gie birth. After the
consultation of Dr. Escao, it was deemed that the operation was going to be
difficult for child birth, but regardless, Dr. Pelayo proceeded with the job
of operating on the subject and also removed the afterbirth. The operation
went on until morning, and on the same day, visited several times and billed
the defendants the just amount of P500 for the services rendered to which
defendants refused to pay. In answer to the complaint, counsel for the
defendants denied all of the allegation and alleged as a special defense, that
their daughter-in-law had died in consequence of the said childbirth, that
when she was alive she lived with her husband independently and in a separate
house without any relation whatever with them, and that, if on the day when
she gave birth she was in the house of the defendants, her stay their was
accidental and due to fortuitous circumstances. Therefore, he prayed that the
defendants be absolved of the complaint with costs against the plaintiff.
IssueL:
Can the defendants be held liable to pay for the obligation?
RULING
No. According to article 1089 of the Civil Code, obligations are created by
law, by contracts, by quasicontracts, and by illicit acts and omissions or by
those in which any kind of fault or negligence occurs. Obligations arising
from law are not presumed. Those expressly determined in the code or in
special laws, etc., are the only demandable ones. Obligations arising from
contracts have legal force between the contracting parties and must be
fulfilled in accordance with their stipulations. (Arts. 1090 and 1091.) The
rendering of medical assistance in case of illness was comprised among the
mutual obligations to which the spouses were bound by way of mutual support.
(Arts. 142 and 143.) If every obligation consists in giving, doing or not
doing something (art. 1088), and spouses were mutually bound to support each
other, there can be no question but that, when either of them by reason of
illness should be in need of medical assistance, the other was under the
unavoidable obligation to furnish the necessary services of a physician in
order that health may be restored, and he or she may be freed from the
sickness by which life is jeopardized. The party bound to furnish such support
was therefore liable for all expenses, including the fees of the medical
expert for his professional services. In the face of the above legal precepts,
it was unquestionable that the person bound to pay the fees due to the
plaintiff for the professional services that he rendered to the daughter-inlaw of the defendants during her childbirth, was the husband of the patient
and not her father and mother- in-law of the defendants herein.
De la Via v. Villareal, 41 Phil 13
Facts

On September 17, 1917, Narcisa Geopano filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of the
Provinceof Iloilo against Diego de la Via for divorce, partition of conjugal property, and alimony
pendente lite inthe sum of P400/month. She alleged among others that since the year 1913 and up
to the date of thecomplaint, he defendant had been committing acts of adultery with one Ana
Calog, sustaining illicitrelations with her and having her as his concubine, with public scandal and in
disgrace of the plaintiff.
That because of said illicit relations, the defendant ejected the plaintiff from the conjugal home,
forwhich reason she was obliged to live in the city of Iloilo, where she had since established her
habitualresidence. That the plaintiff, scorned by her husband, the defendant, had no means of
support and wasliving only at the expense of one of her daughters.
Subsequent to the filing of the said complaint, Narcisa Geopano, the plaintiff therein, presented
amotion alleging, among other things, that since the filing of her complaint she had personal
knowledgethat the defendant was trying to alienate or encumber the property which belonged
to the conjugalpartnership between the plaintiff and the defendant, to the prejudice of
the plaintiff, and prayed that apreliminary injunction be issued against the defendant restraining
and prohibiting him in the premises.CFI granted preliminary injunction but respondent appealed
claiming that CFI Iloilo has no jurisdictionsince his wife should follow his domicile and that the
judge has exceeded his power in granting thepreliminary injunction
Issue:
1.
WON a married woman ever acquire a residence or domicle separate from that of her
husbandduring the existence of marriage?2.
WON the wife may obtain a preliminary injunction against the husband restraining andprohibiting
him from alienating or encumbering any part of the conjugal property during thependency of the
action
Ruling:
YES, when the husband has given enough reason for her to do so as example, cause of divorce.- The
law will recognize a wife as having a separate existence, and separate interests, and separaterights,
in those cases where the express object of all proceedings is to show that the relation itself
oughtto be dissolved- The law making the domicile of the husband that of the wife is applicable only
to their relations withthird parties, and has no application in cases of actual separation and
controversy between themselvesas to the temporary or permanent severance of the marriage ties
by judicial proceedings
VAN DORN VS. ROMILLO

FACTS:
Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino Citizen and private respondent, Richard Upton, a
US citizen, was married in Hong Kong in 1979. They established their residence

in the Philippines and had 2 children. They were divorced in Nevada, USA in
1982 and petitioner remarried, this time with Theodore Van Dorn. A suit against
petitioner was filed on June 8, 1983, stating that petitioners business in Ermita
Manila, the Galleon Shop, is a conjugal property with Upton and prayed therein
that Alice be ordered to render an accounting of the business and he be
declared as the administrator of the said property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private
respondent in Nevada is binding in the Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino
citizen.
HELD:
Private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue petitioner to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is
estopped by his own representation before the court from asserting his right
over the alleged conjugal property. Furthermore, aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. Petitioner is not bound to her marital obligations
to respondent by virtue of her nationality laws. She should not be discriminated
against her own country if the end of justice is to be served.
LLorente vs. CA
FACTS:
Lorenzo Llorente and petitioner Paula Llorente were married in 1937 in the Philippines. Lorenzo was an
enlisted serviceman of the US Navy. Soon after, he left for the US where through naturalization, he
became a US Citizen. Upon his visitation of his wife, he discovered that she was living with his brother
and a child was born. The child was registered as legitimate but the name of the father was left blank.
Llorente filed a divorce in California, which later on became final. He married Alicia and they lived together
for 25 years bringing 3 children. He made his last will and testament stating that all his properties will be
given to his second marriage. He filed a petition of probate that made or appointed Alicia his special
administrator of his estate. Before the
proceeding could be terminated, Lorenzo died. Paula filed a letter of administration over Llorentes estate.
The trial granted the letter and denied the motion for reconsideration. An appeal was made to the Court of
Appeals, which affirmed and modified the judgment of the Trial Court that she be declared co-owner of
whatever properties, she and the deceased, may have acquired during their 25 years of cohabitation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the National Law shall apply.
RULING:

Lorenzo Llorente was already an American citizen when he divorced Paula. Such was also the situation
when he married Alicia and executed his will. As stated in Article 15 of the civil code, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, provided that they are validly required in their National Law. Thus the divorce obtained
by Llorente is valid because the law that governs him is not Philippine Law but his National Law since the
divorce was contracted after he became an American citizen. Furthermore, his National Law allowed
divorce.
The case was remanded to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo
Llorentes will and determination of the parties successional rights allowing proof of foreign law.

Garcia-Recio vs. Recio

TITLE: Grace J. Garcia-Recio v Rederick A. Recio
CITATION: GR NO. 138322, Oct. 2, 2002 | 366 SCRA 437
FACTS:
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian
Citizen, in Malabon, Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived as husband and wife in
Australia. However, an Australian family court issued purportedly a decree of
divorce, dissolving the marriage of Rederick and Editha on May 18, 1989.
On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia where it was solemnized
at Our lady of Perpetual Help Church, Cabanatuan City. Since October 22, 1995,
the couple lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage.
As a matter of fact, while they were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were
divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations
secured in Australia.
Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of
bigamy on March 3, 1998, claiming that she learned only in November 1997,
Redericks marriage with Editha Samson.
ISSUE: Whether the decree of divorce submitted by Rederick Recio is admissible
as evidence to prove his legal capacity to marry petitioner and absolved him of
bigamy.
HELD:
The nullity of Redericks marriage with Editha as shown by the divorce decree
issued was valid and recognized in the Philippines since the respondent is a
naturalized Australian. However, there is absolutely no evidence that proves
respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner though the former presented a
divorce decree. The said decree, being a foreign document was inadmissible to
court as evidence primarily because it was not authenticated by the consul/
embassy of the country where it will be used.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as

a public or official record of a foreign country by either:
(1) an official publication or
(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document.
If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be:
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country
in which the record is kept and
(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the Regional Trial Court of
Cabanatuan City to receive or trial evidence that will conclusively prove
respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner and thus free him on the ground
of bigamy.

Republic vs Orbecido
Republic vs. Orbecido
GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005
FACTS:
Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24, 1981
at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Ozamis City. They had a son
and a daughter named Kristoffer and Kimberly, respectively. In 1986, the wife
left for US bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Orbecido
discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen and
learned from his son that his wife sometime in 2000 had obtained a divorce
decree and married a certain Stanley. He thereafter filed with the trial court a
petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family
Code.
HELD:
The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying
the rule of reason, Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases
involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were
Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign
citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be

allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage.
Hence, the courts unanimous decision in holding Article 26 Par 2 be interpreted
as allowing a Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had
acquired a citizenship and remarried, also to remarry under Philippine law.

Corpuz vs. Sto.Tomas

Facts:

Petitioner was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship

through naturalization. He was married to the respondent but was shocked of the infidelity
on the part of his wife. He went back to Canada and filed a petition for divorce and was
granted. Desirous to marry another woman he now loved, he registered the divorce decree
in the Civil Registry Office and was informed that the foreign decree must first be judicially
recognized by a competent Philippine court. Petitioner filed for judicial recognition of foreign
divorce and declaration of marriage as dissolved with the RTC where respondent failed to
submit any response. The RTC denied the petition on the basis that the petitioner lacked
locus standi. Thus, this case was filed before the Court.
Issues: WON the second paragraph of Art 26 of the FC extends to aliens the right to petition
a court of this jurisdiction fro the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
Decision:

The alien spouse cannot claim under the second paragraph of Art 26 of the

Family Code because the substantive right it establishes is in favour of the Filipino spouse.
Only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second par of Art 26 of the Family Code.
The unavailability of the second paragraph of Art 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not
necessarily strip the petitioner of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his
foreign divorce decree. The petitioner, being a naturalized Canadian citizen now, is clothed
by the presumptive evidence of the authenticity of foreign divorce decree with conformity to
aliens national law.

Crim Law 1 Case Digest: Perez V. CA 2002

Perez v. CA
G.R. No. 143838 May 9, 2002
Lessons Applicable: Attempted Rape (abandoned)

Laws Applicable:
FACTS:

March 25, 1988: Julita Tria was in the kitchen doing the dishes when Adelmo Perez Y Agustin

appeared at her back with unzipped shorts and bare torso, embraced her and warned not to make a
sound or hell kill her

April 14, 1988 morning: After Julita was through with washing the dishes, she proceeded to the

bedroom to store away their, beddings. Suddenly Adelmo appeared pulling her by the hand,
embraced her from behind and held her breasts. He pulled her to the bamboo bed, positioned
himself on top of her and placed her hands behind her as he kissed her lips and neck. She tried to
avoid his kisses by moving her head from side to side. As she was pinned, he managed to insert his
right hand inside her t-shirt and bra and squeezed nipples. Then, he tried to raise her balloon-like
skirt with his right hand, inserted it inside her panty and while making up and down motions. Adelm
said: Sige na, pagbigyan mo na ako. She then cried out Inay.

Eufemia Tria: She peeped into their window which was just a few meters from where she was

and there saw her daughter Julita lying flat on a bamboo bed with her skirt raised and Adelmo on top
of Julita as her hands pinned down. She then rushed to the room and found Adelmo hiding under
the bamboo bed. She thought of hacking him with a bolo but realized she couldnt so she brought
him to his parents house to tell them what happened.

Dr. Emmanuel Cortez-Asuncion: extent of injuries sustained by her and that the slight physical

injuries could have been caused by attempted rape

Adelmo: He invited Julita as they were already becoming intimate to the room where they could

not be seen by her mother. But, her mother called her and went into the room. Sensing this, he
stood up and hid under the bed.

RTC: Attempted rape

CA: Affirmed

ISSUE: W/N there is attempted rape

HELD: NO. MODIFIED acts of lasciviousness

Under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, there is an attempt when the offender commences

the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution
which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance.

In the crime of rape, penetration is an essential act of execution to produce the felony. Thus, for

there to be an attempted rape, the accused must have commenced the act of penetrating his sexual
organ to the vagina of the victim but for some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance, the penetration, however slight, is not completed.

There is no showing in this case that petitioners sexual organ had even touched complainants

vagina nor any part of her body.

acts constitute acts of lasciviousness. The elements of said crime are: (1) that the offender

commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) that it is done (a) by using force and intimidation
or (b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the
offended party is under 12 years of age; and (3) that the offended party is another person of either
sex.

Estrada vs Escritor (August 4, 2003)

Estrada vs. Escritor
AM P-02-1651, August 4, 2003
FACTS:
Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City.
Alejandro Estrada, the complainant, wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, presiding
judge of Branch 253, RTC of Las Pinas City, requesting for an investigation of
rumors that Escritor has been living with Luciano Quilapio Jr., a man not her
husband, and had eventually begotten a son. Escritors husband, who had lived
with another woman, died a year before she entered into the judiciary. On the
other hand, Quilapio is still legally married to another woman. Estrada is not
related to either Escritor or Quilapio and is not a resident of Las Pinas but of
Bacoor, Cavite. According to the complainant, respondent should not be
allowed to remain employed in the judiciary for it will appear as if the court
allows such act.
Escritor is a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovahs Witnesses and
the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society where her conjugal arrangement with
Quilapio is in conformity with their religious beliefs. After ten years of living
together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness
which was approved by the congregation. Such declaration is effective when
legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union.
Gregorio, Salazar, a member of the Jehovahs Witnesses since 1985 and has
been a presiding minister since 1991, testified and explained the import of and
procedures for executing the declaration which was completely executed by
Escritor and Quilapios in Atimonan, Quezon and was signed by three witnesses
and recorded in Watch Tower Central Office.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge
of gross and immoral conduct and be penalized by the State for such conjugal
arrangement.
HELD:
A distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should
be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular
morality.
The Court states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality
approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required
by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for
accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interests.

The states interest is the preservation of the integrity of the judiciary by

maintaining among its ranks a high standard of morality and decency. There is
nothing in the OCAs (Office of the Court Administrator) memorandum to the
Court that demonstrates how this interest is so compelling that it should
override respondents plea of religious freedom. Indeed, it is inappropriate for
the complainant, a private person, to present evidence on the compelling
interest of the state. The burden of evidence should be discharged by the proper
agency of the government which is the Office of the Solicitor General.

Yaptinchay v. Torres, 28 SCRA 489

FACTS: Teresita C. Yaptinchay alleged that the deceased Isidro Yaptinchay had lived with her
continuously, openly and publicly as husband and wife for 19 year. The deceased died without a will left
an estate consisting of personal and real properties situated in the Philippines, Hongkong and other
places with an estimated value of about P500,000. The deceased left three daughters, Virginia
Yaptinchay, Mary Yaptinchay Eligir and Asuncion Yaptinchay, who carted away from the residences
aforesaid personal properties belonging to the deceased together with others exclusively owned by
petitioner. It was averred that in these circumstances the appointment of a special administrator to take

custody and care of the interests of the deceased pending appointment of a regular administrator became
an urgent necessity.
ISSUE: Can petitioner claim ownership.
HELD: Until such right to co-ownership is duly established, petitioner's interests in the
property in controversy cannot be considered the "present right" or title that would make
available the protection or aid afforded by a writ of injunction. For, the existence of a clear
positive right especially calling for judicial protection is wanting. Injunction indeed, is not to
protect contingent or future rights; nor is it a remedy to enforce an abstract right. Commonlaw wife was not able to prove that they jointly bought the property in Forbes Park so it
belonged to the legal marriage.

Juaniza vs Jose
Juaniza vs Jose
GR. No. L50127-28, March 30, 1979
FACTS:
Eugenio Jose, a registered owner and operator of the passenger jeepney
involved in an accident of collision with a freight train of the PNR that took place
in November 1969 resulted in the 7 deaths and 5 physical injuries of its
passengers. That time, Eugenio was married to Socorro but had been
cohabiting with Rosalia Arroyo, defendant-appellant for 16 years as husband and
wife. Trial court decision rendered them jointly and severally liable to pay
damages to the heir of the deceased, Victor Juaniza. A motion was prayed for
by Rosalia for the decision to be reconsidered.
ISSUE: WON Eugenio and Rosalia are co-owners of the jeepney.
HELD:
The co-ownership provided in Article 147 applied only when the parties are not
incapacitated to marry. Hence, the jeepney belongs to the conjugal partnership
with the lawful wife. The common-law wife not being the registered owner
cannot be held liable for the damages caused by its operation. There is
therefore no basis for her liability in the damages arising from the death of and
physical injuries suffered by the passengers

Consuegra v GSIS G.R. No. L-28093 January 30,

1971
J. Zaldivar
Facts:

Appeal on purely questions of law from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Surigao del
Norte, dated March 7, 1967, in its Special Proceeding No. 1720.
The late Jose Consuegra was employed as a shop foreman in the province of Surigao del Norte. He
contracted two marriages, the first with Rosario Diaz and the second, which was contracted in good
faith while the first marriage was subsisting, with Basilia Berdin.
Consuegra died, while the proceeds of his GSIS life insurance were paid to petitioner Basilia Berdin
and her children who were the beneficiaries named in the policy. They received Php 6,000.
Consuegra did not designate any beneficiary who would receive the retirement insurance benefits
due to him. Respondent Rosario Diaz, the widow by the first marriage, filed a claim with the GSIS
asking that the retirement insurance benefits be paid to her as the only legal heir of Consuegra,
considering that the deceased did not designate any beneficiary with respect to his retirement
insurance benefits.
Petitioner Berdin and her children, likewise, filed a similar claim with the GSIS, asserting that being
the beneficiaries named in the life insurance policy of Consuegra, they are the only ones entitled to
receive the retirement insurance benefits due the deceased Consuegra.
The GSIS ruled that the legal heirs of the late Jose Consuegra were Rosario Diaz, his widow by his
first marriage who is entitled to one-half, or 8/16, of the retirement insurance benefits, on the one
hand; and Basilia Berdin, his widow by the second marriage and their seven children, on the other
hand, who are entitled to the remaining one-half, or 8/16.
Basilia Berdin didnt agree. She filed a petition declaring her and her children to be the legal heirs
and exclusive beneficiaries of the retirement insurance.
The trial court affirmed stating that: "when two women innocently and in good faith are legally united
in holy matrimony to the same man, they and their children, born of said wedlock, will be regarded
as legitimate children and each family be entitled to one half of the estate.
Hence the present appeal by Basilia Berdin and her children.
Issue: To whom should this retirement insurance benefits of Jose Consuegra be paid, because he
did not designate the beneficiary of his retirement insurance?
Held: No. Petition denied.
Ratio:
Berdin averred that because the deceased Jose Consuegra failed to designate the beneficiaries in
his retirement insurance, the appellants who were the beneficiaries named in the life insurance
should automatically be considered the beneficiaries to receive the retirement insurance benefits.
The GSIS offers two separate and distinct systems of benefits to its members one is the life
insurance and the other is the retirement insurance. These two distinct systems of benefits are paid
out from two distinct and separate funds that are maintained by the GSIS.
In the case of the proceeds of a life insurance, the same are paid to whoever is named the
beneficiary in the life insurance policy. As in the case of a life insurance provided for in the Insurance
Act, the beneficiary in a life insurance under the GSIS may not necessarily be a heir of the insured.
The insured in a life insurance may designate any person as beneficiary unless disqualified to be so
under the provisions of the Civil Code. And in the absence of any beneficiary named in the life
insurance policy, the proceeds of the insurance will go to the estate of the insured.

Retirement insurance is primarily intended for the benefit of the employee, to provide for his old age,
or incapacity, after rendering service in the government for a required number of years. If the
employee reaches the age of retirement, he gets the retirement benefits even to the exclusion of the
beneficiary or beneficiaries named in his application for retirement insurance. The beneficiary of the
retirement insurance can only claim the proceeds of the retirement insurance if the employee dies
before retirement. If the employee failed or overlooked to state the beneficiary of his retirement
insurance, the retirement benefits will accrue to his estate and will be given to his legal heirs in
accordance with law, as in the case of a life insurance if no beneficiary is named in the insurance
policy.
GSIS had correctly acted when it ruled that the proceeds should be divided equally between his first
living wife and his second. The lower court has correctly applied the ruling of this Court in the case of
Lao v Dee.
Gomez vs. Lipana- in construing the rights of two women who were married to the same man, held
"that since the defendant's first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void the conjugal
partnership established by that marriage has not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or relinquished
her status as putative heir of her husband under the new Civil Code, entitled to share in his estate
upon his death should she survive him. Consequently, whether as conjugal partner in a still
subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she has an interest in the husband's share in the
property here in dispute....
With respect to the right of the second wife, although the second marriage can be presumed to be
void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for
judicial declaration of such nullity. And inasmuch as the conjugal partnership formed by the second
marriage was dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity, "the only lust and equitable solution in
this case would be to recognize the right of the second wife to her share of one-half in the property
acquired by her and her husband and consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal
partnership of the first marriage."

Valdes vs RTC
Valdes vs. RTC
260 SCRA 221
FACTS:
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5
children. Valdez filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their
marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code, which was granted hence,
marriage is null and void on the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity.
Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of their mother while the other
3 siblings are free to choose which they prefer.
Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the
procedure for the liquidation of common property in unions without marriage.
During the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing
desire to stay with their father.

ISSUE: Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership.

HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause
thereof, the property relations of the parties are governed by the rules on coownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to
have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate
in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed
thereto jointly if said partys efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of
the family.
CARINO vs. CARINO

In 1969 SPO4 Santiago Cario married Susan Nicdao Cario. He had 2 children with her. In
1992, SPO4 contracted a second marriage, this time with Susan Yee Cario. In 1988, prior
to his second marriage, SPO4 is already bedridden and he was under the care of Yee. In
1992, he died 13 days after his marriage with Yee. Thereafter, the spouses went on to claim
the benefits of SPO4. Nicdao was able to claim a total of P140,000.00 while Yee was able
to collect a total of P21,000.00. In 1993, Yee filed an action for collection of sum of money
against Nicdao. She wanted to have half of the P140k. Yee admitted that her marriage with
SPO4 was solemnized during the subsistence of the marriage b/n SPO4 and Nicdao but
the said marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due to the absence of a valid
marriage license as certified by the local civil registrar. Yee also claimed that she only found
out about the previous marriage on SPO4s funeral.
ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of marriage may be invoked to claim
presumptive legitimes.
HELD: The marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due the absence of a valid
marriage license. The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the
same has been solemnized without the judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage
between Nicdao and SPO4. Under Article 40 of the FC, the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole
basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than
remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For
other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or

illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case

for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the
parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said
marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. In such instances,
evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds
rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to
an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void.
The SC ruled that Yee has no right to the benefits earned by SPO4 as a policeman for their
marriage is void due to bigamy; she is only entitled to properties, money etc owned by them
in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Wages and salaries earned by
each party shall belong to him or her exclusively (Art. 148 of FC). Nicdao is entitled to the
full benefits earned by SPO4 as a cop even if their marriage is likewise void. This is
because the two were capacitated to marry each other for there were no impediments but
their marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage license; in their situation, their property
relations is governed by Art 147 of the FC which provides that everything they earned
during their cohabitation is presumed to have been equally contributed by each party this
includes salaries and wages earned by each party notwithstanding the fact that the other
may not have contributed at all.
SAGUID VS. CA
FACTS:
Seventeen-year old Gina S. Rey was married, but separated de facto from her husband, when she met
and cohabited with petitioner Jacinto Saguid In 1996, the couple decided to separate and end up their
9-year cohabitation. private respondent filed a complaint for Partition and Recovery of Personal
Property with Receivership against the petitioner. She prayed that she be declared the sole owner of
these personal properties and that the amount of P70,000.00, representing her contribution to the
construction of their house, be reimbursed to her.

ISSUE: WON there are actual contributions from the parties

HELD:
it is not disputed that Gina and Jacinto were not capacitated to marry each other because the former
was validly married to another man at the time of her cohabitation with the latter. Their property
regime therefore is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code, which applies to bigamous marriages,
adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage, relationships where both man and
woman are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of the same married man. Under this
regime, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of

money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions Proof of actual contribution is required.
Even if cohabitation commenced before family code, article 148 applies because this provision was
intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code.
The fact that the controverted property was titled in the name of the parties to an adulterous
relationship is not sufficient proof of co-ownership absent evidence of actual contribution in the
acquisition of the property.
In the case at bar, the controversy centers on the house and personal properties of the parties. Private
respondent alleged in her complaint that she contributed P70,000.00 for the completion of their house.
However, nowhere in her testimony did she specify the extent of her contribution. What appears in the
record are receipts in her name for the purchase of construction materials.
While there is no question that both parties contributed in their joint account deposit, there is,
however, no sufficient proof of the exact amount of their respective shares therein. Pursuant to Article
148 of the Family Code, in the absence of proof of extent of the parties respective contribution, their
share shall be presumed to be equal.

Dino v. Dino
G.R. No. 178044; January 19, 2011
FACTS:
Alain Dino and Ma. Caridad Dino were childhood friends and sweethearts who started living together in
1984, separated in 1994, and lived together again in 1996. On January 14, 1998, they were married
before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Pinas City. On May 30, 2001, petitioner filed for the Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage on the ground of the respondents psychological incapacity. Petitioner alleged that
respondent failed in her marital obligation to give love and support to him, abandoned her responsibility to
the family and that she was unfaithful. Petitioner later learned that respondent filed a petition for divorce
and was granted by the Superior Court of California and that she married a certain Manuel Alcantara.
Doctor Tayag submitted a report establishing that the respondent was suffering from Narcissitic
Personality Disorder.
ISSUE:
Did the trial court err when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued
after liquidation, partition, and distribution of parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code?
HELD:
Section 19(1) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages does not apply to Article 147 of the Family Code. It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code
that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio under Articles 40
and 45 and not under Article 36 which is the ground for the nullification of the petitioner and respondents
marriage. Thus, the decision of the trial court is affirmed but with modifications.